Question:
You are given the full text of a scientific research paper.

    Your task is to generate a structured **policy brief** that includes the following components:

    - A concise, descriptive **title** that captures the central theme or policy issue addressed in the paper (do not label it with “Title:”).
    - **Policy Problem** - What societal or strategic challenge is the paper addressing?
    - **Scientific Research Findings** - What are the key results relevant to this issue?
    - **Scientific Research Study Methods** - What methodology or data supports these findings?
    - **Policy Implications** - How might the findings guide or influence policy?

    Write each section in a clear, accessible style suitable for policymakers. Avoid overly technical language, but use essential terms when necessary. Structure the output as a labeled five-part policy brief document.

    Scientific Research Paper:
    Nature Climate Change | Volume 13 | March 2023 | 244–249
244
nature climate change
Article
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-023-01597-5
Cross-national analysis of attitudes towards
fossil fuel subsidy removal
Niklas Harring
  1
, Erik Jönsson
  1, Simon Matti
  2, Gabriela Mundaca
  3 &
Sverker C. Jagers1
In 2021, governments of 51 countries spent US$697 billion on subsidizing
fossil fuels. Removing fossil fuel subsidies is crucial not only for reducing
CO2 emissions and making carbon pricing more effective, but also for
making more valuable use of government funds. Currently, however,
scientific evidence on the scale and scope of public attitudes towards
fossil fuel subsidy-removal policies is lacking, yet it is instrumental for
gauging political feasibility. Furthermore, previous studies tend to focus
on carbon pricing in the developed world only. Here we present a
comparative analysis of attitudes towards both carbon taxation and fossil
fuel subsidy removal, focusing on five developing countries across four
continents. It is found that (1) removing fossil fuel subsidies is not more
undesirable than introducing carbon taxation and (2) the public has
more-positive attitudes towards subsidy removal if optimal use of the saved
fiscal revenues is specified.
To reach the CO2-emission reduction targets of the Paris Agreement’s
Nationally Determined Contributions, a growing number of countries
are considering implementing domestic carbon taxes. These would
increase the price on fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, end-use electricity
and petroleum) to decrease fossil fuel consumption (for example, Coali-
tion of Finance Ministers). However, and repeatedly recognized during
both the 26th UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP26) meeting in
Glasgow and the recently finalized COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, many
countries currently have policies that keep end-user prices artificially
low through subsidies. This encourages increases in both production
and consumption of fossil fuels and thus effectively counteracts the
intended objective of carbon pricing. In addition, subsidies repre-
sent a burden on the governments’ fiscal budgets through deficits
and revenue losses. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) found that tax breaks and spending programmes
(fossil fuel support) in the G20 countries, linked to both the produc-
tion and use of coal, oil, gas and other petroleum products, had risen
to US$190 billion in 2021, a level that is higher than in previous years
(30% higher than in 2020)1. The OECD and International Energy Agency
(IEA) have also estimated that governments in 51 countries provided
US$697.2 billion in fossil fuel subsidies in 2021, doubling the amount
from 20202, an amount that is three times the annual amount needed
to eradicate global extreme poverty3.
All these mentioned costs are, however, only the direct costs of the
subsidies themselves. According to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), including also indirect costs (the contribution of fossil fuels to
global warming, local air pollution and other externalities, and foregone
consumption tax) would increase the figure for annual fossil fuel subsi-
dies by around US$6 trillion, or 6.5% of global GDP3,4. They also find that
45% of the benefits from direct fossil fuel subsidies goes to the richest
quintile, while only 7% goes to the poorest 20% of the population5.
Removing subsidies on all fossil fuels simultaneously should be
the natural first step to reduce CO2 emissions6 since removing subsi-
dies only on some fossil fuels will risk increasing the consumption of
another, still subsidized, fossil fuel (compare ref. 7). Particularly in devel-
oping countries, increasing fiscal revenues originated from savings
from removed fossil fuel subsidies can be used for welfare-enhancing
projects (for example, investments in health care and education) and
spurring economic growth8 and eradicate the regressivity of the exist-
ing subsidies.
Received: 16 March 2022
Accepted: 6 January 2023
Published online: 23 February 2023
 Check for updates
1Centre for Collective Action Research, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden. 2Political Science Unit,
Department of Social Sciences, Technology and Arts, Luleå University of Technology, Luleå, Sweden. 3Department of Geography and Spatial Sciences,
University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA.
 e-mail: niklas.harring@pol.gu.se

Nature Climate Change | Volume 13 | March 2023 | 244–249
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to investments that increase social and economic welfare systems lead
to more-positive attitudes towards subsidy removal (refs. 26,30,31). At the
outset, we report that optimal use of savings from subsidy removal has
positive effects on public attitudes.
In our survey, the respondents were also asked about their social
and economic characteristics, whether they own a fossil fuelled vehicle
and their views regarding various climate change scenarios (Supple-
mentary Information). In addition, we empirically analyse the effects
of these variables on their policy attitudes.
We proceed from the well-established hypothesis that an impor-
tant driver of policy attitudes is the balance of perceived personal
costs and benefits of a proposed policy32–35. First, we hypothesize that
acceptance of removing fossil fuel subsidies will be lower than the cor-
responding attitude to introducing a carbon tax, as the former indicates
a more visible and direct loss of money for the consumer compared
with the indirect workings of a tax.
H1: The public acceptance of removing subsidies on fossil fuels
is lower than the public acceptance of introducing a CO2 tax on
fossil fuels.
Second, a range of studies (for example, refs. 36,37) have demon-
strated how individuals display more-positive attitudes towards poli-
cies directed towards industry rather than towards themselves, in much
the same way as people in general tend to prefer less-stringent policies
over more-coercive ones (for example, ref. 38). This might be due to both
general beliefs concerning how the proposed policy will have direct
implications for personal welfare (personal outcome expectancies)33
and distributional preferences driven by the attitude that industry
rather than individuals should bear the main costs of climate change39.
As such, we hypothesize that people dislike policies that imply direct
personal costs more than policies aimed towards industry, even if these
might indirectly affect consumer prices, and that public acceptance
of removing fossil fuel subsidies for private consumption therefore is
lower than for those for industrial use.
H2: The public acceptance of removing fossil fuel subsidies for
private consumption is lower than the public acceptance of removing
fossil fuel subsidies for industrial use.
Moreover, a growing body of research concludes that negative
attitudes towards price-based climate policy tools can be alleviated
through policy design, in particular revenue recycling, where a price
increase is combined with a specified use of the available public
funds26,31 (but see ref. 30). Although research is somewhat inconclu-
sive concerning the attitudinal effects of different forms of revenue
recycling (for example, fee-and-dividend solutions, increased invest-
ments in welfare systems (for example, education and health care) and
using revenues for specific climate-related projects), we nevertheless
expect that transparency in the use of generated public funds will
trigger more-positive attitudes compared with non-specified use of
public funds19,40. Such additional information aims to prevent peo-
ple’s perception that the subsidy removal is only an increased cost for
the household.
H3: Compared with non-specified revenue use, the public accept-
ance of removing fossil fuel subsidies for private consumption is higher
when revenue use is specified.
Public attitudes towards fossil fuel subsidy
removal
To determine how different policy designs affect public policy sup-
port, as well as test our three hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3), we randomly
assigned the respondents to one of a total of seven groups (Methods).
On a 0–10 scale, the average support is 6.22 for removing industrial-use
subsidies, 6.31 for removing subsidies on private consumption of fossil
fuels and 6.33 for introducing a carbon tax. Apparently, the differences
between these numbers are small. The statistical testing of the means
(M) confirms this as well. When t testing the differences between the
proposal of removing subsidies on private consumption (M = 6.31,
These issues have started to be acknowledged also by world lead-
ers, for example, in the Glasgow Climate Pact at the 2021 COP26, which
calls for “accelerating efforts toward the phase-out of […] inefficient
fossil fuel subsidies, recognizing the need for support toward a just
transition”.9 The concept of just transitions implies recognizing and
attempting to counteract the profound societal impacts that a shift
towards a low-carbon future implies, not the least in the form of job
losses due to fossil fuel industry decline and uneven distribution of
costs and benefits both within and between countries (for example,
ref. 10). Given that such a shift may have immediate negative conse-
quences for individuals and groups, the political feasibility of removing
fossil fuel subsidies in any country highly depends on the degree of
public acceptability of such a policy11,12.
Numerous scholars and policy experts have advocated putting
a price on carbon as a highly cost-effective way to reduce GHG emis-
sions13,14. Introducing such policies has, however, become a vexing
problem for decision makers worldwide. The examples of Australia in
2015, France in 2018 and Ecuador in 2019 demonstrate how widespread
the public’s negative attitudes towards carbon taxes and removal of
fossil fuel subsidies seem to be, and thus how difficult they are to imple-
ment. Several factors are known to determine policy attitudes, includ-
ing perceptions of fairness, effectiveness, political trust and climate
concern15 (compare refs. 16–21.) Political feasibility of carbon-pricing
implementation and subsidy removal requires that one measures and
analyzes how public opposition can be minimized. Such analyses are
indeed crucial for stakeholders, policymakers and academics involved
in climate change and policymaking. The empirical analysis of politi-
cal feasibility, balancing effectiveness and cost efficiency with public
acceptability, is imperative, especially as policymakers tend to be
reluctant to introduce policies if levels of public acceptability are low22.
From a theoretical perspective, understanding why certain policies
generate negative perceptions, and the extent to which a design of a
policy measure affects mass policy attitudes, is of great interest since it
speaks to theories of policy feedback and how policy design can create
its own constituency of support (for example, refs. 23,24)
In light of this, a number of recent experimental survey studies
have suggested policies that could make carbon pricing more readily
acceptable to the public, for example, fee-and-dividend approaches25
(feebates), earmarking of tax revenues for necessary investments26 and
even rhetorical shifts from ‘tax’ to ‘fee’27. These studies have focused
mostly on (1) carbon taxation and (2) the developed world. Far fewer
studies are concerned with public attitudes towards climate policy in
developing countries, and even fewer, if at all, with attitudes towards
the removal of fossil fuel subsidies as a climate change mitigation
strategy15. However, considering the literature focusing on both con-
textual drivers of climate policy attitudes (for example, ref. 21) and
cross-national patterns in carbon pricing (for example, ref. 28), we
do not expect that attitudes and attitude formation differ systemati-
cally between the Global North and Global South. We rather assume
that both attitudes and policy are sensitive to a range of complex and
country-specific factors.
By using a 1 × 7, pre-registered, factorial-design survey experiment
(N = 6,636), we make the following contributions to the related litera-
ture. (1) We consider five developing countries (Ecuador, Egypt, India,
Indonesia and Mexico) that currently subsidize both consumption and
production of fossil fuels. We select these countries because they have
some of the highest levels of subsidies on consumption of fossil fuels29.
(2) We analyse public attitudes in these countries towards (a) the intro-
duction of a carbon tax and (b) the removal of subsidies on both indus-
trial and private consumption of fossil fuels. (3) We examine whether
and how attitudes towards subsidy removal and carbon taxation may
differ from each other. (4) We compare attitudes towards removal of
subsidies on private consumption of fossil fuels with those towards
removal of subsidies on fossil fuels for industrial use. (5) We study
whether policies that reallocate money spent on fossil fuel subsidies

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s.d. = 2.67) and the introduction of a carbon tax (M = 6.33, s.d. = 2.77),
we find no statistically significant differences (t(1,893.16) = –0.1604,
P = 0.4363). The first hypothesis is thus rejected. Nor do we find
any differences between attitudes toward removing subsidies on
industrial-use fossil fuels (M = 6.22, s.d. = 2.57) and subsidies on private
consumption of fossil fuels (M = 6.31, s.d. = 2.67) (t(1,896.18) = 0.6985,
P = 0.7575). Hence, we reject H2.
Revenue recycling and fossil fuel subsidy removal
As a next step, we investigate whether people’s attitudes towards
the removal of subsidies on private consumption of fossil fuels are
impacted when four alternative uses of fiscal revenues saved from such
removals are part of the proposed policy. In addition to the proposal to
remove subsidies on private consumption of fossil fuels, the respond-
ents were randomly assigned five different alternatives for revenue use:
investments to enhance welfare in society (for example, education and
health care), income tax reductions, investments in climate adaptation
measures, cash transfers to the poor and most-affected households
and no information about revenue use.
When aggregating the groups where revenue use is specified
(M = 6.49, s.d. = 2.59) and comparing them with the group with unspeci-
fied revenue use (M = 6.31, s.d. = 2.67), we find a significant differ-
ence (t(1,428.25) = 1.88, P = 0.03). In line with H3, public acceptance
of removing subsidies for private consumption of fuels is higher
when revenue use is specified, as compared with non-specified rev-
enue use. Considering the treatment groups separately, we find
that private-consumption subsidy removal reaches a higher level of
acceptance if revenues are directed towards investments in welfare
systems (M = 6.59, s.d. = 2.55) compared with a non-specified use
(t(1,893.68) = 2.36, P = 0.01) or towards investments in climate adap-
tation (M = 6.62, a.d. = 2.65) compared with non-specified revenue use
(t(1,887.99) = 2.57, P = 0.01). However, we do not find any statistically
significant differences between a proposal to use fiscal revenues to
reduce income taxes (M = 6.25, s.d. = 2.48) or to provide cash transfers
to the poor and most-affected households (M = 6.49, s.d. = 2.66) and
non-specified revenue use (M = 6.31, s.d. = 2.67): (t(1,884.34) = –0.50,
P = 0.69) and (t(1,894) = 1.53, P = 0.06), respectively. Taken together,
we cannot reject our third hypothesis. Attitudes towards removing
subsidies can turn more positive when revenue use is specified. How-
ever, these results are also dependent on the type of revenue recycling
proposed. Whereas investments overall drive more-positive attitudes,
monetary compensation (either to all or to the most affected) does not.
Cross-national comparison of public attitudes
When we, more exploratorily, consider each of our countries (Ecua-
dor, Egypt, India, Indonesia and Mexico) individually, we find that the
attitudes towards fossil fuel subsidy removal are on the same level as
attitudes towards the introduction of a carbon tax. In the comparison,
Egypt constitutes an exception, with the least positive attitudes towards
removal of fossil fuel subsidies for industrial use (M = 5.4) and private
consumption (M = 5.3) compared with averages in the other countries
of 6.2 for industrial use and 6.3 for private consumption (Fig. 1). Over-
all, from our results, we can conclude that the resistance towards (or
acceptance of) the removal of fossil fuel subsidies is on par with the
public opinion on introducing taxes on CO2.
A commitment to use the tax money saved from removing existing
subsidies in a way that benefits stakeholders will increase the level of
public acceptance. At the country level, we find that the use of revenues
for ‘investment in climate adaptation’ is the most popular alternative
in both Mexico and Ecuador, while it is the least popular alternative in
Egypt (Fig. 2). These results indicate that there are potentially impor-
tant country-specific characteristics that should be considered by
policymakers aiming to remove fossil fuel subsidies. In this explora-
tive part of our study, we do not have any causal claims or hypotheses
regarding mechanisms. However, factors such as cultural differences,
tax levels and differences in welfare programmes could potentially
explain country variation in support for various uses of revenues.
Discussion
Contrary to our expectations, when investigating public opinion on the
removal of existing fossil fuel subsidies in five developing countries,
we do not find the attitude towards removal of existing subsidies to
–2
–1
0
Ecuador
Egypt
India
Indonesia
Attitude
Attitude
Attitude
Attitude
Attitude
Attitude
Mexico
All countries
1
2
–2
–1
0
1
2
–2
–1
0
1
2
–2
–1
0
1
2
Taxes (baseline)
Production subsidies
Private consumption subsidies
–2
–1
0
1
2
–2
–1
0
1
2
Fig. 1 | Attitudes towards a tax on CO2 and removal of fossil fuel subsidies worldwide. Estimated average treatment effects. Points indicate the estimated effect;
lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

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be more negative than that towards the introduction of a carbon tax.
Our study is unique in its focus on fossil fuel subsidies, and there are,
currently, not many studies with which we can compare our findings.
Therefore, there are reasons to be cautious and not draw any conclu-
sions regarding the level of support for fossil fuel subsidy removal in
these countries. Survey research is always sensitive to certain formula-
tions and sampling strategies, and we know, from both previous studies
and a range of real-world examples, that carbon pricing is indeed politi-
cally challenging and that rising fuel prices have spurred resistance in
many countries across the world. However, one way of interpreting
our results is that the public in fact considers a subsidy-removal policy
as being equally acceptable (or not acceptable) as the introduction
of a carbon tax. If this is the case, we should expect real-life sugges-
tions for subsidy removal to be met with similar public opposition
or acceptability as we have seen for other carbon-pricing measures.
Furthermore, another finding from our study is that attitudes can be
affected (in this case, increasing public acceptance) by combining a
possible subsidy removal with a revenue-recycling policy. Yet again,
we call for more studies to be able to more thoroughly evaluate and
calibrate the size and strength of this effect. However, the results so
far correspond with previous research on carbon pricing, consistently
showing that revenue recycling increases support for such policies25–27.
We also find that the respondents’ concern for climate change appears
to be a strong driver of policy attitudes, which has also been previously
shown to be a strong predictor of climate policy support in the Global
North15, and finally that the impact of revenue recycling varies across
the five countries (compare ref. 31).
These findings may have important policy implications. First,
our overall results concerning policy attitudes imply that removing
subsidies on fossil fuels may not present much more of a political chal-
lenge than introducing carbon taxation. More important, by specifying
alternatives for revenue recycling where public funds currently used
for subsidies are instead directed towards other public investments,
the level of acceptability may increase. However, the answer to the
question of which specific investments are the most popular seems
to be determined by national context. This further highlights the need
for careful country-specific empirical investigations to determine pre-
ferred options for revenue recycling among the public, before making
political decisions to remove or roll back existing fossil fuel subsidies.
The study has other limitations. Although conducted over several
continents, the total number of countries is small, and there are prob-
ably important nuances to be grasped by extending the sample to
other countries using representative samples. Furthermore, neither
different levels of subsidy cuts nor any variation in how quickly the
subsidies should be removed is specified by the study. From previ-
ous research, however, we can expect that such elements of policy
design do affect policy attitudes. In addition, fuel prices are always
fluctuating, and the survey was conducted before the notable rise in
energy prices caused partly by the conflict in Ukraine. Furthermore,
the current experimental design has no control group to benchmark
the treatment groups against.
A venue for future research is to study the degree to which public
acceptance of various policy instruments is affected by such price fluc-
tuations. Furthermore, future research should test similar hypotheses
where respondents are provided with more information on how certain
policy instruments work. Misunderstanding, or lack of information,
might be part of the explanation to the similar support for removing
subsidies on fossil fuels and introducing a carbon tax. Developing a
more innovative design, including a control group, may also be a future
avenue to consider.
Our study is one of rather few investigating attitudes towards
climate policy instruments in the Global South. As these countries
are parties of the Paris Agreement and thereby struggle to find ways
to limit their emissions, there is an increasing need for knowledge on
attitudes and attitude formation in contexts outside the Global North.
Simultaneously, there is a need for studies targeting actors’ (citizens,
consumers, business and other stakeholders) acceptance of subsidy
removals in specific contexts. This need is palpable in both the develop-
ing and developed countries as subsidies on fossil fuel consumption
and production do exist also within the OECD member states and
–2
–1
0
Ecuador
Egypt
India
Indonesia
Attitude
Attitude
Attitude
Attitude
Attitude
Attitude
Mexico
All countries
1
2
–2
–1
0
1
2
–2
–1
0
1
2
–2
–1
0
1
2
–2
–1
0
1
2
–2
–1
0
1
2
Revenue use unspecified (baseline)
Welfare
Cash transfers to poor and most-afected households
Adaptation
General reduction of income tax
Fig. 2 | Support for different proposals of revenue use from the removal of fossil fuel subsidies by country. Estimated average treatment effects. Points indicate
the estimated effect; lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

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since the formation of policy attitudes is probably driven by a range
of complex country- and situation-specific factors.
Finally, since climate change concern is a factor that significantly
affects policy attitudes, further public and media attention assigned
to climate change may make subsidy removals more conceivable and
open up promising avenues for developing countries to contribute to
the global mitigation of climate change. At the same time, fossil fuel
subsidy removal frees public funds for investing in social and economic
development, which would be of great value and use in many develop-
ing countries.
Online content
Any methods, additional references, Nature Portfolio reporting sum-
maries, source data, extended data, supplementary information,
acknowledgements, peer review information; details of author con-
tributions and competing interests; and statements of data and code
availability are available at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-023-01597-5.
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Nature Climate Change
Article
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-023-01597-5
Methods
We conducted an online survey experiment (carried out through You-
Gov) in five countries. Our sample is based on pooled groups from
Ecuador, Egypt, Mexico, Indonesia and India, which all have substantial
consumption- and production-based fossil fuel subsidies. We had
slightly more than 1,000 respondents in Ecuador and slightly more than
1,400 in each of the other countries, all of whom were asked about their
support/acceptance of climate policy introduction. We use a 1 × 7 facto-
rial survey experiment where respondents participating in the study
were randomly exposed to different kinds of policy measures (treat-
ments), which they were asked to evaluate (hypotheses pre-registered
at OSF Registries41). (1) One group gave their opinion about the proposal
of introducing a carbon tax in their country (as a point of reference
for us to compare with the other proposals). (2) One group gave their
opinion about the proposal of removing the current industrial subsides
to fossil fuels in their country. (3) One group gave their opinion about
the proposal of removing the current private-consumption subsides
to fossil fuels in their country. Four different groups gave their opinion
about the proposal of removing the current consumption subsides on
fossil fuels in their country plus any of the following additional policies:
(4) use the surplus funding for general welfare purposes (for example,
improved health or education), (5) use the surplus funding to com-
pensate for a general reduction of the income tax, (6) use the surplus
funding for climate change adaptation projects (for example, flooding
prevention) and (7) use the surplus funding for cash transfer to the
poor most-affected households to keep their welfare levels unchanged.
Following previous research demonstrating how factors at the
individual level affect policy attitudes, the study includes both beliefs
(climate concern) and standard socioeconomic items (age, sex, income,
education and urban/rural place of residence).
Sample and respondents
The samples are based on quota criteria. That is, the probability for
each individual who could theoretically be included is not determined
in advance but is based on their demographic background information,
such as gender, age and region, from population statistics/census from
each country.
Respondents participating in the study were randomly exposed
to different kinds of policy measures (treatments). They did not know
the treatment group to which they had been assigned. Subsequent to
the question on policy support, they were asked to state their evalu-
ative response to the specific policy. The respondents also answered
survey questions regarding their gender, age, educational background,
household income level, area of residence and climate concern.
Data collection
Data were collected by YouGov. YouGov uses their proprietary panels
and proprietary sampling technology. YouGov begins by framing quo-
tas on the basis of the census of the named populations. This frame is
the basis on which the sampling software controls the flow of members
into each survey. The sampling system will randomly select from each
panel and allocate to surveys according to the quotas set. Panellists
receive an invitation email containing a survey link. When they access
the link, the router checks against quotas on all live surveys and allo-
cates them to a survey they qualify for.
Statistical analysis
All the samples from the different countries were pooled when testing
H1, H2 and H3. With 1,400 respondents in four countries and 1,000
respondents in one country, the total sample contained 6,600 respond-
ents. These were then divided into seven groups (1,000 respondents
in each group). To test H1, H2 and H3, we used independent-sample
one-sided t tests and ordinary least-squares regression models with
robust standard errors (results reported in Supplementary Informa-
tion). We used the standard P < .05 criterion for determining whether
there are differences between the groups. Hypotheses H1, H2 and H3
were supported if the null was rejected, and the estimates are statisti-
cally significant and have the expected signs and directions for both
these tests. To test H3, group 3 was compared with an aggregated group
based on group 4, group 5, group 6 and group 7. For the exploratory part
where we investigated the role of individual factors for policy support,
we used ordinary least-squares models.
Ethics
This study has been reviewed and approved by the legal division of
Luleå University. In addition, the survey company (YouGov) has all the
required permits and obtained informed consent from all participants.
Reporting summary
Further information on research design is available in the Nature Port-
folio Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
Data for replication are available via the Harvard Dataverse 41: https://
doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0SU8CJ
Code availability
The code for the statistical analysis is available via the Harvard Data-
verse41: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0SU8CJ
References
41.	 Harring, N., Jönsson, E. Matti, S., Mundaca, G. & Jagers, S. C.
Replication data for: cross-national analysis of attitudes towards
fossil fuel subsidy removal (OSF Registries, 2022, and Harvard
Dataverse, 2023); https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/89CWY;
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0SU8CJ
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for financial support from FORMAS—the Swedish
research council for Sustainable Development, 2019-00916, 2019-
02005; the Swedish Research Council, 2016-03058; the Swedish
Energy Agency, 2019-006655.
Author contributions
S.C.J. initiated the study. N.H., E.J., S.M., G.M. and S.C.J. conceptualized
the paper and designed the survey experiments and contributed
to the interpretation of the results. E.J. performed the analyses and
implemented the data presentation and visualization with contribution
from N.H., S.M., G.M. and S.C.J. G.M. provided statistics on fossil fuel
consumption, production and subsidies. Finally, N.H., E.J., S.M., G.M.
and S.C.J. wrote the main manuscript.
Funding
Open access funding provided by University of Gothenburg.
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
Additional information
Supplementary information The online version contains supplementary
material available at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-023-01597-5.
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed
to Niklas Harring.
Peer review information Nature Climate Change thanks Ayşe
Uyduranoğlu and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their
contribution to the peer review of this work.
Reprints and permissions information is available at
www.nature.com/reprints.

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Study description
The study uses a experimental 1x7 factorial design where quantitative survey data were used.
Research sample
The sample consists of 1009 respondents from Ecuador, 1407 respondents from Egypt, 1416 respondents from India, 1402
respondents from Indonesia and 1402 respondents from Mexico. The sample is representative with respect to gender and age.
Sampling strategy
Data were collected by YouGov. YouGov used their proprietary panels and proprietary sampling technology. A power calculation
(G*Power, Faul et al., 2007) based on effect size Cohen's d = 0.15 suggests a group sample size of 699 to ensure sufficient power
(two-tailed, α = .05, β-1 = .80). We have group sample sizes of minimum 1 000 respondents.
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Data were collected through an online survey where the respondents were randomly assigned to the seven different experiment
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Ecuador: June 30th – July 14th 2021. Egypt: June 29th – July 9th 2021. Indonesia: June 29th – July 9th 2021. India: June 29th – July
10th 2021. Mexico: June 29th – July 10th 2021.
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Respondents were randomly assigned to the seven experiment groups.
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    Policy Brief:

Answer:
**Public acceptance of fossil fuel subsidy removal can be reinforced with revenue recycling**

**Policy Problem**Annually, the world spends about US$697 billion on directly subsidizing fossil fuels. If indirect costs were also included (such as the contribution of fossil fuels to global warming, local air pollution and other externalities, and foregone consumption tax), subsidies would be 6.8% of the global gross domestic product. The costs of maintaining fossil fuel subsidies are expected to increase and be regressive for developing countries especially when they are less resource-endowed and have more difficulties in raising fiscal revenues than developed countries. Removing fossil fuel subsidies is crucial not only for making more valuable use of government funds, but also for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and making carbon pricing policies more effective. Currently, scientific evidence on the scale and scope of public attitudes toward fossil fuel subsidy removal policies is scarce. We investigate the public opinion on the removal of fossil fuel subsidies in five developing countries.

**Scientific Research Findings**We find that opposition to removal of existing subsidies is not greater than opposition to possible carbon pricing implementation. Our results indicate that the public in fact considers a subsidy removal policy as being equally desirable (or undesirable) as the introduction of a carbon tax. If so, we should expect suggestions for subsidy removal to be met with similar public opposition or support as has been seen for other carbon pricing measures. There are few studies with which we can compare our findings. Therefore, there are reasons to be cautious in making general conclusions about the extent to which there will be support for the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, at least in the countries we studied. Furthermore, the public in different countries may turn out to have different preferences for how additional revenues from either removing subsidies or collected taxes should be used .

**Scientific Research Study Methods**By using a 1 × 7, pre-registered survey experiment (N = 6,636), we contribute to the existing literature in the following ways: (1) fivedeveloping countries (Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia and Mexico) are studied — they were selected because they all have large subsidies for fossil fuel linked to both its consumption and production; (2) we analyse public attitudes toward the introduction of a carbon tax, and the removal of subsidies on both industrial and private consumption of fossil fuels; (3) we examine whether and how attitudes toward subsidy removal and carbon taxation may differ from each other; (4) we study whether policies that use savings from fossil fuel subsidy removals to invest in the social and economic welfare system lead to more positive attitudes toward subsidy removal.

**Policy Implications**• The results concerning policy attitudes imply that removing subsidies on fossil fuels may not present much more of a political challenge than introducing carbon taxation.• Specifying alternatives for revenue recycling — where public funds currently used for subsidies are instead directed toward other public investments — might increase the level of acceptability of carbon pricing and subsidy removal.• Fossil fuel subsidy removal frees public funds for investing in social and economic development, which would be of great value and use in many developing countries.• Before deciding on removing existing fossil fuel subsidies, careful country-specific investigations should be done to determine the preferred options for revenue recycling among the public.