Forewords

Timothy Whitton

In 2012 London will come under the scrutiny of the entire world as athletes, spectators and the media converge on the capital city for the Olympic and Paralympic games. In view of this international event the Observatoire de la Civilisation Britannique decided to devote one of its publications to London as a multicultural, international and indeed Olympic capital city. 1 This description of London is particularly relevant in today's context given the extent to which the city manages to attract people from all walks of life. The buoyancy and volatility of London's labour market is often given as the main reason for this especially in the contemporary context whereby unemployment in the richer European countries is again reaching unprecedented heights, particularly for young people. Yet London fascinates far beyond the employment opportunities it can offer and the kaleidoscope of languages, ethnic minorities, communities and neighbourhoods that can be found within its boundaries bear witness to the fact that variety is the true spice of life there. To this end, this publication looks not only into the vibrant economy of London but also its recent history, geography and of course politics. London is seen as one of the most international capitals in the world but above all one that constantly strives to meet the challenges of such a demanding reputation.

In the first contribution, Susan Finding reminds us that only a century ago, the multifunctional city of London was steeped in Britain's imperial past to the extent that it had definitely become the capital of the Empire, the throbbing heart of imperial activity. Finding describes the trade activity of London, the occupational distribution and its administrative organisation, emphasising how the municipal socialism of the authorities had to deal with the biggest city in the world in the throes of an urban sprawl. As the population grew, transport rapidly became a key issue and inevitably led to a city of contrasts where inequality was rife and an ideal target for the reforming Liberal government. Thus the suffragettes would take to the streets as would the Dockers to voice their respective grievances, the former taking full advantage of the imperial celebrations of 1911 to gain greater publicity. London had indeed undergone extensive renovation in the years leading up to the 1911 festivities which were designed to promote the Empire. Yet despite all efforts, spectators tended to be imbued with the history of Britain rather than the greatness of her Empire, mere consumers rather than participants in their country's destiny. Finding remarks that making the Empire accessible to all enabled people to become aware and proud of Britain's greatness in the world, an essential ingredient for an international event such as the Olympic Games to be a success.

In the following article, Carine Berberi questions London's ability to accommodate the euro more easily than the rest of the country given its financial centre which gives it a particular resonance within the European Community. Berberi describes the financial role that London has always played in Britain's history -domestic, international, imperial and now European -and how the city -or City -was divided into supporters and critics of adhesion to the single currency. Since 1997 and Britain's refusal to adopt the euro, indicators show that London has lost none of her financial supremacy. This is because from the launch of the single currency and bolstered by the historic flexibility, independence and fiscal environment of its markets, the City used all its financial expertise to ensure that it was at the forefront of transactions in the euro zone. Even though the City seemed reticent about the euro, opinion polls showed that for the people of London the single currency enhanced the cosmopolitan dimension of their capital making it even more attractive for tourists. Generally speaking, people from the southeast are more favourable to adhesion than other parts of the country and in the same vein, people from London far more than other cities. This leads many observers to state that the City will decide when Britain joins the euro zone. Yet the recent economic crisis has divided the two camps even more between those who feel that adhesion would protect Britain's economy and those who feel that on the contrary, it would weaken it. For the time being and consolidated by recent instability within the euro zone, it would seem as if the City is playing "wait and see" whereas the government's attitude towards the euro appears to be dictated by short term gains, rather like the markets.

Hervé Marchal and Jean-Mac Stébé then take us beyond the boundaries of Britain in order to assess how two of Europe's most important urban nodosities, London and Paris, have fared both individually, together and as competitors in the process of globalisation. Marchal and Stébé provide readers with a precise description and definition of the network of "world" and now "global" cities which tend to govern the planet. Whereas in the past these cities could quite happily ignore each other, globalisation has forced them to become interactive to the point of homogenising much of their activity. London stands out as being exemplary in this process which started in the 1950s but accelerated as from 1979 when the Conservatives came to power. They actively promoted the transformation of the city into one of the leading service and financial centres in the world, to the detriment of a more traditional urban way of life and landscape. London still honours this reputation and has added a long list of high value professional skills and expertise as well as a flexible labour force to these advantages. But above all, London has managed to maintain the easily identifiable geographical cosiness that is so propitious to business thus enhancing its ability to play such a vital role at the heart of the urban planet network. The country's imperial past, underlined elsewhere in this publication, adds the historical dimension to this process linking past to present, the Empire to the multicultural business world to which London belongs.

Paris can count on its demographic dynamism to belong to the family of global cities as well as its economic activity especially in certain high value-added fields of activity. Even though the city's industrial base has been eroded, Paris still accommodates many international firms and the Île-de-France region as a whole is the home to a high percentage of head offices. But above all, thanks to its cultural heritage, Paris stands out as being the main tourist destination in the world. Far from resting on these laurels, Paris has taken full advantage of several major urban renovation projects to bolster its dynamism. Both London and Paris bear the scars of this evolution, the deepest one being on human relations within their boundaries. Local populations in particular have borne the brunt of gentrification and this would tend to underline the duality of globalised cities between the winners and the losers and the challenge that faces future developments in their trajectories as global cities.

In his article, Ian Gordon focuses on the academic interest in global cities and warns that the "superstar" status of some of them can lead to a form of blindness vis-à-vis their diversity. With this in mind, Gordon examines the economic success of London and its reaction to recent economic instability. During the late 19 th century, London was an imperial city whose economy was artisan and service based dependant on a largely volatile workforce living in a competitive agglomeration. At the beginning of the 20 th century London turned into a more Fordist national capital as industrial sites moved closer to the major markets and lighter industries settled in and around the capital. As manufacturing employment in Greater London declined, the nature of the local population changed ushering in the era of London as a post-industrial global city, harking back in some respects to the situation it had known in the late 19 th century. As from the early 1980s, London's real potential was unleashed by the combination of international competitive forces and domestic deregulation. This was compounded by high population growth boosted by migration, especially international inflows attracted by the higher wages paid in the capital. This was all the more so once the industrial decline had been absorbed by the London labour market. Yet at the same time, the emerging sectors of finance, information and communication were turning cyclical sensitivity to the labour market into the norm: the boom-bust syndrome was associated with economic dynamism, innovativeness and competitive advantage, a far cry indeed from an earlier period when such fluctuations were perceived as structural weaknesses.

Gordon continues by explaining the particular volatility of the London labour market in the context of what is known as the "new economy". He suggests that the "bust" at the beginning of this century could have had disproportionate effects on London employment but in fact did not. Indeed, the labour market in London remained fairly buoyant during the first stages of the credit crunch caused by the subprime fiasco in the United States not only because it had fewer jobs in manufacturing but above all because its knowledge-based economy is far more competitive than elsewhere. Gordon also underlines the impact of employment growth in the public sector during this periodparticularly in London -which offset many jobs shed in the private sector. Government "bail-outs" in order to protect the financial system also contributed to keeping employment buoyant or at least to avoiding huge layoffs in some parts of the banking sector. All in all it would seem that London has to be permanently ready for the next boom.

Martine Drozdz examines the forces at play between the territorial expansion of the City and the dynamics that lie behind its contribution to the global financial markets. Following the big bang in 1987 and the need for increased office space for British and international companies alike, large swathes of land particularly to the north and east of the City were transformed, often absorbing areas not contained within its historic boundaries. A clear priority was given to office space to the detriment of residential infrastructures thus increasing reliance on the transport system to make workplaces accessible. Residential complexes have thus burgeoned on the outskirts of the areas taken over by the City's expansion but plans to increase population density there do not always tally with local populations' views of how their neighbourhoods should be renovated, or with other development plans already under way. Some of these areas have been continually renovated since World War II to form a very heterogeneous urban mosaic in which residential developments of many shapes and sizes are being inserted. Local authorities in turn are under pressure to build and the Olympic agenda also means that construction is looked on favourably. To illustrate her argument, Drozdz gives some colourful examples of the projects underway and goes on to point out that local residents have very little say in these matters even if some vociferous groups have on certain occasions won their cases. Given their financial situation, local authorities can but approve most projects and cajole local opinion by obtaining suitable compensation for residents. The expansion of the City's territory has certainly slowed down recently but is still frowned upon by local populations even though they are generally powerless to stop it.

In the following article Manuel Appert looks at London's skyline. Skyscrapers and high-rise blocks have improved the attractiveness of real estate in many areas by helping to increase urban density while enabling those who design them to leave their particular architectural signature on the space occupied. Given that they can provide a real "allin-one" hub for commercial activity, these buildings also symbolise cities' ability to keep abreast of globalisation and, as such, have been fully integrated into the highly competitive property market. But because in some instances they compete with other historical buildings in sculpting the skyline, opposition to their construction can be strong especially when they interfere with considerations such as identity and memory, St Paul's Cathedral being the perfect example in London. It is only over the last fifty years that commercial buildings have competed with more historical ones in London and gradually, location rather than mere quantity has become the keyword. In more recent years the Greater London Authority has been particularly active in emphasising the need for skyscrapers that can contribute to bolstering London's financial activities without fundamentally restructuring the skyline. Exceptions have been made for some very high quality architectural projects -such as the Shard -and have exacerbated tensions between the different forces involved in urban regeneration. Despite the presence of some outstanding architectural projects devoted to business, a majority of the recent high-rise buildings are residential tower blocks. Baring a few exceptions, they tend to be concentrated in the most densely occupied areas and generally obey the rule that the more expensive the land, the higher the tower which is in the interest of all parties involved, especially property developers and borough councils. High-rise projects tend also to be faithful to the functional distribution of space and areas which have diversified their occupations and have attracted different types of skyscrapers accordingly. Certain distortions can nevertheless be identified especially when it is in local residents' financial interest to support a particular type of building. It would be churlish to suggest that high-rise building in London has been purely market orientated and monument view protection has been a serious preoccupation of the authorities, once again with exceptions. The Greater London Authority's "London Plan" is in tune both with urban regeneration and the city's need to constantly renew its efforts to keep pace with the challenges of globalisation. Tall buildings map out the use of urban space and as such are the true beacons not only of urban densification and regeneration but also of the potential input of public private partnerships in maintaining London's global reputation. Timothy Whitton deals with the change of mayors that occurred in 2008 when Ken Livingstone was replaced by the Conservative, Boris Johnson. Whitton recalls the early days of Ken Livingstone when he was leader of the GLC from 1981 until 1986 and explains that Mrs Thatcher got rid of the Metropolitan Councils mainly to stamp out their particular brand of municipal socialism that did not tally at all with her political project. Following abolition, it took fourteen long years for central government in Great Britain to realise that the capital city had lost its voice and one of New Labour's election pledges was to establish a new authority to deal with pan London questions. Hence the creation of the Greater London Authority (GLA) and a mayor elected directly by Londoners. Having been excluded from the Labour Party, Livingstone won the election as an independent candidate and his first term in office saw the implementation of the congestion charge in central London. This success was enough to insure a second victory in 2004 but from then on, Whitton contends that it was a downhill struggle for the mayor. Despite Livingstone's contribution to London being awarded the Olympic Games in 2012, he had the reputation of "lording" it over the city while dealing with international affairs that had little to do with his responsibilities as mayor. His office became bogged down in sleaze and scandal to the extent that his rival, Boris Johnson, was able to make full advantage of his campaign slogan "Time for a Change". London has definitely changed since the GLA was created in 2000 but in 2008 somehow Livingstone was no longer "our Ken" as many Londoners would fondly refer to him.

Nancy Holman and Andrew Thornley question how Boris Johnson, the new mayor of London elected in 2008, will manage to combine his particular brand of popular pragmatism both with the capital's need for integrated policies on a regional scale and a strong sense of leadership.

London is indeed such a diverse city that only coordinated crossborough policies can provide the sort of cohesion that will give Londoners a sense of having a shared future. Holman and Thornley remind us of recent changes in local government in London, emphasizing the effects on strategic planning following the removal of the Greater London Council in 1986. The authors contend that the subsequent minimalist approach to local government in London led the private sector to become far more involved than before in improving the capital's competitiveness in the transition from international to global city status. Yet despite these efforts, London lacked a single authoritative voice capable of clearly mapping out the city's future. The Labour government elected in 1998 acknowledged this void and duly created the Greater London Authority in 2000 with a directly elected mayor. His main remit is to coordinate strategies for London in the form of the London Plan, which the authors use to compare the first mayor of London's approach to sustainability with his successor's.

Once elected, the first London mayor, Ken Livingstone, chose to use the plan in order to adapt London's infrastructure in a sustainable way to the growth the city needed in order to be able to compete as a global capital. The idea was not to increase spatial occupation but to develop sustainability guidelines that local authorities could use in exploiting existing land more efficiently. The Plan was thus an attempt at creating a shared and joined-up "vision" of London between central and borough government but its authoritative style did not always go down well. Indeed, the 2008 mayoral elections were the opportunity for Boris Johnson to show that he could provide a suitable alternative to Livingstone and intense canvassing meant that they also showed a certain degree of political success of wealthier outer London over Inner London. Nevertheless, the authors suggest that because of this divisive style, the new mayor will find it difficult to be a strategic leader. Johnson's Plan is much the same as his predecessor's but will apparently be used less forcibly to control the boroughs even though the overall aim of striking a happy balance between the role of the private and public sectors will be maintained. Johnson intends to give boroughs more leeway in their relationship with central government so that local planning can fit in with rather than have to adapt to strategies emanating from the centre. In this respect it must be said that Livingstone was far more dominant and used a broader definition of sustainability to indicate long-term choices for the whole city rather than individual notions of quality of life. The authors feel that sustainability in terms of balancing the needs of the economy, society and environment will inevitably suffer from this new approach and to emphasize their point, compare the two mayors' Plans. Their analysis leaves little doubt that whereas Livingstone's Plan tended to be more explicit providing prescriptive strategic guidance, Johnson has adopted a far looser, conciliatory approach. Holman and Thornley believe that this will weaken the overall strategic vision of future planning in the capital.

Nassera Zmihi then reminds us to what extent rough sleeping is a blight on London's image especially in the light of the targets set by successive governments. There is no denying that the number of people sleeping on the streets of London has declined over the last two decades but it is unlikely that the Olympic "effect" will be sufficient to eradicate the phenomenon. Counting "official" rough sleepers acknowledged by the social services as such is an almost impossible task given their high mobility and this difficulty has been compounded by the arrival of immigrants from eastern European countries. Even so, Zmihi supplies some figures as an indication of the numbers involved and sketches out the various initiatives implemented recently along with cost assessment. In order to tackle homelessness in the capital local and central government have attempted to use the joined-up approach under the auspices of the London Delivery Board. Yet targeting the specific needs of the homeless is complex given the different categories of people concerned (rough sleepers, roofless, address less…) and at times, internment, expulsions and Anti Social Behaviour Orders have been used to reduce the number of people sleeping in the streets of London. Zmihi gives a vivid account of even more coercive methods that some authorities can use on occasions in order to rid the streets of rough sleepers. Despite this, there is little chance that even with the Olympic Games in full swing, people will be able to claim that no one is sleeping rough in London.

Jeremy Tranmer reminds us that London has always been host to a multitude of demonstrations and adds that recent new forms of action have had a considerable impact on the geography of protest in the capital. Generally speaking, capital cities are the ideal places to organise protest and London is no exception. To this end, Tranmer lists some of the main demonstrations that have taken place there over the last two centuries and points out the route that a vast majority of them took, usually from Hyde Park to Trafalgar Square or vice-versa. Tranmer continues by studying some of the more symbolic places of protest in London and the extent to which they give legitimacy to protest. Recently, protest geography has changed as illustrated by the May Day marches which tend to target symbols of the city's role as an international capital of finance. These anti-globalisation demonstrations also dwarf other protest movements which Tranmer describes in detail. He underlines the influence that new forms of anarchism have had on protest and analyses the reasons for the reappearance of such a model of political expression. The decline of the traditional left, modern methods of communication and the attraction of radical methods of protest as being more media friendly are examined by the author. The upshot of this is that the space devoted to protest in London has expanded and has become more fluid and unpredictable. The author suggests that this inevitably contributes to creating an alternative London where economic imperatives can be challenged, albeit symbolically, by a more libertarian vision of the city.

The last contribution to this book also looks into the protest geography of London but focuses more particularly on space occupied by opposition movements to the Olympic Games. Cities which host the Games are subject to a period of considerable tension between the different parties involved while local residents tend to bear the brunt of strategies designed to prioritise land occupation. Generally speaking, their protest is swamped by the enthusiasm generated by the extensive media coverage and to illustrate this, Corinne Nativel draws comparisons between the demonstrations organised round the winter 2010 Games in Vancouver and the summer 2012 Games in London. Nativel's theoretical stance is that the politics of the Olympic Games easily compete with the sporting event given that the host city has the world's spotlight focussed on it. Given this stark reality, the success of the Games often depends on how local communities "buy in" to the Olympic ideal against a backdrop of commercial exploitation, extensive renovation and sometimes financial scandal. Nativel dwells on the concept of militant particularisms whereby local communities defend their perceived rights to land despite the authorities' claims that the overall legacy of the Games will be the sustainable regeneration of large areas of the host city. Their claims fall foul though of the failure of recent Olympic cities to be able to boast any real improvement to the everyday life of local communities.

Nativel then reminds us of London's 20 th century involvement in the Olympic Games and the application to host them again in 2012 after the successive failures of Birmingham and Manchester. That "red" Ken Livingstone, mayor of London, should have accepted to apply in 2003 seemed to be go against the grain of his convictions but he was quite obviously seeking funds to renovate the east end of London. Londoners do seem enthusiastic about the Games despite the spiralling costs and realise that they will contribute to the renovation of the Lower Lea Valley. Nativel lists the transformations that are under way while emphasising the authorities' attachment to the legacy of the Games. Yet the critics have been quick to point out that the environmental beauty of the Lower Lea Valley will suffer irretrievably from the short term onslaught of the Olympic Games and even the job creation involved will not offset this major drawback.

Opposition to the Games in London has highlighted public opinion's general distrust of the multinational companies involved. Security measures verge on the military and the authorities intend to experiment innovative biometrical identification equipment which acts as a stark reminder that Britain is at war. Working conditions for employees on the Olympic site are also cause for concern as are questions concerning the damage the Games will wreak on the environment, but generally speaking it is the displacement of local residents which is the most unpopular. This was the case for Vancouver where a whole neighbourhood was taken over by property developers whereas in London, displacement has concerned more isolated areas and groups of people, sometimes with claims based on particular activities.

Nativel continues her analysis with two case studies concerning militant organisations in London opposed to the Olympic Games. One considers itself to be a watchdog whose main aim is to supply public opinion with information and the other, a more militant organisation drawing on the experience of the transnational anti Olympic urban network. It would seem as if the protest movement in London were more sporadic thus lacking a broad structural base. The key to this lies in the integration of local networks that would give the overall movement a more long-term credibility and substantially reinforce its ability to organise, react and even thrive. In turn, this could attract more political attention, as was the case in Vancouver, and increase public awareness of the issues at stake. To this end, it is difficult to talk about a real anti-Olympic movement in London even though recent demonstrations focussing on budget cuts have shown that the potential for protest definitely exists.

London will indeed be the centre of attention during the summer 2012 but its success as a global city stretches far beyond the Olympic agenda. This publication attempts to underline to what extent the geography, politics and history of the "Big Smoke" are intricately interwoven, and to identify the points where these forces converge to provide Londoners with a sense of identity. This is one aspect that the architects of the capital city's future will have to pay particular attention to if they want to avoid disappointing the people who are attracted by what London actually means rather than merely what it represents.


Making Thatcher's Britain

Ben Jackson & Robert Saunders (eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 353pp. ISBN-978-1-107-68337-2

Reviewed by Timothy WHITTON

Given that Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders have both written extensively on the history of British politics and political thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Thatcherism was bound to crop up on their research agenda. As official papers are continually released according to the thirty year rule, so historians are able to broaden their focus on the eleven years during which Mrs Thatcher was Prime Minister and their book, Making Thatcher's Britain, has enabled them to bring together thirteen case studies written by a variety of researchersincluding themselves -, professors, lecturers and PhD students, which in itself shows that "Thatcherism" continues to interest a wide spectrum of scholars. Jackson and Saunders fully acknowledge the fact that a very impressive body of literature has already been devoted to Margaret Thatcher but their claim to novelty lies in the fact that they have adopted a historian's standpoint in order to connect the varieties of Thatcherism not only to an ideology and political creed but to the overall history of twentieth century Britain.

The book is divided into three parts which focus in turn on the different periods during which Thatcherism emerged as a political creed, secondly the way in which it has transformed and moulded Britain across different classes, regions and identities and thirdly, its impact on Britain's place within the wider world is studied. There are two appendices, one of which is devoted to a detailed timeline from Mrs Thatcher's birth in 1925 to her visit to Gordon Brown in Downing Street in 2007. The second appendix contains statistical information about elections in Great Britain, the economy, trade unions and government spending.

The introduction contains a useful biography of Margaret Thatcher explaining her rise to power, her three terms as Prime Minister and her demise in 1990. Readers are also reminded of the main political events that stand out during this period (the Falklands' crisis, the miners' strike, the Poll Tax...) and enabled Thatcher to highly personalise her contribution to British politics. Indeed, the editors refer readily to the "Thatcher effect" in order to enhance the historical perspective they seek to give to their interrogation of the wider impact of Thatcherism. This said, Thatcherism as an ideology, as a deliberate attempt to modify the very foundations of British politics is a line of analysis that cannot be forsaken. Yet, as the period during which Thatcher was Prime Minister of Great Britain draws away in time, it is becoming easier to assess the impact her personal legacy and particular brand of politics has had on Britain. The editors point out the pragmatic changes in society that were ushered in during the Thatcher decade but remain wary about the fundamental upheaval in British culture that Thatcherism is supposed to have brought about. They suggest that in many instances, Britain has been simply swept along by the "wind of change" blowing in from other parts of the world, and that Margaret Thatcher was more the local architect of these changes than the instigator of any major revolution in British politics. To this end, and once again in an attempt to bolster their historical perspective, Jackson and Saunders attempt to identify the space occupied by Thatcherism within the Conservative political tradition. The Conservatives' love of high politics has indeed constantly incited them to insulate the power which they crave from the grubby fray of day to day governing. And it is precisely the fine line drawn between the pressures of office, the force of ideology, adapting to crises and societal changes already in motion that historians are now grappling with in order to unravel the confusion and the ambiguities that surround Thatcherism. It is their task to assess why Thatcherism emerged in the first place, to what extent it veered away from the post-war consensus and the traditional Conservative line, if it really did modify the outlook of the British on their society and whether or not promises made in 1979 were actually kept.

The first contribution deals essentially with the evolution of the narrative that gave the theoretical backbone to Thatcherism both within and without a Conservative Party that she had inherited in the throes of a crisis of confidence. Robert Saunders deals with the necessary distinction between ideas and ideology insisting that despite common belief fuelled essentially by Thatcher's own pragmatic approach to such issues, Thatcherism is a subtle blend of the two that was defined both as a constructive project and as a warning against the opposing political forces at bay. While the former was portrayed as being a series of answers to particularly antagonistic situations, the latter blended perfectly with Thatcher's personal brand of eschatological politics all the more so when it came to her main enemy: socialism. Thatcher's anti-socialism was not only a political crusade but alsoand mainlya moral one. To prove this point, Saunders maps out both the moral and political failings of the Labour Party during the seventies and the threat it posed to "free" society that ushered in Thatcherism. He dwells particularly on the period after 1976 when Thatcher was obliged to tack between instinct and political necessity in order to obtain power at the next election especially in the relationship between the Conservatives and the trade unions. To this end, the "Winter of Discontent" occurred appropriately to underline both Labour's failure to govern properly and the need for a new political settlement, opening up a breach that Thatcher was only too glad to use to her full advantage. Saunders concludes by stating that if at the outset Thatcherism was an oppositional creed, the post 1979 task necessarily involved transforming this into a positive programme for government. This is precisely where the narrative of Thatcherism played a vital role, tying up the strands of 1970s' opposition into credible policies for the 1980s in the hope that a radical culture change in Britain would be achieved. Yet when after a decade a majority of Thatcher's enemies had been slain, the resonance of Thatcherism itself had been altered leaving her successors to grapple not only with their own political identities but also with the task of redefining the legacy of their mentor.

The following article written by the co-editor, Ben Jackson, explores the complex relationship between neo-liberalism and Thatcherism by putting the dissemination of this doctrine into a wider historical perspective, in accordance with the book's claim to originality. Jackson bases his analysis on two assumptions namely that neo-liberalism is primarily disseminated via elites and that a great deal of archival evidence still remains insufficiently exploited. The author's initial angle relates to the mobilisation of resources in putting the neoliberal case and he gives a detailed account of how one of the main think tanks, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), emerged to broadcast the neo-liberal message supplied by its extensive network of international intellectuals. Jackson identifies the use British neo-liberals made of this input in defining the specificities of neo-liberalism in and for Britain and points out just how the IEA targeted its highly receptive elite audiences in order to imbue them with the neo-liberal message that in the seventies was also beginning to enjoy a broader penetration of the British press and broadcast journalism. Jackson's last point deals with politicians themselves especially given that the IEA continually claimed to be non-partisan. This said, its agenda framed far more easily within the Conservative Party's outlook and links with the Right seemed far more natural. Nevertheless, Jackson is quick to point out that before taking office and despite surrounding herself with neo-liberal advisors, Mrs Thatcher's own links with the think tanks have yet to be confirmed. Her devotion to the free market, her desire to woo the middle classes by not being over zealous in dismantling the welfare state and her lack of interest in marketing her ideas perhaps explain this.

The third contribution in this book deals with inflation and Thatcherite thinking, focussing on the period 1975-79. Jim Tomlinson begins by retracing some of the major characteristics of inflation during the twentieth century and then dwells particularly on how the Conservative abhorrence of inflation fed through into Mrs Thatcher's political strategy vis-à-vis unemployment, the unions, and her desire to protect the middle classes. Indeed, for Thatcher, inflation was the Giant that had to be slain to put Britain back onto the road of recovery for it was synonymous with decline. To this end, the Conservatives identified four issues, namely the effects of organised labour on boosting wages claims and thus inflation, unemployment, public spending and borrowing and finally housing. In each case, the situation was examined through the monetarist prism and justification found for the Conservatives to rely on market forces to rebalance. Thus according to them, incomes' policies artificially reinforced union power and once again artificially drove up wages while unemployment could not be solved by government but by reform of the labour market. This latter involved trade union collaboration and conveniently transferred some of the responsibility for high unemployment onto their shoulders. The dilemma concerning public spending and borrowing was particular in that although it could be neatly dealt with by the Conservatives' desire to roll back the frontiers of the state, some of the main monetarist thinkers disagreed, favouring direct control of monetary growth over what they considered to be piecemeal and inappropriate intrusions into the money market. Housing was particular in that a property-owning democracy was central to Thatcher's vision of British society especially if the overall decline were to be addressed. Yet this vision was incompatible with the much broader commitment to economic liberalism that Thatcherism came to symbolise. Indeed, as Tomlinson points out in his conclusion devoted to an assessment of the anti-inflation measures taken during the first years of government, housing is the perfect example of how Thatcher was unprepared to accept the means to the desired end. Otherwise, the failings of monetary policy to curb inflation after 1979 are put down to a neglect of the international context in which the British economy was evolving, the impact of exchange rates being a case in point. Despite this weakness, the Conservatives were able to weather the unemployment storm at the beginning of the eighties not only thanks to contingent factors but mainly because their overall credibility concerning the economy, bolstered by a hard-line attitude towards the unions, was sounder than the Opposition's. The rise of monetarism can be linked to the rise of inflation during the seventies but the success story of monetarism as an economic policy ends there. What it did enable the Conservatives to achieve was a vision of society with less state, a de-legitimisation of the trade unions and the promotion of the declinist case which made it all the more easy to portray socialism as the greatest evil of them all.

In the following article, Matthew Grimley points out that there is a common tendency to view Thatcherism as primarily an economic phenomenon and to overlook its moral and religious dimensions. In the first part of his chapter, he deals with Thatcherism as a reaction to the permissive society and pinpoints Thatcher'sas a woman, mother and politicianviewpoints on some of the outstanding legislation that characterised this period and the moral anarchy that she sought to redress. For many, the government's role had gradually been reduced to that of regulating the economy and in doing so, moral issues had somewhat fallen by the wayside. Yet Thatcher's ambition was to create a flourishing society far more than any sort of economic system and it was becoming everyday more apparent to her that any major recovery was doomed without substantial moral regeneration. One of her main targets in this process was the so called molly coddling state, which she considered had not only weakened individual responsibility but also perverted morals and she laid the blame for this squarely on the permissiveness born from socialism and the Labour Party. The remoralising process that Thatcher envisaged was infused with Christian principles but Grimley wonders just to what extent religion contributed to her success in politics. He contends that whilst mainstream Conservatives were wary about religion, the morality of Christian principles gave a form of coherence to their political strategy by enabling them to appeal to people's sense of tradition. But while Thatcher continually resorted to moralised language in her rhetoric, her party did little to reverse permissiveness mainly because the Prime Minister's own conception of morality was strongly individualised. There was, even so, one notable exception, namely religious education, which Thatcher believed necessary in order to raise children's awareness about belief and practice. As time passed by in N°10, Thatcher's interest in theology seemed to grow as a throwback to her youth or to plug gaps that her political victories had left in her personal landscape. But because she believed that legislation was a blunt weapon as far as the remoralisation of society was concerned, religious groups had a particular role to play and should they shirk this responsibility, then people would turn to the state, something she wanted to avoid at all costs. Yet Thatcher's disappointment with the Church of England and Anglicanism was on many occasions palpable and often, she needed no prompting to draw unfavourable comparisons with other religious communities. By and large, Thatcher attempted to appeal to the sort of Christian morality that a majority of British people could relate to, however tenuously. It was this stance that ushered her into power but also fuelled one of the paradoxes of her mandates that of preaching morality but engendering rampant materialism.

The last article in this first part looks at the coherences between Thatcherism and Powellism given that both were fighting different battles against different enemies but with the similar weapons of true conservatism. Just like other writers in this book, Camilla Schofield underlines the fact that Thatcher promoted the idea of Britishness in her defence of moral order whereas she was surrounded by supporters who readily used economics in the same crusade. For Powell, on the other hand, the same concept was wielded as a sign of allegiance to the nation and a refusal to turn his back on British sovereignty in the face of American dominance. The author contends that Powellism paved the way for Thatcherism in that it prepared the British electorate for radical politics, and his racist statements were designed to show that Britain was still living in her glorious international past rather than defending today's nation and workers. He used race to thematise the crisis that British society was traversing, the permissiveness that was creeping into all walks of life and above all white sacrifice and white victimisation. But whereas Powell tended to politicise social deviance, Thatcher would readily criminalise it thus justifying her belief in the authority of the state. This said, Powellism is seen by many as a warning of the social dislocation of the 1970s and this is reflected in the broad-based support he found amongst electors disappointed with the political system. The author ends this section of her article by reminding readers of Powell's notorious fall and government immigration policy until 1974. Although Powell no longer had a front seat on the political stage, he had nonetheless started the ball rolling and preached the "transformism" that Thatcher was going to adhere to. Yet whereas many of her colleagues readily believed that the economy could be used to spark off a sea change in attitudes, Thatcher continued to preach the need to stamp out socialism and the corporatism that it had engendered to get the country back on its moral feet again. The trade unions were a case in point given the collective force they could muster up as compared to individual salvation. Interestingly, Thatcher and Powell collided in their disbelief that economic policy could affect the morals of the nation: economics were only a method. Thus Powell spoke out against the Thatcherite economics that attempted to achieve this just as Thatcher herself was wary of Powell's discourse on racial nationalism which she feared would have pushed the Conservatives too far to the right. Instead, in order to integrate the anti-immigration argument into her politics, Thatcher resorted to promoting the responsibility government had to protect the "nation", hence her much quoted analysis of Britain being "swamped" by different cultures. Thatcher and Powell came together once again over the value of war during the Falklands' crisis, the former declaring in typical 1940s rhetoric that this conflict underlined the moral responsibilities that the British had both home and abroad. For Powell, the war was an opportunity to lambast the permissiveness ushered in during a period when young people did not experience armed conflict, harking back to the rhetoric of 1945. But where the two disagreed was on Thatcher's Atlanticism and to a certain extent her views on Europe because Powell believed that in the long run they would jeopardise British sovereignty and even worse, fail to protect the conservative nation. Powell had set the trend of identity politics to identify defenders and opponents of the British state. Fundamentally for him, values were transcendental and could not or should not be fought for. Yet what he misunderstood was the force of the free market that once unleashed under Thatcher, would prove to be a far more revolutionary power than any of the other social dynamics he feared.

Part II of this book deals with the Thatcher years per se and the first contribution written by Laura Beers analyses the Conservative's Party appeal to women during the 1980s given the progressive swing in women's support for Labour. Beers begins with an assessment of the gender gap in British politics underlining the fact that different survey results showed a tendency for this to decline in the 1980s. These findings intrigued political scientists given Mrs Thatcher's overt lack of support for feminism and the causes generally defended by women's movements and prompted them to examine women's so-called deviant electoral behaviour or apparent conservatism. Yet even if sex no longer seems to be a viable indicator of political preference, this "dealignment" has not put an end to either generational divisions among female voters or motivational ones between the two sexes. On many occasions, these latter have proven to alienate women voters from the Conservatives rather than attract them to the Labour Party, except for those on the same hard-line moral wavelength as the Prime Minister. Thatcher appealed to women by emphasising her housewife-come-mother-come homemaker's approach to politics, in short by promoting the family as being the main social unit. According to her, it is in this sphere that women achieve their essential purpose, which explains her government's reticence to promote policies that might have encouraged them to shirk these responsibilities. The author continues her analysis by providing detailed poll data about women's reactions to Thatcher as a role model. Generally speaking, they reacted more positively than their male counterparts to Thatcher's influence on politics or at least would publicly admit their admiration for her. Labour was intrigued by women's liking Thatcher, commissioned research and found once again that her strength of character was an important vote catcher among women electors especially those who identified with success and exceptionalism rather than solely feminist driven equality seekers. The author's argument is the same when it comes to Mrs Thatcher's "housewife" and "common sense" approach to economics whereby countries should organise their economies along the same lines as households and families, spending no more than they earn. Yet, attitudes to government spending show slightly different approaches according to sex, especially in the fields of welfare, employment and above all, education. The Conservative's knew full well that this was traditionally an issue that women -and especially mothers -felt more strongly about than men and deliberately played the education message in respect of this potential support. The author's main contention is that the emphasis on Thatcher's "law and order" appeal to women has obscured other important aspects of their support for her and that by breaking down poll data, sub trends can be established that explain to what extent the powerful housewife figure of Mrs Thatcher attracted so much support from women during the 1980s.

The following contribution deals with the decline of class politics in Mrs Thatcher's Britain with the authors contending that it was her own class image which prompted her to aim for a more positive and classless vision of politics. Added to this was the creation of a new range of oppositions within British society that left little room for the "class" argument all the more so as Thatcher herself believed in ordinary people who would adhere to the "ordinary" universal values she promoted rather than those dictated by nebulous class distinctions. Hence the creation of a new class constituency that revolved around the "middle" of the country sharing Thatcher's commonsense and ordinary values, their common enemy being, if all went well, socialism. To highlight this transition, the authors, Jon Lawrence and Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, take a step back in time and describe the post-war historical backdrop against which class distinction took place. They maintain that moving the goalposts of affluence was not necessarily accompanied by a transfer of corresponding values, especially given that stereotypes -especially those conveyed by popular media, and culture -die hard. The idea of a class ridden society was still manifest and social science seemed to tap into this trend thus opening up a breech which Thatcher and her disciples could exploit adroitly. This they did by decontaminating the middle class and relabeling it the "aspirational" class, who shared her affection for ordinariness but whose members would nevertheless endeavour to improve their lot whatever their background or life circumstances. Once again, it was the socialist class construct that she abhorred preferring the rugged individualism that was to characterise her own vision. Housing and tax were used conspicuously in the crusade not only to encourage individual responsibility, but also legitimise material improvement. These efforts were somewhat timid in 1979 due to the belief that promising material improvement was not enough to secure victory and that some compromises had to be accepted. Yet the future electoral victories in 1983 and 1987 were to enable the Conservatives to slay the giants of economically and occupational definitions of class and replace them with a vision based on individuals and families: ultimately this was part and parcel of their strategic onslaught on the socialist collectivism that they felt was at the heart of all society's evils.

The 1984-1985 miners' strike is one of the outstanding events during the Thatcher years pitting the reinforced legislative arsenal of the state against the specific cultural and industrial forces of the miners. David Howell recounts the evolution of trade unionism within the industry and the impact on union truculence of differential wage structures and government imposed productivity targets as from the late 1970s. A detailed account of the strike itself is provided and the author lays particular emphasis on the multitude of divisions and disputes that appeared within the movement itself at all levels, especially when the legality of strike movements was challenged in the courts. The overall impression the reader gleans is that much of the strike movement escaped the control that any national mining authority, union or otherwise, would have been keen to enforce. Howell concludes by dealing with the legacies of this episode on politics and points out the shift of support from Labour to both the Conservative Party and the Liberal-Social Democrats. He contends that industrial relations within the mining sector were damaged beyond repair during this period but suggests that the very culture of the mining industry was just as much to blame for this as any attempt by the main political actors to reap benefit from any kind of fragmentation of the union movement.

The following contribution is devoted to the different brands of devolution promoted in Scotland and Wales and begins by identifying the different concepts of unionism, unitarianism and nationalism, all prone to misinterpretation. The author, Richard Finlay, then points out the importance of class identities and civic nationalism in the devolution debate. The first part of the chapter deals with unionism in both countries and kicks off with an analysis of electoral fortunes of the main parties there, underlining the fact that electoral systems can potentially distort results and in the case of Scotland, amplified what was widely perceived to be an outright rejection of Thatcherism and the Conservative Party. Thatcher tried to appeal to nationalist sentiment especially in Scotland but somewhat unwittingly tended to advocate unitarianism rather than unionism in the name of British uniformity and "sameness". Yet this latter concept came across a major stumbling block namely public sector agencies which the thatcherites were busy dismantling but to which both the Scottish and Welsh were particularly attached as one of the raisons d'être for the post-war union in the first place. Thatcher's main failing was indeed her inability to deal adequately with sub-British identities just as she failed to engage correctly with regional ones. Instead, her Party would merely preach the financial benefits of union for the Welsh and the Scottish thus giving the impression that they ignored the wider issues linked to nationalism. This left Labour and the Liberal Democrats to champion the cause of devolution as a response to the democratic deficit caused by the almighty strength of the Conservative Party in England, all the more so in Scotland which enjoyed greater territorial integrity. The author pursues his analysis by relating the major socio-economic changes that affected Great Britain during the Thatcher years. He contends that both countries and whole communities suffered acutely from deindustrialisation which was perceived as being an assault on working class culture, another wedge driven between areas of the "old" and the "new" economy. In Wales and Scotland, this is precisely what generated the most hostility towards Thatcherism and exacerbated nationalistic, territorial tendencies far more than any fragmentation of the political parties due to issues linked to the Falklands, the miners' strike, the Poll Tax or even devolution itself. The author pursues his argument by broaching the question of how the notion of "civil society" was used in both countries. In Scotland, it was used to unite the opponents of Thatcherism and enabled them to foster a form of popular sovereignty but as the author is quick to point out, it was also a short cut used by those who had lost out from the Thatcherite revolution to return to the political limelight, rid their claims of the traditional class structure argument and portray Thatcher and her party as being quite simply alien to Scots and Scotland. In Wales, the same "myth" of civil society was far less exploited to conjure up a national response to Thatcherism especially given the loyalty to traditional class structure, the ethnic nationalism that Plaid Cymru tended to be associated with and the lack of territorial insularity. Richard Finlay concludes by stating that the same socio-economic consequences of Thatcherism produced different results in the two countries: in Scotland a more national response to Thatcherism was manufactured by accusing Britishness of being mere Englishness whereas in Wales, traditional structures of society came under less assault and therefore there was a lesser need to throw up a national barricade to reject the effects of Westminster government.

The following author tackles the question of Ireland and starts by surveying the different settlement frameworks available based on the east-west, Catholic-Protestant, north-south axes. Marc Mulholland adroitly explains the articulation of rights, duties and claims between Britain and Ireland before suggesting that Britain's constant change of tack over the course of the Troubles fuelled inconsistencies that were hardly propitious to uniting the feuding communities. He underlines the fact that Thatcher herself, on becoming Prime Minister, rapidly crystallised all the bitterness and hatred generated by the protracted dealings linked to the Irish question. A great deal of this was due to her overt contempt for the Irish nationalist identity while her distrust of so-called catholic alienation from state institutions during the rapprochement process also ruffled many feathers. This explains why many policies were hammered out by articulate civil servants with expert knowledge who could then rely on the authority of the Prime Minister for implementation. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement smacks of this logic but the author contends that it was Thatcher's way of bolstering the middle ground against the extremes given her constant obsession with security considerations. This attitude contributed inevitably to the electoral success of Sinn Féin as they moved away from armed struggle, the extreme that Thatcher despised above all others.

Part three of this book deals with Thatcherism and the wider world. The first author, Richard Vinen, looks at Thatcherism through the prism of the Cold War and devotes his first part to defence policy. He notes that 1979 did not usher in any major change given mainly that there has always been a high level of consensus in this field given the degree of highly specialised knowledge it requires. To this end, the commitment to the free market left defence largely unaffected while Thatcher's skills in military matters were often -silently -questioned by those bemused by the so-called incongruity of a woman becoming involved, all the more so as she had never worn military uniform. In fact, the biggest changes in defence questions during Thatcher's premierships were raised by the Labour Party who were openly turning their backs on Britain's nuclear deterrent. The backlash on this was substantial especially after the Falklands War which ensured a considerable electoral victory for the Conservatives in 1983 and also devastated Labour's political credibility for years to come, voters believing that a leading member of NATO could not suffer such humiliation in the Cold War context of the 1980s. This latter also dictated Thatcher's view of other European countries and leaders: despite her distrust of Europe, she had good relations with European leaders and indeed countries who would stand firm on their allegiance to the western block. She was prepared to accommodate the Soviet Union given her belief that it could not be changed and her Atlanticism -especially during Reagan's two mandateswas geared towards elaborating containment policies designed to thwart the spread of communism. Towards the end of her premiership, Thatcher saw herself increasingly as an international statesperson having played a crucial role in ending the Cold War characterised by the fall of the Wall. But as her role on the international scene became more personified, so did her reputation for eccentricity, the prerogative of great leaders with vast experience. But the end of the Cold War reduced Britain's thirst for greatness given that unity vis-à-vis the Soviet block was no longer necessary. This provides some explanation for her wariness about the construction of the European Union given that the threat from the east was gradually dwindling. Thatcher wanted Britain to be a great world power and believed that economic success was a key element in achieving this if only because, like other European countries, the military power of Britain exceeded the country's economic power. Vinen concludes by stating that one of Mrs Thatcher's strengths was the ability to combine radicalism and pragmatism in her approach to the Cold War the result of which was to redefine Britain's greatnessand thus her ownwhere military power was not the only defining element.

In the following contribution Andrew Gamble deals with the evolution of Thatcher's relationships with the international community and especially with Europe and America. To explain why and how Thatcher managed to bequeath a Eurosceptic identity on her party, the author looks back at the three phases through which the Conservative Party moved namely pro-European, to increasing scepticism followed by a renewed interest in her links with America. The first part deals classically with the decline of the British Empire and her subsequent "natural" desire to turn towards her more immediate European partners while maintaining her "special" relationship with America. Thatcher was to put an end to this zealous attitude vis-à-vis the construction of Europe within her party. Gamble's second part deals with the security community to which Britain was so eager to be part of to the extent that her governments would readily show subservience to the American "master". Thatcher followed suit but managed to underline the need for strong American leadership by focusing attention on security policy given the expansionist threat posed by the Soviet Union and her support was characterised by the use of airbases and the siting of American missiles on British soil. Likewise her personal relationships with world leaders; none was so strong as the friendship she cherished with Reagan as stated elsewhere in this book, and despite upsets caused by the Falklands crisis and the US intervention in Grenada, there is no denying that Britain's Atlanticism was by and large rekindled during Thatcher's premierships. The collapse of communism in Europe allowed Britain and America to revel in the bond they had created around liberal capitalism and the knowledge that they had created a new world order in which their leadership in the quest of freedom would be paramount. With this in mind, it goes without saying that the European project would be relegated to a secondary level. Yet Thatcher's attitude towards Europe was ambiguous given the zeal with which she promoted a free market eurozone on the one hand while shirking the collective responsibilities that the community set out to foster on the other. The author explains how this divided the Conservative Party forcing the different factions into defining their perceptions of Britain's overall political economy, whether they believed more in the American model or the continental one. Where Thatcher stands out particularly on this issue is the link she made between security, defence and political economy, emphasising the advantages Britain would have by remaining faithful to its Atlanticism for all three. This explains her promotion, along with her accomplice Ronald Reagan, of the Anglo-American model of capitalism as opposed to any European social model of society. This was portrayed as being a strategic choice for the country settled in political economy terms. Gamble ends his contribution by reflecting on the ideological community that Thatcher was supposed to have inspired and how her particular brand of realpolitik meshed in with the "grand design" often associated with Thatcherism. Between Britain and America there was indeed the ideological potential to move mountains and for Thatcher, this was to be used in order to reverse British decline. Thus her neo-liberalism was designed to bolster economic prosperity, unleash market forces and in doing so, ultimately slay the Giant socialism. The finer details were perhaps ignored or only partially understood but the overall picture of a free economy corresponded to Thatcher's instinct to what she believed was "international common sense", based on the model of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. To this end, Thatcher was particularly skillful in identifying British interests in accordance with the way America defined her own interests, not as any sort of rival but an accomplice underling willing to recreate the old Anglo-American bond based on common traits of national character. Thus Britain had bounced back from a former position of wariness vis-à-vis "Americanisation" which embodied high modernity and the constant adapting of culture. Although many Conservatives found this latter aspect difficult to assimilate, Thatcher managed to make Britain's interests in security, political economy and ideology converge in one direction namely the United States, and there could be noor at least very littlealternative.

The last contribution attempts to provide coherence to the "end of empire" narrative during the Thatcher years. Stephen Howe insists from the outset on the imbrication between imperial, colonial and British history and begins his analysis by delving into the background of Thatcher and empire. To many intents and purposes Thatcher was one of the most "aimperial" political leaders Britain has ever had and although she would never apologise for colonisation, neither would she indulge in imperialist leanings. Howe takes the reader through some of the main incidents that occurred during the Thatcher years that had strong links with the legacies of empire and points out the Prime Minister's idiosyncratic behaviour during the Rhodesian crisis, the Falklands War -which for many stands out as the defining point of Britain's imperial past during the Thatcher years -, the US invasion of Grenada, South Africa and Hong Kong. For the author, these can be considered as mere post imperial "episodes" and he follows these descriptions with an attempt at defining the bigger picture of internal decolonisation within Britain itself: the decline in Britain's national purpose, identity and even economy can be linked to the decline of the Empire with the Falklands episode redressing this momentarily; the desire for independence expressed by Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is the "natural" conclusion to the end of the empire while Thatcher's attitude to some regions or even towns in Britain smacked of her country's attitude towards former colonies. Yet Howe believes that by focussing so much attention on decolonisation, too little has been said about the continuities of the Empire, for despite claims of decline, Britain still holds a world role. To link this to the Thatcher years, Howe identifies four defining developments: the reintegration of the Dominions into the "end-of-empire" story, internal decolonisations within Europe especially amongst former imperial powers where the consequences of imperial memory on national identities has been potent, the Europeanisation of decolonisation which tends to show that European integration and Atlanticism are not mutually exclusive and lastly, the relationship between decolonisation and the Anglo-American partnership.

Making Thatcher's Britain provides invaluable insight into the role the Thatcher years have played in twentieth century Britain. To this end, the authors' claim to originality is genuine and the goal achieved. Nevertheless specialist knowledge of the period is a prerequisite to drawing full benefit from reading given that each author's focus is highly specialised, technical and detailed. This is therefore a book for advanced students who have an interest in political science and the contemporary history of Great Britain and who are interested in an analysis of the 1980s that does not isolate the period from the rest of the century as if Thatcherism should be considered as being out on a limb rather than part of the whole picture. There is indeed a "before" and an "after" Thatcher and this set of articles provides the links that are necessary to understand what Britain has become since the Iron Lady's occupancy of N°10 Downing Street.


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Improving the performances of the combustion engines by improving the ignition system

Dragoş-George Astanei

To cite this version:

Dragoş-George Astanei. Improving the performances of the combustion engines by improving the ignition system.