Yngvar Lundh
email: yngvar@ifi.uio.no

Development of Internet Technology and Norwegian Participation

Keywords: Networking, packet switching, resource sharing, TCP/IP

Ideas emerged over several years. From 1968, some fundamental techniques developed in an admirable cooperation between academic groups. The technical development was at its most active during a decade from the early 1970s in a close collaboration between ten groups, eight in the USA, one in England, and one in Norway.

Introduction

Computer networking was not new. From the early 1960s airline ticket reservations could be made in minutes from almost anywhere. What made that possible was SABRE, a large computer network resulting from collaboration between American Airlines and IBM. That operation began about 1960. IBM, the largest computer manufacturer and leader of the industry in many ways, had their own system network architecture -SNA. Most major computer companies had their networks in the 1960s, useful for large companies and organizations. Each network was populated by hardware and software native to the respective computer company. Internet technology was the result of basic technical research and development by a collection of research groups in which none of those companies took part.

Ideas

Resource sharing was the mantra of many early contributors to the internet's development. We may trace some ideas back as far as the late 1940s. In a famous article "As we may think" in The Atlantic magazine in 1945, Vannevar Bush, leading science and technology advisor in the USA, outlined some visions of how machines could be made to extend the power of the brain for logic, memory, and communication. He compared it to machines that increased the power and productivity of hands. Many important contributions later referred to his work.

The Soviet Sputnik event in 1957 stimulated an upswing in American public investment in basic research. One effort was the establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency -ARPA. A leader of ARPA, J.C.R. Licklider, discussed some possibilities. He wrote some notes in 1962, apparently inspired by Vannevar Bush, inviting proposals. Lawrence (Larry) Roberts, then working at MIT, responded and produced some basic ideas of generalized computer networking.

One of Roberts' classmates from MIT was Leonard Kleinrock [START_REF] Kleinrock | An Early History of the Internet[END_REF]. In his PhD thesis, he discussed the possibilities of packet switching, a method of "chopping up" long messages into small packets that were encapsulated with administrative information and sent separately through the net. A network of transmission channels interconnected by computers in the nodes would be able to route and transmit the packets through the net to their destinations. Hence, high-speed lines, necessary for quick response, could be shared for improved economy. At about the same time Paul Baran at the Rand Corporation issued a note discussing similar ideas. Later, they reissued Kleinrock's thesis as a book that attracted great demand.

The Arpanet: A Great Laboratory

In 1966, ARPA employed Larry Roberts to lead a project, building a computer network. It was named "Arpanet." The company Bolt Beranek and Newman -BBNin Cambridge, Massachusetts received a contract to implement it. Robert (Bob) Kahn was a leading engineer in the project.

Ideas pertinent to resource sharing among computers abounded in academic places in the US during the 1960s. A comprehensive demonstration, later to become celebrated, was held at Stanford University in 1968 by Douglas Engelbart. He showed a number of new ideas such as a display screen, mouse, hypertext, and workstations interconnected in nets.

Delivery of components of the Arpanet began in September 1969, first to UCLA. By the end of that year a network between four places was working: UCLA, SRI, UCSB, and the University of Utah. Kleinrock was professor at UCLA. Vinton (Vint) Cerf was one of his students.

The net continued to grow. By 1972, it comprised some thirty universities and research organizations. The main component was an interface message processor (IMP) in every network node to route and transmit packets. One or more computers, called host machines, could interface with the IMP. At that time, a computer was a large investment that few could afford. Therefore, just the possibility of sharing computing power was an enticement. A "terminal IMP" (TIP) had the additional feature to allow direct connection of interactive terminals, teletype or more fancy typing machines, enabling people without a computer to make use of host machines in the Arpanet via inexpensive terminals. A number of academic groups began collaborative projects exploiting resource sharing in a wide sense. Leased lines, mostly at the (American) standard transfer capacity of 56 kb/s, interconnected the IMPs. Each IMP was connected to two or more other IMPs, hence always providing alternative routes for traffic in a mask network. That was a significant difference from commercial computer networks. An important part of Arpanet was the network control center (NCC) at BBN. It could observe various traffic statistics at IMPs. Transfer times of each packet could be measured. Packets could be time stamped and observed at selected points along its path to measure where time was spent. Each IMP could be reprogrammed from the NCC. The Arpanet became a large laboratory for networking techniques. The centralized control facility allowed experiments, covering rather extensive geographical distances, managed efficiently with a minimum of travel.

Another important facility was the network information center (NIC) at SRI. It was a repository of a series of notes called request for comment (RFC). Many of them are still available [START_REF]RFC Homepage[END_REF]. It was a library of information pertaining to Arpanet and activities around it. A comprehensive network directory was issued and updated at intervals.

Resource Sharing

Bob Kahn arranged a public conference and a broad demonstration of a number of collaboration projects in Washington, DC in 1972. It was an impressive display of resource sharing. Isolated fields of study such as mathematical analysis, natural language translation, weather forecast, and many others were producing extraordinary results and they opened challenging novel roads of progress. A networking culture developed from the start of Arpanet. The services and functions were less powerful and flexible, but the stimulating environment of open networking was fertile.

Shortly before that conference, Larry Roberts and Bob Kahn, greatly stimulated by the far-reaching aspects of networking, saw a need for also investigating international aspects. They visited University College London (UCL) where Peter Kirstein grew an interest. They visited institutions in Norway and presented their project. ARPA already collaborated with Norway. It concerned an international network of seismic observatories. Working as research engineer at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (NDRE) at Kjeller in 1965, I had been involved helping to establish the Norsar observatory. It now had a 2.4 kb/s leased line across the Atlantic. I attended Roberts' and Kahn's presentation. Inspired by the prospects they gave of resource sharing, I went to the conference in Washington.

Norwegian Participation

The demonstrations in Washington impressed me, and I decided to collaborate. I was invited to participate in meetings of a group that called itself Packet Switching Project Working Group -PSPWG -and learnt some of the basic ideas. I made new contacts at ARPA, SRI and UCL and with other members of that group.

It turned out to be difficult to create interest in Norway. That precluded financing a separate project. So I permitted myself to spend some time studying networking, as part of another project on digital communications. I proposed a topic for graduate student Asle Hesla who began unraveling the mysteries of layered protocols. From 1975, I "borrowed" two research engineers from another project, Pål Spilling and Åge Stensby. Later I received two more engineers, Finn Arve Aagesen and Øyvind Hvinden; they were allowed to serve their military duty at NDRE, an arrangement for fresh university graduates on some rare occasions when their unit could renounce them. NDRE is part of the Norwegian Department of Defense. However, the ARPA project was civilian. At NDRE we had great interest and need for basic technology. Projects with civilian goals were acceptable. Ultimately, in the late 1970s my "Arpanet group" was five people. I had it formalized as project "Paradis" to study packet switched radio channels and distributed information systems. Its own budget was zero. NDRE management was positive to my general ideas, and I let Spilling spend two months in Peter Kirstein's group at UCL for a good start.

ARPA sponsored a TIP at Kjeller, installed in the summer of 1973. Improved modems transmitting 9.6 kb/s were connected in the existing cross-Atlantic line. Multiplexers rendered 7.2 kb/s for the TIP while the seismic traffic kept its 2.4 kb/s. Shortly thereafter, a second European node was assembled at UCL connected by a line from Kjeller. The next node outside the US was installed in Germany in 1980.

Hoping to stimulate interest in Norway, I arranged a seminar at Kjeller in May 1976 and invited some twenty persons from academia and industry. I obtained an international grant allowing me to invite Douglas Engelbart to present his ideas on "Computer Augmentation of the Human Intellect." The experienced and charming inventor lectured his ideas to us for three whole days. He brought and demonstrated his invention, the workstation with CRT and mouse. That was years before people even had seen such screens. My disappointment was sad when the only comment I heard from the audience was "baroque"! Moreover, I could not find interest outside Kjeller.

Developing the Goals

An important encounter took place in the INWG-group of IEEE in August of 1974. That international group spent two whole days on board the Stockholm-Åbo ferry. Sacrificing the view while cruising through the beautiful Åland archipelago, we discussed computer networking. Desirable goals and potential problems unraveled thoroughly in working groups sharing two conference rooms aboard. Many members of the PSPWG were there. In the next several years, some of the same persons began meeting every three months. Venues rotated between the ten groups of researchers from ARPA, SRI, BBN, Linkabit Company, ISI, UCLA, Comsat, MIT, UCL, and NDRE. These meetings were essential during the most active period of internet's technological development until the early 1980s.

In the following years, goals for technical development had matured; they were successively set and reexamined during PSPWG meetings based on theoretical and experimental work at the various sites and they presented, discussed and documented intermediate suggestions, questions, and results. Bob Kahn, employed by ARPA from 1973, was the quiet and efficient leader of those meetings. Jon Postel of ISI was the gifted author of many clear and precise documents -RFCs. Vint Cerf was a most active participant in the discussions. Typically, he pursued all questions persistently until the group considered every conceivable situation. Individuals communicated intermediate discussions and practical arrangements by email between meetings. In summary, the most important goals were as follows. A) Any type of information transport medium should be made useful for optimal packet transport. B) Any type of traffic should be managed in accordance with its specific need. C) The network should be robust and working without any central control. All the work during the development had those goals in distinct view. It took several years of development to identify what that meant in all detail and to generate the practical solutions.

Emerging Solutions

Network of Nets

It soon became clear that A) could not be met with the simple packet handling algorithms of the Arpanet. They assumed lines of given fixed characteristics between IMPs. Other media, notably wireless ones were different. Bob Kahn and Vint Cerf launched the ideas of a network of inter-connected nets. An article in the IEEE Transactions on Communication in 1974 [START_REF] Cerf | A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication[END_REF] documented their ideas. Cerf was then professor at Stanford University. He led a group of graduate students actively working on the respective issues. One of them was Dag Belsnes, on leave from the University of Oslo. The main idea was to consider each type of transmission medium as a separate net, and to optimize the transmission algorithm for that medium. Pertinent details of packets and their handling could be shaped for optimum transmission in that medium. The individual nets would be interconnected by gateways that would repackage each packet, fragment it if need be, and deliver to the next net in size and shape optimized for that medium.

Traffic Types

They recognized that various traffic types required different accommodations in the net. Two types of traffic were illustrated as examples. Some media are more prone to noise than others are. A noisy channel may cause transmission errors. They can be corrected by retransmission(s), repeatedly if necessary, until it achieves exactness. It is not always best to insist that all traffic should be error free, though. If packets carry the symbolic value of funds, no one would disagree that absolute correctness is paramount. A few seconds delay is less important. As another example, if the packets contain coded speech, such delays are detrimental, while a lost or damaged packet may hardly be observable in the received sound picture, and it is better to leave it alone.

Requirement C), of robustness without central supervision and control, means that the functions that transmit packets through the net, as well as the gateway functions, should be self-sufficient, including routing of packets on their way to destination, always capable of working without supervision. Today's routers perform all those functions. The intricate logic took many years of idea generation, trials, errors and testing to perfect. During some tests, queues of packets could pile up in the IMPS, causing deadlocks that people had to unlock. The internet ultimately became selfhealing. Packets route through the many interconnected nets according to the internet protocol (IP). The end-to-end transfer of a message between two entities -typically two programs, one in each host computer -is handled by the transfer control protocol (TCP) according to required reliability and urgency. Today's computers come furnished with operating systems equipped to perform, among so many other tasks, the logic of "TCP/IP."

Different Channels

To optimize transfer of packets in a transmission medium requires understanding of that medium's nature. A local net of radio stations sharing a frequency is set up to transfer packets one by one between any two stations. Many concepts are possible for handling such a situation. The routers need to transfer packets and verify that they actually went through. The performance criterion -optimum exploitation of the channel's capacity in terms of transferred bits per second of the actual message -was characterized by means of "throughput and delay" diagrams. The aim is to transfer maximum bit rate at minimum delay. If many stations compete by offering much traffic, there will be queues, losses, retransmissions, and ensuing delays. It takes clever algorithms to optimize the exploitation of different channels for varying traffic demands.

That became critical for packet transmission through satellites. The travel time for a packet via a synchronous satellite some 36,000 km away is a limiting factor for achieving stability in packet transfer. It was a challenge to develop algorithms for optimum use of a shared satellite channel. Theory and experiments using three independent ground stations resulted in the CPODA algorithm for packet switching in shared satellite channels. Mario Gerla documented it in Kleinrock's group at UCLA.

Another transmission medium is cable, especially useful in local areas. Robert (Bob) Metcalfe, then at MIT, developed the Ethernet. It used an ingenious scheme of running a coaxial cable around the area. Each host used a device disrespectfully penetrating the shield of the cable at any point. The Ethernet name alludes to using an algorithm similar to that of a radio net. Cables have later been more courteously used one for each host, while active electronic circuits in a "hub" mimic the ether.

Theory and Experiments

All the work on development of optimized algorithms and protocols included comprehensive theoretical analysis. Kleinrock's group at UCLA, famous for its achievements in traffic and queuing theory, was productive in that area. Experimentation was made by generating and observing traffic. A large number of situations were thoroughly investigated. That is probably the single most important reason for the internet technology to have become so useful. The development of network technology took place in a laboratory -the Arpanet -used at the same time by resource sharing projects having actual "real life" needs. It generated practical traffic that one could observe. Moreover, it was a living reminder of practical needs and possibilities. In addition to the "natural" traffic, they used generators for artificial traffic. They could vary the offered traffic in controlled ways, including increases to saturation. For observation, the NCC could also insert instrumentation functions in IMPs that sent traffic measurements to the various researchers, automatically by email. I could control and observe transatlantic packet experiments while sitting at my desk.

Satellite experiments were made using three ground stations and a free channel of the "Spade" system in the Intelsat IV satellite. Comsat and British Telecom were helpful in providing support at stations in Maryland and England. After some persuasion, the Norwegian Telecom Administration (NTA) provided free use of their shared Nordic ground station at Tanum, Bohuslän including housing of a "satellite IMP" and a line to Kjeller. Ole Petter Håkonsen of NTA was helpful in allowing that. Hence, we could investigate packet satellite transmission from late 1975.

The development was carried out in close collaboration between the groups. People discussed ideas, propositions, theoretical analysis, and experimental verifications at the three monthly meetings and by email in between. Everybody felt ownership of the problems and resulting solutions. Accordingly, experiments were carried out working together as practical needs suggested. Sometimes experiments required direct "hands on" simultaneous attention. As an example NDRE, UCL and BBN carried out experiments using speech codecs developed by MIT's Lincoln Lab. Several groups were active, leading up to a successful demo of three-site transatlantic internet speech conferencing. It comprised several carrier channels including packet satellite.

The group at BBN had major roles. They were responsible for everyday reliable operation of the net as well as extensions and modifications. They were helpful in setting up experiments and implementing revisions of network functions.

Over to Internet

In 1983, the internet technology had reached a stable state that allowed its use on the net. Parts of the Arpanet lingered on, but from about 1986, it was all "Internet." Commercial traffic was forbidden, but was later permitted from 1991. In 1993, the web was launched as a new service on the network and a really rapid growth began.

After the main network development was completed in the early 1980s, various other people in Norway (as elsewhere, of course) had heard of the Arpanet. Interest began to emerge at some other academic places. Spilling spent a "sabbatical year" at SRI from 1979 to 1980. He was helpful in making the network become available beyond NDRE in Norway in the 1980s. He began teaching classes in computers and communications. He joined NTA's research department and had actively taught in the area of computers and communications at UNIK, Kjeller. Aagesen and Hvinden have also worked in the area of computers and communications since then. Some of us believed that the new communication forms such as email had potential as general public services. I suggested that the Norwegian Telecom Administration should develop public email. Technical director Ole Petter Håkonsen accepted my proposal and I joined the NTA in 1985. During the rest of the 1980s, that effort led to a limited success when company called "Telepost" began to provide electronic mail service. Telepost grew quite fast and issued email address books. Two difficulties are of historical interest. The international standardization processes by CCITT and others had now produced some new "recommendations," notably X.25 and X.400. We based our Telepost development on those. However, in reality they were less practical and could not compete with the internet standards. Secondly, the new "value added services" were not politically acceptable as monopolies. Hence, a radical new political environment for telecom began to emerge during the 1980s.

Significant networking efforts took place at universities in Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, and Tromsø in the 1970s and 1980s, independently of the efforts at NDRE and the internet technical development. Considerable general knowledge accumulated, especially in connection with the Uninett project. The good knowledge base and enthusiastic people supporting the Uninett became interested in the internet from the mid-1980s and took a substantial role from then on, making use of the net and expanding it in Norway from the late 1980s. In the mid-1990s the phenomenon "internet" began to be mentioned in the media and becoming generally known.

Success

I have mentioned these examples of the development as representative of the environment in which it took place. Admirable teamwork in collaboration with enthusiastic persons allowed a Norwegian group the privilege to participate actively. I can best characterize it as "basic technical research." Research may be fertile if driven by a vision well defined as a goal and bravely pursued. That was prevailing feeling of the two or three dozen engineering researchers most central in the development of the internet's technology and the foundation of its success.

Fig. 1 .

 1 Fig. 1. Arpanet, September 1974.

Fig. 2 .

 2 Fig. 2. Workstation demonstrated 1968.

Table 1 .

 1 PSPWG meetings.


Anna Orrghen
email: anna.orrghen@konstvet.uu.se

Collaborations between Engineers and Artists in the Making of Computer Art in Sweden, 1967-1986

Keywords: Art and technology, art and science, computer art, computer pioneers, human computer interaction

The aim of this paper is to describe and analyze collaborations between artists and engineers working together in the making of computer art in Sweden 1967-1986. The paper is based on interviews with artists and engineers who collaborated during this time. By using the theoretical concept "coconstruction," I map the phenomenon and discuss the driving forces behind the social, as well as the economical and institutional conditions of the collaborations.

Introduction

During the mid-1960s, when artists started to gain access to computer departments at universities and research departments in large industrial companies, a new kind of collaborations between artists and engineers developed [START_REF] Shanken | Artist in Industry and the Academy: Collaborative Research, Interdisciplinary Scholarship and the Creation and Interpretation of Hybrid Forms[END_REF]. Next to the US, Germany and Great Britain, Sweden is put to the fore as one of the countries where artists and engineers at an early stage explored the possibilities of using computers for creating art [START_REF] Davis | Art and the Future: A History/Prophecy of the Collaboration Between Science, Technology and Art[END_REF][START_REF] Bijvoet | Art as Inquiry: Toward New Collaborations Between Art, Science, and Technology[END_REF]. For instance, the programmer Göran Sundqvist at Saab in Linköping, and later at AB Skandinaviska Elverk, used the Saab manufactured computer D21 at Skandinaviska Elverk to help the composer and artist Jan W Morthenson. He also used the ABC 80 computer with a XY-plotter for collaboration with the composer and artist Lars-Gunnar Bodin. Another example is the long-term collaboration between IBM employed programmer Sten Kallin We can regard contemporary art in general and computer art in particular as complex negotiation processes between artists and other actors. The foundation of the American organization Experiments in Art and Technology (E.A.T.) in 1966 and their famous event 9 Evenings: Theatre and Engineering in October that same year must be considered as crucial events regarding the changing possibilities for these kinds of collaborations [START_REF] Loewen | Experiments in Art and Technology: A Descriptive History of the Organization[END_REF]. Art today increasingly seems to turn into interdisciplinary projects involving a number of different actors.

How can we understand these collaborations? In this paper, I use the insights made within the interdisciplinary field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). A basic assumption in the STS approach is that we should describe scientific and technological activities as the result of relations between different actors rather than the result of singular individuals, disciplines or groups. By adopting such a perspective, we regard scientific knowledge and its use as a conscious cooperation between different actors who produce and use this knowledge [START_REF]The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies[END_REF].

An STS concept particularly apt to study collaborations between different actors is "co-construction." Nelly Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch introduced the concept in their book How Users Matter from 2003. Their main argument is that researchers interested in users and technology had a narrowly focused view on users as separate objects of study. By using the term co-construction as a point of departure, they aim at changing the perspective and instead, they underscore the development of new products as a cooperation effort between "producers" and "consumers" and that the use of the products is the result of a negotiating process between these two groups. Hence, the term emphasizes the importance of studying production and consumption of knowledge together rather than as separate phenomena. Oudshoorn and Pinch pay attention to the role of the user in technological development in general and they are interested in how users consume, modify and resist technologies. Although their primary focus includes "what users do with technology," they are also interested in "what technology does with users" [START_REF] Oudshoorn | How Users Matter[END_REF].

The aim of this paper is to describe and analyze collaborations between artists and engineers working together in the making of computer art in Sweden 1967-1986. Earlier, the Swedish art historian Gary Svensson has studied the introduction of computer art in Sweden. Although he also mentions that the collaborations took place, he focuses mainly on mapping the actors and the art works, as well as placing the Swedish development in an art historical context [START_REF] Svensson | Digitala pionjärer: Datakonstens introduktion i Sverige[END_REF]. In my approach, on the other hand, attention is paid to the collaborations only. I am particularly interested in questions on three different levels. The first one deals with mapping the phenomenon, i.e. which artists and engineers participated in collaborations and which art works did they create during those collaborations? The second one concerns the driving forces behind the collaborations: Why did they collaborate? What did they expect to gain and what did they gain from the collaborations? How do they consider their role in the collaboration? What impact did the collaboration have on their work as artists as well as engineers?

The third question includes the social, economic, and institutional conditions of the collaborations. How did the artists and engineers get into contact? How did they carry through the collaboration? Where did it take place? Which computers did they use? How did they finance the collaborations? By taking Oudshoorn and Pinch's concept co-construction as a theoretical point of departure, I shed light upon these questions from the point of view of the artists as well as the engineers. I argue that early Swedish computer art illustrates a kind of co-constructed contemporary art.

The sources for this paper are mainly interviews with Swedish artists and engineers who collaborated to create computer art. I conducted these interviews within the documentation project "From Computing Machines to IT." The project aimed at documenting the Swedish IT history; it was collaboration between the Div. of History of Technology at KTH in Stockholm, the National Museum of Science, and Technology in Stockholm and the Swedish Computer Society [START_REF] Lundin | Documenting the Use of Computers in Swedish Society between 1950 and 1980[END_REF].

Although these oral sources are necessary to be able to study these collaborations, there are, however, a number of difficulties concerning source criticism related to interviews as a methodology. One such difficulty concerns how the researcher is to relate to an interview conducted several years after the case in question. This underlines the importance of being aware of memory and time in relation to oral history as a method [START_REF] Portelli | The Death of Luigi Trastulli: Memory and the Event[END_REF]. However, one way of dealing with this question is to supplement the oral sources with written sources.

Three Case Studies

This paper contains three case studies followed by a concluding discussion.

Case 1: Göran Sundqvist, Jan W Morthenson and Lars-Gunnar Bodin

One of the earliest collaborations took place between the programmer Göran Sundqvist (b. 1937) and the composer and artist Jan W Morthenson (b. 1940). Sundqvist, at Saab in Linköping, and later at AB Skandinaviska Elverk, used the Saab manufactured computer D21 at Skandinaviska Elverk to create a digital sound for Morthenson's musical piece Neutron Star in 1967. In 1969, Sundqvist made the computer animations for Supersonics, a TV-film Morthenson made for Westdeutscher Rundfunk [START_REF] Svensson | Digitala pionjärer: Datakonstens introduktion i Sverige[END_REF][START_REF] Broman | Kort historik över Framtidens musik: Elektronmusiken och framtidstanken i svenskt 1950-och 60-tal. Gidlunds[END_REF][START_REF] Morthenson | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF]. Morthenson met Sundqvist at Fylkingen, a society committed to experimental and unestablished forms of contemporary art, where the latter's musical experiments with the computer D21 had gained him a reputation for being interested in the field of art, music and computers [START_REF] Morthenson | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF]. At Fylkingen, Sundqvist also made acquaintance with the composer and artist Lars-Gunnar Bodin (b. 1935). In 1968, he used the Saab manufactured computer D21 at Skandinaviska Elverk to realize Bodin's work on stochastic compositions and in 1979, the collaboration continued, although this time Sundqvist used the ABC 80 computer with a XY-plotter to continue the elaboration on the same theme.

Morthenson and Bodin nursed an interest in new aesthetic expressions, which led them to the computer. Although they lacked access to computers, they were both well acquainted with the international development within the field and they had ideas of how to use this new technology for artistic purposes. Sundqvist, who earlier had elaborated with SARA at Saab and later with D21 at AB Skandinaviska Elverk, also shared this interest to create sound and images. Hence, the main reason for Morthenson and Bodin to approach Sundqvist was twofold: he could offer access to a computer, and he knew how to use it. Alternatively, as Morthenson puts it: "He was important since he was the first one who could offer access to a computer, a so called D21" [START_REF] Morthenson | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF]. Even though Sundqvist, Morthenson and Bodin shared a mutual interest in the artistic possibilities of computer technology, it is nonetheless clear that they had different roles. Describing their roles during the work with Supersonics, Morthenson says, "I drew pictures and courses [of events], pretty much the same thing as when one makes an animated movie. I made him a storyboard and then he tried to realize it as well as he could by using the oscilloscope" [START_REF] Morthenson | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF]. Moreover, when Sundqvist describes their collaboration on Neutron Star, he says, "He wanted short sound beats with a number of different frequencies, and I made that" [START_REF] Sundqvist | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF]. Afterwards, Morthenson himself put the piece together. The collaboration with Bodin follows a similar pattern which Bodin expresses, "I gave a number of rules for how these should be" [START_REF] Bodin | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF], and Sundqvist explains, "I was curious and he had ideas" [START_REF] Sundqvist | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF].

The quotations illustrate their different roles where they asked Sundqvist to perform a specific task that made it possible for the artists to realize their ideas. Sundqvist's description of his role in the collaborations is similar to his description of the working tasks that he received and carried through at Saab and AB Skandinaviska Elverk. There he occasionally was asked to elaborate on the computer, preferably by creating sound and images to demonstrate its possibilities for presumable clients. In 1960, he received a similar task to impress on a group from the military air force interested in the computer D2: … [Bernt Magnusson] gave me the equation of a trajectory, and I managed to draw it by the help of sub programs for sinus and cosinus that they used on SARA, the large copy of BESK at SAAB. […] I kept on experimenting with it for many years after that, in order to make different pictures [START_REF] Sundqvist | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF]. Today, the program described is probably considered the first computer game created in Sweden [START_REF]Transkript av ett vittnesseminarium vid Tekniska musset i Stockholm den 12[END_REF]. I would like to dwell upon the later part of Sundqvist's answer, which I find particularly interesting. On one hand, he received instructions and followed them, but on the other hand, he also used these instructions as a springboard to continue to elaborate on and develop his knowledge of how to create sound and images with the computer for his own sake of interest. Of course, it is not possible to say whether those collaborations really contributed to Sundqvist's development as a programmer. However, considering that he carried out these tasks in a similar way as he did at AB Skandinaviska Elverk and Saab, and that he wrote his own programs to realize Morthenson's and Bodin's artistic ideas, one might assume that this was the case.

Financially, AB Skandinaviska Elverk sponsored the collaborations since Sundqvist could use their computers. Although Sundqvist often used the D21 in his spare time, occasionally he also used it during working hours while waiting for the result of his programming to appear [START_REF] Sundqvist | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF].

Case 2: Sten Kallin and Sture Johannesson

In 1969, the artist Sture Johannesson (b. 1935) approached IBM in Sweden. Inspired by the development in the U.S., where the computers were reported to be able to "draw pictures," Johannesson was anxious to find out more about this new technology and its possibilities. The request ended up at Sten Kallin's (b. 1928) desk and became the starting point of a long time collaboration that resulted in the projects Intra (1969)(1970)(1971)(1972)(1973)(1974) and EPICS (1986-present) [START_REF] Bang Larsen | [END_REF]. Kallin was an instructor in programming languages and program design and development, a "systems engineer," and in the 1980s "senior consultant." Similar to Sundqvist, Kallin was well known among his colleagues at IBM because of his interest in elaborating with the computer for his own sake, and thus he had gained a reputation to have "some strange ideas and projects going on" [START_REF] Kallin | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF].

Before Johannesson contacted IBM, he had elaborated with a number of different artistic techniques such as painting, drawing, screen print and clay. The subjects of the pictures were often taken from an "alphabet" he had developed containing different symbols, e.g. a key, a heart and a combination of both. With Intra he continued to elaborate on these symbols in yet another technique: computer technology. Johannesson and Kallin worked with Intra at IBM in Stockholm where they used an IBM 1130 computer to elaborate on graphical pictures constructed by mathematical curves. In 1986, Kallin's and Johannesson's second project started, EPICS [START_REF] Svensson | Digitala pionjärer: Datakonstens introduktion i Sverige[END_REF][START_REF] Kallin | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF]. EPICS was carried out with a PC-AT and a graphic screen. However, this time, Kallin approached Johannesson by saying: I think we should make a project together, I have an idea. And I think we should continue our exploring of a picture space. But not a picture space with the keyhole, the heart and stuff like that, because it's difficult to figure out how we could develop it. My idea is that we let simple graphic elements on a picture space be surrounded by some kind of aesthetical power field, a power field similar to gravitation or an electrostatic field that reduces by distance. […] And I would like to elaborate on this aesthetical power field and be able to visualize it graphically in one way or another. [---] And he jumped at it and we gave it a thought and made a number of suggestions and I probably made a simple prototype of something. After that we went to IBM and said that we would like to do this. I will only do it during my spare time but Sture needs equipment. IBM Malmö lends him a pretty good PC-AT, the third generation of IBM PC's and a graphic screen [START_REF] Kallin | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF].

Kallin's thorough description of how EPICS started and how it was realized puts to the fore a number of interesting things. For instance, it illustrates the interaction that was taking place between Kallin's involvement in artistic projects and his regular working tasks at IBM. Kallin's driving forces behind the collaboration were twofold. On one hand, he was interested in "the huge possibilities of visualizing with the help of computer technology" [START_REF] Åkerman | Dekorerad IBMare gör vad han vill[END_REF]. On the other, he had always been interested in solving problems. By collaborating with Johannesson he gained new experiences of how to visualize with the computer. Some might interpret the fact that he wanted to continue the collaboration to develop his newly achieved skills as a sign of the impact of the collaboration on his work as an engineer. Kallin confirms the interpretation by claiming, "Yes indeed. Everything I have done has taught me a lot one can use later on" [START_REF] Kallin | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF].

An interest in visualizing by using new technology was also the main driving force for Johannesson. Before Johannesson started to work with Kallin he had tried different printing techniques. Hence, turning to the computer should be a natural step in his artistic development. However, another important factor needs mentioning. Before contacting IBM, Johannesson had gained a reputation of being a troublemaker, which, according to himself, froze him out within the art world. Contacting IBM was for him a way of finding a new arena "free of prejudices" where he could continue to elaborate with his art [START_REF] Johannesson | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF].

Given that Johannesson initiated Intra and Kallin initiated EPICS, makes the question of their different roles particularly apt to study. On one hand, one can easily assign them different roles where Kallin possessed the technical knowledge and access to computer technology and Johannesson had a broader experience of visualizing in different techniques. There is, however, another question brought to the fore by Kallin who touches upon a highly interesting, yet difficult, question of creativity while describing the collaboration: I completed the program but gave him as many parameters as I could, so he could do that on his own, so he would feel that at least he was participating. That is of course a sensitive question concerning creativity, where the creativity is… And I do think that the main creativity comes from the one who designs the program since that is the one who completely decides the frames [START_REF] Kallin | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF].

Thus, on the other hand it is much harder to claim one of the roles as the more creative one. Kallin's description of his interest and involvement in what became EPICS makes their collaboration an interesting illustration of Oudshoorn's and Pinch's co-construction. Although Kallin initiated EPICS and had a clear idea of what he wanted to do, he needed Johannesson's artistic experience to realize his ideas, just as Johannesson needed Kallin's knowledge of and access to computers. However, Kallin's description also tells something about the economical conditions of the collaboration. Economically, IBM financed the collaboration in terms of allowing Kallin to use their computers. IBM also sponsored Johannesson's participation in a couple of international conferences in Denmark, Germany and Switzerland where he and Kallin demonstrated EPICS as well as lent him the technical equipment he needed. One might also talk about an important institutional support from IBM since according to Kallin the collaboration was "heavily supported" [START_REF] Kallin | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF] by the information department at IBM that also initiated the contact between Kallin and Johannesson. This institutional support also reflects when Johannesson describes IBM as a space free of prejudices against him where hecontrary to the art world -was trusted and given an artistic freedom: "I borrowed a key to IBM's laboratory in Solna and went there by myself and unlocked and locked when I left" [START_REF] Johannesson | medie-och kommunikationsvetenskap[END_REF].

Case 3: Mikael Jern and Beck & Jung

In 1965, the artist Holger Bäckström (1939-1997) and the mathematician Bo Ljungberg (1939-2007) started out on a lifelong collaboration. They called themselves Beck & Jung and were early users of computer technology. The computer technology was specifically apt for combining their mathematical and artistic skills and their early experimentations with computer graphics have gained them an international reputation [START_REF] Svensson | Digitala pionjärer: Datakonstens introduktion i Sverige[END_REF][START_REF] Popper | Art of the Electronic Age[END_REF][START_REF] Nilsson | Beck & Jung med glada hälsningar! Torekovs Kulturstiftelse[END_REF].

Initially, they started to develop a new kind of alphabet called Bildalfabetet (the Picture Alphabet) based on a module system consisting of eleven basic forms. In 1966, Beck & Jung began to collaborate with Leif Svensson at IBM in Malmö where they used the IBM manufactured computer IBM/1401 to examine the possibilities of Bildalfabetet. The collaboration lasted until 1967 and Felixsnurran (the Felix Pivot) (1967)(1968)) is one of their most famous works during this time [START_REF] Eriksson | Chromo Cube. Wedgepress & Cheese[END_REF].

From 1970 to 1976, the programmer Mikael Jern (b. 1946) worked together with Professor Hellmuth Hertz (b. 1920) on a project where they developed the first color plotter in the world, the Color Ink Jet Plotter [START_REF] Hertz | Hard Copy Color Display System Using Ink Jets[END_REF]. The Color Ink Jet Plotter was developed because of collaboration between the department of Building Function Analysis, the Department of Electrical Measurement, and the University Computing Center at Lund University. As such, it was an important step in the development of computer graphics [START_REF] Svensson | Digitala pionjärer: Datakonstens introduktion i Sverige[END_REF]. Jern developed the program Color that made it possible to draw color pictures and he continued to develop the idea during the years to come [START_REF] Jern | Color Jet Plotter. International Conference, Computer Graphics[END_REF]. Jern was an early and ardent advocate of raster graphics, instead of vector graphics, and he argues that one way of interpreting his work with Color might be considered as a way of visualizing the advantages and possibilities of raster graphics [START_REF] Jern | interview from[END_REF]. Color was used on a UNIVAC 1108, mainly for environmental research such as visualizing community planning [START_REF] Svensson | Digitala pionjärer: Datakonstens introduktion i Sverige[END_REF]. However, although they formed a relatively almost invisible group, a few artists used the Color Ink Jet Plotter such as Beck & Jung. In 1972, they made their first color pictures by using the Color Ink Jet Plotter [START_REF] Eriksson | Chromo Cube. Wedgepress & Cheese[END_REF].

In 1979, Jern used Color to create the Color Cube (consisting of 17x17x17 small cubes). The Color Cube was a way of demonstrating the 3D graphics as well as visualizing the color system itself. Although the principle for the color cube had been described before, this was the first time it was possible to visualize the technique by a computer. Beck & Jung became interested in the color cube and approached Jern to ask whether they could use it and Jern agreed [START_REF] Jern | interview from[END_REF]. The result became their project The Chromo Cube that started in 1980. Between 1982 and 1986, Beck & Jung continued to elaborate with different forms. However, this time they worked together with Bob Wissler, a technician at Lund University, who helped them to use the program developed by Jern [START_REF] Eriksson | Chromo Cube. Wedgepress & Cheese[END_REF].

When Jern describes the collaboration with Beck & Jung it becomes quite obvious that they had different roles:

Beck & Jung came to me and asked if they were allowed to use my programs that made these cubes. And I made the first one for them, but after that I didn't have time for it, instead there was a guy called Bob Wissler in Lund, who was a programmer, who became their programmer and helped them to use my programs [START_REF] Jern | interview from[END_REF]. This collaboration is different from the two other cases discussed in this paper, since in this case Jern had already made the program as well as the color cube for another purpose. Hence, the color cube "was used but not invented by Beck & Jung" [START_REF] Svensson | Digitala pionjärer: Datakonstens introduktion i Sverige[END_REF]. There is also a difference in the economical conditions surrounding the collaboration between Jern and Beck & Jung. At the computer department, one was able to rent time at the computer according to a specific rate. There were also additional costs in relation to color prints [25].

Fig. 1 .

 1 Fig. 1. Spirals 106, from Intra 1969/70-1974. Courtesy of Sture Johannesson.

Fig. 2 .

 2 Fig. 2. Sten Kallin (left) and Sture Johannesson (right) during their work with Intra at IBM Stockholm in the early 1970s. Courtesy of Sture Johannesson.

  and the artist Sture Johannesson, which began in 1969 and resulted in the projects Intra and Exploring Picture Space (EPICS). Johannesson and Kallin worked with Intra at IBM in Stockholm where they used an IBM 1130 computer to elaborate on different kind of patterns. A third example is Mikael Jern who developed the program Color for the Color Ink Jet Plotter at the computer department at Lund University in 1970s. The artists Beck & Jung, among others, used Color on a UNIVAC 1108 for making computer art.

Acknowledgments. The author wishes to thank Stiftelsen Längmanska kulturfonden, Helge Ax:son Johnsons stiftelse and Anna Ahlströms och Ellen Terserus Stiftelse for valuable financial support. Per Lundin has given valuable comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.


Tomas Ohlin
email: tomas@telo.se

The Baby Networks: Nordic Positions Before the Internet

Keywords: CEPT-3, internet, Minitel, Prestel, standards, TCP/IP, TeleGuide, videotex, Viewdata

This paper discusses the computer network situation immediately before the arrival of the internet. In various countries, there were a number of isolated network "islands," following different standards of technical characteristics called videotex. The paper discusses the different regional standards that were used and what types of services were made available, and asks what role the Nordic countries played in this development and in the transition to the internet.

The International Background

One does not have to be religious to be challenged about how it all started. All of a sudden, there were islands, and all of a sudden, island organizations started ferry lines of connection. The internet was born and, after a few years, there were so many users. Then, who defined the islands? Were there islands everywhere, even in the Nordic countries? Moreover, what language did they speak for connection?

There are several priests in this church. How did it start? Was it a big network bang-a concentrated point of supreme intelligence that simply blew up? Some of us who were there refer to the story of a growth of small islands that enlarged intermittently. Surely, the course was not quite smooth. Many analysts stressed early ARPA computer connections and their technically formatted messages. Some refer to university computer connections that developed between academic computer science departments, while others point directly to early versions of TCP/IP and preach that only with this standard did it all become possible. Many of us applaud Tim Berners Lee, who received all his medals for defining the web grammar.

The technological pioneers were active in the 1960s. The DARPA collection of large -primarily military -computers became technologically connected at that time, becoming the ARPANET. The same period also already saw the development of the TCP/IP protocol. Pioneering connection experiments took place in several countries in the 1970s, and time-sharing also appeared on the market, building up local star networks around centralized computer stations. Tim Berners-Lee and his scientific group published their ideas about the world wide web much later, in 1989. The HTML and HTTP languages and the URL grammar were born soon afterwards, around 1990-91.

The Importance of the 1980s

So what happened between the 1970s, the times of the ARPANET and its followers, and the 1990s when the internet arrived? The answer is that the period of the 1980s was the time of videotex, internet's forerunner.

What role did that type of system and technology play? How can we describe this development, technology, structure, and/or user influence?

Applications had an important role here. Several mail-oriented systems, as well as computer conferencing, emerged at different points of time in the 1970s. Thereafter, interactive services based on those systems spread in the 1980s. Nevertheless, when did user oriented networking really "start"? In addition, were Nordic developers and enthusiasts around, at the time of the "birth"?

There are different types of answers to this. Certain experts tend to stress the importance of the basic technology and network structure, while others refer to the situation of the information providers, and yet a third group take the perspective of the user and analyze types of services.

How did so many technologically inexperienced users suddenly become aware of these new possibilities of contact? How did it eventuate that hundreds of thousands of users started to connect through early mail forms, and that certain large groups began to use numerical addresses like 3615 (in France), to connect to communications, advertising, and telephone type services through new terminal devices, or home or office equipment? This all happened long before the PC.

Characteristics of Videotex Systems

We cannot completely exclude the comments about technology here, since it influenced network structure. Videotex was a type of communication characterized by a type of transmission, speed, interactivity, and user-screen presentation form. Transmitted on packet switching networks and with coordinated gateway protocols, the message transmission speed of videotex was 1,200 bps in and 75 bps out. The presentation screens contained 24 rows and 40 columns for characters and picture elements.

At the approach of the 1980s, the challenge regarding the character representation language for videotex in Europe stood between the UK -with its Viewdata system, renamed Prestel, and France -with Teletel and the Minitel terminal (whose production cost was 100 Euro!). France had a clear formal lead; in user numbers, which had increased enormously (in 1984, there were already 1.8 million Minitel users and, in 1993, 6.3 million users). Nevertheless, the cultural differences played a role, and a number of European countries chose Prestel instead of Teletel for their networks.

An attempt to unify the standards based on compatibility problems was tried by the central European telecom organization CEPT, which defined a common videotex standard in the late 1970s. Implementations were introduced at the beginning of the 1980s. An increasing number of countries successively chose the CEPT-3 as standard, since it was flexible and technically efficient. However, several countries had already invested in Prestel and Teletel.

The Nordic countries that found themselves, individually, with the initial choice of the Prestel standard, later changed to CEPT-3. However, these decisions were mainly unilateral.

Important parts of the struggles concerning the standards were fought based on applications. A number of large companies invested in services that depended on standards and, as it transpired, during the 1980s, the network operators were not strong enough to force the unification of standards. In addition, the global plurality of videotex made cooperation difficult. For example, in the U.S., the NAPLPS standard (North American Presentation Level Protocol Syntax) grew in the 1980s, while in Canada, which was an early videotex enthusiast, the more graphically able Telidon standard was used quite extensively. On the other hand, in Japan, the flexible CAPTAIN could present the Japanese language visually, which Japanese applications naturally needed. This confusion about global standards did not help national cooperation.

The terminals used for videotex came from a line of major equipment producers, including some from Nordic countries. During the latter part of the 1980s, software that made communication in videotex format via PC possible became available for PCs.

In the Scandinavian countries, this network concept for the information market was first called "teledata." The Swedish PTT, Televerket, used the term "Datavision" for a time, but the U.S.-rooted term "videotex" [START_REF] Ohlin | Videotex. Riksdataförbundet[END_REF] was finally chosen by many in the middle of the 1980s.

Pioneering Work

From the 1970s and onwards, an important influence emerged in the U.S. regarding services that early emphasized message communications. Public mail and computer conferencing appeared before 1970 [START_REF] Hiltz | The Network Nation[END_REF]. Jaques Valle and Bob Johansen at the Institute for the Future, in Menlo Park, were also among the early creators of new social contact systems.

With regard to the Nordic development, mentioning these pioneers is relevant. Turoff and Hiltz were visitors and discussion partners not only in Sweden (on several occasions from the middle of the 1970s), but also in Vallee. In particular, Johansen visited Sweden on numerous occasions until the end of the 1980s, discussing and implementing project ideas. These pioneers were influential and in 1977, Bertil Thorngren and Tomas Ohlin implemented public mail applications in the north of Sweden [START_REF] Ohlin | Projekt TERESE. Styrelsen för Teknisk Utveckling[END_REF]. In addition, Jacob Palme developed his important KOM system in 1978, after inspiration from Turoff and Hiltz [START_REF] Palme | History of the KOM Computer Conferencing System[END_REF].

However, for Europe in general, France defined a user market, although, in all honesty, France received its inspiration from the United Kingdom. Around 1970, Sam Fedida at the British Post Office experimented with a connection between the telephone and the television. The issue was expanding and finding new applications for the telephone network. His invention, called "viewdata," allowed the user to "see the text." Fedida aimed at the home user, whose telephone usage at the time was low.

Ceefax complemented viewdata in the UK, which was a TV bound one-way teletext service that used a few upper lines of the TV picture for centrally produced text and comments. This was followed in numerous countries, as centralized TV bound short text services were evident and understandable.

At the same time, French experiments were being carried out [START_REF] Abadie | Minitel Story[END_REF]. In 1970, services for numerical calculations via the telephone were presented in Issy-les-Moulineaux. Issy continued to be early with its creative appetite. Later in 1972, the French telecom research institute CCETT was established, in order to bring together telephony and TV research. At the SICOB fair the same year, flexible message output was shown, both in synthetically vocal form and visually. In Vélizy, a practical demonstration of a screen presentation was attempted. Telecommunications analysis expanded and, in 1975, the French X.25 bound Transpac data network was presented.

In 1975, much to the surprise of the French developers, they discovered that the UK intended to start a Viewdata service very soon. The French were hurt. In 1976, President Valéry Giscard d´Estaing asked Simon Nora to produce a visionary report about the information society. This work, by Simon Nora and Alain Minc [START_REF] Nora | L´informatisation de la societé[END_REF], would become important for the expansion of applications and for user understanding of public network services. With support from the French government, it helped pave the way for Minitel and for its successors also internationally. There were other visionary reports at that time (such as the "Instant world" report, produced by the Canadian government, work led by Douglas Parkhill, Canadian Ministry of Communications), but they were not many.

These descriptions of the information society made it apparent that both the private and the public sector would be interested in new types of communications. Contributions indicated that the citizen as well as the consumer was interested. Applications and services of a democratic nature started to appear; questions were raised about the possibilities of electronic voting.

Pioneers such as Yoneiji Masuda in Tokyo, defined a space where thoughts about cooperation could be expressed on public platforms. Masuda visited Sweden on several occasions at the end of the 1970s, and even discussed Nordic public applications, in his monumental book "Information Society" [START_REF] Masuda | Information Society[END_REF]. He proposed a democratic arena that provided citizen access on the new online platforms.

Early Videotex Networks

At the beginning of the 1980s, a number of different national videotex networks were created, several of them conceptually inspired by the French system. Packet switching technology was used for the supporting structures.

The influence of the French videotex system had certain characteristics: o a decentralized system structure allowed local hosts to be connected everywhere in the network, o flexible payment was centralized, combined with telephone bills, o public e-mail was introduced, o Annuaire Electronique, a centralized telephone book, was provided online in France.

These characteristics of the pioneering French systems were not introduced in the videotex systems of all other countries, but they played important roles in these countries' national expansion.

The Nordic Connection

In several countries, there were groups of enthusiasts who recognized what was happening. Widespread interactivity attracted attention, creating interest and tension. Established technological market forces took a stand, usually restrictive at the beginning. Furthermore, several representatives of the existing telecom networks and industries considered the initially small islands of videotex users as competitors.

Finland was an early videotex country. Inspired by the French development and through early personal contacts, they began to conduct experiments in Helsinki at the beginning of the 1980s. The leading newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, was active, together with the inspired developer Jaako Hanukselä. An analysis was made concerning online news and experiments were carried out locally and shown at Nordic conferences. Other early producers of Finnish information included the business chain SOK.

In Denmark, the Danish PTT was conducting videotex trials, called Teledata, from 1980 onwards; the official market introduction occurred in 1985. Norway conducted Teledata field trials already from 1979 onwards, with the commercial launch in 1986.

In the middle of the 1980s, a number of types of service applications, including grocery sales, travel reservation, and insurance and banking services were tried in almost all Nordic countries.

In some, a politically based public analysis was initiated. One of the forces behind this was the mass media, but after the first shock, newspapers and TV became nervous. Was this a serious threat to the ordinary paper bound press?

In Sweden, a parliamentary commission, Informationsteknologiutredningen [8], including leading politicians, was formed in 1978. Its secretary was Tomas Ohlin. The newspapers had been actively supporting the creation of this commission; they were concerned about the possible competition from electronic information forms. The results of the commission's analysis were rather broad, it was noted that this media change would take time. Actually, the regulation of commercial online information (advertisements) was politically proposed, but never implemented. Similar commissions or public analysis groups were created in other countries.

The late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s were times of analysis. Existing market forces had to become involved.

User Influence

In several countries in the 1980s, information providers formed branch-oriented organizations. For example, in Sweden, Videotexföreningen was formed in 1983, and later expanded into InformationsProducentFöreningen, IPF (with active chairman Tomas Persson). Internationally, the Association for Videotex Information Providers already existed. The driving market forces behind the development of Swedish videotex were Aktievisionen (financial services, developed by Paul Östling), LantbruksData (services for farmers), ATG (administrative services for gambling), TINA (Teledata I Norr, with regional services), and Riksdagen (public information services), as well as banks and insurance companies.

Videotexföreningen developed ethical guidelines for videotex already in 1985 [START_REF] Ohlin | Etiska riktlinjer för videotex[END_REF]. These were among the first such guidelines published globally.

A group of Swedish industrialists created the company TeleGuide in 1988. The organizations behind this company were IBM, Esselte, and Swedish PTT -Televerket. The aim of Teleguide was to repeat the French success with Minitel, for home applications.

Plans were to develop further the Swedish PTT videotex network. A dedicated terminal equipped with a smart card reader, aimed at the electronics market, was bought from Loewe in Germany. In 1990, they advertised the following TeleGuide services:

o Several of these services were in early forms of development, but the marketing was offensive.

Due to a lack of collective financial support, plans for joint Nordic activity were drawn up but not implemented. The TeleGuide company did not receive any public support and was only able to attract 22,000 customers. The PTT interest decreased over time and, after three years, the project was discontinued. It had been too early; there was no market for its services.

The PTT Positions

The activities of the PTTs [START_REF] Lernevall | 11.8 Videotex[END_REF] were offensive at the beginning; telephone based profits were still substantial. However, conceptually, the plans were conservative, from user perspectives. The old single market thinking ruled. PTTs employed many engineers, who at times had a limited understanding of small-scale online market services for the office and home.

There were, however, certain markets that were offensive at an early stage, often based on powerful organizations such as farmers' services, medical drug markets, banks, and insurance companies. In order to service these markets, the PTTs kept the X.25 network and its videotex counterpart network, in good shape technically. Nevertheless, not everyone was quite willing to accept new market thinking, smallscale usage as well as strong competition.

After a thorough analysis, the Swedish PTT videotex network was discontinued in 1992-93. Although the internet was not fully available at the time, there was an expectant feeling among experts that the different videotex networks would have difficulty cooperating well. Compatibility problems among network dialogues were substantial.

In addition, information providers were dissatisfied with the, in essence, monopolistic PTT. Opposition was evident with regard to the making of certain policies. Reasons for closing the Swedish PTT videotex network were:

o

Problems for the Small Network Islands

At the beginning of the 1990s, national videotex networks were becoming aware of problems. The market was not expanding to expectations; new technology (new terminal types, and the PC) and new system structures were appearing. It transpired that the problems that had become relevant for the Swedish PTT had also become relevant for others. In this respect, there were Nordic contacts. However, French Minitel had shown what later was to become an internet market. The Teletel network that formed the base for the Minitel success (reaching over seven million terminals) was created according to certain principles of decentralized system structure, centralized payment, a "killer app" (phonebook), plus e-mail.

In many countries, there were attempts to duplicate this, for example, the Swedish TeleGuide. This system failed because the application development policy was too narrow, financial support was lacking, as was, subsequently, customer interest.

Transition from Videotex into the Internet

No doubt, there were a number of advantages with the videotex format such as low cost, ease of use, flexibility, and interactivity. There were also disadvantages such as slow speed and a lack of graphical sophistication For a medium of its time, these characteristics were important and no doubt showed the way for the internet. Videotex was a fantastic medium because it was so early with direct user interactivity and influence. Several of internet's later successful services stem from videotex developments in the 1980s.

Historically, it is certainly not the first time that small decentralized services, after initial development problems, pave the way for a broader, centrally combined and successful system. In the early 1990s, many observers had noted Minitel and the different videotex islands, and they had been increasingly convinced that this was a development on which to expand.

In this author´s opinion, there is no doubt that the internet would have taken much longer to arrive were it not for the experiences gained from the regional videotex systems. The concepts of the electronic market and the open platforms were already established when the internet arrived.

Videotex had an obvious educational effect on the coming online market. It was the first widely distributed system, which enabled users to become acquainted with controlled interactivity, with early public access, thus becoming a pioneer system for democratic dialogue.

It is often important to be at the right place at the right time. Successful inventions have historically arrived at a time when there is sufficient user understanding. The invention of a technical standard and a network grammar is a beautiful achievement. However, large groups of users form the basis for the real gold medals.

Strangely enough, in 2010 there are still a number of Minitel terminals in France. Phonebook services and personal mail are, to some extent, still used with this equipment, although such use must surely be declining. It is amazing, however, that a network invention from the 1970s can survive for over thirty years in these times of explosively rapid technological development. Videotex paved the way for the internet, and platforms for the many, although there is a lesson in that social platforms need time to mature.

If not for videotext, the internet would have arrived on the international (including the Nordic) user market several years later than its actual introduction. Some reasons for this relate to user maturity. Videotex enabled millions of new network users to gain an understanding of the new system. Although not an earthquake in the technical sense, its speed and standardization was only low. It was, however, a system that introduced user interactivity, which was a substantial contribution to network expansion. Suddenly, users found themselves with influence.

What can we say about Nordic contributions? Although the Scandinavian countries were early, they were not at the forefront. However, they did provide important test markets for the coming videotex systems. Actually, during discussions with Frank Burgess, general manager of Prestel in the middle of the 1980s, he confirmed quite clearly that expansion into the Nordic markets had been a necessity for Prestel, and this had provided training for other market developments. Burgess visited the Nordic countries frequently and was keen to maintain close contact with Scandinavian representatives. This is also relevant for the introduction of CEPT-3. There was close contact between the Nordic countries and CEPT representatives in the middle of the 1980s. The Scandinavian countries were important start-up markets that were used to test several aspects, both technically and with regard to new applications. The Nordic countries were important partners for the expansion of videotex and they helped pave the way for the internet, about ten years later.

Table 1 .

 1 Table 1 lists which standard was utilized and the year of the official launch of videotex services (trials were conducted earlier) in European countries. Launch of videotext.

	Country	Launch	Standard
	Austria	1984	Prestel
	Belgium	1986	Prestel
	Denmark	1985	Prestel / CEPT-3
	Finland	1986	Prestel
	France	1984	Teletel
	Germany	1984	CEPT-3
	Italy	1985	CEPT-3 / Prestel
	Netherlands	1984	Prestel
	Norway	1986	Prestel / CEPT-3
	Sweden	1982	Prestel (CEPT-3 in 1987)
	Switzerland	1986	CEPT-3
	UK	1980	Prestel

  Videotex was a cultural problem for PTT o Telecom markets were beginning to be liberalized, no monopolies o Resources were scarce, with no state support o The videotex network (CEPT type) was expensive o The number of users was too small o TeleGuide was closed o The compatibility problems between networks were too costly o New types of equipment appeared, teletex, ISDN, smart phones


Per Lundin
email: per.lundin@abe.kth.se

Designing Democracy: The UTOPIA-project and the Role of the Nordic Labor Movement in Technological Change during the 1970s and 1980s

Keywords: Graphic industries, history of computing, industrial democracy, IThistory, labor movement, Sweden, trade unions, users

By using the UTOPIA-project as an example, this paper highlights the role of the Nordic labor movement in technological change and underlines that there are different incentives for technological change. While corporations developing technology usually pursued increased efficiency in production, the UTOPIA-project aimed at other, alternative goals such as translating social values regarding job skills, quality of work, and quality of products into new computer hardware and software for the graphic industries. In the larger context, the UTOPIA-project can be seen as an attempt by the labor movement to revitalize and realize the old dream of industrial democracy by designing computing technology.

Introduction

When the computer-based wave of rationalization hit industry, trade, business, and the public sector during the 1970s and the 1980s, many occupational groups feared they would lose control of their work and eventually their jobs. The "microelectronics revolution" during the mid-1970s transformed the job made by graphic workers [START_REF] Magnusson | Den tredje revolutionen -och den svenska arbetsmarknaden[END_REF][START_REF] Wennersten | Mikrodatoriseringen: Den tysta revolutionen: En guide för beslutsfattare[END_REF]. Many of them lost their jobs, and especially in the United States and Great Britain, extinction threatened the very existence of the occupation. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the counter-strategies developed by organized labor were in general Ludditian, i.e. characterized by a resistance towards technological change [START_REF] Noble | Progress without People: New Technology, Unemployment, and the Message of Resistance[END_REF][START_REF] Bix | Inventing Ourselves Out of Jobs? America's Debate over Technological Unemployment, 1929-1981[END_REF][START_REF] Moore | New Technology and the Trade Unions[END_REF].

This paper demonstrates that the responses articulated by the labor movement in the Nordic countries developed along a different path. The Nordic trade unions argued that if new technology could be developed on the premises of workers, it would be possible for them to keep their occupations. By investigating the conscious counterstrategies elaborated by Nordic trade unions and politically radical computer scientists during the 1970s and 1980s, this paper shows that they aimed to organize themselves with the help of technology rather than against technology. Particular attention will be paid to the UTOPIA-project and its attempts to develop computer hardware and software for the graphic industries. The important contextual elements discussed are the altering notions of technological change during the post-war period, the question and old dream of industrial democracy, the strong welfare states and long-lasting social democratic rule in the Nordic countries, and the belief in allegedly Nordic/Scandinavian values such as consensus, participation and democracy.

The UTOPIA-project 3 Technology as Ideology

The Norwegian mathematician and computer scientist Kristen Nygaard, who worked at the Norwegian Defense Research Agency (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt) and later at Norsk Regnesentral, inspired the researchers in the UTOPIA-project. Originally liberal in his views, he was influenced by the social movements of the 1960s and engaged himself politically to the left. His interests moved toward the social consequences of computerization. Together with Olav Terje Bergo, he cooperated in the early 1970s with the Norwegian Iron and Metal Workers' Union (Norsk Jern-og Metallarbeiderforbund, NJMF) on a project that dealt with planning, control, and data processing in enterprises from the perspectives of the employees [START_REF] Nygaard | Databehandling, planlegging og styring: Grunnbok for fagbevegelsen[END_REF]. Another important source of inspiration was Harry Braverman's seminal book from 1974 on the degradation of work, Labor and Monopoly Capital, which was translated into Swedish in 1977 [START_REF] Braverman | Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century[END_REF][START_REF] Braverman | Arbete och monopolkapital: Arbetets degradering i det tjugonde århundradet[END_REF].

The NJMF-project received a couple of Nordic successors in the 1970s: the Danish DUE-project and the Swedish DEMOS-project. DEMOS, an acronym for Demokratisk styrning och planering (Democratic Control and Planning in Working Life) took place between 1975 and 1980, as a form of cooperation between the Swedish Center for Working Life and a number of trade unions. It dealt with planning, control and the use of computers from a wage-earner perspective, aiming to accumulate knowledge for the union movement [START_REF] Ehn | Brytningstid: Teknik, arbete och facklig kamp i grafiska branschen: Rapport från samarbetet mellan Svenska Dagbladets Kamratklubb och Demos-projektet[END_REF].

Like its precursors, UTOPIA was an explicitly ideological project from the outset. The research program for the project from 1980 stated:

The experience gained by organized labor and the research conducted by trade unions during the 1970s into the ability to influence new technology and the organization of work at local level highlighted a number of problems. One fundamental experience gained is that the "degrees of freedom" available to design the content and organization of work utilizes existing technology is often considerably less than that required to meet trade unions demands. Or expressed another way: Existing production technology more and more often constitutes an insurmountable barrier preventing the realization of trade union demands for the quality of work and a meaningful job [11, p. 255].

According to its participants, technology was an expression of the sort of society in which we live. It was value-laden -and the participants argued that existing technology and new technology largely reflected corporate interests instead of the interests of workers. Hence, it constrained the demands of workers and trade unions. In contrast to the trade unions' earlier "defensive strategies" for coping with technological change (e.g., reducing the negative effects of technology on employees by demanding reforms in legislation and concluding agreements), the participants in the UTOPIA-project worked with a "yet untried offensive strategy." The trade unions themselves were supposed to develop alternative technologies that mirrored the interests of trade unions rather than the ones of corporations:

The trade union movement itself draws up the technological and training alternatives and takes the sole responsibility for their implementation and development at local level [11, p. 256].

Thus, the aim with the UTOPIA-project was to help unions translate their social values regarding the job skills, quality of work, and quality of products into new computer hardware and software for the printing industry. Its participants held a strong belief that technology largely shaped working conditions. The underlying notion of technology being deterministic led them to argue that it was crucial for workers to develop and control alternative technologies.

Altering Notions of Technological Change

The concept of technological determinism ruled during the post-war period. However, as pointed out by David Edgerton, we should distinguish it from the notion of technology as autonomous -as out-of-control -an important theme in Western thought during the 1950s and the 1960s [START_REF] Winner | Autonomous Technology: Technics-Out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought[END_REF][START_REF] Edgerton | Tilting at Paper Tigers[END_REF]. Thus, the trade unions and the UTOPIA-project questioned the inevitability of technological change, not the technological determinism in social change per se. On the contrary, UTOPIA presupposed a 'soft' technological determinism [14, p. 2]. The point of departure for the project was that technology largely shapes the workers' conditions.

In the following, the paper will examine the governing Social Democrats' and the labor movement's approach to technology and technological change during the postwar period. Already in the Arbetarrörelsens efterkrigsprogram from 1944, a joint labor movement program set up by the Social Democrats and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, LO), a growing technological optimism could be sensed. It was through technological progress that material and social welfare should be reached. The so-called Rigoletto conference organized by the Social Democrats in 1955, with participating scientists, technicians and politicians as well as representatives for trade and industry, received public attention. It resulted in the publication Tekniken och morgondagens samhälle (Technology and the Society of Tomorrow) and manifested an optimistic belief in technology and science [START_REF]Tekniken och morgondagens samhälle[END_REF]. This belief was established as a "supreme ideology," an ideology above all other ideologies, an ideology that unified all the existing political ideologies. It was also reflected in the discourse on the "death of ideologies" that took place in the Western world during the mid-1950s [START_REF] Skovdahl | Tingsten, totalitarismen och ideologierna[END_REF]. The notion of technological change as autonomous was strong. Thinking in the inevitability of technological progress, there was no need for considering alternative directions. There was only one way to go. The overall strategy was "total adaptation" to the demands of the assaulting technology. People understood that technology determined social change. Thus, both the belief that technology is autonomous and the belief that technology is largely deterministic in its character, existed side by side. Trade unions largely shared this approach. For example, the Trade Union Confederation adopted a "rationalization friendly approach," i.e., a strategy of adaptation towards technological change [17, p. 355].

In the aftermath of the "Boom Years" of the 1950s and the 1960s came the crisis of the 1970s. Technology changed from a promise to a threat. The rationalization that followed technological change did not produce prosperity to the same extent as before; instead, it increasingly made workers redundant and ultimately led to unemployment. A broad spectrum of political organizations and interest groups began to question the inevitability of technological change. It was almost as a discovery: technology is political! Instead of adapting ourselves to the inevitable technological progress, they argued, we should choose technology, thus choose our future; we should take control over technology in order to take control over work; etc. [START_REF]Att välja framtid: Ett underlag för diskussion och överväganden om framtidsstudier i Sverige: Betänkande. Statens offentliga utredningar[END_REF].

A very strong labor movement expanded its ambitions from wage negotiations into changing work organization and eventually technology [START_REF] Isacson | Arbetets organisation och ledning[END_REF]. For instance, the Trade Union Confederation established a Committee for Computing (LO:s dataråd) in 1976, the Workers' Educational Association (Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund, ABF); it conducted courses on the role of computers in social change; the Social Democratic Party presented an action program on computers and politics [START_REF]Företagsdemokrati och data: Sammanfattning av LOs handlingsprogram[END_REF][START_REF]Solidariskt medbestämmande: Rapport till LO-kongressen 1976: Med kongressens beslut[END_REF][START_REF] Frejhagen | [END_REF][START_REF]Datoranvändning: Från samråd till medbestämmande[END_REF][START_REF]Datorer på människans villkor[END_REF][START_REF]Datorer på människans villkor: Program för datapolitiken[END_REF]. They movedin their own words -from a "defensive" to an "offensive" strategy. Instead of being the passive object of automation, they argued that the worker should be an active subject in shaping technological change.

Tage Erlander's Computer Symposium became an important political manifestation of this new posture. The symposium took place in 1980 at the Social Democratic residence Bommersvik and resulted in, among other things, the publication Datorerna och samhällsutvecklingen (Computers and the Development of Society). This labor movement summit conference consisted of participants such as the Social Democratic party secretary Sten Andersson (later Minister for Health and Social Affairs, and Foreign Minister), the president of the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens centralorganisation, TCO) Lennart Bodström (later Foreign Minister, and Minister for Education and Science), the member of the Social Democratic party executive Kjell-Olof Feldt (later Minister for Finance), the secretary for the Swedish Trade Union Confederation Rune Molin (later Minister for Industry), Hans Gustafsson (later Minister for Housing), Anders Ferm (managing director for the leading Social Democratic publishing house Tidens förlag) as well as the social democratic icons such as former Prime Minister Tage Erlander and former Minister for Finance Gunnar Sträng [START_REF]Datorerna och samhällsutvecklingen: Debattinlägg vid Tage Erlanders datasymposium 1980[END_REF].

The well-known Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright opened the symposium with a reflection over Man, Technology, and the Future. He drew the attention to the profound social consequences of modern technology and thus addressed the overall themes of the conference: What social consequences does technological change have? Of special concern at the conference were the effects of technological change on employment. Given the profound consequences of technology: Who influenced and controlled technological change? Was it possible to control the progress of technology or was humanity forced to adapt itself to this development? Different visions and strategies for confronting technological change were suggested. The participants from trade unions, such as Rune Molin, emphasized that trade unions had to take command over technological change; another participant demanded "offensive decisions." In short: the employees needed to create their own alternatives [START_REF]Datorerna och samhällsutvecklingen: Debattinlägg vid Tage Erlanders datasymposium 1980[END_REF].

Thus, during the 1970s it is possible to discern a shift in the notion of technological change from a belief that it was autonomous and out-of-control, towards a belief that it is controllable. However, the notion that technological change determined social change was as strong as before; it also was a very important incentive for the trade unions to take control over technological change. It is in this vein that we should understand the attempts of the Scandinavian labor movement to take control over work organization and technology and, consequently, projects such as NJMF, DEMOS, DUE, and above all, UTOPIA.

Industrial Democracy Reborn

Henry Ford's assertion that "democracy stops at the factory gates" strikingly illustrates a problem that gained attention during the 1920s in connection with the wave of democratization that swept through Europe after World War I. It dealt with the employees' influence in companies. After the seminal Saltsjöbaden agreement in 1938 between the Swedish Trade Union Confederation and the Swedish Employers' Confederation (Svenska arbetsgivareföreningen, SAF) the question gained renewed attention. The so-called Swedish Model was established during the 1930s and the 1940s and it became a role model manifesting technological optimism during the Boom Years of the 1950s and the 1960s [START_REF] Johansson | Taylorismen och arbetarrörelsen: En problemdiskussion[END_REF][START_REF] Johansson | Teknikoptimismen i den svenska modellen[END_REF]. The social conflicts that arose at the end of the 1960s politized the industrial rationalization and the Swedish Model was questioned by the trade unions who protested against the "over-profits" made by corporations which they claimed did not sufficiently reach the employees. As a response, the powerful Social Democratic Party carried through a number of legislations during the 1970s that considerably strengthened the position of the employees in private companies. For instance, a law concerning the right of participation in decision-making, the Codetermination Act (Medbestämmandelagen, MBL) was legislated in 1976, and in the wake of these many reforms the question of industrial democracy called for attention once again [START_REF]Företagsdemokrati och data: Sammanfattning av LOs handlingsprogram[END_REF]. Pelle Ehn, UTOPIA's project leader, rephrased Ford's assertion as, "democracy stops at the office door and the factory gate" [START_REF]Computers and Democracy: A Scandinavian Challenge[END_REF].

The attempts to re-vitalize the question of industrial democracy had important parallels in other Scandinavian countries. Norway was pioneering with its program for industrial democracy during the 1960s and a number of experiments in work organization were completed. Similar attempts took place in Denmark, where several experiments in industrial democracy were conducted between 1969 and 1973. It should be noted that this trend is also discernible outside Scandinavia, and particularly in West Germany, which, among other things, carried through a similar Codetermination Act in 1976 [START_REF] Pedersen | Fagbevaegelsen og spørsmålet om industrielt demokrati i Skandinavien: Nogle problemstillinger og resultater fra et komparativt skandinavisk project[END_REF][START_REF] Judt | Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945[END_REF].

In conjunction with passing the Codetermination Act, the Swedish Parliament decided in June 1976 to establish a research institute with the purpose of bringing the research community and trade unions together. The Work Environment Fund (Arbetsmiljöfonden) 2 , based on a wage tax paid by all employers, financed the Swedish Center for Working Life [START_REF] Johansson | Arbetsmiljöfonden: Lagen om avsättning till arbetsmiljöfond[END_REF]. One of the aims of the center was to "promote democracy in working life," and the concept of industrial democracy so to speak, was built in its regulations [33 p. 9, p. 13]. Furthermore, it edited (and financed) the international quarterly journal Economic and Industrial Democracy published by Sage Publications starting in 1980. The Center for Working Life carried out three big research projects dealing with trade unions and development of technology and organization: DEMOS (1975)(1976)(1977)(1978)(1979)(1980), UTOPIA (1981UTOPIA ( -1986)), and FRONT [START_REF]Arbete, ledning och teknik: Resultat från ett forskningsprogram om omvandling i företag och fack vid Arbetslivscentrum 1975-1991[END_REF]. In the statutes of the Center for Working Life, it legislated that the research conducted should not consist of traditional reflective, analytic social science. Instead, it should take the form of "action research" where the "researcher's contribution as well as the reporting" should be "highly dependent on the actions of local parties" [33, p. 12]. The argument supported by the Center for Working Life was that trade unions needed to develop independently knowledge in order to shape technology and work organization actively. The center took a seminal role in the DEMOS and UTOPIA projects [START_REF]The Swedish Center for Working Life[END_REF].

To conclude this section, the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s was a period when powerful trade unions made several attempts to realize the old dream of economic or industrial democracy. Through a number of governmental decisions, several new institutions with affinities to the labor movement such as the Work Environment Fund and the Center for Working Life took place on stage and quickly gained in strength. A state-supported complex giving voice to the demands of the labor movement was established and it became an important prerequisite for projects such as DEMOS and UTOPIA.

Democracy by Design

A "technology laboratory" where researchers and workers worked closely together was established at the Swedish Center for Working Life. The American Robert Howard reviewed UTOPIA for the MIT-based journal Technology Review, and was amazed at what he saw when visiting the laboratory. He reported that it could be a research department at any high-tech manufacturer; instead, the lab belonged to the government-funded Swedish Center for Working Life in Stockholm and he described the scene where graphic workers and computer scientists sat side by side as "an intriguing experiment in technology development" [START_REF] Bødker | A UTOPIAN Experience: On Design of Powerful Computer-Based Tools for Skilled Graphic Workers[END_REF][START_REF] Howard | UTOPIA: Where Workers Craft New Technology[END_REF].

One of the more important results was the publication of requirement specifications (kravspecifikationer) in 1983. The requirement specifications acted as guidelines for what workers should require of new technologies or organizations when introduced, and they were used in collective bargaining and local negotiations [START_REF]Kravspecifikation -teknik, arbete och utbildning[END_REF].

The UTOPIA-project presented its results at a conference in May 1984 at the Social Democratic Youth League's (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsförbund, SSU) residential study center Bommersvik [11, p. 259]. The choice of place symbolized and manifested the strong connections with the labor movement; during the latter half of the twentieth century, the Bommersvik residence was a political and cultural center for the Swedish labor movement.

Should the UTOPIA-project be evaluated as a success or as a failure? According to the researchers, the project led to "a successful conclusion" as a "single demonstration example." It demonstrated that alternative technological and organizational solutions for newspapers could be developed, which gave possibilities for graphic workers to improve their skills and keep their jobs. The participating researchers nurtured a dream that the project would contribute to a "new Scandinavian model" for technological development. However, as they later pointed out, the lack of trade union cooperation put an end to this dream [6, 11, p. 260]. Nevertheless, as a project on participatory design it must be considered seminal. It gave rise to the so-called Scandinavian School of System Development (Den skandinaviska skolan), where the users' participation in system development has become a key element [START_REF] Asp | Trender inom skandinavisk systemutveckling[END_REF]. Moreover, quite interestingly, an observer noted in 1990 that graphic workers in Sweden had managed to keep their occupations to a considerably higher extent than in the Anglo-Saxon countries [START_REF] Johansson | Teknikoptimismen i den svenska modellen[END_REF]. To sum up, the counter-strategies against a computer-based wave of rationalization developed by the Nordic trade unions differed fundamentally from those articulated by trade unions in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Former Occupational Safety Foundation (Arbetarskyddsfonden).

Acknowledgments. Handelsbankens forskningsstiftelser and Ridderstads stiftelse för historisk grafisk forskning have provided financial support for the research carried out in connection with this paper. Isabelle Dussauge, Johan Gribbe, Arne Kaijser, Anna Orrghen, Julia Peralta, Gustav Sjöblom, and Björn Thodenius have given valuable comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.