Elisabeth Longuenesse

Paul Tabar

Longuenesse, Tabar -Migrant workers and class structure in Lebanon 1 Migrant workers and class structure in Lebanon Class, race, nationality and gender

Keywords: Migrant labor, foreign workers, labor market, Lebanon, class, race, nationality, workers" rights

Whilst a few scholars have examined the situation of domestic workers, the issue of migrant labor as a whole (its contribution to the labor market, the status and situation of different categories of workers, and their impact on the resilience of the Lebanese social structure), is largely ignored, whereas the high proportion of foreign workers in Lebanon results in an increasing fragmentation of the working class, and the embeddedness of the Lebanese class structure in globalization. After examining the legal framework that organizes non-Lebanese workers in Lebanon, this paper discusses the findings of a field research on the labor force inthe cleaning and the industrial sectors, by focusing on two case studies. Our research question addresses the social impact of the imbalance in the labor market between Lebanese and non-Lebanese workers, and the impact that such diversity (of both nationalities and class status) has on labor relations and the structure of the working class. Eventually, we argue that specific conditions of employment, characterised by the role of labor importing agencies, the so-called sponsorship system, outsourcing, the casualization of work and the ethnic fragmentation of the labor market, result in the segmentation of the labor force along nationalas well as gender lines. The strategy of many large employers in Lebanon appears tobe based on the simultaneous and tactical application of inclusionary and exclusionary processes; i.e.the inclusion of migrant workers into the labor market whilst continuing to exclude them from available benefits as laid out in the Lebanese labor law.

Introduction

Lebanon"s position as a hub for French economic interests in the Middle East, largely precipitated by the growth of the silk industry in the 19 th century, development of transportation links including roads, railways and tramways, and the enlargement of Beirut harbor at the dawn of the 20 th century, contributed to the emergence of the country"s first working class groups and labor unions [START_REF] Couland | Le Mouvement syndical au Liban[END_REF]. In spite of its mercantile orientation and the hypertrophy of the service sector, the share of industrial workers in the whole labor force was still higher in Lebanon than in neighboring countries (Nasr1982, [START_REF] Gates | The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open Economy[END_REF], Gaspard 2004).But due to the weight of the small-scale production, and the strength of regional and sectarian identities, class belonging was never the sole point of reference for the identification of most Lebanese [START_REF] Dubar | Les classes sociales au Liban[END_REF], Picard 2002) 1 .

More recently, the civil war (1975)(1976)(1977)(1978)(1979)(1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990) resulted in the disruption of industry; many plants were physically destroyed and forced to close, whilst others relocated to safer areas of Lebanon or even moved abroad, and much of the workforce either emigrated or enrolled in local militias (Makdisi 2004: 44, 62-64).The boom in oil productionfurther transformed the entire region, with oil producing and sending countriesbecoming rentier economies.Lebanon is a good case in point. The surge in the number of domestic employees employed by Lebanese households is an indication of the transformation of the Lebanese society into a consumer-rentier society [START_REF] Jureidini | Female Sri Lankan Domestic Labour in Lebanon: Contractual, Slavery-like Practices and Conditions[END_REF].

By the end of the 20 th century, many labor unions in Lebanon had been transformed into "clientelistic"organizationsas a result of the strategy pursued by the Lebanese authorities and their Syrian "godfather"which aimed to put an end to the autonomy of the Lebanese Trade Union movement (Slaiby 1999). A short-livedmobilization of Syrian workers was largely utilized by the Syrian regime as a tool in the general framework of its control of Lebanon (Chalcraft 2008). Today, according to most estimations, around half of the labor force is non-Lebanese, labor unions are helpless and apathetic, and labor struggles are limited to middle class groups, state employees and teachers (Abi Yaghi, Catusse 2011). One notable exception to this assertion is the recent establishmentof a union fordomestic workers, for which the support of NGOs was crucial to its (relative) success, as well as the fact that these workers do nothave competitors in the local labor market. 2 Despite this exception, the situation remains bleak for foreign workers in other industries and economic sectors, who still have no voice.

Research question

1 One of the very rare studies on the sectarian composition of the labor force was conducted by Salim and Marlène Nasr before the civil war, based on fieldwork conducted in the Eastern suburbs of Beirut. It revealed that although all sects were represented in the workforce, the position of the different sects on the occupational scale was unequal, as well as the distribution of capital in different industrial branches. [START_REF] Nasr | [END_REF][START_REF] Nasr | [END_REF]) 2 Announced since March 2014 (See al-Akhbar, المنازل :عامالت كثير كالم قلبنا ,في 24/3/2014 (online: http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/203196, see also, English edition, http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/19147, accessed 26/3/2014). The creation of the union was mentioned in a previous issue of al-Akhbar on 13/2/2014, مدني ـ نقابي حراك أجل »الدولة«من (www.al-akhbar.com/node/200560), the creation of the domestic workers union was made public on January 25, 2015, after gaining the support of the National Federation of Labor Unions, and the International Labor Organization (Daily Star, 30 January 2015). But as long as the Ministry of Labor does not recognize it, it is still unofficial.

With the exception of analyses of migration flows to oil producing Gulf countries, most migration studies concern Northern developed countries which have been studied extensively since the 1980s. Studies into the situation of migrant labor in Lebanon are sparse, and whilst a few scholars have examined the situation of domestic workers, the issue of migrant labor as a whole(its contribution to the labor market, the status and situation of different categories of workers, and their impact on the resilience of the Lebanese social structure), is largely ignored.

The high proportion of foreign workers in Lebanonreflects the degree of dependence of the Lebanese economy on a global labor market (similar to that found in Saudi Arabia and many Gulf countries), which should encourage scholars to address the issues of the embedding of the Lebanese class structure in globalization, and the challenges such a condition poses to social protest.It could be said that the conditions of migrant employment in Lebanon, as well as the specific legal status of foreign workers, the role of labor-importing agencies and the sponsorship system act as a means for the state to manage the presence of migrant communities and protect employers against social unrest.

Using this preliminary observation as a starting point, our research question addresses the social impact of the imbalancein the labor market between Lebanese and non-Lebanese workers, and the impact that such diversity (of both nationalities and class status) has on labor relations and the structure of the working class.

Fieldwork conducted in two companies in the service and industrial sectors will allow us to examine the contribution that non-Lebanese workers have on the labor force. Observations and findings from these field studies have enabled us to secure a solid understanding of the evolution of the labor market in Lebanon, whilst also revealing the role and impact of non-Lebanese workers on the Lebanese labor market, the politics of labor recruitment, and the dynamics of the relationship between employers and employees in Lebanon.

We discuss the legal framework that organizes non-Lebanese workers in Lebanon whilst considering the extent to which these laws are enforced,and we also investigate the market and "work situation"ofmigrant workers, their qualifications (or lack thereof), levels of pay, and job security. In terms of "work situation", we will focus on labor contracts, and questions of control, power and authority within their occupation. This paper will be presented in two broad sections;in the first section, we will discuss the general social and legal framework that the reader should bear in mind in order to understand the context for the employment of foreignworkers and their position in the labor force. The second section will be dedicated to the presentation and discussion of the main results of our fieldwork. We will conclude the paper by answering the initial research question, whilst suggesting possible avenues of further research.

I -Demographic and legal framework

The imbalance in the labor market should be considered to have a double dimension, the first being demographic, and the second, legal.It is first and foremost demographic, considering the increasing number of foreign workers and diversity of the nationalities across all the sectors of employment.It is also legal, as the restrictions imposed on foreign workers entail strict conditions of residence and employment that can differ depending on nationality and sector or type of employment, all of which have important consequences on wages and working conditions.

A labor force composed of a majority of service workers… and an increasing share of foreign manpower

Because of the scarcity of statistics, it is difficult to secure precise and reliable information on the distribution of the labor force across the various sectors of the Lebanese economy.Nevertheless, studieshave indicated that between 1974 and 1997, the proportion of agricultural workers in the labor force dwindled from 22% to 15%, whilst the share of the labor force working in industryhovered around 16%, and services witnessed a new boom, which was only moderated by the increasing importance of foreign labor (Gaspard 2004: 155, 247).

According to the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS), of a 2009 sample of 18,526 employedpeople aged 15 years and above:6.3% of the labor force was employed in agriculture, 12.1% in industry, 8.9% in construction, 6.8% in transportation and telecommunication, 27% in trade, 36.9% in services, and 2% in finance. Remarkably, almosttwo-thirds of women, and less than one-third of men were found to be employed in the service sector(see table 1 in Appendix).

The composition according to occupation is not easy to interpret: 12.1% are classified as "professionals" (7.9%among males;25.9%among females), and 18.6%are classified as "skilled workers" (ummal mahara) (22.8%male; 4.8%female).Unsurprisingly, a higher proportion of women than men work as service workers and in occupations that required unskilled workers (see table 2 in Appendix). If we combine economic activity with employment status, we can observe that 20% of so-called industry workers are self-employed, and only half of them are employed on a monthly basis (see table 2 in Appendix).

Broadly, these figures reveal that thecurrent working class is mainly composed of service workers, most likely concentrated in small companies and enterprises, with a large proportion offemale workers. The number of non-Lebanese workers is unknown, since the statistics did not include reference to nationality. The same CASsurvey registered 354 domestic workers across 13,573 households (2.6%), which the authors consider to bea gross underrepresentation of the reality.

On the other hand, World Bank3 figures suggest that the labor force in Lebanon in 2011 was1,500,000 (out of a population of 4,200,000), of which 760,000 were foreign workers. Compared to this estimation, the figures released by the Ministry of Laborfor the same year, indicate that the number of work permits (new and renewed) issued to foreign workers amounted to185,000, of whom 75%werelisted as domestic workers 4 . If we estimate the number of Syrian workers to be around half of the grand total of foreign workers (i.e. 380,000), this would leave us with almost 200,000 other non-Lebanese workers who were employed in Lebanon "illegally" (i.e. undeclared, unreported and invisible) 5 . In summary, in 2011, estimates indicate that around half of the labor force wascomposed of foreigners (non-Lebanese), with a lower proportionof those workers employed in professional services (mainly education), and a much higherproportionemployed in the construction, industry, agriculture, and the service sectors.Importantly, around half of the non-Lebanese labor force was composed (as of 2011 6 ) of non-Arabs (mainly from South Asian countries). Specific lawsallow Syrian workers to enter the country with a rather cheap and easily renewable three-month residency permit 7 ,and work without a work permit,however, other foreign workers are forced to pay high fees to obtaina residency and a work permit. For this reason, the conditions of employment for Syrian workers and other foreign workers often differ (as we shall see in the second part of this paper), as stricter conditions mean that the latter are more likely to partake in informal, unregistered employment, which greatly increases their vulnerability 8 . The next section will focus on workers" rights, and howworkers can defend themselves within Lebanese society and markets.

The legal status as a tool against workers' rights

Officially speaking, the law does not formally distinguishbetween workers according to their nationality, and everyone is subject to the Lebanese labor law. Nevertheless, widespread vulnerability of foreign workers stems fromthe conditions of their entry into Lebanon, which in practice means that there are vast differences between those who depend on labor agencies to enter the country, and those (mainly Syrians, up to 2011), who can enter and work in Lebanon more or less freely, or at least, with many fewer restrictions.

LikeLebanese workers,foreign workers should not regularly work more than 48 hours per week (and 12 hours in a day), and overtime must be compensated at a rate of 1.5 more thanstandardtime. The maximum working periodper week (including overtime) should never be more than 60 hours. Formally, all workers are entitled to one day off per week, and two weeks ofpaid holiday per year (this becomes three weeks after five years employment in the same company). 5 According to Jureidini and Moukarbel (2002) the number of Syrian workers could be estimated around 2,000 up to 300,000, Palestinian workers 10,000, Egyptians 20,000…they also contrasted the official number of Sri Lankans (22,917 in 1999), and Filipinos (5,788) to the number estimated by their respective embassies (80,000 Sri Lankans and 20,000 Filipinos). 6 The massive influx of Syrian refugees, which accelerated in the second half of 2012, has changed de facto the conditions of employment of the Syrians, and the balance between Syrians and non-Arabs. The main characteristics of the labor market discussed in this section concern the situation just before the Syrian crisis. 7 Our research was conducted in 2012-13. This is no longer strictly true since january 2015. 8 For a discussion of the concepts of illegality or « irregularity », see Nicholas P. [START_REF] Genova | Migrant "Illegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life[END_REF] If « illegality » is created by state policies, in Lebanon, we might say that it can"t be separated from the delegation of responsibility to the employer for the presence of the foreign workers (the so-called sponsorship, or kafala system). See infra.

Foreign workers who are employed legally (with residency and work permit) should be registered with Social Security, and the employer should pay for their registration fees 9 . However, foreign workers are onlyallowed to benefit from the social security protections if their country of origin applies the principle of reciprocity (which, according to the Ministry of Labor, is the caseforonly five countries in the world: Belgium, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Syria). As a resultof this restriction, in cases of foreign workers originating from any country not included in the above list, the employer is forced tocover the costs of medical insurance for his workers(to cover work accidents and the repatriation of the body in case of death).Palestinian workers were considered like other non-Lebanese until 2010, when a new law exempted them from the requirement of reciprocity and the costs associated with the work permit fee. Importantly, although foreign workers cannot benefit from the indemnity of social security, articles 54 and 59 of the labor law stipulate that they are entitled to end-ofservice compensation, something that is often flagrantly ignoredbyemployers 10 .

It is not uncommon for employers to avoid declaring the total number of workers they employ, and consequently, they do not pay their dues to the department of Social Security. Moreover, some employers pay medical insurance for only a small number of employees, leaving the rest uncovered in the event of an accident or illness. In fact, our fieldwork revealed that in many cases, female workers in cleaning companies are falsely registered as domestic workers, either because these work permits are less expensive and easier to obtain, or because the workers have left their employment as domestic workers and chosen to work at a private cleaning company without declaring the change to the relevant government department. 11 Accessto the labormarket is further regulated bya series of decreesand regulationsissued by theMinistry forLabor,which list a numberoccupationsreserved forLebaneseworkers, as well asstipulatingthe conditions for the employmentof foreign workers.To workin Lebanon, a foreigner must obtain priorapprovalfrom theMinistry forLabor,whichthen issuesa work permitto the applicant. The worker will will be provided with a three monthresidency permit indicating the name of the employer, or so-called "sponsor". In practice, it seems that "importing agencies" can play the role of the sponsor, bypassing the need for a work request from a future employer, allowing these agencies to import (mostly female) domestic workers under their sponsorship with greater ease (Jureidini andMoukarbel 2002;HRW 2010;[START_REF] Longuenesse | Travailleurs étrangers, droit du travail et réglementation de l'immigration[END_REF].

In fact, the issue of sponsorship and the legal structures surrounding its application (Farhat 8 May 2013, LCHR, Young 1999)remainunclear. Although it is often considered as similar to systems found in Gulf countries, the reality is actuallyrather different.One commonality is the delegation of legal responsibility for the worker to the employer, however, in the Gulf it also 9 According to the social security law (Decree No. 13955, 26 09 1963), the employer is supposed to pay for each foreign worker 15 percent of the amount of the salary, instead of 23.5%, for health and welfare, as he is exempted of the allowance of end of service. 10 L"Argus de la législation libanaise, Publication du Bureau de Documentation Libanaise et Arabe, Quarterly publication, vol. 56, n.1, Code of Labour http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/docs/710/Labour%20Code%20of%2023%20September%201946%20as %20amended.Publication%202010.pdf (accessed Feb. 10, 2014) Art 54: « Pending the law on social security, the employer is required to pay the wage earner or salary earner dismissed […] a dismissal indemnity equal to one month pay per year of service … » Art 59: … « On their dismissal foreign wage-earners and salary earners benefit from the rights accorded to Lebanese workers, on condition of reciprocity » 11 See second part of the paper. acts as a means of rent redistribution, since most employers are also foreigners, and local sponsors end up taking a share of the company"s profit in return for their sponsorship.In the Gulf countries, sponsors can also officially trade visas [START_REF] Beaugé | La kafala : un système de gestion transitoire de la main-d'oeuvre et du capital dans les pays du Golfe[END_REF][START_REF] Longva | Keeping migrant workers in check[END_REF]. In Lebanon, sponsors are supposed to pay for the work permit of the foreign worker they wish to employ, but in reality, many employers deduct the associated costs from the wages of the employees themselves; importantly,the law does not mention the kafala as such.Activists often state, "[i]n the Lebanese law (which includes the kafala, or sponsorship system), the foreign worker "belongs" to his employer" 12 ; in fact, this is an inaccurate representation of the truth. The notion ofkafala is not mentioned in the decree on the employment of foreign labor 13 , although it appears in several articles of the decree related to recruitment agencies 14 , and interestingly,in the Information Guide for Migrant Domestic Workers published (in English) by the Ministry of Labor in 2012. In practice, the kafala concerns mainly domestic workers in so much as it essentially ascribes the employer with absolute power over the domestic worker [START_REF] Jureidini | Female Sri Lankan Domestic Labour in Lebanon: Contractual, Slavery-like Practices and Conditions[END_REF]), rendered possible by the fact that the labor law does not apply to this sector (whatever their nationality).

Young states that foreign workers need to "be guaranteed by a Lebanese employer (a kafil)" in order to get a visa and be allowed to enter Lebanon. This means that for the migrant worker, the kafil is no more than an employer.Another study specifies that "[t]o enter Lebanon, a MDW [Migrant Domestic Worker] has to be officially sponsored by a Lebanese agency or an individual employer"15 and adds, "[t]he name of the "sponsor" is stamped on the three-month visa". The word "sponsor"is clearly often a synonym for "employer", but it is not clear whether it is always the case, as some agencies also seem to play the role of a sponsor. What seems clear, however, is that the law transfers the responsibility of the control of migrants" presence in the country totheemployers, or rather, tothe person or agency that coordinated the migrant worker"s arrival in the first place. The fact that the employer is required to cover significant costs as part of this process encourages many to seek out and utilize different strategies to discourage their employees from leaving work once he or she arrives in the country; delaying the payment of wages and confiscating passports or other important documents are just an example of common strategies carried out by employers.

On one hand, the worker signs a contract with the agency in their country of origin, and pays a fee for the trip and for their entry to Lebanon. On the other, the employer also has to pay a high fee to the corresponding agency in Lebanon, which explains why they often attempt toprolong the stay of their employee by a number of extra-economic means.

The paradox is that such a system results in an increase in the illegal employment of foreign workers once they are in the country. The numerous legal requirements involved in the system, including the legal obligation to seek approval from the Ministry of Labor for the recruitment of a foreign worker, the requirement that workers should return to their country of 12 See the website of the Lebanese Center for Human Rights: http://www.cldhlebanon.org/francais/presentation-du-cldh/racisme-discrimination-esclavage (accessed 30/9/13).

13 [START_REF] Diab | Le droit libanais relatif aux migrations internationales[END_REF], gives a list of legal and administrative texts concerning the conditions of arrival, stay and work for activity of foreigners in Lebanon, and never mentions the words kafala, kafil, sponsor, or (in French) garant..

14

.Both published on the website of the Ministry of Labor: see http://ahdath.justice.gov.lb/law-nearby-Foreigners.htm and http://www.labor.gov.lb/_layouts/MOL_Application/Cur/ (accessed: March 12, 2013) origin in order to obtain a new visa, and the high financial costs to the employer mean that both parties are encouraged to seek ways to bypass the laws, in spite of the risks involved.

II -Work conditions and socioethnic differentiation: Two case studies

For this paper, our primary research concern was to identify the various conditions of employment of foreign workers in different economic sectors and the "division of labor" between different nationalities: how do employers "play" with this variable; the extent to which nationality affects the status of the worker in different types of enterprise; the degree of interaction between foreign workers on the one hand, and their interaction with Lebanese workers on the other, and the perception of the "other" by each national group.

To that end, we chose to focus on two case studies:a cleaning company in the service sector, and a beverage company in the industrial sector.The fieldwork was conducted in Beirut during the winter of 2012-2013, and consisted first of extensive open interviews (conducted mainly in English and Arabic) at the worksite with employees of the cleaning company, andwith human resource managers in client administrations contracting with the company.Several meetings (conducted in French and Arabic) were held with the director of the beverage company.Further Arabic language interviews/meetings were held between the authors and the following individuals: two workers(oneSyrian worker and one Lebanese union activist)and one Lebanese commercial director in a regional branch of the beverage company,several other Lebanese union activists outside the company, and a fewforeign workers of different nationalities employed in small industries of different sectors. In spite of our efforts, we did not succeed in meeting any member of the executive staff of the beverage plant.

Whilst our sample is of course too small to be formally representative of the workers of any company,our aim was to obtain exemplary stories and experiences from concerned individuals on different work sites. Our material is clearly of a qualitative nature and thereliabilityof all recorded information was checked via systematic comparisonand appraisal between the declarations of different actors and parties. We were also able to secure complementary information about the two companies through administrative documents and commercial websites.

The cleaning company: an extreme diversity of nationalities and status

Aside from the companies in charge of cleaning public spaces (of which Sukleen is the most famous), more and more companies in Lebanon today offer a diverse range of cleaning services to private and public organizations. In the past, most private organizations and public institutionstended to employ full-time contractual workers for such tasks, however, more recently, the tendency is to employ staff from cleaning companies, generally on service contracts. This option affords employers more flexibility and reduces costs by shifting the management responsibility of cleaning staff entirely to the service companies.

Observations of the composition of these service companies clearly demonstrate a complex ethnic segmentation of labor. On the whole, and generally speaking, administrative workers tend to be Lebanese, whilstemployees working in cleaning or similar roles are generally non-Lebanese (mainly from India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Ethiopia, Cameroon, and other non-Arab countries, although there are a small number of Lebanese womenemployed for this task outside of Beirut). "Supervisors" (or foremen)are found to be primarily Lebanese or Egyptian, but it is not uncommon for supervisors to be drawn from the Asian workforce, including Indians.

Let us clarify the situation by reference to the following portrait: "A"is 30 years old, and he travelled to Lebanon from the south of India in 1998. He paid $3,500 to a labor agency in order to come to Lebanon, and has been working in the same company for the last 15 years. "A" has a degree in commerce, and worked in an industrial plant in India.He is married, and four years ago his wife joined him in Lebanon, working at the same company, however his two four year old daughters remain in India,looked after by their grandmother. His working day starts at 6.30am, and lasts until 9pm. In the morning,until 10.30am, he works for an administrationcompany in Beirut, after which he takes a half an hour break before leaving to Jounieh (a Christian coastal city north of Beirut), where he works from 1pm until 4.30pm."A" then returns to the administrationcompany where he works from 6pm until 9pm. His colleagues who finish work at 4pm or 5pm are paid $270for 46 hours workper week, and those who, like him, work overtime, are paid $370. Although his employer does not consider himself to be breaking the law, the workers indicate that because they spend their breaks on the work site or travelling from one worksite to another,they often work continuously from 6.30amor 7amuntil 4pm or 5pm, which is 10 hours instead of the legal eight,or until 9pm (14 hours instead of 11). "A" also works on Sundays cleaning buildings and private houses; this work is conducted of his own accord, and not linked to any company or organization. His wife works part time, from 3pm until 9pm. Together, they pay rent of $250 per month, as well as $50 for electricity and other charges. They also have to pay for their residencies, work permits and insurance fees in addition to travel expenses. (Interview, 22/2/2013) This storyisjust one of the stories told to the authors by 15 workers, men and women,who are employed by the cleaning company that we investigated. His situation is by no means the worst that we encountered, and undoubtedly, the presence of his wife by his side contributes to easing the strains on his life as a migrant worker in Lebanon.

The cleaning company in question was founded in the1970s, just before the outbreak of the civil war, and it now has branches in Kuwait and Qatar as well as Lebanon. According to the founding manager, the company employed around 6,000 workers in 2012, of which 1,500 were Lebanese. While those figures are relatively difficult to verify, according to a source from the Ministry ofLabor, the companyobtained 404 work permits for foreign workers in 2011 (187 new permits and 217 renewed ones), which is significantly fewer than the figure quoted by the founding manager. There are numerous possible explanations for this discrepancy: a) the figures may beincorrect, b) some of the workers may be registered as employed by private employers, or c)some of the workers may be residing in Lebanon without regular residence and work permits.Our source at the Ministry of Labor was unable to provide us with information regarding the nationality of the workers, but of the 16 workers we interviewed, including three foremen, there were five Indians, three Bangladeshis, three Filipinos, two Ethiopians, one Nepalese, one Egyptian and one Lebanese. One of the two sites observed (where the cleaning company sends workers to clean), an embassycompound representing a foreign country, had mainly south Asians with a high proportion of male workers. The other site, a private university, employed more women and they were of generally more diverse nationalities.

When asked about the nationalities of their fellow workers, most of thecleaners mentioned that therewere Indian, Bangladeshi, Sri-Lankanas well as Sudanese and Egyptian. The women on the second site also mentioned the aforementionednationalities,but also includedFilipino, Ethiopian and Nepalese. Some mentioned that there were also Lebanese, but pointed out that they were mainly supervisors working at a higher administrative level.

The company has also developed a special service for cleaning hospitals, whichrequiresa more skilled workforce. A young Lebanese professional who is the head of the hospital division, states that the company provides 140-150cleaning staff to the hospital, including Bangladeshi, Lebanese andFilipino workers, headed byEgyptian supervisors.Aside from the head of the team, only the stretcher-bearers are Lebanese.

Interestingly, no Syrians are mentioned by any of the staff we spoke with. 16 According to the director of the company:

In the "60s and "70s, we had Syrians, but when the civil war started, Syrians were not welcome in the Christianneighborhood. 17 As a result, things changed. We brought Sri Lankan first, and now, the number of Bangladeshi is higher. As for the supervisors, most of them are Egyptians, they are smarter, maybe because they are Arabs and they understand the mentality better, making it easier for them to deal with the Lebanese. (Interview, 26/2/2013) It is also interesting to note how nationalities are perceived and the prejudices towards them:

Clients don"t like the Syrians…in the pastwe had Lebanese, but you couldn"t ask the same from them…they were a problem. They wouldn"t come onholidays. We had to pay for somebody else to replace them. So in the end the client himself preferred foreigners. (Interviewwith Lebanese head of section, 5/12/2012)

The Lebanese only want to be drivers.They wouldn"t work as cleaners.They think it is…I don"t know what they thinkit"s a job like any other…the Egyptians, they get paid twice as much a driver, because they know how to work…(Interview with the company director, 26/2/2013) If nationality is a factor of differentiation, gender is even more so. Female workers are more often than not, found to have no legal status in Lebanon. Six of the ten womenwe interviewedhad previously worked as domestic workers and left their initial employer to work for the cleaning company. This means that many of the women interviewed were working under the name of their previous employer and sponsor, having not renewed their work and residency permit. As the company director explained, one reason for employing these "irregular" workers was that other than domestic workers, it is more difficult to secure work permits for women than it is for men. His estimate is that one third of his employees (numbering around 2,000) have left their previous employer (household head), leavingtheir 16 One Indian foreman mentioned that the number of Syrians was increasing due to administrative problems with the embassies of the migrants who started to demand that [the company] pays for the work permit for its migrant workers, and because Syrian workers were not submitted to the same laws as other migrants. But we found no concrete evidence of such a trend, at least in the company we were studying. 17 Because of the oppressive presence of the Syrian army, and the hatred that resulted and included the workers, seen as possible spies or agents of the Syrian regime.

passport behind in the process (Interview 20/03/2013).The paradox is that the onset of such an "irregular" situation actually seems to imbue the women with more freedom than they previously had in their former employment.

The employer is supposed to pay for the residency permit as well as health insurance, although this is not taking place at the cleaning company we investigated. The workers we met complained bitterly that their employer takes a portion of their monthly wage to pay for the residency permit and insurance. A source close to the client company informed the authors that hesuspects the company pays a lump sum fee to the insurance company to cover a number of workers, although that number is apparently much fewer than the real number employed by the company.

Workers also complained that the outsourced company holds their passports (which prevents them from quitting work), frequently pays their wages one or two months late, and that the wages are particularly low, compared to other companies. Nevertheless, "A" reports that a group of Bangladeshi workers at the same company had recently quit and were in the process of trying to get their passports back with the help of their embassy.

Although the cost of the work permit is supposed to be $300 dollars, some women say that in practice they pay much more than this, indicating thatthey are paying additional fees,either to their official sponsor (i.e. their fictitious employer), or to the office that brought them in the first place and is acting as their sponsor.As for their housing conditions, we discovered a variety of situations, as workers seem to develop different strategies, depending on the amount of money they send to their family. Some live in groups of 10 in a small apartment, paying $500 per month for the entire apartment ($50 per person); others live in groups oftwoper room, paying $200 per month for the room ($100 each). "A"and his wife are charged $250 per month for a small appartment. On the whole, excluding a few exceptional cases, the migrant workers we spoke with pay anything from $50 to $100 per month; electricity and water are occasionally included in this price.

The amount paid to agencies to secure a contract and travel to Lebanon ranges depending on the agency and the originating country, for example an Ethiopian woman can expect to pay around $500, whilst an Indian man can expect to pay around $2000. Typically, foreign workers in Lebanon will send their families back home between $100 and $300 per month. Considering that the average wage for foreign workers is around $370 per month (working the maximum number of hours), it is hardly surprising that they look for additional work on Saturdays and Sundays.

Again, though, situations appear to differ according to nationalities: an Egyptian foreman working for the cleaning company in one of the client universities reports that his wage was raised to $450 when he was promoted tosupervisor, and that this was later increased to $650.Whereas, an Indian foreman asserts that his wage did not change, and his workstill includes duties similar to other workers, despite the fact that he is now a foreman. In 2012, the minimum wage was raised by law from $330 to $450, althoughmany companies never applied it, even to their Lebanese workers. The cleaning company we investigated did apply the new minimum wage to its Lebanese employees, but not to employees of other nationalities.

There is a clear hierarchical systemthat operates in the workplace between the different nationalities. Although the director asserts that Lebanese women are occasionally employed to clean banks or offices in small towns, of the few Lebanese that we metmen and women alikewere all supervisors or head of divisions. As previously noted, some of the supervisors at the company were Egyptian, and considered by the company director to be "more intelligent" than the Indians. Furthermore, whilst some Indians were found to be foremen, they had worked at the company for a number of years, and in these cases, the team of workers they were responsible for tended to be smaller in size.

The above cases clearly demonstrate that by employing migrant workers, employers can avoid paying the minimum wage, as well as the fees for medical insurance and social security, at the same time as lengthening the working day/week. Moreover, because of the ever-present possibility that migrant workers could be deported, they often fear losing their job or livelihood, and so very rarely seek legal or occupational redress for their workplace grievances. / Under these work conditions, the outsourced companiesend up benefitting from a more flexible workforce as well as a lesser financial and administrative burden; i.e. work is more often than not, done on time (no absenteeism) at minimal cost. For the outsourcing company, the benefits are reaped by the fact that theyoperate ina lucrative market, byoffering a compliant workforce and dealing withminimal controlsby the state. For the workers, the situation is ambiguous. Instead of a typical dual relationship with an employer, migrant workers in this system deal typically with around three players, if not more, including the office that"imports" the workers, the embassy of their country, and the Ministry of Labor. The complexity of the network makes it all the more difficult for the workers to address their complaint, as we shall see later. However, some authors suggest that contrary to common belief, migrants themselves have their own agenda, they are aware of the constraints they will have to deal with, and they have made the decision that they are willing to deal with them [START_REF] Chalcraft | The invisible cage, Syrian migrant workers in Lebanon[END_REF].

The beveragecompany: Lebanese, Syrian and others 18

In a 2007 report, the Ministry of Industry listed 4,033 establishments employing five workers or more, and only 32 employing more than 250 workers (representing 16.5% of the industrial workforce, but 18%of the total number of the wage-earners). Half of those establishments are located in the district of Mount Lebanon.The main industrial sectors arefood and beverages, metal products, chemicals, rubber and plastic products, electrical machinery and apparatus,wood and furniture, printing and media. The main industrial zones(and the largest proportion of plants with more than 20 workers) are located in the southern and eastern suburbs of Beirut (part of the district of Mount Lebanon) [START_REF] Verdeil | Atlas du Liban[END_REF]).

Although there is not yet any clear and reliable data on this matter, it is generally observed that migrant workers (mainly Syrian) are increasingly replacing Lebanese employees, and particularly so in large industrial plants. However,we also found employees from India working in small enterprises in Mount Lebanon; in many cases, these workersarrived in Lebanon in the middle of the civil war (as early as 1980"s) to replace Syrian workers. A number of Bangladeshis have followed more recently.

In the food and beveragecompany we investigated, we discovered that they were using what is in Lebanon a relatively unconventionalmethod of hiring workers:the use ofoutsourcing companies. This method enables the "end/recipient" employer to recruit on a day-to-day basis, with no time limit in the workday, which could last up to 12 hours a daywithout including an overtime component. Similarly there are perks for the workers too; for instance, itallows the employeesto work intermittently, and stop for an indefinite period, possibly to visit family in Syria. The story of "M" is a good illustration 19 . "M" comes from a small village in Syria near Deir Ez-zor. He first came to Lebanon at the beginning of 2000, andas a Syrian, he was given a 6 months residency and a work permit. He worked in a chicken factory for some time, alongsidearound 300 other workers, mainly Lebanese and Syrians, who were all paid the same ($270 a month). After a few months, the company went bankrupt and "M"returned to Syria. He came back to Lebanon just one month later, and worked for some time in the construction sector. From 2004 to 2011, "M" workedin the warehouse of the beverage company that is under study for this paper.After a short break of two months back in Syria, he returned to Lebanon, changed his positionat the company. He started to work as a helping hand for four technicians who were Lebanese, in the division that deals with the preparation of the beverage. Nowadays, "M" is officially considered an employee of an outsourcing company, which puts him in the same position as several of his cousins who are working with him. During the first few years of his employment, "M" was employed by the beverage company itself, and used to work eight hours a day, six days a week, for one dollar per hour, and he was paid fortnightly ($96 a week). After several pay rises (including the most recent, in February 2012), he is now paid $2.50 per hour, but his legal situation has changed, as the company decided a few years ago to employ non-Lebanese unskilled workers through an outsourcing company. In contrast, Lebanese workers are employed directly by the beverage company and are found working on highly automated production lines. At the time of the interview (March, 2013), "M", like the other Syrian workers,was employed by theoutsourcing company on a daily basis, according to the needs of the client (in this case, the beverage company). He did not have a work contract, but had to sign a blank paper when hired. Mhas to leave the country every three months 20 , as work permitsfor longer periods are only issued for special reasons. When asked if he has a work contract, he replied: "Yes, but a formal (shakli) contract…the contract is for three months, after that, they tell you to leave work to avoid the obligation of signing a legally-binding contract." If we consider such breaks, it will mean that on average M.workedseven months a year and hada five months break.His yearly average income wouldthen be no more than $5,600 (around $460 a month).During his break on Sundays, hewould rest in a small flat close to his place of work, which was shared with four cousins working in 19 Our experience showed that it is much more difficult to investigate industrial firms that service companies. In spite of our repeated demands, we never could meet neither the director nor any executive of the company we chose to investigate. For the same reason, workers are far more difficult to reach than service workers. The control of the company is much heavier, and the risk of losing their job probably real. We completed two long in-depth interviews with one Lebanese and one Syrian worker of the company, one with a commercial manager for north Lebanon, and several other interviews with union activist, and with Asian workers employed in small plants. In spite of this scarcity, the resulting material appeared to be rich enough to warrant analysis. 20 The first permit is usually for 6 months and then it is renewed for 3 months.

the same factory for around $170 a month. At the time of the interview,"M"hadn"t seen his family for eight months.Probably, this could be explained by the crisis in Syria.

(Interview, 1/3/1013)

The beverage company under questionis a local franchise of an international firm, founded in the 1950s.It has a factory for the manufacturing and bottling of fruit juice and soft drinks in the southern suburbs of Beirut, and many warehouses in various regions in Lebanon. The majority of the 1,000 workersare non-Lebanese: about 400 Syriansare employed under the same conditions as "M",andaround 100 Bangladeshis and Sudanese workers are employed mainly for cleaning through another outsourcing company. The Bangladeshis and Sudanese employerswork 10 hours a day for a wage of $330 dollars a month.The Lebanese are primarily either qualified production line workers, or lorry drivers.

In contrast to the foreign employees, the Lebanese production line workers enjoy higher wages (between $660 and $800 per month, for eight hours a day, six days a week); they also have more favorable social benefits, and bonuses whenever they have to work overtime. But they rarely stay in the plant until the age of retirement, due to the difficultnature of their work.In fact, the number of qualified production line workers has been steadily decreasing for a number of years, as the managers are increasingly choosinginstead to invest in better technology and machinery, in an attempt to reduce labor costs. In the year 2000, 200 workers were dismissed, followed by a further 22 in 2011. At the core of the manufacturing process is the laboratorywhere the"mix" for the various drinks is prepared, followed by the bottling process;thisprocess is monitored by two Lebanese controllers who alternate every hour. The Syrian employees work at the end of the line, putting the bottles in boxes and placing them on storage/transportationpallets. Each day, 36,000 boxes are filled in 10 hours. It is estimated that it would take four men to fill 2,000 boxes per hour and have one hours rest every four hours.The Sudanese(andsometimes Bangladeshi) women are employed for cleaning. Bangladeshi men are employed for loading and unloading theboxes onto the lorries.

According to our Lebanese informant, a union activist, the hardest job is done by the Syrians, who are compelled to keep up withthe speed of the production line without stopping;"[i]magine…2,000 boxes per hour, how can you do that? The Lebanese worker…you ask him to do it and he will just leave…the Syrian works for 4 hours, then he rests for one hour. I tell you what: he is brave…he has to be!" (Interview, 1/11/2012) Workers are also employed in the different regionsfor distributing the end product to the shops. In North Lebanon, there are four commercial managers covering four districts, as well as a supervisor for the warehouse; under their authority are 132 further employees,including 60 lorry drivers and 60 laborers who are employed to load and unloadthe boxes. Laborers and guards are employed through an outsourcing company on a day-to-day basis, but according to the regional manager, neither Syrians nor Palestinians are employed: "…because the lorry drivers have money on their way back, there is a risk of robbery; Syrians could go to Syria, and Palestinians could hide in the camp, which means it would be difficult to chase them legally…" (Interview, 31/3/ 2013).

It is difficult to compare the situation of Syrian workers to that of non-Arab (mainly south Asian) workers. We did not manage to interview anyone from the same beverage factory and receivedonly indirect information. There are differences in the type of work done by the non-Arab workers, as well as the contracts they hold, not least because they have generally come to Lebanon with the intention of staying for several years. They too, are not directly employed by the organizationwhere they work, but they are contracted by a different outsourcing company to the one that outsources the Syrian workers. More importantly, as "M"stated,and in contrast to the Syrians, the non-Arab workers are paid on a monthly basis, and have longterm contracts which are renewable each year. The type of job they do tends to be lessphysicallydemanding than the jobs held by the Syrians, but their wages are lower. The relation of subordination is in some way more binding, and is related to the dynamics and constraints of the global labor market, whereas their Syrian counterparts circulate on a regional market, and are more dependent on the particular relations between Syria and Lebanon.

In summary, the contrast between the work conditions of the local workforce (highly paid, qualifiedand small in number), and those of the non-Lebanese workers (occupying unskilled jobs,getting paid far less than the national minimum wage, and large in number) is enabledvia the use ofa variety of"tricks" (outsourcing, no contract with workers, long working hours, payment on an hourly basis and no social benefits). These "tricks" are probably best described as a strategy adopted by the management to "survive" in a highly competitive market in a context of the absence of any state policy to protect the national markets and industry as a whole.

Asian workers are also present in the labor market in smallerenterprises in small towns and villages located in Mount Lebanon. We interviewed several of these Asian workerswho were employed a plastic factory, a stone factory and a wood factory;some of them have been in Lebanon for more than 20 years, often irregularly.In many cases they reported that they had initially entered Lebanon overland via Syria, and since succeeded in regularizing their presence by securing a residence permit with the help of their employer. Like other foreign workers, their situation is precarious and their social life is poor, but their relationship with their employer can be said to be more paternalistic.They tend to live in a common area, and are well known to each other. In their casehowever, theirwork pressuresare lighter because they produce for the local market, and their work condition is slightly closer to that of their Lebanese counterparts.

In lieu of a conclusion

Our aim in this paper has been to explore the contributionof foreign manpower to the Lebanese economy, the position of the migrant workforce in labor relations, and its role in the fragmentation of the working class. We chose to focus on large firms in two sectors -service and industrial-through two qualitative case studies. We are conscious that in so doing, we left out important sectors, perhaps most importantly the construction sector where Syrians represent an overwhelming majority, but also small workshops that may reveal quite different situations and work relations, with almost as many foreign workers of different nationalities.One of the most influential characteristics of Lebanon is the coexistence of a fierce capitalist logic with many aspects that appear somewhat pre-capitalist, whilst both are in fact complementary [START_REF] Lautier | Pour une sociologie de l"hétérogénéité du travail[END_REF]. Our concern was to shed some light on an oftenignored aspect of society in Lebanon: the articulation of the complementarity between different categories of workers, whose presence is purely accidental or temporary.

In a globalized world economy, of which Lebanon plays an increasingly integralpart (as muchthrough ties of debt and aid, as international trade, consumption and the import of labor), reducing the cost of production isoften the main concern foremployers,as they fight to survive in a competitive and largely unregulated market; this is even more trueconsidering the lack of government policy to protect local production orthe national labor force. In the industrial sector, these conditionshave resulted in the emergence of a two dimensionalstrategy:automation of production on the one hand, and the replacingof qualified (expensive) local workers with cheap migrant labor (when automation is either impossibleor not perceived to be as profitable).In the service sector, automation is rarely an option, meaning that the only way to reduce costs is to cut wages and avoid paying workers" social benefits andother due taxes;many employers find that the strategy of employing workers through outsourcing companies is the easiest way to achieve this aim. This profit-seeking strategy does not necessarily receive blanket support however, as many portions of the Lebanese workforce view the employment of non-Lebanese to be an unfair encroachment on the local market; many consider that foreign workers compete on unequal terms with the local labor force, particularly because they are more willing to accept poorer working conditions and lower wages.Although some Lebanese are indeed aware that defending foreign workers" rights to fair wages, social protection and good living conditions would indirectly serve the interest of Lebanese workers, the corruption and clientelism that characterize the labor unions (Slaybi 2001) remain an important obstacle to any solidarity movement for a common cause with foreign workers.Still however, the greatest obstacle is the ever-increasing size of the migrant workforce, and the huge diversity of their status and work conditions, which don"t help them to develop a sense of common interests.

Simply put, the strategy of many large employers in Lebanon appears to based on the simultaneous and tactical application of inclusionary and exclusionary processes; i.e.the inclusion of migrant workers into the labor market whilst continuing to exclude them from available benefits as laid out in the Lebanese labor law. This tactical and undeniably discriminatory (some would even go so far as to say exploitative) interplay between inclusion and exclusion is made possible by the specific conditions under which the migrant workforce is admitted into the Lebanese labor market, and is heightened by the introduction of a third party -the outsourcing company or the sponsorwhich distorts the traditional class relationship between employer and employee.Finally, the system is supported by broader political and social mechanisms, and is something of a "vicious circle", in that the greater the level of deprivation or exclusion migrant workers in Lebanon experience (i.e. the more they are deprived of their social and political rights), the more attractive they become to profitseeking employers, and thus their inclusion in specific increase concurrently.

Beirut, june 2014

World Bank, 2011, Migration and Remittances fact book 2011, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/Lebanon.pdf. (accessed 13 Oct. 2013). The source of these figures is not indicated.

Human Rights Watch, 2010, Without Protection: how the Lebanese justice system fails migrant domestic workers, Human Rights Watch, probably quoting[START_REF] Jureidini | Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon[END_REF]

Remarkably, Michael Young does not even mention the industrial sector as a sector of employment for foreign workers (p. 5). Neither does Chalcraft. The industrial sector was largely destroyed or disrupted during the civil war. It is more and more marginalized, in what is now a rentier economy dominated by the service sector. We argue though that the invisibility of industry, as well as the absence of labor protest in the private sector, is partly due to the fact that the workers are non-Lebanese.

Acknowledgements

The research benefitted from the support of the Lebanese Center for Scientific Research.Rim Hachem conducted an important part of the fieldwork during her internship at Ifpo as a research assistant; she conducted half the interviews, some with the help of Mariam Chfiri (Ifpo intern). Suzanne Menhem, from the Lebanese Institute of Migration Studies at Notre Dame University, conducted the interviews with Indian workers in the Metn area of Lebanon.

Appendix


Milan Erdelj
email: milan.erdelj@hds.utc.fr

Enrico Natalizio
email: enrico.natalizio@hds.utc.fr

UAV-Assisted Disaster Management: Applications and Open Issues

The fast-paced development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and their use in different domains, opens a new paradigm on their use in natural disaster management. In UAV-assisted disaster management applications, UAVs not only survey the affected area but also assist in establishing the communication network between the disaster survivors, rescue teams and nearest available cellular infrastructure. This paper identifies main disaster management applications of UAV networks and discusses open research issues related to UAVassisted disaster management.

I. INTRODUCTION

Large-scale natural disasters test the most fundamental human instinct of survival by inflicting massive, and often unpredictable loss to life and property. Various types of natural disasters, such as geophysical (earthquake, tsunami, volcano, landslide, avalanche), hydrological (flash-floods, debris flow, floods), climatological (extreme temperature, drought, wildfire) and meteorological (tropical storm, hurricane, sandstorm, heavy rainfall), among others, have caused losses of many lives in addition to increase in material losses in the order of 100% 150% over the period of last 30 years [START_REF]Loss Events Worldwide 1980-2014[END_REF]. Acknowledging the need for bolstering disaster resilience, this paper describes a vision of leveraging the latest advances in wireless sensor network (WSN) technology and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to enhance the ability of networkassisted disaster prediction, assessment and response.

The occurrence of natural disasters is an important problem in all the areas of the world, both developed and developing. The problem arises from the physical extent of the disaster, which makes it out of scope of human possibilities to react to it. Currently, efforts are being done in order to recognize and forecast the possibility that a disaster will happen, to react in an efficient manner to the disaster in course of happening, and to quickly and efficiently assess the damage, fix and restore normal state. In this paper, we present different applications of UAV-assisted disaster management systems, and discuss about open issues and research challenges facing them.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: disaster management stages are presented in Section II, UAV-assisted disaster management applications in Section III and open issues and challenges in Section IV. Conclusions are drawn in Section V.

II. DISASTER MANAGEMENT STAGES

Natural disasters happen daily worldwide and represent an important factor that affects human life and development.

In order to respond to different types of natural disasters and develop a feasible disaster management techniques and methods, it is important to understand the nature of a disaster, its phases and constituents.

When a disaster occurs, the most important issue that needs to be solved is to preserve human lives. In this context, the first 72 hours after the disaster hit are the most critical, which means that Search and Rescue (SAR) operations must be conducted quickly and efficiently. The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) provides an international SAR protocol and methodology and publishes a set of guidelines 1 which states that the SAR process must be conducted by teams. Activity assignment and local decisions are brought by a team leader, while all the team activities are coordinated by an incident commander. A common SAR mission is conducted in four major steps: 1) the commander establishes the search area (a smaller search area minimize the problems of communication among the rescuers), 2) establishing of a command post in the search area, 3) first responders are divided into scouts and rescuers and 4) scout teams report their findings to the command post and rescuers gather the information from the command post in order to know where to act.

In this paper, we envision a three-stage operational lifecycle where UAVs participate in natural disaster management:

• pre-disaster preparedness -concerning surveying-related events that precede the disaster, static WSN-based threshold sensing and setting up Early Warning Systems (EWS), • disaster assessment -providing situational awareness during the disaster in real time and completing damage studies for logistical planning, • disaster response and recovery -including SAR missions, forming the communications back-bone, insurancerelated field surveys.

Each stage imposes a set of task demands on the UAVs, lasts different lengths of time, and has varying priority levels.

III. UAV-ASSISTED DISASTER MANAGEMENT

APPLICATIONS

In this work, the classification of the WSN and UAVassisted applications in disaster management is based on the goal of the particular set of applications. For instance, the applications of structural monitoring, disaster forecast, environmental monitoring and early warning system design are grouped together since their common goal is to predict and forecast the occurrence of a disaster. WSN and UAVassisted applications in disaster management that are taken into account in this work are the following: (a) monitoring, forecast and early warning systems, (b) disaster information fusion, (c) situational awareness and logistics, (d) damage assessment, (e) standalone communication system, (f) search and rescue missions. The review of related works on using WSN and UAVs in disaster management is presented in Table I.

A. Monitoring, forecast, early warning systems

This section covers the applications of WSN and UAVs where the goal is to predict the disaster by structural and environmental monitoring, information analysis for forecasting and early warning systems. The goal of predicting and forecasting the natural disaster are executed during the prevention and preparedness phases of the disaster management cycle. An early warning system for natural disasters, which relies on existing and available WSN technologies and that focuses on issues of providing reliable data transmission, important amounts of data from heterogeneous sensors and minimizing energy consumption is described in [START_REF] Chen | Natural disaster monitoring with wireless sensor networks: A case study of dataintensive applications upon low-cost scalable systems[END_REF]. Methodology, techniques and integrated services adopted for the design and the realization of a web-based platform for automatic and continuous monitoring of the Rotolon landslide (Eastern Italian Alps) is tackled in [START_REF] Frigerio | A web-based platform for automatic and continuous landslide monitoring: The Rotolon (eastern Italian Alps) case study[END_REF]. The solution that employs UAVs to reduce problems that arise from faults in a sensor network during natural disaster is outlined in [START_REF] Ueyama | Exploiting the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to provide resilience in wireless sensor networks[END_REF].

B. Disaster information fusion

Although information fusion is necessary and helpful in all the disaster management stages, its most important impact is seen in the assessment stage. The goal of the information fusion and knowledge sharing is to combine different sources of information available and/or to make a bridge between different information technologies that can be of use in other applications for disaster management. For instance, a first responder system that implements information fusion and that is based on the use of mobile autonomous agents that are deployed in the emergency area is proposed in [START_REF] Kumar | Robot and sensor networks for first responders[END_REF].

An experimental system where multiple heterogeneous vehicles come together and are controlled and coordinated via cyberspace to accomplish a complex logistical operation in automated humanitarian missions is presented in [START_REF] Mosterman | A heterogeneous fleet of vehicles for automated humanitarian missions[END_REF]. In [START_REF] Bartoli | A novel emergency management platform for smart public safety[END_REF] and [START_REF] Grocholsky | Cooperative air and ground surveillance[END_REF], authors propose an efficient architecture of a smart public safety platform that integrates heterogeneous components such as smart data gathering and analysis system, communication system, WSN and social networks in [START_REF] Bartoli | A novel emergency management platform for smart public safety[END_REF] and UAVs and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) in [START_REF] Grocholsky | Cooperative air and ground surveillance[END_REF].

C. Situational awareness and logistics

The goal of this set of applications in disaster management is to gather the information during the disaster phase, especially regarding the movement of the people endangered by the disaster, as well as the rescue teams deployed on the disaster area. The platform that focuses on both static and mobile sensors and addresses the challenges of sensor data aggregation, routing, responders activity monitoring and different mobility issues is presented in [START_REF] Erman | Enabling mobility in heterogeneous wireless sensor networks cooperating with UAVs for mission-critical management[END_REF]. Experiences from La Conchita (California) mudslide response in January 2005 are described in [START_REF] Murphy | Rescue robots for mudslides: A descriptive study of the 2005 la Conchita mudslide response[END_REF], where authors provide a study about information regarding mudslide responses, what tasks robots are needed for, how the rescue robots performed and how responders viewed the robots. The solution for crisis management proposed in [START_REF] Sardouk | Multi-agent system based wireless sensor network for crisis management[END_REF] is focused on tracking and data aggregation methods in order to gather the information about the fire status and its evolution, besides the tasks of safe-zone discovery and aggregation of rescue personnel biomedical signs. In [START_REF] George | DistressNet: A wireless ad hoc and sensor network architecture for situation management in disaster response[END_REF], authors present DistressNet, an ad hoc wireless architecture that supports disaster response with distributed collaborative sensing, topology-aware routing using a multichannel protocol, and accurate resource localization.

D. Damage assessment

When a disaster happen, it is important to assess the scale of the damage by using different methods such as structural health monitoring and UAV video inspection. In this context, Kruijff et al. describe the deployment and experience in working with the Italian National Fire Corps involved in the post-disaster assessment on July, 2012, after two major earthquakes that occurred in Emilia-Romagna region in Northern Italy [START_REF] Kruijff | Rescue robots at earthquake-hit Mirandola, Italy: A field report[END_REF]. The conclusion brought after the mission is that UAV and UGV operator suffered from cognitive overload, which justifies the research in the field of automatic damage assessment systems. Key challenges to implement faulttolerant and efficient deployments of collaborative autonomous aircraft to increase operational reliability and performance when performing aerial sensing and assessment are described in [START_REF] Robinson | Resilient and efficient MANET aerial communications for search and rescue applications[END_REF]. In [START_REF] Ezequiel | UAV aerial imaging applications for postdisaster assessment, environmental management and infrastructure development[END_REF], authors discuss the use of a low-cost UAV-based remote sensing system for disaster assessment, environmental management and infrastructure development monitoring. Similarly, in [START_REF] Wada | A surveillance system using small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) related technologies[END_REF], authors develop a small UAV system that is capable of acquiring aerial disaster assessment information.

E. Standalone communication systems

The application that receives the most attention during the disaster management is related to standalone communication systems, where the goal is to re-establish the damaged or destroyed communication infrastructure during the disaster. Its application is most relevant during the disaster response phase, while the re-established standalone communication system can be of use during the recovery phase as well. In order to facilitate the intercommunication between disaster victims and rescue teams, an integrated emergency communication system that relies on WSN is proposed in [START_REF] Bai | Emergency communication system by heterogeneous wireless networking[END_REF]. Similar concept is proposed in [START_REF] Carli | A joint routing and localization algorithm for emergency scenario[END_REF], [START_REF] Dalmasso | WIMAX networks for emergency management based on UAVs[END_REF], [START_REF] Fujiwara | An ad hoc networking scheme in hybrid networks for emergency communications[END_REF], [START_REF] Marinho | Using cooperative mimo techniques and UAV relay networks to support connectivity in sparse wireless sensor networks[END_REF], [START_REF] Morgenthaler | UAVNet: A mobile wireless mesh network using unmanned aerial vehicles[END_REF], [START_REF] Nelson | The evolution of hastily formed networks for disaster response: Technologies, case studies, and future trends[END_REF] and [START_REF] Tuna | Design strategies of unmanned aerial vehicle-aided communication for disaster recovery[END_REF], where the network of UAVs acts as a backbone of a communication network damaged during a disaster. Another flexible network architecture that provides a common networking platform for heterogeneous multi-operator networks, for interoperation in case of emergencies is proposed in [START_REF] Fragkiadakis | Ubiquitous robust communications for emergency response using multi-operator heterogeneous networks[END_REF]. Authors measured the performance of a video streaming application in a real wireless metropolitan multiradio mesh network, showing that the mesh network can meet the requirements for high quality video transmissions [START_REF] Pinson | Video performance requirements for tactical video applications[END_REF]. A distributed mobility algorithm for re-establishing connectivity among the disconnected end-user in post-disaster scenarios is proposed in [START_REF] Di Felice | Self-organizing aerial mesh networks for emergency communication[END_REF]. The architecture proposed in [START_REF] Minh | On-the-fly establishment of multihop wireless access networks for disaster recovery[END_REF] extends Internet connectivity from surviving access points to disaster victims using their own mobile devices and it is set up on demand using wireless virtualization to create virtual access points on mobile devices.

F. Search and rescue missions

The goal of this set of WSN and UAV-assisted applications is to search for and to rescue the misfortunate people that happen to be lost, trapped by debris or injured during the disaster or immobile by any other means. An architecture for urban SAR and a methodology for mixing real-world and simulation-based testing, where a sensor suite and sensor fusion algorithm for victim detection permits aggregation of sensor readings from various sensors on multiple robots is provided in [START_REF] Nourbakhsh | Human-robot teaming for search and rescue[END_REF]. A similar ad-hoc sensor network for disaster relief applications that provides rescue teams with a quickly deployable and reliable tool to collect information about the presence of people in a collapsed building is presented in [START_REF] Pogkas | Architecture design and implementation of an ad-hoc network for disaster relief operations[END_REF]. Approach to WSN deployment with the use of mobile robots for human existence detection in case of disasters is shown in [START_REF] Tuna | An autonomous wireless sensor network deployment system using mobile robots for human existence detection in case of disasters[END_REF].

G. Other applications

Health and wellbeing of people are among the most critical issues that an efficient disaster management system should take care of. Therefore, different medical applications are widespread prior, during and after the disaster happened. It includes the problems of mitigating the disease risks triggered by the disaster, as well as the first aid and supply delivery. Finally, the use of WSN and UAVs in infrastructural reconstruction is relied on during the stage of recovery after the disaster, where the goal is to improve the construction process that will allow the "smart" construction of infrastructure taking into account the knowledge gained in prior disaster occurrences.

IV. OPEN ISSUES

Involving UAVs in disaster management have several networking-related research challenges, as described below:

A. UAV Localization

Given their limited flying time and the need for time-critical action, allowing UAVs to autonomously scout the disaster area and select their locations with self-learning techniques using repeated trials may be sub-optimal. We advocate the use of partial external inputs to guide the UAVs in establishing the last-hop connectivity to users as well as establishing a relay network. Last recorded information from cellular network location database as well as pings from mobile devices can be leveraged to estimate the density of affected people and their geographical distribution, which requires new signaling protocols between operators. Approaches like ant-foraging algorithms that reinforce paths based on availability/number of mobile pings can drive the UAVs towards the locations with high density of survivors.

B. Creating and maintaining the relay network

The relaying network formed by the UAVs is completely aerial and must have a high level of resilience towards link outages owing to motion-related changes or energy-level changes among the UAVs. A two stage process is neededan initial round of centralized determination of optimal relay points (which we call anchors) that connect the disaster region to the nearest radio access network is followed by a round of de-centralized correction during deployment. The problem of allocating backup UAVs for each anchor point is analogous to reserving backup channels in cellular environments, with several major differences: the ability of the backup UAVs to serve as relay-anchors may change over time depending on energy level variations; the handoff process itself consumes resources in terms of movement towards the anchor location; the functional loss that results in altering the role of the UAV from surveying to relaying, among others.

Interesting problems include: (i) performing optimal handoffs between the roles of surveying, communication with users, and data relaying, (ii) choosing the charging duration, i.e., making tradeoff decisions on whether charging instants should be proactive, even if their battery is not completely depleted, (iii) optimizing the number of hops by building accurate 3-D channel models for various weather conditions and land topologies, (iv) designing distributed control algorithms at different layers of the UAV-assisted disaster management system, etc.

C. Data fusion and handover issues

The video/images collected by the UAVs present an overview of the situation. However, affected humans may also use various social media or forward text messages and images via the UAV relay network. These offer fine-grained on-theground information that can be fused at the control center with the high definition UAV feeds. In-network data fusion within a mobile UAV network with energy constraints has not yet been investigated thoroughly. Additionally, the need for data fusion can impact the UAV network in interesting ways: (i) a more complete view of the situation can direct UAVs towards specific regions, (ii) it can reduce the data forwarding requirements from the UAVs, thereby saving more energy for flight. Existing source/channel coding from the domain of multimedia sensor networks are not sufficient as they consider a static network topology with varying channel conditions. Here, both topology and the channel changes with time.

The handover process among UAVs can begin early, during the approach time of the UAV towards the designated location, though this involves higher transmission power and increased impact of the 3-D propagation environment. Additionally, the simultaneous actions of movement in air and RF transmissions may introduce signal fluctuations caused by Doppler effect at the incoming UAV. On the other end, UAVs can align themselves next to each other in air, and then begin the handover. However, there is a tradeoff between the advantage of aerial stability during handover-related messaging with low transmission power, and the correspondingly lengthy duration for completing the entire handover process.

D. UAV-assisted system sustainability

The majority of UAVs have about 20-30 mins of flight time, and one way to extend the network lifetime is to alternate network responsibilities among them. Some parallels with techniques to manage networked nodes in the Bluetooth standard can be drawn here, such as the master node placing selected slave nodes in parked mode, once the number of active connections increases beyond 7. Works on moving Bluetooth slaves between active and parked modes based on energy availability and anticipated traffic needs can provide some preliminary strategies, though these will need to be majorly extended for the UAV scenario. However, the parking action in the UAV context is not merely switching the role status to an inactive mode. Instead, it involves complex spatio-temporal coordination of identifying safe stationary locations for the UAV to land on-ground and perform other non-aerial tasks. For example, redundant on-ground UAVs can serve as groundrelay nodes connecting to the aerial mesh layer, or fixed base stations serving mobile handsets, without consuming energy for continuous flight (Figure 1).

The location of charging points as well as the energy transfer methods must be carefully optimized as this impacts the duration of active service. Magnetic-induction based charging plates installed on on the supporting ground vehicles is one feasible option, which allow the UAVs to land and re-charge without manual intervention. This also raises new possibilities of joint optimization and practical applications of existing research on target tracking, where the vehicles are mobile and can position themselves in optimal locations, such as around the periphery of the affected area, to minimize the UAV travel time from its designated operational area to the selected charging point.

Fig. 1 .

 1 Fig. 1. Illustration of a UAV-assisted disaster management system.

TABLE I UAV

 I -ASSISTED DISASTER MANAGEMENT APPLICATIONS.

	Related'works			Disaster'stages	Technology		UAV8assisted'applica:ons
	Authors	Year	Pre,disaster/ preparedness	Disaster/ assessment	Post,disaster/ response/&/recovery	WSN UAV	Monitoring,/ forecast,/EWS	InformaCon/ fusion	SituaConal/ awareness	Damage/ assessment	Standalone/ comm./system	SAR/ missions
	Frigerio/et/al/[11]	2014	•			•		•
	Ueyama/et/al/[30]	2014	•		•	•	•	•				•
	Erman/et/al/[8]	2008	•	•		•	•	•		•
	Chen/et/al/[5]	2013	•	•		•		•	•
	Bartoli/et/al/[3]	2015	•	•		•			•
	Kumar/et/al/[16]	2004		•		•	•		•		•
	Mosterman/et/al/[20]	2014		•		•	•		•
	Sardouk/et/al/[27]	2010		•	•	•			•				•
	Grocholsky/et/al/[14]	2006		•			•			•
	George/et/al/[13]	2010		•		•				•
	Pogkas/et/al/[25]	2007		•	•	•				•			•
	Murphy/et/al/[21]	2008		•	•		•			•			•
	Wada/et/al/[31]	2013		•			•				•
	Ezequiel/et/al/[9]	2014		•			•				•
	Kruijff/et/al/[15]	2012		•	•		•				•		•
	Fujiwara/and/Watanabe/[12] 2005			•	•						•
	Bai/et/al/[2]	2010			•	•						•
	Fragkiadakis/et/al/[10]	2011			•	•						•
	Nelson/et/al/[22]	2011			•		•					•
	Tuna/et/al/[29]	2012			•	•	•					•
	Morgenthaler/et/al/[19] 2012			•		•					•
	Dalmasso/et/al/[6]	2012			•		•					•
	Marinho/et/al/[17]	2013			•		•					•
	Minh/et/al/[18]	2014			•	•						•
	Carli/et/al/[4]	2014			•	•						•
	Di/Felice/et/al/[7]	2014			•		•					•
	Robinson/and/Lauf/[26]	2013			•		•					•	•
	Nourbakhsh/et/al/[23]	2005			•	•							•
	Tuna/et/al/[28]	2014			•	•	•						•

http://www.insarag.org/en/methodology/guidelines.html

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work has been carried out in the framework of the project "IMATISSE" (Inundation Monitoring and Alarm Technology In a System of SystEms), which is funded by the Region Picardie, France, through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).