Claire Bénit-Gbaffou

Spatial justice and the poor's access to urban resources in post-apartheid Johannesburg. Redistributive policies, participatory democracy and clientelist practices in urban governance

Introduction

Spatial injustice has been considered to have two cardinal forms [START_REF] Marcuse | Searching for the Just City-an introduction[END_REF])-the confinement of any group to a limited space (segregation) and the unequal allocation of resources over space. Interestingly, planning for spatial justice [START_REF] Young | Justice and the politics of difference[END_REF][START_REF] Harvey | Social Justice, Postmodernism and the City[END_REF][START_REF] Fraser | Redistribution or recognition[END_REF][START_REF] Fainstein | Planning and the just city[END_REF]) puts more emphasis on the political aspect of injustice, and contrasts two main approaches that are both necessary to achieve spatial justice: a redistributive dimension (that can be understood as addressing the two capital forms of injustice-because it allows for de-segregation by promoting access to housing for the poorest; and because it can focus on a broad distribution and fair access to urban resources); and what can be called a procedural dimension, emphasizing access to decisionmaking and recognition in urban governance. The articulation between these two dimensions of spatial justice (redistributive and procedural) is often forgotten, as if one could assume that they are always going in the same direction [START_REF] Visser | Spatialities of Social Justice: Reflections on South African Cities[END_REF][START_REF] Bénit-Gbaffou | La difficile définition de la justice spatiale à Johannesburg: un processus de démocratie participative?[END_REF]. Some authors however stress the potential contradictions between these two dimensions of spatial justice-when community participation conflict with the objectives of redistribution, for instance [START_REF] Fainstein | Planning and the just city[END_REF]. This article tries to address this gap by focusing on some of the articulation between the two dimensions of spatial justice, looking at the poor's ways of accessing urban resources in post-apartheid Johannesburg, and developing around the notion of "clientelism."

Firstly, it is useful to draw the broad context in which spatial justice can be understood in postapartheid Johannesburg. Paradoxically in a post-apartheid city, the way local government conceives the achievement of "a just city" in Johannesburg is not primarily defined in spatial terms, at least no longer primarily. The immediate aftermath of the 1994's discard of the apartheid regime was the place for intense debates on the apartheid city's unequal, segregated and inefficient urban structures, and on the need to spatially "restructure" the city through a number of integrated housing programmes and a cap on urban sprawl fuelling the housing-jobs spatial mismatch. However, with the shift to growth oriented strategies at the national level (GEAR) in 1997, with the financial crisis of the City of Johannesburg at the end of the 1990s and the subsequent adoption of urban new management principles [START_REF] Watson | Metropolitan Planning in Cape Town under Political Transition[END_REF], this spatial component seems to have been put aside as the role of the State in urban policies was being redefined. Currently, the attempt of the City to build a "World Class African Cities for All" seems to take two dominant dimensions: a redistributive (but a-spatial) dimension, and a participatory (but limited) dimension.

Published in Dufaux F, Philifert P (eds), 2013, Justice Spatiale et Politiques Territoriales. Presses Universitaires de Nanterre, pp. 187-202.

The City of Johannesburg has indeed an important redistributive policy, even though disconnected from the city's major agenda of urban growth and international competition-both agendas led thanks to a powerful metropolitan council (political integration of former black and white local authorities). It provides a free package of water (6Kl) and electricity (50Kw) for all, in an attempt to guarantee access to basic services to the poorest. This policy is not spatially defined, even if it has spatially differentiated effects1 . The provision of public housing to lower-income households, although more a provincial prerogative than a metropolitan one, can also be understood as a part of this redistributive urban policy. After a decade of massive delivery on the outskirts of the City, some attention seems to be given to the spatial location of such projects (as manifested in the model Cosmo City project): but the instruments for a land policy conducive to integrated and well-located projects are still missing.

The participatory dimension of Johannesburg's local democracy is important rhetorically, in line with the legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle where the civics2 were crucial; and in line with global "good governance" principles3 giving a strong place to community participation in urban governance. Community participation is organised principally at the ward level, around the figure of the ward councillor (who is supposed to be available for daily interaction with his/her constituency; and to liaise with a ward committee elected by the local voters). However, the councillor has both limited powers and limited accountability to the voters, for three main reasons (Bénit-Gbaffou 2008):

-a dominant party system (the ANC is not really challenged politically at the metropolitan level);

-a centralised Council (decisions are made by the mayor and his nominated, ANC mayoral committee);

-a de-spatialised structuration of council (councillors stand for a thematic portfolio like housing, not for their ward, in Council).

The limited power of councillors and the absence of territorial representation in Council stems from a political decision to limit infra-metropolitan representation and decentralisation. This is a response to the fear of recreating the apartheid urban governance structure (where coexisted racially separated municipalities). It is also a political device to avoid giving opposition parties (like the Democratic Alliance) a platform-that could only be achievable at the infra-metropolitan level); and to side line oppositional residents' movements (both from the right-NIMBYsm against desegregation policies; and from the left-social movements' opposition to the current growth agenda). As a consequence, institutional participation is quite dysfunctional and residents mostly participate through extrainstitutional channels (protests, riots, law suits).

As apparent in this brief summary, there is a disconnection between the two dimensions of spatial justice policies and processes, as participatory mechanisms have limited bearings on a technocratically defined and a-spatial redistributive agenda (not to say on the overall metropolitan growth strategy).

There is also a clear attempt from the municipality of Johannesburg to avoid territorial representation and mobilisation (that would equate, due to the still segregated structure of the city, to racial Published in Dufaux F, Philifert P (eds), 2013, Justice Spatiale et Politiques Territoriales. Presses Universitaires de Nanterre, pp. 187-202.

representation and mobilisation). Does it mean that "spatial justice" is an irrelevant concept in postapartheid Johannesburg or at least in its policy, and that one should rather study the dimensions of social justice in current urban governance and policies? I argue that although the spatiality of urban policy geared towards justice is not central, it still has some importance in the definition and negotiation of the public good (or at least public goods).

I will start by presenting two illustrations of how these two dimensions of social/spatial justice come together in the local and contested implementation of urban policies; and how the spatial dimension plays an important role therein.

Two stories

In Kliptown (Soweto), a major housing programme is being developed: about 7 000 public houses are being built (5 500 RDP or serviced sites; 1 500 rental), in an area where about 40.000 persons live in informal settlements. There are debates and conflicts4 over the criteria for housing allocation (given the fact there are not enough houses for all households currently living in informal settlements).

Conflicts are all the more erupting as the public criteria for housing allocation are unclear and full of internal contradictions.

-At the State and Provincial level, there are two main criteria for public housing allocation to eligible households5 .

The first is the registration on the housing list (often called "housing waiting list")-with a priority given to the households having being waiting for the longest time (principle of "first come first served").

The second, equally at this level, is a priority given to families living in life-threatening conditions or undergoing a crisis of any sort.

These two criteria, which reflect two competing legitimacies, can be at odds but there seem to be no clear criteria allocating houses for the first and for the second.

-At the metropolitan level, other elements come into play as far as the allocation of public housing is concerned6 .

Firstly, there is a de facto agreement (very unclear though) that local residents have a say on the allocation of public houses being built in their vicinity. In many cases, local communities are being displaced and their dwelling demolished for the development to take place: the housing allocation process therefore takes into account this local or community "right" to the houses being delivered.

This "priority to local communities" in housing allocation plays an important role in the process, in which local councillors have a crucial role to play. No matter how legitimate it is, it often conflicts with the two previous criteria or legitimacies mentioned above. Although not clearly stated in any text, the "priority to local communities" is encouraged by the whole philosophy of community/ local participation. It is furthermore an easier criteria to implement than the two previous ones (and a legitimacy more difficult to discard), as local communities are directly aware and affected by the new housing developments-unlike registered individuals on a housing list (scattered in the metropolitan area) or families living under life-threatening conditions (often living far away from the project). But

Published in Dufaux F, Philifert P (eds), 2013, Justice Spatiale et Politiques Territoriales. Presses Universitaires de Nanterre, pp. 187-202.

the coexistence of the three different allocation criteria/legitimacies, without clear articulation, often lead to conflicts-when local communities see "outsiders" benefit from public housing built in "their" environment, conflict is rife.

Secondly, technical aspects of housing delivery (especially when they require demolition of existing structures, for instance informal settlements) might impact the order and therefore the nature of the allocation process7 . This has less to do with an insider/outsider conflict as the previous criteria mentioned; but this involves internal community divisions and competition that often lead to the fragmentation of local communities and the definition of insiders/outsiders within the neighbourhood8 .

Thirdly, new metropolitan policies stress the need to develop "inclusive housing" policies (in line with Breaking New Ground, the 2004 national housing strategy). In an attempt to avoid creating ghettos or pockets of poverty, public housing projects always include middle-range housing (lower middle-class groups) that also benefit from public housing subsidies. This often means that houses built in a specific project are not all targeted at lower-income households, and often benefit residents considered as "outsiders" to the community. In July 2007, riots erupted in Kliptown, after many attempts to protest, liaise with the municipality and hand over memoranda to the Mayor and his mayoral committee: the participants were threatening to invade houses built on the golf course and requesting that houses built in Kliptown be "for the people of Kliptown."9 Beyond stories of corruption and nepotism from local councillors and existing civics under accusation in these protests10 , beyond difficulties in management of a large and complex project (Bénit-Gbaffou 2008), beyond the lack of understanding about the (very visible) delivered rental units being unaffordable for most Kliptown residents, it is important to stress that such frustration may emerge of contradictory understanding of what is just, in terms of access to public resource-here housing. Revealing is the Housing MMC's statement: "The townhouses have been built for you. However, you will need to follow a certain procedure in order to get access." 11 The lack of clarity on the process, even in the official legislation itself, is leading both to flexibility (local negotiation, power games) and to confusion and conflict (lack of understanding, frustration). The process of engagement between local government (in its multiple agencies and actors), official representative structures (the Greater Kliptown development Forum) and contesting civics (Anti-Privatisation Forum) is still under way so as to explain and maybe negotiate the process of houses allocation in Kliptown.

What does this case study show? Is it a local process of definition of justice, leading to a compromise in terms of resource sharing, in a process of engagement with contesting civics? Is the multiplicity of allocation criteria and competing legitimacies allowing for flexibility and negotiation, enhancing a constructive and processual definition of justice (following Harvey's famous 1992 text on social justice postmodernism and the city), rather than a conception of justice defined abstractly and a priori? I have two reservations on this interpretation. Firstly, this configuration opens the way for negotiations over the allocation of (too) scarce resources, and is therefore divisive more than constructive for local communities. Negotiations (more or less peaceful) can only occur at the implementation phase, not at the policy making phase: they deal with who will get the houses, not on the number and type of houses built. To quote Luke Sinwell, who did a similar study on Alexandra (2008), it is a "zero-sum game" whereby if one residents group wins it is necessarily at the expense of the other one. Secondly, lack of clarity on allocation criteria may indeed allow any kind of civic or residents group to claim its legitimacy and enter the process. However, this means that access to public housing depends on an individual's affiliation to a (powerful) civic-no longer on his/her status as urban citizen: depending on his/her loyalty and involvement in the civic, his/her access to public housing will be granted. This certainly is a form of clientelism that raises issues of democratic accountability; the question is-is it better than nothing in terms of accessing urban resources (as argued by Gay 1998)?

The second case study I would like to present concerns an inner city derelict neighbourhood, Bertrams, which is currently undergoing an urban regeneration process to get the city ready for the 2010 Soccer World Cup (as the area is neighbouring Ellis Park Stadium, one of the venues selected for the Cup). The main public intervention here is about evictions-getting rid of derelict or squatted building (named "bad buildings" or "sinkholes") in order to regain control over public space (also affected by a high level of insecurity). Bertrams, a transient neighbourhood (point of entry for national and international migrants to the city), appears a very fragmented society; various civics have adopted different strategies to resist eviction.

Published in Dufaux F, Philifert P (eds), 2013, Justice Spatiale et Politiques Territoriales. Presses Universitaires de Nanterre, pp. 187-202.

1. In a place nicknamed "the seventeen houses," located very close to the stadium, former antiapartheid activists have built strong internal social links and have kept high profile ANC political networks. This saved them in 1995 (during Rugby World Cup) where their houses were already threatened of demolition; but this was not enough for 2010. This group of residents therefore called the Center for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), a legal NGO who has been successful in several lawsuits against the City, and has in particular compelled it to provide alternative accommodation if it wants to carry on evictions. CALS has started threatening the City of legal action; but high rank ANC members of Council have negotiated with the residents, for them to drop the lawsuit (and CALS) and the houses will be spared. The residents have agreed, and they have dropped CALS, now accusing it of being "anti-ANC" and "destroying the nation" (by opposing government). They have eventually obtained their right to stay in their houses thanks to a subtle balance of threat and political networks.

Bertrams, Johannesburg, 2008. © Claire Bénit-Gbaffou.View of the Seventeen Houses (with the Stadium lights in the background), as public works have started to widen the road for 2010 Soccer World Cup.

2. Other civics are not as powerful. One, the Bertrams Community Forum, has emerged from a block (called the "Priority Block") bought by the city and deemed to be demolished (for private development). Residents are proposed relocation (thanks to CALS broader struggle) in tiny but affordable rental rooms, however considered by the City to be only "temporary shelters." The Forum is not focused on fighting against eviction, but rather on obtaining contracts in the construction to be expected from urban regeneration. As this is depending on the City to have its list of members enrolled (or at least considered) in the contract allocation, this diminishes the Forum's capacity to criticise the relocation policy.12 3. A third civic, SANCO, usually focusing on housing issues, is equally limited in its ability to challenge ANC policies. It is the liaison chosen by the City to distribute food parcels to local residents (on the pretext it has a good knowledge of social needs locally; from the City's point of view, it is also an easy way to side-line the opposition party local councillor in the distribution of public resource). If SANCO criticises the ANC growth agenda, it loses its resource and its constituency. If a member of SANCO criticises the civic or its policies or practices, this member risks of being deprived of access to these resources (here food parcels). 13What do these examples show? Civics are sometimes able to bargain local arrangements, but most are politically manipulated (sedated and caught in clientelist logics), if not themselves manipulating the residents. CALS' action has had some impact on urban policies, as blank evictions are put on hold, and the city is now compelled to provide affordable alternative accommodation; but it does so in a reluctant manner, providing temporary shelters for an undetermined period of time. The city, as was illustrated previously with the issue of public housing allocation, often lacks of clarity on the rules of the game (who gets what public resources, in terms of food parcels, contracts, houses to be saved or demolished, etc.). This lack of clarity might emanate from pragmatism in the face of the scarcity of public resources for the poor-too few to be distributed universally or even to means-tested groups14 . It opens the door to local negotiation and political clientelism-to some flexibility but also to a great deal of inequality between well connected individuals or groups and the others. Competition between groups for access to resources is the key, rather than a joint (even if conflictual) platform to negotiate and define "the public good" for the area. The City might be aggravating this competition, using existing fragmentation in a "divide and rule" strategy, rather than encouraging a joint platform for these competing (but similar) interests to find a collective understanding and agreement. This strategy is rather successful, leading to the sedation of civic movements or to tacit arrangements with the most powerful ones, so as to prevent a broader anti-eviction front to emerge. In any case the growth agenda is not questioned [START_REF] Logan | Urban Fortunes: the Political Economy of Place[END_REF].

Based on these two case studies, I would like to ask two questions on the nature and the place of "spatial justice" in contemporary urban governance.

Is "flexible" urban governance good news for spatial justice?

Urban governance is led, at least in the implementation phase of projects or policies, through more or less informal, local arrangements. Some call this "flexible governance" (Bénit-Gbaffou, Morange 2008), others "territorialisation of public action" [START_REF] Jaglin | Territorialisation des espaces urbanisés dans les grandes villes: une confrontation Nord/Sud[END_REF]-meaning that the nature of public policies and instruments vary in space and time. What are the consequences of this form of governance in terms of spatial justice?

"Flexible governance" and "territorialised public action" can be understood as a management or governance tool providing local governments with flexibility and adaptability to local needs-a procedural conception of policy or at least policy implementation, in order to make it more sustaina-Published in Dufaux F, Philifert P (eds), 2013, Justice Spatiale et Politiques Territoriales. Presses Universitaires de Nanterre, pp. 187-202.

ble. This form of governance seems to be in line with the procedural dimension of spatial justice, as embracing the process of constructing a joint, negotiated, locally situated vision of what is "just," and of integrating conflict and power relations in the very definition of this compromise. However, this understanding is not necessarily relevant, as this flexible way of governing cities has important impacts in aggravating spatial and social divisions.

Firstly, and this is what the case studies have been illustrating, it has a strong potential to divide urban policies spatially, since issues are negotiated locally and lack visibility at the neighbourhood and at the city scale. The nature and the outcomes of this negotiation depend on the political resources of local movements, obviously uneven accross space and even within a given area. Moreover, a successful local negotiation, because of its lack of visibility, cannot set an example or a culture that can be used by other communities (as can a judiciary decision for instance). This has serious consequences as the construction of a collective political culture (at a neighbourhood, city, regional or national scale) is often seen as a crucial element in terms of political resources for mobilisation [START_REF] Tarrow | Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics[END_REF].

Secondly, this form of governance divides urban policies into strategies (not, or seldom, debated) and implementation or allocation (given for debate to divided communities). This allows avoiding major policy orientations to be discussed (and in particular the extent and nature of redistributive policies), and channels debates towards either highly divisive issues (distribution of too scarce resources) or irrelevant ones (how will the furniture of evicted households be moved out of the place).

Maybe even more importantly, this form of governance allows for a blurring of polical responsibility and democratic accountability. Firstly, public stakeholders are fragmented in their mode of action and level of responsibility, and this leads to a high level of opacity on the rules of allocation of public resources that is conducive to clientelism and corruption [START_REF] Wilkinson | Explaining changing patterns of party-voter linkages in India[END_REF]. Secondly, the most powerful way residents can contest urban policies is through the justice system-as lawsuits seems to be the most efficient instrument for social movements. This means of action is praised uncritically since the very progressive South African Constitution offers a backing for the poor's claims, and South African Judges are generally progressive in their judgements a decade after the demise of the apartheid regime. But this might change, and the fact judges are not democratically elected needs to be stressed when looking at accountability and decision-making in terms of urban governance.

Finally, this procedural/local arrangement form of public policy is giving local civics an important and sometimes debatable power in the allocation of resources at the neighbourhood level, which creates a form of clientelism not conducive to any form of accountability (unlike some forms of clientelism led by elected representatives-see below, second point). Unlike local councillors indeed, civic leaders are not elected but by the members of the civic itself; and, when being side-lined or excluded in the access to resources, an individual has fewer ways to contest a local civic than an elected councillor. In other words, if it is necessary for access to resource to have good personal relationships with people in power, it seems less damaging for democratic accountability that this powerful individual is a councillor (that can be removed from office or defeated in elections) than if it is a local notable or a civic leader or both. Lisa Brawley has been arguing for a renewed form of accountability in contemporary urban governance (2008), stressing the increasing privatisation of urban management (mainly referring to city improvement districts). Similarly, it is not sure that the implication of community organisations at all level of management of public resources would lead to increased accountability. Although progressive literature on participation argues, in a post-modern context, that more participation means more democracy and accountability, these case studies (and others-Staniland 2008;[START_REF] Sinwell | Participation as popular agency: the limitation and possibilities for transforming development in the Alexandra Renewal Project[END_REF] tend to show that it is not the case for all forms of participation. What does the theoretical and practical proximity between local democracy and clientelism teach us on spatial justice?

The second important point is about the fine line between local democracy and clientelism, as far as accountability is concerned. It is important to stress it as local democracy is often uncritically seen as conducive to a greater spatial justice (it is one of its dimensions); and clientelism as the epitome of "unjust" distribution of resources (and here we are considering it in its territorial and local dimension).

I am adopting a non-normative view of clientelism, which I define as the exchange of public goods for votes or political support. I follow here [START_REF] Kitschelt | Citizens-politicians linkages: an introduction[END_REF] in arguing that there is not a difference in nature, but rather a difference in gradient (a continuum) between democratic and clientelist practices, both relying on exchange of public goods against votes. What differs is --the type of goods proposed (individual or club or collective goods in clientelism/collective or universal goods in democratic governance);

--the way it is offered (directly, with an ability to control the beneficiaries' vote and support, in the former; or indirectly, through expectations-you propose a policy for a constituency and expect it to vote according to its interest, in the latter);

--the clarity or transparency of the allocation criteria (absent in the former, important in the latter).

There is an even closer proximity between clientelism and local democracy (in its two dimensions of decentralisation and participation). Clientelism, decentralisation and participation have in common the following features:

--they operate on the basis that spatial proximity (the local scale) can make the state more accessible to citizens;

--having the state "close" to the people allows for greater flexibility and adaptability of policies to local specific needs;

--this proximity can lead to a personalisation of the state (not a distant and anonymous apparatus but a state that is personified by local figures-a more humane and "caring" state).

These features are shared by both local democracy and clientelism, even if they are valued differently (positively for the former, negatively for the latter). And I here wish to debate Purcell's argument (2006) that the local scale does not have intrinsic qualities in terms of the nature of democracy: fair enough, but it has specific potentialities based on spatial proximity-like this ability for personal relationships with representatives of the state. The fact local democracy shares this feature with clientelism shows the ambiguities of the former-calling for a "caring" state in opposition to the weberian idea of construction and operation of a modern state (based on rights and not on networks or personal relationships). This "caring state" or "caring city" is often seen as a positive step towards a broader spatial justice (see Greta Goldberg quoted by Marcuse 2008)-allowed by more local scales of urban governance. However the fine line with forms of clientelism (that can be-not necessarilyun-democratic and un-just) is not really thought of. More generally, clientelist practices are probably consubstantial to local democracy, even if not named so.

Conclusion on some theoretical gaps in the analysis of spatial justice

As conclusive remarks, I would like to stress at least three theoretical gaps in the reflexion on spatial justice, which this article has helped identify.

Published in Dufaux F, Philifert P (eds), 2013, Justice Spatiale et Politiques Territoriales. Presses Universitaires de Nanterre, pp. 187-202.

1. On the definition of redistributive justice after the post-modernist critique (that no measurement or definition of distributional justice is absolute or neutral; that justice is a relative concept since it is eminently a constructed object). Harvey for instance tries to address it by providing narratives and analyses of how different agents have different and competing conceptions of what is "just" in specific urban policies-and how a conception of justice could potentially be built by the confrontation and compromises between their different understanding. It is not clear however, and Harvey stresses it in his text, who can promote, defend, support redistributive policies-as each agent is locally grounded or legitimised by specific interests, metro-wide interests being the most difficult to represent. As suggested by the case studies presented here, it is not sure that social movements can find the legitimacy and power to bring the voice of the poor in the forefront of urban policies; nor can lawsuits be sufficient to influence policies in the long term (there is a need to look, as argued by [START_REF] Fainstein | Planning and the just city[END_REF], at the outcomes of the processes of defining justice locally).

2. A second gap lies in the timid analysis so far of social movements and participation as potentially undemocratic (and not only when they are captured by conservative groups)-because of the question of accountability, and their practices of clientelism (but without vote). Participatory democracy, which constitutes theoretically the procedural dimension of social/spatial justice (especially at the local level where it relies on-as well as it constructs-a feeling of shared belonging to a place) is not always and necessarily in practice conducive to spatial justice. This paper is a call for a more critical look at local participation and some research on the conditions in which it is conducive to spatial justice.

3. Finally, following [START_REF] Murray | Political parties and the city: some thoughts on the low profile of partisan organisations and mobilisation in urban political theory[END_REF], there is a need to include party politics in these interrogations on urban governance and spatial justice. Party politics are often discredited for a number of reasons, but its presence, at least in cities of the South, is crucial to understand local democracy, access to resources and eventually spatial justice in both of its dimensions.

Claire Bénit-Gbaffou University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

  Published in Dufaux F, Philifert P (eds), 2013, Justice Spatiale et Politiques Territoriales. Presses Universitaires de Nanterre, pp. 187-202. Kliptown, Soweto, 2006. © Claire Bénit-Gbaffou. Families settle in Joshco rental housing, under police surveillance.

It is the case in Kliptown, where 500 rental units have already been built by Joshco (Johannesburg Social Housing Company), for residents that are mostly not from Kliptown nor from the housing waiting list neither "families living in crisis."

  Published in Dufaux F, Philifert P (eds), 2013, Justice Spatiale et Politiques Territoriales. Presses Universitaires de Nanterre, pp. 187-202.

  Published in Dufaux F, Philifert P (eds), 2013, Justice Spatiale et Politiques Territoriales. Presses Universitaires de Nanterre, pp. 187-202.

In particular in inner city areas, where the importance of tenants and absentee owners make access to free basic services difficult (as it is granted to the dwelling's owner, not to its residents).

Residents associations in low-income areas: they developed in the 1980s in particular in opposition to the apartheid regime (as political parties were forbidden) and were organised from the street level to the national scale.

"Good governance" is an ideology developed by the World Bank and promoted in many African countriesencouraging the State to withdraw from direct intervention into society and to partner with non-State actors in decision-making (in particular business and civil society). The concept of "governance" is understood here as a way of governing that includes non-State actors in public decision-making (with no normative statement on the role of the State neither in the process nor on the balance existing or expected between the various actors).

See "The Struggle for Housing in Kliptown." Anti-Privatisation Forum, Press Release, 13 August, 2007 (http://apf.org.za/spip.php?article200&lang=en).

Earning less that R3.500 a month, being a legal South African resident, etc

Municipalities are expected to lead the allocation/implementation phase in the public housing process (where the National and Provincial levels of Government decide on housing projects to be funded, set up technical requirement and provide funding).

For instance, in Alexandra township, the necessity to demolish existing structures in order to build new ones lead the City to adopt a "block by block" approach, and therefore to relocate households into new houses according to this approach, and not to existing housing list or previous agreement with communities[START_REF] Sinwell | Participation as popular agency: the limitation and possibilities for transforming development in the Alexandra Renewal Project[END_REF]).

The recent "xenophobic events" that occurred in particular in Alexandra township in May 2008, where many (but not enough for everybody) public houses are being built and allocated, were partly triggered by the perception that "foreigners" (in fact, South African citizens from foreign origin) were allocated the houses. In a context of competition, they were defined as "outsiders," as happened many times in Alexandra's history.

Madumo, Lesego. "Drive to provide Kliptown houses." City of Johannesburg, 21 August, 2007 (http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1495&Itemid=204).

See "The Struggle for Housing in Kliptown." op. cit.

Madumo, Lesego. "Drive to provide Kliptown houses." op. cit.

There is more to this as apparently the Forum's leader has been paid for each family relocated to the temporary accommodation. The City has made this clear when it has become apparent that this leader had brought families in that were not from the Priority Block, in order to get more money for himself.

SANCO has moreover been involved in a scam-some leaders have been said to ask money from members in exchange for access to public housing which never materialized.

For instance, if there are about 20 temporary building contract linked to an urban project (as is the case in the Bertrams story), what is the fairest procedure for councilors to allocate these contracts, in an area of high unemployment? Clearly a general tender for the whole neighborhood is disproportionate and irrelevant.


Xiaohan Wu

Mario El Kazzi

Dr Claire Villevieille
email: claire.villevieille@psi.ch

Surface and morphological investigation of the electrode/electrolyte properties in an all-solid-state battery using a Li 2 S-P 2 S 5 solid electrolyte

Keywords: All-solid-state batteries, solid electrolyte, sulfides, Li4Ti5O12, X-ray photoemission spectroscopy

All-solid-state lithium-ion batteries represent a promising battery technology thanks to the replacement of the volatile and flammable state-of-the-art liquid electrolyte by a solid electrolyte. Despite the recent progress in the synthesis of sulfide based solid electrolyte with high ionic conductivity, little is known about the interface reactivity of the solid electrolyte with electrode materials. In this study, we synthesized and characterized an amorphous solid electrolyte with the nominal composition (Li2S)3(P2S5). We assessed the feasibility of using this electrolyte at the laboratory scale, and we discuss the potential challenges that govern its electrochemical performance. Galvanostatic cycling and rate performance measurements were conducted using lithium titanium oxide (Li4Ti5O12) as the negative electrode material. The electrochemical measurements were performed using two different counter electrodes, namely Li metal and an InLix alloy. The alloy counter electrode suppressed the formation of lithium dendrites, resulting in increased cycling stability and cell safety. Post mortem X-ray photoemission spectroscopy measurements reveal the reactivity of the solid electrolyte Li3PS4 with the Li4Ti5O12, lithium metal, and InLix alloy.

Introduction

High energy and power densities, environment-friendliness, and safety during user operation are just a few of the many criteria required for the next generation of electrochemical energy storage devices. Lithium-ion batteries offer superior specific energy densities compared to other battery chemistries. However, their cost and, more importantly, safety problems raise concerns regarding the use of lithium-ion batteries for mid-to large-scale applications, such as for electric vehicles. All-solid-state lithium-ion batteries (SLiB) are an attractive alternative because the volatile, flammable liquid electrolyte is replaced by a safer solid electrolyte. [1] Historically, the application of SLiBs has been limited, mainly because of the slow ion transport through the solid electrolyte and the resultant low power density of the battery. Recently, sulfide-based superionic conductors (e.g., Li10Ge2PS12 (LGPS) and Li9.54Si1.74P1.44S11.7Cl0.3) that have conductivities close to those of organic electrolytes have been discovered. [2,3] In addition, solid electrolytes are considered single-ion conductors with lithium ion transference number close to unity. [4] Thus, no polarization due to concentration gradients is expected to occur in SLiBs. Given these properties, the power density of SLiB is no longer limited by the bulk solid electrolyte material. The electrolyte stability is another critical parameter necessary to ensure the long-term operation of the SLiB. Theoretically, sulfide-based electrolytes have a very narrow electrochemical stability window (1.71-2.31 V vs. Li + /Li for Li3PS4) [5]. The interface stability of sulfide-based solid electrolytes with typical cathode materials, e.g. lithium cobalt oxide, has been the subject of several experimental studies using transmission electron microscopy (TEM) and electrochemical impedance spectroscopy (EIS), [6,7] and the interface of the electrolyte with metallic lithium has been studied using scanning electron microscopy. [8,9] Very recently, Janek et al. utilized X-ray photoemission spectroscopy (XPS) to further investigate the interface of the solid electrolyte with metallic lithium. [10,11] This method provided a direct way to obtain chemical information about the interface. Wang et al. also used XPS to assess the decomposition mechanism of LGPS at high and low potentials. [12] XPS investigations of the interface between the solid electrolyte and active materials other than metallic lithium have not been reported so far. In this paper, we discuss our attempts to elucidate the interfacial reactivity between the amorphous solid electrolyte Li3PS4 and a Li4Ti5O12 electrode using XPS. The impact of the counter electrode on the formation of lithium dendrites was investigated using electrochemical techniques. Prior to the interfacial characterization, electrochemical characterization and cycling of the solid electrolyte using the Li4Ti5O12 electrode were carried out to demonstrate the impact of the counter electrode on the cycling stability.

Experimental

Material preparation

Synthesis of amorphous Li3PS4 and pellet preparation

The sulfide electrolyte Li2S-P2S5 with a molar ratio of 75:25 (referred as Li3PS4) was prepared by ball milling using the synthetic parameters reported in the literature. [4,13,14] All procedures were conducted inside an Ar-filled glove box unless stated otherwise. Li2S (Alfa Aesar, purity 99.9%) and P2S5 (Sigma-Aldrich, purity 99%) were briefly mixed by hand in an agate mortar and then placed in a zirconia ball milling jar with 5-mm ZrO2 balls. Mechanical milling was conducted for 180 cycles with each cycle consisting of 10 min active milling (510 rpm) and 5 min rest. The synthesized powder was ground in an agate mortar and stored in an Ar-filled glove box until further use.

Dense pellets of Li3PS4 were prepared by sintering an appropriate amount of the synthesized amorphous powder at ambient temperature and 450 MPa using a Specac GS03000 pressing die and a hydraulic press (13 mm in diameter and ~500 μm in thickness).

Preparation of the LTO-Li3PS4 composite electrode (hereinafter referred as the LTO-composite) and cell assembly

Li4Ti5O12 (50 wt%, LTO, Süd-Chemie) and Li3PS4 (50 wt%) were mixed by hand in an agate mortar to produce the composite electrode powder. The InLix alloy was prepared by embedding ~0.38 mg of lithium foil (Alfa Aesar, purity 99.99%, thickness 200 μm) in a pocket made of 21.5 mg indium foil (Alfa Aesar, purity 99.99%, thickness 100 μm). Depending on the experiments, the lithium foil was also used as counter electrode and cut into disks of 5 mm in diameter.

The electrochemical test cell was prepared using a high-pressure cell configuration. The cell body was made of an electrically insulating polyoxymethylene (POM) cylinder with an inner diameter of 7 mm. First, Li3PS4 (30 mg) was spread onto the bottom pressing plate, and this was then compressed at 100 MPa. Approximately 2 mg of LTO-composite powder was then uniformly spread on one side of the solid electrolyte layer and served as working electrode. This electrolyte-electrode bilayer was compressed at 400 MPa to form a dense pellet and ensure intimate contact between the electrode and electrolyte. Finally, the counter electrode, either Li or InLix alloy, was pressed on the other side of the solid electrolyte. Cu and Al foils served as current collector on the counter and working electrode side, respectively. The internal pressure of the cell stack was maintained by the screws as shown in Figure 1.

Material characterization

Powder X-ray diffraction (XRD) experiments were conducted on a PANalytical Empyrean diffractometer using Cu Kα radiation. The solid electrolyte powder was filled in a 0.7-mm borosilicate glass capillary and sealed under an inert atmosphere. The patterns were collected between 10° and 60° in 2θ with a step of 0.03°. To improve the signal to noise ratio, we collected each pattern 12 times.

Raman spectroscopy measurements were carried out with a Raman microscope (Labram HR800 Horiba-Jobin Yvon, Japan) with a He-Ne laser (632.8 nm) and a 50× objective (ULWDMS Plan 50, NA = 0.55, Olympus, Japan).

Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) measurements were performed with an Ultra55 (Carl Zeiss) using a secondary electron detector (SE2). The SEM samples were fixed on the sample holder by means of an adhesive conductive carbon tape. An airtight transfer chamber was used to avoid any exposure of the sample to air. X-ray photoemission spectroscopy measurements were carried out with a VG ESCALAB 220iXL spectrometer (Thermo Fisher Scientific) using focused monochromatized Al Kα radiation (1486.6 eV). After disassembling the cells in a glove box, the electrodes were transferred to the XPS spectrometer using an argon-filled transfer chamber to avoid air exposure and surface modification. The spectrometer was calibrated using the Ag 3d5/2 peak with a binding energy of 368.3 eV. The samples had an analyzed area of about 500 μm 2 , and the analysis chamber had a recorded pressure of approximately 2 × 10 -9 mbar. The spectra were recorded in constant analyzer energy mode at a pass energy of 30 eV. [15] The acquired spectra on different samples were normalized by the intensities of the respective S2p core level in Li3PS4. To compensate for any charging effects on the surface, we aligned all spectra using the C1s peak of the hydrocarbon components at 285.7 eV. Peak deconvolution was performed by applying the sum of Gaussian (70%) and Lorentzian (30%) line shapes after Shirley-type background subtraction. The deconvolution of the S2p3/2-1/2, P2p3/2-1/2, and Ti2p3/2-1/2 peaks were carried out by fixing their spin-orbit splitting (ΔE) and branching ratio (β) to (ΔES = 1.2 eV, βS = 0.5), (ΔEP = 0.87 eV, βp = 0.5), and (ΔETi = 5.7 eV, βTi = 0.5), respectively.

Electrochemical characterization

AC-Electrochemical impedance spectroscopy (EIS)

was conducted on symmetric cells using blocking electrodes and the solid electrolyte Li3PS4. Approximately 30 mg of the solid electrolyte was pelletized under the same conditions as described previously using carbon-coated aluminum foil as the current collector. The thickness of the electrolyte pellet was measured using a micro-caliper (Δl = ± 10 μm). The measurements were conducted at the open circuit potential (OCP) with an AC perturbation of 10 mV in the frequency range of 1 MHz to 1 Hz. The spectra were recorded on a Biologic VMP-3 potentiostat. The temperature was controlled by an ESPEC SU-221 temperature chamber. Prior to each measurement, the cells were allowed to reach a steady state for 12 h. The EIS measurements were conducted between -20 °C and 80 °C in 10 °C increments with an exception for the measurement at 25 °C. The spectra were fitted using Zview and an equivalent circuit consisting of a series connection of the bulk electrolyte resistance and a constant phase element representing the imperfect capacitive behavior of the interface.

DC-Polarization experiments

were conducted using a Biologic VMP-3 potentiostat and the same blocking electrode configuration as in the EIS experiments. After stabilization at 25 °C for 6 h, a DC voltage of 0.5 V was applied. The current response was recorded as a function of time. After the current had reached a steady state, the value recorded was used to estimate the electronic conductivity.

Cyclic voltammetry (CV)

and cycling experiments were performed at room temperature using Computer Controlled Cell Capture software and hardware (CCCC, Astrol Electronic AG, Switzerland). When using the InLix alloy (x < 1) as the counter electrode, a voltage shift of 620 mV was taken into account for the cycling window. [16] CV measurements were conducted at a scan rate of 50 μV s -1 . The LTO composite electrodes were cycled between 1 and 2 V vs. Li + /Li. The current (i) at which the galvanostatic cycling experiments were conducted is denoted as the C-rate (f) with respect to the theoretical charges (Qtheo) of the respective LTO working electrode. The C-rate was calculated as follows:

𝑓 = 𝑖 𝑄 !"#$ Equation 1
At a C/10 rate, the cell will be fully discharged (or charged) in 10 h, based on a 100% theoretical charge of the active material. When cycling successively at different rates, a potentiostatic step was applied at the low and high voltage limit after each galvanostatic step to fully lithiate and delithiate the electrode, respectively. The constant voltage hold was terminated once the current inside the cell fell below 5 μA.

Galvanostatic lithium plating and stripping experiments were conducted to investigate the reactivity of the solid electrolyte with metallic lithium under electrochemical cycling conditions. The cells were built in a similar manner as that for the cycling experiment described above. The working electrode, in this case, was the stainless steel current collector and the counter electrode was the above mentioned InLix alloy. First, lithium was deposited on the current collector by applying a current of -20 μA for 10 h. The deposited amount of lithium corresponds to a thickness of ~2.5 μm assuming a homogenous deposition of the film. This initially deposited charge equivalent of lithium is further referred to as Q0. Subsequently, 10% of Q0 was stripped (Qc) and plated (QD) in each step to simulate the cycling conditions. The experiment was terminated once the overpotential exceeded 500 mV vs. Li + /Li. The number of cycles before termination (n) was then used to estimate the lithium electrode cyclic efficiency as described by Equation 2. [17] 𝜂 = 𝑄 % * 𝑛 𝑄 & * 𝑛 + 𝑄 ' Equation 2

Results and discussion

Material synthesis and characterization

As can be seen from the XRD results shown in Figure 1a, 30 h of active milling were necessary to obtain an amorphous solid electrolyte. [4,13,14] On lowering the effective milling time to 20 h, we noticed the presence of crystalline Li2S, indicating that the synthesis had not reached completion.

To confirm the conversion of the precursor to the desired solid electrolyte compound (after 30 h), we conducted Raman spectroscopy measurements, as shown in Figure 1b. The formation of PS4 3-is indicated by the peak at 421 cm -1 , as reported in the literature, [14,18,19] while a weak shoulder at 387 cm -1 corresponds to the formation of P2S6 In the next step, the solid electrolyte powder was compressed to produce dense pellets prior to the electrochemical measurements. Based on the mass and the measured volume of the pelletized Li3PS4, its apparent density was estimated to be 1.79 g cm -1 , reaching approximately 95% of the theoretical density. The dense morphology of the electrolyte pellet was confirmed by SEM, as illustrated in Figure 3. The SEM image further shows imperfection of the process due to the uniaxial pressing. In addition to the large, dense areas, coarse areas with many grain boundaries were observed.

Lithium ion conductivity measurements

The ionic conductivity of Li3PS4 was measured by means of AC-EIS measurements, and the activation energy was extracted from the temperature dependent Arrhenius plot as shown in Figure 4. The room temperature ionic conductivity is around 0.4 mS cm -1 , and the activation energy was determined to be 0.37 eV. The values found in this study are in good agreement with those reported in the literature. [4] The electric conductivity of this solid electrolyte pellet was determined to be less than 5 × 10 - 10 S cm -1 , meaning that the solid electrolyte is an electrical insulator.

Cycling behavior with LTO as the working electrode and lithium metal as the counter electrode

The theoretical potential stability window of Li3PS4 has been determined to be between 1.71 and 2.31 V vs. Li + /Li. [5] Thus, most commonly used cathode materials, e.g., lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), and lithium nickel cobalt manganese oxide (NCM), would result in the irreversible oxidation of the solid electrolyte. We, thus, decided to study the cycling behavior of the Li3PS4 solid electrolyte using LTO as the working electrode material and lithium metal as the counter electrode.

In the first attempt to cycle LTO vs. metallic lithium, we observed the irreversible cycling behavior of the test cells. As can be seen in the CV of the Li|Li3PS4|LTO-composite cell (Figure 5a), it was only possible to obtain one lithiation of LTO, with the reduction occurring between 1.5 V and 1.1 V vs. Li + /Li, and significant peak broadening was observed. Notably, even at 1 V vs. Li + /Li, the lithiation did not complete, as the current did not reach 0 mA, indicating that some current was still flowing inside the cell. The delithiation was partial, with a broad peak at 1.6-1.8 V vs. Li + /Li. However, once a potential of 1.8 V vs. Li + /Li had been reached, the current suddenly increased to very high values, and the cell stopped (shadowed area). This steep current increase at a given potential indicates a drop in the internal electrical resistance of the cell, generally referred to as an internal short-circuit. Similar behavior was also observed during galvanostatic cycling of a cell with the same Li|Li3PS4|LTO configuration, as shown in Figure 5b. The first lithiation occurs with the known potential plateau for LTO at ~1.55 V vs. Li + /Li despite the large polarization, most probably caused by the applied cycling rate. However, once again the delithiation was abruptly terminated by strong fluctuations in the potential, indicative of the internal short-circuit, as reported previously. [8] Even after uniaxial pressing (see Figure 3), some porosity remained, so the contact between the solid electrolyte and the lithium metal anode is likely not homogeneous, and locally high current densities cause dendrite formation by acting as preferential sites for lithium metal deposition. The formation of dendrites is further illustrated in Figure 6, which presents the maximum and minimum voltages observed during each lithium stripping and plating step. Internal short-circuits are visible after only three cycles of lithium plating and stripping. Using Equation 2, the cycling efficiency was estimated to be 23%. The chemical composition of the surface of the Li3PS4 solid electrolyte in contact with metallic lithium was examined by post mortem XPS. As shown in Figure 7a, the pristine sample yielded the main S2p3/2 peak at 162.2 eV and that of P2p3/2 at 132.8 eV, which is in good agreement with the literature values. [12,20] Besides Li3PS4, the pristine sample contains polysulfides, as suggested by the presence of sulfur-sulfur bonds (peak of S2p3/2 at 163.3 eV). [21] The post mortem XPS analysis shown in Figure 7b was conducted at the interface between the solid electrolyte and metallic lithium, revealing further smaller amounts of reduced sulfur species. A new peak appeared at 160.8 eV (S2p3/2), and this was attributed to the formation of Li2S, in accordance with theoretical calculations and experimental data. [5,21,22] Apart from these observations, no changes in the chemical environment of phosphorus were observed. Li2S is a poor electronic and ionic conductor at ambient temperatures. Therefore, the presence of Li2S likely increases the interfacial resistance. However, this effect alone would not explain the short-circuit behavior observed in the cycling experiment. Thus, the growth of lithium dendrites appears to be the sole cause of cell failure. As demonstrated, metallic lithium is not a suitable counter electrode for use with the Li3PS4 solid electrolyte. In the literature, InLix alloys have been reported to be more stable; thus, we discuss these alloys in the next section.

Cycling behavior with LTO as the working electrode and an In-Li alloy as the counter electrode

An advantage of InLix (with respect to the electrochemical stability of Li3PS4) is its higher potential compared to that of a Li-metal counter electrode (620 mV vs. Li + /Li for x < 1). [16,23] As can be seen in the CV plotted in Figure 8a, the InLix alloy is the key to the successful cycling of the solid-state In-Lix|Li3PS4|LTO-composite cell batteries. The CV shows the reversible lithiation and delithiation of LTO with reversible lithiation and delithiation peaks centered at ~1.49 V and ~1.73 V vs. Li + /Li, respectively. We observed a very large overpotential due to the low ionic conductivity and the relatively high current occurring during the CV measurements. Similar behavior was observed in the galvanostatic cycles, which are shown in Figure 8b, where different cycling rates were applied. As shown in Figure 8b, as the cycling rate slowed, the polarization was reduced, and the obtained specific charge increased. At C/20, a specific charge of more than 150 mAh/gLTO was obtained, more than 85% of the theoretical specific charge of LTO. The missing charges may be a consequence of insufficient electronic conductivity due to the absence of conductive carbon additive in the electrode. Even at C/5, the specific charge retention was over 100 mAh/gLTO. However, at higher rates, the performance of the cell decreased drastically, falling to a specific charge of less than 50 mAh/g at 2C. To determine the capacity retention arising from the lithiation and delithiation, a potentiostatic step (not plotted in Figure 6b) was introduced to either fully charge or discharge the cells. Notably, at rates of >C/5, the specific charge was always higher for the delithiation than for the lithiation. This may arise from the sluggish kinetics of the InLix counter electrode.

Figure 9a shows the long-term stability of the InLix|Li3PS4|LTO-composite cell cycled galvanostatically at a C/10 rate. Overall, with the exception of the first cycle, the coulombic efficiency exceeded 99% over 70 cycles, indicating the highly reversible (de)lithiation of LTO. The specific charge remained constant at ca.120 mAh/gLTO for 70 cycles (lower than the theoretical capacity, most probably due to the slight polarization observed). As shown in Figure 9b, there is no additional overpotential build-up during cycling in the voltage profiles, indicating the good cycling stability of the cell and the favorable nature of the electrolyte-electrode interface. The good cyclability observed for LTO electrode can be explained as follow: the pristine LTO has a low electronic conductivity, which increases drastically once the titanium is reduced. The high conductivity is maintained during cycling, due to the fact that some Ti 3+ is still present, as shown by the XPS experiments. Post-mortem XPS measurements are useful to probe interfacial reactions because the method is highly surface sensitive. During the first lithiation, as depicted in Figure 10b, we observed the reduction of Ti 4+ to Ti 3+ . However, the reduction of LTO is not 100% reversible upon delithiation because traces of Ti 3+ were detected, as shown in Figure 10c. In addition to the LTO activity, no electrolyte The lithium stripping and plating behavior of the InLix counter electrode coupled with the Li3PS4 solid electrolyte were also studied. The peak values of the plating/stripping overpotential recorded for each cycle are shown in Figure 12. Sixty cycles were achieved without any noticeable internal short-circuiting. According to Equation 2, this value corresponds to 86% cyclic efficiency. However, the experiment was terminated due to the significant build-up in overpotential during lithium stripping. The increasing overpotential is indicative of the consumption of lithium at the counter electrode, which may be due to the formation of Li2S, as indicated by the XPS measurements.

Conclusion

An amorphous solid electrolyte with the nominal composition Li3PS4 was synthesized by ball milling.

After obtaining a dense pellet with acceptable ionic conductivity, all-solid-state half-cells using LTO as the active material and an InLix counter electrode were tested. The replacement of metallic lithium by the InLix alloy was determined to be the critical parameter for reversible cycling. The test cell exhibits good capacity retention at rates between C/20 to C/5 and long-term cyclic stability. Post-mortem XPS analysis was used to investigate the reactivity of Li3PS4 with LTO, metallic lithium, and an InLix alloy. The reduction of Li3PS4 by the counter electrode was observed for both Li and InLix, resulting in the formation of Li2S. The rapid failure of the cell using a Li metal counter electrode can be explained by the formation of an internal short-circuit due to dendrite growth. No reduction of the solid electrolyte by LTO at 1.55 V vs. Li + /Li was observed. The electrode-electrolyte interface for LTO and Li3PS4 is considered to be stable, and the electrochemical activity of LTO can be traced by XPS via the changes in the titanium oxidation state.

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. Schematic design (not to scale) of the all-solid-state test cell.

Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. (a) XRD patterns of Li3PS4 powders milled for 20 and 30 h. (b) Raman spectrum of the Li3PS4 powder after 3 h effective ball milling time.

Figure 3 .

 3 Figure 3. SEM image of the Li3PS4 pellet compressed at 450 MPa showing a) the dense pellet with inhomogeneous morphology due to uniaxial pressing and b) dense and c) coarse areas at higher magnification.

Figure 4 .

 4 Figure 4. Temperature dependence of the ionic conductivity of Li3PS4 in pellet form. The solid line indicates the linear regression fit of the Arrhenius plot.

Figure 5 .

 5 Figure 5. (a) Cyclic voltammetry (Scan rate: 50 μV s -1 ) of the Li|Li3PS4|LTO-composite cell. (b) Galvanostatic curves at C/10 rate of an all-solid-state half-cell with the Li3PS4 solid electrolyte, LTO-composite as the working electrode, and Li as the counter electrode. The shadowed areas represent the short-circuit situation.

Figure 6 .

 6 Figure 6. Peak overpotentials during lithium plating and stripping in a Li|Li3PS4|SS cell configuration. Initially plated charge equivalents of metallic lithium on the solid-state working electrode (Q0): 0.2 mAh cm -2 . Charge equivalents passed through each cycle (Qc, QD): 0.02 mAh cm -2 .

Figure 7 .

 7 Figure 7. S2p3/2-1/2 and P2p3/2-1/2 XPS core levels acquired a) on pristine Li3PS4 and b) at the interface between Li3PS4 and the Li counter electrode after five cycles.

Figure 8 .

 8 Figure 8. (a) Cyclic voltammetry (scan rate: 50 μV s -1 ) of InLix|Li3PS4|LTO-composite cell; (b) Voltage profile of the first galvanostatic lithiation and delithiation of the InLix|Li3PS4|LTO-composite cell at different C-rate. A potentiostatic step was introduced after each galvanostatic step.

Figure 9 .

 9 Figure 9. (a) Capacity retention during long-term cycling of an InLix|Li3PS4|LTO-composite cell cycled galvanostatically at a C/10 rate. (b) Voltage profiles during cycling.

  in the S2p or P2p spectra. This confirms the stability of the electrodeelectrolyte interface during the first cycle.

Figure 10 .Figure 11 .

 1011 Figure 10. S2p3/2-1/2, P2p3/2-1/2, and Ti2p3/2-1/2 XPS core levels acquired on a LTO-composite cathode: a) pristine, b) fully lithiated, and c) fully delithiated electrodes.The reactivity of Li3PS4 with the InLix alloy counter electrode was also examined by XPS. Again, the assumed formation of Li2S (S2p3/2 at 160.7 eV) was seen in the S2p spectrum, along with the formation of polysulfide species. Additionally, the reduction of phosphorous is suggested by the peak component at 130.4 eV, attributed to InP.[20] Furthermore, a small amount of phosphate was observed. Besides the indication of metallic indium at 443.8 eV (In3d5/2), InP is also indicated by a peak at 444.9 eV.[24]

Figure 12 .

 12 Figure 12. Maximal overpotential during lithium plating and stripping in an InLix|Li3PS4|SS cell configuration.

  ] vs. Li/Li +

  4-dimers. Yamada et al. have suggested that local inhomogeneity during the ball mill synthesis could lead to the formation of this sulfur-deficient phase.[14]

Acknowledgement

This work is supported by the Competence Center Energy and Mobility (CCEM) and the Swiss Electric research initiative (SER). We would like to thank Mr. Giulio Ferraresi for his help in the electrochemical tests and synthesis.


Dr Claire Bénit-Gbaffou

Elisabeth Peyroux

Wolfram Schneider

Policing Johannesburg wealthy neighborhoods: the uncertain 'partnerships' between police, communities and private security companies

The paper examines the challenges raised by "partnerships" between state and non-state security stakeholders, relying on two security experiments developed in Johannesburg wealthy neighborhoods. It raises the question of their monitoring by the police -understood as the police capacity to coordinate the multiple, non-state policing initiatives that otherwise remain fragmented "security networks". The community initiatives seem easier to integrate within the local police strategies -since the private security sector has got its own, marketdriven logic. However, the formalisation of partnerships between police and communities have generally failed, due to their technical fragility (flexibility of community involvement, personalization of relationships leading to possible corruption and conflict) and their political difficulties (if the private sector can easily target the high income area, it is considered less legitimate for police to set up "elitist policing" thanks to the involvement of wealthy communities). Finally, abandoning these forms of partnerships might encourage a further privatization of the production of security -using more classical, easier-to-set "contracts" with the private sector that do not seem to lead to a real "partnership" with, nor a monitoring by, the police.

In the context of the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa, which witnessed both the spread of crime into areas that were previously protected through the apartheid containment strategy, and the necessary restructuring of the police service 1 , the South African State massively appealed to non-State actors to help the police fighting crime, describing civil society (defined as both business and community organisations, private security companies and police reservists) as important "partners" to the State in the fight against crime 2 .

These public partnerships with residents associations on the one hand, with the private sector on the other, are in line with worldwide trends to promote security governance, and reform the police in order to make it more accountable to the residents and more efficient in its crime prevention strategy 3 . However, behind the term "partnership" lays a plurality of agreements: roles, functions and responsibilities regarding crime prevention are unevenly shared, depending on the local contexts and the stakeholders involved. Some authors rather speak of "security networks" to describe the pluralisation of policing agents at the local level 4 . The notion of network is looser than that of partnership. Newburn defines it as an "increasingly complex and diffenciated patchwork of security providers"; he stresses the importance, "when thinking of the idea of a 'network of security', not to overemphasize the degree of integration". The term of network might be closer than that of 'partnership' to the reality experimented on the ground -lack of real coordination, prevalence of ad hoc and flexible agreements, etc. On the contrary, partnership implies an agreement between several parts, legally or morally binding, and in the case of public-private partnerships indicates some control implemented by the public authority. However, in the security field, little empirical evidence or theoretical analysis have been devoted to the monitoring or regulating capacity of the police over non-state security initiatives; and this is what this paper wishes to address, since we follow Shaw 5 in arguing that the central issue in security governance is not so much how to eradicate "these security instruments that compete with the state", but how to manage them.

There are of course forms of partnership that involve a minimal public control, such as sub-contracting or outsourcing police's functions and duties 6 -where control is reduced to the legal regulation of non-state activity (with little resources to actually check its application 7 ), and to a possible (but difficult) assessment of the outcomes of such activity. In this paper we looked for a little bit more than that: we considered joint security operations where the police can try and make use of the supplementary technical, financial and staff resources offered by the non-state actors. In this sense, we assume8 that the state is more than just "one (albeit important) player in a network of governing agencies"9 , and, especially in South Africa where it has got some administrative capacity as well as a strong political legitimacy, it ought to play a monitoring role over non-state security initiatives. Therefore, even if the boundaries between public and private policing stakeholders, practices and strategies are 1 Leggett 2005. 2 White Paper on Safety and Security, 1998. 3 Shearing and Stenning 1983. 4 Newburn 2001, Johnston 2001. 5 Shaw 2000. 6 Schönteich et al 2004. 7 Berg 2003. 3 increasingly blurred 10 , we'll insist, on the contrary, on the remaining, major distinction between the two types of actors -that has to do with the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.

The paper will draw on two case studies 11 : Parkview and Atholl, two middle-to upper-class areas located in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg, where the residents have chosen not to erect gates and barriers to protect themselves 12 , but have preferred to rely on community policing as formally encouraged by the State. In both cases, they have created non-profit, "community" security companies, a kind of "third way" between full reliance on public policing and the hiring of a private security company. These experiments have been -or are being currently-discarded by the police, after having operated in informal ways for several years. They are highlighting, by both their successes and their failures, not only the technical complexities but also the political challenges lying in the construction of security partnerships between state and non-state actors. The first part of the paper will track down the specificity of this "third way", and the blurred line distinguishing community and business security initiatives; the second part will discuss the options available for the police to monitor non-state security initiatives.

How different are community security initiatives from private security companies?

Residents' groups in Atholl and Parkview, two suburban areas in northern Johannesburg, have decided to set up their own "community" security company, deemed not for profit and dedicated to the neighbourhood. Many residents had indeed claimed their dissatisfaction with private security companies, judged not "dedicated" enough to the area and becoming complacent after a while. The development of Community Policing Forums 13 (CPFs) and the public encouragement for community policing constituted a favourable context, the police often enhancing locally what was seen as a supplementary manpower more akin than the private sector to work with the police.

In Atholl, a high-income suburb not far from Alexandra township, a residents' association launched what they call Atholl Security Project. Residents contribute on a voluntary basis about R400 14 a month to the project, which pays for the seven private security guards (3 shifts) permanently standing at the entrances of the suburb, and also for a few agents employed by Atholl Project, repairing pavement and lighting, trimming the trees, collecting garbage etc. 10 Baker 2002, Carrier 1999. 11 Field research was conducted in 2004 and 2005, as part of the programme on « Privatisation of Security in African Cities : urban dynamics and new forms of governance », funded by the French Institute of South Africa. 12 We have elaborated elsewhere on the road closure issue in Johannesburg (Bénit 2004; Bénit-Gbaffou forthcoming). See also Peyroux 2005. 13 Statutory bodies set up by the police in each police precinct, in order to develop links with the residents. 14 About 50 euros in January 2006.

Photo 1-Different layers of security companies -one can never be too careful

In Parkview (a police precinct including several middle-income to wealthy suburbs), unlike in Atholl the community security project was initiated and monitored by the Community Policing Forum (CPF). Parkview police have indeed largely supported the initiative, enhancing what they considered a real partnership with the "community", under the name CPF on the Beat. CPF on the Beat is a non-profit organisation set up by the Community Policing Forum in order to employ reservists (security guards, after it has been declared illegal to pay reservists -supposed to be mere "volunteers" helping the police) to patrol the area. The police would train and monitor the guards, and they would be in control of its operational use; whilst the community was in charge of the finance (collection of the money 15 and payment of the guards) through CPF on the Beat. The creation of the CPF on the Beat was rendered necessary because the Community Policing Forum itself, being a police statutory body, could not legally directly raise funds to employ security agents… Both projects have been tempted over time to expand beyond the neighbourhood's boundaries -their success in terms of crime reduction being an incentive for growth (figure 1, map 1).

Competition between security companies to access a local market is fierce, especially in wealthier suburbs where a demand for expensive security policies is likely to develop. In Atholl for instance, the ward councillor had to intervene to stop a physical battle between agents of competing private security companies: one of them 15 From R100 to R200 depending on the nature of the contributor (resident, small or big business): 12 to 25 euros.

Atholl, 2004, © Claire Bénit. The 7 suburb entrances are guarded by security agents. The suburb is not closed off, but it is quite strictly controlled, each « stranger » to the suburb being watched, sometimes registered and followed. Whilst the overall cost is higher, the difference with enclosed neighbourhoods in terms of freedom of movement is here becoming subtle! Atholl, 2006, © Claire Bénit-Gbaffou. The Atholl logo (green triangle) is used more as a means of social pressure on those who are not "contributors", than as a crime deterrent for outsiders. It does not prevent the "contributors" to keep contracting with their former private security company. The total household expense for security can reach R1.000 (150 euros) a month.

Photo 2-Guard hut at each entrance of Atholl suburb

was blocking the roads to prevent the others to enter the suburb, even throwing stones against the houses of people contracting with its competitors! In such a competitive context, attempts to create integrated security networks, or real partnerships not only with the police but amongst different private security companies, are doomed. Bramley police (under which Atholl is falling) for instance proposed to set up a room within the police station to be used jointly by a police officer and a security agent (everyday from a different company) -which meant each private security agent would have had to work for the whole area (and not only for its company's customers). The initiative failed spectacularly.

In this context also, "community security companies" (set up as nonprofit organisations) are very clearly identified by private security companies as competitors, and even "unfair competition" since the community security companies obviously do not comply with the private security regulations -and have pretensions to a local monopoly. It was one of the reasons why the Parkview initiative was eventually declared illegal by the Provincial commissioner, lobbied by a big private security company 16 .

The competition is even more direct in Atholl, where the private security company originally hired by Atholl Security Project to guard the entrances of the suburb is progressively being ejected from the area, Atholl Security Project attempting to replace the private company's staff with its own contract workers. The manager of the Project indeed argues that it would allow the residents for a better crime prevention strategy, avoiding "outsourcing" and the unnecessary spreading of information to "outsiders". For the private security company, however, the progressive replacement of its agent by people employed by the Atholl Security Project is only a business strategy. Dumping the prices on the pretext of being a nonprofit project, failing to pay regularly the private company it hired for the 7 permanent security posts, the chairman of the residents association is accused to try and push the security company out of the area 17 . The security company is currently busy 16 The other reasons being: a community initiative becoming a business; the growing visibility of the initiative, becoming a model (with other suburbs asking for its extension to their area); the political accusation of representing "elitist policing"; a personal conflict between the chair of the CPF and the manager of CPF on the Beat. 17 The Atholl Project proposes to patrol the street at night for R250 per household (R400 for the current private security company). Its failure to pay the security company led the latter (running at R30.000 a

Figure 1-Portraits of community leadersand security businessmen

The operational manager of the Atholl Security Project is a former employee of a security company. He was the local representative for the security company in Atholl, and got to know the customers. He then decided to do his security project on his own, sidelining the security company, and approached the chair of the residents association who was seduced by his project.

In Parkview, the manager of CPF on the Beat owns two businesses in Parkview, and he started uniting businesses to join a common security scheme, before being given the opportunity (by the CPF and the police) to create CPF on the Beat: a statutory non-profit organisation, collecting funds from voluntary donations (for which the acronym CPF is a good marketing device). The manager also was nominated deputy-chair of the CPF, but due to increasing conflicts with the other members of the CPF (accusing him of hiding CPF on the Beat's benefits, supposedly to be transferred to the CPF account), he had to resign.

denouncing to the police authorities these illegal (deemed "criminal") practices -not only business-wise, but also by using employees as street patrollers, who are not legally registered as security agents.

The distinction between community-and business-driven security projects is obviously extremely blurred. In such wealthy neighbourhoods, the households' contributions are potentially high and security issues are a major political concern, giving local leaders much scope for political advancement as well as personal enrichment 18 . Non-profit, "community" security companies seldom remain such, since temptations are numerous to transform into a thriving business and to make huge profits.

"Community" security companies are located in a specific niche of the private security market, promoting their small-scale, flexibility and accountability to the residents and to the police. But it is also a niche developed by some small private security companies, operating in a few suburbs only, who compete with the major ones by underlining their flexibility, their responsiveness to local demands, their closeness to the "community" 19 . The term "community" is indeed a very powerful marketing instrument, with or without the police support 20 . In Parkview, the confusion on the name CPF on the Beat allowed the organisation to raise funds in the name of the Community Policing Forum (CPF) -and there was a fierce legal battle led by the CPF and the police (after the project had been discarded) in order to forbid the use of such a misleading name.

Photo 3-CPF on the Beat: The police and the community support as a marketing device

loss per month for its guarding operations) to cross-subsidise it by using the profit made by its armed response unit (about 300 customers in the area). 18 As was stated by Didier and Morange (2005) in the case of Cape Town. 19 The main difference with "community" security companies being the nature of the link with public authorities (the police in particular). This is the main point developed infra. 20 See Angot 2006.

Parkview, 2004, © Claire Bénit. CPF on the Beat is displaying these pamphlets now against the will of the community and the police, who have discarded the initiative (that they originally supported, as stated) as a profit-making operation, and voluntarily playing on the confusion with the CPF.

Moreover, in the name of the "community", security projects are able to put an increased social pressure over the residents who do not contribute financially, for instance in Atholl through the creation of a database pinpointing the residents not contributing.

However, community security projects are also being criticised by some residents for their lack of efficiency, in spite of their supposed local commitment. Small is not always beautiful, as smaller security companies (being community or business) lack the "back-up" system -an efficient radio system, a good training, backing cars, etc., allowing for quick and efficient response. This criticism is extended by residents to the police service itself, whose lack of resources is understood as the root of their inefficiency.

How can police monitor non-State security initiatives?

However, non-state security stakeholders wishing to help the police 21 in addressing its lack of resource or personnel shortage encounter important technical as well as structural difficulties. We are not even mentioning here the political issue 22 : the overall equity question raised by the creation of an "elitist" police -obvious in these types of initiatives in the wealthy areas (where residents are able to pay for a better service), but also contained in a way in the very principle of "community policing", a factor of inequality since it is drawing on whichever resources are locally available.

The direct, personal contacts between police officers and residents or security companies, especially when involving money, are likely to slip into basic corruption practices. The weberian notion of an anonymous and therefore efficient and just bureaucracy is still entrenched in the very centralised South African Police Service, unlike in many other African countries 23 . However trends for decentralization, an increasing accountability to the residents at the station level and the enhancement of local partnerships, have certainly created expectations difficult to fulfill 24 , as well as opened a scope for the personalization of relationships with the police 25 .

In a system of locally unequal policing resources 26 , what were the options for the residents of wealthy areas willing to help the police with what they have to offer: their money, while trying to avoid setting up mechanisms for corruption? Money 21 As stated by several residents, they would better 'help the police' than 'make the security companies millionaires '… 22 This point is developed in Bénit, 2005. 23 Olivier de Sardan 2004. 24 See Steinberg 2005, showing the contradiction between white rural communities' expectations, developed through a participation process (that the police and/or the residents target stock theft) and the national priorities leading to focus the local police resources on personal assaults, dominant in the townships. 25 Hornberger 2004. 26 The legitimacy of which is not discussed in detail here (see note 20). NON-contributors. We are currently trying to appeal to all residents of Atholl to assist us in some way, and we acknowledge those who really cannot afford the extra burden […]. The map of our suburb has really assisted us in the following up of residents, and one family has also really contributed in assisting us with the computerization of Atholl map and database! This is near completion, and we will be able to detail residents and all contributors, as well as those regrettably still "unknown" to the project.

Atholl newsletter, November 2003

handling, or hiring of supplementary policing personnel, needed to be mediated, either through a change of scale within the police (national police), or through an intermediary non-state body, providing in both case a form of control by creating a distance between contributors and beneficiaries. The first solution -involving for instance donations to the national police budget that will eventually be allocated to the ad hoc police station-has not been adopted very long in Parkview nor in Atholl, because of the high level of social and spatial inequalities in South Africa and the post-apartheid importance of the principle of redistribution of public resources. In this context, donations to the national budget coming from a wealthy neighborhood are to be redistributed to deprived areas 27 . There are some informal agreements between donating communities and the police hierarchy (at the metropolitan and provincial level) to allocate the donated funds to the area it originated from -so as not to discourage donations; however these agreements remain informal and their formalization would be politically difficult.

The second solution was attempted in Parkview, through the creation of CPF on the Beat-a non profit organization that could collect funds, unlike the Community Policing Forum, a police statutory body. However the financial monitoring of this mediating agency by the Community Policing Forum failed 28 , as CPF on the Beat acted less and less as a "community" body, more and more like a business.

An alternative and more common mediating agent would be …a private security company hired by the residents, and that would be expected by its collective customer (the "community") to work with the police. Establishing partnerships between the police and private security companies is indeed easier when there is one dominant, if not monopolistic, security company (be it private or community) in an area. Berg 29 , in her case study of Cape Town, showed that the most efficient public-private security partnerships emerged in the City Improvement Districts 30 , where a single security company is usually in charge with patrolling the delimited area. The same could be said about enclosures (restriction of access to public streets in a suburb), or in the security villages (private and walled neighbourhoods) -manned and patrolled as well by a dominant security company.

Photo 4 -"you enter a zone patrolled by Stallion"

27 Legislation allows police authorities to redistribute donations if they wish to do so. 28 The manager of CPF on the Beat refused to submit its financial accounts to the Community Policing Forum (CPF), as had been agreed, but very informally, between him and the CPF chair when they were still friends. 29 Berg 2004b. 30 A City Improvement District is a perimeter within which property owners and businesses agree to pay a supplementary levy that will be used within the perimeter to enhance urban services, in particular security and cleanliness. The board of owners will usually hire a managing agency, which will employ a team of cleaners and security agents servicing the area. See also Didier and Morange, Peyroux in this issue. Cyrilldene, 2003, © Claire Bénit. Residents have gathered to hire a single security company to patrol their neighbourhood, in order to avoid security network fragmentation. Such initiatives are however difficult to set up, due to residential mobility, ongoing contracts with rival security companies (the cost of changing security provider can be high), and unequal household financial capacity in the neighbourhood.

However, these partnerships remain very fragile and probably quite limited. The marketing strategy of private security companies necessarily puts forward a competitive agenda -and their crime priorities and logic of action significantly differ from the police's31 . Such a competition did not exist in Parkview residential area, where a strong relationship existed between the police and the 'community' security company through an empowered Community Policing Forum, whose representatives were significantly attending police management meetings, and were not pushed by any marketing concerns to take over the monitoring of the supplementary security force they were paying for. These difficulties are highlighted a contrario by the enthusiasm Parkview police expressed when talking about the community security initiative:

"They [CPF on the Beat] had the support of the police: they had the same radio channel, a direct link with the police. It was in a way the police's own private company. I could dictate them where to go: 'there is crime in that street, deploy ten guys over there…' It is the way we should actually work with private companies! But I can't just say to ADT [a big private security company]: 'go there, there is crime'!" (Parkview police officer)

Conclusion

The difficulty in setting up 'real' partnerships lies in the complexity of the public monitoring of supplementary funds or personnel devoted to street policing. While donations to the police are acceptable, the direct payment of regular sums into police operational budgets by business or community stakeholders is very problematic, leading to a loss of independence and possible corruption of the police service. If mediating organisations can deal with the supplementary funds (be it community non-profit or business organisations), the question of monitoring the supplementary security personnel remains. The community initiatives seem easier to integrate within the local police strategies -since the private security sector has got its own, market-driven logic. However the formalisation of partnerships between police and communities have generally failed, due to their technical fragility (flexibility of community involvement, personalization of relationships leading to possible corruption and conflict, blurred boundaries between community and personalfinancial and political-interests) as well as their political difficulties (if the private sector can easily target the high income area, it is considered less legitimate for police to set up "elitist policing" thanks to the involvement of wealthy communities).

Very aware of these complexities, the South African government is busy refining its monitoring of non-State security initiatives, by drafting new legislation on private security companies 32 as well as on Community Policing Forums (the 1995 legislation being considered to broad, having led to too big a variety of community security initiatives). However, the latter (in its Provincial version) seems to forbid -as a likely consequence of the Parkview experiment-the Community Policing Forums to have a close link with, or to set up and monitor any non-profit association. Initiatives like Atholl security project, much less genuine in terms of community involvement and not monitored by any public authority, are given preference and therefore are likely to develop, as well as communities' collective contracts with private security companies -also leaving the police aside. It is as if the complexity of a formal agreement with the police was too dangerous, possibly associating a public authority with dubious (business and political) practices, which are tolerated as long as no public authority puts its name on it: making money out of security, financing an "elite" police service, are accepted as long as they remain non-State initiatives, endorsed by non-State agents. Would it mean the abandonment of any attempt to monitor security networks -leaving vast areas to be policed by the private sector, giving up too complex partnerships with communities?

Figure

  Figure 2 -The "community", a marketing device?

In line with[START_REF] Loader | Policing as a public good: reconstituting the connections between policing and the state[END_REF]

[START_REF] Johnston | Crime, fear and civil policing[END_REF]

[START_REF] Shearing | Private security: implications for social control[END_REF][START_REF] Irish | Policing for profit: the future of South Africa's private security industry[END_REF]

[START_REF] Berg | The private security industry in South Africa: a review of applicable legislation[END_REF][START_REF] Minaar | Partnership policing: a role for the private security industry to assist the SAPS in preventing crime?[END_REF]

She is currently working as a senior research specialist in the Urban Unit of the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa.