Ari Sitas

Sumangala Damodaran

Wiebke Keim

Nicos Trimikliniotis

Deviance

DEVIANCE

by Ari Sitas, Sumangala Damodaran, Wiebke Keim & Nicos Trimikliniotis Don Quixote tilted at windmills. He was considered to be "deviant," but this was the opinion of the bewildered millowners.

Our study begins in the 1600s and continues through to the present time. We are concerned to show briefly how modernity steered human effort, and how people were clustered in unique ways to achieve goals. We start from a historical moment when a number of foraging states redefined world relations. Starting from the seventeenth century enables us to bring Latin America, Africa, and Asia within the narrative of modernity.

It also avoids the silliness of concepts like "traditional society" and "mechanical solidarity" and the outrageous binaries of evolutionary sociology. There was nothing traditional about the world in 1650 and there were very few places untouched by the robust exchanges of an emerging capitalist modernity.

I. A typology of deviance

It is hardly unusual to define the alterity of individuals or groups as "deviant." Although the word has suffered from a century of overuse, it is nevertheless a pragmatic concept that can be used to describe something disquieting to the upholders of dominant norms in a given society. Similarly, it is not strange to have bouts of panic about deviance or deviants, or about the conditions that produce such phenomena or people, or about the perceived failure of the institutions that were supposed to eliminate, control, or shape deviance.

Modern institutions have tried to cluster people in certain ways to achieve both long-term and contingent goals.

The particularity of each institution usually has to do with the manner through which it clusters people and the modalities through which it does so. The familiar list of institutions includes the factory, the mine, the plantation, the corporation, the state or local bureaucracy, the army, the police, the prison, the concentration camp, the gulag, the school, the hospital, the madhouse, and so on. Be they "closed" or "total" (Goffman 1974) or more open and permeable in their design, their social architecture is filled with commonalities and resemblances. There is a rhythm to their story punctuated by property and possession, by fences and boundaries.

We shall deal with four forms of perceived deviance, whose importance and frequency waxes and wanes throughout key turning-points in modern history, but which never disappear entirely. They are:

 Behavioral deviance: when the behavior of an individual, a group, or a social ensemble is deemed to be deviant.

Different strategies are followed for its containment, depending on whether it is seen as "reformable" or not.

 Articulatory deviance: when an individual or a group articulates or signifies something in word, sign, or symbolic performance that is deemed to be deviant. This might be a religious tract, a document, or a public statement.

 Existential deviance: when a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group of people or an individual belonging to such a group is classified as "other" or "deviant" sui generis. The social majority may eliminate such a group in whole or in part, or may dispossess it of its demarcated territories.



Miasmic deviance: when a group or an individual belonging to a group is seen as a polluted carrier of impure substances, such as bad spirits or viruses.

There are two possible criticisms of this pragmatic fourway split of the concept of deviance -that the "existential" mode is rather unorthodox, and that the distinction between "behavioral" and "articulatory" is rather forced.

It is however not true that the "existential" mode is unorthodox. Two pieces of legislation passed in Nazi Germany in 1936 resulted in a classification of Jews and non-Jews that was existential and, in the long term, lethal. Both the "Law of the Reich Citizen" and the "Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor" involved classification and codification of existential deviance and its contrasting normality. Such work was common from the seventeenth century onwards. Social groups all too often were classified as other, foreign, excludable, or exterminable because of who they were rather than what they did.

As for the second criticism, we know from theories of social agency and communication that a speech act can have illocutive or perlocutive effects -that is, the saying of something turns into the doing of something (Habermas 1981: 388-390). In this sense, the threshold between articulatory and behavioral becomes permeable, often blurred, and subject to interpretation. Some jurisdictions and institutions have been particularly sensitive to this and tended to define an expressed belief as a concrete subversive action, thus turning articulatory into behavioral deviance. We felt it was necessary to distinguish between the two because, on many occasions, men and women of socially faultless manners and behavior went to the rack because of what they said, wrote, or drew. This is particularly relevant to struggles relating to freedom of expression, scientific freedom, and censorship.

So how can these four types of deviance be utilized in our analysis? Before we can study forms of deviance over the last five centuries, we need more refinement and focus.

II. Clearing the undergrowth

The story starts with absolutist states in interaction.

There were patterns of expansion and contraction. Boundaries shifted and borders became permeable. People were clustered by states. We shall speak metaphorically of foragers and of fence-builders. The foragers set boundaries and borders, and the fence-builders defined them and clustered human effort.

The foragers engaged in wealth-creation. They had to be innovators and model-builders in the process of colonizing the planet. Models that were successful resulted in expansion and assimilation, and were often ruthless. Models that succeeded include the seventeenth-century United Provinces (Dutch), England, France, Russia, and the embryonic United States.

Models that failed resulted in contraction and collapse -the Mughals or the Spanish Crown. Case studies of comparative modernity or of the comparative paths to it tend to miss these entanglements and interrelationships.

Boundary-setting and keeping was the preserve of wellorganized armed ensembles of men. Good foragers created longdistance capacities, better logistics, and more effective long-term boundary-keeping forces. They also had capacities that allowed them to contract boundaries without losing much advantage.

Foraging states also played a major role in clustering people in new ways. And this leads to our second metaphor.

III. Two hypotheses

We largely agree with Michel Foucault (2004Foucault ( [1974-75]-75]: 52) that deviance is "productive." Part of the impetus behind an impressive record of innovation and organization laws involved the attempted elimination, control, and management of deviance. It was at the same time, as Foucault so aptly described, a process of confining and segregating deviant populations into dedicated institutions for the purposes of work, service, punishment, treatment, or care. The evidence garnered by us so far across four centuries has led us to the development of two interrelated hypotheses.

(1) A focus on non-teleological thinking, deviance, and institutions brings Michel Foucault center-stage. We share with Foucault a concern that, instead of more freedom or progress, we see different forms of control and domination replacing each other over time. In his words, we witness "the endlessly repeated play of dominations" (Foucault 1984(Foucault [1971]]: 85). But Foucault tells only one part of the story. The modern world has not only been about the shift from one form of domination to another. There has also been the ratcheting and cascading effect of deviant struggles towards more freedoms and autonomy. We observe "progress" when the struggle by the deviants succeeds in winning space and societal recognition.

Many forms of deviance came to be integral components of popular cultural formation, and some of them have remained so in story and song -the rebel, the bandit, the pirate, the rebellious peasant, the slave. However much we agree with Immanuel Wallerstein's work and world-systems analysis (1974),

we have to stand the theory of economic cycles on its headthe up-phases of the world-economy are contingent on the ways deviance and alterity have been dealt with by those powerful enough to do so. In doing so, new paths for accumulation and growth became possible.

(2) The central and perhaps the most important point in our work is our contention that there are anomalic phases and cycles of deviance that are fascinating to study in their own right. They tell us something about the societies we live in at present.

IV. Cycles of deviance

A key pivot for our work is that there are cycles of deviance that are very much like the cycles of boom and bust in the capitalist system, cycles that enable creative destruction and innovation.

We believe that cycles of deviance have accompanied the development of capitalist modernity, discrediting simplistic accounts of linear human progress. Some periods were defined by an increasing public shrillness about the proliferation of deviance. Stanley Cohen (1972) defined these shrill episodes of perceived or real deviance as "moral panics" -an amplified and angry reaction to individuals or groups who were deemed to be a threat to values, resulting in escalating demands for greater social control. The cycles have proceeded in this way:

There is a real or perceived proliferation of deviancy, and a growing perception of social disorganization and normlessness, reaching levels of moral panic. This brings about efforts to define and classify the "problem" as well as debates about such definitions. There is then a process of classifying the deviance, and codifying it into rule, norm, or law. At that point, there starts the process of reorganization, institutional reform, violence, and re-clustering, and the creation of new institutions. This launches a new Up-phase.

Failures in each historical period cut right through a powerful ideology of success and improvement that defined, however violent and inhuman it has been, contemporary humanity. And panic was at its shrillest because the new attempt was perceived as the "best way" -the most advanced, technically sound, and rational. We are trying to turn "cycle theory" on its head -the fixers, through their innovations and repression, through the reconfigurations they bring with them, create conditions for a new sustained A-phase of accumulation. Without that, any system would have spun out of control.

We postulate that such a cycle becomes what we term an "anomalic phase" when it coincides with two other cyclical processes -an economic B-phase, and a cycle of increasing subaltern resistance. The B-phase throws many more people into unemployment, landlessness, and vulnerability, and more often than not it increases actions that are deemed by societal elites to be anti-social. The coincidence of a B-phase with a proliferation of deviance has been common, but so has been the coincidence of the two with the rise of movements challenging the class or social order of a society. There is always dissonance in any social system, and this often turns into alterity -an understanding by those below that there is an "us" and a "them." This may or may not lead to resistance. But when it does, and when this coincides with an economic Bphase, and when deviance is on the increase, it translates into an anomalic phase -a period of social polarization.

On the basis of our research (Sitas et al. 2014), we could present detailed accounts of cycles of deviance in each century. However, the scope of this paper does not permit that. We shall offer only a very brief summary of some examples.

V. Deviance during the seventeenth century

The first period of the seventeenth century was primarily concerned with behavioral deviance, even though articulatory, miasmic, and existential deviance were strongly present.

In the early seventeenth century, a spread of moral panic was evident in many places. Because this largely coincided with an economic downswing and the rise of challenges to existing forms of authority, we may call it an anomalic phase.

There was panic about "masterless men" roaming the countryside The behavioral deviants were part and parcel of the cultural formations of the working masses in both rural and urban locales. What was deviance for those in power was the normal stuff of people's lives. Such deviants stood at the point of tension of the system. The slave whose ears were cutoff after flight would make other slaves shudder but the empathy would never be with the cutters of ears nor would it de-legitimize "flight" as a survival strategy. And so it was with the criminals against private property, the cutters of fences, the poachers, and the indigent poor. It is from these groups that ships were crewed, armies constituted, and settlers served.

As for articulatory deviance, apostasy was everywhere (Sumner 1986, Embree 1991[1958], Blackwell 2006,). All governments in Europe responded to the rise of printing by establishing controls and censorship. If the printed word and a radical outlook made people deviant, the performance of those recently colonized or enslaved made authorities shrill.

Sedition, blaspheming, Godless thinking, apostasy, and slander kept institutions hard-pressed to respond, but as the century moved on and absolutist states gained in confidence, the apparatus of rule was refined.

During the seventeenth century, a "knowledge interest" emerged. Its rationalism was embryonic, but it was there This period, despite its short-term normalization, left behind dissonance and alterity. John Locke, for example, declared that hereditary powers were not absolute but accountable through a social contract. This created a new terrain of struggle. For the "laboring poor" -wage-earners, serfs, peasants, slaves, and the indentured -there was a growing sense that authority was not a divine right.

VI. Deviance in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

It could be said that, by the eighteenth century, although behavioral deviance was not in decline, the intensity of articulatory forms gained crescendo -for example, the literary pogroms in China (Brook 2007) and the large numbers of levellers in Europe. Existential forms of deviance were also on the rise, as indigenous people in the great land rush of the century were defined, classified, and rendered surplus to the emerging forms of possession.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, the emerging powers in Europe and the settlers they unleashed through their forage points were gravely concerned because indigenous peoples did not cede land willingly but rather fought against incursions with some ferocity. This shaped a European conception of savagery, which was used to justify the fierceness of their suppression by settler militia and by troops. This existential deviance had two dimensions -their relation to nature and to land as pastoralists and/or huntergatherers; and their heathenism. Indigenous people were inassimilable others who had to be cleared off the land -the surplus people of a shifting frontier. Key here was the Lockean idea of private property (Thompson 1977).

Levelling ideas were also on the rise. The critique of The most significant aspect of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the explosion of existential deviance and how quickly inter-imperial rivalry made such definitions, classifications, and forms of control similar.

But it also provided the backdrop for the emergence of the holocaust and racial deviance (Keim 2014).

VIII. Deviance in the twentieth century

The post-second World War period was defined by a bold attempt to create a transnational system of rules of It is apparent that we now live in a "world which is lurching from crisis to crisis" (Krugman, 2008: 184). Unlike There has also been a breakdown of the distinction between categories of deviance. There are important colonial linkages to the current "era of migration" (Castles & Miller 2003[1993]). Modern migration can be traced back to colonial time via its historical Many contemporary institutions were developed to deal decisively with the fall-out of a previous cycle -for example, the economic depression of the 1930s, the rise of fascism, the Holocaust. The multilateral, regional, national, and local institutions that were created faced a serious crisis by the late 1960s. There was a growing consensus that the welfare and developmental states that emerged were seen to be a hindrance to profitability and growth.

There are currently a series of institutions that have come to be seen as incapable of dealing with deviance and with deviants, which has exacerbated moral panics. Key here has been the nation-state as the boundary-keeper and norm-enforcer (Castells 1999;Sassen 2005). The denationalization of activities -be they criminal, economic, military, or political -has increased the calls for a planetary carapace of rules and norms. However, the international regimes created to create such rules and norms faltered at implementation.

As a result, it has become as essential as ever for the nation-state to define, control, and discipline the new behavioral deviants, not least through the erection and expansion of infrastructure for surveillance, imprisonment, and punishment. Even as rights have been granted and safeguards against existential deviance institutionalized, discrimination was allowed against those who stretched limits. The moral panic is perhaps shriller in present times due to the contradictory duality outlined so far. On the one hand, there is progress in terms of recognition of rights as a result of historic struggles. On the other, there is the expansion of disciplinary surveillance and the law-and-order institutions to control society.

The evidence we have garnered points in two directions.

First, there are cycles in which, instead of more freedom or progress, we see more control and domination. In Foucault's words (Foucault 1984(Foucault [1971]]: 85), we witness "the endlessly repeated play of dominations" or how "humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination." Some periods are defined as polarizing, as a threat to the socio-economic system, as signs of imminent collapse, followed by decisive action, change, and re-steering. Yes, there are cycles that involve the perceived proliferation of deviance (anomalic phases), which point to institutional failures. These cycles not only generate concern but bring with them improvisation, innovation, and institutional reconfiguration. Nevertheless, we also observe a cascading "progress" when the deviants struggle hard enough to win space or societal recognition. Not all deviants did so effectively, but the many that did have counter-steered the system to more equality and more freedom.

(

  Sumner 1986). It was encouraged by factors such as travel, new discoveries by the likes of Kepler and Copernicus, and revolutions in cartography, philology, and medicine. Much of it was conducted through the networks of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation(Hill 1991: 287ff.). It was also a time of religious ferment in Hinduism and Islam(Chand 1979, Embree 1991). In Ethiopia, the Arabs controlled the coast and the Ottomans the north. The route to the Christian spiritual homeland of Alexandria was blocked. The Portuguese offered a new way: silver, arquebuses, and cannon (Sumner 1986).One of the most distinguishing features of absolutism powerful tool in the organization of society. It aided the power of the throne against grumbling and resistant overlords, but at the same time it limited the despot's personal power. West though were the Chartered Companiesthe Dutch East India Company, the British East India Company, and the French East India Company, as well as the slave factories that processed people for trans-Atlantic passage.Since each state furthermore existed within a web of inter-state relations, the development of military strategy, tactics, and logistics made each one believe that the balance of forces could lie in its hands. As expected, the foragers were the most active in managing, controlling, and attempting to eradicate deviance. Then, on the basis of miasmic forms of deviance and the panics that followed plague outbreaks social tensions brought about in the first half of the century demanded swift solutions by emerging social strata. Underlying many of the new institutional arrangements was a determined effort at classification and codification. It is important to distinguish between the two. Classification was the domain of new and rising intellectual elites in Europe, the Mandarins in China, religious scholars in the Papacy and Islam, and of the growing scientific spirit. Foraging provided the motivation for taxonomies and orders. Codification, on the other hand, was the process of defining and refining categories of discipline and categories of people. Through the latter, people become existential deviants. The latter part of the seventeenth century involved the classification of races, which was to become a fundamental prop for all foraging states. Although the taxonomies and definitions of biology were to take off only in the next century, its framework was created in the seventeenth century. Two people in particular should be mentioned here. Francois Bernier was the first definer of "race" (Bernier 1864/5 [1684]; 1981 [1670], Lach 1993 [1965]). Bernier's work led to Linnaeus's binomial classification of plants, animals, and humans seven decades later. Then there was the great Jean-Baptiste Colbert. He led the work on the impressive Civil Law Ordinance of 1667 and the Criminal Ordinance of 1670, which stand out as remarkable works of rationalization. Colbert and his aides thought hard about the world of races. The Black Code (Code Noir) of 1685 (Édit du Roi 1687) was the formidably decisive result (Sala-Molins 1987).The Édit du Roi of 1685 set out several important ground rules about slavery. Slaves had to be baptized in the Roman Catholic Church and all slave masters had to be Catholic.Slaves were the economic domain of their masters but they were at the same time a property of the State's domain (community property) and therefore protected by the domain. Masters could beat their slaves but not kill or torture them. Slaves belonging to different masters were prohibited from gathering together. Slaves could not carry weapons. Fugitive slaves would have their ears cut off if away for up to one month, their hamstrings for up to two, and executed if longer. But then the code turned to areas of freedom from slavery. Slaves could be freed and would then be considered to be legal subjects of the French domain.

  Social Contract. Voltaire asserted the equality of all people and their right to religious freedom. Couched in deist argument, he preached tolerance even if the other to those ruled. In addition, the voicing of egalitarian ideas in bourgeois and artisan circles in London were direct challenges to the social order. The critique of Manchu rule was more veiled, but the settlement frontiers had their rough and ready definitions of the existential deviants. Back in Europe, however, there was a broader taxonomic zeal. Much of the foraging brought with it an enormous amount of information about creatures, human or animal. Systematic investigation in Europe reached amazing levels of co-operation and peer respect. The Levelling tradition led to polarization and social, political, and national revolution. In most cases "deviants" won the day. At the same time, the foragers prohibited Black subjects from becoming citizens. The former tradition became the heart of anti-slavery sentiment; the latter legitimated subordination and, in the longer term, colonialism.In short, in the eighteenth century, the intensities and polarizations were expressed as existential and articulatory deviance. Of course, there were expanding boundaries as armed men took possession of larger tracts of land. This in itself created tensions, which brought about exclusions and violence.For European societies the conquest of the Americas was the last step in the development of a global market. This was the period of specific forms of deviance that threatened the functioning of the market -the pirates by sea and the bandits on land(Cordingly 1999; Linebaugh & Rediker 2000; Haude 2010).By contrast the nineteenth century was shrill in three domains: first, the enormous behavioral and articulatory deviances industrial capitalism found in its working-classes and emerging nationalisms in their demos; secondly, the enormous behavioral, existential and miasmic forms of deviance that the sub-continent of India threw in the face African continent between insiders and outsiders in centralizing states that were based on slavery and the raids of slaves before and after its de jure abolition.

  engagement and create norms that made the horrors of the holocaust non-replicable. Due to space limitations we have to assume that the reader is conversant with the conditions of growth and social development and the forms of inter-state relation in the bi-polar world after 1945. In the contemporary period beginning in the 1970s, articulatory and existential forms of deviance have decreased but behavioral forms have gained new momentum. The anomalic phase in the twentieth century combined an economic B-phase, a cycle of increased deviance, and a new cycle of resistances. The decline of the old movements of collective action has not ended alterity and conflict, but it has animated new forms of resistance, not least through new technologies and networks. The very same technologies, however, also enable better systems of control, discipline, and surveillance. Acting together, these produce serious tensions.

  previous B-phases and anomalic phases, this one is in a quagmire. In the West, the restructuring of the welfare state, new ideology of institutional change, neoliberalism. In the Far East, too, a new phase was ushered in, which within a decade moved the economy away from self-reliance. The unprecedented growth of capitalist production had as much to do with the former as with the latter.The down-phase has had polarizing effects at many levels.Therupture of 1989 -the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the annexation of the former German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany -marked the defeat of so-called Communism in the bipolar confrontation between East and West and was said to demonstrate the worldwide victory of capitalism. With China and India joining the global accumulation game, the attempt to create a market-driven world is today global. A large number of the deviants of the colonial phase were co-opted and sanitized. The new deviants were those who worked against the consensus on national development and the priority of rupture by the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the inability of large parts of the developing world to address fundamentally livelihood, poverty, and consumption became clear. Since then, the dismantling of welfare-state structures and neo-liberal structural adjustment has led to the decline of the middle strata. This has had a profound polarizing effect between the powerful rich and the powerless poor.As for intensities, we argue that we can see a dramatic increase in moral panics about behavioral deviance -economic, be said to have declined.Existential deviance is no longer defensible as an idea, and racial superiority and gender discrimination no longer expressible within the paradigm of modernity. The granting of gender, ethnic, and racial rights has meant that it is no longer possible to define any group as a category to be eliminated or disciplined. Furthermore, it is no longer in perhaps half of the world's countries today. Formal reciprocity(Sitas 2004: 104-113) favors the legitimacy and necessity of co-existing divergent views and positions, and therefore articulatory deviance is on the decline. Nevertheless, some recent cases -like Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses or the Mohammed cartoons -have stretched the limits of intercultural relations. There are tensions concerning the explosion of pornography. There are modes of dress and appearance that define deviant prototypes at custom control points and in the streets. Nevertheless, in comparison to other periods, the post-1970s have been more tolerant to the world of signification.There are a stupendous number of poor people on the land, whose income is often supplemented by remittances from migrations. Two types of deviance have emerged -where rural cultivators have turned to the mass cropping of coca, hashish, opium and marijuana; and where they seek the assistance of bands of armed groups. Their relatives in the urban areas are also proving to be troublesome: vigilante slum-defenders, enforcers, gang-recruits and pirates on the coastline.

  current migratory systems are products of the colonial division of the world. This migration of people from the former colonies to the more "developed" world has created a multicultural setting within the North that is redefining the world. Nation-states have been under severe pressure by social reactions to a perceived social insecurity about such others.Existential profiling of racial, cultural, and gender types is on the increase again. This melds with articulatory deviance into a dangerous mix. At the core of anti-immigrant politics is the discourse and political praxis of combating "illegal immigration," a subject intimately connected to social phenomena such as racist populism in debates easily give rise to moral panics about xenophobia, and could lead to genocide. Articulatory deviance has often been seen as behavioral deviance insofar as the expression of a belief in visible or audible signs is considered to represent a concrete and serious threat to the established order. Generic panics about dangerous spaces and places are increasingly being racialized, to the extent that it is almost impossible to dissociate race, and darker strangers came to be nudged to live in those urban slums, an inherent lawlessness and normlessness became attached to their existence.Finally, there are countries whose people in general have been identified as deviance-bearing or potentially deviancebearing. These threatening states are to be found mostly in Africa or in ungovernable urban locales. The existence of such states of being, and the need for a balance between direct and indirect interventions, refines and constantly transforms the forms of governance necessary to decrease the threats.To pull together what is being presented here, this "melding process" has three dimensions: first, an ontologizing tendency made up of a range of common-sense tautologies about others; secondly, the creation of three sites of deviance that need direct or indirect intervention; thirdly, a metadiscourse of the need to manage crises by defining the period as a state of exception. It has turned politics and political competition into the politics of unease, and has opened up the space for the media to valorise fear.

  So for the current period the correct question is what are the polarizations embedded in current forms of deviance, and can this might have become since the digital and the genetic revolutions, and how much the 226 nationstates that constitute the map of the present invest in them, the bubbles of panic continue in a very long B-phase. We can sketch the anomalic phase but cannot as yet grasp the ascending fixers and moral entrepreneurs. What technology has done is to make deviance theatrical and immediate, but the world is in no way "normalized." So virus carriers, foreign migrants, terrorists, traffickers, and rogues keep the media working, the panic sustained, and the world on tenterhooks as it searches for a new Don Quixote.

  and invading cities, the proliferation of beggars and vagabonds in all the major towns of the West, fleeing serfs and slaves in the Russian domain, Brahmin defiance in the interstices of the Mughal Empire, slave rebellions in the Such rebellions were common through Russia, Hungary, and the southern parts of the Germanic zone. They took acute forms in France after a plague that ravaged the countryside

	between 1627-30 and a deflation of agricultural prices in the
	Americas, recalcitrant lords resisting Manchu rule, pirates 1630s (LeRoy Ladurie, 1975: 386). Slavery provided new images
	everywhere, of Black deviance (Fouchard 1981) -an uncontrollable and and a general restlessness in "frontier"
	encounters from China and Russia to Ireland, the Americas, savage figure of animal sensuality and sexuality, murderous
	India, and West Africa. and cannibalistic, irrational and utterly destructive. It has
	At one level, the story is simple. There was a world-wide remained a persistent latent basis of White feelings of
	crisis in the first part of the seventeenth century. Many otherness and danger ever since (Sala-Molins 1987).
	millions died during the Thirty Years War, the Manchu conquest If the behavior of peasants and slaves ranked high as a
	deviance, idleness was close by as a perceived social malady.

of China, the continuing destruction of indigenous peoples in North America, the mass slaughter of Jews by Cossacks in Poland, Aurangzeb's campaigns on the Indian subcontinent, and the escalation of the slave trade. The ascending strata reorganized repressive apparatuses and introduced new rules of conduct and behavior, enabling the "inhaling" of a new economic phase. The period after 1650 should be understood as a period of methodical organization of the means of destruction by absolutist states. It also strengthened the claim of the state to monopolize the means of violence.

The most vital work, though, was to create the preconditions for a dynamic new phase of accumulation. In the process deviants were confined, transported, or killed. The world at the end of the century had been "normalized" -the new laws or tropes of power pointed to new indices of domination that were more effective than ever before. Yet in this shift some strata won more spaces than others, and more nascent rights were negotiated. Property rights were the most enduring of these. Existential, articulatory, and miasmic forms of deviance were in ample supply in this century, but behavioral deviance troubled authorities the most. Peasant and slave rebellions and "idleness" were paradigmatic in the "Iron Century"

(Kamen 1971)

.

A commission established by the King of France in 1630 recommended prosecuting beggars and vagabonds, as well as "all those who live in idleness and will not work for reasonable wages or who spend what they have in taverns"

(Foucault 1984(Foucault [1961]]

: 131-132).

  the pre-conditions necessary for the easier movement of global flows in goods, information, communication, financial transactions and, to a lesser extent, people. Neither the new surveillance systems nor an enhanced regionalism has seemed to lessen the moral panics about institutional failure. Conclusion Thousands gathered to witness the stoning of an adulterer, and news crews sent televised images of it to the world. Tens of millions watched the last moments of Saddam Hussein with a rope around his neck, thanks to a cell-phone's video function. Knives were used to commandeer airplanes and fly them into the World Trade Center. Stones twine, and knives, the oldest means of violence, interfaced with the latest technologies to bring performances of violence and deviance into our intimate spaces.

	The privatization of policing and technological control
	of whole populations has exacerbated the problem on the
	institutional side that defines, administers, and manages the
	deviants. At the same time, organized violence -such as
	networked terrorist associations; mafia-like structures in
	drug, weapons, and human trafficking; and violent criminal
	behavior by former soldiers (the three kinds often being
	interrelated or combined) -has increased. The transfer of
	policing functions to civil society has not necessarily led to
	increasing	"success"	and	more	democracy.	It	has	made
	communities more resolute in their frustration with the state
	and readier to take on a vigilante role.
	Nevertheless, the state has not caved in. What have been
	forming through the interaction of states in the contemporary
	period are three patterns. Firstly, the "war on terror" has
	brought about an intelligence and surveillance system co-
	ordinated by the United States that is unaccountable to
	national legislatures or the United Nations. Secondly, there
	is an executive-led commitment to regionalism as a new form of
	multilateral inter-state relationship, whose exemplar is the
	European	Union.	Thirdly,	we	see	a	reformed	national
	administration that fiscally is larger than ever before and
	whose	raison	d'être	has	brought	about	new	allocative
	priorities, creating


Veronika Wöhrer

Wiebke Keim

Christian Ersche

Ercüment Çelik

Conclusion: Next Steps towards Global Knowledge Production in the Social Sciences

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(geographical) space. A closer look at empirical cases of knowledge circulation reveals very different practices of engagement with the ideas of others. These may be scholars who are becoming more self-confident -generation by generation -in further developing received theories and adapting them to their societal background, as Rodriguez Medina has shown in the case of the reception of Luhmann's theory in Latin America; or scholars who occupy peripheral positions in different countries in the scientific centre, creating their own networks and elaborating new perspectives, as Guilhot has illustrated in the case of the emergence of international relations theory. Furthermore, as Devés-Valdés has shown for the past, and Valdés and Webster for the present, there are different regional and trans-regional networks in the South and beyond, seeking to create autonomous spaces for their research. Some contributions also highlight ways of conducting social science research which are less familiar or mainstream within North Atlantic practice, such as in-depth cooperation between social movements and academia (Devés-Valdés, Valdés, Webster and Damodaran). All of them confirm the point that knowledge is not produced in one location and then internationalized through its subsequent circulation, but is more often than not produced in and through circulation.

The presented examples thus contest commonly accepted assumptions, such as the idea that national academic fields precede international academic exchange. While postcolonial perspectives on transnational entanglements and connections, as presented here by Bhambra, contribute to abandoning an unquestioned starting point from the national context, John opens up a critical tension in arguing that the specific constellation of the national must equally not be overlooked. With regard to discourses around gender in India, she contests commonly accepted terms and assumptions like the current almost self-evident usage of the term 'postcoloniality'. More specifically, we cannot afford to speak about international circulation of knowledge, let alone 'social sciences at a world scale', an example of an all-too-quick assumption in the field of gender studies and feminism (see also Wöhrer forthcoming), without thorough in-depth knowledge of the regional, national, local and institutional contexts in question. Differences in accentuation may be related to the fact that Guilhot, for instance, addresses the emergence of a transnational intellectual field across countries whose basic contextual elements can be taken for granted -in contrast to a scholar like John who writes from a location where the reconstitution of the most basic historical and contextual framework needs to be provided due to overall ignorance of an international audience.

Keim's conceptualization of three types for different configurations of the international circulation of knowledge is important in this regard. Her contribution outlines major characteristics of these types of circulation, their preconditions and functioning as well as their methodological implications. She tries to expand on existing literature, taking into account particular issues related to circulation across unequal positions within the international social sciences community. However, it is important to mention that these types drawn by Keim should not be taken as definite 'models' that prevent us from imagining other possible approaches to various scholarly engagements with knowledge in circulation.

Practical and Material Challenges for Global Knowledge Production in the Social

Sciences

One key problem apparent in most contributions is that of differentials in power and prestige as well as material and institutional inequalities. These affect knowledge circulation and contradict the aim of non-hegemonic forms of knowledge production declared by many contributors. The so-called 'rise of the South' has not solved this problem. Instead of leading towards non-hegemonic forms of international communication, recent geopolitical developments seem to rather transpose the problem, leading to a diversification of centres and peripheries. And as [START_REF] Heilbron | The Social Sciences as an Emerging Global Field[END_REF] and Gingras and Mosbah-Natanson (forthcoming, cited in Heilbron 2013) show in their analyses of publications, quotations and translations, the globalization of social science research has even led to an increased dominance of Northern American and European research as well as raising the of other regions (Heilbron 2013: 8). This refers to various practical and material issues involved in knowledge circulation.

For instance, what needs to be underlined, in correspondence with the contributions in this book, is that people also travel. In spite of a highly developed information and communication technology, we have seen, from the development of international relations theory to gender studies, from the history of South-South intellectual spaces to social movements and arts, that travelling people play a key role in the travelling of ideas, theories and concepts. It is so important, as Rodriguez Medina has shown, that one person travelling with a baggage of a specific theory can shape the institutionalization of a discipline in a given country. Briefly, the journey itself and the people travelling are key components of the circulation of knowledge.

Another key concern regarding the practical and material, especially institutional, side are new forms of academic cooperation. Various contributions emphasize the circulation of knowledge across the periphery. The acknowledgement of the social science production of the South has been developing through academic cooperation in terms of research and teaching as well as policy programmes. This can be regarded as a learning process that includes developing familiarity with diverse research agendas, methodologies, theories and conceptual frameworks as well as institutional structures and curricula. Valdés's contribution on a given South-South cooperation demonstrates that the development of a common research agenda, conceptual frameworks and teaching programmes, as well as policy programmes, is challenging but possible. Valdés, Damodaran and Webster also remark that this process includes circulation of knowledge between academic and extra-academic spaces, referring to the cooperation of academics and activists in several areas. However, there is also a danger of building new hierarchies or centres and peripheries within the South, such as in the frequent reference to a couple of countries usually labelled as BRICS. This would correspond to an extension of the intellectual and institutional landscape as it has prevailed within North Atlantic academia for a long time, which is equally not a homogeneous 'bloc', but internally similarly structured along centre-periphery relations at various levels. That knowledge is made in circulation between Southern countries does not per se mean that the involved circuits are in themselves non-hegemonic nor that the involved partner countries do not in fact establish new hegemonic relations with other countries.

Nevertheless, strengthening such networks outside of the North Atlantic milieu enables Southern scholars to re-engage and communicate with the scholarly community in the North and vice versa on a more equal footing. The South-South research network in Webster's contribution is a good example. The network, established at a university in Germany, functioned as South-South cooperation, and favoured new ways of thinking on social policy that not only circulated between Southern countries, but also contributed to new thinking on Northern welfare states and their declining trade unions.

However, these developments seem to be in conflict with current developments in higher education and research policy worldwide. Instead of encouraging different takes on social scientific work, current changes in the organization of the higher education systems in most countries demand the opposite move: it becomes increasingly important to publish 'internationally' -meaning in English -and in peer-reviewed, high-impact journals. This means in fact that arenas dominated by US-American and European universities, journals and publishing houses set the standards [START_REF] Heilbron | The Social Sciences as an Emerging Global Field[END_REF]. Authors from a variety of locations worldwide increasingly feel the pressure to adapt to a certain canon and writing style that is required by these institutions (for example, ISA 2013). It will be one of the major upcoming challenges to find solutions to the contradiction between visions for the discipline (see below) and ongoing higher education policies.

Epistemological Challenges

There seems to be a general acceptance of critiques of the current canon and its ignorance of theories elaborated elsewhere as well as of calls for more diversity and acceptance of seemingly 'different' ways of arguing -or tuning the cello. A more equal international circulation of knowledge, we argue, could thus deliver a vast amount of perspectives and experiences that would enrich the disciplines. This mutual learning should at least enable social scientists to question the paradigms they have been using in the past. However, more scholarly efforts are needed to imagine connections between these diverse traditions that should in turn render possible a process of mutual learning . This implies, first of all, the need to recover, through systematic in-depth historical studies, the history and heritage of circuits of knowledge circulation that have remained invisible or largely unacknowledged by the mainstream history of the social sciences (Devés-Valdés) as well as of the substantive contributions they have elaborated (Connell and Dados, Damodaran).

Secondly, such efforts would need to address an observable discomfort with the idea of 'Southern theory', expressed by numerous concerned scholars today. Two points are made in this regard: focusing on individual intellectuals and their works from the South still does not help, on the one hand, to convince a large group of scholars, who search for a better explanation of what characteristics make these intellectuals 'Southern' and how their intellectual engagements are connected to the realities of their own societies. On the other hand, while more and more individual works of Southern scholars are put under the spotlight, some of them are seriously concerned with how their internal debates are portrayed by others.

Sometimes they feel that others in fact provide prominent lenses through which to look at Wöhrer, Veronika;Keim, Wiebke;Ersche, Christian;Çelik, Ercüment (2014): Conclusion: next steps towards global knowledge production in the social sciences. In: Keim, Wiebke et al. (éd.): Global knowledge in the social sciences. Made in circulation. Farnham: Ashgate, p. 251-257 their work without necessarily assessing the aspired aims or ends of a given debate. A general discomfort with 'Southern theory', 'theory from the South' and 'sociology "of" or "for" the South' is that they are seen as intentions to make these Southern scholars and their works into important theory before seriously delineating the content and quality of their intellectual contribution. Further dialogue and critical confrontation (see below) as well as critical (self-) reflexivity around issues of representation would be needed to erase this discomfort.

Thirdly, contributors have highlighted the need to move beyond general critiques and abstract all-encompassing claims for diversity and non-hegemony, thus moving towards a careful identification of research areas and suitable locations of theoretical inputs in relation to the arguments made. This involves providing, in specific domains, the necessary empirical richness and theoretical and conceptual detail (Connell and Dados, Damodaran, Webster).

Connell and Dados showed, for example, that global phenomena like neoliberalism, which are experienced differently in various places, also look different when they are analysed from alternative perspectives and by means of varied categories. We need to ask, in each particular case, what has been gained from transformations of existing approaches as well as from alternative conceptualizations, in order to make the argument credible that we should engage in mutual learning. Why should sociologists engage in such a task at all? Which domains of research do empirically confirm that knowledge produced in processes of international circulation on an equal footing is particularly theoretically relevant? What experience and theoretical potential is lost and falls out of the picture otherwise? Fourthly, it also seems that, while calls for more visibility, respect for unacknowledged thinkers and the will to include more multicultural voices in the history and canon of the discipline have been crucial to open up spaces for dialogue, this cannot work without a much more consistent and critical attitude towards one another. This concerns various levels of argumentation. On the one hand, there is a need to engage in serious and critical theoretical If we take our craft seriously, an overall critical attitude imposes itself in order to systematically sort out the richness and potential of the debates that have been going on in recent years and to really take theoretical and conceptual advantage from them. Any attitude that contents itself with acknowledging diversity and the coexistence of a multiplicity of voices without engaging in a thorough intellectual confrontation will remain a half-measure and will actually waste potential for the advancement of the disciplines. On the other hand, this also involves the need to take on a more humble attitude with regard to rapid calls for 'social science on a world scale'. It should first be possible to clarify and empirically sustain with regard to specific debates, concepts and theoretical approaches, at what level these apply, and what their potential for abstraction and generalization is or could eventually be. In order to do so, the much-welcomed focus on entanglements and connections could be complemented with a not-yet-obsolete approach of systematic comparison and robust confrontation of empirical insights from different situations, time periods and locations and the conceptualizations building on them (as, for example, given by Damodaran).

Visions for the Future

This book brings together contributions that enable us not only to identify some problems concerning global knowledge production in the social sciences, but also to point out some cornerstones for the next step in their development. Some of the chapters envision possibilities of how the recognition of a more diverse set of theoretical ideas might be possible. Connell and Dados try to give a view on neoliberalism that acknowledges theories and experiences with neoliberalism elaborated in the South, which connect the influence of neoliberalism in various regions of the world and make us rethink mainstream concepts of neoliberalism and its consequences. While Sitas challenges the hegemonic canon of sociology, he stresses mainly that the 'non-theorizations' of Southern scholars are yet theorizations and they do not match with dominant ways of reasoning. He calls for the art of improvisation and the productive use of metaphors and parables as condensed forms of social knowledge with a theoretical surplus value. These not only serve the demands of excellence and importance, but also the ones of preservation and dissemination of predominantly oral forms of social knowledge. Thus, beyond the dimensions of politics and rhetoric, beyond empirical case examples and in-depth analyses of given circulating scholars, theories and concepts, what is at stake are the very epistemological foundations of the sociological endeavour. The last section provides a panorama of possible epistemological stances. Rehbein elaborates a 'kaleidoscopic dialectic'; Bhambra argues for a 'postcolonial global sociology'. Still, as the diverging visions of Rehbein, Bhambra and Savransky indicate, the question remains whether it is possible -or even desirable -to elaborate new paradigms, concepts and theories we all could agree on in a global sociology or whether 'global sociology' is a term that is better used in the plural.

Savransky is the most radical in turning the whole question on its head. What remains to be done is to investigate given fields of knowledge production in order to estimate where his suggested reorientation from the epistemological to the ontopolitical level (that is, away from the assumption of 'one sociology/many sociologies for one world' towards 'many sociologies for many worlds') could lead. If such a repositioning sounds challenging, it would also need to elaborate measures of quality, such as validity, adequacy, problem-solving efficiency, intersubjectivity or relevance, or other elements to be collectively debated in the future, that

  Wöhrer, Veronika; Keim, Wiebke; Ersche, Christian; Çelik, Ercüment (2014): Conclusion: next steps towards global knowledge production in the social sciences. In: Keim, Wiebke et al. (éd.): Global knowledge in the social sciences. Made in circulation. Farnham: Ashgate, p. 251-257

  Wöhrer, Veronika; Keim, Wiebke; Ersche, Christian; Çelik, Ercüment (2014): Conclusion: next steps towards global knowledge production in the social sciences. In: Keim, Wiebke et al. (éd.): Global knowledge in the social sciences. Made in circulation. Farnham: Ashgate, p. 251-257 and conceptual work that goes beyond ethically and politically motivated calls for 'Southern alternatives'. While these are legitimate and necessary in the face of the current constitution and structuring of the social sciences, they do not help us to understand and differentiate in detail what is gained, what has potential to inform and advance (for example) sociology as a discipline, and what remains at the level of rhetoric.

  Wöhrer, Veronika; Keim, Wiebke; Ersche, Christian; Çelik, Ercüment (2014): Conclusion: next steps towards global knowledge production in the social sciences. In: Keim, Wiebke et al. (éd.): Global knowledge in the social sciences. Made in circulation. Farnham: Ashgate, p. 251-257 could allow us to venture further in this direction without falling into an anything-goes relativistic position.

  Wöhrer, Veronika; Keim, Wiebke; Ersche, Christian; Çelik, Ercüment (2014): Conclusion: next steps towards global knowledge production in the social sciences. In: Keim, Wiebke et al. (éd.): Global knowledge in the social sciences. Made in circulation. Farnham: Ashgate, p. 251-257

  Wöhrer, Veronika; Keim, Wiebke; Ersche, Christian; Çelik, Ercüment (2014): Conclusion: next steps towards global knowledge production in the social sciences. In: Keim, Wiebke et al. (éd.): Global knowledge in the social sciences. Made in circulation. Farnham: Ashgate, p. 251-257