Hervé Guyomard

Chantal Le Mouël

Tensions around a trade regime: The GATTfWTO banana story

Introduction

On 1 July 1993, the European Union (EU) finally established a common market in bananas as part of the completion of the Single European Market (SEM). Previous national policies gave preferred market access to both sorne developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacifie (ACP) and EU regional suppliers. Hence, a major objective of the original Common Market Organization (CMO) for bananas was to rnaintain the preferential access to bananas produced in the EU and in ACP countries. However, giving preferential access to sorne supplying countries most often means restricting access to other supplying countries. Therefore in designing its new banana trade regime, the EU had to take care of keeping in line with the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which restrict the use measures that discriminate between trading partners. Thus, the new CMO for bananas had to be a balanced solution between the interests of the EU regional supplying zones and the ACP producing countries on the one hand and other exporting countries (mainly Latin American countries) on the other hand.

Clearly, the original CMO for bananas implemented in 1993 did not succeed in finding such a balanced solution since from the beginning it became the target of complaints from numerous sources and challenged under the GATTIWTO (World Trade Organization) dispute setl!ement procedure.

The first objective of this paper is to give an overview of this trade banana dispute emphasizing the changes that the EU has progressively introduced in its CMO for bananas in response to the requests of the successive GATTIWTO panels. Following the historical sequence of events, we show how the successive reforrns of the CMO for bananas have resulted in progressively eroding the preferential access that the EU had initially atlempted to reserve to the ACP group as a whole, and within this group, to the least competitive ACP countries (mainly the Caribbean countries).

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The second objective of this paper is to illustrate this view by assessing the Iikely impact of the final EU banana trade regime arrived at in May 200 l, as a conclusion of the 8 years WTO banana dispute.

The final EU banana regime is a two-step process towards a tariff-only system that should enter into force no later than 1 January 2006. During the transitional period, bananas will continue to be imported into the UE under a tariff-rate quota system through import licences distributed on the basis of past trade. How EU market shares of the main EU supplying countries will evolve during this transitional period is of major importance as regards to the Iikely impact of the future tariff-only step.

Furthermore, the level of the future tarif[, which will constitute the only preferential trade measure that the EU will be able to grant to ACP countries has still to be negotiated between the EU and its trading partners. It is Iikely that this tariff level will be sharply discussed and that an agreement will be difficult to reach between the EU and the major banana exporters, making possible a new start of the WTO banana story.

Using an up-dated version of a single-commodity, multi-country, partial equilibrium model of the world banana market (Guyomard et al. 1999a and1999b), we assess the Iikely impact of the new EU banana trade regime on the structure of EU imports. Attention is focused first on the evolution of the respective position on the EU banana market of Latin American countries, ACP States and EU regional suppliers during the transitiona! period 2001-2005. In a second step, we provide an evaluation of the tariff equivalent that should be applied in 2006 on EU imports from non-preferred suppliers.

The analysis shows that the most vulnerable ACP countries, mainly the Caribbean States, would suffer from the new regulation unless they were to recei ve direct aid to make their banana production more competitive.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the GATTIWTO trade banana dispute. Section 3 deals with the quantitative assessment of the final 2001 EU banana regime. Finnaly, section 4 concludes.

2. The GATTIWTO banana story 2.1. The pre-1993 situation: Co-existence of disparate regimes On 1 July 1993, the European Union (EU) adopted a unified banana policy as part of the completion of the Single European Market (SEM). Before that date, EU Member States pursued their own trade regimes. This resulted in three broad different regimes applied, making the EU banana market compartmentalized (cf. table 1).

As a result of historical relations, many EU Member States had obligations and arrangements with their former colonies in Africa and the Caribbean and Pacifie regions (ACP). These arrangements \Vere subsequently incorporated as a special protocol of the Lomé Convention, which formalised trade and aid relations between the EU and the ACP States. Hence, under the Lomé Convention, the EU was committed to give preferential access for banana imports from the ACP countries.

Therefore, the standard reglme involved a 20% common extemal tariff on banana imports, ACP imports being exempt from this duty. Before 1993 however, this standard regime applied in five Member States only: Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and The etherlands.

As allowed through the banana protocol, other Member States applied additional protective measures aimed at giving preferential access targeted to imports from panicular ACP countries. Funhermore, sorne of these Member States were themselves banana produeers. Henee, these Member States were granted special provisions in order to protect their own production. These provisions applied to the French overseas departments (Guadeloupe and Martinique), the Portuguese island of Madeira, the Spanish Canary Islands and the Greek island of Crete.

Thus, the second regime involved, in addition to the 20% common extemal tariff, a complex system of import quotas aimed at preserving the shares of domestically produced bananas and/or imponed bananas from specifie ACP sources on concemed national markets. This second regime was applied by six Member States: Greece, Portugal and Spain (each reserving its market to its own banana production), France (reserving its market to its overseas departrnents and IWo ACP eountries, Cameroon and Ivory Coast), Italy (granting preferential provisions to one ACP State, Somalia) and the United Kingdom (granting preferential provisions to four ACP States, Windward Islands, Jamaica, Belize and Surinam).

Finally, under a special protocol to the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957, Germany was granted a derogation allowing this Member State to impon bananas duty free. This third regime was the one applied in Austria, Finland and Sweden as weil before they joined the EU in 1995.

Applied by Germany

The overall effects of these disparate arrangements were: i) to glve nse to significant market segmentation \vithin the EU; ii) to raise the eost to the EU consumers of ail bananas and to cause priees to be different in eaeh Member State and higher than the world market priee (see, e.g., [START_REF] Borrell | EC banana policy 1992, Picking the best option[END_REF][START_REF] Read | The EC Internai Banana Market: The Issues and the Dilemma[END_REF][START_REF] Matthews | The European Community's Banana Policy after[END_REF]Guyomard et al., 1999a and b); iii) to either deny or restrict substantially aceess to sorne Member States markets to banana imports from third countries, that is mainly Latin American countries, generally referred to as the Dollar area. The SEM of 1992 provided the impetus to eliminate internai border restrictions since il would be no longer possible to enforce Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome to prevent intracommunity trade.

However, as noted by [START_REF] Thagesen | The EU's Common Banana Regime: An Initial Evaluation[END_REF], replacing national policies by a unified market regime was far from an easy task, given the competing obligations and objectives, which the EU faced. Firstly, the Common Market organization (CMO) for bananas had to be consistent with ail aspects of the SEM. Secondly, it had to be compatible with the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), particularly with the objective of maintaining or improving market access. Thirdly, EU commitrnents giving a preferential access to bananas produced in ACP countries, under the Lomé IV Convention, had to be honored. Finally, contradictory interests of EU regional suppliers and EU consumers had to be considered. 1t is worth noted that this is this attempt of the EU to preserve the position of ACP countries on its banana market, which has been at the core of the GATTIWTO banana conflict. And ail the changes to the original CMOB adopted by the EU in response to the requests of the successive GATTIWTO panels have resulted in eroding the whole ACP preferential access in favor of other third supplying countries (main!y Latin American countries).

The firsl GATT complainls

The first GA TT panel (June 1993) The first GATT complaint against the EU banana regime was made in February 1993, prior to the imp!ementation of the original CMOB. A formai complaint was made by five Latin American producing countries (Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela), with the support of the United States (US). As the original CMOB was not yet finalized and implemented, the complaint could only focus on the EU regime currently in force, that is the pre-CMOB regime which Iife had been extended on to the 30 June !993.

The complaint raised two main points. On the one hand, il was argued that the preferential tariff was in contravention with GATT rules since it discriminated between imports from the ACP States and other developing countries (subject to the 20% common extemal tarif!). On the other hand, the specifie national quotas applied by some Member States were considered by plaintiffs, as contrary to the GATT rules on the use of discriminatory tariff quotas.

In ils findings published on 3 June 1993, the GATT panel found that the EU's preferential tariffwas covered by the annual derogation from the GATT, known as the Lomé Waiver. On the second point however, the GATT panel considered that the Lomé Waiver did not give the EU the right to use discriminatory tariff quotas. Hence, the GATT panel concluded that these tariff quotas should be brought into confonnity with the GATT rules.

As noted by [START_REF] Read | The Anatomy of the EU-US WTO Banana Trade Dispute[END_REF], the weakness of the GATT dispute seulement procedure and the lack of enforceability of a panel decision, given the need for unanimity, implied that the EU was able to veto the verdict and ignore the adverse ruling.

The secolld GATTpallel (February 1994)

The same five Latin American countries requested for a second GATT panel, once the original CMOB came into force in July 1993. This second complaint still focused on the discriminatory nature of the new EU tariff quota system while it added the point of the system of distribution of import Iicenses among banana suppliers.

This second GATT panel concluded on II January 1994 that regulation 404/03 was inconsistent with GATT rules because the new tariff quota system was excessively restrictive while the new Iicensing system unfairly restricted market access to some suppliers and was not covered by the Lomé Waiver [START_REF] Read | The Anatomy of the EU-US WTO Banana Trade Dispute[END_REF].

Once again, the EU was able to block the implementation of the panel's ruling. Meanwhile however, the Uruguay Round negotiations had made progress and the WTO's dispute settlement procedures had been strengthened. Given the adverse conclusions of the second GATT panel, the original CMOB became vulnerable to a WTO complaint.

2.4. The Framework Agreement on Bananas (December 1994)

In the context of the Uruguay Round discussions, the EU pursued negotiations with four of the original Latin American plaintiffs. In March 1994, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela accepted the so-called Framework Agreement on Bananas (FAB). By the tenns of the FAB, the EU pledged to increase the size of the tariff quota to Dollar and non-traditional ACP bananas and to incorporate, within this general quota, specifie national quotas for the four plaintiffs. ln exchange, the four Latin American countries agreed to forego further action against the EU under the GATTIWTO during the life of the banana regime.

The FAB is laid down in CounciJ Regulation (EEC) 3290/94 of 22 December 1994. Its mam

provisions are summarized in table 3. Specifically, the FAB expanded the MFN tariff quota level to 2.2 million tons and decreased the within-quota tariff rate to 75 commercial ECU per ton.' Part of the tariff quota (49.3%) was divided up into country-specifie quota shares allocated to the four Latin American countries, Costa Rica receiving 23.4%, Colombia 21%, Nicaragua 3% and Venezuela 2%.

Furthermore these four countries were allowed to issue export certificates for up to 70% of their specifie quota with the clear objective to alter the distribution of the MFN tariff quota rent in their favoL Within the remaining 51.6%, 90,000 tons were reserved for the Dominican Republic (55,000 tons), Belize (15,000 tons), Ivory Coast (7,500 tons), Cameroon (7,500 tons) and other countries

(5,000 tons).

Deficiency payment

One immediate consequence of the FAB relative to the 1993 regulation was to reduce the "advantages" and the EU market share reserved to traditional ACP countries (Guyomard et al.,J999a).

Another important consequence of the FAB was that by introducing discrimination between non-ACP suppliers, it satisfied sorne third countries but strongly dissatisfied the others. Hence, as noted by [START_REF] Josling | Bananas and the WTO: Testing the New Dispute Settlement Process[END_REF], the FAB became the target for much of the complaint by other Latin American countries and made a solution much more complex.

2.5. The WTO complaint (September 1995 and February 1996)

A new dispute seulement procedure was initiated by the US, supported by Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, in September 1995. Ecuador joined them in February 1996, after its WTO accession. This third complaint against the EU banana regime differed from the two previous ones in two main respects. Firstly it was the first one which subjected the EU banana regime to the discipline of the WTO procedures, including its new and more effective dispute settlement procedures [START_REF] Read | The Anatomy of the EU-US WTO Banana Trade Dispute[END_REF].'

Secondly, it was the first complaint the US participated to as the main plantiff.'

The five complainants mainI y challenged the conformity with WTO rules of the category B import certificates and of the system of calculating reference quantities. The WTO Appellate Body (AB) issued its report in September 1997. It upheld some findings of the panel report issued in May 1997, i.e., the licensing system, the activity function rules (allocation of import certificates to primary importers, secondary importers and ripeners) and several aspects of the FAB considered inconsistent with non discrimination and national treatrnent provisions of the GATT and of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Services (GATS). Contrary to the panel, the AB concluded that the Lomé Waiver did not coyer Article XlIl of the GATT on the allocation and management oftariff quotas. However it also indicated that the EU could provide tariff preferences for traditional and non-traditional ACP exports covered by the Lomé Waiver. Finally it did not rule out the size of the tariff quota as bound in the Uruguay Round Agreement (2.2 millions tons for the l2-EU) and the income support scheme to EU domestic producers. The deadline for amending the regime was the 1 January 1999.

2.6. The 1998 reform of the CMOB (July 1998) and the subsequent evolution

The 1998 reform ofthe CMOB

The 1998 reform of the CMOB is laid down in Council Regulations (EC) 1637/98 of28 July 1998 and 2362/98 of 28 October 1998. Although the licensing system was significantly reformed with now only , As noted by Clark ( 2002), with the "aulomaticity" procedure, a reverse consensus system under which panel mlings would take effect automatically unless rejected by a consensus of WTO members, "blocking" became effectively prevented because non single state, or bloc of States, could keep a panel repon from being implemented.

, According to some authors (e. g., [START_REF] Read | The Anatomy of the EU-US WTO Banana Trade Dispute[END_REF][START_REF] Josling | Bananas and the WTO: Testing the New Dispute Settlement Process[END_REF][START_REF] Taylor | Evolution of the banana multinationals[END_REF], this significant change in the policy stance of the US was precipitated by the shoncomings of Chiquita, the leading US banana firm, in dealing with the impact of the CMOB. In anticipating the single EU banana market, "Chiquita's European supply strategy was switched IOwards concentrating on Latin American Dollar area impons" (Read, 2001, pp. 269). The two categories of operators defined on the basis of imports during the reference period 1994-96

(traditional and new market participants), the regime remained under heavy political pressure. Many plaintiff countries considered that proposed changes were not sufficient and that the reformed CMOB remained non-compliant with WTO rules.

The orbitratioll pOllel (Jolluary 1999)

Then, the WTO dispute moved on to an Arbitration panel, which confirmed that the new 1998 EU On 10 November 1999, the EU proposed to modify, one more time, the CMOB. The proposaI followed a IWo-step approach by defining a transitional tariff-quota system in a first stage and a tariffonly system in a second stage. The latter would enter into force no later than 1 January 2006.

According to the European Commission, the proposaI would allow "establishment of a more viable and stable banana import system that is fully compatible with WTO rules. sorne interested parties as not having fulfilled the ruling of the Dispute Settlement Body. The US and sorne Latin American producing countries in panicular opposed to the FCFS system by considering it were not WTO consistent. More prosaically, these opponents estimated that the new policy ignored the dominant position they had before the CMOB was implemented in 1993.

On 2 May 200 l, the EU adopted a regulation to implement a new banana import regime in line with It continues to follow the main thrust of proposaIs presented in November 1999 and October 2000.

However it supersedes the October 2000 approach for the management of the tariff-rate quotas on a FCFS basis. Under the 2001 agreement reached with both the US and Ecuador, the tariff-rate quotas will be managed on the basis of historical references. For its pan, the US agreed to lift the punitive tariffs it had placed on certain European impons as a result of the long-running dispute over bananas.

The new banana import regime in the EU is a two-step process towards a tariff-only regime that should enter into force no later than 1 January 2006 in replacement of a transitional tariff-rate quota system effective from 1 July 2001. Table 4 gives an overview of the new trade regime.'

T7le Transitional TarifJ-Rate Quota Regime

Each year from 1 January 2002, three tariff-rate quotas will he open, i.e., a bound tariff-rate quota of 2,200,000 tons net weight (quota A), an additional tariff-rate quota of 453,000 tons net weight (quota B) and an autonomous tariff-rate quota of 750,000 tons net weight (quota C). The tariff-rate quotas A and B will be managed as one (quota AIB) and will be open for imports of bananas originating in all third countries. The tariffapplied to imports within the quota AIB will be 75 Euros per ton with a tariff preference of 75 Euros per ton granted to ACP bananas. The tariff-rate quota C will be open for imports of bananas originating in ACP countries. Impons under the quota C will enter the EU market at a zero duty.'

The impon license system will still be managed on the basis of historical references. For the quota NB, 83 percent of licenses will be allocated to traditional operators and 17 percent to non-traditional operators. For the quota C, 89 percent of licenses will be allocated to traditional operators and II

• We do not describe phase 1 of the transitional regime which applied from 1 July 2001 ta 1 January 2002.

Relative ta phase 2, main differences concemed the sizes of the tariff-rate quota B (353,000 tons in phase 1 and 453,000 tons in phase 2) and of the tariff-rate quota C (850,000 tons in phase 1 and 750,000 tons in phase 2).

The Tariff-On/y Regime

The tariff-only regime will replace the transitional tariff-rate quota system from 1 January 2006. The rate of the tariff has still ta be negotiated. Il will be defined to provide a level of protection and trade as close as possible to the system oftariff-rate quotas of the transitional period.

Il

Quantitative assessment of the transitional tariff-rate quota system

The effects of the tariff-rate quota system are ana!yzed on the basis of simulations camed out with a partial equilibrium model of the world banana market. We briefly present the model and then simulation results:

Model Outline

The model consists of constant-elasticity demand (import) and supply (export) equations.

Transportation costs and constant-margin equations link CIF import priees in importing zones and SupplY (export) and demand (import) functions include time shifters. Growth trends of supply and demand were estimated from data over the past fifteen years. These growth trends were then separated from price-trend impacts assuming independence of price and time effects. This assumption implies that policy changes have no effect on the magnitude of supply and demand shifters. This is certainly restrictive, in particular because technical change in supply equations is then constrained to be purely deterministic without taking into account the possibility of price-induced innovations. A similar procedure was adopted in the "Newcastle" (Thompson, 1984) and MISS [START_REF] Guyomard | Technical Change and EC-US Agricultural Trade Liberalisation[END_REF] models of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

The simulated impacts on the EU banana import structure

Analysis with the model shows that both the quota AIB of 2.653 million IOns and the quota C of 750,000 tons would be eonstraining in 2005. It also shows that the tariff preference of75 Euros per ton would be insufficient to allow ACP bananas to compete with non-ACP bananas within the quota AIB.

As a result, the quota NB would be filled with non-ACP banana imports only. Over-quota tariffs would be prohibitive and over-quota imports would be zero. Once the quota AIB is filled, it would be more profitable for non-ACP country suppliers to export to ROW markets than to incur the over-quota tariff applied on non-ACP banana imports-'

Table 5 presents the structure of the EU banana import market in 2005. EU imports from non-ACP eountries would be equal 10 the binding level of the quota NB (2.653 million tons). This represents an inerease of 239,400 tons (9.9 percent) with respect to 1996-98 (2.414 million tons). The fill rate of the quota C would be 100 percent. EU imports from ACP countries would be equal to 760,523 tons, an increase of 59,052 tons (8.4 percent) with respect to 1996-98 (701,471 tons).' Supplies of EU territories wouid be equal to 797,090 tons, an increase of 6.2 percent relative to 1996-98 (750,671 tons). ACP country exports to the EU would represent 18.1 percent of EU consumption in 2005, the same share than in 1996-98. Exports of non-ACP countries and EU territories would represent 63.0 and 18.9 percent, respectiveIy, of EU consumption in 2005. , ACP country expons to the EU wou1d be slightly greater than the quota C level of 750,000 tons in 2005 (10,500 tons). There is no significant change in the results if ACP country exports are eonstrained te be strietly equal te the quota C leve!. in the US. Exports from other Central American (CA) countries would increase by about 7.6 percent for Costa Rica and Guatemala, and 12 percent for Panama and Honduras (with respect to 1996-98). According to Table 7, a tariff of about 182 Euros per ton with a tariff preference of the same amount granted to ACP bananas would be "equivalent" to the transitional tariff-rate quota system in 2006. A tariff equivalent of that order of magnitude would keep the average CIF priee in the EU at its 2005 level, and it would leave dollar zone exports to the EU as those from ACP countries largely unaffected in 2006 (relative to 2005). Of course, this result is contingent upon parameter choice and policy assumptions adopted in the simulation exercise. In particular, a tariff of that order of magnitude would be underestimated (i.e., less than "equivalent") if the Euro weakens vis-à-vis the US Dollar, if productivity gains are larger in dollar zone countries and if demand shifters are higher in EU member states. Funhermore, the "equivalence" applies strictly for the year 2006 alone. As autonomous productivity and production increases are likely to be greater in the dollar zone than in ACP countries, in particular the Windward Islands and Jamaica, the tariff equivalent would have to be gradually increased to permit ACP country suppliers to maintain a long-term EU market share comparable to that of 2005 (other things being equal, in particular without reflux of tariff revenues to ACP producers).

The analysis incorporates certain simplifying assumptions and the empirical results are subject to several caveats. In particular, a pertinent and complete analysis of the quota AIB rent issue does need 182.1 carefu1 modeling of all the operators involved in the banana industry and of ail the aspects of the market structure, including operator strategies and expectations. These aspects have to be correct1y represented and modeled to obtain consistent estimates of the rent sharing. 10 Unfortunately no data are available to perforrn such a modeling exercise since only country data exist. This is a particularly important point because the new licensing import scheme in the transitional tariff-rate quota regime remains, to a large extent, a system of company quotas. (2) assumes in addition to (1) that demand shifters (in percent) in the EU are multiplied by 2. Experiment (3) assumes in addition to (2) that annual supply shifters (in percent) in the dollar zone are increased by 2 points.

Final Comments

From a country point a view, the transitional import regime in the EU may large1y be viewed as a continuation of a managed market with Iwo tariff-rate quotas and an import licensing system based on past trade. The choice of the 1994-96 reference period does not take into account the dynamic changes and investments that have taken place since that period by many operators. From Table 8 and despite many uncertainties about data, it clearly appears that the EU and world market shares of one multinational company, Chiquita Brands International, have substantially decreased since 1992 while Dole Food Company has significant1y increased its EU and world market shares. Causes of market share changes are difficult to evaluate. They may reflect variations in investment activities but may also be attributed to other factors, e.g., outbreaks of banana disease, bad weather, strikes by workers and shipping and operating disruptions. Furtherrnore, taking 1992 as a reference point may be JO Three multinational fmns account for about 70 percent of the world import-export banana market and mast national markets in the EU are dominated by a small number of firrns/operators, including these three multinational firms. This suggests that the perfect competition assumption is questionable [START_REF] Mccorriston | Market Structure Issues and the Evaluation of the Reform of the EU Banana Regime[END_REF].

However, this does not imply automatically that the world banana import-export market is not competitive. Hermann and Sexton (1999) have shown that the German banana market cannot be characterized by the exercise of market power despite the very low number of fmns that compete in that market (the four-firm concentration ratio is greater than 80 percent for Germany).

eight-year period 1993-2000. However, distribution of changes varied substantially among ACP countries. While Cameroon and the Ivory Coast increased their production and exports, supplY from the Catibbean producing countries decreased. In the case of the Windward Islands for example, exports decreased from 280,000 tons in 1992 to 131,000 tons in 1999. This decline has had devastating effects on the banana industry in these countries with a decrease in the number of active banana growers by 26 percent between 1992 and 1998. Since the modification of the CMOB in 1998, the traditional ACP quota was no longer allocated between ACP countries. This is still the case in the transitional tariff-rate quota regime. Our simulation results suggest that Caribbean country exports to the EU would continue to decline in the transitional tariff-rate regime (Table 6). Welcoming agreement reached in April 2001, both the EU and the US recognized that they had shared objectives, notably to protect the vulnerable ACP producers. It appears that it would be very difficult to reach this objective for the Caribbean country producers. By contrast, the transitional tariff-rate quota regime could benefit West African countries where production costs are lower and where sorne multinationals (Dole and Del Monte) now run large plantations. West African countries have welcomed the new EU import banana regime. However, the quota C level could limit their future exports to the EU.

Furthermore, as their historical import rights are smaller than expected exports, licenses would have to be purchased to export additional bananas.

There are no certainties that the tariff-only regime will enter into force on 1 January 2006. The sening of the appropriate tariff is likely to be a point of considerable discussion until the deadline. The banana industry in ACP countries, notably in Caribbean states, is clearly at a competitive disadvantage with respect to LA suppliers. An EU policy that combines a simple tariff on dollar banana imports with direct aid to preferred suppliers presents several advantages relative to a multiple tariff-rate quota regime with cross-subsidization of non-preferred suppliers through allocation of import licenses within the preferred suppliers' quota. It reduces distortionary impacts and eliminates the quota rent problem.

The acute dependence of many ACP countries upon the exports of bananas to the EU means that any change of the European policy is of crucial importance to these economies. However, as noted by van de Kasteele (1998) in the case of the Windward Islands, "the need for diversification is repeatedly mentioned but given the conditions on the Islands, it is far from an easy task to find alternatives [to banana production] which guarantee reasonable income and employment levels."

Our simulation results show that many ACP producers will need some form of support in both the transitional tariff-rate quota system and the tariff-only regime to obtain viable returns. The higher the 2000). Preliminary estimates suggest that the unit direct aid should be substanrially lower in 200 l, between 230 and 280 Euros per ton (FruiTrop, March 2002), due to banana priee increase on the EU market.

However, the increase in EU imports from ACP countries will be more than offset by the decrease in EU impons from non-preferred country suppliers. As a result, the higher the dollar zone import tariff in the tariff-only regime, the higher the EU banana price and the lower total EU imports and consumption. This implies thatthe tariff should be set at a level sufficiently low to ensure supplying of the EU market at a reasonable price for EU consumers. This is in the interest of EU consumers and, obviously, non-preferred suppliers. EU territory producers would require extra compensation (in the forrn of increased direct aid) to maintain their returns. In the same way, ACP producers would need direct aid. The reflux of tari ff revenues to ACP producers does pose legal problems, but they are Iikely not insurrnountable. Part of the aid program should be targeted to modernize ACP country banana industries. However, it is more than Iikely that many ACP countries would have difficulties to improve significantly their cost competitiveness. This means that modernization and investrnent aid programs should be complemented by long-terrn income support schemes to maintain returns of ACP banana producers. This income support program should be differentiated among ACP countries and producers to take into account differences in production costs and conditions.

  The original Cornmon Market Organization for bananas(July 1993)

  banana trade regime was not WTO-compliant. The decision of the Arbitration panel was published on April 1999. The Arbitration panel found that the new 1998 EU banana regime did not comply with WTO rules in three respects. First the preferential import rights for bananas from the ACP countries continued to constitute discrimination against other WTO members and were larger than the EU was allowed to grant to the ACP countries under the exemptions permitted by the WTO. Second the distribution of the tariff quota among supplier countries in Latin America was based on out-of-date and non-representative reference quantities. Third the distribution of import licenses was still based on the old, discriminatory system.The Arbitration panel also stated that both the US and Ecuador had the right to impose sanctions against the EU totaling, respectively, to $US 191.4 million and 201.6 million annually (which is far Jess than the originally $US 520 million requested by the US and 450 million requested by Ecuador). 2.7. The 2001 reform of the CMOB: A two-step approach[START_REF]A Viable Solution to the Banana Dispute[END_REF]

  understandings anived at with the US on II April 2001 and with Ecuador on 30 April 2001 (WTO, 2001). The new import regime is laid down in Commission Regulation (EC) 896/2001 of 8 May 2001.

  percent to non-traditional operators (Official Journal of the European Communities, 2002). However the definition of traditional and non-traditional operators has changed relative to previous regulations. Traditional operators are now economic agents established in the EU who have purchased a minimum quantity of bananas (250 tons) originating in third counnies. Traditional operators A/B are traditional operators who have carried out the minimum quantity of imports of third-country and/or nontraditional ACP bananas, while traditional operators C are traditional operators who have carried out the minimum quantity of imports of traditional ACP bananas. on-traditional operators are economic agents established in the EU who have been engaged in the commercial activity of importing bananas into the EU for a declared customs value of at least 1.2 million Euros, and who do not have a reference quantity as a traditional operator under the tariff quota for which they are applying for registration. For each category of operators, import licenses are allocated on the basis of historical references. For a traditional operator A/B for example, licenses will be disnibuted through 31 December 2003 on the basis of the average of imports during 1994, 1995 and 1996 taken into account in 1998 for the purposes of administering the tariff quota for imports of third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas. Thereafter, the share of import licenses will be allocated based on usage of licenses issued since 1 January 2002.

FOB

  export priees in exporting zones. Market-clearing equations guarantee the supply-demand equilibrium in "relevant" markets. The number of market-clearing equations closely depends on the the transitional tariff-rate quota regime (see below), two market-clearing equations have to be specified, one equation for the EU market to determine CIF prices in the EU as weil as FOB prices in EU territories and ACP countries, and one equation for the Rest of the world (ROW) to determine CIF and FOB prices on ROW import and export markets. Volume and value of bilateral trade f10ws (i.e., imports of purchaser i from exporter j and exports of supplier j to importer i) are based on EUROSTAT (COMEXT) and FAO (FAOSTAT) data. CIF and FOB unit values are derived from volume and value data. Base period data used for model initialization and calibration correspond to the 1996-98 average.

( 1 )

 1 Base period data. (2) Source: ODEADOM (2001) and FAO (200\a). (3) Source: FruiTrop, Oetober 2001. (4) Simulation results. (5) ln 2005, ACP country expons to the EU are slightly greater than the quota C level of 750,000 tons (10,500 tons). There is no signifieant change in the results if ACP country expons to the EU are constrained to be strictly equai to the quota C leve!.

FüB9

  price in dollar zone countries ta decrease by about 20 US Dollars per ton, from 292 US Dollars in 1996-98 ta 272 US Dollars in 2005. As a result, the quota rent on EU banana imports from the dollar zone would decrease by about 57 Euros per ton, from 239 Euros in 1996-98 to 182 Euros in 2005 9 The quota rent on EU banana imports from the dollar zone is calculated as follows: Average Clf priee in the EU, minus transportation casts between the EU împoI1 market and the dollar exp0rl zone, minus average corrunercial margins, minus average FOB priee in the dollar zone. Il is worthwhile to remember that the EU import market clears in Euros while the ROW market clears (to a large extent) in US Dollars.

Table 1 . Banana 1 regime: the pre-1993 situation Standard regime 20% conunon tariff for non-preferential bananas

 1

Applied by Belgium, Danemark, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands "

Protective" regime 20% conunon tariff for non-preferential bananas,

Applied by France, Greece, !taly,

additional national import quota systems Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom Free trade regime Free trade in bananas

Table 3 .

 3 Banana ID regime: the Framework Agreement on Bananas(December 1994)

	Categories of bananas Provisions	Allocation of Iicenses
	Tradirional ACP	Quora: 857,000 tons	Specifie quotas for individual ACP countries
		Tariff: 0
	Dollar and non-	Quota: 2.2 million tons	49.4%: Costa Rica (23.4), Colombia (21 %),
	traditional ACP	TaritT: 75 commercial ECU/ton	Nicaragua (3%), Venezuela (2%)
			50.6%: other third countries
		Tariff: 0 for non-traditional ACP	including 90,000 tons reserved for non-
		bananas up to 90,000 tons	traditional ACP bananas: Dominican Republic
		Over-quota tariffs: 750 commercial	(55,000), 8elize (15,000), Ivory Coast (7,500),
		ECU/ton for non-traditional ACP; 850 Cameroon (7,500) and other countries (5,000)
		commercial ECU/ton for other
		bananas	Category A: 66.5%
			Category 8: 30%
			Category C: 3.5%
			Category A and 8: operator a: 57%; operator
			b: 15%; operator c: 28%
	EU	"Quota": 854,000 tons

Specifie "quotas" for individual EU territories

  " (European Commission, Directorate-general of Agriculture, Newsletter nO 17 of November 1999). As many important issues remained to be clarified, the European Commission invited "ail interested parties to examine its proposaI in order to continue consultations resulting in a satisfactory compromise." (European Commission, Directorate-general of Agriculture, Newsletter nO 17 of ovember 1999). A new proposaI was presented by the European Commission on 4 October 2000. Il followed the main thrust of the ovember 1999 document and proposed to manage access to tariff-rate quotas on a First-Come,

	First-Served (FCFS) basis (European Commission, Directorate-general of Agriculture, NewsJetter nO
	28 of ovember 2000). This new revision of the EU banana import regime was still considered by

implementation of the CMOB thus had a negative impact on Chiquita's EU market share (cf. table XXX in the concluding section).

Table 4 .

 4 Banana V regime: The new banana trade regime in the European Union[START_REF]A Viable Solution to the Banana Dispute[END_REF]

	Transitiona/ rariff-rate quota regime (phase 2trom / January 2002)
	Tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system \Vith three quotas:
	A bound TRQ A of 2,200,000 tons net weight
	An additional TRQ B of 453,000 tons net weight
	An autonomous TRQ C of 750,000 tons net weight
	TRQ management:
	Quotas A and B managed as one (quota A1B) and open to ail suppliers
	Quota C reserved ta ACP suppliers
	Historical references (1994-96 through 31 December 2003)
	Quota A1B: 83 percent oflicenses to traditional operators and 17 percent ta non-traditional operators
	Quota C: 89 percent oflicenses to traditional operators and Il percent to non-traditiona! operators
	Tariffs:
	Quota A1B: 75 Euros per ton for non-ACP countries and 0 for ACP countries
	Quota C: 0 for ACP countries
	Over-quotas: 680 Euros per ton for non-ACP countries and 380 Euros per ton for ACP countries (tariff
	preference of 300 Euros per ton for ACP countries)

Tariff-on/y system (!rom / Janumy 2006) Tariffrate still to be negotiated WTO, WTIDS27/58, 2 July 2001; Commission Regu!ation (EC) 896/2001 of7 May 2001; Council Regulation (EC) 2587/2001 of 19 December 2001; Commission Regulation (EC) 349/2002 of25 February 2002; FruiTrop, vanous issues.

  Table 5 shows that EU imports from ACP countries and EU territories would he close to import levels observed in 2000. As a resu!t, the increase in EU consumption between 2000 and 2005 (from 4.067 million tons to 4.210 million tons) would mainly benefit non-preferred country suppliers. Their exports would increase by 125,000 tons over the five-year period 2000-2005.

	Table 5. The Structure of the EU Banana Import Market in 2005 (Quantities in Tons)
		1996-98 (t)	1999 (2)	2000 (3)	2005 (4)
	EU terri tories	750,671 [19.4]	730,000 [18.6]	782,176 (19.2]	797,090 (18.9]
	ACP eountries (5)	701,471 [18.1]	678,000 (17.3]	756,808 [18.6]	760,523 [18.1]
	Other countries	2,413,603 [62.4]	2,513,000 [64.1]	2,528,172 [62.2]	2,653,000 [63.0]
	Total	3,865,745 [100]	3,921,00 [100]	4,067,156 [100]	4,210,613 [100]

Table 6

 6 shows that distribution of expon changes would vary significantly among ACP countries.Exports from Ivory Coast and Cameroon to the EU would increase by 22.0 percent(from 168,410 tons in 1996-98 to 205,466 tons in 2005) and 17.0 percent(from 146,490 tons in 1996-98 to 171,374 tons in 2005), respectively. By contrast, exports from the Windward Islands and Jamaica to the EU wou!d decrease by 5.7 percent (from 230,953 tons in 1996-98 to 217,802 tons in 2005). Table6also shows distribution of world export changes among Latin American (LA) countries. Ecuador would export 4.84! million tons in 2005, i.e., about 793,000 tons (19.6 percent) more than in the base period 1996-98. The world's largest exporter would profit from an increased access to the EU market thanks to a quota AIB leve! set a 2.653 million tons as weil as an increased demand in ROW markets, in particular

Table 6 .

 6 World banana exports of ACP and LA countries in 2005 (quantities in tonnes) The transitional tariff-rate quota regime would lead the average CIf price in the EU ta decrease by about 33 Euros per ton, from 593 Euros in 1996-98 ta 560 Euros in 2005. It would lead the average

	1996-98 (1)	2005 (2)

Table 7

 7 illustrates the sensitivity of the quota AIB rent to policy parameters and/or exogenous variables. The benchmark experiment corresponds to the simulation of the transitional tariff-rate quota system which results have been described previously. Experiment 1 aims at illustrating the sensitivity of the rent to the EurolUS Dollar exchange rate. Results of this experiment suggest that the quota rent decrease of 57 Euros per ton observed in the benchmark experiment is mainly due to the change in the EurolUS Dollar exchange rate that was assumed to occur between 1996-98 and 2005. In the benchmark simulation, the Euro is assumed to strengthen vis-à-vis the US Dollar over the medium term, !Tom a parity of 0.85 in 1996-98 (0.85 Euro = 1 US Dollar) to a parity of 1 in 2005 (1 Euro = 1 US Dollar). In experiment 1, the EurolUS Dollar exchange rate is assumed unchanged at the 1996-98 parity. In that case, the quota rent in 2005 would be equal to 227.4 Euros per ton and the quota rent decrease would thus be lirnited to about 12 Euros per ton relative to 1996-98. Starting !Tom experiment 1, experiment 2 shows that an exogenous increase (i.e., not induced by priee effects) in EU demand would lead the quota rent to increase (a doubling of EU demand shifters would increase the rent by about 31 Euros per ton in 2005, other things being equal). In the same way, starting !Tom experiment 2, experiment 3 shows that an exogenous increase in dollar zone supply would lead the quota rent to increase (if annual supply shifters in percent are increased by 2 points in dollar zone countries, the quota rent would increase by about 12 Euros per ton, other things being equal).

Table 7 .

 7 Sensitivity of the quota AIB rent to policy parameters and/or exogenous variablesThe benchmark experiment assumes that the EurolUS Dollar exchange rate increases from 0.85 in 1996-96 to 1 in 2005. Experiment (1) assumes this exchange rate remains unchanged nver the simulation period. Experiment

	Quota A!B tent in 2005 (Euros
	per tonne)

On 1 January 1995, the MFN tarifT quota was increased up to

2.553 million tons following the enlargement of the EU to Austria, Finland and Sweden.

At the Fourth Ministerial Meeting in Doha in ovember 200 l, waivers were granted regarding obligations under GATT Article 1 (permitting continued tariff preference for ACP imports) and Article XII (permitting the reseTVation of the quota C to ACP producers).

The model is detailed inGuyomard et al. (1999aGuyomard et al. ( , 1999b)). The current version of the mode! includes a larger number of exporting zones (decomposition of LA and ACP zones), as weil as time shifters in supp!y and demand equations.

The quota C \Vas open to ail suppliers in phase 1 of the transitional tariff-rate quota regime. This is no longer the case in phase 2 whete it is reserved to ACP suppliers. But even in phase l, the quota C tariffof300 Euros per ton applied on non-ACP bananas would be too high to allow non-ACP banana imports within the quota C.

ln 1996-98, the unit direct aid granted to EU producers was around 260 Euros per ton (tbree-year weighted average). lt increased significantly in 1999 (297 Euros per ton) and 2000 (383 Euros per ton). This increase is essentially due to the increase in historical reference eamings used for compensation calculation (trom 592.9 Euros per ton for the years 1993 to 1997 to 622.5 Euros per ton in 1998 and 640.3 Euros per ton in 1999 and

somewhat misleading insofar as banana exporters from the dollar zone began to increase their shipments to the EU in the years immediately preceding the original 1993 CMOB, in anticipation of the new trade regime to come. The fact remains that the transitional tariff-rate quota regime gives Chiquila Brands International a significant advantage by allocating il a "flXed" EU market share much greater than its current share. Na: Not available.

Since the original CMOB in 1993, EU producing regions have benefited from income support in the forro of direct aids. The growth rate of EU territory supply was positive over the eight-year period 1993-2000, and it is likely that this favorable trend is a consequence of the income support scheme."

Lack of reliable data does not allow evaluation of the extent EU producing regions have used the income support scheme to reduce unit production costs and improve their cost competitiveness.

Simulation resu1ts conclude that EU territory supply would expand during the transitional tariff-rate quota regime (Table 5). EU territories would supplY 797,090 tons in 2005, about 46,000 tons more than in 1996-98, at a priee 33 Euros lower than the 1996-98 average. Since we assumed that the effective priee (fOB priee per ton plus direct aid per ton) considered by EU producers remained unchanged at its 1996-98 level, this implies extra compensation of 24 million Euros in 2005 relative to 1996-98. This corresponds ta an extra compensation of 30 Euros per ton of bananas. 12 On the other hand, EU produeers would 10se from the suppression of the category B of operators.

" However, it is worth noting that quantities supplied in 1991-92 (aboU! 703,000 tons) were signifieantly higher than volumes marketed in tbe four fITst years of the CMOB (1993CMOB ( to 1996)).


domain: sdv info

text:
HUMAN EPIDIDYMAL SECRETOME AND PROTEOME: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH OTHER MAMMALS.

Jean-Louis Dacheux (1) Maya Belghazi (2) , Yves Lanson (3) , Françoise Dacheux (1) (1) UMR INRA-CNRS 6175, France-37380 Nouzilly (2) In all mammals studied, testicular spermatozoa do not develop the ability to fertilize an ovum until they transit the epididymis. In this organ, several successive differentiations occur to the gametes, particularly in the lipid and protein composition of their plasma membrane inducing important changes in the characteristics of the sperm surface. These sperm modifications occur always in the epididymal environment which regulated continuously, particularly in protein composition. Synchrony between changes in sperm and the epididymal milieu indicate that they are associated.

We present a comparative analysis, of human and several other mammals, in the sequential changes in the protein composition of the epididymal luminal fluid and in the synthetic activity of the epididymal epithelium.

The secreted proteins were determined by incubating tubules in vitro and the luminal proteins were determined using luminal fluid collected by flushing lengths of tubules, and the preparations were analysed by two dimensional electrophoresis and nano LC MS/MS.

In most species, such as in porcine, bovine, equine and rodent, epididymal activity is highly regionalized both in the secretory activity of the epithelium and the protein composition of the luminal fluid. However, in humans, this regionalization is present, but the number of sequential changes along the epididymis is reduced. Several proteins are found in all the species studied but their concentrations along the tubule are species specific.

In conclusion, in all the species studied, the protein composition of the luminal fluid changed significantly according to the region of the epididymis. However in humans, there were only minor changes in the major proteins secreted. It is suggested that specificity of protein secretion could be related to the difference between species in the location in the epididymis where the sperm become fertile.

  Service Urologie CHUR, 37000 Tours, (3) Service de Spectrométrie de Masse pour la Protéomique, INRA, F-37380 Nouzilly.


R Goebel

Elisabeth Tabone

J Rochat

E Fernandez

Biological control of the sugarcane stem borer Chilo sacchariphagus ( Lep:Pyralidae) in Réunion Island

HAL is

Introduction

Species of the hymenopteran genus Trichogramma occur worldwide on a broad range of hosts in many crops. Research on the use of this egg parasitoid in biological control started in the early 1900s. The past 20 years have seen considerable use of this parasitoid on a large scale, particularly on corn, sugarcane, cotton, fruit trees and vegetables in more than 30 countries [START_REF] Li | Worldwide use of Trichogramma for biological control on different crops : a survey[END_REF]. Today, Trichogramma spp. are the most widely used parasitoids in biological control [START_REF] King | Introduction talk[END_REF]. In sugarcane, Trichogramma spp are considered to be effective egg parasitoids of many lepidopterous stem borers [START_REF] Metcalfe | Egg parasites (Trichogramma spp.) for control of sugar cane moth borers[END_REF]Nagarkatti and Nagaradja, 1977;[START_REF] Browning | Indigenous and exotic Trichogrammatids (Hymenoptera: Trichogrammatidae) evaluated for biological control of Eoreuma loftini and Diatraea saccharalis (Lepidoptera : Pyralidae) borers on sugarcane[END_REF][START_REF] Pham | Results of utilization of Trichogramma chilonis for biological control of sugarcane stem borers. In: Trichogramma and other egg parasitoids, Ciaro (Egypt), October 4-7[END_REF].

In the Indian ocean islands, attempts to control stem borers, mainly the spotted stem borer Chilo sacchariphagus with exotic parasitoids started in the 1940s [START_REF] Greathead | A review of biological control in the Ethiopian region[END_REF]. However, variable results were obtained [START_REF] Brenière | Une tentative d'introduction Madagascar et à la Réunion de Diatraeophaga striatalis, parasite de Proceras sacchariphagus 'borer ponctué' de la canne à sucre[END_REF][START_REF] Etienne | Introduction of Eulophidae into Reunion Island for the control of sugar cane borers[END_REF]. For example, in Mauritius and Reunion Islands, introduction and large scale releases of parasitoids, mainly originating from India, did not control C. sacchariphagus, despite the successful acclimatisation of species such as Trichogramma chilonis Ishii and Cotesia flavipes Cameron (Hymenoptera, braconidae) in sugarcane fields [START_REF] Moutia | Notes sur Apanteles sesamiae Cam. Un nouveau parasitre de Sesamia calamistis Hmps. A Maurice[END_REF][START_REF] Etienne | Tentative d'implantation de deux espèce de tachinaires contre Chilo sacchariphagus à la Réunion[END_REF][START_REF] Williams | The sugar cane stem borer (Chilo sacchariphagus) in Mauritius[END_REF]. These inconsistent results showed the difficulty of acclimatization of exotic parasitoids in the specific con- In Réunion, under natural conditions, [START_REF] Vercambre | Equilibre actuel entre la canne à sucre et ses ravageurs à l'île de la Réunion[END_REF] indicated that parasitism of C. sacchariphagus eggs ranged from 80 to 90%. [START_REF] Brenière | Les Trichogrammes parasites de Proceras sacchariphagus Boj. borer de la canne à sucre à Madagascar, I : Ecologie de Trichogramma australicum Gir., parasite autochtone. Effet du renforcement de la population du parasite[END_REF] found similar results in an extensive study on T. chilonis in Madagascar.

However, in Réunion, results were based on irregular surveys and biases were introduced because visual estimations of parasitism were influenced by leaf density and the black colouration of parasitised eggs being more visible than unparasitized eggs.

To date, C. sacchariphagus remains a major pest of sugarcane in Réunion Island, causing significant yield loss, particularly in the variety R579 where 10-30 tons cane/ha can be lost [START_REF] Goebel | Caractéristiques biotiques du foreur de la canne à sucre Chilo sacchariphagus (Bojer, 1856) (Lepidoptera : Pyralidae) à l'île de la Réunion[END_REF]. Integrated protection is currently implemented on the basis of new results obtained from experiments and farm surveys. In this respect, varietal resistance appears to be an effective strategy of controlling the stemborer [START_REF] Goebel | Predation and varietal resistance as important components of integrated protection of sugarcane stemborer Chilo sacchariphagus (Bojer) (Lepidoptera: Pyralidae) in Reunion. In: Sugarcane Pest Management Strategies in the New Millennium, PG Allsopp and W Suasa-ard[END_REF].

A new biological control programme using Trichogramma spp. began in 2000. This important programme encompasses different steps from field and laboratory research to technology transfer. It includes choice of suitable species and the selection of strains to improve field performance (higher fecundity, survivorship and more efficient parasitism). The selected strain should also have qualities suitable for mass rearing. Technology transfer includes examining release density per hectare, methods of conducting releases (manual or mechanical), weather assessment during releases, timing of releases, and integration with other methods of pest or weed control and existing natural control (e.g. predation by ants). This paper examines current progress in the use of Trichogramma chilonis as a suitable biological agent to control the spotted stemborer in Réunion.

Level of parasitism by Trichogramma chilonis Ishii and the importance of egg predation

During 1996 and 1997, regular surveys were carried out at two sites on Réunion (Savannah and Sainte-Marie) on the susceptible variety R579. Fields ranging in area from 0.15 to 0.25 ha were surveyed on commercial farms. Five plots of 60 m 2 were ob-served every 10 days in each field. All the sampled plants were carefully inspected for C. sacchariphagus egg masses. Parasitism was noted when black-coloured eggs were found in egg masses (Figure 1). Observations stopped when the vegetation became too dense. In the same plots, predation was also recorded on eggs brought from laboratory cultures and placed directly in the field every week.

Results (Table 1) showed a peak of Trichogramma activity in November, December and January. This corresponds to the main period of egg laying of the stemborer and coincides with the rainy season as well as the beginning of the crop growth period (3-4 months old), when borer attack can be high. However, the percentage of egg parasitism remained half that observed by [START_REF] Vercambre | Equilibre actuel entre la canne à sucre et ses ravageurs à l'île de la Réunion[END_REF] at both sites (Table 1).

Importance of predation of eggs by ants was observed and appeared to interfere with parasitism. In the two surveyed sites (Savannah and Sainte-Marie), when sugarcane was six months old, 70% and 100% respectively of the eggs were attacked by ants [START_REF] Goebel | Caractéristiques biotiques du foreur de la canne à sucre Chilo sacchariphagus (Bojer, 1856) (Lepidoptera : Pyralidae) à l'île de la Réunion[END_REF]. Trap catches and regular observations in the plots revealed that Pheidole megacephala F. (Hymenoptera : formicidae) was the major predatory species. This result shows the importance of timing of releases which must take place before ant predation occurs in the fields. To ensure the highest efficiency, the releases of Trichogramma should be conducted during the window period of low predation by ants.

Revised programme with Trichogramma spp.

The first phase of the new programme was to survey egg parasitoids in the sugarcane agrosystem (Figure 2). Trichogramma was collected in nine of the ten sites (Figure 2). However, the mean percentage parasitism of Galleria eggs was surprisingly low (0-3%) compared with previous results from direct counts of C. sacchariphagus eggs [START_REF] Goebel | Caractéristiques biotiques du foreur de la canne à sucre Chilo sacchariphagus (Bojer, 1856) (Lepidoptera : Pyralidae) à l'île de la Réunion[END_REF]. However, G. mellonella eggs may be less attractive than those of C. sacchariphagus in the field, underestimating parasitoid efficacy. In future field experiments, only C. sacchariphagus eggs will be used.

Molecular and morphological characterisation of Trichogramma spp.

Trichogramma species collected in the fields were identified by the molecular means and morphological traits.

Molecular identification.

For molecular studies of insects several methods are available (Isoenzymes, RFLP, RAPD, etc.). Here the Random Amplified Polymorphic DNA (RAPD) technique is applied. It allows the differentiation of species by comparison of molecular patterns of the individuals, and their identification when the pattern matches the pattern of reference species. Results in Figure 3 show that all strains from different localities on Réunion have the same pattern, compared with other Trichogramma strains from INRA. This method is also used to monitor quality of the Trichogramma produced in industrial processes.

Morphological characterisation. This method is usually used for the identification of known species and the description of new species. It requires the examination of male genitalia [START_REF] Voegelé | Caractérisation morphologique des groupes et espèces du genre Trichogramma Westwood[END_REF][START_REF] Pinto | Systematics of the Trichogrammatidae with emphasis on Trichogramma[END_REF]) (Figure 4). Morphometric criteria (e.g. length of tibia, length of antennal hair) as well as characteristics such as the sex ratio of the population, the colour and the general aspect of the individuals can also be used to complete or to confirm the identification.

On the basis of these methods, all the examined strains from Réunion were determined as T. chilonis (Figures 3 and4). All biotypes identified by INRA will be assessed locally for parasitism and the most suitable one will be mass reared for inundative releases in the field.

Future Trichogramma research and development

In the context of Reunion, where numerous exotic parasitoids were introduced and released, different steps for the use of a suitable strain of Trichogramma are required. Consequently, research on Trichogramma strains associated with biology and population dynamics is particularly important.

The inventory of egg parasitoids in sugarcane will continue in 2001 at different ecological sites. Simultaneously, studies on population dynamics of T. chilonis will commence. For these experiments parasitoids will be collected, preferably with C. sacchariphagus eggs rather than G. mellonella eggs for reasons previously stated. Moreover, C. sacchariphagus eggs are more resistant to field conditions than eggs of the factitious host and consequently remain suitable and attractive for longer during the exposure period.

Further studies on population dynamics of T. chilonis will focus on the susceptible variety R579, at two different sites, where numerous studies have already been done. The period of trapping will be completed for all ages of cane and the best trapping system will be used.

The main objective of this study will be to investigate the response of T. chilonis to different densities of C. sacchariphagus eggs (density-dependence). This information is essential to determine the ability of T. chilonis to control the borer in the field. In addition, at each site, all the ecological parameters will be recorded to investigate their impact on population dynamics of insects.

S t-D en is S t-P ierre Predation will be monitored to confirm the results obtained in 1996/97 [START_REF] Goebel | Caractéristiques biotiques du foreur de la canne à sucre Chilo sacchariphagus (Bojer, 1856) (Lepidoptera : Pyralidae) à l'île de la Réunion[END_REF]. The presence of Pheidole megacephala must be taken into account in the timing of Trichogramma releases. This natural control could even be used to improve overall control of C. sacchariphagus.

The technology for mass rearing of Galleria moths to produce high quality Trichogramma has already been transferred to a professional organisation, which has many contacts with the farmers. This method will need to be improved, particularly in the case of mass releases (possibly for a future commercial use). Nevertheless, small scale production of Trichogramma will allow the testing of different factors linked to the methods of release, quantity of Trichogramma/ha, time of releases, packaging of the parasitoids, and indicators to assess efficacy of the releases. These practical studies will be conducted in partnership with farmers.

  The parasitoids were collected in the field, from May to December 2000, at 10 sites selected around the island to get a wide range of climatic and cropping conditions. At each site, 8 plots about 200 eggs of the greater wax moth Galleria mellonella (Lepidoptera, Pyralidae), a factitious host of Trichogramma, or about 75 eggs of C. sacchariphagus, were placed in the field. Eggtraps were renewed weekly with fresh eggs. Each Trichogramma strain collected from different geographic areas was reared separately and kept in the laboratory as original material for different bionomics studies. A sample was sent to INRA, for specific determination (collaboration with B. Pintureau, INRA-Lyon and F. Vanlerberghe, INRA-Antibes) .

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. Trichogramma chilonis Ishii (from Williams, 1983) and parasitized eggs of Chilo sacchariphagus.

Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. Localities on Reunion island of the 10 sites where egg parasitoids of C. sacchariphagus have been trapped and observed parasitism rates (pie charts -the size of the circles is proportional to sampling intensity).

Figure 3 .

 3 Figure 3. Molecular pattern of 10 strains of Trichogramma collected in sugarcane (2000): electrophoresis of amplified DNA fragments obtained with the primer Bioprob ® N7. R : standard pattern of T. chilonis from Réunion, A -J : pattern of tested individuals collected from field. Sch. INRA : different strains of Trichogramma spp. from INRA-Valbonne ; Sp ref. : other reference species (Process and photograph by P. Chavigny, INRA-Antibes).

Figure 4 .

 4 Figure 4. Aspect of genital ampoulae of T. chilonis male (photograph by E Fernandez/B Pintureau).

  BIOLOGICAL CONTROL OF THE SUGARCANE STEM BORER CHILO SACCHARIPHAGUS (LEP: PYRALIDAE) IN RÉUNION ISLAND: CURRENT AND FUTURE STUDIES ON THE USE OF TRICHOGRAMMA SPP.

	R GOEBEL 1 , E TABONE 2 , J ROCHAT 3 AND E FERNANDEZ 3
	1 South African Sugar Association Experiment Station, Private Bag X02, Mount Edgecombe 4300, South Africa
	2 INRA, Entomologie et Lutte biologique, 37 Bd du Cap, 06606 Antibes, France
	3 CIRAD, laboratoire d'entomologie, 97408 Saint-Denis messageries, cedex 9, Réunion, France
	ditions of islands with patchy local climates, such as Reunion.
	Paradoxically during these years of mass-releases, there was a
	lack of ecological studies on C. sacchariphagus and its indig-
	enous parasitoids and predators. Moreover, no accurate infor-
	mation is available concerning the parasitisation rate of borer
	eggs by Trichogramma species and other egg parasitoids.

Table 1 . Percentage of C. sacchariphagus eggs parasitized by Trichogramma spp. in 1996/97 at two different sites.

 1

			Sainte-Marie			Savannah
	Months (age of crop)	No. egg masses	No. eggs	% parasitism per egg mass	No. egg masses	No.e ggs	% parasitism per egg mass
	Sept-96 (2)	-	-	-	2	44	13,1
	Oct-96 (3)	15	371	35,8	7	188	16,3
	Nov-96 (4)	15	372	49,4	13	309	38,2
	Dec-96 (5)	17	390	39, 2	17	384	40,5
	Jan-97 (6)	24	549	40,1	8	198	24,3
	Feb-97 (7)	7	163	30,3	3	80	33,3
	Mar-97 (8)	4	92	31,8	4	105	20,3
	Apr-97 (9)	3	72	0	1	28	0
	Total	85	2009	38,2	56	1326	32,4
	Counting periods : Sainte-Marie: 9/10/96-29/04/97; Savannah: 26/09/96-15/04/97

Aknowledgments

The authors wish to thank the CIRAD staff who have contributed to the current Trichogramma programme, particularly Abdoul Ruttee, Jean-Marie Bègue and Marie-Charlyne Gauvin. The authors are also grateful to the scientists and the technicians of INRA for their involvement, specially Nathalie Lezcano. The work is funded by the Conseil Général de la Réunion and Europe-FEOGA (Fond Européen d'Orientation et de Garantie Agricole).