French Muslims: A Silent Community?

Vincent Geisser

The reactions of French Muslims to the attacks that have struck France since 2015 constitute a blind spot for many commentators. Indeed, editorial writers and politicians conveyed the image of a 'silent community', and sometimes invited the Muslims in France to publicly condemn terrorist acts, as if they were incapable of doing so by themselves. Apart from the fact that this image is based on normative presuppositions -Muslims are deemed to be not sufficiently attached to the principles and values of the nationsuch assertions have never been supported by precise facts. In a way, the Muslims of France have been rendered invisible as citizens in the demonstrations of mourning and the mobilizations that followed the attacks; and this is connected to the double-bind injunction addressed to them : to explicitly dissociate themselves from the terrorists as 'Muslims' (in a particularist register) while, at the same time, "blending in" with French society (in a universalist register).

The aim of this chapter is to deconstruct this idea of a 'silence' in the face of Islamist terrorism. To do so, I analyse the different positions, actions and mobilizations of Muslim organizations and personalities in France between January 2015 and October 2020 (the murder of the high-school teacher Samuel Paty and the attack on a church in Nice). I take these attacks as moments that reveal the ways in which 'Islamicness'1 and French citizenship are linked in the public space. In a sense, the terrorist crisis creates an opportunity for the sociologist to observe 'French Muslim scenes', unfolding in many different places, registers and temporalities. The 'commemorative polysemy' (Mauger, 2015, p. 88) that appears then is a characteristic shared by French citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims. There is no such thing as a 'Muslim way' [START_REF] Roy | La peur d'une communauté qui n'existe pas[END_REF] of mourning or of mobilizing against Islamist terrorism, but different mechanisms and modes of doing so that depend on local, even micro-local contexts (cities, neighbourhoods, municipalities, etc.) and on the social, educational and religious trajectories of individuals and groups.

A terrorist attack is a social ordeal. It revives 'one of the founding questions of sociology, that of the relationship between individuals and groups, and of the mechanisms of solidarity in modern societies' (Truc, 2018, p.4). If the attacks that France has experienced since 2015 have not called into question the cultural, socioeconomic and political integration of Muslims into French society, this integration has nevertheless been debated in the public sphere, thereby maintaining doubts about their loyalty to the national community. Muslims have constantly been called upon to express their opinion on the depth of their adherence to the principles and values of 'secular and republican France.' Although they have rarely been accused by politicians or by the media of being guilty of terrorist attacks or accomplices of the terrorists, Muslim organizations and leaders have sometimes been presented as morally responsible for the radical excesses of certain members of 'their' community, or have been suspected of separatist tendencies that may lead to jihadist violence [START_REF] Geisser | Is France Fueling Muslim Terrorism by Trying to Prevent It?[END_REF].

The analysis presented here is based on a series of semi-structured interviews carried out between September 2015 and April 2017 with forty Muslim leaders and spokespersons in France, but also with some thirty 'ordinary Muslims,' most of them living in Ile-de-France, Normandy and the South of France. Community websites (Oumma.com, Saphirnews, Al Kanz.org, Halalbook.fr, Ajib.fr, islamophobie.net, etc.), blogs, personal and community pages on Facebook and forums and press releases published in the regional and national press by prominent or anonymous Muslims were also monitored and analysed. A qualitative survey on the way young French Muslims relate to the Prophet Muhammad was administered in 2018-2019, as part of a research program (ANR-DFG Prophet). Questions focused on their reactions to the publications of cartoons and on the terrorist acts carried out explicitly in 'revenge for the honour of the Prophet.' Finally, we attended and observed many local and national events organized by Muslim associations and mosques relating to the themes of 'radicalization', 'terrorism', 'solidarity with the victims' and 'interreligious dialogue' [START_REF] Geisser | Musulmans de France. La grande épreuve face au terrorisme[END_REF].

Tribute, Voice and Loyalty: reassuring the national community

Faced with the Islamist attacks, French Muslims, both as individuals and as collectives, are regularly confronted with the paradoxical injunction to condemn violence in a universalist register, attesting to their mastery of the republican political lexicon, while also accepting as their own a particularist discourse that rejects Islamist terrorism 'in the name of Islam'. This twofold constraint favours a form of discursive alchemy where the proclaimed adherence to republican and secular values is combined with doctrinal and theological references aimed at religiously delegitimizing any recourse to violence.

Despite their quarrel with the satirical journal Charlie Hebdo over the regular publication of cartoons deemed offensive to the Prophet Muhammad, almost all Muslim institutions and organizations in France unambiguously condemned the attack on the paper's editorial staff on 7 January 2015 and clearly called on 'citizens of Muslim faith to join the national and republican demonstration of Sunday 11 January 2015 in large numbers so as to affirm their desire to live together in peace and show respect for the values of the Republic.'2 A few days later, the French Council for Muslim Worship (CFCM), joined with independent Muslim federations and the main mosques in France, invited 'the imams of France, on the occasion of next Friday's sermon, to recall in unity the essence of the Qur'anic message and its universal and humanist values.'3 These calls were widely relayed at the local level by Muslim associations, religious figures and mosques, so as to reach ordinary believers and practitioners. The sociologist Warda Hadjab, who carried out a participant observation during the great 'Republican March' of 11 January 2015, noted that many anonymous Muslims, not affiliated with organizations or mosques, attended this march, thus contradicting the thesis that there was a Muslim boycott of it [START_REF] Hadjab | Les musulmans français se manifestent pour protéger leur citoyenneté et le sens de leur sacré[END_REF].

However, the attacks of 13 November 2015 caused a profound shock to people's sense of citizenship and spiritual identity, prompting Muslims in France to mobilize more against terrorism and to make their participation in the mourning community visible. The magnitude of the event (130 dead and 413 wounded), the diversity of the social origins of the victims, and the multicultural character of the places targeted by the terrorists (an auditorium, cafes, the Stade de France, etc.) led Muslims in France to identify more intensely with the victims and to publicly state their participation in the mourning community. From 14 November, the main Muslim federations launched a call for unity and national mourning: 'Muslim federations call on all mosques in France and all the faithful to raise prayers for peace in our country and the safety of our fellow citizens. May Allah protect our country France from all misfortune.' 4 A fortnight days later, the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris organized an event that brought together more than 300 national and local Islamic leaders from France. The staging, the bodily postures of those who attended, and the content of the speeches evoked the great patriotic 'masses' (in the sense of Catholic services) of the Third Republic, when the sacred was expressed in a twofold register, both profane and religious.

There were also explicit references to a civic Islam [START_REF] Sèze | Leaders musulmans et fabrication d'un "islam civil[END_REF]:

We, Muslims of France, affirm our deep attachment to the republican pact and to the universal values which found our Republic as well as our attachment to the principle of secularism, which guarantees freedom of conscience and respect for the diversity of religious convictions and practices. […] In the name of the Muslims of France, we raise our prayers so that France may live happy and prosperous, and may be strong and great through union and harmony; may the Most Merciful help and protect France and the French people' (Citizen Manifesto of Muslims in France, adopted on 29 November 2015).

The mobilization of Muslims against terrorism reached new levels in the summer of 2016, following the attack in Nice on 14 July 2016a national holidaywhich left 86 dead and 458 wounded. The event triggered an outpour of anti-terrorist language: community leaders, and some ordinary Muslims, expressed their shock more publicly and explicitly than after previous attacks. At the local level, an increased number of Muslim representatives of all persuasions, from the most liberal to the most conservative, called their brethren to demonstrate, to pay tribute to the victims and to provide assistance to the wounded. They asked for blood donationsa powerful symbolic act. On 17 July 2016, a delegation of imams from the Nice region visited families who had lost loved ones in the 14 July attack. 5 The large number of Muslims among the victims of the Nice attack (a third, according to some figures) may have contributed to a process of identification with the mourning community and may have naturalised demands for a civil and patriotic Islam, rejecting all forms of political and religious violence. [START_REF] Bastié | Attentat de Nice : une victime sur trois était musulmane[END_REF][START_REF] Charrihi | Ma mère patrie. Face aux attentats restons unis[END_REF] A few days later, on 26 July, two young French jihadists assassinated an 86-year-old Catholic priest, Jacques Hamel, who was leading a service in the church of Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray (Seine-Maritime). On this occasion, the French Council for Muslim Worship and local associations (such as the Rouen Union of Muslims) solemnly called on Muslims to attend mass on Sunday in order to express their solidarity with members of the Catholic community. This initiative, unprecedented in the history of Islam in France, also mobilized ordinary Muslims, although there are no precise figures on the extent of their participation. 'When an attack affects Catholics, we are all Catholics. When an attack affects a teacher, we are all teachers. We are united to fight this scourge which ultimately affects us all.' 7 The very many condemnations of terrorist acts committed in the 'name of Islam' or 'to avenge the honour of the Prophet' and the wide array of expression of sensitivities and of 'mourning' confirm the hypothesis of a commemorative polysemy.

Being 'Charlie' in one's own way

Whilst the institutions representative of Islam in France (the French Council for Muslim Worship and the Regional Councils for Muslim Worship), the large mosques and the main Muslim federations of France condemned the January attacks, discrete criticism were also expressed at the local level (associations and prayer rooms) and especially in the 'muslimosphere' (community networks on the Internet). On the fringes of institutional Islam, there was even an adversarial debate on the question of whether or not to display'Je suis Charlie', the logo created by Joachim Roncin. [START_REF] Calabrese | Être ou ne pas être Charlie ? Parcours d'un hashtag devenu argument[END_REF] Many Muslim organizations and personalities joined the 'national mourning', taking part in marches and vigils. As they did so, they emphasized their reluctance to accept the slogan 'Je suis Charlie' or to appreciate the publication by the weekly magazine of new cartoons representing the prophet Muhammad wearing a turban vaguely evoking the shape of a penis and carrying a sign reading 'Je suis Charlie. Everything is forgiven.' Even the Office of the French Council for Muslim Worship, expressed reservations 'as to the latest issue of Charlie Hebdo which offends the sensibilities of Muslims' 8 in spite of its eagerness to present the image of a law abiding 'respectable Islam' and its keenness to maintain good relations with the political authorities.

Ordinary Muslims, not affiliated with religious associations or federations, were reluctant to adopt the slogan 'Je suis Charlie'. They considered that it obscured the 'other victims' of terrorism, and appealed to the combination of a republican homage with respect for the 'sensitivity' of Muslim believers. [START_REF] Badouard | Être ou ne pas être 'Charlie'. Débattre des attentats sur la page Facebook d'un média musulman[END_REF] In general, these ordinary Muslims preferred self-censoring their own feelings for fear of being accused of boycotting national mourning and of being perceived as complacent towards terrorists 'On Facebook, everyone was saying "I'm Charlie", and there was kind of a pressure if you didn't. (…) Of course I condemned the terrorists' acts. It's horrible what they did.

But that doesn't make me Charlie, because I don't support the publications of this journal and being Charlie is a bit reductive'.

Other Muslims, who conveyed an identity-based conception of Islam, also expressed a clear desire to hijack Joachim Roncin's slogan and turned it into a slogan to the glory of the Prophet Muhammad. After January 2015, alternative slogans circulated on social networks, for example 'I am a Muslim with Muhammad', 'I am Muhammad', 'I am a Muslim and I love my Prophet', etc. In the strongly emotional context after the attacks, Muslims in France often adjusted their identities: the affirmation of a religious allegiance and an emotional attachment to the prophetic figure (Muhammad) were combined with more classic expressions of citizenship, patriotism and participation in national mourning.

A reinvention of republican and religious rituals

More than being the expression of an antinomy between citizenship and religiosity, the reactions of Muslims in France to the Islamist attacks showed a symbiotic relationship 8 Office of the French Council for Muslim Worship, press release dated 14 January 2015. between the 'religious sacred' and the 'profane sacred', with individuals simultaneously invoking Allah and the Republic. On and around the sites hit by the attacks of 13 November 2015, for example, many Muslims came to deposit bouquets of flowers and short messages.

Written in Arabic or French, these were a mixture of Muslim prayers, the expression of their solidarity with the victims, and a way of voicing their attachment to the idea of living together [START_REF] Truc | Ce que disent les messages du 13 novembre[END_REF][START_REF] Frouard | Un monument de papier. Les registres de condoléances de la mairie du 11 e arrondissement[END_REF].

Appropriating a tradition initiated at the beginning of the nineteenth century, several Muslim associations and federations decided, after the attacks of January 2015, to institutionalize the practice of a Muslim prayer for France, on the model of the prayer for the Republic uttered on Shabbat in French synagogues. [START_REF] Barbouch | Le RMF prône une prière pour la France chaque vendredi[END_REF] From November 2015, local and national Muslim officials, from the most conservative to the most liberal, elected to hoist the French red-white-and-blue flag on mosques and the headquarters of Muslim associations (around a hundred throughout France). This symbolic act, unprecedented in the recent history of Islam in France, followed the French President's call for the flag to be flown [START_REF] Boussaguet | Mobiliser des symboles pour répondre au terrorisme : l'exécutif français face aux attentats de 2015 à Paris[END_REF] Finally, after the November 2015 attacks, many Muslim Internet users updated their profile photos on Facebook with a tricolour filter, as a sign of solidarity with the victims of the terrorist attacks. This decision to display the national emblem, while common to many Internet users, also reflected a change of attitude in the way the new generations of Muslims who had been socialized and educated in France related to national identity. Although 'French on paper', many had felt a sort of uneasiness in publicly asserting their attachment to the French nation, because of the colonial dispute and because of their experience of everyday racism. For that matter, the terrorist attacks produced a disinhibiting effect and incited a number of young Muslims, practising or not, to express their patriotism in the public sphere.

Conclusion

Since the 2015 attacks the Muslims of France have been confronted with contradictory injunctions. Far from pushing them into paralysis and silence, this situation has actually led them to develop original responses have helped them both reverse the stigma they felt and reject the implicit suspicion of complicity with radical jihadism, passivity and silence.

The reaction to the attacks of representatives of institutional Islam were largely framed by their close relations with local and national public authorities, by routine cooperation with security authorities (the Ministry of the Interior and the prefectures) and by regular dialogues with French opinion leaders and intellectuals and with the dignitaries of other religions. In the circumstances, their main concern was to consolidate the image of a 'respectable Islam' [START_REF] Dazey | Les conditions de production locale d'un islam respectable[END_REF] consistent with secular and republican values. Beyond responses guided by their position within the institutional framework, their initiatives also aimed at developing a Muslim counter-narrative to the religious rhetoric of terrorist organizations. [START_REF] Bajrafil | Réveillons-nous ! Lettre à un jeune Français musulman[END_REF][START_REF] Oubrou | Appel à la réconciliation! Foi musulmane et valeurs de la République française[END_REF][START_REF] Mamoun | Manuel de contre-offensive[END_REF].

In the same context, ordinary Muslims drew on very diverse registers, usually less formal and 'official' in their format. Their participation in post-attack marches and vigils was strongly linked not only to the local context, their socio-professional status, their age and their educational background, but also to their integration into Muslim or non-Muslim associations. The most active and visible individuals in the post-terrorist mobilizations were the new middle and upper-class Muslims in France, often strongly involved in the public debate and very involved in the civic community. One can thus apply to the French population of Muslim culture and/or religion the classic sociological analyses linking levels of mobilization to social characteristics. It appears that the intensity and the frequency of mobilization against terrorist violence and the propensity to publicly express adhesion to the mourning community simply reflects the unequal distribution of social and political resources amongst individuals and groups [START_REF] Mayer | Le simplisme d'Emmanuel Todd démonté par la sociologie des "Je suis Charlie[END_REF].

However, the attacks also had a specific effect: the double-bind constraint we have discussed (demonstrating as an ordinary citizen while displaying one's Islamicness) was also a vector of politicization for a number of French Muslims who experienced as a burden their 'invisibility' within ones of the Republic. They used their participation in collective mobilizations to distance themselves from the disparaging view of a 'Muslim silence' in the face of Islamist attacks.

  Our survey, carried out in several churches in France, confirmed the presence of imams and community elites (presidents of associations, notables and local elected officials of Muslim faith) at Sunday Mass on 31 July 2016 as well as of ordinary Muslim believers who had come to testify to their solidarity with the Catholics of France and their rejection of terrorism committed 'in the name of Islam.'In October 2020, after the murder of Samuel Paty, a history and geography school teacher in the Paris region, national federations and local associations, and anonymous Muslims expressed their dismay at the atrocity of the modus operandi (decapitation of the victim). They expressed shock about an attack on a teacher, a symbol of state education, freedom of expression and 'living together'. The majority of Muslim federations and personalities participated in demonstrations of republican homage to Samuel Paty despite the polemical comments made by the Minister of the Interior. In effect, Gérald Darmanin attributed the moral responsibility for the terrorist act to a number of Muslim organizations who had denounced Islamophobia. He accused them of inciting radical Muslims to commit vengeful acts and called for their dissolution 6 . However, there were a number of out of the ordinary initiatives: non-Muslim pupils (atheists, Catholics or Jews) enrolled in state schools were invited to dialogue with others, enrolled in Muslim denominational establishments:

  . It was accompanied by a patriotic discourse reminiscent of those produced under the Third Republic by Jewish notables in favour of a total assimilation of the Jews of France to the Nation. For instance, Dalil Boubakeur, the Rector of the Great Mosque of Paris addressed the Citizens' Rally of the Muslims of France, convened at Institut du Monde Arabe on 29 November 2015 and declared: 'We are proud of and attached to this homeland which welcomed us and our parents. […] Let us be proud to be French and to belong to the land of human rights and the Enlightenment, of freedom of thought and tolerance. […] Let us work with our children as citizens for the defence of Peace in our country and in our families.' Since the 2015 attacks, large Muslim gatherings in France have mobilized a patriotic symbolism that was more discreet previously. Although renowned for its conservatism and its proximity to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Union of Islamic Organizations of France ('Muslims of France' since 2017) adorns the main stage of its meetings in red-white-andblue. The symbiosis between secular rituals and religious rituals works: the tricolour and the national anthem combine with religious songs (anashid) to the glory of the Prophet Muhammad, giving this community gathering the atmosphere of a patriotic gathering.

We use this notion of 'Islamicness' (islamité) drawing on the term 'Jewishness' (judéité), referring to the different ways of being, living as and feeling oneself to be Jewish, outside of any religious belief or practice(Schnapper, Bordes-Benayoun and Raphaël,

2009).

CFCM (French Council for Muslim Worship), press release of 8 January 2015. This text was signed by all the Muslim federations of France, including the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), though the latter has withdrawn from the CFCM.

CFCM, press release dated 14 January 2015.

Call for unity and national mourning by Muslim federations, Saphirnews, 11/14/2015 https://www.saphirnews.com/L-appel-al-unite-et-au-deuil-national-des-federations-muslim_a21538.html. Accessed on 12/05/2015.

Source http://www.umam06.com/actualites/2016/17-06-2016-visite-des-familles-endeuillees.html. Accessed on 05/05/2021.

'Darmanin annonce la dissolution officielle du CCIF [Collectif contre l'islamophobie en France] en conseil des ministres', L'Obs, 2 December


Ducruet César
email: cesar.ducruet@economix.fr

Notteboom Theo
email: theo.notteboom@gmail.com

Global maritime networks in container shipping

After a brief background about the development of containerization in recent decades, this chapter reviews the current characteristics of liner shipping networks under three main themes. First, it provides an overview of the different service types of shipping lines and dynamics in liner service configuration and design. Second, a global snapshot of the worldwide liner shipping network is proposed by means of vessel movement data. The changing geographic distribution of main inter-port links is explored in the light of recent reconfigurations of liner shipping networks (e.g. multiplication versus rationalisation of port calls). We also discuss the position of seaports in liner shipping networks referring to concepts of centrality, hierarchy, and selection factors. The chapter concludes by elaborating on the interactions and interdependencies between seaport development and liner shipping network development notably under current economic changes.

INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND ON LINER SHIPPING

Container liner shipping has a relatively short history. In 1956 Malcolm McLean launched the first containership Ideal X. Ten years later the first transatlantic container service between the US East Coast and North Europe marked the real start of long distance scheduled container liner services. The first specialized cellular containerships were delivered in 1968. In the 1970s the containerization process expanded rapidly due to the adoption of standard container sizes and the awareness of industry players about the advantages and cost savings containerization brought [START_REF] Rodrigue | The future of containerization: perspectives from maritime and inland freight distribution[END_REF][START_REF] Levinson | The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger[END_REF]. Although container shipping occupies a relatively minor share of the whole maritime fleet (about 12 per cent), it is the fastest growing sector and currently concentrates more than half of world trade value, regularly expanding to other commodities (e.g. neo bulks).

The world container traffic, the absolute number of laden containers being carried by sea, increased from 28.7 million TEU in 1990 to about 100 million TEU in 2008 with a further growth to 155 million TEU in 2018 (UNCTAD, 2019 based on figures of MDS Transmodal).

Worldwide container port throughput increased from 36 million TEU in 1980and 88 million TEU in 1990to 237 million TEU in 2000, 545 million TEU in 2010and 771 million TEU in 2018 (figures Drewry). A comparison between world container traffic and world container port throughput reveals a container on average is handled (loaded or discharged) 3.5 times between the first port of loading and the last port of discharge. This figure amounted to 3 in 1990. The rise in the average number of port handlings per box is the result of more complex configurations in liner service networks as will be explained later in this chapter. Furthermore, the centre of gravity of these liner service networks has shifted to Asia. The dominance of Asia is reflected in world container port rankings. In 2018 fifteen of the twenty busiest container ports came from Asia, mainly from China (Table 8.1). In the mid 1980s there were only six Asian ports in the top 20, mainly Japanese load centres. The emerging worldwide container shipping networks helped to reshape global supply chain practices and supported the globalization in production and consumption. New supply chain practices in turn increased the requirements on container shipping service networks in terms of frequency, schedule reliability/integrity, global coverage of services and rate setting. When designing their networks, shipping lines implicitly have to make a trade-off between the requirements of the customers and operational cost considerations. A higher demand for service segmentation adds to the growing complexity of the networks. Shippers demand direct services between their preferred ports of loading and discharge. The demand side thus exerts a strong pressure on the service schedules, port rotations and feeder linkages. Shipping lines, however, have to design their liner services and networks in order to optimize ship utilization and benefit the most from scale economies in vessel size. Their objective is to optimize their shipping networks by rationalizing coverage of ports, shipping routes and transit time [START_REF] Zohil | The MED rule: the interdependence of container throughput and transshipment volumes in the Mediterranean ports[END_REF][START_REF] Lirn | An application of AHP on transshipment port selection: a global perspective[END_REF]. Shipping lines may direct flows along paths that are optimal for the system, with the lowest cost for the entire network being achieved by indirect routing via hubs and the amalgamation of flows. However, the more efficient the network from the carrier's point of view, the less convenient that network could be for shippers' needs [START_REF] Notteboom | The time factor in liner shipping services[END_REF].

Bundling is one of the key drivers of container service network dynamics. The bundling of container cargo can take place at two levels: (1) bundling within an individual liner service and (2) bundling by combining/linking two or more liner services. The objective of bundling within an individual liner service is to collect container cargo by calling at various ports along the route instead of focusing on an end-to-end service. Such a line bundling service is conceived as a set of x roundtrips of y vessels each with a similar calling pattern in terms of the order of port calls and time intervals (i.e. frequency) between two consecutive port calls.

By the overlay of these x roundtrips, shipping lines can offer a desired calling frequency in each of the ports of call of the loop [START_REF] Notteboom | The time factor in liner shipping services[END_REF]. Line bundling operations can be symmetric (i.e. same ports of call for both sailing directions) or asymmetric (i.e. different ports of call on the way back), see Figure 8.1. Most liner services are line bundling itineraries connecting between two and five ports of call scheduled in each of the main markets. The Europe-Far East trade provides a good example. Most mainline operators and alliances running services from the Far East to North Europe stick to line bundling itineraries with direct calls scheduled in each of the main markets. Notwithstanding diversity in calling patterns on the observed routes, carriers select up to five regional ports of call per loop.

Shipping lines have significantly increased average vessel sizes deployed on the route. In October 2019, the average container vessel on the Asia -North Europe trade measured 16,100 TEU compared to 11,711 TEU in 2015, 9,444 TEU in 2012, 6,164 TEU in 2006and 4,250 TEU in 2002(data Blue Water Reporting and Alphaliner and Notteboom et al., 2017). These scale increases in vessel size for a long time put a downward pressure on the average number of European port calls per loop on the Far East-North Europe trade: 4.9 ports of call in 1989, 3.84 in 1998, 3.77 in October 2000, 3.68 in February 2006, 3.35 [START_REF] Baird | Optimising the container transshipment hub location in northern Europe[END_REF][START_REF] Fagerholt | Designing optimal routes in a liner shipping problem[END_REF][START_REF] Guy | Shipping line networks and the integration of South America trades[END_REF][START_REF] Mccalla | The Caribbean basin: adjusting to global trends in containerization[END_REF]. The hubs have a range of common characteristics in terms of nautical accessibility, proximity to main shipping lanes and ownership, in whole or in part, by carriers or multinational terminal operators. Most of these intermediate hubs are located along the global beltway or equatorial round-the-world route (i.e. the Caribbean, Southeast and East Asia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean).

These nodes multiply shipping options and improve connectivity within the network through their pivotal role in regional hub-and-spoke networks and in cargo relay and interlining operations between the carriers' east-west services and other inter-and intra-regional services.

Container ports in Northern Europe, North America and mainland China mainly act as gateways to the respective hinterlands.

Two developments undermine the position of pure transhipment/interlining hubs [START_REF] Rodrigue | Foreland-based regionalization: integrating intermediate hubs with port hinterlands[END_REF]. First of all, the insertion of hubs often represents a temporary phase in connecting a region to global shipping networks. Hub-and-spoke networks would allow considerable economies of scale of equipment, but the cost efficiency of larger ships might be not sufficient to offset the extra feeder costs and container lift charges involved. Once traffic volumes for the gateway ports are sufficient, hubs are bypassed and become redundant (see also [START_REF] Wilmsmeier | Determinants of liner shipping network configuration: a two region comparison[END_REF]. Secondly, transhipment cargo can easily be moved to new hub terminals that emerge along the long distance shipping lanes. The combination of these factors makes that seaports which are able to combine a transhipment function with gateway cargo obtain a less vulnerable and thus more sustainable position in shipping networks [START_REF] Notteboom | The relationship between transhipment incidence and throughput volatility in North European and Mediterranean container ports[END_REF].

In channelling gateway and transhipment flows through their shipping networks, container carriers aim for control over key terminals in the network. Decisions on the desired port hierarchy are guided by strategic, commercial and operational considerations. Shipping lines rarely opt for the same port hierarchy in the sense that a terminal can be a regional hub for one shipping line and a secondary feeder port for another operator.

The liner service configurations in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 are often combined to form complex multi-layer networks. The advantages of complex bundling are higher load factors and/or the use of larger vessels in terms of TEU capacity and/or higher frequencies and/or more destinations served. Container service operators have to make a trade-off between frequency and volume on the trunk lines: smaller vessels allow meeting the shippers' demand for high frequencies and lower transit times, while larger units will allow operators to benefit from economies of vessel scale. The main disadvantages of complex bundling networks are the need for extra container handling at intermediate terminals and longer transport times and distances. Both elements incur additional costs and as such could counterbalance the cost advantages linked to higher load factors or the use of larger unit capacities. Some have suggested that the most efficient east/west pattern is the equatorial round-the-world, following the beltway of the world (e.g. [START_REF] Ashar | Revolution Now, Containerisation International[END_REF][START_REF] Monie | The global economy, very large containerships and the funding of mega-hubs, Port Finance Conference[END_REF]. This service pattern focuses on a hub-and-spoke system of ports that allows shipping lines to provide a global grid of east/west, north/south and regional services. The large ships on the east/west routes will call mainly at transhipment hubs where containers will be shifted to multi-layered feeder subsystems serving north/south, diagonal and regional routes. Some boxes in such a system would undergo as many as four transhipments before reaching the final port of discharge. The global grid would allow shipping lines to cope with the changes of trade flows as it combines all different routes in a network.

Existing liner shipping networks feature a great diversity in types of liner services and a great complexity in the way end-to-end services, line bundling services and transhipment/relay/interlining operations are connected to form extensive shipping networks. The ultimate goal of the market analysis is not only to estimate the potential cargo demand for a new liner service, but also to estimate the volatility, geographical dispersion and seasonality of such demand. These factors will eventually affect the earning potential of the new service.

Maersk

Once the market potential for a new service has been determined, the service planners need to take decisions on several inter-related core design variables. These design variables are indicated in dark gray/shaded boxes in Figure 8.3 and mainly concern (1) the liner service type, (2) the number and order of port calls in combination with the actual port selection process, (3) vessel speed, (4) frequency and (5) vessel size and fleet mix.

The array of liner service types and bundling options available to shipping lines was discussed in the previous section.

Limiting the number of port calls shortens round voyage time and increases the number of round trips per year, thereby minimizing the number of vessels required for that specific liner service. However, fewer ports of call mean poorer access to more cargo catchment areas.

Adding port calls can generate additional revenue if the additional costs from added calls are offset by revenue growth. The actual port selection is a complex issue. Traffic flows through ports are a physical outcome of route and port selection by the relevant actors in the chain.

The most relevant service-related and cost factors explaining port selection by the main players of the transport chain (e.g. shippers, ocean carriers, and forwarders) are identified in the scientific literature on port choice, see e.g. [START_REF] Murphy | Port selection criteria: An application of a transportation research framework[END_REF], [START_REF] Murphy | A comparative analysis of port selection factors[END_REF], [START_REF] Malchow | A disaggregate analysis of factors influencing port selection[END_REF], [START_REF] Tiwari | Shippers' port and carrier selection behavior in China: A discrete choice analysis[END_REF], [START_REF] Nir | Port choice behaviour -from the perspective of the shipper[END_REF], [START_REF] Chou | Comparison of two models for port choice[END_REF], [START_REF] Song | A competitive analysis of Chinese container ports using the analytic hierarchy process[END_REF], [START_REF] Guy | Port selection and multicriteria analysis: An application to the Montreal-New York alternative[END_REF] and Wiegmans et al. (2008). Port choice has increasingly become a function of the overall network cost and performance. Figure 8.3 incorporates the approach of [START_REF] Notteboom | Complementarity and substitutability among adjacent gateway ports[END_REF] to group port selection factors together in the demand profile of the port, the supply profile of the port, and the market profile of the port.

Human behavioural aspects might impede carriers from achieving an optimal network configuration. Incorrect or incomplete information results in bounded rationality in carriers' network design, leading to sub-optimal decisions. Shippers sometimes impose bounded rational behaviour on shipping lines, e.g. in case the shipper asks to call at a specific port.

Wiegmans et al. ( 2008) argue that port selection by shipping lines can also be heavily influenced by the balance of power among the shipping lines of the same strategic alliance, or the carrier's objective to make efficient use of its dedicated terminal capacity in specific ports.

The choice of vessel speed is mainly affected by the technical specifications of the vessel deployed (i.e. the design speed), the bunker price (see [START_REF] Notteboom | The effect of high fuel costs on liner service configuration in container shipping[END_REF], environmental considerations (e.g. reduction of CO2 through slow steaming) and the capacity situation in the market (i.e. slow steaming can absorb some of the vessel overcapacity in the market, see e.g. [START_REF] Cariou | Bunker costs in container liner shipping: are slow steaming practices reflected in maritime fuel surcharges?[END_REF]Notteboom, 2011 and[START_REF] Notteboom | The organizational and geographical ramifications of the 2008-09 financial crisis on the maritime shipping and port industries[END_REF].

The number and order of port calls, the total two-way sailing distance and the vessel speed are the main determinants of the total vessel roundtrip time. The theoretical/optimal roundtrip time will seldomly be achieved in practice due to delays along the route and in ports giving rise to schedule reliability problems. Low schedule integrities can have many causes ranging from weather conditions, delays in the access to ports (pilotage, towage, locks, tides) to port terminal congestion or even security considerations [START_REF] Notteboom | The time factor in liner shipping services[END_REF]. A shipping line can insert time buffers in the liner service to cope with the chance of delays. Time buffers reduce schedule unreliability, but increase the vessel roundtrip time.

When it comes to the service frequency, carriers typically aim for a weekly service. The service frequency and the total vessel roundtrip time determine the number of vessels required for the liner service. Carriers have to secure enough vessels to guarantee the desired frequency.

Given the number of vessels needed and the anticipated cargo volume for the liner service, the shipping line can then decide on the optimal vessel size and fleet mix. As economies of vessel size are more significant on longer distances, the biggest vessels are typically deployed on long and cargo-rich routes.

Decisions on all of the above key design variables will lead to a specific slot capacity offered by the new liner service. The resulting slot capacity should be in line with the actual demand as to maximize average vessel utilization (given expected traffic imbalances, cargo dispersion patterns and cargo seasonality and volatility).

SHIPPING ROUTES, NETWORK PATTERNS, AND PORT CENTRALITY

The aforementioned services altogether form a global maritime network within which local, regional and global links among ports become interconnected through the establishment of hub, interlining and relay ports. In this section, we provide a global perspective of the spatial distribution of maritime container flows and zoom into port centrality and functional specialization using vessel movement data obtained from Lloyd's List Intelligence (LLI), a world leader in marine insurance and shipping consultancy. The database covers the entire world fleet of fully cellular containerships and its actual port-to-port call sequences over the period 1977-2016. The database covers no less than 2,565,790 vessel movements in total, spread over four complete months each year. This dataset has the advantage of covering real flows and to include smaller vessels (more local activity) that are not reported by other data such as the shipping schedules of major shipping companies. The data is also more reliable than Automated Information System (AIS) or radar / data in the sense that it does not distort the true ports of call along vessel trajectories [START_REF] Ducruet | Advances in Shipping Data Analysis and Modelling[END_REF].

The distribution of container flows

The weight and growth of major trade routes measured in TEUs provides evidence about the imbalanced structure of the global liner shipping network based on the offer of liner services (Table 8.2). The distribution shows the predominance of the transpacific (Asia-North America) link in terms of volume, closely followed by Asia-Europe and the trans-Atlantic (Europe-North America) link. This confirms the study by [START_REF] Frémont | Transport maritime conteneurisé et mondialisation[END_REF] Another method for measuring the weight of links is to trace the worldwide circulation of container vessels (Table 8.3). Each time a vessel calls at one port, its capacity (in deadweight tonnage, DWT) is added to the port and to the inter-port link. The yearly total is thus an expression of the frequency and capacity of the links formed on various levels (i.e. ports, regions, continents) in an origin-destination matrix.

The global pattern appears even more explicit, with some variants, however, as the Asia-Europe and trans-Atlantic links appear at the second and sixth rank in 2016, respectively. The divergence between Table 8.2 and Table 8.3 comes from the higher shipping frequency of certain North-South links such as Europe-Africa and Latin-America, which are also based on geographic proximity and history. Another deviation from the pattern obtained using schedule data is the high rank of the Africa-Asia route. Africa as a whole has been increasingly integrated within Asian trades not only for bulk cargoes but also for manufactured goods as shown for the mid-1990s and early 2000s [START_REF] Ducruet | The worldwide maritime network of container shipping: Spatial structure and regional dynamics[END_REF]. Source: own elaboration based on LLI data

N.B. calculated based on direct calls between regions

Vessel movements can also reveal different patterns of regional circulation. We calculated that on average, over the 1977-2016 period, Asia had the highest share of intra-regional flows, i.e. about 90 per cent, followed by Europe (85 per cent) and Oceania (80 per cent), all of them being very stable overtime. Latin America shifted from about 40 per cent in the late 1970s to 75 per cent in the late 1980s, with this share continuously rising up to 80 per cent in the latest period. North America kept the lowest share, oscillating around 5 per cent up to the mid-1990s and around 10 per cent up to 2016. This level and evolution are certainly due to geographic factors (land separation between East and West coasts) but also to technology (late Panama Canal expansion motivating sea-land transhipment at US and Canadian ports) and regulation. In the latter case, the Jones' Act (1920) excludes from US cabotage all foreign flag ships, giving an incentive to transhipment activities at Caribbean ports such as Puerto Rico, the Bahamas and Jamaica to name but a few. The intensity of intra-regional traffic in total traffic can thus be explained by various factors, also including the presence of hub ports and the level of trade integration within the region. Regions with high internal connectivity through the extensive use of hub-and-feeder systems, such as Asia and Europe, often have a high share of intra-regional traffic. et al., 2004). The aforementioned emergence of mega-ports exerting hub-and-spokes functions resulted in fewer links relative to the number of ports in order to make the whole system more efficient and fluid. Yet the diffusion and current pattern of container flows across world ports can be seen as path-and place-dependent, since it is, among other traffic types, the most overlapped with other types on links and on nodes, compared with liquid bulk or passenger flows that are more concentrated on certain links and nodes. Container flows are thus, on average, a good marker of functional diversity for ports [START_REF] Ducruet | Network diversity and maritime flows[END_REF], except for the category of "pure transhipment hubs" (i.e. container ports with an elevated transhipment incidence).

In addition to these results, [START_REF] Ducruet | The worldwide maritime network of container shipping: Spatial structure and regional dynamics[END_REF] also underlined that about 80 per cent of total worldwide traffic concentrates over inter-port links of 500 km or less, while links of 100 km or less support more than half. Besides the influence of coastal morphology and the necessity following successive calls in relative proximity, such figures can be explained by some local service configurations, as in the case of adjacent seaports serving shared hinterlands (e.g. Le Havre-Hamburg range) or acting as dual hubs (e.g. Busan and

Gwangyang), which often receive multiple calls for the same vessels or liner services. The noticeable increase of the longest links was explained by stronger trans-Pacific ties (the China effect) and also by rapid technological progress in the shipping industry, allowing longer sailing distances between two ports.

The extent to which the strategies of shipping lines are reflected on the topological structure of the network can also be verified by applying some measures from graph theory and complex networks. On a world level, [START_REF] Hu | Empirical analysis of the worldwide maritime transportation network[END_REF] were the first to confirm that container shipping networks belong to the category of so-called "scale-free" and "smallworld" networks, i.e. where a limited number of nodes have the majority of links, the latter's frequency being distributed along a power-law, and with high cluster densities among smaller nodes outside hubs. Although [START_REF] Kaluza | The complex network of global cargo ship movements[END_REF] contradict [START_REF] Deng | Worldwide marine transportation network: Efficiency and container throughput[END_REF] about the extent to which the global maritime network is more or less "efficient" (i.e. low average number of stops between two nodes) than other transport networks such as airlines, we denote in Figure 8.4 an increase in efficiency as the Average Shortest Path Length (ASPL) has gradually diminished, especially since the early 2000s. Besides the expansion of the global liner shipping network, this effect of scale economies is compensated by regional integration dynamics, as seen with the increase of the average clustering coefficient on nodes and on links. This means that route rationalization goes hand in hand with an increase of local/regional density, which may in turn be interpreted in terms of regional integration backed by the multiplication of links served by coastal and shortsea shipping.

Another important trend topologically speaking is the decreasing hierarchical structure of the network, as revealed by the slope of the power-law fit between degree centrality and its probability (EXP). Thus, three trends affected the evolution of the global liner shipping network: expansion, regional consolidation, and polarization. Such trends may contradict each other but our analysis suggests that they are in fact concomitant. Integration processes (multiplication of intraregional links, new direct calls and multi-port services using shortsea shipping), as in the small-world model, may benefit from diseconomies of scale in large gateway and hub ports, while competition is fierce between existing and emerging hub ports.

Shipping lines may use both types of ports to build their services, resulting in the concentration of links among fewer hubs as in the scale-free model. This is in line with the empirical literature on complex networks where it has been increasingly recognized that spatial networks are in fact both small-world and scale-free, i.e. which structure and growth being dictated by the existence of dense communities connected internally and externally by a few large nodes.

The centrality of container ports

The impact of liner shipping network's operation on container ports is often analysed in terms of throughput, the most widely available indicator of port performance in official statistics.

Table 8.1 shows the classic port hierarchy with regard to the number of containers (TEUs)

handled by top ports since the 1970s, regardless of the function of ports in the maritime network. However, the network perspective allows for calculating the connectivity of ports, which long remained missing in the related literature [START_REF] Ducruet | Maritime Networks. Spatial Structures and Time Dynamics[END_REF]. In this chapter, we compare three measures of centrality based on the configuration of inter-port links in a binary port-to-port matrix (i.e. presence or absence of links between two given ports). First, betweenness centrality counts the number of positions of a node on possible shortest paths among all nodes in the entire network (Ducruet and Rodrigue, 2019). It is a measure of accessibility or reachability on the global scale (see Table 8.4), reflecting upon ports' uneven ability to be positioned along major routes and/or crossroads. Second, the average clustering coefficient of connected links, which is named here intermediary, corresponds to the capacity of ports to connect communities with each other, or in the maritime world, to act as a bridge hub between different port regions. Values close to 0 indicate a high bridging or interlining role, while those closer to 1 mean that such ports are better situated within such port regions.

Thirdly, the clustering coefficient is the proportion of connected neighbours (thus forming triangles or "cliques") in the maximum possible number of links among adjacent neighbours.

The lower the value, the more likely is the port in the middle of a star-shaped or "hub-and-

spokes" system whereby it centralizes flows to/from secondary nodes. Higher values underline the position of the port within a dense network with more numerous options to circulate.

These measures originating from network analysis across all fields of investigation from physics to sociology can provide answers to theoretical configurations provided by [START_REF] Fleming | Spatial characteristics of transportation hubs: Centrality and intermediacy[END_REF] on the centrality and intermediacy of transportation hubs and about the aforementioned liner service configurations (Figures 8.1 and 8.2). These measures can reveal other dimensions than sole throughput, with which they also can be more or less correlated. In particular, Table 8.4 looks at how the world's top 25 ports (in terms of betweenness centrality) exert these three functions simultaneously, interpreted in terms of scale: global reach, regional intermediacy, and local hubbing.

A first look at the linear (Pearson) correlation between centralities and vessel traffic (DWT) at selected years for the whole world sample of ports shows a relatively low significance overall, with an R² around 0.30 for intermediate centrality (declining significance), around 0.50 for global -betweenness -centrality (growing significance), and about the same for local (hub) centrality (stable significance). The weak relationship between centralities and deadweight traffic is interesting as it suggests that each port function works differently and has different impacts on the final product, total port activity measured by volume. This is the first time that such functions are compared with each other and the following analysis will only concentrate on the specialization effects among the top 25 ports. Our analysis of different centralities may search for correspondence between them, as in the case of the global liner shipping network where degree centrality (or number of adjacent neighbours) fits well nodes' strength (or weighted degree centrality, total traffic), but also divergence, as in the case of airline networks where very central airports (betweenness) may have few direct connections (degree centrality or number of direct neighbours) (Guimera et al., 2005). This chapter provided evidence about the increasing complexity and number of cargo movements that occurs in parallel with increased concentration and polarisation, depending on the measures and methodologies applied for revealing such trends. It discussed some fundamental aspects, such as the economic and geographic dimension of the variety of services offered by the industry, as well as the functional specialization of maritime centrality for container ports, although in this simple equation, hinterland connectivity and port efficiency are not included. Looking at the distribution of main trading routes as well as disaggregated interregional and inter-port shipping links, the latter being compared with kilometric distance, we observed that the overall network is growing in size and length notably thanks to a catching-up of South-South linkages versus North-North and North-South linkages. However, most worldwide traffic still concentrates over very short distances, that is more specific to maritime transport than to air transport due to adjacent calls between ports.

In light of our results, further research on container shipping networks should go deeper in the analysis of the causal relationship between throughput and centrality for container ports, while better identifying specific cases and outliers. Another avenue of future research would be to test the impact of the global financial crisis on the overall structure of regional and global liner shipping networks, as well as on the position of individual container ports, which would complement the classic view of shipping based on aggregated cargo flows among major trade routes. The global database on vessel movements has been expanded to back to the 19 th century (see [START_REF] Ducruet | China's global shipping connectivity: internal and external dynamics in the contemporary era (1890-2016[END_REF] looking at the urban dimension and other types of vessels so as to better appreciate the changing determinants of network structure and growth, but these elements may be further investigated to test the effects of port competition, port system formation, urban congestion, and port migration. Last but not least, the analysis of the situation of ports and cities within the all-encompassing supply chain including other modes [START_REF] Robinson | Afterword[END_REF] would prove helpful for the study of logistics chains, the hinterlandforeland continuum, intermodal transport systems, and port competitiveness.

  Source: Containerisation International, The Journal of Commerce, Lloyd's List and AAPA This chapter analyses liner service networks as configured by container shipping lines. In a first section we discuss the drivers of and decision variables in liner service design as well as the different liner service types. Next, the chapter provides a global snapshot of the worldwide liner shipping network based on vessel movement data. The changing geographic distribution of main inter-port links is explored in the light of recent reconfigurations of liner shipping networks. Third, we zoom in on the position of seaports in liner shipping networks referring to concepts of centrality, hierarchy, and selection factors. The chapter concludes by elaborating on the interactions and interdependencies between seaport development and liner shipping network development notably under current economic changes. 2. CONFIGURATION AND DESIGN OF LINER SHIPPING SERVICES 2.1. The configuration of liner shipping services and networks Liner shipping networks are developed to meet the growing demand in global supply chains in terms of frequency, direct accessibility and transit times. Expansion of traffic has to be covered either by increasing the number of strings operated, or by vessel upsizing, or both. As such, increased cargo availability has triggered changes in vessel size, liner service schedules and in the structure of liner shipping.

Figure

  Figure 8.1: Bundling within an individual liner service Line bundling service (symmetric and asymmetric)

  scheme of traffic circulation through a network of specific hubs (many of these hubs are not among the world's biggest container ports) and a more selective serving of secondary markets such as Africa (strong presence by MSC), the Caribbean and the East Mediterranean. Notwithstanding the demand pull for global services, a large number of individual carriers remains regionally based. Asian carriers such as Japanese carrier ONE (Ocean Network Express) and South Korean carrier HMM mainly focus on intra-Asian trade, transpacific trade and the Europe -Far East route, partly because of their huge dependence on export flows generated by the respective Asian home bases. Evergreen and Cosco Shipping are among the exceptions frequenting secondary routes such as Africa and South America. Profound differences exist in service network design among shipping lines. Some carriers have clearly opted for a true global coverage, others are somewhat stuck in a triad-based service network forcing them to develop a strong focus on cost bases. Alliance structures (cf. THE Alliance, Ocean Alliance and 2M) provide its members easy access to more loops or services with relatively low-cost implications and allow them to share terminals.

Figure 8 . 3 :

 83 Figure 8.3: The process of liner service design

  of the global container shipping network through the mapping of the top shipping lines' service schedules among world regions. They explain the dominance of Asia by the role of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) that provide consumers goods to industrialized countries, thus intensifying trans-Pacific flows at the expense of transatlantic flows. They also calculated that in 2002, such relations among the main economic poles of the "Triade" concentrated about 67 per cent of total service capacity, 22 per cent only remaining for North-South relations with these poles, and South-South relations being negligible in size. Transpacific flows are imbalanced due to low US exports, posing severe logistical issues like the repositioning of empty containers.

Figure

  Figure 8.4: Size and topology of the global liner shipping network, 1977-2016

Table 8. 4 .

 4 Maritime centrality of top 25 ports at selected years, 1977-2016 Source: own calculation based on LLI data In 1977, Piraeus stands out by it strong regional and local centrality, being at that time the leading Mediterranean hub linking East, West, and the Black Sea with each other along the Europe-Asia trunk line. Thus, Piraeus, like Rotterdam for North Europe, is an exemplary case of a triple hub, centralizing flows at all scales, resulting in high throughput volumes. Singapore as well is particularly well scoring in such a category, confirming its overwhelming transhipment function, which reaches more than 80 per cent of its total throughput nowadays. Another example is Surabaya in 2006, which developed inter-island services across Eastern Indonesia or Reykjavik at a smaller scale in 1996. In more recent years, Piraeus lost its pivotal role to other Mediterranean hubs such as Gioia Tauro (Italy), although the latter is more a local hub than an intermediary hub in 2006 and 2016, like Marsaklokk (Malta) and Tanger Med. At the opposite side of the coin, it is possible to detect gateway ports in Table 8.4, which may be well positioned along trunk lines made of pendulum and deep-sea services, but with a lower transhipment function regionally and locally. Typical examples are Los Angeles, Marseille Fos, Genoa in 1977, New York, Charleston, London, Tokyo in 1986; ports which became even somewhat peripheral in the network due to the emergence of hub ports from the 1990s onwards.This would suggest that network indicators are very good tools for understanding overall port performance, although they do not include land-based dimensions of hinterland connectivity (see[START_REF] Berli | Sea-land interdependence in the global maritime network: the case of Australian port cities[END_REF] and other aspects of performance such as technical standards and the availability, quality, size, and cost of terminal handling facilities and services. At the top of the hierarchy, large gateway ports such as Shenzhen and Yokohama may have less betweenness centrality than transhipment hubs, while ports combining both functions may rank high in the three indicators. Overall, the position of ports in shipping networks seems to explain a large part of their overall activity.5. CONCLUSIONSThe extensive worldwide container shipping networks are key to globalization and global supply chains. The requirements on container shipping service networks have tightened in terms of frequency, schedule reliability/integrity, global coverage of services and rate setting.The evolutionary path of liner shipping networks and port operations is characterised by drastic changes as well as permanencies. Shipping lines have embraced a wide range of bundling concepts and liner service configurations to drive container service network dynamics. As global trade expands in economical and geographic terms, despite difficult conjunctures such as the global financial crisis, new ports and new shipping networks are regularly created to cope with demand. Shipping lines logically adapt to such trends as well as influence them, sometimes by refining their services through rationalization or by creating new service configurations through a combination of line bundling itineraries and transhipment/relay/interlining operations at pivotal ports of the network.

Table 8 .1. Top 25 container ports 1970-2018 (000s TEUs)

 8

	Rank	1970	1980	1990	2000	2009	2014	2018
	1	Oakland	336 New York	1947 Singapore	5224 Hong Kong	18098 Singapore	25866 Shanghai	Shanghai	42010
	2	Rotterdam	242 Rotterdam	1901 Hong Kong	5101 Singapore	17040 Shanghai	25002 Singapore	Singapore	36600
	3	Seattle	224 Hong Kong	1465 Rotterdam	3667 Busan	7540 Hong Kong	20983 Shenzen	Shenzen	27740
	4	Antw erp	215 Kaohsiung	979 Kaohsiung	3495 Kaohsiung	7426 Shenzhen	18250 Hong Kong	Ningbo	26350
	5	Belfast	210 Singapore	917 Kobe	2596 Rotterdam	6280 Busan	11955 Ningbo	Guangzhou	21870
	6	Bremen/Br.	195 Hamburg	783 Los Angeles	2587 Shanghai	5613 Guangzhou	11190 Busan	Busan	21660
	7	Los Angeles	165 Oakland	782 Busan	2348 Los Angeles	4879 Dubai	11124 Qingdao	Hong Kong	19600
	8	Melbourne	158 Seattle	782 Hamburg	1969 Long Beach	4601 Ningbo	10503 Guangzhou	Qingdao	18260
	9	Tilbury	155 Kobe	727 New York	1872 Hamburg	4248 Qingdao	10260 Dubai	Tianjin	16000
	10	Larne	147 Antw erp	724 Keelung	1828 Antw erp	4082 Rotterdam	9743 Tianjin	Dubai	14950
	11	Virginia	143 Yokohama	722 Yokohama	1648 Shenzhen	3994 Tianjin	8700 Rotterdam	Rotterdam	14510
	12	Liv erpool	140 Bremen/Br.	703 Long Beach	1598 Port Klang	3207 Kaohsiung	8581 Port Klang	Port Klang	12320
	13	Harw ich	140 Baltimore	663 Toky o	1555 Dubai	3059 Port Klang	7310 Kaohsiung	Antw erp	11100
	14	Gothenburg	128 Keelung	660 Antw erp	1549 New York	3050 Antw erp	7310 Xiamen	Kaohsiung	10450
	15	Philadelphia	120 Busan	633 Felix stow e	1418 Toky o	2899 Hamburg	7010 Dalian	Xiamen	10000
	16	Sy dney	118 Toky o	632 San Juan	1381 Felix stow e	2853 Los Angeles	6749 Hamburg	Dalian	9770
	17	Le Hav re	108 Los Angeles	621 Bremen/Br.	1198 Bremen/Br.	2752 Tanjung Pelepas	6000 Antw erp	Los Angeles	9460
	18	Anchorage	101 Jeddah	563 Seattle	1171 Gioia Tauro	2653 Long Beach	5068 Tanjung Pelepas	Tanjung Pelepas	8960
	19	Felix stow e	93 Long Beach	554 Oakland	1124 Melbourne	2550 Xiamen	4680 Los Angeles	Hamburg	8730
	20	Kobe	90 Melbourne	513 Manila	1039 Durban	2497 Laem Chabang	4622 Long Beach	Long Beach	8090
	21	Hamburg	72 Le Hav re	507 Bremerhav en 1030 Tanjung Priok	2476 New York	4562 Laem Chabang	Laem Chabang	8070
	22	Zeebrugge	70 Bordeaux	453 Bangkok	1018 Yokohama	2317 Dalian	4552 Tanjung Priok	Tanjung Priok	7640
	23	Montreal	68 Honolulu	441 Tacoma	938 Manila	2292 Bremen/Br.	4536 New York	New York	7200
	24	Hull	59 San Juan	428 Dubai	916 Kobe	2266 Jaw ah. Nehru	4061 Yingkou	Colombo	7050
	25	Toky o	54 Sy dney	383 Nagoy a	898 Yantian	2148 Tanjung Priok	3800 Colombo	Yingkou	6500
	Total 25 ports	3551	19483	49168	120820	242417		384890
		World total	4423	34806	84642	235569	432018		771000
	Share 25 ports	80%	56%	58%	51%	56%	55%	50%

Table 8 .2. World's major trade routes in 2018

 8

		Transpacific	Europe-Asia	Transatlantic
	Main route	East Asia-North America	North America-East Asia	East Asia-Europe	Europe-East Asia	North America-Europe	Europe-North America
	Cargo flows (million TEUs)	20.9	7.4	17.4	7.0	3.1	4.9
	Growth 2017-2018 (per cent)	7.0	0.9	5.7	-1.3	6.8	6.4
		Source: UNCTAD (2019), based on data from MDS Transmodal

Table 8 .3. Distribution of interregional container flows, 1977-2016 (million DWT)

 8

	4.8	6.4	6.3	8.3	5.4	8.9 10.0 11.7 13.8 12.9 16.0 17.0 17.4 19.7 18.6 20.9 22.5 25.3 27.1 26.2 30.1 31.9 35.9 42.0 45.1 48.0 52.6 56.9 64.5 71.2 73.7 74.0 60.4 63.7 65.5 64.0 68.1 69.9 71.1 66.8	Asia-
	0.2	1.0	0.7	1.9	0.9	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.8	4.7	4.6	4.7	5.7	5.9	6.9	7.3	8.6	9.3	8.7	9.8 12.4 13.9 14.6 13.6 14.8 19.2 22.5 29.0 35.3 45.8 47.7 49.8 53.8 55.3 60.4
	0.6	0.7	3.2	4.7	3.9	5.0	6.1	7.1	6.8	6.4	5.9 10.0 12.0 10.4 10.3 12.1 14.2 14.5 12.0 14.1 15.2 17.2 17.2 18.5 20.6 25.4 27.9 29.4 30.9 29.7 32.5 32.3	73.4 78.0 77.7 81.3 79.9 81.6 82.4	55.1
	1.8	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.4	2.3	1.9	2.5	3.1	3.6	3.5	3.6	4.4	4.9	5.7	8.0	8.1	9.3 11.2 15.0 17.9 23.3 23.7 25.8 23.7 26.5 31.7 31.9 33.5 34.7 34.3 34.8 31.1 31.0 41.7 43.5 44.1 44.5 49.8 52.8
	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.9	2.9	2.7	3.1	4.6	5.4	5.9	7.4	8.1	9.2 10.7 10.9 11.8 14.6 12.9 14.0 15.8 20.3 21.9 27.2 27.5 36.4 37.1 41.2 44.5 46.4 45.8
	4.0	5.0	4.6	5.9	4.1	5.8	6.4	6.5	7.5	7.6	8.4	9.3	9.9	9.7	9.9 10.5 10.6 12.8 13.2 12.7 14.5 16.6 13.7 14.5 17.0 17.1 18.0 15.5 15.6 19.2 20.4 17.2 19.3 18.5 22.7 23.7 23.6 25.0 26.2 23.2
	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.4	0.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.6	3.5	3.5	4.1	4.2	4.8	6.1	7.3	8.2	8.4	8.5	9.1	9.6 10.3 11.0 12.0 13.6 14.5 12.8 13.8 15.2 14.7 15.6 18.2 18.0 17.8
	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6	2.2	2.1	2.6	2.8	3.2	3.7	4.0	3.6	4.1	5.1	6.2	8.2	7.4	7.7	8.9	9.6 10.5 15.7 15.4 16.0 17.2 15.7 16.2 17.6 16.4
	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.5	1.0	1.2	1.8	1.6	2.4	3.6	4.9	5.1	7.4	8.3	8.8 10.6 11.0 8.7	8.6 11.3 10.8 8.7	9.1 11.4 14.3
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	1.1	1.3	1.7	2.1	1.9	1.6	2.2	3.0	3.4	4.1	5.2	6.0	3.6	3.1	4.4	4.0	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.2	4.1	3.9
	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.8	1.1	0.7	0.8	1.4	2.1	2.6	1.6	2.4	2.0
	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	2.1	2.8	1.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.6
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.4
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.9	0.9	1.3	0.9	1.2
	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.5

North America Africa-Europe Asia-Europe Latin America-North America Africa-Asia Europe-North America Asia-Oceania Europe-Latin America Asia-Latin America Africa-Latin America Africa-North America North America-Oceania Latin America-Oceania

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																																								Africa-Oceania
																																								Europe-Oceania

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