Marie D'udekem-Gevers
email: marie.gevers@unamur.be

A Little-Known Chapter in the

Keywords: Belgium, dissemination of innovations, history of computing, stored program computer

des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Introduction

The present contribution1 addresses a subject that remains largely 2 unknown: the origins of computing in Belgium. It discusses the design and building in Antwerp of a computer known at the time as the Machine Mathématique IRSIA-FNRS [START_REF] Meinguet | Telephone communication on[END_REF] (MMIF) because it was funded by the Institut pour l'Encouragement de la Recherche Scientifique dans l'Industrie et l'Agriculture [START_REF] Meinguet | [END_REF] (IRSIA) and the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique 5 (FNRS).

The information presented here is the result of research 6 begun in 2005 and completed in 2011. The study focused initially on interviews with pioneers in the computing field 7 . Each of these interviews was conducted in a semi-directed manner and was audio-taped 8 . Each taping was then transcribed and sent to the interviewee for corrections. However, it quickly became apparent that, in order to confirm details or resolve any ambiguities or contradictions, it would be necessary to telephone the interviewees after the interviews or to contact new eyewitnesses. Furthermore, during the study, E-mail exchanges became increasingly important and relevant. They enabled us to compare diverging accounts and also to encourage reminiscences. In all, twelve people9 who were actively involved in the history of the MMIF were contacted and gave their accounts. In addition, these eyewitnesses provided contemporary documents 10 about the Machine: texts pertaining to the description, functioning and programming of the MMIF, as well as photos from that time. On the basis of these eyewitness accounts and, above all, the contemporary texts and photos about the MMIF, I began to write a technical description of the Machine. Then, I systematically gave the eyewitnesses the texts I had written for corrections and additions. Subsequently, it became evident to me that the historical context of the prototype would have to be addressed. There were major gaps in my information about this subject, and therefore I went to the FNRS Archives. Using photocopies of documents found there, I was able, step by step, to write the detailed history of the MMIF. This text was further enhanced with information from other sources already gathered about the Machine. Finally, the completed monograph was sent to a number of people (including participants in the MMIF project), who agreed to read it and make any suggestions for improvements.

Historical Context

The first event that would lead to the building of the MMIF dates back to 3 May 1946 [25]: this was the decision by the FNRS Board of Directors to ask Professor Charles Manneback e/ that the Committee and Bell Telephone shall undertake all necessary measures to ensure that a certain number of scientists -engineers, mathematicians and physicists -are assigned to design and build the Machine and are trained in the techniques for the building and use of said Machine; f/ that the building shall be performed under the leadership of Mr W. Pouliart, Mr. Linsman and Mr. Belevitch [START_REF] Wiedmer | E-mail dated[END_REF] working on it full time." In early May 1951, the design of the MMIF began, followed almost immediately by work on its construction. On 14 May 1952, following a visit to BTMC, Aiken wrote a letter [21] in which he recommended a few new improvements and proposed a schedule for completion. In June of that year, the assembly [START_REF]CECE: Document no. 1, Manuel de programmation pour la machine mathématique IRSIA-FNRS[END_REF] of the MMIF commenced. On 13 December 1954 [24] the initial version of the MMIF (17 racks), located on the top floor of an old BTMC building became operational. In January 1955, King Baudouin of Belgium was given a private tour, and then the Machine was officially unveiled on 12 February of that same year 15 . The operational period came immediately after this test phase. On 10 July 1957, a favourable assessment about the MMIF was written by Aiken and van Wijngaarden 17 [22]. Both were later present when the MMIF was received by the CCCE. From mid-May to early November 1958, use of the MMIF was temporarily interrupted when the Machine was being moved from Antwerp to Brussels. Then operation continued until April 1960, when use of the MMIF was discontinued on an almost definitive basis. However, it was only in late December 1962 that the CECE was effectively disbanded.

The real overall cost of the MMIF has been able to be calculated on the basis of several documents contained in the FNRS Archival Fund. It amounted to 25,515,000 Belgian francs at the time [START_REF] Bell | Bell Telephone Manufacturing Company 1882-1982[END_REF] . This was almost four times the cost as it was first fore- [START_REF]CECE: Document no. 2 -Pseudocode Manual for the IRSIA-FNRS Computer[END_REF] Committee for the Study and Use of Electronic Calculators. [START_REF]CECE: Liste des problèmes traités par le CECE[END_REF] A. van Wijngaarden was the head of the Computing Department at Mathematisch Centrum in Amsterdam. [START_REF] Bell | Bell Telephone Manufacturing Company 1882-1982[END_REF] This investment added up to 178 millions Belgian francs at the end of 2010 (considering inflation since 1955 according to IMF), that is to say 4.4 millions euros.

seen in 1950. Of this total, 22,935,000 francs were provided by IRSIA and the FNRS while the remainder came from Bell.

Designation and Definition

The MMIF was considered at the time to be a "universal scientific digital computer" [15]. In current terminology, it is known as a stored program computer.

Logical Architecture

The logical architecture of the MMIF is classical: it can be described as being composed mainly of five parts or "components" [19]: 1. Memory: on which the data and programs are written separately. This distinction between the two types of memory is characteristic of what is now called "Harvard"19 architecture; 2. "Arithmetic unit" [15]: which is in charge of basic arithmetic operations; 3. "(Automatic) Control" [19], also known as the "control circuit" [29]:

which distributes "instructions provided by the program to the Machine" [29] ; 4. "Input components" [29]; 5. "Output components" [29].

External Aspects

The following is the description of the "initial" MMIF in 1955, provided by Linsman and Pouliart [19]: "The Machine is in the form of a set of racks arranged around the perimeter of an open rectangle [START_REF] Aiken | Typewritten letter sent to L. Henry[END_REF] behind and inside of which the magnetic memory cylinder is housed. Its footprint is 7.50 m X 2.50 m X 2.50 m". These authors [19] also state: "The [standard] racks, which are 20 cm deep, are similar to those used in Bell Telephone Manufacturing C o transmission equipment […]. All the parts in the racks are removable, and spare parts are available for a quick return to service in case of a breakdown."

The "final" MMIF had 34 racks and as a function of its successive locations, it had first an L-shape (13 m long) and later regained a U-shape.

Introduction

In 1955, according to Linsman and Pouliart [19]: "the Machine had about 3,000 hot cathode vacuum tubes, 1,000 cold cathode gas tubes, 400 relays, 1,000 selenium rectifier diodes and about 5,000 germanium diodes. It used about 15 kW of power." In 1957, according to the CECE, these numbers were the same for the rectifiers and gas tubes, but the MMIF then had 5,000 hot cathode vacuum tubes [START_REF] Aiken | Typewritten letter sent to L. Henry[END_REF] and used 25 kW of power [15].

We should state that the MMIF was, according to Meinguet [8], analogous to the Harvard Mark IV machine. While the MMIF did use technology from across the Atlantic, it is nevertheless true that it was also the opportunity, on the local level, for innovative technical research and execution in computer hardware. Linsman and Pouliart [19] note that there were certain components "whose design clearly differentiates MMIF from other computers." These authors [19] list the following distinguishing features:

 The magnetic tape memory;  The magnetic cylinder memory;  Amplifiers to record and read magnetic signals;  Electronic memory on cold cathode gas tubes;  The arithmetic unit.

Owing to a lack of space, we will focus here only on the memory units [START_REF] Aiken | Typewritten letter sent to L. Henry[END_REF] and in particular on those that make the MMIF unique.

Physical Memory

We can classify, in line with Rouche [5] and Loeckx [35], the memory of the MMIF in three categories as a function of access time: slow memory, faster memory and fastest memory.

Until (at least) 1957, the only slow memory cited in the texts used magnetic tape technology. This involved six identical mechanisms 23 "which can be used either to provide input for the Machine or to collect calculation results. They are composed each of a small pulley and a pneumatic device whose combined action controls the movement of a continuous magnetic strip" [29]. "On the tape, the whole made of the word and its address forms a series of 22 figures, with the address before the word […]. A tape is able to hold more than 2,000 words. […] The reading or writing time on the tape is about 30 msec. per word, the starting and pausing time after each word being included. " [14] Fig. 7: One of the six magnetic-tape memories (Source: [19], photo III)

The MMIF also had a magnetic cylinder memory24 , which was faster, and built entirely by BTMC [19]. As Figure 8 shows, this cylinder was actually composed of two half-cylinders, each made of five discs stacked on a single axis. In the photo, one can also see the "writing and reading heads placed above and below a brake shoe-shaped support along the two axes of the cylinders" [34]. The double cylinder "has 200 circular tracks or channels: one hundred of them are reserved for numbers and the other hundred for programs" [29]. The capacity of the cylinders is "2,000 decimal numbers (a 15-digit mantissa and a two-digit exponent with their signs) and 4,000 instructions," according to Fosséprez [34], who was one of the instrumental actors in implementing this magnetic memory. "In the drums, the information is divided into 18-digit words (numbers or pairs of instructions) whose location is given by a four-digit address" [14]. We can also cite some numerical values: the rotational velocity of the cylinder is 4,100 rpm, and the average access time (individual selection of a word) is 7 msec [15]. The very fast memory of the MMIF is obviously electronic. "Two types of electronic memory" were used: the first involved "[cold cathode] gas tubes" [19] and the second hot tubes.

The cold cathode gas tube technology is specific to the Machine: it was the Bell Company that had the idea to use an existing, commercially available neon tube to make memory. "The tubes are assembled in rows [START_REF] Henry | Présentation et démonstration de la machine à calculer IRSIA-FNRS, Speech given by Mr. Henry[END_REF] in which a direction of flow is established, such that when an advancement pulse command is given, each tube sends its information to the next tube," explain Linsman and Pouliart [19]. "A row of memory of this type ran, under laboratory conditions, at the frequency of 70 kilocycles per second, which is the speed limit of the tube… This type of row is used, in this machine, at frequencies between 0 and 25 kilocycles per second. " [19] "In general, the use of memory rows on cold cathode gas tubes enables significant desynchronisation of the Machine" [19]. As such, the gas tubes were used in particular for asynchronous transfers between drums and magnetic strips and between the cylinder and the arithmetic unit [29]. These rows of memory also played a fundamental role in constituting the arithmetic unit [19].

Hot tube technology was used to make the fastest memory employed by the MMIF [1]. It was used in many places: in particular, to make the logic gates which played a role in implementation of the control unit. It also participated in the making of the arithmetic unit [19]. However, this form of memory can be "found in any electronic machine" [29]. Fig. 9: Front view of a rack frame containing, in the centre, nine columns of four cold cathode gas tubes [START_REF] Henry | of appendices[END_REF] (Source: [19], photo VII)

Programming

The pioneers who built the MMIF were confronted with a twofold challenge: the first was to design a code (or language) that could be used to program the machine and the second was to write programs.

Programming Codes

"The Machine has a single address, which means that any instruction (or order) is composed of an operating prefix followed by a single address" [14]. "The address contained in an instruction may be the address for a number (operation instruction or write instruction) or the address for a pair of instructions ('renvoi' instruction)" [14].

In fact, two programming codes were written for the MMIF: the first is known as the "[regular] code" and the second, simpler one, is called the "pseudocode". The (regular) code used for programming the MMIF was obviously the work of specialists in electrical circuits or hardware in general [4]. Using the original vocabulary, we can make up the following list [START_REF] Manneback | Les machines mathématiques aux États-Unis[END_REF] of its main orders:

1. "operation orders" (in particular, addition, subtraction, multiplication); 2. "write orders" on the drum or tape or register;

3. "alterations" (operations "affecting a single number, and modifying its different parts or making permutations between them (sign, mantissa, exponent)"; 4. "usual organisation orders" for the drums (since "the left and right drums can each be used to record numbers or pairs of instructions) and tapes; 5. "calls, whether conditional or not"; 6. "operations on addresses"; 7. "transfer organisation", i.e. the movement of data or instructions, e.g. from the tape to the drum or vice versa. This (regular) code was found to be difficult to use. An improvement was therefore sought out, leading to the pseudocode. According to Meinguet, who was the linchpin in programming the MMIF from 1956 onwards, the pseudocode was practically on the level of an assembly language, since it was a simplification of the machine language ([regular] code), particularly by replacing a five-digit prefix with a two-digit prefix and, above all, by replacing some addresses with designators.

Programs

Let us first look at the programs known at the time as "routines". They were written using [regular] code. Some were used by each program [14]. The routines were as follows:

 "start-up program" (written permanently on the instruction drum);  "initial transfer program [from the tape to the drum]", written on tape;  printing program;  "translation routine" (called up by all programs in pseudocode) [16].

Other routines were called up by certain programs only. These include the routines that calculated elementary functions [START_REF] Belevitch | Le calcul numérique des fonctions élémentaires dans la machine mathématique I[END_REF] (inverse, sin x, log x, etc.). According to the CECE [14], these sequences were built solely "using calculation methods described in the article by V. Belevitch and F. Storrer" [START_REF] Linsman | La Machine mathématique IRSIA -FNRS en construction à la Bell Téléphone Mfg[END_REF] . These methods were aimed at the "approximation of functions by polynomials, with a defined maximum relative error" [28]. Some of them are original in conception. As such, we can see that the building of the MMIF was also coupled with research in numerical analysis.

The other programs, i.e. the "programs for customer problems", were first written in "code" and then, as soon as possible in "pseudocode" [3]. This occurred starting in 1955, with experimental programs (particularly for the calculation of Bessel functions as requested by the École royale militaire [START_REF] Biot | Charles Manneback[END_REF] ). However, in late March 1957, a regular programming period began for a variety of customers [17], in particular: the Institut météorologique [START_REF] Courtois | Notice Biographique de Vitold Belevitch[END_REF] , the Fabrique Nationale (FN) d'armes de guerre [START_REF] Courtois | The Belgian Electronic Mathematical Machine[END_REF] , the Université de Liège and the Commission des tuyauteries [START_REF] Udekem-Gevers | -1962[END_REF] .

Discussion

Several documents from the 1950's describe the US influence on the MMIF. For example, the preface to the 1955 text by Linsman and Pouliart [19] highlights the role played by Howard Aiken. However, several documents from that time [START_REF] Fosséprez | Les fondements de l'Informatique et des Télécommunications, 35. Notes de cours à l'Université des Aînés (UDA)[END_REF] also stress that the design and building of the MMIF were Belgian. And these Belgian achievements were made at the suggestion of Aiken himself [20]. As Henry [25] stated during the unveiling of the MMIF in 1955: "We could have purchased a machine, we could have copied a machine that had already been tried and tested, but more than anything we wanted to spark interest in new automation techniques and, by undertaking a difficult, long-term project, we wanted to orient young people towards promising new pathways." To try to understand Aiken's contribution to the Belgian project in greater detail as well as the manner in which computing technologies were spread to Belgium, I interviewed the eyewitnesses in great depth. As far as MMIF architecture is concerned, the accounts by Wiedmer and Iselin, two Swiss engineers who designed the circuits of the Machine, have proved capital in this respect. "Using two drums, one for data and one for programs, was decided by W. Pouliart who had visited Harvard," Wiedmer readily admitted [11]. However, he immediately added: "I do not remember anything else that came from Harvard. We began from scratch." In particular, he states that he never looked at any drawings from the USA. Furthermore, during the design and building phases of the MMIF, these pioneers, by their own admission, had only very rare contacts with the Americans. Wiedmer [11] says "Aiken visited BTMC once or twice, but he never talked to our engineers nor gave us anything." Iselin [6] agrees: "The influence of the Americans? In my opinion, there wasn't any, except for one or two visits by the head of Bell USA, Mr. Sosthenes, who made a whirlwind tour of the lab, without looking at or speaking to any of us." He adds [7]: "We saw Mr. Aiken one or two times, for about five minutes, during a four-year period." When asked about their educational background, these two linchpins in the design of the MMIF replied that they are both graduates of the ETH (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule) in Zurich. Wiedmer [13] adds: "The best professors I remember were P. Scherrer for physics and E. Baumann for what is called electronics today. But I also learned a lot in my first job, at Standard Telephon und Radio AG in Wollishofen-Zürich." Now let's examine the influences experienced by those who worked on programming the MMIF. The sub-routines for elementary functions and for application programs were completed in Antwerp, without any foreign contributions or influences. In this area, the Belgian pioneers "started from scratch", in the words of Meinguet [2]. In [START_REF] Courtois | Notice Biographique de Vitold Belevitch[END_REF] Belgian Weather Institute. [START_REF] Courtois | The Belgian Electronic Mathematical Machine[END_REF] National Weapons Plant. [START_REF] Udekem-Gevers | -1962[END_REF] Pipes Commission. [START_REF] Fosséprez | Les fondements de l'Informatique et des Télécommunications, 35. Notes de cours à l'Université des Aînés (UDA)[END_REF] See for instance Figure 3. mation gathering and for managing the oral interviews, and Professor Robert Halleux, for his advice and support.

Fig. 1 :Fig. 2 :Fig. 3 :

 123 Fig. 1: People responsible for designing the MMIF, in front of the machine during construction (Source: HIBAF with annotations by M. d'Udekem-Gevers)

Fig. 4 :

 4 Fig. 4: Cover photo from [19] (Source: HIBAF)

Fig. 5 :Fig. 6 :

 56 Fig. 5:The "initial" MMIF (with 17 racks), front view (Source:[19], photo I)

Fig. 8 :

 8 Fig. 8: Magnetic memory cylinder (Source: [19], photo IV)

It is a summary of a detailed monograph[START_REF] Udekem-Gevers | -1962[END_REF], published only in French.

This was how Jean Meinguet, Nicolas Rouche, Claude Fosséprez and then later André Fischer were interviewed.

Each tape recording has been added to the "Histoire informatique belge" Archival Fund (HIBAF).

The ten main eyewitnesses were the four people cited above as well as Paul Dagnelie, Armand de Callataÿ, Frédéric Iselin, Jacques Loeckx, Paul Parré and Fritz Wiedmer. Pierre Macq and Guillaume Van Mechelen also provided some information.

10 These documents (either originals or copies) have also been added to

HIBAF. 11 See[START_REF] Biot | Charles Manneback[END_REF].

Committee for the Study and Construction of Electronic Calculating Machines.

See[START_REF] Courtois | Notice Biographique de Vitold Belevitch[END_REF].

See Figure 1.

See Figures2 and 3.

Wikipedia. This architecture should therefore be distinguished from von Neumann's, in which this separation does not exist.

This is clearly illustrated in Figures5 and 6.

F. Wiedmer[12] states: "The increase in racks to 34 and vacuum tubes to 5,000 was mostly due to the more elaborate control and program circuits".

A description in English of the arithmetic unit can be found in[START_REF] Courtois | The Belgian Electronic Mathematical Machine[END_REF].

It corresponds the component referred to above as "memory".

See Figure9.

Four gas tubes correspond to a decimal number represented in bi-quinary code. Nine columns of four tubes correspond to an instruction or a half-number[START_REF] Fosséprez | Les fondements de l'Informatique et des Télécommunications, 35. Notes de cours à l'Université des Aînés (UDA)[END_REF].

[START_REF] Manneback | Les machines mathématiques aux États-Unis[END_REF] This list has been compiled from selected information in[START_REF]CECE: Document no. 1, Manuel de programmation pour la machine mathématique IRSIA-FNRS[END_REF] and[15].

See[START_REF] Courtois | The Belgian Electronic Mathematical Machine[END_REF].

See[START_REF] Belevitch | Le calcul numérique des fonctions élémentaires dans la machine mathématique I[END_REF].

Royal Military Academy of Belgium.

Elektronische Rechenmaschine der ETH.

The computer Z4based on electromechanical technologywas completed in 1944 by the then almost unknown scientist Konrad Zuse. The machine was fortunately kept safe from Allied bombing over Germany and then leased by ETH, where it served from 1950 to 1954. Z4's long lasting life continued until 1960 at the French Institute of Aerodynamics.

Acknowledgements. I would like to warmly thank the twelve people who provided eyewitness accounts of the MMIF for their support and assistance: they are truly the co-authors of this work. I would also like to recognise the FNRS, which allowed me to use its archives and also made my task much easier by providing a great number of photocopies. I also thank Dr. Sandra Mols, in particular for her contribution to infor-

addition, Meinguet [8] writes: "the people who have influenced me most in terms of numerical analysis (…) are Belevitch, Stiefel and Rutishauser." And the direct influences cited by Meinguet for programming techniques are Rutishauser, Speiser and Stiefel: these influences are not directly American, but rather Swiss. However, we can then ask how these three Swiss engineers acquired their expertise. Meinguet [10] shines some light on this subject:

"During their stay in the USA (beginning in October 1948), Professor Stiefel (until March 1949) and his assistants (Rutishauser and Speiser, until late 1949) did serious research about contemporary American achievements and, more broadly, American ideas relating to electronic calculating machines. Like other European forerunners, they then used the acquired knowledge to develop their own ideas. This, I believe, is how things went. . Stiefel felt validated in his opinion: a relatively simple and slow machine (at moderate cost), but still reliable, would be particularly suitable for the Swiss (science and industry); this led to the design of ERMETH 35 with its specific characteristics (large memory but with limited speed), whose later construction would also benefit from the experience acquired at ETH on Z4 [START_REF] Loeckx | Computer design and software development in Belgium before 1970 : a personal retrospect[END_REF] . In addition, Stiefel and his assistants visited a number of European colleagues, particularly in Germany." In the end, I thus believe that we can say that Aiken's contribution to the MMIF can be found mostly on two levels: explaining the basic principles of a computer (in particular, to those people who visited Harvard prior to construction of the Belgian prototype) and coaching the leaders of the MMIF construction project. Furthermore, this contribution is restricted essentially to the project's leaders, to the virtual exclusion of the engineers who designed the Machine and the mathematicians who programmed it. Finally, both in terms of the physical architecture and its programming, the American influence on the Belgian project was merely indirect, whereas the direct influence was provided by the ETH in Zurich.


Christopher Leslie
email: chris.leslie@nyu.edu

Patrick Gryczka

Ingenuity in Isolation: Poland in the International History of the Internet

Keywords: Internet, Poland, Cold War, innovation, technology transfer, ethics

The popular understanding of the invention of the Internet is that it was the work of researchers in the United States working in relative isolation. However, the Internet is about connection, and so its success required the independently developed networks of the international community. By analyzing early network development in politically isolated Poland toward the end of the Cold War, one sees development concurrent to the development of the Internet but separated technologically through CoCom trade embargoes. By analyzing information technology periodicals, FidoNet newsletters, and other sources, a number of projects have been identified: data distribution over radio and the use of computer networks to protest communist propaganda. In addition to these amateur efforts, we learned about commercial products and academic research. While these efforts were not successful in a conventional sense, they do demonstrate how the computer industry and network research in Poland played an important role despite the political restrictions.

Introduction

The Internet is popularly considered to be an invention of the United States. At the height of the dot-com boom, the myth of the American ingenuity that created the Internet in isolation was perfected: once TCP/IP was perfected for a military research network, ARPANet, it was brought to the academic world with CSNET, discovered by civilian users with USENET and other online sources, and finally distributed to the rest of the world in the 1990s via NSFNET projects (see, for instance, [START_REF] Naughton | A Brief History of the Future: From Radio Days to Internet Years in a Lifetime[END_REF][START_REF] Segaller | Nerds 2.0.1: A Brief History of the Internet[END_REF]). The first mention of the international community in this narrative is often Tim Berners-Lee, the British inventor of the World Wide Web. This fable of Yankee ingenuity disregards both the global nature of the Internet community and the national infrastructural developments needed to provide the necessary intellectual and technical infrastructure for Internet technology to be widely adopted. As presented elsewhere, core concepts behind the Internet, such as packet switching, have roots in the international technical and scientific community. What is more, the Internet is about connecting networks, and a key design consideration of TCP/IP was to allow independently developed networks from the international com-munity a means to connect [START_REF] Leslie | Competing Histories of Technology: Recognizing the Vital Role of International Scientific Communities behind the Innovation of the Internet[END_REF]. It should not be controversial to state that the U.S. relied heavily on their counterparts in other countries to produce the flexible protocols that account for the rapid spread of the technology, and yet this story is not often told.

In addition to the direct influence of the international community, one should consider how researchers in countries who were not directly involved. The dictum that the number of Internet users reached 50 million in 4 years, while it took television 13 years and radio 38 years, may be difficult to verifyit certainly depends on which statistics one uses [START_REF] Hannemyr | The Internet as Hyperbole: A Critical Examination of Adoption Rates[END_REF] but there is no question that the seeds of TCP/IP fell on fertile ground. The impression that the Internet spread to many corners of the world quickly, however, should lead one to question the notion that it diffused on its own accord. As noted by in the case of the diffusion of the Internet to Israel [START_REF] John | The Diffusion of the Internet to Israel: the First 10 Years[END_REF], the Internet "is unable to 'march' anywhere" (327): adoption of Internet technology depends on the preparation and interest of identifiable people. This insight can be profitably applied to the analysis of technology transfer to Poland. Although it might seem that the Internet could not be diffused to Poland until after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, this would deny the active effort of individuals in Poland who prepared the way for a technology like the Internet even while they were politically separated from areas that used it.

The entry of western technology at the start of the 1990s is described as if hightech companies were entering into barren field, a rhetoric that might be expected given a world weary of the more than 40 years of standoff. A press release distributed by IBM [START_REF] Budd | IBM and Polish Universities Create Computer-Network[END_REF] announced a grant for the creation of a "backbone of a computer network" linking 14 Polish universities "with each other and with similar networks created by IBM." The program was to include training "to increase the level of information technology skills, skills that are vital for competitive economies." Poland was described in the Wall Street Journal as leading the computerization of eastern Europe: "Entrepreneurs are starting small personal-computer dealerships, business people are equipping their firms with low-powered computers, and small companies are fighting for government software contracts" [START_REF] Hooper | Poland Moves Toward Leading Role In Computerization of Eastern Europe[END_REF]. The triumphant tone is still visible in articles like [START_REF] Cortada | Patterns and Practices in How Information Technology Spread around the World[END_REF], which notes that "changes came quickly" after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Demand for privatization in the former Soviet block along with relaxing restrictions on the export of technology brought computing to eastern Europe, and "companies that survived began modernizing" [START_REF] Wasiak | Computing behind the Iron Curtain: Social Impact of Home Computers in the Polish People's Republic. Tensions of Europe & Inventing Europe Working Paper Series[END_REF]. From these descriptions, it seems as if there had been no computers and no networks in Poland earlier, and only through the beneficence of the victors of the Cold War was Poland able to enter the computer age.

The sensation that the countries of eastern Europe were in a state of technological depravation, while accurate in some ways, does not tell the entire story. The online magazine Pigulki snidely commented on the paragraphs of the 1991 IBM press release [START_REF] Budd | IBM and Polish Universities Create Computer-Network[END_REF], noting "the Poles themselves have brought this network into being already, as Pigulki readers would have gathered by now" and suggesting "Big Blue was, to say the least, not among the major forces spearheading Poland's academic computer network." The foundation for the connection to the west was done by those in the hard sciences, computer systems administrators, and colleagues in the Polish diaspora [9]. With the connection to the west, there was a sudden sense of connectivity, though this apparently was more keenly felt from the outside. One researcher [START_REF] Smereczynski | One Year of EARN Networking in Poland[END_REF] writes, "there were [a] lot of people from the USA, Germany, the UK, and France, checking constantly whether PLEARN was already on line." A question he was asked in one of his first chats with someone in the U.S. was whether he could send messages without censorship from any terminal. Nevertheless, network connections had already existed.

It is true that Cold War prohibitions on high-tech exports had restricted Poland's access to the computer technology and, more specifically, to the growing community of TCP/IP users as well as other networks. What are now known as the CoCom restrictions began as part of the administration of the Marshall Plan aid to Europe in 1948. As a condition of receiving aid, recipient countries were prohibited from exporting products to non-recipients anything that the U.S. would normally disallow [START_REF] Cain | Computers and the Cold War: United States Restrictions on the Export of Computers to the Soviet Union and Communist China[END_REF]. In this way, the U.S. hoped to prevent communist countries from mustering the strength to wage war. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom for short) was set up to manage the embargo. The ban was not absolute; in a 1960 meeting to review items on the embargo, the U.S. was unsuccessful in convincing British authorities to classify digital computers as munitions subject to the embargo, asserting that the Soviet Union used computing for military purposes. In 1969, the U.S. announced new guidelines that only between 6 and 18 fast computers per year could be exported to eastern Europe (excluding the USSR). In 1984, these restrictions were tightened to include recent advances in smaller, personal computers. In a newspaper article at the time, an Assistant Secretary of Defense was cited as the source of the idea that the military uses Apple 2 computers for targeting nuclear weapons, and so proliferation of such small devices must be restricted [START_REF] Lewis | Allies Curb Computers for Soviet[END_REF]. In spite of these challenges, a number of developments, potentially unique to Poland, can be identified. Among them, a radio modem, which was developed to deal with the unreliable telecommunications infrastructure in Poland, and the use of computer networks to protest communist propaganda.

The story of Poland's ingenuity despite being isolated from international developments, taken together with other stories of the diffusion of the Internet, presents an ethical challenge. It might be simpler and more dramatic to tell the story of U.S. engineers wresting control of a military research project for the benefit of the international public. However, this story is unethical in that it suggests that innovation takes place within isolated national borders, disregarding the role of individuals outside of those borders on which innovation depends. The World Wide Web, for instance, depended heavily on the conventions of TCP/IP and the DNS that had already been designed with the engineers in different countries in mind and vetted by the international community. Without this this deep involvement with researchers outside of the United States, Berners-Lee's innovation would have remained a distributed hypertext project confined to workstations at CERN. Documenting the projects that encourage the development of computing intellectual capitalin other words, the development of engineers and scientists who are familiar with computing conceptsis pivotal in the diffusion of technologies like the Internet. Because innovation sometimes comes from the negotiation of different technical and cultural standards, and because technical innovations fail and succeed based on a larger community of practitioners, it is unethical to assert that a small group of researchers in one country are responsible for a widespread technical achievement like the Internet.

Methodology

In Science and Technology Studies, the concept of the user has gained increasing prominence over the past twenty years, and the study of the history of the Internet could benefit from this development. In Poland, the situation was that a user base was previously established onto which TCP/IP could easily be transmitted once the necessary political blocks were eliminated. To analyze the technical developments of early network development in Poland and the cultural influence on the network's uses, documents pertaining to the topic have been found, compiled, translated, and analyzed. By combing through numerous information technology periodicals, FidoNet newsletters, and other assorted sources, we have sought evidence of an important ethical consideration: it is not the case that a relatively isolated country like Poland was passively waiting for a connection.

Although there are no books on the topic, articles do mention Polish academic networks and personal connections to FidoNet. To find out as much as possible about the beginnings of the Internet in Poland and the early academic networks that came out of Polish universities, it seemed appropriate to look for previous works on that topic; however, it soon became evident that there were few if any published academic works on this topic in either English or Polish. Turning to the technical periodicals of the time and newsletters of early networks such as FidoNet, an enormous archive of network newsletters and newspaper and magazine articles from the time period, interesting and significant papers in Polish were found. In addition, attempts were made to email contributors to the early academic networks in order to gain firsthand information about the networks; a portion of the information gathered has been found in the university libraries and archives. Many of the technical details that were learned about the early networks were found by visiting the universities where these networks originated and reading through students' and professors' theses and works that have been written about the networks.

This documentation supports a different ethical framework that appreciates the complex interactions between innovation and diffusion of technology. In telling the story of Poland's researchers in the waning years of the Cold War, we hope this methodology demonstrates the importance of adopting different ethic of innovation.

Polish Networking at the End of the Cold War

Networking in Europe was well underway in the 1980s. One of the most visible international networking efforts began in 1983, when IBM established a counterpart to its 1981 network, BITNET, in Europe. Called the European Academic Research Network (EARN), IBM provided access to networking through a connection through Wisconsin [START_REF] Naumann | Vom Abakus zum Internet: Die Geschicte der Informatik[END_REF]. With a connection provided by EARN, one could browse the famous Request for Comments (RFCs) distributed by the burgeoning Internet community, making people curious about its protocols even though the official policy was to wait for the formalization of OSI standards [START_REF] Grassmuck | Internet[END_REF]. As the German Internet pioneer Claus Kalle has remarked, this connection finally gave users an experience of the Internet, "das man damals höchstens aus dem Kino (War Games) kannte)" (which one then at least knew from the cinema (War Games)) [START_REF] Kalle | Das Internet in Deutschland -Ein alter Hut?[END_REF]. Through e-mail came RFCs about TCP, IP, Telnet, and FTP, from which users and learned how the new protocols could be implemented on local platforms. These efforts to use TCP/IP in Europe, however, did not extend to the Warsaw Pact countries due to an interpretation of the CoCom restrictions. In fact, the only way to users in this region were able to connect their computers was to a friendly computer on the other side of the Iron Curtain, but according to Tomasz Hofmokl this was inexpensive and unreliable, and more official solutions were not forthcoming. He writes, "I received the official refusal from the French side to establish a permanent communication line with Paris in 1987 by e-mail in Warsaw" [START_REF] Hofmokl | Academic Networks in Central and Eastern Europe[END_REF].

In early 1990, when the CoCom restrictions were relaxed, countries in Eastern Europe could connect to international computer networks. A few months later, the board of directors of EARN decided to admit eastern European countries; Poland was the first, bridging the divide between Europe and former Soviet Block countries. This link was followed by Czechoslovakia and Hungary [START_REF] Hofmokl | Academic Networks in Central and Eastern Europe[END_REF]. The president of EARN, Frode Greisen, visited Warsaw University to make the announcement on April 10 [START_REF] Smereczynski | One Year of EARN Networking in Poland[END_REF]. The symbolic date denoting the beginning of the Internet in Poland was 1990 when engineers at Instytut Fizyki Jadrowej (IFJ, the Institute of Nuclear Physics) in Krakow sent the first email from Poland. Within a few months, many connections to EARN were set up and within a year many of Poland's larger cities connected to the Internet.

As seen in Figure 1, Poland's first international link to the TCP/IP Internet was established by Naukowa i Akademicka Sieć Komputerowa (NASK, or Research and Academic Computer Network) in November 1991, with a data line of 64Kb/s. A month later, Polish Internet traffic was then allowed into the United States network, NSFNET. In 1992, the first academic metropolitan area network (MAN) was built, which ran on fiber optic cables. That same year, a networking organization for the region, Central and Eastern European Network (CEENet) was established; it would grow to 19 members. Soon after, in 1993, ten more MANs were set up across Poland in cities with large universities. Then in 1997, these MANs were interconnected with a new broadband network. The network, POL-34, started with speeds of 34 Mb/s and was quickly upgraded in 1998 to 155 Mb/s, and it was also connected to the global internet through a Swedish satellite link through Telenordia. By 2002 POL-34 had been upgraded to even faster lines and upgraded to use ATM, Gigabit Ethernet, and Cisco routers (7200, 7500, 12000 GSR). These upgrades allowed for a main line of 622 Mb/s and 155 Mb/s and 34 Mb/s branching lines. After these upgrades were completed halfway through 2002, POL-34 was connected to a new Polish academic network, the PIONIER fiber optic network [START_REF] Binczewski | Sieci Komputerowe w Badaniach Naukowych[END_REF].

The fact that Poland was the first of the Soviet Block countries to connect to the west was not an accident. This achievement, after all, was built on earlier accomplishments and the successful lobbying of members of the Polish computer science community. In spite of CoCom restrictions, manufacturers were allowed to export computers in excess of the quotas under an exceptions clause related to computers for non-military use; interestingly, Poland was the "largest designation" of exceptions at 135 cases [START_REF] Cain | Computers and the Cold War: United States Restrictions on the Export of Computers to the Soviet Union and Communist China[END_REF]. One can assert that this embargo was effective. While, as noted by [START_REF] Geipel | The Information Technologies and East European Societies[END_REF], "it is extraordinarily difficult to prove, with hard economic data, that Western export controls have held back the development of computing" in Poland and other countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the "causal observer" can see that eastern Europe was behind (429; emphasis in original). Nevertheless, Geipel et al. demonstrate that CMEA countries in general, and Poland in particular, made an effort to invest in computers. Investment "always either increased more or decreased less" when compared to other light industries, and the percentage of the population engaged in scientific research ranged from 0.25 to 0.45, as compared to 0.22 in the United States.

Furthermore, Poland along with Hungary allowed private enterprise in computing starting in the 1980s, and at the time of the Wende there were more than 500 private computing firms in Poland. Additionally, personal computers were excluded from CoCom restrictions in the 1980s, which meant importers were free to bring them to market. This community of personal computer usersbased on ZX Spectrums, Commodore 64s and Atari 800XLssought to connect Poland to FidoNet, a loose organization of amateur bulletin board systems (BBSs). Jan Stozek translated FidoNet documentation into Polish in 1987 and soon a BBS was set up in the offices of Komputer magazine [START_REF] Stozek | FidoNet in Poland[END_REF]. This publication covered modems and FidoNet, and the community began to grow. Region 48 was assigned to Poland by a Dutch computer club official of Polish descent, and it would be the first region in the Soviet Block. The following year, Stozek would become the network coordinator in Poland. By 1991, there were 15 BBSs operating in Poland, most of which were set up at private companies by individuals who convinced their superiors that such a service would support their commercial activity. One BBS was located at the University of Poznan, where Zbyszek Borowiec was able to transfer messages to BITNET before PLEARN was established.

Poland's readiness to accept international data was also facilitated by earlier work in networking. Because these networks used X.25, it was simpler to make the connection; Smereczynski, who set up the Polish node of EARN, PLEARN, notes that the "constrained isolation" of networking in Poland in the last years of the Cold War helped to show how a network could be formed in adverse conditions. "The main achievement of the KASK project," he writes, "was the experience of showing that you cannot ignore the international standards, or your project would fail" [START_REF] Smereczynski | One Year of EARN Networking in Poland[END_REF]. Smereczynski's tone is one of despair concerning the state of computer science in Poland, but this is clearly from his perspective as someone who could see the future potential. For instance, he was not positive in his recounting of IBM's support; he recollects several experiences with IBM equipment that was late and delivered with software full of bugs, and the first connection to EARN was actually made on an IBM clone, a BASF 7/38 with Hitachi components. This alone demonstrates his effectiveness in dealing with less than optimal conditions. Likewise, Smereczynski notes that there were many people in the Polish computer science community that did not know what it meant to send email or to join into an international network, and so he and his colleagues set up seminars on EARN, e-mail, Listerv, and fundamentals of networking commands, or "just enough to introduce people to EARN networking." The fact that there was a technical community ready to undergo this training, and individuals from Poland ready to offer it, makes it clear the active role the local community played in the diffusion of this technology. In 1988, the first effort to connect BITNET to Poland came from the high-energy physicists. This community, which was accustomed to working in international groups, had enjoyed using BITNET while working abroad "and felt very handicapped without it at home" [START_REF] Gajewski | Polish Bitnet: How It All Started[END_REF]. They desired to set up a local network connection to SASK, the Warsaw branch of KASK, with the hope that their counterparts in other countries might eventually help to connect them to BITNET. With the support of the university hierarchy, the physicists leveraged their contacts, both with BITNET in the United States and inside the Polish government.

1971-1973

Networks in Poland

The myth of the computerization of Poland after the fall of the Iron Curtain also neglects prior work that was done. The earliest observations of the project had to do with how quickly Poland was able to connect to the Internet after the loosening of CoCom restrictions. It seemed unlikely that without any previous effort Poland could have so suddenly connected to the Internet within months of getting access to western computing and networking technology and then within two years have been able to put down the infrastructure necessary to connect many of its major cities to the Internet. COCOM actually seems to have been more of a political catalyst in Poland's connection to the Internet, rather than a technical one.

The credit for the technical underpinnings of Poland's connection to the Internet seems instead to lie with the scarcely mentioned academic networks. A number of early networks were found, but the earliest identified was the Miedzyuczelniana SiecKomputerowa (MSK, or the Inter-university Computer Network), whose efforts eventually evolved into Krajowa Academicka Siec Komputerowa, (KASK, or the National Academic Computer Network). As seen in Figure 1, MSK and the Warsaw localized Akademicka Siec Komputerowa (ASK, or the Academic Computer Network) stemmed from government research topics IV.6 "Computerization of the Ministry of Education and Higher Learning" (mgr inz. Andrzej Zienkiewicz, UW) and RI.14 "Computerization of Institutions of Higher Learning" (dr inz. M. Bazewicz, PWr), which were proposed between 1977 and 1978. Work on MSK began in 1978; however, at the time the engineers who were working on MSK were unaware of ISO documentation on the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. Fascinatingly, for its pilot program, MSK connected the Centrum Obliczeniowe Politechniki Wroclawskiej (Computation Centre of the Technical University of Wroclaw), the Osrodek Elektronicznej Techniki Obliczeniowej Politechniki Slaskiej (Electronic Computing Technology Centre of the Technical University of Slask), and at the Centrum Obliczeniowe Instytutu Podstaw Informatyki (Centre of Electronic Computing Technology at the Institute of the Fundamentals of Information Technology) in Warsaw. Within this pilot configuration there were two sub nodes in Wroclaw, an Odra 1305 and a R32; one in Warsaw, an Odra 1305; and one in Gliwice, an Odra 1305 as well.

Warsaw, Wroclaw, and Gliwice were chosen as the initial nodes in the MSK not only because these cities contained well-respected universities that possessed the necessary computer resources to take part, but also because of the existing telephone line infrastructure between the cities. Of course, with the expected expansion of MSK into KASK, plans to connect numerous other cities were already made, namely to connect Krakow, Katowice, Poznan, Torun, Bydgoszcz, and Gdansk. In addition to connecting new cities there were also intentions to connect more and more subnodes within the cities, allowing more universities to join the network, and beyond that, there were also hopes for establishing a direct link between the Warsaw node and the Gliwice node. From these aspirations, it is clear that Polish engineers were moving ahead with their own networks and making sizable strides in spreading their network across Poland.

For the most part, the early academic networks, such as MSK, were seen as purely academic endeavors by both the Polish authorities and many of the academics who made use of them. Within its pilot stage, MSK allowed users to access data bases within the processing computers from any connected terminal, to send collections of data between any two processing computers, run programs available on any of the processing computers on any given terminal, and communicate between terminals.

Standards and Connections

Despite the fact that the early Polish academic networks were developed behind the isolative barrier of CoCom, connection to outside networks came about quite rapidly once the political situation allowed organizations like EARN to grant Poland connection to their networks. This was in no small part thanks to the mindset of the engineers behind networks like MSK. While ISO documentation on networks was unknown to the engineers behind MSK at the start of their project, in order to one day connect to the international community the engineers went through the substantial effort of restarting their work to have MSK follow the standards set by ISO [START_REF] Bilski | Protokoly w Miedzyuczelnianej Sieci Komputerowj[END_REF].

At the start of MSK, the engineers were basing their work on the data link protocol ISO HDLC (High Level Data Link Control) and INWG 96, a transfer protocol that guaranteed datagram transfer. Despite a lack of access to the latest in western computing equipment, Polish engineers found equivalent hardware for their networks in their own Odra and Mera computers or Soviet SM3s. Work on MSK began in 1978; however, at the time the engineers were unaware of the effort by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) renewed effort to define data protocols. Although the concepts behind TCP/IP reach as far back as 1973 in INWG 39, their implementation was not yet fully developed in 1975 when INWG 96 was released. Despite the agreement on INGW 96, DARPA broke off, at this point, stating that the were "too close to completing implementation of the updated INWG 39" [START_REF] Mckenzie | INWG and the Conception of the Internet: An Eyewitness Account[END_REF]. Nevertheless, the rest of the international community had come to a consensus to move away from TCP/IP towards a model that would better manage bandwidth allocation.

Fascinatingly, once the engineers found out about the documentation they restarted their work on the network in order to have it meet international standards, implying that the engineers intended to make a network that would be able to connect to the rest of the world when the political situation allowed. After becoming acquainted with ISO documentation on the OSI model and the CCIT documentation pertinent to the first three layers, the conception of MSK was shifted in a direction that would maximize agreement with the OSI model [START_REF] Bilski | Protokoly w Miedzyuczelnianej Sieci Komputerowj[END_REF]. Poland's decision to move away from the datagram model to the more moderated model of OSI may seem counterproductive if we are comparing their networks to today's internet; however, at the time the international community was moving away from TCP/IP, considering it to be a temporary experiment [START_REF] Abbate | Inventing the Internet[END_REF]. Poland's switch to an OSI model does point to a desire and effort to stand with the international community and move towards a model that would, in the future, best be able to interact with other academic networks abroad.

Computers and the Underground

Poland's rich computer culture has been documented elsewhere, but it is worthwhile to note that the first local personal (micro) computer produced began production in 1983, the Meritum, which was reverse-engineered from the Tandy corporation's TRS-80, released in the U.S. in 1977. In collaboration with Bajtek, a Polish computer magazine founded in 1985, the Polish Boy Scout association broadcast programs over FM radio in BASIC that users would record on cassettes and load into their computers [START_REF] Baran | Polish Internet at the End of the 20th Century[END_REF]. Other examples of selling western computers on the so-called informal market abound.

Computers in Poland and Hungary were commonly used at home, and PCs played an important role in producing and distributing bibuła (the Polish version of the Russian samizdat). A covert program, which [START_REF] Fischer | Solidarity, the CIA, and Western Technology[END_REF] calls "the best-kept secret of all the CIA's Cold War operations" (429), smuggled printing presses, radios, computers, Telex machines, and the first fax machines to Poland to help the Solidarity movement. In addition, computers were used to "organize the boycotts and evaluate data" concerning the election results (462). The Solidarity paper Tygodnik Mazowsze, which started as an underground journal, was produced on a PC and printed on a laser printer [START_REF] Geipel | The Information Technologies and East European Societies[END_REF], [START_REF] Diehl | In Moscow and Warsaw, Official and Unofficial Press Playing New Roles; Solidarity Weekly Evolves in Scope, Sophistication[END_REF]. Being seen purely as tools to enhance academic capabilities within the fields of physics and astronomy, the academic networks largely escaped any monitoring of use. Thus, the networks created a uniquely safe environment, where academics, or at least those who wished, could communicate freely amongst themselves about topics that strayed from academia into something closer to political criticism and dissent. A prominent example of dissenting expression within such an environment is Donosy (Fig. 3), the first Polish digital newspaper, which originated within the Warsaw University's Physics department in 1989. In August, this daily newspaper in e-mail format gathered uncensored news and rumors from a variety of sources, and also published information about salaries and pricing, reprinted letters to the editors, and made reflections on current events. The return addresses indicate that Donosy was distributed via BITNET and DECNet.

Conclusion

The thesis that significant investments in network research and implementation were necessary on national levels in order for the Internet to spread to Poland as quickly as it did provides an important insight into the ethics of innovation. Myths about the Internet being created by the U.S. in isolation and diffusing to other countries effortlessly suggests that ideas succeed on their own merits. The theory that information technology spread easily into Poland once political blocks were eased is satisfying in some ways, but in fact does not tell the entire story. Technology transfer is dependent upon the work of many individuals in the target area, and it is these users who have as much to do with the innovation's success as do the innovators. The story of facile technology transfer seems to suggest that a good idea will diffuse on its own accord, so the only responsibility of an innovator is to develop a good idea. A more nuanced story is needed so that future innovators recognize how technologies depend upon a user base that is ready and able to take advantage of it.

This story also demonstrates the fact that what might seem to be innovation for the sake of innovation was a success in Poland. The story of the 20th century is sometimes told as one of the loss of disinterested scientists who no longer were able to follow their curiosity. As shown by [START_REF] Shapin | The Scientific Life[END_REF], however, this is not an entirely accurate portrait. In fact, it would seem as if there has been plenty of time and effort dedicated to amateur and disinterested pursuits. The story in Poland demonstrates how this effort paid off. Even while scientists had no way of knowing that the Cold War was drawing to a close, they continued in isolation to innovate and explore current ideas in computer networking. This effort paid off unexpectedly when they were able to join the TCP/IP Internet, in much the same way one would expect the disinterested inquiry of science to pay off in unforeseen ways.

Finally, this story points toward the importance of international standards organizations such as ISO. This is not to be expected, given that the story of TCP/IP is generally told as "standards war" in which the ISO's OSI protocols failed. As much as the success of TCP/IP seems to be a triumph over the failed OSI standards, the story of Poland seems to indicate that the story needs to be told differently. Even as political barriers prevented trade in high technology goods, access to international standards allowed Polish engineers to independently create computers and networks that would eventually be able to connect to the rest of the world.

Fig. 1 .

 1 Fig. 1. Important dates leading to the first TCP/IP connection to Poland

Fig. 2 .

 2 Fig. 2. Initial Hardware of the Inter-University Academic Network

Fig. 3 .

 3 Fig. 3. Donosy E-Newspaper

Acknowledgement. The authors are indebted to the Undergraduate Summer Research Program and its founder, Associate Dean Iraj M. Kalkhoran, at the New York University Polytechnic Institute of Technology, which provided Patrick Gryczka with a stipend that supported this research.


Valery V Shilov
email: shilov@mati.ru

Sergey A Silantiev

Reasoning vs. Orthodoxy, or, The Lesson from the Fate of Russian "Reasoning Machine"

Keywords: Stanley Jevons, Pavel Khrushchev, Alexander Schukarev, logical machine, reasoning, ideology

This paper devoted to Russian scientist Alexander Schukarev and his work on logical machine. Historically, this

Introduction

On 25 May 1865 the great English logician Stanley Jevons wrote to his brother Gerbert: "My newest job on hand is a reasoning machine, or logical abacus, adapted to show the working of Booles Logic in a half mechanical manner. I got a rough model to work excellently the other night, and I think I can easily get it finished during the summer" [1, p. 205]. This "reasoning machine" was in fact the first version of the first in history mechanical engine which really may be called reasoning (or logical) machine -Jevons famous "logical piano". At the beginning of XX century famous American philosopher and psychologist James Mark Baldwin in his Dictionary gave such definition: "Logical Machine: Ger. logische Machina; Fr. machine logique; Ital. macchine logistiche. An instrument devised to facilitate by mechanical means the handling of logical symbols or diagrams" [2, p. 28]. Baldwin added that "There are three such instruments which merit attention" [ibid.]; these "instruments" were constructed by Jevons (1869), John Venn (1881) and Allan Marquand (1881,1883).

Martin Gardner gave remarkable review of the history of logical machines in his classic work [START_REF] Gardner | Logic Machines and Diagrams[END_REF]. However, he did not describe some of them because of various reasons. In particular, he did not know very interesting Jevons type logical machines invented in Russia by professor Pavel Khrushchev (1849-1909) and then improved by professor Alexander Schukarev (1864Schukarev ( -1936) (Fig. 1).

Professor Khrushchev was prominent chemist. Circa 1900 he built his machine  but this is the only established fact. The further fate of machine is related with the name of Schukarev. That is why this paper devoted to this scientist and his work on logical machine. Historically, this work may be divided on two periods -before and after Russian October revolution. We try to understand the reasons why Schukarevs activity in the field of logic and theory of cognition was ceased and his logical machine was forgotten for a long time. Exactly these reasons explain why until recently only few and rather brief publications about this machine are known [START_REF] Veligzhanin | K istorii sozdaniya logicheskikh mashin v Rossii (К истории создания логических машин в России)[END_REF][START_REF] Povarov | Russkie logicheskie mashiny (Русские логические машины)[END_REF][START_REF] Povarov | The First Russian Logic Machines[END_REF]. Significant part of Schukarev scientific publications was devoted to his main specialty -physical chemistry but he also was interested in the problems of logic, methodology of science and philosophy. From the beginning of 1900s Schukarev regularly published articles with philosophical analysis of natural science. In 1913 he published monograph under the title "Problems of theory of cognition and its applications to the natural science" [START_REF] Schukarev | Problemy teorii poznaniya: v ikh prilozhenii k voprosam estestvoznaniya i v razrabotke ego metodami (Проблемы теории познания: в их приложении к вопросам естествознания и в разработке его методами)[END_REF].

During his work in Kharkov University, Alexander Schukarev saw Khrushchev logical machine in one of physical-chemical laboratory storerooms. It was very interesting for Schukarev who investigated the problems of logic and theory of cognition. He recalled that he in fact had "inherited" the logic machine from Khrushchev. Probably it means that this machine was simply handed to the scientist.

Khrushchev machine as it prototype -Jevons logical piano -was constructed as a high drawer with keyboard on which separate messages were set. It had also indicator board with the openings where the possible term combinations were formed (Fig. 2). Unfortunately, the description of Khrushchev machine made by Schukarev contains a brief statement that its construction and principles of work are the same as Jevons one. I simply gave the instrument the smaller dimensions, made it from metal and eliminated some constructional defects. The further step forward was the connecting the special illuminated screen to the instrument. The work of machine is transmitted to this screen and results of "thinking" appear not in symbolic form as on Jevons machine but in ordinary verbal form [START_REF] Schukarev | Mekhanizatsiya myshleniya: Logicheskaya mashina Dzhivonsa. (Механизация мышления: Логическая машина Дживонса)[END_REF].

Schukarev so ended his description:

"In my device, the rear rods connect electrically with special screen consisting of 16 horizontal racks, each bearing two ordinary electrical lamps.

List of transparent paper with ordinary words written by drawing ink is hanged before these racks. These words coordinate with the combinations on rods. For example, let A designates "silver", B -"metal", C -"current conductor", O -"possess free electrons". Than the words "Silver -metal, current conductor, possess free electrons" will be written on the first upper line of illuminated screen against the first rack with the lamps.

In null machine position, all screen lamps are lit and all combinations could be seen very clear by audience. After installing definite sentences, some rods are lifted up and appropriate racks are deactivated. Only those combinations of concepts which compatible with given settings remain illuminated" [START_REF] Schukarev | Mekhanizatsiya myshleniya: Logicheskaya mashina Dzhivonsa. (Механизация мышления: Логическая машина Дживонса)[END_REF].

New life of logical machine

Logical machine regained the new life due to Schukarev. In 1912 he demonstrated it on the conference of Society of physical-chemical science at Kharkov University. This demonstration was repeated "almost 10 times" (apparently before various audiences) by "public insistence".

Undoubtedly, the character of modifications made by Schukarev (though he specified that they "were not of principle character") allows us to conclude that he built just new machine. It was not simple improvement of Khrushchev machine (Fig. 3). He wrote that machine "at present time [in 1912[in -1913 -Auth.] -Auth.] is the property of Kharkov University" [7, p. 49]. That is why we may suppose that after building of his own machine the inventor returned its prototype back to the University. Unfortunately, the fate of original Khrushchev machine is unknown.

During his public lectures Schukarev used the logic machine for supporting his opinions and theoretical statements. It is worth to mention that unlike Stanley Jevons who considered his machine useful only for the purposes of learning, Schukarev thought that "it may be used not only for that": "In 1916 after several demonstrations of my device, which now is well known on the South Russia, I received the following letter from one of my students:

…"Local magistrate acquittal one of the accused person, which was motivated by the following justification: during the investigation there were no information excluded the absence of ill-will from the accused. Local jurists stated that this formula did not correspond to the acquittal verdict and they asked me to write you in order to check it with the help of logic machine".

I executed this request and set on machine: A -"case", B -"contain information excluded the absence of ill-will", C -"charge". In result, I got the following combinations: AbC Abc aBC abC abc Thus, the given case A as it doesnt contain information excluding the absence of ill-will b allows the charge C and discharge c as well. Any other case a which also doesn't contain information excluding the absence of ill-will b allows the charge C and discharge c as well.

Thus, magistrate from Rostov was absolutely right in his acquittal verdict (because discharge is preferred to charge)" [START_REF] Schukarev | Mekhanizatsiya myshleniya: Logicheskaya mashina Dzhivonsa. (Механизация мышления: Логическая машина Дживонса)[END_REF].

"It is possible that in other same lawsuits logical machine could find practical application" -so Schukarev completed his article. In Appendix to his monograph [START_REF] Schukarev | Problemy teorii poznaniya: v ikh prilozhenii k voprosam estestvoznaniya i v razrabotke ego metodami (Проблемы теории познания: в их приложении к вопросам естествознания и в разработке его методами)[END_REF] and in the article [START_REF] Schukarev | Mekhanizatsiya myshleniya: Logicheskaya mashina Dzhivonsa. (Механизация мышления: Логическая машина Дживонса)[END_REF] he also gave the example from the field of chemistry when logic machine helped to get "absolutely true" conclusions.

Until 1917 Schukarev demonstrated his machine not only in Kharkov but in other cities of South Russia. In April 1914 he gave some lectures in Moscow. It is known several newspaper advertisements about these lectures. For example, in the newspaper "Russkie Vedomosti" from 16 April 1914 we may read:

Thinking machine

Public lecture of Professor A. N. Schukarev "Cognition and thinking" will be presented on Saturday, 19 April, in large auditorium of Polytechnic museum. Thinking machine will be demonstrated during the lecture. This apparatus allows to reconstruct mechanically the process of human thinkingto draw conclusions from determined statements. Initially, machine was built by mathematician Jevons and improved by the author of the lecture. Results of it operations display on the screen in verbal form.

One of spectators of this lecture gives additional information about Schukarev logic machine: "Professor of Kharkov Technological Institute A. N. Schukarev presented in large auditorium of Polytechnic museum the lecture under the title "Cognition and thinking". He demonstrated "logic thinking machine", invented by Englishman Jevons and improved by the author.

<…> A. N. Schukarev reconstructed and modified it. This machine performed mechanical process of thinking more perfectly without human mistakes.

Machine consists of vertical box of 40 sm height, 25 sm width and 25 sm length. It has keyboard: its rear row designates subjects and front row designates verbs.

There are lines of rods (sticks) inside the box moving by keys pressing. Four letters A, B, C and D are printed on each rod. There are 16 rods at all. They can present all possible combinations of letters <…> After pressing the appropriate keys the combinations of terms inconsistent with given premises are eliminated. Thus, only combinations consistent with premises are remained -that is logical conclusion <…>.

Machine mechanically and without mistakes draws the conclusion and works more perfectly than human brain.

<…> Professor A. N. Schukarev has long worked on the improvement of Jevons machine. He made the special modification -every rod connects with electrical contact. This contact closes the chain of lamps on illuminated screen with some sentences written on it. Every sentence corresponds to one of letter combinations. Some contacts are broken when the rods are moving and sentences incompatible with given premise become invisible.

Thinking machine draws the conclusions better than the man does because all the conclusions are derived from our experience. In this sense machines are more useful than human brain.

We have arithmometers which can add, subtract and multiple great numbers by simple turn of the handle. It is obvious that time demands to have logic machine capable for unmistakable conclusions when you only press the appropriate keys. It will keep for a man a lot of time for creative work, hypothesis, fantasy and inspiration" [START_REF] Sokov | Myslitelnaya mashina (Мыслительная машина)[END_REF].

Scientist and ideology: the fate of the doomed

Schukarev was continuing public presentations and further improvement of his machine until the 1925. It is known that besides regular demonstrations of logic machine in Kharkov, Schukarev showed it in Moscow and Leningrad. Logic machine caused the great interest of spectators as was earlier. However, after 1917 the situation in Russia was changing. To the mid of 1920s part of leading philosophers were expatriated and many others were prohibited to work and publish. All editions propagated "idealism and clericalism" were suppressed. Marxist monopoly was established in philosophy. Many traditional philosophical doctrines including formal logic were radically revised. In 1925 Soviet philosopher Ivan Orlov published the article "About the rationalization of brainwork" [START_REF] Orlov | O ratsionalizatsii umstvennogo truda (О рационализации умственного труда)[END_REF] in ideological journal "Pod znamenem marksizma (Under the banner of Marxism)". He criticized the scientific activity of Schukarev from the standpoint of Marxist dialectics.

The main Orlov thesis was -"he [Schukarev -Auth.] wants to convince us in the formal character of thinking and possibility of its mechanization by logical machine". Orlov declared that conception of formal character of thinking "drastically contradicts to the dialectic materialism". Orlov ascribes to Schukarev the statement that "machine will think instead of man". But Schukarev says only about possible mechanization of some thinking functions! First part of Orlovs article is completely based on falsifications of Schukarev ideas.

However, in post-revolutionary Russia not only Schukarev ideas were unclaimed but he himself was non grata person. If we get to know Schukarev better not only as a scientist but also as a man it would be more clear the fate of his logic machine. Unfortunately almost all known publications do not describe him particular as a man. That is why the unique document discovered by authors -memories of his Kharkovs colleague professor A. Filippov published in 1950 in Paris [START_REF] Filippov | Dva sovetskikh professora: Dva portreta. I. A. N. Schukarev (Два советских профессора[END_REF] -obtains specific value.

Memoirist describes Schukarev as a typical Russian pre-revolutionary professor who lived only for science and who "did not note surrounding reality". Schukarev of course saw and understood Soviet reality but it seems he principally ignored it. According to Filippov, Alexander Schukarev lived well enough as many other academicians worked in field of natural and technical science. Meantime many humanitarians "lived in poor hovels, languished from enforced idleness and wandered ragged along the streets". For example, professor of philosophy Vladimir Karinsky "did not differ in appearance from the ordinary beggar". However, Schukarev continued to live in the flat he occupied from Tsar Times. He dressed "decently and even smartly" and "came always dressed in frock-coat" on his public lectures.

But it is obvious that life position and behavior of such men as Alexander Schukarev were determined not only by the degree of material wellbeing. That is why his administrative superiors were in constant strain that Schukarev "will do some politically unacceptable thing". For example, memoirist writes that the so called "Circle ("Kruzhok") for studying of dialectic materialism" was organized in Kharkov soon after withdrawal of White Army at the end of 1919. Attendance of the Circle meetings was obligatory for all professors. On the very first meeting Schukarev made serious scientific report and at the end "he scratched forehead and said: oh yes, I forgot that the goal of our Kruzhok is the study of dialectic materialism. Well, what may I said about the learning of dialectic materialism? One can do everything, it doesnt matter, for example you may collect the white mice". Professor calmly went out but scandal erupted was hardly extinguished. Memoirist also provides interesting information about Alexander Schukarev logic machine: "Especially famous was A. N. with his logic machine. In fact, it was machine of English logic Jevons and he only attached the large screen to it. All machine operations immediately displayed on the screen. On this screen, he demonstrated the specific examples of abstract character combinations. In whole, A. N. was wonderful constructor. For example, according to the opinion of specialists, the "calorimetric bomb" constructed by him was much better than that of famous French chemist Berthelot. Even before the revolution well-known journalist Alexander Yablonsky described in jocular form the misadventures of logic machine. Once during it demonstration one of the spectators (young girl student) was indignant -"this machine as any other machine is the instrument of people exploitation". Next time on the question: "do we have Constitution" machine answered: "not we, not have, not Constitution". Finally, police superintendent stopped the political dispute. These misadventures continued in Soviet period but now not as a joke. One time a year A. N. dressed in frock-coat visited "House of Scientists" (Club of scientists) and demonstrated operation of his logic machine. He illustrated its work by such very "suitable" for Bolshevik examples as "the evidence of God existence". Needless to say, how violently the Marxists presented on the lecture attacked A. N. and his machine. However, these attacks did not produce any effect on A. N. He only laughed merrily and good-naturedly as a child" [START_REF] Filippov | Dva sovetskikh professora: Dva portreta. I. A. N. Schukarev (Два советских профессора[END_REF].

One more episode described by memoirist shows how much logic machine impressed spectators. Once after the usual antireligious lecture the propagandist who just "had proved the nonexistence of God" suggested the listeners to say their opinion. "To his surprise one of elderly University janitors stood up and began to speak. "You say -started this janitor -that God does not exist". Lecturer compassionately nodded. "But machine of professor Schukarev, -continued janitor, -had proved clearly that God exists". Surprised lecturer did not find what to answer (all Bolsheviks deeply believed in power of technology). Lecturer had just considered and disproved all known proofs of Gods existence but overlooked the "machine proof". Probably, Alexander Schukarev himself would be surprised by such effect of his demonstrations!

The range of Schukarev scientific interests was always very wide. It was mentioned above that he did not limit himself by investigations in the field of special problems of physical chemistry. Beside the theory of cognition, he examined the problems of social life, human talent etc. He always sought the possibility to use mathematical methods in his researches. For example, he derived some empirical relations and then gathered statistical data with the help of volunteers. Professor Filippov recalled that "his a priori graphical curve was generally confirmed on practice".

Alexander Schukarev wrote: "regarding the politics, I never before the revolution nor after it wanted to participate in this kind of activity because I early admitted the thesis -"where the struggle begins there the creative work ends". I mainly was interested in the latter". To the end of 1920s such accentuated political indifference was interpreted as especially hostile to the Soviet power. Punishment must be expected earlier or later. Moreover, the scientist who "did not notice … Soviet reality" obviously gave reasons for repressions.

When in 1929 Bolsheviks decided to establish Ukraine Academy of Science they really did this with great pompousness. Meetings and sessions were organized, articles in newspapers were published, pompous speeches were delivered etc. Professor Schukarev was also invited at one of such ceremonial meetings. He came and said that it was no need absolutely to establish Ukraine Academy of Science because there were no worthy candidates to the members of this Academy. After the speech, he gathered his papers and went out not hear abuses to his address [START_REF] Filippov | Dva sovetskikh professora: Dva portreta. I. A. N. Schukarev (Два советских профессора[END_REF].

Immediately after this statement, the communist press began campaign of harassment. Newspapers wrote that though Schukarev was eminent scientist it is impossible to elect him to the members of Academy. Professor replied by sending the letter to the newspaper "Kharkov Proletarian" (of course it was not published). With old-fashioned courtesy ("Dear editor! Please do not refuse to take in consideration…") he fully agreed with the opinion not to be elected to the Academy. Firstly, there was no need in this Academy at all. Secondly, if there is a need to elect somebody, he must be devoted Marxist obligatorily, -"than we might finally find out what Marxism is."

All in all, "cup of patience" was overfilled. In the middle of 1920s the "Explorating Chair of European Culture History" was founded in Kharkov. Its members were mainly non-Marxists humanitarians who were prohibited to teach at the universities. Alexander Schukarev was a member of this Chair as well. In 1929 Chair issued the volume of Works which very angered the Bolshevik ideologists. The newspaper "Communist" wrote: "Hostile elements oppose their own culture to the growth of socialist culture … Spongers got rich on the Soviet bread begin propagate bourgeois ideology and philosophy to the youth". Accusations were dreadful  denial of Party character of science, "clear idealism, clericalism, … reactionary, doublefaced philosophy" etc. Schukarev article under the defiant to that period of time title "Alchemist-gnostic philosophy of play cards" caused especially violent attacks. Schukarev and his colleagues were named "the open agents of bourgeois philosophy, who … spit on our reality". Communists demanded to summon the Worker-Peasant Inspection and CheKa ("punishing sword of Revolution") for the struggle with "the demonstration of ideology which is alien to the proletariat". In result, the Chair was closed in 1930.

At first Schukarev did not suffer but situation around him became more and more threatening. Just that time the forty-year jubilee of Shukarevs scientific activity was approaching. A. Filippov recalls: "Surely, I began thinking how to organize the celebration. Main specialty of A. N. was chemistry. That is why I decided to ask physicochemical society to arrange this celebration. The secretary of the society professor Mukhin agreed enthusiastically. After that, I several times met Mukhin but he did nothing. When I directly asked him -why? -the answer was -"I am afraid that A. N. could say something politically dangerous". <…> Finally, the celebration of A. N. science activity was not arranged at all" [START_REF] Filippov | Dva sovetskikh professora: Dva portreta. I. A. N. Schukarev (Два советских профессора[END_REF].

In result, Schukarev was forced to retire in 1931, but as far as we know he stopped the public demonstrations of his logical machine several years before. Soviet historians did not connect these two events. They did not even explain the reasons of Schukarev retirement. They also wrote that the only reason for canceling logical machine demonstrations was the sharply rejection of the idea of thinking mechanization by orthodox Marxist philosophers. They considered the logical machine as "fruitless and absurd venture" [START_REF] Povarov | Russkie logicheskie mashiny (Русские логические машины)[END_REF]. However, this point of view seems too simple. It is also doubtful that the single publication of his violent critic Ivan Orlov (by the way, the only one we know by name) could impress Schukarev so strong. We think that the reason not in this. Not only Schukarevs scientific and philosophical views but he as an individual was not acceptable for the Soviet power. The ideological campaign against him described above is evidently proved it.

Many of his colleagues were arrested or dismissed. But Schukarev was permitted to consult several research institutions. In particular, he cooperated with the Institute of Experimental Medicine studying living cell thermodynamics. He also continued to work on the large paper in the field of logic and philosophy entitled "Experience of substantiation of structural realism system". In 1934 scientist sent his manuscript to Moscow to the Lenin Library and to Leningrad to the Academy of Science Library. Shukarev was in poor health in last years and died in spring 1938. A. Filippov recalls: "Funeral was ceremonial. His colleagues and pupils pronounced heartfelt speeches. The only communist who delivered a speech was director of Institute of Experimental Medicine <…>. However, even he did not say anything about the "Party and Government" and "building the socialism in our country". All orators remembered Schukarev as a wonderful man and scientist" [START_REF] Filippov | Dva sovetskikh professora: Dva portreta. I. A. N. Schukarev (Два советских профессора[END_REF].

After the Schukarevs death his logical machine was forgotten as well as the Khrushchevs one. They were remembered in the USSR only at the beginning of 1960s. It was time of common enthusiasm by cybernetic ideas and active discussion of the problem -"Could machine think?" In 1963 academician Axel Berg who was the chairman of the Council on cybernetics saw by chance the half-century old advertisement about the demonstration of "thinking machine" in Polytechnic Museum. Berg was very interested and asked the staff of Polytechnic Museum to give him more detailed information.

23 March 1964 well-known Soviet historian of technology A. Yarotsky sent a letter to Axel Berg with the results of his search. Photocopy of the chapter about the logic machine from Schukarev book and English article about Jevons machine were attached to the letter. Yarotsky wrote: "Instinct did not deceive you -the problem is really interesting. I will be glad to continue my search and present you more information". At the same time, he hinted at ideological ambiguity of Schukarev person. ("Philosophical aspect of the problem is of acute interest", -Yarotsky wrote to Berg whom he notified that "Jevons was founder of so-called school of vulgar political economy" criticized by Marx [START_REF] Fet | Kibernetika v Politekhnicheskom muzee (Кибернетика в Политехническом музее)[END_REF]). Probably, particular for the reason of political ambiguity it took more than seven years when the first publication [START_REF] Veligzhanin | K istorii sozdaniya logicheskikh mashin v Rossii (К истории создания логических машин в России)[END_REF] about Khrushchev and Schukarev machines got published. For example, these machines just were not mentioned in detailed article "Logic machines" containing the historical review of logical machines from Lull till Marquand [START_REF] Biryukov | Logicheskie mashiny (Логические машины)[END_REF]. In general, the works [START_REF] Veligzhanin | K istorii sozdaniya logicheskikh mashin v Rossii (К истории создания логических машин в России)[END_REF][START_REF] Povarov | Russkie logicheskie mashiny (Русские логические машины)[END_REF][START_REF] Povarov | The First Russian Logic Machines[END_REF] in fact are the only ones which describe the logical machines constructed by Khrushchev and Schukarev.

Only in last years several papers were published where an attempt was made to evaluate newly the life and works of Alexander Schukarev [START_REF] Shilov | Logicheskie mashiny P. D. Khruscheva i A. N. Schukareva (Логические машины П. Д. Хрущова и А[END_REF][START_REF] Shilov | K istorii russkikh logicheskikh mashin (К истории русских логических машин)[END_REF][START_REF] Shilov | Istoriya logicheskikh mashin (История логических машин)[END_REF][START_REF] Koshkin | Professor Aleksandr Nikolaevich Schukarev. Trudno byt geniem[END_REF]. Today, A. N. Schukarev and P. D. Khrushchev finally gained deserved recognition and got the worthy place in the pantheon of Russian science. Schukarev memorial plaque was erected on the wall of Kharkov Polytechnic Institute on 21 October 2011 since of 75 years of his death (Fig. 4).

Conclusion

Authors of this paper hope that it is clear now why the logical ("reasoning") machine of Alexander Schukarev was so rarely mentioned in Soviet scientific literature. Never in conditions of totalitarian political regimes talented but dissent persons can create and live in full mere. Creative scientific work and life of professor Alexander Nikolaevich Schukarev was uneasy beginning from 1917. He could not did what he wanted to do in the field of philosophy and logic. But he never agreed to make ideological compromises and keep a virtue of the real Scientist and Man.

Fig. 1 .

 1 Fig. 1. Pavel Khrushchev and Alexander Schukarev

Fig. 2 .

 2 Fig. 2. Khrushchev logical machine (Source: [7, p. 52, 53]) Circa 1913 Schukarev made the improved variant of Jevons logic machine and described it (unfortunately also very laconically) in the article "Mechanization of thinking (Jevons logical machine)" published in 1925:I simply gave the instrument the smaller dimensions, made it from metal and eliminated some constructional defects. The further step forward was the connecting the special illuminated screen to the instrument. The work of machine is transmitted to this screen and results of "thinking" appear not in symbolic form as on Jevons machine but in ordinary verbal form[START_REF] Schukarev | Mekhanizatsiya myshleniya: Logicheskaya mashina Dzhivonsa. (Механизация мышления: Логическая машина Дживонса)[END_REF].Schukarev so ended his description:

Fig. 3 .

 3 Fig. 3. Schukarev logical machine (Source: [9]) Any other case a which contains information excluding the absence of illwill B demands indisputable charge C.Any other case a which also doesn't contain information excluding the absence of ill-will b allows the charge C and discharge c as well.Thus, magistrate from Rostov was absolutely right in his acquittal verdict (because discharge is preferred to charge)"[START_REF] Schukarev | Mekhanizatsiya myshleniya: Logicheskaya mashina Dzhivonsa. (Механизация мышления: Логическая машина Дживонса)[END_REF].

Fig. 4 .

 4 Fig. 4. Schukarev memorial plaque (Source: [16, p. 186])