Catherine Bros
email: cathbros@yahoo.fr

Power Distribution and Endogenous Segregation

The aim of this paper is to provide a detailed analysis of the process of segregation formation. The claim is that segregation does not originate from prejudice or exogenous psychological factors. Rather it is the product of strategic interactions among social groups in a setting where one group has captured power. While using a model featuring random matching and repeated games, it is shown that whenever one group seizes power, members of other groups will perceive additional value in forging long term relationships with the mighty. They will systematically cooperate with the latter either because it is in their interest to do so or because they do not have other choice. The mighty natural response to this yearning to cooperate is to refuse intergroup relationships. The dominated group will best reply to this new situation by in turn rejecting the relationships and a segregation equilibrium emerges. Segregation stems from the systematic cooperation by one group with another. However, not all societies that have experienced power captures converge towards segregation. It is shown that the proportion of individuals that are actually powerful within the mighty group determines convergence towards segregation.

Introduction

Inequalities de…ned as an unequal distribution of valued attributes such as wealth or power have been often seen as the origin of prejudice and its corollary: discrimination. [START_REF] Becker | The Economics of Discrimination[END_REF] …nds that discrimination is rooted in an exogenous taste for discrimination, or we could say prejudice, that springs from the cultural arena. [START_REF] Arrow | The Theory of Discrimination[END_REF] …nds that discrimination makes up for a lack of information regarding individuals' capacities. As an employer may not be able to test individually candidates'skills, he would approximately assess them at the average skills'level of the candidate's group or by resorting to cognitive dissonance when his perception is at odds over reality. In these two theories and their later developments, inequalities give rise to prejudice that, in turn create discrimination. However, the very origin of prejudice has rarely been delved into by economists. The latter have often given up investigating this question, treating prejudice as a disconcerting phenomenon that belongs to a peripheral …eld : a society speci…c culture. It seems that one step is missing in the argument that is to demonstrate how inequalities can generate such a large cleavage within a society that antagonism and rejection among groups and as a result prejudice appear. We intend to show in this article how inequalities and more speci…cally unequal power distribution across groups may give rise to a segregation equilibrium. Our assumption is that prejudice and discrimination are the logic outcome of identitary phenomena, that stems from a deep cleavage in society whose utmost form is segregation. Therefore, through the study of the creation of segregation, we may be able to understand the forming of prejudice.

Our work aims at showing that segregation may pre-exist prejudice. Works in the wake of [START_REF] Schelling | Micromotives and Macrobehavior[END_REF] segregation theory have shown that a segregationist equilibrium may appear even in the absence of discriminatory dispositions, or even when agents have pro-integrationnist preferences. Such an equilibrium is the product of individuals'strategic decisions, who do not perceive the general e¤ect of the sum of their microdecisions. This impact may often widely di¤er from their individual motives. In this article, we signi…cantly concur on this view by considering that segregation is an equilibrium produced by the junction of individual rational decisions that have nothing to do with discriminatory intentions. Discrimination here should be understood as a negative treatment an individual receive due to its social or ethnic origin, its sex, etc.

We need to make clear what is understood here by segregation. This term has often been reduced to its spatial de…nition in economics works. Authors have mainly focussed on the fact for example that blacks and whites do not live in the same neighborhood, do not attend the same schools, etc. However, we argue that this term should be taken here in a broader sense. We de…ne segregation as a refusal by members of di¤erent groups or communities to interact. Such a refusal may manifest itself through marriage decisions or by choosing a neighborhood or friends'company. Spatial segregation is only a speci…c case of this refusal to interact with members of another social or ethnic group.

It is striking that authors who investigated segregation phenomena addressed only three kinds of issues: (i) how is segregation perpetuated and why doesn't it collapse? (ii) How could segregation be measured, and what point has it reached? How has it evolved over time especially in the United States? (iii) What are the properties of segregation equilibria? Works on segregation may be grouped in three kinds along these three types of questions. Studies that intend to explain why do agents choose strategies that allow them to avoid contacts with members of another communities are few.

As far as the …rst issue is concerned, a couple of economists have tried to show how a society could move from a segregation equilibria to a more mixed one and vice versa. Akerlof in his 1976 and[START_REF] Akerlof | A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence[END_REF] papers, identi…ed some of the factors that prevent the caste system from collapsing but did not look into the forming of the caste institution. Lundberg and Starz in a 1998 paper presented a model that aim at explaining how segregation reinforce itself through prejudice. [START_REF] Chaudhuri | Statistical Discrimination with Neighborhood E¤ects: Can Integration Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?[END_REF] showed how neighborhood e¤ects perpetuate segregation, while [START_REF] Loury | Social Exclusion and Ethnic Groups: The Challenge to Economics[END_REF] emphasized the concept of social capital. Most of these works do raise the question of the persistence of segregation but not of its origin. Sethi and Somanathan did approach this issue in a paper published in 2004. They found that segregation "can be stable when racial income disparities are either very great or very small, but instable in some intermediate range. And small income disparities can give rise to multiple equilibria, with segregation and integration both being stable". Even though these authors pointed out factors that make a society move from a segregation equilibrium to integration, this work exhibit one major drawback: it only depict movements of an already segregated society. The model fails to explain how segregation is produced ex nihilo but show how a society may return to its original situation. These types of analysis focus on societies that have segregation conditions already embedded in them and provide little help in explaining the occurrence of these conditions. However, these studies are helpful at establishing relationships between levels of segregation and other variables such as income distribution within and across groups.

The second kind of issue regards segregation measurement and calls for empirical studies. These works have mainly focused on either spatial segregation or labour market discriminations since these are the most tangible forms of segregation and almost the only viable source of data. Such pieces of work are legion.

The third group of studies do not address in our view the issue of the segregation origin but rather look into the e¢ ciency of segregation equilibria. Studies undertook by Cutler, Glaeser andVigdor (1997, 2007) are good examples. The work undertook by [START_REF] Eeckhout | Minorities and Endogenous Segregation[END_REF] on which our model is based, does push the analysis quite far but …nally fails to explain why do agents adopt segregationist strategies. In his article segregationist strategies are exogenous. The author is most concerned with the stability and Pareto e¢ ciency features of a segregation equilibrium.

Schelling's works are an interesting exception to the three groups mentioned above. Schelling brilliantly managed to show how a segregation equilibrium may be produced by the junction of decisions made by individuals who do have only very mild preferences regarding whom they interact with. Nevertheless, such preferences need to be speci…ed in his model. The question as to why do individuals prefer a certain proportion of their likes in their neighborhood is left open. Again there seems to be a missing link in our search for the very origin of segregation. We …rmly share Schelling's view that segregation is generated by individual strategic decisions that did not intend to be discriminatory and that segregation may preexist prejudice. Indeed the objective of this article is to show that inequalities create a cleavage (through a process that will be laid out in this article). Such a cleavage generates identitary responses and prejudice that in turn will lead to discriminatory practices as described by either Becker or Arrow.

As our stand is that segregation is produced by individual strategic decisions, game theory models seem appropriate tools to analyze the conditions under which this equilibrium appears. The model used in this paper relates to the literature on random matching and repeated games. In this research …eld, the main question is how do individuals create and maintain long term relationships that are at odds with sel…sh individual motives. This problem is center to the study of segregation, as the latter may be viewed as a systematic rejection of any form of cooperation among two social groups. One solution to this problem provided by repeated game theory is that cooperation arises from a punishment threat such as reputation loss or social norms [START_REF] Rosenthal | A Game Theoretic Analysis of Bargaining with Reputations[END_REF]. This paper aims at showing that norms such as ostracism are the consequences and not the origins of a particular equilibrium, contrary to Lundberg and Startz position (2004). [START_REF] Ellison | Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching[END_REF], [START_REF] Kranton | The Formation of Cooperative Relationships[END_REF], [START_REF] Ghosh | Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows[END_REF] provide solutions to the cooperation emergence puzzle. Their models show that cooperative equilibrium may arise despite the absence of information ‡ows among individuals and provided that players are su¢ ciently uncertain about their partners'valuation of future transactions, and that cooperation payo¤s increase over time. These main features are accounted for in the model used in this paper. The originality of this paper lies in the fact that we do not assume that prejudice, discrimination or to some extent hierarchy exist prior to the formation of the segregation equilibrium.

Although the model presented here is close to the one used in [START_REF] Eeckhout | Minorities and Endogenous Segregation[END_REF], it di¤ers by the fact that agents'choices between segregationist and non discriminatory strategies are endogenized. The main example that will be used in the article is the caste system in India, while it is believed that the analysis could be applied to many other segregated societies such as colonial societies for example. Indeed many anthropologists support the theory according to which the formation of one of the most perfect form of segregation, the caste system in India, arose from the invasion by the Aryan in India some 3 600 years ago who progressively took over most of the sub-continent's resources. Relationships between individuals considered here are analyzed through marriage decisions while it could be generalized to many other types of relationships.

Section 2 gives an account of the model's main features and depicts equilibrium conditions assuming that social group membership has in ‡uence neither on strategies nor on pay o¤s. In section 3 it is assumed that one group captures most of the power. The other group will perceive additional bene…ts in entering into long-term relationships with them. Members of the powerless group will start systematically cooperating when matched with a member of the powerful group and the latter will best reply to this new situation by systematically rejecting any cooperation with the powerless. A stable segregation equilibrium will appear. Section 4 addresses the following question: why do some societies converge towards a segregation equilibrium while other move towards mixed equilibrium? It is argued that power distribution within the powerful group triggers segregation. Section 5 discusses the …ndings and provides selected historical examples. Section 6 concludes.

The model 2.1 Basic hypothesis

Consider a society with a continuum of in…nitely lived agents. In each period a mass one of the agents is born. Time is discrete. At the beginning of each t period, agents are either single or matched in pairs. Two social groups are present in society: Ls and Hs and no individual can possibly hide his membership to one group that is costlessly observable. The proportion of Hs in the society is denoted : The model is symmetric prisoner's dilemma. In this section we suppose that social group membership has no impact on the game payo¤s. The importance of group memberships is analyzed in the following section. Individuals are randomly matched in pairs. Each individual while being in a relationship with another can choose between the action C which implies cooperation, or D, non-cooperation. When making the decision of action, each individual is unaware of his partner's simultaneous action decision. The action couple fC; Cg means that both partners cooperate, while fC; Dg, means that the non cooperative individual who played D free rides his cooperative partner. The fD; Dg action couple means that both partner refuse to cooperate. Hence the prisoner's dilemma action space is A = fC; Dg fC; Dg. The stage game pay o¤ function : A! R 2 is as follows:

C D C 1; 1 l; 1 + g D 1 + g; l 0; 0
where g > 0, l > 0. We assume g l 1:

The action couple fD; Dg with payo¤s (0; 0) is the only Nash and dominant strategy equilibrium. In this section, given that social group membership does not have any impact on the payo¤s, it will be assumed that individuals will not condition their action decisions on their partners' social group, name or type. This situation will be investigated in section 3.

Game lay-out

The game has numerous stages. The …rst phase could be identi…ed as the "meeting period" where both individuals make their action decision without knowing the partner's decision. The outcome is observed by both individuals at the end of each stage of the game. Depending on the outcome, they individually decide whether they terminate the relationship. If at least one partner decides to terminate the match, the partnership is dissolved and a new match is formed in the second period. It is assumed that if one partner has played D, the match is terminated by the other partner. Hence a match could only go on if both partners have played C at each stage of the game. The pay o¤ of any s strategy over the repeated game is denoted by (s) and players discount the future at a common factor < 1: The objective of the player is to maximize the normalized sum

(s) = E(1 ) P t (s)
The normalization allows us to compare the repeated game pay o¤ directly with the stage game pay o¤.

Equilibrium condition

We assume that individuals are not allowed to condition their actions on their historical actions in past partnerships and have no information about their partners actions in previous matches. Therefore, should a partner deviate and play D, the match is dissolved and the deviator can not be punished for its deviation beyond the termination of the match. Individuals will therefore be tempted to adopt a systematically non-cooperative strategy (systematically play D) and no cooperation can occur. In order to reach a certain level of cooperation a no-deviation constraint must be placed on strategies that is to say, the pay o¤ from deviating should be inferior to the cooperation pay o¤.

No deviation constraint de…nition

Given an in…nite horizon, pay o¤ from cooperation is 1. pay o¤ from deviation ( D ) can be written as 1) + (s);

D = (1 + g)(
In a …rst period the deviator free rides his partner and receives 1 + g discounted by the factor ( 1) and has to start a partnership anew whose pay o¤ will be (s) discounted back by the factor . The no deviation constraint requires the pay o¤ from deviation ( D ) to be lower than the pay o¤ from eternal cooperation that is to say 1. The non deviation constraint can be written thus:

D 1 or (s) 1 g 1
In other words, a s strategy may be considered as an equilibrium strategy provided its pay o¤ (s) is lower than 1 g 1 = V i.e. provided that the no-deviation constraint is respected. Should a strategy pay o¤ be greater than V , then any player would systematically deviate from the equilibrium strategy that is play C until a deviation occurs. A player who adopts a strategy s such as (s) > V will systematically play D and no equilibrium can occur.

Equilibrium strategies de…nitions

Suppose players i and j enter into a relationship.

Let's note for player i the pay o¤ from playing C by F i (s) at one stage of the game and the the pay o¤ from playing D by G i (s);where:

F i (s) = j + (1 j )[(1 )( l) + (s)]
As F i (s) is considered, player i plays C with certainty. His partner j plays C with a probability j : In this case, the outcome of the stage game would be fC; Cg and player i will receive a pay o¤ of 1. Hence the …rst term on the right side of the equation ( j ): Should partner j choose to play D with a probability (1 j ); the outcome of the stage game would be fC; Dg and player i would be free ridden by his partner j (j is not cooperative while i is). Player i would receive in a …rst stage l discounted at a factor ( 1). Given that D had been played, a new match would be formed in the future whose pay o¤ will be (s) discounted at the rate :

G i (s) = j [(1 )(1 + g) + (s)] + (1 j ) (s)
Similarly, player i is now assumed to play D. His partner j plays C with a probability j ; in which case, i would free ride j and receive (1 + g) in a …rst stage discounted at a factor (1 ) and a new partnership would have to be formed given that the outcome is fC; Dg: If partner j decides on playing D (probability 1 j ), then the outcome would be fD; Dg; and player i would receive 0 in a …rst stage and a new partnership would have to be formed in the future which pay o¤ will be (s) discounted at the rate.

Then the expected pay o¤ for a newly matched individual i at the beginning of the game is

(s) = i F (s) + (1 i )G(s)
where i is the probability that individual i will choose to play C. Best equilibrium strategies s are found by solving the following problem s 2 arg max (s); s.t. (s) V and in addition, supposing indi¤erence between the pay o¤ of playing C and D if j 2 (0; 1): Note that if the partner j plays C with certainty, i would no longer be indi¤erent between playing C and D and will choose D with certainty.

We suppose that when at equilibrium, social group membership does not make a di¤erence in the choice of strategies. This equilibrium will be named a "group-blind equilibrium". Speci…cally, the probability for a player to play C or D does not depend on the social origin of the partner.

3 Formation of a segregation equilibrium

Introduction of an attractive feature of group H

So far, social group has had no incidence on partnership formation. Let's assume from now on that one group, the Hs, monopolize all the economic resources. For example, the Hs may invade the Ls'country and seize most of the land or political power. Entering into a relationship such as marriage with an H may bring additional opportunities to an L. Ls will perceive additional value in a long-term relationship with Hs. In the context of India for example, a low caste father may be eager to have his daughter married to a higher caste man as such an alliance may give his own family, or if not his direct family his lineage, access to better opportunities. This may be true beyond the context of marriage. International trade literature has shown that less developed countries are more eager to trade with developed countries as these relationships give them access to products of di¤erent quality. This additional value perceived is symbolized by parameter z in the pay o¤ matrix. It is worth noticing that this additional parameter only appears on the L side in a H-L relationship. Intragroup payo¤s and Hs payo¤s are unchanged. Payo¤s for a H-L match are represented in the matrix below: pay o¤ to the L pay o¤ to the H

C D C 1; 1 + z l; 1 + g D 1 + g; l 0; 0

Impact of the parameter z on relationships payo¤s

Let's note F H=L the pay o¤ from playing C to a member of the H group when matched to a partner drawn from the L group. Similarly G L=H is the pay o¤ from playing D to a member of the L group when matched to a partner from the H group. Please note that the introduction of the parameter z only modi…es the pay o¤ from playing C to an L who meets an H i.e. F L=H : All other payo¤s remain identical as in section 2.5. For the sake of clarity the four possible cases are laid out below.

Pay o¤ to an H individual in a H-L relationship

F H=L = L=H + (1 L=H )[(1 )( l) + H (s)]
Where F H=L is the pay o¤ from playing C to an H who meets an L.

L=H is the probability that the L partner plays C given the fact that he is matched to an H. Should this case occur it means that both partners would have played C; pay o¤ to the H would be 1 and the partnership is never dissolved. Should the L partner choose to play D (probability 1 L=H ), the H would be free ridden by the L, earn l in the …rst period (hence the (1 ) discount factor), the relationship would be terminated and a new match formed whose pay o¤ to the H would be H (s) discounted at a factor :

Symmetrically, pay o¤ from playing D to an H who meets an L is

G H=L (s) = L=H [(1 )(1 + g) + (s)] + (1 L=H ) H (s)
L=H the probability that the L plays C when matched to an H. In this event, H would have played D and L, C. H would earn 1 + g in the …rst period and the match would break up. If the L individual chooses to play D (probability (1 L=H )), the action couple fD; Dg would appear. In this case no one would receive any payment in the …rst period, the relationship would be terminated and the H would start a new match whose discounted pay o¤ is H (s):

The expected pay o¤ for an H that is newly matched to an L is therefore

H=L (s) = H=L F H=L (s) + (1 H=L )G H=L (s)
where H=L is the probability that the H chooses to play C given the fact that the other player is drawn from the L group.

Pay o¤ from intragroup relationships

Intragroup relationship payo¤s are derived in the same way as above

For an H meeting an H

F H=H (s) = H=H + (1 H=H )[(1 )( l) + H (s)] G H=H (s) = H=H [(1 )(1 + g) + H (s)] + (1 H=H ) H (s) H=H (s) = H=H F H=H (s) + (1 H=H )G H=H (s)
For an L meeting an L

F L=L (s) = L=L + (1 L=L )[(1 )( l) + L (s)] G L=L (s) = L=L [(1 )(1 + g) + L (s)] + (1 L=L ) L (s) L=L (s) = L=L F L=L (s) + (1 L=L )G L=L (s)

Pay o¤ to L individual in an H-L relationship

Pay o¤ from playing C to an L member matched to an H is somewhat di¤erent due to the introduction of the parameter z.

F L=H = H=L (1 + z) + (1 H=L )[(1 )( l) + L (s)]
If the L partner chooses to play C and the H partner is also cooperative (probability H=L ) then a long-term relationship may be set up and the L individual will gain 1 from the partnership plus all the additional opportunities such a partnership may provide him with. The value of these additional opportunities is estimated by the parameter z. Note that this parameter plays a role only if the action couple fC; Cg is the outcome.

Pay o¤ from playing D to an L matched to an H is similar to those occurring in intragroup matches.

G L=H (s) = H=L [(1 )(1 + g) + L (s)] + (1 H=L ) L (s)
The expected pay o¤ for an L who is newly matched to an H is therefore

L=H (s) = L=H F L=H (s) + (1 L=H )G L=H (s)
We mentioned in section 2 that at the group blind equilibrium, i.e. prior to the introduction of the parameter z, players do not condition their strategies on the social origin of their partner. Therefore L=H = L=L : Now that z has been introduced in the pay o¤ matrix, it can be argued that L players will modify their probability to play C when matched to an H.

Systematic cooperation from the Ls leads to a segregation equilibrium

It is quite obvious that the introduction of the z parameter increases Ls'potential payo¤s. In the event of a match with an H they do not only bene…t from the value of the match itself but also from additional social opportunities such a relationship may bring them. The intuition is as follows: Ls individuals have a strong interest in building long-term relationships with H members. They are enticed to cooperate when matched to an H in order to maximize the chance of having a long term relationship. The probability to play C for an L meeting an H increases up to 1 as a consequence of the introduction of the parameter z. Now that the H individual knows for certain that the L partner will cooperate, he has no incentive anymore to cooperate. He would be better o¤ by systematically free riding his cooperative partner. In this case, the only equilibrium strategy will be for the H to systematically reject any cooperation with an L. The …nal equilibrium situation is the one where a guaranteed cooperation from one group leads the other group to systematically reject any relationship with this group. Perfect segregation has emerged and in the aftermath prejudice that reinforces segregation. It is rather counter intuitive to think that segregation germinates from the yearning by one group to cooperate with another. Several historical examples support this argument. It is striking that Portuguese colonies contrary to the French and British ones, were not segregated. While the Portuguese mainly set up trading posts, the French and the British led an active power and wealth takeover policy. In the french and british empires, natives had to be cooperative with the new masters to secure social opportunities, while in Portuguese colonies trade enabled locals to make social progress on their own. In the …rst case, segregationist ideologies appeared while in the second a more integrated situation prevailed. More historical examples will be discussed in section 3.3.2. A formal demonstration of the argument is provided below.

Proposition 1 The introduction of the parameter z increases the probability for an L to play C when matched to an H up to 1 that is L=H = 1

We mentioned that an equilibrium condition must be the indi¤erence between the pay o¤ of playing C or D that is F (s) = G(s). If this condition was not satis…ed, a player would modify his probability to play C. For example, if the pay o¤ from playing C increases comparatively to the pay o¤ from playing D, (F (s) > G(s)) a player would adjust upward his propensity to play C, until the equality condition between F (s) and G(s) is restored. Let's note = F (s) G(s): We assume that @ @ > 0. The introduction of the parameter z alters the pay o¤ from playing C for an L who is matched to an H. The L individual will therefore alter his probability to play C ( L=H ) consequently. Let's note L=H = F L=H (s) G L=H (s) then @ L=H @ L=H > 0. and the following equation can be written:

@ L=H @z = @ L=H @ L=H @ L=H @z
where we know that the …rst term on the right hand side of the equation is positive. The second term of the equation is also positive since the inclusion of the parameter z has unilaterally increased F L=H (s) without altering G L=H (s):

Introducing the parameter z increases L=H i.e. the probability for an L who meets an H to cooperate. An increase in L=H will alter the pay o¤ for the H matched to an L to play C comparatively to playing D. H=L will be modi…ed and H=L will therefore be adjusted. A movement in H=L will modify in turn L=H , and so on. So the total e¤ect on L=H due to the introduction of the parameter z can be written:

@ t L=H @z = @ i L=H @z + @ i L=H @z n P j=1 ( @ H=L @ L=H @ L=H @ H=L ) j = @ i L=H @z (1 + n) Where @ i L=H @z
is the initial impact of z on L=H and

@ t L=H @z
is the total e¤ect of the introduction of z. The introduction of z has two impacts:

-one with the direct increase of L=H via the increase of L=H -one with the cumulative e¤ect of a positive shock on L=H n is the number of periods in the game needed for players to adapt their action strategies. It is argued that there exists n ; so that L=H will move from its group blind equilibrium level ( L=H = L=L ) to a new equilibrium level L=H = 1: n is de…ned by the following equation:

@ i L=H @z (1 + n )dz = 1
L=L Proposition 2 Whenever L=H = 1 the only possible equilibrium for an H-L partnership is given by H=L = 0 Recall that in order for a strategy s to be an equilibrium strategy, the no deviation constraint must be respected that is (s) 1 g (1 ) :

If L=H = 1, F H=L = L=H + (1 L=H )[(1 )( l) + H (s)] = 1 G H=L (s) = L=H [(1 )(1 + g) + H (s)] + (1 L=H ) H (s) G H=L (s) = (1 )(1 + g) + H (s) H=L (s) = H=L F H=L (s) + (1 H=L )G H=L (s) 1 g (1 ) H=L (s) = H=L + (1 H=L )[(1 )(1 + g) + H (s)] 1 g (1 ) After rearranging, H=L [ g(1 ) H (s)] g(1 ) H (s) g (1 ) Recall that V = 1 g (1 ) ; then V = g(1 ) H=L [ ][V H (s)] [ ][V H (s)] g (1 )
Recall that V is the non deviation constraint i.e. the highest attainable pay o¤ for any equilibrium strategy. Therefore any player tries to minimize the di¤erence V s)] is equivalent to replacing the expression by its minimum g (1 ) in the equation: ) ] 0 [g (1 ) ] > 0 by de…nition H=L 0 by de…nition. The only strategy that maximizes the pay o¤ while respecting the no deviation constraint is H=L = 0 when L=H = 1: However, whenever H=L 2 [0; 1[, an equilibrium is attainable provided that L=H 2 [0; 1[. In other words, if a partner cooperates for sure, the only strategy that guarantees both an equilibrium and the other partner's pay o¤ maximization is a systematic non-cooperative behavior.

H (s) under the constraint [ ][V H (s)] g (1 ) 0: Indeed, H=L [ ][V H (s)] cannot be negative so 0 H=L [ ][V H (s)] [ ][V H (s)] g (1 ) : If this constraint is respected then [ ][V H (s)] lowest level is g (1 ) . Minimizing [ ][V H (
H=L [g (1
Once H=L = 0; i.e. the Hs play with certainty D when matched to an L, Ls maximize their pay o¤ in such a match by setting their probability to play C to 0 i.e. L=H = 0: Indeed, if H=L = 0

F L=H = (1 )( l) + L (s) G L=H (s) = L (s) L=H (s) = L=H F L=H (s) + (1 L=H )G L=H (s) L=H (s) = L=H (1 )( l) + L (s) Given that L=H (1
)( l) 0; L=H (s) is maximized by setting L=H = 0 It is worth noticing that whenever one of the partner plays D with certainty, the other partner maximizes his pay o¤ while respecting the no-deviation constraint by setting his probability to play C at 0.

Equilibrium stability

The equilibrium obtained here is a segregation equilibrium where members from two groups systematically refuse to cooperate when matched to each other. The path to the segregation equilibrium is as follows:

-one social group captures more power or economic resources. The other group (the Ls) perceive additional bene…ts from entering into long-term relationships with the previous group (the Hs) through additional opportunities or may not have much choice but to cooperate to survive. The parameter z is introduced in the matrix.

-the introduction of the parameter z increases the propensity of L group members to cooperate with Hs, which increases the likelihood of a cooperation from the Hs, which in turn raises the probability for Ls to play C, and so on. At the end of n periods, Ls cooperate with certainty with Hs. At this time, although the probability for Hs to play C has reached quite high levels, as soon as H=L = 1; Hs have no equilibrium strategy available but to be systematically non-cooperative with Ls, thus L=H = 0:

-Whenever H=L = 0; Ls maximize their payo¤s by choosing never to cooperate whenever matched to an L, thus L=H = 0

At the end of the n periods a segregation equilibrium prevails: members of the two groups will systematically refuse to cooperate when matched to each other. This result is rather interesting when thinking about the ambiguity one may …nd in the dominated groups attitudes towards dominant groups. Dominated often wishes to conform to dominants (translating a will to cooperate) while depreciating them when they feel they're being rejected by the mighty. As the fox in Aesop fable who can not reach grapes hanging high up on a vine, that he eyed greedily retreats and says: "The grapes are sour anyway!".

As mentioned above, as soon as one partner sets his probability to play C to 0, the other partner will reciprocate by setting his probability to play C to 0 and cannot be better o¤. Therefore L=H = 0; H=L = 0 is a stable equilibrium on the L-H market. The path that leads to a segregation equilibrium is rather interesting. Assuming that one group is deprived of power, it has not much choice but to cooperate with another. We may conclude that given this systematic cooperation, the latter will refuse any interaction with the …rst one. Finally the deprived group's best response will be to refuse any relationship too.

Segregation origin: economic circumstances and the dominated group

Two interesting points stand out from the demonstration above. Firstly, segregation is not the direct product of psychological and exogenous factors such as prejudice or a taste for discrimination. Such a situation arises from a socioeconomic context in which one group has taken over much of the power, be this power economic, political or to some extent symbolic. Indeed, many authors have considered that segregation is the consequence of psychological factors or social prejudice that are most of the time exogenous and in any case beyond the …eld of economics. We have tried to show that an unequal economic opportunities distribution triggers social strategies that generate a stable segregation equilibrium. Secondly, it has been shown that segregation does not originate from a favored group's intention to put a deprived group at its mercy. On the contrary, it is the systematic yearning or necessity by the latter to build long-term relationship with the mighty that leads to a rejection by the favored group of any relationship with the powerless. Although that result is in con- ‡ict with the generally accepted idea that segregation comes from the favored group, there are many good historical examples, especially related to colonization processes. Amartya Sen recounts in "The Argumentative Indian : Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity" an interesting story. At the time when British trading posts were created in India in the XVIIth and early XVIIIth centuries, some British actually settled into the sub-continent, married Indian women and somewhat managed to mingle with the local society. Then came the time of the proper colonization process in the XIXth century, when the Honourable East India Company and later the British government took over power and wealth in the sub-continent. The locals had then to deal with the new masters to secure social opportunities. At that time, a new ideology started to appear in the Raj according to which India and its civilization were backward and needed to be patronized. Indian and British communities were set aside and any admitted relationship between the two was to be on a teaching mode.

The power takeover by the British led to a segregation between Europeans and Indians that is well illustrated by novels from that time. Although the demonstration above sheds an interesting light on the process of segregation formation it fails to explain why some societies exhibit high levels of segregation, as it is the case in India through the caste system, and other societies lower levels of segregation. Indeed, in any society at least one group is more dominant than the others but all societies do not move towards a segregation equilibrium. The next section will try to identify factors that trigger a segregation equilibrium. Power distribution within the favored group appears to be the determining factor for a segregation equilibrium to occur

Segregation versus non segregation equilibria

Let's assume that Ls have access to additional social opportunities only when establishing long-term relationships with powerful Hs who are in proportion 2 [0; 1] in the H population and the Ls receive the same kind of pay o¤ as in other relationship when matched to powerless Hs. The probability to gain z for an L matched to an H depends on the proportion of powerful individuals in the H population i.e. . The intuition tells us that the lower this probability, the less inclined will be the L individuals to adjust upwards their probability to cooperate. In other words, the lower ; the more limited the increase in L=H due to the introduction of z. It will take a longer time for L=H to reach its maximum value of 1. The time needed is called the "adaptation phase". In the meantime, mixed H-L couples may be formed. We may realistically assume that a mighty H who forge a long term relationship with an L loses its power, but remains an H. Indeed, let's take the example of an aristocrat who marries a commoner. The odds are that he or his children will still be considered as members of the nobility but somewhat of a second rate. Therefore as mixed matches are made, the proportion of powerful H decreases over time. Should the adaptation phase be long enough, which is the case if the initial is small, the proportion of powerful H declines and converges to 0 before the segregation equilibrium is triggered, i.e. before L=H = 1: At this point in time, there is virtually no powerful H any more and the H group becomes similar to the L group. Members of the latter do not perceive additional value in building long term relationships with the Hs and the situation is back to the group blind equilibrium. By intuition, we understand that the initial proportion of powerful H is the determinant of the …nal degree of segregation. A more formal argument is presented in the following sections.

4.1

The impact of z is conditional upon the proportion of powerful individuals within the H group.

Proposition 3 the impact of the parameter z on L=H is an increasing function of the initial (the proportion of powerful H within the H population).

Let's note t the time period, t the proportion of powerful H at time t; L=H;t the probability an L plays C when matched to an H at time t; F L=H;t the pay o¤ from playing C for L matched to an H at time t, L;t the strategy total pay o¤ for a newly matched L at time t.

The pay o¤ from playing C for an L matched to an H at time t can be written

F L=H;t = H=L;t [(1 + z) t 1 + (1 t 1 )] + (1 H=L;t )[(1 )( l) + L;t (s)]
An L is matched to an H at time t. L plays C with certainty. If H plays C as well (probability H=L;t ) and is powerful (probability t 1 which is the proportion of powerful H within the H group at the start of the period hence the subscript t 1), a long term relationship starts and the L receives 1+z. In the case the L is matched to a powerless H and they start a long term relationship, he receives the same pay o¤ as in a L-L relationship. In the event H plays D, a new partnership must be formed.

The pay o¤ from playing D for an L matched to an H at time t can be written

G L=H;t = H=L;t [(1 )(1 + g) + L;t (s)] + (
)
where t is the proportion of H in the society at period t, L=H (s) the strategy pay o¤ for an L matched to an H and L=L (s) the strategy pay o¤ for an L matched to another L for the period t.

Let's assume that the parameter z is introduced during the …rst period i.e.; for t = 1.

@ L;1 @z = 1 @ L=H;1 @z + (1 1 ) @ L=L;1 @z = 1 @ L=H;1 @z
Note that the strategy pay o¤ for an L matched to an L is independent from z; therefore @ L=L @z = 0: As for the impact of z on the strategy pay o¤ for an L matched to an H is as follows (it is assumed that in a …rst phase L=H;1 is not dependent on z as L=H;1 will be modi…ed in the subsequent periods)

@ L=H;1 @L = L=H;1 [ @F L=H;1 @L @G L=H;1 @L ] + @G L=H;1 @L @F L=H;1 @L = H=L;1 0 + (1 H=L;1 )( )( @ L;1 (s) @L ) @G L=H;1 @L = @ L;1 (s) @L @ L=H;1 @L = L=H;1 H=L;1 ( 0 @ L;1 (s) @L ) + @ L;1 (s) @L @ L=H;1 @L = L=H;1 H=L;1 ( 0 1 @ L=H;1 @L ) + 1 @ L=H;1 @L @ L=H;1 @L = 0 L=H;1 H=L;1 1 1[1 L=H;1 H=L;1 ]
0 Please note that the increase in the strategy pay o¤ due to the introduction of z is now a function of 0 ; the proportion of powerful Hs at the outset of the game. The higher this probability, the larger the impact of z on the pay o¤ and arguably the larger the increase in the probability to play C for an L matched with an H. Note that it is only the proportion at the beginning of the period when z is introduced that matters and not subsequent values of . Indeed subsequent increases in L=H are only related to movements in H=L that are linked to the initial move in L=H due to the introduction of z: Hence only the initial value of (i.e. 0 ) matters for the size of the increases in L=H :

To estimate the total impact of z on the probability that an L will play C when matched to an H, we …rst estimate the impact of z on L=H without taking into account the cumulative e¤ect of an increase in L=H on H=L ; and so on.

We can write

@ i L=H;1 @z = @ i L=H;1 @ L=H;1 @ L=H;1 @z L=H;1 = F L=H;1 G L=H;1 @ L=H;1 @z = H=L;1 0 + (1 H=L;1 ) @ L;1 @z @ L;1 @z @ L=H;1 @z = H=L;1 [ 0 1 @ L=H;1 @z ] @ L=H;1 @z = H=L;1 [ 0 1 0 L=H;1 H=L;1 1 1[1 L=H;1 H=L;1 ] ] @ L=H;1 @z = H=L;1 0 [ 1 1 1 1[1 L=H;1 H=L;1 ]] ] @ i L=H;1 @z = @ i L=H;1 @ L=H;1 [ H=L;1 0 ][ 1 1 1 1[1 L=H;1 H=L;1 ]
] The same scheme as in section 3 applies. Any move in L=H will trigger a change in H=L that in turn will modify L=H ; and so on. So the total e¤ect of the introduction of z at period t can be written The graph below depicts the evolution of the proportion of powerful individuals within the H group for every period of time i.e. t : For example in our base case of 0 = 1; it is worth noticing that L=H reaches 1 and segregation is triggered when t = 0:66: On the other hand, when 0 is small enough, say 20% or 10%, L=H takes such a long time to reach 1, that t becomes close to 0 and a group blind equilibrium is triggered. Indeed, as approaches 0, the H group does no longer di¤er from the L group and the situation is back to a group blind equilibrium.

Evolution of depending on its initial value

This …gure illustrates our reasoning by showing that the initial proportion of powerful individuals within the H group is the main determinant of a segregation equilibrium. This does not mean that segregation may be uprooted by changing power distribution within the H group. It has been shown in a previous section that once the segregation equilibrium is in place it is stable and robust. Our argument only helps at explaining why do some societies exhibit high degrees of segregation and other lower degrees of segregation. The reason advanced is the following: when a group takes over most of the power within a society, provided that this power is uniformly distributed within the dominant group a segregation equilibrium is triggered. However, at the time of the takeover, if only a minority captures this power within the dominant group, a group blind equilibrium appears. For segregation to be uprooted, intuition tells us that power need to be redistributed across the H and L group. We have not provided any proof of this as we leave this question to future research. This may explain why revolutions are the most common way to overthrow segregation.

Discussion and selected examples

Power distribution within one group determines whether a society moves toward or away from a segregation equilibrium. The term power should be taken in a broad acceptance, that is the ability for someone to give another person additional opportunities that are otherwise unreachable. We have shown that the process through which segregation occurs starts with a dependence of one group on another to gain access to additional opportunities. The deprived group will start looking for long-term relationships with the more powerful group who in turn will start setting up barriers. The caste system in India is a good example of the move from one equilibrium to another from many standpoints.

When the Aryans settled in the sub continent some 4 000 years ago they brought along a large corpus of religious texts: the Vedas. The …rst text codifying the caste system is known as Manu's law and it is considered by tradition as part of the Vedas. Many experts support the idea that Manu's code was written in a much later form of Sanskrit and is therefore more recent. Some anthropologists allege that such a segregationist frame was brought forward by the Aryans once their power over most of what is now India was totally secured. Therefore it seems that power grasp was prior to the set up of a segregationist ideology. This thesis remains nevertheless much controversial, especially as the text in question is still very much revered and considered as a revelation.

Much less controversial is the theory according to which the Aryans assigned a very low status to the submitted Indian natives, whose descendants are the actual outcasts. Indeed as the natives did not have the same religion as the invaders they were not included in the caste system (therefore labelled "outcasts") and assigned humiliating statuses and occupations. It seems that through this invasion, conquerors took over most of the powers and generated a segregated society. Some sociologists such as [START_REF] Dehejia | Religion and Economic Activity in India: An Historical Perspective[END_REF] support the idea that the caste system in India was quite ‡exible until the Medieval age when land granting replaced cash salaries. Land was progressively granted mostly to the higher castes, starting a feudalization process that made lower caste dependent on the higher-ups. "Concurrent with the feudalization of India was the ossi…cation of the once ‡exible caste system".

Another good example is the jâti …ssion process that has been widely observed and commented. Indian society is made of a very large number of groups the jâtis, whose features are the prohibition of relationships especially strict endogamy rules, hierarchy and professional specialization. When questioned about his caste any Indian will refer to his jâti. One is born in a jâti and cannot leave it. It has been observed that as soon as a fringe of one jâti becomes wealthy or more powerful, this sub-group will adopt a number of customs including rules in allowed relationship that aim at improving its status. This new group will ban any relationship with the group they want to escape from, takes a new name and adopt customs that are more adequate to their desired status. This process is referred to as "Sanskritization" by sociologists. It seems that a decisive improvement in the scope of opportunities leads to a rejection of those who do not bene…t from the same kind of perspectives.

The Sanskritization process could be considered as the materialization of the yearning by one group to gain association with another and as [START_REF] Srinivas | The Social System of a Mysore Village[END_REF] noted, this can lead to a severe rejection and its corollary discrimination. "Discrimination against the Smiths occurs everywhere in peninsular India, possibly as a result of their attempts in the past to rise high in the caste hierarchy by means of a thorough Sanskritization of their customs". This con…rms our result that segregation originates from the desire of one group to associate with another.

Concluding remarks

This paper aims at providing an analytical framework of a phenomenon, namely segregation, that is often considered as exogenous and intricate. We have tried to break up the process of segregation formation, drawing from this analysis two interesting points.

Firstly, segregation is not the result of psychological factors and does not come of the mighty group. Rather, it stems from a socioeconomic context in which one group seizes power. Power should be understood in a broad sense, that is to say the ability to give someone else additional opportunities that are otherwise unreachable. Dominated groups members are given little choice but to systematically cooperate with the mighty. A natural response to a potential partner's ensured cooperation is to reject the relationship. This is what the powerful group will do. The dominated group will best reply to this situation by in turn rejecting cooperation. A stable segregation equilibrium is set. Such an equilibrium is the product of strategic "microdecisions", as Schelling put it, that have little to do with prejudice, discrimination and other pyschological factors. It is our belief that discrimination arises from segregation and not the opposite.

Secondly, segregation equilibria are triggered by power distribution within the mighty group at the time of power capture. It has been shown that whenever power is widely shared by members of the dominant group, society may be trapped in a segregation equilibrium. On the contrary, when power is grasped by only a small fraction of the powerful group, society may converge towards a mixed equilibrium. Please note that an economic de…nition of power has been taken so far, although it is believed that the analysis could apply to any kind of power such as religious and symbolic ones.

One point should be made clear. One of the points made in this article is to explain why do some societies move towards a segregation equilibrium and others do not. Power distribution within the dominant group at the time of power takeover appears as the trigger. Once segregation is set, it is a remarkably stable equilibrium. Variations in power distribution within the dominant group as well as in the perception by the Ls of the value of relationships with Hs will not modify the equilibrium. No group will have any interest in raising its probability to be cooperative, knowing that the other group's probability is null. As a consequence, it may be quite di¢ cult to explain what makes a society move from a segregation trap to a mixed equilibrium. This question is left open.

be large enough, the society may be trapped in a segregation equilibrium.

Detailed calculations and additionnal simulations are available upon request

The larger 0 ; that is to say the initial proportion of mighty individuals within the H group, the larger the impact of z on L=H : This result means that if the proportion of powerful individuals within the H group is relatively small, then the increase in H=L will be quite limited and it will take a rather long time before it reaches its maximum value of 1. In the meantime, mixed long term relationships may be formed.

Evolution of the proportion

As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that a powerful H who enters into a long term relationships with an L loses its power but not his H membership. Therefore the proportion of H in the population does not vary over time: t = . During the period t; the proportion of mighty who are matched to L individuals is 1 2 t 1 (1 ); where t 1 is the proportion of mighty individuals in the society. The so matched L-H couple decide to cooperate with the probability L=H;t H=L;t : The proportion of mighty among the H at period t (i.e. t ) is the proportion of powerful among the H for the previous time period minus the proportion of powerful H who forged relationships with Ls, formally

) L=H;t H=L;t ] and rewrite t = 0 (p 1 )(p 2 )(p 3 )::::(p t ) Given that p t is lower than 1, t decreases over time but less and less rapidly as L=H;1 increases over time. t decreases up to the time L=H;t reaches 1, at which point segregation occurs and no mixed long term relationship may be forged anymore. Note that when L=H;t reaches 1, t may still be quite large if 0 was large enough or t may be close to 0 if 0 was small enough (this point will be shown in the next subsection). If t becomes su¢ ciently close to 0, Hs are not more powerful than the L any more and the two groups become similar. The Ls do not perceive additional value any more in building relationships with the Hs, that is to say that the parameter z virtually disappears and the situation moves back to a "group blind equilibrium".

Comparative evolution of the proportion t ; when 0 is large or small

Recall that the smaller 0 ; the smaller the impact of z on L=H ; the longer the time until L=H reaches 1. Let's consider two situations: one in which 0 is small and noted 0 0 . If 0 0 is small, then in virtue of proposition 3, we know that L=H;t will be small and will be noted 0 L=H;t . Let's note n 0 the number of periods necessary for 0 L=H;t to reach 1. n 0 will be large. In another case, let's note 00 0 the large initial proportion of mighty individuals among the Hs. 00 L=H;t will be large and n 00 the number of periods necessary for 00 L=H;t to reach 1 small.

Proposition 4 if the initial proportion of powerful individuals within the H population is small, i.e. 0 small, then by the time L=H reaches 1, which occurs at period n, n may be close to 0. If n is close to 0, then the society moves back to a "group blind equilibrium".

Let's note p ):::( ) > 1

We also know that U n 0 converges towards 0. For n 0 su¢ ciently large relatively to n 00 (which is the case when 0 0 is small and 00 0 is large), U n 0 is close to 0. Thus, for 0 0 small and 00 0 large, 0 n 0 00 n 00 is close to 0. This may occur in two ways: either 00 n 00 has become in…nitely large, or 0 n 0 is in…nitely small. The …rst case may not occur as 00 t is a decreasing sequence whose maximum initial value is 1. Therefore, 0 n 0 has become very small. To put it all in a nutshell, if 0 0 is su¢ ciently small, by the time 0 L=H reaches 1 that ensures a segregation equilibrium, which occurs at the period n 0 , 0 n 0 will be close to 0, meaning that virtually no H will be powerful. The Hs will not di¤er from the Ls any more and the latter will not perceive additional value in building relationships with them. The parameter z would disappear and the situation would reach a group blind equilibrium. Segregation would not occur. On the other hand, should 4.4 Characterization of the comparative evolution of the proportion ; when 0 is large or small

This section illustrates the evolution of over time. We take as a base case 0 = 1 and decline it for di¤erent values of 0 : Values are assigned to key parameters such as ; @ i L=H;1 @z ; @ H=L @ L=H and L=H;0 , H=L;0 randomly. Note that for the declined cases, @ H=L @ L=H , L=H;0 and H=L;0 are left unchanged (indeed variations in 0 do not a¤ect the values of these parameters). By virtue of proposition 3, we know that if for 0 = 1; @ i L=H;1 @z = x; then for a case where 0 = y; then

is adapted in this manner for every variation of 0 made. The table below presents the values assigned to key parameters in the base case:

Base Case: The table below illustrates the case for a small initial value of : Following our argument, the time needed for L=H to reach 1 is much larger (83 periods versus 9) and at the time segregation is triggered, the proportion of powerful individuals is so low that the H group doesn't di¤er anymore from the L group. A group blind equilibrium emerges.


Claske Dijkema
email: claske.dijkema@univ-grenoble-alpes.fr

HAL is a

Text

A group of young men routinely hang out in a spot at the foot of a block of flats. They meet there, sit, talk, eat and drink, and allegedly deal drugs. In the evenings, under the influence of narcotics and alcohol, they are noisy and leave their litter behind. Other residents have come to fear this area and have started to avoid it, despite the fact that there are several shops. After having been informed of the situation by the neighborhood union, in response to complaints from residents and shop owners, the municipality sent in their maintenance workers to transform the seating area into a wall. This stirred an angry reaction from the young people, who had lost their meeting place. They broke the freshly applied concrete, but by the very next evening a new layer of concrete had been added by the municipal workers, which in turn was immediately covered in paint as a further protest by the displaced young people.

(Field notes author, 17 December 2013, Villeneuve, France)

Paint, concrete and contested public space

This example of contested space is an illustration of what [START_REF] Iveson | Publics and the city[END_REF] meant when stating that public space does not exist as such because there is not one public. In reality there are several groups who compete over access to public space and over who is the 'public' in a particular space. Competing claims to space therefore should be understood as competing claims to be considered as part of the public [START_REF] Iveson | Publics and the city[END_REF][START_REF] Staeheli | The people's property?: power, politics, and the public[END_REF]. The story of applying and breaking layers of concrete, followed by layers of pink and white paint applied by loitering youths and municipal workers respectively, is part of a narrative of contested public space in Villeneuve. This article builds on the rich literature that has emerged over the last decades on the political character of public space (Springer, 2011;[START_REF] Staeheli | Publicity, Privacy, and Women's Political Action[END_REF][START_REF] Mitchell | The right to the city: social justice and the fight for public space[END_REF][START_REF] Staeheli | The people's property?: power, politics, and the public[END_REF]. Community gardening, graffiti, street vending, protesting, skateboarding, flash mobs and night markets are all examples of the 'everyday and not-so-everyday making of public space' that Hou has termed 'insurgent public space' as they 'defy the conventional rules and redefine and expand the idea of what it means to be a citizen' (Hou, 2010, p.25).

The authors cited above have all focused on non-violent forms of claiming public space. The violent potential of competition, confrontation and insurgency has been ignored by most authors. We can even detect some romanticism around violent strategies for change in Hou's term 'guerilla urbanism' or Holston's reference to insurgency in 'spaces of insurgent citizenship' that are created through grass-roots mobilization and everyday practices that 'empower, parody, derail or subvert state agendas' and that redefine 'what it means to be a member of the modern state' (Holston, 1999, p.47). This article focuses on a form of appropriating public space that clearly does not correspond to the progressive ideals of bikeriding, or of vegetarian and pacifist protesters: the everyday practice of occupying hallways and street corners by groups of youths. It argues that claims to space which are widely considered as uncivil or violent should be interpreted as claims to citizenship of the subaltern, whose discursive claims are not heard. The study area is Villeneuve, a large social housing neighborhood located to the south of Grenoble, in France.

The article first sets Villeneuve in the context of French urban policy and debates around security issues and everyday tensions; the second section discusses the political nature of space in this marginalized social housing neighborhood. The third section provides a theoretical discussion on the connection between claims to space and citizenship. The fourth section is an explanation of the methodology used for the research into the everyday appropriations of the neighborhood's halls and hallways by groups of youths. It is followed by an empirical description of these appropriations and places them in the wider context of a feeling of being denied a place in French society. In the conclusion I come back to the question to what extent the subaltern's claims to space through the everyday occupations of hallways in Villeneuve can be understood as claims to citizenship.

Villeneuve: everyday tensions and targeted urban policy

Built in the 1960s, Villeneuve is the last large housing estate constructed in France. This project was inspired by progressive ideas about public space. The buildings were constructed on pillars, thereby opening up the space under them for pedestrians; it is car-free; the high-rise architecture has freed space for a stunning park; and facilities were integrated within the architecture, thereby creating large publicly accessible areas. Over the years it has lost a lot of its appeal. According to administrative jargon, the neighborhood is "sensitive", a euphemism for dangerous. It is part of the French state's geography of special intervention zones that require specific attention in terms of security, and other types of urban policy that target low income areas (for a detailed analysis see [START_REF] Dikeç | Revolting Geographies: Urban Unrest in France[END_REF]. Urban social policy has been developed in reaction to incidents of urban violence in marginalized social housing neighborhoods in France. From the late 1970s onwards, a large number of commissions have been set up and reports and laws drafted with the aim of reducing social inequalities between different territories. This focus on specific areas rather than on certain 'ethnic' groups is a French particularity. In its 2015 Atlas of 'priority neighborhoods', the state authorities redrew their maps of special intervention zones and again, Villeneuve is one of the 1300 neighborhoods considered problematic. 1 Two statistics illustrate the relative precariousness of Villeneuve's residents in comparison to the rest of the city: 24% of its households receive an unemployment allowance compared to 16% in Grenoble as a whole; and 23% of the households have low incomes compared to 7% in Grenoble as a whole. 2 Moreover, Villeneuve is on the list of the French government's priority security zones and, as a result, neighborhood policing is carried out by a specialized brigade rather than by the local police force. Indeed, public space in Villeneuve, as with other marginalized social housing neighborhoods in France, has become the object of everyday tensions and competition: tension between the police and youth in relation to the drug trade (see for example [START_REF] Marlière | Les « jeunes de cité » et la police : de la tension à l'émeute[END_REF], tension due to boundary-marking and the imaginary borders that draw lines between territories and identities (see for example [START_REF] Sauvadet | Le capital guerrier: concurrence et solidarité entre jeunes de cité[END_REF], and finally tension due to belonging and the visibility of 'otherness'. Halal butchers and the hijab are the subject of heated debate around what is 'normal' in public space, and who has the right to impose their norms (Del Grosso, 2015). The example with which this article opens illustrates the tense relationship in Villeneuve between those who claim the right to occupy publicly accessible space, and others who claim the right to security, tranquility and the enjoyment of a clean and non-degraded public space.

The political nature of public space in marginalized social housing neighborhoods

In the context of economic globalization and the delocalization of employment in France and the resulting decline in manufacturing and other industries the collective identity of the working class has lost much of its importance, and therefore its ability to act as a mobilizing factor. Space has become a new terrain for struggle (Lussault, 2009). For the French sociologist Jean-Pierre Garnier, the street is an 'alternative space of representation' for those excluded from the job market (2007). Beyond everyday uses of the street for the purpose of representation, at times the street 'metamorphoses into a stage where the struggle between the dominant and dominated reappears in the spotlight' (Garnier, 2007, p. 67). Garnier's observations are based on an analysis of the 2005 revolts that broke out in 400 marginalized social housing neighborhoods in France, and which lasted for over three weeks. The direct cause was the deaths of Zyed and Bouna, two youths who died by electrocution in an electricity transformer where they hid in order to escape a routine identity check in a suburb of Paris. The reason for the anger was not the deaths of the two boys alone, but also the reaction of the judicial and political authorities which initially contested police responsibility and denied that the boys were being chased (Mucchielli and Le Goaziou, 2007). Groups of men -and some women-went out on the street and made their fury visible to the wider public in France through the images of burning cars that spread through television screens both nationally and internationally. Since then it has become widely accepted in academic literature that acts, generally interpreted as incivility or violence, can be considered as political expressions in the sense that they are a means of drawing attention to unmet needs (Dikeç 2007a[START_REF] Dikeç | Badlands of the Republic : space, politics and urban policy[END_REF]Mucchielli et le Goaziou, 2006;[START_REF] Mansouri | Révoltes postcoloniales au coeur de l'Hexagone: voix d'adolescents[END_REF][START_REF] Mauger | L'émeute de novembre 2005 : une révolte protopolitique (l'association Raisons d'agir)[END_REF].

While the scale and the duration of the 2005 revolts were without precedent in France, violent confrontations between younger residents and security forces are a recurring phenomenon in marginalized social housing neighborhoods. Villeneuve has not been spared. Riots broke out in 2010 when a 27-year old man died in a violent confrontation with the police. Karim Boudouda and his partner in crime were tracked down in Villeneuve after having organized a casino hold-up not far from Grenoble. Karim was shot by the police and died from the impact of a bullet that hit his body from the back. 3 That night and the one that followed a group of thirty young men went out in the streets to express their anger over the death of this man they knew well. They burnt roughly 100 cars, broke the glass of the neighborhood's tram stops, threw stones at the police and firemen, and set fire to street furniture. Lighting fires during the 2010 riots was definitely meant to provoke police intervention, as the latter accompany firefighters into Villeneuve. But this was not the only motivation, as fire also has the performative function of making a statement in public space. The actions of burning cars, damaging street furniture, and writing graffiti statements in mid-July 2010 should be interpreted as a form of public address. The flames expressed anger about the death of a man with the message targeting the security forces, but they also had a larger audience: all those representing the state. Two weeks later the President of the Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, came to Grenoble to make a speech. In this speech the deviance of 'two individuals' was generalized to an entire neighborhood, needing a targeted intervention to bring them back into the Republic, and insisting on their foreignness although both held French nationality. 4 Both the burning cars and Sarkozy's speech illustrate the struggle over public space that Iveson analyzes as the competition between several publics over who is the 'public' in public space and thus the political nature of public space in Villeneuve.

Beyond paroxysmal violence, the remaining of the article will focus on everyday confrontations in (semi-) public space. The main protagonists are on the one hand young men -and in rare cases women-between roughly 16 and 26 years old without employment or in precarious work situations who occupy public and semi-public spaces in Villeneuve on a regular basis. On the other hand there are residents who contest these uses of space by appealing to the neighborhood's night mediation service and calling on it to intervene on their behalf. The English term 'loitering', frequently used for youth that stay in an area without an obvious purpose, does not quite capture the emotional charge of the words that residents, night mediators and civil servants use in French: 'to squat' and 'to occupy'. I will use the terms 'the unsanctioned use of' and 'occupation of' (semi-)public space'. The term public space is not used here in its judicial sense, but rather to denote all neighborhood spaces that are publicly accessible. I also use the term communal areas if they are privately owned but publicly accessible. Residents' attitudes towards this behavior vary from the understanding, if they see in it an innocent gathering to get out of sight of the police or parents; through tolerant and compassionate if they feel that these youths have nowhere else to go and if they identify with them; to intolerant if they interpret these gatherings as a violation of the rules and as a form of incivility. The latter group of residents takes offense at the image of degradation that this behavior gives to the neighborhood, in addition to the direct nuisance it presents, and the fact that some groups engage in illegal activities.

Theoretical arguments on the claims to citizenship through occupying space

The article's title "If you can't hear me, I will show you" is a reference to both Rancière and Spivak. The first asserts that "political activity makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise" (Rancière, 1999, p. 30; translation modified in Dikeç 2012, p. 674). The second affirms that 'subaltern people can't speak' (Spivak, 2008). When Spivak said that the subaltern cannot speak, she meant that they are not represented in institutions of power, and that they cannot represent themselves as they lack the power to do so (Spivak, 1988, p. 279). Does the context of structural inequality in 21st century France justify the consideration of young men and women in marginalized social housing neighborhoods as subaltern, in reference to the colonial context evoked by Spivak? This is indeed the argument of Mustafa Dikeç, drawing on Rancière, when he discusses 'the ways in which the inhabitants of certain areas are deprived of their right to the city in the political sense of the term' (Dikeç, 2002, p. 95). These areas correspond to the state's geography of special intervention zones evoked earlier. They are racialized spaces [START_REF] Bonam | Racialized physical space as cultural product[END_REF][START_REF] Calmore | Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: Hewing a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair[END_REF][START_REF] Neal | Living Multiculture: Understanding the New Spatial and Social Relations of Ethnicity and Multiculture in England[END_REF], marked by a 'colonial fracture' (Bancel et al., 2005) in addition to other (e.g. economic) disparities associated with marginalized social housing neighborhoods (MSHN). Ramon Grosfoguel articulates Fanon's reading of race relationships as between those in the zones of being and non-being (Fanon, 1952:8) with Boaventura de Sousa Santos' concept of an 'abyssal line' (2014) between those who live above and those who live below the line of the human (2013,45). Those above this line are granted access to rights and subjectivity, while this is not the case for those below the line (Grosfoguel and Cohen, 2013, p.44). Racism operates as separating force between the two. Fanon has been criticized for his manichean dualism (Kipfer, 2007) between white and black and being/non-being. I argue that these should rather be understood as abstract categories that help us to consider the complex relationships between humans that are racialized in different ways. In addition, these zones 'do not refer to specific geographic places but are positionalities' and within a country they correspond to 'zones of internal colonialism' (Grosfoguel and Cohen, 2013, 45-46). The current context of France is not that of Fanon's writings in the 1950s when it still was a colonial empire, neither that of Boaventura de Sousa Santos' North-South relations. The distinction between human/nonhuman should be replaced by citizenship/non-citizenship, or rather 2 nd class citizenship.

Citizenship here is not limited to formal membership but is understood in a broader sense, with regard to the array of civil, political and social rights available to people, also referred to as substantive citizenship (Holston, 1999, p.52). If citizens are those who have the right to claim rights (Isin and Nielsen, 2008, p.8), it is exactly this right that is denied to inhabitants of MSHN. Whenever they manifest discontent in the public sphere, their immigrant, non-French, origins are evoked. MSHN, in the non-spatial sense that Lapeyronnie attributed to them, that of 'urban ghetto ' (2008), can be understood to fit with the idea of spaces of non-citizenship. This is due to the fact that the gaze of those in power is structured in such a way that they do not recognize, intentionally ignore, or distort, both the verbal and non-verbal means of expression used by inhabitants of mshn. The nature of this power can be considered colonial in the sense of Anibal Quijano's conception of the coloniality of power which asserts that 'the social classification of the world's population around race has a colonial origin and character but has survived the colonialism in whose matrix it was established ' (2010, 533). The working of this power in 'the ghetto' should be understood as following: "More than poor or excluded, inhabitants of the ghetto live as 'colonized'" (Lapeyronnie, 2008, p.17). They are defined by the gaze and categories of dominant outsiders, that they subsequently interiorize and, as a result, they find themselves alienated as if the dominant norms constantly invalidated their own reality (Lapeyronnie, 2008).

Let me insist though that not all inhabitants are concerned equally with the workings of the coloniality of power, depending on their racialization, gender, class, education, sexual orientation and gender. In the zones of citizenship conflicts are dealt with through evoking rights, through negotiation and political action. These means of managing conflict are discursively, institutionally and legally framed in the language of emancipation (freedom, equality, autonomy): violence is the exception here (Buonaventura de Sousa Santos Grosfoguel and Cohen 2013:46). But as 2 nd class citizens "can't speak", violence may replace discursive claims and may become a means of expression, as was the case with the riots in Villeneuve in 2010. If 'the subaltern can't speak' politically [START_REF] Spivak | Public Space as Emancipation: Meditations on Anarchism, Radical Democracy, Neoliberalism and Violence[END_REF], this does not necessarily mean they will remain silent and submissive. Many will, but others will find new ways to be taken into account, by occupying space and making themselves visible. The pink paint and broken concrete mentioned at the beginning of this article is one such example.

It is in space that a subject becomes a citizen

Public spaces in the city are eminent places for bodies to perform the shift from the place assigned to them, from their place of subjects, to that of citizens (Isin and Nielsen, 2010).

Investing the spaces where one is made to feel 'out of place' can thus be a de facto claim to citizenship. For example, if youths collectively go to an area where they feel out of place with the intention of showing that they also have the right to be there, this should be understood as a claim to citizenship. Both Holston's interest in the sites where new, subversive citizenship emerges, and Isin and Nielsen's inquiry into the acts through which this process takes place are central to this article's inquiry into the practice of everyday occupation of hallways as both sites and acts of insurgent citizenship. Because, if a political act is what makes a citizen, and if the act of burning cars is political in certain contexts [START_REF] Arfvidsson | Burning cars in the banlieues as acts of citizenship[END_REF], we could argue in similar vein that the everyday occupation of hallways is a political act in the sense that it involves the shifting of bodies from the place assigned to them as subjects to that of citizens. The section that follows will present the methodology used to inquire into everyday unsanctioned uses of communal areas by groups of youths in Villeneuve.

Methods

The research presented here is part of a wider (PhD) project that seeks to develop a decolonial approach to mshn in France. For the overall project a mixed methods approach was adopted, made up of participatory observations in collaboration with four neighborhood organizations over a four-year period from 2013 to 2016. This article draws in particular on three forms of collaboration. Firstly, with the Régie de Quartier, a community development organization based on a triple partnership between residents, local authorities and housing corporations, and financed by both public and private funds. It offers a range of services, one of which is night mediation. In the context of increasing feelings of insecurity and the decline in the attractiveness of real-estate and social housing in the neighborhood, the night mediation service was created in 1998 in response to residents' complaints about the nuisance caused by groups of youths in alleys and hallways. While its reports distinguished between 18 categories of nuisance in the neighborhood, the core of their work was centered on two of them, namely the 'gathering of persons' and 'unsanctioned occupations'. The work of the night correspondents consists of patrolling the communal areas in the neighborhood from dusk onwards, of taking note of logistical issues such as broken windows, lights, locks etc., of approaching groups of youths that occupy these areas and of convincing them to leave. The daily reports produced by the neighborhood's night mediation service over the period from 2009-2016 provide short descriptions of 1,439 reported unsanctioned uses of (semi-)public space considered problematic. They were analyzed using Excel and Nvivo in order to understand the motives of the night correspondents' interventions, their outcomes, their frequencies, their distribution throughout the year, and which specific places in the neighborhood were occupied. In addition I draw on informal, semi-structured interviews with four night correspondents and two youth workers. Secondly, this article draws on participant observation in the 'Université populaire' project that seeks to configure places of speech to discuss issues proposed by neighborhood residents. In preparation for the debate, "Ghettos, apartheid, ZEP, ZUP, ZUS, ZSP: the neighborhood between experience and stereotypes", roughly 70 informal (street) interviews were carried out by the author and two collaborators in November 2015. Finally, I draw on an interview with a 25-year old man from the neighborhood next to Villeneuve who belongs to a youth collective in which I also participate, called "Acting for Peace". This collaboration made it possible to reach out to youths involved in the unsanctioned use of public space. The next section will draw on these different voices to paint a more detailed picture of what is involved in the practice of occupying communal areas.

Occupying hallways as an insurgent claim to public space and citizenship

Jean-Pierre, a youth worker who only recently started working in Villeneuve but with previous experience in other MSHN in Grenoble, discusses some of the drivers behind youths' appropriation of public space.

I will generalize a bit but in the families they are often quite a lot. There is no place for everybody at home and so children don't have much space. The only private space there is, is reserved for the parents. Children don't have a place to relax, to watch a movie or something like that, so they are out there in the street and they turn public space into private space. They eat outside, they work outside, there are those that have their first sexual experience outside. Really, public space becomes their property.

When one arrives… when we [as youth workers] start to work in a neighborhood, we really feel that we are in their place 5 .

An analysis of the night correspondents' reports provides us with 15 categories of behavior observed during 'unsanctioned use' of (semi-)public space: unrest (disputes, fights, aggressive behavior); alcohol consumption; hanging out in a calm manner; smoking weed and cigarettes; confrontation (when youths demonstrate aggressive behavior towards the night correspondents or when they refuse to leave the place they occupy); degradation of the site (breaking locks, graffiti, urination); talking and debating; seeking shelter (from rain or cold and from the surveillance of parents or police); partying; playing ball-, card-and computer games (they even at times install play stations in the hallways); eating; listening to music and making noise; watching a movie on a TV or a computer installed in the hallway for the occasion; dealing drugs; and finally surveillance, when they use the spot to surveil the neighborhood or when the night correspondents feel surveilled. The night correspondents stressed during the informal interviews that the nuisance the youths cause in these communal areas is very variable, "You have differences and we need to make a distinction": from zero to extreme nuisance. Despite the wide variety of behavior, one night correspondent made the distinction between two categories of youths:

You can very well have a group of youths that occupies a hallway and all that they have done during the day is being bored. They have nothing to do, no education, no perspectives; they have quit school at the age of 16 and since, they have "held the wall" [direct translation of the French expression for loitering while leaning against a wall]. In the evening they probably don't feel like staying at home, at their parent's place, so they loiter in a hallway, smoke a cigarette if they have one, drink a beer if they can obtain one. Those ones, you can make leave if you explain to them nicely that they have no business being there and that their presence will annoy the residents. But there is this other group that is the real problem. You have groups that go from one hallway to another, from one building to another between [two spots in the neighborhood] and whom we know are already under the influence of weed or alcohol and that supposedly deal drugs. When we are up against these groups of youths, you can imagine that the night correspondents disturb them in their activity or, if they don't disturb them, it is simply impossible to reason with them because they have already been partying, they have already consumed…. Well, the result is that the night correspondents cannot act on these groups, as opposed to the groups I talked about before: nice boys that are bored. 6 One such 'nice boy' explained in an interview that hanging out is part of the life style in mshn.

Interviewee: Whereas some go out on Friday night, have a drink and party, that is not at all our style. We stay here in the neighborhood. [..] We spend our evenings among friends, we are cool, we play [on the play station] or we talk and have fun [and smoke weed]. Many of my friends, actually the majority, feel ill at ease when they go out of the neighborhood [..] simply because they miss their reference points. They like to stay in the neighborhood where they know everybody and where they have their little comforts.

Interviewer: Is it a question of financial resources?

Interviewee: No, it's not even that. If they go out of the neighborhood, they don't feel they belong, I think. They feel apart from society, they don't feel in their place, maybe because they feel gazed at, they feel spied on and therefore…[they stay] 7 . This statement formulates a recurrent theme in 70 street interviews which highlight the feeling, among those associated with post-colonial immigration, that 'there is no place/space for us'. It is an expression of the sentiment of being assigned to, or even imprisoned in, an 'urban zone' which has clear demarcation lines between 'our' and 'their' space. A claim to space in the neighborhood can be understood as making it 'ours'. The feeling of being denied a place is reinforced in the case of unemployment. 'Our' space is that of the neighborhood, destined for those 'of immigrant origin' and 'theirs' is that of 'the French', who are imagined as white. Where precisely this border lies varies among interviewees but the "Simply" supermarket beyond the tram line is mentioned at several occasions as one of the most immediate demarcation points of the neighborhood. It is situated on a major road that connects the neighborhood to the rest of the city. One youth worker, Teddy, affirms that while "certain youths are mobile, like the rest of us and go from one place to another, others have more difficulty, they think France starts at Simply" 8 . The latter statement implies that the neighborhood is outside of France and that France is not for them. Teddy further evokes a symbolic barrier between the space of the neighborhood and beyond and that leaving the neighborhood induces a confrontation with different social codes. Jean-Pierre adds that when they take them out of the neighborhood: "it's violent because they realize that the real society is the one outside and not the one that reigns in the neighborhood" 9 . Despite differences in situating the neighborhood's borders, opinions converge that the city-center is beyond the boundary. It is here that many report that they are stared at and that they feel 'out of place'. "I don't even go to the city center anymore. Even if we respect the law, they don't want us. They let us know through their gazes, through small remarks at the cash register". 10 Frequent identity checks further reinforce the feeling of being denied a place, particularly among young men associated with immigration, who regularly have to justify their presence in public spaces. "They [the French] reject us through police controls with words that hurt" 11 and "They [police officers] always associate you with something that you are not." 12 This permanent suspicion also means that one is no longer master of one's own time. A police control can take 10 minutes or half an hour, depending on what they find. Police interventions in the neighborhood are perceived by those who do not feel represented by the state as a form of state penetration into a space considered as private.

On the basis of these informal interviews, three strategies can be identified in response to the feeling of 'having no place': the first is withdrawal from public space in favor of a retreat into domestic space, leading to isolation; the second is assimilation, adapting as much as possible to the projected image of the Frenchman and hoping to dissolve into this category, escaping one's otherness; the third is confrontation in public space, as a place where one encounters 'the dominant other', 'the Frenchman'. A retired immigrant from Tunisia attributed this difference in strategies partly to a difference in generation: the younger generation no longer conforms to the imperative of invisibility and chooses to make themselves visible in public space: "Now they are visible, but not really how we would have liked them to be". 13 The function of the unsanctioned everyday use of communal areas, as described in the night correspondents' reports, is that of self-defense, of survival, according to Jean-Pierre. He has often heard youth say: "I am in France but look at my face! People treat me as an Arab but when I go with my parents to the 'bled' 14 , they treat me as bloody French. So who am I?". He observes that "it's complicated if you don't know who you are. (...) In some way, it's a question of survival huh? One has to exist, one has to be somewhere and someone" 15 . The space of the neighborhood becomes this somewhere. The pictures below illustrate this spatial claim. They both show communal areas where youths have marked the space, respectively with a pen and a lighter. "38100" and "38" are references to the local postal code but they are also references to "93", the area code of the Paris banlieue that has the highest concentration of mshn. It is also here that the revolts started in 2005. This number is frequently used by rap artists in their lyrics about the banlieue.

Conclusion: Claiming a place in France

As the empirical data has demonstrated, the act of occupying hallways and alleys may be interpreted as uncivil and at times violent behavior in the sense that it regularly goes hand-inhand with litter, noise, insults, and threats; and thus with disrespect for the needs of the other inhabitants. In order to argue that they are acts that claim citizenship, I draw on the four theoretical inputs discussed before. Firstly on Rancière's definition of a political act (that shifts a body from the place assigned to it, makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise); secondly on Isin and Nielsen's argument that performing a political act is what makes us citizens; thirdly on Spivak and Grosfoguel's distinctions between the subaltern and a citizen (the latter are audible); and finally on Iveson's notion of public address.

Arguments in favor of qualifying the acts of occupying hallways by groups of marginalized youths in Villeneuve as political is that they constitute a rupture in the sense that they break in the neighborhood. Occupying a public space in the neighborhood in a society where one is made to feel 'out of place' is a de facto claim to the right to access the city and indirectly to be part of society.

To conclude, this article on contested public space in a marginalized social housing neighborhood in France contributes to the academic debate on conflict in, over, and for public space. It has sought to expand the spectrum of case-studies beyond the fetishes of the political left, focusing on 'guerilla gardening', bike-riding and peaceful protests in parks, to include everyday occupations of public space that are considered harmful by other residents. These insurgent claims to space subvert power and challenge established norms and therefore are part of the subalterns' struggle for citizenship. They have a political meaning and deserve to be heard as such. However, despite becoming visible and making noise, they have not yet become politically audible. Spaces need to be created in which their noise can be turned into voices.

  Image 1. A building's floor number has been transformed into the postal code of Villeneuve (Photo by author) Image 2. Youths have drawn with a lighter the area code on the ceiling of one of the communal areas. (Photo by author)

France. She has received a research grant from the Auvergne Rhône-Alpes regional government.

with the historic invisibilization in France's post-colonial context and the imperative to assimilate and remain discrete. They open a confrontation and they pose a conflict. When marginalized and racialized youths make their bodies collectively visible, they 'make visible what had no business being seen'. These forms of appropriation of public space however only partially correspond to Rancière's definition of what it means to be political, as rioting and loitering so far have not made the voices of these youths heard. While groups of young men (and on rare occasions women) position themselves in space, we cannot speak of public address. Youths do not use the street to make a claim and address a wider public: access to space is the claim. This is what distinguishes everyday occupations from setting fire to cars as a contestation of police action. The de facto claim to publicly accessible space is an enactment of young people's right to access the city and thus of their larger struggle to be part of 'the public'. Their acts of occupation are not accompanied by discursive claims. Through occupying space, they question, resist, challenge and disrupt the established order of things but they do not produce discourse, apart from the rare demands they express to the night correspondents of jobs and a place to meet. Spivak, Grosfoguel and Fanon have provided arguments for understanding why they have recourse to noisome acts rather than speech and why they are not politically audible. These acts therefore do not turn youths into citizens, but should be understood as claims to citizenship.

In the context of the widespread feeling among immigrants' (grand)sons and (grand)daughters living in marginalized social housing neighborhoods that they are being denied a place in France, making oneself visible in public and semi-public spaces takes on a political meaning.

The transgression of laws, rules and norms in public spaces carried out by a post-colonial 'other' may be a way of distancing themselves from and refusing the power of the dominant 'one' and thus performing the shift from the place assigned to them to a place that is claimed.

Hallways and street corners become sites of struggle. This is what Holston referred to as the 'sites of insurgent citizenship', where everyday practices from those at the margins challenge power relations and redefine what it means to be a citizen. Occupying public space in Villeneuve and its associated behavior transgresses laws (anti-gang law, drug use, public drinking), and the housing corporation's rules with regard to communal spaces and norms (extending living room behavior to the street, being loud and impertinent). For these reasons, it can be qualified as 'insurgent'. Claiming a place in the neighborhood as 'theirs', should be understood as an alternative claim to citizenship: if one cannot be considered a French citizen in the political sense of the term, then at least one can appropriate the space one needs to exist

Notes

Please find the notes at the end of the document. I have not been able to include them here Notes 1 Observatoire national de la politique de la ville, 2015. Annual Report and its "Atlas of priority neighborhoods". <https://sig.ville.gouv.fr/Atlas/QP/> (accessed 01.02.2017) 10 Street interview with man on the Place des Géants, 30 years old, 20 October, 2015.

11 Ibid.

12 Interview with young man of roughly 25 years old, 18 June 2015 13 Interview with man of around 70 years old, Union de Quartier, 9 November 2015 14 'Bled' is an Arab word that literally means small village but that has become jargon for going to Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria if that is where one's parents come from. 15 Jean-Pierre, Ibid.