Milena Doytcheva

On the Edge of Diversity: Anti-Muslim Racism and Discrimination in White Diversity Spaces

This article traces back the development over the last decades in France of anti-Muslim racism and discrimination within professional and organisational fields. It shows how, in the wake of 2004 law banning religious symbols in schools, new demands for religious neutrality have spread far beyond educational grounds, to permeate a variety of institutions, including those purportedly designed to fight against discrimination and achieve equality. Drawing on a longitudinal, qualitative analysis of workplace diversity policies, I show the eviction of faith diversity from corporate diversity procedures through the implementation of "white diversity" concepts, based on two tenets. First, patterns of Muslim racialisation, as faith options are turned into "personality styles" and "identity problems". Second, the perceived legitimacy and widespread social acceptance of this "respectable racism", woven into claims upon meritocracy, and disguised as "corporate culture".

It was not till the early 2000s that the language of diversity [START_REF] Ahmed | The language of diversity[END_REF] entered French professional and organisational fields. In the context of an emerging EU legislation against racism and workplace discrimination, some pioneering initiatives championed by big business leaders sought to translate the new legal and policy framework into categories for institutional change. Launched in 2004, by a nationwide corporate social movement in favour of workplace diversity [START_REF] Alaoui | Promouvoir la diversité en entreprise : genèse et ambiguïtés d'une initiative patronale[END_REF], the Diversity Charter was a landmark initiative in the field. Further texts of voluntary commitment, also prompted by companies, included the LGBT Charter (sponsored by Accenture in 2011), a Parentality Charter (promoted by L'Oréal in 2008); then a state-owned protective labour standard, the Diversity Label, set up by public authorities with help from human resource professional organisations. Mimicking the paths first taken by US and multinational firms, this set of initiatives has shaped the formation of an everexpanding corporate diversity field, revolving around two principles: 1/ moving away from legal ideals and social justice causes towards for-profit rationales for equal opportunity and privatised governance forms; 2/ stretching the concept of diversity management far beyond the legal anti-discrimination frame to embrace a variety of grounds and categories [START_REF] Médard-Inghilterra | Face à la fragmentation matérielle et formelle, plaider la consolidation du droit antidiscriminatoire en France[END_REF], upon which to perform organisational change.

In the French, but also EU settings, these trends were however fuelled by some major features of the novel communitarian antidiscrimination framework, based on the assumption of what legal experts termed the "legal universality" [START_REF] Lanquetin | La double discrimination à raison du sexe et de la race ou de l'origine ethnique[END_REF] of non-discrimination. Though antiracism was core to the EU's emerging endeavour to racial justice and equal opportunity, a turn towards universalisation soon occurred in the construction of these concerns, providing within the same legal system, and in an undifferentiated manner, for a variety of grounds of non-discrimination 1 . Referred to in retrospect as a "diversion strategy" [START_REF] Guiraudon | Construire une politique européenne de lutte contre les discriminations: l'histoire de la directive 'race[END_REF], the move received support from NGOs as well as from EU officials and authorities, in an attempt to neutralise resistance against and deflect attention from migrant communities who "not always enjoyed the greatest sympathy", to say the least, among European deputies and national governments alike.

As early as the mid-2000s, corporate diversity procedures embraced universalised -also called "global" or "inclusive" -notions of diversity, mixing issues of race, sex, gender, health, and disability to achieve equal opportunity. Although formally generic or inclusive, these procedures relied on de facto highly selective tactics [START_REF] Doytcheva | Réinterprétations et usages sélectifs de la diversité dans les politiques des entreprises[END_REF]. Wielding a language of "priorities", organisations remained free to engage, as if from a menu, with only a few items and status categories, which they considered "meaningful" or "high priority". Yet, building on such à la carte tactics, diversity policies soon proved to be predominantly white: by taking precedence over race and racism at first, they eventually yielded more binding visions about "good" and "bad diversity" [START_REF] Doytcheva | De la lutte contre les discriminations ethno-raciales à la « promotion de la diversité[END_REF][START_REF] Doytcheva | Politiques de la diversité. Sociologie des discriminations et des politiques antidiscriminatoires au travail[END_REF]; see also [START_REF] Lentin | The crises of multiculturalism: Racism in a neoliberal age[END_REF], with the latter, such as race but also faith diversity, being almost completely banned from corporate action plans.

As I will argue in this paper, faith diversity in particular forms a major blind-spot in this perspective, as issues of religiosity are commonly construed as antinomic to public spaces and activities, under an assertive conception of public secularism, termed "combat laïcité" (Roy 2005). Methodologically, I draw on a qualitative, longitudinal approach, based on of more 80 in-depth semi-structured interviews (N=86 see table 1 for breakdown). Within this extensive dataset, I draw here in particular on interviews and observations with "diversity brokers" and professionals (such as coaches, mentors, but also diverse workforce intermediaries and experts); and, to a lesser extent, with "diverse candidates" or a racialised workforce trained and mentored through specific schemes, and a service provided for companies willing to flesh out their engagements.

In what follow, first I trace back the way in which new demands for "religious neutrality" have spread, since the early 2000s, from public schools to supposedly private corporate spaces, to consistently expand "spatialities of secularism" [START_REF] Hancock | Spatialities of the Secular: Geographies of the Veil in France and Turkey[END_REF]; while mostly concentrating, on the other hand, on Muslim-related issues and practices. Next, I turn to the analysis of work done by "diversity brokers" and intermediaries [START_REF] Doytcheva | Intermédiaires et "opérateurs de la diversité" dans les politiques des entreprises[END_REF] to show how, despite their vocal commitment to social justice and equal opportunity, they widely adhere to the ban of religious symbols and practices, exposing once again primarily, if not exclusively, Muslim faith and identities. Finally, I argue how this in turn bolsters processes of racialisation of these latter identities and populations (Hajjad and Mohammed, 2013), as they are notably excluded even from the spaces designed to purportedly "redress" harm and discrimination. As such, while more broadly reinstating racism and hostility towards migrants, "white diversity" [START_REF] Doytcheva | La diversité normalisée à la française: Définitions et rapport au droit[END_REF](Doytcheva, , 2020a) also acts to significantly mainstream Islamophobia [START_REF] Mondon | Articulations of Islamophobia: from the extreme to the mainstream?[END_REF] in organisational spaces.

or sexual orientation"), there were 17 protected classes in the 2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ; 12 in the French law n°2001-1066 of November 16, 2001 on the fight against discrimination -which was the first to transpose the novel EU's legislation ; and up to 25 under current French law, including but not limited to : sex, family status, physical appearance, surname, health condition, disability, morals (moeurs), sexual orientation, age, political opinions, religious beliefs, union activities, genetic characteristics, pregnancy, residence or address, language, social precariousness, "actual or perceived affiliation or non-affiliation with an ethnic group, nation or race".

Laïcité, a legal principle enforced with (less and less) "empiricism"

Dating back to the 1905 Law separating Churches and State, laïcité poses that "the Republic does not recognize, wage or otherwise support any religious worship."2 However, this founding principle and a pillar of the work done by governments of the Third Republic, heir to the revolutionary will to unite and modernise France, was reputedly enforced "with empiricism" (Stasi, 2003, p. 13). It was not until the late 1980s, then, that minority religious practices sparked resentment and hostility and were framed as a "threat" to republicanism. In October 1989, the exclusion pronounced against three middle school pupils in the suburb of Creil, who refused to remove their headscarves in class triggered the first in a series of controversies known as the "veil affairs" [START_REF] Scott | The politics of the veil[END_REF]Tevanian, 2012;[START_REF] Bouamama | L'affaire du foulard islamique: la production d'un racisme respectable[END_REF]. At the government's request, the Council of State -a body acting as both a legal adviser of the executive and a supreme court for administrative justice -ruled for the first time on these matters. Taking into account international law as well as domestic sources (in particular the recently enacted 1989 school orientation law, which enshrines the principle of freedom of expression for students), the Council recognised the freedom of pupils to wear religious symbols on school grounds; provided that they do not display an assertive (revendicatif) or ostentatious (ostantatoire) character and do not undermine the school's mission, both in terms of curriculum and attendance3 . Some fifteen years later, however, this position came to a spectacular reversal, in the aftermath of 9/11 and the context of global securitisation of both migrants and migrations. A new "civilizational discourse" on tolerance (Brown, 2008: 6), nevertheless, increasingly pitted against each other "Occidental" and "liberal values" and "democracies" and their supposedly "barbaric" immigrant, and mostly Muslim, communities: "the tolerant, and the civilized on one side, and the fundamentalist, and the intolerant, on the other". It is noteworthy that it was at the time of the release of the report by the Stasi Commission (2003), which recommended the legal ban of religious symbols on school grounds4 , that the diversity rationale first made it into the French national political and media mainstream; wherein it was almost uniquely used till then to refer to the U.S. or British situations [START_REF] Dalibert | Apparition et diffusion du terme « diversité » dans la presse quotidienne nationale de référence[END_REF][START_REF] Doytcheva | De la lutte contre les discriminations ethno-raciales à la « promotion de la diversité[END_REF]. For the authors of the Stasi report, the repressive strand of the law was to be coupled indeed with a more positive one, aimed at "valuing the diversity" of French society by, among other things, introducing holidays appropriate to different worships into the school calendar. While only the repressive strand of their report was passed into the law, arguably, such formation speaks a lot to the paradoxes ahead of diversity's institutional and political career, as those I shall expand upon in this paper.

To engage with, I draw here on a Foucault-inspired conceptualisation of diversity that frames it as a dispositif, i.e. a "system of relations" to be considered within "a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical and moral propositions" (Foucault 1980, p. 194). Considering diversity as a dispositif -an "apparatus of security" -allows us to bring together ideational, and actual social, as well as technological fields, which otherwise are often siloed in academic discussions. Following [START_REF] Matejskova | Governing through diversity: Migration societies in post-multiculturalist times[END_REF], what such perspective helps account for in the first place is the "commonplace at-oddness and contradictoriness of practices, policies, uses, and deployments of diversity". However, from my position here, such analytical perspective should be also more strongly moored to critical approaches to diversity, a bourgeoning field that emerged since the mid-1990s as a reaction to the re-appropriation of equal opportunities by business [START_REF] Zanoni | Guest editorial: Unpacking diversity, grasping inequality: Rethinking difference through critical perspectives[END_REF]; despite their distinct perspectives, critical diversity approaches share a common opposition to the instrumental view of differences inherent in much of this paradigm's organisational applications. It should be more strongly linked, on the other hand, to critical race and critical whiteness theories, emphasising the pervasiveness of racist structures and power relations in white racialised organisations [START_REF] Ray | A theory of racialized organizations[END_REF][START_REF] Bonilla-Silva | Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States[END_REF]; as well as their ability to produce every-day, organisational, and structural dominance based on "epistemologies of ignorance" and other "epistemic maneuvers" by hegemonic whiteness [START_REF] Mueller | Racial Ideology or Racial Ignorance? An Alternative Theory of Racial Cognition[END_REF][START_REF] Mills | The racial contract[END_REF]; see also [START_REF] Garbes | When the "Blank Slate" is a White One: White Institutional Isomorphism in the Birth of National Public Radio[END_REF] to hamper social change. With these theoretical backgrounds, the critical approach, which I advocate for, pays moreover particular attention to the intertwining of scholarly and practical articulations of the diversity paradigm (Doytcheva 2020), not least by considering language as practice, at the interface of structures of cognition and action [START_REF] Fairclough | Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language[END_REF].

Table 1: Research design, sample and data analysis

I draw here on a qualitative, longitudinal approach to corporate diversity policies in France, based on three surveys conducted between 2006 and 2014 (2006-2008, 2011 and 2014, respectively). Relying mainly on in-depth sociological interviews (N= 86), the research design also includes ethnographic work, based on participant observations, documentary study and analysis of grey literature (official reports, practical guides), and communication materials (brochures, booklets, flyers, internet sites).

Overall, one of the main objectives of the research design is to include a multi-actor, multi-site (local and national), and multi-temporal approach in order to 1/ confront corporate commitments and aspirational policy statements with the practical outcomes of their diversity work 2/ address these concerns over the medium term (i.e. the decades 2000 and 2010, from the inception of the diversity corporate social movement to present). It builds on a sample of participants stratified by the various profiles of stakeholders at play: 1/companies and companies' professionals (managers, diversity officers) 2/ business and political leaders, state officials 3/ diversity intermediaries and experts 4/ "diverse candidates", modestly referred to as "diversity applicants" (candidats issus de la diversité), i.e. a workforce trained and monitored through these schemes.

Constructed and updated incrementally, these relatively autonomous yet connected datasets have been fully transcribed and analysed, favouring a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) method, aimed at considering discourse as social practice, at the interface of structures of cognition and action [START_REF] Fairclough | Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language[END_REF].

The new demands for workplace "religious neutrality"

Although the ban of religious symbols in secondary schools was justified by a particular understanding of laïcité's role in education 5 , by the mid-2000s, new demands for "religious neutrality" spread quickly beyond these specifically educational contexts into public spaces, as with the 2010 law banning full-face covering 6 ; but also, into theoretically private spaces, as notably the workplaces, wherein a contentious politics on faith and religion was already increasingly at stake. Similar to school debates, workplace conceptions of neutrality unfolded in France along a dual line. On the one hand, while framed as general and universalistic -i.e. not targeting a single community -they involved in practice overwhelmingly Muslim employees; singling them out once again as the "primary figure of undesirable otherness" [START_REF] Liogier | Le Mythe de l'islamisation. Essai sur une obsession collective[END_REF], while placing, in particular, an undue burden on female Muslim employees, with the wearing of the hijab stirring again the most heated debates.

On the other hand, new claims for neutrality only concerned private businesses, as public agents were already bound by a "duty of restraint", including the ban of any religious or ethnic sign in the course of their activities. Starting in 2008, the impressive judicial career of the "Baby loup" case [START_REF] Hunter-Henin | Religion, children and employment: the baby loup case[END_REF][START_REF] Vauchez | L'affaire Baby Loup ou la nouvelle laïcité[END_REF], bore witness to this new conflictuality over workplace religious claims. After multiple upheavals (six years of litigation and four prior rulings on the case), in 2014, the Court of Cassation eventually reached a final decision by upholding the dismissal of a childcare worker, who refused to remove her hijab, despite the general religious neutrality requirement adopted by its employer 7 . In 2015, a correspondence study first highlighted the breadth and scope of anti-Muslim hiring discrimination with religious Muslims submitting twice as many applications as religious Christians before being called back (and up to four times for male applicants only: [START_REF] Valfort | Les discriminations religieuses à l'embauche: une réalité[END_REF][START_REF] Valfort | Anti-Muslim discrimination in France: Evidence from a field experiment[END_REF] 8 . Particularly high, these rates place France at the EU's forefront in terms of hiring discrimination against immigrants from Muslim-majority countries, but also ahead of countries such as Australia and the United States on a global scale.

Anti-Muslim sentiment and rhetoric are nowadays conveyed in the workplace by a wide variety of actors, ranging from managers and human resource professionals to workforce intermediaries, and public service agents alike. Under the guise of secularism, they were expressed with varying degrees of restraint or acuity by a fair share of my respondents, nonetheless reportedly committed to fighting employment discrimination:

[...] In the company, religion is a no-no! Of course, I have my personal convictions, but in the company, it's a no-no! 5 According to it, mere religious pluralism is not enough to build a "neutral" and tolerant space for citizens' education, which rather needs a complete "neutralisation" of religious prescriptions and norms in order to open up a "common critical space" [START_REF] Kintzler | Penser la laïcité[END_REF], a place for deflection, withdrawal and doubt, which is a constitutive dispositif of liberty. 6 French Law n° 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 prohibiting the wearing of full-face concealing clothing in public spaces. 7 Plenary of June 25, 2014. 8 A follow-up survey confirms that the signal used to convey applicants' religiosity is not only viewed as relevant but is also correctly interpreted by employers. Samira and Mohammed, Esther and Dov, Nathalie and Michel are the six profiles tested, respectively Muslim, Jew and Catholic: all six grew up in the same neighbourhood of Beirut, before convincing their parents after high school to continue their studies in France. All of them have acquired French nationality and are 23 years old in the testing. While Mohammed experiences the hardest "penalty", religiosity works as a premium for Christians, with Michel's call-back rate being boosted when he exhibits it. Q: I mean, legally speaking... I don't even ask myself this question! We're in a company where we talk about relationships, relations. When I have someone... I can't talk to them... so it's a no! Q: And for you, diversity does not include religion? Not, because... For me it's an anti-freedom. We're in a company, in a collective space, the first thing is to respect the other; we should respect the other in what he or she is and as we are all different, at some point, we have to learn to make compromises. So, when you go from one extreme to the other, whether it's the veil, or I don't know... like crosses everywhere, which is another form of extremism, this isn't respecting others! We should all make compromise (HR Director at a large company in clothing industry) When I receive a young girl wearing a chador for an interview on the approach to the job market, I try to make an overture, but that's all …; if such is her way of thinking, that's all, we just stop there ... the interview wouldn't go any further. Q: "Make an opening", what do you mean? Tell her: "You know, with this type of presentation, you risk not being received in much companies." I hope I'm wrong and that she will be admitted, but still there is a constraint (Public service for executive employment, department "young graduates") Yet positions like these become all the more problematic since, in contemporary immigration societies, and modern France in particular, religion is one of the privileged signifiers of differentiation, often and perhaps more and more frequently converted socially into ethnic minority affiliation [START_REF] De Rudder | Les syndicats et le racisme dans le secteur de la grande distribution[END_REF]. To put it another way, Muslim faith is not only a confessional option, but also a social condition -and therefore a sociological category [START_REF] Joly | Muslim women and power[END_REF] -that speaks to highly minorised and racialised communities.

Here I refer to raci(ali)sation [START_REF] Poiret | Les processus d'ethnicisation et de raci(ali)sation dans la France contemporaine: Africains, Ultramarins et 'Noirs[END_REF] as the process of naturalising and essentialising socially constructed differences, be they based on "culture", religion, history, or physical and phenotypic traits. The proper of racial thinking being to introduce a strict determinism between social behaviour and individual attributes, be they "chosen" or assigned, these latter attributes are considered as forming an essence, or an intrinsic difference, whereby culturalism joins biologisation to enclose into a radical otherness (De Rudder et al. 2000, p. 32;[START_REF] Guillaumin | Genèse et langage actuel[END_REF].

Ironically then, although freedom of conscience forms an integral part of fundamental freedoms and a core component of the novel EU legislation on equal treatment and non-discrimination, faith diversity is hardly targeted by companies (as instanced, among other things, by its remarkable erasure from the Diversity Charter's text I trace below, see table 2); nor is it fully admitted, or only providing it is rendered invisible through discrete and segregated spacesillustrating then how repertoires of diversity are being caught up in hegemonic rearticulations, as we shall see next. 3. Endeavour to reflect the diversity of the French society in all its forms, at every level of the workforce.

4. Communicate to all employees and encourage their adhesion and commitment in favour of nondiscrimination and diversity.

5. Make the development and implementation of the diversity policy a subject of dialogue with the employees' representatives.

6. Insert a chapter in the annual report describing commitments to non-discrimination and diversity: measures implemented, internal procedures and results achieved.

Managing with "pragmatism"

Indeed, just as much as race and ethnicity, religion in the workplace falls along social division of labour lines: if intolerance is up within a head office and in management positions, wherein corporate branding is built in a privileged way, it is seen with more "pragmatism" in so-called "operative jobs". This is not to say that religion is admitted or, moreover, positively viewed and treated in such jobs; but while still considered a problem, the company resolves to "manage it", as if it were the natural attribute of a workforce, from which company "cannot cut off" [START_REF] De Rudder | Les syndicats et le racisme dans le secteur de la grande distribution[END_REF]; see also [START_REF] Doytcheva | Politiques de la diversité. Sociologie des discriminations et des politiques antidiscriminatoires au travail[END_REF]. As one female interviewee, going through a process of diversity mentoring and workforce and intermediation to access job, puts it: In the mid-2000s, this is a typical situation among large scale retail companies, such as Carrefour, Auchan or Casino: religion is the focus of both "a secular consensus" and "a practice of compromise" (De Rudder et al. 2005, p. 71). Compromises essentially arise from individual treatment, on a case-by-case basis, relying on the goodwill of managers: if they are "quiet", they might accede to the employee's request (by adjusting schedules, granting a work transfer, or holydays). In large-scale distribution, it is generally at checkouts that the most acute questions arise; while, once again, the wearing of Muslim headscarves concentrates the most heated debates 9 . Hijabs are usually prohibited in stores by way of general workplace regulations, as they are considered conspicuous religious signs, likely to "shock the clientèle" 10 . As the authors of the report point out, however, the exact appreciation of what an "Islamic headscarf" is and of its "obviously ostentatious" character is far from settled. When worn "discreetly", as a "bandana", the scarf can be assimilated to a fashion accessory and the employees may benefit from an effet de mode.

I
In the wake of the 2004 law banning religious symbols in schools, these local arrangements have been however gradually construed as "uncertain", and a source of "embarrassment" for companies [START_REF] Doytcheva | Politiques de la diversité. Sociologie des discriminations et des politiques antidiscriminatoires au travail[END_REF]; whose managers and diversity officers complained of feeling "disarmed" as the trade-offs and possible compromises to be drown reportedly appeared to them as "less and less clear". By the end of the decade, they started writing to the HALDE (High Authority for the Fight against Discrimination and Equality) 11 asking for clarifications 9 Other demands include the arrangement of working schedules to break the fast during the month of Ramadan or for Friday prayers, the avoidance of contact with pork, rarely the installation of a workplace prayer room. 10 For instance, Carrefour's workplace regulations read: "It is reminded that out of respect for customers and in order not to offend any of the sensibilities that they may represent, staff in contact with the public may not wear any obviously ostentatious signs of a political, union or religious kind. about how to address these situations in daily working life. As a diversity manager at a major food retail chain observed: "We wrote to the HALDE saying, listen, there was this Stasi report that addressed issues of secularism in schools. But there is nothing about the private sector at all!"

At the same time, personal professionals organisations such as ANDRH (National Association of Human Resource Directors), which is in theory proactive towards the workplace diversity agenda (chairing the National Committee of the Diversity Label), undertook work to clarify the challenges raised by religious claim-making and provide guidance on how to accommodate them (or not). But as of 2011, according to the opinion issued by the High Council for Integration (HCI), these initiatives had not led to a "decisive clarification" and "a lack of responses" persisted regarding the application of laïcité in the workplace (HCI, 2011, p. 10; see also [START_REF] Hajjat | Islamophobie: Comment les élites françaises fabriquent le « problème musulman[END_REF]. Calling for legislative action in its turn, HCI has fostered corporate demands for an extensive reading of neutrality principles, much like the regulation adopted for schools, to be enforced in workplaces. According to [START_REF] Liogier | La France et ses religions d'Etat[END_REF], such situation is highly representative of French secularism, which, rather than a strict separation or restraint of intervention, entails the process of political construction of "neutrality", as the cornerstone of public action.

Laïcité in reverse?

There are, however, companies where issues of religiosity seem to operate in reverse, or at least to a certain extent, since these organisations are eager to build their employer image and recruitment policy partly on the argument of "some tolerance". In field observations, this was especially the case for call centres or telemarketing companies -but one could hypothesize and extend this analysis to other back-office jobs (in the hotel or restaurant business), i.e. having no visibility and no "contact with customers". As a human resource manager at a telemarketing company based in Roubaix explained, "I know that in many call centres people can work dressed in their normal veil". In the terms of workforce intermediaries, for women who wish to dress in a hijab there are only two options: "either the cleaning or, at the very least, the telephone".

When it first opened offices in Roubaix, a city in Northern France, where according to some municipal estimates more than 40% of the inhabitants are of immigrant descent, mostly from Muslim majority countries 12 , this telephone consulting firm had to recruit a large number of employees at the same time; consequently, it had to "drain" numerous applications. The company was faced then with the "veil problem", as the human resource manager for the Roubaix site, also in charge of the internal diversity policy, explains:

Our company stands for laïcité. However, it was a bit particular here at the beginning for female employees who wore a headscarf, due to the method we used to recruit in large numbers, based on a particular hiring procedure, which is called "hiring by skills" (recrutement par les habiletés) 13 ... So, I asked them to tie their headscarf in a bun, and that it be colourful. In short, that it not be significant, or at least not ostentatious. And then, Discriminations et pour l'Egalité (HALDE) is an independent administrative body, in charge of receiving and mediating complaints of discrimination; similar to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in the U.K., its powers are however strictly extra-judicial in France (Latraverse and [START_REF] Doytcheva | La diversité normalisée à la française: Définitions et rapport au droit[END_REF].

https://www.mediacites.fr/enquete/lille/2017/12/01/roubaix-terre-de-religions-et-de-conversions/ See also : Autrement dit, 15 March 1996 ;La Voix du Nord, 10-11 March 1996 ;Nord-Eclair, 10-11 March 1996. everything went very well, it went really well! We have some girls who have their pink scarves, who have their coloured scarves, and then it's pretty, isn't it! This represents approximately 5% of our workforce ... Out of 450 people, there must be about 20 young women concerned. But it's true that in the company, we rather promote laïcité. So now, when I have people in a recruitment session, I ask them if they don't mind taking off their scarf or tying it in a bun to come to work.

Then the women tell me: if they want to take it off, they work without it, and in this case, we are completely neutral. If they prefer to wear it in a bun, they can do so, but I am quite vigilant on this point, when I see people who are starting to be more and more... [e.g. wearing a veil that covers their shoulders] I try to see them in private... I know that in Roubaix-Tourcoing, there are many call centres where women can work wearing their usual veil. It depends on companies. Here, we prefer that it be without the veil, that is completely laïque. Now we have a kind of tolerance.

As observed in other companies faced with significant recruitment needs in sectors where the labour market is tight and a high workforce turnover prevails, corporate diversity policies are framed internally as a way to "make sense" of workplace relations; and as such are expected to function as employee retention schemes. This is particularly the case in areas such as telemarketing, debt recovery, but also credit and insurance, the banking sector for receptionist jobs, restaurant and food retail chains. The corporate ambitions displayed by organisations in line with their managerial diversity policies are thus not only to sell more, but also, and in a less-expected way, to hire more, at least on certain very specific positions -with low to intermediate qualifications and skills. As explained by another diversity officer, eager to leverage diversity for employer branding, "today people who are looking for jobs, especially young people, are really seeking for companies that are able to give a sense to their work." However, and without prejudging the potential interest of the work done in this matter by companies, it prompts questions about the political and social meaning of diversity being deployed in such way. Although diversity claims in this setting take on the meaning of stigma reversal, from a sociological viewpoint, they also appear as being constructed in a discretionary and segregative manner, i.e. 1/ relegated to certain jobs and occupations, where "diversity already exists", in the very terms of its professionals (who nevertheless chose to concentrate efforts therein); 2/ invisibilised and concealed by means of technology and the absence of faceto-face relations, making thus sure not to "shock client sensitivity", on the other hand. To make it short, this is the story of Fatima, recruited by a call centre, where she was soon asked to change her name to Michelle 14 (given that it will be disclosed to customers' attention).

Highly paradoxical articulations of diversity are given free way under the guise of nondiscrimination, contributing to hegemonic rearticulations, and working to de facto reinstate racist structures and power relations within the very spaces designed to pursue equality. That is what I have referred to as "normalised diversity" [START_REF] Doytcheva | La diversité normalisée à la française: Définitions et rapport au droit[END_REF](Doytcheva, , 2020) ) -not least based on governance techniques it takes upon, namely those of standardisation, which is termed normalisation in French; one of its most prominent characteristics is that of being predominantly white. The concept of white diversity is thus intended to highlight the ways in which business re-appropriation of equal opportunity intersects with racist structures and power relations to uphold hegemonic whiteness. As we shall see next, religion, and Muslim identities in particular, lie at the core of "good" versus "bad diversity" divide, which is how race hierarchies are being re-embedded in organisations.

"Good" and "bad" diversities

The way in which religiosity and Muslim faith, in particular, operate as factors of racialisation [START_REF] Hajjat | Islamophobie: Comment les élites françaises fabriquent le « problème musulman[END_REF] has been made particularly visible in fieldwork through processes of diversity mentoring and workforce intermediation, aimed at supplying companies with "diverse candidates", or candidates "from diversity" as they are called in French (candidats issus de la diversité); and thus help them to flesh out their diversity action plans. As I have argued elsewhere [START_REF] Doytcheva | Intermédiaires et "opérateurs de la diversité" dans les politiques des entreprises[END_REF][START_REF] Doytcheva | Politiques de la diversité. Sociologie des discriminations et des politiques antidiscriminatoires au travail[END_REF], in French-style corporate diversity management, "diversity brokers and intermediaries" -i.e. structures developing such specific, diversity labelled, mentoring schemes -are key players, insofar as they allow organisations to outsource the management of some particularly "problematic" topics, including, but not limited to, racism and the management of ethnoracial categorisations. Furthermore, I hypothesise that the work done by intermediaries, in as much as it relies on an explicit articulation of employer norms and expectations, provides a productive vantage point from which to try and open up the black box of discrimination in organisational processes.

Based on primary field observations, these players exhibit contrasted profiles: while the majority are non-profit associations, a few act as recruitment firms; among the non-profits, some assert an activist and anti-racist approach, yet the majority come from social and philanthropic strands of employer-led social movements, gathering under the banner of "corporate patronage" (mécénat social, mécénat d'entreprise) 15 . Within this growing network of foundations, institutes, think-tanks and business groups dedicated to diversity management, some self-identify as "left-wing" or "progressive", while many others display strong connections with employer unions, and sometimes even position as their "social showcase". Voluntarily re-appropriating challenges of equal opportunity in the early 2000s, in the wake of the Diversity Charter movement, their interventions have appeared as quite significant of the above-mentioned "good" versus "bad diversity" divide. Indeed, while diversity brokers and intermediaries lack the overall capacity to effectively place their trainees and mentees in jobs, they engage nonetheless in a harsh normative work, aimed, in their own words, at "acculturating [minority job-seekers] to the manners of French companies", and sometimes even to French culture itself. Based on the procedures and schemes observed in fieldwork, this work is premised on a deficit model, assuming "a wide gap" between "corporate culture" and minority youth graduates. Under "neutral", deemed "meritocratic" organisational language -conveying notions of competency, employability, and interpersonal skills -it is above all the lack of savoir-être (which can be imperfectly translated into softskills) that is blamed on minority applicants; and this, even when they reach the highest educational levels, including PhD. Furthermore, in French-style competency management, a thriving personnel professional rhetoric on savoir-être actually overlaps with another key category, namely that of "personality". Yet, as demonstrated by the interviews excepts below, in hiring and human relations, personality issues, not surprisingly, are very quick to acquire a prominent "identity-related" dimension; based on cultural and even more so religious dynamics, this latter dimension distinctively embodies the very logic of organisarional racism and anti-Muslim discrimination, in particular: Some can't find a job because of a lack of network, but others ... well, you know, I'd say rather cause of identity problems.... I'd say there's about 20% in each promotion we accompany every year. These are the people who have the hardest time finding a job... Well, there's the veil, there's the person who's very hurt and has difficulty accepting a remark ... then there's also the gaze (la manière de regarder), the way of presenting oneself, the way of sitting through the interview, the handshake... At this point, I must and speak up: "careful there, with regard to the norm, you have to re-centre and make an effort." […] A lot of HR managers and directors won't hire because of the veil, because it signals a kind of personal rigidity, you know; so, they would say, she will have difficulty adapting within a group; or if she's looking for a job in the communication business, they will say no right away; if her job is in commerce, they will say no […] So, I tell the candidates frankly: in the company, you must leave everything you have of your culture, your private life at home; so as when you arrive there, you should first serve the company and get a salary in exchange; you really need to make this break and to arrive at work being yourself, and without cultural baggage. And this, they either understand it, or for those who don't, I tell them honestly: we can't network together, I'm sorry; I won't introduce you to companies; as long as you are unwilling to acknowledge that, we couldn't move forward. [diverse workforce volunteer coordinator at one large nonprofit organisation, emphasis added]

A respectable racism

The cases profiled above are part of a broad dynamics towards shifting selection devices and categories and their embedding into organisational processes framed as merely "neutral" and "meritocratic", for relying on notions of competency, employability, and corporate culture16 . Against the backdrop of new civil rights awareness and legislation, racism as ideology that excludes minorities is vocally condemned, while the latter minorities and Muslims in particular are no less seen as "culturally unsuitable", or otherwise "deficient" (Bonilla-Silva, 2018); and having therefore to accomplish an important "work on themselves" [START_REF] Doytcheva | Politiques de la diversité. Sociologie des discriminations et des politiques antidiscriminatoires au travail[END_REF] in order to integrate. As shown by the case study, this pejorative image of oneself and the injunction to "work on oneself" is significantly interiorised by some job applicants, especially those who, first, are closest to highly selective educational careers; and second, to whom it partly offers a self-protective coping strategy to deal with racism. As Hamza, a 25-year-old business school graduate, puts it:

Finally, I became aware in the process [of mentoring] that there was indeed something wrong with my way of being (ma manière d'êre) throughout interviews, while conducting my job research; I was actually, if you want, conveying a kind of victimised image of myself, that doesn't define me at all and that sometimes even hurt me a little... What I'm saying is that, for the problems I encountered, I don't feel like applying them to my origins. Now, I could tell you that I have been discriminated against but I don't want to feel it, I don't want to see this thing because, otherwise, it's just too horrible 17 . [emphasis added]

Based on field observations, within nevertheless diversity labelled set-ups and schemes, participants perceived as "too religious" -i.e. in this case Muslim -are automatically discarded from the selection processes; while the discriminatory nature of this exclusion remains unacknowledged, for being disguised on the one hand under supposedly rational or merely technical considerations, meant to derive from "corporate culture"; while coalescing, on the other hand, with new concepts of laïcité and secularism.

On the one hand, the naturalising and differentialistic assumptions that underpin the selection outcomes are to be understood in the terms of what Bonilla-Silva (2018) frames as a "colorblind racism" or "racism without racists", or what has been more recently referred to as "not-racism" by [START_REF] Lentin | Why Race Still Matters[END_REF]. Evidence that the majority of lived experiences of workplace racism nowadays encompass situations where bias and discrimination get "subtle", insidious, or otherwise embedded in socially sanctioned rationales, is prevalent. Embodied in day-to-day realities, mundane and repetitive practices, this "everyday racism" [START_REF] Essed | Understanding everyday racism: An interdisciplinary theory[END_REF][START_REF] Feagin | Living with racism: The black middle-class experience[END_REF], becomes "respectable" [START_REF] Bouamama | L'affaire du foulard islamique: la production d'un racisme respectable[END_REF] towards Muslim, as it involves socially admitted phenomena, increasingly framed as legitimate.

On the other hand, this broad sociological dynamic of evolving patterns of racism deeply intersects with the crystallisation, in recent years in French settings, of new constructions of secularism. Termed "axiological" [START_REF] Degirmenci | Le rapport Clavreul ou les errements d'un certain discours sur la laïcité[END_REF], these new constructions of laïcité no longer embody a legal principle, but rather a moral and political "value", which consequently should be enforced in every single practice and activity. Still the ambitious and far-reaching project of "neo-laïcité" (Hennette [START_REF] Vauchez | L'affaire Baby Loup ou la nouvelle laïcité[END_REF][START_REF] Dawes | Charlie Hebdo, free speech and counter-speech[END_REF]) -portrayed as "rigid" and "disciplinary" [START_REF] Hajjat | Islamophobie: Comment les élites françaises fabriquent le « problème musulman[END_REF] or otherwise "invasive" [START_REF] Tessier | Les arrêts Achbita et Bougnaoui de la CJUE, ou le triomphe d'une 'nouvelle laïcité' française au niveau européen[END_REF] -is far from being the prerogative of French republicanism alone. Across national borders, a politics of repression and widespread anti-Islamic hostility towards those assigned by religion is mainstreamed and deployed on a global scale [START_REF] Liogier | Le Mythe de l'islamisation. Essai sur une obsession collective[END_REF][START_REF] Mondon | Articulations of Islamophobia: from the extreme to the mainstream?[END_REF]. As put by [START_REF] Liogier | Le Mythe de l'islamisation. Essai sur une obsession collective[END_REF], Islam has become the "negative integrator" of an unfolding spectrum of "unexpected" new European right-wing movements: self-presenting as egalitarian, feminist, concerned with homophobia and anti-Semitism, they have not only revitalised national far-rights, but now provide them with a shared, pan-European, and transnational cause.

Following the analyses by a Belgian jurist, Lacorne (2019, p. 188) points out the ongoing construction of new conceptions of neutrality in ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) decisions. Between an exclusive conception (forbidding all public display of religious symbols outside of places of worship), and an inclusive one that allows public space to be filled with a pluralistic array of such symbols, a new path is now explored, based on "neutrality of compensation". Neutrality of compensation acknowledges State's right to invoke an "old tradition", whether cultural or "identity-linked", in order to give a "predominant visibility" to the majority religion. This position was reflected in several recent Court rulings, such as the upholding of the display of Christian crosses in public school classrooms in Italy; the recognition of France's right to enact legislation banning full-face covering clothing in the public space for the sake of protecting a harmonious "living together" and ideals of "republican fraternity" 18 .

Yet such developments also have a very clear and direct impact on workplace relations and employment discrimination. In 2016, the newly passed French labour law explicitly reasserted the possibility for employers to enforce workplace religious neutrality by way of general internal policy requirements 19 . While recent decisions by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) committed to provide some general guidelines for the purpose: not all businesses may adopt such internal rules, which must be justified by a "legitimate aim" and rely on "appropriate and necessary" means 20 . In November 2017, the French Court of Cassation confirmed this ruling, retaining in its turn "the contact with customers" as a legitimate condition under which an employer can introduce neutrality requirements on religious, philosophical or political grounds 21 . Although the CJEU decision was criticised, including in France, it was no less directly inspired by a French concept of secularism, which is now shown to be expanding and even "triumphing" [START_REF] Tessier | Les arrêts Achbita et Bougnaoui de la CJUE, ou le triomphe d'une 'nouvelle laïcité' française au niveau européen[END_REF] at European scale.

Conclusion

In this paper I have argued how the development, over the last decades in France, of specific anti-Muslim racism affects professional and organisational fields, but also a wide array of social spheres and activities. I have emphasised the undue burden it places on female employees; while, it is towards male Muslims that this religious penalty is the strongest in hiring, with nearly four times less chance of being called back following an application. In French organisational settings, this situation is unfolding under present day conditions based on an extensive reading of laïcité principles which, in the wake of 2004 law banning religious symbols in schools, have been applied with ever less empiricism. While the law's passage was justified by the need to prevent international judicial action against France, we are witnessing, some twenty years later, the extent to which the ban rationale has permeated a variety of institutions, including those that do not fall strictly speaking within the public space. Adding new territories to spatialities of secularism, it has been used in turn to bolster and justify the unfolding of specific, anti-Muslim racism.

Based on a longitudinal, qualitative research on workplace diversity policies, I have shown how the widespread hostility and discriminations it triggers coalesce around two tenets. First, patterns of racialisation: while the disqualification of Muslims from white corporate spaces is presented as stemming from "general" and merely "neutral" requirements, not targeting a single community, empirical evidence reveals on the contrary their very strong racial imprint; as faith options are systematically turned into "personality styles" and "identity problems". Second, the perceived legitimacy and widespread social acceptance of this "respectable racism", woven into claims upon meritocracy, and disguised as "corporate culture". While exposing once again the power dynamics of white racialized organisations, these findings from my position here gain further significance, as they involve actors and procedures explicitly designed to fight discrimination and promote workplace diversity. Repertoires of what I term "white diversity" uphold and re-instate organisational whiteness by dismissing race issues and hierarchiesdeemed "low priority", "unsuitable", or "coming up next" -but also and even more so faith issues and diversity. As such, it testifies to the pervasive, deeply entrenched, and gaining public legitimacy nature of such exclusionary practices. With secularism moving nowadays from legal principle to moral value and political and ideological creed, this situation is ultimately, I argue, less and less local and French, and increasingly global and European -although France continues to embody in some respects a "textbook case" of these trends.

Table 2 : The six commitments of the Diversity Charter: Erasing faith, race, and ethnicity from corporate diversity spaces The initial text of proposition

 2

					The definite agreed upon text
	Sabeg and Méhaignerie (2004, p.151)	www.diversity-charter.com
	1. Acknowledge France's multi-ethnic	1. Raise awareness on non-discrimination and
	dimension and, in this regard, commit	diversity issues among top management and staff
	to valuing and promoting equity and the	involved in recruitment, training and career
	respect of diversity in recruitment,	development and educate them in these matters;
	career development, and wage policy;
					2. Respect and promote the application of the
	2. Enact equality between men and	principle of non-discrimination at every stage of
	women by promoting gender equality	the human resources management, in particular
	through	recruitment,	career	in the recruitment, training, promotion and career
	development and wage policy;	development	of	employees.
	3. Include a non-discrimination clause in
	recruitment, on the basis of equal merit,
	skills and qualifications or talents;
	4. Commit	to	equitable	career
	development	and	prohibit	any
	prejudice, bias or oppression, and any
	form of discrimination, based on race,
	ethnicity, skin colour, religion, culture,
	gender, class or sexual orientation;
	5. Include pictures of the company's top
	20 to 30 executives and the details of
	diversity initiatives and their results in
	social reporting;
	6. Carry out awareness-raising and
	training in diversity management for
	executives,	HR	managers	and
	employees to provide a climate
	conducive to the recognition, respect
	and dignity of all individuals within the
	company in their cultural, ethnic and
	religious diversity. [emphasis added]

  have a female cousin who has a degree in psychology and who works as a cleaning woman. And, in fact, as a cleaner, things are going very well! In other words, French companies, if you want, on certain jobs, they don't care if you're of North African origin or whatever, if you're fat or thin... on some positions only, with no qualification, of course. Fatima, she works as a cleaning woman and it goes pretty well, no worries: nobody tells her, "you're going to shock with your scarf," "you're going to shock with your accent", or with your physical appearance, your colour of skin ... But for me, it goes bad because what I want is a position in the company, a position that comes to complement the corporate image and brand.

My translations.

"[ ... ] this freedom [of expression] cannot allow students to display symbols of religious affiliation which, by their nature, by the conditions in which they are worn individually or collectively, or by their ostentatious or assertive nature, would constitute an act of pressure, provocation, proselytising or propaganda, would violate the dignity or freedom of the student or other members of the educational community, jeopardise their health or safety, disrupt the conduct of teaching activities and the educational role of teachers, or disrupt order in the establishment or the normal functioning of the public service."

French Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 regulating, in accordance with the principle of laïcité, the wearing of religious symbols or clothing in public schools.

See Léa Balage, "La fin des discriminations au travail, c'est pour quand?", https://blogs.mediapart.fr/edition/les-invites-de-mediapart/article/170516/la-fin-des-discriminationsau-travail-c-est-pour-quand accessed April 20, 2021.

As recently as the early 1990s, indeed, explicit racial nomenclatures, coding BBR for bleu, blanc, rouge, i.e. "French white jobseekers only", were found in French public employment services, complacent with openly racist employers(Doytcheva et al., 2008, p.

172). But the issue will hardly surface in public debates at that time. 17 It should be noted that at the time of field interviews, "candidates" are not yet in job, but in the process of being coached by diversity intermediaries, whose work I have argued is strictly non-binding for companies (i.e. with no obligation of hiring or other results, seeDoytcheva 2015, p. 168, 171).


Antoinette Baujard
email: antoinette.baujard@univ-st-etienne.fr.

Ethics and technique in welfare economics: How welfarism evolves in the making

Keywords: Welfare Economics, Welfarism, Ethics, Practice, Ethical welfarism, Technical welfarism, Demarcation, Neutrality, Non-Neutrality, Axiological transparency, Value judgements Économie du bien-être, welfarisme, éthique, pratique, welfarisme éthique, welfarisme technique, démarcation, neutralité, non-neutralité, transparence axiologique, jugements de valeur. JEL-Codes: B4, D6, I31

niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Introduction

If, following Sen (1970: 105-120), we accept that "there are marked differences, both logical and rhetorical", between mathematical, factual, and value judgements, then Philippe Mongin's insight that "one's vision of economics cannot be the same regardless of whether one construes it as a primarily neutral or a primarily non-neutral discipline" (2006: 258) seems ineludible. And hence [START_REF] Mongin | Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics[END_REF] famously conducted an investigation into value judgements and value neutrality, defending the "weak non-neutrality thesis" against alternative positions regarding the demarcation between the positive and the normative in economics.

Elaborating on the Weberian distinction between making and studying value judgements, Mongin observes that the latter requires us to split the "traditional concept of a value judgement into a statement and a judgement proper", something which is possible only on the condition that the value judgements are clearly explicated. After my two previous papers in this vein [START_REF] Baujard | Value judgments and economics expertise[END_REF][START_REF] Baujard | Values in welfare economics[END_REF], this paper pays a further tribute to Philippe Mongin's major contribution in this area: here, I apply the weak-non-neutrality thesis to the normative analysis of the assertions of welfare economics, highlighting the difficulties that the transparency condition faces in the move from theory to practice.

Welfare economics provides a general theoretical framework intended to enable the evaluation of social states and to assist in the making of public decisions. For this purpose, welfare economics evaluates alternative situations or public policies in terms of their consequences for social welfare. If policy A generates better consequences for social welfare than policy B, then the evaluator should recommend policy A. The central matter for debate, of course, concerns the criteria that determine what "better consequences" means. Welfare economics standardly considers that social welfare only depends on individual well-being: it is this feature that is called "welfarism". 3The wide literature on welfarism, and especially that which is critical of it, has focused mainly on formal or philosophical issues, seeking to illuminate which ethical values are or are not embedded in the welfarist approach. Philosophical enquiries which adopt this perspective are concerned to investigate why and how welfarism is justified, and also to specify what "ethical load" is conveyed by the adoption of welfarism in the first place. The focus on individual well-being requires, foremost, that other ethical values, including rights or freedom, should not be assigned intrinsic importance; they can at most have only instrumental value.

3

Besides this point, we note that well-being can be defined by reference to some version of subjective utility, or in terms of objective welfare. There are indeed strong disagreements on which conception of welfare should be retained for normative purposes (e.g. Sen 1979a[START_REF] Griffin | Well-being: Its meaning, measurement, and moral importance[END_REF][START_REF] Sumner | happiness, and ethics[END_REF][START_REF] Tiberius | Well-being: Psychological research for philosophers[END_REF][START_REF] Sugden | The community of advantage. A behavioural economist's defence of the market[END_REF] among many others). The concept of individual well-being adopted by any given author will therefore at root be linked to some specific theory of well-being, which provides a justification in its favor and counterarguments against competing theories [START_REF] Haslett | What is utility ?[END_REF], see also the chapters by Bykvist, Haybron, Hurka, Lucas or Graham in [START_REF] Adler | The Oxford Handbook of Well-being and public policy[END_REF]. Hence 'welfarism' implies a reference to the ethical values embedded in the given welfarist framework, where these are delineated by the focus on individual well-being to the exclusion of other values, and also by the specific choice of the interpretation of individual well-being. This emphasis on theoretical aspects raises a number of issues, however, given that the tools of welfare economics, including the ubiquitous cost-benefit analysis, have been designed and are used for practical matters, specifically evaluations and recommendations. There are, in particular, technical issues arising because of the operational conditions in which information on well-being is to be gathered. Much indeed has been written on the difficulties of measuring and comparing well-being in practice,4 the core of the debate concerning whether welfare is best captured by preference-satisfaction,5 the happiness view of well-being,6 or appropriate alternatives. In particular, van der Deijl (2018: 128) argues that a given notion of individual well-being can be "so data-demanding given its basic theoretical commitments, that it would be practically infeasible as a useful tool for policy"; he notably shows how preference-measures face strong methodological challenges in concrete contexts, and highlights which trade-offs with the theoretical commitments are involved in the operationalization process. Beyond the ability to measure welfare faithfully, another issue regarding the ethical transparency of welfarism arises when practical matters are brought into consideration. The question of whether ethical values are to be seen as embedded in the welfarist approach, and if so which, may be sensitive to different considerations when it is posed at the applied level. We might indeed claim that the way the framework is applied in practice may have an impact on our assessment of the ethical content of welfarism itself. This paper aims to bridge this gap: my aim is to explore how the concept of welfarism fares in the translation from the ethical domain into the technical. 7 Let us use the term 'ethical welfarism' to refer to the theory's moral or philosophical perspective on economic assertions, according to which individual utilities are all that matters in determining what social welfare is. Seeking to improve social welfare must involve taking into account individual utilities and, at the very least, not diminishing them. Bentham, for instance, builds his utilitarian theory on this idea, and aims to exclude from it any normative source other than the value of individual utilities. More generally, every philosophical welfare theory is supposed to provide a sound deliberative justification of what individual well-being should be, i.e., why a given notion of well-being is more appropriate than an alternative. Hence from this perspective we do not discuss which is the proper interpretation of utility, and we simply assume that 'well-being' and 'utility' are synonymous: we accept as a premise that there exists some persuasive justification for our adoption of whatever specific notion of utility that in the end we retain. From this perspective, then, the ethical claim of a given welfarist theory depends, as one would expect, on its ability to improve individual well-beings, as well as more specifically on the interpretation of individual well-being it adopts.

In contrast to the above, let us use the term 'technical welfarism' to mean the evaluation of economic assertions from the perspective of the given notion of well-being which has in practice been adopted, according to which it is individual utilities, so operationalized and as observed and measured in real situations, which are the only source of information used to measure social welfare. This is what is to be done in the evaluation of public policy or in issuing recommendations, irrespective of whether such evaluations or recommendations are themselves implied by the theory of welfare economics. For instance, most cost-benefit analyses appeal to individual preferences measured on the basis of willingness to pay or willingness to accept. Thus, besides that basic focus on well-being, the ethical content of a welfarist measure will also manifest some dependency on the information regarding well-being that is actually gathered.

Since welfarist assertions focus only on individual well-beings, the higher the individual well-beings in a social state, the better we judge this social state to be; and policies enhancing well-being are hence commended as the means to improve social states. Yet the co-existence of two different perspectives, ethical and technical, on what is ostensibly a single common doctrine, welfarism, is likely to generate unexpected difficulties. Let us say we defend, on some theoretical grounds, that well-being is x, while in practice, for various operational reasons, the well-being measure we use is y; we strongly expect-or assume-that the two measures x and y track each other, that is to say they tend to improve or decline in the same direction. If such is not the case, not only have we adopted a bad perception of well-being, but public decision makers may be enjoined to choose a policy which improves well-being as measured by y, whereas this very policy might decrease well-being understood as x-i.e., decrease well-being in the sense considered relevant and accordingly justified by the chosen ethical theory. In this specific case, the contradiction between the interpretations of well-being induces a violation of the main principle of welfarism: social welfare as measured is improving even though wellbeing is actually decreasing. Whether for the evaluation of states or for policy recommendations, such a situation is undesirable. The provision of reliable normative analyses of welfarism, both from the ethical and the technical perspective, is a necessary condition to be able to check whether the undesirable situation described above does indeed obtain. This paper examines how these two perspectives on welfarism, ethical and technical, are articulated, what tensions may emerge from distinguishing them, and how these tensions may be resolved. To answer these questions, the paper contrasts different views regarding the duality of welfarism and challenges their underlying rationales. The first section develops the standard claim that there is no reason to be alarmed by the duality of welfarism, since the two facets are relevant at different stages and within different domains: evaluators first choose an ethical theory among the many that are available, and in a second step they operationalize it, assuming that the normative choice made at the ethical stage will be preserved at the stage of practice. By contrast, the second section presents the 'proxy' claim, according to which using genuine well-being, although it can claim impeccable ethical justification, would face technical difficulties in practice. Thus a convenient proxy for utility must be employed at the technical stage, subject of course to the constraint that the proxy selected does correlate with genuine well-being, and hence that we have a measure of utility which is capable of tracking well-being with an acceptable level of accuracy, however well-being may be conceived. The third section presents the 'conditional evidential' claim, namely the claim that in practice welfare economics should use preferences to measure individual utilities, even though these are not identical to well-being. One reason to accept this approach is it seems that preferences do provide sufficient evidence for well-being, i.e., well-being improves when preferences are satisfied, and deteriorates when they are not. Clearly, whether the normative analyses are conducted on the basis of a chosen ethical theory of well-being or with the actual information used to approximate well-being, each employs different basic information, and therefore each is likely to provide outcomes that are distinct; in order to make sure the different measures covary (at least approximately), therefore, the conditional evidential claim requires that we frame the ethical conditions such that observed preferences are indeed a roughly reliable measure for social welfare. The fourth section presents the tension claim: even on the assumption that the ethical theory has well been chosen and the associated measure can be observed, the operational constraints in making such observations may obscure the most relevant information and guide evaluators to decisions that may have the effect of reducing the utility of the majority of people.

This study thus issues a strong warning that the tension between the ethical and technical versions of welfarism is likely lead to misleading ethical implications.

1-The standard claim

In line with the condition, mentioned above, that the value judgements should be made clear and explicit [START_REF] Mongin | Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics[END_REF], or, equivalently, what I have called the "transparency requirement" of the social welfare function approach [START_REF] Baujard | Values in welfare economics[END_REF], the ethical stage is standardly assumed to be axiologically transparent. This stage is simply an association of the framework with the value of individual well-being; or, more precisely, it is to say exactly what normative values from among a number of alternative potential interpretations of well-being are involved in the choice of a theory of well-being. Having deliberated and selected a desirable theory of well-being, evaluators then seek to provide an operational definition of this specific notion of well-being such that it can be measured (as an illustration, see, e.g. Adler 2019: 9, 20-21, ch. 2; Adler and Holtug 2019). Any recommendations deriving from this analysis can be "tied to specific goals and declared values. Prescriptions that are explicitly conditional on certain values and goals leave ample room for disagreement to the actors who do not share those values and goals" (Adler and Fleurbaey 2018: 444). This transparency guarantees that experts may "consciously think of their contribution as a component of the democratic debate" (Adler and Fleurbaey 2018: 448), while the latter is improved by the transparent analysis of the normative presuppositions of their assertions.

The standard view is that there are no grounds to distinguish the ethical and the technical versions of welfarism, apart from the fact they pertain to different domains and apply at successive stages. Ethical welfarism pertains to the justification stage, and belongs to the domain of moral or political philosophy. Technical welfarism pertains to the stage of application, and belongs to the domain of practical evaluation or decision making regarding public policies. The latter stage is intended to be a faithful translation of the ethical choices made at the former, albeit now in a concrete setting. Obviously, both domains have their own specific requirements: ethical concerns in the former stage which might not mean much in practice, and the exigences of technical adaptation to context in the latter.

All in all, ethics and technique comprise two different domains; however, the technicalities play an ancillary role, restricted to applying the deliverances of the ethical stage without introducing bias. According to the standard claim, then, the technical stage does not engage any further ethical values in translating the ethical stage; as a result, the ethical load of the technical stage is exactly equivalent to that which was explicitly assumed at the ethical stage. Any further details arising due to the circumstances of application are "technical".

Such an analysis is familiar to many, and echoes the general intuitive idea that technicalities are merely technicalities, and that ethics and technique may be kept separate. In the philosophical and sociological study of science, however, this claim is often challenged.

Following this line of argument, we now call this familiar distinction into question for the case of welfare economics.

2-The proxy claim

Some supporters of welfarism claim there is a substantial distinction between the ethical and the technical versions of welfarism. According to what we may call the 'proxy' claim, an acceptable proxy for well-being, i.e., information that is well correlated with but in essence distinct from genuine well-being, should suffice in the context of technical welfarism. Due to operational constraints, the appeal to a proxy is likely to perform better than the consideration of actual well-being as regards the main goal, which is to improve well-being.

Bentham's utility calculus provides a perfect illustration of the proxy claim [START_REF] Bentham | Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation[END_REF]. It is unquestionable that Bentham is an ethical welfarist, since he defends above all the essential and exclusive role of individual utility. Welfarism here implies an appeal to Bentham's chosen interpretation of utility in the measurement of social welfare when designing utilitarian policies. Utility, according to Bentham, is defined through the utility calculus, which I have claimed [START_REF] Baujard | A return to Bentham's felicific calculus: From moral welfarism to technical non-welfarism[END_REF] 8 proceeds in three successive stages: the list of elementary pains and 8 Baujard (2009) provides a novel 'reading' of Bentham's utility calculus, in which the philosophical justification and the operational application of the calculus are properly disentangled and defined. Since the influential work of Elie [START_REF] Halévy | La formation du radicalisme philosophique[END_REF]Halévy ( , 1905)), there has existed a standard reading, which here we may call the duality thesis, according to which Bentham sometimes defended a calculation based on the classification of pains and pleasures, and sometimes a calculation based on an arithmetic of pains and pleasures. While this distinction is historically significant, given the divergent influences of Bentham's utilitarianism in the realms of law or economics, it is nonetheless questionable in the face of the numerous texts where the calculus is introduced. [START_REF] Baujard | A return to Bentham's felicific calculus: From moral welfarism to technical non-welfarism[END_REF] pleasures; the weighting of the unit elements by different criteria; and, finally, the list of elementary circumstances affecting the sensitivity of individuals and allowing the integration of an idiosyncratic (yet not subjective) aspect to the measurement of pains and pleasures. Being an ethical welfarist within this framework amounts to affirming that only utilities measured in this manner count for the measurement of social welfare.

By contrast, when Bentham contemplates how judges, legislators and public decisionmakers should evaluate social states, he considers a separate method of calculation. When considering the practical reality of measuring and deciding, Bentham identifies serious operational problems concerning the availability and reliability of information, in as much as it is tedious and expensive to gather the information on substantive utilities, and because such information is not directly available to, or is asymmetrically available or strategically manipulable by, the stakeholders. For these operational reasons, Bentham defends the need to appeal to a monetary standard, e.g., willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept, to measure the intensity of utility (Bentham 1822-43: 540-1). Furthermore, he adapts such measures for different individuals by identifying their secondary circumstances: the latter are objectively observable and hence do not raise the problems of the ideal calculus, and they convey the idiosyncratic features which allow the measure to be adapted to each individual. Information related to the monetary standard and the secondary circumstances are not in themselves utility, but rather constitute some satisfactory approximation of utility suitable for practical purposes (Bentham 1802a: 82-4).

Bentham suggests we should not resort to authentic utilities to measure social welfare:

"the principle itself is not denied, but it is the application that is thought impossible" (Bentham1802a: 82). At first sight it seems this technical choice cannot but be analyzed as nonwelfarist, at least from the perspective of ethical welfarism. For operational reasons, other information apart from well-being is now countenanced for use within evaluations, precisely because using this distinct information is likely to be compatible with, or even serve, ethical welfarism. In this instance, ethical theories do not in practice need to measure well-being on the basis of the genuine definition of well-being; they rather need to appeal to some distinct information, measured by a proxy and adapted by reference to secondary circumstances. This measure in practice is used for operational reasons, although it is not justified a priori by ethical theories. Still, the appeal to proxies does have ethical implications, since the result itself will rather defends that Bentham's calculus is a single process embedding these different phases. This thesis seems to be accepted in the community today: we can now assert that Bentham defines utility in large part by appeal this calculus.

be better when judged from a utilitarian point of view-the ideal calculus being impracticable in the context. It is only necessary to prove that there is a strong correlation between actual well-being and the operational measure that is applied at the technical stage.

In a nutshell, then, the proxy claim first upholds that operational constraints generate serious difficulties as regards gathering real and reliable information on well-being which would then be measured according to the ethical theory of well-being. Second, evaluators should thus rely on information that is different from genuine well-being, in so far as it is still a satisfactory proxy for well-being.

3-The conditional evidential claim

In the welfarist welfare economics, social welfare typically depends on individual wellbeing only, while "economists traditionally adopt a preference view of well-being" (Adler 2019: 11)-i.e., the claim that an individual is better off in one outcome than in another if she prefers the first outcome.9 This amounts to believing that the ethical theory here chosen asserts that well-being is defined by the satisfaction of preferences, which implies that satisfying preferences is morally valuable, whatever the preferences.

However, Hausman and McPherson (2009) and [START_REF] Hausman | value, choice, and welfare[END_REF], among others,10 strongly challenge the view that welfare can be identified with preference satisfaction, enumerating at least six reasons for this: first, there can be false beliefs; second, people care about other things than their well-being, including altruistic or malevolent inclinations; third, there are preferences changes such that there is a need to select the relevant preference from among a number; fourth, there may be inconsistencies between individuals' first-order and second-order preferences (the preferences over their preferences); fifth, recommendations would be meaningless in case of expensive or antisocial tastes; sixth, it is difficult to tackle cases of coercion, manipulation or any other problematic psychological mechanisms. Besides these problems, they reject a list of bad reasons which may be cited in support of the idea that welfare is preference satisfaction. They thus conclude that wellbeing and preferences are irrevocably distinct, which clearly challenges any ethical theory of wellbeing which considers preferences to be at the core of social welfare. [START_REF] Hausman | value, choice, and welfare[END_REF] raises concerns that using improper information in welfare economics involves risks: "to provide helpful information, those who do cost-benefit analysis must employ it cautiously and with good judgement. Bad advice is not always better than no advice." Hence the evidential claim cannot avoid special scrutiny. The ability to resolve the tensions between well-being (which is the ethical aim) and preferences (the technically available source of information) turns on specifying precisely which are the conditions under which preferences are to count towards the assessment of well-being; such conditions could include for example, being based on full information and true beliefs, exhibiting rationality, etc.

According to these authors, in circumstances in which people are concerned with their own interests and where they are reasonably good judges of what will serve those interests, their preferences will be reliable indicators of what is good for them. Although welfare ontologically speaking is not preferences, preferences, if framed under certain conditions or having been subjected to a "laundering" process, may constitute a sufficiently reliable source of information for use in welfare economics. Although the definition of well-being used in both domains is indeed different, these conditions (and laundering processes) enable the restoration ex post of a link between technical and ethical welfarism, Thus, to conclude, technical welfarism is not just the translation of ethical welfarism into another context; the technical stage is not meant to capture just any suitably reflective theory of well-being. It appeals to an utterly different source of information, which is able to serve the aim of ethical welfarism only at the expense of imposing conditions which restore a satisfying correlation between ethics and technicalities.

4-The tension claim

The tension claim belongs to another line of argument that supports the distinction between ethical and technical welfarism, but which, as we will see, is more pessimistic as regards to the consequences of this distinction.

Let us for a moment admit, contrary to Hausman and McPherson's claim, that we are able to justify revealed preference theory as the proper political theory of well-being. A problem then occurs, however, because actual revealed preferences are limited to the alternatives in which agents do in fact choose [START_REF] Reynolds | The concept of choice, and Arrow's theorem[END_REF]Paris 1979: 357-363, Hausman 2012: 27). We thus propose to take seriously the consequences of the restriction of the contexts of revelation of preferences to assess the quality and reliability of the information thereby conveyed.

Behavioral observations under revealed preference theory typically provide comparisons limited to the context of observation. As we have seen previously, technical elements then convey unexpected difficulties: in particular, elicited preferences are limited to the alternatives belonging to the opportunity set actually faced by the individuals observed, rather revealed on the basis of a comprehensive map of all possible combinations of individual preferences in any choice contexts whatsoever. Observation does not provide the complete profile of individual preferences over the universal domain of states of affairs, as the data collection is restricted on two grounds: information about choices is considered at an aggregate level rather than at the level of individual well-being, and it is only defined over the actual choice sets faced by individuals, these being subsets of the universal domain.

A generic example based on transport choices is chosen to illustrate this issue. Let us imagine we observe that more than half of the population chooses the car over the bus when facing a choice set restricted to cars and buses, and more than half chooses the taxi over the metro when facing the choice set restricted to taxis and metro: the revealed preference theory hence concludes that the population largely prefers cars over buses, and taxis over metro. A difficulty occurs when it then pretends to conclude that the population prefers the combination including cars and taxis over that including buses and metro, as such a result is indeed not included in the observed data. A combination of modes may impact the reasons for choice, following Reynolds and Paris's argument (1979); individual preferences may be impacted by possible complementarities between transportation modes. No reliable information on preferences over combinations of modes is available when restricting our attention to pairwise choice contexts. Pursuing this line of argument, [START_REF] Baujard | L'estimation des préférences individuelles en vue de la décision publique. Problèmes, paradoxes, enjeux[END_REF] elaborated a model of public economics tools to study the problems generated by welfarist decisions within the framework of revealed preference theory, inspired by a technique introduced by Saari and Seiberg (2001) in voting theory to compute the occurrence of paradoxes under different assumptions over the distribution of preferences. The model is able to measure, on the basis of the reliable information that can be gathered from choice contexts, the probability of each possible consistent utility profiles.

Considering a weak assumption on the distribution of preferences, preferences are uniformly distributed over the universal domain of modes. With a preference of 56% of the population for cars over buses and 52% for taxis over the metro, the model enables us to compute that the probability that more than half of the population actually prefers cars and taxis over buses and metro is only 4.55%. If the number of choice contexts increases, or if the assumption on the distribution of preferences is a normal distribution rather than a uniform distribution, the problem is exacerbated. For data based on more than three pairwise choice contexts, following the majority of preferences on the choice set would violate the preference of a majority of agents over the universal sets of alternatives. Evaluators may hence be tempted to support a ranking of social states (based on a utility profile on restricted available choice sets) under welfarist justifications, which may prove, under certain realistic operational conditions, to be contrary to the utility of a majority of individuals (based on their choices made over the universal domain of alternatives).

Revealed preferences have been here taken as an example to show the constraints that may exist at the applied stage. The problem we have highlighted with revealed preference theory is due to the fact that the full picture of preferences is not accessible to reliable observation and measurement as this technique, as it is embedded in certain contexts of observation of choices, lead us to ignore a part of actual preferences. As a consequence, the decisions taken on the basis of such partial or biased information are likely to be in contradiction with these actual preferences.

Other techniques of elicitation of preferences are currently used in applied welfare economics in addition to revealed preferences. These methods of elicitation of preferences rely on surveys where respondents answer a questionnaire regarding individuals' subjective perception, their hypothetical behavior in a plausible experimental situation, or their hypothetical valuation of such situation. There is however no guarantee that stated preferences will never fail where revealed preferences does. Contingent valuation may ignore or violate some of the target preferences because of strategic behaviors [START_REF] Samuelson | The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures[END_REF], endowment effects (Kahneman, Knetsch, andThaler 1990, 1991), anchoring effects [START_REF] Randall | Bidding Games for Valuation of Aesthetic Environmental Improvements[END_REF], and so on (see, e.g., [START_REF] Diamond | Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number[END_REF]Hausman 1994, Bhanzhaf 2017). In happiness studies, the correlation between actual preferences and elicited preferences also raises skepticism as far as, at least, questionnaires on happiness strongly depend on the framing of questions and on the choice of scales [START_REF] Fleurbaey | Beyond GDP: Measuring welfare and assessing sustainability[END_REF]. Whether these alternative methods may still provide useful information is not to be disputed here, but we cannot ignore that a wide and diverse literature casts doubts that the tension issue could be easily bypassed.

According to the tension claim, the operational conditions of gathering information generates technical issues. Depending on the practical contexts of gathering and treating information, difficulties and paradoxes may occur. As a consequence, ethical utilities may translate poorly into technical utilities, and an intractable tension emerges between ethical welfarism and technical welfarism. The normative load of ethical welfarism does not guarantee any information on the associated technical welfarism. In the course of discussing the previous claims we described the evolution of the notion of well-being from theory to practice, but the tension claim now insists on the potential violation of the principle of improving individual well-being no matter how it is defined. This situation may be misleading for evaluators as the appeal to ethical welfarism fails to guarantee their ability to derive reliable information and transparent normative conclusions from the observable and available data.

5-Discussion and conclusion

In the social welfare function approach, the specification of the normative load of an evaluation or of a recommendation ought to be entirely exhausted by the transparent axiomatic analysis of the social welfare function or index thereby employed. Ethical welfarism and technical welfarism provide a framework to scrutinize the normative load of an economic assertion respectively in theory and in concrete contexts. The articulation between them specifically governs the evolution of welfarism 'in the making'. This paper illustrates three widespread views about how this articulation is to be understood, and introduces a fourth one.

According to "the standard claim", technical welfarism is merely a translation of ethical welfarism into a distinct domain; no specific effort is required to study which ethical values are conveyed once a given welfarist social welfare function is being used in practice. Once we consider the fact that information on genuine well-being is hard to gather in practice, however, this intuitively appealing view is then undermined by more convincing counterclaims.

According to "the proxy claim", technical welfarism is based on substantially different sources of information than genuine well-being, the former being only a means to provide the best approximation of the latter in the presence of operational constraints. According to the "conditional evidential claim", welfare does not amount to preference satisfaction, although using preferences as approximations for welfare is desirable in practice, provided that some normative conditions over the ethical acceptability of the gathered data are met.

The conditions under which the appeal to certain information in technical welfarism can be considered reliable are based on either a positive confirmation of the correlation between such information and genuine utilities-in the proxy claim-or on a normative condition-in the conditional evidential claim. Notably, these two claims are distinct provided we assume that the discussion of the correlation in the proxy claim belongs only to the domain of technicalities;

but this assumption may be challenged. To continue our example, Bentham mentions that legislators and judges are entitled and indeed encouraged to check whether the proxy does properly respect the utility principle (Bentham 1802a: 84). In other words, whether the correlation holds relies in the end on the ability to check whether ethical conditions are met.

The distinction between both views begins to fade as ethical issues arise in the concrete context under consideration.

Finally, we elaborated a fourth view, which we called "the tension claim". Rather than expecting satisfying correlations, this view insists on the possibility that, due to the actual conditions of gathering information, a policy might seem to be improving welfare, as technically measured, when it is actually decreasing genuine welfare, as ethically defined; and the converse. In the terminology introduced in this paper, technical welfarism is liable to violate ethical welfarism. As a result, analyzing the normative load of a welfarist claim on the basis of ethical considerations only concerning the social welfare function is not self-sufficient, and is potentially misleading. This makes a case for extending the analysis of the normative load to the applied level, rather than restricting it to the ethical level.

What we can learn from these particular views is therefore of widespread application.

On the one hand, when the value of well-being is justified from the philosophical perspective, we feel intuitively that welfarist measures of well-being are able to reflect this notion of wellbeing without any bias. This perspective strictly conforms to the transparency requirement regarding values in welfare economics. But this intuitive approach does not hold when the concrete context is taken into account, as non-welfarist approaches may in practice fare better than welfarism.

On the other hand, in order to justify the concept of well-being used in welfare economics or, alternatively, to properly interpret the normative load of the welfarist approach that is employed, the unveiling process should not concern so much the ex-ante debate on ethical welfarism, but also the ex-post debate on technical welfarism. In order to serve wellbeing-as is enjoined by any ethical welfarist doctrine-the consideration of operational difficulties pushes us to take appropriate precautions: the information to be used in practice might not be the justified notion of well-being, only the best approximation in the specific context of the scientific implementation of the tools of welfare economics. Hence the issue of selecting the relevant information for welfare economics or analyzing the ethical load of evaluations is not only a problem of political philosophy, but also an issue for the sociology of science.11 Conversely, any reflection on practical matters raises normative debates of its own.

As a tentative conclusion, we suggest that the issue of ethical transparency ought to be pushed further, beyond the exclusive domains of political philosophy and the formal analysis of the social welfare function, so as to encompass the concrete arena of application.

  Hausman and McPherson, however, claim this does not imply that preferences should not be used in welfare economics. They defend the claim that welfare economics should be independent of any philosophical theory of well-being. Welfare economics requires nothing more than an evidential connection between preferences and welfare, i.e., if preferences are sufficiently correlated to welfare, it is acceptable use preferences in welfare economics, although they do not constitute well-being. In other words, technical welfarism and ethical welfarism are distinct and work differently. The notion of welfare used in practice is not the same as that notion of well-being that should count according to the chosen political theory of well-being.The cloth of Hausman and McPherson's argument is woven from pragmatism, awareness and caution. For one thing, evaluators need a guide for policy-making, and preferences may provide sufficient evidence to help ensure decisions are more likely to be favorable for individual well-being. At the same time, however, preferences are not well-being, and hence

After Hicks (1959), in the late seventies Amartya Sen introduced this concept[START_REF] Sen | On weights and measures: Informational constraints in social welfare analysis[END_REF](Sen , 1979a b) b) in order to bring out some of the difficulties of welfare economics, in addition to the more standard aggregation issue.

See, e.g.,[START_REF] Robbins | Interpersonal comparisons of utility[END_REF][START_REF] Harrod | Scope and method of economics[END_REF][START_REF] Cooter | Were the ordinalists wrong about welfare economics[END_REF], 1988[START_REF] Hennipman | A new look at the ordinalist revolution: Comments on Cooter and Rappoport[END_REF][START_REF] Hammond | Interpersonal comparisons of utility. Why and how they are and should be made[END_REF]. For a comprehensive view of the issues concerning the measurement of utility, seeMoscati 2018.

See, e.g., Infante, Lecouteux and Sugden (2016).

In particular, there is significant progress in the psychological foundations of the measurement of subjective well-being[START_REF] Frey | Policy consequences of happiness research[END_REF].

For an historical overview of the chosen interpretation of utility in economics and its impact on welfare economics, see[START_REF] Baujard | L'économie du bien-être est morte. Vive l'économie du bien-être ! In Philosophie économique[END_REF][START_REF] Baujard | A utility reading for the history of welfare economics[END_REF].

On the difficulties of linking preferences with well-being, see, among others,[START_REF] Sen | Well-being, agency and freedom: The Dewey lectures 1984[END_REF],Agner (2010Agner ( , 2018)),[START_REF] Bykvist | Preference-based views of well-being[END_REF]

Similar arguments in favor of a science of ethics in applied contexts have been provided by[START_REF] Rudner | The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments[END_REF],[START_REF] Baujard | Value judgments and economics expertise[END_REF][START_REF] Martini | The role of experts in the methodology of economics[END_REF].