Mathieu Couttenier
email: mathieu.couttenier@univ-paris1.fr

Daniel Berkowitz

Jerome Hericourt

Thierry Mayer

Marc Sangnier

Farid Toubal

Relationship Between Natural Resources and Institutions

Keywords: Natural Resources, Institutions, Rent Seeking JEL : Q32, O43, O10, F10

This article analyses through a rent seeking model, the relationship between institutions' quality and natural resources. Depending on the institutions quality, each country has a specific structural capacity to stand natural resources dependency. It is shown that for each country, a threshold exists, such that beyond this point, any additional amounts of natural resources begin to have a negative impact on institutions. As the stock of natural resources increases, this improves the expected profitability of rent seeking, which in turn lowers the quality of institutions. The mechanism comes from a new balance of power within the country. However, the institutional degradation's intensity is determined by social interactions and depends on both the resources nature and their appropriability level. The inverse U-shaped curve obtained from empirical studies presented in this article supports the natural resources non-monotonic effect on institutions found in the model.

Introduction

From [START_REF] Sachs | Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth[END_REF] we have extensive literature studies the relationship between natural resources and growth. It explores the following standard interrogation : how is possible to explain that oil is a curse in Nigeria and a blessing in Norway ? What are the channels to explain this stylised fact ? Table 1 (in appendix) shows distinctly that countries with a high natural resource rent (columns 1 to 3) do not consistently have a weak Human Development Indicator (HDI) but a high natural resources dependence (columns 4 and 5) is highly correlated with a weak HDI. [START_REF] Sachs | Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth[END_REF] offer one of the first explanations of this stylised fact. They found that natural resources dependence has a direct impact on growth. According to them this effect is more important than the indirect effect via the institutions and openness. [START_REF] Sala-I Martin | Addressing the Natural Resource Curse : An Illustration from Nigeria[END_REF], [START_REF] Isham | The Varieties of Resource Experience : Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth[END_REF] and [START_REF] Boschini | Resource Curse or Not : A Question of Appropriability[END_REF] conclude that the indirect effect via the institutions is more influent.

They take into account the endogeneity problem for the institutions with some standard instrumental variables. 1 It introduces the institutions' importance for the natural resource abundant economies which is discussed in recent studies (e.g. [START_REF] Knack | Institutions and Economic Performance : Cross-Section Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Mesures[END_REF], [START_REF] Hall | Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others ?[END_REF], [START_REF] Acemoglu | Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions[END_REF]) which show that institutional quality is a fundamental cause of economic growth and play a key role in explaining cross-country differences in economic growth. Indeed institutions affect economic incentives, notably incentives to invest in physical and human capital. Moreover [START_REF] Easterly | Tropics, germs, and crops : how endowments influence economic development[END_REF], [START_REF] Rodrik | Institutions Rule : The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development[END_REF] estimated the contribution of trade, geography and institutions on income levels. This "race" to determine the prevailing factor revealed that the institutions are one of the major determinants of a country's income level.

The two following graphs represent the institutional level difference between two groups illustrating the institutions'importance for the natural resource abundant economies. 2 The institutional measure Polity IV ( which varies from -10 to +10 ) gives a gap between 7 and 12 points between these groups (graph 1).

It is the same conclusion with the ICRG measurement (ranging from 0 to 100) where the gap between these two groups varies between 10 and 35 ( graph 2).

1 They take "Settler Mortality" due to Acemoglu et al. (2001a) and the fraction of the population speaking English and European languages due to [START_REF] Hall | Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others ?[END_REF] 2 Data from R.Feenstra and with own calculation from 1962 to 2000. The first group has a natural resources dependence (percentage of total exports from primary commodity exports) each year below 40% and also a dependency's mean along the period below 40%. The second group has a dependency over 90% each year and a dependency's mean along the period over These stylized facts are confirmed by political sciences which distinguishes three mechanisms to explain the natural resources impact (more precisely the oil dependence) on the institutions : "Rentier Effects", "Delayed Modernization" and "Entrenched Inequality" [START_REF] Ross | Extractive Sectors and the Poor[END_REF] and [START_REF] Isham | The Varieties of Resource Experience : Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth[END_REF]).

The first channel is certainly the most well known. The opportunity for a country's government to access financial windfall has various significant consequences, which depend on the balance of power between the government (relates to the elite) and the rest of society. Indeed the State does not need to levy heavy taxes in order to develop modern systems, and can avoid over-taxing the population. With weak institutions, as the population is less taxed, it will be de facto less inclined to protest, to organize and to develop a civil society able to overthrow the power in place [START_REF] Beblawi | The Rentier State[END_REF]). In addition, the government could limit the ambitions of challenging its power. The financial windfall expected makes it possible to distribute some allocation to content the population (the roman principle of "Panem and circemses"), in order to corrupt political opposition. It also enables the establishment of a strong army which could use repression and violence. 3The second channel is "Delayed Modernization". Modernization is also characterized by a growing role of education, urbanization, a specialization in production as well as greater openness (economic, political, cultural ...) which depends on the balance of power between different social groups within the society (Elite / Rest of the society, Rural / Urban ...) as well as on the country's history (such as the colonial origins, the settler mortality (Acemoglu et al. (2001a)), the legal origin...). It appears that any modernization process triggers inevitable changes in the country. Consequently, a government that heads a country with abundant natural resources will have a tendency to keep this privilege which gives it access to a financial windfall and will delay the modernization process which could weaken this power and his capacity to capture the rent. For example, large enrolment rates or education expenditures are not found in resources rich country [START_REF] Gylfason | Natural resources, education, and economic development[END_REF]). 4The third channel has mainly been developed by [START_REF] Engerman | Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies : A view from Economic Historians of the United States[END_REF]. "Entrenched Inequality" which draws a parallel between growth trajectories of North and South American countries. They explain development divergence through an interaction between the timing and the nature of decolonization, the natural resources endowment and agricultural capacity. This interaction results in some institutions which have an impact on long term growth. Some natural resource types appear to favor economic development and long-term growth through the social structure and has a significant influence on the institutional quality . This paper focuses on institutions' formation and changes but more precisely on the preferences of different groups which have the power to build institutions . We borrow the meaningful definition given by [START_REF] North | Economic Performance through Time[END_REF] which defines institutions as "...the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints, informal constraints and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and especially economies.". We take into account their endogeneity through a model of balance of power. [START_REF] Aghion | Endogenous Political Institutions[END_REF][START_REF] Acemoglu | A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions[END_REF], [START_REF] Acemoglu | Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions[END_REF], have developed endogenous institutional models based on two powerful groups (Elite and Citizens). The balance of power between these groups explains the institutional level. Incentives for different groups play a key role for the institutional change. [START_REF] Mehlum | Institutions and the Resource Curse[END_REF] consider this assumption to build their model and take natural resources as one financial incentive which impacts the balance of power inside a country and therefore influence institutional level. These authors highlight additional evidence : the resource curse could appear only in the countries with grabber institutions. 5 That means that natural resources' effect on growth depends on the quality of institutions (grabber friendly or producer friendly). This conclusion contrasts with the findings of [START_REF] Tornell | The Voracity Effect[END_REF] and [START_REF] Torvik | Natural resources, rent seeking and welfar[END_REF] which exhibited a negative relationship between natural resources dependence and growth, without institutional condition.

Our analysis extends the literature in several dimensions and provides an answer for the standard question : why oil is a curse in Nigeria and a blessing in Norway. Our main contribution is to explain the relationship between institutions and natural resources rent. A good understanding of this relationship can allow comprehensive enhancement of natural resources' effect on growth. In order to identify a theoretical effect of a relationship between natural resources and institutions' evolution, we derive a new model from [START_REF] Mehlum | Institutions and the Resource Curse[END_REF]. Our model is built on the balance of power between two groups, both belonging to the elite, which have unlike preferences over institutions. The group's constitution rides on the incentive, the payoff to belong or not to this group and the each group's payoff depends upon the natural resources rents. These rents are treated as the leading incentive in this model. First, our main prediction from this model is that each country has a structural institutional capacity to bear some natural resource rent. National institutions determine a threshold in the amount of natural resources and beyond this point the resources positive impact on institutions becomes negative. Moreover, after a natural resource shocks prices, each country has a variant feedback according to its institutional quality which could deteriorate or improve the institutional quality. Lastly, all these results depend on the type of resource in abundance in each country.

Second, we confirm this prediction by an empirical study. We found empirically a non linear effect of natural resources on institutions. In most cases, this effect stands for an inverse U-Shape. This result rests on a new natural resources database from the World Bank which allows a panel study. We also control for a variety of variables used in the literature. To confirm our empirical results, following [START_REF] Koenker | Quantile Regression[END_REF], we also use a simultaneous quantiles regressions and confirm the presence of an inverse U-Shape thanks to [START_REF] Lind | With or Without U ? -The appropriate test for a U shaped relationship[END_REF]'s test. We use two other estimating procedures to check our prediction : a Hausman-Taylor regression and the methodology of Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition [START_REF] Plümper | Efficient estimation of time-invariant and rarely changing variables in finite sample panel analyses with unit fixed effects[END_REF]).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 provides the estimation method and the data used. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes.

Baseline Model

Assumptions

We consider a homogeneous population of entrepreneurs (denoted N ), like the elite which has the power to build institutions. Inside this population, there are two interest groups, the grabbers and the producers. Both of them have the power to modify the institutional level according to a balance of power between them [START_REF] Aghion | Endogenous Political Institutions[END_REF] , [START_REF] Acemoglu | A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions[END_REF], [START_REF] Acemoglu | Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions[END_REF]).

We have n g the grabbers' number and n f the producers' number with N = n g + n f and α the fraction of producers : α = n f N . In contrast with [START_REF] Tornell | The Voracity Effect[END_REF], we treat the numbers of grabbers and producers as endogenous.

The grabbers target rents from the natural resources. They use their entire effort for the rent-seeking activity. Our notation for natural resources is more precise and allows us to observe more precisely a shock price impact on balance of power according to the type of resource and the quantity of the resource being traded. The rent from one natural resource i is calculated by the difference between the price (p i ) and the cost (c i ) times by the quantity (q i ). Natural resources rent is the sum of all the natural products (from i=1 to i=V) extracted and exported by the country. Each natural resource is weighted by his appropriability's level (0 < γ i < 1) [START_REF] Boschini | Resource Curse or Not : A Question of Appropriability[END_REF]). 6 This makes it possible to give more weight for the natural resources who are highly appropriable (γ i close to 0) than other who are less appropriable (γ i close to 1). For each grabber, the payoff is π g :

π g = s N V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) (1)
The grabber's payoff function is decreasing with elite's size (N ). Indeed, the more the power is concentrated in hands of a minority, the higher the potential rent is for each agent belonging to this elite.

Moreover, the grabber's payoff function increases with the parameter s. It is a very important parameter often used in the conflict literature or rent-seeking literature [START_REF] Mehlum | Institutions and the Resource Curse[END_REF]) and that brings into play a modified function of Tullock (1975) :

s = 1 1 -α + αλ (2)
This expression of s, which comes from the effort from producers and grabbers, introduces the institutions (0< λ <1) where institutional quality is high when λ is close to 1, and low when λ is close to 0 (see the appendix for more explanation). s decreases in the institution's level and increases in α. It means that the lower institutional quality is, the higher the grabber's payoff is, ceteris paribus. Hence grabbers want institutions that permit rent seeking, like "extractive" institutions (Acemoglu et al. (2001b)) : they are in support of an institution's deterioration . Moreover the grabber's payoff is increasing in n f or decreasing, by definition, in n g . The bigger the grabbers numbers is, the less each of them gets paid.

The producer group is institution friendly. For production side, as [START_REF] Mehlum | Institutions and the Resource Curse[END_REF], we follow [START_REF] Murphy | Industrialization and the Big Push[END_REF] with L workers (the equilibrium wage is set to unity) and M different goods. The payoff of each producer (π f , f for friendship) is the sum of the profit from production (π) and a share of the natural resource rent :

π f = π + λπ g (3)
This share of the natural resource rent depends on the producer's effort in the rent-seeking activity.

This effort is lower than the grabber's effort and depends on the institutional level. The better the institutional quality is, the more efficient the effort to capture a part of rent is.

We use a very simple form for the profit from production :

π = y(1 - 1 β ) -F , ( 4
)
where y is the quantity with a price equal to one, β the productivity. F is the fixed cost.

In [START_REF] Mehlum | Institutions and the Resource Curse[END_REF], the fixed cost doesn't depend on the institutional quality. But since [START_REF] Anderson | Insecurity and the pattern of trade : An empirical investigation[END_REF] a large literature has demonstrated the institutional quality does matter in trade. [START_REF] Berkowitz | Trade, law, and product complexity[END_REF] argue that a high institutional level permits a country to produce and export more complex goods. In the same way, in [START_REF] Do | Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions[END_REF] the fixed cost could express the quality of institutions like corruption, the investment climate or the judicial system inefficiency. In our framework we introduce a decreasing fixed cost with the institutional level ( δF δλ < 0). Combining equations (1) and (3), we obtain :

π f = y(1 - 1 β ) -F + λ s N V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) (5)
This function increases with institutional quality, confirming that producer is institutional friendly.

We then express the total income Y in order to determine the impact of the share of producer on the profit function. The total income is a sum of the total of natural resources sales and the production of the M differentiates goods at the same quantities y :

Y = V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) + M y (6)
At the equilibrium all is spent, hence total income is also the sum of wage income(L) and the sum of profits. Taking into account equations (1) to (3) and the equation ( 6) may be combined as follows :

Y = L + N (απ f + π g (1 -α)) = L + N απ + V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) (7)
After having found the expression of y, we can express π :7

π = β(L -F M ) -L β(M -n f ) + n f (8)
It appears that π increases in n f and consequently π f is also increasing in n f . The model is solved according to a 3-stage game :

-At the initial period ( t = 0 ), we have an initial institutional level (λ 0 ). The initial institutional level comes from a balance of power in previous period between producers and grabbers, if there are. In our case, we avoid a previous institutional formation and we consider λ 0 as given. We have also a natural resource rent ( V i=1 1 γ i q i,0 (p i,0 -c i,0 )) which defines with the initial institutional level, the payoffs of producers and grabbers (π f,0 and π g,0 ).

-At t = 1, each agent observes the two payoffs and chooses to be producer or grabber. An equilibrium is found with or without grabbers inside the economy. This defines two different cases (α 1 = 1 or α 1 < 1). At this period, the institutional level is always the same as at t = 0 (λ 0 = λ 1 ).

-At t = 2, the interaction, the balance of power between producers and grabbers, if there are, yields an institutional level (λ 2 ).8

λ 0 R 0 π f,0 π g,0 Presence of Grabbers in the Economy ? YES NO t=0 t=1 t=2 α 1 <1 α 1 =1 λ 2 < λ 0 : Institutional deterioration λ 2 ≥ λ 0 : Institutional enhancement FIG. 3 -3-Stage Game
Both payoff π f and π g are increasing in the share of producers. Figure 4 shows the different possibilities of equilibrium according to producer and grabber's payoffs. The dashed line represents grabber's profit. We can distinguish two different cases :

The first case : π f,0 > π g,0

The producer's profit is above the grabber's profit (π f,0 > π g,0 ). In this case, all agents make the choice to be producer, α 1 = 1, whatever α 0 . 9 In the second step of the game, we have always π f,1 > π g,1 . For a given institutional quality, rents are not high enough to create incentives to become grabber. In the same way, the institutional level is above the following threshold for a given natural resource rent :

λ 0 > (α 0 -1)N π o + V i=1 1 γ i q i,0 (p i,0 -c i,0 ) V i=1 1 γ i q i,0 (p i,0 -c i,0 ) + α 0 N π 0 (9)
Here, the institutional level is high enough to bear this natural resources rent. With these institutional and natural resource rent levels, nobody has an incentives to become a grabber. 10

The extreme specification in this case is the point A (fig. 4) where π f,0 = π g,0 . The institutional level is high enough to support the natural resource rent but now :

λ A 0 = (α 0 -1)N π o + V i=1 1 γ i q i,0 (p i,0 -c i,0 ) V i=1 1 γ i q i,0 (p i,0 -c i,0 ) + α 0 N π 0 ( 10
)
9 α0 is the fraction of producers at the game's beginning.

10 If α0 = 1 also λ0 >

P V i=1 1 γ i q i,0 (p i,0 -c i,0 ) P V i=1 1 γ i q i,0 (p i,0 -c i,0 )+N π 0 n f n g π g π f π B A

FIG. 4 -Payoffs and grabbers appearance

At this point A (with α 0 = 1), there are no incentives to become grabber, all agents make the choice to stay producer but it's the turning point from where some grabbers could appear. 11 This turning point is defined by the initial institutional level and more precisely by the institutional capacity to bear some natural resources rent.

The second case : π f,0 < π g,0

Here, the grabbers's profit is above the producer's profit (π f,0 < π g,0 ) , there is an incentive to become grabber. At t=0, the producer's number is above the following threshold and doesn't allow them to equalize the profits :

α 0 > (λ 0 -1) V i=1 1 γ i q i,0 (p i,0 -c i,0 ) + N π 0 (1 -λ 0 )N π 0 (11)
This incentive implies α 1 < α 0 < 1 such as this defines the point B which is a single equilibrium where π f,1 = π g,1 for a given rent's level and institutional quality. The grabbers number allows the

11 If α0 = 1 also λ A 0 = P V i=1 1 γ i q i,0 (p i,0 -c i,0 ) P V i=1 1 γ i q i,0 (p i,0 -c i,0 )+N π 0 adjustment between payoffs : 12 α 1 = (λ 0 -1) V i=1 1 γ i q i,0 (p i,0 -c i,0 ) + N π 0 (1 -λ 0 )N π 0 < α 0 (12)
The grabber group is powerful and damages the institutional quality to obtain more rents from natural resources. The new power redistribution inside the country leads to an new institutional level where (λ 0 > λ 2 ). The institutional deterioration is intensify by the fixed cost in the production side increasing (F 2 > F 0 ).

At t = 1, the equilibrium is found thanks to the equality between the profits. But it arises from a social interaction. We refer to the definition of the social interaction by [START_REF] Brock | Discrete Choice with Social Interactions[END_REF] : "By social interactions, we refer to the idea that the utility or payoff an individual receives from a given action depends directly on the choice of others...". In this model, it appears clearly that the payoff for everybody depends on the choice of others in the sense that π f and π g increase with α.

The figure 4 provides a proof that the equilibrium is unique and stable. If we are on the right side of the point B, π g > π f . There is a difference between both payoffs and creates an incentive for some producers to switch to the grabber status. This incentive leads to a shift which implies a decreasing grabber's profit and a increasing producer's profit. This play leads again on the equality between π g and π f . The explanation is the same if we are on the left if the point B. Moreover, at point B, there is no incentive to shift to another activity because the profit's variation is negative.

A price shock

What happens if we have a positive exogenous price shock on one natural resource ? 13 Results will be different according to the presence of grabbers inside the society when shock occurs.

The first case : No grabbers before the shock

Here we assume that α 0 = 1. The natural resource rent is growing with p i . Despite π g grows faster than π f 14 and that the gap between π g and π f decreases, π f > π g could hold. There are no incentives to become a grabber, the balance of power inside the country does not change. Therefore, this positive price shock has no negative effect on institutions. Moreover the effect could be positive. Indeed, this sudden increase in natural resource rent can supply an significant windfall, which could be used to enhance 12 Like by assumption α1<1, it occurs λ0 <

P V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) P V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i )+N π 13
The exogenous shock could be an increasing price or quantity of a natural resource or a decreasing cost of research.

14 Actually,

δπ f δp i > δπg δp i , only if λ > 1 or 0<λ<1.
institutions, all the more since fixed cost decreases with institutional quality. Consequently, to anticipate another positive shock which could involve an incentive for somebody to become a grabber, in this case, producers have a better interests to promote institutions, reduce the fixed cost and then increasing their payoff. This conclusion is useful until the turning point A, where π g = π f .

Another effect could happen even if at the beginning α 0 = 1. Indeed, if the price shock is very large, the grabber profit could be above the producer profit (π g > π f ). Some grabbers appear inside the economy because the institutional level (λ 0 ) is not high enough to bear this new windfall. The rent is also beyond the threshold defined by the institutional level (λ 0 ). It appears even if the initial institutional level is high enough at t = 0 that a big price shock could create an incentive to become grabber, involving an institutional deterioration.

The second case : In the presence of grabbers before the shock Now, we assume that some grabbers settle in society (α 0 < 1) . Taking into account the equation ( 12), it appears that an increasing rent decreases α 1 given a new balance of power and so damaging the institutions :

δα 1 δp i = q i γ i (λ 0 -1) (1 -λ 0 )N π < 0 (13)
Equation ( 13) explains the impact of a price's increase when there are some grabbers in the economy.

For the same variation of the resource's price i, the quantitative impact is different according to the appropriability level, the quantities of the product i or the initial institutional level. Note that the sign is always negative, inducing 3 conclusions.

Firstly, the more appropriable the resource i is (i.e γ i is low) the more important its impact on α 1 becomes. The resource's appropriability is an important factor in determining the effect of an increasing commodity price on the balance of power inside the society and therefore on the institutional level. The fact that the natural resource is very appropriable entails more rent opportunity because the resource has a highly intrinsic value and is easily transportable and stockable.

Secondly, the larger the quantities (q i ) of the product i is, the larger the quantitative impact will be. This means that a country which produces a lot of natural resource i is more sensitive on a price variation than a country with a weak production of the natural resource i .

The last conclusion concerns the initial institutional level. At the beginning, the worse the institutions are, the more an increasing price shock involves a bigger increase in the grabbers' number. It is logical in the sense that, poor institutions allow a larger grabber's profit. The decreasing fixed cost with institu-tional quality reinforces this effect because the production profit (π) decreases with the fixed cost.

To make a long story short, an increase in price could have some positive or negative effect depending on the initial institutional level (λ 0 )(Figure 5). Indeed, each country (here country i, j, k) with its own initial institutional level has the capacity to bear a specific natural resources rent. This initial institutional level determines a natural resources threshold R 0 , which is different for each country . R 0 is as well an indicator rent level or natural resource dependance.

If R 0 < R 0 , we could have an increase in the institutional quality. Because the incentive is not enough for a producer to switch to become a grabber, there is not an institutional degradation (α = 1). The rent is an income for the country which could permit to increase the public expenditures to improve for example the infrastructures, the education or the institutions. Producers benefits from this improvement notably because the fixed cost decreases with the higher institutional level.

If R 0 > R 0 , the incentives to pursue rent-seeking is too strong and the institutional level too weak to bear this rent. More grabbers then appear, which by definition, have an interest to degrade the institutions.

λ k,2 λ j,2 λ i,2 λ i,2 R i,t R i,0 (λ 0 ) R j,0 (λ 0 ) R k,0 (λ 0 ) A i A j A k FIG.
5 -Different turning point according the initial institutional level

Natural resource dependance

The conclusion could be extended for the natural resource dependance. Indeed, we show that the natural resource rent have a non linear effect according to the institutional level. But much previous research did not take rents, but rather natural resources dependence as a natural resources variable. Hence, we introduce this measurement in the model.

We define :

X a = P V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) Y and X b = P V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) n f π
.The new variable X a represents the resource dependance on the GDP (Y ). X b could be seen as a production specialization measurement.

This indicator compares natural resources production and manufacturing production inside a country. If α 0 = 1 the equation ( 9) become :

λ a > X a X a + N π/Y (14) λ b > X b 1 + X b (15)
Here, an increase in dependence has a positive effect on the institutional level( δλa δXa > 0 and δλ b δX b > 0 ) .

At the point B, with α 0 < 1, X a , X b and equation ( 12), we have :

α a,1 = (λ a -1)X a + N π/Y (1 -λ a )N π/Y (16) α b,1 = (λ b -1)X b + N/n f N/n f (1 -λ b ) (17)
But, in this case, an increased dependence leads to an increase in grabbers' number and an institutional deterioration( δα a,1 δXa < 0 and δα b,1 δX b < 0 ). There exists also a threshold, a turning point for the natural dependence which is determined by institutional level inside the country. On the other hand we find theoretical evidence contrasting with the literature concerning the impact of the natural resource dependence. Our conclusion is a non-linear effect. Under the threshold defined by the institutional level, the dependence's impact is positive on the institutions. But above this threshold, the impact is negative. In this case the institutions do not bear this dependence level and the producer switches to grabber status.

3 Estimation Method and Data

Regression Specification

In this section, we intend to test empirically some of our theoretical conclusions and develop panel studies with the following equation :

λ t = β 0 + β 1 RN t-n + β 2 RN 2 t-n + i=1 β i X ti + ξ ti (18)
where λ t is an institutional measurement at time t. RN t-n is the variable which represents natural resources, with a lag n. It could be either the percentage of national income from primary commodity exports, the percentage of total exports from primary commodity exports or the natural resources rents.

In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the natural resources rents (cf infra). RN 2 t-n tries to capture the natural resources' non-linear effect on institutions. So we expect β 1 > 0 and β 2 < 0 to find an inverted U-Shape curve (Fig. 5).

X i is a set of control variables used in the literature to explain the institutional level. We have 6 main variables. The first one is the Log of GDP per capita in 1990 or 1980 according to the institutional variable we use. The second one is the distance to equator in [START_REF] Rigobon | Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness and Income : Estimating the Interrelationships[END_REF]. 15 The third one is the Economic Openness with a lag of 5 years. 16 We use also the secondary school enrollment in 1965 and the fraction of the population who speaks an European language or English [START_REF] Hall | Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others ?[END_REF]).

Data

Natural Resources Data

Two main criticisms could be raised on the natural resources measurement used in academic research.

First, many studies just take one measurement for only one year for the natural resources dependency 17 and don't make any difference according to the natural resources type 18 . It could have some bias with a single measurement for one year. In fact the measurement rides on natural resources prices and produced quantities and are measured only for one year. If natural resources prices increase for example, the ratio 15 The calculation for distance to equator is : abs(Latitude)/90. 16 Results are not sensitive to the lag's modification. 17 grows artificially. In the same way, there could be a problem for the natural resources extraction (Climatic matters, political matters...) and by definition dependence would be under-evaluated. Secondly, many authors use World Bank measurement (SXP) which reflects the GDP dependence, which allows us to understand the natural resources economic importance for a country. But it does not include precious stones which could have a great influence, in the sense that these natural resources are very appropriable (e.g. diamond) [START_REF] Fearon | Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War[END_REF]). Moreover, this ratio does not give any information about the country's specialization.

An additional criticism of this natural resources measurement is that in our case this one must be the most exogenous towards outdoor institutions. The percentage of total exports from primary commodity exports and the percentage of national income from primary commodity exports could be influenced by the institutional level. Indeed, GDP as well as total exports are related to economic development, economic policies and institutions [START_REF] Brunnschweiler | Cursing the blessings ? Natural resource abundance, institutions, and economic growth[END_REF], [START_REF] Brunnschweiler | The resource curse revisited and revised : A tale of paradoxes and red herrings[END_REF]). Consequently we face of a potential problem of endogeneity.

To avoid this problem we use an alternative measure of natural resources rents calculated by the World Bank. 19 First, this measurement allows a panel study. Data are available from 1970 to 2004 for 15 different commodities. 20 Secondly, rents are derived by taking the difference between world prices and the average unit extraction or harvest costs (including a 'normal' return on capital). The cost is calculated by regions. 21 . For some resources (e.g., Oil, Gas...) there are different world prices. The unique price is calculated as the weighted average of all available prices.

Natural resources rents allow an exogenous measurement from the national institutional level. Indeed, we could assume that national institutions have no effect on world prices. In other words, countries are price takers. It is true that in a few markets, national institutions could have some power and could influence the world price. It is the case in the oil's market with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). But in the long term, we argue that price depends only on the market's power. In the same way, the amount sold could be impacted by institutional levels if the extraction or harvest is done by a national firm. We make the assumption that even these firms make their product choice according to world prices. We could then consider natural resources rents more exogenous like other natural resources measurements. 22We also build from natural resources rents three new indicators according to the appropriability level.

For this classification, we follow the standard classification on these topics used in the literature according SITC classification. We aggregate rents from gas, oil, hard coal, brown coal on a single variable (named rents 3) ; bauxite, copper, gold, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, zinc in an another variable (named rents 6). A third variable is created with forest. We separate this one because it is the only natural resource which is renewable.

Institutional Data

A new far-reaching literature uses institutional data. We use some different indicators to test empirically our theory through a panel analysis.

PolityIV provides a measurement from 1960 to 2004. We take Polity2 as measurement from PolityIV.

This one is computed by subtracting an autocracy score from a democracy score and measures a balance of the "Competitiveness of executive recruitment", the "Openness of executive recruitment", the "

Constraint on chief executive", the "Competitiveness of political participation" and the "Regulation of participation". This measurement is clearly a political score.

The PRS Group has been producing the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) since 1984. This provides a synthetic indicator that could be distinguished between political, economic and financial risks.

These measurements range from 0 (Low Institutions) to 100 (Good Institutions).

To complete institutions data with a large time series, we take a measurement for corruption (cri). It comes from Risk International and ranges from 0 (High Corruption) to 8 (Weak Corruption).

Kaufman's data provides interesting details with indicators which are more precise than ICRG or Po-lityIV. We use 6 variables : "Voice and Accountability" (VA) which measures political, civil and Human rights ; "Political Stability" (PS) which gives the probability to reverse a government ; "Government Effectiveness" (GE) is a quality government measurement ; "Regulatory Quality" (RQ) takes into account politics against the economy market ; "Rule of Law" (RL) and "Control of corruption" (CC). They range from -2.5 (Bad Institutions) to 2.5 (Good Institutions) and are available from 1996 to 2004. 23 ranges from 0 (Bad Economic Freedom) to 100 (Good Economic Freedom). To complete the institutional dataset, we introduce two measures from Heritage, the first a is composite variable (heri) and the second is a variable which measures the property rights (pr). Each variable is ranked from 0 (Low Institutions)

to 100 (Good Institutions) and are available from 1995 to 2007.

To check the robustness of our empirical work, we used some others variables which could influence institutions. We provide the list of these variables in the appendix.

Results and Estimating Procedures

In this section we test equation 18. Each section uses different estimating procedures to provide empirical proof on the theoretical conclusion.

Results with Random-effects

For tables 3 to 5, we use a panel with random-effects. For some specifications, Hausman test indicates that the model with fixed effect is the best. But for four main reasons we take into account a model with random-effects. First, descriptive statistics for main variables indicate clearly that standard deviation between is bigger than within. Second, most of the specifications have a weak time dimension.

Third, classical institutional determinants are mostly invariant. Fourth, for each specification, we make a Breusch Pagan Lagrange-multiplier test. In all our cases random-effects are significant. These four reasons give a motivation to use GLS random-effects.

Table 3 stands for the baseline results. We have 8 different institutional measurements which are endogenously determined by natural resources rents and control variables.

Table 3 here.

All equations give the expected results, β 1 > 0 and β 2 < 0. These results seem to be robust whatever the institutional measurement. This provides a support for the theoretical result. For low rent levels, the effect on the institutional level is positive and after the turning point the effect is negative, producing the predicted inverted U-shape curve.

We calculate the turning point for each equation. It appears to be different according to the institutional nature which is measured. Voice and Accountability (equation 1 ) breaks up with a great amount of rents (Turning point at 26.2 Millions dollars) as Rule of Law (Turning point at 8.9 Millions dollars). With Kaufman's data, Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption exhibit the same turning point.

The natural resources impact has a different intensity according to institutional nature measurements.

The literature considers that if the quadratic terms are significant (positive or negative) we have a non linear effect (respectively U-shaped or inverted U-shape curve). [START_REF] Lind | With or Without U ? -The appropriate test for a U shaped relationship[END_REF] supply a new theory which permits confirmation of the non linear effect. Indeed they find that a significant quadratic term is too weak a criteria. According to them, we must estimate if the turning point is in the data-range and test slopes on the interval's beginning and ending. In our case (for an inverse U-shape), we must find for the lower bound, a positive slope and for the upper bound, a negative slope. They adopt a test which has been developed by Sasabuchi (1980). The Sasabuchi Test indicates whether we have an inverted U-Shape curve or not.

Table 4 here.

Table 4 summarizes all results with this methodology for the first eight specifications. Specifications

(1), ( 2), ( 4) and ( 8) are strongly significant and confirm natural resources non linear effect on institutions with an inverted U-Shape curve.

Results for specifications (3), ( 5), ( 6) and ( 7) suggest some different interpretations. Indeed the slope at the lower bound is less significant (but always positive), Sasabuchi Test is significant but only at 5% or 10%. For these specifications, the lower bound of the interval confidence with Fieller method is very quite or lower at the lower bound of Log rent's interval. The turning point could be outside the data range even though Sasabuchi test is significant. But, if the turning point is near the lower bound of the Log rent interval, the significance inverse hump shaped relationship is weak. Therefore, we could reconsider the natural resources positive effect on institutions quality. The inverted U-shape curve is not always identified, and for some special institutional measurements, we could only have a negative effect.

Results for Different Turning Point

One of our main predictions is that the turning point should be different between countries according to country's institutional quality (see fig. 5).

Table 5 here.

Table 5 shows that this theoretical assumption is confirmed by data and even using a panel with random-effects. We take 4 institutional measurements to test this prediction, always with random-effects.

We split the sample in two parts according to the institutional level at the initial period. We take the institutional level mean in 1996 for each measurement. Specification (1) and ( 2) show that the turning point is different if we consider the full sample (26.2 Million dollars) or if we just take countries which have an initial institutional level lower than the mean ( 20.4 Millions dollars). It appears clearly that for countries with a low institutional level, natural resources degrade the institutional level more quickly. Specifications (3) to ( 8) confirm this hypothesis. The turning point for countries with an initial institutional level superior to the mean is higher than the turning point for the sample as a whole.

To provide additional proof we carry out a simultaneous quantile regression (Table 6). This methodology considers the errors correlation between different quantiles. It enables comparison between coefficients in the different quantiles [START_REF] Koenker | Quantile Regression[END_REF]).

Table 6 here.

In our case, it allows observation of the evolution and the intensity of the impact to β 1 and β 2 . We split the sample in seven groups according to the Polity 2 measurement. It appears clearly that the turning point increases with quantiles. The higher the quantile is, the higher the turning point. This means that natural resources' positive impacts prevail less for a country with weak institutions than for a country with a high institutional level. Intensity for β 1 and β 2 between specifications ( 5) and ( 6) fail. We test if β 1 between equations ( 5) and ( 6) are significantly different. We cannot reject the hypothesis according to which β 1 's in each equations are equal. It allows to minimize for specification (6) the turning point and that's the turning point is lower for the last quantile than for the next to last quantile . We also observe that for high quantile, the model's power of explanation is reduced. Indeed, countries with a high institutional level are less influenced by rents or by the Distance to Equator, which are significant for the first four quantiles. Table 6 confirms one of our predictions about the different turning points according to the institutional level.

Results with the "Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition" Method

We choose a panel with random-effects to avoid the estimation problem with fixed effets and timeinvariant variables. [START_REF] Plümper | Efficient estimation of time-invariant and rarely changing variables in finite sample panel analyses with unit fixed effects[END_REF] provide a new methodology, Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition" (FEVD), which enables estimation of models with time-invariant variable with fixed effects and to provide a new robustness check. The FEVD estimation procedure consists of a three-step estimation. The first step consists in estimating the fixed effects with a panel regression without time-invariant variable. The second step provides the regression of the fixed effects on the time-invariant variable using OLS. The residual part of this regression is the unexplainable part of fixed effects by the time-invariant variable. The third and last step is an estimation of a pooled OLS that includes time-varying and timeinvariant variables, and the unexplained part of fixed effects .

Table 7 here.

The table 7 contains Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition which assumes problems with a randomeffect model yields β 1 > 0 and β 2 < 0. Even results with random-effects, even seem to be robust.

Results with the Hausman-Taylor Procedure

According to [START_REF] Plümper | Efficient estimation of time-invariant and rarely changing variables in finite sample panel analyses with unit fixed effects[END_REF], the FEVD seems to perform better than a panel with random-effects or the Hausman-Taylor procedure. Nevertheless, in our case, the Hausman-Taylor procedure is able to overcome the endogeneity problem which could appear in our main specification and the time-invariant variable with a fixed effects problem. Indeed a panel with random-effects assumes that random individual effects are exogenous with others variables. [START_REF] Hausman | Panel data and unobservable individual effects[END_REF] assume that some regressors could be correlated with individual random effects. Therefore they use the various dimensions of variation in the panel to build instruments and estimate a 2SLS regression. In our specification, we consider that GDP per capita and Economic Openness are the potential endogenous time-invariant variable and endogenous time-variant variable. Table 8 provides further proof about the robustness of our main specification.

Table 8 here.

It is the same conclusion with the table 8. Hausman-Taylor procedure allows to overcome the endogeneity problem which could appear with the random individual effect and the time-invariant variable with fixed effets problem. Except for the specification ( 3) and ( 7) we regain β 1 > 0 and β 2 < 0 and confirm our results about the non linear natural resources effect on institutions.

Results According to the Appropriability's Level

Table 9, with random-effects, illustrates another theoretical prediction about the appropriability level.

The effect on institutions is not the same according the natural resources type.

Table 9 here.

Specification (1) is the baseline and gives for a global rent the non linear effect on ICRG (Panel with random-effects is always using). Specifications (2) to (4) take into account the different natural resources types. The effects are different. Indeed, specification (2) indicates a U-Shape which is confirmed by [START_REF] Lind | With or Without U ? -The appropriate test for a U shaped relationship[END_REF]'s theory even though Fieller interval is near the lower bound of the dataset. With this closeness between the turning point and the Fieller interval, if the negative effect exists, we have quickly a positive effect. This particular case could be explained by the nature of the natural resource. In fact, the variable Rents 4 includes only a measurement for forest. Although it is a renewable resource and all our predictions and the literature about this topic are about non-renewable natural resources.

For products ranking in the class 3, we find again the inverted U-shape curve which is confirmed by Lind and Mehlum ( 2007)'s test. On the other hand, specification (4) indicates a U-Shape with a Turning Point at 98.5 Millions Dollars but the test does not find the presence of a U-Shape. We could suppose that there is just a negative effect without a Turning Point. Specifications ( 5) and ( 6) refine this assumption. If we split the sample between those that belong to the High Income OECD Countries and those that don't, we observe two distinct effects. For the richest countries, we found again an inverted U-Shape curve which is confirmed by the test. For poorer countries, we have a U-Shape but the test indicates clearly that the turning point is not. De facto, with this test, we could have only a negative effect. According to the natural resources type, the effect on institutional level measured by ICRG could be different. If we do not have an inverted U-Shape curve, it appears that the effect is negative which is developed by the literature on this topics. We explain this permanent negative effect by a very weak institutional quality which is not able to bear natural resources rents.

Robustness Check

Table 10 provides a robustness check with ICRG used as the institutional measurement. Indeed, with ICRG we have a large panel and with these data we are clearly in the presence of an inverted U-Shape curve. Following the literature, we test some variables which have some explanation power on the institutional level.

Table 10 here.

The first specification is the baseline using panel data with random-effects. We introduce ethnic fractionalization, malaria in 1994 and the part of population which lives on a temperate zone in 1995. The estimated coefficient of these three variables are not significant and natural resources effects don't vary.

Ethnic fractionalization is non-significant as [START_REF] Alesina | Fractionalization[END_REF], [START_REF] Hodler | The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries[END_REF] found once they control for distance to equator.

We test the robustness of our results with the civil war lagged for one year. It appears that civil war damages the institutional level but we still find our natural resources non linear effect on institutional quality, but its less significant. This point could be explained by the literature about the conflict and notably by [START_REF] Collier | Greed and grievance in civil war[END_REF]. They found that natural resource dependence increases civil war probability because rents provide a financial opportunity for rebelion. Indeed, without natural resources dependence, civil war probability is near 0.5% and with a percentage of national income from primary commodity exports at 23%, the probability climbs to 26%. [START_REF] Fearon | Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War[END_REF] offers a new interpretation. He thinks that rebels could finance themselves with natural resources only marginally. Civil war probability grows because there is an institutional degradation and the country chooses "extractive" institutions.24

These authors found a negative relationship between natural resource and civil war which could explain our specification (4).

To check the robustness on our results, we control for the geographic localization by regions. We test for 8 diverse areas but we present just two specifications ( 6) and ( 7). 25 However in all cases, the natural resources effect is robust. The two last robustness checks concern legal origin matter. Again, we test for 4 diverse legal origins and we find for each one that natural resources effect is robust. Specifications ( 8) and ( 9) show regression with French and German legal Origin.

Conclusion

This paper examines the natural resources effect on institutions. Our conclusion about a hump shaped or negative effects on institutions partially confirm the view provided by various authors such Ross (2001a), [START_REF] Leite | Does Mother Nature Corrupt -Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth[END_REF], Sala-i Martin and Subramanian (2003), [START_REF] Isham | The Varieties of Resource Experience : Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth[END_REF][START_REF] Bulte | Resource Abundance, Poverty and Development[END_REF] . But these authors do not contemplate a positive effect. [START_REF] Brunnschweiler | Cursing the blessings ? Natural resource abundance, institutions, and economic growth[END_REF] finds that "Natural resource abundance does not necessarily lead to worse institutions...". Moreover, why Norway has strong institutions whereas Nigeria has weak institutions ? Our results offer a response to this puzzle.

Each country has a structural institutional capacity to bear some natural resource rent. National institutions determine a threshold in the amount of natural resources and beyond which this point the resources positive impact on institutions becomes negative.

Further interesting research could take into account this finding about the non linear effect to explain an another discord within the literature on rent-seeking. Indeed there is a debate on natural resources impact on growth. Since [START_REF] Sachs | Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth[END_REF], many authors found a negative relationship but some authors [START_REF] Stijns | An Empirical Test of the Dutch Disease Hypothesis using a Gravity Model of Trade[END_REF], [START_REF] Brunnschweiler | Cursing the blessings ? Natural resource abundance, institutions, and economic growth[END_REF]) reject this negative relationship. [START_REF] Mehlum | Institutions and the Resource Curse[END_REF] provide a first response on this debate : natural resources could be a blessing for countries with good institutions or a curse if country has bad institutions. But authors do not weigh the natural resources non linear effect on institutions. Our findings furnish one complementary explanation in this debate.

6 Technical Appendix

Proof for s value

To find s we must take into account the shares of resources for each group (like [START_REF] Mehlum | Institutions and the Resource Curse[END_REF] ). Grabbers use their entire effort for the rent-seeking activity, that's why we have a proportion (1 -α)

with the effort normalized to one. Producer's effort is lower than the grabber's effort and depends on the institutional level. The better the institutional quality, the more efficient is the effort to capture a part of rent. The sum of shares cannot exceed one. It comes : αλs

+ (1 -α)s ≤ 1. If the constraint is saturated (no waste), it is implying : s = 1 (1-α)+αλ 6.2 Proof for π First : π = y(1 -1 β ) -F then we have : n f π = yn f (1 -1 β ) -n f F .
We express GDP like :

Y = L + N (απ f + π g (1 -α)) = L + N απ + V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) (19)
Which gives :

n f π = M y -L.
With a factorization, we found :

y = β(L-n f F ) β(M -n f )+n f .
We have an expression for π that does not depend on the institutional level :

π = β(L-F M )-L β(M -n f )+n f If π f > π g then, λ > (α -1)N π + V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) + αN π (20) and if α =1, λ > V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) + N π (21)
If

π f = π g then, α = (λ -1) V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) + N π (1 -λ)N π (22)

The turning point A

On the point A, we have π f = π g and no grabbers in the economy (α = 1). If the price increasing, we can stay on the same point A and have some improvements on the institutional quality :

λ = s N V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) s N V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) + N π (23) δλ δp i = q i γ i N π ( V i=1 1 γ i q i (p i -c i ) + αN π) 2 > 0 (24)
with the assumption that π > 0. [12.32 ; 18.98 ] [12.86 ; 17.64] [-3 ; 18.59] [13.28 ; 17.9] [3 ; 15.74] [6.52 ; 19.32] [-21.04 ; 16.17] [11.84 ; 19.51] (Fieller method )

Note : With * * * , * * and * respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels TAB. 5 -Diverse Turning Point Model :

(1)

(2)

(3)

(5)

90%.

  FIG. 1 -Deviation of the institutional level measured by PolityIV according to the natural resources dependency

  [START_REF] Sachs | Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth[END_REF],[START_REF] Bulte | Resource Abundance, Poverty and Development[END_REF], take a dependence for 1970, Boschini a dependence for 1971 and[START_REF] Isham | The Varieties of Resource Experience : Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth[END_REF] a dependence for 1980 for exemple18 Isham et al. (2005), Sala-i Martin and Subramanian (2003) and[START_REF] Boschini | Resource Curse or Not : A Question of Appropriability[END_REF] are first to introduce a difference between the natural resources type. They conclude, according the natural resource type, that impacts on their interests variables are not the same.

  Standard errors in parentheses with * * * , * * and * respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels TAB. 9 -Impact on Institutional Quality According Natural Resource Types Note : Standard errors in parentheses with * * * , * * and * respectively denoting significance at the Standard errors in parentheses with * * * , * * and * respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 > % levels

					TAB. 8 -Hausman Taylor TAB. 10 -Robustness Check With ICRG
	Model :				(1)					(2)				(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Model : Depvar : Model :		(1) (1)	icrg	(2) (2)			(3) icrg	(3)			(4) icrg (4)	(5)	icrg (5)	(6)	(6)	(7) icrg	(7)	(8) icrg	(8)	(9)
	Depvar : LogRent t-3 Depvar :		VA icrg 3.059 * *	RL icrg			GE icrg			CC	icrg	pr	icrg	heri	icrg	PS	icrg	icrg icrg	icrg
	LogRent t-1 LogRent t-3	0.238 * * (1.312) 0.283 * * * 3.059 * * 3.280 * *	0.160 3.073 * *			0.323 * * * 2.464 *	9.942 * * * 2.780 * *	2.60 * * 3.180 * *	2.510 *	3.105 * *	2.889 * *
	LogRent 2 t-3	(0.097) -0.091 * * (0.085) (1.312) (1.314)		(0.098) (1.314)			(0.098) (1.295)	(2.754) (1.326)	(1.155) (1.292)	(1.283)	(1.305)	(1.297)
	LogRent 2 t-1 LogRent 2 t-3	-0.006 * * (0.037) -0.009 * * * -0.091 * * -0.099 * * *	-0.005 * -0.092 * *	-0.009 * * * -0.075 * *	-0.358 * * * -0.082 * *	-0.074 * * -0.096 * * *	-0.071 *	-0.091 * *	-0.084 * *
	LogRent t-3 4	(0.003) (0.037)	(0.002) (0.038) -10.797 * * * (0.003) (0.037)			(0.003) (0.037)	(0.077) (0.038)	(0.032) (0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
	LogRent t-3 Log GDP/cap 1980		4.365 * * *		(3.016) 4.588 * * * 4.239 * * *	3.717 * * *	4.176 * * *	4.359 * * *	0.150 4.914 * * *	4.951 * * * 4.509 * * *	4.135 * * *
	LogRent 2 t-3 4		(1.004)		0.456 * * * (1.056) (1.062)			(0.915)	(1.017)	(0.948)	(0.122) (0.938)	(1.573) (0.988)	(0.966)
	LogRent 2 t-3 Distance to Equator		12.170 *		(0.094) 12.538 * 11.296			10.928 *	5.428	-0.005 20.168 * * * 17.604 * * *	-0.153 * * * 12.283 *	11.531 *
	LogRent t-3 3		(6.825)		(7.398)		(7.212)			2.929 * (6.154)	(8.744)	(6.802)	(0.004) (6.414)	(0.047) (6.688)	(6.540)
	Openness t-5 Openness t-5	0.161 * * * 4.614 * * *	-0.142 * * * 4.672 * * *	-0.018 4.607 * * * -0.219 * * * (1.561) 3.923 * * *	-5.015 * * * 4.668 * * *	1.247 * 4.662 * * *	-0.080 5.018 * * *	4.242 * * * 4.695 * * *	4.782 * * *
	LogRent 2 t-3 3	(0.057) (1.119)	(0.050) (1.199)		(0.057) (1.119)			(0.055) -0.112 * * * (1.154)	(1.770) (1.119)	(0.747) (1.107)	(0.084) (1.107)	(1.217) (1.115)	(1.112)
	Distance to Equator Fraction European Speaking	2.738 * 3.279		0.743 3.871		1.442 2.957			1.153 (0.043) 3.557 *	-90.870 3.267	6.201 5.027 * *	1.412	1.179	-1.463 5.036 * *	2.822
	LogRent t-3 6	(1.571) (2.238)	(0.890) (2.421)		(0.959) (2.392)			(0.922) (2.022)	(58.152) -2.540 * * (2.230)	(14.408) (2.162) 5.966 * * * (0.859) (2.134)	(10.826) -3.228 * * (2.349)	(2.152)
	Fraction European Speaking Fraction English Speaking	1.387 * * * -0.469	-0.008 -1.604		0.293 -0.316			0.113 -1.318	-22.890 (1.243) -0.577	9.683 * * -2.289 (2.021) 0.565 * -0.187	-0.999 (1.474) -3.999	1.203
	LogRent 2 t-3 6	(0.468) (3.875)	(0.263) (4.036)		(0.283) (3.915)			(0.274) (3.491)	(17.192) 0.069 * (3.839)	(4.231) (3.679) -0.171 * * * (0.299) (3.533)	(3.444) 0.092 * (4.156)	(3.767)
	Fraction English Speaking Secondary Schooling 1965	-0.403 0.178 * * *		0.293 0.195 * * *	0.288 0.175 * * *	0.414 0.201 * * *	18.147 (0.039) 0.155 * *	2.706 0.106 (0.060) -0.027 0.121 *	2.614 (0.047) 0.160 * *	0.165 * * *
	Log GDP/cap 1980	(0.503) 4.365 * * * (0.261) (0.066) (0.068) 10.153 * * * (0.290) (0.067)			(0.290) 4.748 * * * (0.060)	(19.213) 3.480 * * * (0.069)	(4.460) (0.066) 6.762 * * (0.409) (0.063)	(5.042) 2.847 * * (0.065)	(0.064)
	Secondary Schooling 1965 Ethnic Fractionalization	0.059 * * * (1.004)	0.009 0.037	0.017 (1.777)			0.015 (1.125)	-1.031 (1.243)	0.286	0.023 * (3.290)	-0.044 (1.370)
	Distance to Equator	(0.021) 12.170 * (0.013) (0.033)	(0.014) -0.248			(0.013) 8.934	(0.785) 9.833	(0.203)	(0.013) -11.806	(0.142) 3.977
	Log GDP/cap 1990 malaria 94	-0.864 * (6.825)	0.414	0.154 (11.296) -1.190			0.274 (7.010)	43.061 * * (7.218)	-1.221	(12.543)	(8.556)
	Openness t-5	(0.523) 4.614 * * * (0.314)	(0.334) 6.546 * * * (3.022)			(0.315) 3.648 * * *	(19.107) 5.302 * * *	(4.975)	12.754 * * *	5.147 * * *
	Log GDP/cap 1980 Civil War t-1			(1.119)			(1.629)				(1.322) -8.505 * * *	(1.304)	-0.068 (1.910)	11.253 * * * (1.548)
	Fraction European Speaking			3.279			-0.531				4.593 * (0.901)	3.406	(0.314) 2.219	(3.721) 2.357
	N Population Temperate Zone 95		597	(2.238)	597		594 (4.308)			588 (2.541)	918 (2.413) 4.879	918	555 (3.081)	1564 (2.954)
	R 2 Fraction English Speaking		0.	-0.469	0.	0. -144.778 *			0. 1.227	0. -0.873 (3.902)	0.	0. -0.850	0. -3.936
	East Asia and Pacific			(3.875)		(80.806)				(4.099)	(4.213)	(3.302) 9.038 * * *	(8.483)
	Secondary Schooling 1965			0.178 * * *		-0.056				0.157 * *	0.268 * * *	0.123 (2.535)	0.245 * *
	Middle East and North Africa			(0.066)			(0.097)				(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.099)	-8.432 * * *	(0.095)
	N					1564				566				1146	1253	298	(2.418)	955
	Sample French Legal Origin		All countries All countries	All countries	All countries	High Income	Non OECD -3.624 * *
																	OECD Countries	Countries (1.747)
	R 2 German Legal Origin			0.7332			0.563				0.699	0.7219	0.4487	0.3930	9.698 * * *
	Turning Point (Millions Dollars)			19.9				0.14				0.47	98.5	37.7	41.6	(3.722)
	N			1564		1524		1564			1480	1561	1564	1564	1564	1564
	R 2	1%, 5% and 10% levels	0.733		0.736		0.733			0.775	0.739	0.768	0.771	0.747	0.755
	Note :

Note :

[START_REF] Collier | Resource Rents, Governance and Conflict[END_REF] already highlighted that the natural resources dependance accentuated the probability of civil war.

Moreover the extractive activities do not require very intensive workers and the little which is required comes or forms often from foreign countries. In fact the country does not need a priori a very developed education system in order to continue to exploit its natural resources.

Grabber institutions are the same that extractive institutions favoring the rent seeking activity(Acemoglu et al. (2001b)).

[START_REF] Boschini | Resource Curse or Not : A Question of Appropriability[END_REF] uphold the concept of appropriability for a natural resource. A resource is highly appropriable if it has a highly intrinsic value and is easily transportable and stockable. Precious stones for exemple are highly appropriable whereas oil and gas are not if we just take into account non renewable resources. According to them, the more appropriable a resource is, the higher the probability that the resource lead to rent-seeking, corruption or conflict is great.[START_REF] Isham | The Varieties of Resource Experience : Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth[END_REF] and[START_REF] Sala-I Martin | Addressing the Natural Resource Curse : An Illustration from Nigeria[END_REF] also introduce a difference between the type of resource and their impact.

See the appendix for more explanation

Our model don't take into account the direct relationship between α1 and λ2. This third stage leans upon seminal work on the building of endogenous institutions[START_REF] Aghion | Endogenous Political Institutions[END_REF],[START_REF] Acemoglu | A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions[END_REF],[START_REF] Acemoglu | Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions[END_REF]). These one are building on a balance of power between groups. According the power of each groups appears a sure type of institution.

See website for more explanation :http://web.worldbank.org

Gas, oil, hard coal, brown coal, bauxite, copper, gold, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, zinc and forest

Rent = ( National Production Volume) ( International Market Price -Average Unit Production Cost )

For another reason, we do not take indicator which reflects natural resources abundance(The World Bank 1994, 2000). Indeed, data are available only for two years. Yet our empirical procedure consists on panel study and we have not enough

Acemoglu et al. (2001b) consider "extractive" institutions as a main cause of bad economic performance.

Others are available upon request

Note : Standard errors in parentheses with * * * , * * and * respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Sample : Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bénin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

 142) Gabon ( 123)

Mexico ( 53) Oman ( 71) Nigeria ( 158) Nigeria ( 158) Iraq (.)

Canada ( 5) Libya ( 58) Libya ( 58) Mauritania ( 152) Congo ( 142) Venezuela ( 75) Trinidad and Tobago ( 57) Iran ( 99) Cameroon ( 148) Qatar ( 40) India ( 127) Norway ( 1) Qatar ( 40) Gabon ( 123) Kazakstan ( 80) Kuwait ( 44) Venezuela ( 75 99) Iran ( 99) Algeria ( 103) Iran ( 99) Algeria ( 103) Libya ( 58) Suriname ( 86) Libya ( 58) Russia ( 62) Angola ( 160