Leone Gazziero, « Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's Reader » [M. Lewis & D. Rose (ed.), The Bloomsbury Italian Philosophy Reader, London, Bloomsbury, forthcoming (2021)] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola : Introduction Of the Italian Humanists victims of their own success -and, in Florence alone, there's been more than a few -Giovanni Pico count of Mirandola (and Concordia) was, already in the eyes of his contemporaries, the most talented one. Whilst he definitely deserved to enter the Renaissance pantheon of thought and learning, Giovanni Pico was just as much, if not more, the latest in a line of mediaeval polymaths of genius. Besides being well acquainted with Aristotelian and Averroist philosophy -which was no less true of a number of contemporary despisers of mediaeval lore and technicalities -Pico was well conversant in scholastic logic and theology, whose « Parisian » Latin (as he refers to it in several occasions, most notably in [T5]) he spoke without accent, having spent some six years studying the likes of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Francis of Meyronnes, John Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome first in Padua and then in Paris. It may well not be the most striking feature of Pico's intellectual personality, it is nonetheless what sets him apart from many of his contemporaries and helps explaining the peculiar agenda he relentlessly pursued in his lifetime. Assuming the whole letter -as its occasional reminders in other works are to suggest ([T1], [T2] and [T3] being the most telling ones) -is more than an elaborate in-joke Giovanni shared with Ermolao Barbaro who -presumably -came up with the idea in the first place and Poliziano who advertised it soon afterwards (it would be harder to assume that Leonardo Bruni and those who picked it up later on were privy to it or, catching up quicker than the average reader, did not give the game away), [T4] makes it pretty clear that -to say the very least -Pico didn't care as much as his fellow-humanists for exquisite writing. As a matter of fact, he had no qualms about using the uncouth, graceless jargon of the School, which -as it happens -he considered a language all onto itself : as he explains in [T5], Scholastics talked their own Latin, which had certainly strayed away from its roots, but deserved -as much as any other dialect, Roman Latin (and its Renaissance revival) included -to be taken on its own terms. Scholastic Latin has been philosophers' shoptalk for quite some time and, for all his eagerness to bring about great changes, Pico seemed pretty content with it, as his disparaging gibe at his censors plainly imply, for -as Pico claims in [T6] -he suffered to relinquish Scholastic style only to indulge the latter's inability to cope with its intricacies the way men of philosophical reputation were expected to. Moreover, disputes over eloquence are, in fact, pointless when philosophical matters are at stake : philosophers need neither educated mouths nor educated ears. All they need is an educated mind ([T4]). Accordingly, they will be better off with a decent tool for discerning things through reason rather than with cosmetic enhancement and ornamentation which will make things look better (or worse) than they actually are ([T4]). All of which makes excellent sense, if we are to take Pico at his word [T7] : even if Philosophy is but one thread in a much larger scheme -which embraced more exotic disciplines (like magic and Qabbalah) as well -its path leads man beyond earth and heaven and ultimately beyond himself. Philosophy will teach man how to check his urges and emotions, it will dispel the confusions of his mind and it will show him the truth of all things, human and divine alike; what it will not do is to entertain him. Pico and Pico's man could live with that and their willingness to forego all spiritual comfort in their philosophical quest for knowledge and wisdom stands as a lasting testament to the greatness of the former ([T8]) and to the dignity of the latter ([T7]), for -as Pico reminded his friend Ermolao -« non est humanus qui sit insolens politioris literaturae, non est homo qui sit expers philosophiae ». « The following nine hundred dialectical, moral, physical, mathematical, metaphysical, theological, magical, and cabalistic opinions, including his own and those of the wise Chaldeans, Arabs, Hebrews, Greeks, Egyptians, and Latins, will be disputed publicly by Giovanni Pico of Mirandola, the Count of Concord. In reciting these opinions, he has not imitated the splendor of the Roman language, but the style of speaking of the most celebrated Parisian disputers, since this is used by almost all philosophers of our time. The doctrines to be debated are proposed separately by nations and their sect leaders, but in common in respect to the parts of philosophy -as though in a medley, everything mixed together ».

[T2 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola] Ioannis Pici de Mirandula oratio quaedam elegantissima, F. Borghesi, M. Papio and M. Riva (ed.)

[T3 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola]

Ioannis Pici de Mirandula de ente et uno, F. Bacchelli and R. Ebgi (éd.), Milano, Bompiani, 2010, 202.10 -204.4 : « Quoniam qui Aristotelem dissentire a Platone existimant, a me ipsi dissentiunt, qui concordem utriusque facio philosophiam, rogabas quomodo et defenderetur in ea re Aristoteles et Platoni magistro consentiret. Dixi quae tunc mihi in mentem venerunt, confirmans potius quae tu Laurentio inter disputandum responderas, quam novum aliquid afferens. Sed non tibi hoc satis. Efflagitas enim ut, quamquam de his fusius in ipsa quam adhuc parturio Platonis Aristotelisque Concordia sim scripturus, brevi tamen ad te commentariolo perstringam ea quae tunc tibi coram de hac quaestione sum locutus, […]. Ego vero negare tibi quid possum ? In re praesertim litteraria, socio paene dixerim individuo ? Liceat autem mihi per te, linguae politioris vindicem, verbis uti quibusdam nondum fortasse Latii iure donatis, quae tamen ipsa rerum novitas et quaedam prope necessitas [204] expressit, nec elegantioris stili lenocinium quaeras. Ut enim Mallius inquit, "ornari res ipsa negat, contenta doceri" » P.J.W. Miller, Pico della Mirandola. On Being and the One, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1965, p. 37-38 : « Since those who think that Aristotle disagrees with Plato disagree with me, who make a concordant philosophy of both, you asked both how Aristotle might be defended in this matter and also how he might agree with his master, Plato. I said what came to my mind at that time, confirming what you answered to Lorenzo <de' Medici> in the discussion rather than bringing in anything new. But this was not enough for you. Although I am to write at greater length on these topics in the Concord of Plato and Aristotle which I am now bringing forth, you entreated me to collect in a brief compendium what I said about this question then in your presence. […]. What can I deny you? May I say that you are an almost inseparable companion, particularly in a literary matter? May I also be allowed, through you who vindicate a more elegant language, to use some words which are not yet perhaps legally given to Latin. Still, the newness of the subject makes such expression almost necessary, and therefore you should not look for the allurement of a more elegant style. As Manilius <Astronomicon, III, 39> says, "The subject itself refuses to be ornamented; it is content to be taught" » [T4 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola] Ad Hermolaum de genere dicendi philosophorum, F. Bausi (ed.), Napoli, Liguori, 1998, p. 40-42 and 50 : « Tanta est inter oratoris munus et philosophi pugnantia, ut pugnare magis invicem non possint. Nam quod aliud rhetoris officium, quam mentiri, decipere, circunvenire, praestigiari? Est enim vestrum, ut dicitis, posse pro arbitrio, in candida nigrum vertere, in nigra candidum; posse, quaecumque vultis, tollere, abiicere, amplificare, extenuare dicendo; demum res ipsas magicis quasi, quod vos iactatis, viribus eloquentiae, in quam libuerit faciem habitumque transformare, ut non qualia sunt suopte ingenio, sed qualia volueritis, non fiant quidem, sed, cum non sint, esse tamen audientibus appareant. Hoc totum est nequicquam aliud quam merum mendacium, mera impostura, merum praestigium, cum a natura rei semper vel augendo excedat, vel minuendo deficiat et fallacem verborum concentum, veluti larvas et simulacra praetendens, [41] auditorum mentes blandiendo ludificet? Eritne huic cum philosopho affinitas, cuius studium omne in cognoscenda et demonstranda ceteris veritate versatur? […] nostrum esse componere mentem potius quam dictionem, curare ne quid aberret ratio, non oratio. Attinere ad nos ἐν διαθέσει λόγον, non attinere τὸν ἐν προφορᾷ ; laudabile in nobis habere Musas in animo et non in labris » Q. Breen, « Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and Rhetoric », Journal of the History of Ideas, 13, 1952, p. 395-396 and398 : « So great is the conflict between the office of the orator and the philosopher that there can be no conflicting greater than theirs. For what else is the task of the rhetor than to lie, to entrap, to circumvent, to practise sleight-of-hand ? For, as you say, it is your business to be able at will to turn black into white, white into black; to be able to elevate, degrade, enlarge, and reduce, by speaking whatsoever you will; at length you do this to the things themselves by magical arts as it were, for by the powers of eloquence you build them in such a way that they change to whatever face and costume you please; so that they are not what their own nature but what your will made them. of course they may not actually become what you willed, but if they should not it may nevertheless appear so to your audience. All this is nothing at all but sheer mendacity, sheer imposture, sheer trickery; for its nature is either to enlarge by addition or to reduce by subtraction, and putting forth a false harmony of words like so many masks and likenesses it dupes the listeners' minds by insincerities. Will there be any affinity between this and the philosopher, whose entire endeavour is concerned with knowing the truth and demonstrating it to others? […]. It is our business to set in order our minds rather than our delivery; to be careful lest what strays be reason, not speech; that we attain to the word as thought, not to the word as expression. It is praiseworthy to have the Muses in the soul, and not on the lips ».

[T5 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola] Ad Hermolaum de genere dicendi philosophorum, p. 56-57 : « Sed amabo incognoscamus quid istaec sit latinitas, quam solam dicitis debere philosophos et non persolvere. Si dicendo incurrat, exempli causa, a sole hominem "produci", "causari" hominem nostrates dicent. Clamabis actutum : "hoc non est latinum", hucusque vere ; "non est Romane dictum", hoc uero uerius ; "igitur non recte", peccat argumentum. Dicet Arabs eandem rem, dicet Aegyptius; non dicent latine, sed tamen recte. Aut enim nomina rerum arbitrio constant, aut natura, si fortuito positu (ut scilicet communione hominum in eandem sententiam conveniente, quo sanxerit unumquodque nomine appellari, ita apud eos recte appelletur), quid prohibet hosce philosophos, quos nuncupatis barbaros conspirasse in unam dicendi normam apud eos non secus sanctam, ac habeatur apud vos Romana ? Illam cur rectam non appelletis, appelletis vestram nulla est ratio, si haec compositio nominum tota est arbitraria. Quod si dignari illam Romani nominis appellatione non vultis, Gallicam vocetis, Britannicam, Hispanam, vel quod vulgares dicere solent Parisiensem. Cum ad vos loquentur, continget eos pleraque rideri, pleraque non intelligi. Idem accidet vobis apud eos loquentibus: " 'Ανάχαρσις παρ''Αθηναιοίς σολοικίζει, 'Αθηναῖοι δὲ παρὰ Σκύθαις", idest, "Anacharsis apud Athenienses soloecismum facit, Athenienses apud Scy-thas" <Epistulae, 1>. Quod si nominum rectitudo pendet ex natura rerum, [57] debemusne Rhetores, an philosophos, qui rerum omnium naturam soli perspectam habent et exploratam, de hac rectitudine consulere? Forte quae aures respuunt utpote asperula, acceptat ratio utpote rebus cognatiora » Q. Breen, « Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and Rhetoric », p. 400 : « Both of us should know what is that good Latin, which you say is the only debt philosophers owe but fail to pay when it comes to using it in speech. For example, instead of "a sole hominem produci" our colleagues will say "causari hominem". Forthwith you shout: That is not Latin; and so far you are right. More right you are when you say: It is not the Roman way of speaking. But you are wrong when you say: An Arabian and an Egyptian will say the same thing, but not in Latin; but still they will speak correctly. For the names of things are established either by arbitrary convention or by nature. It may happen that a society of men agree on a word's meaning; if so, for each thing that word is among them the right one to use for the meaning agreed on. That being the case, what will prohibit those philosophers you call barbarians from agreeing together on a common norm of speaking? And let it enjoy with them the same respect as does Roman among you. There is no sense in saying that the one standard is wrong and yours right, if this business of name-making is altogether arbitrary. What of it, if you do not wish to dignify our standard by calling it Roman? You may call it French, British, Spanish, or even what the vulgar is accustomed to call Parisian. When they speak to us they will for many things be laughed at and to a great extent will not be understood. The same will happen to you when you speak to them. Remember the saying: "Anacharsis commits a solecism among the Athenians, the Athenians do so among the Scythians". But if the rightness of names depends on the nature of things, is it the rhetorician we ought to consult about this rightness, or is it the philosopher who alone contemplates and explores the nature of everything? And perhaps while the ears reject the names as harsh, reason accepts them as more cognate to the things ».

[T6 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola] Ioannis Pici de Mirandula oratio quaedam elegantissima, 89-97 : « Moralis primum, si noster homo ab hostibus indutias tantum quesierit, multiplicis bruti eff renes excursiones et leonis iurgia, iras animosque contundet; tum si rectius consulentes nobis perpetuae pacis securitatem desideraverimus, aderit illa et vota nostra liberaliter implebit, quippe quae cesa utraque bestia, quasi icta porca, inviolabile inter carnem et spiritum foedus sanctissimae pacis sanciet. [90] Sedabit dialectica rationis turbas, inter orationum pugnantias et syllogismorum captiones anxie tumultuantis. [91] Sedabit naturalis philosophia opinionis lites et dissidia, quae inquietam hinc inde animam vexant, distrahunt et lacerant. [92] Sed ita sedabit, ut meminisse nos iubeat esse naturam, iuxta Heraclitum, ex bello genitam, ob id ab Homero "contentionem" vocitatam; idcirco in ea veram quietem et solidam pacem se nobis prestare non posse, esse hoc dominae suae, idest sanctissimae theologiae, munus et privilegium. [93] Ad illam ipsa et viam monstrabit et comes ducet, quae procul nos videns properantes "Venite," inclamabit, "ad me qui laboratis, venite et ego refi ciam vos, venite ad me et dabo vobis pacem quam mundus et natura vobis dare non possunt." [94] Tam blande vocati, tam benigniter invitati, alatis pedibus, quasi terrestres Mercurii, in beatissimae amplexus matris evolantes, optata pace perfruemur: pace sanctissima, individua copula, unianimi amicitia, qua omnes animi in una mente, quae est super omnem mentem, non concordent adeo, sed ineff abili quodammodo unum penitus evadant. [95] Haec est illa amicitia quam totius philosophiae fi nem esse Pythagorici dicunt; haec illa pax quam facit Deus in excelsis suis, quam angeli in terram descendentes annuntiarunt hominibus bonae voluntatis, ut per eam ipsi homines ascendentes in caelum angeli fi erent. [96] Hanc pacem amicis, hanc nostro optemus seculo, optemus unicuique domui quam ingredimur, optemus animae nostrae, ut per eam ipsa Dei domus fi at; ut, postquam per moralem et dialecticam suas sordes excusserit, multiplici philosophia quasi aulico apparatu se exornarit, portarum fastigia theologicis sertis coronarit, descendat Rex gloriae et cum Patre veniens mansionem faciat apud eam. [97] Quo tanto hospite si se dignam praestiterit (qua est illius immensa clementia) deaurato vestitu quasi toga nuptiali, multiplici scientiarum circumdata varietate, speciosum hospitem, non ut hospitem iam, sed ut sponsum excipiet, a quo ne unquam dissolvatur dissolvi cupiet a populo suo, et domum patris sui, immo se ipsam oblita, in se ipsa cupiet mori ut vivat in sponso, in cuius conspectu preciosa profecto mors sanctorum eius: mors -inquam -illa, si dici mors debet plenitudo vitae, cuius meditationem esse studium philosophiae dixerunt sapientes ». F. Borghesi, M. Papio and M. Riva, Pico della Mirandola. Oration on the Dignity of Man, p. 151-157 : « If our man would just seek a truce from his enemies, moral philosophy will beat down the unbridled stampede of the manifold beast and the aggression, ire, and arrogance of the lion. Then, if we yearn rightmindedly for the safety of perpetual peace for ourselves, it will come and liberally satisfy our desires; indeed, both beasts having been sacrificed like a stuck sow, it will ratify an everlasting pact of the most holy peace between the flesh and the spirit. Dialectics will calm the tumults of reason agitated and tossed about between the contradictions of speech and the captiousness of syllogisms. Natural philosophy will allay the differences of opinion and disagreements that vex, perplex, and afflict our restless soul from all sides. But it will bring harmony in such a way as to remind us that nature is the off spring of war, as Heraclitus said, and is therefore called "strife" by Homer. Thus, it is said that in philosophy true rest and stable peace cannot reveal themselves to us alone, that this is the duty and privilege of its mistress; that is, of the most holy Theology. She will show us the way to this peace and like a companion will lead us. Seeing us hurrying along from afar, she will call out, "Come to me, you who exert yourselves in vain; come and I will restore you; come to me and I will give you that peace which the world and nature cannot give to you." So gently called, so kindly invited, we will then fly away into the embrace of the most blessed Mother like terrestrial Mercuries with winged feet and will rejoice in the longed-for peace. This is that most holy peace, the indissoluble bond, the harmonious friendship in which all souls, in one mind (a mind that is above all minds) are not only in agreement but, indeed, in a certain ineffable way, inwardly become one. This is the friendship that the Pythagoreans call the end of all philosophy, that peace which God makes in His heavens, which the angels who came down to earth announced to men of good will so that these men would, ascending to heaven, be transformed by it into angels. Let us desire this peace for our friends, for our times; let us desire it for whatever home we enter. Let us desire it for our soul so that in her may be made a house of the Lord, so that, after casting off her impurities through moral philosophy and dialectics, our soul may adorn herself with multifaceted philosophy, as if with royal magnificence, and so that she may crown the heights of her doors with the garlands of theology. And let us desire this peace for our soul so that the King of Glory may descend at last, together with the Father, to make a home in her. If our soul shows herself to be worthy of such a Guest -for His Clemency is immense -she (clad in gold, as in a wedding toga, and surrounded by a diverse variety of sciences) will receive her handsome Guest not merely as a Guest but as a Bridegroom. So as not to be separated from Him, she will wish to be separated from her people. Having forgotten her own father's home -indeed, having forgotten herself -she will wish to die in herself so that she may live in her Spouse, in Whose sight the death of His saints is truly precious. This is the death, I say (if one must call that plenitude of life death), whose contemplation is, according to the sages, the study of philosophy ».

[T7 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola] Ioannis Pici de Mirandula oratio quaedam elegantissima, 142-150 : « Haec sunt, patres colendissimi, quae me ad philosophiae studium non animarunt modo, sed compulerunt. [143] Quae dicturus certe non eram, nisi his responderem qui philosophiae studium in principibus praesertim viris, aut his omnino qui mediocri fortuna vivunt, damnare solent. [144] Est enim iam hoc totum philosophari (quae est nostrae etatis infoelicitas!) in contemptum potius et contumeliam, quam in honorem et gloriam. [145] Ita invasit fere omnium mentes exitialis haec et monstrosa persuasio, aut nihil aut paucis philosophandum: quasi rerum causas, naturae vias, universi rationem, Dei consilia, caelorum terraeque mysteria pre oculis, pre manibus exploratissima habere nihil sit prorsus, nisi vel gratiam inde aucupari aliquam, vel lucrum sibi quis comparare possit. [146] Quin eo deventum est ut iam (proh dolor!) non existimentur sapientes nisi qui mercennarium faciunt studium sapientiae, ut sit videre pudicam Palladem, deorum munere inter homines diversantem, eiici, explodi, exsibilari, non habere qui amet, qui faveat, nisi ipsa, quasi prostans et praefl oratae virginitatis accepta mercedula, male paratum aes in amatoris arculam referat. [147] Quae omnia ego non sine summo dolore et indignatione in huius temporis non principes, sed philosophos dico, qui ideo non esse philosophandum et credunt et praedicant, quod philosophis nulla merces, nulla sint praemia constituta; quasi non ostendant ipsi, hoc uno nomine, se non esse philosophos, quod cum tota eorum vita sit vel in questu, vel in ambitione posita, ipsam per se veritatis cognitionem non amplectuntur. [148] Dabo hoc mihi, et me ipsum hac ex parte laudare nihil erubescam, me nunquam alia de causa philosophatum nisi ut philosopharer, nec ex studiis meis, ex meis lucubrationibus mercedem ullam aut fructum vel sperasse alium vel quesiisse, quam animi cultum et a me semper plurimum desideratae veritatis cognitionem. [149] Cuius ita cupidus semper et amantissimus fui ut, relicta omni privatarum et publicarum rerum cura, contemplandi ocio totum me tradiderim, a quo nullae invidorum obtrectationes, nulla hostium sapientiae maledicta vel potuerunt ante hac, vel in posterum me deterrere poterunt. [150] Docuit me ipsa philosophia a propria potius conscientia quam ab externis pendere iuditiis, cogitareque semper non tam ne male audiam, quam ne quid male vel dicam ipse vel agam ». F. Borghesi, M. Papio and M. Riva, Pico della Mirandola. Oration on the Dignity of Man, p. 183-189 : « These are the reasons, most reverend fathers, that have not only encouraged me but even thrust upon me the duty of studying philosophy. And I would certainly not elaborate on them if I were not compelled to respond to those who are accustomed to condemning the study of philosophy, especially in men of high rank or, even more generally, in those of a middling fortune. For philosophizing as a whole (and this is the misfortune of our age!) is now derided and disparaged, instead of being honoured and glorified. Thus, nearly everyone's mind has been invaded by the ruinous and monstrous conviction that either no one or only a very few may study philosophy, as if having before our eyes and at our fingertips the causes of things, the ways of nature, the logic of the universe, the divine plan, and the mysteries of Heaven and Earth were of no value whatsoever unless accompanied by the possibility of garnering some favour or making a profit. Indeed, it has now reached the point (what sorrow!) that only those who reduce the study of wisdom to a business are considered wise. It is like seeing chaste Pallas, who dwells among men out of the generosity of the gods, rejected, hooted off and hissed at, with no one to love or protect her, lest she, like a prostitute who accepts a pittance for her deflowered virginity, deposit the ill-earned profit into her lover's money chest. And I say all these things (not without the deepest grief and indignation) not against the lords of our times but against the philosophers who believe and openly declare that no one should pursue philosophy if only because there is no market for philosophers, no remuneration given to them, as if they did not reveal in this very word that they are not true philosophers. Hence, insofar as their whole life has been dedicated to moneymaking and ambition, they are incapable of embracing the knowledge of truth for its own sake. This much shall I grant myself (and I shall not blush a bit for self-praise in this regard): that I have never pursued philosophy for any other reason than for the sake of being a philosopher, nor have I ever hoped for or sought from my studies, from my queries, any reward or fruit beyond the nourishment of my mind and the knowledge of the truth, something I have always very greatly desired. And I have always been so avid for it and so enamoured of it that, setting aside all private and public concerns, I devoted my whole self to the leisure of contemplation, from which no calumny of the envious, no slander of the enemies of wisdom, has thus far managed to distract me, nor will it in the future. Philosophy herself has taught me to rely upon my own conscience rather than upon the opinions of others, and always to be careful, not so much that people do not speak badly of me as, rather, that I not say or do anything that is in itself bad ».


Leone Gazziero, « Machiavelli's Reader » [M. Lewis & D. Rose (ed.), The Bloomsbury Italian Philosophy Reader, London, Bloomsbury, forthcoming (2021)] Machiavelli : Introduction Confusion verging on chaos aptly describes Italian politics between any two points in time. That being said, the amount of outright violence, political backstabbing and social upheaval Machiavelli had to put up with -as a successful bureaucrat and diplomat first (1498)(1499)(1500)(1501)(1502)(1503)(1504)(1505)(1506)(1507)(1508)(1509)(1510)(1511)(1512), and afterwards as a disgraced citizen (1512-1527) -is, with few if any exceptions, virtually unmatched in the history of Italian philosophy. At any rate, it is conspicuous enough to put him in a league (of political thinkers) of his own. All the more so since, in Machiavelli's own words ([T1]), his claim to originality rested on a return to the things themselves and the « real truth » they convey through experience, as opposed to the traditional proclivity to speculate on « imaginary things », most notably by portraying fanciful characters and devising political regimes that can only exist on paper. Indeed, philosophers have been lecturing -either in flawless syllogistic fashion or in vivid rhetorical style -both rulers and subjects on how they should behave and get along. However, they have taken little notice of how they actually go about their business. Conversely, what does unbiased, direct observation of the present and extensive, informed reading of the past teach us about the ways of the world ? Excerpts from [T2] provide us with a colourful reminder of Machiavelli's views on what human beings are capable of and how best to deal with them. In a nutshell, when it comes to human relationships, there is no such thing as being too dumb to be wicked. As a matter of fact, ordinary people are guilty as charged on both counts. (One might as well dispense with labels, as Machiavelli does in [T2] Excerpt 3, insofar as non-ordinary people are so extraordinarily few as to make no difference). Men are a sorry lot (they are peevish, greedy, selfish and treacherous), and a credulous bunch to boot (they can't help rising to the bait when they are told what they want to hear). No wonder Machiavelli came up with some peculiar pieces of advice concerning state management and social control. A couple of straightforward recommendations of his will help us get the gist of (Machiavelli's) Machiavellianism, and then some. It should be understood from the start that enjoying an excellent reputation is one thing and being righteous is quite another. It should also be understood that, when they happen to be at odds, Machiavelli urges whoever is running things to surrender moral principles and embrace whatever course of action keeps him ahead of the competition. In other words, for all practical purposes, good politics and bad ethics get on together far better than the other way around ([T3], Excerpt 3). As a matter of fact, to take one's moral notions for political realities is a recipe for failure. So, as far as Machiavelli is concerned, the real issue is not so much whether or not one should get his hands dirty, since nobody in his right mind would keep them clean when the situation calls for extreme measures. For it can't be helped, the only problem one ought to worry about is rather how to get away with questionable practices such as betrayal, assassination or cruelty (three examples Machiavelli treats as a matter of political course, as in [T3], Excerpt 5). Even though the vast majority of people do not care much about the way the powers that be deliver a reasonable amount of peace and security at home, Machiavelli's golden rule has been met with a certain amount of suspicion. Yet, he definitely had a point and -like every rule of thumb worthy of the name -it makes things a lot easier while reducing the risk of getting hurt in the process. As Machiavelli puts it in devising ways to avoid being hated and despised, rulers should have someone else endorse and especially enforce unpopular policies, whereas they should claim credit for those actions which will increase their popularity. Given the overall purpose of the chapters ([T3], Excerpt 3-4) and their broad moral compass, no stretch of the imagination is required to infer that, in order to succeed, a ruler had better take the merit whenever it is convenient to do the right thing and lay the blame at someone else's door whenever criminal behaviour is in his best interest. What if there's nobody around either to help with the dirty work or, failing that, to conveniently take the fall ? Machiavelli spelled out his answer in a number of different ways, but -bottom line -his counsel remains pretty much the same and it emphasizes convenient timing ([T3], Excerpt 4) and careful dissimulation ([T3], Excerpt 1). When the time has come to match violence with more violence and subtlety with more subtlety, one should put some extra care into keeping up with moral appearances, at least until, having no further use for those his previous façade of respectability has deceived, one can afford -on top of dealing with his current foes -to treat old friends as new enemies ([T3] Excerpt 2). In this respect, it is worth noting that it is rather commonplace, albeit inaccurate and somewhat misleading, to saddle Machiavelli with a clear-cut distinction between ethics and politics. True enough, according to Machiavelli, politics has reasons and rules of its own, which morality condemns more than it understands. And true enough again, when push comes to shove, political expediency and moral integrity are mutually exclusive. Still, always according to Machiavelli, good faith, mercy and honour, as well as whatever else passes for good manners or helps you win your neighbour's love and respect, are an asset as long as they don't become a liability. All these fine qualities have their uses in the political arena, provided we use them, that is provided we treat ethical concerns as means to an end rather than as ends in themselves. Granted that the realm of political possibilities is wide enough to include everything short of mindless violence and random destruction ([T4] Excerpt 2) and, as a result, it encompasses what is morally acceptable, how do we get to choose whether to stay within the boundaries of either the ethically or the politically correct ? Although apparently well-formed, questions along these lines rest on a fundamental confusion to the extent that they overlook the basic fact that we don't really carry the burden -or have the luxury, for that matter -of choosing between the two. Of course, there's plenty to be right or wrong about, but one simply does not decide when it is expedient to go rogue and when, on the contrary, it is unwise to push the moral envelope ([T3] Excerpt 1). Eventually, situations sort themselves out and, when the dust settles, the head count provides a reliable indicator of who got his priorities straight and who didn't. This is, arguably, the most distinctive feature of Machiavelli's talk of skill, fortune and how statesmen are supposed to prevail through a solid display of the former and a healthy respect for the latter. First of all, it accounts for the remarkable scope of Machiavelli's « virtue », which is a constant disposition to do whatever circumstances require, be it good, evil or a bit of both. Secondly, it goes a long way toward explaining why Machiavelli's prince is so flexible a character that tycoons and gangsters no less than political and military leaders have boasted they borrowed a page from his book. No surprise there, either: in a world where everything is negotiable and virtue is simply the art of getting the upper hand, it is immaterial whether it takes a good or a bad person to be a successful ruler. As a matter of fact, it is immaterial whether it takes a person at all. While Dante portrayed Farinata as an individual who would have rather died than give up everything he stood for and thus become somebody he could not live with, Machiavelli is the prophet of another kind of humanity altogether. His prince is less an individual than a calculating force who doesn't let anything personal -neither his moral scruples nor his nasty habitsinterfere with his commitment to success. A model which matches humans (monarchs, executives, bureaucrats, diplomats, etc.) as much as human institutions (political parties, state cabinets, corporate boards, criminal cartels and any combination thereof). And this alone should be enough to ensure Machiavellianism a place of choice amongst the archetypes of philosophical wisdom.

Machiavelli : Texts [T1 Machiavelli] Excerpt 1

Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, G. Inglese (éd.), Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2013, XV : « De his rebus quibus homines et praesertim principes laudantur aut vituperantur (Di quelle cose che li òmini, e spezialment'e' principi, sono laudati o biasimati). Resta ora a vedere quali debbano essere e' modi e governi di uno principe co' sudditi o con li amici. E perché io so che molti di questo hanno scritto, dubito, scrivendone ancora io, non essere tenuto prosuntuoso, partendomi massime nel disputare questa materia dalli ordini delli altri; ma, sendo l'intento mio, scrivere cosa utile a chi la intende, mi è parso più conveniente andare dietro alla verità effettuale della cosa che alla immaginazione di essa. E molti si sono immaginati republiche e principati, che non si sono mai visti né conosciuti essere in vero, perché elli è tanto discosto da come si vive a come si doverrebbe vivere, che colui che lascia quello che si fa per quello che si doverrebbe fare, impara più presto la ruina che la preservazione sua, perché uno omo che voglia fare in tutte le parte professione di buono conviene che ruini fra tanti che non sono buoni. Onde è necessario a uno principe, volendosi mantenere, imparare a potere essere non buono e usarlo e non usarlo secondo la necessità. Lasciando adunque addreto le cose circa uno principe immaginate e discorrendo quelle che sono vere, dico etc. » P. Bondanella, Niccolò Machiavelli. The Prince, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005 : « (Of those things for which men, and particularly princes, are praised or blamed). Now, it remains to be considered what should be the methods and principles of a prince in dealing with his subjects and allies. Because I know that many have written about this, I am afraid that by writing about it again I shall be considered presumptuous, especially since in discussing this material I depart from the procedures of others. But since my intention is to write something useful for anyone who understands it, it seemed more suitable for me to search after the effectual truth of the matter rather than its imagined one. Many writers have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen nor known to exist in reality. For there is such a distance between how one lives and how one ought to live, that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done achieves his downfall rather than his preservation. A man who wishes to profess goodness at all times will come to ruin among so many who are not good. Therefore, it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain himself to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge or not to use it according to necessity. Leaving aside, therefore, matters concerning an imaginary prince, and taking into account those that are true, let me say that etc. ».

[T2 Machiavelli] Excerpt 1 Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, XVII : « De crudelitate et pietate; et an sit melius amari quam timeri, vel e contra (Della crudeltà e pietà, e s'elli è meglio essere amato che temuto o più tosto temuto che amato). Nasce da questo una disputa, s'elli è meglio essere amato che temuto o econverso. Respondesi che si vorrebbe essere l'uno e l'altro; ma perché elli è difficile accozzarli insieme, è molto più sicuro essere temuto che amato, quando si abbi a mancare dell'uno de' dua, perché delli òmini si può dire questo generalmente, che sieno ingrati, volubili, simulatori, fuggitori de' pericoli, cupidi di guadagno, e, mentre fai loro bene, sono tutti tua, offeronti el sangue, la roba, la vita, e' figliuoli, […], quando el bisogno è discosto, ma, quando ti si appressa, e' si rivoltano ; […], e li òmini hanno meno respetto ad offendere uno che si facci amare che uno che si facci temere, perché l'amore è tenuto da uno vinculo di obligo, il quale, per essere li òmini tristi, da ogni occasione di propria utilità è rotto, ma il timore è tenuto da una paura di pena, che non ti abandona mai ». P. Bondanella, Niccolò Machiavelli. The Prince : « (Of cruelty and mercy, and whether it is better to be loved than to be feared or the contrary). From this arises an argument: whether it is better to be loved than to be feared, or the contrary. The answer is that one would like to be both one and the other. But since it is difficult to be both together, it is much safer to be feared than to be loved, when one of the two must be lacking. For one can generally say this about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, simulators and deceivers, avoiders of danger, and greedy for gain. While you work for their benefit they are completely yours, offering you their blood, their property, their lives, and their sons, as I said above, when the need to do so is far away. But when it draws nearer to you, they turn away. […]. Men are less hesitant about injuring someone who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared, because love is held together by a chain of obligation that, since men are a wretched lot, is broken on every occasion for their own self-interest; but fear is sustained by a dread of punishment that will never abandon you ».

[T2 Machiavelli] Excerpt 2 Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, XVIII : « Quomodo fides a principibus sit servanda (In che modo e' principi abbino a mantenere la fede). Quanto sia laudabile in uno principe mantenere la fede e vivere con integrità e non con astuzia, ciascuno lo intende; nondimanco si vede per esperienzia ne' nostri tempi quelli principi avere fatto grandi cose, che della fede hanno tenuto poco conto e che hanno saputo con la astuzia aggirare e' cervelli delli òmini, e alla fine hanno superato quelli che si sono fondati in sulla lealtà. […]. Non può pertanto uno signore prudente né debbe osservare la fede, quando tale osservanzia li torni contro e che sono spente le cagioni che la feciono promettere; e se li òmini fussino tutti buoni, questo precetto non sarebbe buono, ma perché sono tristi e non la osserverebbano a te, tu etiam non la hai a osservare a loro. Né mai a uno principe mancorono cagioni legittime da colorare la inosservanzia. Di questo se ne potrebbe dare infiniti essempli moderni e mostrare quante pace, quante promesse sono state fatte irrite e vane per la infidelità de' principi; e quello che ha saputo meglio usare la golpe è meglio capitato; ma è necessario, questa natura, saperla bene colorire e essere gran simulatore e dissimulatore; e sono tanto semplici li òmini e tanto obediscano alle necessità presenti, che colui che inganna troverrà sempre chi si lascerà ingannare. Io non voglio, delli esempli freschi, tacerne uno: Alessandro VI non fece mai altro, non pensò mai a altro che a ingannare òmini, e sempre trovò subietto da poterlo fare, e non fu mai omo che avessi maggiore efficacia in asseverare e con maggiori giuramenti affermassi una cosa che l'osservassi meno; nondimeno sempre li succederono l'inganni ad votum, perché conosceva bene questa parte del mondo. » P. Bondanella, Niccolò Machiavelli. The Prince : « (How a prince should keep his word). How praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his word and to live with integrity and not by cunning, everyone knows. Nevertheless, one sees from experience in our times that the princes who have accomplished great deeds are those who have thought little about keeping faith and who have known how cunningly to manipulate men's minds; and in the end they have surpassed those who laid their foundations upon sincerity. […]. A wise ruler, therefore, cannot and should not keep his word when such an observance would be to his disadvantage, and when the reasons that caused him to make a promise are removed. If men were all good, this precept would not be good. But since men are a wicked lot and will not keep their promises to you, you likewise need not keep yours to them. A prince never lacks legitimate reasons to colour over his failure to keep his word. Of this, one could cite an endless number of modern examples to show how many pacts and how many promises have been made null and void because of the faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to use the ways of the fox has come out best. But it is necessary to know how to colour over this nature effectively, and to be a great pretender and dissembler. Men are so simple-minded and so controlled by their immediate needs that he who deceives will always find someone who will let himself be deceived. I do not wish to remain silent about one of these recent examples. Alexander VI never did anything else, nor thought about anything else, than to deceive men, and he always found someone to whom he could do this. There never has been a man who asserted anything with more effectiveness, nor whose affirmations rested upon greater oaths, who observed them less. Nevertheless, his deceptions always succeeded to his heart's desire, since he knew this aspect of the world very well. » [T2 Machiavelli] Excerpt 3 Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, XVIII : « Facci dunque uno principe di vincere e mantenere lo stato: e' mezzi sempre saranno iudicati onorevoli e da ciascuno laudati, perché el vulgo ne va preso con quello che pare e con lo evento della cosa, e nel mondo non è se non vulgo e li pochi non ci hanno luogo, quando li assai hanno dove appoggiarsi. Alcuno principe de' presenti tempi, quale non è bene nominare, non predica mai altro che pace e fede, e dell'una e della altra è inimicissimo; e l'una e l'altra quando e' l'avessi osservata, li arebbe più volte tolto e la reputazione e lo stato » P. Bondanella, Niccolò Machiavelli. The Prince : « Therefore, let a prince conquer and maintain the state, and his methods will always be judged honourable and praised by all. For ordinary people are always taken in by appearances and by the outcome of an event. And in the world there are only ordinary people; and the few have no place, while the many have a spot on which to lean. A certain prince of the present times, whom it is best not to name, preaches nothing but peace and faith, and to both one and the other he is extremely hostile. If he had observed both peace and faith, he would have had either his reputation or his state taken away from him many times over ».

[T3 Machiavelli] Excerpt 1 Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, XVIII : « A uno principe adunque non è necessario avere tutte le soprascritte qualità [1] , ma è bene necessario parere d'averle; anzi, ardirò di dire questo, che, avendole e osservandole sempre, sono dannose, e parendo di averle, sono utile, come parere pietoso, fedele, umano, intero, relligioso e essere, ma stare in modo edificato con l'animo che, bisognando non essere, tu possa e sappi mutare el contrario. E hassi a intendere questo, che uno principe, […], non può osservare tutte quelle cose per le quali li òmini sono tenuti buoni, sendo spesso necessitato, per mantenere lo stato, operare contro alla fede, contro alla carità, contro alla umanità, contro alla religione; e però bisogna che elli abbi uno animo disposto a volgersi secondo che e' venti della fortuna e la variazione delle cose li comandano, e, […], non partirsi dal bene potendo, ma sapere intrare nel male necessitato ».

[1] XV : « <esser>liberale, donatore, pietoso, fedele, animoso, umano, casto, intero, grave, religioso ».

P. Bondanella, Niccolò Machiavelli. The Prince :

« Therefore, it is not necessary for a prince to possess all of the above-mentioned qualities [1] , but it is very necessary for him to appear to possess them. Furthermore, I shall dare to assert this: that having them and always observing them is harmful, but appearing to observe them is useful: for instance, to appear merciful, faithful, humane, trustworthy, religious, and to be so; but with his mind disposed in such a way that, should it become necessary not to be so, he will be able and know how to change to the opposite. One must understand this: a prince, […], cannot observe all those things for which men are considered good, because in order to maintain the state he must often act against his faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion. And so it is necessary that he should have a mind ready to turn itself according to the way the winds of Fortune and the changing circumstances command him. And, as I said above, he should not depart from the good if it is possible to do so, but he should know how to enter into evil when forced by necessity ».

[1] XV : « <to be> generous, open-handed, merciful, faithful, fierce, humane, trustworthy, serious, religious ».

[T3 Machiavelli] Excerpt 2 Niccolò Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, F. Bausi (ed.), Roma, Salerno Editrice, 2001, I, 41 : « Saltare dalla umiltà alla superbia, dalla piatà alla crudeltà, sanza i debiti mezzi, è cosa imprudente e inutile. Oltre agli altri termini male usati da Appio per mantenere la tirannide, non fu di poco momento saltare troppo presto da una qualità a un'altra. Perché l'astuzia sua nello ingannare la plebe, simulando d'essere uomo popolare, fu bene usata; furono ancora bene usati i termini che tenne perché i Dieci si avessono a rifare; fu ancora bene usata quella audacia di creare se stesso contro alla opinione della Nobilità; fu bene usato creare compagni a suo proposito: ma non fu già bene usato, come egli ebbe fatto questo, secondo che disopra dico, mutare, in uno subito, natura; e, di amico, mostrarsi inimico alla plebe; di umano, superbo; di facile, difficile; e farlo tanto presto, che, sanza scusa niuna, ogni uomo avesse a conoscere la fallacia dello animo suo. Perché chi è paruto buono un tempo, e vuole a suo proposito diventar cattivo, lo debbe fare per i debiti mezzi; ed in modo condurvisi con le occasioni, che, innanzi che la diversa natura ti tolga de' favori vecchi, la te ne abbia dati tanti de' nuovi, che tu non venga a diminuire la tua autorità: altrimenti, trovandoti scoperto e sanza amici, rovini ». « To Leap from Humility to Pride, from Mercy to Cruelty, without Due Degrees Is Something Imprudent and Useless. Among the other means badly used by Appius to maintain his tyranny, it was of no little moment to leap too quickly from one quality to another. For his astuteness in deceiving the plebs, pretending to be a man of the people, was well used; also well used were the means he adopted so that the Ten would have to be remade; also well used was the audacity of creating himself against the opinion of the nobility; creating partners to his purposes was well used. But it was not at all well used, when he had done this, as I say above, to change nature of a sudden and from a friend of the plebs show himself an enemy; from humane, proud; from agreeable, difficult; and to do it so quickly that without any excuse every man had to know the falsity of his spirit. For whoever has appeared good for a time and wishes for his purposes to become wicked ought to do it by due degrees and to conduct himself with opportunities, so that before your different nature takes away old favour from you, it has given you so much new that you do not come to diminish your authority; otherwise, finding yourself uncovered and without friends, you are ruined » [T3 Machiavelli] Excerpt 3 Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, XIX : « De contemptu et odio fugiendo (In che modo si abbia a fuggire lo essere sprezzato e odiato). E qui si debbe notare che l'odio s'acquista così mediante le buone opere come le triste; e però, […], uno principe, volendo mantenere lo stato, è spesso sforzato a non essere buono. Perché, quando quella università, o populi o soldati o grandi ch'e' si sieno, della quale tu iudichi avere per mantenerti, più bisogno, è corrotta, ti conviene seguire l'umore suo per satisfarle; e allora le buone opere ti sono nimiche » P. Bondanella, Niccolò Machiavelli. The Prince : « (Of avoiding being despised and hated). Here, one must note that hatred is acquired just as much through good actions as by sorry ones. And so, […], if a prince wishes to maintain the state, he is often obliged not to be good, because whenever that group you believe you need to support you is corrupted-whether it be the people, the soldiers, or the nobles-it is to your advantage to follow their inclinations in order to satisfy them, and then good deeds are your enemy » [T3 Machiavelli] Excerpt 4 Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, VIII : « De his qui per scelera ad principatum pervenere (Di quelli che per scelleratezze hanno acquistato principati). Potrebbe alcuno dubitare donde nascessi che Agatocle e alcuno simile, dopo infiniti tradimenti e crudeltà, possé vivere lungamente sicuro nella sua patria e difendersi da li inimici esterni, e da' suoi cittadini non gli fu mai con spira to contro -con ciò sia che molti altri mediante la crudeltà non abbino etiam ne' tempi pacifici potuto mante nere lo stato, non che ne' tempi dubiosi di guerra. Credo che questo avvenga da le crudeltà male usate o bene usate. Bene usate si possono chiamare quelle -se del male è lecito dire bene -che si fanno a uno tratto per la necessità dello assicurarsi, e di poi non vi si insiste drento ma si convertono in più utilità de' sudditi che si può. Male usate sono quelle le quali, ancora che nel princi pio sieno poche, più tosto col tempo crescono che le si spenghino. Coloro che osservono el primo modo possono con Dio e con li uomini avere allo stato loro qualche rimedio, come ebbe Agatocle; quegli altri è impossibile si mantenghino. Onde è da notare che nel pigliare uno stato debbe lo occupatore d'esso discorrere tutte quelle offese che gli è necessario fare, e tutte farle a uno tratto per non le avere a rinnovare ogni dì e potere, non le innovando, assi curare li uomini e guadagnarseli con benificarli. Chi fa altrimenti o per timidità o per mal consiglio, è sempre necessitato tenere il coltello in mano; né mai può fondarsi sopra e' sua sudditi, non si potendo quegli per le fresche e continue iniurie mai assicurare di lui. Per che le iniurie si debbono fare tutte insieme acciò che, assaporan dosi meno, offendino meno; e' benifizi si debbono fare a poco a poco acciò si assaporino meglio ». P. Bondanella, Niccolò Machiavelli. The Prince : « (Of those who have become princes through wickedness). One might well wonder how, after so many betrayals and cruelties, Agathocles and others like him could live for such a long time secure in their native cities and defend themselves from foreign enemies without being plotted against by their own citizens. Many others, employing cruel means, were unable to hold on to their state even in peaceful times, not to speak of the uncertain times of war. I believe that this depends on whether cruelty be badly or well used. Those cruelties are well used (if it is permitted to speak well of evil) that are carried out in a single stroke, done out of necessity to protect oneself, and then are not continued, but are instead converted into the greatest possible benefits for the subjects. Those cruelties are badly used that, although few at the outset, increase with the passing of time instead of disappearing. Those who follow the first method can remedy their standing, both with God and with men, as Agathocles did; the others cannot possibly maintain their positions. Hence it should be noted that, in conquering a state, its conqueror should weigh all the injurious things he must do and commit them all at once, so as not to have to repeat them every day. By not repeating them, he will be able to make men feel secure and win them over with the benefits he bestows upon them. Anyone who does otherwise, either out of timidity or because of bad advice, is always obliged to keep his knife in his hand. Nor can he ever count upon his subjects, who, because of their recent and continuous injuries, cannot feel secure with him. Therefore, injuries should be inflicted all at once, for the less they are tasted, the less harm they do. However, benefits should be distributed a little at a time, so that they may be fully savoured ».

[T3 Machiavelli] Excerpt 5 Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, XVII : « Ma quando el principe è con li esserciti e ha in governo moltitudine di soldati, allora al tutto è necessario non si curare del nome del crudele, perché sanza questo nome non si tenne mai essercito unito né disposto a alcuna fazione. In tra le mirabili azioni di Annibale si connumera questa, che, avendo uno essercito grossissimo, misto di infinite generazioni di uomini, condotto a militare in terre aliene, non vi surgessi mai alcuna dissensione né in fra loro né contro al principe, così nella cattiva come nella sua buona fortuna. Il che non possé nascere da altro che da quella sua inumana crudeltà: la quale, insieme con infinite sua virtù, lo fece sempre nel conspetto de' sua soldati venerando e terribile. E, sanza quella, a fare quello effetto l'altre sua virtù non bastavano: e li scrittori, in questo poco considerati, da l'una parte ammirano questa sua azione, da l'altra dannano la principale cagione di essa. E che sia vero che le altre sua virtù non sarebbono bastate si può considerare in Scipione, rarissimo non solamente ne' tempi sua ma in tutta la memoria delle cose che si fanno, dal quale li esserciti sua in Ispagna si ribellorno: il che non nacque da altro che da la sua troppa pietà, la quale aveva data alli sua soldati più licenza che alla disciplina militare non si conveniva; la qual cosa gli fu da Fabio Massimo in senato rimproverata e chiamato da lui corruttore della romana milizia ». P. Bondanella, Niccolò Machiavelli. The Prince : « But when the prince is with his armies and has a multitude of soldiers under his command, then it is absolutely necessary that he should not worry about being considered cruel, for without that reputation he will never keep an army united or prepared for any action. Numbered among the remarkable deeds of Hannibal is this: that while he had a very large army made up of all kinds of men that he commanded in foreign lands, there never arose the slightest dissension, either among themselves or against their leader, both during his periods of good and bad luck. This could not have arisen from anything other than his inhuman cruelty, which, along with his many other virtues, made him always venerable and terrifying in the eyes of his soldiers. Without that quality, his other virtues would not have sufficed to attain the same effect. Having considered this matter very superficially, historians on the one hand admire these deeds of his, and on the other condemn the main cause of them. That it is true that his other virtues would not have been sufficient can be seen from the case of Scipio, a most extraordinary man, not only in his time but in all of recorded history, whose armies in Spain rebelled against him. This came about from nothing other than his excessive compassion, which gave his soldiers more licence than is suitable to military discipline. For this he was censured in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, who called him the corruptor of the Roman army ».

[T4 Machiavelli] Excerpt 1 Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, XV : « Lasciando adunque addreto le cose circa uno principe immaginate e discorrendo quelle che sono vere, dico che tutti li uomini, quando se ne parla, e maxime e' principi per essere posti più alti, sono notati di alcune di queste qualità che arrecano loro o biasimo o laude. E questo è che alcuno è tenuto liberale, alcuno misero -[…] -; alcuno è tenuto donatore, alcuno rapace; alcuno crudele, alcuno piatoso; l'uno fedifrago, l'altro fedele; l'uno effeminato e pusillanime, l'altro feroce e animoso; l'uno umano, l'altro superbo; l'uno lascivo, l'altro casto; l'uno intero, l'altro astuto; l'uno duro, l'altro facile; l'uno grave, l'altro leggieri; l'uno religioso, l'altro incredulo, e simili. E io so che ciascuno confesserà che sarebbe laudabilissima cosa uno principe trovarsi, di tutte le soprascritte qualità, quelle che sono tenute buone. Ma perché le non si possono avere tutte né interamente osservare, per le condizioni umane che non lo consentono, è necessario essere tanto prudente ch'e' sappi fuggire la infamia di quegli vizi che gli torrebbono lo stato e da quegli che non gliene tolgono guardarsi, s'egli è possibile: ma, non possendo, vi si può con meno respetto lasciare andare. Et etiam non si curi di incorrere nella infamia di quelli vizi sanza e' quali possa difficilmente salvare lo stato; perché, se si considerrà bene tutto, si troverrà qualche cosa che parrà virtù e, seguendola, sarebbe la ruina sua, e qualcuna altra che parrà vizio e, seguendola, ne nasce la sicurtà e il bene essere suo ». P. Bondanella, Niccolò Machiavelli. The Prince : « Leaving aside, therefore, matters concerning an imaginary prince, and taking into account those that are true, let me say that all men, when they are spoken of-and especially princes, since they are placed on a higher levelare judged by some of those qualities that bring them either blame or praise. And this is why one is considered generous, another miserly […]. One is considered a giver, the other rapacious; one cruel, the other merciful; one a breaker of faith, the other faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, the other fierce and courageous; one humane, the other proud; one lascivious, the other chaste; one trustworthy, the other shrewd; one hard, the other easygoing; one serious, the other frivolous; one religious, the other unbelieving; and the like. And I know that everyone will admit it would be a very praiseworthy thing to find in a prince those qualities mentioned above that are held to be good. But since it is neither possible to have them nor to observe them all completely, because the human condition does not permit it, a prince must be prudent enough to know how to escape the infamy of those vices that would take the state away from him, and be on guard against those vices that will not take it from him, whenever possible. But if he cannot, he need not concern himself unduly if he ignores these less serious vices. Moreover, he need not worry about incurring the infamy of those vices without which it would be difficult to save the state. Because, carefully taking everything into account, he will discover that something which appears to be a virtue, if pursued, will result in his ruin; while some other thing which seems to be a vice, if pursued, will secure his safety and his well-being ».

[T4 Machiavelli] Excerpt 2 Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, VIII : « Non si può ancora chiamare virtù amazzare li sua cittadini, tradire li amici, essere sanza fede, sanza pietà, sanza relligione, li quali modi possono fare acquistare imperio, ma non gloria: perché, se si considerassi la virtù di Agatocle nello intrare e nello uscire de' pericoli e la grandezza dello animo suo nel sopportare e superare le cose averse, non si vede perché elli abbia a essere iudicato inferiore a qualunque escellentissimo capitano: nondimanco, la sua efferata crudelità e inumanità con infinite sceleratezze non consentono che sia in fra li escellentissimi òmini celebrato » P. Bondanella, Niccolò Machiavelli. The Prince : « Still, it cannot be called virtue to kill one's fellow citizens, to betray allies, to be without faith, without pity, without religion; by these means one can acquire power, but not glory. If one were to consider Agathocles' virtue in getting into and out of dangers, and his greatness of spirit in bearing up under and overcoming adversities, one can see no reason why he should be judged inferior to any most excellent commander. Nevertheless, his vicious cruelty and inhumanity, along with numerous wicked deeds, do not permit us to honour him among the most excellent of men »

  H.C Mansfield and N. Tarcov, Niccolò Machiavelli. Discourses on Livy, London, The University of ChicagoPress, 1996 :