Jochen E Gebauer

Michael Riketta

Philip Broemer

Gregory R Maio

Geoff Haddock

Tony Manstead

Constantine Sedikides

"How Much Do You Like Your Name?" An Implicit Measure of Global Self-Esteem

Keywords: Self-Esteem, Self-Evaluation, Implicit Measure, Single-Item Measure

We introduce a single-item implicit measure of global self-esteem. The measure is based on the mere-ownership effect and asks participants to indicate how much they like their name. Six studies attested to the validity of this measure. In addition to showing high test-retest reliability (r=.85), the studies found that Name-Liking was (a) unrelated to impression management, (b) positively related to the Name-Letter-Task, the Self-Esteem IAT, explicit self-esteem measures, and selfreported subjective well-being, (c) more strongly related to explicit measures of global than domain-specific self-esteem, (d) more strongly related to self-esteem judgments made spontaneously as well as under cognitive load, and (e) predicted observer-reported anxiety during an anxiety-inducing interview whereas an explicit measure of self-esteem did not.

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 3 "How Much Do You Like Your Name?"

An Implicit Measure of Global Self-Esteem

Self-esteem is one of the most strongly researched topics in psychology [START_REF] Sedikides | Portraits of the self[END_REF][START_REF] Swann | Do our self-views matter? Selfconcept and self-esteem in everyday life[END_REF]. Recently, implicit measures of selfesteem have garnered much theoretical and empirical attention. Although self-esteem researchers heavily debate whether implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem assess the same theoretical construct (i.e., single-attitude theories; e.g., [START_REF] Olson | Reporting tendencies underlie discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem[END_REF] or whether these measures assess two different theoretical constructs (i.e., dual-attitude theories; e.g., Koole, Dijsterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001;[START_REF] Wilson | A model of dual attitudes[END_REF], there is agreement that valid and reliable implicit measures of self-esteem are vital for self-esteem research. Thus, several implicit measures of self-esteem have been developed in recent years and have produced an impressive corpus of evidence. The measures include evaluative priming techniques [START_REF] Spalding | Unconscious unease and self-handicapping: Behavioral consequences of individual differences in implicit and explicit self-esteem[END_REF], word-stem completion tasks [START_REF] Pelham | Implicit self-evaluation[END_REF], the evaluation of self-related objects (i.e., name letters, birth date numbers; [START_REF] Koole | What' s in a name: Implicit selfesteem and the automatic self[END_REF], and the self-esteem version of the Implicit Association Test (Self-Esteem IAT; [START_REF] Greenwald | Using the Implicit Association Test to measure selfesteem and self-concept[END_REF].

Perhaps the biggest drawback of current implicit measures of self-esteem is that they are generally unrelated to each other [START_REF] Baccus | Increasing implicit self-esteem through classical conditioning[END_REF][START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF][START_REF] Jordan | I love me … I love me not:" Implicit selfesteem, explicit self-esteem, and defensiveness[END_REF][START_REF] Riketta | Gender and socially desirable responding as moderators of the correlation between implicit and explicit self-esteem[END_REF]. This finding has led some researchers to suggest that different implicit measures assess different facets of self-esteem [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF]. More recently, this claim has been supported for the only two implicit measures that have acceptable psychometric properties [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF]: the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT. In particular, [START_REF] Wentura | Masked affective priming by name letters: Evidence for a correspondence of explicit and implicit self-esteem[END_REF] suggested that the Name-Letter-Task assesses self-evaluations that pertain predominantly to the social domain.

Also, [START_REF] Sakellaropoulo | The hidden sides of self-esteem: Two dimensions of implicit self-esteem and their relation to narcissistic reactions[END_REF] found that the Name-Letter-Task assesses either an agentic or a communal facet of self-esteem depending on the wording of the instructions. Finally,

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 4

Campbell, [START_REF] Campbell | Do narcissists dislike themselves "deep down inside[END_REF] showed that the Self-Esteem IAT assesses different facets of self-esteem depending on the specific items used.

It is therefore timely and important to develop an implicit measure that assesses global rather than domain-specific self-esteem. This was the aim of the present research. Specifically, we constructed and validated a new implicit measure of global self-esteem. The next section presents the rationale for this measure.

The Mere-Ownership Effect

Similar to the Name-Letter-Task [START_REF] Koole | What' s in a name: Implicit selfesteem and the automatic self[END_REF], our new implicit measure of global self-esteem is based on the mere-ownership effect. This effect is the tendency to evaluate selfrelated objects more positively than self-unrelated objects. For example, people generally favor personal belongings over the belongings of others, people prefer the numbers appearing in their birth date over non-birth date numbers, and they like the letters included in their name more than other letters [START_REF] Koole | On the nature of implicit self-esteem: The case of the name letter effect[END_REF]. The mere-ownership effect allows the implicit assessment of self-esteem because people with high self-esteem extend their positive self-evaluation to the evaluation of objects representing the self, without conscious awareness that self-esteem is contributing to these evaluations [START_REF] Greenwald | Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes[END_REF]. Thus, people with high self-esteem should show a stronger mere-ownership effect than people with low self-esteem. [START_REF] Koole | On the nature of implicit self-esteem: The case of the name letter effect[END_REF] argued that the strength of the mere-ownership effect is more indicative of global self-esteem when the owned object is more representative of the self. Koole and Pelham reviewed a large number of studies attesting to the centrality of one's name for one's global self and concluded that the letters included in one's name are suitable objects for assessing self-esteem implicitly, because "it is difficult to think of a social symbol that is more closely associated with a person's identity than his or her name" (p. 99). In support of this notion, people report that they would not be the same person if they had another name, couples report that the perpetuation of their family name is one of the most important reasons for having a child, students

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 5 feel flattered if their professors know their name, and namelessness is in many cultures equivalent to possessing no honor or identity. [START_REF] Koole | On the nature of implicit self-esteem: The case of the name letter effect[END_REF] used these arguments to explain why assessing people's liking for the letters in their name constitutes an implicit measure of self-esteem. However, an implication of their arguments is that assessing people's liking for their name as a whole would be an even better implicit measure of self-esteem. According to a well-known proposition of gestalt psychology, the whole is often more than the sum of its parts. This view suggests that the evaluation of one's name might be a better way of assessing the individual's global self-esteem than summing up the evaluation of name letters. Moreover, most word recognition models [START_REF] Mcclelland | The TRACE model of speech perception[END_REF][START_REF] Norris | Merging information in speech recognition: Feedback is never necessary[END_REF] assume that words are encoded holistically and are represented phonetically in memory (that is by phonemes and not by letters).

Above and beyond this, the Name-Letter-Task does not take the order of one's name-letters into account. However, the order of letters is crucial to determine the meaning and valence of a target object. For example, a person called Blake may possess very high self-esteem despite the fact that rearranging his name letters gives the negatively valenced word bleak.

Based on this reasoning, we expected that Name-Liking is a useful implicit measure of global self-esteem. We developed and tested three measures of Name-Liking: Evaluations of one's first name, surname, and first and surname together (i.e., full-name). We tested our hypotheses for all three measures, although the full-name measure should be most powerful and valid (cf. gestalt psychology).

An additional advantage of our Name-Liking measure over other implicit measures is its brevity. Our measure consists of a single item. As such, it complements a recently developed single-item explicit measure of self-esteem ("I have high self-esteem"; Robins, Hendin, & Tresniewski, 2001). According to Robins et al., multi-item measures, such as the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale [START_REF] Rosenberg | Society and the adolescent self-image[END_REF], are relatively complicated and time-consuming

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 6

to administer; cause fatigue, frustration, and boredom; and may result in participants skipping questions. These concerns also apply to the Self-Esteem IAT, which typically consists of about 200 trials, and to the Name-Letter-Task, which asks participants to rate all 26 letters of the alphabet.

Study 1

The aim of Study 1 was to provide a preliminary test of the viability of Name-Liking as an implicit measure of global self-esteem. Therefore, we examined the correlations between Name-Liking and the only two implicit self-esteem measures that have been shown to have acceptable psychometric properties: the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF]. We expected to replicate evidence that the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT are unrelated [START_REF] Baccus | Increasing implicit self-esteem through classical conditioning[END_REF][START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF][START_REF] Jordan | I love me … I love me not:" Implicit selfesteem, explicit self-esteem, and defensiveness[END_REF][START_REF] Riketta | Gender and socially desirable responding as moderators of the correlation between implicit and explicit self-esteem[END_REF], while finding that Name-Liking is moderately positively related to both measures. This pattern would constitute further support for the hypothesis that the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT assess different facets of self-esteem [START_REF] Campbell | Do narcissists dislike themselves "deep down inside[END_REF][START_REF] Sakellaropoulo | The hidden sides of self-esteem: Two dimensions of implicit self-esteem and their relation to narcissistic reactions[END_REF]Wentura et al., 2006; see discussion above). More important, this finding would be consistent with our argument that Name-Liking is an implicit measure of global (rather than domain-specific) selfesteem.

Additionally, we expected a moderately positive correlation between Name-Liking and explicitly measured global self-esteem. According to [START_REF] Greenwald | Using the Implicit Association Test to measure selfesteem and self-concept[END_REF], implicitly and explicitly measured self-esteem should be positively related, because both explicit and implicit measures are determined in part by affective associations with the self. Further, [START_REF] Greenwald | Using the Implicit Association Test to measure selfesteem and self-concept[END_REF] argued that the conscious expression of valenced self-views should strengthen the connection between the self and these evaluations. Finally, [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF] argued that, even if the constructs tapped on by implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem are acquired through

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 7 different learning processes, the learned content should be similar and produce some overlap between the two constructs.

We did not have a specific hypothesis about whether Name-Liking is more strongly related to other implicit measures of (domain-specific) self-esteem or to explicit measures of (global) selfesteem. On the one hand, one might expect a stronger relation between Name-Liking and other implicit measures, because these measures should not be biased by impression management and they should not depend on one's conscious awareness of one's level of self-esteem. On the other hand, existing implicit measures seem to assess domain-specific aspects of self-esteem more than global self-esteem. Hence, Name-Liking, as a measure of global self-esteem, may relate to explicit measures of (global) self-esteem at least as strongly as to the existing implicit measures of (domain-specific) self-esteem.

Method

This online-study was advertised on John Krantz's "Psychological Research on the Net" web-portal. Table 1 contains information about the samples in this and the other five studies.

Participants completed the Name-Liking measure, the Name-Letter-Task, the Self-Esteem IAT, and two explicit measures of global self-esteem. Table 2 contains details about the measures used in all of the studies. The order of all measures was randomized across participants, except that Name-Liking always appeared after the Name-Letter-Task to prevent suspicion that the evaluation of one's name may play a role in letter preferences. At the end of this and all subsequent studies, participants were thanked and debriefed.

Results and Discussion

When describing this and the following studies in the text, we report only the results involving the full-name version of the Name-Liking measure, but not the first name and surname versions. We focus on the full-name version because the results across the present studies supported our aforementioned hypothesis that the full-name version is the most valid implicit

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measure of global self-esteem. Nonetheless, in order to allow direct comparison of the performance of the three candidate Name-Liking measures, we present the zero-order correlations between all variables in separate tables (for this study, see Table 3), including all three candidate Name-Liking measures (i.e., first name, surname, and full-name). Further, for all studies, the results of any analyses for the first name and surname versions of the Name-Liking measure that do not take the form of zero-order correlations are presented in the Appendix. Parallel results for the full-name version of the Name-Liking measure are presented in the text.

As in previous research, the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT were unrelated, r=.12, ns. In contrast, higher self-esteem on Name-Liking predicted significantly higher selfesteem on the Name-Letter-Task, r=.30, p .001 and the Self-Esteem IAT, r=.24, p .01. These correlations speak to the validity of Name-Liking as a global measure of self-esteem.

Also, Name-Liking was positively related to explicitly measured self-esteem, as assessed by the single-item measure, r=.38, p .001, and the multi-item measure, r=.30, p .001. Note that this finding is consistent with the single-attitude view if one assumes that Name-Liking and the explicit measures assess the same construct but are affected by different types of measurement error [START_REF] Greenwald | Using the Implicit Association Test to measure selfesteem and self-concept[END_REF]. Our finding is also consistent with the dual-attitudes view if one assumes that Name-Liking and the explicit measures refer to distinct constructs that share common sources [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF].

Study 2

In Study 2, we garnered additional support for the idea that Name-Liking is a measure of global rather than domain-specific self-esteem. Specifically, we tested whether Name-Liking is more strongly related to explicit measures of global self-esteem or to explicit measures of domainspecific self-esteem.

Further, we garnered additional evidence that Name-Liking is an implicit rather than explicit measure. [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF] assert that "explicit self-report measures are essentially

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 9

tapping broad beliefs or schemas about who we think we are. They are essentially self-theories: 'I think I am this way'; 'I feel certain I' m not this other way.'" (p. 641) Implicit measures differ from explicit measures in this respect, because implicit measures "provide estimates of individuals' attitudes without our having to directly ask them for such information" [START_REF] Fazio | Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their meaning and uses[END_REF]p. 303). Thus, if participants respond to our Name-Liking measure without directly indicating their self-theories of their self-esteem, Name-Liking formally classifies as an implicit measure of selfesteem [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF][START_REF] Fazio | Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their meaning and uses[END_REF]. However, it is possible that participants in Study 1 assumed that Name-Liking is meant to assess self-esteem and thus reported their selftheories concerning their self-esteem. To check this possibility, we asked participants at the end of

Study 2 what guided their responses to the Name-Liking measure. This enabled us to find out whether they had completed the Name-Liking measure by indicating how much they like their name and not according to how much they like themselves (self-theory of self-esteem).

Method

This online-study was advertised on "Psychological Research on the Net." Participants (see Table 1) completed the Name-Liking measure, the explicit measure of global self-esteem, and the explicit measure of domain-specific self-esteem (see Table 2). The order of all measures was randomized across participants. Finally, participants were asked about the strategy that guided their responses to the Name-Liking measure.

Results and Discussion

Table 4 shows all zero-order correlations between the measures used in this study. To test whether Name-Liking is a measure of global rather than domain-specific self-esteem, we performed a hierarchical regression analysis with global self-esteem and the five facets of selfesteem (all explicitly measured) as predictors of Name-Liking. As expected, the first step of the regression was the only one yielding a significant relation. Only global self-esteem predicted Name-Liking, =.36, p .001 whereas none of the five facets of self-esteem predicted Name-Liking

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 10 over and above global self-esteem, -.08 s .15, ns. This evidence supports our hypothesis that Name-Liking assesses global rather than domain-specific self-esteem.

Next, we examined participants' reported strategy for completing the Name-Liking measure. Six participants (4.1%) did not complete this item, 129 (92.8%) indicated that they completed the item according to how much they like their name, and 10 participants (7.2%) indicated that they completed the item according to something else. Six of these ten participants obviously misunderstood the task and indicated a number or a phrase that reflected their nameliking (e.g., "I like my name very much"). One participant indicated that her answer was "quite random". The remaining three participants made irrelevant statements (e.g., "I love my initials").

Thus, although Name-Liking was embedded in explicit measures of self-esteem in this study, not a single participant indicated that (s)he reported his/her self-theory concerning his/her self-esteem.

Therefore, any effects of this measure are indirect and not attributable to conscious theories about self-esteem. Hence, Name-Liking meets the criteria for an implicit measure as defined by [START_REF] Fazio | Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their meaning and uses[END_REF].

Study 3

As mentioned above, [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF] found that only the Self-Esteem IAT and the evaluation of self-related objects (i.e., name letters and birth date numbers) exhibited satisfactory test-retest reliability. The first goal of Study 3 was to test if the Name-Liking measure also exhibits satisfactory test-retest reliability.

As a second goal, we tested whether Name-Liking predicts subjective well-being. Explicit measures of self-esteem are among the strongest predictors of subjective well-being [START_REF] Diener | Cross-cultural correlates of life satisfaction and self-esteem[END_REF][START_REF] Sedikides | Are normal narcissists psychologically healthy?: Self-esteem matters[END_REF]. However, previous studies found weak empirical links between implicitly measured self-esteem and explicitly measured subjective well-being [START_REF] Schimmack | Predictive validity of explicit and implicit self-esteem for subjective well-being[END_REF][START_REF] Shimizu | The unconscious cost of good fortune: Implicit and explicit self-esteem, positive life-events, and health[END_REF], and these relations were non-significant after controlling for explicitly measured self-esteem [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF]. If

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Name-Liking is an indicator of global self-esteem, it should be a better predictor of subjective well-being than are the (arguably) domain-specific implicit measures used in those studies.

Furthermore, because Name-Liking circumvents conscious reporting biases and does not rely on conscious theories about the self, it should predict subjective well-being over and above explicitly measured self-esteem.

Finally, [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF] reported that implicit measures of self-esteem worked best when self-esteem was primed by the completion of explicit measures of self-esteem. [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF] concluded that "order effects may raise concerns about the 'implicitness' of some of the implicit self-esteem measures" (p. 641). This concern is relevant to our use of Name-Liking in the previous studies, because Name-Liking was mainly administered after explicit measures of selfesteem (see randomized order of measures across participants in Studies 1 and 2). It is thus important to show that meaningful effects emerge when Name-Liking is administered prior to other measures of self-esteem. Such evidence would indicate that the validity of the Name-Liking measure does not rely on the completion of explicit measures beforehand.

Method

This study was conducted using a British sample of psychology undergraduate students (see Table 1). Participants completed the Name-Liking measure, an explicit measure of selfesteem, and a measure of subjective well-being in the listed order (see Table 2). Four to six weeks later, 118 of the initial participants (62%) completed the Name-Liking measure again over the internet.

Results and Discussion

Table 5 shows all zero-order correlations between the measures used in this study. At first, we examined the test-retest reliability of the Name-Liking measure. The correlation between scores at time 1 and 4-6 weeks later was very high, r=.85, p .001, whereas most other implicit

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 12 self-esteem measures suffer from too low or barely acceptable test-retest reliability [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF].

Further, explicitly measured self-esteem and Name-Liking were both significantly related to depression, r=-.59, p .001, and, r=-.29, p .001, respectively. To test whether Name-Liking was related to depression over and above explicitly measured self-esteem, we regressed depression on Name-Liking, while controlling for explicitly measured self-esteem. Name-Liking predicted depression independently of explicitly measured self-esteem, =-.15, p .01. This finding supports the assertion that implicitly measured self-esteem relates to subjective well-being over and above explicitly measured self-esteem (e.g., [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF][START_REF] Shimizu | The unconscious cost of good fortune: Implicit and explicit self-esteem, positive life-events, and health[END_REF]. Notably, previous studies were unable to support this assertion using other implicit measures (e.g., [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF][START_REF] Schimmack | Predictive validity of explicit and implicit self-esteem for subjective well-being[END_REF][START_REF] Shimizu | The unconscious cost of good fortune: Implicit and explicit self-esteem, positive life-events, and health[END_REF].

Finally, Name-Liking exhibited the same strength of relationship to explicitly measured self-esteem as in the previous studies, where Name-Liking was assessed following other selfesteem measures, r=.26, p .001. Further, as shown above, theoretically sound relations were obtained between Name-Liking and depression. Thus, these results demonstrate that the validity of Name-Liking does not depend on the prior completion of an explicit self-esteem scale.

Study 4

In [START_REF] Koole | What' s in a name: Implicit selfesteem and the automatic self[END_REF] third study, participants with a dispositionally fast (as opposed to slow) response style on explicit measures of self-esteem manifested a stronger relation between these measures and implicit measures of self-esteem. This finding fits dual-attitude theories of selfesteem, because implicit self-esteem is assumed to be based on faster, automatic processes, rather than slower, controlled processes [START_REF] Epstein | Is the self motivated to do more than enhance and/or verify itself[END_REF]. However, this finding also fits single-attitude theories, because people might be more honest when they respond quickly to selfreport measures [START_REF] Olson | Reporting tendencies underlie discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem[END_REF]. Regardless of which theory applies, we should

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 13 be capable of replicating [START_REF] Koole | What' s in a name: Implicit selfesteem and the automatic self[END_REF] finding with our Name-Liking measure. This would further attest to the validity of our measure.

In addition, we tried to replicate Study 3's finding that Name-Liking predicts subjective well-being over and above explicitly measured self-esteem. This time, we operationalized subjective well-being broadly, by using a composite score of anxiety, depression, and life satisfaction.

Method

This online-study was advertised on "Psychological Research on the Net." Participants (see Table 1) completed two explicit measures of self-esteem, a measure of affect-based subjective well-being, a measure of cognition-based subjective well-being 1 , and the Name-Liking measure in the listed order (see Table 2).

Results and Discussion

Table 6 shows all zero-order correlations between the measures used in this study. We tested whether the relation between implicitly and explicitly measured self-esteem was especially strong when the response latencies of the explicit measure were short. To this end, we conducted a multiple regression analysis with explicitly measured self-esteem (centered), the response time of explicitly measured self-esteem (centered) 2 , and the cross-product of these two variables as predictors of Name-Liking. As predicted, we obtained a significant Self-Esteem x Response Time interaction, =-.11, p .05. Figure 1 shows that explicitly measured self-esteem was a better predictor of Name-Liking for participants who responded more quickly to the explicit measure.

Thus, we replicated Koole et al.'s (2001, Study 3) finding with our Name-Liking measure.

Subjective well-being was related to explicitly measured self-esteem, r=.67, p .001, and Name-Liking, r=.36, p .001. Further, a simultaneous regression revealed that Name-Liking predicted subjective well-being even when explicitly measured self-esteem was controlled, =.12, p .05. Thus, we replicated Study 3 using a broader operationalization of subjective well-being.

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 14

Study 5

Our interpretation of Study 4 rests on the assumption that response times mainly depend on the amount of cognitive deliberation. This follows from both single-attitude and dual-attitude theories because both faking on explicit self-esteem measures (cf. single-attitude theories) and the activation of explicit self-esteem (cf. dual-attitude theories) should require cognitive capacity (e.g., [START_REF] Koole | What' s in a name: Implicit selfesteem and the automatic self[END_REF][START_REF] Paulhus | Bypassing the will: The automatization of affirmations[END_REF][START_REF] Wilson | A model of dual attitudes[END_REF]. Nonetheless, a more direct test of our assumption is to manipulate cognitive capacity. Thus, following [START_REF] Koole | What' s in a name: Implicit selfesteem and the automatic self[END_REF] validation of the Name-Letter-Task, we extended Study 4 by manipulating cognitive load while completing the explicit measure of self-esteem. Koole et al. showed that the relation between implicitly measured and explicitly measured self-esteem became stronger when participants were under cognitive load while completing the explicit measure. We expected to replicate this finding using the Name-Liking measure.

Moreover, we wanted to demonstrate that Name-Liking predicts subjective well-being even in a context where explicitly measured self-esteem fails to predict subjective well-being. [START_REF] Spalding | Unconscious unease and self-handicapping: Behavioral consequences of individual differences in implicit and explicit self-esteem[END_REF] found that implicitly measured self-esteem is a better predictor of observerreported anxiety during a demanding interview than is explicitly measured self-esteem. Replication of this pattern using the Name-Liking measure would further bolster the argument that Name-Liking is a valid measure of self-esteem and in this regard is at least as useful as other implicit measures of self-esteem.

Method Participants and Procedure

This study was conducted using a German sample of non-psychology undergraduate students (see Table 1). Participants completed an explicit measure of self-esteem without cognitive load, a parallel version of the same explicit measure under cognitive load, the Name-Liking

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 15 measure, and were subjected to an anxiety-inducing interview (modelled after [START_REF] Spalding | Unconscious unease and self-handicapping: Behavioral consequences of individual differences in implicit and explicit self-esteem[END_REF] in the listed order (see Table 2).

Results and Discussion

Table 7 shows all zero-order correlations between the measures used in this study. At first, we tested whether Name-Liking was more strongly related to explicitly measured self-esteem under cognitive load than without load. Because each participant completed the explicit measure of self-esteem both under load and without load, we simultaneously regressed Name-Liking on load self-esteem and no-load self-esteem. Name-Liking was related to explicitly measured load selfesteem , =.55, p .05, but unrelated to explicitly measured no-load self-esteem, =.05, ns.

Next, we tested whether Name-Liking is a better predictor of observer-rated anxiety during an interview than is explicitly measured self-esteem. Therefore, we simultaneously regressed observer-rated anxiety on Name-Liking and explicitly measured self-esteem (i.e., no-load selfesteem). As expected, Name-Liking was negatively related to anxiety, =-.41, p .05, whereas explicitly measured self-esteem was unrelated to anxiety, =-.13, ns. Together with Studies 3 and 4, this study suggests that Name-Liking is at least as valid as other implicit measures and predicts important outcomes (subjective well-being and state anxiety) over and above explicit measures of self-esteem.

Study 6

Explicit measures of self-esteem have been shown to relate the impression management component of socially desirable responding in particular (e.g., [START_REF] Greenwald | Using the Implicit Association Test to measure selfesteem and self-concept[END_REF][START_REF] Riketta | Does social desirability inflate the correlation between self-esteem and anxiety[END_REF]. This finding has been labeled the "Achilles' heel" of explicit measures of selfesteem [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF]. One crucial advantage of implicit measures, then, is that they are less likely to be influenced by impression management than explicit measures [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF]. In

Study 6, we tested whether Name-Liking does have this virtue; that is, whether it does not relate to impression management.

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How Much Do You Like Your Name? 16

A second and distinct self-presentational strategy, and another component of socially desirable responding, is self-deceptive enhancement. This strategy is defined as any positively biased response that the participant believes to be true. [START_REF] Paulhus | Measurement and control of response bias[END_REF] argues that self-deceptive enhancement is a valid component of self-esteem. In line with this claim, prior research has revealed a positive relation between explicitly measured self-esteem and self-deceptive enhancement (e.g., [START_REF] Raskin | Narcissism, self-esteem, and defensive selfenhancement[END_REF][START_REF] Paulhus | Measurement and control of response bias[END_REF][START_REF] Riketta | Gender and socially desirable responding as moderators of the correlation between implicit and explicit self-esteem[END_REF]. It is not entirely clear whether a positive relation between implicitly measured self-esteem and self-deceptive enhancement should be expected [START_REF] Riketta | Gender and socially desirable responding as moderators of the correlation between implicit and explicit self-esteem[END_REF]. Although some researchers have argued that implicitly measured self-esteem should be independent of self-deceptive enhancement [START_REF] Epstein | Is the self motivated to do more than enhance and/or verify itself[END_REF], [START_REF] Paulhus | Measurement and control of response bias[END_REF] assumes that self-deceptive enhancement is an automatic process.

In the latter case, it may be positively related to implicitly measured self-esteem. Thus, the answer to this question appears to depend on whether self-deceptive enhancement is truly automatic.

Given our evidence for the validity of the Name-Liking measure, we expected that the correlation between self-deceptive enhancement and Name-Liking would be conclusive in this regard.

Method

This online-study was advertised on "Psychological Research on the Net." Participants (see Table 1) completed questionnaires assessing self-deceptive enhancement, impression management, and Name-Liking in the listed order (see Table 2).

Results and Discussion

Table 8 shows all zero-order correlations between the measures used in this study. To disentangle the empirical overlap between self-deceptive enhancement and impression management, [START_REF] Paulhus | Measurement and control of response bias[END_REF] suggests controlling for one when testing for the effects of the other.

Therefore, we regressed Name-Liking simultaneously on impression management and selfdeceptive enhancement. Impression management was unrelated to Name-Liking, =.03, ns, whereas self-deceptive enhancement was associated with higher Name-Liking, =.23, p .001.

These results indicate that Name-Liking overcomes a crucial limitation of explicit selfesteem measures in that it is unrelated to impression management. Moreover, the positive relation between Name-Liking and self-deceptive enhancement is consistent with [START_REF] Paulhus | Measurement and control of response bias[END_REF] argument that self-deceptive enhancement operates automatically. This argument suggests that self-deceptive self-enhancement should color responses to implicit (and not only explicit) measures of self-esteem, and our data support this reasoning.

General Discussion

Past research and theory suggests that existing implicit measures of self-esteem assess different facets of self-esteem, rather than global self-esteem [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF][START_REF] Campbell | Do narcissists dislike themselves "deep down inside[END_REF][START_REF] Sakellaropoulo | The hidden sides of self-esteem: Two dimensions of implicit self-esteem and their relation to narcissistic reactions[END_REF]Wentura et al., 2006). Thus, we aimed to develop an implicit measure that assesses global, rather than domain specific, self-esteem.

Building on the mere-ownership effect [START_REF] Koole | What' s in a name: Implicit selfesteem and the automatic self[END_REF], we devised an implicit measure that simply asks participants to evaluate their name with a single item. We expected that Name-Liking should capture global self-esteem more adequately than the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT, because the evaluation of one's name is particularly representative of the self as a whole [START_REF] Koole | On the nature of implicit self-esteem: The case of the name letter effect[END_REF]. In line with this argument, inspection of Table 3 reveals that the evaluation of one's full-name was the most suitable implicit measure of self-esteem, although the first-name and surname versions of Name-Liking produced similar results. In fact, the first name and surname versions correlated positively with each other across all six studies, r(1090)=.42, p .001 (see also Tables 3 to 8). This supports our assumptions that responses to these items, too, are driven by the mere-ownership effect.

Results across studies indicated that Name-Liking was positively related to the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT, even though the latter two tasks were unrelated.

Furthermore, Name-Liking predicted responses to explicit measures of global self-esteem and subjective well-being. Moreover, the relation between Name-Liking and subjective well-being remained significant even after controlling for explicitly measured self-esteem. This finding provides initial support for the claim that implicitly measured self-esteem should predict selfreported subjective well-being (e.g., [START_REF] Bosson | Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited[END_REF].

Support for the "implicitness" of Name-Liking was obtained in several ways. For one, we used a validation criterion developed by [START_REF] Koole | What' s in a name: Implicit selfesteem and the automatic self[END_REF]. These researchers expected that the implicit-explicit relation is especially strong for people who (a) are dispositionally prone to responding quickly to the explicit measure and (b) are under cognitive load. We replicated both findings with the Name-Liking measure. Furthermore, we replicated [START_REF] Spalding | Unconscious unease and self-handicapping: Behavioral consequences of individual differences in implicit and explicit self-esteem[END_REF] finding that implicit measures of self-esteem predict observer-reported anxiety, whereas explicit measures do not. Moreover, a post-experimental probe that asked participants what they had indicated when completing the Name-Liking measure revealed that not a single participant reported that (s)he had responded on the basis of his or her self-esteem. Finally, Name-Liking was unrelated to impression management (a controlled process) but related positively to self-deceptive enhancement (an automatic process; [START_REF] Paulhus | Measurement and control of response bias[END_REF]. On the whole, these findings suggest that responses to the Name-Liking measures are more strongly affected by automatic self-evaluative processes, which is the characteristic of implicit measures. Moreover, our findings show that Name-Liking is at least as valid as other implicit measures of self-esteem and has predictive power over and above explicit measures of self-esteem.

An interesting question for future research is whether Name-Liking is a valid measure of self-esteem in Eastern, collectivistic cultures, and not only in Western, individualistic cultures, as examined here (US, UK, and Germany). The tendency to link objects to the self may be less strong in relatively non-materialistic, Eastern cultures than in materialistic (i.e., Western) cultures, which may make Name-Liking less suitable for assessing self-esteem in Eastern cultures. Alternatively, a person's name is clearly of less material value than other self-related objects, such as personal belongings. Furthermore, admitting to thinking very positively about oneself (i.e., indicating high

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self-esteem on explicit measures) violates the cultural norms of many Eastern societies. Therefore, the Name-Liking measure may be even more suitable in Eastern cultures. This latter position is consistent with studies showing the predictive validity of other mere-ownership based implicit measures of self-esteem (evaluation of name letters and birthday numbers) in Eastern cultures (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997).

A provocative finding is that people who reported higher name-liking exhibit higher selfdeceptive enhancement. This result is consistent with [START_REF] Paulhus | Measurement and control of response bias[END_REF] claim that self-deceptive enhancement is a valid part of self-esteem. Given the strong validity and test-retest reliability of the Name-Liking measure, it may help to enhance the corpus of data being amassed to examine the automaticity of the self-enhancement bias [START_REF] Sedikides | Portraits of the self[END_REF][START_REF] Sedikides | Self-evaluation: To thine own self be good, to thine own self be sure, to thine own self be true, and to thine own self be better[END_REF]. It is likely that the measure would also be useful in analyses of other issues, such as the relation between self-esteem and subjective well-being. Because Name-Liking predicted subjective wellbeing over and above explicitly measured self-esteem, this measure should play an important part in future analyses of the role of various factors that influence subjective well-being through selfesteem (e.g., belongingness, narcissism, habitual negative self-thinking). Thus, we believe that the Name-Liking measure is an extremely useful tool for future research. To the researcher's advantage, the measure is very brief, easy to administer and score, reliable, and valid.

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M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Footnotes 1
The subjective well-being measures were included in the study after the first 154 participants.

Thus, only 203 of the 357 participants completed these measures.

2 We excluded response times greater than 20 seconds per item because we considered such long responses an indication of exceptionally low attention to the item. After excluding these trials, the internal consistency of the response times to the multi-item explicit measure of self-esteem was very high ( =.90), suggesting that the mean across these response times is a reliable indicator of an individual's response style (i.e., spontaneous vs. deliberate). Note. NA = North America, SA = South America, EU = Europe, AS = Asia, AF = Africa, AU =

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Australia. Note. Additional information concerning these measures can be obtained from the first author.

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Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. The Moderating Effect of Response Time on the Relation between Implicitly and Explicitly Measured Self-Esteem (Low = M -2SD, High = M + 2SD).

Table 1

 1 Demographic Data of Participants in Studies 1 to 6.

	continents

  , "funny", "relaxed", "indecisive", "weak", "clumsy", and 24 others [these 30 traits appeared for half of the participants in the load self-judgment task]

	Domain-Specific Self-Esteem Inventory -Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale Social subscale Domain-Specific Self-Esteem Inventory -Ability subscale Satisfaction with Life Scale	Hoyle (1991) Zigmond and Snaith (1983) Diener, Hoyle (1991) Griffin (1985) Emmons, Larsen, and	5 14 5 5	"I feel secure in social situations." "I feel confident of my social behavior." "I feel tense or 'wound up." "I feel as if I am slowed down." "I am able to do things as well as most other people." "I almost always accomplish the goals I set for myself." "In most ways my life is close to my ideal." "If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing."	1 (not at all like me) -5 (very much like me) 1 (never) -4 (most of the time) 1 (not at all like me) -5 (very much like me) 1 (does not apply at all) -7 (applies completely)	.87 3.64 .94 .87 2.02 .50 .77 3.89 .68 .90 4.21 1.47
	Domain-Specific Self-Esteem Inventory -Appearance subscale Domain-Specific Self-Esteem Inventory -Public subscale Response Strategy on Name-Liking Measures used in STUDY 3 Full-Name Name-Liking Amount of Self-Esteem Scale Beck Depression Inventory -Version 2 Measures used in STUDY 5 Full-Name Name-Liking No-Load Self-Judgment Task Load Self-Judgment Task (simultaneously rehearsing an 8-digit number) Observer ratings of anxiety during interview Measures used in STUDY 6 Full-Name Name-Liking Measures used in STUDY 4 Full-Name Name-Liking Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale BIDR -Impression Management subscale BIDR -Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale	Hoyle (1991) Hoyle (1991) current Author(s) current Gebauer et al. (2007) Beck, Steer, and Brown (1996) Author(s) current Koole et al. (2001) Koole et al. (2001) current Author(s) current Author(s) current Tafarodi and Swann (2001) Paulhus, 1988 Paulhus, 1988	5 5 3 N items 1 5 21 N items 1 30 30 3 N items 1 N items 1 16 20 20	"I feel that others would consider me to be attractive." am satisfied with the way I look." "I enjoy being in front of large audiences." "When I speak in a large group discussion, I usually feel sure of myself." "I answered the question 'How much do you like your first name/surname/name, in total?' by indicating…" Example Item(s) "How much do you like your name, in total?" "In general, I hold myself in high regard." "I do not like and value myself." (reverse-scored) "SADNESS: (a) I do not feel sad, (b) I feel sad much of the time, (c) I am sad all of the time, or (d) I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it" Example Item(s) "How much do you like your name, in total?" "competent"[i key] (applies to me) 1 (not at all like me) -5 (very much like me) 1 (not at all like me) -5 (very much like me) (a) "…how much I like my name" or (b) "[textbox]" Scaling 1 (not at all) -9 (very much) 1 (does not apply at all) -7 (applies completely) Specific to each item (see example) Scaling 1 (not at all) -9 (very much) and [e key] (does not apply to me) "Participant shows anxiety." "Participant's hands are shaking." "Participant sits in a defensive and closed way." 1 (does not apply at all) -7 (applies completely) Example Item(s) Scaling "How much do you like your name, in total?" 1 (not at all) -9 (very much) M A N U S C R I P T Example Item(s) Scaling "How much do you like your name, in total?" 1 (not at all) -9 (very much) "I am very comfortable with myself." "I am highly effective at the things I do." 1 (does not apply at all) -7 (applies completely) "I never cover up my mistakes." "I sometimes tell lies if I have to." (reverse-scored) 1 (disagree strongly) -7 (agree strongly) E P T E D "I have not always been honest with myself." "I rarely appreciate criticism." (reverse-scored) 1 (disagree strongly) -7 (agree strongly)	.90 3.41 .96 .91 3.11 1.14 α M SD 6.71 1.92 .92 4.52 1.28 .90 sum 10.8 8.20 α M SD 6.89 1.41 21.5 5.47 22.8 4.56 .60 3.58 .85 α M SD 7.17 1.81 α M SD 7.01 1.97 .93 4.52 1.19 .79 3.71 .81 .69 4.05 .66

"polite", "caring", "helpful", "vain", "cranky", "egoistical", and 24 others [these 30 traits appeared for half of the participants in the no-load self-judgment task]

[i key] (applies to me) and [e key] (does not apply to me)

"In general, I hold myself in high regard." "I do not like and value myself." (reverse-scored) 1 (does not apply at all) -7 (applies completely).88 5.31 1.12

[surname]; all familiar but not self-related), PLEASANT category ("loved", "positive", "liked", "good", "worthy", "nice"), UNPLEASANT category ("hated", "negative", "disliked", "bad", "failure", "awful")

Zero-Order Correlations Between all Measures used in Study 1.

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A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Table 5

Zero-Order Correlations Between all Measures used in Study 3.

(1) First Name Name-Liking @ Time 1

--

(2) Surname Name-Liking @ Time 1

.41*** --

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(1) First Name Name-Liking --

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Table 7

Zero-Order Correlations Between all Measures used in Study 5.

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Sarah Teige-Mocigemba

Karl Christoph Klauer

'Automatic' Evaluation? Strategic Effects on Affective Priming

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In Study 1, participants could strategically eliminate priming effects with attitudinal prime categories (Arabs and liked celebrities) represented by several exemplars per category while priming effects for control categories remained intact. In Study 2, two strategies (payoff and faking) were induced to motivate participants to respond particularly fast and accurately to incongruent targets. Both strategies were successful in counteracting the usual priming effects, while leaving priming effects for non-targeted primes intact. We consider the role of so-called implementation intentions in accounting for the present findings.

(136 words) KEYWORDS: affective priming, implicit measures, faking, attentional control, automaticity, strategic effects, implementation intentions In recent years, several response-time based measures have been argued to tap fast evaluative processes without the respondent's intention (see [START_REF] Fazio | Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their meaning and use[END_REF]. These socalled implicit measures were claimed to be uncontrollable making them particularly interesting for socially sensitive domains [START_REF] Wittenbrink | Measuring Attitudes Through Priming[END_REF]. While recent research revealed that one famous class of implicit measures, namely Implicit Association Tests (IATs; [START_REF] Greenwald | Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test[END_REF]) can be faked under certain circumstances (e.g., Fiedler & Blümke, 2005), the controllability of another well-known class of implicit measures, namely affective priming [START_REF] Fazio | On the automatic activation of attitudes[END_REF], has not yet been studied as extensively [START_REF] De Houwer | What are implicit measures and why are we using them[END_REF]. Extending research by [START_REF] Klauer | Controllability and resource dependence in automatic evaluations[END_REF] Study 1) the present research therefore investigated whether participants are able to control the outcome of a priming measure of prejudice intentionally.

On the controllability of affective priming

Referring to findings in the semantic priming literature [START_REF] Neely | Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memory: roles of inhibitionless spreading activation and limited capacity attention[END_REF]; but see [START_REF] Hutchison | Attentional control and the relatedness proportion effect in semantic priming[END_REF] it is often argued that affective priming reveals automatic evaluations when stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) is below 300 ms. [START_REF] Moors | Automaticity: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis[END_REF] identified partial autonomy as a core feature of automaticity: A process is partially autonomous if it, once started, runs to completion independent of goals to modify, alter, or to stop it. Recently, [START_REF] Klauer | Controllability and resource dependence in automatic evaluations[END_REF]Study 1) showed that the assumption of partial autonomy does not hold for affective priming. Participants were able to strategically use prime information to modify their responses by preparing for a target of opposite valence although a short SOA of 275 ms and an 800 ms response-window impeded intentional processing of the prime.

Importantly, the affective priming paradigm employed by Klauer and Teige-Mocigemba differed from affective priming measures typically used by social psychologists [START_REF] Wittenbrink | Measuring Attitudes Through Priming[END_REF] with regard to three aspects: Firstly, primes were clearly valenced, yet did not exemplify socially relevant categories (e.g., Arabs). Secondly, the number of exemplars per prime category was restricted to one. In a standard priming measure however, the prime category is typically represented by several exemplars. Use of expectancies based on prime category might be more difficult than use of expectancies tied to specific prime exemplars because prime categorization now has to precede the strategic use of the prime information. Thirdly, a negative contingency between prime valence and target valence was In times of frequent media reports about terrorist attacks, prejudice against Arabs is prevalent in Western cultures [START_REF] Echebarria-Echabe | Effects of terrorism on attitudes and ideological orientation[END_REF]. We therefore regarded the attitude towards Arabs relative to liked celebrities as a suitable socially sensitive domain for a standard priming measure.

Method Participants

Participants were 51 University-of-Freiburg students with different majors. They received 1 Euro plus a pay that was contingent upon their performance in the priming task.

One participant was excluded from all analyses because both his error rate (49.38%) and his mean latency (182 ms) were "far-out" values [START_REF] Tukey | Exploratory data analysis[END_REF] compared to the total sample's distributions (M=13.26% and M=520 ms, respectively).

Materials

Target words, presentation parameters, and list of trials were the same as in [START_REF] Klauer | Controllability and resource dependence in automatic evaluations[END_REF]Study 1). Prime categories comprised two categories denoted as "shift primes" and two categories denoted as "non-shift primes". As shift primes, we selected four portraits each of Arabs (with turbans and beards) and liked celebrities (Jürgen Klinsmann, Albert Einstein, John Lennon, Ulrich Wickert). Four pictures each of ugly landscapes (two garbage dumps, cigarette stubs, and a bombed house) and beautiful landscapes (two sunsets and two seascapes) served as non-shift primes. In all studies, control strategies were only directed to trials with shift primes.

Priming trials

A priming trial started with the presentation of the prime picture in the screen's center.

After 275 ms, the prime was replaced by the target word which remained on screen until 800 ms had passed or a response was given by pressing one of two mouse keys [START_REF] Voss | How to make your own Response Boxes: A Stepby-Step Guide for the Construction of Reliable and Inexpensive Parallel-Port Response Pads from Computer Mice[END_REF]. After an incorrect response, the red word "FEHLER" (error) immediately appeared for 200 ms. The intertrial interval was 500 ms.

List of trials

Following [START_REF] Klauer | Controllability and resource dependence in automatic evaluations[END_REF], there were five experimental blocks of 48 prime-target pairs, 12 pairs for each prime category. In each block, shift primes were followed eight times by inconsistent targets and four times by consistent targets. For non-shift primes, this eight-to-four-ratio was reversed. In the preceding practice block, shift primes were followed by nine inconsistent and three consistent targets, whereas for non-shift primes, this nine-to-three-ratio was reversed. The order of trials with shift versus non-shift primes was randomized.

Procedure

In individual sessions of 25 minutes, participants first read instructions for the upcoming priming task, were shown all 16 prime pictures, and were told about the payoff rules (1 Euro fixed amount plus 2 Euro Cents per correct response within 800 ms). Members of the experimental group, but not the control group, were told that shift primes would in most cases be followed by evaluatively incongruent targets (i.e., portraits of Arabs would usually be followed by positive words and portraits of liked celebrities by negative words). They were advised to use this knowledge (cf. [START_REF] Blair | Automatic and controlled processes in stereotype priming[END_REF] to maximize their payoff. Then, the practice block started followed by five experimental blocks. Each block began with a reminder of the payoff-rules and, for the experimental group, the advice on how to maximize payoff, and ended with performance feedback. Finally, participants judged each prime stimulus on a semantic differential, thereby validating the chosen prime stimuli.

Results and Discussion

All analyses throughout the paper are based on log-transformed response latencies of correct responses. All latencies were preprocessed by discarding latencies that were outliers in an individual's reaction time distribution according to [START_REF] Tukey | Exploratory data analysis[END_REF] outlier criterion (i.e., latencies below (above) the first (third) quartile minus (plus) 1.5 times the individual's interquartile range).

A two (consistency) times two (prime type) times two (group) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the first two factors revealed a significant three-way interaction, F(1,48)=4.88, p=.03. Separate analyses with factors consistency and group were conducted for trials with non-shift primes and shift primes, respectively. For non-shift primes, a main effect of consistency, F(1,48)=41.78, p<.001, indicated the normal priming effect (all other Fs<1). In contrast, for shift primes, only the interaction of consistency and group reached significance, F(1,48)=4.09, p<.05, all other Fs<1. Thus, priming effects differed between groups for shift primes, but not for non-shift primes (see Figure 1). Whereas all other priming effects were larger than zero, t(24)≥2.14, p≤.043, priming effects for shift primes in the experimental group were (non-significantly) reversed in direction, t(24)=-.96, p=.35. Thus, participants were able to prepare for a target of the opposite valence by using expectancies based on prime categories.

Study 2

In Study 2, we removed the contingency between (non-) shift prime valence and target valence. Two strategies motivated participants to control their responses to incongruent targets following shift primes (i.e., trials in which positive words followed pictures of Arabs or negative words followed pictures of liked celebrities).

Payoff manipulation. Participants in payoff-manipulated groups were told that it truly paid to anticipate incongruent targets following shift primes. For accurate responses below 800 ms in these critical trials, they earned 5 Euro Cents instead of one as for all other trials, respectively. Unlike in Study 1, participants could not benefit from a contingency between shift prime valence and target valence to control their responses strategically.

Faking manipulation. Research on the fakeability of the IAT suggested strategies participants might intentionally generate to influence an implicit measure's outcome [START_REF] Blair | The malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice[END_REF][START_REF] Blair | Imagining stereotypes away: The moderation of implicit stereotypes through mental imagery[END_REF][START_REF] Steffens | Is the Implicit Association Test immune to faking[END_REF]. One such strategy was instructed in Study 2. First, the affective priming effect was explained. Then, participants were asked to fake and reverse the prejudice priming effect by responding particularly fast and accurately to incongruent targets following shift primes. Participants were advised that in order to do so, it might be helpful to think of something positive (negative) about Arabs (liked celebrities).

Participants received 60 seconds to practise such imaginations.

The two orthogonally manipulated strategies resulted in four groups: The payoff group received a payoff manipulation; the faking group a faking manipulation; the payoff+faking group both manipulations; the control group no manipulation. We assumed that applying the payoff and/or faking strategy to trials with shift primes as instructed should eliminate or even reverse the priming effect for shift primes, whereas the priming effect for non-shift primes should not be affected. Accordingly, we expected differences between the control group and the three experimental groups (payoff, faking, payoff+faking) only for priming effects engendered by shift primes, but not for priming effects engendered by non-shift primes. We did not expect pronounced differences between the three experimental groups.

These predictions were tested by means of planned comparisons on the priming effects. The comparisons contrasted (1) the control group with the experimental groups to test for overall effectiveness of the manipulations and (2) the three experimental groups with each other to test for differences in the manipulations' effectiveness.

Method Participants

Participants were 120 University-of-Freiburg students with different majors.

Participants of the faking and control group received 3.50 Euro. Participants of the payoff and payoff+faking group received 1 Euro plus a pay that was contingent upon their performance in the priming task (see above). One participant was excluded from all analyses because her error rate of 50.00% was a "far-out" value [START_REF] Tukey | Exploratory data analysis[END_REF] in the total sample's distribution (M=11.97%).

Procedure

In individual sessions of 20 minutes, participants first read general instructions about the upcoming priming task and were shown the 16 prime pictures. Then, they received groupspecific instructions (see above). Afterwards, all participants worked through the priming task that used the same materials, parameters of stimulus presentation, and priming trials as in Study 1 except that there were as many evaluatively inconsistent trials as evaluatively consistent trials for shift primes as well as for non-shift primes in all blocks.

Results and Discussion

The difference score between priming effects for non-shift primes and priming effects for shift primes was submitted to the above described contrast analyses. According to the first contrast, the difference score between the two priming effects in the control group, M=-2 ms, SD=20 ms, was lower than the average difference score across the three experimental groups, M=14 ms, SD=30 ms, F(1,115)=6.66, p=.011. At the same time, there were no significant differences between the remaining three experimental groups, F<1. In all three experimental groups, priming effects for non-shift primes were significantly larger than priming effects for shift primes, all ts≥2.11, p≤.044, whereas they did not differ in the control group, t<1 (see Figure 2). Separate contrast analyses were conducted for priming effects engendered by non-shift primes and shift primes. The priming effect for non-shift primes in the control group, M=9 ms, SD=14 ms, did not differ from the average priming effect for non-shift primes across the three experimental groups, M=12 ms, SD=18 ms, F<1. Likewise, the second contrast revealed no significant differences between the remaining three experimental groups, F(2,115)=1.32, p=.27. However, the priming effect for shift primes in the control group, M=11 ms, SD=15 ms, significantly differed from the average priming effect for shift primes across the three experimental groups, M=-1 ms, SD=23 ms, F(1,115)=8.79, p<.004. There were no significant differences between the three experimental groups, F<1.

Priming effects for shift primes in the three experimental groups were (nonsignificantly) negative, |t|<1. All other priming effects were significantly larger than zero, all ts≥3.04, p≤.005.

Note that mean response latencies and error rates did not permit the identification of participants who applied strategies (see Table 1). The control group neither differed from the three experimental groups in mean latencies, F(1,115)=2.04, p=.16, nor in mean error rates, F(1,115)=1.91, p=.17. Nor were there differences between the experimental groups in these dependent variables, Fs<1.39.

General Discussion

Two studies examined strategic effects on affective priming. Study 1 showed that not only specific prime exemplars but also prime categories (e.g., Arabs) can be strategically used to counteract affective priming effects. In Study 2, we removed the contingency between prime valence and target valence implemented in Study 1. Two strategies (payoff and faking) motivated participants to respond particularly fast and accurately to incongruent targets following specific prime categories. Both strategies effectively and selectively eliminated the usual priming effects. The present results therefore provide first evidence that a standard affective priming measure as typically used by social psychologists can be intentionally controlled.

Note that unspecific control goals have little effect on affective priming: Priming effects occur even when participants are asked to ignore the prime or not to be influenced by it [START_REF] Klauer | Affective priming: Findings and theories[END_REF]. Why then were participants able to use prime information strategically in our studies? According to [START_REF] Gollwitzer | Goal achievement: The role of intentions[END_REF][START_REF] Gollwitzer | Implementation intentions: Strong effects of simple plans[END_REF], goal intentions are more easily attained when furnished with implementation intentions. Implementation intentions specify the when, where, and how of goal striving as a kind of if-then rule, thereby linking anticipated critical situations to goal-directed responses. Instructions like "respond especially fast and accurately given a positive (negative) word following an Arab (liked celebrity)" might serve as such if-then rules. Following Gollwitzer, implementation intentions are effective because they operate in a quasi-automatic fashion: They are elicited spontaneously and fast if the situation specified in the "if"-part is encountered. The implementation intentions induced through our instructions may thus be successful because they trigger the actions that are required to counteract normal priming effects in concrete situations spontaneously and sufficiently fast to interact with speeded responding (for similar effects in go/no-go, task switching, and Simon tasks, see Brandtstaetter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001;[START_REF] Cohen | Self-regulatory strategy and executive control: Implementation intentions modulate task switching and Simon task performance[END_REF].

Although participants might be able to develop successful implementation intentions by themselves [START_REF] Gollwitzer | Implementation intentions: Strong effects of simple plans[END_REF], it remains an open question how much and how elaborate advice is needed for successful faking. Given the ineffectiveness of unspecific control goals, we assume that unlike for self-reports, it is not sufficient to instruct participants to present themselves as unprejudiced (cf. [START_REF] Payne | Best laid plans: Effects of goals on accessibility bias and cognitive control in race-based misperceptions of weapons[END_REF]. More research is needed to delineate the boundaries and limits of strategic control in affective priming. Process dissociation approaches may help to disentangle the processes involved in the controllability of the priming measure's outcome (e.g., [START_REF] Conrey | Separating multiple processes in implicit social cognition: The Quad-Model of implicit task performance[END_REF]Klauer & Voss, in press). What we know at this point is that even standard affective priming with short SOAs can be distorted by control attempts in the service of selfpresentation tendencies.

  induced which might provide critical bottom-up support for control attempts. Participants might learn that tuning in to the contingency pays as it predicts correct responses in two thirds of the trials. Hence, additional evidence is needed to evaluate whether more standard priming measures can be intentionally controlled. Study 1 aimed at replicating the pattern of Klauer and Teige-Mocigemba's findings using (a) attitudinal prime materials and (b) four exemplars instead of one per prime category. Study 2 removed the contingency between prime valence and target valence. Study 1

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. Mean correct response latencies in Study 1 as a function of prime-target consistency

Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. Mean priming effects in Study 2 as a function of prime type and group. Error bars

Table Table 1

 Table Mean response latencies and error rates in Study 2 as a function of group

		Mean Response Latencies (ms)	Mean Error Rates (%)
		M	SD	M	SD
	Control	525	51	10.15	6.63
	Payoff	540	67	11.14	5.52
	Group
	Faking	562	76	12.49	7.29
	Payoff+Faking	534	55	12.77	7.31

Author note

Sarah Teige-Mocigemba, Karl Christoph Klauer, Institut für Psychologie, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany.

We would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for thoughtful comments on a previous draft of this manuscript. The research reported in this paper was supported by Grant Kl 614/13-1 from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft to Karl Christoph Klauer.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sarah Teige-Mocigemba, Institut für Psychologie, Sozialpsychologie und Methodenlehre, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, 79085 Freiburg, Germany. E-mail: teige@psychologie.uni-freiburg.de