Julie Olivero Maitre
email: julie.olivero@unimes.fr

Towards a Taxonomy of Environmental Management Decision: From Rudimentary to Sophisticated Model. An Empirical Study on French Coastal Industries

This article aims to understand how French coastal industries perceive and treat the negative impacts of their daily activities on the natural environment, and question the determinants of environmental management decision. From an analysis of 196 questionnaires, this survey reveals that if regulatory stakeholders and leaders' values primarily guide industries towards a more responsible management, environmental practices are reactive and rather recent. Costs, complexity of regulation, and lack of resources are the main barriers to the pursuit of more ambitious environmental actions. A need for information on the environmental regulations is also mentioned by managers. Finally, environmental management is more an expensive way to legitimize and maintain activities than an economic or competitive advantage. Despite convergences between the investigated cases, especially in terms of motivations and purposes, three models of environmental management decision emerge, ranging from a rudimentary position, and a more sophisticated and proactive approach, and the factors explaining these discrepancies are essentially corporate culture, size, business sector, and leaders' values.

Introduction and conceptual framework

The increasing number of ecological accidents regularly reminds us the vulnerability of the natural environment to human activities. The oil spill caused by the Erika wreck occurred on December 1999, and more recently the red muds accident in 2010 in a Hungarian alumina industry still draw attention. There are also less apparent but nevertheless harmful environmental damages. Indeed, industrial activities can generate gradual and diffuse pollutions likely to cause long-term negative impacts, called "industrialo-environmental risks" (IER for convenience). These risks cover two dimensions: firstly, the "ecological risk", considered as the probability of an industrial activity to impact its natural environment (air and water pollutions, soil contamination, etc.), and secondly, the "economic risk" which can occur afterward, further to the stakeholders' reactions feeling threatened by this activity. This penalty can take several forms (new laws, warnings and plant closures) whose decision depends on the government. It can also come from other stakeholders and be expressed in terms of boycotts, image degradation, difficulty of finding loans, etc. Consequently, it is not necessarily pollution that creates a threat for income and value of the business assets, but environmental concern and public opinion.

In France, the issue of interactions between organizations and their natural environment is relevant. There are about 500,000 classified installations for environmental protection (ICPE i ), among which 54,000 are subjected to prefectoral authorization (including Seveso sites) because of the dangerous nature of their activity. These installations are often located in major cities nearby estuaries and deltas that are ecologically sensitive areas. Five coastal departments are especially selected in our survey: Nord, Seine Maritime, Gironde, Loire Atlantique, Bouches-du-Rhône.

Rooted in the field of CSR, this article aims to understand how the "actors of modernity" ii (industries) perceive and treat the negative impacts of their daily activities on the natural environment, and question the determinants of IER management decision. The latter is studied through four dimensions: perception (degree of priority given to environmental issues, constraint or strategic opportunity), evaluation (methods of IER assessment), management (reactive or proactive measures, level of investment in environmental protection), and communication of IER (internal and external communication). We especially reflect on the institutional and organizational influences on the IER management decision in French industries. Indeed, if organizations, subject to many pressures, adopt management practices expected from their environment that determine their legitimacy and survival, their motivations do not solely depend on the phenomenon of institutional isomorphism. It can also be explained by the internal configuration of organizations, especially leaders' values [START_REF] Oliver | Strategic responses to institutional processes[END_REF][START_REF] Viardot | Entreprises et écologie : le rôle des dirigeants dans la réponse stratégique aux contraintes écologistes[END_REF][START_REF] Egri | Leadership in the North American Environmental Sector: Values, Leadership Styles and Contexts of Environmental Leaders and their Organizations[END_REF][START_REF] Fernandez | Manager's profile in environmental strategy: a review of literature[END_REF]Kerr, 2006;Reynaud & al., 2007Reynaud & al., , 2008;;[START_REF] Olivero | Entreprises et management environnemental : Pratiques de gestion dans les établissements à risques réglementés situés sur le littoral français[END_REF].

Many studies have demonstrated the relevance of the neo-institutional theory to understand and explain the implementation of environmental practices in organizations [START_REF] King | Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program[END_REF][START_REF] Hoffman | Linking organizational and field level analyses: The diffusion of corporate environmental practice[END_REF][START_REF] Reverdy | Les normes environnementales en entreprise : la trajectoire mouvementée d'une mode managériale[END_REF][START_REF] Boiral | La certification ISO 14001: une perspective néo-institutionnelle[END_REF][START_REF] Boiral | Corporate Greening through ISO 14001: a Rational Myth?[END_REF]. According to them, the adoption of environmental practices results from an "institutional isomorphism" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and these practices are far from contributing to the improvement of environmental performance [START_REF] Boiral | La certification ISO 14001: une perspective néo-institutionnelle[END_REF]. Because of their significant environmental footprint, industries are faced to more social and political pressures that encourage them to reduce their negative externalities and commit to a sustainable development policy. Then, organizations do not only need inputs (raw materials, equipment, or capital) to exist, they also need social legitimacy [START_REF] Suchman | Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches[END_REF][START_REF] Hoffman | Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the US chemical industry[END_REF][START_REF] King | Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program[END_REF][START_REF] Bansal | Why Companies Go Green: A Model of Ecological Responsiveness[END_REF][START_REF] Champion | De la responsabilité sociale à la citoyenneté corporative : l'entreprise privée et sa nécessaire quête de légitimité[END_REF][START_REF] Boiral | La certification ISO 14001: une perspective néo-institutionnelle[END_REF]. They give the illusion of the rationality to stakeholders by adopting standards of the institutional environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1997), and tend to become uniform by conforming to it (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Here, we refer to Dohou-Renaud typology (2009) that identifies institutional pressures according to their nature (coercive, normative and mimetic) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and the category of actors who exert these pressures (the "environmental stakeholders") [START_REF] Marquet-Pondeville | Le contrôle de gestion environnemental[END_REF]. The latter are represented by the "regulatory stakeholders" (State, public authorities, European Union), the "organizational stakeholders" (leaders, shareholders, employees), the "environmentalists" (NGO, associations, local communities, media, scientists), and the "stakeholders of market" (customers, competitors, professional associations) (see Table 1). But if we consider that institutional pressures encourage organizations to implement environmental practices, the latter are not necessarily homogeneous [START_REF] Nash | Factors that shape EMS outcomes in firms, in Regulating from the inside: can environmental management systems achieve policy goals[END_REF]Andrews et al., 2003;[START_REF] Boiral | Gestion Environnementale et ISO 14 001: Une Approche Néo-Institutionnelle[END_REF]. We especially propose a taxonomy of the IER management decision, ranging from a rudimentary and reactive position, and a more sophisticated and proactive approach, and the factors explaining these discrepancies are leaders' values, corporate culture, size, and business sector. According to the authors of the new institutional theory, firms do not all respond at the same time nor in the same way face to institutional pressures. Demil (1998), who works on business strategies face to regulation, shows that some of them adopt a proactive strategy by trying to "act before the regulatory deadline (or any other type of pressure) and introduce a major innovation in the given context", while others adopt a strategy consisting in "acting by the deadline imposed by regulations and not to introducing innovation". In the first case, decisions are based on anticipating events and a willingness to go beyond the regulations by integrating the ecological environment as a key factor in the success of the development strategy. In the second case, decisions are consecutive to events and institutional pressures with no real anticipation. It's a "problem solving" approach in which organizations manage IER as and when necessary, without holistic and integrated view. Solutions are often curative or palliative. In this perspective, the IER management is considered as a barrier to the economic development of organizations. The various levels of business responsible commitments observed in the literature are probably the manifestation of the joint and unequal influence of different forces on organizations [START_REF] Carroll | A Three Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance[END_REF]Hunt & Auster, 1990;[START_REF] Roome | Developing Environmental Management Systems[END_REF]Hart, 1995;Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998;[START_REF] Martinet | Stratégie d'entreprise et écologie[END_REF].

From these typologies result two business logics [START_REF] Martinet | Shareholders, stakeholders et stratégie[END_REF]. For some companies, the integration of environmental issues is synonymous of constraints and costs [START_REF] Denison | Effects of Selected Changes in the Institutional and Human Environment Upon Output per Unit of Input[END_REF][START_REF] Dufour | Regulation and Productivity in the Quebec Manufacturing Sector[END_REF][START_REF] Walley | It's not easy being green[END_REF], for others, it is a source of opportunities and creates value [START_REF] Reynaud | Les compétences centrales "environnement" comme source d'avantages concurrentiels et de légitimité[END_REF][START_REF] Persaix | L'écologie comme atout stratégique : une validation de l'approche ressources par la méthode PLS[END_REF]. From an internal perspective, the most common motivations are cost reduction [START_REF] Hart | Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable World[END_REF][START_REF] Bensédrine | Comment devenir une entreprise verte[END_REF] through a better waste management and use of resources, improvement in productivity [START_REF] Porter | Towards a Dynamic Theory of Strategy[END_REF][START_REF] Porter | Towards a New Conception of the Environmental-Competitiveness Relationship[END_REF] and environmental performance [START_REF] Foulon | Incentives for Pollution Control: Regulation or Information?[END_REF]. From an external perspective, improving competitiveness [START_REF] Elkington | Towards the Sustainable Corporation: Win-Win-Win Business Strategies for Sustainable Development[END_REF][START_REF] Martinet | Stratégie d'entreprise et écologie[END_REF], access to markets/ethical funds (Depoers & al., 2003), and a better reputation are mentioned. However, firms report difficulties with the implementation of an

Environmental stakeholders

Pressure environmental management: lack of human and/or financial resources [START_REF] Tilley | Small Firm Environmental Ethics: How Deep They Do?[END_REF][START_REF] Hillary | EMS: Environmental Protection the Voluntary Way[END_REF][START_REF] Berger-Douce | Freins et moteurs de l'engagement des PME dans une démarche de management environnemental[END_REF], lack of information [START_REF] Lazzareschi | Interfaces management stratégique -Management environnemental en PME -PMI, Mémoire pour l'obtention du diplôme de l'IHIE[END_REF][START_REF] Hillary | EMS: Environmental Protection the Voluntary Way[END_REF], ignorance of the sustainable development issues [START_REF] Berger-Douce | Freins et moteurs de l'engagement des PME dans une démarche de management environnemental[END_REF], and skepticism about the expected benefits (Tilley, 1999;[START_REF] Zutshi | Adoption and Maintenance of Environmental Management Systems: Critical Success Factors[END_REF].

Material and methods

Definition of the target population

The units which compose the target population were identified from the French Ministry of Ecology website iii . Sites with ICPE were selected according to their geographical situation (located on one of the five departments), and their level of risks (sites subject to prefectoral authorization, including Seveso high and low thresholds sites). Several business sectors are represented: mining, manufacturing, power generation, waste management, transportation, and storage. 484 sites were finally identified (see Table 2), with 380 Non-Seveso sites, 31 Seveso low threshold sites, and 73 Seveso high threshold sites.

Elaboration and administration of questionnaires

Construction of questionnaires

As [START_REF] Evrard | Market. Etudes et Recherches en Marketing[END_REF] underlined, the construction of a questionnaire is the most important step in the implementation of a survey. The difficulty is "to find the best conciliation between the aim of the researcher who has to follow a theoretical model and respect its concepts, the imperative of the respondent who has to be comfortable to answer questions which must be easily understandable, and finally, the objective of the methods of data analysis imposed by the statistical tools" (Thiétart & al., 2007, p. 230). The questionnaire was thus made by respecting three main objectives that are "to translate the information required in a series of specific questions which the participants can and have to answer", "to be motivating and encouraging so that the respondent feels involved in the interview", "to minimize the response errors" (Malhotra, Décaudin, Bouguerra, 2004, p. 218).

A particular attention was given to the introduction in order to define concepts and specify the confidential character of the survey. Questions were also written in a logical order and according to a thematic clustering iv in order to avoid any inward-looking attitude of participants (see Figure 1). In every theme, we distinguished factual questions from more subjective questions to avoid the halo effect. Besides, to minimize the effect of contamination, the "funnel" technique was preferred, paying attention to the order of questions. The latter were so designed "to make comfortable", with the aim of determining the best logical and psychological sequence for respondents. Finally, control and filter questions were inserted to, respectively, test the sincerity and the coherence of answers, and to manage a part of respondents towards intimate questions. To make the data processing easier, closed questions (single and multiple choice, rating scale v ) were mainly used. To make the data processing easier, closed questions (single and multiple choice, rating scale) were mainly used. 7 recto-verso pages finally composed the questionnaire, and the average duration of completion was about 15 minutes according to the pre-test made from 4 experts and 9 managers.

Administration of questionnaires

To maximize the response rate, and given the sensitive character of the study, data were collected by e-mail and mail questionnaires. If we recognize their disadvantages (rigidity of the instrument, strong influence of the questionnaire and its logic, its impersonal character, etc.), respondents don't undergo the influence of the investigator and have time to think, that allows a better approach of the opinion questions. Thanks to the ROHM and OHM-BMP vi financial support, we decided to contact by phone 484 managers in charge of IER management. This ambitious approach allowed sending 340 questionnaires by Internet. This is less expensive and gets higher quality data than mail questionnaires (Dillman, 2007), especially with sensitive topics [START_REF] Thiétart | Méthodes de recherche en management[END_REF]. Finally, six stages, detailed in the figure 2, structure our approach: Thanks to its intelligent optimization system and its Internet dimension, Sphinx iQ software was used for data processing. If the quality of the data set is good (91% filling), the total nonresponse rate remains high (60%). The impossibility to contact the managers when calling, the impossibility for them to participate in the survey for professional (business travel, overloaded agenda, etc.) or personal (sick leave, maternity leave) reasons, the technical issues (locked access to the questionnaire by the informatics policy of the firm), the sensitivity of the topic or the optional character of the survey may explain these non-responses.

Being unable to control a priori the total non-response, the representativeness of the sample was checked a posteriori according to the quota method vii , based on information from the target population (level of risks, geographical location, and business sector). The adjusted data were, firstly, subjected to cross tabulations and frequency tables that highlight the main trends in terms of environmental practices within French industries, and the main issues that the managers of IER are daily exposed. Secondly, given the variety of empirical observations, we propose a taxonomy from a K-means cluster analysis viii . Three decisional models of IER management were observed, ranging from a rudimentary and reactive position, and a more sophisticated and proactive approach. After having specified the methodological details of the research, the main results are presented. All the graphs and boards are extracted from the Sphinx software. The significance thresholds are 1% (very significant or TS), 5% (significant or S), 10% (not significant or PS), and figures are rounded to the nearest unit, which can explain the inaccuracy of totals in tables.

Results

Finally, 196 managers participated in the survey, a response rate of about 41%. Respondents are essentially men (64.5%), from 25 to 45 years old (67%), and with a training background in engineering (45.2%). Almost half of them practice for less than 7 years within firms. In spite of this low seniority, there is an increasing formalization of the responsibilities regarding environmental issues through the emergent status of the "environment manager" or "HSE/QSE manager". It shows the increasing importance placed on the environmental protection within risky sites. Respondents essentially work within "non Seveso" (78.5%), and small or medium sites (63%). Almost all of them belong to the manufacturing sector (chemistry, food-processing industry). And firms mainly arise from the private sector (94.8%), only two sites depending on the energy public sector.

The analysis of institutional isomorphisms explaining IER management decision within firms highlights convergences between the case studies. Firstly, IER management decision mainly depends on searching conformity with social values (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983): industrial activities adopt environmental practices in order to strengthen their legitimacy and perpetuate their activities [START_REF] Suchman | Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches[END_REF][START_REF] Hoffman | Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the US chemical industry[END_REF][START_REF] King | Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program[END_REF][START_REF] Boiral | La certification ISO 14001: une perspective néo-institutionnelle[END_REF][START_REF] Bansal | Why Companies Go Green: A Model of Ecological Responsiveness[END_REF][START_REF] Champion | De la responsabilité sociale à la citoyenneté corporative : l'entreprise privée et sa nécessaire quête de légitimité[END_REF]) much more than to increase their economic performance. Business opportunities and the economic benefits, outlined in some research [START_REF] Porter | Towards a Dynamic Theory of Strategy[END_REF][START_REF] Elkington | Towards the Sustainable Corporation: Win-Win-Win Business Strategies for Sustainable Development[END_REF][START_REF] Porter | Towards a New Conception of the Environmental-Competitiveness Relationship[END_REF][START_REF] Hart | Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable World[END_REF][START_REF] Bensédrine | Comment devenir une entreprise verte[END_REF][START_REF] Martinet | Stratégie d'entreprise et écologie[END_REF] are not clear (see Table 3). Secondly, coercive pressures from environmental regulations are predominant: IER management is implemented to be accountable to the "regulatory stakeholders" in priority; mimetic and normative pressures are minor. Coercive pressures from leaders (the "organizational stakeholders") are also a key element influencing firms in a greener orientation [START_REF] Oliver | Strategic responses to institutional processes[END_REF][START_REF] Viardot | Entreprises et écologie : le rôle des dirigeants dans la réponse stratégique aux contraintes écologistes[END_REF][START_REF] Egri | Leadership in the North American Environmental Sector: Values, Leadership Styles and Contexts of Environmental Leaders and their Organizations[END_REF][START_REF] Fernandez | Manager's profile in environmental strategy: a review of literature[END_REF]Kerr, 2006;Reynaud & al., 2007Reynaud & al., , 2008;;[START_REF] Olivero | Entreprises et management environnemental : Pratiques de gestion dans les établissements à risques réglementés situés sur le littoral français[END_REF], especially in very small firms and extractive industries. We thus recognize the institutional (regulation) and organizational (leaders) influences on the IER management decision in French industries (see Table 4).

Table 3. Main motivations of environmental actions Table 4. Pressures felt by managers regarding IER management

If regulation and leaders' values primarily guide French industries towards a more responsible management, IER management is mainly reactive, and environmental practices have significantly emerged for the last decade. And these practices are only beginning. Indeed, if "globalization and sustainable development are the keywords of the 21th century" [START_REF] Boiral | Les pays du sud à l'épreuve des normes ISO : vers un sous-développement durable ?[END_REF], most respondents express difficulties in adopting a sustainable environmental management. Costs [START_REF] Denison | Effects of Selected Changes in the Institutional and Human Environment Upon Output per Unit of Input[END_REF][START_REF] Dufour | Regulation and Productivity in the Quebec Manufacturing Sector[END_REF][START_REF] Walley | It's not easy being green[END_REF], regulatory complexity, and lack of resources [START_REF] Tilley | Small Firm Environmental Ethics: How Deep They Do?[END_REF][START_REF] Hillary | EMS: Environmental Protection the Voluntary Way[END_REF][START_REF] Berger-Douce | Freins et moteurs de l'engagement des PME dans une démarche de management environnemental[END_REF] are the main barriers to the pursuit of more ambitious environmental actions. A need for information on the regulations is also mentioned [START_REF] Lazzareschi | Interfaces management stratégique -Management environnemental en PME -PMI, Mémoire pour l'obtention du diplôme de l'IHIE[END_REF][START_REF] Hillary | EMS: Environmental Protection the Voluntary Way[END_REF] (see Table 5). Actually, only half of respondents say they have adopted an ISO-14001 Environmental Management System (EMS). The low number of sites signing partnerships with environmental associations and/or NGO or using an eco-audit system (EMAS) confirms, besides, the nervousness of environmental initiatives. The emergence of a different way of doing business is not up to date. The role and the mission we wish to give to firms (that is to say a social player working for solidarity and general interest) seem difficult to put into practice. This result strengthens Walley and Whitehead's argument (1994, p.46) that "responding to environmental challenges has always been a costly and complicated proposition for managers…Talk is cheap, environmental efforts are not ".

Table 5. Obstacles perceived by managers regarding IER management

However, if we observe convergences between the investigated cases, especially in terms of motivations and purposes, three models of environmental management decision appear from the K-means cluster analysis (see Table 6). This method aims to bring together the closest observations. This criterion of nearest neighbors means that each case is assigned to a class if it is very close to its center of gravity. It is recommended when the number of observations is greater than 100 and when variables are quantitative, which is our case. In addition, the preparation step of the data was facilitated given the absence of missing values and extreme points, and the use of comparable scale (Likert scales). The high value of Cronbach's alpha (0.77) also indicates that the explanatory variables are highly correlated. Finally, to increase the validity of the classification, we first used the method of hierarchical cluster analysis to get a sense of the number and composition of classes. Then we refined this classification with a non-hierarchical analysis as recommended by Punj and Stewart (1983). It appears that the latter has a higher (0.35) than that from the ascending hierarchical method (0.32) discriminating power. First, the basic model or class B (34.2% of the sample) includes industries for which environmental issues are perceived as a constraint. They meet difficulty to assess their IER, their environmental investments are limited, and their communication is mainly internal. They have a low environmental culture, and their environmental management is quite reactive. This profile mainly concerns small and medium sites that do not have the support of management, and for which the economic context has put environmental protection in the background. Their environmental approach is rather recent (from 1 to 10 years). They have not implemented EMS and perceive many obstacles in the IER management (costs, reluctance of executives and shareholders, low perception of immediate benefits, lack of human and/or financial resources). Second, the intermediate model or class A (38.3%) concerns firms that adopt a reactive environmental management despite a high priority given to IER, the nonperception of difficulties in assessment, a strong internal communication and a highly developed environmental culture. It mainly includes very small and very large firms characterized by a leadership sensitive to environmental issues. Most of them have implemented an EMS, but their environmental approach is relatively recent (from 11 to 15 years). Third, the sophisticated model or class C (27.5%) is characterized by a fundamentally proactive attitude towards IER, both from the viewpoint of the management that the internal and external communication. Environmental issues are considered as a real strategic opportunity, compatible with the traditional model of profit maximization and shareholder value. This group mainly covers the big firms with 250-2000 employees, Seveso high threshold sites, and firms with a leadership sensitive to environmental issues. These sites have implemented an EMS and their environmental approach is old (from 16 to 25 years).

Environmental management decision is consequently differently perceived by firms, both in the level of IER perception and related issues, and in actual behavior. In spite of a collective awareness of environmental issues and the development of many actions to reduce IER, only 27.5% reported an IER proactive management. There are contradictions and "organizational paradoxes": industries that report adopting more reactive approaches (the intermediate model) are not necessarily firms ignoring issues related to IER or with a non-existent environmental culture. Instead, they declare implement important internal communication devices, and integrate very common environmental issues in management meetings or new projects. We note as well, through this model, a strong environmental culture and a real involvement of leaders is not enough to adopt a proactive posture. It may take time and need maturity to be able to integrate these issues into business strategies, especially in very small firms. In other words, environmental culture and sensitivity leaders do not they constitute the conditions required for a proactive environmental approach?

Contributions and research perspective

From a theoretical perspective, if the neo-institutionalist approach is a relevant theoretical framework in management sciences, or even dominant to understand organizations [START_REF] Greenwood | The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism[END_REF], our survey provides a less deterministic view of the basic model to analyze the adoption of environmental practices in firms. We discuss the development of voluntary actions through a neo-institutional perspective, thus reconciling deterministic and proactive approaches to understand IER management decision. Moreover, while most studies deal with large or small companies (with a long domination of large firms), we propose an empirical study that compares sites of different size, including small organizations which can also be affected by environmental issues given their significant environmental impacts [START_REF] Hillary | EMS: Environmental Protection the Voluntary Way[END_REF]Friedman & Miles, 2002;[START_REF] Ammenberg | Tracing Business and Environmental Effects of Environmental Management System[END_REF]. And contrary to some authors' suggestions [START_REF] Guyenot | Effort, performances et gestion environnementale des entreprises -Données et Références[END_REF], we show that some small firms, characterized by sensitive leaders to environmental issues, are also able to develop proactive environmental management. Finally, while many works discuss the information requirement of small and medium firms about environmental matters [START_REF] Lazzareschi | Interfaces management stratégique -Management environnemental en PME -PMI, Mémoire pour l'obtention du diplôme de l'IHIE[END_REF][START_REF] Hillary | EMS: Environmental Protection the Voluntary Way[END_REF], this survey points out that this informational problem is also affecting large organizations.

From an empirical perspective, "if articles, theses and books on environmental management have developed rapidly since the mid-1990s, how companies daily integrate environmental concerns, the content of these activities in this field, and the process of implementation are still relatively unknown" [START_REF] Boiral | Corporate Greening through ISO 14001: a Rational Myth?[END_REF]. Indeed, the goal of the survey is to "take the organizational pulse" in terms of environmental awareness and management, in a context of high population density and ecological vulnerability. Our approach is pragmatic. It aims to have an "unchaste" look on the environmental practices of French industries, the latter being relatively unclear because of the difficulty to obtain information which are usually "bogged down" in normative, reassuring speeches, and consistent with the dominant managerial orthodoxy (Boiral 2008, p.64). Moreover, to our knowledge, there are few recent empirical studies describing and analyzing environmental practices within French industries causing risks to the natural and human environment [START_REF] Glachant | Politiques d'Environnement et Management Environnemental : Une Enquête OCDE sur 300 Etablissements Industriels Français[END_REF]. This survey so provides a rich empirical material structured around interviews with managers of IER. It concretely illustrates the decisional process in terms of IER management in polluting firms daily confronted with environmental issues. And although we observe mimetic environmental behaviors, there are discrepancies between the surveyed industries. A taxonomy has been proposed in order to, firstly, simplify the elements of the theory and practice by providing a reading grid built around a limited number of criteria, and secondly, enhance scientific ideas for managers.

A critical look at French and European public policies in encouraging environmental protection

If regulations mainly influence environmental practices in French industries, the solution is not more rules. Indeed, the investigation, contrasting perceptions, practices, motivations and barriers for an IER management, provides a critical look at French and European politics regarding incentives to environmental protection. It reveals the difficulties managers may face through their functions in environmentally responsible arbitrage. The deficit of regulatory information expressed by nearly 60% of respondents especially highlights the relative efficiency of the flow of information between regulatory experts and industries. Then, a particular effort must be made to make sensitive and inform managers through meetings, regular emails about the new regulations, etc. This research leads us to recommend not higher laws, but a gradual hardening which would be more adaptive to one of the main actors of social responsibility. The dissemination of a more qualitative and adaptive regulatory information would, for example, much appreciated by managers. Some industries also fear relocations, plant closures because of high regulations, which let us think that other ways of governance should be considered. For instance, more "flexible" regulations could be likely to improve the environmental performance of organizations in a "win-win" logics [START_REF] Porter | Towards a New Conception of the Environmental-Competitiveness Relationship[END_REF]. However, this investigation raises questions about the fairness and sustainability of organizational environmental commitments in a context of more flexible regulations. Are risky industries always ready for this "trip" that requires them to improve managerial skills and a continuous focus [START_REF] Shrivastava | Demain l'entreprise durable ?[END_REF]? Would we observe a real determination from industries to enroll in an environmentally friendly approach, or, on the contrary, a lack of interest or a total ignorance of environmental issues? The question of integration of environmental issues in organizations, especially in a context characterized by uncertainty and repetitive financial and economic crises, leads to the well-known dilemma. Should we promote a certain "laissez-faire", trusting environmental leaders and considering the possibility of an independent IER policy institutionalized by the industry itself (Oström, 2010)? Or, do we consider Gendron & al.'s recommendations (2004, p.78) that "voluntary measures and regulations are two sides of the same coin and, as demonstrated by [START_REF] Harrison | Volontarisme et gouvernance environnementale, Gérer l'environnement : défis constants, solutions incertaines[END_REF], the first will be more effective than the latter are strict "?

The observation of a contingent phenomenon: "the environmental practices of French risky industries from May 2011 to April 2012"

For a long time, IER have been no concern on the part of public authorities, society or industry. This is from the late 20th century that awareness for the protection of the global environment appears, especially with the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972). Twenty years later, at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the environment is considered as a common and public good. And it is only since the 1990s, under pressure from the public and media, laws have multiplied. Environmental practices within companies have developed in favor of the environmental protection, and will certainly evolve in a different way. If the goal of our investigation is to highlight the structural elements of the IER management decision in risky industries, it is accepted that we only provide a photographed version of reality. Indeed, there is no permanence as in "hard sciences" where, for example, the researcher can observe the behavior of earthworms in an experimental context. Permanence and duration are thus "destroyed" by time and the learning phenomenon; the rules are only valid for a defined period. We are thus "sentenced" to observe obsolete phenomena because of their strong dependence on the context of the study.

In our case, we analyzed an evolutionary phenomenon and dated in time: the IER management in the French risky industries from May 2011 to April 2012. The survey results are not only dependent on the economic situation (economic crisis), the social context (tightening of environmental regulations), but also the cultural context (increasing sensitivity to environmental protection). In China, for example, frequent atmospheric pollution peaks, mainly caused by traffic emissions and industries, contributed to the gradual emergence of protest movements. In 2011, a movement was born around Pekingese public figures, businessmen and writers to require the government pollution measuring and information for populations. If this social pressure prompted the government and the Environment Agency to take measures to better regulate industrial activities, it is mainly multinationals that drive Chinese companies to manage environmental risks (Ortolano, 2012). A "code of practices for Apple suppliers" shows, for instance, that there is a set of rules on hazardous substances, solid waste, sanitary and storm wastewater, and gas fumes in the chapter on environmental impacts. However, when Apple is faulted, as has already occurred, NGOs or the media grab it and point fingers for its laxity vis-à-vis Asian suppliers. We understand that Apple, like other corporations, can defend itself by refusing to deal with ISO 14001 non-certified suppliers. This example shows the effectiveness of the market forces sometimes outweighs the regulators.

Proposal for a study focusing on the leaders' psychology: what leader and agent of change to address the environmental challenges?

The survey emphasizes the importance of "displayed" values by leaders to promote proactive environmental practices within firms. A study based on the leaders' psychology would thus identify capabilities for a more integrative IER management in businesses: be able to work with multiple stakeholders and understand their viewpoints, have a systemic view of reality, take into account the complexity of the issues, manage conflict (listening and negotiation), anticipate, etc. Interviews could be conducted with business leaders, whose analysis would lead to a typology of environmental leadership, and identify favorable organizational conditions for a proactive environmental management (selection of managers through an examination of their intrinsic qualities, their awareness of environmental issues; recruitment of ecologists and researchers within the organization, etc.) [START_REF] Boiral | The Action Logics of Environmental Leadership: A Developmental Perspective[END_REF]. In a Barrett Brown article (2012), the vertical learning is considered as the main trend of the future in the development of leaders. The vertical learning is "living deep changes in our mental structures that change the way we see the world." Leaders committed to sustainable development would require both a horizontal learning to constantly update their knowledge about the world, as a vertical learning to learn to change their way of seeing the world. Questions for which there

are not yet answers are numerous. What leader and agent of change to address environmental challenges? How to guide managers towards action logics more favorable to IER management? While many studies have investigated ethics and leadership from a normative or philosophical perspective, research on ethical leadership, specifically environmental leadership, are still embryonic, which offers opportunities for discovery for researchers and the opportunity for leaders to improve their efficiency to better address the new environmental challenges.

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. Thematic clustering of the questionnaire

Thematic 1 :

 1 Figure 2. Stages of the questionnaire administration process

Stage 2 :

 2 Pre-test from 4 experts, then from a first sample of 9 industries (contacted during the qualitative study ) Stage 3: 484 managers of IER contacted by phone + reminders in the case of repeated absences in the office Stage 4: Constitution of an e-address book (337 emails) Stage 5: Sending of emails to managers who gave us their electronic address Stage 5': Sending of mail questionnaires to managers who didn't give us their electronic address Stage 6: Reminders of electronic questionnaires (about 1 reminder every 2 or 3 weeks) Stage 1: Identification of 484 risky sites according to our 2 search criteria (geographical location, level of risks)

Table 1 . The « environmental stakeholders » and the nature of their influence (Dohou-Renaud, 2009, p.120).

 1

		Coercive	Normative	Mimetic
		European Union,
	Regulatory stakeholders	Government, Authorities of	SME/ISO (14001, 26000), GRI, EMAS
		regulation
	Environmentalists	Residents associations, NGO, local communities	Universities, Scientific institutions	Media, Press
	Stakeholders of the market	Customers, Associations of consumers, Banks, Insurance companies	Professional organizations (UIC), Charters (UNICEM), (Responsible Care) Programs	Competitors, Suppliers, Rating agencies
	Organizational stakeholders	Leaders, Shareholders, Investors	---	Employees and trade unions

Table 2 . Distribution of the target-population according to the study basins Study basins Main cities Example of industries Number of sites Bouches-du- Rhône

 2

	Loire Atlantique	Nantes, Saint Nazaire, Montoir de Bretagne, Donges, Saint Herblain, Rezé, Pornic	St Nazaire, EDF de Cordemais, Total de Donges	97
	Seine Maritime	Le Havre, Rouen, Dieppe	Port Jérôme, Notre Dame de Caux, EDF au Havre Gravenchon, zone de Caudebec en	89
	Nord	Dunkerque, Grande-Synthe, Capelle-la-Grande	Rubis Terminal, Raffinerie de Dunkerque, ALFI	49
	Number of sites			484

Istres, Fos-sur-Mer, Berre, Rognac, Port de Bouc, Martigues, St Martin de Crau, Meyreuil, Rousset, Gardanne Plateforme de Lavéra, Arcellormittal de Fos, SNET de Meyreuil, Esso de Fos, Atmel et ST Microelectronics de Rousset 150 Gironde Bordeaux, Bassens, Ambès, Bègles Zone de Bassens, Bec d'Ambès 99

Table 6 . Main results of the K-means cluster analysis

 6

	Class Population	Proportion	Average Distance	Standard deviation	Concentration
	A	75.00	38.27	3.31	1.05	0.30
	B	67.00	34.18	3.88	1.32	0.35
	C	54.00	27.55	3.78	1.46	0.34

Note: For variables marked in green (Resp red), the middle class values are significantly higher than in the rest of the sample (lower resp.).


Economic Theory, Phoenician Pre-coinage External Trade, Changes in the Economic Surplus and its Appropriation -An Initial Perspective

Keywords: Ancient societies and exchange, economic evolution, media of exchange, Heckscher-Ohlin theory, pre-coinage exchange, Phoenician trading JEL Classifications: B11, F10, F11, E42, N00, N48. Economic Theory, Phoenician Pre-coinage External Trade, Changes

Patterns are explored of the evolutionary stages in the management of economic exchange as economic activity grows and becomes more diverse and complex. These patterns are related to the economic development and external trade of Phoenician city-states. In addition, attention is given to how well economic theories explain the evolution of Phoenician external trading, with particular attention being given to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade. Also explored is the role of 'new' (evolving) media of exchange in facilitating interactive trade, especially that of Phoenicia. The possible methods that Phoenician rulers (and some other ancient rulers) adopted to extract a portion of the economic surplus from trade are outlined, and the policy issues they faced are discussed. It is concluded that media of exchange such as gold, silver and other treasures which initially fostered the growth of international trade, subsequently resulted in stifling this growth. This is because these items came to be regarded as a measure of real material wealth and led to policies being adopted by states which were intended to increase each state's stock of these treasures. The seeds of mercantilism were sown.

This system had several negative economic consequences and it actually tended to reduce international trade and decrease the economic prosperity of nations.

Introduction

Determining patterns of the economic development of ancient societies is a difficult task given the lack of information about the economic activity of these societies. This becomes apparent in studying the economic development of Phoenicia, which is the main focus of this paper. In her introduction to a discussion of early Greek and Phoenician trade, Susan Sherratt (2010, p.

138) states:

"Archaeological interpretation -particularly when social or ideological aspects are concerned -is always going to be an art rather than a science, and if we want to bring alive those peculiarly human elements that otherwise elude us, we will always have to resort to a certain amount of imagination and tentative reconstruction."

This paper begins by providing a general perspective on the development of external trade in ancient times and its economic implications. In doing so, attention is given to the accompanying decentralization of economic activity and changes in the nature of external economic exchange and its expansion (especially Phoenician international trade) as well as the role of proto-currencies in this evolution. Following this general perspective, different scholarly views are then reviewed about the extent to which Phoenician rulers controlled the international trade of their city-states and eventually devolved the management of much of this trade to a separate class of merchants.

The question is then posed of how well do economic theories explain the evolution and characteristics of Phoenician international trade? Particular attention is paid to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of the determinants of international trade [START_REF] Heckscher | Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Theory[END_REF] because [START_REF] Temin | Mediterranean trade in biblical times[END_REF] claims that it explains the evolution in and the attributes of the international trade of Phoenician city-states. We find that the Heckscher-Ohlin theory provides a poor explanation of the development and nature of Phoenician international trade. We identify different determinants to those which seem to be suggested by this theory to be very important contributors to the nature and success of this trade.

Next attention is given to the facilitators of international trade. These include initial gift-giving as a precursor to trade based on bargaining which involved the exchange of commodities. Some of the problems involved in 'kick-starting' long-distance external trade are raised and some of the methods that could have been used to start this trade are identified. It is noted that the importance of different methods for facilitating exchange have altered with the passage of time.

It is claimed that even prior to the introduction of coinage, new media of exchange (such as the use of metal ingots) used for exchange purposes helped to stimulate international trade, provided increased support for its growing diversity, and fostered the expansion of multilateral trade.

The expansion of international trade provided the rulers of trading states with an opportunity to increase their economic wealth. However, extracting the economic surplus from trading involved greater challenges than when rulers relied primarily on extracting domestic agricultural surpluses to provide the basis of their wealth. This was particularly so in the case of trade-dependent Phoenician city-states. They had little domestic surplus of agricultural goods to collect, unlike in Egypt which primarily remained an agrarian economy. Hence, economic models based on the appropriation of the domestic food surplus by the elite (such as those of [START_REF] Tisdell | The Ability in Antiquity of Some Agrarian Societies to Avoid the Malthusian Trap and Develop[END_REF][START_REF] Winterhalder | The Exchequer's Guide to Population Ecology and Resource Exploitation in the Agrarian State[END_REF] do not capture the Phoenician situation. Methods adopted by Phoenician rulers in order to extract an economic surplus from trading are outlined and analysed. This aspect is followed by a concluding discussion.

A General Perspective

As pointed out by Kristiansen and Earle (2015, pp. 239-240), nowhere during the Neolithic and the Copper Age do we find permanently, well organized long-distance trade networks. On the contrary all Bronze age communities were dependent on metals for their social identity, warrior weaponry and their basic subsistence economy. This triggered international flows of metals which must have been connected with reciprocal flows of exports, including various commodities (salt, cattle, amber, fur...) as well as slaves. As economic development occurred in antiquity, the scope for economic specialization and exchange of commodities expanded and the diversity of commodities available for trade grew. These trends were to some extent interdependent. Increased international (cross border) trading added to the economic wealth of those societies which became important traders and increased their economic surplus especially when such trade became more 'market' oriented and more impersonal.

As economic systems evolved in this way, the ruling elites no longer relied so much on collecting grains and other physical commodities from their subjects in order to appropriate the economic surpluses. Thus as societies came to rely more heavily on long-distance trade for their economic wealth, the collection of and the importance of their domestic agricultural surplus diminished in significance and their gains from international trade became quite important. Consequently, models based on the collection of the agricultural surplus by the ruling elite became less relevant.

Increased international trading possibilities provided both new challenges and opportunities for the ruling elites. The extra wealth created by greater trade meant that: 1. A greater economic surplus was potentially available to add to the coffers of the elites; 2. They had to devise new ways of collecting this surplus and collect it other than in the form of agricultural produce; and 3. They had to give greater attention to the extent to which trade and economic activity should be centralized or decentralized as well as to the manner in which this decentralization should be allowed to occur. These types of issues are well illustrated by the economic development of Phoenician citystates. As the volume and particularly the diversity of long-distance trade of these city-states increased, indications are that the extent of centralized direction of this trade by its rulers declined. This decentralization (privatization) of trade helped to foster the growth of international trade and added to the wealth of these city-states but possibly reduced the proportion of the economic surplus that the elites were able to extract from their subjects. While the amount of economic surplus collected by the elites may have risen, a considerable increase in the wealth of an oligarchic class of merchants (traders) also occurred. [START_REF] Niemeyer | The Phoenicians in the Mediterranean. Between expansion and colonisation: a non-Greek model of overseas settlement and presence[END_REF] claims that this shift is quite obvious when comparing the periods before and after the "collapse" which occurred around 1200 BC in southwest Asia and Europe, but this is disputed by other scholars (see later in this paper). According to Niemeyer, before 1200 BC, the Phoenician (Canaanite) elite had considerable control of trade and the associated surplus extraction, while after this, its control declined and the power of merchants increased. 1 This group therefore (due to their growing wealth) were a potential threat to the political supremacy of the traditional ruling elite. However, [START_REF] Moore | Multinational enterprise in ancient Phoenicia[END_REF] contend that the political meddling and ambitions of Phoenician merchants were kept in check by their religious obligations and by the general social ethos of Phoenician societies.

As the amount of economic activity increases and the diversity of economic commodities grows, greater efficiency in the management of economies is usually achieved if they become more decentralized and this decentralization can also stimulate economic growth.

The gains from decentralizing economic activity and the extent to which this decentralization is worthwhile depends on the stage of economic development of economies. For example, economies which are initially completely centrally controlled by palaces (kings) may subsequently adopt decentralized forms of hierarchical administrative systems as their economic development occurs. Market-oriented systems involving less administrative control tend to come later as economies develop. Fig. 1 illustrates a set of different possible stages in the evolution of the management of economic systems. These stages are not, however, necessarily discrete. For example, economic systems are often controlled by a combination of market and administrative mechanisms; the relative importance of which varies. Phoenicia's economic development accords with this pattern to some extent. For example, Tyre's control of its trading colonies partly involved hierarchical administrative structures.

Fig. 1:

The above diagram shows one possible stylized pattern of evolutionary stages in the management of economic exchange as economic activity grows, becomes more diverse and complex. Particularly in stage 3, exchange is less reliant on gift-giving and social obligation and more impersonal and profit motivated. In stage 3, the development of trade is fostered by intermediate facilitators of trading, e.g. the use of proto-currencies such as gold, silver and copper ingots, and eventually by the use of money and later by more advanced intermediate media of exchange.

As economic development occurred in Phoenicia, some researchers claim that gift-giving and socially determined exchange by its rulers became of reduced relative importance as a means for the international exchanging commodities. These forms of exchange were increasingly replaced by impersonal (socially disembodied) market-like exchange (van Alfen, 2015). There was also a corresponding trend for Phoenician economies to become more decentralized and for Phoenician ruling elites to reduce their central control of international trade. Private merchants had increasing power to manage this trade and to expand it, frequently in cooperative arrangements with the ruling elite. This development contributed to the continuing economic growth of Phoenician city-states and added to their economic sustainability, e.g. by making it easier for them to adjust to changing market opportunities. The gradual shift from the bartering of commodities to the use of proto-currencies (such as gold, silver and copper ingots), as intermediate means of exchange also assisted the expansion of Phoenician international trade.

To What Extent Did Phoenician Rulers Control Trade?

Phoenician city-states developed a considerable amount of international trade and their economic prosperity and the size of their economic surpluses became highly dependent on it.

What was the basis of their economic success? To what extent can it be attributed to the nature of their economic organizations? Some scholars have attributed the trading success of the Phoenicians to their devolution of the control of trade from rulers to a separate class of merchants or traders. These traders were motivated by their desire in their economic activities to profit from the exchange of commodities. Indeed, Bernholz (1998) largely attributes the economic development of Phoenicia to a high degree of reliance on free trade and presents its development as a historical example of the relevance of "New Economic History" [START_REF] North | The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History[END_REF][START_REF] North | Structure and Change in Economic History[END_REF], which attributes the rise of the western world to the evolution of free markets and the development of institutions supporting these markets. However, the trade of Phoenician citystates was almost certainly less free (more imperfect) than portrayed by Bernholz.

Although scholars differ about the extent to which Phoenician rulers regulated international trade, most believe that these rulers exercised considerable influence on this trade.

Nevertheless, the extent of their control on this trade declined with the passing of time. Phoenician cities managed to wrestle trade policy away from the monarchs and so oriented the cities' governance towards enhancing personal profits. Although such a scenario is plausible, the evidence is rather thin."

Nevertheless, it seems to be agreed that a merchants' oligarchy eventually came to have an increasing and significant influence on the trade of Phoenician city-states. Furthermore, it seems to be widely accepted that this influence tended to grow with the passage of time.

Therefore, economic decisions about international trade become more decentralized, less regulated and controlled by Phoenician rulers, and more motivated by the seeking of profits.

Increased freedom in trading developed. [START_REF] Moore | Multinational enterprise in ancient Phoenicia[END_REF] provided what seems to be a more nuanced view of the relationship between the rulers of Phoenician city-states and their merchant class. They argue (on the basis of evidence from Tyre and Ugarit) that a synergistic relationship existed between the state and its merchants. They also argue that the reasons why the Phoenicians were so successful as traders are similar to those that explain the success of modern day multinational enterprises. In their analysis of Phoenician trading success, they draw on the theories of [START_REF] Dunning | Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy[END_REF] which are intended to explain the economic success of multinational businesses today and to provide reasons for their existence.

Moore and Lewis (2000) claim that a keiretsu style relationship (similar to that in contemporary Japan) existed in Ugarit and Tyre between their rulers and their merchant class. This relationship plus the reliance on multinational enterprises as part of their international trading largely explains the success of Phoenician city-states as international traders. As a result of their international trade, the Phoenicians were able to achieve much greater economic prosperity and a larger economic surplus than if they had relied for their economic wealth only on the resources within their own borders, or had been more dependent on these resources than otherwise. Although international trade was undoubtedly the key to Phoenician economic success, the basis of this success was probably more complex than portrayed by [START_REF] Moore | Multinational enterprise in ancient Phoenicia[END_REF] and really needs to be explained by the historical processes (developments) that enabled Phoenicians to prosper and sustain a very diverse and large volume of trade (by ancient standards) for several centuries.

How Well do Economic Theories Explain the Evolution and Characteristics of

Phoenician International Trade?

Reliable information on the nature and evolution of Phoenician international trade is very limited and most information has been obtained from secondary sources (van Alfen, 2015;

Sherratt, 2010). However, given that the Phoenicians developed such a major international trading network in ancient times and that this was a very important factor in contributing to their economic prosperity, it is worthwhile analysing the development of their international trade taking into account economic theories of the determinants of international trade.

Temin (2006) relies on the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of the determinants of international trade [START_REF] Heckscher | Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Theory[END_REF] to largely explain the composition, and the geographical direction of Phoenician trade. This theory postulates that differences in the resource endowments can be expected to be major determinants of external trade. He quotes Tyre's export of timber from Tyre to Egypt in return for Egyptian wheat as an example of the relevance of this theory and argues that Phoenician involvement in the shipping of bulk cargoes grew in importance as they developed superior ships. However, it seems that the composition and characteristics of Phoenician trade were determined by multiple factors of which differences in their natural resource endowments and those of their trading partners were just one. Moreover, the relative importance of different influences on their external trade altered with the passage of time.

The dynamics of the development of international trade are not captured by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade. Like most renditions of comparative cost theory of international trade, it is a static theory.

One might expect that in the early stage of their economic development the differences in the natural resource endowments of societies would be significant influences on their trade and exchange (including gift exchange). Nevertheless, even in the early stages of development, skills in adding value to raw materials and primary produce could have also exerted a significant influence on the development of Phoenician external trade. Sometimes such skills were developed by societies making use of the particular natural resources with which individual societies were better endowed than others, or which were relatively specific to particular communities. For example, the Phoenicians developed skills in textile manufacture by making use of their access to murex organisms (marine gastropods) from which purple dye was obtained. They used this source to dye linen, the production of which was based on Egyptian flax.

They also produced and dyed woollen garments relying to a large extent on imported wool. In addition, they developed superior shipbuilding skills and ship designs using their Phoenician timber (e.g. the cedars of Lebanon). This was probably a natural development from relying on marine fishing as an important contribution to the livelihood of many Phoenicians. Their shipbuilding skills in all probability enabled them to develop their skills in building generally.

As a result, an agreement was made between Tyre and Israel for temple building in Israel. Tyre Tyre also supplied craftsmen to Egypt in the late Bronze Age to add value to its exports of cedar to Egypt (Markoe, 2005, p. 9). Furthermore, Markoe (2005, p. 5) believes that it is likely that Phoenician engineers and workers helped in the sixth century BC (with the project of Darius I) to build a canal between the lower Nile and the Red Sea to cater for maritime transport. This is quite plausible.

Cunliffe (2017, pp. 225-227) points out that Hiron of Tyre was an energetic builder. For example, he joined several islets together to form one large island for Tyre and engaged in temple building, for instance, built the Melquet temple in Tyre. We can conclude that the Tyrians had significant skills which they used to foster international exchange. These were so important as a contributor to their external trade that is clear that the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade poorly typifies the nature of their international trade and its development;

as it does in the case of Singapore and Hong Kong today.

Markoe (2005, p. 112) observes that an important shift occurred in Tyre's trading activities as time passed. Compared to the situation in the Early Iron Age, Tyre's international exchange became relatively less geared to importing goods for internal consumption and in addition, its own material (natural) resources contributed much less to the composition of its exports. He states that later in the Iron Age, "the commodities that Tyre acquires -precious metals and minerals, dyed and embroidered garments and fabrics, spices, wines, and livestock -are obtained not only for internal use but for redistribution abroad" (Markoe, 2005, p. 112). This supports the thesis put forward in this paper that the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of the determinants of international trade become increasingly irrelevant in explaining the nature of international trading by Phoenician city-states as time elapsed. Phoenician international trade was increasingly decoupled from its material resource base. Similar economic dynamics have been observed in modern times. For example, this has occurred in the case of many higher income countries e.g. major European powers, Japan and even the United States. China is also following a similar path.

The Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade (like many renditions of the comparative cost theory of trade) fails to capture the above types of dynamics, because they are all basically static theories. In addition, most applications of these theories do not sufficiently allow for the diversity of resource endowments of a country. For example, the Leontief paradox [START_REF] Leontief | Domestic Production and Foreign Trade; The American Capital Position Re-Examined[END_REF] which casts doubt on the applicability of the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis to US exports, took into account only physical capital and labour as American resource endowments. Land (natural resources) was not considered. Neither was human capital and 'superior' American inventions and technologies. In fact, US exports are quite diverse. Its agricultural and mineral exports are considerable and its 'high-tech' exports are one of the main components of its export income. Advanced technologies are frequently embodied in its exports. While the Phoenician trade did not have the same attributes, the attributes involved overlap to some extent. Skills and human capital played a major role in the trading success of Phoenician citystates.

As Phoenician city-states developed, the size of their transiting international trade grew but often value was added to commodities as these transited through Phoenicia e.g. gold, silver, ivory and gems were turned into jewellery or ornaments. The manufacture of superior ceramic containers for holding wine and olive oil by Phoenician city-states also enabled them to make use of their skills in this regard to develop their transit trade in these commodities. Presumably also, they had suitable wood resins to seal the wine containers.

The comparative economic advantage of Phoenician city-states in external trade changed and evolved with the passage of time. For example, their comparative advantage in producing superior pottery containers diminished as other societies learnt how to produce similar pots (Master, 2003, p. 59). However, by that time, they had developed other advantages in international trade which enabled them to maintain and even increase their incomes and their economic prosperity.

The pre-eminence of Phoenicians in shipbuilding and design enabled them to establish farflung maritime trading networks which eventually extended from the east to the western Mediterranean and beyond. Trading colonies were established in Spain (as far away as Huelva)

and in between as well, and along the North African coast. Once these were established, it was made more difficult for competitive traders from other states or nascent states to obtain a foothold on the trade involved. To some extent, the Phoenicians established a first-mover trading advantage. Their established trading contacts, trading skills and knowledge provided them with superior ability as traders.

It is, therefore, not surprising that during the periods when Phoenician city-states were under the domination of Egypt and then Assyria, the Phoenicians were left relatively free to manage their own international trade. The reason most likely is that both Egypt and Assyria lacked sufficient skills and adequate networks to manage this trade to their best advantage. This trade assisted Phoenician city-states in paying tribute to the foreign powers and resulted in continuing mutually beneficial trade between Phoenician states and Assyria and Egypt.

One might expect, on the basis of the theory of comparative economic advantage (developed initially by Ricardo, 1817), that as the external trading opportunities of societies expanded they would become more specialized in the production and export of their commodities. As shown by [START_REF] Earle | The political economy and metal trade in Bronze Age Europe: Understanding regional variability in terms of comparative advantages and articulations[END_REF], such theory seems well tailored to explaining the international trade of Bronze Age Europe. However, it is doubtful if this happened in the case of Phoenician citystates because of the importance of transit trading in their exports. This trade was not tied (except possibly initially) to their own natural or material resources. It depended increasingly on the skills of Phoenicians as traders and/or their ability to value-add to commodities passing through their ports. Their comparative economic advantage in international trade was increasingly man-made and dependent on their own skills, not on their natural or material resources.

A pertinent example of the process of value adding to imported materials is provided by Cunliffe. Cunliffe (2017, p. 232) states "Ivory, one of the commodities regularly traded by Phoenicians was worked as decorative items by their craftsmen for their Assyrian patrons".

Elephant tusks would have been imported for this purpose. Cunliffe (2017, p. 232) provides a photo of the prowess of the Phoenicians as ivory carvers -an ivory carving of a lioness mauling a Nubian boy.

Master (2003, p. 57) states that as the trading networks of Tyron and Sidon expanded in the seventh century BC in the Mediterranean, "Phoenician ports began to transfer commodities that they neither produced nor consumed. Their new commercial economy was wholly reliant on their role as intermediaries between producers and consumers. There was very little to export that was not imported, no home-grown material resources." As an example of Tyre's transit trade, he provides the case of the role of Tyre in trading goods from Ashkelon and Ekron.

He reports that "Phoenician traders received Ashkelon's goods and distributed them throughout their networks to the west …… The Phoenicians transported and sold the olive oil of Ekron and the wheat of Ashkelon throughout the entire Mediterranean" (Master, 2003, p. 59).

However, the Phoenicians did not solely act as intermediaries for foreign producers and foreign consumers. They also imported goods for consumption and added value to some imports before re-exporting the value added products.

The observations of [START_REF] Master | Trade and politics: Ashkelon's balancing act in the seventh century BCE[END_REF] further add to the evidence that if in the early stage of Phoenicia's economic development, its supplies of material resources were important in determining the composition of its exports, then they became of little importance as a part of its exports as it developed. Consequently, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of the determinants of exports and of international trade virtually became irrelevant, contrary to the thesis of [START_REF] Temin | Mediterranean trade in biblical times[END_REF].

Moreover, the view of [START_REF] Temin | Mediterranean trade in biblical times[END_REF] that Phoenician ships often carried bulk commodities possibly needs to be qualified. Although some of the items were bulky, most appear to have been of high value in relation to their size, e.g. wines and metals. Moreover, most minerals were processed abroad near to where they were mined in order to reduce bulk. Valuable metals were frequently cast into ingots before being transported.

The economic operation of Phoenician shipping was improved by their ships carrying cargoes both in their outward journeys and return journeys to Phoenicia. In addition, some cargoes would have been downloaded and new cargo loaded on many of the stops made during their sea journey, for example, between their trading colonies. Some of Phoenicia's external trading colonies also added value to commodities which they acquired locally. It must have been a

challenging administrative task for Phoenician city-states such as Tyre, to extract economic surpluses from their far away trading colonies.

An interesting aspect of Phoenician trade was the ability of Phoenician traders to alter the geographical direction of their international trade as circumstances changed. [START_REF] Moore | Multinational enterprise in ancient Phoenicia[END_REF] have noted this and have provided a table showing the chronological changes in the geographical direction of Tyrian external trade. The extent of this change is illustrated in Figure 2. The Phoenician trading system exhibited considerable flexibility partly facilitated by alterations in its institutional trading structures. Furthermore, historical changes in international political relationships played a significant role in altering the direction of Phoenician trade, as most likely did elements of chance. These factors are not accounted for by economic theories.

Phoenicians were adept at responding to such changes. However, the rendition of Moore and Lewis, illustrated in Figure 2, covers only a limited time period for which international trade was of importance to Canaan and Phoenicia and focuses only on Tyre. It does not take account of Canaanite trade prior to 1200 BC, for example between Egypt, Ugarit and Mesopotamia. Furthermore, it does not take into account differences in the long-term trading success of different Phoenician city-states. For example, prior to 1000 BC, Byblos was, it seems a more important external trader than was Tyre but later, the opposite occurred. Moreover, the composition of the international trade of different Phoenician citystates varied to some extent. [START_REF] Moore | Multinational enterprise in ancient Phoenicia[END_REF] argue that Dunning's theory of the involvement of multinational enterprises in international trade combined with co-operation between private trading groups and the state, is important for understanding why the Phoenicians were so successful as international traders.

Just how important Dunning's theories are in explaining the nature of Phoenician trading networks is unclear. While it is true that the Phoenicians developed multinational enterprises, we need to learn more about why they did this and why there was co-operation between the state and their private multinational trading enterprises. The reasons probably included the following. Trading Areas: Assyria, Spain, W. Africa and Babylon 1. Multinational activities relying on colonies were essential for the relatively efficient management of Phoenicia's long-distance trade. This trade could not be efficiently managed from Phoenicia. Its management needed to be decentralized because of knowledge constraints of various kinds. Asymmetry in trading and other information existed between Phoenician centres and their outlying colonies and this disparity must have increased as the distance between these colonies and these centres increased. Eventually, some of the Phoenician colonies became self-sufficient and were able to set themselves up as independent states, e.g. Carthage, or as semi-independent entities.

Evolving Complexity of International Exchange Networks and Facilitating

Media of Exchange -The Phoenician Example

As early economic development occurred, more and more commodities started to be transported for trade or exchange and long-distance trading became more common. Different mechanisms must have facilitated the beginning of long-distance trade in goods in ancient times. It is not possible to explore all these mechanisms here. However, in some cases, initial gift-giving would have been essential for establishing long-distance trade. For simplicity consider the following case. Three tribal groups (A, B and C) exist in separate territories. A and C have no contact but both have territory adjacent to B's. A and C have different goods that all tribes would like to have.

However, B has no goods that A and C want. How can trade be established between A and C?

One possibility is that A provides a gift of a wanted good to B who gives a portion of it to C. C then reciprocates with a gift of its wanted good to B who gives a portion of it to A. Consequently, B acts as an intermediary. Initial gift-giving could then develop into exchange of the wanted goods based on the self-interest of the parties involved. Although some variations in the possible chain of events which helps to establish long-distance trading in the above types of circumstances, gift-giving is necessary as part of the sequence of events that brings about long-distance trade in the type of circumstance mentioned.

The above pattern assumes that traded goods are passed from one tribe to the next. However, in some cases specialized traders could transport the goods. For example, traders from A or C may pass through the territory of B carrying the traded goods they would pay a fee to tribe B for their permitted passage. However, in the case of travel by sea, the territory of B might be avoided and no toll paid to B for using its territory to transport traded goods. The maritime trade of the Phoenicians possibly helped to reduce their trading transaction costs compared to land-based trade. 2 Voluntary gift-giving in the ancient world was probably rarely an act of pure philanthropy.

Gifts were often given in the expectation of desired reciprocation of some kind. For example, Cunliffe (2017, p. 229), describes an act of gift-giving by the king of Sidon and points out that "valuable gifts of this kind were very much 'introductory offers' designed to establish relationships between two parties. Once gifts were exchanged, more routine trading could follow".

Although van Alfen (2015) stresses the importance of studying the evolution of trading networks, he does not analyse their development. However, he states that: "Gift-giving, barter and monetized market exchange all were used in Phoenician trade as voluntary mechanisms of exchange. The operation, interaction and primacy of these mechanisms is less than clear, however. While some have argued for an evolutionary development -from barter and gift-giving to markets -it is equally possible that all mechanisms were in use at the same time, if not in the same place, and from an early date." (van Alfen, 2015, p. 8).

Despite this statement by van Alfen, it is clear that monetized market exchange was a later development than gift-giving. Furthermore, direct bargaining over goods to be exchanged (as well as monetized exchange) increased in frequency as time elapsed. This is borne out by the Phoenician example. The Phoenicians were late (for instance, compared to the Greeks) in using money as a medium of exchange. Markoe (2005, p. 22) states: "The Phoenicians were late in adopting the practice of minting coins. The first mainland issues appeared around 450 BC -more than 140 years after coinage first circulated in western Asia Minor. The reason for the delay is easily understood: with an economy based upon a long tradition of fixed exchange involving raw goods and metals, there was no practical incentive to coin." However, it is likely that some Phoenician states made some use of foreign coins for exchange before minting their own coins. Markoe (2005, pp. 122-125) outlines reasons why most Phoenician city-states eventually began to mint their own coins and made greater use of coins for international trade. These include changes in the geographical direction of Phoenician trade as well as the fact that minted coins could be used to reinforce national identity. As trade increased with areas already using coins as a medium of exchange, the Phoenicians found that trade was facilitated with those areas if they had their own coins to exchange.

Prior to the use of coins as a medium of exchange, several different media were used. It seems likely that the earliest media were increasingly replaced by metal ingots such as those of gold, copper, silver, lead and tin. Of these, it also appears that gold, silver and copper came to be the preferred media of exchange. These media were durable, portable, of reasonably high value relative to weight, held their value well and had attributes which made them particularly attractive as media of exchange. It is possible that ox-hides were one of the earliest media of exchange in the eastern Mediterranean region. Markoe (2005, p. 11) mentions that copper ingots in the form of ox-hides were produced in Cyprus in the thirteenth century BC. Cunliffe (2017, p. 202) suggests that they may have been cast in this form for easier handling, but their shape could also be reflective of the prior use of ox-hides as an important medium of exchange.

In any case, we know that there was a transition from bullion as a major medium of exchange to the use of coinage based on metals. [START_REF] Demps | Every tradesman must also be a merchant": Behavioral ecology and household-level production for barter and trade in premodern economies[END_REF] point out that several different commodities could have functioned as money or methods of exchange in ancient times. They state: "Commodities that are promising as early money would feature easy quantification, high value, uniform and readily observable quality, durability, portability and divisibility". They give several examples but most appear to lack all the desirable attributes mentioned. They do not mention amber which was circulated widely in the Bronze Age in Europe. They do point out that commodity monies increased "the ability to complete indirect exchanges, should a coincidence of needs fail to materialize [START_REF] Melitz | Primitive and Modern Money: An Interdisciplinary Approach[END_REF])".

The use of metals (as ingots and in other forms) was especially valuable in promoting the indirect exchange of the Phoenicians. The evolution of the use of metal ingots, and then coins as media of exchange facilitated the growth of multilateral trade and helped to cater for a greater diversity of traded goods.

Markoe (2005, p. 109) contends:

"Prior to the adoption of money in the fifth century BC, Phoenician commerce with the outside world was governed largely by financial pacts or trade agreements that established fixed terms of exchange. Such treaties, which established equivalencies in raw materials, were especially needed in trade with large complex economies like those of Egypt, Babylonia or Cyprus".

However, the meaning of a fixed rate of exchange is not clear in this context. Possibly, it is an agreed rate of exchange. Furthermore, it is likely that these rates of exchange altered periodically as supply and demand conditions changed. The agreed rate of exchange could be expected to alter with different individual agreements.

The example which Markoe (2005, p. 109) gives of an agreement between the royal household of Byblos to supply cedar wood to Egypt is based on agreed (pre-determined) rates of exchange which were established presumably by some bargaining. Later agreements would in all probability result in different terms of trade. Byblos only exported a single item (cedar wood in this case) in return for the import of several different types of items from Egypt. Therefore, less difficulty would be involved in 'reaching' an agreement than if many goods were to be exchanged between both the parties. The evolution of new media for international exchange made it easier to engage in external trade as the diversity of international trade increased.

The Extraction of Trade-related Surpluses by Phoenician Rulers

Increased trade provided new opportunities and challenges for Phoenician rulers as far as their extraction of the economic surplus is concerned. International trade increased the economic surplus of trading states. However, rulers had to devise new ways to extract the economic surplus generated by this trading. They also had to weigh up the risks and benefits of encouraging greater international trade as a result of allowing private traders or trading groups to be involved in it.

It seems, at least during the time of Hiram of Tyre and Solomon of Israel, that international trade was monopolized by the kings who controlled it in a relatively direct manner. In fact, Markoe (2005, p. 115) contends that Phoenician Kings monopolized the external trade of their city-states prior to the 8 th century. Subsequently, joint ventures between private merchants and the leaders became of greater importance. It is likely that subsequently, private traders obtained increased freedom to conduct external trade on their own in the exchange of a widening range of commodities. Nevertheless, it is reported that the rulers of Tyre continued to monopolize the exports of timber, the imports of wheat and local shipbuilding. Therefore, they could obtain monopoly profits from exports of timber and from the sale to their own merchants or others of ships built in Tyre. Their monopoly on wheat imports was possibly maintained in order to ensure that their population had sufficient food, and also as a means to ensure that the population remained obligated to the royal house for its subsistence.

It is know that the Phoenician rulers imposed levies or tariffs on commodities at their ports and borders. They may also have granted trading rights to merchant traders for a payment of a fee.

Collecting the economic surplus from their distant trading colonies must have been quite challenging. Some of the distant colonies were taxed after they became established. Duties could also be collected on trade between colonies or on goods dropped off by ships at stops on their way back to Phoenicia or on outward journeys. Potentially, a combination of export and import duties could have been used by royal Phoenician households to fill their coffers or to provide them with their wanted goods. These were most likely collected by government appointed officials. However, the possibility also exists that tax-collectors paid fees to royal households to act as tax collectors.

Markoe (2005, pp. 121-122) cites evidence that Phoenician mainland capital (for example, Tyre and Sidon) imposed annual taxation on their own dependencies. He points out that: "evidence for state assessment of annual imposts may be found, beginning with the fourth century BC on a series of seals and bullae attesting to such fiscal imposition and, on occasion, tax exemption".

Apart from anything else, Phoenician rulers were under varying degrees of pressure in the Iron Age to obtain and then supply tributary goods to the rulers of Assyria, Babylon and Persia.

The form in which the trading surplus was collected by Phoenician royal households most likely altered with the passage of time. Increasingly the trading economic surplus appears to have been collected in the form of treasures, such as gold, silver and copper ingots and items made from these. The stock of these treasures held by the elite came to be regarded as a measure of the economic wealth of a nation. Subsequently, mercantilist economic theories were developed (for example, by Kautilya, (1961 [4th century BC]) and by [START_REF] Mun | England's Treasure by Forraign Trade[END_REF]Mun ( [1664]]) to support the view that such items constituted economic wealth. Mercantilists also proposed state policies which in their view would enable the crown to amass an increased amount of treasures.

In 1776, Adam Smith pointed out that such measures could in fact reduce the economic wealth of nations.

No doubt an important challenge faced by Phoenician rulers was to ensure that their imposts on external trade were not so high that these significantly restricted this trade. If these were set too high, this would reduce the surplus collected by rulers by causing a significant reduction in their external trade. In addition, it could result in less economic prosperity than otherwise.

Unfortunately, we do not have the archaeological data to inform us how Phoenician rulers coped with this challenge. Nevertheless, it is clear from Winterhalder and Puleston (2018) that there was awareness of these types of issues in ancient times.

Concluding Discussion

Although there are many gaps in our knowledge about the management of the external trade of Phoenician city-states, virtually no information exists on trading within these city-states. Furthermore, it is not know if the ruling elite extracted any economic surplus from internal trade. However, it is known that the Aztecs established market-places within their cities and that the rulers charged a fee for the use of spaces within those places. Trading outside these market places was forbidden. These markets primarily traded local goods. Hodge (1994, p. 64) states: "In all [local] markets, products were bartered for other goods or for any of a range of relatively non-perishable goods that were valued in themselves as a form of wealth. These included cotton cloth, cacao beans, quills filled with gold dust, copper bells and axes and beads of shell and various green stones." These latter items acted both as a store of value and as media of exchange. She also points out that long-distance trading was regulated by Aztec rulers. Only particular persons or groups of persons (guilds) were permitted to engage in it (Hodge, 1994, p. 64). One of the important functions of these traders was to import luxury goods which rulers gave as gifts to foster loyalty and social obligations [START_REF] Hodge | Aztec trade: a marketplace tradition[END_REF].

Different ancient societies evolved different sets of media of exchange but these sets often overlapped to some extent. Moreover, these sets have continued to evolve in more recent times.

In this respect, consider the evolution of modern 'paperless' currency used for exchange (based primarily on 'accounting' entries) as well as new methods of exchange made possible by the advent of the internet. It should also be observed that the development of international trade in Asia Minor and the Mediterranean seems to have sown the seeds of the economic doctrine of mercantilism. Rulers started to account for their wealth in terms of the value and quantity of their treasures, such as gold, silver and so on. Stocks of such items were regarded as a measure of national wealth by mercantilists such as Kautilya (1961 [4th century BC]) and [START_REF] Mun | England's Treasure by Forraign Trade[END_REF]Mun ( [1664]]) who recommended policies which might be adopted to increase these stocks. Also see the discussion by [START_REF] Tisdell | Rent extraction, population growth and economic development: Development despite Malthus' theory and precursors to the Industrial Revolution[END_REF]. However, as pointed out by Adam Smith (1776), these items did not constitute 'real' economic wealth. In fact, amassing them often reduced the economic wealth of states.

For example, effort put into mining or otherwise obtaining these treasures involved an economic opportunity cost. Other commodities which would have added to economic growth and wealth were foregone. In addition, the mercantilist recommendation that each state should strive to have an excess of exports over imports in order to increase its stock of treasure had counterproductive consequences. This is because such policies tend to reduce the total value of international trade. It is ironic that the evolutionary development of currencies that in the beginning fostered international trade, subsequently led to an economic system (the mercantilist system) which tended to stifle international trade and limit the realization of economic prosperity.

3

 3 Less control of trade by the state. Greater free (market-based) trade

  supplied builders and timber. In return, Israel entered into co-operative trading agreements with Tyre and supplied wheat and olive oil to Tyre.Markoe (2005, p. 110) provides more details on the agreement reached between King Solomon of Israel and Hiram of Tyre in relation to the building of the Jerusalem Temple. Hiram agreed to contribute and deliver timber (cedar and fir) from Tyre and to provide the services and expertise of his own men (as well as possibly some sub-contractors from Byblos) to help in the construction of the temple. In return, Solomon agreed to supply Hiram with annual amounts of wheat and oil for a duration of twenty years. This agricultural produce was destined for consumption in Tyre, primarily by the royal household; not for re-export. In addition, Hiram and Solomon agreed to engage in joint trading ventures in the Red Sea.It is noteworthy that in the exchange agreements between Hiron and Solomon, the supply of services by Tyre to Israel was very important. Apart from the services mentioned above, Tyre supplied artisans for the bronze-work in the Jerusalem temple(Markoe, 2005, p. 31), assisted with the building of the Red Sea merchant fleet in Israel and supplied crew for these ships.

Figure 2 :

 2 Figure 2: Changes in the geographical direction of Phoenician international trade based on the chronology of Moore and Lewis (2000, p. 21) and their commentary.

2 .

 2 The state hoped to profit by facilitating multinational trade by means of joint ventures and contributing to the capital involved in establishing trading colonies. The returns may not have been immediate. The colonies also required protection by the Phoenician city-states.The colonies once established paid taxes to Phoenician city-states.

Notes 1 .

 1 Phoenicia was recognized as an entity after 1000 BC as a sub-geographical area of Canaan.According to Cunliffe (2017, p. 224) "the Phoenicians of the Levantine Coast who emerged to prominence [late] in the twelfth century were descended from the indigenous population of Canaan, whose roots go back to the third millennium". The Canaanites of Byblos and Ugarit were significant traders and acted as middlemen in the trade between Egypt and Mesopotamia. Both these city-states were destroyed by hostilities prior to the rise of the Phoenician city-states to their south.2. Nevertheless, sea-based trade was risky due to piracy and the possibility of ships being wrecked.

  79. Bounded Rationality, Satisficing and the Evolution of Economic Thought: Initial Draft by Clem Tisdell, November 2017 80. Economic Theory, Phoenician Pre-coinage External Trade, Changes in the Economic Surplus and its Appropriation -An Initial Perspective by Clement Tisdell and Serge Svizzero, July 2019

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