Marc-Antoine De Pastre
email: marc-antoine.de_pastre@ens-paris-saclay.fr

Yann Quinsat

A novel approach for geometrical deviations determination of lattice structures from volumetric data

Keywords: Computed tomography, lattice structures, virtual volume correlation, modal decomposition

Additive manufacturing (AM) questions traditional approaches that manufacturer and metrologist have developed relative to formative or subtractive manufacturing technologies. As specific-to-AM parts, lattice structures are being investigated in many applications and efforts are focussed on modelling manufactured different-scale defects to predict the part properties before manufacturing. To date, X-ray computed tomography (XCT) is the most suited measuring instrument to reveal additively manufactured part internal defects, i.e. defects inaccessible to optical or tactile instruments. However, XCT requires surface determination tools which choice may be discussed. In this paper, a virtual volume correlation (V2C) method is proposed relying on modal decomposition. In other words, lattice structure shape defects are expressed directly from volumetric data, without any use of XCT surface determination tool. Extending previous works validated for representative lattice struts, entire lattice structure shape defect is identified by iteratively deforming a virtual volume, to minimise its least square grey level differences towards the measured volume. The proposed method particularly describes the strut form defects and the node displacements. This method allows to define at the same time and separately the shape defect of each strut but also the global geometrical defect of the structure. This approach is more relevant to assess the suitability of the structure with respect to mechanical loads than a deviation map that is difficult to handle.

Introduction

Additively manufactured lattice structures are challenging to measure [START_REF] Sperling | Challenges and approaches for metrology of additive manufactured lattice structures by industrial x-ray computed tomography[END_REF][START_REF] Echeta | Review of defects in lattice structures manufactured by powder bed fusion[END_REF]. They involve 3-dimensional repeated patterns where all surfaces are not accessible to traditional optical or tactical measuring systems. Alternatively, X-ray computed tomography (XCT) has the noteworthy advantage of being able to measure both internal and external part surfaces [START_REF] Echeta | Review of defects in lattice structures manufactured by powder bed fusion[END_REF][START_REF] Chiffre | Industrial applications of computed tomography[END_REF]. Measurement by XCT has three main steps: the measurement itself by projecting X-rays, reconstruction and surface determination. Whereas reconstruction is mainly performed by filtered backprojection algorithms, surface determination depends on the user's choice such as ISO or gradient-based methods [START_REF] Kruth | Computed tomography for dimensional metrology[END_REF][START_REF] Ding | On the canny edge detector[END_REF].

In literature, previous work has compared surface determination tools [START_REF] Kruth | Computed tomography for dimensional metrology[END_REF][START_REF] Lou | Development of 2d local searching algorithms for surface determination of x-ray computed tomography measurement[END_REF][START_REF] De Oliveira | Experimental investigation of surface determination process on multi-material components for dimensional computed tomography[END_REF]. Although ISO methods are easy to understand and to implement, gradient-based tools are mainly commercial software black boxes, where parameters can't be easily checked. That is why, there is no definitive solution about surface determination tools and discussions are still ongoing. To overcome this surface determination tool uncertainty, we propose a novel approach to estimate lattice structure geometrical deviations based on virtual volume correlation (V2C). This paper particularly extends previous work [START_REF] De Pastre | Shape defect analysis from volumetric data -application to lattice struts in additive manufacturing[END_REF], validated for elementary struts representative of a BCCz lattice structure, to the entire lattice structure, in order to identify its geometrical deviations. V2C adaptation is presented in section 2 and applied on a substructure extracted from a 2x2x2 BCCz lattice structure in section 3.

Methodology

Virtual volume correlation for lattice structure

V2C consists of identifying the displacement field embedded in measured volumetric data [START_REF] De Pastre | Shape defect analysis from volumetric data -application to lattice struts in additive manufacturing[END_REF]. This is done by successively deforming a virtual volume until it matches the measured volume, which is achieved by minimising the grey level difference between both volumes. This section presents the V2C suited for an entire lattice structure through the description of an unit BCCz cell (see Figure 1) that is repeated in three directions to form the net. An unit cell is composed of struts and a strut indexed by p is defined by two nodes: 𝑁 " # and 𝑁 $ # .

𝑑Ω

Where 𝑓 and 𝑔 refer respectively to the physical (stemming from XCT measurement) and virtual (numerically computed) volumes.

(

) (4) (6) (7) 3
(2)

(5)

𝑅𝑂𝐼 is the region of interest of the measured volume and 𝐮 refers to the displacement field that should be identified.

As the structure is made of p struts, the problem can be decomposed into p correlation problems with limit conditions on the node displacements. We focussed the correlation on struts rather than on nodes. In fact, node identification from volumetric data is challenging as the structure manufacturing itself introduces fillets and increases the node position determination uncertainty.

The V2C problem can then be written as: Correlation score that should be minimised :

Φ(𝐮) = 𝑓 𝐗 -𝑔 𝐗 + 𝐮 #|ℛ <=>> . 𝑑Ω /01 ? @ ABCDBA #EF
Limit conditions: common nodes to several struts should have the same displacement.

where 𝑁 GHIJHG is the number of struts, 𝑅𝑂𝐼 # is the region of interest defined for the p strut. 𝐮 #|ℛ <=>> refers to the displacement field applied to the p strut relative to the cell frame. More details are provided in the next section.

Shape defect basis

For lattice cells, the question of whether geometric deviations are studied on the strut scale or on the entire structure should be raised. In this approach, we propose to combine both scales by simultaneously studying struts shape defects and the overall geometric deviations of the structure. In the following equation, the displacement field is assumed to be found by modal decomposition [START_REF] De Pastre | Shape defect analysis from volumetric data -application to lattice struts in additive manufacturing[END_REF][START_REF] Homri | Tolerance analysis: Form defects modeling and simulation by modal decomposition and optimization[END_REF]. More precisely:

𝐮 #|ℛ <=>> = 𝜆 L # 𝐮 L|ℛ <=>> M L = 𝜆 L # 𝒯 ℛ p →ℛ 𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐮 L|ℛ ? M L
where 𝜆 L # are the components of 𝝀 # and refer to the modal amplitude associated with the considered modes of the p strut, 𝒯 ℛ ? →ℛ <=>> refers to the geometric frame transformation matrix between ℛ # and ℛ UVWW frames.

In the following, modes are defined by family types:

• Rigid transformations of the struts (3 translations and 2 rotations) • Dilatation of strut diameter • Vertical defects along the struts • Plane defects described by sinusoidal descriptors. All these modes define the considered shape defect basis which can be adapted for each strut. The suitability of this shape defect basis towards cylindrical shapes has been discussed in [START_REF] De Pastre | Shape defect analysis from volumetric data -application to lattice struts in additive manufacturing[END_REF][START_REF] Homri | Tolerance analysis: Form defects modeling and simulation by modal decomposition and optimization[END_REF] and and a literature review on the modelling of shape defects is proposed in [START_REF] De Pastre | Shape defect analysis from volumetric data -application to lattice struts in additive manufacturing[END_REF]. A first order linearisation and the application of a Gauss-Newton optimisation scheme [START_REF] De Pastre | Shape defect analysis from volumetric data -application to lattice struts in additive manufacturing[END_REF] leads to:

𝑴 # 𝚫𝝀 # = 𝒃 #
Limit conditions: common nodes to several struts should have the same displacement.

with 𝚫𝝀 # the elementary modal amplitude to apply to the p strut. This iterative scheme is repeated until convergence.

Association of struts

By developing equations and taking into consideration the limit conditions, the correlation problem is transposed from the ℛ # frame to the ℛ UVWW frame by application of a variable transformation matrix 𝑸 (see equation 6). In other words, rigid transformations expressed in the local strut frame are then translated into nodal displacements in the cell frame. This allows the expression of the minimisation problem for all struts in a row and the integration of limit conditions in the problem expression.

With 𝝀 #E{F,…,@ ABCDBA } being the concatenated list of all 𝝀 # defined for all p struts, then the variable transformation is expressed as: 𝝀 = 𝑸 𝝀 * where 𝝀 * is the list of all nodal amplitudes expressed in the ℛ UVWW frame concatenated with non-rigid modal amplitudes for all struts. By integrating limit conditions, and applying equation 6 to elementary displacement, equation 5 is then simplified to:

𝑸 k 𝑴𝑸 𝚫𝝀 * = 𝑸 k 𝒃 thus, 𝚫𝝀 = 𝑸[ 𝑸 k 𝑴𝑸 mF (𝑸 k 𝒃)]
with 𝚫𝝀 being the elementary modal amplitudes to apply to all struts, resulting in an iteratively updated virtual volume. The described method can now be applied on a manufactured lattice sample.

Sample manufacturing and measurement

The sample is a 2x2x2 BCCz lattice structure where the beam radii have been set to 0.6 mm and struts have a 6 mm length, all designed in a computer-aided-design (CAD) software. The lattice structure was produced by laser powder bed fusion (PBF) on an Addup FormUp 350 using Inconel 718 powder and the printing parameters displayed in Table 1.

Hatch space 55 µm

The manufactured sample was washed with water and dried with compressed air. It was removed from the substrate using an electrical discharge machine. The manufactured lattice structure was then measured using XCT with the measurement setups summarised in Table 2: A warmup scan of approximately 30 minutes was performed prior to the scan and data were reconstructed in the manufacturer's software, using a filtered backprojection algorithm and a beam hardening correction without specific filter. Reconstruction was saved in a .raw file format. An elementary 1x1x1 substructure was extracted from the 2x2x2 measured volumetric data; this was done to reduce the computation time and the size of data handled in this problem.

Numeric methodology

V2C was applied on the measured substructure, resulting in a V2C envelope. Vertical defects were taken as simple flexion, and plane defects were assigned to 10 sinusoidal modes. At the same time, ISO 50% [START_REF] Kruth | Computed tomography for dimensional metrology[END_REF] envelope was extracted from the substructure volumetric data. Each envelope was compared to the CAD model, and was then compared to one another. All data treatments included in this paper are summarised in the pipeline displayed in Figure 3.

Results

Nodal displacement field was identified by V2C and is shown by each blue array in Figure 4. Associated nodal displacement norms are displayed in Figure 5. It is worth noting that V2C independently corrects nodal positions resulting in the nominal model deformation, or the structure shape defect identification. To refine the analysis of the data distributions, statistical boxplots of the distributions are displayed in Figure 7 for each of the considered comparative sets.

Discussion

When compared to the CAD model, ISO 50% and V2C envelopes provide similar results in terms of mean values around -21 µm (see Figure 6 and7). This negative mean value may be explained by an overall material retraction during manufacturing. Standard deviation discrepancies are explained by the ISO 50% envelope embedding surface roughness which is not estimated by the V2C algorithm. As a result, the CAD/V2C distribution is narrower than the CAD/ISO 50% set. In addition, relative to the chosen shape defect basis (see section 2.2), V2C provides shape defect information and is not sensible to lower defect wavelengths. A similar observation is made in Figure 7 with CAD/V2C set showing a narrower distribution width than the CAD/ISO 50% set. The V2C/ISO 50% comparative set shows that apart from the roughness consideration, V2C and ISO 50% have common trends. As illustrated in both Figures 6 and7, the centred V2C/ISO 50% set mean value confirms that V2C is efficient in estimating the structure shape defect relative to the considered basis.

In Figure 6, signed distance plots also show that identifying nodes in a lattice structure is a challenging task when fillets between struts are introduced at the manufacturing step. Indeed, these regions have the highest discrepancies in all of the considered comparative sets. Thus, focussing on struts allows access to all the information embedded in the volumetric data rather than adding node determination and approximation steps. This choice provides an overall estimation of both orientation and deformation defects of each strut composing of the lattice structure, with node connections defined as limit conditions.

A note should be made about the resulting modal decomposition amplitude for the lattice structure. Considering the nature of the strut i.e. vertical or inclinded, modal amplitudes are similar to the modal amplitude obtained in the strut analysis performed in [START_REF] De Pastre | Shape defect analysis from volumetric data -application to lattice struts in additive manufacturing[END_REF]. In other words, modal amplitude computed in this study are in the same order as node displacement displayed in Figure 5.

Conclusion

This paper introduced the V2C method adapted to entire lattice structures. We show that V2C is a tool that can provide the CAD model with shape defect information. The main advantage of this virtual volume correlation technique is that it relies only on volumetric data, without any post-reconstruction additional step, in order to estimate lattice structure shape defects relative to a chosen shape defect basis. Previous work supports the suitability of the considered shape defect basis in this paper. Improvements to the basis could focus on introducing lower wavelength defects and integrating specificto-the-process defects such as spatters or local recesses. The latter may require to turn the proposed approach into a meshbased one to specifically address these typologies of defects. In addition, as V2C deals with volumetric data, V2C requires strong computation resources, notably RAM resources. As an illustration, this work required about 200 Gb of RAM. Future work will continue to focus on defining a strategy such as resolution adaptation, to apply V2C in a reasonable computation time.

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. Cell (left) and strut (right) wire representation with associated frames The V2C problem can be expressed by the following correlation score minimisation: Φ 𝐮 = 𝑓 𝐗 -𝑔 𝐗 + 𝐮 ./01

  𝝀 # are found by minimisation of the correlation score reduced to the p strut and equation 2 can be expressed as: Correlation score minimisation: 𝝀 𝒎𝒊𝒏 𝒑 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 Φ M (𝒖) 𝝀 𝒑 Limit conditions: common nodes to several struts should have the same displacement.

Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. Designed (left) and manufactured (right) 2x2x2 lattice structure

Figure 3 .

 3 Figure 3. Data treatment

Figure 4 .

 4 Figure 4. Nodal displacement vectors identified by V2C, represented on the lattice wire model. Vector amplitudes have been enhanced for more readability. Dilatation, plane and vertical defects are not represented.

Figure 5 .

 5 Figure 5. Nodal displacement norms.

Figure 6 .Figure 6

 66 Figure 6. Signed distances between comparative sets: CAD model vs ISO50% envelope (left), CAD vs V2C (middle) and V2C vs ISO50% (right)

Figure 7 .

 7 Figure 7. Statistical boxplots for considered comparative sets (green dashed line highlights the 0 value).

Table 1 .

 1 Printing parameters

	Powder	Inconel 718
	Layer thickness	40 µm
	Laser power	220 W
	Scan speed	2100 mm.s	-1
	Contour scan power	210 W
	Contour scan speed	1800 mm.s	-1

Table 2 .

 2 XCT measurement setups

	Magnification	x11.4%
	Voxel size	15 µm
	Projections	1200
	Tube voltage	180 kV
	Tube current	130 µA

Acknowledgments CT measurements at ENS Paris-Saclay have been financially supported by the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche, through the Investissements d'avenir program (ANR-10-EQPX-37 MATMECA Grant) This work was performed using HPC resources from the Mésocentre computing center of CentraleSupélec and École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay supported by CNRS and Région Île-de-France (http://mesocentre.centralesupelec.fr/).


teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

Trade unions and labour law in France during the Second World War By Jean-Pierre Le Crom Enthusiasm for corporatist ideas reached its peak in France under the Vichy regime, between 1940 and 1944. A law of 1940 created the Peasant Corporation, then, in 1941, the status of the civil service was altered, and, lastly, the reorganisation of trade and industry was to be achieved by the Labour Charter. The first two laws have been extensively researched, early on by Isabel Boussard for the Peasant Corporation, and 1 later, as part of a larger piece of work, by Marc-Olivier Baruch, for the civil service. Here I 2 shall discuss only the third landmark, the Labour Charter, a very long and very ambitious document emblematic of the French State headed by Maréchal Philippe Pétain. 3 There are two main reasons for taking a closer look at this text. First, it is a good gauge of the range and influence of corporatist ideas in Vichy France, which had made corporatism into a mainstay of the National Revolution. Second, it is a privileged vantage point from which to observe trade unionism in France under German Occupation. As the philosopher Jacques Rancière noted over 40 years ago: "Vichy's entire labour history can be summed up as waiting for the Charter, then waiting for its application. Trade unionists talked of nothing else -of what it would be, of what they hoped it wouldn't be, of why it was delayed, of how it would be applied, of what was missing from it, and of how reality would knock it into shape." 4 This text was indeed immensely ambitious. Its Preamble mentions "determining harmonious and just relations" between employers, workers, technicians and craftsmen, and "making a clean break with the old system of class struggle." These goals were attuned to a two-fold European-wide movement at the time: the rise of fascism and authoritarianism, and the burgeoning of corporatist ideas. In Germany and Italy, but also in Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal and Dolfuss's Austria, Labour Charters were passed which broke completely with all the systems of labour relations in force until then. In these countries, the right to strike, as well as cross-sector trade union relations were abolished or made illegal; mechanisms for compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes became widespread, as did exclusive and compulsory trade union membership. We shall attempt to show here that the French Labour Charter, while very similar to other Charters of the same kind, stands apart as regards its origin, its contents and its effects. Jacques Julliard analysed this law, without access to the archives, in the first major symposium on the history of Vichy France, in 1970, organised by the Fondation nationale of the Ministry of Labour's Department for the Organisation of Work and Welfare, which had been created specifically to implement the Labour Charter, enabled me to carry out the research required for my Doctorate in Law, entitled L'organisation des relations professionnelles en France (1940-1944). Corporatisme et Charte du travail ["The organisation of labour relations in France (1940-1944). Corporatism and the Labour

Charter"]. Two collective volumes on similar themes were published around the same 6 time, Syndicalismes sous Vichy, and Ouvriers pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. What I shall be attempting to do here is summarise what my thesis (of 1992) contributed to the debate, while also bringing in later works. I shall first discuss the wide range of opinions which fed into the Charter, and the fact that the text was conceived as a compromise solution. I shall then examine why it failed in its primary objective of establishing a trade union-based corporatism, but also why it succeeded in one of its subsidiary goals, developing welfare provision within individual enterprises. I shall conclude with a brief overview of the major differences between French corporatism at the time, and the situation in other authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, namely Italy and Germany.

The Charter: a compromise solution

In France, trade unions, which had first been banned and then tolerated at the end of the Second Empire, gained legal recognition by a law of 21 March 1884. This law was quintessentially liberal in that it gave employees the right to join a trade union, or not, and it did not impose any specific type of union (according to trade or industry, for example, according to category -workers, employers, etc.-, or mixed, and so forth).

The 1884 law remained in force until the Second World War, with only a small reform concerning trade unions' legal capacity (law of 12 March 1920). However, with the resurgence of corporatist ideas under France's Third Republic, culminating in the 1930s, this liberalism of trade unionism came under fire. Some protagonists close to the Action française called for a return to the Ancien regime system of corporations. Others wanted trade unions to become part of the State machinery, as occurred in Italy under fascism.

Most people, however, advocated moving towards an associative corporatism based on models already in existence such as collective agreements, the compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes or the National economic council.

These considerations lay at the heart of the Vichy regime's economic and welfare reforms. Initially, trade unions were only indirectly affected, and the 1884 law remained in force throughout the first changes concerning industrial production, and civil service associations. However, with the publication of the Charte du travail in October 1941, trade union law and labour relations were to be entirely reworked.

The diverse viewpoints represented in the Charter

Three systems, in three different chapters of the Charter, were concerned with how class conflict could be eradicated. The first and most important system (called "the cornerstone" in the Preamble) established permanent occupational work and welfare committees [des comités sociaux professionnels] (which were tripartite: employers; the intermediate categories of managers, engineers and supervisors; and industrial and whitecollar workers). These committees were to be set up at local, regional and national level in some 30 occupations or "occupational families". Underpinning these committees were exclusive ("to be frank" ["pour être francs"]) and obligatory ("to be strong" ["pour être forts"]) trade unions, themselves divided into 5 categories. The work and welfare committees were to have significant normative power, ranging from setting salary levels to working hours, organising apprenticeship and implementing hygiene and safety policies.

They were to reflect upon and introduce "all the measures necessary for corporations to fulfill their duties to their members" regarding social welfare, in the areas of unemployment, insurance, retirement, mutual aid and assistance, and improvement in living conditions.

The Charter's authors, startled by their own boldness (since compulsory union membership meant a potential threat of millions of people brought together) made sure trade unions were strictly supervised. Their statutes and regulations had to be approvedunless they were standard -by the occupation's work and welfaire committee at national level, or by the Minister for Labour, and stringent conditions were applied for the nomination of union officers. Although Jews were not singled out in the Charter, they were unable, due to their "status", to become trade union officials.

Moreover, the first trade union heads were provisionally -but it was a "provisionally" which lasted until the Liberation -nominated by ministerial decree. As a last precaution, the workings of trade union governing bodies were strictly regulated: there was to be a secret ballot, a maximum of two consecutive terms in office, and the Board was to be replaced on a rolling basis, all of these measures being designed to "shelter these organisations from the sudden changes which have occurred in the masses." 10

State control also weighed heavily on the occupational committees. A government commissioner was present in each of these national-level committees, who could impose a veto on the execution of decisions in order to paralyse whatever was not to his liking. The government could also dissolve or suspend work and welfare committees, and appoint a provisional management committee, with full powers, to replace the suspended committee.

The second, and rival, system proposed in the Charter was that of mixed occupational associations, which also had welfare responsibilities, or else corporations, which played both an economic and a welfare role. What both systems had in common was their blindness to categorial differences within a particular occupation. All members were part of a single organisation that could be divided, on certain issues, into two sections (labour and management), but no other trade union membership was allowed. Again, these bodies operated under strict conditions: in both cases, motions required ratification by 50% of the members in each category in the occupation, or else a decision in favour by the trade unions concerned.

The Charter also mentioned a third mode of organisation: company-level work and welfare committees [les comités sociaux d'entreprise]. These were not an alternative to the occupational committees, but were complementary organisations. They were made compulsory in companies of over 100 employees. These committees were in charge of organising relations between employers and employees within the company or the branch, as well as managing welfare programmes, but they played no economic role.

Divergent logics

The reason why the Charter proposed a variety of ways of organising labour relations was because a disparate band of Vichy officials had been called upon to draft it, and Maréchal Pétain was too weak politically to impose a single line.

We shall not dwell here on the vicissitudes of the drafting process, described by Henry W. Ehrmann as "grotesque", and by Jacques Julliard as more of a "Western" than of due The honest citizen who is neither better nor worse than the others asks himself whether the parliamentary system, which is often confused with democracy, still deserves to be fought for to the death." 18

As Minister for Labour and Industrial Production, Belin adopted positions far removed 19 from those of the "die-hard" corporatists, and accepted, for example, the existence of class conflict, even if he sought to eliminate its effects. In his view, labour law should take two phenomena into account. The first was "the extraordinary intertwining of interests".

Although within a single occupation there existed divergent interests according to one's category, there were transverse interests also, and even where categorial divergences appeared, these did not exclude common interests. Take for example, he argued, the "corporation of miners" where, from the boss down to the apprentice, everyone wants to protect the industry from massive coal imports; even if, at the same time, conflicts can erupt between engineers applying for a particular post, or between workers for access to a particularly good gallery. For Belin, the Charter could reverse people's perspective and emphasise common goals. He denied reproducing the traditionalist illusion that disagreements could simply disappear. As he said, "it is not a question of ignoring them, but of finding a method for expressing them under conditions which are normal and healthy for the whole country; one must enable divergences to be resolved, and when this is not possible, make arbitration compulsory in order to put an end to these present disputes." 20

Belin sought to align legislation on collective labour relations with trade union practice.

He was shocked by the disparity between the increasing powers granted to the trade unions, especially since the Popular Front, and their structural weaknesses. The movement was, in his view, vitiated by politics and bureaucracy, with too many declarations and too little coherence. Its positions since 1938 followed a logic which was incompatible with modernising its relations with management. Thirty years later, reflecting on the reasons why he had advocated institutionalising the trade unions in 1940, Belin said, with reference to the law professor Georges Scelle and the employers' representative Auguste Detoeuf, "laws on collective labour relations can only be implemented where there are entities with clear limits, which have the real capacity to shoulder a defined collective responsability." Since, in 1940, the moribund trade union movement seemed 21 unable to redress itself by its own means, only the vigorous action of a State able to command obedience could, he maintained, revitalise it. This action would be founded on a "restored authority" and a "hierarchy", which themselves were only effective if imposed by "disciplines", with the overall goal being the precedence of the general over the particular interest.

Pétain proved incapable of acting decisively in the face of these disagreements. He would endorse one camp one day, and go back on his decision the next. He wanted social legislation that embraced the range of situations present in trade and industry, and was wary of a single status for all occupations. Yet he also sought to preserve his image as a figure of unity, refusing to take sides among the many camps which tore each other apart around him on how labour and welfare issues should be handled. Overall, however, his speeches and articles position him in the camp of the traditionalists. 22

A relative failure

The long-awaited Labour Charter became law on 4 October 1941. The new leadership of the Ministry of Labour's Department for the Organisation of Work and Welfare was responsible for its implementation, using a number of means, including a monthly bulletin, the Bulletin de la Charte du travail. Company-level work and welfare committees were provided with an Office in every département, to boost their activities. The Office also had its own Bulletin, often piloted by a trade unionist aligned with René Belin.

These propaganda instruments proved far too weak to elicit the enthusiasm the Vichy regime had hoped for. The Charter's refashioning of the occupations failed dismally, whereas the company-level work and welfare committees were strikingly successful.

Reorganising the occupations: a political failure

The main, trade union-based, corporatist system was a resounding failure. The Vichy government had initially planned to create 15000 to 20000 exclusive and compulsory trade unions, then lowered its sights to 5500 to 6000, by expanding their territorial coverage. In the end, only 1749 were created. Of these, 331 were entirely inactive, while the rest hardly organised more than two meetings, convened around what to do and how to do it.

Since the trade unions were to constitute the basis of the occupational work and welfare committees, these were equally unsuccessful. Of the 30 occupational families envisaged, only one saw the light of day, the "subsoil family" (mining).

The results were just as bad for the mixed occupational associations and the corporations. There were 14 in the first category, primarily in the radio-electrical and hardware sectors, and seven in the second, all in the food trades. Other corporations were set up outside the framework of the Labour Charter in the sea fishing, merchant navy, and inland water transports sectors.

What were the causes of this failure? Leaving aside the nature of the Charter's text -its incoherence, ambiguities, and lacunae -and also more general considerations relating to the development of the Vichy regime and how it was perceived by public opinion, two causes appear fundamental.

The first could be called the "clanic wars" which affected labour relations and more broadly work and welfare issues, which continued right up to the Liberation. They were so intense that most of the decrees required to clarify the Charter's imprecisions could not be passed. Far from being simply technical, the decrees were often politically loaded, and as such became the focus of heated debate between the Ministry of Labour and the traditionalists. The success of the "spuds committees"

Although the Charter's main programme -union-based corporatism -was a failure, the establishment of company-level work and welfare committees (which, we must remember, were a complementary and not an alternative system) can be deemed a success.

In contrast to the small number of trade unions set up, the number of company-level work and welfare committees established was huge: 7807 in January 1944 and roughly 9 000 in August 1944, that is, as many as the number of companies of more than 100 employees, where they were mandatory. How is this at least quantitative success to 27 be explained?

It should be stressed that the trade unionists, including those in the Resistance, were not opposed to the principle of workforce representation at the company level. A study published by the Comité d'études économiques et syndicales -a body composed of ex-CGT and ex-CFTC trade unionists hostile to Vichy -showed that trade unions were divided on the issue of the development of these Committees: "Some were mistrustful, going as far as turning their back on them. Others were more involved, less wary, or else were more opportunistic." Many believed that the representatives on the 28 company-level work and welfare committees could replace the staff delegates created under the Popular Front in 1936; these, although not explicitly abolished, did not figure in the Charter. So the trade unionists did not criticise the idea in itself, but rather the highly paternalistic criteria according to which worker representatives were nominated:

when the employer did not himself nominate the Committee members, he often wielded the Vichy motto of "Work, Family, and Fatherland," and singled out for separate lists the older employees, the most productive, the war veterans, and the fathers or mothers of large families. After 1943, however, elections according to category or college became the rule (supervisors, white-collar workers and technicians, workers), partly because of government directives, and partly due to Pétain's expressed preference for election, and also no doubt due to management's sense that the tide was turning. 29 Another reason why unionised workers who were also Resistance fighters participated in the meetings and activities of the company-level work and welfare committees was because they provided usesful services for employees. An inquiry 30 carried out by the car manufacturer Renault in March 1943 showed that the employees knew next to nothing about the Committee itself, but could identify all the services it provided. 31 The Committees's main focus was mutual assistance and health insurance, and help to prisoners, but their primary virtue was actually providing food, hence their expressive nickname of "spuds committee" [comités patates]. Of the 100-odd committees of this kind, around 70 managed a company-level cantine, and 50 owned a cooperative, or belonged to a cross-company purchasing group. Employees sometimes contributed to 32 financing these services, but employers paid the bulk of the costs. They financed all the Committees, and, in 30% of the cases, were the sole funders. In some companies, the outlay could represent as much as half the direct salary of employees. In Renault plants, the "liberal" -non-mandatory -welfare expenditure, which was essentially the costs of these "spuds committees", came to 11% of the turnover in 1943, as against 2% in 1938. For the employers, this massive investment had the advantage of reducing the physiological impact of shortages on the workers (malnutrition, illness, and accidents), and it countered the correspondingly low productivity levels. But it also functioned as a way of indirectly increasing salaries and thus retaining workers drawn to these higher wages, like those offered by the organisation Todt for building Nazi Germany's Atlantic

Wall.

The company-level work and welfare committees proved to be so useful that already -------

The Labour Charter was long considered to be a foreign import, particularly from

Italy. This argument rested on the fact that René Belin's successor as Minister for Labour, Hubert Lagardelle, whose law doctorate of 1905 was entitled "The general strike and socialism", had been a counsellor for social affairs in the French Embassy in Italy in the 1930s, and had met Mussolini on several occasions. Additionally, mention is made of the fact that Pétain was a fervent admirer of Salazar, and kept a copy of his book "How to restore a State" on his desk. The situations in France during the Second World War and in other Southern European countries, and even elsewhere in the 1930s and 1940s, did indeed have much in common. The outlawing of strikes, the abolition of cross-sector trade union relations, and the compulsory arbitration of labour disputes were common to almost all the Southern European countries.

Yet there were also many differences. In Germany, trade unions were simply abolished in 1933, and replaced by a "Labour Front" responsible for ensuring "labour peace". In the words of an ordinance of 24 October 1934, this "Labour Front" was "the only organisation with jurisdiction in all areas concerning the representation of workers and the resolution of disputes between them and employers". It was also empowered in certain work and welfare areas (training, safety and hygiene, and leisure activities under the aegis of the organisation "Strength through Joy"). However, it existed in companies principally as an instrument of Nazi Party policies, in order to ensure their application. 35 In Italy, the existing trade unions were progressively brought to heel with the development of Fascist unions, whose power was officially enshrined in a law of 3 April 1926. For each occupation, the State officially recognised one, non-mixed trade union.

Although not strictly obligatory, the union's prerogatives and characteristics were such that freedom of association was a pure fiction. The union had to demonstrate "good political conduct", and there was no right to strike. It could collect the subscription fees from all members of the occupation and sign mandatory collective agreements on its own, within the overall framework of disciplining the labour market and improving producton.

The The originality of Fascist trade unionism consisted in the primacy of the political, and the subordination of work and welfare issues to totalitarian dogmas. The French Labour

Charter did not go that far. Needless to say, its Preamble shows the dependence of the trade unions on the State, in the claim that their doctrines could never differ from those of the government. However, the single trade union under Vichy was never conceived as a means of relaying the National Revolution.

Besides, it is important to stress that in France the existing trade unions, created under the 1884 law, were not dissolved, and neither were their local or départemental branches.

Among the transitional arrangements of the Charter, Article 72 precisely provides that "the trade unions and groupings of existing trade unions at the date of publication of the present law will continue their activity until a decree is passed for their dissolution or their integration into the new occupational organisation".

Finally, to summarise this comparative aspect, the essential difference between the three countries was the relation to the trade unions: in Germany, they were simply abolished; in Italy, they were subordinated to political ends; and in France, the objective was, on the contrary, to depoliticise the trade unions. The text of the Labour Charter is reproduced in J.-P. Le Crom (ed.), Deux siècles de droit du La politique du patronat français (1936-1955), Paris, Colin, 1959, pp. 88-91. 11 Op. cit., p. 167. Vichy (1940-1944), op. cit., pp. 196

Translated by Sashia Brown

7 8

 7 Since then, trade unionism during the Second World War has attracted quite a lot of research, often with a sectoral focus, and since it cannot all be cited here, I shall mention only the collective volume published in 2008, Le syndicalisme dans la France occupée. 9

  11 political process. A first draft was prepared by the Ministry for Labour in August and 12 September 1940. It was reworked several times after the opposition it encountered from Maréchal Pétain's civil cabinet, and from the Office for corporative and social affairs of the Vice-Presidency of the National Council. It was abandoned after Laval, the Vice-President of the Council, was dismissed, on 13 December 1940. In order to break the stalemate, a Committee for occupational organisation [Comité de l'organisation professionnelle], or COP, was set up, which met three times, between June and August 1941. The text drafted by this select group was altered dozens of times thereafter, including after it had been passed by the Council of Ministers, giving rise to a plethora of meetings and audiences with Pétain. One version was even substituted for another as it was going to press in the Journal Officiel.Two crucial areas were the object of controversy: the role of trade unions in the new organisation of labour relations; and the conditions for the creation and accreditation of mixed occupational associations and corporations. The Vichy regime had decided to establish these as a way of rewarding Jules Verger, the President of the Confederation of Mixed Occupational Associations (an umbrella organisation for companies from the electrical, building, and public works sector). After the large-scale strikes of 1936, this stalwart supporter of Pétain took it upon himself to try to reduce the "dreadful incomprehension reigning between employers and workers". The first mixed occupational association was created in his company, L'entreprise électrique, in 1937. Jules Verger's 13 vision of labour relations was extremely paternalistic, and based on strongly reactionary Catholic ideas. He was very much out on a limb during the COP's deliberations, while claiming to be "the only true corporatist in the strict sense" present. Over this period, on numerous occasions, he condemned what he deemed to be a most unholy alliance between the two main groups in the COP, representatives of big business on the one hand, and ex-CGT trade unionists on the other.Marcel Rouaix and Jean Paillard, who were active in the Office for corporative and social affairs of the Vice-Presidency of the National Council represented the "hardline" corporatist stance which sought to limit trade union involvement as far as possible, even if it was stripped of Communist influence, in order to extend the role of corporations as far as possible. Rouaix is little known. Jean Paillard is better known because of the memoirs he published, at his own cost, in 1979. He was a die-hard supporter of Pétain, and an 14 activist in the far-right, monarchist Action française, a movement and a journal whose bestknown figure is Charles Maurras. Although neither Rouaix nor Paillard were members of the Committee responsible for drafting the Labour Charter, one of their close associates, Colonel Cèbe, also a member of the Action française, was the Committee's secretary and responsible for the final form of the Charter. He was a member of Pétain's civil cabinet, and close to its head, Du Moulin de Labarthète.15 The opposition to these unconditional devotees of corporatism was made up of proponents of a trade union-based corporatism, founded on the occupational work and welfare committees, themselves made up of representatives of single and compulsory trade unions differentiated according to category. Their main advocate was the Minister for Labour, René Belin, and the trade unionists who toed the same line as he did, and were members of the COP, such as the leaders of the ex-CGT federations for metallurgy (Roy), mining (Bard) and the food industries (Savoie), as well as employer 16 representatives of major industries. There were of course divergences between employer 17 and employee representatives, and nuances in the positions defended. However, all agreed on Belin's diagnosis of the failure of the French system of labour relations under the Third Republic, and on the ways to remedy this. From 1936, Belin headed the Syndicats tendency and journal within the CGT. Disappointed by the Third Republic's record, a convinced pacifist, and a relentless anti-Communist, he became increasingly critical of parliamentary process, declaring in 1938, that "what is really intolerable is the regime itself.

  excluded after the German-Soviet Pact), deleted from its statutes references to the class struggle, and replaced them with an article on mandatory arbitration of labour disputes, despite the fact that from 1937 to 1939 the effects of this procedure on salaries had been largely negative. The search for stability, and the construction of a system sufficiently constraining to prevent management eluding debate by invoking the "red peril", yet based on an understanding of the complexity of contradictions in the world of work, seemed a realistic objective for Belin's reforms at the time, in the summer of 1940, given the hugely traumatic defeat of France. A sign of this realism is the fact that a large number of workers' representatives (heads of private-sector federations and of local and départemental union branches) reacted favourably to Belin's proposals, especially because he integrated long-standing workers' demands such as contributory pensions for older salaried workers (vetoed by the Senate under the Popular Front), and an increase in the number of health and safety inspectors.However, this relative good will was soon withdrawn. Already in the Autumn of 1940, the authoritarian character of the regime's first measures had radicalised trade union opposition, which until then had remained isolated through lack of a political alternative.But it was not until 1943 that resistance to the Charter really won out over mistrust and wait-and-see attitudes. 1943 was the year in which the two previously antagonistic branches of the CGT, the Communists and the Reformists, were reunited. A direct consequence of this was that the Comité d'études économiques et syndicales [Committee for economic and trade union studies], whose leading members had been in the Resistance since 1940, adopted increasingly outspoken positions. Gone were the days when, reading between the lines of the many criticisms, one could detect support for the principle of occupational work and welfare committees and single trade unions "as long as they are free". The time had come for actively sabotaging the Charter, that "fascist muzzle they want to put on the French working class", and for getting a political foothold in the surviving older trade unions, in preparation for the postwar period, which felt imminent.26

  in early 1944, in Algiers, the Commissariat for Social Affairs (the equivalent of a Ministry) of Général de Gaulle's provisional government was planning to continue them after the Liberaton: "As regards welfare services, I think you can usefully consult the remit of the company-level work and welfare committees as laid down in the Labour Charter. It is probable that some of the texts defining the powers of these Committees could be maintained." Despite the abrogation of the Charter in July 1944, the 33 committees continued to function until their replacement by Works Councils in February 1945. 34Our inquiry into the application of the Labour Charter shows two phenomena. First, the failure of the corporatist organisation of labour. This had political causes, namely the authoritarian and intransigeant attitudes of the Vichy regime. Second, the success of the company-level work and welfare committees, which owed nothing -or almost nothing -to the political sphere of Vichy. Their 70,000 delegates and 160,000 volunteers did not get involved in order to please Maréchal Pétain. Their motivation was first and foremost to reduce the disastrous effects of the German Occupation and the Collaboration on everyday life, and one can imagine that they would have acted in much the same way had the Charter not existed.

  Italian trade unions formed one of the three groups, with the employers on the one hand, the State and the Fascist party on the other, of each of the 22 corporations instituted by the law of 5 February 1934. They were also represented in the Corporative Chamber, which replaced the Chamber of Deputies in 1927, and they later became part of the Party's National Council within the Chamber ofFasci and Corporations, in 1939. 36

I

  . Boussard, Vichy et la corporation paysanne, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des 1 sciences politiques, 1980, 414 p . M.-O. Baruch, Servir l'État français : l'administration en France de 1940 à 1944, Paris,

  La structure professionnelle de demain. L'association professionnelle mixte, centre de 13 la Charte du travail, 1943, 123 p. La révolution corporative spontanée, 1979, 350 p. 14 J.-P. Le Crom, « La défense du corporatisme intégral sous Vichy. Ses acteurs, leurs inspirations, 15 leurs réalisations », Les Études sociales, n° 157-158 : Les sciences sociales et la corporation (1850-1945), 1st and 2 nd Quarter 2013, pp. 245-259. On this federation, see M. Margairaz, « La Fédération des travailleurs de la métallurgie CGT 16 sous l'Occupation ou les "échelles" de la présence », in Le syndicalisme dans la France occupée, op. cit., pp. 235-252.For example, the heads of the employers' federations in the chemical and metallurgy industries,

12 J. Verger, 17 respectively Painvin and Lenté. Syndicats, n° 77, 1st April 1938. 18 René Belin published his Memoirs under the title : Du secrétariat de la CGT au gouvernement 19 de Vichy, Paris, Albatros, 1978, 201 p. French National Archives F22 1788. René Belin's audition before the Conseil national, 20 6 December 1941. René Belin's paper at the collloquium organised by the Fondation nationale des sciences 21 politiques, in Le gouvernement de

  and 199.See particularly Philipp.e Pétain, « La politique sociale de l'avenir », Revue des deux mondes,

	22
	15 September 1940.
	23	A note quoted by Georges Lefranc, Les expériences syndicales en France de 1939 à 1950,
	Paris, Aubier, 1950, p. 70 et 71.
		Institut d'histoire sociale, Archives René Belin, hand-written note, n.d.

24

French National Archives, F22 1843. 25

After the publication of the Charter, Pétain received a number of notes from Rouaix, Paillard and Cèbe, which criticised the Ministry of Labour as "the rallying point and keystone of a certain number of trade unionists who are real professionals of this system, and who will do anything to maintain this profession [as trade union leaders].

They supplement their sparse numbers with a plethora of official activities (newspapers, meetings, study seminars, and so forth). But the majority of employees are completely separate from their former leaders. They are waiting for the new organisation announced by Maréchal Pétain." 23 Belin was also critical. He wanted Pétain to curb Rouaix and Paillard, "who, in the mind of any serious worker or employer, ruin the notion of corporation", and he also wanted the Ministry of Labour to be in charge of applying the Charter. 24 The conflict focused on the procedure for accrediting mixed occupational associations, and corporations. Article 40 of the Charter provided that they should be approved on a case by case basis, by a decree countersigned by the Vice-President of the National Council and the relevant ministers (or their highest civil servants), on receipt of an opinion delivered by a commission composed of their representatives. The fact that this "small commission" was placed under the authority of the Ministry for the Coordination of New Institutions, and that its headquarters were to be in the Ministry of Labour spelt failure for the proponents of a fully-blown corporatism, as did the provisional dismissal of Rouaix and Paillard. All the leaders who succeeded one another in the Ministry of Labour would have echoed the analysis made by Moysset, the Minister for the Coordination of New Institutions: "The commission wonders whether the corporations are capable of being guided by the general interest in the leadership of their professions. Anyone can see that the corporations in their present state are corporations only in name […]. The goal we should pursue at present -and it is a distant goal -is to give workers the instruction necessary for them to be associated with employers in leading the professions. To want to establish corporatism immediately, despite the state of ignorance of the working classes today, is to end up with economic paternalism and so to "torpedo" the very idea of corporation". 25 The second, crucial, reason for the failure of the occupational chapter of the Labour Charter, was the absence of union support. In 1940, and even in 1941, the need to renew the system of labour relations seemed urgent to most of the social partners. In July 1940, the CGT's national confederate committee in Toulouse -its "Parliament" -, which represented all union tendencies (except for the Communists, who had been


Jean-Pierre Le Crom

Helping the Most Needy: the Role of the Secours National

During the Second World War in France, everyday life was largely shaped by German demands.

The objective of the occupant was to exploit as many resources (whether human, agricultural, mineral or industrial) as possible, in order to sustain the German war effort against the British, and later, the Russians and the Americans. This situation led to a significant drop in the French population's financial and material means, which the Vichy regime tried to address in a number of ways. In the spirit of the National Revolution, the answer could not come from the state, which, according to Marshal Pétain, was 'overweight and defective' ; it had to come from families, 1 professionals, communities and organisations (whether philanthropic or charitable).

It is in relation to the question of charitable giving that Pétain would transform and develop the Secours National, which had been founded in August 1914, was active during the First World 2 War, and officially recognised as contributing to the public good in September 1915. Its purpose 3 was to help civilians in their struggle against deprivations brought about by war, through the collection of private donations which were then allocated via various other private organisations, over which it had no control. Fifty million francs were thus reattributed to civilians in need, in the space of the four years of the Great War. It was this organisation which the Daladier government decided by decree to revive shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War on 19 October 1939.

Bearing the same name, but slightly different in nature, the new Secours National also received subsidies from the State -which would increase substantially over time. It was also now responsible for all the other wartime charities which appealed to the generosity of the public. These charities were only permitted to work on condition that they adhered to the Secours National and pledged to follow its general policies.

Recognising the scope of the problems stemming from the 1940 defeat, the newly-born Vichy regime decided to resort principally to the Secours National in the implementation of its mutual aid policy. This went on to impact directly upon the everyday life of millions of French people: during the German Occupation, the Secours National considerably expanded its activities, becoming a sort of 'State within the State'. It was eventually closed down in 1949, after having undergone post-war purges of personnel, and renamed Entraide Française in late 1944. This chapter will focus on its activities during the Second World War only. After describing and analysing its ever-growing field of activity during those years, it will go one to show how the État Français repeatedly tried to use it for its own political ends.

To the rescue of the French population

Initially created to coordinate the activities of all other charitable organisations involved in helping the civilian victims of war, the Secours National progressively extended its activity beyond emergency aid to include social care as well. This section will deal first with its supervision of other charities, and then consider the multi-faceted nature of its own activity.

Following the creation of a national system of social insurance in France, and of a benefit system intended for the most deprived, including, among other things, free healthcare and support for the elderly and disabled, by the early twentieth century, the role played by private (often religious) charities had notably diminished. Furthermore their resources, in spite of the relative stability of donations, had also been hit by growing inflation. In response to requests to increase 4 state contributions, the Third Republic had been trying to improve coordination between charities; the Popular Front government was particularly active here, but Finance Minister Henri Sellier failed to deliver any substantial change. 5 The advent of the Vichy regime changed this situation considerably. Three factors help explain this: first, most charities were receptive to the values put forward National Revolution, which made them more favourable to the reforms the new government proposed; second, the nature of the difficulties faced by millions of French people called for a rationalisation of emergency help; and third, the regime was, in its early days, deeply influenced by the ideas of Charles Maurras, key thinker of the Action française movement, and in particular his preference for private organisations over public institutions. This new policy was crystallised on the 11 October 1940, by the promulgation of a new law entrusting the Secours National with the supervision of all charitable organisations in France.

This supervision was first and foremost effected through a monopoly over all appeals to public generosity. Before the war, the Comité français de lutte contre la tuberculose (the French Committee for the Struggle against Tuberculosis) or the Petites soeurs des pauvres (the Little Sisters of the Poor, a Catholic charity) could collect donations in churches or launch subscriptions, via the press for example. This was forbidden under the new system: it was now the responsibility of the Secours National to initiate and manage these appeals, as well as to allocate funding to each association, which could no longer rely solely on its own members' contributions and donations.

However, the Secours National only had jurisdiction over providing aid to civilian victims of war. The other organisations which were in charge of aid related to military concerns, and in particular to prisoners of war, were the Committee for the Assistance to Prisoners of War (also known as Comité de Calan), the Service for Prisoners of War, the Légion française des combattants (French Legion of Veterans) and the French Red Cross. This complex and barely comprehensible arrangement would be numerous times throughout the war.

In return for its monopoly on all appeals to public generosity, therefore, the Secours National had to decide the allocation of funding to each of the different charitable organisations. By 1 August 1944, it had given a total of 1.6 billion francs to 12,000 such charities. This large sum is partly explained by the fact that the Secours National understood its responsibilities in a fairly generous way. Alongside charities in the strict sense of the term, it also subsidised organisations attached to movements and services whose purpose was not directly linked to charity or aid, such as the kitchens of the Légion française des combattants, working on a mutual aid basis, and even children's summer camps organised by the Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme (the Legion of French Volunteers against Bolshevism, the LVF, better known for sending French soldiers to fight alongside the Nazis on the Eastern Front). In addition, the Secours National was always ready to 'assist the public services, by endeavouring to complement their work'. This it did 6 through occasional funding initiatives, for example, the financial support of people returning from a period in a sanatorium, and even the building and development of prisons.

It should be noted that not all charities called on the Secours National for funding, whether systematically or periodically, and nor did the Secours National grant all requests: out of 7,893 requests made in 1943, 590 were turned down (7.4 per cent). But the majority of charities soon came to rely solely on its subsidies. Before the war, the Comité français de lutte contre la 7 tuberculose, for example, mainly funded its own activities through the sale of stamps, which brought in some twenty million francs in 1938, and thirteen million in 1939. These campaigns were suppressed from 1940, and the Committee came to be funded by the Secours National -with a little over 12.5 million francs in 1940, and 20 million in 1941. 8 The Secours National could also request that the State dissolve a charity. Indeed, the article 4 of the 4 October 1940 law stipulated that any charity which did not act upon its injunctions could be forbidden to continue by government decree. This device was used to dissolve the Salvation Army, on the official grounds that the activities of this association were too similar to those of the Secours National, and [that] it was important, in the domain of charity and assistance, to ensure that the equitable repartition of the country's resources devoted to the people in need be supported by a unity of inspiration and direction. 10 The truth was that the Salvation Army, having Protestant roots, was suspected of being opposed to the regime, and even of being Gaullist. In the same way, there were plans to dissolve the French 11 branch of the Quakers, who, being both Protestant and American, were doubly suspicious. But 12 while this dissolution was effectively carried out in the Occupied Zone, Pastor Boegner, president of the French Protestant Federation, successfully asked of René Bousquet and Pierre Laval that they allow Quaker activities to continue in the southern part of the country. The price to pay was a number of changes in the composition of the board of directors. Boegner's protestations may have 13 inspired amendments to a new law of 23 August 1943, which specified that non-compliant charities would first be handed a warning, before being suspended for a maximum of three months by the prefect, and could even be dissolved by a governmental decree on the prefect's request. 14 The Secours National was not only the 'charity of charities', it was a charity in and of itself.

At first its own activity only concerned a few targeted sectors of the population: those who were the direct victims of the war. Yet its action on this front was multi-faceted. The first group of such victims were refugees, whose number reached 2,600,000 during the course of the war. The second were people whose homes had been wholly or partly destroyed -whether by Allied or German bombs, or by ground conflict -many of whom were also refugees. Over the period 1939-1945, around four French million people were categorized as 100 per cent bombed out, losing the entirety of their homes and property, while around one million people were considered partially bombed out. Among the ruins, there was much to be done: tending to the injured, burying the dead, feeding, clothing and accommodating the survivors, evacuating children to the countryside. These tasks were tackled by a number of organisations, including the Défense passive (the national air raid precautions organisation), the French Red Cross, the Service interministériel de protection contre les événements de guerre (SIPEG -Inter-ministerial Service for the Protection against the Events of War), the COSI, and also but also collaborationist political parties such as Marcel Déat's Rassemblement national populaire or Jacques Doriot's Parti populaire français. The Secours National's remit was threefold: providing emergency -material, not financial -aid, through the allocation of food, clothes, furniture and temporary accommodation; taking care of refugeesparticularly children -by evacuating them to the countryside; and providing food for the youth teams who were assisting bombed-out civilians. In 1943, the Secours National thus distributed to the latter and to refugees 7.92 million food rations, 1.5 million clothes and sheets, 100,000 pieces of furniture, and 600,000 pairs of shoes. 15 However, the notion of a 'direct victim' quickly came to be interpreted by the Secours National in the largest possible way. Indeed, the Secours soon extended its activities to include what might be termed 'indirect' victims. Among these, some categories were more privileged than others, particularly the elderly, who, in the words of Maréchal Pétain, were 'more affected than all the others by these hard times'. Their situation before the war was already fairly precarious: those 16 who benefitted from a small pension, such as railway workers, postmen or tabac employees, could make ends meet with 6,000 to 12,000 francs per year. But for those who had not paid any contributions to the 1910 workers' and peasants' pension system -this amounted to two thirds of the total of theoretical subscribers -and for those who were subject to social insurances -which were also limited in their application -the situation was far more problematic. These people had to resort to state-funded Aid for the Elderly: a sum of around 1,800 francs, to which they sometimes could add small annuities accumulated throughout their working life. This, along with homegrown vegetables, fishing (for men) and paid housework (for women), meant that they could just about meet their basic needs. Yet wartime inflation made their situation considerably worse. As a social worker based in the Sarthe during the war explained: They began by giving up the superfluous: no more wedding anniversary presents bought in secret, no more fancy dinners to celebrate important days. Then they had sell the house in return for an annuity, remove meat from their daily diet, stop buying clothes and start spending less on wood and coal. Those who could still work started looking for menial jobs, such as chopping wood, cleaning and taking in mending. 17

These material difficulties were more often than not accompanied by a great deal of distress and anxiety. The newly introduced allowance for older waged workers, offered those aged over 65 years with insufficient resources the sum of 3,600 francs per year (with Parisians receiving an extra 1,600 francs). But this was not enough, especially as it excluded farmers and self-employed people, a large part of the workforce.

One of the Secours national's main initiatives in this respect was to get a young personoften a secondary school or university student -to 'adopt' an elderly person. This might involve the the former bringing meals to the latter, staying for a chat, and accompanying them out for a stroll, among other things. Although this system, first implemented in 1941 in the Seine Department, would eventually reach 18,000 beneficiaries by September 1944. Yet the fact that 16 per cent of 18 the population was aged over 60 or more in 1946 means that the success of this enterprise should be qualified. 19 Children were another section of the population favoured by the Secours National. It helped them by supplying and assisting school canteens, distributing protein biscuits or vitamin tablets, organising summer holiday camps and opening specialised care establishments. In December 1943 there were 43 such institutions, which welcomed either soldiers' children and children of prisoners of war, children of French workers based in Germany, or physically disabled children. They accommodated 4,000 children in total, but 10 per cent of the available spaces were not filled. 20 The families of prisoners of war were another recipient of the Secours National's aid. As in many other areas, its shared this remit with other organisations. In this particular instance, the other main actor was the Famille du prisonier (the Family of the Prisoner), whose autonomy its president (Madame la générale Huntzinger) defended on the grounds that it employed only volunteerswhich was incorrect -and that the families of prisoners of war should not be treated in the same way as the 'needy' people usually associated with the Secours National. The confusion regarding who was in charge of what would only be partly cleared by an April 1941 decision, stating that while the Famille du prisonier was indeed autonomous when it came to intellectual and moral assistance, the material aid it provided was to be monitored nonetheless by the Secours National.

Similarly, the latter also supervised the Famille du prisonier's departmental delegates, and its managing director was accountable to a 'super-director'.

The last category benefitting from the Secours National's direct assistance is perhaps more surprising: prisoners and internment camp inmates were not exactly a favoured group, but the infrastructures meant to keep them alive were becoming increasingly inadequate. In internment camps, inmates received only 700 to 900 calories per day, which led increasing instances of gastro- The Secours National began intervening in internment camps from January 1942, alongside the Quakers, the charitable organisation of Saint-Vincent-de-Paul and the Red Cross. In relation to food, this brought about daily portions of thick soup, and an additional sixty grams of dried vegetables, twenty grams of pasta, two grams of fat, and either one salted sardine or twenty-five grams of jam or fresh fruit. Out of the 9,000 camp inmates identified by the Secours National in 1943, 2,400 benefitted from its assistance. These were selected by doctors, in agreement with social workers. The Secours National's kitchen worked independently from that of the camp, and was situated in a separate building, which also included a canteen and a storeroom. 23 Food and clothing aid was thus the Secours National's main and prefered way of providing assistance, whether to refugees, bombed-out people, the elderly, prisoners' families or camp inmates. But in reality this assistance did not stop at any specific category of the French population: from 1940 onwards, it would apply to more and more people, for whom the common denominator was hunger.

From 1 January 1941 to the Liberation, the Secours National served an astonishing 470 million rations in mutual aid canteens (not including those served to bombed-out people), and 405 million more in school canteens. Figures such as these were published on a regular basis, as part of the regime's ongoing propaganda. But when it came to food aid, the Secours National rarely acted alone. School canteens were actually usually managed by town or school councils, and mutual aid 24 canteens by town councils or charitable organisations, such as the Assistants du devoir patriotique, the Salvation Army or the Little Sisters of the Poor, who had traditionally played an active part in the organisation of soup kitchens, food banks and the supply of cheap meals.

The role of the Secours National was first to help fund these initiatives as they were set up, often by attributing coupons granting access to primary resources, initially destined for the refurbishment of soup kitchens. It was also to complement the existing food supplies and to provide financial support up to 30 per cent of the cost for those who could not pay for their meal in its entirety or at all. The Secours National also contributed up to a quarter or a third -depending on 25 the case -of the cost price of school canteen rations.

From 1941 onwards it also organised mothers' tea parties, at which pregnant women, and mothers, their babies and toddlers were given food supplements adapted to their specific needs. The summer holiday camps organised by the Secours National were also motivated by food shortages: it was reported that in 1941, children who went to such camps came back 1.7 kilograms heavier and 1.2 centimetres taller on average. But one of the Secours National's most important operations in this respect was the distribution in schools of vitamin tablets containing vitamins C and B1, and of casein (protein) biscuits. These were made of flour, casein lactose, margarine and sugar, and were reminiscent of the famous 'soldiers' biscuits', although they tasted much better. Depending on how old they were, children were given two, four or six such biscuits.

Finally, the Secours National also played a role in the production of food supplies. It organised or supported family-owned canning factories (112 in 1942) and dehydration centres (6 in 1942), and helped with the cultivation of family-owned vegetable gardens (3 million in 1943, against one million in 1939) by distributing tools, seeds, plants, fertilisers, and so on. The produce of these gardens, whose average surface area was about 400 square metres, provided up to 3 per cent of their owners' caloric needs and 6 per cent of their protein needs in 1943; it also provided some financial relief, around 10 francs per square metre according to estimates. 26 As well as food aid, the Secours National was actively involved in supplying clothing to the French population. Thousands of refugees had lost almost all of their clothes, and the poorest families lacked the means to buy even basic items of clothing or bedding. The prices for these had risen sharply, as Germans requisitions of primary sources meant that manufacturers had to slow down production. A letter of a woman from Nantes to her prisoner husband illustrates this:

The boys have nothing to wear. Their shirts are in tatters. Their Communion robes are now four years old and ridiculously short, yet as there's no alternative they still have to wear them. They just don't fit anymore into their green overcoats, which are so shabby! Everything they have is either wearing thin or too small. I spend an awful lot of my time mending. I'm doing it so often that they're becoming a patchwork of different shades of blue. When I was unemployed, I had to sell my textile coupons for food, which means I couldn't buy them the two jackets they needed. I've got a coupon for long-johns -I'll try to get them big and dark so that they last longer, and then I can pass them on to Gustave. I'm going to write to the Secours National as they give second-hand clothes to people in need. 27 Working with the authorities, the Secours National came up with a system whereby clothes could be salvaged and reused. This was done in three ways: the first option was that which Gustave Pilon, the general secretary of the Secours National, called the 'grey market', as opposed to the betterknown 'black market'. This grey market implied buying stock from manufacturers who had not declared it, and who were thus threatened with confiscation. The second way of getting hold of old clothes was to collect them through a public campaign called the poignée de laine (the 'handful of wool'). In the early days of the Occupation, these collections were organised with the Comité central d'assistance aux prisonniers de guerre (Central Committee for the Assistance of Prisoners of War -CCAPG). Donors were invited to bring clothes to designated establishments such as prefectures, town halls, schools or Secours National centres; at the same time, primary and secondary school pupils and youth groups were sent out to gather second-hand clothes directly from their owners, using handcarts. While the first collections were rather successful, they were not without incident: for example, a ton of clothes was left for several days in front of the public library in Rodez before it was spotted on the 1 January 1941, soaked in rain water. No action had been taken to store the clothes in a dry place. Moreover, as people learnt to 'make do and mend' what little they had, the quantity of clothes given to the Secours National was diminishing. This is why 29 a third mode of gathering clothes was implemented. On the 11 February 1941, a law was passed which allowed people to buy new clothes without coupons if they gave to the Secours National double the quantity purchased in old but mendable and reusable garments. Six weeks after this system was put into place, the Secours had collected sixteen tons of clothing items.

All these clothes would then be sent to the Secours National sewing workshops, to be mended and sold through its clothing outlets. These sewing workshops provided the Secours with an opportunity to develop aid through work, which was one of its leitmotivs. However, while the number of sewing workshops increased to reach about 800 in 1943, the number of employeesmostly women often working part-time and from home -decreased significantly, from around 50,000 in April 1941 to 17,500 in 1943.

To the rescue of the Vichy regime

The fast-growing development of the Secours National's activities would generate an immense bureaucracy, similar to that of a public institution; however the fact that it formally remained a private organisation meant that it was a perfect vehicle for the Vichy regime's propaganda. By providing aid through work, by founding seventy-seven social centres and by establishing housework training centres for 5,000 to 6,000 women and older girls, the Secours National went well beyond the confines of emergency aid and put in place a more lasting and ideologically charged form of social action. This development owed a lot to the ideological thought and activities of the Secours National's director, Robert Garric.

Garric was a Catholic intellectual and man of letters, whose social ideas around national duty were close to those of Marshal Lyautey, and who had created the Équipes sociales (social teams) which were both a philanthropic association and a further education institution. In 1939, the Minister of Munitions Raoul Dautry, who became president of the Entraide Française after 1944, called on Garric to head the social services he had just created. There, Garric had worked with Jean Toutée, who became vice-president of the Secours National, Gustave Pilon, who became its general secretary, and Hyacinthe Dubreuil, who also took on managing responsibilities within the organisation. Within the Secours National, these men promoted a humane and non-bureaucratic conception of social action, which earned them the nickname of 'Socials', with a capital 'S'. At the 1942 conference of Secours National delegates, it was declared:

Our job, within the social sector of the Secours National, is to make all forms of aid more humane, more respectful and more compassionate. At no moment should there be any association, in people's minds, between the Secours National and a vast office, a vast anonymous counter behind which bureaucrats would dispense, on a regular basis, in a cold and mechanical and therefore inefficient and dead manner, some kind of assistance. 30 This group's work and philosophy give us an insight into the development of social services during the Second World War. In each of the departmental delegations of the Secours National was posted a qualified social worker, helped by a number of social auxiliaries who held hospital or district nursing qualifications, along with various unqualified extra care workers. The same system was put in place in departmental sub-delegations, and in some rare cases at cantonal level. A few social workers were also employed as resident workers in social centres. It has been estimated that the number of social workers employed by or 'associated with' the Secours National was 6,023, out of a total of around 9,000 social workers active in wartime France. 31 The proliferation of the Secours National's activities beyond its initial realm of emergency aid for direct victims of war led to a number of questions about the nature of its attributions and responsibilities. Robert Garric himself asked: 'Will the field of our organisation's activities and perspectives thus expand almost indefinitely? Is it not time we tried to enclose our domain, to define and clarify it?' The same day, he also wondered: 'Why do we -the Secours National -32 take on the duty of teaching about housework? Why are we concerned about juvenile delinquents, or about farming apprentices? And why did we, yesterday, mention nursery schools and other social institutions?' For Garric, the answer was evident: 'the Secours National's work (…) cannot be restricted to emergency aid.'

The significant expansion of the Secours National's activities, which owed much to the wide variety of charities it supervised and to other organisational problems, was met with fierce protestations from inside the Vichy regime itself. Thus in June 1941, the Prefect of the Côte-d'Or department regretted that little by little, [the Secours National] is becoming a state within the State, with its cantonal delegates, its regional delegates and its national delegates. This charitable organisation's current policies, however legitimate, may well, one of these days, lead to a conflict with the government's own representatives -or even with the government itself. 33 In his June 1942 monthly report, the Prefect of the Seine pointed out that 'some mayors seem a little unsettled by the growing importance of these big, new charitable organisations', and quoted the mayor of Charenton, for whom 'the Secours National's work, while arguably immensely beneficial to the population, tends to deprive communes of their local charities, turning them instead into its own satellites'. Bureaucratisation and the gigantic size of the institution, which were at odds with the spirit of the Vichy regime, were notable targets here: 'people seem to deplore that local traditions and parochialism should be progressively disappearing from the commune, seen as a natural extension of the family.' In 1943, the Prefect of Maine-et-Loire asked the Secours 34 National's departmental delegate to 'stop employing more people and to update him, on a regular basis, on any vacant positions it may have'. This request, however, was deemed by the Minister of the Interior to be incompatible with Pétain's explicit instruction that prefects show support towards the Secours National and not interfere with its operations. 35 Calls to order kept on coming from the highest echelons of the regime, however, as the problem became increasingly conspicuous. In December 1941, in a stern letter to the president of the Secours National, Pétain's chief of staff Du Moulin de Labarthète thus stated that 'it is not in the Secours National's remit to replace the authorities where food scarcity in cities or rising prices are concerned', and that '[the Secours National] was given to an excessive development of its institutions', which led it to take on 'the scope and the characteristics of a vast collective administration', and 'tended to turn citizens into passive recipients of social assistance'. 36 Du Moulin de Labarthète's assertion that the Secours National had the characteristics of a 'vast collective administration' begs the question of whether it was, in actual fact, a public or a private institution. When, in July 1941, the Secours provided the municipalities of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais departments with the means to fund the benefits allocated to people in need there, Mr Musin appealed to the government. He stated that 'the 19 October 1939 decree which re-established the Secours National and approved its new statutes confirms, in the wake of the 29 September 1915 decree, that this institution works in the public interest'. But while the 4 October 1940 law entrusted the Secours National with the coordination and supervision of charitable organisations, and has given it a monopoly over the management of subsidies and appeals to public generosity, it was not intended to alter the private nature of this institution and its activities; from this, it should be inferred that its representatives' decisions cannot be referred to the Conseil d'État. 37 But this decision should not be taken at face value. The Secours National, in many respects, resembled and acted like a public institution. First because it operated in a bureaucratic way, in Max Weber's sense of the term; it was divided into departments, which were themselves divided into services, just like any administration. It implemented laws and decrees, and generated its own rules, through dated and numbered circulars which were then published in an administrative Bulletin looking suspiciously like the bulletins published by government ministries. It was tightly centralised and hierarchised, and its work was checked by the Court of Audit and the Inspectorate of Finances. A substantial part of its managerial personnel came from the State's Grands Corps, such as the Conseil d'État.

Another important question was that of the Secours National's funding. In 1942, its budget was of 3,184 billion francs, which represented three per cent of the French State's revenue, loans excepted. Over the period between 1939 and 30 June 1946, the sum total of its financial resources was more than twenty billion francs, fifty-five per cent of which came from subsidies and revenues, while the rest came mainly from public donations, including cash, food and clothing. Its income also included earnings from sources as diverse as the sale of national lottery tickets or of abandoned property, the taxation of public auctions, real estate operations and pari-mutuel betting, the fines for gas and electricity overconsumption, or shared profits from the sale of tobacco coupons or casein biscuits. A notable mainspring was the gains made from the sale of the goods belonging to French citizens deprived from their citizenship rights. A law passed on the 23 July 1940 specifically allocated those earnings to the Secours National. Among the 450 people targeted by this measurepeople who had left the national territory between the 10 May and the 30 June 1940 -were Charles de Gaulle, René Cassin, Maurice Thorez and five members of the Rothschild family. The Secours National benefitted from the latter's numerous goods, vineyards (Château-Lafitte, Mouton Rothschild), castles and Parisian buildings, especially the 19 to 25 and the 26 rue Lafitte, which became its headquarters.

The last aspect to consider is that of the Secours National's employees. These (around 12.000 workers for 40.000 volunteers) were not recruited via examinations or any other selection process, which distinguished them from civil servants. But this needs to be qualified by the facts that a number of ministries, during that period, relied on contractual staff, that social workers held a state certificate, and, above all, that the Secours' workers' wages were aligned with those of their government counterparts.

A propaganda tool

The Secours National's growing power and influence would soon prove attractive to the authorities.

As evidenced in a note issued before the October 1940 law, the government was already contemplating two scenarios: either the Secours National should be done away with and replaced by a 'more decidedly political and propagandist' institution directly attached to the state, or it should be reinforced and be made more perennial, but also bear a more visible mark of Pétain's authority.

The author of the note was in favour of the latter solution, on the grounds that, 'with some publicity, it would be possible to convince the public that the Secours National was Pétain's own charity'. The main idea was to orchestrate a campaign around the theme of 'the Maréchal taking care of the people's needs'. This plan was implemented during the 1940 Winter Campaign. One of its means 38 of action was via the sale of portraits of Pétain. In the so-called Free Zone, a million such portraits were initially printed, in poster, postcard or vignette forms; then, responding to demand, another million were released. In the Occupied Zone, five million portraits were apparently sold. The operation was a clear success.

It must be noted that the authorities' manipulation of public opinion was tightly controlled during the Winter CampaignPétain's appeal to the population had to be published in every single newspaper, on the same day, in the middle of the front page. On the radio, it was to be delivered by a 'sensitive and sincere' speaker, after having been announced in earlier programmes. On each and every day during the following week, newspapers and radio programmes were to reiterate the same message, albeit each time drafted by another 'very talented man, talented enough to be able to channel the essence and the inspiration of the Secours National'. The message itself should be 'ever more objective, more focused on instances of extreme poverty, and with a pressing, anxious, moving and imperious appeal to people's conscience and generosity'. Newspaper editors were expected to 'break down any opposition and show any objections to be irrelevant, especially when these revolved around the idea of "manipulating public opinion".' 39 H. R. Kedward has pointed out that humanitarian activities were placed at the forefront of local policies from the very beginning of the Occupation, being deemed apolitical in that they were carried out by left-wing and right-wing municipal authorities alike. This apolitical stance was 40 precisely what allowed Pétain to reiterate the unity of the French nation, to which he had 'given the gift of his person'. This observation certainly applies to the Secours National's first Winter Campaign. Pétain, in this instance, appeared not to be acting as a politician, but to be putting his status and, more importantly, his person, at the service of an apparently neutral social agenda.

Within this narrative, it was not the Secours National which worked for Pétain, but Pétain who worked for the Secours National. In reality, the Secours National was being instrumentalised by In our opinion, in the current situation, the only propaganda which can be exerted freely and efficiently is that in favour of the Maréchal, through the many activities of the Secours National and the Entraide d'Hiver. 41 From then on and until the Liberation, the image of the Head of State would be associated, in one way or another, with every poster, film or radio report focusing on the Secours National's action: almost all of the profits from the sale of objects representing Pétain go to the Secours National: the generosity displayed in buying or donating for that organisation invariably involves a reference to the Maréchal (through objects, portraits and other symbols). Each and every one of us shares with the poor not only our cloak (following the example of Martin of Tours), but also the Head of State's warm, enveloping banner. 42 The Secours National was thus one of the most prominent organisations used by Vichy to manipulate public opinion. Pierre Laborie, in his study of these organisations, notes that 'the sacralisation of the cult of the Maréchal leaves no room for improvisation. Everywhere, specialist committees attend to it in the greatest detail, and create ever more emblematic images of the myth'. 43 It is however important to add, before closing the subject, that the Secours National should not be seen only as a den of Pétainists or collaborationists. Working for it were also a number of authentic resistors, such as Michel Debré, who would go on to become Prime Minister under the Fifth Republic, Léon Chevalme, former secretary general of the CGT branch of Metallurgists' Federation, Roger and Yvonne Hagnauer, pacifist teachers and revolutionary trade-unionists, and many social workers who, in some cases, paid for their engagement with their lives. 44

Conclusion

As this chapter draws to a close, it is worth reflecting on the idea that while everyday life can of course be studied for its own sake, it is crucial not to lose sight of its political implications.

Everyday life in Occupied France was mostly shaped by scarcity -of food, clothes, or shelter.

Vichy's way of dealing with this scarcity was to rely on 'natural' communities, such as families, businesses or charitable organisations. The efforts of the latter, under the supervision of the Secours National, to rationalise emergency aid -offered first to civilians directly affected by the war, and then to increasingly larger portions of the population -arguably played a significant role in both alleviating the hardships of a large number French people, and in avoiding a health crisis -although it is difficult to quantify precisely what part it played here. Its recognisable and significant contribution was undeniably why it carried on with its work as the Entraide Française until 1949.

It is quite common to oppose, both when it comes to the Second World War and more generally, everyday life to unequivocal political choices, such as choosing to collaborate with the Germans or joining the Resistance -both of which supposedly only concerned a small number of citizens. Yet this distinction has a rather heuristic dimension. In an earlier work, I have shown that, while the heavily politicised professional terms of Vichy's Charte du Travail (Labour Charter) were met with considerable hostility, its workplace-based social committees -known as 'spud committees' ('Comités patates') by some -were much more successful, on account of the significant role they played in workers' everyday lives. Within the Secours National itself, a 45 number of important figures were also in favour of substituting politics, seen as 'deleterious' since the Third Republic, with the Social, with a capital 'S'.

The study of the role played by charitable organisations or associations under Vichy, however, suggests that such a distinction between the political and the social be qualified. The improvement of everyday life was at the heart of the regime's political agenda, and the development of the Secours National was instrumental to the promotion of Pétain's image. It is uncertain just how much impact this propaganda would have had on a hungry population, but those in charge believed it had some: any reflection on everyday life must take this into account.

Translated by Benjamin Bâcle

  enteritis and hunger oedema. In the camp at Gurs in the Basse-Pyrénées, an average of 12 people died every day during December 1940 [QUI SONT LES INTERNES ICI EN 1940? CA AIDERA LES LECTEURS, PEUT ETRE?]. Overall, there were 3,000 such deaths in French camps between 1940 and 1944. Things were hardly better in prisons, where numbers increased from 19,000 in 21 1939 to 50,000 in 1942. In the detention centre of Riom, 120 people died during the first three months of 1942, as opposed to four people per year before the war. 22

  Vichy. An early 1941 note from Pétain's cabinet made this clear:On the other hand, the conditions are ideal for propaganda in favour of the Maréchal via the Secours National and the Entraide d'hiver [the Parisian branch of the Secours National]. With the Secours National under his authority, and his role in the choice of the Entraide d'Hiver's president, the Head of State can justly claim the moral benefits attached to both organisations' achievements.

  3: Presentation given by Melle Le Bailly at the Sarthe Departmental Conference of 17 the Entraide Française, 6 February 1947. ADC, 419F 6. Détail ici nécessaire? 18 ADC, 419F 3: Press conference given by Justin Godard, 19 November 1946. 19 ADC, 419F 7: Executive Committee of the Secours National, 7 December 1943 20 D. Peschanski, Vichy 1940-1944. Contrôle et exclusion (Brussels: Complexe, 1997), p. 93. 21 P. Pédron, La prison sous Vichy (Paris: L'atelier, 1993), p. 52-3. 22 ADC, 419F 55: Secours National Social Workers' Conference, 1943. Speech by Mme Discher 23 on 'The action of the Secours National in camps and prisons', p. 36-8. On this subject, see Matthieu Devigne's chapter in this volume. 24 ADC, 419F 49: Answers to questionnaires sent in preparation of Secours National Social 25 Workers' Conference, 1943. AVP, 24W 13: Secours National Departmental Delegates' Conference, 1942.26 G. Douart, Les civils sous l'Occupation. Nantes dans la guerre (Maulévrier: éditions Hérault, 27 1993). AN, F/60 388: Note A/MB, President of the Council (general secretariat) Cdt Ausseur, 28 2 January 1941. AN, 2 AG 500: Letter from Clément Decomble (Toulouse) to Jean Masson, Winter Campaign 29 of the Secours National in Vichy, 20 November 1941. AVP, 24W 13: Secours National Delegates' Conference, 20-22 June 1942. 30 R.-H. Guerrand, M.-A. Rupp, Brève histoire du service social en France (1896-1976) 31 (Toulouse: Privat, 1978), p. 83. AVP, 24W 13: Report from Secours National Delegates' Conference, 20-22 June 1942, p. 2 32 AN, 2 AG 500: Extract from the Prefect of the Côte d'Or's monthly report, June 1941.

  500: Extract from the Prefect of the Seine's monthly report, February 1942. 34 AN, F/1A 3661: Letter from Ingrand, delegate of the Ministry of the Interior, to the Regional 35 Prefect of Maine-et-Loire, 18 January 1943. AN, 2 AG 500: Letter dated 1 December 1941.

Secours National can be translated as 'National Aid'.

2

This chapter is drawn from the author's book on humanitarian work during the Second World 3 War, which also covers the activities of other organisations, such as the French Red Cross or the Workers Committee for Emergency Aid (Comité ouvrier de secours immediate, COSI): J.-P. Le Crom, Au Secours Maréchal! L'instrumentalisation de l'humanitaire (1940-1944) Boegner (1940-1945), introduced and annotated by Philippe Boegner

Carnets du pasteur