Pavel D Simashenkov
email: pavel.simashenckov@yandex.ru

AESTHETICS OF HISTORY: THE EXAMPLE OF RUSSIA

Keywords: Russian history, Russian philosophy, creativity, religious philosophy, social ethics, philosophy of history, apophaticism, aesthetics

The article highlights the problem of studying historical time in terms of aesthetics and social ethics. The essence of history, according to the author, is not so much in retrospection or reflection, but in the gap between feeling and awareness. Guided by the apophatic method, the author analyzes the historiosophical views of domestic and foreign scholars and comes to the conclusion that the Soviet paradigm is true, where the only vector of human development is the liberation of labor in the name of creating a bright future for the sake of all people and for everyone.

Introduction

If the Russian people are destined to receive value in the future destinies of mankind, then only as the bearer of great truth -the mutual complement of spiritual personalities, moral unity of all people.

N. Grot

History begins when we have transcended what had happened, evaluating and thereby recognizing it, because even when telling someone a story, a person transforms it with his own manner of narration. Consequently, objective historicism is impossible at all, and the subjectivism of historians is smoothed with their worldview, conscience and talent. Ever since the chronicles in Russia, defeats have been described in more detail than victories -probably, as an edification in what must be surpassed and what should not be repeated. It turns out that history and time exist as long as people do not know what they are doing. According to M. Pogodin, "the more humanity develops, the clearer its actions will be ... and, finally, History will be the present time itself, i.e. a Man will act and know his actions at the same time, or, it is better to say, there will be no History anymore " [1]. Its essence, therefore, is not so much in retrospection or reflection, as in syncope, in the gap between meter and rhythm, feeling and awareness, between thought and action (that is why, probably, in the old days the historianchronicler was called the records-maker).

Nowadays, Tyutchev's line "in Russia we can only believe" is topical as never before. Two generations, fooled by anti-Soviet propagandists, are completely disoriented and trained in the atmosphere of their native history oblivion and contempt for the Russian culture. It is late and useless to appeal to documentary sources as truths of first instance because it is easy to present particular as general against a background of the abundance of information.

Rational arguments in the clip-like nano-consciousness of young people are mixed with scraps of memes, quotes from show sociologists, folk historians, political freaks and other populists and idle talkers. There is only one conclusion and way out: to take as a basis a paradigm based on common human values created in the USSR and to believe in the Soviet vision of the world and national history course. The Marxist base does not interfere with the belief, quite the contrary. Consciously professing the ideals of communism, one can conscientiously develop science, and not only from the standpoint of determinism (by the way, bourgeois theories are much more guilty of it).

During perestroika, people were lured out of the Russian world with promises of publicity and openness. However, the Russian world has never been closed, because it has always been internal! It is whole -that is what could not be forgiven. Moreover, just as the acquisition of the inner, spiritual world treasures makes external relations secondary, so the development of culture forms self-sufficiency. It is important to emphasize: isolation and selfsufficiency are not the same thing. The Orthodox, by its very nature, the Russian (and Soviet, of course) world did not know the "external", therefore the law of conservation acted specifically in it: the generously wasted energy of the Russians was diligently appropriated and kept by the sharp, practical neighbors.

While western researchers succeeded in the world cognoscibility problems (in fact, cognoscibility through speculative schemes devising), domestic thinkers were fond of the recognizability of Perfection in the manifestations of human existence. This category is providential. The aestheticization of the temporal is a national feature and a special form of our historical thinking.

Discussion

It is ridiculous to see apotheosis, it is unfair to see only anathema

A. Herzen

The stumbling block in the discourse of Russian history is European history, which, for some reason, is taken for reference simply because of its presence. It is all right for differential diagnostics, but it is unlikely fit for realization of the mission and the search for the Path. The fact that the national culture absorbs foreign experience with surprising speed proves only the user's orientation of the latter, its time-serving vector. Of course, technological delights are not bad, but they are just the optimization of various aspects of life in the plane of its convenience, while the issues of prospects (and, therefore, of meaning) are left without proper attention. Let us recall the lines of Yu. Ryashentsev: "it is not a thing to overcome the lack of roads, it is a challenge to work your way through".

Speaking of prospects and continuity, let us note: the excess of activity of one generation was harmonized by the excess of the feelings of the next one, which idealized the simplicity of the predecessors' practice, transforming it into the pathos of creation. In Russia, the amplitude of this affective-effective pendulum was so great that the domestic version could be characterized almost as a bipolar disorder of history [2]. It was saved from such a diagnosis by the amazing integrity of the Russian people nature. The periods of power stability engendered the affected internal emigration, while the heroic moments brought forth the harsh "practitioners." The most touching legends are written in silence of stagnation, the most heroic ones -in the wilderness of timelessness.

The state has always tried to keep up with the century (such is the cross of sovereigntyto focus on external challenges and symptoms), that is why it was fatally late with transformations. But the intelligentsia is destined to be either desperately advanced, or hopelessly old-fashioned (which is, in fact, the same thing), that is why its time comes one way or another. It seems to us that the key to understanding the Russian "historical feeling" is in this desynchronization, derived from idiosyncrasy, intolerance of power: the bronzing stagnation stimulated the desire to comprehend your place in alien world. On the contrary, reforms contributed to the accumulation and assimilation of knowledge, least of all disposing to reflection and sentiment (more likely -to the criticism of reformers).

However, after hastily strapping up the political background to the Russian culture, we risk to understand nothing. Actually, politics was of no concern to anyone here, but the problem of social ethics was always painful (ethics of power, first of all). Of course, the history of Russia is largely determined by the history of its statehood. Even because the cream of the national culture are entirely the accusers of the ruling regime. Moreover, precisely those who placed special hopes on the state; who believed that the right power would lead people into the realm of justice.

The championship belongs to the one who runs faster; who, having got rid off all the unnecessary burden, even the very clothes, travels lightly and overtakes rivals, argued B. Chicherin [3]. This is very accurate -about the bourgeois-positivist model of progress, which has thrown off unnecessary moral and cultural principles and perished in the supermarket of happiness technologies created by it. In Russia, philosophy developed primarily as an art, not a science, for it lived more with a talent than a method -"as a direction that frees Russian thought from spiritual slavery" (words by I. Aksakov [4]). From this point of view, it is hardly correct to debate about domestic universal-philosophical constructs -historiosophical problems were studied primarily (A. Khomyakov, P. Lavrov, L. Karsavin), social-ethical (A. Radishchev, N. Berdyaev, bro. Aksakovs) and aesthetic (Vl. Soloviev, K. Leontiev, A. Losev). However, these questions were never perceived as particular ones; a distinctive feature of the Russian worldview is striving for integrity (as by K. Balmont: "the whole world must be justified so that you can live"). We believe that the specificity of national philosophy is in the scale of the personalities of thinkers who have suffered their views. Social ethics is the concern of people with a moral core, while unprincipled creatures crawl into politics. All sorts of constraints in the sphere of social activities perfectly contribute to the cultural and spiritual growth of thinking individuals, without lowering them to the kind of public people.

Our knights of the mind have their own "Holy Grail" -the search for answers to "cursed questions". As a result, the concept of social is usually ideological (and moreover, it is not at all ideologized). This is (in the words of V. Bibikhin) "not permitted and not prohibited state of philosophy in Russia" [5]. Here they tried to turn the ideal into the real, in the West they cashed the ideal into the real [6]. Russian restlessness originates from here, it is contrastingly noticeable against the background of a cozy Euro-life. The God-bearing people will not find a place for themselves until all people feel well (Chekhov's "we are unhappy, but all of humanity will be happy"). Restlessness -is a kind of disorder in the first place; that is why we are building all the time, while others get settled in what we have built. Naturally, this is not about a place under the sun (there is a plenty of it in Russia), but about complacency.

Evolution (even in bio-format) is a way of shallowing, and the Russian soul is most distressed by shallowing: both scales and morals. Therefore, psychological techniques and management storyboards are not for us. The attempts of modern domestic (are they really domestic?) sociologists to formulate the "commandments of motivation", "ten habits that enrage the boss", "how to impress the interviewer" etc. look stupid, cynical and vacuous [7]. In the American format, the fabrication of science from such trifles looks even cute in some ways and not so coarse, but such pettiness humiliates the researcher in the national tradition.

The angle of national culture descent is equal to the angle of bourgeois mass cult ascent. Therefore, eastern philosophy attracts the West not by its depth and antiquity, but by spiritual practices, i.e. again by tricks of enlightenment. Even Hinduism met the demands of consumers by mutating into cosplays for hippies and hare Krishnas. We believe that Russian philosophy will avoid such an unenviable fate and will never become an average-world-wide popular. This is not a localistic tendency, but the need for special cultural preparation and asceticism, without which approaching to the treasury of Russian thought is possible, but communicating is doubtful: it is too personal, unique thing that cannot be duplicated.

As they say, the darkest place is under the lamp: few book truths have taken root in national life, which is why the gap between the desired and the real in Russia is so dramatic. The notorious questions "what to do?" and "who is to blame?" were being solved by thinkers impractically, pretending to be "in the spirit". Hence the bitter disappointment in the degradation of ideals, and the peculiar "apocalyptic optimism" of Russian thought. Spiritual Russia was never preoccupied with the idea of "catching up and overtaking". Meanwhile, the state Russia was rushing around in the circle of reforms, now boasting of advanced positions, now wondering at its lagging behind others. No wonder: it is difficult to understand who is running away and who is catching up in the circle, and to distinguish the outsiders from the leaders. According to the tagged characteristic of G. Fedotov, Russian messianism is an extreme form of reaction to Western temptation, an extreme form of anti-Westernism, and, therefore, again the same Westernism [8].

Perhaps the well-known difference between foreign and Russian cultures lies in the very sense of reality. In Europe, for example, realism (as a direction in art) was quickly replaced by other, more tendentious, alternative "-isms" (impressionism, cubism, Fauvism etc.). In Russia, critical realism predominated for a long time (and it was not officially proclaimed at all) as a general line; in the USSR, socialist realism was especially revered. But, no matter how the unfortunate avant-garde and anti-Soviet propagandists ridiculed it, it turned out to be genuine and it was incomparably higher than the primitive-descriptive naturalism of the perestroikatime depressive things. The reason, apparently, is the point of view: the socialist realists preferred the promising one, while the artisans of noir and art house narrowed their horizons and "creative methods". As a result, their life observations degenerated, in the best case, into still lives (literally "dead nature") of everyday signs, and, at worst, into the mediocre protocol statement of the politicized topic of the day.

The passion of the West for Dostoevsky, Chekhov and Tolstoy is a phenomenon of the same order, explained quite simply: all three authors described ordinary people reliably. There is no need to explain that the mentioned classics are far from being simple descriptors that is why the understanding of their works "here and there" is so different. Nevertheless, foreign interpretations of Russian literature seldom went beyond the limits of illustrativeness, at best hopelessly resting on the "phenomenon of the mysterious Russian soul", which became (and rightly!) a synonym for a beautiful and insoluble paradox. So, Russian (in our opinion) is not an ethnic characteristic, but cultural affiliation, and it is innate at the same time.

Results

In nations developing distinctively, richness of content precedes perfection of form.

A. Khomyakov

History paints its self-portrait with people as if with oil colors. But what a miracle -in general, the picture resembles each of us. There is its own, special, personal iconostasis in the temple of the soul. Nevertheless, as long as individuals form a society, then there will be images (for the most part) of the same saints -the conscience of the nation in such temples. However, this does not mean that the faces of all the icons will be displayed as standard. The canon and the template are incompatible things, and the inviolability of dogma in Russia is ensured by its beauty (such as, for example, separateness and inseparability). Russian thinking is speculation in colors (the term of E. Trubetskoy), but not in abstractions, because abstraction is nothing more than nude concrete thing. Therefore, it is attractive to immature minds, as every nudity to all immature ones. The beauty of Truth is in the image, but not in the formula.

N. Leskov subtly notes the essence of aesthetization in the immortal tale about the Russian Lefthander, shoeing a steel English flea [9]. The dancing flea is a joke, a techno-Kunstwerk, but a shoed one is a witty artifact, and why should it dance in such a status? The pursuit of functionality turns art into design and mass culture. The competitive rush needed in flea search is hardly conducive to contemplative God-seeking. This is an answer to those who believe that the Russians have acquired technologies and philosophical theories in bulk from the West. Perhaps they adopted something, but how they assimilated and decorated those things, how much they transformed them!

We understand the aesthetics of history as a creative search for co-existential harmony. These researches are not similar either to criminalistics (detection, fixation and evaluation of evidence at the trial of history), or to the substitution of harmony with the dead symmetry of checks and balances. Aesthetization is a way of resolving the antithesis between love for near person and love for distant one, designated by F. Nietzsche and developed by S. Frank. Let us make a reservation: craving for beauty and justice in the Russian character has little in common with Nietzsche's "love for things and ghosts," since the materialization and the phantom of the ideal are equally disastrous for it. The ideal is not a standard, much less it is an illusion that hides or decorates improper realities. The irrational reality of the ideal comprehends reality. Such is the superation of history, when the next note adorns and justifies the previous one: if only because without the previous one it would be impossible, even in dissonance. Harmonization is an aesthetic interpretation rather than reconciliation, adaptation, compensation, or a formal alternative.

To find harmony means to grasp the consonances and resonances of the worldview with the universe; in this sense of rhythm, syncope is the root of the perception of history. Naturally, it is at a certain frequency; consequently, there are as many variations as there are frequencies -those details and circumstances around which, in agreement with which harmony is built. There is a subjective, very humane moment: which image we should consider as the key one; therefore ideology seems to us to be the aesthetic category, and creativity the ethical one. In a word, against the background of the principle of equality of all under ideals vulgarization law, distinctiveness is in the way the ideal of creativity is realized by one or another nation. "The Russian man thinks like in the plastic art, not abstractly. He is an artist, an esthetician in religion too. A slight soaring over the heavy inertia of historical positivism is the most archaic feature, the first Christian one in Russian religiosity. Russians are modern Thessalonians, children of Paul," wrote A. Kartashev [10]. We believe that the imaginative thinking of Russians is clearly manifested in the unique sense of subtexts, allegories and allusions, for there exist only those things that are not for real in the present. Moreover, it is no longer surprising why satire from all the literature in Russia is the genre, which is always up-to-date and prophetic; although (according to the logic of things) it should be the most "perishable" and tightly tied to a temporal context.

The golden rule of social mechanics says: we lose in politics -we win in conscience. Perhaps the legend about the Varangians invitation is not a statement of a specific fact (it doesn't matter, if it is distorted or not), but a witty idea when the people do not wait for the chance to be conquered, but determine for themselves those strangers who will remain alienated in power status forever. Russian statehood was not formed by a foreign conquest, but expanded by an internal conquest, fabricated according to an external scheme: for example, in the Petersburg period hereditary bureaucracy (the term of I. Aksakov) earnestly oppressed their own people. However, it is true enough that the fury of Peter's reforms is partially redeemed by the enlightenment of Russia (as in G. Gorin's bitter aphorism: "He was a great enlightener, flogged ruthlessly!")

We emphasize: individuality creates history, i.e. inseparability (in literal translation from Latin). In masses, it manifests itself objectively, physically (solidarity, unity), in the personality -psychologically: the integrity of the great personality nature elevates proselytes spiritually, forcing to recall conciliar person. People inspired (and not motivated) by prophets and saints are transformed into the world, and led by leaders -into the nation. We believe that the dilemma of "personality or mass" in the creation of history issue is not so relevant. The historical role of the masses is in the revision and reduction of ideals. It is noteworthy that there are means in the Russian language that can unmistakably mark retirement from the scene: chaadaevschina -characteristic of Chaadaev (snobbish criticism), dostoyevschinacharacteristic of Dostoevsky (obsessive repentance), tarkovschina -characteristic of Tarkovsky (dull pretentiousness). This device emphasizes the typification, parodying the external forms of something originally extraordinary, personal, and sincere.

In this perspective, an associative circle that closes to domestic history is also extremely interesting. For example, Peter the Great is called the first Russian Bolshevik, and Count S. Witte -the first Commissar (respectively, People's Commissar of Finance G. Sokolnikov -is called "Soviet Witte"). On the other hand, few people would think of correlating the personality of Ivan the Terrible with Henry VIII Tudor or Nero; a comparison with Stalin is much more adequate (at the same time, not Stalin with Hitler!). We deliberately made analogies in the field of politics, as its principles are simple and, therefore, universally similar. However, even here the parallels are artificial and strained. In the field of literature, this sounds utterly absurd: is it not ridiculous to call Lermontov -Russian Byron, and K. Leontiev -Russian Nietzsche, and talk about the identity of "War and Peace" with "Gone with the Wind"? As you can see, such comparisons are superficial at best, incorrect, irritate the eyes and grate upon the ears -in other words, they are ugly. Here, there is a decisive nuance, in this irrational but quite perceptible aesthetic feeling, it is obviously higher than factology and abstract logic.

However, there are indicative exceptions that support the rule. They quite rightly liken Gorbachev to Judah. It is precisely because Gorby is certainly an anti-Russian character, alien to Russian culture cosmopolitan (in general, traitors are the same and despicable everywhere). Moreover, the scale of his betrayal is truly universal.

The fact is that Brezhnev, along with Lenin, is one of the most consistent humanists of all time. "Dear Leonid Ilyich", not possessing Lenin's gift as a theoretician, was remembered as endlessly touching person in his sincere desire to bring a bright future for millions of Soviet people, taking care of improving their life, education and, in general, social well-being. But the people, historically brought up by the atmosphere of solving a priori overwhelming tasks, were discouraged by the opportunity to stop, take a rest and experience a "feeling of deep satisfaction" with their deeds. Eternal dissatisfaction with the present situation manifested itself in the fact that the temporary halt was later called temporal stagnation. We emphasize that stagnation is a thoroughly false formulation -a propaganda stamp that claims to be the image of an era, but paradoxically sanctified by the people's memory.

The Hollywood history of Russia began with Perestroika, the era of popular colonial guignol. To discredit socialism, the overseas masters of Gorbachev told him where to get a "conscience of the nation" -among "Afghan" veterans and supposedly miraculously surviving "victims of Stalinist repressions" (for some reason lived quite safely until the end of the eighties, and even worked on a fat media field). It is significant that in Brezhnev's times, the supreme authority shied away from high life and was modest in behavior, although its representatives received numerous state awards. It was on the desire not to publicize their merits that demons of glasnost played, fanning the myths that the leaders of the stagnation era were not leaders at all, and the departed leaders were not leaders. In this low competition with the dead, Gorbachev was able to acquire cheap authority for a while and obtain the status of guarantor of perestroika. The following guarantors exploited the same know-how, destroying historical continuity, distorting the very idea of progress and the historical fate of the nation [11].

Thus, the vulgarization of the ideal begins when exceptions become rules, thereby losing their exclusivity. The current (initiated and provoked by the West) restoration of the Stalin's Empire-style ruins and the old-fashioned willful autocracy is nothing more than a wax figures show and an entertaining and distracting Disneyland style farce, fabricated on imperial tales and Soviet political jokes base. Oddly enough, a purely Russian tendency to self-denial, bitter self-irony of looking at themselves from the "beautiful far away", from the "impossible world" just helps the colonialists. But Russian kenotism also contains a powerful superational stimulus for development and improvement. It is not amazing that one of the most ridiculed Soviet idioms was the notorious "feeling of deep satisfaction", credo of the blessed Brezhnev's "stagnation". Only after a thirty-year-old post-perestroika wonderland, these words became clearer and closer to us, shining like stars that are always better seen from the bottom of the well.

Conclusion

Can one imagine history? What is its form? History can only be felt. The historian's task is to feel God.

M. Pogodin

History is written as a warning to posterity, living people need it, and it must certainly be alive in order to console, educate and teach. Its lessons are that it tends to repetition, calling for work on mistakes correction. History is not for the apology of the past, but for the sake of the justification of the living.

These are times when utilitarian "how?" and "why?" are not convenient any more, people are not satisfied with objective "why?", they ask -for what? The main thing in any history is to find out its ending; this tragic knowledge gives it special value in terms of research and gives a sense to aesthetization. Historical research is not an investigation experiment and it is not limited to reconstruction of events; it rather needs restoration of cultural memory (in a way, these are Gestalten of the national history, deduced from it as contents from content). The human mind and imagination will restore the lost fragments more delicately and more naturally than formally calculated interpolations and averaged bits and pixels.

Probably, our respected reader has noted that our text is replete with negative particles and antitheses. Firstly, thereby emphasizing its polemic nature (by the way, very characteristic of the traditions of Russian thought). Secondly, the apophatic character and method of presentation are indicated, because apophatics is the art of persuading without argument, therefore -fundamentally alien to confrontation. According to Val. Muravyov, "all changes in the world studied by science are a function of one or another multiplicity of elements" [12]. It turns out that it is extremely difficult for a person to embrace unity, to think in timeless categories. Science is not capable of this, but religious and creative thinking has a chance.

Let us reject simplifications: humanity is not at all a statistical totality of "people", it is more correct to represent it in a way that should be in the future. Collective humanity will surpass the contradictions of any theories of progress: mystical, positivistic, and idealistic. Ultimately, the dispute between the two worlds (Soviet and bourgeois) is also rooted in the symbol of faith -the question of the possibility of building communism. Perhaps, it is because the Russian word "построение" paradoxically exists in the measurements of both the process and the result. Result-oriented ones mock, devotees, believing in the Path -build. We are convinced of the truth of the Soviet paradigm, where the only vector of human history is the liberation of labor in the name of creating a bright future for all and for everyone.

Undoubtedly, Russian history is unique, but it is by no means local, not isolated and not marked with the eternal Horde label of Eurasianism. If we consider the West and Russia in terms of power, there is an amazing synchronization of government forms: military democracy, early feudal monarchies, fragmentation, nation-states, estate-representative monarchies, enlightened absolutism, etc. When compared in the context of technological growth, the obvious lag of our country is revealed. Comparing the history of philosophy, we find rare statics, the inviolability of the Russian picture of the world ("a stopped watch at least twice a day shows the correct time"), especially against the background of a foreign worldview assortment. As a result, we can say that the three selected coordinate systems completely form an integral space of historical time for Russia, while bourgeois humanities often serve needs, adapting reality to obviousness, simplifying the eternal to relative. Hence, we have various forms of determinism, tolerance, quasi-concepts (modern, postmodern), nihilism and a lot of criticism, however, not always constructive. Naturally, we cannot live without criticism and comparisons, but our purpose is in transcending it, in superation.

Thus, Russia is indeed another planet, but together with the planet of the West it revolves in different orbits around common Christian ideals. Another question is that the West is permanently experimenting with the settings of the orbit radius and speed of rotation, planning to land on the Luminary and its closest appropriation (the dialectics of the proper and the existing, metaphysical and empirical), and Russia's attitude to the sacred Luminary is proper reverential, it does not change its orbit, and it will rather allow the apocalypse at home than the disappearance of a light source.

We may have allowed ourselves not quite academic imagery, and metaphorical presentation, but this is again in line with the national tradition. It seems to us that aesthetization is the path (of course, difficult) that does not cause people to quarrel and reminds them: there is a sense of beautiful in everyone; the mission of a man is a creative search for harmony in himself and in everything around him. There will always be both scientific and eventual novelty in such an approach. Russian aesthetics of history is unthinkable without paradoxism.

Симашенков Павел Дмитриевич, кандидат исторических наук, доцент кафедры государственного и муниципального управления и правового обеспечения государственной службы АНО ВО Университет "МИР", г. Самара pavel.simashenckov@yandex.ru

ЭСТЕТИКА ИСТОРИИ: ПРИМЕР РОССИИ

Аннотация. В статье обозначена проблема исследования исторического времени в ракурсе эстетики и социальной этики. Суть истории, по мнению автора, не столько в ретроспекции или рефлексии, сколько в разрыве между чувством и осознанием. Руководствуясь апофатическим методом, автор анализирует историософские взгляды отечественных и зарубежных мыслителей и приходит к выводу об истинности советской парадигмы, где единый вектор человеческого развития -освобождение труда во имя сотворения светлого будущего ради всех и для каждого.

Ключевые слова: история России, русская философия, творчество, религиозная философия, социальная этика, философия истории, апофатика, эстетика.

Введение

Если русскому народу суждено получить значение в будущих судьбах человечества, то лишь как носителю великой истины -взаимного дополнения духовных личностей, нравственного единения всех людей.

Н. Грот

История начинается тогда, когда мы превосходим происшедшее, оценивая и тем самым осознавая его, ведь даже рассказывая кому-то историю, человек преображает её собственной манерой повествования. Следовательно, объективный историзм невозможен вовсе, а субъективизм историков скрашивается наличием у них мировоззрения, совести и таланта. Еще с летописных времен на Руси поражения описывались детальнее побед -вероятно, как назидание в том, что дОлжно превзойти и что не должнО повториться. Выходит, история и время бытуют дотоле, покуда люди не ведают, что творят. По версии М. Погодина, "чем больше будет развиваться человечество, тем деяния его будут яснее… и, наконец, История будет само настоящее время, т.е. человек будет вместе и действовать и знать свои действия, или, лучше, уже не будет Истории" [1]. Суть ее, стало быть, не столько в ретроспекции или рефлексии, сколько в синкопе, разрыве между метром и ритмом, чувством и осознанием, между мыслью и действием (вот почему, наверно, в старину историка-хрониста называли дееписателем).

Ныне как никогда актуально тютчевское "в Россию можно только верить". Два поколения оболваненных антисоветскими пропагандистами -полностью дезориентированы и выдрессированы в атмосфере забвения родной истории и презрения к русской культуре. Апеллировать к документальным источникам в качестве истин первой инстанции поздно и бесполезно, на фоне изобилия информации частное запросто можно выдать за общее. Рациональные аргументы в клиповом нано-сознании молодежи перемешиваются с обрывками мемов, цитат шоу-социологов, фолкисториков, политфриков и прочих популистов и пустосвятов. Вывод и выход один: взять за основу парадигму, основанную на общечеловеческих ценностях -созданную в СССР. И веровать в советское видение хода истории мировой и отечественной. Марксистская база вере не помеха, скорее наоборот. Сознательно исповедуя идеалы коммунизма, можно осознанно развивать науку, и отнюдь не только с позиций детерминизма (им, к слову, в гораздо большей степени грешат буржуазные теории).

В перестройку людей выманили из русского мира посулами гласности и открытости. Но русский мир никогда не был закрытым, поскольку всегда был внутренним! Он цельный -вот чего ему не могли простить. И как обретение сокровищ внутреннего, духовного мира делает внешние связи второстепенными, так и развитие культуры формирует самодостаточность. Важно подчеркнуть: изолированность и самодостаточность -не одно и то же. Православный по самой природе своей, русский (и советский, конечно же) мир не ведал "внешнего", поэтому и закон сохранения в нем действовал особенно: щедро растрачиваемая русскими энергия прилежно присваивалась и сохранялась сметливыми, "туго знающими жизнь" соседями.

Пока западные исследователи преуспевали в вопросах познаваемости мира (на деле -познавабельности посредством умозрительного схемопостроения), отечественные мыслители увлекались опознаваемостью Совершенства в проявлениях человеческого бытия. А это категория провиденциальная. Эстетизация временнОгонациональная черта и особая форма нашего исторического мышления.

Дискуссионные моменты интерпретации

Видеть апотеозу смешно, видеть одну анафему несправедливо А. Герцен

Камень преткновения в дискурсе русской истории -история европейская, которую почему-то берут за эталон просто благодаря ее наличию. Для дифференциальной диагностики такое сгодится, но для осознания миссии и поиска Пути -вряд ли. То, что отечественная культура с удивительной быстротой впитывает зарубежный опыт, доказывает лишь пользовательскую ориентированность последнего, его приспособленческий вектор. Разумеется, технологические изыски это неплохо, но они -всего лишь оптимизация разных аспектов жизни в плоскости ее удобства, тогда как вопросы перспектив (а значит -и смысла) оставляются без должного внимания. Припомним строки Ю. Ряшенцева: бездорожье одолеть не штука, а вот как дорогу одолеть?

Говоря о перспективах и преемственности, отметим: избыток деятельности одного поколения гармонизировался избытком чувств последующего, которое идеализировало незатейливость практики предшественников, преобразуя ее в пафос созидания. В России амплитуда этого аффективно-эффективного маятника бывала столь велика, что отечественный вариант можно было характеризовать чуть ли не как биполярное расстройство истории [2]. От подобного диагноза ее спасала удивительная цельность натуры русских людей. Периоды державной стабильности порождали аффектированную внутреннюю эмиграцию, в то время как героические моменты являли на свет суровых "практиков". Самые трогательные легенды пишутся в тиши застоя, самые героические -в глуши безвременья.

Государство всегда пыталось идти в ногу с веком (таков крест суверенитетаориентироваться на внешние вызовы и симптомы), потому-то фатально запаздывало в преобразованиях. А вот интеллигенции суждено быть либо отчаянно передовой, либо безнадежно старомодной (что, собственно, одно и то же), оттого ее время так или иначе наступает. Нам представляется, что ключ к пониманию русского "исторического чувства" -в этой рассинхронизации, происходящей от идиосинкразии, непереносимости власти: бронзовеющая стагнация стимулировала желание осмыслить свое место в не-своем мире. Наоборот, реформы способствовали накоплению и усвоению знаний, менее всего располагая к рефлексии и сантиментам (скорее -к критике реформаторов).

Однако, наскоро приторочив к русской культуре политическую подоплеку, мы рискуем ничего не понять. Собственно политика здесь мало кого волновала, зато вечно болезненной была проблема социальной этики (этики власти -в первую очередь). Конечно, история России во многом определяется историей ее государственности. Хотя бы потому, что весь цвет отечественной культуры -сплошь обличители правящего режима. И именно те, кто на государство возлагал особые надежды; кто верил, что правильная власть приведет людей в царство справедливости.

Первенство принадлежит тому, кто бежит скорее, кто, скинув с себя все ненужное бремя, даже самую одежду, налегке пускается в путь и перегоняет соперников, утверждал Б. Чичерин [3]. Это очень метко -о буржуазно-позитивистской модели прогресса, скинувшего с себя ненужные моральные и культурные принципы и сгинувшего в им же созданном супермаркете технологий счастья. В России философия развивалась преимущественно как искусство, а не наука, ибо жила скорее талантом, нежели методом -"как направление, освобождающее русскую мысль от духовного рабства" (слова И. Аксакова [4]). С данной точки зрения едва ли верно рассуждать об отечественных универсально-философских конструктах -разрабатывались преимущественно проблемы историософские (А. Хомяков, П. Лавров, Л. Карсавин), социально-этические (А. Радищев, Н. Бердяев, бр. Аксаковы, ) и эстетические (Вл. Соловьев, К. Леонтьев, А. Лосев). Впрочем, вопросы эти никогда не воспринимались частными, отличительная черта русского миросозерцания -стремление к целостности (как у К. Бальмонта: мир должен быть оправдан весь, чтоб можно было жить). Мы полагаем, что специфика отечественной философии -в масштабе личности мыслителей, выстрадавших свои взгляды. Социальная этика волнует людей с нравственным стержнем, в политику же ползут существа морально беспозвоночные. Разного рода стеснения в сфере общественной деятельности прекрасно способствуют культурному и духовному росту думающих личностей, не опуская их до масти публичных людей.

У наших рыцарей разума свой "святой Грааль" -поиск ответов на "проклЯтые вопросы", в итоге понятие социального почти всегда идеологично (притом -вовсе не идеологизировано). Таково (словами В. Бибихина) "не разрешенное и не запрещенное состояние философии в России" [5]. Здесь старались претворить идеальное в реальное, на Западе идеальное обналичивают в действительное [6]. Отсюда русская неприкаянность, контрастно заметная на фоне уютного евро-быта. Народ-богоносец не найдет себе места, пока всем людям не станет хорошо (чеховское "мы несчастны, но все человечество будет счастливо"). Неприкаянность -в первую очередь неустроенность, оттого мы все время строим, а другие в построенном нами устраиваются. Естественно, речь не о месте под солнцем (в России его с лихвой), но об успокоенности. Эволюция (даже в био-формате) есть путь измельчания, а русскую душу более всего огорчает измельчание: и масштабов и нравов. Посему психотехники и раскадровки менеджмента -не для нас. Потуги современных российских (отечественных ли?) социологов сформулировать "заповеди мотивации", "десять привычек, которые бесят шефа", "как понравиться на собеседовании" и проч. выглядят скудоумно, цинично и бессодержательно [7]. В американском формате фабрикация науки из пустяков смотрится в чем-то даже мило и не столь аляповато, но в отечественной традиции подобная мелочность унижает исследователя.

Угол падения национальной культуры равен углу отражения ей буржуазного масскульта. Так, восточная философия привлекает Запад не глубиной и древностью, а духовными практиками, т.е. снова трюками просветления. Даже индуизм потрафил потребительству, мутировав в косплеи хиппи и кришнаитов. Нам верится, что русская философия избежит столь незавидной участи и никогда не станет усредненновсемирно-популярной. В этом не местечковость, а необходимость особой культурной подготовки и подвижничества, без которых приближение к сокровищнице отечественной мысли возможно, но приобщение -сомнительно: слишком уж личностный, неклишированный подход, не поддающийся тиражированию.

Как говорится, самое темное место -под лампой: мало какие книжные истины пустили корни в национальный быт, оттого и разрыв между желаемым и действительным в России столь драматичен. Пресловутые "что делать?" и "кто виноват?" решались мыслителями непрактично, претворяясь "в духе". Отсюда и горькое разочарование в деградации идеалов, и своеобразный "апокалиптический оптимизм" русской мысли. Русь духовная никогда не была озабочена проблемой "догнать и перегнать". А Россия государственная тем временем носилась по кругу реформ, то кичась передовыми позициями, то изумляясь своему отставанию. Ничего удивительного: в круге трудно понять, кто убегает, а кто догоняет, и отличить запаздывающих от успевших. По меткой характеристике Г. Федотова, русское мессианство есть крайняя форма реакции на западный соблазн, крайняя форма антизападничества, и потому все то же западничество [8].

Может быть, известная разница между иностранной и русской культурами заключается и в самом чувстве реальности. В Европе, к примеру, реализм (как направление в искусстве) быстро сменился другими, более тенденциозными, альтернативными "-измами" (импрессионизм, кубизм, фовизм etc). В России же критический реализм надолго закрепился (а вовсе не был официально провозглашен) в качестве генеральной линии; в СССР особо почитался реализм социалистический. Но, как бы это ни высмеивали горе-авангардисты и антисоветчики, он оказался подлинным и был несравненно выше примитивно-описательного натурализма перестроечной чернухи. Причина, видимо, в точке зрения: соцреалисты предпочитали перспективную, в то время как ремесленники нуара и арт-хауса тенденциозно сужали и кругозор и "творческие методы". В итоге их жизненные наблюдения выродились, в лучшем случае, в натюрморты (досл. "мертвая натура") бытовых примет, а в худшем -в бездарнопротокольную констатацию политизированной злобы дня.

Явление того же порядка -увлечение Запада Достоевским, Чеховым и Толстым, объясняемое достаточно просто: все трое достоверно живописали обывателей. Нет нужды объяснять, что упомянутые классики отнюдь не бытописатели, оттого столь разнятся понимания их произведений "у них" и "у нас". Тем не менее, импортные интерпретации отечественной литературы крайне редко выходили за пределы иллюстративности, в лучшем случае безнадежно упираясь в "феномен загадочной русской души", ставший (и справедливо!) синонимом красивого и неразрешимого парадокса. Итак, русский (по нашему убеждению) есть принадлежность не этническая, а культурная, но при этом -врожденная.

Образы и образа истории: русский взгляд

В народах, развивающихся самобытно, богатство содержания предшествует совершенствованию формы.

А. Хомяков

История пишет свой автопортрет людьми, словно красками. Но вот чудо -в целом картина похожа на каждого из нас. В храме души -свой, особенный, личный иконостас. Но коль скоро личности образуют общество, то в таких храмах будут образа (в большинстве своем) тех же святых -совести нации. Однако сие не означает, что лики всех икон станут изображать стандартно. Канон и шаблон -вещи несовместные, и незыблемость догмы в России обеспечивается ее красотой (как, например, неслиянность и нераздельность). Русское мышление это умозрение в красках (термин Е. Трубецкого), но не в абстракциях, ведь абстракция -не более чем обнажёнка конкретики. Тем и привлекательна для незрелых умов, как всем незрелым -всякая обнажёнка. Красота же Истины -в образе, но не в формуле.

Суть эстетизации тонко подмечена Н. Лесковым в бессмертном сказе о русском Левше, подковавшем стальную аглицкую блоху [9]. Танцующая блоха -прикол, технокунштюк, подкованная же -остроумный артефакт, и зачем ей в таком статусе плясать? Погоня за функциональностью превращает искусство в дизайн и масс-культ. Конкурентная спешка, необходимая при блохоискательстве, вряд ли способствует созерцательному богоискательству. В этом -отповедь полагающим, будто русские-де оптом приобрели у Запада технологии и философские теории. Возможно, кое-что переняли, но как освоили и украсили, насколько преобразили! Эстетику истории мы понимаем как творческий поиск со-бытийной гармонии. Изыскания эти несходны ни с криминалистикой (обнаружением, фиксацией и оценкой доказательств на суде истории), ни с подменой гармонии мертвой симметрией сдержек и противовесов. Эстетизация -путь разрешения антитезы между любовью к ближнему и любовью к дальнему, обозначенной Ф. Ницше и развитой С. Франком. Оговоримся: тяга к красоте и справедливости в русском характере имеет мало общего с ницшеанской "любовью к вещам и призракам", поскольку овеществлённость и призрачность идеала равно для него гибельны. Идеал не эталон, тем паче -не иллюзия, скрывающая либо декорирующая малосимпатичные реалии. Иррациональная реальность идеала осмысливает действительность. Такова суперация истории, когда последующая нота украшает и оправдывает предыдущую: хотя бы потому, что без предыдущей и она была бы невозможна, даже в диссонансе. Гармонизация -скорее эстетическое истолкование, нежели примирение, адаптация, компенсация или формальная альтернатива.

Обрести гармонию -значит уловить консонансы и резонансы мироощущения с мирозданием; в этом чувстве ритма, синкопы -корень восприятия истории. Естественно, на определенной частоте; следовательно, и вариаций столько же, сколько частот -тех деталей и обстоятельств, вокруг которых и в согласии с которыми выстраивается гармония. Субъективный, очень человечный момент: какой образ считать ключевым, поэтому идеология представляется нам категорией эстетической, а творчество -этической. Одним словом, на фоне принципа равенства всех перед законом опошления идеалов, самобытность -в том, как исповедуется идеал творчества тем или иным народом. "Русский человек мыслит не отвлеченно, а пластически. Он художник, эстет и в религии. Легкое воспарение над тяжкой инерцией исторического позитивизма -черта наиболее архаическая, первохристианская в русской религиозности. Русские -это современные фессалоникийцы, дети Павла", писал А. Карташев [10]. Мы считаем, образное мышление русских ярко проявлено в уникальном чувствовании подтекстов, аллегорий и аллюзий, ибо в настоящем есть лишь то, чего нет по-настоящему. И уже не удивляет, почему в России из всей литературы сатира -жанр вечно актуальный и пророческий, хотя (по логике вещей) должна быть самой "скоропортящейся" и намертво привязанной ко временнОму контексту.

Золотое правило социальной механики гласит: проигрываем в политикевыигрываем в совести. Возможно, легенда о призвании варягов -не изложение конкретного факта (неважно, искаженное или нет), а остроумная идея, когда народ не ждет случая быть завоёванным, а сам определяет себе тех чужих, которые во властном статусе навсегда отчужденными и останутся. Русская государственность не была сформирована иноземным завоеванием, но ширилась завоеванием внутренним, сфабрикованным по схеме внешнего: так, в петербургский период наследственное чиновничество (термин И. Аксакова) усердно оприходовало собственный народ. Правда, лютость петровских реформ отчасти находит искупление в просвещении России (как в горьком афоризме Г. Горина: "большой просветитель был, порол нещадно!") Подчеркнем: историю творит индивидуальность, т.е. (в дословном переводе с латыни) нераздельность. В массе она проявляется объективно, физически (сплоченность, солидарность), в личности -психологически: цельность натуры великой личности духовно возвышает прозелитов, заставляя вспомнить о личности соборной. Люди, вдохновляемые (а не мотивируемые) пророками и святыми, пресуществляются в мир, а ведомые вождями -в народ. Мы полагаем, дилемма "личность или массы" в вопросе сотворения истории не столь актуальна. Историческая роль масс -в ревизии и редукции идеалов. Примечательно, что в русском языке есть средства, безошибочно определяющие выход в тираж: чаадаевщина (снобское критиканство), достоевщина (обсессивная покаянность), тарковщина (унылая претенциозность). Этим приёмом подчеркивается типизация, пародирование внешних форм чего-то изначально неординарного, личного, пропущенного через сердце.

В данном ракурсе чрезвычайно любопытен также ассоциативный круг, замыкаемый на родную историю: так, Петра Великого именуют первым русским большевиком, а графа С. Витте -первым наркомом (соответственно, наркома финансов Г. Сокольникова -"советским Витте"). С другой стороны, мало кому придет в голову соотнести личность Ивана Грозного с Генрихом VIII Тюдором или Нероном; куда адекватнее сравнение со Сталиным (при этом -не Сталина с Гитлером!). Мы намеренно провели аналогии в сфере политики, т.к. принципы ее незатейливы и оттого повсеместно схожи. Тем не менее, даже здесь параллели искусственны и натянуты. В области искусства такое звучит сущим абсурдом: не дико ли называть Лермонтова русским Байроном, К. Леонтьева -русским Ницше, и говорить о тождестве "Войны и мира" с "Унесенными ветром"? Как видим, подобного рода сопоставления в лучшем случае поверхностны, неверны, режут глаз и слух -иными словами, некрасивы. Вот в этом иррациональном, но вполне уловимом эстетическом чувстве заключен решающий нюанс, он заведомо выше фактологии и абстрактной логики.

Есть, однако, показательные исключения, подтверждающие правило. Горбачева совершенно справедливо уподобляют Иуде. Именно потому, что Горби -персонаж откровенно антирусский, чуждый отечественной культуре (вообще, предатели повсюду одинаково отверженны и презренны), космополитичный . К тому же, и масштаб совершенной им измены -поистине вселенский.

Дело в том, что Брежнев, наряду с Лениным -один из самых последовательных гуманистов всех времен. Не обладая ленинским даром теоретика, дорогой Леонид Ильич запомнился бесконечно трогательным в искреннем желании приблизить светлое будущее для миллионов советских людей, заботясь об улучшении их быта, образования и вообще -социального самочувствия. Но народ, исторически воспитанный обстановкой решения априори непосильных задач, был обескуражен возможностью остановиться, передохнуть и испытать "чувство глубокого удовлетворения" содеянным. Вечное недовольство настоящим проявилось и в том, что врЕменный привал позже окрестили временнЫм застоем. Подчеркнем: застой -насквозь лживая формулировка -пропагандистский штамп, претендующий на образ эпохи, но парадоксально освященный народной памятью.

С перестройки началась голливудская история России, эра лубочно-колониального гиньоля. Для дискредитации социализма заокеанские хозяева Горбачева подсказали ему, где раздобыть "совесть нации" -среди ветеранов-"афганцев" и якобы чудом уцелевших "жертв сталинских репрессий" (отчего-то вполне благополучно доживших до конца восьмидесятых, да еще и подвизавшихся на тучной ниве СМИ). Характерно: в брежневские времена высшая власть чуралась светской жизни и была скромна в поведении, хотя представители её получали многочисленные государственные награды. Вот на стремлении не афишировать свои заслуги и сыграли бесы гласности, раздувая мифы о том, будто лидеры эпохи застоя -не лидеры вовсе, да и ушедшие вожди -не вожди. В этом низком состязании с умершими Горбачев смог на время обзавестись дешевым авторитетом и получить статус гаранта перестройки. Гаранты-последыши эксплуатировали то же ноу-хау, уничтожая историческую преемственность, извращая саму идею прогресса и исторической судьбы нации [11].

Таким образом, опошление идеала начинается, когда исключения становятся правилами, тем самым теряя свою исключительность. Нынешнее (инициированное и провоцируемое Западом) восстановление руин сталинского ампира и кондового самодуро-державия -не более чем шоу восковых фигур и развлекательноотвлекающий балаган в духе Диснейленда, сфабрикованный по мотивам имперских баек и советских политических анекдотов. Как ни странно, в помощь колонизаторамчисто русская склонность к самоотрицанию, горькая самоирония взгляда на себя из "прекрасного далёка", из "мира невозможного". Но в русском кенотизме заложен и мощный суперационный стимул развития, совершенствования. Неспроста одной из самых осмеянных советских идиом стало пресловутое "чувство глубокого удовлетворения", credo благословенного брежневского "застоя". И только после тридцатилетнего постперестроечного зазеркалья слова эти стали понятнее и ближе нам, засияв, как звезды, которые всегда лучше видно со дна колодца.

Эстетика и парадоксализм

Можно ли представить историю? Где форма ее?

Историю вполне можно только чувствовать. Задача историка -почуять Бога.

М. Погодин

История пишется в назидание потомкам, она нужна живым и непременно должна быть живой, дабы утешать, воспитывать и учить. Уроки ее -в том, что она имеет обыкновение повторяться, призывая к работе над ошибками. История не для апологии минувшего, а ради оправдания живущих.

Настают времена, когда уже не устраивает утилитарные "как?" и "зачем?", людям становится мало объективного "почему?", и они вопрошают -за что? Главное в любой истории -узнать ее финал; сие трагичное знание придает ей особую ценность в смысле исследования и наделяет смыслом эстетизацию. Историческое исследование не следственный эксперимент и не исчерпывается реконструкцией событий, оно скорее нуждается в реставрации культурной памяти (в известном роде это гештальты национальной истории, выводимые из нее самой как содержимое из содержания). Человеческий ум и воображение гораздо деликатнее и органичнее восстановят утраченные фрагменты, нежели формально просчитанные интерполяции и усредненные биты и пиксели.

Вероятно, уважаемый читатель заметил: наш текст изобилует отрицательными частицами и антитезами. Во-первых, тем самым подчеркивается его полемичность (кстати, весьма свойственная традициям русской мысли). Во-вторых, обозначается апофатический характер и метод изложения, ибо апофатика -это искусство убеждать, не аргументируя. И потому -принципиально чуждое конфронтации. По Вал.Муравьеву, "все изменения в мире, изучаемые наукой, являются функцией то или иной множественности элементов" [12]. Получается, человеку исключительно сложно объять всеединство, мыслить вневременными категориями. Наука на такое не способна, но у религиозного и творческого мышления шансы есть.

Отринем упрощения: человечество -вовсе не статистическая совокупность "человеков", куда правильнее представлять его образом, коему должно пребывать в грядущем. Соборное человечество превзойдет противоречия любых теорий прогресса: и мистических, и позитивистских, и идеалистических. В конечном счете, спор двух миров (советского и буржуазного) тоже укоренен в символе веры -вопросе о реальности построения коммунизма. Возможно, оттого что русское слово "построение" парадоксально существует в измерениях и процесса, и итога. Результатоориентированные глумятся, верующие в Путь подвижники -строят. Мы убеждены в истинности советской парадигмы, где единый вектор человеческой историиосвобождение труда во имя сотворения светлого будущего ради всех и для каждого.

Вне сомнений, русская история уникальна, но при этом отнюдь не локальна, не обособленна и не помечена вечным ордынским ярлыком евразийства. Если рассматривать Запад и Россию в плане власти, налицо удивительная синхронизация форм правления: военная демократия, раннефеодальные монархии, раздробленность, национальные государства, сословно-представительные монархии, просвещенный абсолютизм и т.д. При сравнении в контексте технологического роста -выявляется очевидное запаздывание нашей страны. Сопоставляя историю философии, обнаруживаем редкостную статику, незыблемость русской картины мира ("остановившиеся часы хотя бы дважды в сутки показывают правильное время"), особенно -на фоне зарубежного мировоззренческого ассортимента. В итоге можно сказать, что три выбранных системы координат вполне образуют для России целостное пространство исторического времени, тогда как буржуазная гуманитаристика зачастую обслуживает потребности, адаптируя реальность к очевидности, упрощая вечное до относительного. Отсюда -разные формы детерминизма, толерантность, квазиконцепции (модерн, постмодерн), нигилизм и очень много критики -не всегда, впрочем, конструктивной. Естественно, без критики и сравнений -никуда, но ее предназначение состоит в ее же превосхождении, суперации.

Итак, Россия -и впрямь иная планета, но вместе с планетой Запада вращается по разным орбитам вокруг единых христианских идеалов. Другой вопрос, что Запад перманентно экспериментирует с настройками радиуса орбиты и скорости вращения, планируя высадку на Светило и его ближайшее присвоение (диалектика должного и сущего, метафизического и эмпирического), а Россия относится к сакральному Светилу подобающе благоговейно, орбиту не меняет и скорее допустит конец света у себя, чем исчезновение источника света.

Возможно, мы допустили не вполне академичную образность, метафоричность изложения, но и это -снова в русле национальной традиции. Нам представляется, эстетизация есть тот путь (безусловно, сложный), который и не рассорит людей, и напомнит им: в каждом живет чувство прекрасного; предназначение человекатворческий поиск гармонии в себе и во всем окружающем. В таком подходе всегда пребудет и научная, и событийная новизна. Эстетика истории по-русски немыслима без парадоксализма.


Milla Wirén
email: milla.wiren@utu.fumatti.mantymaki@utu.fi

Matti Mäntymäki

Strategic positioning in big data utilization: towards a conceptual framework

Keywords: big data, strategy, big data utilization

This paper introduces a conceptual framework for strategic big data utilization. We discuss big data through i) its origins (where and how does the data accumulate), ii) its constitution (what is the nature of the data), and iii) its applications (how and why can the data be processed and utilized). Based on this conceptual analysis, we argue for three continua that can guide the process of making strategic decisions regarding the utilization of big data. We further use these continua as a foundation for proposing a conceptual framework for strategic data use and strategic positioning. The conceptual framework facilitates understanding the firm-specific possibilities that emerge from aligning the overarching business goals with the opportunities emerging from big data.

Introduction

Big data has become a richly researched phenomenon from the perspectives of its accumulation (Brynjolfsson, McAfee 2012), attributes [START_REF] Chen | Business intelligence and anaytics: from big data to big impact[END_REF]), implications [START_REF] Newell | Strategic opportunities (and challenges) of algorithmic decision-making: A call for action on the long-term societal effects of 'datification[END_REF][START_REF] Zuboff | Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization[END_REF] and individual applications [START_REF] Davenport | How big data is different[END_REF][START_REF] Varian | Computer mediated transactions[END_REF]. At the same time, there are increasing calls for integrating the information systems, or digital strategy with the overarching business strategy [START_REF] Bharadwaj | Digital business strategy: toward a next generation of insights[END_REF]). However, maybe reflecting the fundamentally amorphous nature of the phenomenon labelled big data [START_REF] Constantiou | New games, new rules: big data and the changing context of strategy[END_REF], the discussions under the same label suffer from a level of amorphousness where the origins, constitution, threats, possibilities and utilization are somewhat conflated. As argued by [START_REF] Zuboff | Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization[END_REF], the abundance of definitions for the concept of big data suggests that understanding the phenomenon is still suffering from a lack of sufficient conceptual clarity. We ground our approach on a threefold conceptualization of big data: the phenomenon can be explored by zooming into its origins, emergence and accumulation; from the viewpoint of addressing its attributes, nature and constitution; or from the perspective of outcomes, emerging both through deliberate utilization and from un-intended implications. Our focus lies in the third vantage, explicitly in the part of the deliberate, strategic level utilization of the big data.

Previous discussions about this third vantage of big data, its outcomes, are either focused on specific business applications or use cases such as customer relationship management (McAfee, [START_REF] Brynjolfsson | Race against the machine: How the digital revolution is accelerating innovation, driving productivity, and irreversibly transforming employment and the economy[END_REF], predictive maintenance [START_REF] Wang | A new paradigm of cloud-based predictive maintenance for intelligent manufacturing[END_REF], or game analytics [START_REF] Koskenvoima | Why do small and medium-size freemium game developers use game analytics?[END_REF]. The practitioner-oriented advices pivot primarily on the need of employing capable data scientists and on the need of making decisions based on data driven knowledge [START_REF] Davenport | How big data is different[END_REF], McAfee, Brynjolfsson et al. 2012[START_REF] Schildt | Big data and organizational design-the brave new world of algorithmic management and computer augmented transparency[END_REF]. Another avenue within this third vantage is the critically tinged stream of literature assessing the implications of the phenomenon of big data (Zuboff 2015, Newell and[START_REF] Newell | Strategic opportunities (and challenges) of algorithmic decision-making: A call for action on the long-term societal effects of 'datification[END_REF], however while we acknowledge a set of insights derived from those approaches, our focus is not on the unintended implications. Instead, we address another gap: research providing strategic directions for the use of big data is largely absent in the literature. We argue that to reap the strategic benefits of big data, data-driven decisions need to be underpinned by knowledge of how do the specific choices regarding big data utilization reflect and fit the overall business strategy.

To address this void in the literature, we draw on Newell and Marabelli (2015) and [START_REF] Zuboff | Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization[END_REF] to categorize the sources of big data into five types. We thereafter categorize big data into two types based on its constitution [START_REF] Constantiou | New games, new rules: big data and the changing context of strategy[END_REF]. In practice, we take the aforementioned threefold approach and identify the phenomenon labelled big data through i) its origins (where and how does the data accumulate), ii) its constitution (what is the nature of the data), and iii) its applications (how and why can the data be processed and utilized). Distinguishing between these three vantages is important for the sake of conceptual clarity, because conflating the three vantages in the descriptions threatens to muddle the conceptual understanding of the complex phenomenon.

As a result of this conceptual analysis, we argue for three questions that can guide the process of making strategic decisions regarding the utilization of big data. We further use these questions as a foundation for proposing a conceptual framework for strategic data use and strategic positioning. In addition, the proposed framework facilitates positioning the data-use related firm-specific choices into a wider context of strategic tradeoffs that allow assessing the level of alignment between the overarching business goals of the firm and its choices related to utilization of big data.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: we begin by outlining and continuing the discussions [START_REF] Constantiou | New games, new rules: big data and the changing context of strategy[END_REF][START_REF] Tilson | Desperately seeking the inrastructure in IS research: Conceptualization of" digital convergence" as co-evolution of social and technical infrastructures[END_REF][START_REF] Zuboff | Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization[END_REF] delineating and crystallizing the phenomenon labelled big data and its impacts on strategizing. In sum, we view big data from the three vantages of its origins, constitution and use, with the emphasis on the last part. Then we continue by identifying three continua along which the firms need to position their strategic approaches in regards to utilizing big data. Subsequently, we propose a framework to support strategic utilization of big data and conclude by recapping the contributions and providing future research avenues.

2

Big Data: Origins, Constitution and Utilization

According to [START_REF] Zuboff | Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization[END_REF], as most discussions of big data are accompanied by efforts of defining it, a satisfactory definition of the phenomenon loosely given the label seems

to not yet exist. The origins of the concept are often traced to the 2001 paper by Laney at Gartner [START_REF] Gartner | last update, 3D data management: Controlling data volume, velocity and variety[END_REF], where the qualitative changes in data and its accumulation were defined by three v's, volume, velocity and variance. Subsequent definitions have introduced for example additional v's, like veracity, variability, visualization, value to name a few [START_REF] Newell | Strategic opportunities (and challenges) of algorithmic decision-making: A call for action on the long-term societal effects of 'datification[END_REF], blurring the definition further. For the sake of conceptual clarity, here we identify the phenomenon through three vantages: origins, constitution and use.

With respect to the origins of big data, [START_REF] Newell | Strategic opportunities (and challenges) of algorithmic decision-making: A call for action on the long-term societal effects of 'datification[END_REF] propose a category of two (human-digital interaction, e.g. social media and internet searches and signals from embedded sensors), whereas [START_REF] Zuboff | Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization[END_REF] identifies three more sources (computer-mediated digital economic transactions, corporate and government databases, and surveillance systems) to present altogether five source categories. Here we utilize the more comprehensive categorizing by Zuboff to ground our approach.

The human-digital interaction refers to the traces people leave when utilizing the digital devices by e.g. browsing the web, using social networking sites and navigation services, or storing online fitness activities recorded by wearable devices. Especially when using mobile digital devices, we are creating data harnessed also by embedded sensor technology tracking for example our location [START_REF] Abbas | The regulatory considerations and ethical dilemmas of location-based services (LBS) A literature review[END_REF] or even the intensity of our discussions (Greene 2014). The developments in sensor technology are quite notable: it is for example possible to detect from a distance whether the driver of a car driving by is under the influence of alcohol [START_REF] Hewitt | [END_REF], or even to monitor brainwaves (Sundaresan 2017), each of these applications resulting in creating data in numerous forms. Equally notable are the sensor technology developments underpinning the Industry 4.0 scenarios [START_REF] Gilchrist | Introducing Industry 4[END_REF][START_REF] Hermann | Design Principles for Industrie 4[END_REF][START_REF] Kagermann | Change Through Digitization-Value Creation in the Age of Industry 4.0[END_REF] in the industrial setting, and in the creation of the so called internetof-everything, the development of smart gadgets and equipment for both industrial and domestic use. These developments in the sensor technology have also an impact on the third data source identified by Zuboff (2105), the surveillance systems [START_REF] Lyon | Surveillance after Snowden[END_REF], taking additional advantage of the increasingly ubiquitous cameras and satellites.

These three types of data sources represent the new forms of data creation, where the data being harvested is far from uniform or categorized at the outset. In contrast, the fourth source, government or corporate databases, is old and as such, mostly reliant on a priori categorizing the desired data, including its form. This means that the type of data originating from these more traditional sources is qualitatively different to the data resulting from the more contemporary sources of big data: for example, a governmental health related database contains only such information of the citizens that someone at some point has deemed pertinent to ask and store. The fifth identified source, the traces of digital transactions [START_REF] Varian | Computer mediated transactions[END_REF] falls in between these categories, as a part of that data is predefined and -categorized, consisting of alphanumerical information, whereas a part of that data is mere imprints of the events and actions accompanying the transaction processes.

In terms of the constitution of big data, [START_REF] Constantiou | New games, new rules: big data and the changing context of strategy[END_REF] detail the diversity of the types of data being accumulated. Part of the data is pre-categorized and alphanumerical (like the data in governmental databases, for example), but more notable are for example the images, location specific data, audio signals and social network system tokens, such as Facebook "Likes", resulting from the newer types of data creation. In contrast to such data that has long been used in business intelligence (i.e. harvested by firms to facilitate decision-making by seeking out answers to predefined questions), these new forms of data do not result from a priori planning and categorizing the specific type of data needed for specific business purposes but accumulates as a trace of all types of digital activities [START_REF] Chen | Business intelligence and anaytics: from big data to big impact[END_REF]). This type of data is not "sorted in the way in" [START_REF] Weinberger | Everything is miscellaneous: The power of the new digital disorder[END_REF]), but instead requires advanced analytical and processing capabilities in distilling the meaningful from the noise.

To recap, the sources of big data can be categorized into five types, and the constitution of data can be reduced into two types based on prior literature. However, similar typologies focusing on the uses of big data are largely absent in the literature. To address this void in the extant literature, we argue for three questions that can guide both data use related theorizing and strategically exploiting the potential of big data.

Three continua of strategic utilization of big data

The first continuum stretches between generalizability and personalization. It pertains to the expected value generation of data: do we want to use the data in seeing patterns and trends, or do we want to be able to predict the actions of an individual, be it human or machine? The second continuum relates to our access to data, and consists of the polar ends of proprietary and networked sources of data: can we source all data through our own efforts, or do we need data from external sources? The third continuum relates to the level of investments we are willing to make in our data processing capabilities: is our business primarily in refining the raw data, or in utilizing the refined data? Next, each of these continua is explored in more detail, followed by a synthesizing framework that can provide starting points for strategic data use.

Utility: Generalizability vs. personalization

The first strategic question in thinking about the potential use of the enablers of big data is: does the business benefit more from understanding general trends and patterns, or from being able to understand the behavior of an individual, be it a human, a process or a machine? The answers to this question form a continuum along which the firm can position itself. A furniture retail firm was struggling with staffing issues in their physical storesthe customers peaked seemingly at random, which meant that the store was constantly either overstaffed or understaffed in regards to the customer needs. The firm hired a consultancy specialized in data analysis, and after some twists and turns, it was found out that the customer peaks correlated with local weather patterns: customers kept pouring in the day after it had rained and poured outside. While the data revealing this insight did not enable analyzing the causes of this, it however helped the firm in its staffing issues: a year later the personnel costs were notably smaller, and the turnover rate of sales on the peak days was notably better.

This example captures nicely the potential of big data in identifying patterns and creating generalizable preferences. The massive amounts of data about seemingly unrelated issues processed with algorithms enables seeking and seeing correlations. In industrial setting, such correlations can be found between error logs and for example specific type of use or location, thus helping in designing predictive maintenance protocols.

However, while these correlations and patterns reveal a lot about the aggregated tendencies, they do not yet yield information about the individual dispositions. Newell and Marabelli (2015) highlight the issue with an example from the field of insurance. Based on comparing the accident logs with the information about the drivers of those vehicles, young male drivers, as a group, drive more recklessly than other groups. However, this information cannot be used as grounds for charging young men more for their car insurance, because that risks discriminating against such young men who drive safely.

This leads towards the other end of the continuum; the use of big data in personalization, also dubbed as little -or small -data by some authors (Boncheck 2013, Newell, Marabelli 2015). Continuing with the insurance example, it is possible to gather data from the driving behavior of an individual with equipment fitted into the vehicle (eg. use of gas, brakes, speed, acceleration) or through identifying a passing car by means of surveillance equipment (cameras, road sensors) and a connection to for example license plate registries. This data can then be compared to the general data about what type of driving typically leads to accidents, and from those correlations it is possible to derive a personalized prediction about the likelihood of a specific individual having an accident. That information can then be used in allocating a risk premium or offering a discount on the insurance, as for example some companies already do (Progressive N/A).

In social media marketing, the recent case of Cambridge Analytica (Cadwallar, Graham-Harrison 2018) highlights other applications of personalized insights extracted from big data. By first harvesting vast masses of Facebook "likes" from diverse individual and connecting that data to the results of the online personality quizzes of those same individuals, it has been possible to deduce for example the political opinions of people based on their "liking" Kitkat or Harley Davidson [START_REF] Kosinski | Private traits and attributes are predictable from digital records of human behavior[END_REF]. This means that through analyzing the "likes" of an individual, it is possible to create fairly accurate predictions of the preferences of that individual, which then in turn enables microtargeting of ads, personalized marketing. Additionally, in the industrial side this approach enables monitoring a specific piece of equipment and predicting its maintenance and service needs. Comparing the general error log data with the data about how specific environmental circumstances and use of that equipment correlate with that data, and then analyzing the accumulated data of the environment and use of a specific piece of equipment enables estimating the need for servicing of that specific piece of equipment.

To sum, while from the technical perspective of harvesting and analyzing data this use-related distinction can be to a degree neglected, understanding the business utility of big data is an essential strategic choice.

Access: Proprietary vs networked data

The question facilitating the positioning along the second continuum of data access is: to what extent is it possible to ground the strategic decisions of the firm on the internally generated (operational) data, and to what extent is access to external data sources necessary for strategic purposes?

The second continuum is underpinned by the insight that data required and generated in the process of firm activities (stored often in diverse CRM and ERP solutions), and the data needed in strategic business related decisions should be seen as two distinct types of data as defined by its use. The first type of data is operational, necessary in and generated as a side product of the operations of the firm, but it is the second type of data that is required in strategic decisions. The important distinction to understand is that while the underlying data sets (including generating, storing and processing the data) may be the same, the use of that data is different depending on whether it is used for operational or strategic purposes. In our second dimension, the question is about the tightness of the coupling between these two uses of data.

At the one end of this continuum, it is possible for the firm to exploit the data it generates for the operational purposes also in strategic decisions to the degree where it is not necessary for the firm to source data externally. An example can be found from traditional heavy machinery industries where the main economic logic is that of economies of scale, and the competitive advantage results from superior cost-efficiency. In that context the data generated by the operations, including operative costs like fuel, material, downtime of machinery and personnel can be utilized in identifying factors that increase the costs and thus diminish the bottom line. What follows is that from the business perspective, such decisions that reduce the costs are directly aligned with the low-cost strategy, and as such, strategic. In these contexts, the benefits from big data emerge from the capability of the firm to process its operational data also in its strategic pursuits of low costs.

In this realm, the only external information required is the buying and selling prices of the relevant markets. The required data sources are primarily internal, related to the operations of the firm, however the technological advances in sensor technology and connectivity mean that in order to exploit the potential of big data fully in this context, it may be necessary to retrofit the mechanical pieces of equipment with such systems that enable the more comprehensive monitoring of all operation related processes and resulting costs.

At the opposite end of this continuum this connection between the internally generated data and the data required for strategic decisions is decoupled. The firm may or may not generate data for its operational purposes, but the business decisions are highly dependent on data from external sources. Shipyards serve well to illustrate this position at the other far end of the continuum. Shipyards operate in the nexus of on the one hand the ship owners and carrier lines, and on the other hand the multitude of subcontractors responsible for designing, constructing and implementing diverse systems, ranging from the heavy machinery like the engines to the interior design, electrical systems and various navigating related solutions. In short, the shipyards can be envisioned as a type of platform where the diverse needs of the ship owners and operators meet the diverse offerings in the field of maritime engineering. In order for this platform to create value, it needs access to several external sources of data, related to not only the contemporary technological advances in the maritime engineering, but also to the drivers of competitive value in the shipping industry, the overarching regulatory and environmental developments in the maritime industries, and the overall market trends and ecosystems in global maritime transportation industries.

In these types of settings, the value from big data emerges from the capabilities geared towards creating appropriate data collaboration relationships grounded on strategic insights about which types of big data have strategic value, where do such types of big data originate from, and how and by whom should the volumes of heterogeneous data be processed. This last type of capability leads towards the third continuum in the conceptual framework of strategic data use.

Investments: Raw vs refined data

The third continuum assesses the optimal tradeoff between the investments on the requisite data-processing capabilities and the expected value returns of those investments: can the firm create value from possessing such sophisticated data-processing capabilities that enable dealing with the raw data, or does the value emerge only from wielding refined data?

The third continuum can be approached through looking at the diverse stages of making sense of the masses of data. Each stage is accompanied with specific requirements, in other words investments in specific types of data-processing capabilities. This translates into strategic decisions, where the required investments in data-processing capabilities in different stages of data analysis can be weighed against the business goals: in short, where is the firm-specific cut-off point where the benefits of having such capabilities in-house outweigh the costs of the requisite investments.

As previously discussed, the big data consists of both pre-categorized alphanumerical data, and uncategorized, highly heterogeneous data. This means that the processing of the latter type of data has to begin with rendering the data uniform enough to be processed together: ultimately this underpins the notion of digitalization, which means that the diverse types of data signals are digitized, made into bits (binary digits) [START_REF] Tilson | Desperately seeking the inrastructure in IS research: Conceptualization of" digital convergence" as co-evolution of social and technical infrastructures[END_REF]) that can then be processed by various digital technologies. So, the first set of data processing capabilities are such technologies that facilitate digitizing of previously heterogeneous data.

However, the subsequent mass of digital data is still amorphous and unorganized. Unlike traditional data already gathered based on predefined categories, this mass of data needs to be categorized. This is the second stage of data processing, where the artificial intelligence, i.e. sophisticated algorithms are necessary, because processing the vast amounts of data isn't a feasible task for human capabilities. However, this has two pre-requirements: first of all, the firm needs to have the resources needed in developing or accessing the requisite algorithmic capabilities, and secondly, the firm needs to have the human capabilities required in delineating the desired categories then filled with the sorted data -even the most sophisticated algorithms function only based on what they are coded to do, based on the categories they are programmed to identify.

In the third stage, the algorithms are equally necessary. When the unorganized noise of big data is first digitized and then categorized, the artificial intelligence can be used in finding patterns and correlations within or in between the diverse categories. It is here that the business benefits begin to emerge. However, what is still needed, especially on the human side, is the fourth stage, the capability of understanding how and why certain patterns and correlations could have business value, what is the strategic importance of the unearthed insights.

The strategic positioning of the firm in this third continuum emerges through asking the question of whether our competence lies in the first three, or in the fourth stage -or maybe the competitive advantage is a result of having the requisite capabilities in all stages. Amazon is an example of a firm that has invested heavily on capabilities spanning the whole continuum, there are data analyzing firms exploiting the business potential of focusing on the first two stages, whereas for most of the businesses the value of big data derived insights begins to emerge only when the results of the third stage of analysis are combined with the specific strategic needs and ambitions of the firm identified with the fourth stage capabilities.

This third continuum has also another dimension, related to the discussion in the context of the second continuum. Many firms generate masses of operational data that they may or may not use in the strategic decision-making. In the case where the operational data does not carry business value for the focal firm, it might however carry business value to another actor. This means that one of the offerings a firm could consider would be selling (or sharing) the data it generates, either as raw or refined, depending on the emphasis on the data analyzing capabilities in-house. So, ultimately a firm has four choices in regards to data collaboration, depending on its choices in data analysis capabilities, its evaluation of the strategic value of its internally generated data, and its evaluation of its strategic external data needs.

First, if the firm has invested little in the data analyzing capabilities, it can sell (or share) such internally generated raw data it regards of little strategic importance to itself and acquire such refined external data it deems having strategic business value. The other three options presume a level of internal data analyzing capabilities. The firm can still sell (or share) raw data with little value to itself but acquire such raw data it deems valuable and possesses the capabilities to analyze. With adequately sophisticated analyzing capabilities, the firm can sell its data in an already refined form and acquire raw data it then processes to meet its needs -or the needs of its customers, if the firm is in the actual business of data analyzing. Finally, the firm can also acquire refined external data, and in turn offer refined internally generated data. This last option requires a crystallized understanding of the specific data needs in both the strategic actions of the business itself, and in the businesses of the data collaborators.

3.4

Conceptual framework: starting points for strategic big data utilization

Traditional data gathering processes result from predefined data needs answered by gathering pre-categorized data to answer premeditated questions. As a result, the data in traditional corporate and governmental databases is relatively homogeneous (alphanumerical), structured, and it fills a predefined purpose. In contrast, the big data generated from the sources of human-digital interaction, surveillance systems, sensors and partly digital transactions is highly heterogeneous and trans-semiotic (including not only text and numbers, but also image, sound and activity tokens), and un-or semistructured, and its accumulation is not only a result of purposeful data collection but a residue of the actions and interactions within the digital realm. Tackling these issues emerging from the origins and constitution of big data leads towards our conceptual framework. To begin with, can the firm benefit from making the heavy investments required in having the capabilities spanning the whole continuum or should it focus on a specific set of data processing capabilities? In addition, as the raw data is in itself useless, how does the firm ensure the adequate access to the other stages of data processing capabilities, if its position on this continuum is narrow? Furthermore, what is the level of coupling between the internally generated operational data and the data required for strategic purposes: i.e. is possible to rely of proprietary data alone or is external data needed, and if so, should it be raw or refined -and with whom and how should the data collaboration agreements be sketched?

Ultimately, however, the aforementioned questions need to be aligned with the anticipated business utility of data: in terms of the business goals of the firm, is it necessary to glean personalized insights or can most value be derived from generalizations? To sum, these choices can be envisioned as a three-dimensional matrix, depicted below. In the nexus where the utility of the data is realized from generalizable insights, access to data is proprietary, and the investments on data processing capabilities are primarily based on dealing with refined data, the strategic data use is still quite traditional, merely enhanced by the efficiency enabling facets of data and automation. However, as soon as the strategic aspirations move onwards on any of the dimensions, the changes in the data use become more profound, increasing both the potential benefits of harnessing big data, and the risks, costs, and complexities in handling the big data. This means that moving onwards on any of these dimensions should be firmly grounded on the overarching strategic choices and business goals of the firm, which subsequently implies that the optimum position along each continuum is highly firm specific, dependent on both the endogenous capabilities and dispositions, and the exogenous environmental elements.

Discussion

Contributions

As its chief contribution to the literature on the strategic potential of big data, the present paper has put forward a framework for strategic utilization of big data. In doing so, the paper responds to the call for research on big data and decision-making (Abbasi, Sarker, Chiang, 2016). Moreover, this research also continues the discussion initiated by Constantiou and Kallinikos (2015) who highlighted the changes in the strategic contexts resulting from big data: we acknowledge the inevitable changes and go further in exploring the subsequently emerging choices regarding the strategic approaches to utilizing data. Furthermore, we heed the call (Bharadwaj, El Sawy et al. 2013) for the need of digital business strategy where the strategic choices of data use are embedded in the overarching business strategy. As our contribution, we present the conceptual framework identifying the questions underpinning the deliberate data use, which enables assessing the alignment between the overall business goals of the firm and its big datarelated choices.

The framework has both theoretical and practical value. In terms of theorizing, it provides a possible way of categorizing the discussions concerning the third vantage of big data, the deliberate use of big data. For practice, our framework highlights that the further from the nexus of generalizable, proprietary and refined data use the ambitions of the firm in terms of data are, the bigger the complexities, required investments and potential rewards are -and the less the firm can rely on traditional methods of using big data as a subset of business intelligence. Furthermore, understanding these strategic choices of data use can serve as a basis for differentiation through developing analytical capabilities and insights [START_REF] Abbasi | Big data research in information systems: Toward an inclusive research agenda[END_REF]).

Limitations and future research

Like any other, the present study is not without limitations. We thus suggest future research addressing the limitations and shortcomings of the present study. First, due to the conceptual nature of the present study, we cannot provide first-hand empirical evidence of the applicability of our framework. As a result, future research should empirically scrutinize the framework, including also the firm-dependent guidelines for assessing the optimum position along the continuums.

Second, due to space limitations, we have not discussed role of analytics and business intelligence (cf. [START_REF] Chen | Business intelligence and anaytics: from big data to big impact[END_REF]). Future research should investigate and elaborate on the analytical capabilities, tools and processes needed to obtain the desired business impact of each type of big data use presented in our framework.

Third, in addition to analytical capabilities, tools and processes, the strategic choices presented in and guided by our framework are likely to have ramifications on the firm level but also the network-level business model. We thus suggest future research focusing on how utilizing different types of big data should manifest in the business model and vice versa (cf. Woerner & Wixom 2016), including the network-level effects.

And finally, the big data driven changes to the strategic choices and decision-making processes are by no means limited to the questions of data use. The research on these changes is nascent, with ample room for further scholarly contributions.

Figure 1 :

 1 Figure 1: Conceptual framework of strategic data use