Nitesh Bharosa

Haiko Van Der Voort

Joris Hulstijn

Marijn Janssen

Niels De Winne
email: n.dewinne@tudelft.nl

Remco Van Wijk

Impose with leeway: combining an engineering and learning approach in the management of public-private collaboration

Keywords: public-private collaboration, engineering, policy making, standard business reporting

The ongoing financial crisis is forcing governments to consider leaner (less resource intensive) forms of public service delivery. This is a difficult process, especially since recent private sector scandals demand that governments become also more vigilant. Public-private collaboration (PPC) needs to address this 'lean yet vigilant' challenge. However, PPCs have proven to take a long time to establish and bring to fruition. Hurdles that delay the achievement of goals include the need to agree on standards in an environment with heterogeneous interests, changing laws and unclear revenue models. While literature on managing PPC hints towards the need for both compulsory measures (plan-driven, restrictive) and adaptive measures (learning-driven, leeway), case studies illustrating how these measures can be integrated in practice are scarce. Drawing on the Standard Business Reporting case in the Netherlands, this paper shows that both compulsory and adaptive measures are necessary to advance in multi-actor standardization processes. Our findings indicate that PPC managers need to impose with leeway by taking an engineering approach to architecture development yet providing leeway in the details.

Introduction

Following the global financial crisis, governments around the world face a thorny dilemma. On the one hand, they need to cut cost and become leaner. One way to achieve this goal is to reduce their compliance monitoring tasks and request less business information reporting from the private sector. On the other hand, private sector failures and scandals in various domains (e.g., financial reporting, food, oil) demand that government agencies become more vigilant. More vigilance is often associated with more regulations, more business reporting and information provision to various government agencies. In addition, more vigilance (e.g., regular inspections) often increases the compliance-monitoring burden for government agencies. This dilemma does not necessarily require government agencies to perform more tasks with fewer (human) resources. For instance, when it comes to regulation and monitoring tasks, government agencies can perform their tasks more efficiently depending on the agreements with the sector monitored. When developing architectures for public-private information exchange, a key step in addressing this dilemma is to collaborate with the public sector [START_REF] Osborne | Public-private partnerships: theory and practice in international perspective[END_REF]. In order to come to such agreements, various forms of public-private collaboration (PPC) are discussed in literature [START_REF] Donahue | Public-Private Collaboration[END_REF]. Tan et al., [START_REF]Accelerating Global Supply Chains with IT-Innovation[END_REF] for instance report on a form of PPC in supply chains driven by the need to conduct more efficient and effective compliance monitoring. In such forms of PPC, trust and coordination are important drivers for collaboration. Kerschbaumer [START_REF] Kerschbaumer | Public-private partnerships in Eastern Europe: Case studies from Lithuania, Republika Srpska and Albania[END_REF] reports on the rise of PPC in the health sector, primarily driven by the need standardize information flows, share resources and risks. In general, PPC is characterized by common objectives, as well as risks and rewards, as might be defined in a contract or manifested through a different arrangement, so as to effectively deliver a service or facility to the public [START_REF] Reijniers | Organization of public-private partnership projects: The timely prevention of pitfalls[END_REF]. The private sector partner may be responsible for all or some project operations, and financing can come from either the public or private sector partner or both.

In practice, several key types of PPCs can be found across various public sectors. Collaborating with the private sector carries the potential for meaningful benefits to be gained for the public partner and, in some cases the citizen. As such, PPCs are key in achieving a lean government, with reduced spending (e.g., eliminating large upfront investments of scarce public funds), greater efficiency (e.g., due to private partners' operational efficiency), and better management (e.g., of public services and infrastructure). In sectors which traditionally are subject to much regulation and compliance monitoring by government agencies, PPC can also be particularly valuable as a method of leveraging technical or management expertise (e.g., performance-based monitoring and incentives), and spurring technology transfer, all of which can lead to quality improvements. Nevertheless, studies show that managing the transition from traditional government regulation to PPC has proven to be difficult in practice [START_REF] Van Veenstra | Towards an Understanding of E-Government Induced Change -Drawing on Organization and Structuration Theories[END_REF]. Many PPCs crucially depend on information systems. Such systems need to be developed along with the collaboration. Information systems supporting PPCs involve complex inter-dependencies between processes, data and technology infrastructures. In many cases, the interest of the public and private stakeholders are divergent and sometimes even conflicting [START_REF] Reijniers | Organization of public-private partnership projects: The timely prevention of pitfalls[END_REF]. For instance, the interests of the public sector are related to legislation, regulations and authorities, political opinion and political influence, democratic decision-making processes, the minimization of risks and the realization of a social goal. One the other hand, the interests of the private sector, are related to revenues on the invested funds, daring to take business risks, having to anticipate market and competitive developments; realizing a corporate goal.

Top-down management approaches are hardly effective in these situations [START_REF] De Bruijn | Process Management. Why Project Management Fails in Complex Decision Making Processes[END_REF], mainly because they fail in facilitating the level of flexibility needed to deal with the wide range of varying stakeholder needs and project uncertainties. A more open approach, providing room to maneuver for stakeholders seems to be more appropriate. While contemporary literature on project management [e.g., 8] hints towards the integration of plan driven and adaptive learning measures, empirical contributions on how these measures were combined in practice and what kind of effects they had is scarce. This scarcity can be partly attributed to the fact that PPCs emerge in a relatively unstructured manner, often depending on the political agenda, making it difficult to collect data. This paper elaborates on the integration of compulsory and adaptive measures that have proven to facilitate the steady advancement of a PPC program in the Netherlands. The case study is on Standard Business Reporting (SBR), a PPC based lean-government initiative aiming to reduce that regulation burden for companies, while at the same time reducing the compliance-monitoring burden for government agencies such as the tax-office and Chamber of Commerce. Section 3 presents more detail on the SBR case. Since SBR is a new form of PPC consisting of several projects, stakeholders needed a program management methodology that addresses the various complexities and uncertainties inherent to the standardization of data, processes and infrastructure for business-to-government information exchange. Note that we do not claim to have developed a new program management approach. Instead, the objective of this paper is to highlight the combination of compulsory and adaptive measures that were used in managing a PPC in practice. As part of the case study, we collected data through observation, document analysis and interviews with members of the SBR team in the Netherlands.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 illuminates some of the typical uncertainties and progress inhibitors in PPC management found in literature. Section 3 presents some background on the introduction of SBR in the Netherlands. Section 4 discusses the findings and reflects on the combination of measures used in the SBR case study. This paper concludes with some avenues for further research.

Public-private collaboration management: marrying two extreme management styles

A well-known governance tool for complex projects is project management [START_REF] Kwak | A Brief History of Project Management[END_REF]. Typical of project management thinking is getting things done in a limited time frame with predefined quality standards and costs [START_REF] De Bruijn | Process Management. Why Project Management Fails in Complex Decision Making Processes[END_REF]. The main problem for a project manager is framed as controlling just these aspects: time, costs and quality. Project management is an example of an 'engineering approach' to management. An analyst (or an engineer) designs a system that is supposed to be optimal, which makes management an implementation issue. A well-known other example of such an engineering approach is Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) [START_REF] Hammer | Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution[END_REF].

The growth of the use of project management as a form of governance is supported by a growing set of tools, aimed at predicting the design through system engineering, the tasks through a work-breakdown structure, the time to spend through network planning tools and the budget through various cost-estimation techniques [START_REF] Kwak | A Brief History of Project Management[END_REF][START_REF] Lundin | A Theory of The Temporary Organization[END_REF]. Project management adds instruments to ensure that the predicted outcome is actually the real outcome of the project. Project managers are responsible for fulfilling the strictly predefined tasks, which implies a top-down steering approach. Organizational change management, risk management and progress management are tools to command, control and secure that the prediction is realistic and realised. More and more, however, these project management tools are deemed inappropriate for the complexities and dynamics that come from multi-stakeholder networks. An important source of complexity is the need to invent context specific solutions by combining technologies, knowledge, and expertise -dispersed over various actors [START_REF] Von Stamm | Managing Innovation, Design and Creativity[END_REF]. Consequently, these projects behave less predictably and as such, the predictions are less accurate, and control focusing on realising that prediction is less apt. The alternative then is to shift towards adaptive forms of management that focus more on flexibility, cooperation, learning and trust. The underlying bodies of knowledge originate from outside de engineering world, such as public administration, institutional economy and sociology. These draw on literature on innovation, network governance, complexity and innovation, suggesting approaches such as adaptive planning [START_REF] Dempsey | Denver International Airport: lessons learned[END_REF], concurrent engineering [START_REF] Loureiro | Complex Systems Concurrent Engineering; Collaboration, Technology Innovation and Sustainability[END_REF] and process management [START_REF] De Bruijn | Process Management. Why Project Management Fails in Complex Decision Making Processes[END_REF][START_REF] Koppenjan | Managing Uncertainties in Networks[END_REF]. They underline the need for "bonding for internal cohesion" and flexibility. The idea is that surprises will inevitably occur in complex projects. In those situations, the project manager does not need team members, partners and contractors with neatly and narrowly described tasks but broad-thinking and committed collaborators with room to manoeuvre. The manager needs to prepare for surprises and commit everyone involved to dealing with them. Part of that preparation can be to use a broader, more functional description of requirements [START_REF] Morris | The Anatomy of Major Projects: A Study of Project Management[END_REF]. Along the way, lessons will be learnt by the client about what it wants and by other actors (e.g., regulators, accountancy firms, software providers, intermediaries) about what is possible and efficient. Learning requires bottom-up steering processes, room in terms of resources, time and budget, allowing for experimenting, the making, detecting and correcting of mistakes, and the exchanging of experiences. Working in a constantly learning and flexible environment demands suitable contracts that focus on realising a prescribed function rather than a prescribed system. Therefore, incentives and performance measurement are more output-based than work-task based. Furthermore, the project management requires leeway; administrators, politicians and stakeholders allowing it discretionary freedom. The two approaches outlined in Table 1 are extreme representations of possible managerial approaches. It is doubtful whether such a pure form would be effective at all in any kind of project. The engineering approach -as drawn here -does not suit the complexities and dynamics of multi-actor system behavior. The adaptive approach is too open-ended to function in any environment that poses constraints, such as political environments imposing deadlines. A growing stream of literature on project management and innovation suggests that an effective managerial is likely to meet the best of both worlds. It is meandering between the two extremes [START_REF] Geraldi | The balance between order and chaos in multi-project firms: A conceptual model[END_REF]. It is being strict about some aspects and lenient about others. De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof [START_REF] Reijniers | Organization of public-private partnership projects: The timely prevention of pitfalls[END_REF] have developed idea about how to combine both extremes. They suggest command and control by leeway. An engineering approach provides direction and incentives to actors to behave in an orchestrated manner. It, however, becomes vulnerable if main interests of actors are not addressed in the managerial approach. Resistance is problematic when the cooperation of actors is essential for the program or project. A different vulnerability is the fact that essential knowledge is dispersed over the actors involved and evolving over time. Providing room to actors may mitigate their resistance and provides an opportunity to distribute and use their knowledge. An example of combining command and control with providing room is output-based management: time, costs and/or quality standards are well defined and enforced strictly, but the way to meet these standards are open for discussion or decentralized decision-making.

This idea provides us a broadly defined normative framework for public management of compliance processes. It calls for some balance between two extreme management approaches, an intelligent mix profiting from the virtues of both. A balance might be found in using an engineering approach and the same time provide room to maneuver for the actors involved. However, this is still not a full-grown framework. Many 'how'-questions remain. Literature does not address complexities of specific PPC projects. Case studies are needed to show the validity of the framework and refine it. The next section presents a case study on the development of an architecture for standard business reporting in the Netherlands.

Case study: introducing Standard Business Reporting in the Netherlands

This section contains an illustration of the compulsory and adaptive techniques and practices used in the implementation of Standard Business Reporting (SBR) in the Netherlands. SBR concerns the implementation of the set of agreements and information systems used for the exchange of reporting information between companies and pubic organizations. SBR implementation combines both restrictive and adaptive measures such as the ones discussed earlier. The management approach that has been used in the SBR program has two partitioning principles. Firstly, development proceeds iteratively in phases with clear deadlines and deliverables: analysis and design, implementation, execution and monitoring. This provides a temporal partitioning. Secondly, there is a separation between the different layers of a projected solution: process layer, data layer, technological infrastructure, and governance aspects.

Background

In the Netherlands, the Standard Business Reporting Program (SBR Program) is a set of projects in the area of business to government information exchange. In the SBR Program, several government agencies and industry partners collaborate to simplify and standardize (financial) reporting [START_REF] Bharosa | Principles for launching Standard Business Reporting: Lessons learned from the Netherlands[END_REF]. This collaboration is encapsulated in an agreement (covenant) that was signed by over eighty parties, both public and private.

The program started in 2004 as Netherlands Taxonomy Project (NTP). In 2006, a generic infrastructure project was carried out drawing up requirements for a new process infrastructure for financial reporting based on the Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL). XBRL is an XML based computer language for reporting business information enabling data to be tagged and reused [START_REF] Debreceny | XBRL for Interactive Data: Engineering the Information Value Chain[END_REF]. In 2007, the first versions of the technical infrastructure developed for exchanging the data were ready. Stakeholders decided that the government should maintain the infrastructure IT maintenance agency Logius. In 2009, the taxonomy project was handed over to Logius altogether and a steering group consisting of senior representatives of all Ministries involved was appointed. As of 2009, NTP continues under the international name Standard Business Reporting (SBR). Similar approaches have been adopted by Australia, and later also New Zealand, China and Singapore.

Reporting streams in SBR include company (or its intermediary) to the CBS (production statistics, investment statistics and short-term statistics, i.e. revenue per period), Chambers of Commerce (possibility to file the annual financial report) and Tax Office (revenue taxes, corporate taxes, income taxes, intra-EU performance (ICP), and short versions of corporate and income taxes. The business information supply chain starts with companies possibly reporting via an intermediary (accountant, bookkeeping, tax consultant etc.), who are both supported by software providers. In the middle, we find the various taxonomy variants chosen for the different reporting streams, and the gateways. Institutions demanding reports are shown on the right. Information flows follow a 'store once, report to many' principle. According to this principle, the data definitions and the infrastructure may be re-used over different reporting chains, while the actual act of reporting remains specifically addressed to one agency. Based on current legislation, the one-stop-shop scenario [START_REF] Wimmer | Integrated Service Modelling for Online One-stop Government[END_REF] or the single window based continuous monitoring scenario [START_REF]Accelerating Global Supply Chains with IT-Innovation[END_REF] would be too far reaching for three reasons. Firstly, it is legally not allowed to re-use data collected for one purpose, for different purposes. Secondly, because reports may have different legal functions and they have different contents. Thirdly, because data for different report may have a different quality level, aggregation level, precision or source.

Development Phases

In the SBR case, a development schedule with pre-defined development phases is enforced quite strictly. Figure 2 shows a development schedule as it has been used in several rollout projects in the SBR domain. There are two go/no go decision making moments. The first one is after the analysis and design phase, when commitment is needed that the project will go ahead as specified in the blueprint. Note that analysis and design are merged. This does not mean that a requirements specification (analysis) and a design (blueprint) should not be separate deliverables, but rather that determining requirements and developing ideas about what is feasible should be intertwined. Another reason is that these phases involve similarly skilled people: visionaries and architects, with an eye for unforeseen possibilities. By contrast, the implementation phase needs project managers who get the job done. In the third phase, the implemented process and technology components are deployed in practice. Initially this is done in a smaller application area. Only after evaluation and acceptance of the working solution, and with an enriched business case, a roadmap can be drawn up to scale up deployment in other application areas. This also involves a marketing plan to make sure external parties (e.g., companies, intermediaries) will adopt the new way of reporting. Stakeholders have recognized that the implementation of SBR will be a cyclical program, consisting of four recurring activities: analysis, design, deployment and continuation. There are two go/no-go moments built into this cycle, during which stakeholders decide on the progression to the next phase depending on the quality of the deliverables. The following sections discuss the combination of compulsory and adaptive measures regarding the data, processes, infrastructure and governance in the SBR case.

Process layer

One of the major dilemmas for compliance management was gaining agreement on process definitions across the chain of stakeholders. To model reporting processes Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) was proposed as standard. As an recognized standard for business process modeling [START_REF] White | BPMN Modeling and Reference Guide[END_REF], BPMN makes it possible for everyone involved in the reporting process a clear picture and description of the process steps that are in a reporting chain. Accordingly, BPMN modeling provides the basis for implementing the process steps. While the use of BPMN is compulsory, compliance managers soon found out that these standards were not sufficient to capture the complexity and context specificity of the entire reporting process. As such, the use of additional process definitions (e.g., in text) was allowed. When we consider the process of reporting, an interesting dilemma was choosing the type of gateway for facilitating the reporting streams. At first, a one stop shop [START_REF] Wimmer | Integrated Service Modelling for Online One-stop Government[END_REF]

4.Continuation

envisioned, referring to a single point of access from a customer of public administration's point of view. This type of infrastructure requires a high level of integration and standardization across the information systems of the requesting agencies. Moreover, the one-stop-shop infrastructure would be too far reaching. First, current legislation does not permit the re-use of data collected for one purpose to be used for a different purpose. Secondly, because reports may have a different function and may therefore have different contents. For example, in a tax report, the company will try to report as little revenue as possible. In a year-end financial statement meant for shareholders, a company will try to report as much revenue as possible, to appear as a solid investment opportunity. As an intermediate the program managers opted for a 'store once, report to many'-infrastructure. This means that although the data definitions and the infrastructure may be re-used over different reporting chains, the actual act of reporting remains specifically addressed to one agency. Hence, the gateway will operate much like a post office, simply moving electronic messages from businesses' system to the right agency, and returning an electronic receipt. This provides leeway for the requesting agencies in organizing their internal processes.

Data layer

Concerning the data layer, we discuss the dilemma of allowing extensions, versus uniformity of a standard (Section 3.4). As was explained above, the general policy in the SBR program is to prefer the national XBRL taxonomy, but to also allow other open standard data formats for specific domains (alternatives of XML, for instance for human resource management). In the case of the banks, an intermediate solution is chosen. Banks use their own extension of the taxonomy, but in the release schedule they follow updates of the national XBRL taxonomy. Therefore, users can still expect to re-use the common data part. Another issue concerns the possibility of XBRL to generate different reports from the same data, by using presentation formats. This leads to a legal problem. By law, an accountant verifies whether the annual accounts present a 'fair image' of commercial reality. When the metaphor of an image is taken too literally, this means that the accountant can only sign for the actual presentation chosen; not for the underlying data elements. After all, not only accuracy but also completeness is testified. This issue still needs to be settled by experts of the Dutch accountants association.

Technical infrastructure layer

In the SBR program, Digipoort functions as the main gateway for information exchange between the private sector and government agencies. SBR uses open technology standards were possible. As compulsory measure, companies have to connect to Digipoort (using free coupling specifications) which is the exclusive gateway for system-to-system reporting in XBRL. Leeway is provided in the way companies (or their intermediaries) connect their business data systems to Digipoort. Companies are free in deciding which of their systems (e.g., financial, accounting, ERP) they connect to Digipoort and to what extend XBRL is embedded in their business transactions (i.e., bolt on, build in or embedded).

Governance

A strict release schedule is maintained for different stakeholders. In this way, partners can test and use the taxonomy -so possible defects are -found before troubling market parties. As we mentioned, according to the Weill and Ross model we need to determine three things. First, SBR is governed by a council, in which all major stakeholders have a say. User groups are represented in the SBR platform. They can give feedback on the way the program develops. The platform is supported by three expert groups, one for data, one for processes and technology and one for marketing and communications. Expert groups are meant to initiate, discuss and solve current issues. This structure ensures that all major stakeholders have a say, while also guaranteeing enough expertise to reach workable solutions. Second, we need to ensure alignment among stakeholders. The actors in the SBR domain form a network, which together provide a service: an information processing chain. Therefore there are frequent meetings (e.g. platform meetings; expert group meetings) to make sure parties know of reported issues and scheduled changes. Regarding adoption by end users, a professional marketing and communications plan is maintained. Third, formal communication procedures must be followed. For example, before releasing a new version of the taxonomy, it must be tested by all stakeholders. Now suppose one party did not perform the test and the release has to be postponed. This needs to be communicated in a uniform way. Table 2 summarizes the compulsory and adaptive measures found in the SBR case study. Companies have to connect to Digipoort (using free coupling specifications) which is the exclusive gateway for system to system reporting in XBRL Companies are free in deciding which of their systems will connect to Digipoort and to what extend XBRL is embedded in their business transactions (Bolt-on, build in or embedded) Governance Fixed release schedule for the taxonomy and Digipoort components (e.g., certificates)

Flexible requirements and maturity levels for the consecutive versions

As outlined in Table 2, the PPC included both compulsory and adaptive measures related to the data, processes, technology and governance aspects of SBR. Both type of measures were required for different purposes. One the one hand, the compulsory measures were needed to mobilize the stakeholders set the standards for SBR. On the other hand, adaptive measures were needed to cater in the heterogeneous stakeholder requirements and maintain their commitment to the SBR program. The combination of measures listed in Table 2 is specific for the SBR case. Section 4 proceeds with a discussion on what types of combinations can be abstracted from the case study.

Discussion

SBR is a PPC based lean government initiative seeking to reduce the administrative burden for companies and the compliance-monitoring burden for government agencies. The SBR case study illustrates a combination of elements from an engineering approach and a learning approach. In the short term, the form of PPC in the SBR case can be characterized as an engineering approach with top-down steering and extensive planning. These elements were necessary in order to mobilize the stakeholders. Varieties of compulsory measures support this engineering approach. Process and data standards are made compulsory, so there seems no room for experimenting. Time is found an important constraint managed by strict deadlines, so no room seems to exist for lessons learned after the deadlines. The technical infrastructure allows for just a single gateway, so there seems no room for redundancy. And yet, on the long run, some elements of the learning approach such as cooperation and bottom up steering were also apparent. These elements were necessary in order to maintain the commitment to the standards (i.e., data, processes and technology) selected by the stakeholders. The learning approach was combined with the engineering approach in at least three ways:

1. Engineering the broad picture, leeway in the details. The simplest combination is engineering the framework, while providing room to maneuver in managing the details. This is highly visible in the compulsory use of the national XBRL-taxonomy, and the possibility for the use of different extensions at the same time. This provides flexibility and learning possibilities for users, while still using (and accounting for) one standard.

2. Implementing a flexible design by an engineering approach. Leeway can also be apparent in the design itself. The more flexible the design, the more room there is for actors to cope with it, the more legitimate an engineering approach may be. An example is the choice for the relatively flexible 'store once report many' design. A one-stop-shop design would demand a lot more change from a lot more actors. In that case a pure engineering approach would be likely to fail, while for a flexible design more elements of this approach are likely to be accepted.

Leeway within restrictive procedural rules about decision making.

A version of 'command and control by providing leeway' is the top down implementation of decision making procedures. Although the outcomes of the decisions remain open, the procedures (terms, participation) are well defined, so that participants have little room later to reject the decisions on the ground that they had no influence on the outcome. Examples are procedures for agencies to provide existing process models in non-standard formats. Another example is the governance model, in which collective go-no go moments are required in a strict time frame. These combinations provide possibilities for learning by doing within an engineering frame.

The case suggests that a combination between the approaches has been found, by using an engineering approach and providing leeway at the same time. As suggested by theory, this 'management by paradox' could very well be an important success factor of the SBR-case. While there is no set of hard or quantifiable metrics for evaluating the success of this methodology, the prospect of the nationwide requirement to deliver official reports in the XBRL format indicates that the stakeholders have made significant progress in establishing the necessary infrastructure for SBR. In the case of SBR, the combination of such compulsory and adaptive measures has proven to be able to sustain progression in achieving the minimally required program milestones. Considering the results of the SBR program, the Dutch Government has announced that Digipoort will be the exclusive channel for exchanging financial reports with government agencies starting 2013.

Conclusions and further research

Managing public-private collaboration projects is a difficult process, subject to different interests, heterogeneous processes and changing political priorities. Since public and private agencies often have various interests, measures are needed to mobilize their resources on the short run and to sustain their commitment on the long term. Finding this balance is a delicate process. This paper illustrates the need for, and the use of, an adaptive program management methodology, which includes both compulsory and adaptive elements. As such, the case study shows that both compulsory and adaptive measure are necessary as command and control is needed to deliver milestones and standards, while maneuvering space or leeway is needed to mobilize stakeholders and profit from learning effects. In this way, program managers plan for and continue with the most crystalized project outcomes, while at the same time plan for a higher maturity level in future releases.

One of the questions rising from this research is under which conditions a combination of compulsory and adaptive measures would succeed. In retrospect, the case study has four specific conditions that need to be highlighted, since they provide a basis for PPC. Firstly, there is a sufficient level of political consensus on the need for SBR in the Netherlands. Secondly, the technology and data representation standards used (XBRL) and the infrastructure needed (government gateway) are based on accepted open standards and use proven building blocks. Thirdly, the introduction of SBR does not demand any immediate changes in the current laws on business-to-government reporting. This is highlighted by the slogan 'store once, report to many'. We argue that when legal changes would have been required, the implementation would have progressed slower. Finally, an important condition in the SBR case is that it entails a clear business case for the participating stakeholders. Further research may consider other cases in which these conditions are not in place. Careful evaluation of the conditions for success and sustainability is required on a case-by-case basis in order to assess the costs and benefits and the likelihood of success of such an approach. Such cases would allow further specification and testing the type of compulsory and adaptive measures needed for public sector reengineering.

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. SBR implementation approachFigure1outlines the main phases in the deployment of SBR in the Netherlands. Stakeholders have recognized that the implementation of SBR will be a cyclical program, consisting of four recurring activities: analysis, design, deployment and continuation. There are two go/no-go moments built into this cycle, during which stakeholders decide on the progression to the next phase depending on the quality of the deliverables. The following sections discuss the combination of compulsory and adaptive measures regarding the data, processes, infrastructure and governance in the SBR case.

Table 1 .

 1 Two extreme management approaches

		An engineering approach	A learning approach
	Assumptions	Systems are fully specifiable,	System components can be developed
		predictable, and can be built	by small teams using the principles of
		through extensive planning	continuous design improvement and
			testing based on rapid feedback and
			change
	Management style	Command and control	Cooperation
	Requirements	Blueprint	Functional
	Task definition	Narrow for best control	Broad for best cooperation
	Incentives	Work-task based	System-output based
	Change	Limit as much as possible	Facilitate as much as needed
	Steering	Top down	Bottom up
	Information	Limited	Open
	exchange

  was

	Timebox 1		Timebox 2	Timebox 3	Timebox 4
	Data		Data
	Processes		Processes
	Infrastructure		Infrastructure
	1. Analysis	Go/No	2. Design	3. Deployment	Go/No Go

Table 2 .

 2 Summary of compulsory and adaptive measures in the SBR program

		Compulsory measure	Adaptive measure
	Process	Requesting agencies have to use	Requesting agencies are free in
		BPMN for communicating their	organizing their own internal processes
		processes with Logius	for handling business reports
	Data	Use of a single national XBRL	Extensions to the taxonomy are allowed
		taxonomy with predefined	when the requesting agencies demand
		definitions of data elements	additional information
	Technical
	Infrastructure


Arild Jansen
email: arildj@jus.uio.no

Tommy Tranvik
email: tommy.tranvik@jus.uio.no

THE STATE OF IT GOVERNANCE PATTERNS OF VARIATION AT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL IN NORWAY

Keywords: IT governance, e-Government, Norwegian ministries, governance models

The aim of this article is to analyze IT governance practices in the Norwegian government ministries. We seek to identify the ministries IT governance regimes, and, more specifically, the different government sectors policies and principles regarding the use of ICTs. Moreover, we seek to explain differences in IT governance regimes across ministries. The empirical evidence has been collected from policy documents, budget proposals and other document. These data have been supplemented by qualitative interviews with key civil servants in the various government ministries. The analysis of the data is based on a theoretical framework consisting of four IT governance models and a classification of the functions that ICTs fulfill within the various government sectors. Our findings indicate that there is some correlation between IT governance models and ICT functions.

INTRODUCTION

In 1958, the first computer was introduced in public administration in Norway. At about the same time, Leavitt and Whisler claimed, in a Harvard Business Review-article ("Management in the 1980s"), that IT would replace the traditional organizational hierarchies with a leaner structure resembling an hourglass. As the hourglass structure eliminated the need for middle management, productivity would sour, according to the authors. 50 years on, Leavitt and Whistler predictions appears dubious: the IT governance structure of the Norwegian central government, as in most other countries, is still seemingly based on the centralized and hierarchical management style that is associated with the public sector. Moreover, IT governance can be seen as a subset of general administrative policies, which rely on two unchanging principles: sectorization and line organization at the central level; autonomy and self-determination at the municipal level.

This apparent stability notwithstanding, over the last 30 years or so, new administrative policies have been introduced in Norway. The first reform program was launched in the late 1980s and incorporated certain NPM features. But this reform program contained few (if any) initiatives that could meet the challenges created by the use of ICTs in public administration. However, in 1990, performance-based management, Management-by-Objectives, was introduced, and since then ICTs has gradually become a more central factor in central government reforms.

These developments make it relevant to ask how and to what extent 30 years of administrative reforms have impacted on the governance of ICTs at the central government level? Can it, as Leavitt and Whistler predicted more than five decades ago, be described as a singular "hourglass phenomenon" defined by one dominant type or style of governance? Or is IT governance best understood as a plural phenomenon where we find a variety of structures and practices, including the type of governance that Leavitt and Whistler destined for extinction? If so, what characterizes the different types of IT governance and how can we explain the variations?

In this article we argue that IT governance is indeed a plural phenomenon. Thus, it can be understood in light of four theoretical IT governance models that capture the essence of the variation that we find within central government in Norway. These IT governance models are inspired by similar but much more general governance models that appear in the public administration literature.

Furthermore, we argue that the technology itself, (or more precisely, the functions that ICTs fulfill within the ministerial areas of responsibility) is an important factor that must be taken into account when we seek to explain variations in IT governance. As we will see below, we have defined five different functions that ICTs may have.

In the rest of the article, we will address three questions:

1. What IT governance model is dominant within the different areas of ministerial responsibility? 2. What is the typical function that ICTs fulfill within the different areas of ministerial responsibility? 3. What sort of correlation (if any) do we find between the dominant IT governance model and the typical ICT function? In discussing these questions, we must analyze the ministries policies regarding the use of ICTs. We must also understand the ministries need for interaction and cooperation, both within their own sectors and across spheres of ministerial responsibility. Finally, we must identify ICT functions and the amount of resources spent on IT management.

The empirical data that we base our discussions are (1) the ministries budget documents and the corresponding assignment letters to selected subordinate agencies, (2) relevant white papers and government reports and (3) interviews with key civil servants representing all the various ministries.

MANAGEMENT AND IT POLICY IN NORWAY

The political-administrative system in Norway, as in most other Western democracies, is based on a complex and often ambiguous set of norms and values concerning politicaladministrative control, codes of professional behavior, due process and the rule of law, democratic processes, public service ethics and civic participation [START_REF]New Public Management. The Transformation of Ideas and Practice[END_REF]. The historicalinstitutional "climate" in Norway is characterized by homogeneity of norms and values, mutual trust between political and administrative leaders, the balancing of conflicting considerations, and a political style of extensive involvement and co-operation, all of which suggests that government reforms will be implemented in a slow, reluctant and modified fashion.

The first 30-40 years after the Second World War can be described as a period of bureaucratic expansion: government tasks and responsibilities increased dramatically [START_REF] Grønlie | Sentraladministrasjonens historie etter 1945. Bd. 1 and II Fagbokforlaget[END_REF]. In addition, civil servants, with a background from social sciences, economics and natural sciences, were recruited to government ministries and agencies.

During the 1980s, the political-administrative system came under increased pressure. And from the mid-1990s, Norway embarked on a gradual reform path that involved the implementation of performance-based management (Management by Objectives and Rules: MBOR). At the same time, Norway resisted much of the privatization and market measures that characterized public sector reform elsewhere, and adopted competitive tendering only to a limited extent [START_REF] Christensen | Administrative Reform Policy: The Case of Norway[END_REF][START_REF] Christensen | NPM and beyond _ structure, culture and demography[END_REF]. This period was also strongly associated with the massive adoption and use of ICTs. A series of studies proposed new initiatives that aimed at facilitating greater cooperation and coordination of the deployment of ICTs, but very few of the proposals were actually implemented [START_REF] Grønlie | Sentraladministrasjonens historie etter 1945. Bd. 1 and II Fagbokforlaget[END_REF][START_REF] Jansen | Can ICT reform public agencies?[END_REF]. Even so, a number of general measures (such as increased user orientation, new ways of funding ICT investments, outsourcing and changes in conditions of competition) have impacted on IT governance practices. These developments underlined the need for a new type of IT-policy. Two recent white papers 1 clearly points in that direction: new initiatives, based on the need for greater harmonization of ICT solutions, have been taken and a set of common ICT architecture principles have been introduced [START_REF] Aagesen | Service Development For National Government Information Infrastructures -The Case Of Norway[END_REF], [START_REF] Hornness | How to Develop an Open and Flexible Information Infrastructure for the Public Sector[END_REF]. The development of public administrative and IT policies is summarized in table I. However, the general picture is that most major public administration reforms have been initiated in order to fulfil other political goals, and that ICTs have primarily been seen as a tool for accomplishing traditional tasks rather than as an agent of policy change. The current IKT-policy may thus be described in this way:

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Most comparative studies of IT governance in the public sector have analyzed differences and similarities at the national level. The assumption is that national approaches to IT governance can be described according to one distinct and "culture-specific" model (i.e. one nation, one model, see for instance [6][START_REF] Dunleavy | Digital Era Governance (IT Corporations, the State and E-government)[END_REF][START_REF] Dunleavy | From old public administration to new public management[END_REF]. In these studies, therefore, it is assumed that the interesting variations can be found across rather than within national political systems.

As already indicated, this article deviates from this approach. We hold that the IT governance is the product of ministry-specific management trajectories. However, the management trajectories may have been influenced by other factors. Consequently, all that is interesting is not national, significant variations can also be found on the intra-national level. True, the ministries IT governance springs from one particular and distinct politicaladministrative system. But within this overarching system, variations in IT governance may find fertile ground -there is no "one size fits all". In the next section we briefly trace the origin of variation: the development of administrative and IT policy.

IT Governance Models

It is these overall policy changes -past and current -that have spurred variations in IT governance: the changes have affected different ministries in various ways. In order to describe the nature of variation, we have constructed four IT-governance models. The models are (i) the instrumental-structural model, (ii) the cultural-historical model, (iii) the network model and (iv) the market-oriented model.

The instrumental-structural model promotes the view that the governance of public (and private) organizations can be understood as a top-down, predictable and controlled process. According to this model, what is being decided at the top of the political-administrative . . .

Other policy areas

Specific measures and projects

General goals and framework for ICTpolicies

Principles and directions, organization mode of The overall government policy General regulations for financial management and ladder will determine how organizations evolve and change. This means that top management make decisions about how organizations should be structured based on well-defined goals and policy instruments, and that these decisions are implemented in a predictable and relatively frictionless fashion [START_REF]New Public Management. The Transformation of Ideas and Practice[END_REF]. Top management, when deciding goals or changing policies, can be influenced by factors outside their control (public pressure, for instance). Even so, reform processes will generally be controlled by those at the apex of the bureaucratic chain of command. The oversight model, outlined by [START_REF] Hood | Regulation inside government. Waste-Watchers, Quality policy, and Sleaze-Busters[END_REF], is similar to the instrumentalstructural model in the sense that the modification of administrative behavior is achieved by adhering to instructions handed down from "above".

The cultural-historical model assumes that public bureaucracies have long-lasting institutional features that shape administrative behavior. These features are conceptualized as relatively stable norms, values and practices that create a distinct and specific organizational culture. These norms, values and practices are shared by all (or the great majority of) civil servants and the "new recruits" soon come to accept them as "natural" [START_REF] Christensen | NPM and beyond _ structure, culture and demography[END_REF]. An important aspect of this governance style, particularly for top managers, is to represent and maintain "the best of what we stand for". This implies that the cultural-historical style of governance is less based on hierarchy and control, and more on the ability to successfully mediate between the entrenched administrative traditions, on the one hand, and fashionable reform ideas that are held in high regard by "modernizers", on the other. The point is that reforms or changes will be adapted or brought in line (as much as possible) with the existing and entrenched institutional features.

Table II: Major features of the governance model

The network model draws on [START_REF] Peters | The Future over Governing[END_REF] notion of participative government. This model is characterized by a flatter and less hierarchical organizational structure, and the style of governance is based on consultation, negotiations and involvement (for instance, in relation to third parties like private businesses, interest-groups or individual citizens). Internally, governance is not so much about issuing orders and instructions, but is performed by adopting a "softer" and more participatory approach (by way of forming teams or project-groups,

Governance models Features The Instrumental-Structural Model

The Cultural-Historical Model for example). Moreover, the gradualist approach to reforms associated with the culturalhistorical model is replaced by a greater emphasis on change and flexibility (often as a response to third party demands or pressure). This model corresponds, at least to some extent, with the mutuality perspective described by [START_REF] Hood | Regulation inside government. Waste-Watchers, Quality policy, and Sleaze-Busters[END_REF]. Here, administrative behavior is influenced by horizontal interaction and cooperation rather than command and control.

The marked-oriented model is based on devolution and decentralization of initiative and responsibilities -and an emphasis on greater individual incentives (particularly at the management level) for delivering above-average results. This style of governance emulates what is believed to be the essential features of the successful business company (or leader): inventive, risk-taking, mission-focused and performance-driven. Administrative behavior is controlled by exerting greater pressure on civil servants to "deliver the goods", typically by stimulating greater competition by the creation of internal market or through benchmarking (see [START_REF] Hood | Regulation inside government. Waste-Watchers, Quality policy, and Sleaze-Busters[END_REF], [START_REF] Weill | IT Governance: How Top Performers Manage IT Decision Rights for Superior Results[END_REF]). In this model, the critical management challenge is to define a framework for open, competitive and well-functioning public sector markets.

The Function of Technology in Governance Practices

None of the governance models takes into account the functions and roles that ICTs have and how they may influence IT governance. However, since we expect to find that ICTs fulfill different functions depending on the type and structure of the ministry, our assumption is that the way technology is utilized and perceived (by the ministries and their subordinate agencies) is a source of variation in IT governance practices.

This hypothesis is based on insights provided by a number of contributions to the IT literature. For instance, in their seminal article "Desperately Seeking the 'IT' in IT Research-A Call to Theorizing the IT Artifact" [START_REF] Orlikowski | Desperately Seeking the "IT" in IT Research-A Call to Theorizing the IT Artifact[END_REF]] argued that ICT is not just a tool that we use: it is also the ensemble of equipment, techniques, applications and people that define the social context of use. In the corporate management literature, we find similar perspectives (see, e.g. [START_REF] Weill | IT Governance: How Top Performers Manage IT Decision Rights for Superior Results[END_REF]). This means that the technology itself is seen as an agent of change: it is one important factor that will influence how governance is organized and executed.

Below, we describe five different functions that ICTs may have within organizationsand that may be associated with (or underpin) the different models of IT governance.

ICT as a tool. This implies that we can select the appropriate technical equipment or system in order to carry out specific tasks. ICT, according to this view, is the engineered artifact, expected to do what its designers intended it to do. Tools are usually neither particularly complex nor very flexible. Thus, ICT is primarily understood as a technical matter, being separate from and controlled by human actors [START_REF] Kling | Defining the boundaries of computing across complex organizations[END_REF]. This may be exemplified by ordinary office automation support system or case handling systems, carrying out functions that are precisely specified.

ICT as control and management. Here, ICTs is used for reporting, monitoring and controlling purposes, i.e. the collection of data on performance or outcome, or for various surveillance purposes. This use of ICT is normally characterized by limited complexity, but there is a need for some flexibility and organizational integration.

ICT as support for interaction and cooperation. Strongly influenced by the development of the Internet, and particularly the World Wide Web, interaction and collaboration has become increasingly important. And not only within public institutions, but, perhaps more importantly, regarding the interaction between public agencies, citizens, businesses and the private sector as such. These effects of ICTs are less controllable than when they are used as tools, and this use of ICT requires more organizational flexibility.

ICT as an information infrastructure. This means that ICTs is seen as the basic technical and organization capabilities that are necessary to support application systems and solutions. Similar to physical infrastructures, an information infrastructure must be open, standardized, evolving over time and flexible in order to support the large variety of systems and services that run on top of the infrastructure [START_REF] Hanseth | Design theory for dynamic complexity in Information Infrastructures: the case of building Internet[END_REF]. Thus, ICT as an infrastructure implies a high degree of complexity as well as a need for extensive organizational integration.

ICT as part of core (business) activities. In the public sector, core activities and products are by and large information services which is offered to individual citizens or actors within the private sector. These activities and services include both technical and organizational elements, including training, staffing and support. They usually imply a significant level of complexity and flexibility, and organizational integration is crucial for their success [START_REF] Weill | IT Governance: How Top Performers Manage IT Decision Rights for Superior Results[END_REF].

We may summarize these five understandings of the role and function of ICTs in organizations according to two important features: i) degree of complexity and dynamics/flexibility, and ii) their need for integration.(* = weak,** = average, *** = strong). Since we expect to find that ICTs fulfill different roles or functions across the ministries, our assumption is that the way technology is perceived and understood by the various ministries and their subordinate agencies is a source of variation in IT governance practices rather than a source of uniformity. And since we assume that the existing governance structures and practices differ across ministries, it seems likely that we will find dissimilar governance models even in those instances where ministries use and perceive the role of ICTs in similar ways. This means that we identify three main sources of variation in IT governance models:

Table III: Features of the different ICT functions

Attribute ICT Function

Complexity and dynamics

Need for organisational integration

i. The ministries' existing management approach and practices ii. The degree of external influence and interaction with external actors iii. The functions and roles that are attributed to the use of ICTs, reflecting their core business activities

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS

Figure 1 above illustrates the overall policy framework to which each ministry has to adapt its IT governance policy. The framework defines few specific policy goals and instruments, and allows for significant variation when it comes to how ICT is governed. We find that that only a few ministries mention ICT explicitly in their budget document. Even when we look at the assignment letters, the way ICT-related goals are operationalised (if at all) vary considerably. Less than half of the ministries specified measurement indicators for the use of ICT, and the indicators are for the most part rather vague. Based on the assessment on stated goals and outcome requirements, we can identify these dominant management approaches in the different ministries, as illustrated in table IV: This table shows that a minority of the ministries explicit uses management by objectives and result in their IT governance, while only another minority make visible an IT focus in their management policies.

Plans, strategies and other policy instrument

We found that only seven ministries have defined a general ICT-plan or strategy that affected the whole sector. However, some of the ministries argued that a sector-encompassing strategy is not considered relevant, because the subordinate agencies have defined their own strategies which the ministries would follow up and monitor. It should also be noted that the usefulness of sector-encompassing ICT-plans is disputed.

Another (more soft) management approach is to establish forums or coordinating bodies, where the subordinate agencies can congregate and discuss issues of mutual interest, i.e. the harmonization and interaction of different ICT-systems. However, the formal status of such forums varies between sectors, i.e. whether or not the ministries themselves participate in the meeting and the forums ability to make binding decisions. Another interesting issue is the existence of agencies (or enterprises) that have specific responsibilities related to ICT developments or operations that support common ICT-function within the sectors (such as UNINETT in the educational sector, Norwegian Health Network, the Norwegian Mapping Authority/Norway Digital and the Brønnøysund Register Centre operating several registers related to business, trade and industries in Norway We see from table V that the majority of ministries that specify ICT-goals for their subordinate agencies also use measurements indicators. Similarly, those ministries that have a coordinating ICT-body also stimulate sector-wide cooperation and coordination. This illustrates important differences between the ministries regarding their IT governance styles.

In order to explain these differences, we have analyzed the ICT governance patterns in each ministry along with their influence by and interaction with external actors.

4.2

Are the IT Governance Approaches Consistent?

Bellow we will discuss our research question:

What IT governance model is dominant within the different areas of ministerial responsibility?

The instrumental-structural model use measurable objectives (indicators) and obligatory returns as management instruments, and control processes are often supported by the use of ICTs. The Ministry of Finance seems to fit well into this governance model, since it is the initiator and driving force behind the use of Management by objectives and return, as do the Ministry of Reform, Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Children and equity do also have some corresponding characteristics, although their IT governance approach includes elements from the cultural models as well.

The cultural-historical model assumes that public organizations have historical traditions that create a distinct institutional form (both in terms of behavior, norms and values). We find that this governance model is typical for the Ministry of Fishing and Coastal Affairs and also the Ministry of Agriculture seems to belong here (dominated by the agronomist profession, and having close relations to external actors within the agriculture sector). The same is true for the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with the ministries of Transportation and communication as well as the Ministry of local government. The ministry of Justice and Police may also be associated with the instrumental model.

The network model assumes that interaction and collaboration with its environment is crucial, including building an open and flexible ICT infrastructure that can be used within the areas of ministerial responsibility. We find that the Ministry of Environment (MD) matches this model of governance. Other ministries that conform to this model are the Ministry of Education and Research (KD) as well as the Ministry of Culture (KUD), the Ministry of Trade and Industry (NHD) and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy Policy (OED). These ministries have strong relations with the private sector, and are dominated by economist and civil servants with a technical or engineering background.

Regarding the market-oriented model, we find that none of the ministries have a governance approach that fits here, although we find that some ministries include some elements from this model. We can accordingly summarize these finding in table V below.

Cultural

It is interesting to observe that none of the three models are dominating across the government. On the other hand, this picture is not static, but does only reflect the currents situation, where all ministries are involved in various reform processes. Assuming that the cultural-historical model is most similar to former management policies and practices, we would expect that either the instrumental-rational model or the network model become more typical in the future.

What is the typical function that ICTs fulfil within the different areas of ministerial responsibility?

We have identified the individual ministries' specification of ICT goals and means along with the general ICT focus, the existence of ICT strategies and/or ICT agencies etc. Furthermore, we have assessed the ministries view on the functions and role of ICT in their sector. In table VI, we summarize our findings in this way: We see from table VI that the tool function seems to be important in at least 7 ministries. The infrastructure function is important in at least 8 ministries while the same is true for ICT-based interaction and collaboration in 8 of the ministries. The control function is significant in 8 of the ministries and the service function is important in 7 ministries.

What sort of correlation (if any) do we find between the dominant IT governance model and the typical ICT function?

Our analysis indicates that the IT governance approach may be limited to three models: the instrumental-structural model, the cultural model and the network model. The marketoriented model may be more relevant for other countries. Table VIII summarize how the five ICT functions are relevant in relation to the governance models:

Based on a theoretical assumption about the relationship between models and functions, it seems plausible that that the attribute "limited complexity and dynamics" (the tool and the control functions) is associated with the cultural-historical model. This assumption is supported by our data: the tool function is most typical for cultural-historical models. Furthermore, we expect that the control and management function would be mostly associated with the instrumental-structural model, which is not supported empirically, as it also is related to the cultural-structural model. We would on the other hand hypothesize that interaction and cooperation as well as the infrastructure functions is typical for the network model, which is strongly supported. We also see the service function is more dominating in these ministries. We thus find that the attribute "complexity and dynamics" is associated with the network model, as, the infrastructure function as well as the interaction and cooperation functions may be significant within ministerial sectors that are influenced by this model of governance.

When we look closer at the characteristics of the different ministries, there are clearly connections between its core activities and the dominating ICT functions, i.e. the tool perspective relates to the reporting and control functions. The infrastructure function support resource and environment management oriented ministries. These findings tend to support our initial assumptions that, as resource management in itself is shared or common facilities However, this picture is somewhat ambiguous, which can be attributed to other factors as their existing governance structure as well as external influence. The governance structure is probably not static, either.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings show that we can identify three of the IT governance models within the Norwegian ministries, while the (pure) market-oriented model seems to be less important. We also find some correlation between the IT governance models and the ICT functions, where the tool and control function seems to be associated with the cultural-historical and the instrumental-structural models, while the infrastructure and interaction functions are mostly related to the network model. However, our results are preliminary and further analysis has to be carried out.

Figure I :

 I Figure I: The Norwegian IT policy framework

Table I : The relation between public administrative policy and IT policy 1950 -2010 Public Administrative Policy IT Policy Visions and goals Means and measures Objective for ICT Typical measures 1955 - 1975

 I

		The growth of the	Rationalize and	Rationalization	Large computers and
		welfare state,	efficiency. Strengthen	through	computer centers.
		strengthening rule of	the political role of the	automating of	Centrally developed
		law and equality	ministries.	routine task	systems
	1975-	Focus on a clear	Decentralization &	Decentralization of	Support for case
	1990	administrative policy,	delegation, developing	responsibility for	handling etc. by the
		emphasize the division	regional and local	IT-systems.	use of local computer
		between politics and	administration.	Efficiency	systems. Acquisition is
		administration	Introduction of MBOR)	improvements	a local responsibility
	1990-	User orientation and	Changes in budget	Growth of e-gov.	Integration of ICT in all
	2010	freedom of choice.	regulation. Outsourcing	Improve inter-	work processes. ICT -
		Make public services	increased competition.	action with citizens	architecture,
		simpler & accessible.	Improve public services	and private sector.	standardization etc.

The Network Mod- el The Market- Oriented Model

	Focus	Rational thinking	Maintain	values	Reduce	hierarchy,	Avoid	monopoly,
			and norms,	stimulate cooperation	create markets
	Structure/	Well-defined au-	Institutional, histor-	Interaction and col-	Decentralization
	Characteristics	thority & respon-	ical traditions	laboration
		sibilities
	Decision-Making Hierarchical,	Guided by profes-	Participatory, mutual	Decentralized, cre-
		through authority	sional	interests,	influence,	negotia-	ate internal market.
			consultation	tions
	Alignment	Centralized, top-	Compatibility with	Flexible adaptation	Ad-hoc,	perfor-
		down approach	existing values			mance-driven
	Formal commu-	Hierarchical and	"Business as usual"	Horizontal		Various patterns
	nication	centralised
	Management	By objectives and	Path dependency;	Teams, TMQ, Internal	Pay for performance,
	type	return (MBOR)	corporate society	quality management	no specific
	Control process	Obligatory return	Few		Few		Many

Table IV :

 IV Management Practices and External influence

	Ministry	Management Approach
	AD (Labour -Welfare)	MBOR, Citizens focus
	BLD (Children, equity and social Inclusion )	Partly MBOR, traditional management
	FAD (Government administration and reform)	MBOR, Technology and Infrastructure focus
	FIN (Finance)	MBOR, technology and infrastructure focus
	FKD (Fisheries and costal affairs	Traditional resource management,
	HoD (Health and Care services)	MBOR, infrastructure agencies
	JD (Justice and Police) )	Partly MBOR, technology focus
	KRD (Local government & regional dev)	Traditional management, no ICT-focus
	KUD (Culture)	Some MBOR. Technology focus:
	KD (Education and research)	MBOR, technology and Infrastructure focus
	LMD (Agriculture and Food)	Traditional resource management, ICT-focus
	MD (Environment)	Resource management ICT and Infrastructure focus
	NHD (Trade and industry)	Significant ICT focus, infrastructure agency
	OED (Petroleum and Energy)	Resource man. ICT focus security and
	SD (Transport and Communication)	Traditional management, some ICT -focus,
	UD (Foreign Affairs)	Traditional Management, ICT strategy

Table V : The relation between ICT management instruments, external influence and IT governance model

 V

	Ministry	ICT objective focus &means	External Influence	IT Governance
				Model
	AD (Labour -Welfare)	Limited ICT focus, no specific goals	Some	Instrumental
		or means
	BLD (Children, equity	No ICT focus, no specific goals or	Limited, mainly with	Instrumental
	and social Inclusion )	means	municipalities
	FAD (Government adm.	Well-defined ICT-goals, infrastruc-	Significant	Instrumental
	and reform	ture focus, ICT agency & strategy		/Network
	FIN (Finance)	Well-defined ICT-goals, some infra-	Primarily with in the	Instrumental
		structure focus, ICT agency	finance sector
	FKD (Fisheries and cos-	Limited ICT focus, no specific goals	With private actors	Cultural
	tal affairs	or means	in sector
	HoD (Health and Care	ICT goals and strategy for interac-	Significant, with	Instrumen-
	services)	tion, also with private actor	many actors	tal/network
	JD (Justice and Police)	Significant ICT and infrastructure	Some	Cultural/Network
		focus, ICT goals and strategy
	KRD (Local government	Limited ICT focus, no specific goals	With reg. And local	Cultural
	and reg. dev.)	or means	level
	KUD (Culture)	Significant ICT service and infra-	Significant internal	Network
		structure focus, ICT agency	interaction
	KD (Education and re-	ICT goals, Service and infrastructure	Significant	Network / In-
	search)	focus, ICT agency	(EU,OECD,..)	strumental
	LMD (Agriculture and	Significant ICT and infrastructure	Some	Cultural /Network
	Food)	focus, ICT strategy
	MD (Environment)	Significant ICT and infrastructure	External coop. dom-	Network
		focus, ICT strategy and agency	inating
	NHD (Trade and indus-	ICT goals. infrastructure and service	Significant interac-	Network
	try)	focus, ICT agency	tion with industry
	OED (Petroleum and	Limited ICT focus, no specific goals	Significant influence	Network
	Energy)	or means,	from industries
	SD (Transport and	Some ICT focus, an ICT strategy in	Significant in some	Cultural/Network
	Communication)	the transport sector	agencies
	UD (Foreign Affairs)	Some ICT focus, no specific goals ICT	With other ministries
		strategy	and abroad

Table VI :

 VI Management practices and ICT functions in all ministries

	Ministry	ICT objective focus, and	3 dominating ICT	IT Governance
		means	function & roles	Model
	AD (Labour and	Limited ICT focus, no specific	Tool, Control, Inter-	Instrumental
	welfare)	goals or means	action
	BLD (Children,	No ICT focus, no specific goals	Tool, Interaction ,	Instrumental
	equity ..	or means	Control
	FAD (Government	Well-defined ICT goals, infrastr	Infrastructure, In-	Instrumental
	adm. and	focus, ICT agency & strategy	teraction, Control	/Network
	FIN (Finance)	Well-defined ICT-goals, some	Control, Infra-	Instrumental
		infrastr. focus, ICT agency	struct., Service
	FKD (Fisheries and	Limited ICT focus, no specific	Tool, Interaction,	Cultural
	costal affairs	goals or means	Control
	HoD (Health and	ICT goals, strategy for interac-	Interaction, Infra-	Instrumental/ net-
	Care services)	tion, also with private actor	str., Control	work
	JD (Justice and Po-	Significant ICT and infrastr. fo-	Interaction, Tool,	Cultural/Network
	lice)	cus, ICT goals and strategy	Control,
	KRD (Local govern	Limited ICT focus, no specific	Tool, Control, (In-	Cultural
	and reg. dev	goals or means	teraction)
	KUD (Culture)	Significant ICT service and in-	Service, Infrastruct.,	Network
		frastr. focus, ICT agency	Interaction
	KD (Education and	ICT goals, Service and infrastr.	Service, Infrastruc-	Network
	research)	focus, ICT agency	ture, Control	/Instrumental
	LMD (Agriculture	Significant ICT and infrastruct.	Infrastructure, Inter-	Cultural /Network
	and Food)	focus, ICT strategy	action, Tool
	MD (Environ-	Significant ICT and infrastr. fo-	Service, Infrastr., In-	Network
	ment)	cus, ICT strategy and agency	teraction
	NHD (Trade and	ICT goals. infrastructure and	Infrastructure, Ser-	Network
	industry)	service focus, ICT agency	vice, Interaction
	OED (Petroleum	Limited ICT focus, no specific	Interaction, Control,	Network
	and Energy)	goals or means,	Tool
	SD (transport and	Some ICT focus, an ICT strate-	Tool, Interaction,	Cultural/Network
	Communication)	gy in the transport sector	Control
	UD (Foreign Af-	Some ICT focus, no specific	Tool, Control, Inter-	Cultural
	fairs)	goals ICT strategy	action

St. mld. 17 (2006St. mld. 17 ( -2007)): An Information Society for All , St.mld.19 (2008-2009): A Government for Democracy and Community.