PhD Andrea Zinzani

Beyond Transboundary Water Cooperation: Rescaling Processes and the Hydrosocial Cycle Reconfiguration in the Talas Waterscape (Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan)

Keywords: Political Ecology, Transboundary water politics, international development, hydrosocial cycle, borderlands, Talas waterscape, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan

In the framework of the political ecology of water, and specifically of international development policies and hydrosocial relations interfaces, this contribution aims to analyze how the establishment of the Chu-Talas Interstate Commission has influenced rescaling processes and reconfigured the hydrosocial cycle and power relations in the Talas waterscape (Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan) at the borderland level. Through the hydrosocial cycle analysis and the focus on the role of water institutions and linked political discourses, on water users practices, and transboundary infrastructures management, data were collected through semi-structured interviews and informal talks in six villages of the waterscape. The evidence shows that whereas the establishment of the Chu-Talas Commission led to a complex multi-level rescaling process, in contrast, the hydrosocial cycle has been slightly reconfigured by the formalization of the development initiative, but rather by recent internal political transformations (in contrast between the two states) and informal practices.

and hydrosocial relations interfaces, this contribution aims to analyze how the establishment of the Chu-Talas Interstate Commission has influenced rescaling processes and reconfigured the hydrosocial cycle and power relations in the Talas waterscape (Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan) at the borderland level. Through the hydrosocial cycle analysis and the focus on the role of water institutions and linked political discourses, on water users practices, and transboundary infrastructures management, data were collected through semistructured interviews and informal talks in six villages of the waterscape. The evidence shows that whereas the establishment of the Chu-Talas Commission led to a complex multi-level rescaling process, in contrast, the hydrosocial cycle has been slightly reconfigured by the formalization of the development initiative, but rather by recent internal political transformations (in contrast between the two states) and informal practices.

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Repenser la coopération transfrontalière de l'eau.

Changement d'échelle et reconfiguration du cycle hydrosocial dans le bassin du Talas, (Kazakhstan -Kirghizstan)

Résumé

Cette contribution, qui s'inscrit dans une démarche d'écologie politique de l'eau, s'intéresse aux interactions entre les politiques de l' eau menées par les organismes de développement et les relations hydro-sociales en Asie centrale. Elle vise à analyser comment la création de la Commission transfrontalière Chu-Talas a influencé les changements d' échelle, et reconfiguré le cycle hydro-social et les dynamiques de pouvoir dans le bassin du Talas au niveau de la zone frontalière (Kirghizistan-Kazakhstan). Ce travail se fonde sur des données recueillies au cours d' entretiens semi-directifs et de discussions informelles dans six villages qui portent sur le rôle des institutions de l'eau, sur la gestion des infrastructures transfrontières de même que sur les discours politiques, les usagers de l'eau et leurs pratiques liées. Les résultats ont démontré que le cycle hydro-social a été moins influencé par la mise en place de la commission transfrontalière Chu-Talas, qui a été créée conformément aux modèles internationaux de gestion, que par la redéfinition récente des politiques nationales (qui diffèrent entre les deux États) et par des pratiques informelles.

Mots-clefs

Écologie politique, gestion de l' eau transfrontalière, développement international, cycle hydrosocial, régions frontalières, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, bassin du Talas Introduction I n the framework of society-environment interactions, water resources have played a relevant role in shaping these processes, particularly in arid and semi-arid regions as well as in rural and urban areas affected by water scarcity. Whereas for decades water resources management has been considered a technical and hydrologic concern, since the 1970s, in the framework of social sciences, geographers, ecologists, environmental and political scientists have started debating its social and political nature. They have argued that water management processes cannot be exclusively analyzed adopting a technical approach since their dynamics are significantly shaped by socio-political logics and rationales. Furthering this argument, over the last two decades, interactions between water management, politics, power, and institutions and social practices have been central in the Political Ecology and the Geography of Water and Development.

In the current context of globalization and environmental-climate changes, political ecologists and human geographers have made advances in conceptualizing and theorizing interactions between water resources, socio-political power, state and development actors policies, developing new frameworks and approaches to analyze complex interactions between water(s) and society. Some scholars have conceptualized the hydrosocial cycle, combining the physical and social natures of water, and debating the spatial scales for water management to understand current global reconfigurations of water governance [START_REF] Budds | Editorial: Exploring Political Ecologies of Water & Development[END_REF][START_REF] Loftus | Rethinking Political Ecology of Water[END_REF][START_REF] Swyngedouw | Social Power and the Urbanization of Water[END_REF][START_REF] Swyngedouw | The Political Economy and the Political Ecology of the Hydro-social Cycle[END_REF]. Specifically in the "Global South", since the 1990s diverse development organizations and donors (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UN agencies) have started promoting policies and projects aimed to improve water resources management and reduce poverty and inequalities adopting a multi-perspective sustainability (environmental, social and economic) approach. However, these interventions have been debated and criticized by several scholars due to the neglect of considering specific national and local socio-political contexts, and to the depoliticized nature of these projects.

Starting from these assumptions and advancing the debate, this contribution aims to explore and understand how hydrosocial and power relations have been produced and reconfigured by the formalization of an international development initiative, specifically in a Central Asian transboundary waterscape shared by Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Over the last two decades, in transboundary waterscapes development organizations (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UNECE) have supported the establishment of interstate agreements -based on the UNECE Transboundary Water Convention (2010) -to strengthen water riparian states cooperation and promote equal water sharing and provision. In Central Asia, transboundary water management has been considered a relevant interstate environmental and political issue since the collapse of the Soviet Union, when independent states, diversifying national economic paths and water policies, started to claim different water demands. In the region, since the 2000s international organizations have initiated to support and guide governments to the implementation of policies to prevent water disputes and enhance interstate cooperation. However, these measures have often involved exclusively governments and formal state level institutions, downplaying specific local water institutional settings, and the complexity of fluid socio-political borderlands and environmental concerns.

Focusing on the Talas transboundary waterscape, shared by Kyrgyzstan's upstream section and Kazakhstan's downstream section, this contribution analyzes how the recent establishment of the Chu-Talas Interstate Commission -supported by the UNECE, ADB and other donors -has impacted and reconfigured hydrosocial and power relations in the borderlands between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Adopting the hydrosocial cycle conceptual framework, research has focused on the three following aspects: local level water institutions and related roles, the supported political discourse, and the context of formal and informal water users interactions with transboundary water infrastructures. Adopting a qualitative approach, data was collected through semi-structured interviews and informal talks to state and district institutions, associations and water users, and fields& canals surveys. The fieldwork was conducted in six villages of Kazakh and Kyrgyz borderlands between August and September 2015.

This contribution continues with a background on water politics and the interfaces of development The second part focuses on the Talas transboundary waterscape, the institutional structure of the Chu-Talas Interstate Commission. Thus, the following section analyzes the hydrosocial cycle reconfiguration in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz borderlands, by seeking to understand these processes driven by local, national and interstate dynamics. In this context, scant attention had been paid to the role of water institutions, on their supported political discourses and narratives, and on borderlands transboundary infrastructures management practices across the six villages analyzed. This contribution subsequently continues with a discussion on the impact of the rescaling process and linked hydrosocial cycle reconfiguration in the transboundary waterscape, and with some conclusions.

The Political Ecology of Water and Development: Rescaling Processes and the Hydrosocial Cycle

Over the last two decades, against the backdrop of global environmental political debates, a growing body of literature has emerged on the Political Ecology of Resources [START_REF] Swyngedouw | Exploring Human Geography-A Reader[END_REF][START_REF] Swyngedouw | The Political Economy and the Political Ecology of the Hydro-social Cycle[END_REF][START_REF] Bryant | Power, knowledge and political ecology in the third world: a review[END_REF][START_REF] Loftus | Reification and the Dictatorship of Water Meter[END_REF][START_REF] Kaika | Dams as Symbols of Modernization: the Urbanization of Nature between Geographical Immagination and Materiality[END_REF].

Introducing the research framework, political ecology departs from the assumption that nature and environmental issues cannot be understood in isolation from the socio-political and economic contexts within which they are produced.

As underlined by [START_REF] Swyngedouw | Exploring Human Geography-A Reader[END_REF], [START_REF] Budds | Power, Nature and Liberalism: the Political Ecology of Water in Chile[END_REF] and [START_REF] Castree | Environmental Issues: Relational Ontologies and Hybrid Politics[END_REF], political ecology focuses on power structures and politics which are embodied in environmental change processes, and on sociopolitical implications of resources allocation and management reconfiguration processes.

Inspired by a neo-Marxist epistemological tradition reflecting on resources, capital and social power interfaces, in these socio-environmental processes particular emphasis has been given to social inequalities, injustice, political conflict, and to the role of social and political actors in shaping their historic and contemporary dynamics [START_REF] Castree | Environmental Issues: Relational Ontologies and Hybrid Politics[END_REF][START_REF] Swyngedouw | Social Power and the Urbanization of Water[END_REF][START_REF] Blanchon | Radical Political Ecology and Water in Khartoum; a Theoretical Approach that goes beyond the case study[END_REF]. [START_REF] Bryant | Power, knowledge and political ecology in the third world: a review[END_REF] argued that a Neo-Marxist approach offers a means to link social oppression and environmental degradation to wider political and economic concerns related to the capital and resources commodification.

Reflecting on environmental processes, [START_REF] Warner | Going with the flow : river basins as the natural units for water management?[END_REF] claim that the political dimension of ecologic and climate change has often been ignored by experts and donors, who have supported the depoliticization of these processes. Therefore, the urgency and salience of shedding light on the political rationale of actors who formulate environmental and development narratives clearly emerges. Thus Political Ecology puts politics in a prominent position to disentangle the complexities of society-environment interactions.

As [START_REF] Budds | Power, Nature and Liberalism: the Political Ecology of Water in Chile[END_REF] and Loftus (2005) point out, the Political Ecology approach moves towards the questions on who produces specific environments (actors, logics, and competing interests) and with what social and ecologic aims, stressing the need for a political, rather than, a pure technical solution.

Focusing on socio-cultural water(s), this approach reconfigured the way to disentangle water governance, politics and linked socio-power transformations. According to Linton (2010), political, economic and sociological perspectives have contributed to the development of a novel approach in analyzing the nature of water(s) and a new conceptualization of water processes as socio-nature dynamics. Therefore, within the framework of Political Ecology, research on water focuses on the multiplicity of politics that permeate social relations of water resources control in a diverse contexts. Furthermore, this contribution reflects on how water management processes are politically driven, both according to a material and a discursive perspective, in opposition to a pure hydrologic question of allocation [START_REF] Swyngedouw | Exploring Human Geography-A Reader[END_REF]Bakker, 2000;[START_REF] Kaika | Dams as Symbols of Modernization: the Urbanization of Nature between Geographical Immagination and Materiality[END_REF]. The reconceptualization of water as socio-nature, enabled scholars within this tradition to support the idea that social and power relations are not external to water resources but they are embedded [START_REF] Swyngedouw | Social Power and the Urbanization of Water[END_REF]Loftus, 2005;[START_REF] Budds | Contested H20: Science, Policy and Politics in water resources management in Chile[END_REF]. Swyngedouw (2006), transcending the modernist idea of nature-society as separate entities, envisions water circulation as a combined physical and social process, as a hybridized socio-natural flows that merge together nature and society in inseparable ways. He adds that water is a hybrid entity that embodies processes that are simultaneously material, discursive and symbolic. According to this vision, socio-political relations, played out through institutions, policies, regulatory frameworks, and hydraulic infrastructures strongly shape how water flows and how it is allocated throughout waterscapes.

Over the last three decades, on the wave of global political and economic transformations in different regions, in particular in the Western countries, water resources management has shifted from a state centralized control, to decentralized control shared by the state, public-private actors and private enterprises. This reconfiguration has been ideologically inspired by neo-liberalism, which promoted state withdrawal, the commodification of water resources, combined by the financialization and privatization of management and infrastructural property regimes [START_REF] Molle | Nirvana Concept, Narratives and Policy Models: Insights from the Water Sector[END_REF][START_REF] Molle | Hydraulic Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission: Flows of Water, Flows of Power[END_REF]. According to these political and economic processes, since mid-1990s diverse international organizations and development banks have initiated to spread this approach in the "Global South" through the design of development projects. These initiatives, driven by the World Bank, United Nations agencies, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Global Water Partnership and the Asian Development Bank among others, have been characterized by a multi-perspective nature, oriented to guide national water sector reforms, institutional changes, the implementation of international water policies, and the design of interstate treaties.

Over the last two decades, the international support to the Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) and linked Water Users Associations (WUAs) -initiative oriented to liberalize and decentralize water management-, and to the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), the global paradigm aimed to promote integration, good governance and sustainability, have led to complex and heterogeneous political, economic and social reconfigurations in the "Global South" [START_REF] Allan | IWRM/IWRAM: A new sanctioned discourse? Occasional paper 50[END_REF][START_REF] Bakker | A Political Ecology of Water Privatization[END_REF][START_REF] Molle | Nirvana Concept, Narratives and Policy Models: Insights from the Water Sector[END_REF][START_REF] Zinzani | Irrigation Management Transfer and the Dynamics of WUAs: Evidence from South-Kazakhstan Province[END_REF][START_REF] Zinzani | The Logics of Water Policies in Central Asia: the IWRM Implementation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan[END_REF]. Therefore, it is relevant to analyze how these development interventions have produced and transformed hydrosocial relations and linked power reconfigurations at multiple scales. As argued by [START_REF] Loftus | Rethinking Political Ecology of Water[END_REF], [START_REF] Swyngedouw | The Political Economy and the Political Ecology of the Hydro-social Cycle[END_REF] and [START_REF] Budds | Editorial: Exploring Political Ecologies of Water & Development[END_REF], the analysis of the impact of development interventions in different socio-political and environmental context enables us the disentanglement of water and power interactions and linked specific socio-political outcomes. Furthermore, [START_REF] Ekers | The Power of Water: Developing Dialogues between Gramsci and Foucault[END_REF] posit that this research approach enables us also to understand how power is pursued and consolidated by reworking hydrosocial relations. This approach is in part driven by the fact that the majority of water development interventions in the "Global South" have been addressed in a technical manner with insufficient regard for the political processes which characterize and shape their implementation. Furthering the debate, [START_REF] Budds | Contested H20: Science, Policy and Politics in water resources management in Chile[END_REF] explains that this technical manner reflects the desocialized and depoliticized nature of these interventions and justifies problem-solving measures based on scientific and technological expertise rather than socio-political. Moreover, Bakker (2013) points out and criticizes development policies and narratives that do not sufficiently consider mechanisms of power, control and inequalities in regions characterized by diverse water issues. In sum, the naturalized and depoliticized development policies and narratives, as for instance the IWRM or initiatives oriented to water security and poverty alleviation, have in certain cases reproduced the deficiencies and the inequalities that they were designed to address pursuing new forms of power and control (Swyngedouw, 2007;[START_REF] Budds | Contested H20: Science, Policy and Politics in water resources management in Chile[END_REF][START_REF] Zinzani | The Logics of Water Policies in Central Asia: the IWRM Implementation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan[END_REF].

Water Development Policies and Rescaling Processes

A relevant concept, deconstructed and recently debated by political ecologists and geographers, is the politics of "scale" and linked rescaling processes at interstate, national and sub-national level. This concept discusses the spatial extent of water resources management, and related reconfigurations, advocated by development interventions and narratives. Historicizing the concept, in the 1990s Smith (1992) introduced the notion of "politics of scale", defined as the complex socio-spatial practices, state regulations and politics, power interactions and social struggles which characterize the configurations of scales. Subsequently, further research provided a new means to politicize spatial units and related hierarchies, in terms of reflecting on inner socio-political interactions: [START_REF] Brenner | The limits to scale? Methodological reflections on scalar structuration[END_REF] and [START_REF] Marston | The Social Construction of Scale[END_REF] Fondation Maison des sciences de l'homme -190 avenue de France -75013 Paris -France http://www.fmsh.fr -FMSH-WP-2017-123

argue that politics of scale redefine conventional spatial hierarchies (national -regional -local) from fixed containers of space which organize social processes, to categories produced by human efforts to interpret such processes. [START_REF] Neumann | Political Ecology: Theorizing Scale[END_REF] contends that the politics of scale have to question the scalar practices of social actors, inquiring the power asymmetries, to understand the relations between and within different scales. [START_REF] Swyngedouw | Social Power and the Urbanization of Water[END_REF][START_REF] Iskandar | The Socio-Technical Aspects of Water Management: Emerging Trends at Grass Roots Level in Uzbekistan[END_REF] shows how the deconstruction and reconstruction of spatial scales, as for instance water management units in Spain or urban water allocation schemes in Chile, strongly reshuffled spatial perceptions and political and social geometries. In this perspective, scales and boundaries have been repositioned as products of economic and political reconfigurations. [START_REF] Brown | There's nothing inherent about scale: political ecology, the local trap and the politics of development in the Brazilian Amazon[END_REF] add that scales are essentially "fluid", as no scale has any inherent or eternal qualities that make it properly suited to a specific social or ecologic process. Instead, scalar configurations and linked shifts are strategies used by political actors to pursue a specific project. These socio-political and spatial reconfigurations, conducted both by the state and, in this discussion, by development organizations and linked policies, have been defined in rescaling processes. With the aim of disentangling and deconstructing these processes, Daniell and Barretau (2014) have recently discussed the interactions between scales and levels of organizations by focusing on how conflicts among competing scales are managed, on the political and social mechanisms involved in bridging scales, and on which scales are more appropriate to effectively manage water resources. Concerning water development initiatives and rescaling processes, different issues and processes have been discussed over the last years, such as the suitable spatial scale and the boundaries for water management -debating administrative and hydrographic units - [START_REF] Warner | Going with the flow : river basins as the natural units for water management?[END_REF][START_REF] Molle | Hydraulic Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission: Flows of Water, Flows of Power[END_REF]Molle, , 2012;;[START_REF] Cohen | The Watershed Approach : Challenges, Antecedents, and the Transition from Technical Tool to Governance Unit[END_REF]Davidson, 2011, Houdret et al., 2014), the consequences of advocated decentralization and deregulations (Swyngedouw, 2003(Swyngedouw, , 2010)), and the logics of development policies implementation [START_REF] Zinzani | The Logics of Water Policies in Central Asia: the IWRM Implementation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan[END_REF]. In relation with research presented in this contribution, processes of scale reconfiguration advocated by development organizations have occurred since the mid-1990s in transboundary waterscapes, changing their institutional agreements and governance units. In the framework of the UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (1992), and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997), development projects and policies have supported the establishment of interstate commissions, national river basin authorities and councils, and interstate river basin councils to strengthen cooperation between the international counterparts.

The Hydrosocial Cycle

The concept of the hydrosocial cycle as emerged from research on the political ecology of water by different scholars such as [START_REF] Swyngedouw | Social Power and the Urbanization of Water[END_REF]2006), [START_REF] Budds | Contested H20: Science, Policy and Politics in water resources management in Chile[END_REF], and Linton (2010), among others. As briefly discussed in the introduction, these authors have deeply criticized the concept of the hydrologic cycle and its analytical framework, due to its neglect of social and political process analysis in disentangling water management issues. Starting from this assumption and the hybrid nature of water resources [START_REF] Swyngedouw | Social Power and the Urbanization of Water[END_REF], the hydrosocial cycle internalizes social relations, political power and technology. The concept focuses the attention on social relations, power structures and technology interventions that produce and reproduce water in any given contexts (Linton and Budds, 2014). Swyngedouw (2006) -considered as the conceptual pioneer in the articulation and structuring of the framework -initiated the reflection on the relevancy of linking the transformation of, and in the hydrologic cycle at global, regional and local level on the one hand, and the relations of political, economic, social and cultural power on the other. He defines the hydrosocial cycle as a hybridized socio-natural flow that fuses together nature and society in inseparable manners. Based on evidence from research conducted on the waterscapes of Chile and Peru, [START_REF] Budds | Contested H20: Science, Policy and Politics in water resources management in Chile[END_REF] argues that the hydrosocial cycle can better navigate between the material and the socio-political dimensions of environmental change in order to reveal power relations that intersect with bio-physical dynamics in order to produce and reproduce political ecologies. Linton (2010) adds that the utilization of the concept as an analytical framework enables us to inquire on the socio-ecologic nature of water, the progressive politics of the hydro-social changes, and on dialectical relations between water and society. Reflecting on the different contributions to the hydrosocial cycle, its dynamic nature clearly emerges. It embodies geographical and historical processes, meaning that the assemblage which gives rise to a particular kind of water and a particular socio-political configuration, is always changing (Linton and Budds, 2014). Thus, it is relevant to question who or which actors have capacities and power to rework hydrosocial relations, according to what strategies and objectives, and for the benefit of whom. As underlined by recent studies conducted in different regions by [START_REF] Bakker | A Political Ecology of Water Privatization[END_REF], [START_REF] Loftus | Reification and the Dictatorship of Water Meter[END_REF], [START_REF] Molle | Nirvana Concept, Narratives and Policy Models: Insights from the Water Sector[END_REF], [START_REF] Bourblanc | The challenges of rescaling South-African water management: Catchment Management Agencies and interbasin transfer[END_REF], the hydrosocial cycle can be reworked, reproduced and reordered by national or local political and economic transformations, rescaling processes, socio-environmental changes and development initiatives. Therefore, over the last two decades development interventions and policies in the "Global South", advocated by heterogeneous political logics and rationales, have seemingly reworked and reconfigured national and local hydro-social interactions. Referring to the discussion presented in the previous sub-chapter, the relevancy of disentangling rescaling process, supported by development organizations, together with hydrosocial cycle reconfiguration interfaces emerge. In particular, the political nature that characterizes rescaling processes and their supported institutional, power and social reconfigurations, will enable us to understand how these processes impacted and reworked the hydrosocial cycle.

Water and Development in Central Asia: Reconfiguring National and Transboundary Water Policies

Introducing the water management context in the Central Asian region, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of five national states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) led to diverse and complex socio-political and economic challenges. The Soviet state-centralized system and its institutional hierarchy ceased to manage the republican water sectors, and to guarantee the respect of inter-republican water treaties and related barter agreements of economic exchanges (crops, energy, resources) [START_REF] Wegerich | Handing over the sunset"-External factors influencing the establishment of Water Users Associations in Uzbekistan: Evidences from Khorezm Province[END_REF][START_REF] Dukhovny | Integrated Water Resources Management: Putting Good Theory into Real Practice[END_REF][START_REF] Zinzani | The Logics of Water Policies in Central Asia: the IWRM Implementation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan[END_REF]. Therefore, in the framework of the post-Soviet transition, the newly independent states initiated a complex reorganization of the state structure -and linked institutional land and water reforms processes-inspired and oriented towards a state decentralization, economic liberalization and principles of market economies.

Reflecting on the regional context of water resources, the shift from one administrative unit under the Soviet Union to five independent states led to diverse challenges regarding the Aral Sea basin's transboundary water management and allocation. At the beginning of the 1990s, the institutional water framework inherited from the Soviet Union was at risk, and the Central Asian region was considered, by different development organizations, an area of potential crisis in terms of water resources sharing. Nevertheless, soon after independence (achieved in 1991), the governments of the Central Asian republics agreed to maintain the Soviet inter-republican water framework for the two transboundary main rivers, Syr-Darja and Amu-Darja, formalized in the 1980s. Hence, interstate basin agencies BVO SyrDarja and BVO Amu Darja continued their operations. In order to strengthen the international framework, in 1992 five Central Asian states signed an agreement to ensure cooperation in joint management, use, and protection of interstate water resources and established the joint authority named "Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) [START_REF] Wegerich | Handing over the sunset"-External factors influencing the establishment of Water Users Associations in Uzbekistan: Evidences from Khorezm Province[END_REF]Jozan, 2008). In parallel, the International Differently, in Kyrgyzstan and partly in Kazakhstan, the state directed these transition processes through trajectories of decentralization and liberalization, supporting market economy principles [START_REF] Wegerich | Handing over the sunset"-External factors influencing the establishment of Water Users Associations in Uzbekistan: Evidences from Khorezm Province[END_REF][START_REF] Sehring | Irrigation Reforms in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan[END_REF][START_REF] Iskandar | The Socio-Technical Aspects of Water Management: Emerging Trends at Grass Roots Level in Uzbekistan[END_REF][START_REF] Hornidge | Reconceptualising water management in Khorezm, Uzbekistan[END_REF][START_REF] Zinzani | Tra Irriguo e Seccagno: le Trasformazioni Recenti nella Media Valle dello Zeravshan, Uzbekistan[END_REF] [START_REF] Sehring | Irrigation Reforms in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan[END_REF]Wegerich, 2009;[START_REF] Zinzani | The Logics of Water Policies in Central Asia: the IWRM Implementation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan[END_REF]. According to [START_REF] Molle | Hydraulic Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission: Flows of Water, Flows of Power[END_REF], and as argued by [START_REF] Mollinga | Theorising Structured Diversity. An approach to comparative research in water resources management[END_REF], the main aim of development organizations in Central Asia was a structural adjustment of the institutional context through the support of neoliberal policies, such as market deregulation, liberalization, commodification and privatization, leading to a roll-back of the state and its power. However, these policies were mostly hindered behind the concepts of multi-perspective sustainability, water security and good "water" governance, adopting a narrative of depoliticization and naturalization of development interventions [START_REF] Allan | IWRM/IWRAM: A new sanctioned discourse? Occasional paper 50[END_REF][START_REF] Biswas | Integrated Water Resources Management: Is it working?[END_REF].

The supported implementation of both IWRM and IMT initiatives in the Central Asian states over the last two decades has rather been characterized by its influentual political nature, leading to relevant institutional, political and social reconfiguration processes. These processes implied the creation of new institutions, the dismantlement of existent authorities and power relations. Therefore, moving back to the key concepts and the analytical framework presented in the previous chapter -the rescaling processes and the hydrosocial cycle -, the implementation of development policies at a national level led to significant consequences in terms of rescaling and hydrosocial relations changes. Since the 2000s, development organizations initiatives have focused also on the transboundary level through the promotion of agreements and the establishment of commissions to strengthen interstate cooperation on transboundary rivers management.

Reconfiguring The

Talas Waterscape: The Formalization of the Chu-

Talas Commission

The waterscape and geographical background of the Talas basin

The concept of waterscape has increasingly emerged in the last decade in research that discusses the interactions between water, power and infrastructures (Swyngedouw, 1999[START_REF] Swyngedouw | Social Power and the Urbanization of Water[END_REF][START_REF] Bakker | A Political Ecology of Water Privatization[END_REF]Budds, 2008). Adopting a novel perspective, the waterscape is not merely the territory within water flows, but a produced "socio-natural entity" in which social power is embedded in, and shaped by water's material flow, and which becomes embodied in a wide array of physical objectives (Swyngedouw, 1999;[START_REF] Loftus | Rethinking Political Ecology of Water[END_REF][START_REF] Budds | Restructuring and Rescaling Water Governance in Mining Contexts: the Coproduction of Waterscapes in Perù[END_REF]. Thus, it represents a socio-spatial product, a materialized entity featured by power, socio-political interactions and environmental dynamics. Furthermore, [START_REF] Bensidoun | Samarcande et la Vallée du Zeravchan[END_REF][START_REF] Lewis | The Geographical Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia[END_REF]Micklin, 1997;[START_REF] Bichsel | Conflicts Transformation in Central Asia: Irrigation Disputes in the Fergana Valley[END_REF][START_REF] Zinzani | Tra Irriguo e Seccagno: le Trasformazioni Recenti nella Media Valle dello Zeravshan, Uzbekistan[END_REF]. According to this process, the Talas trans-

The establishment of the Chu-Talas Commission

Concerning water sharing and hydraulic infrastructural regulations between the two republics, in 1983, in the framework of the Soviet inter-republican water agreements, a protocol was signed between Kyrgyz and Kazakh SSRs formalizing the Talas flow sharing (50% to each republic) [START_REF] Wegerich | Passing Over the Conflict: the Chu Talas Basin Agreement as a Model for Central Asia[END_REF] In order to shed light on the impact of the establishment of this institution at the borderlands level, farmers and water users were questioned on the evolution of water management and allocation over the last years, and on potential benefits linked to the Commission, underlined by the Secretariat and the members of the Chu-Talas River Basin Agency. The evidence from the three villages showed that many of the farmers and water users were not aware of the existence of the Commission, even ten years after its establishment. Farmers questioned on water availability in Grodikovo argued that over the last ten years no significant changes occurred. They stated that on the one hand it is strictly related to natural conditions, as winter precipitations, while on the other to the mood of Kyrgyz authorities concerning water release from Kirov reservoir. They added that although the Talas river water sharing agreement was signed in 2000, according to them for several years Kyrgyz water authorities have released less water than agreed. Whereas Two main canals, Saiza and Baisu were rented from the department for a period of four years. Interviewed water users stated that after the creation of SaizaBaisu Federation the maintenance of both canals and water allocation procedures improved. Questioned about relations between WUAs and potential issues of inequalities, they state that beside some occasional disputes of water allocation, relations between water users and with their governing boards are not problematic. Considering the reconfiguration of roles and powers in water control, the design of the Fondation Maison des sciences de l'homme -190 avenue de France -75013 Paris -France http://www.fmsh.fr -FMSH-WP-2017-123

SazaBaisu Federation has reduced the role and available funds -delivered by the Ministry -of the Manas district water department. Questioned on the potential establishment of other federations in the district, SazaBaisu Director argued that the creation of new federations would be a serious institutional challenge, since this move would significantly decrease district water department's role, the unique state water institution involved in water control in Manas district. He added that the current context allows an equilibrium of decentralization and liberalization.

The Political discourse

Political discourse is fundamental to achieving power reconfigurations or the support of politics and the implementation of specific reforms.

As argued by [START_REF] Foucault | Power/Knowledge[END_REF], political discourse represents a way to exercise power, the discursive power, and to convey forms of knowledge and truth. The formalization of the Chu-Talas Commission has been characterized by depoliticized narratives, supported by the UNECE, the ADB and other organizations promoting the principles of development, multilevel cooperation, good governance and sustainability. Whereas on the one hand this discourse has been narrated by development organizations to Kazakh and Kyrgyz governments, on the other, national water authorities have not reproduced and spread these narratives to local level administrations and actors.

On the contrary, the Kazakh government and meso-level water authorities have spread a specific political discourse related to institutional and power reconfigurations analyzed in the previous paragraph. Reflecting on the nature and the strategy of these processes, Kazakh water authorities -Chu-Talas River Basin Agency and Taraz Kazvodkhoz -supported the idea of a rethinking of water liberalization occurred over the last decade, and the strategy of water management recentralization. Questioned on the dismantlement of the Kommunalnivodkhoz and on the hydraulic infrastructural property regime change, members of the Taraz Kazvodkhoz argued that canals and water allocation procedures are strategic objectives that should be managed exclusively by the state, underlying that the decentralization of secondary canals control failed, both financially and technically. In addition, they argued that cases of infrastructures privatization, as for instance the Tyute canal, led to unfair commodification of water resources, capital accumulation and inequalities among users. The Director of Chu-Talas River Basin Agency argued that nowadays the state has financial availability to take back control of water infrastructures, and that the dismantlement of authorities operating between the state and water users will lead to a decrease of water charges and the increase of subsidies to farmers. He added that water-decentralization failed. The political discourse which accompanied institutional reconfiguration did not lead to tensions and neither did they result in disputes between water users. Farmers in Grodikovo, questioned on this process, argued that decentralization did not lead to benefits and improvements, and that the WUAs experience failed. Other water users in Besagash and a former water master of Kommunalnivodkhoz agreed that hydraulic infrastructures should be managed by state authorities and that allocation, directly controlled by these institutions without any intermediaries, would be more efficient, while the maintenance of canals and their control would be rendered easier. Therefore, it clearly emerges how the political discourse supported by state water authorities permeated water users ideas and rationalities, still implicitly influenced outcomes of the liberalization phase.

Conversely, Kyrgyz water authorities reinterpreted narratives supported by the UNECE, ADB and in particular those of the World Bank.

In fact, since 2002, when the WB initiated to promote the WUAs establishment and the creation of a national authority supporting this initiative, the political discourse of Kyrgyz water authorities purported the logic of decentralization, liberalization and participatory approaches to water management. Kyrgyzstan is the unique state in Central Asia which supports, through a national authority, international water policies, and where state authorities, included members of hydraulic bureaucracies, claim decentralization. However, this position did not contribute to donors promoted establishment of the Talas Transboundary Basin Council. The Director of Manas district water department remarked agreements between the government and the World Bank, and underlined their organizational and technical support to the district department of WUAs support. Questioned on current water policies and the orientation for the next future, he and a couple of other members argued that, with the exception of

Borderlands transboundary infrastructures and formal & informal practices

Due to its physical characteristics and the materialization of Post-Soviet borderlines, the Central Asian region is characterized by different transboundary streams and hydraulic infrastructures [START_REF] Megoran | The critical geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley dispute 1999-2000[END_REF][START_REF] Lam | Cooperation in the Ferghana Valley borderlands: habitus, affinity, networks, conditions[END_REF][START_REF] Wegerich | Meso-Level Cooperation on Transboundary Tributaries and Infrastructures in the Fergana Valley[END_REF]. This specific physical and political context led to diversely heterogeneous forms of tensions, disputes, and cooperation practices. [START_REF] Megoran | The critical geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley dispute 1999-2000[END_REF] and [START_REF] Lam | Cooperation in the Ferghana Valley borderlands: habitus, affinity, networks, conditions[END_REF] Hence, the canal belongs on the one hand to a private association, while on the other to a state authority, and therefore this institutional configuration makes the canal management a complex challenge. A water master of the Taraz Kazvodkhoz, operating on the Kozh canal, stated that technical maintenance and water allocation issues are frequent, and that water masters are in contact with the director of Maksat A WUA. In cases of issues in the Kyrgyz part of the canal, they can pass the border and meet each other. However, due to the canal property regime, private and state owned, an international agreement is not possible. Questioned on this context, the director of Maksat A WUA affirmed that different issues are at stake; the first 1.6 kilometers of the canal are lined, while the following 1.2 are grounded. This Since the canal does not irrigate Kyrgyz lands, Dikhan WUA, based in Maiska, is not responsible of its management while in Kazakhstan, Besagash canal is still property of the district but it is already managed by Kazvodkhoz. Questioned on its management practices and on forms of cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, two water masters operating along the canal argued that since years they have had informal agreements with border guards. Although the materialization of the border through the construction of the hedge made operations more complicated, they were allowed to pass the borderline to operate and clean the Kyrgyz section of the canal.

Diversely, the Kairma stream represents a unique example for its management practices and forms of cooperation. After the construction of the border hedge in 2012, the stream, originating close to the border, flows in Kyrgyzstan parallel to the borderline for approximately five kilometers.

According to the head of a farmers cooperative

Discussion and Conclusions

The evidences from the Talas waterscape showed that the establishment of the Chu- In fact, the evidence showed that the borderlands level hydrosocial cycle, instead of being reconfigured by the establishment of the Commission, was reworked by national, or even province, political strategies. The analysis of institutional roles, and their political discourses enabled the understanding of these reconfiguration processes. In Kazakhstan, a sub-national or even local initiative led to a rescaling process -the dismantlement of the Dzhambul Kommunalnivodkhoz and linked reconfiguration of the role of Taraz Kazvodkhozoriented to a state recentralization of local level water management, and characterized by a significant shift of power. The rescaling process was strengthened by a political discourse based on the mistrust on decentralization, and on the failure of liberalization, underlying the organizational and technical incapacities of district level authorities, common consequences of privatization, and the bankruptcy of certain WUAs.

Furthermore, state water authorities underlined the importance and the strategic role of national water infrastructures, combined by the imperative that they should be owned and controlled by the state. This order was narrated to water users as a socio-political legacy based on certainties, equalities and lower charges, despite inequalities and loss of power affected former members of the Dzhambul Kommunalnivodkhoz. Water users, given up the idea of creating WUAs, initiative in contrast with the state rescaling process, are today directly linked to state authorities. Reflecting on borderlands level water management and linked practices with Kyrgyz authorities, a state management of water and infrastructures enables Kazakhstan to keep a stronger position in terms of borderlands cooperation and Kyrgyz claims. In parallel formal and informal practices between water users, associations and other individuals emerged.

On the other hand, over the last decade Kyrgyzstan developed a rescaling process, which led to the establishment of WUAs and Federations of WUAs, wholly influenced by World Bank principles and linked political rationales, which processually shaped the borderlands hydrosocial cycle. Since 2002, Kyrgyz government has been supported projects and initiatives promoted by the World Bank, establishing a new state department -Department for WUAs support -at national, province and district level, in order to formalize the process of rescaling. Kyrgyz water authorities, in contrast with those of Kazakhstan, claimed a narrative oriented to decentralization, liberalization, democratization and participatory approaches. Through the discourse of "canals belong to the people and the people should be responsible of their properties", Kyrgyz water authorities supported the legacy that water and infrastructures should be managed according to a public-private partnership. Through the perspective of water users, the rescaling process enabled them to be part of associations, while being involved in decision-making procedures.

The creation of the WUAs Federation showed their power in terms of decision-making, capacities of influencing state policies and reduction of state roles. However, despite this context, members of municipalities, bureaucrats of district water authorities and former members of collective farms still play a relevant role in influencing decisions and power dynamics of WUAs. Hence, this apparent decentralized and liberalized water context is in place due to the political and financial support of local state authorities. Regarding transboundary borderlands relations with Kazakhstan, the evidence displays weaker capacities of negotiations and claims-making, It also reflects on the fact that borderlands demands have been apparently ignored by Kyrgyz authorities and the Commission.

This discussion, and the analysis of the rescaling process, enables us to state that the Talas waterscape hydrosocial cycle has been reworked, in terms of flow control, socio-power reconfigurations and infrastructural regimes, by sub-national specific politics, rather than by international or interstate policies and narratives. These dynamics are in contrast and in conflict regarding the political rationale, resources management politics, state-private actors relations and infrastructural property regimes. Therefore, reflecting on the nature of the Talas waterscape hydrosocial cycle, it emerges that the international development strategy of shaping it and (re)making it homogenous through developmentalist visions and good governance principles failed. Rather, it is possible to state that currently the Talas waterscape borderlands hydrosocial cycle shows a complex heterogeneous and contrasting nature, characterized by contradictory and conflicting political logics and discourses. Therefore, although the development organizations promoted establishment of the Chu-Talas Commission strengthened national level cooperation between Kazakhstan and Fondation Maison des sciences de l'homme -190 avenue de France -75013 Paris -France http://www.fmsh.fr -FMSH-WP-2017-123

Kyrgyzstan, and was streamlined as a "success story and model for cooperation in Central Asia" [START_REF] Libert | The UNECE Water Convention and the development of transboundary water cooperation in the Chu-Talas, Kura, Drin and Dniester River Basins[END_REF], it was not able to shape national water politics, particularly in the case of Kazakhstan. In addition, the formalization of this development initiative rather strengthened the Central Asian state rule, national and local powers, and related development paths.

Fondation

  FIG. 1:A representation of the hydrosocial cycle(Linton and Budds, 2014)

  boundary waterscape has been configured during the Soviet hydraulic mission since the 1970s. Shared by Kyrgyzstan upstream and Kazakhstan downstream, Talas river originates in Kyrgyz central Tian-shan mountains, flows towards Kazakhstan and vanishes, due to water diversion and irrigation uses in the Moinkum Steppe. The waterscape development, specifically its central and downstream part, has occurred during 1973-1975 through the construction of the Kirov reservoir, located in Kyrgyzstan approximately 15 kilometres upstream of the Kazakh border. Commissioned by Soviet water authorities, the reservoir was built to control and regulate the Talas river flow to supply the Kyrgyz and Kazakh central and downstream parts of the waterscape(Krutov and Spoor, 2006;[START_REF] Wegerich | Passing Over the Conflict: the Chu Talas Basin Agreement as a Model for Central Asia[END_REF]. Since the mid-1970s other canals, Kozh, Tyute, Kederali, Novi Kederali and Imankul, connected to the reservoir and the river, have been designed to enlarge the waterscape and enable the development of state and collective farms.

FIG. 2 :

 2 FIG.2: GIS Elaboration of a satellite image (Google Earth TM) representing the Talas river waterscape, shared by the border between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (black line), and the specific area where field-research was conducted (black-yellow shape).

Fondation

  FIG.3: GIS Elaboration of a satellite image representing the case-study area, shared by Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The Impact of the Chu-Talas Commission and the Reconfiguration of the Hydrosocial Cycle: Evidence from Borderlands Adopting the analytical framework of the hydrosocial cycle, this chapter analyzes and discusses how the formalization of the Chu-Talas Commission reconfigured hydrosocial relations in the borderlands of the Talas waterscape. Empirical research findings are analyzed through three main domains: the role of water institutions in relation with water users, political discourses, and formal/informal practices in relation to transboundary infrastructures management. The fieldwork was conducted in six villages located in the Kazakh/Kyrgyz borderlands included Grodikovo, Kyzilkainar and Besagash in Kazakhstan (Dzhambul district, Dzhambul province) and Uckurgan, Maiska and Talas aul in Kyrgyzstan (Manas district, Talas province).

  technical condition leads often to flooding issues in the farmers' fields close to the border, but the WUA's financial condition does not allow structural renovation, neither its maintenance close to the border. He stated that at the beginning of the vegetation season water masters of Kazvodkhoz cooperate with WUAs members for canal's maintenance. In addition, Maksat A WUA director argued that, since the end of Kyrgyz part of Kozh canal provides irrigation exclusively for Kazakh lands, Kazakhstan should be in charge for this section. However, Kazakh authorities argued that it lies in the Kyrgyz territory, and they already financially support joined infrastructures in the framework of the Commission. In parallel, the Manas district water department, despite the flooding issues and the requests of Maksat A WUA, is not intentioned to take back the canal control. The WUA director, claiming that Kozh canal should be included in the interstate strategic infrastructures in the framework of the Commission, communicated the heterogeneous issues both to Talas River Basin Authority and the Commission without receiving any feedback. According to a report of the Commission and the UNECE, Kozh canal should have been included in the list of interstate strategic infrastructures since 2011, but the evidence showed a different reality.A similar transboundary infrastructural property regime issue will be possible on the Tyute canal in the next future, considering the state plan for its renationalization, and management by Kazvodkhoz. According to the Maksat A WUA director, the same issue of Kozh canal will emerge. Nowadays, since Tyute canal arises from Talas river in the WUA territory, informal cooperation between the director and the Tyute private company, based in Grodikovo, Kazakhstan has emerged. The private nature of the two organizations makes relations and cooperation less challenging in comparison with those on the Kozh. Different is the context of the Imankul canal. Since it does not irrigate land in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakh water master has just an informal agreement with border guards to pass the border and be responsible of technical devices. Similar practices and informal cooperation dynamics are at stake regarding the transboundary streams originating in the Kyrgyz village of Maiska, approximately two kilometers upstream of the border. Besagash canal originates in this area, crosses the border and irrigates the land of the Besagash village.

  Moreover the paper engages with concepts of politics of scale and rescaling processes, and the hydrosocial cycle that are hitherto presented and debated. This first section is followed by an overview of water resources development interventions in the Central Asian region.

	Beyond Transboundary Water Cooperation	6/24

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  Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS) was established in 1993 to try to develop interstate policies to face Aral Sea environmental and social challenges. However, in the framework of the two initiatives national interests, rather than an effective cooperation prevailed, with no common guidelines in place to reform national water sectors which were formulated.

	With regard to the national level, Central Asian states during the 1990s have started supporting and conducting water sector reforms, linked to the decollectivization of state agriculture, char-acterized by diverse paths and visions. Despite being formally oriented to market economy principles, institutional water reforms processes were mostly assessed as gradual and state-cen-tric. In some of the independent states, taking for example Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajik-istan, water resources management remains more or less state-owned or state-managed at all levels.

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  water cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. UNECE, UNESCAP and OSCE initiated to support, in partnership with Kyrgyz and Kazakh water authorities, the project "Support for the Creation of a Commission on the Chu and Talas Rivers" aimed to establish an interstate basin commission and to define its procedures and costs for exploitation and maintenance of water infrastructures[START_REF] Libert | The UNECE Water Convention and the development of transboundary water cooperation in the Chu-Talas, Kura, Drin and Dniester River Basins[END_REF]. Although a water sharing agreement was already in place, development organizations decided upon the need of an active intervention in the interstate political and economic context. In 2006 the project was successfully implemented, as underlined by Lipponen and[START_REF] Libert | Challenges and Opportunities for Transboundary Water Cooperation in Central Asia: Findings from UNECE's Regional Assessment and Project Work[END_REF], and the Interstate Chu-Talas Commission established. According to the UNECE (2008), the main activities of the Commission focus on the approval of water resources allocation, on the determination of measures to maintain interstate water facilities, and on the approval of a financing plan for the above measures. Since 2005, these activities have also been supported by the active involvement of the Asian Development Bank, through its aid in strengthening transboundary cooperation and the creation of Commission's working groups(ADB, 2005). The institutional structure of the Commission, its heads and the Secretariat, have been jointly shared by Kazakh and Kyrgyz national authorities. Questioned on the institutional rescaling process, the head of Kazakh Chu-Talas River Basin Agency (Chu-Talas BWO, basin branch of the National Committee of Water Resources) stated that the process has not led to significant power reconfigurations. He argued that while the chairman of the Commission is represented by the head of the Committee of Water Resources, the Secretariat is a member of the Chu-Talas BWO or of the water republican state enterprise Kazvodkhoz (personal communication with the head of the Kazakh Chu-Talas River Basin Agency, Taraz, August 2015). Currently, this position is represented by a former member of the Chu-Talas BWO. Questioned on the same issues, the Kazakh head of the Secretariat pointed out that the rescaling process has not led to any problems, in terms of disputes between the two Kazakh water authorities, due to the alternation of heads of the secretariat and the shared vision and objectives of -water-cooperation in the framework of the Commission (personal communication with the secretariat of the Chu-Talas Commission, Taraz, August 2015).

	Beyond Transboundary Water Cooperation	12/24
	personal communica-tion with the head of Chu-Talas Basin Agency, Taraz, August 2015). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of different agricultural and economic plans between the two states some issues on water amount division emerged: according to members of the Kazakh Chu-Talas Basin Agency, Kyrgyz authorities released less water from the Kirov reservoir (per-sonal communication, Taraz, August 2015). In order to face these disputes and develop mutually beneficial cooperation between the two states, an agreement "On the use and management of water facilities in the Chu and Talas river basins" was signed in 2000. The parties decided to keep the water amount division decided during the Soviet Union, and that water infrastructures' operation have decided to be actively involved in supporting 2002 international development organizations sity of strengthening interstate cooperation, since Therefore, due to this context and to the neces-ing its effective implementation and respect. into force in 2002, uncertainties emerged regard-and Kazakhstan. Despite the agreement came (Kirov reservoir) should be shared by Kyrgyzstan and maintenance of intergovernmental status Since 2008, with the aim of strengthening coop-eration and creating the conditions to develop participatory approaches and good governance, UNECE and OSCE have renewed their involve-ment through the establishment of a new project, "Developing Cooperation on the Chu and Talas river basins" (UNECE, 2008, Lipponen and Lib-ert, 2012). The new project, developed in parallel with the ADB and the SDC, aimed to include some water infrastructures in the agreement -the Kozh canal among others -and to introduce IWRM principles in the framework of the Com-mission. In order to develop this initiative, inter-national organizations supported the establish-ment of a transboundary basin council with the aim to involve, in addition to state actors, NGOs and water users (UNECE 2010).This initiative, which occurred in the framework of the interna-tional support to IWRM in Central Asia, repre-sented a significant challenge in terms of a real strengthening of participatory interstate coop-eration, and of a complex rescaling process and linked hydrosocial cycle reconfiguration at the basin / local level involving two states. The inter-viewed head of the Kazakh Chu-Talas BWO and the secretariat of the Chu-Talas Commission, questioned on the Transboundary Basin Coun-cil, highlighted the complex institutional and political issues related to its establishment, and stressed the priority of strengthening joint opera-tion & maintenance of water facilities rather than focusing on IWRM principles and participatory approaches. This position was remarked by the head of the Kyrgyz Talas River Basin Authority, who expressed doubts on the intended success of this initiative (personal communication with the head of the Kyrgyz Talas River Basin Author-ity, Talas, September 2015). Questioned on the impact of the Commission and its activities at the local level, the Secretariat and the members of the Kyrgyz and Kazakh BWO argued that this insti-tutional reconfiguration led to benefits to farm-ers and water users during the last years, in terms of water allocation, and strengthened interactions among them.

Fondation Maison des sciences de l'homme -190 avenue de France -75013 Paris -France http://www.fmsh.fr -FMSH-WP-2017-123 transboundary

  GIS elaboration of a satellite image (Google Earth TM) representing the canals network of Talas waterscape.

	in the Fergana valley. The Talas waterscape is level cooperation at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border Wegerich et al. (2012) reported forms of meso-ation characterize social dynamics since decades. villages forms of informal and formal cooper-tral states, and that in Central Asia borderlands contexts borderlands cooperate more than cen-argued that in different	characterized by different canals, partly con-nected to the Kirov reservoir system and partly to the Talas river, built during the 1970s on the wave of the Soviet hydraulic mission, as discussed in chapter 3. Among them, Kozh and Tyute canals have a transboundary nature, while other small streams, Besagash, Mergalik and Imankul, ori-ginate from natural springs located in Kyrgyzstan less than 1 kilometer upstream of Kazakh border. Due to these physical characteristics, these wat-ers are mostly used by Kazakhstan. Differently, Kairma stream, originating in Kyrgyzstan, a few hundred meters upstream of the border, flows parallel to the borderline, yet these waters are used to irrigate only Kazakh fields. Their water-scape characteristics, combined with heterogen-eous political, social and management dynamics led to different transboundary issues, in terms of water amount sharing, water use and manage-ment of infrastructures. However, the evidence from borderlands showed that management of these infrastructures is not included in the frame-work of the Chu-Talas Commission. As under-lined in the previous chapter, the Commission is in charge of the O&M of the Kirov reservoir, of the Talas flow water sharing (50%-50% for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), but not of trans-boundary canals and streams, except Kozh canal, at least according to recent reports. This specific physical and institutional context led to the arise of borderlands level tensions and disputes on the one hand, and of formal and informal practices of cooperation between institutions and actors on the other. Kozh canal represents an interest-ing case to shed light on hydro socio-power rela-tions and infrastructural management dynamics of the Talas waterscape borderlands. The canal is linked to the river in Kyrgyz territory and meas-ures approximately ten kilometers; three are in Kyrgyzstan and the remaining seven in Kaz-akhstan. Its ownership and management reflect the different water political rationale of the two states: the Kyrgyz part is controlled by Maksat A WUA,, while the Kazakh one by the Taraz Kaz-vodkhoz since 2014, after the dismantlement of Dzhambul district Kommunalnivodkhoz.

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  , was not even considered by both the Commission and Kazakh and Kyrgyz national water authorities. Its potential establishment would have significantly and deeply reconfigured borderlands power and hydrosocial relations, making political relations challenging between the two states, reflecting in particular on different and conflicting water politics paths undertaken by the two countries over the last few years. Hence, Kazakh and Kyrgyz water authorities were able to reconfigure and adapt logics and principles promoted by development organizations to their own objectives and political strategies. Moreover, whereas in the framework of the Chu-Talas Commission interstate cooperation among the two states at national level was strengthened, these dynamics did not involve local/border level, excluding interactions between different scales of institutional organization.

	reconfigurations and linked contestations. In Kazakhstan, Chu-Talas River Basin Agency and Taraz Kazvodkhoz were both involved, despite the role of the first results more relevant in terms of power in the Commission institutional struc-ture, decision-making processes, and interactions with the Kyrgyz counterpart. In Kyrgyzstan, roles in the Commission are exclusively played by the Department of Water Economy (Ministry of Agriculture) and its basin branch, Talas River Basin Authority. Reflecting on the level of local borderlands, the findings illustrate that local/district level water authorities were excluded by the process and neither informed by national and basin state authorities. It emerged that the majority of their members were not aware of the existence of the Commission, even ten years later its establish-ment. Since WUAs heads, members and farm-ers were unsurprisingly not aware too. A number of questions and doubts on its potential bene-fits at local level in terms of water amount and allocation, underlined by Kazakh basin author-ities emerged. Furthermore, the strategy of sup-porting knowledge sharing, information access, participatory approaches and IWRM principles, developed by donors projects linked to the Com-mission since 2008, were almost ignored by gov-ernments, by the Kazakh in particular. In parallel, also the establishment of the Talas Basin Council, promoted by the UNECE and ADB since 2011 and oriented towards a significant borderlands level rescaling processBeyond Transboundary Water Cooperation 20/24
	Talas Com-mission has slightly impacted and reworked hydrosocial relations at the Kyrgyz-Kazakh borderlands level. Briefly reflecting on the national level, the creation of Commission led to a relevant rescaling process, due to its formal-ization, promoted by the UNECE, UNESCAP and ADB, of a new interstate institution in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz institutional water frame-works. This rescaling process exclusively involved, in both states, national and basin water author-ities without leading to significant power

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and a DAAD grant, based at the Leibniz Center for Tropical Marine Ecology in Bremen in 2016


Béatrice Fracchiolla

Fred Dervin

Computer-mediated communication in French as a lingua franca


Karën Fort
email: karen.fort@paris-sorbonne.fr

Bruno Guillaume
email: bruno.guillaume@inria.fr

Nicolas Lefebvre
email: nicolas.lefebvre@inria.fr

Who wants to play Zombie? A survey of the players on ZOMBILINGO

We present here the results of two surveys we led on ZOMBILINGO's players, aiming at learning who they are and what are their motivations in playing the game, in order to improve the participation in the game.

1 ZOMBILINGO ZOMBILINGO1 is an open source2 game with a purpose (GWAP) for dependency syntax annotation that is described in [START_REF] Guillaume | Crowdsourcing complex language resources: Playing to annotate dependency syntax[END_REF]. We are not aware of any other GWAP successfully addressing syntax annotation. As of February 23 th , 2017, it has allowed 986 players to produce 214,082 annotations on various French corpora, with a surprisingly good quality3 . However, this quality cannot be achieved if the relations are not played by enough players: we obtain 0.69 in Fmeasure on average for the less played relations. Moreover, the participation decreases drastically when we stop advertising the game.

We therefore need to understand our players better, to know who they are and what makes them play. We sent a first questionnaire (Q1) on September 5th, 2016, separating the heavy players (Q1 HP ) from the lighter ones (Q1 LP ). We considered that a player is a heavy player if s/he has produced more than 500 annotation or if s/he has played often (more than 5 distinct days). For Q1 LP , the survey contained an additional question concerning the reasons why they do not play more.

We decided to send a second questionnaire on February 10th, 2017 (Q2) to the new players. This time, we sent only one questionnaire because the criteria used to split heavy from light player was difficult to apply on a shorter time period and we let the players perform a self-evaluation: every player has the additional question about the reasons for which they do not play more with a newly added possible answer "I already play a lot". Players choosing this answer are considered heavy players.

2 Getting to know the players

Participation to the Surveys

For Q1, out of the 515 emails sent (to the users who gave us a valid email address), we got 56 answers (which represents 11%). The response rate is slightly higher for Q2, with 53 answers out of 285 sent emails, i.e. 19%. This improvement is probably due to the fact that the new players were attracted to ZOMBILINGO by reading an article on games for citizen science in a French mainstream scientific journal4 and are therefore more willing to participate to such a survey.

This represents a total of 109 responses out of the 986 registered players (i.e. 11%), 89 of whom were light players (38 from Q1 and 51 from Q2) and 20 heavy players (18 from Q1 and 2 from Q2). Unsurprisingly, the response rate has been considerably higher for heavy players, with 42% responses out of 43 emails for Q1 HP , as compared to 8% of the 472 emails for Q1 LP .

Who are the Players?

As shown in Figure 1, ZOMBILINGO attracts as many female as male players. However, males represent a large majority of the heavy players (65%). This contrasts with the results for PHRASE DETECTIVES (65% of women) and JEUXDE-MOTS (60% of women) [START_REF] Chamberlain | Using games to create language resources: Successes and limitations of the approach[END_REF]. However, our study is more precise, as it takes the difference between heavy and light players into account.

About 80% of the players are between 21 and 60, with more between 21 and 40 in the heavy players (45%) and 17% of players who are more than 60 in the light players.

As Figure 2 shows, ZOMBILINGO's players are very well-educated, with 75% of the heavy players having at least a Master's degree (bac+5). The results are more heterogeneous amongst light players, with 32% having a Bachelor's degree (bac+2/+3) and "only" 57% a Master's degree or more. This, obviously, can be explained by the academic environment we live in: our personal network is very well-educated. This is confirmed by the domain of activity they declare: 25% of the heavy players come from the natural language processing field and 15% from linguistics, which means that 40% of our most active producers originate more or less from our domain. This is less the case for light players, with more than 74% declaring they work in a different domain.

What are their Motivations?

When asked how they heard about the game, 50% of the heavy players reported that they know someone from the project and 15% that it is from word of mouth. The percentage drops to respectively 28% and 13% for light players. 26% of the light players read about it in the press (probably in SCIENCES ET AVENIR), as compared to 15% of the heavy players. The social networks seem to be efficient in making players come back to play again, but not in introducing new players to the game (only 9% of the light players and none of the heavy players).

When heavy players are asked about their motivations for playing, the most common answers are: "I like playing", "I like linguistics" and "to help science" (each are selected by 55% of these players). This confirms that the gamification of a crowdsourcing task is an important aspect to increase the quantity of produced data.

For the light players, the most popular answers are: "out of curiosity" (70%) and "to help science" (66%). The citizen science aspect is therefore important for them (especially for the readers of SCI-ENCES ET AVENIR).

Conclusion

Apart from what is documented in [START_REF] Chamberlain | Using games to create language resources: Successes and limitations of the approach[END_REF], very few such surveys were led on the subject for GWAPs. It will allow us to try and extend our player range (especially heavy players), to women, less-educated and older persons, for example by selecting specific corpora to annotate.

Figure 2 :

 2 Figure 1: Gender of the players.

See: http://zombilingo.org/.

See: https://github.com/zombilingo.

0.9 in F-measure on average for the highly played relations.

SCIENCES ET AVENIR.

For Q2 the distinction cannot be made, as we sent only one questionnaire.