Tostain Manuel
email: manuel.tostain@unicaen.fr

M Anuel Tostain

Should We Have Done with Gender Stereotypes? A Critical Re

We examine a tendency, dominant in the social psychology of relations between the sexes, to focus on gender stereotypes that affect individuals, and to privilege a reading in terms of masculine domination in order to account for them. Through a critical analysis of well-known works in this field, we seek to show that this orientation is usually associated with an overestimation of the impact of gender stereotypes and leads to a partial, and even partisan, vision of the dynamics between the sexes. In reviewing this question, we hope to contribute to a debate on the way in which social psychology often envisages relations between the sexes, and which we believe to be problematic.

Introduction

The objective of this article is to assess the significance of a predominant tendency in social psychology, in the context of strategies for the reduction of inequalities between men and women, to focus on the impact of gender stereotypes 1 that affect individuals, and to privilege an interpretation in terms of masculine domination 2 in order to account for them. 3

1 By gender stereot ype, we underst and traits and behaviors expected of and valori zed for the members of a group of the given sex. If st ereotypes are the result of soci al construction (and in this sense, observing the terminologi cal conventions of t he discipline, refer to gender, with sex being inst ead associ ated with the bi ologi cal di mensi on), then from the poi nt of view of i ndi viduals, these stereot ypes target and affect them above all because they are perceived as bel onging to either the masculi ne or the feminine biologi cal sex. (For a discussi on of the problems posed by this distinction between sex and gender, see Hel ena Hirat a, Françoise Labori e, Hél ène Le Doaré, and Dani èle Senoti er, Dictionnaire critique du fémi nisme [Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000]; Irène Théry, La distinction de sexe: une nouvelle approche de l'égalit é [Paris: Odile Jacob, 2007]). As is conventional, we will speak of the feminine group to designat e girls and women, and of t he masculine group to designat e boys and men. We place femi nine and masculine in scare-quot es when we are not deali ng directly with the sex of indivi duals but with socially construct ed dimensions associat ed, stereot ypi cally, with one or the other sex group: so-called " feminine" or " masculine" traits, for example.

2 By masculine domination we understand the principle according to which men tend to consider themselves superior to women and, in the framework of their will to dominate over women, have at their disposal a material and symbolic power which limits the behavior and thoughts of women, who, for the most part, through alienation by the man's point of view, do not challenge this power. Theories of masculine domination consider that this principle is present in all societies, whether traditional or modern (Pierre Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, trans. Richard Nice [Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002]). 3 For exampl e Peter Glick and Susan T. Fiske, "The ambival ent sexism inventory: Differenti ating hostile and benevol ent sexism," Journal of Personality and Soci al Psychol ogy 70, no. 3 (1996): 491-512; John T. Jost and M ahzarin R. Banaji, "The rol e of st ereotypi ng in syst em justi fi cation and the Our argument here is that gender stereotypes, together with a reading in terms of masculine domination, pose four types of problems. Firstly, such an analysis brings with it biases which encourage an overestimation of the weight and the effects of gender stereotypes. Secondly, this analysis situates itself within what seems to us too deterministic and mechanistic a vision of the relation between individual and society, one which in particular is neglectful of the dynamics of individuals qua autonomous actors cap able of making decisions about their own lives. Thirdly, this analysis fuels a partial, or even partisan, view of the reality of relations between women and men scarcely capable of taking account of contemporary social developments and, in particular, of the social and psychological heterogeneity of feminine and masculine groups. Finally, such an analysis may turn out to be parado xically counterproductive in the struggle against inequality between women and men. Discourses couched in terms of masculine domination, which are widespread in certain policies in favor of equality, can arouse feelings of incomprehension in individuals insofar as they regard them as failing to recogniz e the way in which, in everyday life, as far as they are able, they promote equality between women and men. Thus, since they do not recogniz e themselves in this discourse or in the negative images of themselves that it presents, there is a risk that they may end up distancing themselves from policies of equality, or may not feel they are the ones being addressed and therefore become less engaged with these issues. In the course of this article we look successively at the presence of production of fal se-consci ousness," British Journal of Social Psychol ogy 33 (1994) evaluative biases linked to sex, the threat of gender stereotyping, the validity of the procedures that measure adhesion to gender stereotypes, and sexism and the supposed links between gender stereotypes and discriminatory behavior. Finally, we end with a critical discussion of the basic postulates that very often accompany studies of gender stereotypes. But before beginning, let us state that for us this is not a matter of denying that gender stereotypes, whether through exp licit or unconscious mechanisms, can have negative effects and that in this sense it is quite valid to study them. 4 Nevertheless, as we aim to demonstrate, what is questionable is the general presence of these gender stereotypes and the magnitude of their negative effects.

Contributions of Social Psychology to the Struggle Against Gender Stereotypes and

Everyday Sexism

Social psychology, drawing on a long tradition of research on stereotypes (implicit personality theory, beliefs about certain categories of people or groups) and prejudices (attitudes, whether positive or negative, in regard to these categories), has resolutely taken up the question of stereotypes, particularly gender stereotypes, and their effects. 5 The aim is a legitimate one, and the underlying agenda calls for Fiske, and G. Lindzey (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 357-411; Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1922). advances on theoretical, methodological, and practical planes. At the level of the struggle against gender discrimination, then, social psychology and its works are leading the way. 6 But what is being put forward, in fact? What are the underlying postulates? Is there any correspondence between the results of exp erimental research pursued within the framework of theories of domination, and phenomena observed in the "natural" social milieu?

Three Examples of Typical Research Studies on the Effects of Gender Stereotypes

We will begin by presenting three social psychology research studies that are typical of a certain way of thinkin g about differences between the sexes. Of course, this is an arbitrary choice given the dozens of studies that have been published on the question. Our choice of these three owes to the fact that each of them is heavily referenced in manuals of social psychology, in research, and in campaigns for awareness of discrimination based on gender stereotypes. In this sense, they can claim to be part of a certain common culture both within and beyond social psychology. 7 The message conveyed by these studies aims to alert us to the alterations and deformations of the perception of reality inflicted upon us by our gender preconceptions and stereotypes and, in particular, to highlight the insidious effects of a certain masculine domination.

6 For example, one could consult Pascal Tisserant's and Richard Bourhis's " Discriminations and the management of equality and diversity" on the website Canal U, or the French Ministry of Social Affairs, Health and Women's Rights site femmes.gouv. fr. Interestingly, owing to their popularity, these studies have been replicated by further studies; these replications are not so often referenced, but their results give us an image of the relations between the sexes quite different from the initial message conveyed by the original studies.

The John and Sandra Condry Study (1976)

In this study, a group of students, male and female, were shown a video of a ninemonth-old baby's emotional reactions when shown different toys. 8 In the exp eriment, different groups of subjects were told that the same baby was a girl ("Dana") or a boy ("David"). Subsequently, the subjects had to describe the child's reactions using an emotion attribution scale and Osgood's semantic differential scale. 9 The results showed that when the baby was believed to be a boy, it was perceived as more active, more "potent," and was seen to exp ress more anger and less fear, than when it was believed to be a girl. From this study it is concluded that individuals are influenced by very traditional gender stereotypes (forcefulness and activeness for the boy versus relative passivity and timid emotions for the girl), a simple arbitrary labeling of the sex of the child being enough to bring them into play and to modify the subjects' perception of reality. Let us remark straight away that these effects of labeling linked to sex are far from systematic. In 1989, Stern and Karraker, having analyzed 23 studies on the subject, noted that only 18% of the effects of labeling measured in 8 John Condry and Sandra Condry, "Sex differences: A study of the eye of the behol der," Child Development 47 (1976): 812-19. these studies were significant. Consequently, since the Condry and Condry study dates from 1976, one might well ask whether this type of phenomenon is still in effect today, given social developments since that time and the contemporary tendency toward a greater equality between the sexes. A recent study conducted by Steuer, Bode, Rada and Hittner suggests that in fact this is not the case. 10 They replicated the Condry study with almost exactly the same procedure as in the original. Now, they did not observe any effect of this gender labeling on the perceptions of the subjects: whether the baby was labeled boy or girl, both women and men perceived it similarly.

There is nevertheless an interesting effect noted in the Steuer et al Study: the women insist more on the child's fear, the men on his/her anger-denoting a somewhat different sensitivity on the part of the two sexes. 11

The Kay Deaux and Tim Emswiller Study (1974) In this study, male and female students were presented with recordings of men and women attempting to accurately identify objects with a "masculine" connotation (for example, a car jack) or a "feminine" one (for example, a mop [sic]). 12 Given the role of evaluators, the students had to indicate the extent to which the performances of the men and women were a matter of chance or ability. For male and female students 12 Kay Deaux and Tim Emswiller, " Explanation of successful performance on sex-linked tasks: What is skill for the mal e is luck for the femal e," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 29, no. 1 (1974), 80-85. alike, the results showed that the success of the task with a "masculine" connotation was more likely to be attributed to ability when it was carried out by a man than when it was carried out by a woman, whereas the success of the task with a "feminine" connotation was just as likely to be attributed to ability whether it was carried out by a man or a woman. In other words, there was no symmetry in the evaluations: men were evaluated higher than women in the "masculine" domain, but seen as equivalent to woman in the "feminine" domain. M oreover-an important fact-in so far as there was no effect of sex in the evaluators themselves (both male and female students responded in the same way), this asymmetry in favor of men seemed to be internaliz ed by women themselves, who, therefore, would be adversely affected by it.

These results are interpreted as owing to the higher status and dominance of men in society. But as if this were not enough, when the exp eriment is reported this phenomenon is further accentuated: specifically, it is said that the study shows that the success of a performance of a man is exp lained by ability, that of a woman by chance, 13 which is an over-interpretation of what is actually observed in the exp eriment. Thus preconceptions sometimes influence researchers too. 14 This having 13 For example, Jean-B aptiste Légal and Sylvai n Delouvée, Stéréot ypes, préj ugés et discriminations (Paris: Dunod, 2008). 14 In defense of the comment ators on this experiment, it must be sai d that this exaggeration is already found in the title of Deaux and Emswiller's articl e itsel f. More generally, as far as bias linked t o researchers' preconceptions is concerned, we know that, even in a rigorous experimental framework, these preconceptions can affect the results (Martin T. Orne, " On the soci al psychology of t he psychological experiment: With particular reference to demand charact eristics and their implications, " Ameri can Psychologist 17, no. 11 [1962]: 776-82; Henry W. Riecken, " A program for research on experiments in social psychol ogy," in Decisions, Values and Groups, ed. N.F. Washburne [Oxford: Pergamon, 1962], 25-41; Robert Rosenthal, "The effect of the experiment er on the results of the been said, it should be mentioned that, from the beginning of the 1980s, various studies on this question of the attribution of ability have failed to reproduce these results, and have sometimes even obtained the inverse results: more ability attributed to women than to men. 15 In 1981, Post showed that this negative asymmetrical effect on the part of women depends particularly on political orientation: for example, "liberal" women (in the American sense of "open-minded on moral matters"), unlike conservative women, do not manifest this bias. 16 Finally, a meta-analysis by Swim and Sanna in 1996 concluded that these effects of attribution linked to the sex of the subjects are generally weak. 17 Along the same lines, let us mention that the results of Goldberg's oft-cited 1968 study, showing that when women subjects believe an article to have been written by a woman, they evaluate it less favorably than when they believe it to have been written by a man, were quickly called into question. 18 In 1975, Levenson, Burford, Bonno and Davis, who replicated this study on both a female and a male population, did not observe this bias: the sex of the author did not affect its evaluation, or, when it did, the articles believed to have been written by women were evaluated more favorably. 19 Swim et al's 1989 synthesis confirmed this absence of bias. 20 Furthermore, in 1991 a synthesis by Eagly, M ladinic, and Otto revealed that women, in terms of p ersonality traits and the social desirability of these traits, are generally better evaluated than men, by women as well as men-which they call the "Wonderful Women Effect." 21The "Wonderful Women Effect" can be explained by the fact that positive characteristics (such as care for others and sensitivity) are seen as more frequent in women than in men and that, inversely, negative characteristics (such as aggression or egotism) are perceived as more frequent in the latter than in the former. 22 18 Philip Goldberg, " Are women prejudiced against women?" Trans-Action 5, no. 5 (1968): 28-30. 19 Hanna Levenson, Brent Burford, Bobbi e Bonno, and Loren Davis, " Are women still prejudi ced against women? A replication and ext ension of Gol dberg's study," The Journal of Psychol ogy 89, no. 1 (1975): 67-71. 20

Swim et al, " Joan McKay versus John McKay."

21 Alice H. Eagl y and Antonio Mladi nic, " Are people prejudiced against women? Some answers from research on attitudes, gender stereotypes, and judgments of compet ence, " in European Review of Social Psychology 5, ed. W. Stroebe and M. Hewstone (London: Wiley, 1994): 1-35.

22 Carol Gilligan, Une si grande différence (Paris: Flammari on, 1986). Let us point out that this bi as in favor of women was veri fi ed using procedures in which the eval uati on of femi nine and masculine

To end these studies on stereotypes, we will present one last piece of French research, used widely in promoting awareness of gender stereotypes, and which poses the question of the extent to which the phenomena observed under laboratory conditions pertain to social reality.

(Gender) Stereotype Threat

We have long known that being a part of a group that is the target of negative stereotypes can have deleterious effects on performance. 23 This is what Steele and Aronson designate with the notion of "stereotype threat," where fear of confirming a stereotype, even when it is known to be unfounded, by causing tension and additional mental stress, ultimately leads the subject who is the victim of the stereotype to confirm it. 24 Let us specify that this threat is particularly manifested in situations of targets was realized separat ely and by di fferent subjects (between-subj ect design), in order to avoi d biases of social desirability. Indeed, we know that, when targets of both sexes are evaluat ed by the same subjects (within-subj ect desi gn), the subj ects, in trying not to gi ve the impression of stigmati zing the femini ne target, whose group may suffer inequalities, may be led to eval uate her better than the masculine target. confrontation between groups, where stereotypes become more prominent. Let us also signal a certain misunderstanding that is to be avoided. The studies on stereotype threat do not show that negative stereotypes in themselves exp lain the inferior results of the individuals who belong to the stereotyped groups. 25 What these studies bring to light is that negative stereotypes add extra difficulties for the disadvantaged group; but the root causes are principally a matter of the social conditions of the individuals belonging to these groups. When social conditions between social groups initially of a different status are equalized, when the environment or the context are more egalitarian, the differences of performance between these groups tend to disappear, with stereotype threat thus playing less of a role. 26 At the level of gender stereotypes, Pascal Huguet and Isabelle Régner 27 revealed a phenomenon similar to that studied by Steele and Aronson. 28 In their studies, they aimed to study the effects of the negative stereotype according to which girls are inferior to boys at mathematics, the threat of this stereotype explaining in part why young girls obtain worse results than boys in the subject, and why they are less likely to pursue scientific careers. 29 In this context, they had French schoolboys and girls in mixed groups take a test that was supposed either to measure their ability in geometry (which would implicitly bring into play the negative stereotype for girls), or to gauge their memory or their cap acity for drawing (aspects supposed not to be the subject of gender stereotyping). In confirmation of the hypothesis, girls scored lower than boys when the test was associated with the negative stereotype (geometry). On the contrary, they scored higher than boys when the test was not associated with this stereotype (memory test or drawing), a finding that is not wholly exp lained. Thus, if we take just the results in geometry, this study showed, in a mixed situation, the negative effects of a gender stereotype on the performances of girls. As far as the stereotype threat linked to mathematics is concerned, it must however be noted that a recent meta-analysis bearing on thirty-one published studies and completed by three exp eriments on 931 American pupils aged from 9 to 17, concluded that there was no stereotypi c beliefs in math do not protect school girls from stereot ype threat," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (2009): 1024-27.

28 " Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans." 29 For a synthetic work foregrounding the effect of gender stereotype threat, see Isabelle Régner, Jenni fer R. Steele, Nalini Ambady, Cat herine Thinus-Blanc, and Pascal Huguet, " Our fut ure sci entists: a review of stereotype threat in girls from early el ementary school to middle school," Revue internationale de psychologi e sociale 27, no. 3 (2014): 13-51. significant effect of stereotype threat. 30 M oreover, are these negative effects necessarily present in real life at the level of school results? In order to conclude that stereotype threat is in effect, one would have to observe a minima that in the context of mixed boy/girl schools, girls do indeed achieve lower than boys in mathematics.

But in fact this is not the case. In the US, a meta-analysis by Lindberg, Hyde, Petersen and Lim has shown that girls and boys perform similarly in the subject. 31 This is also true in France, where the 2013 M inistry of National Education statistics reveal that overall girls achieve an equivalent level to that of boys in mathematics. Let us add that in the scientific baccalaureate par excellence, the "bac S," where they represent 45% of candidates, girls even tend to achieve better results than boys. One might therefore wonder about the presence and significance of a stereotype threat whose effects in exp erimental studies are not borne out when one puts it to the test of real situations of mixed schooling. An observation which suggests that, in information campaigns for gender equality, rather than concentrating on the threat of a stereotype whose reality is arguable, we might be better off challenging certain received ideas by highlighting this result: girls are just as good as boys at mathematics. Indeed, recent studies have revealed some paradoxical effects linked to the omnipresence of the discourse alerting us to the dangers of this kind of stereotype. 32 For example, in his 30 Colleen M. Ganl ey, Leigh A. Mingle, Allison M. Ryan, Kat heri ne R yan, Mari na Vasilyeva, and Michelle Perry, " An exami nation of st ereotype threat effects on girls' mathemati cs performance, " Developmental Psychology 49, no. 10 (2013): 1886-97. 31 Sarah M. Lindberg, Janet S. Hyde, Jenni fer L. Petersen, and Marcia C. Linn, " New trends in gender and mathematics performance: A meta-analysis," Psychological Bulletin 136, no. 6 (2010): 1123-35. 32 Thomas Breda and Son T. Ly, "Professors in core sci ence fiel ds are not always bi ased against women: Evidence from France," Paris School of Economics-CNRS (2014): 1-40. study of 3,964 French sixth grade schoolgirls and boys, Terrier observes that mathematics teachers unconsciously mark girls more generously than boys (and this when standardized and anonymous marking-without knowing the sex of the student-reveals equivalent achievement for girls and boys). 33 These teachers therefore practice discrimination in favor of girls, perhaps from fear of being the involuntary agents of the widespread notion that girls are at a disadvantage in relation to boys in scientific disciplines. In other words, the stereotype "girls are not as good at mathematics" here seems to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, but in the opposite direction to which such prophecies are usually understood and expected to operate.

Furthermore, let us recall that, contrary to what certain works on stereotype threat tend to suggest, individuals do not necessarily fall victim to such a threat. When women are exp licitly (and not implicitly, as in most studies on stereotype threat) presented with a negative stereotype about their group (for example, by saying that they are worse negotiators than men), their performance does not get worse but, on the contrary, improves. 34 This result can be explained in terms of reactance, or as the reaction to a feeling of injustice: women mobilize their cognitive resources in order to challenge a stereotype that fixes them in a negative identity. What is more, one might 33 Camille Terri er, " Giving a little help t o girls? Evidence on grade discrimination and its effects on students' achievement," Paris School of Economics-CNRS 36 (2014): 1-41. observe that when women are placed in situations of mastery and autonomy, this kind of stereotype threat also fades away. 35 Ultimately, the message of the original studies outlined above, which are found in many current manuals of social psychology, is that we are the victims of gender stereotypes. Certainly, there is no doubt that negative effects of gender stereotypes are common, yet the message in this form is eminently disputable. As will have been noted, the data issuing both from certain replications of the studies and from social practices in the "natural" milieu do not always corroborate this assertion-far from it.

In this sense, to explain certain differences in behavior between girls and boys solely by way of gender stereotypes seems to us reductive, as is the case when one cites differences in the choice of subject options between them. Although it is true that girls are less likely to take up scientific subjects, it must be added that boys are also taking them up less, and that there is a general decline in numbers for these subjects. This means that what is in play here is not solely a question of gender stereotypes, but also a decline in the social desirability of the subjects in question. It must be added that this loss of interest on the part of young girls only applies to certain specific scientific subjects (physics, fundamental chemistry) and that they are more numerous than boys in other scientific subjects (biology, medicine)-which sits badly with a reading in terms of gender stereotypes unless we consider that the latter subjects are not scientific, or that there is still a categorization of these subjects into feminine and masculine. But even in the latter hypothesis, we see that the potential for girls to engage in scientific subjects has broadened considerably. 35 Katie J. Van Loo and Robert J. Rydell, "On the experience of feeling powerful: Perceived power moderat es the effect of st ereotype threat on women's math performance," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39, no. 3 (2013): 387-400.

At this stage, one might wonder about the external validity of the results of the exp erimental studies often carried out in laboratory conditions-that is, the extent to which they can be generalized into "real" life. In parallel with the conducting of such exp eriments, shouldn't we make sure that the mechanisms studied actually correspond to phenomena observed at the level of social practices?

Having said this, models such as the social judgeability and social determinability approaches can prove fruitful in understanding the conditions under which stereotypes may or may not apply. These models show that social pressures relating to certain stereotypes are only exerted under certain conditions. For instance, when a p erson in the position of a potential judge not only has information at their disposal that can be used to construct their judgment, but also deem that the parameters of the situation permit them to pass judgment (social judgeability). Or when the characteristics of the social situation exert an influence upon the person who has to make a judgement In this section we will try to show how methods of measurement tend to lead to an overestimation of the weight of gender stereotypes and of everyday sexism.

Explicit Measures of Gender Stereotyping and Everyday Sexism

By exp licit measures we understand methods in which the subject is asked to indicate the extent of his or her agreement with propositions relating to gender stereotypes.

The most well known of these measurements is the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI). 37 This questionnaire consists of 60 items relating to personality traits: 20 socalled "feminine" items, 20 so-called "masculine" items, and 20 "neutral" items (not associated with sex roles). When the BSRI was first created, it was based on a true theoretical innovation, since it no longer envisaged femininity and masculinity as two dimensions situated on opposite sides of the same continuum (i.e., if you are very "feminine" you are de facto not very "masculine"), as was the case in older questionnaires, 38 but as two independent dimensions. It thus permitted more freedom in the evaluation of the femininity/masculinity of individuals. We must however note the now obsolete, rather traditional aspect of some of the items on the questionnaire: as "feminine" items we have: " gullible," "flatterable," and "shy"; and as "masculine" items: "forceful," "acts as a leader," "dominant." 39 There is one point that raises a 37 Sandra L. Bem, "The measurement of psychologi cal androgyny," Journal of Consulting and Clini cal Psychology 42 (1974): 155-62. 38 For example, Harrison G. Gough, Manual for the Californi a Psychol ogi cal Inventory (Pal o Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1957). 39 For more details on this type of questionnaire, see Kamel Gana, " Androgyni e psychologique et valeurs socio-cognitives des di mensi ons du concept de soi," Les cahiers internationaux de psychologi e

Comment ed [MM1]:

Il n'ya pas un problème avec " well known". Mais j'ai eliminé le tiret. " Best known" est aussi possible: "The best known of these..." question: the subject's responses (in describing themselves) are often interpreted as a measure of their adhesion to gender stereotypes. 40 But is this necessarily the case? Imagine a resolutely feminist woman who marks her full agreement with certain "feminine" items such as "sensitive to other's needs" or "loves children." Is she just adhering to these gender stereotypes? Couldn't one see this as a personal response emphasizing the priority she places on her relations with others? Often, because of an absence of any complementary information on the person who has filled out the questionnaire, it is impossible to answer this question. When one reasons in terms of adhesion to gender stereotypes, the risk is that one applies the group level of analysis (gender stereotypes) to the individual level (the task of self-description), as if the former were a mere mechanical summation of the former. 41 Modern questionnaires on sexism ("neo-sexism," "ambivalent sexism") have also been developed using these methods of exp licit measurement, in order to measure potentially discriminatory stereotypes about the other sex group. These questionnaires set out from the idea that sexism, qua expression of masculine domination, is now taking subtler forms because it has become socially problematic to overtly challenge the principle of gender equality. Alongside traditional sexism, characterized by negative attitudes and hostility towards women (who are seen as aggressive, manipulative, and incompetent), a "benevolent" sexism develops which, under cover of foregrounding the positive qualities of women (purity, attention to others) and promoting chivalrous or romantic sentiments toward them, keeps them hemmed into a subordinate position (by insisting on their fragility and their need to be protected by men). This second form of sexism, since it is less visible, is seen as more insidious and as having more negative effects upon women than hostile sexism. It is more difficult for women to challenge it, and they may not be so conscious of its perverse effects. One might nonetheless question this idea that modern sexism is more redoubtable than traditional sexism because it is more insidious. Isn't the situation of women in certain traditional societies, because of traditional sexism, more worrying than the situation of women in our western societies, supposedly characterized by a certain benevolent sexism? What is more, it seems to us, speaking for ourselves, that treating women as incompetent or manipulative (traditional sexism) is more problematic than treating them as sensitive but fragile (benevolent sexism).

Nonetheless, these questionnaires rest upon the postulate that masculine dominance is just as present in modern societies; that the qualitative changes in this dominance do not mark any quantitative change in it 42 -leading authors who follow this line of thought to write "plus ça change…." 43 In view of the societal developments of the last thirty years towards greater equality, along with the massive influx of women into the 42 Bourdieu, Masculine Domination. 43 Francine Tougas, Rupert Brown, Ann M. Beaton, and Stéphane Jol y, " Neosexism: Plus ça change, plus c'est pareil," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, no. 8 (1995): 842-49. workplace, and even though many of these advances remain fragile, this postulate seems eminently contestable to us. But let us pass to the point that interests us. We remark on the coding of responses in these questionnaires, which gives the singular impression of artificially systematizing the presence of sexism and of exaggerating its frequency in the masculine population. Here again, as for the studies we looked at above, we will voluntarily limit ourselves to looking at just three examples which, while obviously not exhaustive, seem to us revelatory of a certain mode of thought prevalent in these questionnaires. The first example is taken from Tougas et al's (1995) questionnaire on neo-sexism. 44 Here we find the item: "It is difficult for a woman to work as a boss." An affirmative response is taken as a sexist response.

Coding it in this way amounts to supposing that the response necessarily expresses the opinion that a woman should not be a boss. Now, responding in this way may be an expression of a different point of view which does not question the possibility of a woman being a boss: namely, that because of certain inequalities against which they have to struggle, it is more difficult for a woman to be in a leadership position than it is for a man, an observation that can be supported by figures easy to come by in France: only 17% of company directors are women. 45 The next two examples are taken from Glick and Fiske's 1996 questionnaire on ambivalent sexism, 46 which was adapted into French by Dardenne, Delacollette, Grégoire and Lecocque. 47 It includes 44 Ibid. 45 Chiffres-clés de l'égalité 2011, Minister of Women's Rights, the City, Youth and Sports. 46 Glick and Fiske, " The ambivalent sexism inventory." 47 Benoit Dardenne, Nathali e Del acoll ette, Christine Grégoire, and Del phine Lecocq, "Structure lat ent e et validation de la version française de l'Ambival ent Sexism Inventory: l'échelle de sexisme ambival ent," L'Année psychol ogi que 196 (2006): 235-64. This questionnaire has found a certai n the following item: "M en are incomplete without women." A positive response is recorded as sexism. So, for these authors, if the subject considers that men are incomplete without women, it is because they think that they are different and that one needs this difference. And, as always for these authors, to affirm the principle of a differentiation between the sexes, particularly in the context of heterosexuality, is to betray a sexist position of masculine domination. But is this the case? Since the questionnaire invites the subject to respond generally in regard to their own feelings, let's imagine that the subject responding is heterosexual (a situation that is not uncommon): might he not consider, in view of his sexuated and sexual orientation, that sharing his life with a woman is an important condition of his psychological equilibrium? Could a positive response to this item "M en are incomplete without women" not also be a way of rejecting the contrary ("M en are complete without women"), which would, in this case, be the basis of a sexist vision of relations between women and men? Here is a third example: the item "Women, compared with men, tend to display a greater moral sense." An affirmative response is once again marked as sexism ("benevolent sexism" in this case). The justification put forward by the authors is that, since it differentiates women from men, this type of response expresses a tendency to essentializ e "feminine" qualities, to imprison women in popularity. The articl e in whi ch it is present ed is one of the most frequently cited accordi ng to the websit e of L'année psychol ogi que, the journal in whi ch it appeared. In a similar theoreti cal framework, one can consult the justifi cation scal e of the speci fi c system of gender in Catheri ne Verni ers and Delphine Martinot, "L'EJSAG, une échelle de justifi cation du syst ème spéci fique au genre: validation stereotyped sexuated traits. 48 Now, it might be suggested that, if a subject responds in this way, it is because he considers that, given that they confront greater injustice than men, women might have been led to develop a greater attentiveness to moral matters. 49 If this coding is oriented toward a particular view of things, this is because the questionnaire, in our view, rests on two questionable identifications. The first is that heterosexuality is implicitly envisaged as heterosexism. To defend this point of view, Glick and Fiske emphasize that, from an anthropological and historical point of view, heterosexuality is systematically associated with patriarchy, paternalism and, hence with masculine domination. 50 One might remark that this is to neglect the idea that heterosexuality can be lived in many different ways depending on the individual: certainly, for some, it may relate to dominating attitudes; but for others, heterosexuality can form part of a relationship that is respectful to and even rewarding for the woman. 51 The second identification consists in linking differences between the 48 Let us recall, as an indi cative example, that essenti alism is not necessarily a stigmatizi ng stance; cert ain homosexual and transsexual movements legitimat e their sexuated ori entation by evoki ng a disposition of biol ogi cal ori gin, an intimate essence (Pierre-Henri C astel, La métamorphose impensable. Essai sur le transsexualisme et l'identité personnelle [Paris: Gallimard, 2013]). 49 So as not to overload the text, we have not enumerat ed too many examples, but let it be said that almost a third of the items on the scale could give rise to a critical analysis similar to that outlined here. 50 Glick and Fiske, " The ambivalent sexism inventory."

51 François de Singly, Le soi, le coupl e et la famille (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005); Jean-Claude Kaufmann, Sociologi e du couple (Paris: Presses uni versit aires de France, 2014). Let us mention that this kind of theoreti cal stance, which tends to identi fy het erosexuality with het erosexism, is politically probl emati c. For in the current debat e in France on gender theory, it paradoxically supplies arguments to a whole reactionary current that criticises equality measures in schools as the result of an insidi ous sexes to domination. For these authors, the highlighting of differences between the sexes is at the origin of inequalities between the sexes. In distinguishing the two sexes, in emphasizing qualities that are potentially distinctive to women (whether innate or socially constructed, and even if positive, such as attention to others), one assigns women to specific domains (the private family sphere, social professions, etc.) which prevent them from entering into the sphere of masculine activities that are often more socially valued (managerial posts, activities in the competitive sector, etc.). Let us mention three points here. On one hand, as Fraisse indicates, difference is not the contrary of equality, but of the identical (or indifference). 52 Difference, or the complementarity between sexes in certain respects, does not logically, necessarily, imply inequality. 53 On the other hand, let us recall that the question of whether to valoriz e differences between men and women or to struggle against them does not constitute a clear battle line between antifeminist and feminist positions. 54 Some feminists, advocating a universalist logic, are in favor of an indifferentiation of the genders; 55 others on the contrary, from a differentialist perspective, advocate and will to suppress the differences bet ween the sexes and to contest heterosexuality (See the journal Esprit, 2013). 52 Geneviève Fraisse, La différence des sexes (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1996). 53 Irène Théry, La distinction de sexe: une nouvelle approche de l'égalité (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2007). promote alterity between women and men. 56 Finally, let us add that the chivalrous or romantic attitudes denounced as benevolent sexism are open to a very different reading. Claude Habib has shown that, historically, these attitudes, which develop ed through the (outdat ed?) figure of French gallantry were, contrary to certain received ideas, a vector for the amelioration of the feminine condition. 57 M oreover, it seems to us that if, for example, one valorizes a woman's sensitivity sexism), this does not necessarily make it more difficult for her to enter into varied professional domains.

If we challenge the generality of the presence of sexism, it is not so as to deny its deleterious effects. Authors such as Dardenne, Dumont and Bollier have revealed the negative effects of benevolent sexism on the performance of women. 58 However, when conducting this type of research, one must distinguish more systematicallywhich is not always done-between benevolent sexism proper (when the latter is indeed an attitude that consists in rendering women inferior), benevolence toward women which does not, in our view, imply any will to render them inferior and, finally, voluntarist egalitarian "benevolent " practices such as positive discrimination, where one privileges a woman over a man when both are of an equal level of ability.

These three attitudes, in so far as they belong to different dynamics, can have different effects and must therefore be distinguished in studies. Let us note in concluding that certain advanced effects of sexism are subject to debate. For example, if Brandt concludes, on the basis of a study carried out in 57 countries, that the level of sexism raises the level of inequality between sexes in societies, 59 Ullrich and Schlüter show that this effect ceases to be significant if one excludes a country such as Switzerland from the sample, which singularly limits the import of Brandt's result. 60 Let us now move to implicit methods, which, because of their more technical procedures, are supposed to allow a finer grained measurement of stereotypes, and to allow us to observe their effects.

Implicit Measures of Gender Stereotyping: The Example of the Gender Implicit Association Test

To avoid certain biases pertaining to explicit measurement questionnaires-subjects do not necessarily wish to reveal what they really think, and are not always cap able of doing so-implicit measures have been developed. These measures are called implicit in so far as they are supposed to be able to reveal the true, hidden attitudes of subjects, which may influence them without their being aware of it. For example, a much-used method is based on reaction times. In this method one is usually presented with words on a computer screen, which one must associate with more general categories. 59 Mark J. Brandt, "Sexism and gender inequality across 57 soci eties, " Psychological Science 22 (2011): 1413-18. 60 Johannes Ullrich and Elmar Schl üter, " Detecting nasty dat a with simple plots of complex models:

Comments on Brandt (2011)," Psychological Science 23, no. 7 (2012): 824-25.

Concretely, a word appears on a screen and, for example, you have to press a key on the right of the keyboard as quickly as possible if this word relates to the masculine (the word "brother"), on the left of the keyboard if it relates to the feminine (the word "sister"). Different words are successively presented and each time you must make the correct corresponding association. The basic postulate here is that the more rapidly you make the association, the more it reveals a p ersonal, profound, and truthful tendency. Now, the implementation of such a measure can lead to disputable results. 61 Take for example one of the best known such tests, the IAT or Implicit Associations Test for gender stereotypes. 62 The procedure takes place over four phases. In phase 1, you have to associate words with their corresponding domain (for example, if the word "mathematics" appears on the screen, associate it with the category "sciences" by pressing a key on the keyboard, or if it is the word "literature," associate it with the category "letters" by pressing another key). Phase 2 involves sexuated associations (for example, if the word "father" appears, associate it with the "masculine" domain, if it is the word "sister," associate it with the "feminine" domain). In phase 3, you are asked to make associations relating to gender stereotypes (for example, if the word "mathematics" or "brother" appear, to associate them with a domain containing "sciences" and "masculine," if it is the word "humanities" or "aunt," associate them with a domain containing "letters" and "feminine"). Finally, in 61 For more details on these implicit measurement tests and the problems raised by them, see the last phase, you are asked to make associations that go against gender stereotypes: in this case the words must be associated either with a domain that groups together "sciences" and "feminine" (for example if the words "mother" or "astronomy " appear), or with a domain that groups together "letters" and "masculine" (for example if the words "humanities" or "uncle" appear). To measure the degree to which you are influenced by gender stereotypes, the difference in response time between phase 3 (task of association corresponding to gender stereotypes) and phase 4 (task of association contrary to gender stereotypes) is calculated. If your reaction time is on average higher in phase 4 compared to phase 3, the conclusion is that you are influenced by gender stereotypes, with this influence judged to be greater depending on the magnitude of the difference. This kind of conclusion seems quite a delicate affair, though. Since the procedure involves mobilizing gender stereotypes in phase 3, this might well rub off on phase 4, making it more difficult to complete (in terms of reaction times) in so far as, in this new phase, one must make opposite associations to those that were asked for in the preceding phase. Additionally, since gender stereotypes are a p art of the social world, it seems quite probable that they are easily accessible and available to memory-in any case, more accessible than contrasexuated examples. Faster reaction times when the association goes in the direction of gender stereotypes (and slower when the association goes against gender stereotypes) may thus not necessarily indicate adhesion to the influence of stereotypes, but their greater frequency in the social memory of individuals. In this sense, Karpinski and Hilton conclude that, unlike the explicit measurement of stereotypes, the IAT, rather than measuring personal attitudes, reveals the cultural environment of individuals. 63 According to them, this is what exp lains the often weak links between IAT and exp licit measures: for gender, if we refer to Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann and Banaji, this link between explicit and implicit measures is of the order of .172. [START_REF] Greenwald | Underst andi ng and using the Implicit associ ation test. III. Meta-anal ysis of predi ctive validity[END_REF] Along the same lines, Lynott, Connell, O'Brien and Kansal, on the basis of their study, propose that the results of the IAT reflect the linguistic frequency of stereotypes rather than the subject's adhesion to these stereotypes. [START_REF] Lynott | Modeling the IAT: Implicit association test reflects shallow linguistic environment and not deep personal attitudes[END_REF] There is therefore an open debate between researchers such as Greenwald et al who think that the IAT reveals the personal attitudes of subjects, and those, such as Tetlock et al.

who consider on the contrary that the IAT reflects the cultural knowledge of the subject but not necessarily their own personal attitudes. [START_REF] For Exampl E | Attributions of implicit prejudi ce, or 'Would Jesse Jackson " fail " the impli cit association test?[END_REF] This debate also extends to the predictive nature of the results obtained by explicit and implicit tests. Is having a higher score in these tests an indication that the subject presents actual discriminatory behaviors? On one hand, Greenwald, Banaji and Nosek, although their meta-analysis reveals weak links between the results of these tests and discriminatory behaviors (for gender, around .181 for exp licit associations

Conclusion

Bringing together the various points made above, we can say that the study of gender stereotypes raises numerous questions. Contrary to what is presented to us by campaigns for awareness and by many works of social psychology, stereotypes do not necessarily have the power that is often attributed to them. Firstly, the perception and the judgments of individuals are not necessarily altered by gender stereotypes. And in addition, measures of gender stereotyping are not necessarily neutral, and can direct one towards a vision that artificially accentuates the presence and weight of stereotypes. Finally, the predictive value (in terms of links with discriminatory behaviors) of tests for the evaluation of stereotypes, particularly gender stereotypes, remains subject to debate.

More fundamentally, it is our view that studies on stereotypes, particularly gender stereotypes, pose four problems. Firstly, they often envisage stereotyping as a thinking that is frequently suffered by individuals. 71 Now, this is to risk misunderstanding the fact that individuals can make reference to stereotypes according to different levels of judgment and different persp ectives, and that one must take into account the interaction between the individual and the characteristics of the situation in which they find themselves. 72 Thus, although individuals can certainly use them in the first degree, they can also play with them in subtle ways, for example with 71 Lee Jussim, Social Perception and Soci al Reality: Why Accuracy Domi nates Bi as and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). humorous intent, or as provocation in a discussion. Additionally, studies that aim to struggle against discrimination tend implicitly to adopt a univocal causal schema: that it is stereotypes that bring about discrimination. Is this necessarily the case, though? As Sherif showed in his time, 73 stereotypes can also be a consequence of the nature of the objective relations of discrimination between groups-or both at once, causes and consequences. Finally, it is rather problematic to neglect the fact that, outside of exp erimental situations in which one tries to neutralize certain variables in order to see the specific effects of gender stereotypes activated by the procedure, in everyday situations individuals are constantly faced with heterogeneous dynamics, some of which can be opposed to these stereotypes. Think of the child who can come to absorb very traditional gender st ereotypes (for example when he is read bedtime stories drawn from the great classics of children's literature), can observe differences in behavior between women and men that agree with those stereotypes, but can observe, at the same time, that his father is also doing the cooking and the shopping, whereas his mother is active outside of the house, that she works and takes decisions concerning the family. We must be attentive to the fact that multiple influences, sometimes in agreement, sometimes opposed, are a source of reflection for the child and can ultimately allow him to distance himself from traditional stereotypes and to form his own judgment. 74 All things considered, and coming back to the question of the movement towards greater gender equality, it seems to us that rather than focusing systematically on the 73 Muzafer Sheri f, " A preliminary experimental study of int er-group rel ations," in Social Psychology at the Crossroads, ed. J. H. Rohrer and Muzafer Sherif (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), 388-424. 74 Geneviève Fraisse, Les excès du genre. Concept, image, nudité (Paris: Lignes, 2014); Véronique Rouyer, La construction de l'identité sexuée (Paris: Armand Colin, 2007). weight of gender stereotypes, 75 which carries the risk of presenting a fixed image of relations between women and men and rendering stereotypes more important than they actually are, we should, on one hand, show that we are not necessarily the victims of stereotypes, and that we can appeal to our autonomy and our reasoning. On the other hand, without claiming that everything can be easily reconciled, we should bring to the fore situations in which gender stereotypes and the threats they represent are precisely set aside in individuals' choices (for example, a woman scientist, a woman CEO, a male midwife, nurse, or kindergarten assistant, etc.). Ultimately, we ought to give more prominence to the resources of individuals who grasp situations and transform them so as to become, as far as they are able, unique in their own way. 76 Certainly we are not the first to put forward such reflections. And yet they do not seem superfluous here, in view of certain directions in the social psychology of the relations between the sexes, which read everything in terms of masculine domination. Let us add that, before and beyond gender stereotypes, individuals and groups live in definite concrete, mat erial situations that subserve the devaluation of the self, false consciousness, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. 77 It is the modification of these concrete conditions of existence, comprising inequalities and injustices, that is the major priority. Having said this, one may wonder about the reasons for this gap between the importance accorded to gender stereotypes by many works in social psychology and their sometimes ambiguous effects when we confront these studies with the social reality that they are supposed to depict. Although the attention to gender stereotypes results from a long and fruitful tradition of studies of stereotypes in social psychology and from the legitimate will to struggle against discrimination, the tendency to overestimate the effects attributed to gender stereotypes owes to the idea that we are their involuntary or even active victims. This idea is now a feature of common sense and government policies alike. 78 There is thus a mismatch between the exp ectations of the discipline and the social demand that favors attention to and orientation toward the negative aspects of stereotypes. This way of seeing things can be explained, in our view, by the fact that numerous works situate themselves within the framework of theories of (particularly masculine) domination. 79 These theories prioritize the claim that our mental structures are largely determined, altered unconsciously by the different social positions of women and men, and that the ideology that legitimates masculine domination, and which traffics in gender stereotypes, is inscribed at the heart of our modes of apprehending the real. 80 This point of view seems problematic 78 Marie-Cécil e Naves, Vanessa Wisni a-W eill, Lutter contre les stéréot ypes filles-garçons, Commissariat général à la stratégie et à la prospective, January 2014. 79 As to this " dominance" of theori es of masculine domination in the fi eld of such studies, one may expl ain it by reference to its origin: the feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, one of whose primary obj ectives was the necessary struggl e against masculine domination (Fraisse, La différence des sexes; Camille Froidevaux-M etterie, La révolution du feminine [Paris, Gallimard, 2015]). 80 Bourdieu, Masculine Domination; Jost and Banaji, "The role of stereotyping in system justi fi cati on;

Lorenzi-Ciol di, Les représent ations des groupes dominants et dominés; Jim Sidanius and Felici a to us, because it does not take account of social developments toward greater equality between the sexes, or of the autonomous capacities of social actors. In a forthcoming article 81 we interrogate these psychosocial theories of domination. We evoke empirical and exp erimental data from sociological and psychological works which call into question and go against exp ectations born of a vision of masculine domination, and we emphasize certain problems associated with the postulates of these theories. Finally, we seek to present other approaches to the relations between the sexes which place the accent on the dynamics of subjective appropriation. In so doing, they seem to us at once more respectful of social actors, more likely to take account of current social developments between women and men-in particular of the plurality of situations and of intrasex variability-and, finally, more relevant in moving toward greater equality between them.

Pratto, Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Soci al Hierarchy and Oppression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 81 Manuel Tostai n, "Pour en finir avec la domi nation masculine? Regard critique sur les approches psychosocial es des relations entre sexes," Bulletin de psychologie, forthcoming.

  : 1-27; Fabi o Lorenzi-Ciol di, Les représentations des groupes dominants et domi nés: collections et agrégats (Grenobl e: Presses uni versit aires de Grenoble, 2009); Marie Sarl et and Benoit Dardenne, " Le sexisme bienveillant comme processus de maintien des inégalités social es entre les genres," L'Année psychologique 112 (2012): 435-63; Jim Sidani us, Felicia Pratto, Colett e van Laar, and Shana Levin, " Social dominance theory: Its agenda and method," Political Psychology 25, no. 6 (2004): 845-80.

4

  Allen R. McConnell and Jill M. Leibold, "Relations among the implicit association test, discriminat ory behavior, and explicit measures of raci al attitudes," Journal of Experi ment al Social Psychology 37 (2001): 435-42. 5 Gordon W. Allport, The N ature of Prej udi ce (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1954); Richard Y. Bourhis and Jacques-Philippe Leyens, Stéréot ypes, discrimination et rel ations int ergroupes (Brussels: Mardaga, 1998); Susan T. Fiske, "Prejudi ce, stereotypi ng and discrimi nation, " in The Handbook of Soci al Psychol ogy, ed. D.T. Gilbert, S.T.

7

  Kennet h Gergen, " Social Psychology as History," Journal of Personality and Soci al Psychol ogy 26 (1973): 309-20.

10

  Faye B. Steuer, Blair C. Bode, Kelley E. Rada, and James B. Hittner, " Gender labeli ng and perceived infant emotionality: A parti al repli cation of a 'classi c' study, " Psychologi cal Reports 107, no. 1 (2010): 139-44. 11 Ibid.

  psychological research, " in Progress in Experimental Personalit yResearch, ed. B.A. Maher [New York: Academic Press, 1964],79-114). Cert ain studi es have even shown that the accomplices of researchers, who by defi nition are not supposed to be taken in by the experiment, are also influenced by the things they are supposed to lead their naïve subj ects to beli eve (Dani el Al aphilippe, "L'impost eur aut o-mysti fi é,' Bulletin de psychol ogi e 39:3-6, no. 374[1986]: 191-96; Stéphane Laurens and Serge Moscovici, "The confederat e's and others' self-conversi on: A neglect ed phenomenon," The Journal of Social Psychology 145, no. 2 [2005], 191-207). 15 Dorothy M. Haccoun and Stanley Stacy, "Perceptions of male and femal e success or failure in rel ation to spouse encouragement and sex-associ ation of occupation," Sex Rol es 6 (1980): 819-32; Hilary M. Lips and Anita M. Myers, "Subject reactions to a stimul us person as a functi on of sex of subject and sex-rol e appropriat eness of stimulus person's career goal," Sex Rol es 6 (1980): 675-82; Stephani e H. Smith, George I. Whitehead, and Nan M. Sussman, "Perception of femal e and mal e success in United States and third world nations," Sex Roles 10, no. 11-12 (1984): 903-11. 16 Robin D. Post, "Causal expl anations of mal e and femal e academi c performance as a function of sexrole biases," Sex Roles 7, no. 7 (1981): 691-98. 17 Janet Swim, Eugene Borgida, Geoffrey Maruyama, and Davi d G. Myers, "Joan McKay versus John McKay: Do gender stereotypes bias evaluation?" Psychological Bulletin 105 (1989): 409-29.

23

  Irvin Katz, Edgar G. Epps, and Leland J. Axelson, " Effect upon Negro digit symbol performance of comparison wit h Whites and with ot her Negroes," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 69 (1964): 963-70. 24 Claude M. Steele and Joshua Aronson, "Stereot ype threat and the intell ectual test performance of African Ameri cans," Journal of Personality and Social Psychol ogy 69, no. 5 (1995): 797-811. Let us speci fy that one can also provoke the contrary effect (bett er performances) when one activates a positive st ereotype attached to the group to which the indi vidual who must reali ze the task bel ongs (t he phenomenon of 'stereot ype boost' (Margaret Shih, Todd L. Pittinsky, Geoffrey C. Ho, "Stereotype boost: Positive out comes from the acti vati on of positive stereotypes," in Stereot ype Threat: Theory,

  Process, and Appli cation, ed. M. Inzlicht and T. Schmader (Oxford: Oxford Universit y Press, 2012), 141-56. 25 Paul R. Sackett, Chaitra M. Hardison, and Michael J. Cullen, " On interpreting stereot ype threat as accounting for Afri can American -white di fferences on cognitive tests," Ameri can Psychol ogist 59, no. 1 (2004): 7-13. 26 Virgini e Bonnot and Jean-Claude Croi zet, "Stereotype threat and st ereotype endorsement: Their joint influence on mathemati c performance," Revue international e de psychologi e social e 24, no. 2 (2011): 105-20; Jean-Claude Croizet and Theresa Claire, " Extending the concept of stereotype threat to soci al cl ass: The intellect ual underperformance of students from low socioeconomi c background, " Personalit y and Soci al Psychology Bulletin 24, no. 6 (1998): 588-94; Jean-Claude Croi zet and Marion Dutrévis, "Socioeconomic st atus and int elligence: Why test scores do not equal merit," Journal of Poverty 8 (2004): 91-107. 27 Pascal Huguet and Isabelle R égner, " Stereot ype threat among schoolgirls in quasi-ordi nary cl assroom circumst ances," Journal of Educational Psychol ogy, 99, no. 3 (2007): 545-60; " Count er-

34

  Laura J.Kray, Leigh Thompson, and Adam Galinsky, "Battle of the sexes: Gender stereotype confi rmation and react ance in negotiations," Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychol ogy 80, no. 6 (2001): 942-58.

(

  social determinability). 36 On the Measurement of Gender Stereotypes and Everyday Sexism 36 Pascal Morchai n, Georges Schadron, Roxane Saint-B auzel, Géraldi ne Béchu, "« Le parfum ». Quand l'odeur d'un candidat affect e le recruteur…ou pas: une question de dét erminabilité," Revue Int ernationale de psychologi e soci ale 26, no. 2 (2013): 73-79; Candy Sabati er, Georges Schadron, Isabelle Milhabet, and Daniel Priolo, " La dét erminabilité de « celui qui juge » : impact sur l'ori ent ation d'un jugement et sur la formation d'impression," L'Année psychologique 110, no. 4 (2010): 573-93;Georges Schadron, "Déterminabilité soci ale et essentialisme psychologique : quand une conception essentialiste renforce la confirmation des att ent es stéréot ypi ques, " Les cahi ers internationaux de psychologi e sociale67-68, no. 3 (2005): 77-84.

  social e 25 (1995): 27-43; Pascaline K'Del ant, Kamel Gana, " Analyse multitraits-multiméthodes des scores au questionnaire d' attributs personnels (Personal attributes questionnai re [PAQ]) auprès d'un échantillon fémini n," Psychologie française 54 (2009): 323-29; Paul Fontayne, Philippe Sarrazin, and Jean-Pierre Famose, "The Bem sex-role Inventory: Validation of short versi on for French teenagers, " European Revi ew of Applied Psychology, 50, no. 4 (2000): 405-16. For a critique of BSRI, see Namok Choi, Dale R. Fuqua, Jody L. Newman, " The Bem sex-role inventory: Continui ng theoretical problems," Educational and Psychological Measurement 68, no. 5 (2008): 881-900. 40 Sandra L. Bem, " The BSRI and gender schema Theory: A repl y to Spence and Helmreich,"Psychological Review 88, no. 4 (1981): 369-71.41 Anne Locksl ey and Mary E. Colten, " Psychol ogical Androgyny: A case of mistaken identity?" Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology 37, no. 6 (1979): 1017-31.

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54

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Comment ed [MM2]:Cela marche mieux en anglais.

Comment ed [MM3]:Nous avons changé un peu votre modification.

Comment ed [MM4]:Intrasex, pas " intrasexe".