Samuel Ouoba
email: samuel_ouoba1@yahoo.fr

Bruno Cousin

David Y Toguyeni

Salifou K Ouiminga

Fabien Cherblanc

Jean Koulidiati

Jean-Claude Bénet

Highlighting of a local Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamics during the transfer of trichlorethylene (TCE) in the superficial layers of Arid Soils

Keywords: transfer, non-equilibrium, trichloroethylene, arid soil, phase change

Introduction

The description of a pollutant transfer as trichloroethylene in the surface layers of a dry soil deserves the attention of the scientific community regarding the resolution of problems related to environmental sciences [START_REF] Braida | Influence of Porous Media and Airflow Rate on the Fate of NAPLs Under Air Sparging[END_REF]. However, understanding the phenomena involved in the transfer of a compound in a soil is very difficult because many phenomena are coupled during transfer processes in a multiphase medium which can deform, and where the fluid contents can vary in time and space. Accordingly, any modeling used to describe and predict the dynamic behavior of a volatile compound in an arid soil must be preceded by an experimental investigation to determine the essential parameters involved in the phenomena [START_REF] Auriault | Effective diffusion coefficient: from homogenization to experiment[END_REF]. Most bibliographic works use a classical approach to describe mass transfer in soils, assuming that the continuous phase of the porous medium fully and instantaneously participates to the mass transfer [START_REF] Dridi | Quantification du flux de vapeurs de solvants chlorés depuis une source en aquifère poreux vers l'atmosphère : Biais relatifs à la non uniformité de la teneur en eau et à la non stationnarité du transfert[END_REF]. Such transfer process occurs in the saturated zone of the soil and can be well described by the Darcy's law. In these conditions, it is considered that water is not entirely adsorbed by the solid particles; so that the liquid/vapor equilibrium described by Henry's Law (𝑃 𝑇 𝑒𝑞 = 𝐾 𝐻 𝐶 𝑇 ) can be applied. However, several studies in the literature showed that the low water contents are responsible of soil hygroscopic effects causing a deviation of the water activity. Recent studies realized on water showed that these effects can modify not only the equilibrium between phases but the kinetics of phase change [START_REF] Chammari | Transfert d'eau en sol aride avec changement de phase[END_REF][START_REF] Ouedraogo | Water transfer in soil at low water content. Is the local equilibrium assumption still appropriate[END_REF]. It is therefore logical to wonder if in such circumstances the conventional assumption of equilibrium can still be applied. Otherwise, it becomes necessary to find the suitable way to describe the liquid-vapor phase change dynamics; that is the objective of the present article.

Materials and Method

Presentation of the System and Definition of Initial Conditions

The system studied in this work is a portion of soil containing a liquid phase (subscript L) composed of water (denoted by w) and dissolved TCE (denoted by T) and a gas phase (denoted by g) composed of air (denoted by a).

The physic-chemical properties of TCE and the soil sample are respectively given in Tables 1 and2. Considering the experimental conditions the following assumptions are admitted (Ouoba et al., 2014a):

-A1: the solid phase is chemically inert and incompressible, -A2:the temperature is uniform and constant, -A3: the gas behaves as an ideal gas mixture and is assumed to be stationary so that the filtration flux of the gaseous phase is zero, -A4: the liquid phase is an ideal dilute solution of water and TCE, -A5: there are no chemical reactions in liquid and gas phase. The only physic-chemical phenomenon taken into account is the liquid-gas phase change of water and TCE, -A6: the pressure of the gas is uniform, constant and equals to atmospheric pressure, The previous validation procedures proved the reliability of the theoretical model in the case of pure water; particularly the phase change phenomenon is accurately described by the model [START_REF] Bénet | Phase Change of Water in a Hygroscopic Porous Medium. Phenomenological Relation and Experimental Analysis for Water in soil[END_REF][START_REF] Lozano | Experimental study and modelling of water phasechange kinetics in soils[END_REF][START_REF] Ouedraogo | Water transfer in soil at low water content. Is the local equilibrium assumption still appropriate[END_REF]. Thus, in this section, dissolved TCE is considered to study the non-equilibrium between the phases. The phenomenological evaporation coefficient has not been experimentally determined for dissolved TCE. That is the reason why as a first approximation, we adopted for the evaporation coefficient of dissolved TCE the same expression than that obtained for pure TCE.

The conditions on water are:

-The initial water content of soil is uniform; -The relative humidity of air in the chamber is set to 30% or to 50%.

The tests of simulation have been performed on soil columns with 30 cm of height and 7.5 cm of diameter, where the liquid phase is a solution of TCE with a known initial concentration. The problem is considered as onedimensional so that the initial conditions are defined by:

-𝑤 𝐿 (𝑡 = 0, 𝑧) = 𝑤 𝐿0 -𝑃 𝑤 𝑣 (𝑡 = 0, 𝑧) = 𝑃 𝑤 𝑣𝑒𝑞 (𝑤 𝐿0 ) -𝐶 𝑇 (𝑡 = 0, 𝑧) = 𝐶 𝑇0 -𝑃 𝑇 𝑣 (𝑡 = 0, 𝑧) = 𝑃 𝑇 𝑣𝑒𝑞 (𝐶 𝑇0 )

Basic equations of transfer

A classic approach of mass balance in a Representative Elementary Volume (REV) provides the equations of transfer of water and TCE in the aqueous phase. We then obtain:

For liquid water

𝜕𝜌 𝑤 𝐿 𝜕𝑡 + ∇(𝜌 𝑤 𝐿 𝑣 𝐿 ) ⏟ term of filtration = -𝐽 𝑤 ⏟ phase change (1)
For the vapor of water

𝜕𝜌 𝑤 𝑣 𝜕𝑡 -∇(𝐷 𝑤 𝑎 ∇𝜌 𝑤 𝑣 ) ⏟ term of diffusion = 𝐽 𝑤 ⏟ phase change (2)
Where the diffusion coefficient of water vapor in air, given by Ouedraogo et al. ( 2013) is:

𝐷 𝑤 𝑎 = 2,57 × 10 -5 𝑚 2 /𝑠.

For the aqueous phase of TCE

𝜕𝜌 𝑇 𝐿 𝜕𝑡 + ∇(𝜌 𝑇 𝐿 𝑣 𝐿 ) ⏟ term of filtration -∇(𝐷 𝑇 𝑤 ∇𝜌 𝑇 𝐿 ) ⏟ term of diffusion = -𝐽 𝑇 ⏟ phase change (3)
Where the diffusion coefficient of TCE in water, given by Mahmoodlu et al. ( 2014) is:

𝐷 𝑇 𝑤 = 9,1 × 10 -6 𝑚 2 /𝑠.

For the vapor of TCE

𝜕𝜌 𝑇 𝑣 𝜕𝑡 -∇(𝐷 𝑇 𝑎 ∇𝜌 𝑇 𝑣 ) ⏟ term of diffusion = 𝐽 𝑇 ⏟ phase change (4)
Where the diffusion coefficient of TCE in air, given by Mahmoodlu et al. ( 2014) is:

𝐷 𝑇 𝑎 = 7.9 × 10 -6 𝑚 2 /𝑠.

The term of filtration of the liquid phase is given by:

𝜌 𝑤 𝐿 𝑣 𝐿 = - 𝐾 𝑛𝑠 𝑔 (∇𝑃 𝑤 𝐿 + 𝜌 𝑤 𝐿 𝑔) (5)
Where the coefficient of permeability of soil is given by Ouedraogo et al. ( 2013)

𝐾 𝑛𝑠 (𝑤 𝐿 ) = 𝐾 𝑠𝑎𝑡 ( 𝑤 𝐿 -𝑤 𝐿 𝑟 𝑤 𝐿 𝑠𝑎𝑡 -𝑤 𝐿 𝑟 ) 𝜆 (6)
In this relation the coefficient λ=5

It is important to note that for each compound, the transfers within the two phases are coupled by phase change phenomena through the evaporation rates, J w and J T given by [START_REF] Bénet | Phase Change of Water in a Hygroscopic Porous Medium. Phenomenological Relation and Experimental Analysis for Water in soil[END_REF]:

𝐽 𝑐 = 𝐿 𝑐 𝑅 ϕ g 𝑀 𝑐 ln ( 𝑃 𝑐 𝑣 𝑃 𝑐 𝑣𝑒𝑞 ) , 𝑐 = 𝑇, 𝑤 (7)
Where 𝑃 𝑐 𝑣𝑒𝑞 is given by Ouoba et al. (2010a).

The coefficient of phase change given by Equation ( 7) has been successfully used by Ouoba et al. (2015) in recent publications. Its determination necessarily requires an experimental study and allows determining the evaporation kinetics. It depends on the state variables (temperature T, liquid content w L ), soil properties (composition, texture, compactness, etc.), but no explicit expression is available [START_REF] Lozano | Experimental study and modelling of water phasechange kinetics in soils[END_REF][START_REF] Ruiz | Phase-change in a heterogeneous medium: Comparison between the vaporisation of water and heptane in an unsaturated soil of two temperatures[END_REF].

Experimental Device and Principle

The experimental device used to determine the phase change coefficient of a pure liquid in a porous medium is depicted in Figure 1. It was initially developed to measure water activity and has been called "activity-meter". This device and the associated method were validated in our previous works (Ouoba et al., 2014b;Ouoba et al., 2010a) and have been patented in Europe and United States [START_REF] Bénet | Device for measuring the activity of a liquid in a complex medium and associated method[END_REF] The sample (a) is placed against a pressure transducer (b) (Druck, PMP4030AB) and a temperature thermocouple (c) (type K). This records the total pressure of the gas, P g , and its temperature, T, throughout the test. Data acquisition is performed through a National Instrument DAQ card and analyzed using LabView. A piston pump (d) is placed above the sample to impose a gas pressure below atmospheric pressure. The piston chamber volume is controlled by a screw system (e) with a graduated ruler (f). O-ring gaskets ensure perfect air tightness so that the system can be considered thermodynamically closed. The dimensional characteristics of the device are given by Ouoba et al. (2010b). The whole device is placed in a thermo-regulated bath to ensure a constant temperature.

Because the device is made of stainless steel, its high thermal inertia leads to weak temperature variations and thermal equilibrium is experimentally observed.

Results and Discussion

Determination of the evaporation coefficient of TCE

To describe the hygroscopic effects in the transfer process of a compound in an arid soil, it is necessary to consider the liquid/vapor phase change associated with the transfer of this compound. The method used to determine the evaporation coefficient of TCE is largely developed in Ouoba et al. (2014a). It is based on the principle used by [START_REF] Naon | Evaporation of a volatile organic compound in a hygroscopic soilinfluence of the airflow and its VOC vapor saturation[END_REF] for heptane and by [START_REF] Ouedraogo | Water transfer in soil at low water content. Is the local equilibrium assumption still appropriate[END_REF] for water. We compare in Figure 2 the evaporation coefficients of water, heptane and TCE. One can see that the evaporation coefficient of water is lower than that of heptane and TCE. The evaporation coefficient of TCE is about 7 times higher than that of heptane. These results are related to the highest volatility of TCE compared to the one of heptane and water. Indeed, it is well known that the higher the volatility of a compound, the greater its saturated vapor pressure.

According to literature data (Ouoba et al., 2010b)

Validation of the numerical model

The validation of the numerical model has concerned water. The transfer equations established for water are discretized by using the following approach: -An implicit scheme in time; -An upstream biased for the convection flow diagram; -Considering the non-linearity of the transfer equations, we chose the Newton-Raphson's method for the numerical solution of the problem.

To validate the numerical model, a comparison has been made between numerical results and experimental results.

The experiments consisted in making soil columns with initial liquid content w L compacted in PVC (Figure 3). These soil columns were placed in a climatic chamber where temperature and relative humidity were controlled. The columns were let to evolve in the climatic chamber for various experimental drying times. The samples were then removed from the chamber and sliced in order to determine the water content profiles corresponding to a given drying time.

1 Figure 5 presents the experimental and simulated water content profiles. It may also be noted in this figure that there is a good agreement between both profiles. The differences in the vicinity of the surface may be partly due to possible imperfections of the model but also to errors of measurement during the extraction of the sample and its destruction for measurement.

The profiles highlight a rapid drying front at the beginning of the experience, but much more important near the surface. The examination of the numerical results also shows a significant decrease in water content in the vicinity of the surface a few hours after the starting of the experiment. This value of water content reaches immediately the equilibrium moisture content (0.24 %) and remains constant as shown by all the curves that admit a common point The model (RH=50%)

The model (RH=30%) at the surface. At the beginning of drying, the water content in the lower part of the column increases above the initial water content due to gravitational drainage. This phenomenon is accurately predicted by the theoretical model. As the numerical results are in good agreement with experiments for water, the model has been used to describe the transfer of dissolved TCE using the evaporation coefficient of pure TCE.

Figure 5. Profiles of water content for RH=30%.

Highlighting of a thermodynamic non-equilibrium between liquid and vapor phases

The curves of Figure 6 present an instantaneous vapor pressure profile of TCE, 𝑃 𝑇 𝑣 , and the corresponding equilibrium vapor pressure profile , 𝑃 𝑇 𝑣𝑒𝑞 . The two curves are significantly different which means there is not equilibrium between the dissolved TCE and its vapor. Similar results have been found for other simulation times. Hence, the only parameter that may be responsible of this disequilibrium is the coefficient of phase change. To investigate the influence of the evaporation coefficient of dissolved TCE on the disequilibrium and to better understand the conditions under which the assumption of local equilibrium could be admitted, simulations were performed multiplying the evaporation coefficient of pure TCE by a factor α ranging from 10 -4 to 10 2 . The parameter chosen to quantify the disequilibrium is:

𝐼 = 1 𝐻•𝑃 𝑇 𝑣𝑒𝑞 ∫ (𝑃 𝑇 𝑣𝑒𝑞 -𝑃 𝑇 𝑣 )𝑑𝑧 𝐻 0 (18)
This integral is a dimensionless representation of the area between the curves 𝑃 𝑇 𝑣 and 𝑃 𝑇 𝑣𝑒𝑞 (Figure 6). So, Figures Because of the low value of the evaporation coefficient, the transfers are mainly due to capillary actions and surface evaporation, -A second domain designated by D2 in the interval 10 -2 ≤α≤13 where 0,325≤I<0. The disequilibrium decreases but the assumption of the local equilibrium is still not applicable. The mechanisms of phase change are fairly low and all the transfer phenomena are competing, -A third domain D3 for α>13 where the value of the dimensionless integral I is almost zero. In this interval, the values of 𝑃 𝑇 𝑣 and 𝑃 𝑇 𝑣𝑒𝑞 are the same and the instantaneous equilibrium is reached.

These results have shown that the local equilibrium cannot be admitted in the modeling of TCE transfer in an arid soil. It is unlikely that the evaporation coefficient of dissolved TCE would be 13 times higher than that of pure TCE. It is rather likely that, for dissolved TCE, coefficient α is lower than 1.

Conclusion

In this study, the kinetics of phase change has been characterized for water, heptane and TCE confirming other studies realized on water, i.e., the return to equilibrium is not instantaneous. We have shown that the nonequilibrium is due to the phase change kinetics and we experimentally determined the evaporation coefficient of water, TCE and heptane. From these experiments, explicit expressions of these characteristics have been identified and introduced in a numerical model. The results for water obtained on soil columns with 30 cm of height and 7.5 cm of diameter were compared with the results of the model. This confrontation between the experiments and the model has shown that the proposed model can be used to describe the transfer of water in the soil taking into account the phase change. As the numerical results are in good agreement with experiments for water, the model has been used to describe the transfer of TCE in the aqueous phase of soil. The numerical results have shown that during transfer of TCE in the aqueous phase, there is a substantial difference between the actual vapor pressure of TCE, 𝑃 𝑇 𝑣 , and the equilibrium vapor pressure, 𝑃 𝑇 𝑣𝑒𝑞 , so the assumption of local equilibrium commonly accepted in the literature is not admitted here for TCE. However, awaiting for other researches in other experimental conditions, the results presented in the present work are only valid when the transport of TCE is performed under the same conditions with the same assumptions as these admitted in this work. The contribution of this work has enabled to highlight the importance of phase change on transport of volatile organic compound in hygroscopic soil. However, additional studies need to be extended to other types of soils with different physic-chemical characteristics in order to confirm the results of this work. It would also be desirable to undertake a large-scale study on soil columns and in situ by taking into account more experimental variables such as coupling phenomena and variation of porosity in the medium that can help to improve the numerical model. Finally, it would be important to include in the numerical model most of the mechanisms involved in the transport processes such as chemical reactions, photo-degradation...

  Highlighting of a local non-equilibrium thermodynamics during the transfer of trichlorethylene (TCE) in the superficial layers of arid soils Samuel Ouoba, Bruno Cousin, David Y. Toguyeni, Salifou. K. Ouiminga, Fabien Cherblanc, Jean Koulidiati, Jean-Claude Benet To cite this version: Samuel Ouoba, Bruno Cousin, David Y. Toguyeni, Salifou. K. Ouiminga, Fabien Cherblanc, et al.. Highlighting of a local non-equilibrium thermodynamics during the transfer of trichlorethylene (TCE) in the superficial layers of arid soils. European Journal of Environmental and Civil Engineering, 2015, 19 (9), pp.1096-1107. 10.

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the activity-meter.

Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. Evaporation coefficients of water, heptane and TCE at 30 °C.

Figure 3 .

 3 Figure 3. Climate chamber containing soil samples.

Figure 4 .

 4 Figure 4. Kinetics of drying for an initial water content w 0 = 6% and for two values of relative humidity RH=50% and RH=30%.

Figure 6 .

 6 Figure 6. Values of the pressures 𝑃 𝑇 𝑣 [Pa] and 𝑃 𝑇 𝑒𝑞 [Pa] for a time t=500,000 s for w 0 =3% and C T0 =1000 g/L.

7 and 8

 8 represent the variation of I as a function of α for different values of water contents. Figure7corresponds to a relative humidity of 30% and for an initial concentration C T0 = 100 mg/L and Figure8is obtained for a relative humidity of 50% and for an initial concentration C T0 = 1 mg/L.

Figure 7 .

 7 Figure 7. I value as a function of α for RH=30% and C T0 =100 mg/L.

Figure 8 .

 8 Figure 8. I value as a function of α for RH=50% and C T0 =1 mg/L.

Table 1 .

 1 TCE physic-chemical properties at 30 °C.

	Equilibrium vapor pressure /Pa	Henry's constant /Pa m 3 mol -1	Solubility
			/Mg litre -1
	11912	1195.5	1310

Table 2 .

 2 Main characteristics of the soil.

	Particle size	Particle density	Apparent mass	Porosity
	0-2 mm	2650 kg. -3	density 1500 kg. -3	43%
	quartz content	calcite content	clay content
	40%	45-50%	10%
	organic matter	organic carbon	total N	C/N
	0.28%	0.16%	0.10%	16.83
	𝑤 𝐿 𝑠𝑎𝑡 28.9%	𝑟 𝑤 𝐿 1%	K sat 3.10 -5 m.s -1

Acknowledgments

This work was done within the framework of collaboration between the University Montpellier 2, France and the University of Ouagadougou, Burkina-Faso and supported by the French Ministry of Foreign affairs.


Maria Chiara Morandini
email: chiara.morandini@univ-paris1.fr

Flexibilising the Labour Market: Who Wants to Loosen Employment Protection Legislation in Italy?

This paper presents an explanatory analysis of the political economy of recent labour market reforms recently implemented in Italy. Analysing preferences for a general reduction in employment protection through ITANES survey data, results are partially in line with the insider-outsider theory: self-employed, retired people, managers, craft business and shop owners are in favour of such institutional change as are retired that are not concerned by this kind of reform. Support from "outsiders", unemployed and atypical workers did not strongly emerge. Ideologically, positive opinions are widespread among right-wing voters whilst people feeling close to trade unions oppose it. Geographically, consensus is greater in the industrialised North-East of the country. Comparing our results with findings on voting behaviour in 2013, we advance the hypothesis that the current incumbents' political strategy is not as paradoxical as it seems. At odds with the idea of socialist parties defending "insiders" unionised workers and in line with a generalised detachment between the working class and socialist parties, both the main leftist and centrist parties in the ruling coalition are in fact gaining consensus among the social groups that are the most favourable to labour market flexibilisation, making these policy consistent with an attempt to please these constituencies.

I.

Introduction

As many other capitalist societies, Italy has recently undergone a process of liberalization in several institutional domains [START_REF] Thelen | Varieties of liberalization and the new politics of social solidarity[END_REF][START_REF] Amable | L'économie politique du néolibéralisme[END_REF][START_REF] Jackson | The long term trajectories of institutional change in European capitalism[END_REF][START_REF] Rangone | From the Southern-European model to nowhere: the evolution of Italian capitalism[END_REF], Baccaro and Howell 2001). Dramatic changes have recently occurred and are occurring in labour market regulation.

After ambiguous institutional changes, inspired by CMEs during the 1990s and by LMEs during the 2000s [START_REF] Della Sala | The Italian model of capitalism: on the road between globalization and Europeanization?[END_REF], during the current crisis, the last Berlusconi's government and the three governments after his, with Monti, Letta and Renzi as prime ministers, have progressively flexibilised the labour market. Labour market flexibilisation reforms were perfectly in line with the agenda of a right wing liberal government as Berlusconi's. They were explicitly part of Monti's mandate to implement the "essential measures" suggested by European institutions to overcome the Italian debt crisis. The last two governments led by the left-wing Democratic Party have implemented flexbilisation measures, as well.

While it is too soon to thoroughly evaluate the effects of the latest reform, the "Jobs act" seems to be negatively perceived by voters. According to a recent poll2 , 50% of the interviewed believe that it will not improve employment while 28% consider it beneficial to the firms only and 20% detrimental to both employers and workers. In a 2012 poll Monti government's actions in the field of labour and social policies were negatively assessed by 70% of the interviewees3 .

Yet, these apparently unpopular institutional changes were implemented leading to reverse Emmenegger (2013)'s question: why is it so "easy" to flexibilise the labour market, including reducing dismissal protection in contemporary Italy?

The aim of the paper is to analyse the political demand for labour market flexibilisation and investigate the apparent paradox of these labour market reforms under a coalition governments led by the major left wing party. In fact, in a dualised labour market as the Italian one, a centre-left party is supposed to protect the insiders, the unionised and protected workers, who should oppose a more flexibile labour market [START_REF] Rueda | Insider-outsider politics in industrialized democracies: The challenge to social democratic parties[END_REF](Rueda, , 2006)).

Investigating the political demand can shed light on a second peculiar feature of these reforms, their unilateral character. In fact, despite fulfilling some the conditions for the emergence of social pacts in the literature [START_REF] Ahlquist | Policy by Contract: electoral cycles, parties and social pacts[END_REF][START_REF] Baccaro | Policy concertation in Europe. Understanding government choice[END_REF]Baccaro andLing, 2007, Natali, 2004), both Monti and Renzi's governments have adopted them unilaterally. One possible explanation provided stems from the decline in the power of trade unions [START_REF] Culpepper | Why don't government need trade unions anymore? The death of social pacts in Ireland and Italy[END_REF].

Here we advance another evidence-based interpretation: the traditional left-wing constituency of unionised manual workers that, as insiders, should oppose this reform might not be at the centre of the social coalition the incumbent are seeking support from [START_REF] Amable | L'économie politique du néolibéralisme[END_REF], at least with this specific policy measure.

The paper proceeds with a brief overview of the last institutional changes in the labour market and industrial relations realms in section II. Section III reviews the literature on preferences for labour market policies. Section IV presents the empirical analysis and section VI advances an interpretation of the results. Section V concludes.

II.

The latest institutional changes in the Labour Market and

Industrial relations system

The deinstitutionalisation of labour market rules started at the end of the 1980s and deepened from the 1990s on [START_REF] Rangone | From the Southern-European model to nowhere: the evolution of Italian capitalism[END_REF]. After the cut in wage indexation and then its abolition in 1992, major changes occurred under a centre-left and centre-right government respectively: in 1997 the " dismissal from 4.13 to 3.75. 4 In contrast with previous reforms, it increased exit flexibility by reducing the costs of collective dismissals and deregulating individual dismissals 5 .

Renzi's government has then further deregulated the use of fixed-term contracts with the so called "Poletti decree", and, more importantly, has introduced the the "contratto a tutele crescenti", a single open-ended contract with employment protection increasing with tenure. Only temporary incentives to use this form of contract are provided in the form of three years reduction in social contribution. It also abolished only some types of atypical contracts which might lead to an overall increase in uncertainty on the labour market [START_REF] Cappellari | Quanta instabilità nei contratti a termine[END_REF]. 6 This new form of contract is not covered by the article 18 of the Workers' statute that imposes the worker's reinstatement to the firm after an illegitimate lay-off and which has been at the centre of the political debate for decades. 7 Reinstatement is instead substituted by monetary compensation increasing with tenure.

About its effectiveness on labour market outcomes, short term evidence is mixed: while according to multiple institutional data sources employment under open ended contracts has increased at the end of 2015 8 , [START_REF] Fana | Labour market reforms in Italy: evaluating the effects of the Jobs Act[END_REF] show that this is mainly due to contract transformation rather than employment creation, contrary to OECD (2015a) forecasts. [START_REF] Fana | Labour market reforms in Italy: evaluating the effects of the Jobs Act[END_REF] also show that more than 40% of new open-ended contracts are part time and guarantee lower monthly wages than old contracts did the year before.

The Jobs act was very much welcomed by Confindustria, the major business association, whose president regarded it as "going towards the right direction" 9 . The employers association has even expelled a firm that wanted to derogate from it and still guarantee the respect of article 18 to newly hired. 10 The three major trade unions have instead criticised it for de facto enhancing precarity 11 and have never been substantially involved in the reform process. Renzi's government, as its predecessors Monti's [START_REF] Culpepper | Why don't government need trade unions anymore? The death of social pacts in Ireland and Italy[END_REF], has clearly adopted a unilateral strategy to implement important reforms:

the Minister of Labour Poletti declared "We will be listening but there will be no negotiation" (December 19th, 2014). 12 Even though Italy is characterised by an overall high level of interest group pluralism [START_REF] Lijphart | Patterns of democracy. Government forms and performance in Thirty-six countries[END_REF], these recent institutional changes challenge some of the findings in the literature of social pacts. The degree of coordination in Italy evolved in a non-linear way: low in the 1960s and part of the 1980s, high levels were achieved in the 1970s, the period of the "political exchange" (Pizzorno in [START_REF] Baccaro | Policy concertation in Europe. Understanding government choice[END_REF] marked by the approval of the Workers' Statute. In the aftermaths of the 1992 crisis Italy seemed to move towards a more neo-corporatist system: to obtain the abolishment of wage indexation and two pension reforms aimed at the reducing public expenditure to access the Euro zone, the "technical" governments in 1992 and 1995 successfully engaged in tripartite negotiations. In 1994, trade unions acted as veto players determining the failure of the confrontational approach adopted by the first Berlusconi government [START_REF] Natali | Europeanization, policy arenas, and creative opportunism: the politics of welfare state reforms in Italy[END_REF]. Then, in the 2000s, informal centralisation of industry and firm level bargaining by peak associations (one side, or only some unions) with or without government participation 13 prevailed while further social pacts became less and less effective [START_REF] Regini | Italy: the uneasy co-existence of different social models[END_REF], until the "Pact for welfare" in 2007, as part of the leftist coalition political strategy. 14 Since then, a tendency towards pluralism seems to emerge despite the presence of the conditions that usually lead to bargaining. High unemployment and pressure to enter the European Monetary Union are among the most important determinants of social pacts [START_REF] Ahlquist | Policy by Contract: electoral cycles, parties and social pacts[END_REF], including the ones implemented in Italy in the 1990s.

Mutatis muntandins, these elements are present during the current crisis but have not led to tripartite bargaining process. The unemployment rate passed from 8.4% in 2011 to 12.2% in 2013 and pressure from the European Union was explicit in the letter addressed by M.Draghi and Trichet to the Prime Minister Berlusconi which contained a series of "essential measures" to be implemented, including decentralisation of the bargaining process and flexibilisation on the labour market.

It is also argued that social pacts arise in the presence of weak governments willing to find consensus in the corporatist arena [START_REF] Baccaro | Policy concertation in Europe. Understanding government choice[END_REF]Baccaro andLing, 2007, Natali, 2004). This argument may not apply to Renzi, whose political strength How could a unilateral strategy be adopted, then? [START_REF] Culpepper | Why don't government need trade unions anymore? The death of social pacts in Ireland and Italy[END_REF] suggest that the collapse of social partnership is due to the weakness of trade unions: they have lost their capacity to mobilize consent ("the carrot") and organize strikes ("the stick") and they have nothing to offer to policy makers. This is certainly an influencing factor and unions' weakening process is a phenomenon that reaches beyond the Italian case.

Nonetheless, between 1970 and 2010 trade union density in Italy has declined by 4%, a negligible extent if compared to France (-64 %) or Germany (-42%), and collective bargaining coverage remained unchanged at 85%. Case study evidence in manufacturing sectors also showed that social partners have maintained their bargaining role at the organisation level [START_REF] Colombo | The reform and impact of joint regulation and labour market policy during the current crisis: Italy[END_REF].

Here we propose a complementary approach that, tries to interpret the Italian pattern of liberalisation as stemming from the political coalition that currently dominates its political economy. A tough unilateral approach towards reforms, instead of engaging in tripartite bargaining, could be explained by the fact that the last three coalition governments are implementing a political strategy that excludes unionised workers [START_REF] Amable | L'économie politique du néolibéralisme[END_REF][START_REF] Häusermann | The decline of the working-class vote, the reconfiguration of the welfare support coalition and consequences for the welfare state[END_REF].

After reviewing the literature on preferences for Labour market institutions, we will present an empirical analysis of the political demand for flexibilisation as expressed in 2011-2013 survey data and interpret the results.

III. On the preferences for labour market reforms

As in other European countries, the progressive flexibilisation of the Italian labour market has originated a segmented system [START_REF] Jackson | The long term trajectories of institutional change in European capitalism[END_REF] rents to the detriment of unemployed15 and highly skilled employees, living under the rules of the flexible outside market. Thus, labour is divided along the lines of both employment status and skill levels. Concerning reforms, Saint-Paul (2000) explains rather their absence as there would be a preference for the status quo and a self-entertaining circle of rents originating constituencies defending those rents. Flexibilisation is thus difficult, even if possible under favourable contingent conditions. For instance, when an economic crisis pushes insiders into unemployment, the outsiders' constituency increases in size and makes flexibilisation politically feasible. [START_REF] Rueda | Insider-outsider politics in industrialized democracies: The challenge to social democratic parties[END_REF]Rueda ( , 2006) ) Regarding the insider/outsider theory, evidence from a French survey on preferences for the introduction of the "contrat de travail unique" (CTU), equivalent of the Jobs act "contratto a tutele crescenti", is mixed. Guillaud and Marx (2014) show that there is no significant cleavage in preferences between employees under open-ended and temporary contracts as claimed by this theory but, consistently with it, unemployed seem to support flexibilisation. Furthermore, being unionised appears to decrease support to the reform. Amable (2014) finds no support among the outsiders for this reform and concludes that this can be attributed to the fact that they might identify themselves with insiders if their chances to eventually get an open ended position are high. Retired and elder skilled employees seem to be supportive as not concerned or confident in their employment perspectives. Ideologically, left-wing voters seem to have a negative opinion on the CTU, as opposed to centre and right wing voters.

The French results offer an interesting insight on the Italian case: in 2013 more than 80% of new employment contracts were short-term ones, making it less probable for the Italian outsiders to identify with insiders even considering their employment perspectives.

Thus, we expect the insiders/outsiders divide to emerge. As in France, we expect age to be a relevant factor as the young experience a particularly difficult employment situation:

in 2013 the employment rate of 15-24 years old was only 16.8% against the average 55.7% and their unemployment rate (almost 30% among 18-29 years old) increased at a higher pace than for the rest of the active population (Ministero del lavoro, 2014).

IV. Empirical analysis

We The question analysed asks 5,414 interviewees to express their agreement or disagreement with this claim: "Firms should have greater freedom to hire and fire".17 Answers range from 1 "I strongly disagree" to 5 "I strongly agree". This question is quite general, as it does not explicitly concern a specific policy measure and not directly policies to loosen employment protection legislation. Nonetheless, it reveals preferences for a change in the status quo and a change towards greater freedom for firms in the labour market.

In the following sections, we first present a descriptive statistics analysis of survey data, then, the results of two sets of models. Drawing from the literature, one set utilises employment status and the second set occupation as main explanatory variables for preferences on labour market flexibilisation. For both sets we compare results from a binary logit model, an ordered logit model and random effects ordered logit model.

IV.I Descriptive statistics

As summarised in Table 1, the statement is overall opposed by on average 53.4% of the respondents disagree while 37.3% are in favour. This is somehow consistent with the unpopularity of the "Jobs act" reform in polls in the press, even if there is a slight increase in agreement through time. As ideology appears to influence preferences on labour market policies (Amable, 2014), we expect the respondents' ideological stands to be even more relevant given the general character of the question analysed. In fact, in Graph 3, we can see the percentage of people that agree or disagree and their self-placement on a political left-right scale. There is a clear cleavage between right and left-wing individuals. Disagreement is greater among people that declare a leftist political ideology, the opposite occurs for people on the centre and right of the spectrum. Furthermore, consensus has increased at the centre and right of the political spectrum while remaining stable at the left.

Graph 3: Left-right self-placement and support for Labour Market liberalisation

The ideological bias is also confirmed if we look at individuals' voting (Graph 4 and 5).

In This party was majorly voted by former centre-left supporters but is attracting an increasing number of voters from the centre-right, as well [START_REF] Bordignon | Five stars and a cricket. Beppe Grillo shakes Italian politics[END_REF].

Increasing flexibility in the labour market appears not only to be unpopular in general, but to face the opposition of the voters of the parties supporting governments that introduced liberal reforms. These policy measures do not please the constituencies of the Democratic Party (PD) supporting both Monti and Renzi's governments and of the centrist ones, Centre Union (Unione Di Centro) and Civic choice (Scelta Civica), the former supporting Monti's government and the latter being the party founded by him. Lastly we turn towards trade union membership. Disagreement is slightly higher among Trade Unions members (67.4%) than average. Since a direct question on membership was only asked in 2013, to analyse trends we look at the following question:

"On 0-10 scale, to what extent to you trust the following institutions? (0 means complete distrusts and 10 complete trust)". 18 People that replied from 6 to 10 are considered as having a positive attitude towards trade unions. Among them agreement is lower than average and slightly increasing.

18 Author's translation from Italian. Descriptive statistics confirm the unpopular character of an increase in business' freedom in the labour market but less controversial in time. Consensus increased in all categories but only self-employed and inactive people majorly support it. The insider-outsider divide does clearly emerge even if our operationalisation of the employment status is limited by the data. They also confirm an ideological bias, as only voters on the right-side of the ideological spectrum appear in favour. The econometric analysis that follows partially confirms these results and let new ones emerge.

IV.II Ordered logit models and results

Support for greater employers' liberty in hiring and firing is analysed in a binary logit model in which the dependent variable takes value 1 for "slightly agree" or "strongly agree" categories, 0 otherwise. We also use ordered logit models, without and with fixed effects.

Drawing from the literature on the insider/outsider divide, we present two sets of models, one using employment status as main independent variable (Table 2) and the other occupations (Table 3).

Employment status operationalised in five categories employed, self-employed, atypical, inactive and, unemployed. The data impose to use a restrictive definition of atypical workers: they include people working with very flexible contracts (Co.co.co. and occasional cooperation) or no contract at all, excluding other types of contracts considered atypical in the Italian system. We also include education levels and we control for age, gender and ideology as expressed by self-positioning on a 10 left-right scale categorised as left (from 0 to 2), centre-left (3 and 4), centre (5), centre-right (6 and 7)

and right (from 8 to 10). Being member of a trade union is also a factor that we need to control for. Lacking this direct information, we use a proxy: a dummy variable that takes value 1 when individuals answer positively to the question "How much trust do you have in Trade Unions?" showing at least some sympathy to their positions.

Lastly, as stressed by the OECD (2015b) in the 2015 Economic survey on Italy, the historical geographical divide has even deepened during the recession. We therefore control for the geographical areas North-West, North-East, Centre and South as defined by the national institute of statistics ISTAT. Empirically, the experience of diverse regional labour markets might lead to geographical clusters of standard errors for which we control for in all models as well.

In ordered to test for the other possible conceptualisation of the insider-outsider divide (Häuserman and Schwander, 2011), we run a second series of models (see TABLE 3) in which we use occupation instead of employment status as explanatory variable. All other controls are maintained.

To exclude multicollinearity among variables, we performed tests on polychoric correlation that allow us to consider the issue not relevant in our case (Table AII in the Appendix).

Results of the models on employment status (Table 2) confirm that being self-employed and inactive significantly influences a positive attitude compared to employees consistently throughout all models. Tuning towards the outsiders, being unemployed is also significant in showing agreement but the result is insignificant using the ordered logit model. Atypical workers do not seem significantly favourable. Because the question does not concern a reform that could reduce dualisation, atypical workers' position is not entirely surprising as they might consider their precarious condition the result of the current level of employers' freedom. This result had to be interpreted with caution as its robustness could be affected by the underrepresentation of this category in the data.

Education levels are significant only when very low and not consistently in all models.

Gender and, more surprisingly, age do not seem to play a role in shaping preferences. As expected, political ideology does influence the answers: compared to leftist, right-wing and centrist people agree with allowing firms greater freedom. Trusting trade unions is also a factor significantly related to disagreement. Geographical areas seem to influence preferences: people in North-Eastern Italy show support to a more flexible labour market as opposed to the Centre and the South. This is result is not surprising as North-Eastern regions are highly industrialised and host mainly micro, small and medium enterprises, in 3 shows the results of the models which include professional categories instead of employment status to explain preferences. Consistently with the insider-outsider theory, the "upscale class" [START_REF] Rueda | Insider-outsider politics in industrialized democracies: The challenge to social democratic parties[END_REF] composed of managers are in favour of greater dismissal flexibility and so are craft and shop owners. Professionals and clerical workers also show significant support in the ordered logit models. Education seems to have an inverse relation with support as higher educated groups tend to show disagreement. The other results are the same as in the first set of models.

V.

Flexibilising the labour market from the left: an actual paradox?

From the political supply side, in order to draw some conclusions on the political strategy adopted by the last three governments and particularly Monti's and Renzi's, it is necessary to look a posteriori at all measures adopted in a much more global manner. From the political demand side, voting behaviour is certainly not determined by one single policy measure. Here we focused one issue only, the flexibilisation of labour market, and the data only allows analysing general preferences for a change in the current situation but not for the specific reforms introduced. Nonetheless, despite being partial, the results obtained have some elements of interest.

Even if voters of the main parties members of the coalition in office, the Democratic Party (PD) and Civic Choice (SC), are ideologically opposed to greater dismissal flexibility, interestingly, the socio-professional categories that agree with this proposal coincide with the social groups the most relevant among respective voters in 2013.

In fact, [START_REF] Diamanti | Un salto nel voto. Ritratto politico dell'Italia di oggi[END_REF] presents an analysis based on original data of the Italian's voting behaviour during the last elections and shows that demographically, PD is gaining consensus particularly among seniors between 55 and 64 and over 65 years old where they gather 6.3 and almost 12 points more votes than in the whole population.

Consistently, the socio-professional category the most represented in its constituency is composed of retired people followed by a wider category that includes managers and Movement to occupy the left side of the political offer [START_REF] Conti | Come cambiano le priorità politiche dei partiti[END_REF]. In this framework and limited to this specific policy measure it could be strategic for the incumbent coalition to please the "upscale" group, as growing component of the main parties' constituencies. This is also in line with a stream of literature that has argued for an increasing loosening of the relationship between left wing parties and the working class in Western democracies (Boyer, 2010, Häusermann and[START_REF] Häusermann | The decline of the working-class vote, the reconfiguration of the welfare support coalition and consequences for the welfare state[END_REF].

Our findings are certainly only a hint that at least in the field of employment protection legislation, the last governement coalitions are moving towards a strategy that could be consistent with the emergence of a "bloc bourgeois" as argued by [START_REF] Amable | L'économie politique du néolibéralisme[END_REF].

The centrist alliance that has supported the last three governments could have in fact strategically chosen to please the declared interests of big firms and the highest strata of society, excluding the interests of unionised manual workers. These social groups have gained strength in the respective constituency of the main incumbent parties, including the democratic one. If this new socio-political configuration is really emerging in Italy it is certainly too soon to say and goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, our findings are consistent with this hypothesis.

VI. Conclusions

This paper is an attempt to provide some insight on the progressive flexibilisation of the labour market that Italy has recently experienced. The last three governements, and in particularly Monti's and Renzi's, have reduced employment protection engaging in unilateral reforms that were warmly welcomed by the major business association and opposed by trade unions. The fact that coalition governments that heavily rely on the support of a centre-left party might seem paradoxical as socialist parties are usually considered the insiders' defendant [START_REF] Rueda | Insider-outsider politics in industrialized democracies: The challenge to social democratic parties[END_REF].

Through an analysis of survey data on increasing firms' freedom to hire and dismiss, we

  creating an insider outsider divide that could translate into divergent political preferences. The insider-outsider theory stems back from Doeringer and Piore (1971) who distinguished the internal labour market from the external and competitive labour market, based on the rigidity of pricing and allocation of labour rules. Skill specificity and on-thejob training would in fact make turn over costly and create the incentive for more rigid rules defining the internal labour market. According to Saint-Paul (2000) not only this microeconomic frictions but also rigid market institutions allow insiders to benefit from Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23

  also suggests that the insiders/outsiders divide shape preferences for active labour market policies (ALMP) and employment protection (EPL). The upscale class, mainly self-employed and managers, should oppose both labour market policies.Insiders, employed with full-time open-ended contracts or voluntarily with part-time or short term contracts, should be against ALMP and for EPL whilst outsiders, including unemployed, involuntarily part-time and short-term workers and students, would see in a reduction of EPL and increase in ALMP a chance to exit unemployment or precarious employment. Furthermore, about Italy[START_REF] Thelen | Varieties of liberalization and the new politics of social solidarity[END_REF] argues that the allocation of greater resources to short-time work policies rather than active labour market policies would be the signal of a relative strength of the insiders compared to the outsiders.Instead of relying on the employment status, Häuserman and Schwander (2011) advance an alternative conceptualisation of this divide based on occupation and social class rather than employment status at a specific point in time. They argue that this more subtle conceptualization of the insider-outsider status better explains individual preferences for different welfare policies.

  use data from the ITANES inter-electoral survey from 2011 to 2013 16 . It covers 5,414 individuals interviewed via telephone through the CATI system. The panel was collected in five waves. Four waves include the question of interest: February-March 2011, May-June 2012, January-February 2013 and March 2013. The last wave does not include socio-economic questions and had to be excluded from the econometric analysis.

  both 2008 and 2013 elections, only voters of the right wing parties Norhern League and Berlusconi's People of Freedom are majorly in favour. In 2013 though, the relation between the left-right placement of the chosen party and the distribution of preferences became less of a linear one with the emergence of the third pole Five Stars Movement.

  bureaucrats and, lastly, professionals. Conversely, blue collars and unemployed decreasingly vote for PD to the benefit of the 5 Stars Movement for which they represent two major components of its constituency.19 Retired, professionals and managers are also part of the categories that reveal a positive attitude towards labour market flexibilisation in our analysis. Turning towards the second component of the current majoritarian coalition in office, Civic Choice led by Monti, the picture looks quite similar as retired, managers and professionals also vote more for the centrist parties than the national average.Contrary to what[START_REF] Rueda | Insider-outsider politics in industrialized democracies: The challenge to social democratic parties[END_REF] hypothesised, a government led by a socialist party might reduce employment protection legislation, at least in the particular context of contemporary Italy. The ideological distance between the Democratic Party and the centrist parties seem to have reduced leaving room to the opposition party 5 Stars

Table

  analysed individuals' preferences for employment protection reduction. As expected according to insiders/outsiders theory self-employed and inactive are favourable to this Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -20162014 (Jobs act): single open-ended contract with protection increasing with tenure; abolition of some atypical contracts; looser rules on jobs paid via hourly vouchers; deregulation of individual dismissals; reform of unemployment benefits and ALMP. Source: Sacchi (2013) and http://goo.gl/PNim9K Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23

TABLE 1 : Distribution of answers to "Firms should have greater freedom to hire and fire"

 1

	Waves	Dates	Government Disagree	Agree
	1	February-March 2011	Berlusconi	55.51%	44.49%
	3	May-June 2012	Monti	53.09%	46.91%
	4	January-February 2013	Monti/Letta 51.29%	48.71%
	5	March 2013	Monti/Letta 53.84%	46.16%
	Average			53.43%	46.57%

Concerning the distribution of preferences over employment status, data do not allow do disentangle part-time and full-time employees or workers bound by open-ended or shortterm contracts. We therefore look at self-employed, employees, inactive and unemployed respectively. In Graph 1.1, we can see that the self-employed are the only category that shows an overall positive attitude towards greater dismissal freedom. Inactive people, mainly composed of retired people and housewives, are split in half with a slightly prevalent negative attitude. Both unemployed and employed individuals express a negative opinion. In line with

[START_REF] Rueda | Insider-outsider politics in industrialized democracies: The challenge to social democratic parties[END_REF]

, the self-employed or "upscale" group, are in favour, whilst in contrast with the insider-outsider theory outsiders do not show support for greater flexibilisation. Disagreement is less widespread among unemployed but the majority of them oppose greater flexibilisation. majority of professionals, clerical workers, technicians and manual workers are instead against. Graph 2.2 shows that support has increased through time among professionals, managers, craft workers, clerical workers and manual workers. It has decreased among technicians and services workers. Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23 Graph 1.

1: Employment status and agreement on Labour Market flexibilisation: averages Graph 1.2: Employment status and support for Labour Market flexibilisation: trends

	60,00%
	50,00%
	40,00%
			Self-employed
	30,00%		Inactive
			Unemployed
	20,00%		Employed
	10,00%
	0,00%
		Agree
	70,00%
	60,00%
	50,00%
			Self-employed
	40,00%		Inactive
			Unemployed
	30,00%
	20,00%
	10,00%
	February-March 2011	May-June 2012	January-February 2013

Employed Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23 Graph 2.1

: Occupation and support for Labour Market flexibilisation: averages Graph 2.2: Occupation and support for Labour Market flexibilisation: trends

Trust in Trade Unions and support for Labour Market Liberalisation

	90,0%
	80,0%
	70,0%
	60,0%
	50,0%					Agree
	40,0%					Disagree
	30,0%
	20,0%
	10,0%
	0,0%
	SinArc	PD	IDV	UDC	PDL	LN
	80,00%
	70,00%
	60,00%
	50,00%
	40,00%
	30,00%
	20,00%
	10,00%
	0,00%
	M5S	PD	SC		PDL	LN

Agree Disagree Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23 Graph 6:

TABLE 2 : Estimation results of logit models with employment status

 2 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23 which employees could more likely have preferences closer to their employers' (Amable et al. 2014). p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23

		Binary Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit RE
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Employment status
	(ref. employed)
	Self-employed	0.738***	0.690***	0.956***
		(0.0842)	(0.0962)	(0.126)
	Atypical	0.148	0.0841	0.220
		(0.315)	(0.266)	(0.286)
	Inactive	0.448***	0.358***	0.481***
		(0.0683)	(0.0536)	(0.0519)
	Unemployed	0.288**	0.207	0.361**
		(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.151)
	Education level (ref: Middle
	School)
	Elementary or lower	0.194***	0.0733*	0.0980
		(0.0528)	(0.0402)	(0.0789)
	Professional degree	-0.0132	-0.0302	-0.0208
		(0.0226)	(0.0436)	(0.0692)
	Technical High School	-0.139**	-0.113	-0.104
		(0.0678)	(0.0793)	(0.125)
	High School Diploma	-0.0840	-0.0239	-0.000376
		(0.130)	(0.111)	(0.131)
	University Degree	-0.00260	0.0188	0.0513
		(0.0576)	(0.0849)	(0.107)
	Ideology (ref: Left)
	Centre-Left	0.271***	0.384***	0.469***
		(0.0961)	(0.0654)	(0.0793)
	Centre	0.935***	0.987***	1.133***
		(0.151)	(0.176)	(0.203)
	Centre-Right	1.215***	1.313***	1.462***
		(0.108)	(0.144)	(0.216)
	Right	1.640***	1.671***	1.930***
		(0.160)	(0.190)	(0.234)
	Does not know	0.704***	0.839***	1.044***
		(0.0673)	(0.0271)	(0.0665)
	No answer	0.706***	0.817***	1.081***
		(0.159)	(0.140)	(0.218)
	Trust Unions	-0.431***	-0.428***	-0.504***
		(0.135)	(0.122)	(0.148)
	Geographic area (ref. North-
	West)
	North-East	0.101***	0.0556***	0.00773
		(0.00553)	(0.00749)	(0.00634)
	Centre	-0.0361***	-0.0111	-0.0778***
		(0.0105)	(0.00809)	(0.00889)
	South	-0.122***	-0.0273**	-0.0931***
		(0.0123)	(0.0108)	(0.0115)
	Female	-0.0293	-0.0234	-0.0220
		(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.135)
	Age	0.00147	0.00301	0.00380
		(0.00158)	(0.00271)	(0.00307)
	Wave	0.157***	0.158***	0.216***
		(0.0136)	(0.0119)	(0.0147)
	Number of Obs	5336	5557	5557
	Pseudo R2	0.0708	0.0409
	Wald Chi2	.	.	.
	Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

*

TABLE 3 : Estimation results of probit models with occupation

 3

		Binary Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit RE
		Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Occupation (ref. Manual
	workers)
	Managers	0.519***	0.652***	0.971***
		(0.0898)	(0.0425)	(0.122)
	Professionals	0.357	0.491***	0.653**
		(0.245)	(0.180)	(0.260)
	Technicians	0.160*	0.271***	0.407***
		(0.0881)	(0.0591)	(0.101)
	Clerical workers	0.168	0.240*	0.330**
		(0.151)	(0.131)	(0.161)
	Sales Workers	0.498**	0.515**	0.809***
		(0.216)	(0.214)	(0.228)
	Craft workers	0.754***	0.833***	1.192***
		(0.291)	(0.323)	(0.451)
	Education level (ref:
	Middle School)
	Elementary or lower	0.245***	0.118**	0.165*
		(0.0519)	(0.0547)	(0.0878)
	Professional degree	-0.0689***	-0.0832*	-0.0890
		(0.0236)	(0.0438)	(0.0686)
	Technical High School	-0.237***	-0.204***	-0.229***
		(0.0639)	(0.0601)	(0.0784)
	High School Diploma	-0.159	-0.108	-0.118
		(0.122)	(0.115)	(0.114)
	University Degree	-0.162**	-0.157**	-0.184**
		(0.0826)	(0.0694)	(0.0938)
	Ideology (ref: Left)
	Centre-Left	0.272***	0.383***	0.463***
		(0.102)	(0.0679)	(0.0821)
	Centre	0.926***	0.987***	1.130***
		(0.153)	(0.176)	(0.200)
	Centre-Right	1.210***	1.313***	1.458***
		(0.111)	(0.145)	(0.212)
	Right	1.647***	1.685***	1.943***
		(0.163)	(0.188)	(0.237)
	Does not know	0.701***	0.857***	1.059***
		(0.0540)	(0.0381)	(0.0665)
	No answer	0.838***	0.902***	1.132***
		(0.144)	(0.114)	(0.161)
	Trust Unions	-0.408***	-0.403***	-0.487***
		(0.138)	(0.127)	(0.152)
	Geographic area (ref.
	North-West)
	North-east	0.111***	0.0629***	0.0199**
		(0.00449)	(0.00850)	(0.00776)
	Centre	-0.0484***	-0.0327***	-0.0975***
		(0.0134)	(0.00904)	(0.0121)
	South	-0.114***	-0.0316*	-0.0921***
		(0.0198)	(0.0174)	(0.0168)
	Female	-0.0424	-0.0460	-0.0572
		(0.110)	(0.105)	(0.138)
	Age	0.00232	0.00385	0.00427
		(0.00214)	(0.00338)	(0.00286)
	Wave	0.149***	0.150***	0.211***
		(0.0132)	(0.0116)	(0.0159)
	Number of Obs	5336	5557	5557
	Pseudo R2	0.0674	0.0407
	Wald Chi2	.	.	.
	Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23

TABLE

Published on Corriere della Sera, Novemebr, 23rd, 2014. Accessed at: http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/GestioneDomande.aspx

Retrieved from: http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/GestioneDomande.aspx Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23

InSaint-Paul's (2000) framework unvoluntary unemployement would not exist in a perfectly competitive labour market, in line with neoclassical economic theory. Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de laSorbonne -2016.23

Source http://www.itanes.org/

Original question: "Le leggerò ora alcune affermazioni su politica ed economia che vengono fatte correntemente. Mi dica per ognuna se lei è per niente, poco, abbastanza o molto d'accordo: Le imprese dovrebbero essere lasciate più libere di assumere e licenziare". Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23

Similar results can be found in D'Alimonte (2013). Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.23

measure compared to employees. Outsiders as unemployed and atypical workers show some support is not always significant throughout the econometrics analysis. In terms of occupation, managers show a positive attitude along with self-employed owning their shops or craft businesses. Feeling some closeness to trade unions and being to left of the ideological spectrum increases chances of taking a negative stand on the statement. Lastly, support is stronger in the industrialised North-Eastern regions of the country.

Despite the apparent paradox that this kind of measure do not seem to encounter the favour of voters of two of the main incumbent parties, PD and SC, there is an interesting convergence among the social groups that support this measures and the ones that are gaining more strength within the respective constituencies.

This could be a sign of a political strategy that seeks support from a new social bloc that excludes unionised workers and includes the interests of big firms and higher strata of society as advance in [START_REF] Amable | L'économie politique du néolibéralisme[END_REF], at least in this specific policy domain.

Further research should look in a more encompassing way at the incumbent's global political strategy in other policy domains. -2012-2013/art.-8-l.-148-2011.pdf

APPENDIX Table AI: Recent reforms in the