Eloïse Libourel

Libourel Eloïse
email: eloise.libourel@enpc.fr

Phd Candidate

Trans-European railway corridors creating new territories: the Spanish Mediterranean corridor project

Keywords: Mediterranean railway corridor (MRC), Spain, high-speed rail, territorialisation, stakeholders, local geopolitics, corridors, Trans-European networks of transport (TEN-T), representations

The Mediterranean railway corridor is a project of European scale transport infrastructure to be implemented in the Spanish Mediterranean regions in order to improve the interconnection with the French network. At national, regional and even local level, many political, economic and academic stakeholders take a part in the debate around its realisation and they contribute to elaborate a multiple territorialisation according to their singular visions and objectives. To give evidence of this complex territorialisation, the analysis of stakeholders' discourses and the mapping of their representations of the corridor together with context elements, lead to the production of a series of map hypothesis to be presented to the actors as a basis for interviews and field work. This series of maps displays plural visions of the "corridor territory" that cross the institutional boundaries and force to take into account multi-scalar spatial and even non-spatial dimensions.

INTRODUCTION

The Mediterranean railway corridor (MRC) is a project anchored in both the Trans-European networks of transport (TEN-T) since 1996 and the Spanish historical and political context since the 1920's. It was revived in the 2000's. Despite this quite long history, it is still an infrastructure project, a virtual object discussed by multiple stakeholders as a structuring axis. The project was indeed appropriated by all kinds of actors at all scales (Spanish government, local and regional institutions, intellectuals, economic actors and lobbies…). They all support the MRC project in order to benefit from it, according to their priorities in terms of economy, policy and attractiveness.

Trans-European railway corridors creating new territories: the Spanish Mediterranean corridor project LIBOUREL, Eloïse 13 th WCTR, July 15-18, 2013 -Rio de Janeiro, Brasil 2

The Mediterranean railway corridor project is held in a double context of political competition between Spanish government, regions and cities [START_REF] Loyer | Géopolitique de l'Espagne[END_REF][START_REF] Romero | Geopolítica y gobierno del territorio en España[END_REF], and of economical crisis having a strong impact at all levels (Baron, 2010). Despite its cost, it appears as an opportunity to create new economical dynamics and political cooperation along the Mediterranean coast. Competition between Catalonia and Valencia would eventually decrease thanks to this circumstance cooperation, and the coastal axis would be reinforced as a counterweight to Madrid. Beside its economic and political dimensions, this cooperation has a strong territorializing effect on the corridor, supplying it with a concrete shape by planning actions and political alliances. These aspects of the corridor are nevertheless plural and express different visions of this Mediterranean axis. How is the production of a consensus (Audikana, 2012) on the project creating plural processes of territorialisation? Methodologically speaking, how to represent with geography's tools, this "corridor territory" according to its multiple representations? And what are the spatial forms of such an object?

In order to throw light on the way of emergence of a corridor territory around the Mediterranean railway corridor project, a three phase methodology will be implemented. At the first step, we will focus on a discourse analysis based on public speeches, interviews, medias and advertising. The results of this analysis will be confronted to socio-economic data regarding politics, demography, business and planning operations. This double analysis will lead to the production of a series of maps drawing the different visions of this particular territory, according to the results of the discourse analysis. These maps aim to enlighten the different possibilities of understanding and representing a territorial vision of a future railway axis. The maps could also be used as a support for interviews in an oncoming field work. We will focus on the analysis of the MRC project through institutional documents (European Commission, 2001[START_REF] Debarbieux | Figures (géo-)graphiques et prospective. Cartes, schémas et modèles au service du projet et de la prospective territoriale[END_REF], 2011;Ministerio de Fomento, 2004[START_REF] Star | This is Not a Boundary Object: reflections on the Origin of a Concept[END_REF][START_REF] Libourel | High-speed rail reshaping urban areas: Valencia Parque Central[END_REF], through the discourses in the medias and interviews [START_REF] Libourel | L'insertion de Valence dans le corridor ferroviaire méditerranéen. Stratégies multiscalaires et aménagement urbain[END_REF], and then through the production of a series of maps in order to make visible stakeholders' representations of the corridor territory. We will finally try to show what could be the impact of the construction of these multiple visions on the previous TEN-T project.

MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS GATHERED BY A SINGLE PROJECT Spanish actors towards a multi-scalar consensus for the Mediterranean corridor

The project of Mediterranean railway corridor is historically linked to the economic activities of the Spanish Mediterranean coast: in the 1920's the President of the Federation of Orange Export (FEN), Norberto Ferrer, promoted the idea of a freight axis to carry fruits from the regions of Valencia and Murcia towards central European consumer markets (ABC journal of Madrid, December 28th, 1927). In the 1930's, the first steps of a railway tourism also appeared on this axis with the railway passenger service between France and Morocco. But this coastal axis is opposite to a radial organisation held by Madrid to reinforce its dominant position in Spain as a political and economic capital (Bel, 2010;[START_REF] Olmos | España, invertebrada a gran velocidad[END_REF]. [START_REF] Libourel | L'insertion de Valence dans le corridor ferroviaire méditerranéen. Stratégies multiscalaires et aménagement urbain[END_REF], it is possible to classify the main stakeholders taking part in the debate on the Mediterranean corridor up to their objectives and their vision of the corridor territory. The definition of "corridor territory" is quite wide, different actors have their own scientific or operational definition. The concept of "corridor" emerged in the 1960's in the field of spatial analysis and network analysis (Haggett, Chorley, 1969;[START_REF] Kansky | Structure of Transportation Networks: Relationship between Network Geometry and Regional Characteristics[END_REF]. It was particularly used to describe urban processes linked to the intensification of transit along structuring transportation axis, as shown by C.F.J. [START_REF] Whebell | Corridors: a Theory of Urban Systems[END_REF] and B.E. [START_REF] Prentice | Transport Gateways and Trade Corridors[END_REF] in North-American case studies. In the 1990's and 2000's, the notion of "transportation corridor" was used in multi-criteria economic analysis and supply and demand models. European case studies appear in the 2000's in institutional reports of the European Commission and in national scientific productions. The notion seems to have slipped from spatial to economic analysis [START_REF] Hall | Cities, Regions and Flows[END_REF], but the reactivation of the concept of transportation corridor in the great European projects could bring it back to a central role for geography. The definitions of "corridor" as they appear in the state-of-the-art are very interesting because they show the evolution of the concept along the time and through different disciplinary contexts, and its plasticity.

As one of the main questions of this research is to determine what can be the territory of the Mediterranean railway corridor, we adopt a minimal and inclusive definition of this concept for the interpretation of interviews' results: the "corridor territory" is to be understood as a coherent coalition of interests in a spatial framework. This table, by comparing stakeholders' priorities, leads to two principal findings. First, the impact of the main objectives of each actor on his vision of the corridor territory is obvious. National objectives as those of the Government lead to institutional perimeters, whereas European integration or connection and local development objectives lead to non-institutional perimeters, which extension is variable depending on a more or less extensive vision of the corridor.

Second, there is a huge domination of a freight railway axis in the claiming of the different stakeholders, whereas a passenger axis is mainly a demand of the cities. This can be understood because a freight axis would be economically profitable and gathers all economical actors, whereas a passenger high-speed axis would cost much more than its social profitability would make it acceptable (Bel, 2010). But the idea of a high-speed passenger corridor is present in the discourse of the stakeholders as an attractiveness element and as an argument to convince the inhabitants of the opportunity of the corridor. The European gauge tracks of high-speed rail would also improve the connection and interoperability with France. Even if it's possible to make a difference between economical, political and academic stakeholders according to their priorities and to their visions of the territory, and despite their divergent objectives, they all are involved in the Mediterranean project and cooperating into some debate and proposition task forces, as IIVEE-Euram (Institute Ignasi Villalonga of Economics and Business), an institute which aims to promote a Mediterranean Euro-region [START_REF] Boira | Euram 2010: La via europea[END_REF]. Despite their different objectives and positions about the modalities of the project, all these stakeholders are part of a great pro-MRC cluster lobby. This scheme shows how actors coming from diverse origins with quite unlike cultures and knowledge participate to a common effort in favour of the Mediterranean corridor.

A consensus resulting of very divergent approaches

The different stakeholders are, according to their prerogatives and objectives, drawing diverse representations of the Mediterranean corridor, both as an infrastructure and as a territory. Generally speaking, their visions are quite close considering that they all include the main Spanish Mediterranean regions and promote a best accessibility for economic reasons. But the vision of the extension of the Mediterranean corridor is quite different. Several observations can be enlightened. We can first notice that some stakeholders have a restrictive vision, excluding for example Andalusia form the project, for both technical (the coastal mountains are difficult to cross) and political reasons (Andalusia is a historically socio-democratic regions, when Catalonia, Valencia and Murcia have conservative governments), whereas some others have a very inclusive representation of an axis crossing Pyrenees and Gibraltar towards Europe and North Africa. th WCTR, July 15-18, 2013 -Rio de Janeiro, Brasil 6

Second, there is a difference between continuous and discontinuous visions of the territory. The nature of railway infrastructure imposes a discontinuity due to the distance separating the nodes on the infrastructure. This constraint is not equally present in discourses. Economic actors have a network vision of the corridor territory with very few strategic nodes, whereas for the political reasons, the institutional actors attempt to give a continuous representation of the corridor as a coherent territory organised around a new transport axis which would be equally beneficial to everyone. Third, stakeholders have diverse objectives at the local level and are trying to achieve them by taking benefit from a European scale project. Moreover, political institutions of the Mediterranean regions at all scales are trying to take advantage of the corridor as a factor of attractiveness [START_REF] Boira | Existeix l'economia d'Espanya? Arguments a favor d'una economia regional en un context europeu[END_REF]. Cities are engaged in a strong metropolitan competition which takes argument of a nodal position on this new axis [START_REF] Bellet | Ciudad y ferrocarril en la España del siglo XXI. Le integración de la alta velocidad ferroviaria en el medio urbano[END_REF].

Valencia case study is thus very interesting. The implementation of high-speed rail to Madrid in 2010, which is contradictory with the idea of a Mediterranean corridor excepting the capital, was the occasion for the Mayor and the President of the Community of Valencia to revive Parque Central project of underground railway station and urban renewal [START_REF] Libourel | High-speed rail reshaping urban areas: Valencia Parque Central[END_REF]. At the same time, Barcelona is building Sagrera underground tunnel for the connection of north and south tracks, together with a new railway hub.

Even if the Mediterranean corridor is supposed to be mainly oriented towards freight for economical profitability purposes, the construction of a "corridor territory", in a symbolic way, is also being made by the multiplication of urban projects and the query for a metropolitan positive and attractive image. By the way, all these objectives and actions are strongly linked together and are part of the same dominant discourse in favour of the Mediterranean corridor. This public consensus is the result of a political agreement, but also of the mobilisation of a lexicon of positive and valuable images such as modernity, attractiveness, metropolitan development… Thus, the MRC can be considered as a "boundary object", up to S. L. [START_REF] Star | Institutional Ecology, 'Traslations' and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology[END_REF] expression often reused in social science [START_REF] Star | This is Not a Boundary Object: reflections on the Origin of a Concept[END_REF], that is to say an object of mediation between people and institutions which don't work with the same instruments and don't have the same paradigms to understand things. Otherwise, they are brought together around a single object, the Mediterranean corridor, which makes possible a dialog. In the particular case of Spain, it is remarkable that the MRC did oblige political actors at local, regional and national level to go over their reluctances in order to promote a European scale project. At the same time, it brought political, economic and civil society actors together on behalf of the common interest of a Mediterranean corridor. Therefore, a methodology making these strategies' impacts visible is still to be found out.

The discourse analysis is an interesting element, but it doesn't give a satisfactory vision of the different representations of the corridor according to the different stakeholders.

PRODUCING MULTIPLE TERRITORIALISATIONS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN CORRIDOR PROJECT Mapping the territorialisation of the corridor: stakeholders' representations at work

The representations of the Mediterranean corridor territory are changing from one stakeholder to another, as discourse analysis could show. To understand better how these multiple "corridor territories" are built in their minds, mapping is an interesting methodology. By representing the concrete elements of the territory on which stakeholders insist, we can draw maps representing "their" corridor as a structure formed by these elements.

The following series of maps is drawn by taking successively into account the priority elements enlightened in Table 1. First, political levels and parties are a determinant element, both because socio-democratic and conservative parties are strongly in opposition with a number of topics but seem to converge on the MRC project, and because the Mediterranean cities and regions are making it possible to focus on a common objective, despite the competition between them. Thus, the analysis of electoral results seems interesting to a better understanding of the balance of power at different scales. Second, the dynamism of the Mediterranean coast in terms of economy is strengthened by all the stakeholders who underline the importance of harbours, industry, agriculture and tourism, and of their European hinterland. Third, the coastal cities rank among the main Spanish metropolis (Barcelona is the 2 nd and Valencia the 3 rd city of Spain after Madrid) by their number of inhabitants). These three elements make it interesting to draw maps based on demographic, economic and industrial data in order to interrogate the real position of Mediterranean regions in Spain. Fourth, there is a huge movement of great urban planning projects in the Mediterranean cities, especially as far as transportation infrastructure is concerned, each of these cities are willing to join the narrow group of "European metropolises" by improving its connection to the network and promoting a metropolitan integration. Finally, to enhance the vision of the Spanish Mediterranean corridor project, it is interesting to map the different members of pro-MRC lobbies throughout Europe, in order to make evident the underlying institutional structure of the projects.

The following maps are set by picking in the aforesaid discourse the most important territorial elements listed hereabove and by identifying representative qualitative and quantitative data for mapping.

A changing territory depending on the adopted perspective

The aim of these maps is to show different aspects of the Mediterranean axis actual situation, so as to represent different elements of coherence or structure. Therefore, they have no prospective goal and don't attempt to represent what the corridor could be [START_REF] Debarbieux | Figures (géo-)graphiques et prospective. Cartes, schémas et modèles au service du projet et de la prospective territoriale[END_REF]. Their interest lies mainly in understanding the different components of a Mediterranean complex situation as far as territorial organisation is concerned. Moreover, a huge part of these cities are also dealing with great urban projects concerning infrastructure, as figure 5 shows. From both economic and demographic point of view, the Mediterranean provinces (which are an infra-regional institutional perimeter in Spain) are very well doted compared to the average: together with Madrid and its macro-region, they form the most dynamic Spanish axis, both economically and demographically speaking. In all the coastal provinces the number of companies increased more than 27% in the last decade. Almost all the coastal province capitals had a positive demographic growth in the same period, and half of themespecially intermediary citiesincreased their population more than 16%. This situation is an argument in favour of the MRC in stakeholders' liberal discourse of competitiveness: it appears as a coherent axis and as a centrality for Spanish development, even if it is geographically peripheral. This idea of a Mediterranean coherent and selfsufficient axis is quite contradictory with Madrid's -central government'slogics of providing territorial equity by linking the national capital to every province with high-speed rail services. At a regional level, Catalonia and Valencia are proudly attached to their dynamism as a counterweight to Madrid and as an autonomy argument. In the one hand, this economic and demographic propitious position is a factor of centrality in the country, despite the actual crisis which especially affected them since 2008, for these peripheral regions. Stakeholder's underline that there is a huge potential for economic recovery as soon as European situation gets better. On the other hand, the socio-economic situation also is an argument for nationalist discourse and even independency claiming in Catalonia: nationalist arguments lay on the idea that the crisis comes from a bad management of the national government, but that Mediterranean regions have a great deal of resources and a huge economic potential based on their strong industrial sector and on their powerful harbours, as shown in figure 4. In the Mediterranean regions, industries are quite well represented, in close relationship with harbours. This map especially focuses on the industrial frame of the four Mediterranean regions -Catalonia, Valencian Autonomous Community, Murcia Region and Andalusia. In this spatial framework, automotive industry is a very important productive sector and a leader of the integration to European consumer market, especially with Nissan and Ford factories respectively in Barcelona and Valencia. These industries are strongly linked to harbours for the import of spares and the export of cars mainly towards the European market. And yet these exportations could easily be made by railroad if the interconnection of the Spanish and French networks was completed. The Mediterranean regions are also developing technologic parks directly related to the harbours which could easily benefit from a freight railway corridor [START_REF] Hall | Integrating Seaports and Trade Corridors[END_REF], but also of a high-speed rail axis as a factor of attractiveness for executive. This structure of industry is for now very close to "hubs and spokes" model centred on three main harbour hubs (Barcelona, Valencia and Algesiras) and connected to very local or regional industries. It could shift to a corridor structure combining a few intermodal hubs with a powerful axis connected to Europe. th WCTR, July 15-18, 2013 -Rio de Janeiro, Brasil 11

Figure 5 -Urban planning around stations claiming for the corridor At a local scale, almost all the medium and large Mediterranean cities have great infrastructure projects strongly related to the MRC project. The main high-speed rail stations projects draw a geography of urban dynamism as far as this kind of equipment can be considered a factor of modernity and attractiveness. 22 of the 50 Spanish station projects are in the Mediterranean regions, mainly at the end of the new radial high-speed lines. In the cities which are trying to reach a nodal position with the MRC, a terminus situation on a oneway line to the capital seems unsatisfactory. These stations are symbolic elements of urban landscape, both as urban renewal opportunity and as metropolitan attribute [START_REF] Bellet | Ciudad y ferrocarril en la España del siglo XXI. Le integración de la alta velocidad ferroviaria en el medio urbano[END_REF][START_REF] Libourel | L'insertion de Valence dans le corridor ferroviaire méditerranéen. Stratégies multiscalaires et aménagement urbain[END_REF].

Depending on the objectives of the city, three types of stations are planned. The adaptation of the existing station as a minimal operation consists of the creation of European gauge tracks and of a regulated access platform for the AVE (Spanish high-speed train). The creation of a brand new AVE station can be linked to the peripheral situation of the highspeed tracks, avoiding the centre and it can be considered as an opportunity of urban renewal for peripheral districts. Sometimes, this peripheral situation leads to infrastructure projects several kilometres far away from the centre, widely misconnected to the existing urban shape. Finally, the creation of an underground station, which generally speaking is not a technical necessity, seems to be an extreme case of urban symbolism (Baron, Libourel, 2013;[START_REF] Nas | Cities Full of Symbols: a Theory of Urban Space and Culture[END_REF].

The infrastructure appears as a sign of the dynamism and importance of the city, giving it a metropolitan status. Barcelona-Sagrera and Valencia Parque Central are the most representative colossal underground projects [START_REF] Libourel | High-speed rail reshaping urban areas: Valencia Parque Central[END_REF], and they are a model for Alicante, Murcia or Granada for instance, which had to put their projects of underground stations on hold because of the economic context. All the Spanish cities claiming for the Mediterranean corridor are members of Ferrmed and/or Business Eumed, two business lobbies claiming for a better integration of the Mediterranean regions in the European economy and promoting various great projects of infrastructure and cooperation. The map of both main lobbies reveals transcontinental and circum-Mediterranean visions. The Spanish Mediterranean corridor is a central piece of two greater projects connected to European market and to Mediterranean countries. Both lobbies were born in Barcelona, even if Ferrmed chose Brussels as head office in order to affirm its European position. It also publishes socio-economic studies of the areas concerned by its projects and proposes technical reports about the possibilities of implementation of a transcontinental freight railroad [START_REF] Ferrmed | Ferrmed Global Study. Ferrmed Great Axis Rail Freight Network and its area of influence, Scandinavia-Rhein-Rhone-Western Mediterranean. Feasibility, conclusions and recommendations[END_REF]Centre for Innovation in Transport, 2012).

The map shows a major concentration of members on the Spanish coast, especially around Barcelona and Valencia as the main metropolises and around Gibraltar and the French border, the connections to Europe and North Africa, but also all along the Morocco-Saint-Petersburg corridor. This particular repartition of the members underlines the difference between the Ferrmed operative project, based on many intermediate cities, and the Business Eumed utopia which is presented as a general outlook or a representation to keep in mind and to think about, but not as a project which could be implemented and does not bring so many stakeholders together.

Mapping the priority elements evoked by the main stakeholders is a way to understand their representations of the Mediterranean corridor, characterised by a more or less institutional perimeter, variable length and continue or discontinue vision of the territory. This part of the study on the Mediterranean corridor leads to three main results. First, it allows an immediate, concrete and visual understanding of the situation of the Mediterranean regions in Spain and

Trans-European railway corridors creating new territories: the Spanish Mediterranean corridor project LIBOUREL, Eloïse 13 th WCTR, July 15-18, 2013 -Rio de Janeiro, Brasil 13 of their socio-economic, industrial and political characteristics. Second, it gives an idea of the multiple visions of the Mediterranean corridor that can be elaborated based on the arguments presented in the discourse of stakeholders. This is the main focus point on which will be based our further analysis. Finally, from a methodological point of view, these maps present an operational result, as they are the first step of the elaboration of simplified schemes of the different ways of understanding the Mediterranean corridor territory according to the discourses analysed hereabove.

Changing geometry of the Mediterranean corridor

Thanks to these preliminary maps drawn up to stakeholders' discourses, we can imagine what could be the different modalities of a "corridor territory" in the minds of different actors.

By analysing the structuring elements of the series of maps, we propose to draw a series of schematic figures presenting some hypothesis of representation of the corridor, so as to make its different options very clearly legible and accessible, but to keep at the same time interpretative latitude. This should make of these figures a new research material, summarising the discourse analysis results and allowing to present them to new categories of actors in a second phase of interviews.

The method used here is quite the opposite of the mental maps method as far as their production is concerned: it is an interpretation of discourses, made by the researcher herself, and confronted to the actual socio-economic structures. It will be presented to interviewees so that they can react to the figures instead of asking them to draw their own mental map of the Mediterranean corridor. Schematic representations as these figures are far too minimalist to be capable to take into account all the pertinent elements and interactions creating a potential coherent territory, but they can be a powerful instrument for research. Moreover, other cartographic hypothesis

Trans-European railway corridors creating new territories: the Spanish Mediterranean corridor project LIBOUREL, Eloïse 13 th WCTR, July 15-18, 2013 -Rio de Janeiro, Brasil 14 could actually be proposed by analysing other aspects of the corridor. With these figures, a few simple and clearly identified scenarios are drawn up and made visible, so that we can analyse the perspectives offered by the different hypothesis. These scenarios are as same as those which have been identified in the previous series of maps. Figure 7a draws a political option of the corridor territory, based on the regional borders and the political majorities. Figure 7b and 7c are the result of the two structures of a Mediterranean corridor territory based on economic and industrial data: in the first scheme, demographic and economic aspects show a strong physical link to the centre of Spain and Europe, whereas the second insists on the importance of the maritime foreland and of the connection of the main hubs. The urban planning great projects (figure 7d) lead to a representation based on a series of points along the coast, without a real coherence in the project. On the contrary, the corridor territory as seen by the lobbies is much more continuous because of the very numerous members and their frequent meetings to build a coherent action, centred on a few great metropolises and oriented towards the exportation options of Spanish economy (figure 7e).

Map analysis drawing a "corridor territory"? Findings from map hypothesis

The mapping of the hypothesis of corridor territories reveals unexpected coalitions at both political and economical levels. Main factors emerging from almost all maps are the importance of harbour-cities and of great export industries. Commercial exchange is one of the most essential factors. But intermediate and even small cities also have influence on political and planning levels: urban planning operations claiming for the corridor are quite significant from a socioeconomic and even political point of view. They are also industrial poles, as Figure 4 demonstrates, which is contradictory with the idea that a passenger high-speed axis would be the only opportunity for these cities. They reveal the query of an existence as metropolises at European scale trough their presence in the Mediterranean corridor. These operations contribute to assure a certain continuity of the Mediterranean corridor territory despite its natural discontinuity of railway network. Another important conclusion highlights the fact that there is no institutional pertinent perimeter for the Mediterranean corridor. The political representation is necessarily based on the Autonomous communities, but this institutional scale was not found in any other representation.

There are mainly two kinds of territory: a continuous axis of variable length incorporating every intermediate territory, or a discontinuous hubs and spokes territory based on the articulation of a few nodes in the network. These two visions are linked to two commitments which are not necessarily opposite even if they are quite different in the European territorial organisation tradition: either to promote a territorial balance trying to make every part of the country deriving benefit from the new equipment, or to consider competitiveness as the reinforcement of the main nodes to insert them in the global and continental flows. Finally, one of the most interesting characteristics of these representations is that almost all of the representations are based on the idea of exchange and communication with Europe, with North Africa and with ports hinterlands and forelands, in a context of increasing road transport costs and environmental concern and of European intermodal corridors policy, which makes railroad more attractive for freight.

Passing over the national frame

With the exception of the national government, which acts mostly inside the limits of the national frame, all the stakeholders prefer a transnational vision of the Mediterranean railway corridor. Their representations of its territory are multiple, but they all take into account a European or even global scale as pertinent level for commerce, industry or political cooperation. At the same time, stakeholders act at a very local scale to implement urban infrastructures or to reinforce local productive sector. This simultaneous interest for both macro and micro scales leads to a process of "descalarizing", namely a process which makes possible the emergence of a pertinent territory at different scales with different noncontradictory results in space. The example of the European Union Core Cities Conference, held in Barcelona on June 19 th 2013 with the support of Ferrmed, shows how local interests and actors can face European scale topics and merge together to try to influence the decisions of the European Commission concerning transport corridors. Thus, the "corridor territory" seems to take the form of a non-institutional macro-region at a European level and even at a Mediterranean level: it integrates several territories from other countries such as France and Morocco across Spanish borders, but also other economical and political territories from European consumer market or decision places. For instance, Ferrmed installed its head office in Brussels and the regional leaders of Catalonia and Valencia try to act directly at the European Commission (as the last Ferrmed meeting in the European Parliament building in March 2013 shows) and even at the OECD. The notion of "corridor territory" in the case of the Mediterranean railway corridor must incorporate non-spatial dimensions and pass over the traditional institutional limits. National and regional borders are still important for institutional planning documents, but they are not relevant anymore to implement a great European infrastructure such as the Mediterranean railway corridor.

NEW "CORRIDOR TERRITORIES" AND THEIR POTENTIAL INFLUENCE ON THE TEN-T PROJECT (Co)producing maps

Exploring various representations of the territory made by different actors, this method can be compared to mental maps, but it is quite different because no stakeholder was asked to draw its own map. Moreover, mental maps, requiring an empirical knowledge of space, are usually handled about existing territories. Here, we try to clarify a prospective vision of a notyet existing territoriality, with the tools of geographical analysis and cartography. But the limits of the production of this kind of maps [START_REF] Monmonier | Comment faire mentir les cartes ou Du mauvais usage de la géographie[END_REF] based on the analysis of discourse were underlined: they are not necessarily perfectly coherent with stakeholders' real vision even if they are based on their discourse. They are a simple interpretation of these discourses or a set of hypothesis made by the researcher.

These maps are neither prospective. They don't try to give an orientation for planning or a picture of how the future Mediterranean corridor could look like and be organised [START_REF] Debarbieux | Figures (géo-)graphiques et prospective. Cartes, schémas et modèles au service du projet et de la prospective territoriale[END_REF]. But it's interesting to draw these maps as a research instrument, because it allows us to see the different representations of the Mediterranean corridor which can be co-existing. These representations are the basis of the TEN-T project, inspired from national, regional and lobbying stakeholders' positions, and of the discussion on its concrete realisation.

To complete this approach, we plan to use these maps as a material for next interviews with the actors, so that they can react to this a priori vision and correct, complete or validate it.

The multiplication of this experiment with several actors may show the similarities and differences of vision they can have into the same group of interest, and will allow us to confirm or to redefine our theoretical findings with empirical observations. This will be a way to modify existing prospective maps, as instruments for institutional decision, by taking into account different representations of the territory and different priority elements.

Territorial visions influencing the Mediterranean corridor project

These maps echo the already existing ones, edited by some of the actors of the Mediterranean railway corridor project, for instance those of Ferrmed or Business Eumed lobbies, which are interesting to be analysed as executive projects, but moreover as representation instruments. Ferrmed map (figure 8a) represents a project as it was officially proposed to the European Commission [START_REF] Ferrmed | Ferrmed Global Study. Ferrmed Great Axis Rail Freight Network and its area of influence, Scandinavia-Rhein-Rhone-Western Mediterranean. Feasibility, conclusions and recommendations[END_REF] together with impact and feasibility studies: it actually is an executive prospective map. Nevertheless, it is also an image of a structuring European corridor based on intermediate cities, which are the majority of the lobby. Thus, this map is both a proposal for European networks and the symptom of a synthesis of different stakeholders' interests. Business Eumed, a lobby of commerce and industry companies, presents a map of the "Mediterranean orbital train" (figure 8b) which, according to an interview with the director [START_REF] Libourel | L'insertion de Valence dans le corridor ferroviaire méditerranéen. Stratégies multiscalaires et aménagement urbain[END_REF], is mainly a representation to consider and keep in mind, and not a real executive project. The idea is to create a vision of a fuzzy territoriality around the Mediterranean to strengthen the cooperation between the Mediterranean companies for commerce and industry. Both lobbies were born in Catalonia, their Executive Secretary-General is the same person Joan Amorós, and they are members of each other. The Spanish side of the TEN-T priorities proposes a very large vision of the Mediterranean corridor, which needs to be implemented up to local constraints and context. As it is a project excluding Madrid, its adoption was not self-evident in Spain, and other competing projects were discussed among which the centre-Pyrenean corridor (passing through the Pyrenees and arriving in France in a quite poorly connected space as far as railway is concerned). The political competition between these projects was so strong that the government tried to make both of them to be considered among TEN-T priorities, and that Ana Pastor, actual Minister of Transport, voted against the Mediterranean project at the European Commission to protest against the decision of keeping only one project per country in the priority network. Government successive projects (Ministerio de Fomento, 2004[START_REF] Star | This is Not a Boundary Object: reflections on the Origin of a Concept[END_REF][START_REF] Libourel | High-speed rail reshaping urban areas: Valencia Parque Central[END_REF] have been modified under the pressure of different lobbies and stakeholders, and by the constraints of the economic crisis, coming down of budget from 53 to 1.3 billion Euros and from two highspeed tracks plus two European gauge freight tracks to a single third rail for passengers and a one-track European gauge freight railway. But even if the crisis leads to a reduction of the investments, the Mediterranean corridor still appears as a factor to raise the regional economy and to promote the European cohesion.

The Mediterranean corridor was in the TEN-T since its very beginning in 1996, but its practical modalities were changed many times. The analysis of the evolution of the projects, comparing them with the different visions of the corridor drawn on the maps are interesting to understand how stakeholders can influence European projects.

CONCLUSION

This analysis explores an approach on the territorialisation of the Mediterranean corridor based on the analysis of planning documents and stakeholders' discourses in the media and interviews. The information given in the discourses is compared to the reality of the territory in socio-economic and political terms through a series of maps representing the main statistical and planning data evoked by the stakeholders themselves. Thanks to this first step, this research leaded to the drawing of a second set of very schematic maps presenting the outlines of what could be the representations of the Mediterranean corridor project territoriality. These schemes are a new material produced to be the basis of a second phase of interviews around the question of the creation of a Mediterranean scale coherent territory. They highlight the importance of a multi-scalar approach passing over the institutional limits and national borders, towards the creation of plural macro-regional territories with European magnitude and local realisations, and with spatial and non-spatial dimensions. Methodologically speaking, this paper proposes the use of mapping as an instrument to show up hypothesis and present them to the stakeholders in the interviews of an oncoming fieldwork. The main idea is to replace part of the questions about the possible corridor territories by a dialogue around the figures, and to allow the different actors to comment them, to give their own interpretation of them (which supposes very simple graphics) and even to complete or correct them. This work aims to show the processes of construction of the Mediterranean railway corridor as a coherent network territory. It leads to a reflexion on the application of continental scale political decisions at a local level, which is a recurrent question as far as planning is concerned, especially in Europe, through the very actual example of the Spanish Mediterranean coast. Therefore a comparison with other European case studies would be interesting to lead to a practical research application about the way in which European Commission could take into account this kind of processes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Figure 1 -

 1 Figure 1 -Circles of stakeholders and convergence of their interests concerning the Mediterranean corridor [BARON, LIBOUREL, 2011]

Figure 2 -

 2 Figure 2 -The Mediterranean corridor as a political counter-nature allianceThe map of the political majorities in the Mediterranean regions and cities has to be interpreted in the context of a political change in Madrid. Even though the government changed, the priority given to high-speed rail reinforcement was kept. Until March 2012, Spain had a social-democratic government, supposed to be in opposition with the conservative autonomous government of Catalonia and Valencia. The election of Mariano Rajoy in 2012 could have improved the relationships between both scales of institutions. Nevertheless, especially in the actual context of economic crisis, quite the contrary happened and the Minister of Transport and Public Works, Ana Pastor, eventually voted against the Mediterranean railway corridor project at the European Commission in Brussels. She did that in order to protest against the obligation to choose only one priority project per country, when she would have liked to register two corridors in the European prospective document: the MRC and a centre-Pyrenees corridor together. The map also suggests that the coherent territory for a Mediterranean corridor from a political point of view would exclude Andalusia. It is true that this southern region, connected to Madrid by high-speed rail since 1992, is not as attached to the Mediterranean corridor as Catalonia and Valencia. Nevertheless, the reasons are less political than economic: as far as passenger and freight flows are concerned, the region is mainly oriented towards Madrid than towards the Mediterranean coast cities. If we consider the main cities, another point of view appears: almost all the important cities of the Mediterranean axis are governed by conservative mayors, which could theoretically make political cooperation easier, as demonstrated by the participation of almost all these cities in the pro-MRC lobbies. Moreover, a huge part of these cities are also dealing with great urban projects concerning infrastructure, as figure5shows.

Figure 3 -

 3 Figure 3 -The Mediterranean coast: an economically and demographically speaking dynamic corridor

Figure 4 -

 4 Figure 4 -Harbours and industries: towards a Mediterranean freight axis

Figure 7 -

 7 Figure 7 -Mapping hypothesis of a plural "corridor territory"

Figure 8 -

 8 Figure 8 -The MRC as seen by Ferrmed (a) and Business Eumed (b) lobbies

Figure 9 -

 9 Figure 9 -TEN-T project and Ministry of Transports plan map (El País)

  Audikana, A. (2012). La Politisation de la grande vitesse espagnole : construction d'un mythe, production d'un consensus, emergence d'une controverse. PhD Thesis, Université Paris-Est. Baron, N. and E. Libourel (2013). Legitimate infrastructure projects in a context of crisis: The High-speed Rail Underground Station Project in Valencia or the End of a Dream. AAG Congress, Los Angeles, April 9 th -13 th Baron, N. and E. Libourel (2011). L'AVE, opérateur et révélateur des dynamiques institutionnelles et territoriales en Espagne. AHICF Congress, December 14 th -16 th . Baron, N. (2010). L'Espagne aujourd'hui : de la prospérité à la crise. De Boeck, Brussels. Bel, G. (2010). España, capital París. Origen y apoteosis del Estado radial: del Madrid sede cortesana a la « capital total ». Destino, Barcelona.

  Thus, the actual relative consensus (Audikana, 2012) about high-speed and especially about the project of Mediterranean corridor, supported by economic stakeholders, regional authorities and Spanish government and included in the latest version of TEN-T (European Commission, 2011) was not self-evident. According to the analysis of the Spanish daily press (mainly El País and La Vanguardia) since 2010, and to interviews handled with economic, politic and academic representatives in Valencia,Barcelona and Madrid in March 2011

	Trans-European railway corridors creating new territories: the Spanish Mediterranean
	corridor project
	LIBOUREL, Eloïse
	13

th WCTR, July 15-18, 2013 -Rio de Janeiro, Brasil

3

Table I -

 I Classification of stakeholders according to their vision of the Mediterranean corridor [BARON,

	Trans-European railway corridors creating new territories: the Spanish Mediterranean
			corridor project
			LIBOUREL, Eloïse
			Improving the connexion of	Freight	Connection of the main
			Spanish Mediterranean		cities and harbours as
		CCI	market, despite a great industries to European		important spots to Europe
			competition between
			regional industries
			Improving their service to	Freight	Connecting each port to
		Port authorities	become its door on a great the centre of Europe to		European market
			world freight axis
			-Promoting a Mediterranean	Freight (only	Mainly Catalonia, Valencia
			great region, with a	economically	and Murcia as three
			particular cohesion and	profitable project)	culturally coherent regions
		Academics	identity, -Reinforcing the economical		to be integrated to Europe in a Euro-region
	actors Intellectual		domination of Madrid in Europe, against the weight of the Mediterranean		perspective
			Combining the different	Freight	A great Euro-region
		Institutes (IIVEE-Euram…)	actors and giving the Mediterranean project a structured meaning		encompassing all territories making sense in a Mediterranean
					perspective
	LIBOUREL, 2011; LIBOUREL, 2011]
			Main objectives	Freight or passengers	Vision of the "corridor territory"
			Promoting European	Mix	-One end of a great trans-
		European	networks interconnection		European axis
		Commission	and interoperation		-Opportunity of a railway
					connexion to North Africa
			-Completing high-speed	-Passengers as	-From French border to
		Spanish	network	a political goal	Algesiras as a maximalist
		government	-Improving the connexion to	-Freight as an	hypothesis,
	Institutional actors	(Grupo Fomento : ADIF / RENFE)	Europe in Europe -Improving competitiveness	economical justification	-to Almeria as a mid-term realisation
			-Euro-regional integration,	-Passengers as	Integrating Catalonia,
		Mediterranean Valencia mainly) (Catalonia and regions	-connexion of main Spanish axis avoiding Madrid -creation of a south-north harbours,	a political economical -Freight for image reasons, argument and for	Valencia and Murcia regions
				realism
		Lobbies	-Connecting industries of	Freight	-Piece of a project from
	Economic	(Ferrmed,	the Mediterranean regions,		Casablanca to Saint-
	actors	Business Eumed,	-Opening Spanish coast to		Petersburg,
		AVE)	European market		-Along the Mediterranean
		13 th WCTR, July 15-18, 2013 -Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
			4

th WCTR, July 15-18, 2013 -Rio de Janeiro, Brasil


Gwenolé Le Velly
email: gwenole.le_velly1@udamail.fr

Céline Dutilly
email: dutilly@cirad.fr

Ezzine Driss
email: ezzine@cirad.fr

De Blas

Chloë Fernandez
email: cfernandez2@worldbank.org

Catherine Araujo Bonjean

Catherine Araujo-Bonjean

Serge Garcia

Alain Karsenty

Eric Kéré

Thomas Legrand

Jean-Michel Salles

Alexandre Sauquet

Keywords: PES, Mexico, Communities, Forest conservation, Economic compensation, Distribution of payments. JEL codes Q28, Q23, D63

This article empirically explores the distribution of a Payments for Environmental Services (PES) scheme within Mexican forest communities. The PSA-H is a Mexican federal PES that has been remunerating communities for forest conservation since 2003. During the last decade, Mexico's National Forestry Commission [CONAFOR] has developed a complex targeting system in order to enroll forests owned by communities with certain socio-economic and ecological characteristics. In the present study we analyze the socio-economic characteristics and land use changes of recipients of the PSA-H to understand how the targeting objectives have been expressed in the field. We conducted a combined survey of 47 ejidos and 163 households in the south of the state of Yucatan -the Cono Sur region. We first investigate, at the ejido-level, what determines the unequal distribution of payments. Second, we analyze the amount of payment received depending on the characteristics of households. Our analysis shows that the way the PSA-H is being distributed by ejidatarios bypasses the initial compensation objective. As a matter of fact, the distribution of the payments reflects past land use trajectories.

Introduction

Payments for environmental services (PES) are innovative forest conservation instruments that have developed extensively during the last decade [START_REF] Engel | Designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues[END_REF]. But a fierce debate remains about their objectives. According to Wunder's definitions [START_REF] Wunder | Payments for environmental services: some nuts and bolts[END_REF][START_REF] Wunder | Revisiting the concept of payments for environmental services[END_REF], PES are a direct application of Coase theorem and, to be environmentally effective, PES must demonstrate additionality and focus on credible threats of deforestation [START_REF] Wunder | The efficiency of payments for environmental services in tropical conservation[END_REF]. Therefore, they should focus on threatened forests and compensate landowners for the foregone income. This vision of PES has been criticized by many authors because it ignores the institutional process behind the emergence of PES. In reality, PES are shaped by local institutions (Muradian et al., 2010;[START_REF] Muradian | Payments for ecosystem services and the fatal attraction of win-win solutions[END_REF] and existing regulations [START_REF] Brimont | Between incentives and coercion: the thwarted implementation of PES schemes in Madagascar׳s dense forests[END_REF] and often do not look like a pure Coasean agreement [START_REF] Vatn | An institutional analysis of payments for environmental services[END_REF][START_REF] Wunder | Revisiting the concept of payments for environmental services[END_REF]. PES as a compensation are exceptions to a polluters-pays principle and can be seen as illegitimate and unfair if it only remunerates landowners that are willing to deforest. Making the scheme acceptable and effective on the long-run often requires better considering equity and legitimacy in the attribution of payments [START_REF] Adger | Governance for sustainability: towards athick'analysis of environmental decision making[END_REF][START_REF] Corbera | The equity and legitimacy of markets for ecosystem services[END_REF][START_REF] Pascual | Social equity matters in payments for ecosystem services[END_REF] and PES following a compensation logic are unlikely to emerge.

The PSA-H is a PES scheme to protect watershed services run by the Mexican federal government (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008;[START_REF] Shapiro | Forest conservation and slippage: Evidence from Mexico's national payments for ecosystem services program[END_REF]. In order to conserve the forest cover, the PSA-H offers five year contracts with yearly payments, which are proportional to the area of forest under conservation. The Mexican forest commission, CONAFOR, has developed a complex targeting system in order to focus its intervention [START_REF] Rolon | The Mexican pes programme: targeting for higher efficiency in environmental protection and poverty alleviation[END_REF]Muñoz Piña et al., 2011) on threatened forest in order to maximize additionality.

In Mexico, 80% of the forest cover is owned as commons by communities called ejido1 . [START_REF] Bray | Mexico's community-managed forests as a global model for sustainable landscapes[END_REF][START_REF] Kaimowitz | Mexico: Market options and barriers for timber and sawnwood from Michoacan, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Campeche and Quintana Roo. a summary[END_REF] and a great share of the scheme does not allocate payments to individual landowners but rather to the assembly of each ejido. This assembly then decides how to use the payments and how to redistribute them. The final allocation depends crucially on the community sharing rules.

In this article, we analyze the distribution of the payments within the ejidos in order to understand how the objectives of the PSA-H are understood and whether the internal distribution complies or conflicts with the logic of economic compensation. In particular, we study how land-use heterogeneity impacts PSA-H redistribution. Within ejidos, the ejidatarios2 perform different economic activities that can rely more or less on the availability of forestland to be put into agricultural production. Does the land-use practices affect inequality in payments redistribution?

Who are the final beneficiaries? Studying the interaction between land-use practices and redistribution of the PSA-H within the ejidos allows us to understand how the program's objectives may have been appropriated by the ejidos. We explore this issue in a sub-region of Mexico's Yucatan state. Within the ejido different types of land users whose production activities rely more or less on clearing of the forest cover coexist. We show that inequality in payment allocation tends to be linked to the agro-economic profile of the ejidatarios with cattle ranchers being less prone to receive payments compared to subsistence and sedentary agriculture farmers. Therefore, past trajectories and the current dependence on clearing are the main determinants of the amount of payments received.

The next section presents the PSA-H and its targeting system and discusses payment repartition within the ejidos. Section 3 presents the Cono Sur of Yucatan and the methodology employed.

Finally Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis regarding payment redistribution in the Cono Sur sampled ejidos.

The PSA-H in Mexico : targeting and distribution modalities.

The PSA-H is a federal scheme of payments for hydrological environmental services whose objective is to create a financial incentive to conserve the forest in over-exploited aquifers (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008). Can it be considered as a compensation mechanism? This section discusses this interrogation from the conception of the PSA-H to its implementation at various scales and in particular within the ejidos 3 .

Targeting of the PSA-H

As highlighted by [START_REF] Shapiro-Garza | Contesting the market-based nature of Mexico's national payments for ecosystem services programs: Four sites of articulation and hybridization[END_REF] and [START_REF] Mcafee | Payments for ecosystem services in Mexico: Nature, neoliberalism, social movements, and the state[END_REF], interactions with civil society and other stakeholders, such as NPA commissions, forced CONAFOR to consider multiple objectives. These interactions tended to hybridize the programme into a multiple objectives scheme targeting not only toward threatened forests but also marginal areas. Studying allocation rules of the program, one can distinguish three types of criteria: administrative, marginality and environmental priority. [START_REF] Sims | Adaptive management in Mexico' 's payments for hydrological services program improves targeting for environmental and social goals[END_REF] showed that, through adaptive management of the selection criteria, the PSA-H succeeded in combining both objectives. We here focus on environmental priority. We will show in the forthcoming section that, despite the hybridization, CONAFOR conceived the PSA-H as a compensation instrument to protect threatened forests.

According to CONAFOR's rules, the primary objective of the PSA-H and the PSA-CABSA is to "offer payments for environmental services generated by forest ecosystems 4 " [START_REF] Conafor | Réglas de operacion del programa proarbol 2010[END_REF].

Rural development only appears as one of many objectives of Proarbol "through valorisation, conservation and sustainable exploitation of forest resources 3 ".

Every year, CONAFOR defines eligibility zones based on land-use change maps, advice and propositions from regional offices and a deforestation risk index. The eligibility zones are defined as "areas or forest ecosystems where the degradation process endangers biodiversity and environmental services 5 " [START_REF] Conafor | Réglas de operacion del programa proarbol 2010[END_REF]. The deforestation risk index is computed by the Instituto Nacional de Ecologia y Cambio Climatico (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008). It predicts, at the pixel-level, the risk of deforestation based on past deforestation trends, agro-ecological characteristics and socio-economic variables 6 . Figure 1 shows the evolution of eligibility zones between 2004 and 2012 which have been widely enlarged since 2003 and now cover about a quarter of the Mexican territory 7 .

Only eligible ejidos can apply for the scheme. Every year, CONAFOR receives new applications for the scheme and ranks these applications according to predefined ranking criteria. Because of 3 The beneficiaries of the PSA-H can be private landowners as well as communities, the first ones represented one third of the contracts signed in 2005 (Munoz-Pina et al., 2008, table1) 4 Translation by the authors 5 Translation by the authors 6 See Muño-Piña et al., (2008) for more details regarding the econometric analysis 7 Authors' calculations based on data provided by CONAFOR budget constraints, only the highest ranked ejidos are accepted into the programme [START_REF] Rolon | The Mexican pes programme: targeting for higher efficiency in environmental protection and poverty alleviation[END_REF]. The deforestation risk index is also part of the ranking criteria together with other environmental indicators such as soil degradation, over-exploitation of aquifers or water availability, among others [START_REF] Conafor | Réglas de operacion del programa proarbol 2010[END_REF]. Beneficiaries commit to avoid land-use change for five years in the area of forest enrolled, and receive, in return yearly payments proportional to the area of forest enrolled.

Eventually, the amount of payments allocated per hectare of forest enrolled varies according to the deforestation risk index. Originally, the payments were set at the average income that could be obtained from one hectare of maize in order to reflect the opportunity costs of one hectare of forest (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008). The payments were later diversified per type of forest and deforestation risk to capture OC heterogeneity. The amounts of payments are presented in Table 1.

The above elements tend to show that CONAFOR conceived the PSA-H as a compensation mechanism as it targets threatened forest and as the amount of payments are intended to reflect income loss attributable to conservation. As highlighted above, interactions with civil societies and other groups of interest forced CONAFOR to consider other conceptions of PES and integrate new objectives. This hybridization may be responsible for the low additionality observed in the early cohorts of beneficiaries (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008;Muñoz Piña et al., 2011;[START_REF] Shapiro | Forest conservation and slippage: Evidence from Mexico's national payments for ecosystem services program[END_REF]. Nevertheless, [START_REF] Sims | Adaptive management in Mexico' 's payments for hydrological services program improves targeting for environmental and social goals[END_REF] highlight that, through adaptive management of the targeting criteria, the designers succeeded over time at combining both objectives.

Appropriation of the PSA-H by the ejidos

In Mexico, 80% of the forests are owned by ejidos [START_REF] Bray | Mexico's community-managed forests as a global model for sustainable landscapes[END_REF][START_REF] Kaimowitz | Mexico: Market options and barriers for timber and sawnwood from Michoacan, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Campeche and Quintana Roo. a summary[END_REF]. This unique figure is the result of one century of agrarian reforms spanning from the Mexican revolution in the early 20th century to the second agrarian reforms, called PROCEDE, that took place during the 1990's [START_REF] De Janvry | Liberal reforms and community responses in Mexico[END_REF]Muñoz-Piña et al., 2003). Within the ejidos, each ejidatario owns a private parcel, with complete or incomplete property rights and a share of the commons. In 1992, PROCEDE gave ejidos the opportunity to redefine their commons and obtain formal property rights.

Although PROCEDE led to a vast privatization of lands, however most of the forest is formally owned as commons managed by the assembly.

As emphasized by [START_REF] Corbera | Institutional dimensions of payments for ecosystem services: An analysis of Mexico's carbon forestry programme[END_REF], since the forest is owned as commons, PES does not directly remunerate households or individual landowners but rather ejidos.Once enrolled, the ejido can decide to redistribute the payments among its members, to invest in public goods (roads, school, new income generating activities etc…), or remunerate labor related to activities promoted by the program such as patrolling into the forest or building firebreak. This last use of PSA-H payments has been found in other Mexican States but, in our sample in Yucatan, excepting minor collective investment, all the payments were redistributed among the ejidatarios.

In Chiapas, multiple authors showed that participation and distribution of the payments within the community was not egalitarian and tended to reflect existing power relationships within the community (Garcia et al., 2010;[START_REF] Hendrickson | Participation dynamics and institutional change in the Scolel Té carbon forestry project, Chiapas, Mexico[END_REF]. Our studies complete these results

with an emphasis on the type of land-use and the logic of the distribution rules.

In order to understand how the ejidatarios share the payments, we need to clarify the internal negotiation process taking place. As explained above, the governance of the ejido relies mainly on the decisions made at the assembly of ejidatarios which are composed of families with different community-related historic backgrounds. Reaching an agreement at the assembly to enroll in the PSA-H does not necessarily mean that all ejidatarios choose to enroll in the programme. The assembly can agree to enroll part of the forest and decide that only the ejidatarios willing to participate are eligible to receive payments. On the contrary, non participants can ask to exclude another part of the common forests from the programme. If the per hectare amount of payment is constant within the same agro-ecological zone (Table1), the potential amount received per ejidatario will therefore depend on this negotiation process and vary from an ejido to another.

In the Cono Sur region of Yucatan, we observed three meaningful examples of the distribution rules which vary over time and between ejidos but are often a combination of these three examples. A first distribution rule consists in dividing all the payments equally among the ejidatarios. Here, remuneration is not directly linked to the dependence on forest clearing, some ejidatarios use the commons more than others. Nevertheless, since all of them have land-use rights and voting rights at the assembly, they receive equal payments. Another rule is to divide the payments, not equally among each member, but rather inversely proportional to the share of common forests they have cleared. Each ejidatario owns an equal share of commons and therefore an equal share of the common forest. This forest cover can be converted to agricultural fields or pasture for personal use with the permission of the assembly. The more the ejidatario has converted of his share of forest, the less PES remuneration he receives. A last example of a distribution rule involves sharing payments but only among a certain group of ejidatarios willing to participate. The ejidatarios that do not wish to join the programme are either those who were absent during the assemblies or those who want to keep their share of forest out of the programme. The latter, often cattle-ranchers, do not join either because they consider that payments are not high enough or because they feel that environmental programs threaten their activities.

The objective of CONAFOR was to target threatened forests and compensate the agents that deforest. However, this logic is not found in any these three allocation rules. In the next sections, we will further analyze the distribution of the payments within the ejidos in order to understand whether the internal distribution complies or conflicts with compensation logic.

Methods

Study area and survey methodology

The Cono-Sur is located at the south of Yucatan State between the states of Campeche and Quintana Roo and concentrates most of the PSA-H contracts of the State (Fig. 2). The area has known several periods of large deforestation, especially during the late 1970's and 1980's. During this period, public policies such as PRONADE (a national clearance programme) offered subsidies to clear land and establish mechanised agriculture. Whilst deforestation slowed down in the 1990's with the end of PRONADE and, more generally, with the reduction of state supports to agriculture, it remains an important matter of concern. Cattle-ranching, and to a lesser extent traditional slash-andburn agriculture, are the main sources of deforestation in the area.

Ejidos from the southern part of our study zone lack basic infrastructure such as roads, running water and electricity and have been partly deserted by the population. This has led to the formation of labor-ejidos where ejidatarios maintain economic activities but live in the nearest city. In our sample, about 45% of the households do not live in their ejido. The average size of an ejido in our sample is about 2,500 ha and the average number of ejidatarios is 75. The repartition of the 47 ejidos regarding the first year of reception of the PSA-H is presented in Table 2. Note that ejidos can cumulate PSA-H contracts by enrolling new forest areas and apply to enroll again the same area at the end of the five year contract. Yearly payments allocated to the ejidos vary from 3,500 to more than 93,000 Mexican pesos (300 USD to more than 7,000 USD).

There are on average 44 ejidatarios in each ejido for a superficies of 2,350 ha. Common forests cover on average 64% of the ejidos and measures 1,600 ha. At the household level, the sample size could not exceed 200 households and for logistical reasons it was impossible to conduct household surveys in all the ejidos. We randomly selected 25 beneficiary ejidos and checked the representativity of this sample regarding demography, PSA-H payments and economic activities. Surveying 200 households corresponded to 20% of the total number of ejidatarios, with a maximum limit of 15 households and a minimum limit of 5 households per ejido 8 . Once we excluded outliers and the households from non beneficiary ejidos that were not relevant for this study, our sample was composed of 163 households. The household survey allowed deeper investigation of land user profiles and reception of the PSA-H.

Among those 163 households, 151 declared that they had received payments from the PSA-H.

The average households' size is 4.8 members. The household's head is on average 54 years old and 22% of them do not know writing and reading. 8 The number of ejidatarios varies widely and the results regarding the distribution of the PSA-H within the ejidos would have been biased by the decisions made by larger ejidos

Total payments received per ejidatario between 2005 and 2013 range from 3,000 to 180,000

Mexican pesos (230 to 13,850 USD). Most of this heterogeneity is explained by the fact that some ejidos have only received the programme for one year whilst others participated during the entire period of analysis. Nevertheless, if on average the ejidatarios received around 10,000 Mexican pesos (770 USD) per year of reception, this amount varies between 600 and 34,000 per ejidatarios (46 to 2,615 USD).

Land uses and distribution rules: hypothesis and descriptive statistics

Three land use practices

There are three main land use practices in the area, often combined by the ejidatarios:

 Traditional slash-and-burn agriculture: Shifting cultivation of maize inter-cropped with beans is the traditional form of agriculture called milpa. In our sample, traditional producers cultivate 2 hectares on average. Producers shift parcels every two or three years and fallow periods last for 10 to 15 years. Yields that can be obtained from this activity remain low and vary according to the climatic conditions and the use of inputs (from 0.6 t/ha/year to 1 t/ha/year). Being poorly profitable, traditional agriculture tends to be abandoned or is maintained in combination with other activities such as cattle and off-farm activities. In our sample, 50 ejidatarios implemented milpa in 2005 and 47 in 2013.

 Mechanised agriculture: This form of intensive non-rotative agriculture developed in Cono Sur in the late 1970's with the implementation of PRONADE. The area under cultivation in our sample varies from 1 to 22 hectares. The yields that can be obtained are three to four times superior to those obtained by slash-and-burn if combined with an irrigation system. .

In our sample, 81 ejidatarios engaged in this type of activity in 2005 and 85 in 2013.

 Cattle-ranching: The Cono Sur is also a traditional cattle-ranching area. In our sample, 30%

of ejidatarios have at least one head of cattle but some of them only breed a few heads at home for savings or short-term profit. More than 20% of our sample have individual pastures or use common pasture and forest for grazing. In our sample, 29 ejidatarios engaged in cattle-ranching activities in 2005 and 41 in 2013.

These land uses yield heterogeneous returns and depends more or less on forest clearing. Although mechanized agriculture is the most profitable form of agriculture, cultivating new land requires high investment in land-leveling. Most producers cannot afford this investment and they are not directly dependent on the forest cover, at least in the short-run. Moreover, they mainly cultivate on individual parcels. On the opposite, traditional producers cultivate very small areas with moderate, it cannot be considered in our region as the main source of deforestation since this activity is decreasing since several decades (personal communication with Luis Arias and Luis Dzib). Moreover, as highlighted by [START_REF] Borrego | Estimating the opportunity costs of activities that cause degradation in tropical dry forest: Implications for REDD+[END_REF], if fallow period are long enough, this type of agriculture is likely to be sustainable. In Jalisco, the authors also showed that the highest return on clearing activities were obtained by cattle ranchers and that, land cleared for pasture is larger than for traditional agriculture. Cattle-ranchers also are the main agents that deforested in the past in Cono Sur. Therefore, in line with the objective of the PSA-H to target the agents that deforest, CONAFOR may be willing to target cattle-ranchers in order not to remunerate windfall effects and avoid deforestation. However the redistribution within the ejido may result in a completely different allocation.

Land uses and PES distribution: Descriptive statistics

Figure 3 presents the distribution of the Gini coefficient of inequality for the distribution of payments in the 47 ejidos according to the presence of the three main land use practices in the ejido.

Calculations of the Gini are based on the total amount of payments received by each ejidatario in the 47 ejidos that received payments between the beginning of the PSA-H and 2012. We note that the presence of cattle-ranching in the ejido tends to be associated with more unequal distribution. This pattern seems less marked with mechanized and traditional agriculture.

Model

This section proposes an empirical analysis of the repartition of payments within the ejido. The first section of this econometric analysis investigates the determinants of inequality in payment distribution at the ejido-level. The second section explores the determinants of the yearly amount of payments received by one ejidatario compared to its peer.

Distribution inequality among beneficiary ejidos

We explore the determinants of inequality of payment distribution within the ejidos. We estimate an OLS model with the Gini index of payment distribution between 2003 and 2012 as our explained variable. Our hypothesis is that inequality in distribution is directly linked to land-use heterogeneity within the ejido. Given that the Gini index range from 0 to 1, we use an arc-sinus functional form [START_REF] Chen | The accuracy of approximate intervals for a binomial parameter[END_REF]) and estimates the following model:

arcsin ( √ 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝑗 ) = α + β𝐿 𝑗 + γ𝑋 𝑗 + εj (1)
In equation 1, L j corresponds to the different land use in ejido j as presented in Section 4.2.1. We use the 2005 level of each variable in order to avoid endogeneity. In a first step, we consider dummy variables if mechanised agriculture (mec05_ejid), traditional agriculture (trad05_ejid) and cattleranching (ranch05_ejid) are implemented in the ejido. In a second step, we introduce the percentage of ejidatarios implementing each activity (per_mec05, per_trad05 and per_ranch05). X j includes control variables likely to influence inequality such as number of ejidatarios, average participation to the assembly, area of forests in hectare and percentage of total common lands in the ejido. We also include a dummy variable for labour-ejido defined as the ejido with less than 20 inhabitants.

Within ejido heterogeneity: payments at the household level

Our hypothesis is that PES distribution tends more to reflect past trajectories than to compensate foregone benefits. We test this hypothesis using a panel. The panel is structured with two dimensions: ejido and households. The panel estimation allows us to capture between-ejido heterogeneity and focus on within-ejido heterogeneity, i.e. the difference of payments received by one ejidatario compared with other ejidatarios from the same ejido. We test the impact of the type of land use implemented by the ejidatario before PSA-H implementation on the amount of PSA-H received.

We estimate the following models with fixed effects (2):

𝑝𝑠𝑎ℎ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑗 = α + β𝐿 𝑖𝑗 + γ𝑋 𝑖𝑗 + η𝐷 𝑗 + εij (2)
In equations 2, psahyear ij corresponds to the average yearly amount of payments received by ejidatario i in ejido j during one year of reception. Some ejidatarios joined the programme several years after the others programme either due to absence from the ejido or a reluctance to participate at the program's onset. For this reason, we chose to use average yearly payments rather than total payments.

As in estimation (1), we use the level of the variables in 2005 in order to avoid endogeneity. Three of these variables are linked to land-use: (mec05_hh ij ), (trad05_hh ij ) and (ranch05_hh ij ) respectively for mechanised agriculture, traditional slash-and-burn and cattle ranching. We consider as cattle ranchers only households using either pasture or common land for grazing. We also include one dummy variable to control for permanent off-farm activity. X ij include control variables such as the size of the household and a measure of the assets computed using principal component analysis.

Eventually, we include a dummy variable equals to one if the ejidatario is a member of the ejido authorities, a producer organization and the average percentage of assemblies in which he participated.

Results

At the ejido level

Table 3 presents the results for the estimation of equation 1 on the sample of the 47 beneficiary ejidos. Column (1) presents the results of the estimation with only the control variables. Column (2) adds dummy variables for each activity and column (3) percentage of ejidatarios implementing each activity. Comparing the R-squared of column (1) with columns (2) and (3), we note that considering the type of land-use in the estimation adds to the explanatory power of the model.

As suggested by the box-plots presented in Figure 3, the presence of cattle ranching seems to increase distribution inequality. According to the results of column (3), the more cattle ranchers there are in the ejido, the more unequal is the distribution. Our results also suggest the opposite results for mechanised agriculture. The more ejidatarios with mechanised plots, the less unequal is the distribution. Our results also suggest that the distribution has been more equal in the ejidos with higher participation rate at the assembly.

This result suggests that inequality in payment distribution is linked to the agricultural profile of the ejido. As a matter of fact, whilst ejidos relying on mechanised agriculture tend to have more equal rules of allocation, the ejidos involved in cattle ranching have more heterogeneity in individual payments. Nevertheless, these results do not tell us who benefits more from the programme. In the next section, we study the amount received by each ejidatario according to their land use.

At the household level

Table 4 presents the results of the econometric analysis regarding distribution of the payments using the sample of the 163 recipient households. Columns (1) present the results of the estimation of the model presented in equations 2. The coefficient estimates for our three main variables of interest, mec05_hh, trad05_hh and ranch05_hh, are all significant. The main beneficiaries were the ejidatarios who engaged in mechanized activities and traditional agriculture. Producers with cattleranching activities received less payment than others.

Our results are robust in many settings. Column (2) excludes from the sample the ejidatarios that decided to remain outside of the programme. Columns (3) and ( 4) displays the results using the total amount of payments received rather than average yearly payments respectively with the whole sample and excluding the ones that decided to remain outside of the programme. Our variables of interest remain significant in all specifications, which confirm the robustness of our results.

Discussion and conclusion

This article explores the distribution at the community and household levels of the PSA-H, a

Mexican PES created in year 2003. CONAFOR tried to design the PSA-H as a compensation instrument by targeting threatened forest. However, since most of the Mexican forests are commons, PES payments are allocated to communities called ejidos, and the assembly of each ejido divides payments among the ejidatarios according to their own rules and perception of fairness. Based on ejido and household surveys in a sub-region of Yucatan State, we explore the interaction between the land-use practices and internal payment redistribution. In our study area, cattle ranchers are the agents that deforested more common forests in the past, they are the main agents to target in order to achieve additionality. We estimate the impact of land use type on both the Gini coefficient of distribution at the ejido-level and the yearly payment amount received by each eijdatario at the household-level. Our econometric results suggest that the more prevalent cattle ranching is in the ejido, the more unequal the distribution tends to be. Moreover, within the same ejido, the ejidatarios that conserved the forest in the past receive higher payments whilst the cattle-ranchers, receive less remuneration than their peer- This study highlights the difficulty to involve the land users willing to deforest in the process, especially within common lands. In our study, cattle ranchers may have remained outside simply because they cleared most of their share of commons or because they considered that payments were too low. It is also very likely that they currently regard environmental programs as a threat more than as an opportunity.

PES schemes as compensation mechanisms are exceptions to the polluter-pays principle [START_REF] Pirard | Questioning the theory of payments for ecosystem services in light of emerging experience and plausible developments[END_REF]. The idea that payments should be directed to the agents that deforest is far from being appropriated by forest owners or all intermediaries involved from the federal-level to the ejidos. The ejidos may have reinterpreted the program's objectives according to their own conception of fairness and consider that the program is primarily targeted toward the agents that already conserve the forest as a reward for greener behavior [START_REF] Pascual | Exploring the links between equity and efficiency in payments for environmental services: A conceptual approach[END_REF]. This would explain why cattle-ranchers are excluded from the process.

Once confronted with reality, PES can result in unexpected outcome and our study confirms the difficulty to design a national PES scheme targeted toward the agents that deforest. When dealing with commons, it seems ethically impossible to compensate income loss within a community without rewarding those already conserving the forest. It may not be a problem if, on the long-run, PES impulses a change of behavior by the agents that deforest. Nevertheless, more effort is needed to include the forest users in a process that they currently regard as a threat to their activity.

Figure 1 :

 1 Figure 1: Evolution of eligible areas (Source : Authors)

Figure 2 :

 2 Figure 2: The Cono Sur of Yucatan

Figure 3 :

 3 Figure 3: PSA-H distribution inequality and type of activities (ejidal level)

Figure 4 :

 4 Figure 4: PSA-H yearly payments and type of activities (household level)

ejidatarios.

  Most payments are allocated to the agents that obtain a lower part of their income by exploiting the common forests. Cattle ranchers receive less payment either because they decided to remain outside of the program or because they already cleared their share of commons. The final allocation of the PSA-H reflects mainly past trajectories and the agents that deforested in the past tend to receive fewer payments.

Table 1 :

 1 Area of payments

			Deforestation
		Forest type	risk	Payment
	Area 1 Bosque Mesofilo	Very high	1.100 Pesos per Ha (84 USD)
	Area 2 Bosque Mesofilo	Low to high	700 Pesos per Ha (53 USD)
		Bosque de coniferas, selva
		subcaducifolia and bosque	Very low to very
	Area 3	de encino	high	550 Pesos per Ha (42 USD)
			Very low to very
	Area 4 Selva alta perennifolias	high	382 Pesos per Ha (29 USD)
	Note: Conversion in USD made using 2010 exchange rate (1USD = 13 Mexican pesos)
	Source: CONAFOR, 2009

Table 2 :

 2 Number of ejido contracting PSA-H per year of first reception

	Year	2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
	Nb ejido	1	6	0	20	2	7	4	6	1

Table 3 :

 3 Inequality in payments distribution at ejido-level

		(1)	(2)	(3)
	VARIABLES	gini	gini	gini
	mec05_ejid		-0.1939*
			(0.1071)
	trad05_ejid		0.0104
			(0.0978)
	ranch05_ejid		0.2681**
			(0.1010)
	per_mec05			-0.2441
				(0.1716)
	per_trad05			-0.0934
				(0.1521)
	per_ranch05			0.4995**
				(0.1868)
	Ejidatarios	-0.0013	-0.0022*	-0.0012
		(0.0011)	(0.0012)	(0.0011)
	Forest 2005
	(Ha)	0.0001	0.0001*	0.0001
		(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
	Assembly
	participation	-0.5919**	-0.5394*	-0.6193**
		(0.2567)	(0.2686)	(0.2553)
	% Commons	-0.2874**	-0.3623***	-0.3113**
		(0.1186)	(0.1247)	(0.1284)
	Labour-ejido	-0.1049	-0.0915	-0.1229
		(0.0967)	(0.1102)	(0.1057)
	Constant	1.1671***	1.0701***	1.1833***
		(0.2066)	(0.2207)	(0.2195)
	Observations	47	47	47
	R-squared	0.2454	0.2970	0.3119
	Robust standard errors in parentheses
	*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4 :

 4 Distribution of the payments within ejidos

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	VARIABLES	psahyr	psahyr	psahtot	psahtot
	mec05_hh	3.5699**	2.9309**	14.3650*	12.4988
		(1.4728)	(1.2990)	(8.0749)	(8.3852)
	trad05_hh	2.8864**	3.0168**	15.0109**	16.1110**
		(1.0915)	(1.2050)	(6.5327)	(7.3033)
	ranch05_hh	-1.6087**	-1.7637**	-6.7567*	-7.4813*
		(0.6782)	(0.7243)	(3.8242)	(3.8947)
	Off-farm in 2005	1.0509	0.4371	7.3072	5.2664
		(1.0027)	(0.9260)	(4.6444)	(4.8150)
	Household size in 2005	-0.0300	0.1195	-0.1383	0.6230
		(0.1903)	(0.1614)	(1.0875)	(1.0567)
	Asset index in 2005	1.4733	2.0509	9.6924	17.0019
		(3.0285)	(2.0526)	(15.6316)	(12.4851)
	Assembly participation	1.6631	-0.9907	7.2754	-5.4178
		(1.8753)	(1.2386)	(6.6840)	(5.6671)
	Ejido's authorities	1.6577	0.5970	5.4999	-0.3387
		(1.1905)	(0.8219)	(5.8846)	(4.6936)
	Producer organization	-0.0804	0.1860	2.6979	4.4169
		(0.7211)	(0.6813)	(5.0268)	(5.1885)
	Constant	5.5486***	7.6583***	26.3508**	34.5779***
		(1.6327)	(1.6221)	(9.6076)	(10.7311)
	Observations	163	151	163	151
	R-squared	0.1872	0.1705	0.1378	0.1379
	Number of fixed effects	23	23	23

We use in this paper the term ejido in the sense of nucleo agrario i.e. that encompass the agrarian communities

Within the ejido, the membership is defined in regards to three statuses: ejidatarios, posesionarios and avecindados. Only ejidatarios have a voting right at the assembly. Ejidatarios and posesionarios have rights to parcelised land and a share of commons contrary to the avecindados. In our sample, most ejidos have been recently formed and there are very few posesionarios and no avecindados. For this reason, our sample is composed at 99% of ejidatarios and we use the term ejidatarios is used for all surveyed households.

This work was supported by the LABEX IDGM+ (ANR-10-LABX-14-01) within the program "Investissements d'Avenir" operated by the French National Research Agency (ANR). http://www.cerdi.org/This research is part of the PESMIX project, funded by the French Research Agency (Convention 2010-STRA-0008).

Appendix