Loïs Bastide

Emergency capabilities Deploying WHO's communication in West Africa during the 2013-16 Ebola outbreak

The 2014 Ebola Virus Disease outbreak in West Africa has proven a very demanding emergency setting for organizations involved in the international response, given the lack of locally available resources to assess the situation, to develop relevant response strategies and to carry on effective actions in the field. And yet, one could have hoped that the exponential development of preparedness theory and its implementation in public health and emergency organizations in recent years would have found involved institutions ready and up to the task. However, existing capacities actually largely failed to deliver effective actions to deal with such unanticipated catastrophic events.

. Put in plain terms, this approach posits that actions unfold in specific contexts, which contributes to their framing (they are indexical). More specifically, it considers that actions and their settings are dynamically connected by feedback loops, meaning that:

Introduction

The 2014 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) crisis in West Africa has created a very complex work environment for all the actors involved in the response. Fast contagion, propagation to urban, metropolitan contexts, lack of knowledge in all dimensions of the response, state of public health systems in affected countries, scale of the response and variety of involved jurisdictions and agencies (to cite a few factors) contributed to frame a very demanding action setting for professionals deployed in the field. Deployees were compelled to act under circumstances of scarce knowledge, high uncertainty, and in fast-evolving organizational structures. These elements are identified and expected in emergency settings and tackled in contingency plans and public health preparedness systems [START_REF] Lakoff | Preparing for the Next Emergency[END_REF][START_REF] Zylbermann | Tempêtes microbiennes: essai sur la politique de sécurité sanitaire dans le monde transatlantique[END_REF]. Nevertheless, they were pushed to a completely new level due to the high fatality rate of the EVD, incomplete clinical and epidemiological information on the disease in this unprecedented setting (West Africa), the regional, transborder scale of the epidemic, and the scarcity of locally available resources to mitigate the impact of the disease.

In this context, experts deployed in West Africa by various organizations faced many obstacles, which kept on derailing the international response, at least until spring 2015. As established procedures and action protocols proved ineffective, they had to develop coping strategies to regain agency, in this complex setting. This chapter focusses on this issue, by analyzing first line responders' activities in the field, in view of identifying:

• The multi-dimensional challenges that they faced in their work,

• The resources and capacities that they leveraged to develop their actions, in this difficult setting.

The discussion is based on empirical data collected during a joint research project between the Department of Sociology at the University of Geneva, and the Department of Communications (DOC) at the World Health Organization (WHO). The project, which took place between March and June 2015, aimed at gathering and organizing information produced by communication experts deployed in West Africa through WHO's Emergency Communication Network (ECN), a roster of professionals coming from various organizations, trained in emergency communication by WHO, and ready to be deployed in Public Health Emergency settings.

In this context, we choose to focus on the ability of the ECN to sustain the agency of its members, thus enabling them to carry on their tasks in this challenging crisis environment. We posit that this "support function" had much to do with the morphological character of the ECN, as a loose, "networked" organization. We show that its properties, as an organizational structure, increased individual experts' agency and ability to work in the field, by providing different types of resources and capacities.

To do so, we start by proposing a theory of "situated action" and capability building, by reworking Amartya Sen's concept of capability. We stress the fact that, as an organization, the ECN creates collective capabilities, which proved useful in dealing with the many organizational glitches dysfunctions on the ground. These capabilities, we argue, include specific forms of trust, and the constitution of a "network of networks" which allowed ECN deployees to reach for heterogeneous resources and capacities, according to their needs i .

Situated action and capability building in a crisis setting

Contexts of action

The EVD epidemics deeply disrupted response systems and institutions -at local, regional and global levelsand affected societies in West Africa. WHO communicators sent to the field found themselves struggling to make sense of unfolding events and circumstances, and to define appropriate courses of action, despite their training as emergency responders [START_REF] Bastide | Crisis communication during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa: the paradoxes of decontextualized contextualization[END_REF]. To shed light on this process of "sensemaking" [START_REF] Weick | Sensemaking in organizations[END_REF] and of organizingmaking sense of the situation and designing efficient actions -, it is necessary to assemble a working theory of action that pays attention:

1. to the specificities of the crisis setting, in particular to its high degree of volatility, contingency, and indeterminacy;

2. to the origin and to the processes of mobilization of the resources, skills and capacities needed to act in this uncertain environment.

In view of bringing these dimensions under a unified explanatory framework, the chapter develops an analytics of the response in terms of "situated action" (Garfinkel, 1. Settings participate in framing actions, considering that they offer specific resources and impose particular constraints upon them. This idea is captured in the notion of "affordances" [START_REF] Gibson | The theory of affordances[END_REF], which posits that particular contexts facilitate specific practices and make others difficult, or even impossible.

2. The material and symbolic outcomes of past actions re-structure resources and possibilities available to ongoing practices, thus re-framing action settings.

Given this understanding, it will be necessary to characterize the EVD as a specific context of action. However, a cautionary methodological note is necessary before we start picturing the setting.

Indeed, if social action [START_REF] Weber | Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology[END_REF] is always situatedconsidering that it should be envisioned as the combined outcome of individual and collective agency and of a given context -, it remains that it can be captured and considered at different scales: individual actions can have different reaches [START_REF] Dodier | Les appuis conventionnels de l'action. Eléments de pragmatique sociologique[END_REF]Bastide, 2015, 39-43). For instance, there are long-term, planned and organized actions, aiming at a more or less distant time horizon. In the case of the EVD epidemic in West Africa, such horizon could be the end of transmission, a critical goal of the response (see : World Health Organization, 2015). This aim involved the conception of long-term strategic goals and courses of action, which themselves involved and served as contexts for shorter scale objectives and actions [START_REF] Grossetti | Trois échelles d'action et d'analyse[END_REF]. Indeed, ending the epidemic supposed to develop a broad range of shorter-term targetsbuilding Ebola treatment centers, designing sensitizing campaigns, developing relevant situational assessments, etc.in a variety of domainsepidemiology, laboratory analysis, clinical care, logistics, etc. Conversely, broader time frames were also at play. For instance, a relevant temporality concerned the organizational cycle of international epidemic response systems [START_REF] Zylbermann | Tempêtes microbiennes: essai sur la politique de sécurité sanitaire dans le monde transatlantique[END_REF]. It involved the institutional overhauling of existing response capacities. In this particular dimension, stakes were high for WHO, as its credibility as the main player in public health crisis response was debated and sometimes questioned by member States, by other international and non-governmental organizations, and by the media. As such, the organizational crisis extended well into the post Ebola periodand is still ongoing (On the post-Ebola reform at WHO, see for instance [START_REF] Fleck | WHO's new emergencies programme bridges two worlds[END_REF][START_REF] Moon | Post-Ebola reforms: ample analysis, inadequate action[END_REF].

We capture the Ebola outbreak, as a specific action settings, by leveraging on a rich data set including 17 semi-structured interviews with ECN deployees and two ECN managers, 29 non-published End of Mission Reports, 30 deployees' Terms of References (Tors) forms and various documents referring to deployments. By triangulating these different types of data and drawing complementary insights from interviews with other professionals at WHO (14 formal, semi-structured interviews and numerous informal interactions) and the CDCs (15 semi-structured interviews), we were able to build a consistent picture of the general circumstances in the field. Thus we re-constructed a generic (ideal typical if you wish) characterization of the EVD crisis setting in West Africa. Bearing in mind the nature of our data set, which refers to deployments taking place between March 2014 and February 2015, given also the position of our respondents as first-line emergency responders, we focus the characterization of the context to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, during this period.

Situated action and capabilities

As mentioned, looking at situated action not only involves characterizing relevant settings, but also identifying the resources and capacities implemented in situation. To frame this analysis, we use Amartya Sen's notion of "cababilities" [START_REF] Sen | The idea of justice[END_REF] ii . In terms of an analysis of "social action" [START_REF] Weber | Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology[END_REF] Sen thus recognizes that social actors are to be understood as the partial outcomes of their social trajectories. But his approach focuses on the contextual actualization of functionnings rather than on their acquisition, thus departing from more deterministic approaches to individual trajectories in terms of socialization and dispositions (Bourdieu, 1990;[START_REF] Lahire | L'homme Pluriel: Les Ressorts de l'action[END_REF]. However, we also follow Bénédicte [START_REF] Zimmermann | Pragmatism and the Capability Approach Challenges in Social Theory and Empirical Research[END_REF] when she suggests that Sen's situational approach remains somehow underspecified. Hence our re-conceptualization of action settings.

The proposed approach thus posits that a specific skill, in order to be implementable, needs to meet a fitting environment, or it remains latent. This fact is easy to grasp in the case of highly equipped skills, where the availability of appropriate tools is the sine qua non condition of a successful activation. For the sake of clarity, it is easy for instance to appreciate that the professional skill set of a computer scientist will be much less useful without an available computer.

Therefore, capabilities should be understood, in this framework, as the set of functionings one is effectively able to reach or implement, under current circumstances. There is thus a need to distinguish between functionings, -sets of resources, skills and capacities -, and capabilities, defined as the capacity to actually implement these functionings, in a particular situation [START_REF] Fernagu-Oudet | R)évolution du management des ressources humaines: des compétences aux capabilités[END_REF]. This delineation makes it possible to understand why reputedly well-established skills and response systems failed to be activated in the West African EVD setting. It is of upmost importance in the case of crisis management planning since high-stress environments can easily inhibit individual and, possibly, collective ability to actbeing paralyzed by fear, or overwhelmed by the extent of uncertainty, for instance. This formalization allows understanding that a high skill professional's capacities can be deeply impaired in such context. A high-ranking professional at the United States Centers For Disease Control and Prevention (US CDCs), who had been deployed in Sierra Leone, thus explained that he had to "pull out" some people from the field given their emotional distress, due to the "specter of death" iv .

Following [START_REF] Ibrahim | From Individual to Collective Capabilities: The Capability Approach as a Conceptual Framework for Self-help[END_REF], it is necessary to extend the capability approach by considering that capacities are not only individual attributes: building-up work collectives, such as the ECN, is a way to articulate individual resources and capacities to foster collective capabilities. Not only through improving coordination mechanisms by means of sensemaking practices in an organizational context (Weick and Roberts, 1993;[START_REF] Weick | Sensemaking in organizations[END_REF], but also through more mundane specificities of the ECN, as a social network. Collective capabilities work at two levels. On the one hand, the ECN, as a whole, can undertake tasks that no individual actor could possibly tackle. On the other hand, the ECN gathers, pools and produces (through training) individual resources and capacities, which support and increase the capabilities of its individual members. The organization thus works both by opening up new fields and possibilities of action, as a collective, and by increasing and improving its members' individual capacity to act by creating, pooling and re-distributing skills and resources, as we will see.

The ECN training

To understand the context of ECN deployees' interventions in West Africa, it is necessary to offer a glimpse at the ECN training, as it participated fully to the structuration of affordances in the field, by providing different types of tools aimed at facilitating action in highly uncertain environments.

Before entering the ECN, experts have to complete successfully an "Emergency Communications pre-deployment training" (World Health Organization, 2016), which the research team had the opportunity to observe v . This "is a multi-disciplinary, multihazard communications training for WHO and external experts". A successful completion of the course leads to the admission to the "Emergency Communications Network" roster, and experts can then be deployed in health emergencies, according to their areas of expertise. The training brings together WHO Communication Officers and experts in communication from other international organizations and international NGOs with the objective of having a group of a variety of practically oriented communication specialists that can be deployed rapidly.

During the training, participants go through a week of classroom learning. This first phase is followed by a three-day simulation exercisethe SIMEX, a "serious game" simulating a humanitarian emergency or a disease outbreak. During the exercise, the participants are tested for their ability to work under stress and in a changing environment. Starting with the ECN 2015 training, the participants are accompanied by mentors during the whole session. Those are previous ECN participants, which have already been deployed as ECN members. Each mentor is responsible for a group of ten participants. At the end of the training, one to two days are used for a personal and confidential debriefing of each participant with the "faculty" (World Health Organization, 2016). The faculty comprises the Director of the Department of Communications, the head of the Capacity Building Unit in the department, the mentor and several other WHO experts as well as experts from external agencies (World Health Organization, 2015d). The objective of the debriefing is to find the best fitting role for the candidate in an emergency, given her/his performance in the SIMEX, and the situation she or he can be deployed in. By April 2015 the ECN consisted of a pool of 104 communication experts.

Characterizing the EVD setting

When characterizing the working context of interviewed ECN deployees in West Africa, one has to keep in mind that our dataset encompasses the most "turbulent" period of the epidemic, when the very ability of the international response to curb transmission was still at stake vi . It thus corresponds to a period when the response was disorganized, with few working capacities in place.

Response structure and institutional complexity

In this context, a first challenge related to the institutional complexity of the response context, with local, national and international actors involved. For instance, in Liberia communication was made difficult by the fact that public health issues were dealt with by the Ministry of Health, whereas media resources were concentrated under the Ministry of Information, thus creating a disruption in information flows and coordination.

Institutional complexity was also the product of the structures of international agencies.

Many deployees found it difficult to understand the organizational working of WHOespecially non-WHO deployees. The even greater complexity of the UN system and the additional intricacy caused by the creation of the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) added to the confusion. This resulted in a general difficulty to identify management patterns. The response structure itself was cumbersome, due in part to the sheer number of involved actors vii , causing confusion in communication practices.

Another obstacle related to the shifting nature of the response, as the distribution of roles and attributions were fuzzy and continuously renegotiated and adjusted over time, creating uncertainties in terms of action. The demise of existing response systems led to substantial organizational instability, both in terms of the general response structure and within individual organizations, as existing response mechanisms were questioned, sometimes hotly contested, and transformed. This indeterminacy led to the unregulated development of power plays between individual actors, services and organizations involved in the response -a common reality in humanitarian settings (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010)-, which were resented as counterproductive, as they ran counter to the need of increased coordination and cooperation. For instance, tensions emerged within WHO between different services within the response structure, and between headquarters and Regional Office for Africa (AFRO), a phenomenon somehow typical of crisis situations at large [START_REF] Klein | The shock doctrine: the rise of disaster capitalism[END_REF].

This resulted in the absence of a clear emergency response structure, both at the level of the global response and internally, within WHO. At a global level, the creation of the Sub-Regional Ebola Operations and Coordination Centre (SEOCC -July-September 2014) and its quick demise and substitution by the UNMEER (September 2014-July 2015) is a good illustration. At WHO, the dual location of Community Engagement competences within two branches of the Technical strategy support & standards function of WHO's Ebola Response team structure, as well as the reorganization of deployment procedures during the crisis, are but a few examples. More broadly, the Ebola Response Team Structure at WHO's Headquarters in Geneva, which coordinated the organization's response and was tasked with dispatching responders in West Africa evolved constantly (See Dupras, this volume). In this shifting environment, deployees had a hard time figuring out roles and functions, lines of reporting and authority. It was felt also that successive reorganizations of the response, at all levels, were designed with political agendas in mind rather than according to sound organizational principles aiming at efficiency in the field.

Deployees also stressed the high politicization of Ebola as a public issue, and the difficulties it posed in terms of communication. Political use of Ebola during parliamentary elections in Liberia (The New York Times, December 4 2014), Guinea (Aljazeera, October 10 2015), as in the US during 2014 mid-term elections (FiveThiryEight, October 10 2014; personal interviews at the US CDCs), thus complicated the task of communication officers, by fueling all kinds of controversiesblurring public health messages -and interfered in political decision processes, such as border controls or quarantine. Media were understood as playing an ambiguous role in this respect, by fueling unnecessary controversies and being often too alarmist, thus disrupting the response.

Information management and contextual knowledge

There were also issues with information management and available knowledge to make sense of the situation, on the ground. One of the most important pillars of science-based institutions such as WHO is a strong commitment to evidence-based actions, informed by state-of-the art situational assessments to reduce uncertainty and to define clear lines of conduct. However, the early EVD response was plagued by the paucity of reliable information in all dimensions of the crisis (from virology to epidemiology, from cultural patterns to institutional and organizational contexts, and so on) [START_REF] Garrett | Opinion: Why Ebola epidemic is spinning out of control[END_REF]. According to respondents, such basic information as the list of Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs) in a country was sometimes impossible to obtain. Therefore, seeking the right information actually became one of the main tasks of many deployees. Importantly, organized information channels also lacked. In many cases, information was not systematically collected on the ground, and no system was in place to consolidate and dispatch the data coming up from affected localities. Thus, many deployees spent a substantial amount of time trying to identify information bottlenecks and to bridge individuals and institutions in order to create consistent information channels. They ended up engaging in an organizational work. This unanticipated part of the job, which concerned the necessity to assemble a work environment supportive of communication activitiesto work towards creating more favorable affordancesunder highly contingent circumstances and in an understructured organizational context, often ended-up being a bigger part of deployees' activities than communication per se.

This difficulty with data collection and management, combined with a lack of situational awareness of local social and cultural environments in the field, resulted in difficulties to design locally relevant communication strategies and messages. This situation reflected an organizational weakness in data and knowledge management rather than an information void, since research on the social dimensions of Ebola was in fact readily available, with a substantial share of this corpus having been commissioned by WHO itself (Bourrier, this volume).

Roles and attributions

At the level of individual ECN deployees, an enduring difficulty had to do with the discrepancy between sketchy terms of reference and pre-departure briefings, and actual circumstances met in the field. Many deployees found the situation on the ground chaotic, with little functioning structures in place. In this context, many had:

1. to clarify the actual situation on the ground, including relevant partners, partners' attribution and existing organizational structures; 2. to identify and/or define their own position and attributions within this structure and, as a result, to delineate tasks and tasks contents.

Moreover, too vague expectations about the role of communicator across institutions was also a shared concern. The combination between loose function attributions, interagency competition and a lack of understanding of communication in national governments or in specific agencies resulted in many deployees having to define and carve their own position within the international response structure. This was also caused by a constantly evolving definition of tasks and attributions. For instance, social mobilization tasks diversified and developed into so called "community engagement" practices [START_REF] Bastide | Crisis communication during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa: the paradoxes of decontextualized contextualization[END_REF]. Corresponding tasks, formally located within UNICEF, were progressively taken over by the ECN. A last consequence of this "blurred" environment was that respondents were often required to perform tasks exceeding their formal professional competency sets. For instance, "social mobilizers" were often asked to do interviews with the press, a job some of them did not feel skilled to perform.

The ECN as a social network

Given these circumstances, we now look at how the ECN helped deployees to develop their individual and collective agency, in the crisis setting. Our hypothesis is that the ECN's main quality, as a "capacitating organization" (Fernagu-Oudet and Batal, 2016) in the EVD context, was due to its formal structural features as a social network, rather than to the content of its training. The ECN training creates strong social ties, which facilitate the development of different forms of trust, a critical "moral good" in highly uncertain environments. As we will see, the quality of these social bonds worked toward expanding the resources and skills available to individual deployees through the network.

Forms of trust

Observations conducted during the ECN SIMEX 2015 and interviews with ECN members show that the training creates lasting social bonds among the participants. This is particularly true for those being part of the same team during the drill, since they spend three very intense, emotionally charged days together, collaborating tightly around the same tasks. In the process, they get familiar with their respective working styles. Off-duty time, during meals or in shared bedrooms, provides further opportunities for personal interactions beyond these small groups. This intimacy and a common exposure to extraordinary circumstances seem to create a strong esprit de corps among participants, a significant identification to the ECN and a lasting commitment to the collective entity.

Many deployees thus stressed the particular relations that they have with their colleagues from the ECN. ECN deployees mentioned that the training created a feeling of closeness and belonging among the participants:

"The community value is there". They "have that connection because [coming] from ECN, you have that sense of belonging. You can count on one another. You immediately hand in support and seek support".

These ties are defined in terms of friendship or even a family-like relationship. Thus, being part of the ECN is described as "being part of a network or family". Closeness among the participants is also mirrored and reinforced by their connection through dedicated Facebook groups, for every batch of alumni. Through these groups they can stay in contact and link up with each other at any time, including during deployments.

In addition to the density of social relations within the network, social bonds among ECN participants seem to be characterized by a high degree of trust. If trust is an ambiguous notion [START_REF] Marzano | Qu'est-ce que la confiance ? Études[END_REF] The relationship with mentors, who have been through the same training before and are experienced concerning deployments, may help develop and broaden similar forms of trust. Such trust relations are integral to this function, since mentors will be involved in supervising the trainees and giving advice and backup, including after the training, during deployment.

Recognition trust

More broadly, many respondents recognize that the sole fact of being part of the ECN creates a sense of immediate connivance between individuals. Another type of trust is thus based on the sheer knowledge of a shared background as ECN graduates, and of a shared body of technical skills related to emergency response. It can thus extend beyond direct relations, if involved individuals have been through the training. ECN members share a basic level of skills, a common language and common tools in terms of risk communication.

"Although some of them have more experience, you have a common background […] and you have the same information on how to phase those situations how to phase difficult situations".

Being "part of the same community", having "the same goal together" and knowing it as an implicit of the relationship was thus pointed out as an important element. These shared ways of framing situations, a shared language and shared toolboxes are instrumental in facilitating work relations, as they provide a common ground, thus reducing greatly the need to negotiate a common framework of work and action. As far as time is concerned, as is the case of course in an emergency, this is a valuable asset.

Beyond its formal role as an emergency deployment organization, the ECN thus has a more "latent" efficacy in terms of crisis management. On the one hand, it is similar to the Global Alert and Response Network (GOARN), a well-known "networked" organizations operating in the domain of public health emergencies (Ansell, Sondorp and Stevens, 2012), as it allows the quick identification, mobilization and deployment of trained responders from various organizations. However, it also provides additional capacities in terms of interpersonal and collective coordination. The ECN aligns goals and values among communication professionals with various backgrounds, focuses and streamlines practical norms and methodologies, and provides cognitive routines in the unstable environment of an emergency.

Therefore, by certifying the existence of a common base of knowledge, values and norms, the ECN acts as a "trust device" [START_REF] Karpik | Valuing the unique: the economics of singularities[END_REF] and ascribes a set of known attributes to all of its members. As a result, it formats and stabilizes mutual expectations. This "labelling" greatly facilitates working relations in the field since individuals know what can be expected from each other, even in the absence of existing personal relationships and/or when formal role attributions lack, making the ECN a particularly "loosely coupled" organization [START_REF] Weick | Sensemaking in organizations[END_REF]. We call this second type of trust recognition trust. The importance of this latter form is made obvious when it lacks:

"If there is no such team [ECN team], if the team relationship is not working properly, then you have to build your own network, and to build trust takes a lot of time. And by the time you have built strong ties, then you have to go back."

While complicity trust is based on relationships and substantial interpersonal and intersubjective knowledge, recognition trust is thinner and pertains to the labelling power of the ECN. Bonds related to the first type of trust are multi-dimensional and involve people emotionally, while bonds related to the second type are more focused, professional in kind. Complicity bonds are related to a certain degree of intimacy between individuals, while recognition bonds relate to a formalized body of practices, knowledge, norms and values. The former are more restrictive in scope, as they encompass fewer individuals, but commend deeper interpersonal commitment, while the latter extend further, as they are less demanding to create. Complicity trust is more local and idiosyncratic, while recognition trust is more mobile and more easily transferred, connective.

Pooling social capital

As a property of social relations, these forms of trust hint towards another characteristics of the ECN: as a social network, it greatly enhanced the ability of its members to reach out for different kinds of scarce goods and resourcesfunctionings -, in a highly strained environment. This ability to broaden individual and collective capabilities through social ties fits with the concept of "social capital", as it allows understanding how these relations affect positively or negatively the ability to implement or develop one's other bodies of resources and capacities [START_REF] Bourdieu | Le capital social[END_REF], under given circumstances.

Complicity trust and Recognition trust

Complicity trust Recognition trust

Type of bonds Personal Impersonal

Interpersonal commitment Strong Weaker

Scope Focused Extensive

To understand this aspect, it is useful to draw on Daniel [START_REF] Aldrich | The Importance of Social Capital in Building Community Resilience[END_REF] definition of social capital. For him, social capital can be delineated according to three different forms -different types of links -, namely bonding, bridging, and linking. The first form of social capital is constituted by links between people whose association is based on a tendency to link up with persons with similar social properties (according to a logic of homophily). Conversely, Bridging allows connecting people with heterogeneous social characteristics. Eventually, linking allows reaching for "power brokers, authority figures, and decision makers". Importantly, each of these channels provides different types of resources. Our hypothesis is that the ECN combines these three dimensions.

Bonding

Complicity trust can be associated most closely with bonding social capital, as it combines objective commonality (being an ECN member) and subjective ties (including affects). However, whereas Aldrich applies this type to characterize social relations between "family, kin and close friends", we extend it to characterize the social bonds created between given ECN members. To do so, we posit that there is a more fundamental underlying principle than homophily underpinning bonding, as a relational type: it is based on a subjective sense of belonging [START_REF] Brubaker | Beyond "Identity[END_REF], commanding specific forms of reciprocal obligations and loyalty. This sense of belonging and commonality is salient between ECN members and underpins specific forms of solidarity: Bonding social capital thus shapes the ECN as a close-knit collective with multiple connections between its members. ECN management has leveraged on this property by creating the figure of the mentor, a way of improving the clustering coefficient viii of the network by fostering inter-promotion relations. In contrast with Aldrich's approach, we thus accept that this sense of belonging can develop across social differences (as such, it does not concern only relations ruled by homophily). The ECN training is conducive to the development of such bonds, as it gathers professionals with diverse backgrounds and helps developing strong social bonds between them as they are put into intense, shared social experiences. The ECN generates bonding social capital by creating and broadening commonality between its members.

"[…]
These bondsfeeling of belonging and communalitywere also produced and/or deepened by the shared experience of field deployment during the EVD outbreak. This high-risk, emotionally draining environment fostered mutual recognition and strong mutual commitment between ECN responders. These relations facilitated the expression of and collective dealing with difficult and potentially impairing affects, such as fear. These social dynamics sustained the development of caring practices within the network, which helped deployees deal with the specificities of the EVD crisisas a perceived high-risk environment.

Bridging and linking

The ECN also contributes to develop and pool a great volume of the bridging and linking types of social capital. The network draws members from various organizations with different professional backgrounds and with diverse roles and positions within organizational hierarchies. In the 2015 training, participants originated from all WHO regional bureaus, from WHO HQ, the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC), the US CDCs, and Qatar's Ministry of Health. It also included independent communication specialists, sometimes with a journalism background, some with substantial experience working for international NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) ix . The high turnover of workers in international organizations and NGOs, with individual careers typically bringing professionals to work for different organization, only reinforces this variety. As a result, individuals in these professional worlds are often well connected. This variety creates efficient "bridges" to reach out across various organizations and to mobilize power brokers. Importantly, it allows doing so by using direct interpersonal relations rather than through institutionalized communication channels and processes: Mixing people from different backgrounds thus offers the possibility to tap into their respective networks. In this respect, the ECN functions much like a "network of networks", more than most other agencies where interactions are essentially contained within the organization. As a result, complicity trust and recognition trust developed within the ECN can extend considerably through these secondary relational systems, by building "trust chains" (Roulleau-Berger, 2011, p. 155) across ECN members' personal social networks.

Conclusion:

During the 2013-2016 EVD outbreak in West Africa, the ECN thus displayed specific qualities, as an organization. Importantly, it combined efficiently different types of social capital, helping to cut across institutions and reaching out for help and assistance in a radically resources-deprived environment. In particular, it helped circulate information.

In a context of high uncertainty, with little channels of communication in place among involved actors in the response system, information proved a highly critical good for deployees, especially at the onset of the response, when organization was still very much lacking:

"That was a great thing with the ECN, because through that you had other persons that you could rely on and ask for advice. So, in the beginning I was totally relying on that".

Information was vital for actors to be able to qualify (or assess) situations, and to take informed decisions on appropriate courses of action. Whatever capacities one possesses, lack of information has a debilitating effect on the possibility to implement them.

To keep with our analytical vocabulary, the ECN, as a professional network, thus increased responders' capabilities in the West African setting. The network itself emerged as a "capacitating organization", thus becoming a significant element of the emergency setting, a defining dimension of the context for its deployees. It contributed to shape flexible affordancessuch as trust, information channels, but also, for instance, forms of mutual caring -, thus partly offsetting resource deprivation in the field. Its combination of flexible and strong social bonds and low level of proceduralization (or high level of personal autonomy) proved efficient at gathering, articulating and implementing specific resources and capacities, given unfolding events and circumstances.

i The interviews are covered by a clause of strict confidentiality. As a consequence, we are not allowed to provide any personal identifier when quoting interviewees, including deployments locations.

ii This is undoubtedly a restrictive use of the author's approach, as it detaches his core conceptualization from its broader theoretical context, as a constitutive element of a theory of justice.

The theoretical discussion proposes an adaptation of Sen's propositions in the context of a theory of action.

iii Functionings are states of "being and doing". Being in good health is an instance, or being able to achieve a certain type of specialized action.

  , it remains that it is certainly a critical functioning in situations of high uncertainty as it allows the quick development of cooperation and facilitates collective action. As phrased by one interviewee: "finding good people quickly, that you trust on. It's absolutely crucial to do your job." first form of trust is tied to intimate interpersonal knowledge developed during the training, as part of the network, and reinforced during shared deployments. It often involves strong intersubjective ties, including affective bonds. To this extent, this type of trust appears to be unevenly distributed within the ECN, as it supposes shared personal experiences. Bonds of trust based on positive affects (friendship) and intimate interpersonal knowledge are likely to be stronger between people of a given group formed for the purpose of the SIMEX, among members of the same promotion, or between people who are in regular contact (be it because they work in the same organization, because they are deployed on the same operations, or through sustained relations through communication technologies):We call this type of trust complicity trust to stress the anchoring of this type of social bond in shared, face-to-face situations, involving substantial intersubjective and affective engagements. These bonds are thus strictly limited in demographic terms. However, regarding this latter point, it is important to stress that the recent introduction of mentoring during the ECN training is a way of widening "trust chains" (Roulleau-Berger, 2011) among members, by promoting inter-promotion bonds.

	"[The ECN] continues to expand, which is really nice. So being here as a mentor is
	wonderful because I get to meet this new batch of people. […] So the first year I was
	a participant, the second year I was a role player just in the simulation exercise, I wasn't
	there for this part. And then you meet people there and then two months later you're
	working with them in the field in an emergency. It's pretty... It's pretty amazing."
	Thus:
	-Interviewer: "So it's one of the value of the ECN? Making links, strong links
	between people?"
	-Interviewee: "Yes, definitely. And especially if you have shared the same
	training with them. So... If you have been in the same training with them, you

"It's nicer [to work with ECN members]. It's nicer yeah. It's faster too. You can just hit the ground running already. You know what they know, you know their level of skills because you've seen them working together, you've worked with them together as well.

And that trust we were talking about is already there."

Complicity trust

As an organizational feature, the kind of trust relations developed in the ECN have different components and can take different forms.

A feel that you are one. You feel closer to them. Before ECN I used to work with so many people in here. And we... We did not... We were just colleagues. But now, after ECN... Especially because we were trained together, we feel that we are from the same batch and we are like friends now."

  the ECN operates like I know he[generic ECN colleague] knows what I'm going through, and he was like: "Okay, whatever you need, you call me": And then I also, you know, I was calling him because I knew he was away when the thing […] happened.

	So, you know, we're kind of supporting each other. And then I did have [several]
	members of my ECN team that weren't in the area, that weren't in the Ebola response
	kind of helping me from outside, like sending me materials, you know, checking "how
	are you doing?".

  Two interns in the research team were embedded in the 2015 ECN training, as participant observers, namely Beatrice Nass, and Kayla Jenni. The analysis of the training relies heavily on their accounts. UNMEER, WHO, Médecins Sans Frontière (MSF), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the United Sates Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDCs), the International and national Red Crosses, the International Organization for Migrations (IOM), to mention a few. viii In graph theory, the clustering coefficient indicates a high density of ties within a social group. A high clustering coefficient means that each individual within a group is directly connected to most of its other members. ix Statuses differed during deployment according to individual professional situations: some communication specialists were deployed as consultants, some as WHO personnel. WHO was responsible for Medical evacuation under deployment contracts.

iv Interview at the US CDCs headquarters, Atlanta, August 13 2015. v vi Personal interview, US CDCs. vii


Loïs Bastide

Li Peilin

Laurence Roulleau-Berger

The moral side of disaster: religion and post-quake recognition regimes in Java 1 (In: (2016). Ecological risks and disasters -New experiences in China and Europe

Introduction

On May 27 2006, a magnitude 6.3 earthquake hit the centre of Java early in the morning. It left 6000 people dead, more than 30 000 inured, and about 1.5 million homeless. In a very densely populated area, where no proper anti-seismic design for buildings were implemented, it left the territory in rumbles. Thanks to a burgeoning stream of researches on disasters in the social sciences it is now a widely accepted premise indeed, that so called "natural disasters" are produced at the very intersection between social infrastructures and natural phenomena [START_REF] Quarantelli | A Social Science Research Agenda For The Disasters Of The 21st Century: Theoretical, Methodological And Empirical Issues And Their Professional Implementation[END_REF]. In other words, vulnerabilities, which open the door to for disaster to occur, are produced by the conjunction between social organization and the natural environment. What we would like to do here is to delve precisely into the social organization of local communities in order to assess the part of cultural forms into the framing of the quake as a social fact : our hypothesis is that cultural patterns, in the region, brought people to develop a collective interpretation of the quake as a godly message. This shared meaning sustained the emergence of a moral economy of disaster which, in turn, affected local communities. Laying on a fieldwork conducted in 2013 in Karanglegi 2 , a hamlet sited in the region of Yogyakarta, the most heavily affected by the tremor, we will show how the cultural 1 1 This research is based on the Program PEPS 2012-2013 Disasters and recreation of Society in China, Japan and Indonesia : traumatized identities, public arenas and moral economies with the support of INSHS/CNRS, completed on the basis of cooperation of the CASS research members for which it is hereby appreciated.. Principal Investigator : Professor Laurence Roulleau-Berger, CNRS, Triangle, ENS Lyon in cooperation with Professor Luo Hongguang, CASS, Professor Liu Zhengai, CASS and Professor Zhao Yandong, CASS and Dr.Lu Yangxu CASS, Professor Toshio Sugiman, Kyoto University and Assistant Professor Motohiko Nagata, Kyoto University; Loïs Bastide, Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Sociology, University of Geneva. Fieldwork was done in Indonesia in February 2013. 2 The name of the hamlet has been modified. negotiation of disaster and its meaning affected the social process during the reconstruction phase and until the present.

In the first section, we will introduce the site of investigation, and then we will analyse the emergence of a shared corpus of interpretations of the event in a second section. We will then rely on the concept of character, developed by Ervin Goffman, to show how a moral economy emerged out of disaster, which affected the social circulation of moral and symbolic goods among affected populations. In the last section, we will finally show how the post-disaster period, due to these social dynamics, provoked a revitalization of traditional values, yet in innovative ways.

Setting the scene

Karanglegi, where fieldwork was conducted, is a hamlet located in Trimulyo, a municipality in Jetis District, Regency of Bantul, in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. As it is sited halfway between the city of Yogyakarta and the shores of the Indian Ocean, the municipality was hit very badly by the June 2006 earthquake, as it was at a mere distance of 10 kilometres from the epicentre, which was located a short distance southward, close to the see. However, before we proceed to explore this event and its aftermaths, let us introduce the location in greater details: we will be better equipped to understand the social consequences of the earthquake if we have some knowledge of the ebbs and flows of everyday life in ordinary times.

Bantul regency is part of the very densely populated corridor running on a north-south axis between the Merapi volcano and the Indian Ocean through Yogyakarta in one of the most densely populated region of Java (after Jakarta's region), itself one of the most densely populated territory worldwide (Java). The municipality of Trimulyo has a population of approximately 17 000 inhabitants living throughout twelve hamlets. Among those, approximately 1 300 live in Karanglegi. The hamlet is further subdivided into eight rukun tetangga (RT) units, the smallest administrative cell in Indonesia.

Historically, as elsewhere in Java, village society was divided between "ordinary people" (wong cilik) and a communal lesser aristocracy more or less loosely related to the Sultan's Palace, in Yogyakarta. Economically, this symbolic hierarchy translated into unequal land tenure patterns such that strongmen were endowed with generous portions of agricultural land. It also translated into political power, as most civil servants were recruited from among this petty nobility. However, this basic social structure is being altered by fast and far-reaching socio-economic changes.

Due to Yogyakarta's urban sprawl, Trimulyo, once a rural village, stands today on the outskirts of the city, just a few kilometres off its southern ring road, increasingly close from the urban center.

This proximity means more employment opportunities, as commuting to the city is easy and allows for tapping into the urban labour market. As a consequence, if as recently as thirty years ago people largely relied on agriculture in order to fulfil their livelihood needs, currently, growing rice is very often supplemented by waged labour outside of the community.

In this respect, many ordinary ordinary men of the village work on construction sites, and many young women are employed in small and medium-size industries on Yogyakarta's southern industrial belt. Those endowed with social prestige, political power and wealth (in the form of land) were also able to take advantage of these evolutions: well-off families sent their children to universities, thus drifting away from the agrarian tradition; in a context of widespread clientelism, civil servant positions, usually highly rewarding both in terms of social prestige and economic wealth, were transmitted within families; others created small-scale enterprises, mainly in handicraft and wood processing.

However, even though its critical economic position has rapidly eroded, agriculture remains a deeply anchored socio-cultural device in terms of affective traction, economic activity, and social organization: social, economic and cultural interactions around agricultural practices still deeply shape "connectedness", "commonality" and "groupness" [START_REF] Brubaker | Beyond "Identity[END_REF]. Many household's economies thus rely both on agriculture, for personal consumption and as an economic buffer in case of unanticipated hardship (staples meant for family consumption can always be sold as an emergency expedient), and on waged labour (most often under the form of contract labour, for men at least); more wealthy families combine well paid jobs as self-entrepreneurs or civil servants with their economic status as land owners.

What is important to understand here is the intricacy between the symbolic order of social prestige and economic stratification patterns: basically, symbolic capital translates quite naturally into political power, which in turn opens access to all kind of social, economic and symbolic goods.

The quake hit the vicinity with a devastating violence, living twelve dead in Karanglegi, many wounded and approximately 90 % of all houses down to the ground or damaged beyond rehabilitation. Assistance started to arrive within fourty-eight hours, with a local non-governmental organization (NGO) rapidly settling in the hamlet, soon followed by international NGOs such as IOM, different governmental institutions and foreign relief help under different guises.

Inhabitants also started to self-organize, mobilizing resources through family ties outside of the affected area which contributed labor and capital, hiring a workforce that came from the entire province, attracted by prospective employment related to reconstruction needs, and mobilizing local social structure and institutions to coordinate a collective endeavour to clear rubbles and start building anew. In this respect, RT revealed the natural locus for self-organization, as people turned to the closest existing political and administrative unit, which is woven in dense social and affective (often kinship ties) networks to organize solidarity.

Because reconstruction focused on housing, the economy was badly affected: rice fields were left in a standstill; small village businesses where interrupted either due to physical collapse, to the involvement of shop holders in reconstruction or to the lack of customers; and workers quit their jobs in order to rebuild or rehabilitate their own houses.

Since the quake hit, a common question was arising within the village community: why this event?

Disaster as a divine sentence

In Javanese popular beliefs, nothing occurs out of pure contingency; the world is a text which can be read and is susceptible to metaphysical interpretation: every event retains its own meaning and encapsulates a deeper significance related to mystical forces. When disaster stroke, it was thus widely interpreted as "Nature's" sentence, a godly message (hukum Tuhan; hukum Allah), which had already been the case after the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Aceh [START_REF] Wieringa | God Speaks through Natural Disasters, But What Does He Say? Islamic Interpretations in Indonesian Tsunami Poetry[END_REF]. After these disaster, many reports of holly manifestations surfaced. As reported in Kedaulatan Rakyat, a local paper, M. H. Hasan Basri, for instance, interpreted several cracks in his walls as spelling the Arabic sentence "Allah Allahu Akbar Kabira", meaning Allah almighty, Allah the higher.

Commenting on his finding in the article he explained that for him, this message was a godly call to the human community and, more specifically, to "those who acknowledge as Muslims", in his own terms, to return to a genuine monotheism. As for many people did, he saw the quake as a warning sent to redress a perceived dereliction in religious practices and dedication. In Gedungan Kepuh, a few kilometres away from Karanglegi, people were dumbfounded and found themselves collectively contemplating a small piece of poetry written by a local child about a coming quake, a few days before May 26. The child had died in the quake, and his intriguing writing was gaining popular momentum as a putative divinatory device. This is not to say that controversies did not occur between scientific and esoteric or religious interpretations; of course they did, as local scientists and "rationslists" called for "reasonable" explanations, readily available in the corpus of earth science. However, in popular belief, the main question raised by the event, as it related to a superior will, seems to have been twofold: "why?"

and "for what purpose?". The issue was rendered particularly tricky by the fact that Aceh had been hit by a quake and tsunami two years earlier and with an incredible violence, although the territory is widely represented as the most pious part of the country, where the most rigorous Islam is practiced: why the heck would the Almighty strike Mecca's veranda in Indonesia, as Aceh is often referred to? The issue of a superior intention behind the event was thus opened to a very broad array of interpretations: for instance, in Aceh, some inferred that Christian presence on a holly Muslim land was the real cause behind God's furor and turned against local churches; others blamed a supposed decay of religious ethics and called for an aggiornamento of religious life in the Northern Sumatran provinces; others blamed the a decades-long civil war.

In Karanglegi as well, the quake was generally seen as a godly test. In this context, two different elements came to bear specific moral significance. First, one's degree of ordeal and suffering was generally perceived as meaningful: if God had stricken unequally, this very inequality must have retained some significance, as it was seen to proceed from an overarching intentionality. Then, one's courses of actions during and after the quake also seemed to suggest specific moral qualities (or lack thereof).

People in Karanglegi were diversely affected by the quake. A few families were badly affected. In two houses alone, seven people died, and many more were left injured. Those were not simple house units, however: as is frequent in Java, extended families tended to cluster on the same piece of land, due to the shrinkage in land tenure caused by demographic growth. What might have appeared to be a fairly large house from the outside was often the aggregate product of several contiguous houses, the dwellings of nuclear families related by kinship ties. However, these two families were hit out of proportion. Most of the village businesses were also annihilated.

Nevertheless, for others, the event was conceived as somehow beneficial. Because government compensations were distributed per house unit rather than per household, those endowed with large family houses received much less than those residing in smaller, scattered habitat. Similarly, the central government decided to grant newlywed couples the same compensation as those who had lost their house. Thus, couples who could not have afforded to acquire a house were able to build a home of their own. They gained a measure of freedom, whereas many had difficulties rebuilding their possessions. Compensations were small indeed, and had to be shared between affected households residing in the same building; thus big houses became fairly smaller. Those who benefitted conceive of this as a gift of god.

Thus, the quake produced both "winners" and "losers". Nita, for instance, opened a small food stall: whereas longstanding food outlets were destroyed, she was able to gather a fair amount of capital by tapping into this "emergency market" selling chicken satay. This was enough to complement government compensations and build a two-storey house to replace her old home.

Nurifa was recruited by a local NGO to cook for its volunteers. One thing lead to another and she became the NGO's main intermediary in the village, thus gaining social status that she continues to enjoy. As her father puts it, it is to wonder, six years after the quake, all things considered, whether it was a painful blessing. However, what about those who were most viciously stricken?

There is a sense among the community that they were not hard hit without good reason. Moreover, there is a common understanding that those most badly affected must have been hiding some dark sin, which only could explain God's specific ferocity against them. This kind of moral judgment as mentioned, was also believed to be caused by one's behaviour in time of a crisis. Some local political and administrative personnel and cultural elites were thus reinforced in their position by showing courage and dedication. That was the case for Karanglegi's hamlet chief (pak dukuh), who, although he felt deeply powerless in view of the extent of the devastation, was seen as strongly dedicated and attentive to his fellow villagers, even though he had lost most of his possessions. Others' moral or political authority was undermined as the disaster situation revealed a lack of character. In Bunder Daryang, a municipality in the neighbouring district of Gunung Kidul, the mayor displayed such a lack of concern for his constituency and what was perceived by the people as such an inappropriate selfishness that demonstrations commenced outside of the village council building. He had to engage in a ritualized reparation round to acknowledge his mistakes and to show regrets at his selfishness and lack of concern to restore public order. Thus, the post-disaster emergency can be framed as a "fateful situation", as Erving [START_REF] Goffman | Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face to Face Behavior[END_REF] put it, to the extent that it put people to the test and clarified the character attributions between fellow villagers: in this game, what was at stake was the distribution of social prestige and moral goods. However, Goffman's formulations, as insightful as they might be, need to be fitted in this specific context.

Disaster and character

In the sociological literature on disaster, post-disaster crisis has often been conceptualized in the terms of Victor Turner's "social drama" (i.e. Turner 1975;[START_REF] Turner | Schism and continuity in an African society. A study of Ndembu village life[END_REF][START_REF] Hilgartner | Overflow and Containment in the Aftermath of Disaster[END_REF][START_REF] Boscoboinik | Le processus catastrophe: vulnérabilités, discours, réponses[END_REF]), as a moment of high normative blurring and conflicts, related to the postdisaster crisis, before the social order is restored, whether in similar forms or under new configurations. As a first approach, framing the issue of post-disaster moral-economies in Erving Goffman's terms helps distinguish patterns behind the apparent disorder of a critical situation: the post-disaster period indeed is a moment of trial and error, experimentation, the negotiation of meanings, social norms and values, and is a lengthy struggle to make sense of the event individually and collectively and to assess its impact on collective life. This is precisely where the concepts of "fateful situation" and "character" prove heuristic, provided that we take good note of contextual socio-cultural data which must be accounted for in our handling of this conceptual framework.

For Goffman, character is tied to action, and it is only through one's course of action that it can be assessed. Indeed, the quake generated a specific social time-space where one's courses of action affected one's social status in significant and lasting ways -after all, this feature is the main characteristic of a "fateful situation". Bad behaviours in this context were deemed particularly distasteful and lead to indelible stains on one's reputation: if civil servants' corrupted practices are considered usual in normal times, they became unforgivable in the quake's aftermath. An opposite but telling occurrence can be found elsewhere: in Yogyakarta, a group of street musicians (pengamen), usually disregarded as near beggars, gathered their efforts and donated more than 3 million rupiah (worth about 270 euros at the time) for the victims of the quake. Part of this money was offered through a local newspaper's relief account, giving visibility to their concern: this money, they said during a short ceremony where they handed over their contribution, had been gathered from passengers on the bus lines where they usually worked, and where they played music for the victims. By thanking these passengers through the media in a display of honesty (the money indeed ended-up where they promised it would), they demonstrated socially valued qualities of character. This was a way for them to claim that, as one of them phrased it: "street singers are also humans; they have love and caring" and to gain social recognition. Disaster opens up opportunities for that type of display of character. This phenomenon is probably not peculiar to the region: as noted by Lee Clarke, disaster is a particularly fertile social moment for the creation of collective "heroes" [START_REF] Clarke | Worst cases: terror and catastrophe in the popular imagination[END_REF], such as on September 11, 2001. However there is a specificity to our case: as we have seen, disaster has been perceived as a trial; as such, it contributed to the redistribution of economic, symbolic and moral goods within the village community. One's position in this rapid and intense trade off was the consequence of her or his specific situation in relation to the event, as it was seen as God's judgment. This heavenly verdict was extended to every single individual in the community, as their situations could all be compared in reference to the same event. Thus, the disaster worked much like a "fateful situation" where people's "real" selves were understood as being exposed by God's mighty gesture sometimes stripping off their shiny but undeserved outfits of strong men, or granting opportunities and social recognition to the deprived. Thus, in this context, action is not the only way to assess one's character: moral judgment can arise out of the situation, no matter how one performed during these deadly moments: affliction suggests hidden moral flaws, while an intact house or a spared family is not read as luck but as a sign of "election". In this context, action is displaced, as affected people are understood to be the objects of a godly gesture, which is believed to bear a lesson sui generis. The fateful situation, thus, is less one where judgements arises out of a display of character but more a situation where it results from the revelation of one's true character beneath one's social outfits.

Bandyana and Putri's stories are instructive in this respect: when her husband built their house, Putri, a young woman who runs a small village shop, insisted that he implement an anti-seismic design; Bandyana, a civil servant in his forties who built his house after the 2004 tsunami in Aceh, followed the same path. At this time, both were gently mocked by their neighbours (and Putri by her husband) for their overzealous caution and were seen as mild eccentrics. After all, memories of the last significant earthquake in the vicinity had essentially vanished by 2006. After the disaster, however, their social reputation was obviously vastly changed, and people saw them as having been inspired.

Yet, the fallouts of these social dynamics are not as clear-cut as one could expect: the moral verdicts and symbolic redistributions generated in these momentous times have produced more questions than answers about the relational social statuses: when talking with informants in Karanglegi, most people suggested that those families most heavily affected by the quake "must have done something wrong" or "must have something to blame themselves for"; however, these verdicts are tempered by daily interactions, and people are often taken aback and disconcerted when the picture resulting from their own knowledge of fellow villagers is often at odds with the moral ascriptions resulting from the crisis. To phrase it in a more theoretical stance, the redistribution of symbolic and moral goods is modulated through existing social networks, due to the interplay of social distances and proximities between individuals and groups, as intimate reciprocal knowledge intersect with the picture of one's self as resulting from the quake. Thus, disaster did not produce a specific social order; rather, it blurred pre-existing patterns of social prestige, without providing any easy way to renegotiate social positions and social relations.

What we need to understand, then, are the social processes which sustained the production of new social patterns out of this uncertainty.

Emerging moral economies: the example of gotong royong

In the struggle for reconstruction, people were beset with tensions between far-reaching social changes and innovations, introduced notably through foreign help and actors, and resorting to traditional values and inherited forms of social organization. These tensions were not distributed within the smaller community only; they raised controversies at the regional and national level. Let us start by discussing the latter.

For many Indonesian stakeholders, foreign help was indeed viewed with a good deal of sympathy; yet. However, it also raised anxieties, as is apparent from this quote from a volunteer of a student organization: "I came to help because I felt a responsibility toward the nation and the country (…). This should be our elites and our riches who come here, not us. But they prefer to rely on foreign aid. And the media also incline to publish noisy stories about foreign aid. I am saddened to see the media reporting on a single Turkish public kitchen, rather than on the numerous ones ran by our own people." This feeling of dispossession was acute as foreign aid -bilateral and private, originating from international organizations and NGOs -and foreign actors rushed into the region [START_REF] Macrae | Half Full or Half Empty? Shelter after the Jogjakarta Earthquake[END_REF]. In this context, concerns about existing social equilibriums were also expressed by public figures. Among them, the sultan of Yogyakarta, both a political figure, as acting governor of the region, and a cultural authority, ruled that reconstruction funds should be released in cash and handed over directly to local communities so that "besides the economic dimension people are able to unite by reconstructing with their own hands according to their local culture, in order that traditional forms of solidarities within communities (gotong royong) can grow and reinforce". This was in line with a fast-spreading concern among intellectuals and political personnel alike that foreign help could affect local communities in dubious ways. Dr. Kwartarini, from the Department of Psychology, Gadjah Mada University 3 , who helped in the relief effort by setting up a psychological response unit with student volunteers, phrased it aptly when she describes her program:

"The Life Reconstruction program aims at helping our people to recover on a psychological level and to reconstruct their lives as they were before, by addressing both their psychological and physical needs. (…) Indonesian people have a strong collective culture and their individual resources are lower when compared to groups with a stronger individual culture, as can be found in the West. A decrease in self-sufficiency will impact people's eagerness to live and lower their ability to make projects." More generally, there was a widespread fear that the influx of foreign goods and personnel would undermine existing social organization and cultural patterns by installing a lasting dependency, 3 The main higher education establishment in the city and one of the most prominent university nation-wide destroying what was perceived as a local culture of hard work, and thus damaging communities' self-sustainability and autonomy, and even for some, threatening national sovereignty. These concerns about "cultural goods" among political and intellectual elites were somehow attuned to people's experiences in Karanglegi. Six years later, there is a broad consensus among villagers that the recovery process was a success. The same consensus exists concerning the reasons behind this achievement, as people agree that their strength, in these turbulent times was due mainly to their ability to uphold traditional Javanese values. Thus, their shared commitment toward gotong royong (mutual assistance), a traditional way of organizing collective work and solidarity within Javanese society, is seen as the main reason for what villagers perceive as a quick recovery. In Karanglegi itself, however, and in contradiction with these perceptions, gotong royong did not actually play the pivotal role suggested by these claims; relief and reconstruction were rather organized through kinship networks, as people's relatives convened to the scene and provided manpower, capital and material help. The real social potency of these claims is thus to be found elsewhere. Gotong royong really is not only a work pattern or a regulated system of solidarity. It is a fundamental identification "device" among Javanese, which synthetizes commin values of hard work and solidarity, and signifies an appropriate degree of individual dedication to the community [START_REF] Bowen | On the political construction of tradition: gotong royong in Indonesia[END_REF][START_REF] Kamil | Gotong Royong Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat[END_REF].

The collective invocation of gotong royong can then be viewed as a means for affected people to hold on to a set of fundamental and shared values in a time when social norms were shattered, as were houses and families. It helped people preserve a sense of their individual and collective selves.

Because it is a reputed "Javanese" cultural feature, people in Karanglegi see the values encapsulated in this social form as a cultural asset which, imbued in every Javanese individual, becomes a moral good. These assets, in turn, discriminate between Javanese and non-Javanese Indonesians. Aceh's lengthy and difficult recovery after the 2004 tsunami is for instance usually credited among villagers to the weak character of its people, when compared to Javanese. Many villagers drew a sense of pride and recognition from this perceived specificity as a hard-working, collective-minded ethnic community, and most of them agree that the path through destruction and recovery has revitalized collective involvement in gotong royong.

Gotong royong, interestingly, is not only a vivid ideology traded among local communities. It is also a particularly potent political device [START_REF] Bowen | On the political construction of tradition: gotong royong in Indonesia[END_REF]) which was used ad libitum to mobilize the population after the quake: not only did politicians praised its achievements and called people to achieve resilience through traditional solidarities, it was also felt by many volunteers as a morally binding obligation which drew them toward the affected areas. Megawati Soekarnoputri, a former President of the Indonesian Republic urged the national community to "raise the spirit of gotong royong to help the victims of the quake"; calls were voiced for the reinvigoration of local knowledge (kearifan local) to achieve self-resiliency. Gotong royong was represented in the media and by politicians as a specific asset in terms of collective resilience and, as a cultural feature and as a motive of national pride. There was thus a reinforcing and mutually-elaborating relationship between popular perceptions in Karanglegi and public discourses saturated with calls to local and national values [START_REF] Tambiah | Presidential Address: Reflections on Communal Violence in South Asia[END_REF]).

In a larger perspective, this interplay between public discourses and local interactions contributed to reaffirm potent Javanese socio-cultural values such as "patience" (sabar), stoicism (tabah) and acceptance of one's fate (nrima). Discourses on dignity defined acceptable displays of grief and suffering, following established "interaction rituals" [START_REF] Goffman | Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face to Face Behavior[END_REF], proper ways of giving, helping and receiving

Conclusion

The interpretation of disaster as a meaningful message in Karanglegi thus contributed to frame specific moral economies tied to the event. God would not strike without reason; his message surely pointed toward wrongdoings within Yogyakartan society. There was something wrong for sure, but what was to be addressed was unclear until now; however, it had the effect of pushing people to reflect on their individual and collective behaviors and life patterns. The only clue that they had in order to make sense of this message was related to the patterns of destruction: for sure, God would not strike individuals and families randomly. Unequal patterns of suffering were thus generally interpreted as moral sentences. Moral and symbolic goods were then redistributed according to one's capacity to return to and to uphold values that, it was felt, had been forsaken with the spread of a modern style of living. However, what could be interpreted as a conservative turn toward traditional values had an unexpected outcome: social stature, which was traditionally attributed according to formal social status, has become more sensitive to the morals of action.

Thus those displays of character during these difficult time still return social verdicts to individuals.