Fadi Salem
email: fadi.salem@sant.ox.ac.uk

Open Governance in Authoritarian States: A Framework for Assessing Digital Participation in the Age of Mass Surveillance

Keywords: e-Participation, Authoritarian States, Digital Governance, Citizen Engagement, Citizen-Government Interaction, Surveillance

des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Introduction

Over the past two decades, studying the multifaceted impact of digital technologies on governance has become an essential part of multidisciplinary research and policy agendas. In policymaking today, it is widely accepted that "digital governance" has become central to contemporary governance [START_REF]OECD: Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies[END_REF][START_REF]WEF: Future of Government Smart Toolbox[END_REF]. With more than 3.2 billion individuals online, a critical mass of the world's population is gaining access to a wide range of digital technologies, leading to increased social acceptance of technological means as interfaces between governments and citizens [START_REF]ITU: The World in 2015: ICT Facts and Figures International Telecommunication Union[END_REF]. More recently, with 8 billion "things" connected to the internet, this growth has been coupled with disruptive advances in internet applications and innovative uses of social networking and "smart" technologies, which influenced further changes in the ways citizen participate in governance worldwide [START_REF]E-Government for the Future We Want[END_REF][START_REF]ITU: Measuring the Information Society Report 2015[END_REF]. These fast-paced changes in technological fields have increased the complexity of contemporary policymaking. For example, the adoption of social media by governments, and by society to interact with government, present numerous challenges to the centrality of government and its ability to remain the connecting node in the state. They challenge governments' organizational capacity, specifically, the adequacy of human resources and technology. They also challenge governments' authority, as the only legitimate and official power, with numerous other societal forces increasing their organizational capacity and societal influence through the use of such technologies. In addition to loss of de jure authority, governments are also faced with an important shift of de facto power away from public institutions [START_REF] Hood | The Tools of Government in the Digital Age[END_REF][START_REF] Owen | Disruptive Power : The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age[END_REF][START_REF] Mickoleit | Social Media Use by Governments: A Policy Primer to Discuss Trends, Identify Policy Opportunities and Guide Decision Makers[END_REF][START_REF] Lynch | After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State[END_REF]. In reaction, some governments were pushed to adapt, accommodating increased public participation in governance through technological means. In many cases, the outcome of this adaptation in democratic states meant widening public participation in governance. However, in some authoritarian states this lead to further enforcement of authoritarian rule with governments extending their controls to the digital sphere. In others this enabled substantive opportunities for public participation in governance for the first time. How are these authoritarian states adapting; and are they really becoming more open towards public participation in policymaking in the digital era? This paper is both a critical review of related literature and a foundation for exploring this question. The objective is to explore the scholarly foundations of digital governance and citizen participation in key social science disciplines, and critically assess their applicability to these emerging changes in authoritarian contexts. The scope covers multidisciplinary scholarly literature, as well as influential policy reports produced by established international organizations.

The paper is ordered as follows: The first section provides a review of influential models of citizen participation and citizen-government interactions before and after the digital age. It then provides discusses authoritarian uses of participatory measures in the digital age as discussed in the literature. Based on the comparative review, a framework is then proposed by extending and adapting Arnstein's ladder of participation for the digital era, with focus on authoritarian states.

Public Participation and the "Ladder of Participation"

Citizen participation in policymaking is an established cornerstone of democratic governance [START_REF] Pateman | Participation and Democratic Theory[END_REF]. Over the past fifty years numerous models have been developed to analyse contemporary public participation in multiple aspects of governance [e.g. [START_REF] Arnstein | A Ladder of Citizen Participation[END_REF][START_REF] Cooper | Citizen-Centered Collaborative Public Management[END_REF][START_REF] Fung | Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance[END_REF]. The "ladder of citizen participation" proposed by Arnstein, continues to be one of the most influential [START_REF] Arnstein | A Ladder of Citizen Participation[END_REF]. The eight stages of the "ladder" conceptualize the changes in balance of power between citizens and government in participatory engagements. The model describes a redistribution of power in such interactions, in which citizens gain power as government loses it in the participation process. The eight rungs of the ladder are grouped into three stages:

1) Non-participation stage. This stage includes the "manipulation" and "therapy" rungs of the ladder, where no public participation takes place, but a perception of participation may exist.

2) Tokenism stage. This includes the "informing", "consultation" and "placation" rungs, in which "tokens" of participation are provided, in what can be described as cosmetic attempts by government.

3) Citizen power stage. Including "partnership", "delegated power" and "citizen control" rungs, where meaningful levels of public participation are actually happening.

According to Arnstein, this eight-level typology of citizen participation-or lack of-starts from a stage where the government introduces what seems to be participatory means, with the aim of controlling or manipulating the public, with no citizen participation actually taking place. In contrast, the upper rung of the "ladder" then describes a stage where even "have-not citizens" gain a voice over government decisions.

Over the past four decades, Arnstein's ladder was extended to numerous disciplines in the aim of explaining public interactions with government [for example : 14, 15, 16]. However, as modes of public engagement developed, the model has been critiqued on several fronts. For example, the "ladder" design indicates evolution and progression and implies that the upper rungs on the ladder are "better" than lower ones. While this may be true in numerous cases, in others, "consultation" for example, may provide much better outcomes than full "citizen control" [START_REF] Fung | Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance[END_REF]. Moreover, the zero-sum power balance the ladder implies, where the government loses power as citizens gain it going up the ladder, is limited and one-dimensional. In reality there are cases where the process of public participation itself may lead to increasing social learning, knowledge sharing, social capital or trust generation [START_REF] Tritter | The snakes and ladders of user involvement: Moving beyond Arnstein[END_REF]. In such cases, the participation process itself may lead to increasing both citizens' and governments' power, or at least does not undermine government's power. Overall, the common critiques of Arnstein's ladder can be summarized in 1) its sole focus on the power dimension between government and citizens, were the governments and citizens struggle for more share of power in decision-making, 2) its focus on the outcomes of the participation process, without considering the value of the process itself, and 3) its limited focus to citizen participation within democratic environments [START_REF] Fung | Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance[END_REF][START_REF] Choguill | A Ladder of Community Participation for Underdeveloped Countries[END_REF][START_REF] Tritter | The snakes and ladders of user involvement: Moving beyond Arnstein[END_REF].

However, despite its criticism, a key contribution of Arnstein's ladder is its sophisticated view of the power relations in which citizen-government engagements take place. It recognizes the possibility of government manipulation of public engagements, compared to the overly optimistic view of citizen participation as an unequivocal good [START_REF] Fung | Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance[END_REF]. In authoritarian contexts, this is particularly useful where the "non-participation" and "tokenism" stages of the ladder are often prevalent.

Public Participation in the Digital Era

The impact of technology on citizen participation in governance has been addressed long before the internet emerged as an interface between the public and government. As early as 1977, Laudon proposed a typology of three ways that communication technologies are changing the interface between citizens and government, namely "data transformation", "managerial democracy" and "mass participation" [START_REF] Laudon | Communications Technology and Democratic Participation[END_REF]. A decade later, DeSario and Langton explored the role of technology and information in public policymaking and its impact on "technocratic" and "democratic" citizen participation. They argued that government decisions are increasingly affected by technology, and that citizen participation will be an outcome of the intrinsic characteristic of information as a resource that can be shared without being depleted [START_REF] Desario | Citizen Participation in Public Decision Making[END_REF]. In the digital era, numerous models have been further developed. For example, Chadwick and May used a three dimensional model to explain citizen-government interactions within digital governance contexts: 1) The "managerial" efficiency model, borrowed from Laudon, which focuses on the delivery of efficient public services, 2) the "consultative" model which aims to develop better policies through engaging different interests in society through digital technology, and 3) the "participatory" model which involves engagement in the democratic process. The authors argued that the focus on public service efficiency (or "managerial") model of digital governance is marginalizing its participatory and democratic potential [START_REF] Chadwick | Interaction Between States and Citizens in the Age of the Internet: "e-Government" in the United States, Britain, and the European Union[END_REF]. Observations from authoritarian contexts suggest that the "managerial" view is a prevailing political agenda with regards to the role of digital governance [START_REF] Ciborra | Good Governance, Development Theory, and Aid Policy: Risks and Challenges of e-Government in Jordan[END_REF].

More recently, with the growing influence of social technologies, Fung et al., proposed an explanatory model of citizen-government interactions, specifically in political participation. They argued that political interaction between government and citizens in the digital sphere is taking place in six distinct ways, but that the three most likely to occur are "truth-based" advocacy, crowd-sourced "social monitoring" and constituent mobilization [START_REF] Fung | Six models for the internet+ politics[END_REF]. The increased adoption of social media by governments expanded the citizen participation theme beyond merely the political level. The critical mass of users and growing sophistication of big data tools are reducing scepticism about the effectiveness of participatory digital governance, compared to a decade ago [START_REF] Fung | Six models for the internet+ politics[END_REF][START_REF] Henman | Government and the Internet: Evolving Technologies, Enduring Research Themes[END_REF]. An increasing number of frameworks and explanatory models are emerging to evaluate the impact of social media utilization in different aspects of civic engagement [for example : 24, 25, 26]. Today, governments' use of social technologies in co-design, coproduction and co-delivery of public policy and services is common practice in numerous countries.

Beyond the citizenry, the use of the social media by governments to engage with international communities is also growing. For example, government engagement in "digital diplomacy" or "e-diplomacy" initiatives through social media is growing in sophistication. This ranges from diplomats and embassies reaching out to citizens in host countries for social and political objectives, to foreign affairs departments running international campaigns to push political agendas or analyse perceptions on a global scale. Social media is becoming institutionalized in foreign affairs departments and used by diplomats and politicians to affect international relations and generate "soft power" in the application of foreign policy [START_REF] Nye | Soft Power: the Means To Success In World Politics[END_REF][START_REF] Ross | Digital Diplomacy and US Foreign Policy[END_REF].

Today, participatory digital governance, or what is commonly referred to as "e-participation", is considered an important pillar of maintaining the "quality of government" by numerous governments, policy organizations and scholars [START_REF]OECD: Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies[END_REF][START_REF]E-Government for the Future We Want[END_REF][START_REF] Fung | Six models for the internet+ politics[END_REF][START_REF]The Global Information Technology Report 2015: ICTs for Inclusive Growth[END_REF][START_REF]IAP2: Public Participation Spectrum. International Association for Public Participation (IAP2)[END_REF].

e-Participation in Authoritarian States

This paper is primarily concerned with changes in public-government interactions in authoritarian states in the digital age. For the purpose of exploring the research question proposed, this paper utilizes a well-established conceptualization of authoritarianism as a point of reference. According to Linz, a democratic system is a political system that provides the public with a free space for political preferences to form by using basic freedoms of information, communication and association for the objective of enabling non-violent competition by political leaders to validate their claim to rule at set intervals. Accordingly, authoritarian systems are defined as political systems with limited political pluralism and a lack of extensive mobilization, in which a leader or a small group exercises power within ill-defined-but predictable-limits. As such, authoritarian states in this paper refer to countries in which the system of governance is characterized by, strong central power, limited political pluralism, minimal social mobilization, ill-defined legitimacy, vague executive power structure [START_REF] Linz | Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes[END_REF]. Today, there are currently at least 44 countries categorized as "authoritarian" [START_REF] Marshall | Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility -Global Report 2014[END_REF]. These countries host a large percentage of the world population. Many of them are increasingly utilizing participatory digital technologies in policymaking.

However, in fast-evolving digital age, the powers that technological advancements, such as Internet of Things (IoT) applications and advanced big data analytics, hand to governments and societal powers alike, are blurring the line between how digital technology is used in authoritarian and democratic contexts [START_REF] Howard | Pax Technica : How the Internet of Things May Set Us Free or Lock Us Up[END_REF][START_REF] Mayer-Schönberger | Big Data: A Revolution that Will Transform how We Live, Work, and Think[END_REF]. For example, in numerous cases, what seems to be participatory digital governance applications are utilized in mass online surveillance, breach of privacy and other human rights supposedly protected by the rule of law in democratic contexts. These transformations are creating increased similarities in the ways participatory digital technologies are implemented, regardless of the nature of the state [START_REF] Kelly | Freedom on the Net 2015: Privatizing Censorship, Eroding Privacy[END_REF][START_REF] Lyon | The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society-Computers and Social Control in Context[END_REF].

Generally, the literature on public administration and digital governance has viewed the impact of participatory technologies on citizen-government interactions from two key angles. First, in established democratic systems, main streams in the literature viewed the increased penetration of technology, and more recently the use of social media, as another channel or influencer of democratic participation and digital citizenship [for example : 22, 37, 38-40]. This thread led by political science and related disciplines, largely narrows "e-participation" to the political dimension, where technology facilitates or improves an existing democratic process. Second, in non-democratic contexts, where no formal channels of political or civic participation exist in the first place, the literature has largely dismissed online citizen participation as non-existent or irrelevant. Instead, it primarily focused on what can be referred to as the "collective action thesis", or the role of digital technologies in enabling collective action against authoritarian regimes through citizen empowerment, mobilization, organization and revolt [for example : 7, 9, 41, 42-44]. However, there is little discussion in this thread of the literature, beyond the collective action thesis, on the role participatory digital technologies are playing in citizen-government interactions in authoritarian states where such technologies actually exist. Both of these main threads in the literature have narrowed down the scope of e-participation's definition, overlooking the potential for participatory digital governance beyond the democratic political process or popular collective action.

Digital technologies are being used by governments in a wide scope of civic engagement activities, which imply neither existence of deliberation nor undermining the power of the government. These include, for example, contribution to public administration activities, policymaking, government decision-making and service improvement, among many others. Several socioeconomically advanced authoritarian governments are increasingly providing participatory governance initiatives to engage citizens in policymaking and government decision-making. In such contexts, unlike the case of democratic states, there is little room to use these technologies in democratic political processes, which are rare in the first place. Also, in many of these socioeconomically advanced authoritarian states, there is arguably little citizen demand for democratization, and little appetite to use these technologies for anti-government collective action, let alone revolt. This is unlike the case of brutal military dictatorships and classic autocracies. A more nuanced understanding of the emerging uses of participatory technologies in such authoritarian contexts is needed.

A critical examination of the few existing studies on this emerging phenomenon in authoritarian states indicates several shortcomings. First, much of the literature subscribes to a technology-deterministic view [START_REF] Medaglia | eParticipation Research: Moving Characterization Forward (2006-2011)[END_REF], following a prevailing trend in the wider digital governance literature. Second, it largely focuses on the supply of participatory technologies by governments, regardless of the level of adoption by citizens of such technologies, the quality of use, or whether the uses are actually enabling participation. Third, a large number of these studies assume that "democracy"-in its western incarnations-is the intended and ultimate outcome of public participation through technology. The latter shortcoming may be due in part to the classic coupling of democracy with development in the western-dominated development literature, influenced by the "modernization theory" [START_REF] Przeworski | Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990[END_REF][START_REF] Diamond | The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World[END_REF]. This shortcoming also led to a prevailing confusion in terminology. The terms "e-participation" and "e-democracy" have been used interchangeably in the literature tackling citizen participation and digital governance, whether in democratic or authoritarian states, without serious attempts to understand the distinction. These shortcomings suggest that there is room for nuanced studies of the roles participatory digital technologies play in authoritarian contexts.

Assessing Citizen Participation in the Digital Era

The "e-participation" area of research remains an emerging and relatively young field of study. It still suffers from disciplinary and geographic biases, lack of depth and theoretical clarity and wide inconsistency in definitions [START_REF] Susha | eParticipation Research: Systematizing the Field[END_REF].

Analytical models assessing participatory digital governance have largely focused on "developed" and democratic countries [START_REF] Susha | eParticipation Research: Systematizing the Field[END_REF]. Considering the limitations of existing "e-participation" research, especially with regards to authoritarian states (as discussed in section 2.2 and 2.3), few models may be applicable when analysing citizen-government interactions in authoritarian contexts. Table 1 provides a comparison between three influential citizen participation typologies, which are not internet-specific. It lists the stages of participation proposed according to each of Arnstein's ladder, the OECD's three-stage citizen participation model and the International Association for Public Participation's "spectrum" of citizen participation [START_REF] Arnstein | A Ladder of Citizen Participation[END_REF][START_REF]IAP2: Public Participation Spectrum. International Association for Public Participation (IAP2)[END_REF][START_REF]OECD: Focus on Citizens: Public Engagement for Better Policy and Services[END_REF]. This is followed by Table 2, which provides a summary of four internet-focused models of citizen participation which have also been influential [START_REF]E-Government for the Future We Want[END_REF][START_REF] Neuman | The Internet and Four Dimensions of Citizenship[END_REF][START_REF] Macintosh | Characterizing E-participation in Policy-making[END_REF][START_REF]European Commission: eCitizen II -Towards citizen-centered eGovernment in European cities and regions[END_REF]. Clearly, all typologies and models share the basic pillars of citizen participation, with some variation in sophistication and scope. Most of these typologies have either been designed with democratic processes in mind, or to be neutral towards the political processes. None has been designed to take into account a potential participatory process in an authoritarian context. If we are to design, or extend, a model for analysing technology-driven public participation in authoritarian states, it needs to accommodate the balance of power and all possible explanations for adopting participatory technologies in such contexts. Arnstein's ladder provides a suitable and inclusive starting point, given that the spectrum implied includes possible stages which are non-participatory. Considering the potential explanations for the adoption of participatory digital governance in authoritarian contexts, and the nature of some of these in the digital era (surveillance, control, etc.) as found in the literature, Arnstein's ladder provides a suitable starting point for developing a model to help understand participatory approaches in authoritarian states.

Building on Arnstein's ladder, an extension is proposed here as a basis for an analytical model to assess participatory approaches in authoritarian states. The proposed ladder (Table 3) introduces new "rungs", namely "government control", "surveillance" and "façade". A few other rungs are renamed for more clarity ("selective participation" instead of "placation", and "empowerment" instead of "delegated power"). It is safe to assume that it will be highly unlikely that in authoritarian states, the "citizen control" rung of the ladder will be ever used. Indeed, this would be impossible ex hypothesi. For if citizen control occurs, the state is no longer authoritarian by definition. As such, that top rung of Arnstein's ladder is removed from the proposed extension.

Based on this discussion, there has been some residual dissatisfaction in all of these attempts with regards to applicability to authoritarian contexts. Adapting and developing the ladder of participation, to take into account the specificities of citizen participation in authoritarian states in the digital era is a starting point towards a better model for analysing public participation in the digital era, within authoritarian contexts.

Conclusion

Studying the impact of participatory technologies on policymaking and governmentdecision making is critical to widen the understanding on how citizen-government relations are being transformed in the digital era. This is especially important in in authoritarian states, where dominant literature has largely been defined by the collective action "thesis". This paper provided a critical review of dominant frameworks for assessing participatory digital implementations and citizen-government interactions in an ever changing digital world. The proposed framework here arguably provides a novel perspective to assess e-participation in authoritarian contexts. However, with the increased exploitation of participatory tools for non-participatory practices, such as mass surveillance, even in democratic contexts, the utility of this framework can be universal.

  open for the public to be able to make decisions (though not necessarily always updated or in useful formats) Consultative Initiatives are put in place where the public are consulted and crowdsourced but government does not commit to include input in policymaking Selective Participation Selected members of the public are invited (not necessarily based on merit or expertise) to take part in closed online participation processes Participation Collaborative (Partnership) Functioning public initiatives and online platforms are established for public contribution to policymaking, where policymaking takes place interactively Empowerment A transparent process (and platforms) exists where the government reports details and outcomes of the participatory process, including outcomes which do not fit government stated agendas 6

Table 1 .

 1 Citizen participation analytical typologies (non-internet specific)

	Public Participation Frame-	(Arnstein, 1969) [11]	(IAP2, 2014)	(OECD, 2009) [49]
	works		[30]
		Manipulation
		Therapy
	Stages	Informing	Inform	Information
		Consultation	Consult
		Placation	Involve	Consultation
		Partnership	Collaborate	Participation
		Delegated Power	Empower
		Citizen Control

Table 2 .

 2 Citizen "e-participation" analytical typologies (internet specific)

	e-Participation	(Neuman et al., 2011) [39]	(Macintosh,	(European	(UN DESA 2014)
	Frameworks		2004) [50]	Commission,	[4]
				2013) [51]
				Information	e-Information
		Inclusion on platform	e-Enabling	Consultation
		Capacity to influence agenda	e-Engaging	Cooperation	e-Consultation

Table 3 .

 3 A proposed preliminary extension of Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation for the digital era, considering authoritarian contexts

	Participation Level	Stage	Example


Joachim Åström
email: joachim.astrom@oru

Martin Karlsson
email: martin.karlsson@oru.se

Will e-Participation Bring Critical Citizens Back In?

Keywords: e-participation, mobilization, critical citizens, political culture, democratic satisfaction

This paper sets out to critically examine the mobilizing potential of eparticipation. The extent to which citizens beyond the usual suspects are engaged is studied by way of survey data from two novel e-participation case studies: one Swedish, one Finnish. Besides from the traditional socio-demographic variables, the analyses highlights cultural attitudes and ask: Do e-participation processes succeed in mobilizing citizens dissatisfied with the way democracy works? Can e-participation bring critical citizens back in? Certainly, the empirical analysis indicates critical citizens are clearly overrepresented in these two cases.

1

Introduction 1The nature of civic engagement has changed from participation in political parties and other traditional organisations to more direct and individualised forms. 97% of Swedes and 92% of Finns are not members of one of the eight political parties currently in parliament. In Sweden over 70% do not feel affiliated to any one political party [START_REF] Oscarsson | Nya svenska väljare[END_REF][START_REF] Evs | European Values Study 2008, 4th wave, Integrated Dataset[END_REF]. At the same time, campaigns in favour of individual political issues often draw widespread involvement, not the least online and on social media [START_REF] Dalton | Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies[END_REF].

To accommodate this development many parliaments, governments, and municipalities have begun adopting 'democratic innovations', an umbrella term for several new methods of participation used by a representative democracy to bolster diminishing civic engagement and to bring citizens closer to the decision-making process. The myriad methods available include: citizen panels, councils, participatory budgeting, and eparticipation.

One of the goals ascribed to e-participation is to increase civic engagement in the representative democracy's institutions. But even if e-participation, by virtue of having lower barriers for entry, often do increase civic engagement, it is far from certain that the higher level of participation corresponds to a less unequal division of political activity. If e-participation mostly mobilizes already politically active individuals, groups, and organisations, the consequence instead is that it replicates, or intensifies, existing inequalities. For this reason it is important to assess who participates [START_REF] Schlozman | The unheavenly chorus: Unequal political voice and the broken promise of American democracy[END_REF]. This paper sets out to critically examine the mobilizing potential of e-participation by investigating whether or not citizens beyond the usual suspects are engaged in eparticipation processes. In addition to investigating the socio-demographic characteristics of participants in two e-participation cases, we engage in empirically analysing an often forgotten but arguably important dimension of political inclusion: the cultural attitudes of participants. Do e-participation processes succeed in mobilizing citizens dissatisfied with the way democracy works? Can e-participation bring critical citizens back in?

2

Political culture in change

Over the course of recent decades, major challenges to representative institutions have offered a breeding ground for reflection on the future of democratic governance. Concerns usually relate to the very low levels of political support. There is no evidence that publics in established democracies are expressing diminishing levels of support for the ideals and aims of democracy. People agree on democracy being the best form of government, but are increasingly critical towards how current regimes meet public expectations in practice [START_REF] Norris | Critical citizens. Global support for democratic governance[END_REF][START_REF] Dalton | Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies[END_REF].

Although there are different trends in different countries and fluctuations rather than secular trends in individual countries, many commentators now argue that levels of trust are dramatically low [START_REF] Stoker | Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work[END_REF][START_REF] Thomassen | What's gone wrong with democracy, or with theories explaining why it has?. Citizenship and Democracy in an Era of Crisis: Essays in Honour of Jan W. Van Deth[END_REF]. In the 2012 European Social Survey, where trust was measured on a scale from 0 ('no trust at all') to 10 ('complete trust'), the mean trust score for politicians across all 23 countries was 3.2 [START_REF]ESS Round 6: European Social Survey Round 6 Data[END_REF]. Sizeable proportions of mass publics thus lean towards the view that representative institutions and actors are failing to accurately reflect public values and preferences. An even more generalized attitude of support is the degree to which people feel satisfied with how democracy works in their country. The fact that fewer than half of the citizens in many European countries are now satisfied with democracy have drawn further attention to the need to better understand how and why support for the functioning of democracy varies [START_REF] Thomassen | What's gone wrong with democracy, or with theories explaining why it has?. Citizenship and Democracy in an Era of Crisis: Essays in Honour of Jan W. Van Deth[END_REF].

The prevailing assumption has been that we should look at outcomes rather than processes [START_REF] Birch | How honest do politicians need to be?[END_REF]. However, due to evidence of shifting patterns of political participation, this view has been increasingly challenged. Political parties are commonly regarded as faced by one of the most profound crises in their history, in terms of their ability to attract members and provide meaningful cues to voters [START_REF] Mair | Ruling the void: The hollowing of western democracy[END_REF]. Moreover, a clear rise in non-institutionalised forms of political participation can also be identified. Political participation is not necessarily declining, but it is changing, from the narrow domain of party politics and electoral campaigns to increasingly autonomous, issue-specific forms of expression. Interestingly, empirical research reveals a relationship between political support and patterns of participation: namely, that support for representative institutions and actors is positively associated with conventional participation, and negatively associated with newer forms of participation [START_REF] Hooghe | A Comparative Analysis of the Relation between Political Trust and Forms of Participation in Europe[END_REF][START_REF] Norris | Critical citizens. Global support for democratic governance[END_REF].

The establishment of a link between participation and support has fuelled the debate on how various decision-making processes actually match citizens with different attitudinal predispositions. The classification and interpretation of these predispositions is done in various ways, but they often relate to political support as well as to political interest. Christensen distinguishes four predispositions commonly found in the literature: Traditional Ideal Citizens, Stealth Citizens, Critical Citizens, and Disenchanted Citizens [START_REF] Christensen | Power Sharing and Political Dissatisfactions: A multilevel analysis of the impact of institutional power sharing on kinds of political dissatisfaction in 24 European democracies[END_REF]. The first of these corresponds to traditional understandings of what an ideal citizen should be like in a representative democracy [START_REF] Easton | A framework for political analysis[END_REF]. Traditional Ideal Citizens are supportive of political institutions and actors and politically active, preferably in conventional forms of participation. Stealth Citizens [START_REF] Hibbing | Stealth democracy: Americans' beliefs about how government should work[END_REF], though, tend to support political institutions but do not (nor want to) participate in politics beyond the vote. As Bengtsson and Christensen rightly point out, formal representative structures still have many supporters satisfied merely by choosing their leaders on Election Day. Although this group is detached from the political sphere, it is quite happy leaving the dirty work to the authorities, who are held in rather high esteem.

Yet when it comes to dissatisfied citizens, very much at the centre of current debate, it is necessary to differentiate between Critical Citizens [START_REF] Dalton | Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies[END_REF][START_REF] Norris | Critical citizens. Global support for democratic governance[END_REF] on the one hand, and Disenchanted Citizens [START_REF] Hay | Why We Hate Politics[END_REF][START_REF] Stoker | Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work[END_REF] on the other. Pippa Norris argues that positions of distrust and dissatisfaction sometimes aim to improve the political system [START_REF] Dalton | Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies[END_REF]. Criticism, in this variant, does not imply disengagement. On the contrary, critical citizens are widening their repertoire of political intervention and appear to favour a more direct participatory relationship with rulers. Other citizens, however, grow disenchanted with politics and abstain from political activity altogether [START_REF] Hay | Why We Hate Politics[END_REF][START_REF] Stoker | Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work[END_REF].

How do these various predispositions -ideal, stealth, critical, and disenchantedaffect who (e-)participates?

Method and measurements

The empirical analyses of this article are conducted on survey data from two e-participation case studies. A survey of participants in the Malmö Initiative, an e-petitioning system used in the city of Malmö, Sweden, was conducted as an online survey, and collected 1,470 responses in total. As sample selection targeted all citizens who had participated in the system, the total number of contacted citizens was 7,024, which produced a moderate response rate of 21%. While a low response rate is problematic, it is important to stress that the survey was based on a census selection and not a sample of participants.

A survey to participants of Täsä, a mobile participation process hosted in the city of Turku, Finland, was distributed through the mobile participation app used in the project and hence distributed to all 780 registered participants in the project. The survey received 186 answers equal to a response rate of 24%. Again, a very low response rate, yet based on a census of all participants in the participatory process.

Pre-existing large scale survey studies were consulted in order to gather comparative data on the general public in the two contexts of the participatory processes that make up the cases of this study. In the case of the Malmö Initiative, extensive survey data was available on a random sample of residents of the county of Skåne in which the city of Malmö is located through the SOM-survey studies [START_REF] Som-Institutet | Riks-SOM 2011[END_REF]. In the case of Täsä, no corresponding regional or local survey data was available, compelling us to turn to surveys covering the whole nation of Finland. The European Values Study (wave four) was used to get information about the political participation and satisfaction with democracy among Finnish citizens [START_REF] Evs | European Values Study 2008, 4th wave, Integrated Dataset[END_REF].

In order to investigate the potential of these e-participation cases to mobilize participants beyond the "usual suspects", comparative descriptive analyses were conducted where the characteristics of e-participants were compared to the characteristics of the general public in the respective contexts. Comparable data was analysed regarding the age, gender, education, and satisfaction with democracy and interest in politics of the participants, as well as the general public. Descriptive data is presented and compared between the groups, as well as confidence intervals calculated through bootstrapping (with 1000 samples) in order to produce statistical significance measures of the differences between groups.

The measurements used in the analyses are described in table 1 below.

Item

4

Analysis and results: who participates?

In this section the results of the analyses are presented, discussed, and compared to earlier studies in two separate sections. The first section focuses on resources and sociodemographic characteristics, the second on cultural attitudes.

Täsä

Resources and socio-demographic characteristics

What we know about civic engagement is that, generally speaking, it is higher among the better educated middle class, and also generally higher among men and older people than among women and the young [START_REF] Schlozman | The unheavenly chorus: Unequal political voice and the broken promise of American democracy[END_REF]. One explanation for this involves socio-economic resources in terms of education, income, and social status.

Resources are important, as civic engagement carries with it certain costs for individuals. Citizens need to be assured the gains of participating are greater than the costs; if not, they refrain from engaging. Therefore, the belief in the potency of the specific method is important, while it is also equally important that the form of participation is not too demanding. The challenge facing political institutions lies in developing forms of civic engagement that both enables citizens to influence politics in a meaningful way and that takes into account the limitations of their individual situations.

E-participation processes are often shaped in a way that makes participation easier, but it is unclear how this affects different individuals. Some scientists argue that the internet can contribute to mobilising previously inactive citizens. Digital resources can reduce the significance of traditional resources, while digital social networks can contribute to redistributing political engagement between various social groups. It is often younger citizens who catch the interest of researchers in this field. They are the group with the most developed digital abilities and take part in most digital social networks, which could spill over into political engagement. More knowledge in navigating the online environment enables these users to effectively search for information on topics of interest and get in contact with other users with similar interests. This increases the likelihood of a user being stimulated into participating in politics online.

Other researchers, however, argue that e-participation will primarily only activate those who are already politically interested, rather than mobilising previously inactive citizens. When it becomes easier to take part in political information, and more convenient forms of online participation are developed, it becomes clear that it is mostly those already involved and motivated that are attracted to them. Resources are also considered important. Higher education levels are expected to provide a greater understanding of political issues and societal problems.

The pattern emerging from our empirical studies seems to suggest continued inequalities (see table 1 below). Based on our own studies of the Malmö initiative and Täsä, it seems there is a lasting socio-economic imbalance in relation to education as participants have a higher level of education than the general population. However, women and men participate in largely equal numbers, and the average age is notably lower than among the general population. Hence young citizens are finding an attractive form of political engagement in these e-participation processes, corresponding to what the many earlier studies of e-participation have also shown.

While e-participation arguably makes participation easier, these results support the idea that resources still play an important indirect role. In a Spanish study, Anduiza et al. showed that digital competency is significantly more important than traditional socio-economic factors in terms of explaining participation in the e-participation processes [START_REF] Anduiza | Online political participation in Spain: The impact of traditional and internet re-sources[END_REF]. If everyone had the same digital competency, then socio-economic status would matter, but since socio-economically strong groups have greater access to the internet (and thereby can develop their digital competency), they still play an indirect role.

Similarly, Carman's studies of the Scottish parliament's e-petition system shows that socio-economically strong groups have a significantly higher degree of knowledge about how to participate compared to weaker groups [START_REF] Carman | Barriers are barriers: asymmetric participation in the Scottish public petitions system[END_REF]. Age also plays a part. Middle-aged people tend to be more aware of the opportunities available in comparison to both younger and older respondents. These differences in awareness, in turn, determine the likelihood of signing and writing petitions. Among people with very good awareness of how to participate in Scottish politics, the likelihood of participating was more than ten times higher than it was for those less aware. If the awareness of available opportunities for participating were equal, then socio-economic factors would be insignificant in terms of who would participate.

That the effects largely seem to be indirect suggests there is long-term mobilisation potential if the information regarding new forms of participation and digital competency were spread further. But the imbalance that arises still poses a relevant inequality issue today.

Motivation and cultural attitudes

Interest in politics.

Although the results presented above indicate that socio-demographic characteristics, not least level of education, play an important role in e-participation engagement, the striking difference between the participants of the two cases and the general public instead concerns the level of interest in politics among participants in e-participation processes.

As is evident from table 1 (below), the share of participants in the two e-participation cases that declare to be interested in politics far exceeds the corresponding share in the general public in each context. Among the Täsä participants, 72% are interested in politics, compared to about 40% of the general Finnish public (+32%, p<.01). A staggering 87% of the participants in the Malmö Initiative are politically interested, compared to 57% of the general public (+30%, p<.01). Hence, these e-participation projects do not seem to be able to mobilize the politically disengaged to a very large extent. Rather, the previously engaged, politically interested citizens dominate participants in the two cases.

This bias was also highlighted in a previous study in which the participants in the Malmö initiative were compared to the general population with regard to experiences of political participation. The first group has significantly more often contacted politicians and civil servants, discussed politics online, and worked in political parties and NGOs. The majority of the population of Skåne, Sweden's southernmost province where Malmö lies, has not participated in any of these types of activities during the last year, while more than nine out of ten of those participating the Malmö initiative had [START_REF] Åström | Democratic Innovations: Reinforcing or changing perceptions of trust[END_REF].

Satisfaction with democracy.

When looking at who participates in e-participation processes, it is interesting to note their dual nature. On the one hand, e-participation exists as an informal process dependent on activities among citizens and civic society (from below). On the other hand, they exist as a more formalised process created by institutions to encourage civic engagement (from above). The first category makes up part of a broader set of mobilisation channels and protest movements on the internet, without mechanisms guaranteeing a response from the authorities. This variant of e-participation is often seen as the archetype for the individualising, anti-establishment, and independent forms of civic engagement used by "critical citizens" in order to, as Inglehart and Welzer expressed it, "organize resistance and mobilize people power" [START_REF] Inglehart | Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence[END_REF]. These independent forms of civic engagement are considered especially compatible with the new generations' demands and wishes: they would rather spend money than time and support democratic principles but are critical of how democracy currently works, and they engage in politics but are not fond of party politics and joining traditional organisations.

Institutionalised forms of civic engagement, such as voting in elections, being a member of a political party, or contacting politicians has traditionally been more connected to the electoral process. Participants have "become a part of the system" in a different way than when independent platforms, which offer critical distance, are used. For this reason, institutionalized forms have foremost engaged citizens who are already relatively satisfied with the way the democratic system currently works. Some newer "democratic innovations" have similarly been biased towards already satisfied citizens. Curato and Niemeyer have shown, for example, that those who agree to participate in deliberative consultation meetings tend to be less critical of political institutions than the public in general. Because of their dual nature, e-participation processes can therefore be seen as a critical case: if a form of civic engagement with its roots in protest movements on the internet is not able to engage critical citizens, how will institutionalised forms of civic engagement succeed?

Our analysis shows that participants in the Malmö Initiative are significantly less satisfied with the way democracy currently works in Sweden than the general public. Among the public, 81% are fairly or very satisfied, while the corresponding number for our respondents is 56% (-25%, p<.01). In the same spirit, Schmidt and Johnsen have shown that, compared with the general public, the participants in the German Parliament's e-petitions system tend to be relatively sceptical towards politicians, and that a significant portion have participated in demonstrations and other protests. To this can be added that those who participated in the Scottish parliament's e-petition system, to a much greater extent than the general public, reported having no party affiliation. While 13% of the general public where not affiliated with a political party, the equivalent number for participants was 35%.

The same pattern is not apparent in the Finnish context. While the Täsä-participants share the same level of discontent with the state of democracy (56% of participants in both cases are dissatisfied with how democracy works), these participants share this evaluation of the state of Finnish democracy with the general public (+3%, p>.1). Hence, there is no statistically significant difference in the values of the e-participants and the general public. Still, it is evident that the Täsä case also succeeds in mobilizing critical citizens.

These result, therefore, suggests that critical citizens did not abandon these institutionalized e-participation processes. Rather, it seems that e-participation have been able to attract some of those with weak connections to the party system and who feel there is a discrepancy between how democracy should work and how it actually works. Even if those using e-petitions were already politically active critics, this raises, as Schmidt and Johnsen put it, a hope that e-participation "can bring people who are critical towards politics closer to the parliamentary system and thus prevent them from becoming political cynics or even politically apathetic citizens."

Combining political interest and satisfaction with democracy

Following the previous research presented above, the attitudinal predispositions of citizens can be combined to produce a division into four divergent types of political cultural ideal types: [START_REF] Oscarsson | Nya svenska väljare[END_REF] When this typology is used to compare the participants in the two e-participation cases with the general public (see table 2 above) we find that participants are less often disenchanted or stealth citizens. Hence, citizens that have opted out of politics are not getting engaged in e-participation, regardless of whether they are satisfied (Stealth) or dissatisfied (Disenchanted) with the state of democracy. This is the case in both contexts although the underrepresentation of disenchanted citizens is much less flagrant in the Malmö Initiative compared with Täsä (-3%, p<.1 compared with -15%, p<.01). Further the underrepresentation of Stealth citizens is stronger in the Malmö Initiative (-27%, p<.01, compared to -15%, p<.01 among Täsä participants). These results confirm the difference between the two e-participation processes explicated above: level of satisfaction with democracy is a much stronger predictor for participation in the Swedish case, as participants in the Malmö initiative are much more dissatisfied with the workings of democracy than the general public.

One prominent difference between the two e-participation cases relates to the representation of traditional ideal citizens, the group that most prominently represents the "usual suspects" when it comes to political participation. In the case of Täsä, this group is strongly over-represented compared to the general public in Finland (+18%, p<.01). In the case of the Malmö Initiative, in contrast, the share of traditional ideal citizens is representative for the general public in Scania (+1%, p>.1). Hence, there is among these two cases a great variation in the tendency to mobilize the usual suspects; i.e., citizens that are more prone to be engaged in traditional forms of political participation as well.

The two cases are similar in the overrepresentation of critical citizens. In the Malmö Initiative almost 40% of the participants fall into this category, compared to only 10% of the general public in Skåne (+29%, p<.01). About a third of the Täsä participants are critical citizens, compared to a fifth of the Finnish general public (+12%, p<.05). Both e-participation processes investigated in this study show evidence of successfully bringing critical citizens back in, and thus form pathways for (semi-) institutionalized political participation that are attractive to this group of citizens, who are, in earlier studies, found to be more prone to protest politics.

Conclusion

The aim of this article was to investigate whether or not e-participation lives up to the goal ascribed to it to increase civic engagement in the representative democracy's institutions by way of mobilizing citizens to participate beyond the "usual suspects". Our analysis has been conducted through an analysis of two e-participation processes: the Malmö Initiative, an e-petitioning system implemented in the city of Malmö in Sweden, and Täsä, an innovative mobile participation process in the city of Turku, Finland. The study goes beyond the standard approach to investigating this research topic by way of analysing not only the socio-economic profiles of participants but also attitudinal predispositions creating a framework of citizen profiles with regards to interest in politics and satisfaction with democracy. Earlier research has shown that citizens who are satisfied with democracy tend to engage in traditional, top-down initiated and institutionalized forms of participation such as voting and party engagement, while dissatisfied citizens tend to engage in bottom-up oriented protest politics. An important question is: Can e-participation pro-cesses, which position themselves between top-down institutionalized politics and bottom-up citizen originated forms of engagement, bring critical citizens back in to more institutionalized arenas for political participation and function as channels for critical voices to reach political institutions?

The results of our analysis indicate, in agreement with much earlier research, that participants in e-participation processes are not socio-economically representative of the general public. Specifically, citizens engaging in e-participation are often younger, in the case of Täsä, more often male, and, in the case of the Malmö Initiative, more educated than the general public.

Turning to the attitudinal predisposition, the analysis of the two e-participation cases indicates that e-participation can indeed bring critical citizens back in. Critical citizens who are interested in politics but dissatisfied with democracy are overrepresented in relation to the general public in both analysed cases. This result indicates that while eparticipation has a long way to go to bridge the socio-economic gaps related to political engagement and influence, such processes can play a role in engaging critical citizens in constructive political processes. This is an important function in political systems that need to foster an understanding of critical perspectives on policies and democratic institutions.

Table 1 .

 1 Measurements.

		Survey question	Scale	Categorization
	Age	What year were you born?	-	0-43: low, 44 or
				higher: high
	Gender	What is your legal gender?	-	Male/female
	Educa-	What is your highest com-	[dependent on the	<Bachelor degree:
	tion	pleted level of education	education system	low, Bachelor de-
			in the country]	gree or higher:
				high
	Interest	To what extent do you agree	1 (fully disagree)	1-2: low, 3-4:
	in politics	with the following statement:	-4 (full agree)	high
		"I am interested in politics"?
	Satisfac-	How satisfied are you with the	1 (not at all satis-	1-2: low, 3-4:
	tion with	way that democracy works in	fied) -4 (fully	high
	democ-	[country]?	satisfied)
	racy

Table 2 .

 2 Characteristics of e-participation participants in comparison with the general public.

	The Malmö Initiative

Notes: Confidence intervals were produced using bootstrapping with 1000 samples at 90%, 95%, and 99% levels of statistical significance. Sources: Statistics for the general public in Finland were collected from the European values survey wave 4. Statistics for the general public in the Skåne region of Sweden were gathered from the SOM-survey of 2011. Statistics for the participants in Täsä and the Malmö Initiative were gathered from surveys conducted by the authors.

  Disenchanted citizens, who are neither interested in politics nor satisfied with democracy; (2) Stealth citizens, who, despite having low political interest are satisfied with how democracy works; (3) Critical citizens, who combine high political interest with dissatisfaction with democracy; and, finally, (4) Traditional ideal citizens, who are both politically interested and satisfied with democracy.

		General public	Participants	Difference	Sig.
	Täsä
	Disenchanted	27%	12%	-15%	***
	Critical	20%	32%	+12%	**
	Stealth	29%	14%	-15%	***
	Traditional ideal	24%	42%	+18%	***
	The Malmö Initiative
	Disenchanted	8%	5%	-3%	*
	Critical	10%	39%	+29%	***
	Stealth	34%	7%	-27%	***
	Traditional ideal	48%	49%	+1%	-
	Notes: Confidence intervals were produced using bootstrapping with 1000 samples at
	90%, 95%, and 99% levels of statistical significance. Sources: see table 1 above.

Table 3 .

 3 The political culture of e-participation participants and the general public.

This work was supported by The Swedish Research Council Formas


Anton Talantsev
email: antontal@dsv.su.se

Osama Ibrahim

Aron Larsson

Multi-Stakeholder Preference Analysis in Ex-ante Evaluation of Policy Options -Use Case: Ultra Low Emission Vehicles in UK

Keywords: Public policy analysis, Multi-criteria decision analysis, Stakeholders, Preference elicitation, Decision support tools, Ultra low emission Vehicles

While the simulation-based impact assessment of public policy proposals allows policy makers to identify the feasible policy options and verify their economic, social and environmental impacts, it does not provide the explicit evaluation of policy options. Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) techniques can support an in-depth performance evaluation of policy options taking into acount the preferences of decision makers and stakeholders. These preferences reflect acceptable trade-offs of performance among objectives. This study reviews multi-attribute decision-making (MADM) technique and presents a common policy appraisal format using main evaluation criteria linked to a set of measurable, context dependent attributes. We argue for a rank-based approach for eliciting preferences, select a novel method for attribute weight elicitation, and show how it can be integrated within a public policy multi-criteria evaluation framework. A use case for policymaking, 'Ultra-Low Emission Vehicles (ULEV) Uptake in UK', is used for demonstration of the proposed approach for policy decision analysis. This approach seeks to couple systems modelling and simulation of policy scenarios with MCDA, stakeholder analysis and preference elicitation. The outputs can further provide analytical insights in controversy/acceptability of policy options, and consequently guide further policy formulation and the design of better options.

Introduction

Public policy decision processes are often characterized by the presence of multiple and conflicting objectives and multiple stakeholders or decision makers who may have differing point-of-views. Using decision analysis practices to provide informed public policy decisions is not a novel approach per se. What might differ public policy decision analysis from a traditional decision analysis endeavor is that the former does not explicitly aim to reveal a clear recommendation of choice, but also to explore the problem and reveal conflicts, cf. [START_REF] Quade | Analysis for Public Decisions[END_REF].

Prescriptive approaches for the study of such decision processes have been suggested within the field of systems thinking and in the field of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). In [START_REF] Larsson | Modeling for policy formulation: Causal mapping, scenario generation, and decision evaluation[END_REF], we presented a work process with associated operational research (OR) modeling and analysis tools that supports a prescriptive analysis for policy that includes: the problem definition, ex-ante impact assessment and evaluation activities carried out at the policy formulation stage of the policymaking process. The proposed approach exploited the use of causal maps for problem structuring and scenario-based simulation for the design of policy options, together with decision analysis for evaluating generated scenarios. Having a set of feasible policy options identified, there are two main tasks remaining in structuring MCDA evaluation models; (i) representation of objectives in a structure, commonly a value tree, and (ii) the definition of attributes to measure the achievement of objectives [START_REF] Franco | Facilitated modelling in operational research[END_REF].

Multi-criteria evaluation can be organised with an objective to produce a single synthetic conclusion or to produce conclusions adapted to the preferences and priorities of several actors. Thus, applying MCDA should provide the relative global performance of each alternative taking preferences of decision makers and stakeholders into account. This is particularly useful when selecting one out of a finite set of feasible alternatives.

Since the rise of the graphical user interface, a flora of computer based decision analysis tools have emerged, aiming to exploit the strengths of graphic interaction with users and thereby enabling for users with less know-how of decision analysis to conduct decision modelling and evaluation, see, e.g., [START_REF] Riabacke | Conceptualisation of the gap between managerial decision-making and the use of decision analytic tools[END_REF]. A prerequisite to increase the practical aspects of decision analysis is to offer accessible tools, and of greatest importance for practical applicability of decision analysis methods seems to be how "easy" they are to use [START_REF] Stewart | A critical survey on the status of multiple criteria decision making theory and practice[END_REF][START_REF] Hülle | Multiple criteria decision-making in management accounting and controlstate of the art and research perspectives based on a bibliometric study[END_REF]).

This work is carried out within the contexts of the research project Sense4us1 , which is developing a web portal that integrates public policy decision support tools to linked open data search tools and social media analytics, in order to enable easy access to information sources and knowledge creation. The aim of this paper is the design of a preference elicitation method based on a multi-criteria evaluation model for policy decision analysis. The method should: (i) not require substantial formal decision analysis knowledge; (ii) not be too cognitively demanding by forcing people to express unrealistic precision or to state more than they are able to; (iii) not require too much time; (iv) make use of the information the decision-maker is actually able to supply, and (v) be supported through a graphical user interface (GUI) accessible from different client operating systems.

This paper is structured as follows. Section 1, introduces the research problem, context, challenges and tasks. Section 2 provides a review of the state-of-the-art research related to concept and application of decision analysis and preference elicitation for policy analysis. Section 3 presents the proposed criteria model for ex-ante evaluation of policy options. Section 4 presents the proposed rank-based preference elicitation method. Section 5, describes the public policy use case, as real example for demonstration of the use of the proposed policy decision analysis process. Finally, Section 6, provides the conclusions and possibilities for future work.

Related Work

Elicitation of preferences in policy making requires that there exists a basis for decision, typically in the form of more or less objective so-called "impact assessment reports" describing the impact of different alternatives on objectives but strive to be neutral with respect to decision maker preferences. The impact assessment approaches can be more or less formalized, and examples used together with decision analysis approaches within the context of policy making published in the literature include, e.g., life-cycle assessment [START_REF] Miettinen | How to benefit from decision analysis in environmental life cycle assessment (LCA)[END_REF], quality adjusted life-years [START_REF] Drake | Endoscopic third ventriculostomy versus ventriculoperitoneal shunt in pediatric patients: a decision analysis[END_REF][START_REF] Kivunike | Towards an ICT4D evaluation model based on the capability approach[END_REF], life micro-level simulation and system dynamics [START_REF] Hansson | A framework for evaluation of flood management strategies[END_REF][START_REF] Gou | A system dynamics approach for regional environmental planning and management: A study for the Lake Erhai Basin[END_REF]), scenario planning [START_REF] Montibeller | Combining scenario planning and multi-criteria decision analysis in practice[END_REF], and problem structuring using causal maps [START_REF] Comes | Decision maps: a framework for multi-criteria decision support under severe uncertainty[END_REF]. One important feature of problem structuring approaches is to facilitate the context-setting activity and defining the environment of a decision problem to be modelled and subsequently evaluated, (see, e.g. [START_REF] Belton | Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis: An Integrated Approach[END_REF] for an introduction to how problem structuring relates to the decision analysis process).

Further, the use of decision analytic support in participatory/group decision processes involving several decision makers and/or stakeholders has received increasing attention during the last few decades. The decision makers can actually disagree on what the best alternative is but they need to select a common alternative having sufficient support from the group (Kilgour et al. 2010). Within such a context, a number of proposed decision analytic approaches and cases of its use have been published in the literature. For instance, [START_REF] Danielson | Using a software tool for public decision analysis: the case of Nacka municipality[END_REF] propose the analytical decision layer process, incorporating the stakeholders and decision maker views in an interaction layer and aggregating these preferences in a decision layer exploiting methods from interval decision analysis to accommodate for differing preferences such that all decision maker values are captured by each interval. [START_REF] Hansson | A framework for evaluation of flood management strategies[END_REF] presents an MCDA approach for evaluating flood management strategies, putting weights on the stakeholders when aggregating their preferences. Schroeder and Lambert (2011) outlines a decision analysis process for comparison of transportation policies in the case of an emergency exploiting scenario planning in order to set the context.

Multi-Attribute Decision Making (MADM) techniques can be applied when the decision consists of selecting one out of a finite set of feasible alternatives, [START_REF] Belton | Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis: An Integrated Approach[END_REF]. The process of MADM is an analytical process that brings together three components; the decision objectives as measured by their associated attributes, the decision options or alternatives and the decision maker's preferences toward the importance of the attributes as reflected by the attribute weights.

The determination of attribute weights is an important and time consuming process. Attribute weight elicitation methods, given the decision problem's structural elements, include: the Balance Beam (BB), Lottery Technique (LT), Paired Comparison (PC), Point Allocation (PA), Pricing Out (PO), Ratio Weighting (RW) and Trade-off Weighting (TW), (for a comparative review see [START_REF] Crain | Multiattribute Weight Determination: Elicitation & Approximation[END_REF]). These methods can be distinguished by the specific technique employed to compute the attribute weight and whether the technique is designed to determine an attribute importance weight or an attribute swing weight. Importance weights reflect the relative preference without regard to the decision problem at hand, whereas swing weights are sensitive to the values that the attributes possess for the particular decision problem. [START_REF] Crain | Multiattribute Weight Determination: Elicitation & Approximation[END_REF] emphasized the greater utility and correctness of eliciting swing weights in a MADM problem versus importance weights because of the sensitivity of the swing weight to the range of values taken on by the associated attribute.

A common practicability issue of applying decision analysis methods is that often too hard requirements are put on the users. It can be argued that much of the applicability issues in employing formal decision analysis in practical settings roots in the need to elicit beliefs and preferences from decision makers and stakeholders. One recurrent practicability issue reported in the literature is the need to obtain the decision-maker's preferences in such a way that they can be formally represented. That leads to cognitively demanding methods less encouraging for decision makers to use. See, for instance [START_REF] Riabacke | State-of-the-art prescriptive criteria weight elicitation[END_REF][START_REF] Riabacke | Conceptualisation of the gap between managerial decision-making and the use of decision analytic tools[END_REF]). One increasingly popular way of relaxing the cognitive burden on decision makers is to rank criteria and/or alternatives and using cardinal rankings surrogate values can be generated. Recent studies of rank based approaches include [START_REF] Sarabando | Simple procedures of choice in multicriteria problems without precise information about the alternatives' values[END_REF], Wang and Zionts 2015, Danielson and Ekenberg 2015a), showing that by allowing for the user to provide preference strength information, the equitability of the generated surrogate numbers will improve, (i.e. preferences of the decision maker are more properly reflected).

A Common Policy Appraisal Format

In MADM techniques, the decision process starts by structuring the problem as an attribute tree hierarchically ordering the decision makers' aims at different abstraction levels. It is generally assumes that each criterion can be operationalised by a set of measurable attributes allowing for assessing the consequences arising from the implementation of any particular alternative. In the next step preferential information is elicited. The relative importance of criteria is captured in weights 𝑤 𝑗𝑙 for each criterion 𝑗 at each abstraction level 𝑙. At the lowest level of the value tree these objectives are translated into attributes, with each one of them evaluating a given characteristic of the decision options (for example, an objective 'efficiency' may be measured by the attribute 'operating cost'). The performance of each decision option against each attribute is determined and weights are elicited from the decision-makers [START_REF] Comes | Decision maps: a framework for multi-criteria decision support under severe uncertainty[END_REF].

Figure 1, illustrates a multi-attribute value tree, with measurable attributes in gradient boxes, criteria and overall goal in white boxes. Dependence of attributes on the alternatives (represented as diamonds) is shown by dashed lines.

Given a set of decision options, 𝐴 = {𝑎 1 , … , 𝑎 𝑁 } and 𝑀 evaluation criteria, we can represent a decision option 𝑎 𝑘 with a vector of performance levels (𝑥 𝑘1 , 𝑥 𝑘2 , … , 𝑥 𝑘𝑀 ).

Conforming to multi-attribute value theory (MAVT), the global value of a decision option 𝑎 𝑘 is given according to the additive value function:

𝑉(𝑎 𝑘 ) = ∑ 𝑤 𝑖 𝑣 𝑖 (𝑥 𝑘𝑖 ) 𝑀 𝑖=1

(1) where 𝑣 𝑖 (𝑥 𝑘𝑖 ) is a value function representing the value of alternative 𝑎 𝑘 under criterion 𝑖, 𝑤 𝑖 is the weight of criterion 𝑖, 0 ≤ 𝑤 𝑖 ≤ 1 and 𝜮𝑤 𝑖 = 1. This additive model cannot capture the dependencies between criteria, (i.e., being substitutes or complements of each other). We refrain from eliciting such dependencies from decision makers, to achieve the use of use of the elicitation method. We propose a criteria model for ex-ante evaluation of EU policy interventions, based on a set of main evaluation criteria2 Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence, Relevance and Added value and the underlying measurable attributes. For each of the policy options, the observed changes on the targeted policy impact variables and the policy financial impacts are provided by the impact assessment results. Figure 2, illustrates the structure of the proposed common policy appraisal format as a multi-attribute value tree. The figure shows 𝑘 policy options to be evaluated.

Each of the attributes underlying the "effectiveness" evaluation criterion reflects how successful a policy option is in achieving the policy goals by comparing the observed change (OC) to the targeted change (TC) for each impact variable. The attributes underlying the "efficiency" criterion are concerned with the financial impacts of a policy option, whether financial costs or benefits (cost savings). The evaluation of the impact of the action is expressed as the costs involved on governmental departments given the achieved changes. In addition costs on businesses (including small businesses), or different stakeholder groups are expressed in terms of different attributes. The efficiency evaluations can be made in a quantitative or a qualitative way. The attributes underlying the "relevance" criterion are using qualitative descriptors (or value scales) to assess the relevance of a policy option to the policy objectives, to the problems/needs, to the technological advances and to the citizens. The attributes underlying the "coherence" criterion are using qualitative descriptors or value scales to assess the coherence of a policy option: (i) internally if it includes multiple policy instruments, (ii) with other similar interventions, (iii) with EU policy interventions and (iv) with international obligations. Finally the attributes underlying the "added-value" criterion are using qualitative descriptors or value scales to assess the added value of the policy option in terms of legal impacts, increased effectiveness, complementarities and the need for continuing this intervention.

Figure 2 Common Policy Appraisal Format

Weight Elicitation Method

The proposed preference elicitation method to be used is a rank-based approach complemented with intuitive ways of generating a value function for policy decision evaluation. The value of each option under each criterion from the perspective of the decision maker is then captured in a so-called value function 𝑣(𝑥) such that 𝑣: 𝑿 → [0,1] where 𝑿 is the range of the performance indicator. Further, if we assume positive preference direction (the more the better) and let 𝑥 𝑚𝑖𝑛 denote the worst performance level and 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑥 the best, then 𝑣(𝑥 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) = 0 and 𝑣(𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) = 1. Two simple ways of obtaining values on intermediate performance levels are suggested.

1) Either to assign them proportionally such that 𝑣(𝑥) = (𝑥 -𝑥 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) / (𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑥 -𝑥 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) if the preference direction is positive, or 𝑣(𝑥) = (𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑥 -𝑥) / (𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑥 -𝑥 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) if the preference direction is negative. This is often labelled as "proportional scores" and is an intuitive way to generate a value function. 2) Use surrogate values derived from ranking statements according to the novel CAR method (Danielson and Ekenberg, 2015b). For the CAR method, we use > 𝑠(𝑖) to denote the strength of the rankings between criteria or alternatives, where = 0 means that they are equally ranked, 𝑎 𝑖 > 1 𝑎 𝑗 means that option 𝑖 is better important than option 𝑗, and , 𝑎 𝑗 > 2 𝑎 𝑘 means that option 𝑗 is "much better" than option 𝑘 and so forth. This can be represented such that each option is assigned a preference position 𝑝(𝑖) ∈ { 1, . . . , 𝑄} where lower position indicate stronger preference such that for two options whenever , 𝑎 𝑖 > 𝑠(𝑖) 𝑎 𝑘 then 𝑠(𝑖) = |𝑝(𝑖) -𝑝(𝑘)| and the surrogate value is simply given from

𝑣 𝑖 = (𝑄 -𝑝(𝑖) + 1) 𝑄 (2)
Given a slider with in total Q number of importance scale positions. Each criterion i has the position 𝑝(𝑖) ∈ { 1, . . . , 𝑄} on this importance scale where lower position indicate more importance, such that whenever c i > s(i) c j , s(i) =|p(i)-p(j)|, then the surrogate weight is given by:

𝑤 𝑖 = 1 𝑝(𝑖) + (𝑄-𝑝(𝑖) + 1) 𝑄 ∑ ( 1 𝑝(𝑗) + (𝑄-𝑝(𝑗) + 1) 𝑄 ) 𝑁 𝑗=1 (3)
For example, Figure 3 shows four criteria and a scale with eight steps where scale position 1 is at the right end of the slider and scale 8 at the left end of the slider. The ranking visualized is 𝑐 4 > 2 𝑐 3 , 𝑐 3 > 1 𝑐 1 and 𝑐 1 > 4 𝑐 2 , yielding surrogate weights 𝑤 1 = 0.21, 𝑤 2 = 0.06, 𝑤 3 = 0.26, and 𝑤 4 = 0.47.

Figure 3 Ranking of criteria

Further, following proportional scores value assignments for all three criteria but the Social criterion, for which we have the following ranking for options 1, 2, and 3, a 1 > 3 a 3 , a 3 > 2 a 2 yielding values v 3 (x 13 ) = 1, v 3 (x 33 ) = 0.4, and v 3 (x 23 ) = 0.

This can be illustrated using a multi-criteria evaluation matrix, constructed with as many columns as there are criteria and as many rows as there are decision options to be compared. Table 1 shows exemplary impact assessment results, each cell represents the performance 𝑥 𝑖𝑗 of option 𝑖 under criterion 𝑗 in the performance indicator used for that particular criterion. Note that: MCDA requires an evaluation of all the decision options for all the criteria, but does not require that all the evaluations take the same form. The technique can support a mix of quantitative criteria expressed by indicators, qualitative criteria expressed by descriptors, and intermediate criteria expressed by scores (e.g., a scale 0-10).

Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Criterion 4 Decision option 1

x 11 = 20%

x 12 = 510.5 x 13 = High x 14 = 4

Decision option 2

x 21 = 35% x 22 = 312 x 23 =Low x 24 =2
Decision option 3

x 31 = 10% x 32 = 615 x 33 =Neutral x 34 = 6

Table 1 : Impact assessment matrix

In Table 2 below, we denote positive preference direction with '↗' and negative direction with '↘' together with S or R representing "proportional scores" or "ranking" respectively for the value function model. Unequal weights are assigned to criteria (note that the sum of the weights 𝑤 1 , … , 𝑤 𝑛 equals 1).

Criteria C1 ↗S C2 ↗S C3 ↗R C4 ↘S Weights 𝑤 1 = 21% 𝑤 2 =6% 𝑤 3 =26% 𝑤 4 =47% Decision option 1 v 1 (x 11 ) = 0.4 v 2 (x 12 ) = 0.66 v 2 (x 13 ) = 1 v 2 (x 14 ) = 0.5 Decision option 2 v 1 (x 21 ) = 1 v 2 (x 22 ) = 0 v 2 (x 23 ) = 0 v 2 (x 24 ) = 0 Decision option 3 v 1 (x 31 ) = 0 v 2 (x 32 ) = 1 v 2 (x 33 ) = 0.4 v 2 (x 34 ) = 1
Table 2 : Multi-criteria evaluation matrix Thus, the preference elicitation methods proposed for enabling decision evaluation in the policy formulation process are:  For decision option/alternative values: Cardinal ranking or proportional scores, complemented with direct rating.  For criteria weights: Cardinal ranking, complemented with direct assessment. The reason for complementing the ranking approach with direct rating is that the latter provides flexibility for exploiting other preference elicitation schemes for advanced users.

Use case: Ultra Low Emission Vehicles (ULEVs) in UK 3The British Government wants to increase take up of Ultra Low Emission Vehicles (ULEVs) throughout the UK, as part of its wider plans for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Electric cars are deemed to reduce CO2 emissions, improve urban air quality, create new jobs, and provide other benefits to society. Amongst a set of initiatives to improve the uptake of electric cars, Plug-in Car Grant, Plugged-in Places, London congestion charge, while many others are being proposed, such as creating exclusive city "green-zones", free parking for electric cars, investing in public recharging infrastructure, arranging hands-on trials for electric cars for citizens, and others. While all these policy interventions can be argued for with means-end rationality, they inevitably impact different stakeholders. Finally, when considering several policy options it's not clear how to compare their acceptability.

Analysis of the national UK stakeholders for the use case is needed to provide answers to the following questions:

1. What are the key stakeholder groups and how are they related to the policy instruments? 2. How would a policy option affect the variety of stakeholders? 3. In what extent might the stakeholders be favouring or be against the transition or a specific policy option? 4. How to accommodate this information to prescriptive decision and policy analysis? The identified stakeholders have been grouped in order to better articulate potential opponents, reflect the national (UK) level, and reduce the number of stakeholder groups to a manageable number. The list of selected stakeholder groups includes: government, citizens likely to switch to plug-in cars, citizens unlikely to switch to plug-in cars, electricity suppliers, plug-in car manufacturers, conventional cars manufacturers, renewable energy producer s, fossil fuel energy producers, power grid operators, petrol producers. "Citizens likely to buy plug-in cars" fully or partially encapsulate other stakeholder groups (citizens) with particular characteristics, such as early adopters, urban citizens, can drive, sufficient income to buy an EV, etc. Similarly, "Citizens unlikely to buy plug-in cars" can be characterised as risk-averse to new technologies, citizens with insufficient income to buy an EV, etc.

Preference elicitation implies (1) defining the direction of preference and (2) intensity of preference for each concept/stakeholder pair. The direction of preference refers to whether the higher value of a concept corresponds to a higher preference value (unidirectional, denoted by +1) or lower (oppositely directed, denoted by -1). The preference intensity is a weight showing relative importance of a concept. Each stakeholder group has been profiled in terms of their needs, goals and means for their achievement. Then, for each stakeholder assessing how increase or decrease in each concept would impact (positively, negatively, or no impact) stakeholders' needs, goals and means. In this way, it was relatively straightforward to define preference directions or neutrality (no interest) with respect to the policy evaluation criteria. The selection of the concepts as evaluation criteria and/or attributes for each stakeholder group, has been based on the following principles: (1) the criteria set should represent balance and diversity of aspects for a given stakeholder group, (2) the criteria in the set should be relevant and representative, and (3) preferentially independent for a focal stakeholder group.

For instance, as a representative of the "Government" stakeholder group the Office for Low Emission Vehicles (OLEV) of the British government has been selected. The following attributes were considered for evaluation of the effectiveness of policy options by the government stakeholder group: ULEV industry economic value added, new jobs created, green-house gas (GHG) / CO2 emissions, urban air pollution and local electricity demand.

The proposed policy decision analysis process supports a visual hierarchy of criteria. Figure 4, shows an example for the resulting criteria hierarchy tree with exemplary criteria and attributes weights.

Conclusions

The proposed common policy appraisal format provides a basis for computational decision analysis for evaluation of policy options. Further, identifying the stakeholders groups enables appraising a policy from the perspective of multiple stakeholders with different priorities and preferences. By allowing for preference modelling, we can gain insights into the level of disagreement on policy proposals as well as how a policy could be efficiently refined for the mutual benefits of two or more stakeholder groups or arriving at more than one competing policy options for further decision analysis. The preference elicitation method introduced in this study, uses rank-based elicitation complemented with proportional scores or direct rating in order to provide flexibility for advanced users. Future work aims to design an integrated decision support tool that couples systems modelling and simulation of public policy problems with MCDA techniques and preference elicitation methods. The implementation of the proposed decision analysis process using an online GUI, enables policy makers and stakeholders to provide preferential statements over their respective goals in a simple way.

Figure 1

 1 Figure 1 Multi-attribute value tree. (Comes T., et al. 2011)

Figure 4

 4 Figure 4 Visual hierarchy of the evaluation criteria for the use case A relative global performance of the policy options for stakeholders can be calculated through a step-wise decision evaluation process to define: (i) Stakeholder groups and/or individual stakeholders; (ii) Evaluation criteria and/or the underlying attributes, each stakeholder stipulates its own set of criteria and attributes; (iii) Scenarios/Alternative policy options are common for all stakeholders; (iv) Scenario values: using cardinal

Figure 5 and

 5 Figure 6 provide examples for ranking of criteria or scenario values utilizing a friendly GUI.

Figure 5 Figure 6

 56 Figure 5Example for criteria ranking using a GUI

EU FP7 research project 'Data insights for policymakers and citizens', http://sense4us.eu/

The European commission's better regulation guidelines for evaluations and fitness checks of EU policy interventions. http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/index_en.htm

Department for Transport, UK, (2015),' Uptake of Ultra Low Emission Vehicles in the UK'. A Rapid Evidence Assessment, available on: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/464763/uptake-of-ulev-uk.pdf (Accessed 1/4/2016)