Guest editorial

Explaining ethnic inequalities in educational attainment

ANTHONY HEATH

University of Oxford, UK

YAËL BRINBAUM

University of Burgundy, France

In a number of western countries we are now seeing a 'new second generation' -the children of the migrants who came to Europe and North America in the second half of the 20th century and who are now completing their education and entering the labour market. Many of these migrants came from less-developed countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, North Africa or Mexico as migrant workers.

How this new second generation has fared within western educational systems may well prove crucial for the eventual integration and cohesion of western countries. Pessimists have been concerned that this new second generation may be much harder to integrate than the older migrants of European ancestry: cultural differences may make it harder for the new second generation to thrive within western educational systems, and in the current political context, there are particular worries about the incorporation of Muslim groups. In contrast, optimists believe that immigrants tend to be 'positively selected' for their ambition and drive and that their high aspirations will lead to educational success for their children and, in turn, to occupational integration.

The educational outcomes of the new second generation also provide a challenge to orthodox explanations of educational inequalities in the western academic literature. Can traditional explanations be used exactly as they are to account for ethnic inequalities? Do they need to be broadened in order to apply to the circumstances of the new second generation? Or do we need radically different kinds of explanation? Western literature in the sociology of education has tended to focus on class inequalities in educational attainment and two broad families of explanation focusing on 'structure' and on 'culture' respectively have been developed. The structural explanations (typically indexed by parental occupation) tend to focus on the different costs and benefits facing families, in particular the inequalities in material resources (making it more costly for children from working-class origins to continue in education beyond the period of compulsory schooling). Cultural explanations (typically indexed by parental level of education) tend to focus on aspects such as familiarity with western 'high culture', parental skills in helping children with their school work, and knowledge about how to navigate the educational system.

Given the disadvantaged position of the first generation in the labour market (see for example Heath and Cheung, 2007), and the fact that few of the parents will have had much exposure to western education, these traditional explanations look quite promising as potential explanations of second-generation ethnic minority educational disadvantage. Clearly, it is essential for any serious study of ethnic minority education to take into account any structural or cultural disadvantages that their parents have, and that is the central task that the contributors to this special issue address. Our contributors also address the question of whether these traditional explanations (or, rather, the measures conventionally used to tap these traditional explanations) work as well for the second generation as they do for the majority populations. Measures of parents' social class or socioeconomic position, the stock-in-trade of western sociologists of education, may simply not be as appropriate for the children of immigrants as they are for the majority groups: the immigrant generation (that is the parents), and especially the more highly educated immigrants, were often forced to take lower-level jobs than similar members of the majority group. Traditional measures of social background may therefore be rather poor indicators of the educationally relevant resources within the family, although, of course, they will still be appropriate as measures of the immigrant family's material resources. The question is whether lack of material resources is sufficient to explain educational disadvantages in the second generation.

In this special issue, therefore, we bring together seven papers by scholars from western Europe and the USA who have been studying ethnic inequalities in education. The common theme running through their articles is whether traditional measures of social background can explain the observed ethnic inequalities in educational attainment. A particular challenge has been to find datasets that enable one to examine simultaneously ethnic origins and social background. Our contributors use rather different kinds of datasets, although always employing the best available in each specific country for examining simultaneously ethnic background and social origins. In several cases, they use panel studies, in others cross-sectional surveys, and in others linked data on parents and children. Our contributors also use rather different measures of educational attainment since they are restricted to those measures available in the relevant datasets. Thus, some focus on attainment during the period of compulsory schooling, while others look at the highest qualification obtained throughout the whole educational career. Hence we are not able to carry out standardized analyses that would permit rigorous cross-national comparisons of the extent of ethnic disadvantage. We cannot therefore assess whether one country provides a more favourable context for ethnic minority education than another. Constructing an international 'league table' is not our objective. Rather, we are interested in seeing whether there are common processes in the different countries. In particular, do we find that social background plays the same kind of role in explaining ethnic inequalities in education in each of our countries?

The countries covered in this special issue are:

• Belgium, where Phalet and her colleagues look at the experience of young people of Turkish, Moroccan and Italian ancestry (focusing on the highest level of education reached);

• England and Wales, where Rothon examines the experience of students with Indian, Caribbean, and Pakistani ancestry (focusing on performance in the public examinations taken at age 16);

• France, where Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado look at students with North African and Portuguese ancestry (focusing on test scores and track chosen in upper secondary school);

• Germany, where Kristen and Granato examine the experience of young people of Turkish, Italian, Yugoslav, Greek and Iberian ancestry (focusing on attainment of the Abitur at the end of secondary schooling);

• the Netherlands, where van de Werfhorst and van Tubergen look at the education of young people of Moroccan, Turkish and Surinamese/Antillean ancestry (focusing on test scores at the beginning of secondary school and the type of track in secondary school);

• Norway, where Fekjaer looks at young people of Turkish, Pakistani and Indian ancestry (focusing on the qualifications obtained during one's whole educational career);

• the USA, where Lutz looks at Hispanics, particularly those of Mexican and Cuban ancestry (focusing on high-school graduation).

PATTERNS OF ETHNIC INEQUALITIES AND THE ROLE OF SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND IN EXPLAINING THEM

The results show some clear patterns, which are relatively consistent across our seven countries. First of all, we see some large overall (or 'gross') differences between ethnic groups before taking account of their socioeconomic background. A number of minorities have substantially lower educational attainment or qualifications than do the majority groups. The most disadvantaged groups in this respect are young people of Turkish ancestry (in Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands), those of Moroccan ancestry in Belgium and the Netherlands, of North African ancestry in France, of Mexican ancestry in the USA, of Pakistani ancestry (both in Norway and in England and Wales) and of Caribbean ancestry (in England and Wales). Rather more successful, although still somewhat behind the majority groups, are people of Italian ancestry in Belgium (although faring as badly as the Turkish ancestry group in Germany), of Portuguese ancestry in France and Germany, of (former) Yugoslavian ancestry in Germany and of Caribbean ancestry in the Netherlands.

In contrast, the second generation of Indian ancestry, both in Norway and in England and Wales outperform the majority population, while young people of Greek ancestry in Germany match the performance of the majority.

How far, then, can this pattern of inequality be explained by the differing socioeconomic positions of these groups in the parental generation? Broadly speaking, labour market research has shown that this hierarchy of educational success is parallel to the hierarchy of occupational outcomes found among the parental generation, with the migrant workers from Turkey and other less-developed countries being particularly disadvantaged [START_REF] Van Tubergen | Immigrant Integration: A Cross-National Study[END_REF]Heath and Cheung, 2007;[START_REF] Kogan | Working through Barriers: Host Country Institutions and Immigrant Labour Market Performance in Europe[END_REF].

However, the most consistent finding reported by our contributors is that it is the educational disadvantage of groups of European ancestry that can be most fully explained by their parents' socioeconomic positions. Thus in Germany, Kristen and Granato show that the raw disadvantages of groups of Yugoslav and Iberian ancestry (but not Italian) can be wholly explained by social background (indexed by parental occupation, education and income); in France, Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado show that the overall disadvantage of children of Portuguese ancestry can be explained completely by their social background (indexed by their parents' level of education); in Belgium, Phalet and her colleagues show that the disadvantage of young people of Italian ancestry is wholly explained by social background (indexed by parents' social class, level of education and housing). We should also note that, once we take account of social background, some groups that appeared only to match the majority population now outperform them -for example Greeks and Iberians in Germany.

However, among the most disadvantaged groups, largely the 'visible minorities' from less developed countries, we find that, sometimes, educational disadvantage persists even after taking account of parental socioeconomic position. The results do, however, vary quite considerably from one country to another. In France, social background explains all the raw disadvantages in test scores. In the Netherlands, it explains all the raw disadvantages in test scores for children of Turkish and Moroccan ancestry, but additional variables are needed to explain the Caribbean disadvantage. In Germany, social background explains all of the Turkish disadvantage, but not the Italian disadvantage, in securing the Abitur. In the USA, parental socioeconomic background explains around half the Mexican disadvantage in high-school graduation and similarly in Norway, socioeconomic background also explains around half the Turkish and Pakistani disadvantage in completion of secondary education. 1 In Britain, too, over half of the Pakistani disadvantage in examination performance is explained by social background but rather little of the disadvantage experienced by boys of Caribbean ancestry can be explained in this way. In Belgium, it is the same story with significant remaining disadvantages for people of Turkish and Moroccan ancestry with respect to tertiary education, even though measures of socioeconomic background explain a great deal of the raw differences.

Our results show, therefore, that traditional explanations emphasizing social background go some considerable way towards explaining the 'new' educational differences between minority groups. These traditional models and measures of social reproduction from the sociology of education appear to work rather well in explaining ethnic minority disadvantage, and are particularly successful in explaining the educational disadvantages of the children of migrants of European ancestry. Moreover, our contributors find few interaction effects. That is to say, parental socioeconomic status appears to stratify ethnic minorities in much the same way that it stratifies majority groups, and appears to have very similar consequences for educational attainment. Only in Norway is there compelling evidence of interactions, with socioeconomic background playing a smaller role among ethnic minorities.

One possibility that Fekjaer mentions for the weaker impact of socioeconomic background among minorities in Norway is that our standard measures of social background may not have the same meaning for the parents of the second generation as they do for parents from the majority population. In some cases, the parents (that is the members of the migrant generation) may have had to take low-level jobs in the country of destination that perhaps do not give a true indication of the level of educationally relevant resources in the family. This may be particularly true of migrants who came from middle-class jobs in their countries of origin, although it is unlikely to apply to most of the classic migrant labour groups who came from unskilled manual or farming jobs in their origin countries. 2 There is a potentially even more serious problem of comparability in the case of measures of parental education, since educational opportunities are very different in most developing countries from those in the West. A parent in the majority population who has not completed secondary schooling is likely to be in the lowest deciles of the educational distribution, whereas a parent from a developing country with incomplete secondary education could well be above the average level of education in the country of origin. A western parent with less than secondary education may thus be more 'negatively' selected than a parent in a developing country with a similar lack of qualifications. However, we also need to remember that the kinds of selective processes involved in completing secondary education are almost certainly very different in western and in developing countries, rural location for example being a much more important factor in many developing countries than it is now in the West [START_REF] Buchmann | Education and Stratification in Developing Countries: A Review of Theories and Research[END_REF].

How much of a comparability problem we have depends largely on what kinds of mechanisms we believe to lie behind the correlations between parental occupation, parental education and children's attainment. Indeed, in an ideal world, we would measure the mechanisms directly rather than rely on the proxy measures of parental education and occupation. For example, we may believe that the correlation between parental and filial education can be explained by how often parents read to their children and might therefore wish to control directly for parental reading in our models. Unfortunately, there are no settled sociological accounts of what the main mechanisms are, and in any event scarcely any of our datasets, apart from that used by van de Werfhorst and van Tubergen in the Netherlands, contain data on relevant mechanisms. Perhaps reassuringly, the Dutch results suggest that the inclusion of direct measures of parental involvement do not greatly change conclusions about ethnic advantage or disadvantage, but more research is needed in order to obtain a more definitive answer. 3 Taking, however, our measures of socioeconomic background at face value, which is all we can do at present, we are left with a number of cases where differences in socioeconomic background do not explain all of the ethnic educational disadvantage. There are also several cases where we find educational advantage when comparing young people from similar socioeconomic positions. Assuming that lack of comparability in our measures is not the whole story, how are we to explain these very different cases? We begin this discussion of the results by considering first what kinds of explanation might be useful to explain the gaps that remain after controlling for socioeconomic position. We then turn to consider some possible explanations for the cross-national patterns of findings.

EXPLAINING THE REMAINING ETHNIC DIFFERENCES

In explaining the differences that remain even after controlling for parents' socioeconomic position, it is important to recognize that different explanations may be involved at different stages of the school career. Sociologists of education often make a distinction between the 'primary' and the 'secondary' effects of stratification [START_REF] Boudon | Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality[END_REF][START_REF] Halsey | Origins and Destinations: Family, Class, and Education in Modern Britain[END_REF]. Basically, this distinction maps on to a distinction between the determinants of attainment (as, for example, measured by test scores) during the period of compulsory schooling and the determinants of continuation rates into upper secondary and tertiary education after the period of compulsory education is concluded and students can choose whether or not to continue or to enter the labour market. There might in general be rather different explanations for these two quite distinct outcomes. 4 Broadly speaking, three of our articles (those on England and Wales, France, and the Netherlands) examine test scores or their equivalent during the period of compulsory schooling, two (those on Germany and the USA) look at continuation rates up to completion of upper secondary schooling, while the final two (on Belgium and Norway) look at continuation rates right through the educational career up to university.

This distinction is likely to be particularly important in the case of the children of immigrants. Cultural dissonance, such as lack of the requisite cultural capital, and perhaps, particularly, parental lack of fluency in the language of the majority population, may make it difficult for children of some immigrants groups to succeed in their schoolwork and may lead to lower achievements in test scores than would be expected given their parents' socioeconomic position. (We prefer the expression 'cultural dissonance' to 'cultural disadvantage' since we do not wish to privilege western conceptions of culture.) In contrast, many immigrant groups may be 'positively selected' for their drive, ambition and high aspirations, and this may be reflected in rather ambitious choices by their children when there is the option of continuing beyond the minimum period of compulsory schooling. These ambitious plans may be reinforced by expectations of discrimination within the labour market. Discrimination on entry into the labour market in effect means that the 'opportunity cost' of continuing into upper secondary and tertiary education is lower for the children of immigrants than it is for the children of majority groups who do not face discrimination. Other things (such as test scores and parental socioeconomic position) being equal, we would expect the children of visible minority parents (who are the ones most likely to suffer discrimination) to have higher rates of continuing within the educational system. Strictly speaking, this argument requires the additional assumption that the 'returns to education', that is, the marginal benefits of an extra year of education, are the same for the children of immigrants as they are for the majority population. If returns are lower for the children of immigrants, they will have less incentive to continue within the educational system. However the evidence in Heath and Cheung (2007) shows that, for most groups in most countries, the labour market returns to education are the same for the second-generation as they are for the majority group. Lower returns to education are however often evident for the first, migrant, generation.

These arguments, then, suggest that there may be some additional 'primary' disadvantage for ethnic minorities where the parental generation lacks the relevant cultural capital, especially language fluency, whereas there may be some 'secondary' advantage where minorities have been positively selected and/or anticipate discrimination in the labour market. To be sure, we would not wish to draw too sharp a distinction between these processes: high parental aspirations or anticipated discrimination may also lead to greater achievements during the period of compulsory schooling while cultural dissonance may also affect choices whether or not to stay on in schooling. But we expect the balance between these different processes to be somewhat different when explaining test scores during the compulsory period of education and continuation rates after the compulsory period.

Our authors have some relevant material on these arguments. First, it must be acknowledged that Lutz's paper casts some doubt on our thesis of language as an explanation of ethnic disadvantage. While she shows that there is a strong negative relationship between high-school graduation rates and the dominance of Spanish over English, this relationship becomes nonsignificant after controls for ethnicity and generation. On the other hand, high school graduation essentially represents a secondary rather than a primary outcome (since it is the obverse of dropping out of school at the minimum leaving age before completion of high school). Moreover, a strict test of our thesis would require measures of parents' linguistic fluency.

Van de Werfhorst and van Tubergen's article, on the other hand, does provide more supportive evidence. They are able to include several relevant measures of parental cultural resources, including usage of the Dutch language, knowledge about the Dutch educational system, and involvement with homework, in their models. These variables all have significant and positive effects on children's test scores on entry into secondary school. [START_REF] Esser | Sprache und Integration (Language and integration)[END_REF] also provides some evidence that language difficulties account for Turkish disadvantage in German schools, while [START_REF] Kristen | School Choice and Ethnic School Segregation: Primary School Selection in Germany[END_REF] has shown the relevance of knowledge of the German educational system for explaining patterns of school choice among parents of Turkish ancestry. However, in general the issue of whether parental language usage (or other cultural dissonances) can account for their children's lower test scores is an under-researched area.

Cultural dissonance is thus a potential explanation for some of the ethnic disadvantages that are observed in school test scores after controlling for parental socioeconomic position. They are, for example, a potential explanation of the disadvantage that Rothon shows among children of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ancestry, since lack of familiarity with English has been demonstrated among the parental generation, especially among women (Modood and Berthoud, 1997). It should, however, be noted that this kind of explanation might also be applicable to other groups, such as children of Maghrebian ancestry in France, who do not appear to be disadvantaged with respect to test scores once one has controlled for parental socioeconomic background. We must not pick and choose our explanations to explain 'exceptions' and ignore their relevance for groups that are not exceptions. Still, it may well be that there is higher usage of the French language among parents of Maghrebian ancestry and that the dissonance is not as great as in the Pakistani case.

It is also less likely that cultural dissonance of this form can explain the educational disadvantage of children of Black Caribbean ancestry that Rothon finds in England and Wales. English has long been the first language of Black Caribbeans, although among some Caribbean families distinctive dialects are used that may be of some relevance. Instead, researchers in Britain have tended to focus on black resistance to and rejection of schooling, partly in response to racism within the educational system (Mac an Ghail, 1988;[START_REF] Youdell | Identity Traps or How Black Students Fail: The Interactions between Biographical, Sub-cultural, and Learner Identities[END_REF]. These arguments have much in common with those of [START_REF] Ogbu | Racial Stratification and Education in the United States: Why Inequality Persists[END_REF], and could also be regarded as a form of cultural dissonance, although the key difference is that these are not dissonances arising from distinct cultures in the parents' countries of origin but are ones emerging from the experience of the young people themselves in western schooling.

It is, however, rather remarkable that explanations of this latter sort do not appear to be necessary for explaining test scores of young people of Maghrebian ancestry in France or of Moroccan, Turkish or even Caribbean ancestry in the Netherlands. If the argument about racism and resistance is correct, as it may well be, it will be a challenge to researchers to show why it is so specific to young blacks in Britain and not elsewhere. (Possible explanations could of course include factors such as greater racism in British schools or possibly weaker family structures among people of Caribbean ancestry that result in lower levels of parental enforcement of pro-school norms and aspirations.)

Turning next to the 'secondary' effects, Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado in their article show convincing evidence of the higher aspirations of immigrant families and their children, leading to more ambitious choices for upper secondary education (after the completion of the period of compulsory schooling) than would be expected given their prior test scores (in the Brevet des colleges). The same detailed evidence is unfortunately not available in the other datasets used by our contributors, but the 'positive selection' argument may well be applicable to other groups such as Indians in England and Wales and in Norway, to Greeks in Germany, and so on.

Once again, however, we must be careful not to pick and choose our explanations in an ad hoc way to explain the deviant cases. If the argument for positive selection and higher parental aspirations is correct, why do we not see higher continuation rates on the part of ethnic minority students in Belgium or Norway? There are several possible lines of explanation here. One possibility is that not all immigrant groups were equally 'positively selected'. This has been much debated among economists (see for example [START_REF] Borjas | Self-selection and the Earnings of Immigrants[END_REF], and it is certainly possible that some of the classic 'guest worker' groups such as first-generation Turks in Belgium or Germany were recruited specifically for less-skilled jobs and may well not have been positively selected in the same way as some other migrant groups. Second, it is important to recognize that a crucial element of the positive selection argument when applied to the education of the children of immigrants is that parental aspirations are transmitted to the children. We expect this to be the case more so when there are strong family structures (paralleling arguments in the American 'segmented assimilation' debate).

Third, and perhaps most relevantly, the arguments and evidence adduced by Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado are essentially about continuation rates conditional on prior test performance. On standard models of educational decision-making, we expect students' test scores during the period of compulsory schooling to be a major influence on their decisions whether or not to continue their school careers. Other things being equal, students with low test scores are less likely to feel that it makes sense to continue with higher and educationally more demanding levels of schooling, and indeed Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado show that scores in the Brevet des collèges have a powerful effect on the track chosen in upper secondary school. The crucial point then is that the hypothesis about positive selection and higher familial aspiration levels can only be tested properly if we compare minority and majority students with similar levels of test scores. It could well be, therefore, that students of Turkish or Moroccan ancestry in Belgium show low continuation rates into higher education not because they lack high aspirations but because they had obtained low test scores earlier in their school career.

In order to test fully the mechanisms that generate the observed ethnic inequalities in education, we therefore need panel studies of the sort that are currently available only in France and the Netherlands. Qualitative studies might also be helpful in order to study the kinds of consideration that young people themselves take into account. Are they, for example, aware of the likelihood of discrimination on entering the labour market? Does this encourage them to stay on in schooling, or do they believe that they will be no better off, even with higher levels of education?

EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION

So far we have focused primarily on explaining why we might find differences in educational outcomes between minorities and majorities even after controlling for parental socioeconomic status. But can we also say anything about the cross-national differences in the patterns that we have found? As we emphasized at the beginning of this editorial, we are not in the position to construct international league tables of equality of educational opportunity. However, we cannot ignore the finding that in France and the Netherlands little in the way of ethnic disadvantage was found after controlling for parental socioeconomic position, whereas in Belgium and England and Wales, substantial unexplained inequalities remained.

We must immediately admit that some of the differences in the findings from one country to another will be methodological artefacts, due to differences in the way that our contributors have been able to measure both the educational outcomes and the parental socioeconomic position. Clearly, it will be desirable to move towards more standardized analyses, and we are already working with our contributors on a new project to do exactly this. We might expect socioeconomic background to explain more of the ethnic inequalities if more detailed information about socioeconomic background is available -and the information available to our contributors in the relevant datasets does vary quite considerably. However, we should also note that in Belgium, one of the countries that displays quite large ethnic inequalities after controlling for socioeconomic position, Phalet has some of the fullest and most reliable measures of social background. So while measurement problems are surely part of the story, we very much doubt if they are the whole story. A second important point is that the educational outcomes differ. There might well be different explanations for crossnational variations in test scores and for variations in continuation rates.

Nevertheless, there are some grounds for expecting ethnic inequalities in education to vary cross-nationally. It has frequently been claimed in the sociology of education that early selection will tend to be associated with greater social class inequalities, whereas educational systems that delay selection will be more egalitarian [START_REF] Breen | Inequality of Opportunity in Comparative Perspective: Recent Research on Educational Attainment and Social Mobility[END_REF]. Similar processes might be expected in the case of ethnic inequalities on the grounds that, if minority students have low test scores at the time selection occurs (for example because of language difficulties), these inequalities will be perpetuated throughout their subsequent educational careers.

Within our selection of countries, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany all have relatively early selection and tracking (albeit with 'bridge years' and the like), whereas England and Wales, Norway and the USA have predominantly comprehensive systems and delayed selection. While a much more detailed study of standardized measures is clearly essential for a thorough test of this early selection hypothesis, the results in our articles do not look especially supportive of the hypothesis. To be sure, we find significant ethnic inequalities in Belgium, especially in Flanders, after controlling for parental socioeconomic background, but they are not apparent in Germany, while some of the comprehensive systems also show ethnic disadvantage despite later selection. Moreover, van de Werfhorst and van Tubergen's research (and the other papers on the Netherlands that they cite) suggest that ethnic minorities might even be 'over-advised' and assigned to higher tracks than would be expected given their test scores. We need a better understanding of the precise ways in which selection operates in order to assess its implications for ethnic minority opportunities.

It is also quite possible that neighbourhood comprehensive schools might have some disadvantages for ethnic minority students. Given that ethnic minorities are often concentrated in particular neighbourhoods, typically economically deprived ones, and that deprived neighbourhoods tend to be associated with poorer schooling, higher teacher turnover and possibly adverse 'contextual effects' of the school's social composition on student attainment, comprehensive systems may reduce ethnic minority opportunities. This may be more of a problem in highly unequal societies such as Britain and the USA than in more equal societies such as Norway, where variations in school quality and school contextual effects may also be smaller.

Previous research in the sociology of education has primarily focused on tracking arrangements during secondary schooling, and it should perhaps be noted in passing that during the decades over which these academic and political debates have ranged, a number of notionally 'selective' systems have moved towards more flexible systems, with delayed selection in France, bridging years in the Netherlands and greater possibilities for movement between tracks in Germany. However, it may now also be relevant to consider the nature and availability of tertiary education and the implications for ethnic minorities.

At one extreme we have the American system of 'mass' higher education, which is highly stratified internally but with many opportunities for young people to enter the system and to move within the system between different levels, and relatively loose linkages between school performance and entry (at least to the lower-prestige institutions). To be sure, there is evidence for ethnic minorities to be over-represented in lower prestige tertiary-level institutions in the USA [START_REF] Karen | Changes in Access to Higher Education in the United States: 1980-1992[END_REF] and it should therefore be recognized that high ethnic minority continuation rates into American higher education (as, for example, reported by Rothon and Heath, forthcoming) do not necessarily indicate equality of opportunity.

At the other extreme come some European countries such as Belgium and Germany with notably smaller tertiary sectors, less stratified internally but with much tighter linkages between school performance (for example in the Abitur) and entry to higher education. This might be associated with greater difficulties for ethnic minorities with relatively high aspirations but lower test performance to convert their high aspirations into tertiary-level qualifications. In short, institutional differences in entry requirements for tertiary education may give ethnic minorities varying opportunity to realize their high aspirations.

At this stage, we do not have the evidence to demonstrate rigorously cross-national differences either in early test scores or in continuation rates into upper secondary school or beyond. In essence, the articles collected in this special issue of Ethnicities provide us with the first steps in a crossnational research programme. They also provide some important initial evidence, first on the fundamental importance of socioeconomic background and resources for explaining ethnic as well as social class inequalities, and also for the need in most countries for additional explanations. Second, they provide some important pointers to the other mechanisms that may be involved, especially the role of parental language and aspirations. How much progress we can make in achieving this programme is unclear, given the lack of rich panel datasets in most of our countries, but at the very least, the currently available datasets give us important clues about how we might explain ethnic minority disadvantage -and advantage -within western educational systems.

Notes

1 Lutz shows that, after controlling socioeconomic position, the ethnic parameter estimates are no longer significantly different from zero. However, inspection of the parameter estimates shows that in many cases they are still negative and sometimes around half the original estimate before controls. This contrasts with the position in France, for example, where the ethnic parameter estimates actually become positive after inclusion of the controls. 2 However, research in Britain has shown that downward mobility is actually quite rare, even among the migrant generation, and is not the typical pattern. For example, one quarter of migrants from India and Pakistan were downwardly mobile but just over one third were upwardly mobile [START_REF] Heath | Social Mobility of Ethnic Minorities[END_REF]. The economic evidence also suggests that migrants may initially have rather low incomes on arrival but gradually catch up over their working careers. 3 In the Dutch analyses, measures of parental involvement are included after extended meritocracy measures, but some of their effect may, of course, be mediated by factors such as children's performance motivation. 4 The distinction between primary and secondary effects should not be made too strongly, as ambitions to continue with education until a higher level may influence children's efforts and attainment at a lower level. However, the crucial point is the empirical one that the kinds of mechanism involved in attainment during the years of compulsory schooling may be rather different from those involved in continuation beyond compulsory schooling.


Kevin M Dunn

Natascha Klocker

Tanya Salabay

Contemporary racism and Islamaphobia in Australia Racializing religion

Keywords: asylum seekers, Islam, Lakemba, new racism, racialization

à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

ISLAM, RACISM AND AUSTRALIA

At the mid-2001 Australian Census, 281,000 Muslims were enumerated (Table 1). This is recognized as an under-count, although the extent of that under-enumeration is unclear. Nonetheless, Muslims are now at least 1.5 percent of the Australian population. The largest birthplace group among Australian Muslims is Australia (36.4%), indicating that the Muslim presence is by no means a recent phenomenon. 1 Table 1 also indicates the original sources of Muslim migrants. The two major source countries between 1970 and 1990 were Lebanon and Turkey. More recent migration sources have included countries of the Indian sub-continent, Iran and Iraq, and re-established flows from Bosnia and Afghanistan. Table 1 also shows that countries in the Pacific and south-east Asia are important source areas of Australian Muslims (e.g. Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore). Australian Islam is very ethnically diverse, and Muslims have come to Australia in different eras under various categories of migration (refugee, family migrant, assisted passage, skilled immigrant). Like Muslims in other western nations (e.g. the UK, see [START_REF] Peach | Muslims in the 2001 Census of England and Wales: Gender and Economic Disadvantage[END_REF], their settlement experiences have been diverse, with varied degrees of socioeconomic well-being, both across and within ancestry groups. As in the UK (Hopkins, 2004: 268-9), the way that Islam is practised also varies dramatically in Australia [START_REF] Dunn | Islam in Australia: Contesting the Discourses of Absence[END_REF]. This variation is sustained by the local bases of mosque organization, as well as the specific socioeconomic and cultural contexts in which Australian Muslims reside. This diversity and varied experience is poorly acknowledged in the popular discourses about Islam in Australia.

On the 30 July 2003, the Land and Environment Court in New South Wales (NSW) ruled in favour of an Islamic group's proposal to construct a prayer centre at the rural fringe of north-western Sydney, in Annangrove. The Islamic group had appealed to the court following a development rejection by the municipal authority, Baulkham Hills Shire Council. The Municipal Council's refusal was a research touchstone and is a neat example of the racialization of Australian Muslims. Kobayashi and Peake (2000: 393) define racialization as the process by which groups 'are identified, given stereotypical characteristics, and coerced into specific living conditions', they add that this often involves 'social/spatial segregation' or otherwise 'racialized places'. This process need not operate through supposed racial differentiation (genetics, skin colour, etc), but can also operate through asserted cultural features, such as religious performances. Following the court ruling, mosque opponents in Baulkham Hills were at pains to point out that they were not racists, and that they had never used the word 'race' in their campaign. Formal opposition to the mosque never drew upon themes of racial supremacy or racial separatism. References to biological 'race' were absent and there was little explicit evidence of 'colour racism' (Modood, 2005: 6-7). However, that does not mean that racism was absent. 2 The case showed the grounded operation of dominant discourses about Islam. These constructions of Otherness (incivility, inferiority and incompatibility in the above case) are key tools of contemporary racism in Australia.

The above dispute could ably demonstrate what has been called the 'new racism' (Barker, 1981;[START_REF] Cole | The New Racism in Europe[END_REF][START_REF] Gilroy | There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation[END_REF]Hall, 1992: 256-8;[START_REF] Jayasuriya | Understanding Australian Racism[END_REF]. This is a form of racism where individual (and group) rights are confined on the basis that a cultural group's ways of life are judged as nefarious, or on the basis that a cultural group does not fit or belong within the society as defined by a protagonist. These racisms depend heavily upon discourses of Otherness, but as we demonstrate in this article, they also utilize discourses of inferiority. However, 'new racism' presumes a meaningful departure from 'old' biological racism. As we show in this article, the contemporary racialization of Islam in Australia actually has a great deal in common with old racism. This equivalence exceeds the degree of conceptual separation between 'old' and 'new' racisms to the extent that the old and new division may be misleading. [START_REF] Modood | Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain[END_REF] prefers to distinguish between 'colour racism' and 'cultural racism' so as to provide a more tangible distinction between forms of racism. Our stance is to acknowledge this variation, but to also emphasize how the two logics of racism exist side by side, and furthermore, that they are both reproduced through a similar racialization process. We offer four comments on the similarities between old and new racisms, and these comments also apply to colour racism and cultural racism. In general, our argument conceives anti-Islamic racism as a racialization, based not on some supposed biological grounds, but on religion and culture (including appearance) more generally (see Hopkins, 2004: 257-9). First, much like the old racism (e.g. notions of racial supremacy and separatism), the new racisms operate to reinforce cultural privilege (see [START_REF] Hubbard | Accommodating Otherness: Anti-asylum Centre Protest and the Maintenance of White Privilege[END_REF]. This racism is not necessarily subtle, as suggested by some definitions of new racism. New racisms still fundamentally assist with structures of inferiority (hierarchies) and differentiation (exclusion). A second overlap regards the reliance upon generalizations, or inherentisms (after Blum, 2002), that are the bases of stereotyping. To judge a culture as inferior or alien requires an a priori assertion that the racialized group has a cultural core, a uniform and static way of life that can be judged as lacking (Modood, 2005: 13-14). To assert such a shared cultural inferiority is little different from asserting a shared biological inferiority. Indeed, the reference to indelible and unbridgeable differences for racist purposes, using for example religious difference, long predated the development of scientific racisms and notions of biological difference (Fredrickson, 2002: 4-5). The contemporary racialization of Muslims in Australia draws heavily upon observable elements of culture. This is a third continuity -that racist incidents still depend on physical features for the selection of victims. For example, anti-Islamic sentiment in Britain is meted out against 'Asians', many of whom may not be Muslim (Modood, 2005: 12). These features are often phenotypical, or based on attire, or the suburb where they live. [START_REF] Hopkins | Young Muslim men in Scotland: Inclusions and Exclusions[END_REF] interviews with young Muslim Scots revealed that:

young Muslims who visibly display markers of 'Muslimness', whether this be through dress, through having a beard or simply through skin colour, are more likely to be marginalized through everyday racism and lack of access to employment than Muslims who do not visibly display their 'Muslimness'. (p. 269) For example, in Australia, following terror events overseas, hijab-wearing Islamic women have reported higher rates of racist incivilities and attacks than have Islamic men or those women not wearing forms of cover (Dreher, 2005: 11-14, 20-1;Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2004). Similarly, the linking of such features to Muslim-ness means that people who are not Muslim (Christian Arabs in Australia) are also subjected to racism as a result of this racialization. Fourth, anti-Muslim racism, and religion-based racialization generally, is by no means remarkable to the current era (Frederickson, 2002). Together these four similarities make anti-Islamic sentiment and actions much like old racism or colour racism -they share functional equivalences (Fredrickson, 2002: 7). 3 Our view is that there is a conceptual and political clarity in positioning anti-Islamic sentiment and actions as a contemporary form of racialization. What we have described above is the process through which racist attitudes against a group are converted into racist acts. Nonetheless, the process is by no means straightforward, nor is it logical. The conversion of racist attitudes into racist acts does have certain common features, as we have shown. However, that is not to say that the bases of racist attitudes are always the same; sometimes these attitudes are based on notions of 'biological race', although it is nowadays more common to hear racist dispositions that find fault with the culture of a group of people [START_REF] Dunn | Constructing Racism in Australia[END_REF]. The demarcation between colour/biological/old racism and new/cultural racism has some utility in regard to attitudes. However, the conversion of these attitudes into racist incidents is most simply described as a racialization.

In Australia, there have been generalized complaints about the culture of Islam, constructions applied against all Muslims. These constructions largely ignore the diversity of Australian Muslims, as well as the diversity of Islam world-over. 4 In the Baulkham Hills case cited above, the municipal mayor was of the view that local residents were justified in being concerned at the development of an Islamic place of worship. At a public meeting, the mayor said he was specifically 'concerned about the girls and ladies in this community', strongly implying that their safety would be endangered by the presence of Muslim men (see Lygo, 2004: 171). [START_REF] Hubbard | Accommodating Otherness: Anti-asylum Centre Protest and the Maintenance of White Privilege[END_REF] noted a similar set of discourses in community opposition to accommodation centres for Muslim asylum seekers in Britain. Opponents of the centres asserted that young women would be unable to walk the streets because of the dangers posed by young Muslim men who were unable to control aggressive sexual tendencies. Hubbard outlined how, in some residents' objections, Muslim men were constructed through themes of animality -of lesser civility and humanity. Again, this is a strong means of suggesting both the incompatibility and lesser status of Muslims. As we show in this article, there have also been assertions that Islam does not belong (intimating that Australia is a white/Christian culture). These are mechanisms for the racialization of Islam in Australia.

Opposition to mosque development in Sydney had depended heavily on stereotypes of Islam as fanatical, intolerant, militant, fundamentalist, misogynist and alien [START_REF] Dunn | Representations of Islam in the Politics of Mosque Development in Sydney[END_REF]. These discourses of opposition also relied upon constructions of who does and does not belong, in the locality and in Australia. The twin arguments of the Baulkham Hills Shire Council against the Islamic centre were that a mosque did not belong in Annangrove, and that there were very few Muslims in the area [START_REF] Dunn | Islam in Australia: Contesting the Discourses of Absence[END_REF]O'Rourke, 2003: 3; see also the comments of Council witnesses in Lloyd, 2003: 4). These constructions of non-belonging and absence also depend upon constructions of the 'Self', using narrow articulations of the nation or locality (Dunn, 2003: 160-2;[START_REF] Hage | White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society[END_REF]. Muslim identities in Australia are corralled by this racialization: including discourses of Otherness (threat and inferiority) and fantasies that the Other (in this case Australian Muslims) are absent. In this article, we show how contemporary racism is forcefully operationalized through such grounded debates and disputes. These were not abstract discussions of national identity, belonging and cultural traits. The grounded circumstances include localized moral panics, government and media hostility to asylum seekers, and a security emphasis that implies that Islam is the origin of terrorism. 5 These provide especially fecund circumstances for the racialization of Islam to thrive.

A good deal has been written about the historic roots of racism in Australia. As a settler colony of Britain, there was a foundational racialization that allowed Britons to dispossess the indigenous peoples of the Australian land mass (Chan et al., 2001). The racialization of Indigenous Australians continues today, and is central to unresolved tensions between black and white Australians [START_REF] Hamilton | Fear and Desire: Aborigines, Asians and the National Imaginary[END_REF]Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, 1991). In the latter part of the 1800s, as the white residents of the colonies of Australia considered federating to become a single nation state, there was a surge of racism against non-whites, which was manifest in anti-Asian and anti-Chinese immigration and deportations. One of the first Acts passed in the Australian Federal Parliament was to restrict the entry of Asian migrants; a legislative manifestation of the White Australian policy (Cope et al., 1991: 5). In the post-Second World War era, there was a shift from a 'White Australia' identity and practice towards a phase of Anglo-assimilationism, as more immigrants arrived from European countries other than Britain and Ireland. This draws our attention to hierarchies within white privilege in Australia, and to the presence of an Anglo-Celtic supremacy that mandated the assimilation of non-Anglo Europeans (Greeks, Italians, those from the former Yugoslavia) to the 'Australian way of life'. The latter was code for an Anglo-Australian way of life. Those immigrants who transgressed this assimilation were subject to racialization, their culture critiqued as inferior, apart or alien. In the 1980s, as the sources of immigration to Australia expanded beyond Europe to Asia and the Middle East, the new and principal targets of racialization included Vietnamese refugees, Turkish family migrants and Lebanese who had fled the civil war.

In the current era, anti-Islamic sentiment has come to dramatically inflect public debates about national identity, citizenship and belonging. The prominent social commentator and essayist, Robert [START_REF] Manne | Open Season on Muslims in the Newest Phobia[END_REF], observed in The Sydney Morning Herald that 'Islamaphobia now represents the most serious threat to the idea of multiculturalism, and even to the ideas of religious and ethnic toleration, that Australia has witnessed for very many years'. A range of commentators, from quite different political stances, have implied a new and globally dominant racialization axis -Islam and the West. For some conservative commentators, it is a clash of civilizations. 6 Others have simply made the empirical observation that Muslims in the Islamic world have a racialized view of westerners, and that non-Muslim westerners tend to have a racialized view of Muslims. 7 Modood (2005: 23) has expressed a fear that this century has the awful potential to develop into a Cold War between Islam and the West, a tension that would be sustained by the racialization we describe in this article. There is a good deal of evidence of such a worrying trend in Australia (Maddox, 2005: 173-84). There are strong and perceptible (racializing) effects of current global politics. The global War on Terror has the potential to construct a racialized binary of the (non-Muslim) West and the Muslim world that will have local effects (Hopkins and Smith, in press). In Australia, the racialization of Muslims is thoroughly influenced by these geopolitical trends. During 2006, the Australian Conservative Prime Minister, John Howard, has repeatedly drawn critical attention to a minority of Muslims who have chosen not to assimilate to 'Australian ways', and who have backward views on the status of women. 8 The implication, in the context of the global War on Terror, is that this minority is radicalized, or potentially so, and that it presents a security threat. Over the last decade, organized hate groups have reoriented the focus of their campaigns from anti-Asian 9 to being anti-Muslim [START_REF] Mason | Hating through the Language of Care[END_REF]. The above, then, are the contexts of contemporary racialization in Australia.

SURVEYING CONTEMPORARY RACISM IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO ISLAM

In this article, we draw from three sets of data that demonstrate the attitudinal bases of contemporary racism experienced by Muslims in Australia. These include results from three public opinion surveys as they pertain to The data reveal the constructions of Otherness (threat, nefarious, inferiority and non-belonging) that are central components of the contemporary racism faced by Australian Muslims. In this section, we review Australian public opinion on Islam. One of the aims of the Attitudes Towards Islam Survey was to collect data on the extent of community fear of Islam (Islamaphobia), and to identify the forms such fear takes. Forty-one percent of respondents were of the view that Islam posed a minor threat to Australia, and a further 15 percent perceived a major threat. 10 It is noteworthy that although 736 (66%) respondents had stated that Islam posed a threat of some level, only 255 of these were able to articulate the specific form of this threat. This suggests that there is a strong level of unsupported (and unsubstantiated) fear of Islam. There is then a good deal of low-level community apprehension regarding Islam, and a significant minority who perceive a major threat. Broadly speaking, most comments concerned the military threat posed to Australia by Islam (176 comments), and a second strain of opinion concerned cultural threats (76 comments). The former were dominated by references to terrorism, including many mentions of the Bali bombings in 2002 and the 11 September 2001 terror events in the USA. In these comments, there was often an unquestioned assertion that Muslims are terrorists, although there was also an encouraging level of recognition of the media's role in establishing these perceptions of threat. The perception of an Islamic military threat (including terrorism) has been enhanced in recent decades by the aforementioned geopolitical conflicts, media reporting of those (and reporting on other matters), as well as the actions and statements of western governments. The Islamic Council of New South Wales (ICNSW) (2004) has outlined how the Australian Federal Government's legislative, security and military actions have reinforced this perception of an Islamic military/security threat.

The second theme of threat, cultural threat, pertained specifically to the impact of the Muslim presence within Australia. The single strongest theme in this regard was a fear that Islam was taking over Australia, or that Muslims wished to convert non-Muslim Australians, often assuming some degree of compulsion:

Because they are fanatical about establishing an Islamic government, they want to make Australia an Islamic state. (Respondent comment, Attitudes Towards Islam Survey, June, 2003) The notion of cultural takeover was given some political legitimacy in early 2006 when a prominent member of the Howard Government (Dana Vale, MP) publicly expressed a fear that Australian Muslims' fertility rates 11 meant that Australia would eventually become an Islamic country, unless 'mainstream' Australians were assisted with child care and other family services (Peatling, 2006: 1).

Respondents commented on how the Islamic presence had already generated changes to the celebration of Christmas in Australia.

Well they've come here and they are pushing their beliefs on us: can't have Christmas carols in schools, can't have pork in school lunches, and it's all because of them. They should come here and fit in with us. (Respondent comment, Attitudes Towards Islam Survey, June, 2003) This end-of-Christmas story is an emergent 'urban myth' in Australia, largely sponsored by talkback radio, for which there is little, if any, substantive evidence (Burke, 2003: 3;Lygo, 2004: 156-9;Maddox, 2005: 185-6). These constructions of cultural threat and takeover are typical of the racialization of Islam, with the implication of incompatibility and nefarious cultural traits.

Because of the disrespect of the Moslem young men shown towards Australian women. (Respondent comment, Attitudes Towards Islam Survey, June, 2003) Between October and December 2001, a telephone survey of 5056 residents of Queensland and NSW was undertaken. The survey was composed of a range of questions intended to gather data on racist attitudes (see [START_REF] Dunn | Constructing Racism in Australia[END_REF]. These included questions on the degree of tolerance of key out-groups and on which cultural groups should not belong in Australia. Just under half of those surveyed (44.9%) felt able to say that some cultural groups do not fit into Australian society. Those respondents were then asked to identify those groups. The most commonly mentioned groups were Muslims (28% of mentions) and people from the Middle East (28% of mentions). Muslims and those from the Middle East were the groups that respondents most thought did not fit into Australian society. Anti-Muslim feeling has been strongly recorded in previous attitude polling in Australia (McAllister and Moore, 1989: 7-11). McAllister and Moore's social distance surveys of the late 1980s indicated that Muslim and Arab Australians were key 'out-groups', just ahead of Asian and Indigenous Australians. This intolerance is thought to be sustained through stereotypes, well outlined in qualitative work and media studies by Goodall, Jakubowicz, Hage and Lowe, among others (see Goodall et al., 1994: 61-5;[START_REF] Lowe | Islam and the Media[END_REF][START_REF] Shboul | Islam and the Australian Media: The Implications of Distorting Mirrors[END_REF]. There is then a strong sense of Otherness attached to Islam among many Australians.

A Bogardus type instrument was used to test respondent tolerance of key out-groups. 12 Respondents were asked if they would be concerned (and if so, how much) if a relative were to marry a Muslim, a Jew, a Christian, an Indigenous Australian or a person of Asian, British or Italian background. Over half of the respondents (52.8%) indicated that they would be concerned if a close relative were to marry a Muslim, which was twice the rate recorded for other out groups (Table 2). Within that, almost 15 percent of respondents stated they would be extremely concerned, which was four times the rate of extreme concern expressed regarding the other groups. The encouraging finding is that almost half (46%) of all respondents would not be concerned at all if a relative were to marry a Muslim. Of course, the disappointing observation is that the level of concern regarding Muslims is well above the other 'out-groups'. attitudinal questions asked in that survey, this was the only question where women were more intolerant/racist than men. This suggests that the stereotype of Islamic misogyny is an important component of the racialization of Islam in Australia (see Chafic, 1985: 52). This has also been found in Europe (Dwyer, 1993: 156) and in regard to ethnic 'Others' in general (van Dijk, 1987: 55). The stereotype of misogyny is one of the core means by which Islam is constructed as a nefarious culture, and it also suggests cultural inferiority and backwardness by evoking a perception that Muslim men are generally uncivil to women. These survey results confirm the findings of other researchers and reports on the extent of Islamaphobia in Australia (Browning et al., 2003: 7-8;[START_REF] Dunn | Representations of Islam in the Politics of Mosque Development in Sydney[END_REF]Hage, 1991;Islamic Council of New South Wales, 1989;McAllister and Moore, 1989: 7-11). Constructions of Muslims as a threat, inferior to and incompatible with Australian culture are core to the racialization of Islam. Many of these constructions also rely upon a narrow construction of the Australian Self, perhaps as Christian or white, but most certainly as 'not Muslim' (see [START_REF] Dunn | Representations of Islam in the Politics of Mosque Development in Sydney[END_REF].

MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF MUSLIM SPACES: THE CASE OF LAKEMBA

One of the strong Geographic contributions to 'race' studies has been the demonstration of how the spaces of ethnic 'Others' are important to racialization (Bonnett, 1996). News media involvements in moral panics about certain places are good examples. This has been found with regard to Chinatowns in Australia and in regard to media constructions of recent Indo-Chinese-Australian spaces (Anderson, 1990;[START_REF] Dunn | Media Representations of Ethnic Minorities[END_REF]. The Sydney suburb of Lakemba has become popularly associated with some of the 'ethnic' communities present in the surrounding Local Government Area (LGA) of Bankstown, including the Lebanese communities settled in the area, and, within that, a significant Sunni Muslim community. In 2001, there were 19,538 Muslims resident in Bankstown LGA and a further 15,073 in the contiguous LGA of Canterbury (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002). Together, the two LGAs are home to a quarter of all Sydney Muslims, and they comprise over 10 percent of the local populations. Sixty-five percent of the Bankstown LGA Muslims were born in Australia, most of the non-Australian born were from Lebanon (28.8%) and a further 7.3 percent were born elsewhere in the Middle East (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2003). The suburb of Lakemba has been a focus of critical media attention in Sydney over the last few years. This has been related to clashes between police and youth (de Freitas, 1997), a series of gang rapes of non-Arab women and to police hyper-scrutiny of a local religious leader (the Imam of Lakemba Mosque).

Content analysis of media representations of Lakemba during 2001 was undertaken for the two daily Sydney newspapers. The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) is the so-called quality daily broadsheet in Sydney and The Daily Telegraph (DT) is the daily tabloid. All articles during 2001 that used the term 'Lakemba' were drawn into a data set for content analysis. In all, 149 articles were collected and assessed for their constructions of place and ethnicity. Manifest counts of key words (such as 'violent', and 'crime'/ 'criminal') were tallied. The overall themes and tenor in each article were also collected for latent assessment. 13 Figure 1 illustrates the dominant themes of the 149 newspaper articles that made reference to Lakemba. It is immediately evident that the most common themes of the articles were crime and violence. Together with other 'negative' themes (gangs, disadvantage, victims and references to September 11 terror attacks) this constituted 77.2 percent of all articles (Figure 1). Almost 10 percent of the articles had a neutral focus on the local Muslim and Arab communities, or religious traditions and festivals in the area (such as the Eid festivals). Articles with a dominantly celebratory theme were much fewer, with only seven concerning successful businesses or economic opportunity, and only one focusing on the cultural vibrancy of the area. An assessment was also undertaken of the overall tenor of articles towards Lakemba. A handful of the articles were neutral (11.4%) and fewer still were mixed (4.7%). Most articles were overwhelmingly negative in their construction of Lakemba and its Muslim residents (69.1%). This corresponds with other analyses of media representations of events and communities in that area of Sydney (de Freitas, 1997; [START_REF] Poynting | Bin Laden in the Suburbs: Criminalising the Arab Other[END_REF].

Results of a manifest content analysis support the above findings on tenor and theme. A count was kept of all terms used to describe Lakemba and its residents. Thirty-nine percent of all terms used were ones of crime or criminality and 25 percent were terms of violence. Positive terms, such as law-abiding, peaceful and respectful, each accounted for only 1 percent of all terms used. In all, 64 percent of the articles included a term relating to crime and criminals, and the same proportion contained a term referring to violence. Only 29 percent of articles provided some sense of a context or explanation for crime or social problems in the area, with most articles (71%) deploying well-rehearsed stereotypes of Islam, relying upon established prejudices among their readers. These data point to an overwhelmingly negative media construction of Lakemba, associating that place and the communities with violence and crime.

A tally was also kept of all references to ethnicity in these newspaper articles. The ethnicity or cultural grouping most often mentioned in the more numerous Daily Telegraph articles was Muslim (28%), followed by Australian (16%), Middle Eastern (14%), then Asian (9%). Together, Muslim, Middle Eastern and Lebanese comprised 62 percent of all mentions of cultural groupings. These deployments of 'ethnic' labels have a central role in constructing the suburb of Lakemba as inherently Muslim, Lebanese, or Middle Eastern. The label of Australian was used in reference to 'non-ethnics' or Anglo-Australians (see [START_REF] Hage | White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society[END_REF]. This is a core means of reproducing the construction of Anglo-Australians as the Australian, and of non-Anglos as non-Australian (as 'ethnic', or Muslim, etc). The racialized reporting on Lakemba during 2001 constructed it as a place of Muslims and people from the Middle East, and as a place of violence and crime. It also associated Lakemba with terror events in September of that year. The media depiction of Lakemba has been part of a racialization process identified elsewhere, in which Muslims are constructed as fanatical, intolerant, militant, fundamentalist, misogynist and alien [START_REF] Dunn | Representations of Islam in the Politics of Mosque Development in Sydney[END_REF]. This has been a very strong mechanism in Australia for reproducing discourses of Islam as a threat and as nefarious.

MEDIA AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTIONS OF ISLAMIC ASYLUM SEEKERS

Between mid-2001 and early 2002, we collected data on the portrayal of asylum seekers by the Australian Federal Government and sections of the print media. The work also involved a survey of public opinion in the South Australian provincial city of Port Augusta. The study period was characterized by the prominence of asylum seeker issues in Australian public debate at the time. It encompassed the so-called 'Tampa incident' (when the Australian Navy were ordered by the Conservative Government to intercept a merchant ship that was carrying rescued asylum seekers towards an Australian port), the September 11 terror attacks, a Federal Election, the drowning of asylum seekers en-route to Australia, and claims that other asylum seekers had thrown their children overboard to pressure Australian naval personnel to take them on board (later found to be untrue). Many of the sea-borne asylum seekers attempting to reach Australia, during this period and before it, were from Muslim countries. The already heated issues of immigration and border control were inflamed by an Islamaphobia that had been accumulating a greater intensity. Asylum seekers have been found to be targets of quite extreme hostility in the West in the late 1990s and early 2000s. For example, the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes ( 2004) found that 70 percent of Australians believed the Federal Government should take a stronger stance against 'illegal immigrants'. [START_REF] Pedersen | Attitudes toward Indigenous-Australians and Asylum-seekers: The Role of False Beliefs and other Social-Psychological Variables[END_REF]2006) reviews of the Australian evidence, and their own social psychology surveys in Western Australia, revealed a particularly strong antipathy towards asylum seekers in Australia since the late 1990s. Empirical findings on European attitudes are similar. The European Commission's (1997: 7) Eurobarometer survey of attitudes found that 66 percent of respondents wanted all 'illegal immigrants' repatriated. [START_REF] Schuster | Common Sense or Racism? The Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Europe[END_REF] outlined how the dominant representations of asylum seekers in Europe too easily carry over the racializations imposed upon those people by the persecuting governments and people they are fleeing. Across Europe, this poor portrayal has laid a basis for intolerance and for actions of dispersal, detention and deportation.

The intention of [START_REF] Klocker | Who's Driving the Asylum Debate? Newspaper and Government Representations of Asylum Seekers[END_REF] research was an intertextual analysis of how one set of discourses influenced others (e.g. government upon media, media upon public opinion). All Federal Government statements on refugees and asylum seekers during the six-month study period were analysed for their content, tenor and context (56 statements). The same analytical frame was applied to articles regarding asylum seekers in two metropolitan newspapers (The Adelaide Advertiser and its Sunday stable mate The Sunday Mail) and one local newspaper (The Transcontinental in Port Augusta) (491 articles in total). Port Augusta was selected as a site for analysing public opinion because of its proximity to the desert-based Woomera Immigration Reception and Processing Centre (IRPC) and the even closer and newly built Baxter IRPC. Questionnaires were mailed to a random sample of 1000 Port Augusta residents and 400 valid completions were returned.

In the final days of the November 2001 Federal Election campaign, the Conservative Prime Minister, John Howard, repeatedly proclaimed 'we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come'. This slogan became a key rhetorical device in the conservative's campaign for re-election, appearing on election posters and other campaign materials (Jupp, 2002: 199;Marr and Wilkinson, 2003: 245-6, 277). Asylum seekers were transformed into a 'law and order' issue and were accordingly portrayed as a threat to Australia's border integrity and sovereignty. The Government latched on to the false reports that asylum seekers had threatened to throw their children overboard, despite the fact that these reports were very quickly revealed as inaccurate. 14 The Prime Minister announced 'I don't want people like that in Australia' (see Maddox, 2005: 166-192;Marr and Wilkinson, 2003: 189). Furthermore, the Federal Government mandated that public relations officers within the military and immigration department should not release any images that served to humanize asylum seekers, and various cabinet ministers made direct links between asylum seekers and the threat of terrorism [START_REF] Klocker | Who's Driving the Asylum Debate? Newspaper and Government Representations of Asylum Seekers[END_REF]Marr and Wilkinson, 2003: 280-1). Some MPs even asserted that the Taliban may have been smuggling in terrorists in the guise of asylum seekers (Slipper, quoted in Papps, 2001: 14). 15 Asylum seekers were purposefully constructed by the Government as less (than) human, terror threats. Maddox (2005: 179) observed that it was 'the latest twist in the line of inference and allusion which linked Muslims, suburban teenage criminals, international terrorists, fundamentalist theocrats and desperate asylum seekers as "Them"'.

Content analysis revealed that Federal Government statements were overwhelmingly and consistently negative (90.9%), with only three (out of 56 statements, 5%) coded as having a positive tenor towards asylum seekers [START_REF] Klocker | Who's Driving the Asylum Debate? Newspaper and Government Representations of Asylum Seekers[END_REF]. The most common constructions of asylum seekers in Government statements were illegitimacy (22.8% of terms tallied), followed by illegality (18.0%) and threat (16.3%). Moreover, the Government clearly flagged the ethnicity of these threatening and undesirable asylum seekers. The most regularly mentioned cultural grouping in the Government statements analysed were Pakistani (28%), then Afghan (26%), followed by Middle Eastern (7%), Iraqi (7%) and Sri Lankan (7%). The racializing discourse drew upon, and reinforced, stereotypes of the alien, threatening and violent Muslim. There were also overt evocations of the 'Self' in these statements. Each Government statement also contained at least one reference (on average) to the unspecified self: as 'Australians', and 'our territory/borders, etc'. These references to the Self (non-ethnicized, but Anglo) served to complete the binary with the Muslim Other who were seeking asylum.

The tenor of the newspapers examined was a little more likely to be positive towards asylum seekers, with The Advertiser articles the most sympathetic (18.5% positive), and The Sunday Mail (9.2%) and The Transcontinental (9.5%) much less so. However, the most frequently used terms to describe asylum seekers in the three newspapers were still those in the 'threat' category of description. Constructions of asylum seekers as the Other were also prominent. All three newspapers actively dehumanized asylum seekers, with 'detainee' and 'boat people' being the most frequently used terms within this 'Other' category of description. Extreme quotations, such as that from the Mayor of Port Augusta -'those bastards can run like camels if they escape' (Baluch, quoted in Maiden and Duffy, 2002: 5) served to accentuate dehumanization. Examples of threatening representations of asylum seekers from the three newspapers included:

Residents' safety has been a concern and an issue, especially when a riot at the centre led to a large number of detainees escaping and making their way into the town [Woomera]. [START_REF] Gerlach | Detention Centre -What's Happened in Woomera[END_REF] The violent behaviour of some detainees in a bid to get their own way has been appalling with buildings burnt, guards attacked and claims children have been forced to have their lips sewn together. [START_REF] Crouch | Desert Cloud over our Day[END_REF] Special Air Service troops conducted covert surveillance of a man believed to be a 'sleeper agent' with connections to Osama bin Laden. SAS troops installed a miniature camera in the asylum seekers' sleeping quarters to watch over the suspected terrorist. (Advertiser, 2001) [START_REF] Klocker | Who's Driving the Asylum Debate? Newspaper and Government Representations of Asylum Seekers[END_REF] concluded that the negative media representations of asylum seekers had depended heavily upon, if not been directed by, the representations deployed within Federal Government discourse. As in the Government documents, representations of ethnicity within the newspaper articles associated asylum seekers, and the negativity directed at them, with the Muslim Other. The main ethnicity references in The Adelaide Advertiser were to Afghanis (36%), Iraqis (20%), Middle Easterners (7%), Muslims (5%), Iranians (10%) and Sri Lankans (4%), and references in the Sunday version of the paper were even more dominated by the first four of those cultural groupings. As with Government statements, there were always references to the Self, as: 'Aussies', the 'Australian people','Australian society' and, in the case of The Transcontinental, to 'locals' and 'residents'. These references served to reinforce a definitional divide between the resident (Anglo/non-Muslim) Self, and the threatening asylum seeking Other.

Public opinion, as measured through a questionnaire survey in Port Augusta, was also potently negative in regard to asylum seekers. When asked to select terms representing their opinions of asylum seekers from a list provided, respondents overwhelmingly selected very negative descriptors. Table 3 provides a further sense of the key constructions of asylum seekers selected by questionnaire respondents. Three-quarters of all respondents pointed to the threat that asylum seekers posed to Australian borders and security, and more than six out of 10 identified the issue as a national crisis. Clearly, public opinion on asylum seekers, broadly constructed as Muslims, was of an Other who were a threat to national security and integrity.

Of the 400 respondents, 113 made an unsolicited link between asylum seekers and Islam within open responses and margin annotations to the questionnaire. The comments were overwhelmingly negative and focused on the problems with Muslims or with Arabic asylum seekers. A third of these comments centred on the perceived violence, fanaticism and terrorism that respondents associated with asylum seekers (see Figure 2). These concerns draw directly from the stereotype of the Muslim fanatic [START_REF] Dunn | Representations of Islam in the Politics of Mosque Development in Sydney[END_REF]. A further 38 percent of such comments asserted that the cultures of these asylum seekers were too different from the 'Australian way of life', and 15 percent worried that asylum seekers would cause 'cultural problems' in Australian society. Together, these two forms of response demonstrate the racialization of Islam. Muslim asylum seekers were constructed as possessing inferior cultural traits, particularly as judged against a narrowly defined national cultural norm. Respondents' written comments on asylum media treatment has largely reflected the negative disposition of official government statements. Islamic asylum seekers have been constructed as less (than) human, incompatible and threatening, and considered deserving of inhumane treatment. Government and media discourses regarding asylum seekers have been a key means of racialization.

THE RACIALIZATION OF ISLAM IN AUSTRALIA

The three data sets outlined above point to the generally poor public perception of Islam in Australia. This antipathy is reinforced by problematic media treatment and a hostile government disposition. The negativity has material impacts upon Australian Muslims. Such constructions (mis)inform opposition to mosque development [START_REF] Dunn | Representations of Islam in the Politics of Mosque Development in Sydney[END_REF][START_REF] Dunn | Using Cultural Geography to Engage Contested Constructions of Ethnicity and Citizenship in Sydney[END_REF], and lie behind arson attacks and racist violence (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2004). During 2003, the Racism Monitor collected data from community organizations on the experience of racism and found that acts of discrimination, verbal abuse and violence were commonplace for Australian Muslims [START_REF] Browning | What Can We Say about Racism in Australia?[END_REF]. Such incivility was so widespread that Islamic organizations had come to see it as an 'ordinary experience' of Australian life. An Islamic community representative was quoted: 'it happens so often and goes unnoticed, therefore we have learnt to accept this sort of bad behaviour' (quoted in Browning et al., 2003: 7). Muslims in the West almost unanimously point to the unreasonableness and defamatory effect of media portrayals of Islam. This is a recurring theme of any contemporary ethnographic work with Muslims in western countries, including the UK and Australia (Dreher, 2005: 23;Hopkins, 2004: 268-9). Muslim identities in Australia are corralled by racialization. The accumulating western stereotypes of Islam -a mix of the now well-known stereotypes of fanaticism, violence, misogyny and general incivility (animality)swirl within local debates about mosques and in the racialization of certain suburbs, and in security and asylum seeker discourses. Muslims are constructed as culturally inferior or incompatible with non-Muslim 'Australian' culture -as culturally Other. Certain spaces (such as the suburb of Lakemba) and flows (asylum seekers) are the terrains in which racialization is grounded and reproduced. These representations also depend upon narrow constructions of the Self, supported by a desire that the Other (in this case, Muslims) be absent from the national space. Our argument, influenced by Modood (2005: 11, 17), is that this is usefully conceptualized as a racialization of Islam. The racism faced by Australian Muslims is not a new phenomenon per se; it relies upon asserted inherentisms, and it reinforces cultural hierarchies and privilege. Anti-Islamic sentiment is not a biological racism; such antipathy is rather culturally directed. This justifies the retention of a distinction between colour and cultural racism, although our argument is that both types of racist attitude are operationalized into racist acts in essentially similar ways, through a racialization. In the contemporary context of terror events by extremists and the global War on Terror (including the West's occupation of Iraq), this racialization generates local and palpable experiences of racist abuse, violence and exclusion for western Muslims. These experiences have been extended, following new terror events or 'western' responses (Dreher, 2005: 25). These racist acts against Australian Muslims rely upon certain markers of culture. This is a racialization process, but without 'race'.

What we have outlined above are key instruments and rhetoric of the racialization of Islam in Australia. These Islamic identities contain or imprison Muslim Australians to a circumstance of lesser citizenship. The ICNSW (Islamic Council of New South Wales, 2004) referred to this as an experience of marginalization. This racialization has corralled Muslim identity and citizenship. Of course, Australian Muslims contest this confinement. Organizations such as the ICNSW, and some local mosque associations, have attempted to assert alternative constructions, to speak against damaging portrayals, and to reach out to local non-Muslims. These organizations face an exceptionally difficult task, made all the more difficult by the frequency and reach of contemporary racialization. Australian Islamic organizations have nonetheless remained positive, constructive and hopeful. Indeed, Muslims in the West may be an essential key to contesting this racialization and confounding the emergence of an Islam/West divide [START_REF] Manji | The Trouble with Islam: A Muslim's Call for Reform in Her Faith[END_REF]. Hopkins (2004: 268-9) made reference to three sets of remedy: changing the racialization of Islam through the media, improving public understandings of Islam, and specifically, expanding public recognition in the West of Islamic heterogeneity. We implied earlier that some sections of the media maintain a critical perspective on Government statements and actions regarding Islam, and (some) public opinion retains a healthy cynicism regarding both media and Government. These are a healthy basis upon which to progress the first form of remedy. Drawing attention to the cultural and religious heterogeneity of Australian Islam, as described earlier, would also help to confound the 'inherentism' or static generalizations that are core to racialization. These ruptures against racialization, and potentials, are the sources of hope. Finally, racialization constructs both the Other and the Self, and so expanding popular understandings of Australian-ness beyond Anglo-Celtic/Christianity is fundamentally important.

Notes

1 Muslims in Australia are very urbanized. Indeed, almost half (47.8%) of all Australian Muslims reside within Sydney (134,366), constituting 3.4 percent of the Sydney population. The presence of Muslims is particularly significant in the capital cities, especially Sydney and Melbourne. There has been a substantive presence since the Turkish and Lebanese migration flows of the 1970s, and the number of Australian Muslims has been doubling every ten years. 2 The existing residential building was the target of vandalism and offensive graffiti, the latter daubed on the inside and outside of the structure while the case was under appeal. Later (June, 2004), a racialized attack on the property included the placing of pigs' heads on stakes, and the smearing of pig offal throughout the site. 3 While Frederickson made this important comment on functional equivalence, it should be noted he nonetheless prefers a conceptual distinction between racism and religious intolerance. His argument is that the former (based around 'race') proscribes change and integration between peoples, whereas the latter is based upon a desire for integration. 4 Often these criticisms of Muslims are conflated with criticisms of Arab-Australians, there is a regular conflation of the two within public discourse (see Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2004;[START_REF] Poynting | Bin Laden in the Suburbs: Criminalising the Arab Other[END_REF]. , 2006: 13-17). 8 The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, referred in February to his 'longheld' concern about some Australian Muslims who kept on 'raving about jihad', and the conservative attitudes towards women (Kerbaj and Megalogenis, 2006: 3). These concerns were repeated in August on Macquarie radio, along with concerns about a lack of English language competency among migrants generally and a perception that some Muslims were not integrating well enough. In the same period, the Federal Attorney General expressed his disdain at a lack of tolerance among some Muslims (Kerbaj, 2006: 4). 9 It should be noted that in the Australian circumstance, 'Asian' in everyday speech usually refers to people with ancestries to East Asia, including north-east Asia (e.g. China, Japan, Hong Kong) and south-east Asia (e.g. Vietnam, Thailand). This is different from the British usage, where 'Asia' would normally refer to Pakistan and India. 10 Asking respondents for their opinions on the threat that Islam poses to Australia was itself likely to stimulate an articulation of a perceived threat. That 36 percent of respondents perceived no threat (and a further 6 percent did not feel able to comment) could be seen as an encouraging indicator that Australians are by no means universally convulsed with Islamaphobia. 11 There is little evidence that fertility rates among Australian Muslims are structurally different from other Australians. In general, fertility rates of migrants in Australia tend to quickly approximate the average, certainly within a generation (Burnley, 2001). Furthermore, fertility rates in most Muslim countries are also low, by historical standards, e.g. total fertility rates of 2.2 in Lebanon and 2.02 in Iran. 12 The 'out-groups' analysed were selected, based on previous attitudinal survey research and critical cultural studies work. The survey also included some nonout-groups to test for variation, these included Christians and Australians of an Italian and British background. 13 The content of the two newspapers varied in interesting ways, on some of the issues. However, there is not space here to interpret those variations (see [START_REF] Salabay | The Media Representation of Lakemba, Sydney: Constructions of Place and Methods of Resistance[END_REF]). 14 The Federal Government failed to reveal this falsity to the public until many months after the federal election (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). 15 The Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education (2002) made the useful observation that only one out of 13,000 asylum seekers to Australia in 2001 was actually deemed a security threat.

  Muslims, media representations of key Muslim spaces and contemporary discourses about predominantly Muslim asylum seekers: • The University of New South Wales and Macquarie University Racism Survey, October-December 2001, telephone survey, funded by the Australian Research Council (N: 5056) (carried out by Dunn, Burnley and Forrest); • The Port Augusta Questionnaire Survey on Asylum Seekers, June-October 2001, postal survey, funded by The University of New South Wales (N: 400) (carried out by Klocker and Dunn); • The Attitudes Towards Islam Survey, June 2003, funded by the Australia-Indonesia Institute (N:1311) (carried out by Roy Morgan Research and Dunn).

  5 Australian Government parliamentarians and Ministers have simplistically associated terrorism with Islam. They have commonly used conjunctions of the term 'Islamic' with 'terrorist', 'fanatic' or 'militant' to describe protagonists within Muslim countries. Take for example, the following statement from Foreign Minister Downer (2004: 18): 'The fundamentalist Islamic extremist terrorists (or Islamo-facists) cannot achieve their aims through . . .'. 6 US President George W. Bush's reference to the new 'War on Terror' as a crusade fed this rhetoric of an Islam-West axis (Walker, 2001 cited in Maddox, 2005: 173-4, 345). The leader of the Catholic Church in Australia, Cardinal Pell, has provocatively used precisely the rhetoric of the Cold War to describe an inherent tension he perceives between Islam and Christianity (Islamic Council of New South Wales, 2005; Zwartz, 2004: 3). Cardinal Pell (2004: 17) made a direct analogy between Islam and communism, and implied that Islam could be an intolerant and dark political substitute for the emptiness of secular democracy. 7 The Pew Global Attitudes Project surveyed 14,030 people in 13 countries, between March and May 2006, to gather data on a range of attitudes, including perceptions of Westerners and Muslims. Muslims in Islamic countries saw the West as the cause of geopolitical instability and perceived westerners as immoral, greedy and selfish. Non-Muslims in the West saw Muslims as a threat, and as disrespectful of women (Pew Research Centre

Table 1

 1 Muslims by birthplace, Australia, 2001

	Birthplace	Australian Muslims	Percentage all Muslims
	Australia	102566	36.43
	Afghanistan	9923	3.52
	Bangladesh	7596	2.70
	Bosnia & Herzegovina	9892	3.51
	Cyprus	3708	1.32
	Egypt	3061	1.09
	Fiji	5772	2.05
	India	2819	1.00
	Indonesia	8087	2.87
	Iran	6353	2.26
	Iraq	7749	2.75
	Jordan	1348	0.48
	Kuwait	1610	0.57
	Lebanon	29321	10.41
	Malaysia	2975	1.06
	North-West Europe	2668	0.95
	Pakistan	9238	3.28
	Singapore	2091	0.74
	Somalia	3585	1.27
	Syria	2261	0.80
	Turkey	23479	8.34
	Sub-total	246102	87.4
	All	281576

Source: Australian Bureau of

Statistics, 2003.

  Table 2 also shows that women were much more likely to communicate concern regarding Islam. Of the 19

Table 2

 2 Any stated concern regarding inter-marriage, to selected 'outgroups' , by gender and age Question wording:'In your opinion how concerned would you feel if one of your close relatives were to marry a person of . . .' Chi Square tests of the significance of associations for Age were Muslim (p = < .000), Aboriginal

	Would be concerned if a	Muslim	Aboriginal	Asian	Jewish
	relative were to marry	faith	background background	faith
	a person of . . .	%	%	%	%
	Age
	18 to 34	44.9	20.3	21.0	22.3
	35 to 64	52.7	28.7	27.2	24.0
	65 +	63.7	40.6	36.7	26.7
	Gender
	Male	48.9	30.7	28.5	24.1
	Female	55.6	27.6	26.8	24.1
	All	52.8	28.9	27.5	24.1
	n	5056.0	5056.0	5056.0	5056.0

Notes: (p = < .000), Asian (p = < .000) and Jewish (p = < .026); and for Gender were Muslim (p = < .000), Aboriginal (p = < .021), Asian (p = < .218), and Jewish (p = < .935). Source: The University of New South Wales and Macquarie University Racism Survey, Oct-Dec 2001.

  DUNN ET AL. • CONTEMPORARY RACISM AND ISLAMAPHOBIA

	Cultural vibrancy 2%	Religious traditions 3%	Successful local businesses 5%	Other 6%
	Ethnic/cultural
	diversity
	1%			Danger/
	Muslim/Arab community			violence/crime 40%
	6%
	September 11 10%		Ethnic gangs 2%
	Local victims 13% Lack of resources 3%	5% disadvantage Socioeconomic	Youth activities/ crime 4% Hate crimes 4%
	Figure 1 Main theme of Sydney newspaper articles referring to Lakemba,
	2001

Source: Latent content analysis of The Sydney Morning Herald, and The Daily Telegraph, 2001 (n = 149 articles analyzed).

Table 3

 3 Terms selected by survey respondents as representative of asylum seekers, Port Augusta, 2002 Source: The Port Augusta Questionnaire Survey on Asylum Seekers, Jun-Oct 2001, questionnaire responses to Question 2 'Which of the following terms and phrases do YOU think describe the arrival of asylum seekers by boat in Australia? Please tick a response for EVERY term or phrase' . don't want people who might blow themselves or others up living near me . . . If these people really want to live like Australians in a free country, they should learn to leave some of their customs, beliefs and religion behind them. Why is it that Australians always have to accept everyone else's cultural beliefs but they do not accept our ways, or our beliefs. People from some of these countries do not live like people in Australia. Women to them are second-class and women in Australia are educated and have some, if not all, equal rights in employment etc. (Respondent no. 171, Port Augusta Questionnaire Survey on Asylum Seekers, 2001) Some respondent comments were vitriolic, and incited racist violence: On Federal land, the government should use real ammunition to gain respect and send the rag heads home to their own country. . . . The Navy should blow them out of the water. Sharks and sea lice would clean up. (Respondent no. 128, Port Augusta Questionnaire Survey on Asylum Seekers, 2001) Being close to the camp means that some will wander our streets so I will be able to spit on and abuse them. . . . I can hardly wait. (Respondent no. 282, Port Augusta Questionnaire Survey on Asylum Seekers, 2001) Asylum seekers to Australia in recent years have borne the brunt of government-reinforced, if not endorsed, hostility. The tenor and theme of DUNN ET AL. • CONTEMPORARY RACISM AND ISLAMAPHOBIA The Port Augusta Questionnaire Survey on Asylum Seekers, Jun-Oct 2001. Manifest coding of questionnaire open responses and respondent annotations (where n = 113 respondents made unsolicited comments on Islam, from the 400 valid returned surveys).

	Term/phrase	Yes	No	No opinion No response
		(no.) %	(no.) %	(no.) %	(no.) %
	Flood	(171) 42.8	(136) 34.0	(48) 12.0	(45) 11.3
	Crisis	(254) 63.5	(78) 19.5	(29) 7.3	(39) 9.8
	Invasion	(208) 52.0	(136) 34.0	(23) 5.8	(33) 8.3
	Disorderly	(300) 75.0	(47) 11.8	(15) 3.8	(38) 9.5
	Trickle	(80) 20.0	(222) 55.5	(43) 10.8	(55) 13.8
	Manageable	(109) 27.3	(212) 53.0	(28) 7.0	(51) 12.8
	Small by international
	standards	(139) 34.8	(151) 37.8	(53) 13.3	(57) 14.3
	Threat to integrity of
	Australia's borders	(294) 73.5	(62) 15.5	(15) 3.8	(29) 7.3
	Threat to Australia's security	(306) 76.5	(55) 13.8	(16) 4.0	(23) 5.8

I

Source:

Advertiser (2001) 'Exclusive: Boat People Abused Manoora Crew: Bites, Filth and Threats', The Advertiser, 13 October, p. 1. Anderson, K.J. (1990) '"Chinatown Re-oriented": A Critical Analysis of recent Redevelopment Schemes in a Melbourne and Sydney Enclave', Australian Geographical Studies 28(2): 137-54. Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002) 'Census of Population and Housing', Australian Bureau of Statistics CD Package, CDATA2001, Canberra. Australian Bureau of Statistics (2003) Customised Matrix: Islam by Birthplace. Sydney: Australian Bureau of Statistics. Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (2004) 'Australian Survey of Social Attitudes', Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University [http: //assda224-100.anu.edu.au]. Barker, M. (1981) The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe. London: Junction Books. Blum, L.A. (2002) I'm Not a Racist, But . . .: The Moral Quandary of Race. New York: Cornell University Press. Bonnett, A. (1996) 'Constructions of 'Race', Place and Discipline: Geographies of 'Racial' Identity and Racism', Ethnic and Racial Studies 19(4): 864-83.