Emanuele Ferragina

Martin Seeleib-Kaiser

Determinants of a Silent (R)evolution: Understanding the Expansion of Family Policy in Rich OECD Countries

Keywords: family policy, OECD, socialization, multiple correspondence analysis, welfare regimes

This paper contributes to the comparative social policy literature in two ways. First, we use multiple correspondence analysis in order to assess the different directions and the degree of (employment-oriented) family policy change over the past three decades in 18 rich Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Second, we perform a series of correlations to identify the core drivers of these developments. Our main findings -based on five international datasets -are: (i) we have been witnesses of a significant expansion of family policies over the past three decades in almost all countries analysed, although the degree of change (distinguished by first-, second-and third-order change) differs across the OECD area; an (ii) whilst in the 1980s and 1990s social democracy and organised women were key drivers of family policy expansion, during the 2000s public opinion, that increasingly seems to support a "modernised" family lifestyle in which mothers are employed, seems to have played an essential role in explaining policy change.

Introduction

According to many welfare state analysts we entered an "era of permanent austerity" some time ago (see, e.g. [START_REF] Pierson | The new politics of the welfare state[END_REF]; the economic crisis since 2008 has significantly exacerbated the pressures on public social policies, with the consequence that the expansion and even maintenance of many programmes have been made more difficult. However, during this era of austerity family policies oriented to promoting maternal employment have been significantly expanded in rich Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries [START_REF] Ferrarini | Families, states and labour markets: Institutions, causes and consequences of family policy in post-war welfare states[END_REF]Lewis 2009;OECD 2007). Despite cross-country variation in the degree of "generosity" and duration of parental leaves [START_REF] Ray | Who cares? Assessing generosity and gender equality in parental leave policy designs in 21 countries[END_REF] and childcare services [START_REF] Daly | Care as a good for social policy[END_REF](Daly , 2005;;[START_REF] Hegewisch | Statutory Routes to Workplace Flexibility in Crossnational Perspective[END_REF]OECD 2007), women's increased labour force participation has been facilitated by improved public support, 1 even in those countries that have previously been identified as featuring a "strong male breadwinner model" [START_REF] Fleckenstein | The politics of post-industrial social policy: Family policy reforms in Britain, Germany, South Korea, and Sweden[END_REF][START_REF] Lewis | Gender and the development of welfare regimes[END_REF].

Echoing [START_REF] Goldin | The quiet revolution that transformed women's employment, education and family[END_REF] notion of a "quiet revolution" that transformed women's employment, education, and family, Esping-Andersen (2009) argues that a successful societal and political completion of this process -which he terms an "incomplete revolution" in women's roles -requires further social policy development to avoid deleterious equilibria and the widening of other forms of inequality. 2 In addition, a number of scholars have explored the socio-economic, political, and societal drivers and functional underpinnings of this expansion [START_REF] Abrahamson | Continuity and consensus: Governing families in Denmark[END_REF][START_REF] Bleijenbergh | Equality machineries matter: The impact of women's political pressure on European social-care policies[END_REF][START_REF] Bolzendahl | Making the implicit explicit: Gender influences on social spending in twelve industrialized democracies, 1980-99[END_REF]Daly 2010;[START_REF] Fleckenstein | The politics of ideas in welfare state transformations: Christian democracy and the reform of family policy in Germany[END_REF]Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011;[START_REF] Lewis | Work/family balance policies in the UK since 1997: A new departure[END_REF][START_REF] Morgan | Working mothers and the welfare state: Religion and the politics of workfamily policies in Western Europe and the United States[END_REF][START_REF] Morgan | Path shifting of the welfare state: Electoral competition and the expansion of work-family policies in Western Europe[END_REF]Seeleib-Kaiser 2010). However, there have been few attempts to systematically analyse the developments in maternal employment supporting policies across a large group of rich OECD countries (but see [START_REF] Ferrarini | Families, states and labour markets: Institutions, causes and consequences of family policy in post-war welfare states[END_REF][START_REF] Korpi | Women's opportunities under different family policy constellations: Gender, class, and inequality tradeoffs in western countries reexamined[END_REF][START_REF] Lambert | The comparative political economy of parental leave and child care: Evidence from twenty OECD countries[END_REF][START_REF] Montanari | From family wage to marriage subsidy and child benefits:Controversy and consensus in the development of family support[END_REF][START_REF] Morgan | Path shifting of the welfare state: Electoral competition and the expansion of work-family policies in Western Europe[END_REF].

In this respect we contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we use multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) in order to assess the direction of change, and how this might be characterised using [START_REF] Hall | Policy paradigms, social learning, and the State: The case of economic policymaking in Britain[END_REF] concept of first-, second-and third-order change in analyzing maternal employment-oriented family policy, 3 over the past three decades in 18 rich OECD countries. Second, we perform a series of correlations to identify the potential core drivers of these developments. In accordance with comparative social policy literature we hypothesise a strong effect of social democracy and organised women and a growing importance of cultural values in the explanation of family policy expansion. 1 For a review, see Hegewisch and Gornick (2011). 2 The notion of a "quiet" revolution in gender is contested because the rapid expansion of maternal employment-oriented family policies has not yet done away with traditional gender inequalities even in Scandinavian countries [START_REF] Duvander | Sweden's family policy under change: Past, present and future[END_REF][START_REF] Lundqvist | Family policy paradoxes. Gender equality and labour market regulation in Sweden, 1930-2010[END_REF]. For this reason, [START_REF] England | The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled[END_REF]England ( , 2011) ) argued that the "gender revolution" is "uneven and stalled" and [START_REF] Gerson | The unfinished revolution: How a new generation is reshaping family, work, and gender in America[END_REF] claims that it is "unfinished". Furthermore, Morgan (2008) suggested that governments in Western Europe often promote family policy expansion to increase fertility rates and improve economic efficiency rather than gender equality. 3 Our measurement of family policy rests on a limited number of indicators (that are further discussed in the "Methods and Data" section); for this reason we acknowledge that other significant implicit and explicit measures not included in our work due to the absence of comparable data (i.e. tax breaks, housing allowances, and derived benefits in social insurance) might play an important role in shaping family policy.

State of the Art

Family policy 4 is said to have a multiplicity of functions: horizontal redistribution, the enhancement of individual choices, increasing fertility rates, supporting economic growth and productivity, as well as reducing gender inequalities. 5 From a societal perspective family policies can contribute to "horizontal redistribution," between generations as well as between households with, and without, children [START_REF] Kaufmann | European foundations of the welfare state[END_REF]Saraceno 2007); to favour individual choices by supporting the reconciliation between care and paid work [START_REF] Beck | Risk society: Towards a new modernity[END_REF]Lewis 2009); and to reduce the costs of having children and child poverty [START_REF] Letablier | The costs of raising children and the effectiveness of policies to support parenthood in European Countries[END_REF]. From an economic perspective, employment oriented family policy is part of an overall redesign of welfare states geared to foster "active citizenship", also among mothers who were formerly not employed (see Lewis 2009), through the development of an "enabling state" [START_REF] Gilbert | The enabling state: Modern welfare capitalism in America[END_REF]). More generous family policies are said to lead to higher employment rates for women [START_REF] Huber | Development and crisis of the welfare state: Parties and policies in global markets[END_REF][START_REF] Letablier | The costs of raising children and the effectiveness of policies to support parenthood in European Countries[END_REF], mitigate the risk of unemployment for mothers after a substantial period of leave (Lewis 2009), support a social investment strategy (Esping-Andersen 2009;Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012), and offset some of the costs 6 of raising children (Mahon 2002). From many feminist perspectives, 7 family policies should aim at equalising opportunities between men and women through de-familialising care (Mahon 2002, 343), encouraging men's involvement in care work (Gornick and Meyers 2009), and facilitating employment opportunities for women (Lewis 2002).

Profound social, economic, and cultural changes have led to the decline of the "male breadwinner model" (Lewis 2001(Lewis , 2009) ) and the move towards a variety of "adult worker models" [START_REF] Annesley | Gender, politics and policy change: The case of welfare reform under new labour[END_REF][START_REF] Crompton | Employment and the family[END_REF][START_REF] Hantrais | Family policy matters: Responding to family change in Europe[END_REF]Lewis 2001). 8 Nevertheless, family policy expansion has not always fundamentally challenged gender inequalities (Daly 2011): overall men have not increased their contribution to care work sufficiently to "compensate" for women's increased labour force participation and slightly reduced participation in care [START_REF] Gershuny | Changing times: Work and leisure in post-industrial society[END_REF]. Some scholars (Morgan 2008;[START_REF] Morgan | Paid to care: The origins and effects of care leave policies in Western Europe[END_REF] have even suggested that extended parental or care leaves undermine efforts to promote gender equality via decreasing women's participation in employment and men's participation in care work. [START_REF] Keck | The impact of different social-policy frameworks on social inequalities among women in the European Union[END_REF], however, argued that there is no evidence to support the argument, whereby "long" parental leaves have a negative effect on employment; moreover, "short" leaves can constitute a disincentive to employment. Finally, the 4 Our measurement of family policy rests on a limited number of indicators (that are further discussed in the "Methods and Data" section); for this reason we acknowledge that other significant implicit and explicit measures not included in our work due to the absence of comparable data (i.e. tax breaks, housing allowances, and derived benefits in social insurance) might play an important role in shaping family policy. 5 Political actors are likely to follow different orientations in the broad field of family policy, and even within a common political orientation, policies may have conflicting effects. For example, extensive care leaves, which are certainly "generous", may undermine gender equality if they are not accompanied by greater participation of fathers in care work and greater involvement of mothers in paid employment. Conservative political forces have often championed such long leaves as part of their efforts to win over women voters (Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012;[START_REF] Morgan | Working mothers and the welfare state: Religion and the politics of workfamily policies in Western Europe and the United States[END_REF]Morgan , 2008[START_REF] Morgan | Caring time policies in Western Europe: Trends and implications[END_REF]Morgan , 2012[START_REF] Morgan | Path shifting of the welfare state: Electoral competition and the expansion of work-family policies in Western Europe[END_REF][START_REF] Morgan | Paid to care: The origins and effects of care leave policies in Western Europe[END_REF]. 6 It has been estimated that the cost of children account for 20-30% of the household budget [START_REF] Letablier | The costs of raising children and the effectiveness of policies to support parenthood in European Countries[END_REF]). 7 Gender analyses of the welfare state have greatly contributed to a better understanding of family policy [START_REF] Daly | Gender and the welfare state[END_REF][START_REF] Lewis | Gender and the development of welfare regimes[END_REF]Sainsbury 1994) and welfare regime theory [START_REF] Ciccia | Parental leave regulations and the persistence of the male breadwinner model: Using fuzzy-set ideal type analysis to assess gender equality in an enlarged Europe[END_REF]Korpi 2000;Lewis 1997;[START_REF] Mahon | Theorizing welfare regimes: Toward a dialogue?[END_REF]Orloff 1997;Sainsbury 1999). They have argued that "generosity" is ungendered and have highlighted the fact that there can be very different effects of programs folded into the general rubric of family policy. 8 According to [START_REF] Annesley | Gender, politics and policy change: The case of welfare reform under new labour[END_REF], the "Adult Worker Model" assumes three configurations: (i) the "gender neutral model" in which women have strong incentives to work but there is no institutional support to combine work and care; (ii) the "gender difference approach" in which family policy fosters women's employment, reducing the burden of care for women, but not aiming to promote equal sharing of care between men and women; (iii) a model-so far only an unrealized ideal-that tries to equalize the distribution of paid work and care between men and women (Iceland is the closest case, see [START_REF] Ciccia | Parental leave regulations and the persistence of the male breadwinner model: Using fuzzy-set ideal type analysis to assess gender equality in an enlarged Europe[END_REF]. impact of leaves on gender equality should be also analysed in relation to other related aspects, such as the cost and availability of childcare, the conditions of part-time work, the degree of support for parents and different cultural norms. In this sense, a parallel increase in the length of leave and public childcare provision might not undermine gender equality, but actually benefit it through increased female employment [START_REF] Gornick | Welfare regimes in relation to paid work and care[END_REF]. The impact of family policy on gender equality has also been analysed through the lens of class (Korpi 2000;[START_REF] Mandel | Gender, class, and varieties of capitalism[END_REF][START_REF] Pettit | Gendered tradeoffs: Family, social policy, and economic inequality in twenty-one countries[END_REF], with serious disagreements about the extent to which there is a "welfare state paradox" by which countries characterised by "generous" family policies do less to promote gender equality in terms of occupational sex segregation and other measures, whereas countries with "ungenerous" family policy have lower levels of segregation [START_REF] Korpi | Women's opportunities under different family policy constellations: Gender, class, and inequality tradeoffs in western countries reexamined[END_REF][START_REF] Mandel | Rethinking the paradox: Tradeoffs in work-family policy and patterns of gender inequality[END_REF].

Starting from this long-standing debate about the economic, social, and gender implications of family policy (e.g. Esping-Andersen 2009;[START_REF] Lewis | Gender and the development of welfare regimes[END_REF][START_REF] Lundqvist | Family policy paradoxes. Gender equality and labour market regulation in Sweden, 1930-2010[END_REF][START_REF] Morgan | Family connections: An introduction to family studies[END_REF], we consider this domain as a dependent variable of interest. Family policy constitutes a wide domain and includes many policy instruments [START_REF] Bahle | Family policy patterns in the enlarged EU[END_REF]). Our analysis builds on [START_REF] Kamerman | Family policy: Government and families in fourteen countries[END_REF] conceptualisation of family policy: they have emphasised the need to take a broad approach and differentiate between "explicit" and "implicit" family policies and suggested that analysts should distinguish between cash benefits, time, and services (Kamerman and Kahn 1994). 9 In this respect, we provide a comprehensive map of change in several key family policy programmes over time and we separately investigate the drivers of this expansion for each decade. In our analysis we use "generosity" as a multi-dimensional measure of various explicit family policies, including statutory entitlements relating to the duration and benefit level of maternal, parental, and childcare leaves, as well as child allowances, and the spending on childcare. "Modernisation" is used as a concept to capture the development towards an employment-oriented family policy, especially through the expansion of childcare services. 10 By using the terms "generosity" and "modernisation" we do not intend to suggest that the change in family policy led to greater de facto gender equality. 11Scholars discussed the expansion of welfare states using a very wide range of explanations: functional approaches ("the logic of industrialism", "modernisation", "neo-Marxist explanations"), arguments based on the claim that "politics matter" (via "democracy", "popular protest", "the socialdemocratic model", "influence of other parties", or "power resources"), the evolution of the transnational context ("international trade", "international competition", "international cultural modelling"), state-centred arguments ("state as an independent actor", "path dependency") and ideational approaches (for a review see [START_REF] Amenta | What we know about the development of social policy: Comparative and historical research in comparative and historical perspective[END_REF][START_REF] Flora | The development of welfare states in Europe and America[END_REF][START_REF] Nullmeier | Post-war welfare state development-The temporal perspective[END_REF][START_REF] Skocpol | States and social policy[END_REF]). These theories have also been reflected in family policy research, differentiating between socio-economic, political, ideational, and international factors as potential drivers for policy change (see for an overview [START_REF] Mätzke | a. Introduction: Change and continuity in recent family policies[END_REF]Ostner 2010a, 2010b). Furthermore, the emergence of "new social risks" (NSR) [START_REF] Bonoli | The politics of the new social policies: Providing coverage against new social risks in mature welfare states[END_REF][START_REF] Taylor-Gooby | New risks, new welfare: The transformation of the European Welfare State[END_REF]), low fertility rates (Esping-Andersen 2009), changing skill "requirements" [START_REF] Fleckenstein | The dual transformation of social protection and human capital: Comparing Britain and Germany[END_REF], and the demand for gender equality (Bolzendhal 2009) seem to underpin the political "necessity" to adapt welfare state arrangements in de-industrializing economies, including an expansion of (employment-oriented) family policies.

Although from a functional perspective one might expect the adaptation of welfare state arrangements to happen irrespective of the political system and power constellations, power resources theory, among others, has highlighted the importance of organised labour and political parties in the development of welfare states [START_REF] Korpi | The democratic class struggle[END_REF][START_REF] Stephens | The transition from capitalism to socialism[END_REF]. While [START_REF] Iversen | Partisan politics, the welfare state, and three worlds of human capital formation[END_REF] argue that social democracy cum organised women's movements can explain the expansion of family policy in OECD countries, a number of scholars [START_REF] Huber | Development and crisis of the welfare state: Parties and policies in global markets[END_REF][START_REF] Kittel | Political parties, institutions, and the dynamics of social expenditure in time of austerity[END_REF][START_REF] Seeleib-Kaiser | Neubeginn oder Ende der Sozialdemokratie?[END_REF] have emphasised that the role played by partisanship in explaining social policy developments has been declining significantly. For instance, Seeleib-Kaiser (2010) and [START_REF] Fleckenstein | The politics of ideas in welfare state transformations: Christian democracy and the reform of family policy in Germany[END_REF] have shown how electoral competition and political entrepreneurship have played a crucial role in changing the policy positions of the German Christian Democrats vis-a`vis family policy in the 2000s, from being a staunch supporter of a strong male breadwinner model towards being in favour of an adult worker model. In addition, a number of researchers have argued that political culture plays an important role in understanding cross-national differences in welfare state development [START_REF] Lipset | American exceptionalism: A double-edged sword[END_REF]; recently, [START_REF] Pfau-Effinger | Culture and welfare state policies: Reflections on a complex interrelation[END_REF] has highlighted the importance of culture and ideational change in understanding welfare state developments, while [START_REF] Brooks | Why welfare states persist: The importance of public opinion in democracies[END_REF] and [START_REF] Wendt | Welfare state and public opinion: Perceptions of healthcare systems, family policy and benefits for the unemployed and poor in Europe[END_REF] have emphasized the importance of public opinion and policy preferences.

Despite important qualitative work, which has identified policy drivers for certain countries12 (e.g. Daly 2010) and in some small n-comparisons (Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011;[START_REF] Korpi | Women's opportunities under different family policy constellations: Gender, class, and inequality tradeoffs in western countries reexamined[END_REF][START_REF] Morgan | Path shifting of the welfare state: Electoral competition and the expansion of work-family policies in Western Europe[END_REF]Orloff 2006), research aiming at generalisable explanations continues to be relatively scant. Based on recent socio-economic changes, such as rapid deindustrialisation and unsettling of dominant political cleavages [START_REF] Emmenegger | How rich countries cope with deindustrialisation[END_REF][START_REF] Thelen | Varieties of liberalization: The new politics of social solidarity[END_REF], we hypothesise potential period effects explaining family policy change, i.e. drivers of family policy expansion that have been dominant in the past might be less relevant in subsequent decades. 13

Methods and Data

MCA was pioneered by [START_REF] Bourdieu | La distinction: critique sociale du jugement[END_REF] to map different types of individual consumption preferences onto a continuous space without resorting to predictive techniques (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010). We use MCA to assess the direction and degree of change in family policy (also see [START_REF] Ferragina | Unemployment protection and family policy at the turn of the 21st century[END_REF] and a series of correlations to assess the determinants of change over three decades among 18 OECD countries. Our analysis is based on five international comparative datasets: 14 1. the "Comparative Family Policy Database" (Gauthier 2011); 2. the "OECD Social Expenditure Database" (OECD, 2010); 3. the "Family and Changing Gender Roles Survey" (ISSP 1988(ISSP , 1994(ISSP , 2002)); 4. the "LABORSTA dataset" (ILO 1997(ILO -2008)); and 5. the "Comparative Welfare States Data set" (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014).

MCA visualises change in a Cartesian space and can deal with non-normal distributions of macro-institutional data (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010). To identify the main drivers of expansion in family policy we propose a series of correlations over three decades (the 1980s, the 1990s, and the and the EU, have played in identifying family policies as central to the strategy of achieving higher employment rates, countering demographic trends, contributing to social cohesion and gender equality. Although these developments at the international level have certainly contributed to the diffusion of new ideas, it seems very difficult to model these exogenous factors and we have therefore limited our analysis to domestic determinants. 13 Previous quantitative research only accounts for family policy developments until the early 2000s [START_REF] Ferrarini | Families, states and labour markets: Institutions, causes and consequences of family policy in post-war welfare states[END_REF][START_REF] Lambert | The comparative political economy of parental leave and child care: Evidence from twenty OECD countries[END_REF][START_REF] Montanari | From family wage to marriage subsidy and child benefits:Controversy and consensus in the development of family support[END_REF]. 14 See Appendix Table A1 for the description of all variables.

2000s), thereby avoiding the conceptual problem of the repeated consideration of data without variance15 (for a detailed explanation, see [START_REF] Shalev | Limits and alternatives to multiple regression in comparative research[END_REF].

Describing the Expansion of Family Policy with MCA

MCA simultaneously associates "variables" (categorical variables that capture the "generosity" of family policy) and "cases" (18 rich OECD countries). 16 Hence, if countries within a dataset have particular characteristics represented by categorical variables A, B, and C coded into low, medium, and high, then the corresponding categories within A, B, and C can be plotted onto a twodimensional space (figure 1). Countries and categories are said to occupy a joint space; thus it is possible to interpret the "category plot" (figure 2) and position of each country onto the same space (figure 3). For example, assume a dataset has three categorical variables:17 A (the total number of weeks for various leaves associated with maternity and child rearing), B (the average replacement rate for various leaves associated with maternity and child rearing), and C (the child allowance) are coded "low", "medium", or "high" (the categories for each variable). MCA jointly considers countries and categorical variables in the space. Now, suppose that a country within the data scores as follows: High A, High B, and Medium C (figure 1). This means the country displays a "long" duration for leave, a "high" replacement rate for leave, and a medium level for the child allowance. By triangulation the country can be placed within the category plot as shown in figure 1. Furthermore, by using longitudinal data we are also able to plot countries over time as the categorical variables shift temporally. Finally, a measure of how well the data fit the model is given by the percentage of variance explained. Because the method is not probabilistic, there is no requirement for a large dataset or a random sample (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010). On this methodological basis, we adapted MCA to the study of family policy in three steps. (i) We recoded all continuous, count, and ordinal variables into quartiles before estimating the model in order to avoid the problems associated with poorly distributed variables. (ii) We interpreted the Cartesian spaces emerging from the cloud of indicators and the position of each country, rather than the axes (see figure 2). (iii) Finally, we plotted average scores for three decades (1980s, 1990s, and 2000s) and 18 rich OECD countries. In this way, the trajectory of each country is easy to interpret, because the characteristics of the spaces identified by the category plot remain the same over time.

Although not ideal, our temporal analysis is based on averages for decades in accordance with [START_REF] Sabatier | An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policyoriented learning therein[END_REF], who suggested that one can more realistically capture policy change by analysing a period of 10 years or more rather than simply focusing on one year data points.

Following Esping-Andersen's widely-used typology of welfare regimes, countries can be characterised as belonging to the liberal, Christian-democratic, or social-democratic regime type18 (Esping-Andersen 1990). In addition, the critiques of scholars of gender and welfare, such as [START_REF] Lewis | Gender and the development of welfare regimes[END_REF], [START_REF] Saraceno | The ambivalent familism of the Italian welfare state[END_REF], and others (e.g. [START_REF] Fraser | After the family wage: Gender equality and the welfare state[END_REF]Korpi 2000;Mahon 2002;[START_REF] Orloff | Gender and the social rights of citizenship: The comparative analysis of gender relations and welfare states[END_REF]Sainsbury 1999), have emphasised the necessity of a "fruitful dialogue" between proponents of welfare regime theory and gender typologies [START_REF] Mahon | Theorizing welfare regimes: Toward a dialogue?[END_REF]. Building on his own work on partisanship and power resources and feminist work on welfare regimes, Korpi (2000) introduced a typology of gendered welfare state institutions and family policy with models supporting traditional or dual-earner families, or refraining from offering any families explicit state support (general family support, dual-earner support, or market-oriented policies). These types are linked to distinctive configurations of partisan support. Hence, we bridge the categorisation of [START_REF] Esping-Andersen | The three worlds of welfare capitalism[END_REF], 1999) and Korpi (2000), to define the space and position of each country in the MCA, by also considering the care dimension. It is important to note, that although our approach is informed by welfare regime theory, we do not simply assign countries to clusters. Rather, their position in the space is defined by the correspondence of the indicators chosen to measure the "generosity" of family policy. Thereby, taking into account the multi-dimensionality of family policy (benefit levels, duration of leaves, and care services), our MCA allows us to analyse the evolution of family "policy packages" (Kamerman and Kahn 1994) over three decades.

The Indicators. Building on our definition of explicit family policy we have included the following variables in the model: (1) the weeks of leave (maternity, parental, and childcare), ( 2) the average replacement rate of three types of leave (maternity, parental, and childcare), (3) the child allowance (for the first child), and (4) the expenditure on family services standardised by the number of children. For the first three variables we relied on the updated "Comparative Family Policy Database" (Gauthier 2011). In this database maternity/parental leave refers to leave granted in connection with childbirth and includes a period of leave prior to and after childbirth. Childcare leave is defined as an optional leave taken after maternity/parental leave. There is a strong inconsistency across countries on how these leaves are defined and this has of course an impact on our operational measure [START_REF] Moss | International Review of Leave Policies and Related Research[END_REF]. After the 1990s the distinction between these two types of leaves has become less clear for several reasons (Gauthier 2011, 2-3). (i) Some countries have made part of the "maternal" leave available to fathers, therefore it is harder to distinguish between maternal and parental leave. (ii) In some countries parental leave can be used in a flexible way until the child is 8 years old. This means that parental leave is no longer tightly linked with childbirth and is closer to the more comprehensive definition of childcare leave. 19 (iii) The term parental leave has been extended to encompass leave for family reasons (i.e. reasons related to the care and upbringing of children).

Hence, we integrate the duration and replacement rates of maternal, parental, and childcare leave, into two single indicators: "length of leave" and "replacement rate of leave". This means that we will not be able to investigate, whether, and to what extent, leave is shared between mothers and fathers, which feminist scholars have identified as critical to the construction of gender relations (e.g. Gornick and Meyers 2009), but we will assess the overall "generosity" of the institutional arrangements for families. 20 According to our definition, family policy can be "quite generous" but still insufficient to effectively address the impact of gender inequalities (here echoing Korpi's [2000] claims about the policy model of "general family support").

Due to the lack of internationally comparable longitudinal datasets for childcare provision, we have created a proxy variable, derived from the OECD public social expenditure data for family services (OECD 2010). The indicator is calculated as the expenditure for family services per child aged five and below (as a percentage of GDP per capita in PPP). Although not perfect, this measure allows us to include the service dimension (often disregarded in longitudinal comparative research, but see [START_REF] Lambert | The comparative political economy of parental leave and child care: Evidence from twenty OECD countries[END_REF]. Tables 1 and2 show that OECD countries over the period 1980-2009 have increased expenditure for services, in particular childcare and family services, more significantly than outlays for cash benefits. We discuss the implications of this finding in the "Results" section.

Assessing the Drivers of Family Policy Expansion

In order to identify the determinants of family policy expansion, we propose a series of correlations (for the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s) between our dependent variables, measuring the "generosity" of family policy, and the usual independent variables considered to explain welfare state development [START_REF] Huber | Development and crisis of the welfare state: Parties and policies in global markets[END_REF]. Building on Shalev's argument for simple and descriptive techniques (such as MCA) and [START_REF] Sabatier | An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policyoriented learning therein[END_REF] suggestion to consider longer time periods to capture policy change, we include the average decadal value for the independent variables using simple correlations rather than multiple regression models. 21

The Indicators. The dependent variables to explain the "generosity" of family policy over time are those previously described and used in the MCA, plus public expenditure for family policy as a percentage of GDP (OECD 2010). The independent variables of the model are derived from three general sets of factors determining policy change: (i) socio-economic factors and conditions; (ii) political and institutional explanations; and (iii) ideas.

The socio-economic variables included are: "female labour market participation rate", 22 "dependency ratio", "total fertility rates", "de-industrialisation index", and "the percentage of people/women that are employed in jobs that require high general skills". 23 These variables capture the most important socio-demographic factors identified in the literature to explain the shift of family policies [START_REF] Gauthier | A comparative analysis of family policies in industrialized countries[END_REF](Gauthier , 2011)). However, their impact on the expansion of family policies might be mediated or delayed by other factors. For example, demographic changes might have delayed effects on the expansion of family policy due to the temporal dissonance between the fertility drop and the public recognition of this decline as a social problem (Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen 2011). The de-industrialisation index is a way to capture the emergence and intensification of NSR [START_REF] Bonoli | The politics of the new social policies: Providing coverage against new social risks in mature welfare states[END_REF]). An increase in the proportion of service sector employment might contribute to an expansion of employment-oriented family policy, building on a functionalist logic, whereby welfare states aim to minimise social risk. Following on the work of Estevez-Abe (2005) and Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011), which highlights that employers requiring workers with high general skills are more likely to support an expansion of employment-oriented family policies, and assuming rational actors, we have used the variable "percentage of women employed in occupations requiring high general skills" as a proxy measure for the impact of "organised employers" on family policy. 24 We hypothesise that family policy will expand as a result of "organised employers interests" to protect their investment in human capital.

Political variables included in our model are: "union density", "per cent of the vote for the left, the non-religious centre, Christian-democratic, or right parties 25 ", and "women elected to parliament as a per cent of the total number of MPs". These variables evaluate the traditional "politics matter" hypotheses. The power of the left and "organised labour" are considered the main drivers explaining the expansion of welfare states by a number of influential analysts (e.g. [START_REF] Huber | Development and crisis of the welfare state: Parties and policies in global markets[END_REF]. 21 Hence, we can only identify general trends and associations, rather than provide robust causal explanations including the size of the effects. In addition, we scrutinized the variation of family policy change in fiveyear/ten-year intervals to capture the dynamic of change. More specifically, we have correlated the variation of political and socio-economic variables over five years (ten years) and family policy change over the same period of time (lagged by one year). The additional empirical models confirm the findings we present in 'Results' section. 22 The sources of the data are listed in Appendix Table A1. 23 Unfortunately we have only data for the 1990s and 2000s for these last two indicators. 24 This variable is only a proxy; for a qualitative study of the influence of employers on family policy in Britain and Germany, see Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011). 25 We have also run alternative models by using different variables to capture the influence of political parties, i.e. "the percentage of MPs", "the share of cabinet ministers", "the cumulative share of cabinet ministers"; the outcomes are quite similar to those presented in our analysis.

However, over the last decades partisanship seems to have lost importance in explaining variation in welfare states (see [START_REF] Seeleib-Kaiser | Neubeginn oder Ende der Sozialdemokratie?[END_REF][START_REF] Seeleib-Kaiser | Party politics and social welfare: Comparing Christian and social democracy in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands[END_REF]. Feminists have identified a number of factors associated with gender relations as significant in the expansion and character of family policy. Various indicators have been used to evaluate the effect of gender in politics: women's representation Understanding the Expansion of Family Policy 13 in parliament, women's employment rate, active presence of women's equality movements, and the gender machineries (or equality units) in government administrative bureaucracies [START_REF] Bleijenbergh | Equality machineries matter: The impact of women's political pressure on European social-care policies[END_REF][START_REF] O'connor | Gender, class and citizenship in the comparative analysis of welfare state regimes: Theoretical and methodological issues[END_REF][START_REF] Orloff | The power of gender perspectives: Feminist influence on policy paradigms, social science, and social politics[END_REF][START_REF] Walby | The European Union and gender equality: Emergent varieties of gender regime[END_REF][START_REF] Zippel | The politics of sexual harassment. A comparative study of the United States, The European Union[END_REF]. According to Bolzendhal's (2009) empirical study in 12 OECD countries, political participation of women and women's employment rate are the most important factors in explaining the expansion of family policy and welfare states more generally.

Societal "modernisation" is captured through our public opinion variable. The variable measures the preferences of people relating to the employment of mothers with pre-school children. 26 [START_REF] Crompton | Work-life 'balance' in Europe[END_REF] and [START_REF] Pfau-Effinger | Culture and welfare state policies: Reflections on a complex interrelation[END_REF] have highlighted the persistence of different attitudes in OECD countries in relation to mothers' employment. We hypothesise that in countries where mothers' employment is not perceived as detrimental for the development of young children, family policy-especially public childcare provision-is likely to be more generous and supportive of women's employment. Finally, we could also be witnesses of a virtuous circle, as generous family policy might foster increased public support, which leads in turn to a further policy expansion. [START_REF] Budig | The motherhood penalty in crossnational perspective: The importance of work-family policies and cultural attitudes[END_REF] have argued that cultural attitudes toward women's employment might be seen as a mediating factor between family policy and women's earning. A higher degree of "generosity" of parental leaves and public childcare is associated with higher earnings for mothers when cultural support for maternal employment is high, but have less positive or even negative relationships with earnings where cultural attitudes support the male breadwinner/female-caregiver model (Keck and Saraceno 2013, 5).

Results

An "Incomplete Revolution ?"

Our MCA 27 allows the definition of the characteristics (in accordance to the indicators used to measure family policy generosity) of each "geographical space" presented in figure 2. When we talk about liberal, Christian-democratic and social-democratic spaces we do not refer to specific countries but to spaces in which the 18 countries move over the period analysed. For example, if Germany moves to the "social-democratic" space, it does not mean that Germany has become a socialdemocratic country from an outcome perspective, but rather that public provision of childcare as well as the generosity of parental leave has increased over time to a similar level found in countries that originally occupied the "social-democratic" space.

In this respect, the "cloud of indicators" in the four quadrants can be interpreted as follows (figure 2): the top right quadrant can be defined as a liberal space, characterised by residual public family policy. It is "a liberal space" which is characterised largely by the absence of explicit family policy (what Korpi [2000] has defined a "market-oriented" family policy orientation). The bottom right quadrant is characterised by low to medium comprehensive childcare services and medium to low child allowance-this quadrant seems to represent a "hybrid space" (hybrid because it contains elements of the Liberal and the Christian-democratic spaces, even if closer to the latter). The bottom left quadrant is characterised by a medium provision of childcare services, a medium to long duration of and medium level of replacement rates for leaves, but high child allowances-we can clearly speak 26 See Appendix Table A1. Unfortunately, we can only include this variable into our models for the 1990s and the 2000s, due to a lack of data availability for a large number of countries during the earlier period. 27 Our MCA explains 85% of the variation of the variables used to measure the "generosity" of family policy. This goes well beyond the 60% threshold required for a robust analysis (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010).

of "a Christian-democratic space" which is transfer heavy (what Korpi [2000] has defined "general" family policy orientation). Finally, the top left quadrant is characterised by comprehensive childcare provision, long leave arrangements with high replacement rates, and medium high levels of child allowances-an approach that is often associated with a social-democratic family policy package; this is a space geared towards a dual-earner model (Korpi 2000).

A dynamic MCA, using average values for each of the decades, unveils significant policy changes, with countries moving from one quadrant to another over time (figure 3). The data suggest that we are indeed witnesses to a (r)evolution, although perhaps incomplete (Esping-Andersen 2009). This whole process of transformation can be characterised as a "socialisation" of family policy, featuring an expansion of childcare services and leave entitlements (for the interpretations of the spaces, see figure 2). However, the degree of change is quite different among the 18 countries analysed. 28 In table 1 we classify countries in three groups according to the degree of change of their employment-oriented family policy, following [START_REF] Hall | Policy paradigms, social learning, and the State: The case of economic policymaking in Britain[END_REF] categorisation of first-, second-, and thirdorder change. A first-order change implies that the country did not substantially change the family policy package, remaining in the same space over time. A second-order change implies a stronger movement from one quadrant close to another or from the border of a quadrant to another quadrant, largely indicating a change of various instruments within the policy package. Finally, a third-order change implies the movement from one space to another, suggesting not only a change of a policy instrument, but a change of the paradigm underlying the policy package.

The only country that has not undergone a significant change in "explicit" family policy is the United States [START_REF] Moss | International Review of Leave Policies and Related Research[END_REF]). Here we find no statutory paid maternal, parental, and childcare leaves at the federal level and no sustained policy initiative over time to introduce these (although there are some relevant developments at state level). Furthermore, investment in public childcare services has continuously been at the lowest level among the 18 OECD countries (Gauthier 2011;OECD 2010). However, we note that the United States relies on rather different policy instruments from most of the other countries analysed in order to support families [START_REF] Morgan | Working mothers and the welfare state: Religion and the politics of workfamily policies in Western Europe and the United States[END_REF]Orloff 2006). In particular, the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit and the elimination of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children have been tied to increasing mothers'-especially single, poor, but not onlyemployment levels. Childcare tax credits, aimed at better-off families, might generate similar effects to publicly provided services by offsetting some of the costs of private provision. Moreover, the enactment of the Family and Medical Leave Act in 1993 was quite significant politically, even though it is an unpaid leave.

New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom 29 are characterised by a first-order change in their employment-oriented family policy and have remained within the liberal space over the past three decades. These countries are still characterised by relatively short leaves and low public investment in childcare. Also Belgium and Italy, while undergoing a first-order change over the last three decades, remained within the Christian-democratic space [START_REF] Morgan | Path shifting of the welfare state: Electoral competition and the expansion of work-family policies in Western Europe[END_REF]. They are characterised by a medium level of childcare service provision and a short to medium length of family-related leaves. Finally, the other three countries that are characterised by a first-order change in employment-oriented family policies are France, 30 Finland, and Sweden. These countries occupy the social-democratic space based on their generous leave (long leave with high replacement rates) and comprehensive childcare arrangements. 31 28 For a detailed description of the policy change in parental leaves across the countries analysed, see [START_REF] Moss | International Review of Leave Policies and Related Research[END_REF]. 29 Although maternity leaves in the United Kingdom have been extended during the New Labour governments, there have been only marginal changes with regard to paternity and parental leaves and the replacement rates continue to be rather low (Daly 2010). Furthermore, our model does not consider the potentially significant changes resulting from the expansion of tax credits (for these, see Bradshaw 2011). 30 [START_REF] Mahon | Theorizing welfare regimes: Toward a dialogue?[END_REF] characterised France as undergoing shifts in a "familistic direction" due to change in various policy incentives (for a general overview about the familistic nature of French family policy, see Martin 2010). 31 Mahon (2002), however, argues that in gendered terms, Finland and France are moving toward a "new familialism" and away from gender-egalitarian concerns.

Australia, Canada, and Austria are characterised by a second-order change with regard to their employment-oriented family policy package. Australia moved from the liberal space closer to the Christian-democratic space due to more generous leaves and a higher investment in childcare. Similarly, Canada moved into the Christian-democratic space, starting from a position located between the liberal and the Christian-democratic space in the 1980s, due to more generous leaves and a higher investment in childcare. Finally according to the measurements employed in our MCA Austria moved into the socialdemocratic space, especially because of a higher investment in childcare (see tables 1 and2).

The four countries that have undergone third-order changes are Germany, Norway, Ireland, and Japan. The move of Germany to and the positioning of Austria in the social-democratic space would seem rather surprising according to common welfare regime typologies and their earlier support of male breadwinner models. However, our results confirm [START_REF] Leitner | Germany outpaces Austria in childcare policy: The historical contingencies of 'conservative' childcare policy[END_REF] findings, whereby Austria began a process of rapid family policy expansion, which was subsequently outpaced by the developments in Germany during the past decade. Starting from the late 1990s, Germany developed a "modernised" approach to family policy and since 2002 pursued what has been defined a "sustainable family policy model" (Nachhaltige Familienpolitik) [START_REF] Ostner | Farewell to the family as we know it: Family policy change in Germany[END_REF][START_REF] Rürup | Familienpolitik im Interesse einer aktiven Bevölkerungsentwicklung[END_REF]Seeleib-Kaiser 2010). This model considers children as society's future assets, aims to increase the fertility rate by supporting parents, and tries to reduce child poverty by boosting mothers' employment. These policy changes led to a tripling of spending for maternity and parental leave benefits and a more than doubling of spending for day care/home services (see table 2). Although both Austria and Germany are located in the social-democratic space for the 2000s due to their increased "generosity" of childcare services and leave entitlements, this does not mean they have eliminated all tax incentives for the male breadwinner model-indeed Germany continues to have a joint taxation system. Moreover, in terms of outcomes, significant gender inequalities persist compared to countries which have been characterised by social-democratic policies for longer. For example the gender wage gap continues to be much higher, women's (full-time) employment rates much lower, and representation of women managers on company boards is almost non-existent (see OECD 2011).

Norway also moved into the social-democratic space, largely due to the fact that spending for maternity and parental leave tripled, spending for day care/home services quadrupled, and other benefits tripled (see table 2). Although the policy structure along these dimensions is now similar to those in Sweden (a dual-earner model), there is a consistent difference concerning gender relations due to the higher provision of the so-called "cash for care" schemes, which allows one parent to stay at home for childrearing32 [START_REF] Duvander | Family policy and fertility: Fathers' and mothers' use of parental leave and continued childbearing in Norway and Sweden[END_REF]. This finding supports the claims of Olk (2009, 48), highlighting that Norway can be characterised as a latecomer regarding the expansion of public childcare, when compared to the other Scandinavian countries (Sweden and Denmark in particular).

Ireland and Japan moved from the liberal to the Christian-democratic space. During the period 1980-2009 expenditure for child allowance and maternity/ parental leave in Ireland doubled, other cash benefits including childcare leave increased more than five times and day care/home services, including public childcare, increased from a very low level to 0.8% of GDP (see table 2). The positive state of public finances and the unprecedented employment growth during the 1990s largely contributed to this change [START_REF] Daly | Contemporary family policy: A comparative review of Ireland, France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom[END_REF]. In Japan the expansion is certainly less remarkable than in Ireland, but family policy has clearly departed from the very low levels of "generosity" experienced during the 1980s. Spending on child allowances tripled and spending on maternity/parental leave and day care/home services has doubled, although from a very low base (see table 2). However, these policy changes have not unsettled the Japanese male breadwinner model, which remains deeply rooted in public policy (especially the tax system), cultural norms and business practices [START_REF] Schoppa | Exit, voice, and family policy in Japan: Limited changes despite broad recognition of the declining fertility problem[END_REF][START_REF] Seeleib-Kaiser | Between reforms and birth rates: Germany, Japan, and family policy discourse[END_REF]. In addition, although our multi-dimensional family policy analysis locates Japan in the Christian-democratic space, we acknowledge the absence of a Christian-democratic party and the overall hybrid nature of the welfare state (see Esping-Andersen 1997).

Prima facie Denmark and the Netherlands seem to counter the overall trend of family policy expansion. This counterintuitive "finding", however, needs to be largely understood as an artefact due to the fact that Gauthier's comparative family policy data set only includes data for publicly funded leave benefits not taking into account the considerable degree of occupational and sectoral arrangements, which are often quite comprehensive as they are regulated through collective bargaining agreements (for Denmark see [START_REF] Abrahamson | Continuity and consensus: Governing families in Denmark[END_REF] and for the Netherlands, see [START_REF] Knijn | Changes in the regulation of responsibilities towards childcare needs in Italy and the Netherlands[END_REF]). Denmark and the Netherlands have relatively high "real" replacement rates, if these occupational leave policies are included [START_REF] Groenendijk | The Netherlands[END_REF][START_REF] Rostgaard | Denmark[END_REF].

Let us summarise our argument thus far. According to some scholars (e.g. [START_REF] Bleijenbergh | Trading well-being for economic efficiency: The 1990 shift in EU childcare policies[END_REF][START_REF] Bruning | Parental leave and equal opportunities: Experiences in eight European countries[END_REF][START_REF] Morgan | Paid to care: The origins and effects of care leave policies in Western Europe[END_REF], we would expect countries classified as "male breadwinner" or "caregiver parity" models to mainly focus on leave (and working time) arrangements as well as child allowances. However, even in these countries social care policies have moved in the direction of providing more services that allow mothers to work (Bleijenbergh and Roggeband 2007, 439). If we consider the starting points of the various countries in the 1980s, the changes in family policy have been remarkable and are grosso modo in line with some of the demands feminist scholars made many decades ago (see, e.g. [START_REF] Sassoon | Women and the state[END_REF]). 33This development is even more remarkable, if we take into account the parallel retrenchment that is taking place in other social policy domains (see., e.g. [START_REF] Ferragina | Unemployment protection and family policy at the turn of the 21st century[END_REF][START_REF] Fleckenstein | The dual transformation of social protection and human capital: Comparing Britain and Germany[END_REF][START_REF] Korpi | New politics and class politics in the context of austerity and globalization[END_REF].

However, there are two important caveats to this general argument. The first concerns the different principles that have led to an extension of family policy in different countries and the second is about the significance of this expansion in relation to other social policies. First, Mahon (2002, 344) identified three ideal-typical models of family policy: "the neo-familialist", "the third way", and "the egalitarian horizon". The "neo-familialist" model modernizes child-care provision but does not attempt to substantially modify gender differences. France and Finland, high spenders (table 2) in public childcare provision, come closest to this ideal type. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom come closest to the "third way" model, which seeks to universalise the male breadwinner model, rather than to address the unequal distribution of the care work. "The egalitarian horizon model" aspires to foster an equitable sharing of domestic care work between genders, among others by providing the most comprehensive public childcare services. Sweden and Denmark come closest to this ideal type. Second, one also needs to acknowledge that family policy expenditure, despite significant expansions, remains relatively marginal compared to the expenditure for pensions and health, constituting on average between 8% and 12% of overall public social expenditure (OECD 2010), and that the degree of change varies significantly.

Explaining the Expansion

The 1980s. Our correlation analysis for the 1980s confirms the findings of [START_REF] Iversen | Partisan politics, the welfare state, and three worlds of human capital formation[END_REF], whereby social democracy and politically-organised women (per cent of women in parliament) are closely associated with family policies encompassing (long) leaves with high replacement rates, and high expenditures for childcare services (see table 3). Furthermore, a higher level of union density seems to be an important factor explaining the variation of the overall public expenditure on family policies. The share of the centre-right vote does not seem to affect significantly the variation of "generosity" in the domain of family policy, with the exception of its negative impact on child allowance payments.

Socio-economic factors, as well as political factors, play a crucial role in explaining the different levels of "generosity" across countries. In particular, a higher female labour force participation and a higher old age dependency ratio are positively correlated with the level of "generosity", i.e. long leaves with high replacement rates, generous child allowances, and higher spending for childcare services (see table 3). Confirming whereby the finding of Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen (2011) for Germany and Japan, a low fertility rate per se does not explain the expansion of family policy among rich OECD countries. In addition, the level of deindustrialisation does not have a significant effect. The 1990s. In the 1990s, the impact of political and socio-economic variables on policy changes remained substantially unchanged (see table 4). Also, public opinion did not have a significant effect, which might be explained by the delayed effect of this factor within the policy-making process. Finally, the proportion of (women) workers employed in jobs that require high general skills does not seem to explain the change in the "generosity" of employment oriented family policy. 34 The 2000s. During the 2000s we observe a declining effect of partisanship and socio-economic factors and an increased impact of societal preferences (see table 5). In contrast to the 1980s, partisanship no longer has a significant effect on the level of child allowances. The continued predominance of traditional family values 35 acts as a brake on the overall process of family policy expansion, moderating the degree of expansionary change of leave entitlements as well as spending on childcare services. This finding may be a consequence of a number of socio-economic and political developments. Policies supporting households "headed" by breadwinning men may be perceived to be out of sync with the realities of life, as the families supported by single earners (almost all men) are far less common, and household forms and life styles have become more diversified [START_REF] Beck-Gernsheim | Reinventing the family: In search of new lifestyles[END_REF]. A stronger commitment to gender equality and changing preferences among women plays an important role in encouraging political parties to develop and promote "modernised" family policies. For example, the German Christian Democrats have adopted a "modernised" family policy, which was partially driven by the aim to maximise their votes among the "modern" urban female electorate [START_REF] Fleckenstein | The politics of ideas in welfare state transformations: Christian democracy and the reform of family policy in Germany[END_REF]Seeleib-Kaiser 2010). This example highlights that policies do not operate in a vacuum, but are constructed in relation to changing cultural norms. Culture plays a role not only through policy, but also in its interaction with policy 36 (Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann 2012, 188-189). Finally, family policy expansion might also have a positive feed-back effect, reinforcing "modernised" public opinion [START_REF] Sjoberg | The role of family policy institutions in explaining gender-role attitudes: A comparative multilevel analysis of thirteen industrialized countries[END_REF].

The percentage of women employed in jobs requiring high general skills does not correlate with an expansion of employment-oriented family policy. However, we would like to see further explorations of the connections between the levels of women in low-skilled or high-skilled occupations and the provision of public versus occupational or individually negotiated parental leave arrangements.

It is important to note two data limitations of our model: (i) the lack of data availability for skills during the 1980s, and (ii) the exclusion of public opinion data for the 1980s, due to the fact that only Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States were included in the ISSP (1988) survey. 34 [START_REF] Fleckenstein | The politics of post-industrial social policy: Family policy reforms in Britain, Germany, South Korea, and Sweden[END_REF] show the existence of a correlation between these two variables for a selected group of countries (Britain, Germany, South Korea, and Sweden). 35 Measured by looking at the reported opinions about employment and motherhood provided by the International Social Survey Programme, we consider the percentage of people who answered "stay at home" to the question "when there is a child under school age a women should. . ." 36 This means, for example, that the effect of family policy change on mother's employment and earnings is not universal, but it is mediated by different cultural contexts. As shown by [START_REF] Budig | The motherhood penalty in crossnational perspective: The importance of work-family policies and cultural attitudes[END_REF] and [START_REF] Keck | The impact of different social-policy frameworks on social inequalities among women in the European Union[END_REF], an increased "generosity" of explicit family policy is associated with higher earnings for mothers when cultural support for maternal employment is high, but have less positive or even negative relationships with earnings where cultural attitudes support the male breadwinner model.

However, in all seven countries public opinion supporting the employment of mothers with preschool children has dramatically increased over the decades (see table 6), which is in line with our overall argument.

To sum up, in the 1980s and the 1990s political and socio-economic factors were highly significant in explaining the different family policy approaches in rich OECD countries; however, developments during the 2000s confirm [START_REF] Carter | Postmodernity and the fragmentation of welfare[END_REF] argument, whereby the future of welfare states seem to be more dependent on public opinion and less influenced by traditional political ideologies of political parties or other organised groups.

Conclusion

One of the most important findings of our analysis is that in an era of perceived permanent austerity [START_REF] Pierson | The new politics of the welfare state[END_REF]) and overall welfare state retrenchment [START_REF] Korpi | New politics and class politics in the context of austerity and globalization[END_REF], rich OECD countries have not been prevented from expanding family policies. Au contraire! In many countries, we are witnessing the expansion of family policy, leading to a socialisation of family care responsibilities, traditionally disproportionately performed by women [START_REF] Daly | The concept of social care and the analysis of contemporary welfare states[END_REF]. Although at the institutional policy level the expansion of family policy might be characterised as a "silent revolution" relevant for gender equality, we think a cautious interpretation is necessary: gender inequalities in income, opportunities, leisure and other significant outcomes remain and are sometimes sustained by policy, even if we observe a shift in their character towards support for women's employment.

The policy shift has been particularly significant in countries that had previously emphasised more conservative approaches to family policies, such as Germany, Ireland, Japan, and Norway. Hence, it can no longer be assumed that in the majority of rich OECD countries care for young children will be mainly provided through unpaid work within the family (Mahon 2002, 35). Nevertheless, a certain number of countries still fail to provide adequate childcare arrangements, constituting a barrier for full-time maternal employment (Hegewisch and Gornick 2011, 128). Furthermore, in some countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, gender discrimination continues to strongly intersect with class [START_REF] Mandel | Gender, class, and varieties of capitalism[END_REF]; high childcare costs constitute a disincentive to labour force participation, especially among less educated and unskilled women (Esping-Andersen 2009). This means that higher-class and more educated women tend to have better opportunities than women belonging to a lower social class [START_REF] Evertsson | Is gender inequality greater at lower or higher educational levels? Common patterns in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States[END_REF].

Our analysis clearly confirms partisanship and women's political agency as the main drivers for family policy change during the 1980s and 1990s (cf. [START_REF] Iversen | Partisan politics, the welfare state, and three worlds of human capital formation[END_REF]. For the 2000s, however, the importance of these drivers has significantly declined. As societal preferences have undergone profound changes-to some extent driven by the activities of women's equality movements as well as by the experience of women's employment-the policy preferences of voters have also changed. Electorates in western democracies increasingly want policies supporting "modern" family lifestyles which depend on women's employment. As political parties react to these changed policy preferences, the traditional differences in family policy positions between political parties decline. The extent to which this translates into support for "gender equality", and how such equality might be defined, is as yet not decided.

However, we want to emphasise that societal policy preferences, for too long believed to be set in stone, are undergoing profound changes; public opinion increasingly matters for changing policies. The changed policy preferences are also mirrored in new political discourses that prioritise social investment and the preservation of the human capital of women, especially of those who are highly skilled [START_REF] Knijn | Investing, facilitating, or individualizing the reconciliation of work and family life[END_REF]Mahon 2006;Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012; for a critical assessment of the literature see [START_REF] Nolan | What use is 'social investment?[END_REF]. The expansion of family policies geared to supporting women's employment and investment in children is very likely to continue. (1988,1994,2002).

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. Multiple correspondence analysis: A simplified example. A, total number of weeks of maternity, parental and childcare leave; B, average replacement rate for maternity, parental and childcare leave; C, allowance for the first child. Source: Authors' elaboration.

Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. Category plot: Interpretation MCA family policy 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Notes: 1, lowest quartile; 4, top quartile. Source: Authors' elaboration based on Ferragina et al. (2013).

Figure 3 .

 3 Figure 3. MCA family policy over three decades, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Notes: (1) Ost, Austria; Ger, Germany; Bel, Belgium; Fra, France; Nor, Norway; Den, Denmark; Net, The Netherlands; Swe, Sweden; Fin, Finland; Nzl, New Zealand; Aus, Australia; Ire, Ireland; US, United States; UK, United Kingdom; Jpn, Japan; Can, Canada; Ita, Italy; Swi, Switzerland. (2) Finland 2 represents the position of Finland in the 1980s, Finland 3 in the 1990s and Finland 4 in the 2000s and so forth for the other countries. Source: Authors' elaboration based on Ferragina et al. (2013).

Table 1 :

 1 Degree of change in employment-oriented family policy change is hard to disentangle because of particular arrangements in terms of public and private care.

Table 2 : Classification in the same model as percentage of the total number of classifications

 2

	Cash benefits

Table 6 : Percentage of people that said: "when there is a child under school age women should work (full-time and part-time)"

 6

		1988			1994			2002
		Work	Observations	Work	Observations	Variation	Work	Observations	Variation
						1988-1994			1994-2002
	Australia			51.00%	1714		73.04%	1031	22.04%
	Austria	35.80%	279	68.56%	687	32.76%	70.17%	1398	1.61%
	Belgium						90.12%	1360	90.12%
	Canada			63.26%	909
	Denmark						87.25%	941
	Finland						88.17%	778
	France						82.01%	1273
	West Germany	28.30%	752	64.50%	1528	36.20	72.60%	573	8.10%
	East Germany			88.90%	899		92.04%	314	3.14%
	Ireland	25.60%	364	54.30%	615	28.70%	62.48%	717	8.18%
	Italy	51.60%	339	75.90%	610	24.30%
	Japan			61.21%	928		70.14%	787	8.93%
	Netherlands	19.20%	453	54.43%	1220	35.23%	66.76%	713	12.33%
	New Zealand			55.90%	746		68.65%	724	12.75%
	Norway			67.17%	1316		81.51%	1033	14.34%
	Sweden			75.49%	865		84.74%	747	9.25%
	Switzerland						70.60%	602
	United Kingdom	37.30%	381	61.99%	634	24.69%	67.45%	1241	5.46%
	United States	44.00%	311	67.16%	1075	23.16%	77.81%	775	10.64%
	Source: Authors' elaboration using ISSP

Our analysis also builds on the conceptualization introduced byLewis (2006) whereby family policy can best be understood as a cross-cutting policy area.

[START_REF] Inglehart | Rising tide: Gender equality and cultural change around the world[END_REF] and[START_REF] Jackson | Destined for equality: The inevitable rise of women's status[END_REF] have argued that "modernization" might lead to greater gender equality by promoting cultural changes and women's employment and undermining the legitimacy of different treatment for men and women.

Many feminist scholars disputed that "modernization" necessarily brings greater gender equality (see[START_REF] Adams | Defending modernity? High politics, feminist anti-modernism, and the place of gender[END_REF] Adams, Clemens, and Orloff 2005).

Mahon (2006) and[START_REF] Jenson | Writing women out, folding gender in: The European Union 'modernises' social policy[END_REF] have highlighted the role that international organizations, such as the OECD

In contrast to much of the welfare state literature (i.e.[START_REF] Huber | Development and crisis of the welfare state: Parties and policies in global markets[END_REF], we do not rely on multiple regression (MR) or time series cross sectional (TSCS) analyses to explain the variation of family policy. Although more sophisticated than simple correlations, MR and TSCS analyses present some conceptual problems in relation to comparative analysis[START_REF] Shalev | Limits and alternatives to multiple regression in comparative research[END_REF]. Imagine one wants to test the effect of union power, measured by union density, on the generosity of family policy: by including the variable "union density" for every year, even if there is no significant change in the value, which is quite common in these datasets, one violates the underlying assumptions of regression analysis, as MR and TSCS analyses assume institutional variables to significantly vary.

This section draws heavily on[START_REF] Ferragina | Unemployment protection and family policy at the turn of the 21st century[END_REF].

In our case there are four variables but we use a simplified example with three variables to illustrate the technicalities of MCA.

For a review of welfare regimes literature, see[START_REF] Ferragina | The welfare regime debate: Past, present, future?[END_REF].

For instance in Sweden families are entitled to 450 days of leave that can be shared between parents, and that can be taken on a full-time or part-time basis until the child is 8 years old. This scheme is called parental leave, but is similar to the concept of a childcare leave(Gauthier

2011,[2][3].

See Ferrarini (2006) for an analysis that distinguishes these types of leaves and the implications for gender equality.

Some scholar also claimed that "cash for care" programs have had a limited impact on the level of family policy generosity (see[START_REF] Eydal | Gender equality revisited-Changes in nordic childcare policies in the 2000s[END_REF].

"Gender perspectives have had a growing influence on policy paradigms, both within social-science debates around the role of ideas and culture in policies, and on new social policy paradigms themselves"(Orloff and Palier 2009, 406).

for his crucial input in developing the MCA used in this paper and Mary

Appendix Table A1. Variables used in analysis

Variables Source MCA and dependent variables


A Barachant

J B Carmel

K M Friel

D Gupta

Extraction of motor patterns from joint EEG/EMG recording: A Riemannian Geometry approach

Introduction:

The combined analyses of brain and muscle signals can be very useful in assessing the corticomuscular connectivity and reorganization in brain injury. A basic approach would be to assess the sensorimotor (SMR) rhythms with electroencephalography (EEG) during the muscle activation in a pinch-and-hold task. For this paradigm, a cue is presented to the subject to initiate and stop the pinch-and-hold. However, we have found that this simple task can become quite challenging to perform repeatedly and robustly in children with hypertonic or hypotonic muscles, such as in hemiplegic cerebral palsy (HCP). We observed that many children found it difficult to respond immediately to a cue, hold and maintain the pinch on a force gauge, with a specific force, for the length of a trial for multiple trials. In these cases, a self-paced movement execution task appears more appropriate, albeit without an EEG-EMG time-locking event. Inspired by these experimental challenges in assessing the cortico-muscular connectivity in children with HCP, we developed a novel approach to extract SMR spatial patterns from EEG signals using the dynamic information of the corresponding EMG activation. Essentially, in this method the aim is to find EEG sources that can explain the variation of muscle activity. However, due to the different nature of frequency components between EEG and EMG, usual cross decomposition algorithms (CCA, PLS) are not easily applicable towards this goal. Recently, mSPOC was proposed as a novel approach to solve such an issue employing a complex iterative procedure to find components that maximized the envelop of correlation between sources of two sets of multivariate signals. Here, we introduce a simpler alternative methodology, based on Riemannian geometry, that allows to objectively extract EEG spatial patterns that explain variations of EMG power. We show a proof-of-concept in healthy subject's dataset. Material: 4 healthy subjects participated to this study. 31-channel referential scalp EEG was recorded at 4096 Hz. Differential EMG was recorded at 1200 Hz, using bipolar electrodes at the FDI and ABP muscles of each hand. EEG and EMG streaming data were tagged with a TTL pulse, using hardware triggers, and synchronized offline. EEG and EMG were recorded while the subject engaged in a real-time EMG-controlled video game that presented cues and pinch force feedback, for 20 minutes (executing approx. 40 trials per hand). Method: EEG signal was filtered between 8-15 Hz and EMG signal was filtered between 30-500 Hz. For both modalities, spatial covariance matrices were estimated using a sliding window of 1.5s with 85% overlap. This procedure produced two sets of covariance matrices that were then projected in their respective Riemannian tangent space using logarithmic mapping. Because of the property of invariance by affine transformation of the Riemannian metric, the tangent space obtained was a rotated representation of the source power. This reduces the problem of extracting sources that match EEG and EMG power, to simply finding rotations in the tangent space that explain the maxima of variance between the two signal sets. This can be achieved by applying a Canonical Partial Least Square (PLS) method. Once the coefficients of the rotations are estimated with PLS, they are back-projected using an exponential map, and diagonalized to produce a set of spatial filters and patterns ranked by their importance. For validating the effectiveness of the spatial pattern extraction, we apply a commonly used method to epoched data --common spatial patterns (CSP).

Results: A comparison of the patterns extracted with the CSP algorithm and the proposed method is presented in Figure 1. The two methods converge toward the same solution, proving that our method can effectively extract spatial patterns in the same manner as the well-known CSP method. Significance: This document introduces a simple framework to extract spatial patterns corresponding to movement execution, using EMG signal as a reference, without relying on the time-locking of the cue presentation and the subject's response. This can be very useful in assessing cortico-muscular connectivity in challenging subjects with movement disorders. Furthermore, this method can also be generalized to various types of datasets where spatial patterns may be related to power relationship between two sets of multivariate signals, for example: EEG and audio, and the like.

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. (A) Spatial pattern extracted by Common spatial patterns. (B) Spatial pattern extracted by the proposed method


Christine Toumoulin

Cezary Boldak

Jean Louis Dillenseger

Jean Louis Coatrieux

Yan Rolland

FAST DETECTION AND CHARACTERIZATION OF VESSELS IN VERY LARGE 3-D DATA SETS USING GEOMETRICAL MOMENTS

An improved and very fast algorithm dealing with the extraction of vessels in threedimensional imaging is described. The approach is based on geometrical moments and a local cylindrical approximation. A robust estimation of vessel and background intensity levels, position, orientation and diameter of the vessels with adaptive control of key parameters, is provided during vessel tracking. Experimental results are presented for lower limb arteries in multidetector CT scanner.

INTRODUCTION

The ability to depict the vascular network is of critical importance for the diagnosis of vascular abnormalities, pre-operative planning as well as per-operative actions. The recent advances provided by 3-D Magnetic Resonance Angiography (MRA) and multidetector CT scanner ( CTA) leads to new perspectives for objective and quantitative analysis of vascular networks as far as efficient algorithms are designed. These imaging modalities lead to very large data sets (several hundreds of megabytes) from which the vessels must be extracted under very strict time constraints to face the clinical requirements. Most of the current segmentation methods bring already relevant delineations of vessels but with too high computation time. They rely on intensity-based methods [START_REF] Shiffman | Medical Image segmentation using analysis of isolable-contour maps[END_REF], generalized cylinder approximations [START_REF] Verdonck | Accurate segmentation of blood vessels from 3-D medical images[END_REF], multiscale [START_REF] Sato | R, 3-D multi-scale line filter for segmentation and visualization of curvilinear structures in medical images[END_REF][START_REF] Summers | Multiresolution, model-based segmentation of MR angiograms[END_REF] and skeletonization [START_REF]Segmentation of cerebral vessels and aneurysms from MR angiography data[END_REF] schemes, and deformable model approaches [START_REF] Hernandez-Hoyos | Inertia-based vessel axis extraction and stenosis quantification in 3-D MRA images[END_REF][START_REF] Lorigo | Curve evolution for vessel segmentation[END_REF] applied on successive 2-D slices or on volume data.

The challenge is therefore to reach similar performance in few seconds on a standard PC platform. The present work is a step towards this objective. It relies on a moment-based algorithm [START_REF] Reuzé | A 3-D moment based approach for blood vessel detection and quantification in MRA[END_REF] allowing, after interactive selection of 3-D seed points, to track the vessels and to locally estimate both the diameter and the orientation. Several improvements are brought including an efficient initialisation, iterative positioning of the computation window, adaptive control of its size, and multi-background handling. These new features will be described after a short summary of the initial algorithm. Some preliminary results are then displayed on CTA data.

METHOD

Using the assumption that a vessel can be locally approximated by a cylinder, it has been shown in [START_REF] Reuzé | A 3-D moment based approach for blood vessel detection and quantification in MRA[END_REF] that the three-dimensional geometrical moments of up to order 2 lead to analytical expressions of the orientation of the cylinder axis, the diameter when two homogeneous regions are considered, and the estimated mean gray levels inside and around the vessel. The discrete computation of these moments is performed on the set of elementary volumes (e.g. voxels) arranged on an isotropic grid using a spherical window, associated to a subvoxel decomposition. This way, the computation is reduced to mask convolutions. The tracking is performed by shifting the computation window according to the estimated orientation, and the stopping rule is stated as a decision between two hypotheses, presence or absence of the vessel. This solution has been validated on simulated data, for different signal to noise ratio and window sizes. As far as the window is larger than the vessel, diameter precision in the parameters estimation and robustness to noise have been demonstrated. The method was successfully applied to low field MRA data [START_REF] Reuzé | A 3-D moment based approach for blood vessel detection and quantification in MRA[END_REF]. The core of the method remains unchanged and only the improvements will be reported here which allow to deal with some specific features of CT images, for instance the presence of more than two tissues.

Algorithm initialisation:

In order to avoid the precise pointing of successive seed points located inside the several vascular branches of interest, a region is now defined by the user, in any of the three orthogonal cross-sections. Maxima of intensities, corresponding to potential vessels, are then looked for in this region.

Window centering:

Either centered or non-centered moments can be used for the parameter computation but the estimations are better when using the former expressions. The orientation estimated at a given position of the window does not guarantee a precise positioning at the next point along the vessel in particular when highly curved vessels are tracked. An iterative centering is therefore performed by computing the first order moments and then, the other cylinder parameters are estimated.

Window size adjustment:

The size of the vessels can widely vary (from tens to a very few voxels) when large segments of the body are explored or when diseases are concerned. In addition, the analytical diameter formulation as reported in [START_REF] Reuzé | A 3-D moment based approach for blood vessel detection and quantification in MRA[END_REF] depends directly on the window size as well as the precision of the estimations mentioned above. The window size is then adjusted during the vessel tracking according to the previously computed width.

Multi-region handling:

In contrast with MRA, CT based imaging modalities display other organs and tissues, and the enhanced vessels in CTA can be over or close to them, in other words the computation window can include more than two regions. This problem is solved by exploring the vessel surroundings at each step along equally spaced directions in a plane perpendicular to the currently estimated vessel axis. The profiles along these directions are determined and the highest level, outside the vessel, is used to set the background value to almost zero.

Re-initialisation procedure:

The tracking can be stopped when the model does not fit with the local shape ( bifurcation, high curvature of small vessels), in presence of artefacts or very severe stenosis. A cubic box, twice the size of the computation window, centred on the endpoint, is then open and an intersection of vessels with the faces of the box is searched. The previously visited voxels are marked in order to avoid a potential backtrack.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This new version of the approach has been evaluated on three CTA data sets of the lower limbs acquired on a multidetector spiral CT ( Siemens Somatom 4 plus Volume Zoom, Erlangen). A partial view of a volume image (see Figure 1) representing the lower limbs is depicted using the Maximum Intensity Projection (MIP) technique which emphasizes the difficulties for the physicians to discriminate between the enhanced vascular network and the bone structures. Three orthogonal views of the extracted vessels are shown where the rendering is performed by using the local cylinder surface approximations. The computation time is less than one second on a PC Pentium III 450Mhertz.

It can be seen that the most significant vessels are extracted. This patient suffering from lower limb ischemia has a bilateral thrombosis of the femoral superficial artery. This can be assessed by the study of the axial slices and of the MIP. There is an excellent correlation with the results obtained with our method: the thrombosed vessel is not visible and the collateral vessels coming from the deep femoral artery are nicely depicted. Furthermore, the popliteal artery and the run off are clearly visible. Some discontinuities are recovered and low contrasted and stenosed segments as well as curved vessel segments are preserved.

These results point out the capability of the algorithm to detect and track in CTA the vascular network. It provides a structured description of the vessels (e.g. the axes) and an estimation of the main local features. The extracted data can be displayed using surface or volume rendering techniques and easily analyzed in clinical setting.

However, additional issues have to be considered. The model is no more valid in forking cases. The conducted experiments have shown that, if the tracking is not affected, the parameters are biased ( the diameter for instance is overestimated). A solution may rely on a two steps analysis with a detection of the deviation with regard to the model and, then, through the use of the search box, an approximation by means of two cylinders.

Another concern is related to the presence of calcifications. The high contrast they bring in the immediate surrounding of the vessel exemplifies the need, already mentioned, to take into account multiple regions. But in this case, if the vessel tracking can be ensured, a reliable estimation of the cylinder parameters cannot be directly expected. The approach under study consists to segment the calcifications detected during the tracking through region growing, to subtract them from the volume image and to repeat the parameter estimation of the model.

CONCLUSION

An algorithm has been proposed to extract the vessels from volume image and the experiments conducted on CTA data have been reported and discussed. The emphasis has been put on a critical feature in image analysis, the time computation. This issue will be more and more important in the future with the avaibility of very large data sets in order to answer to the clinical constraints in daily practice.

CAPTIONS

Figure 1 :

 1 Figure 1: : CTA images of left (a) and right (b) limbs (raw data : 200x200 pixels, 12 bits resolution, 400 slices, 600 after a linear interpolation). In (a) the vessels have been extracted from the interactive selection of 3 ROI and 3 points, in (b) from 2 ROI and 2 points.

  Figure 1

Acknowledgements :

The authors are grateful to Brigitte Le Bruno and Jean Claude Galisson, from Siemens France, for supporting this work and for providing the image data, and to Johanne Bezy who helped in managing the data sets.