PhD Jean-Baptiste Suquet
email: suquet.jean-baptiste@wanadoo.fr

Moral standards: underpinning or (re)constructing social order? The case of fraud in a French collective transportation service

The paper advances a certain view on the relationship between moral standards and social order. Referring to the case of fraud in bus public transportation systems, it first reviews research works attending the issue (of fraud and more generally of deviance) with a moral insight. The review reveals major similarities between works from different fields, in the way they look at moral standards and social order together. It is then suggested another view, where moral standards are not necessarily a matrix for a stable social order, but rather tools for a social regulation. This thesis' utility is illustrated by the analyse of a control and reporting interaction. Starting from this interactional and instrumental questioning of moral standards, the conclusion opens up the reflection to the "meso" scale of social order and suggests an organizational study of the making of social order through moral standards.

Introduction

In France, public transportation is actually a controversial topic for public debate. On the one hand, it appears more and more to become what should be considered, according to a growing number of citizens, as a fundamental individual right. On the other hand, public transportation systems face strong difficulties to organize the correct "functioning" of service: as a public service (in the broad understanding of the qualification), they witness the resistance of a "public" (even renamed as a "client"), especially with payment. This seems to be a good way to introduce fraud as a matter for public transporters. Fraud then takes place in the reflexion of this network on moral standards and actually raises as a social order issue (not only a matter of money -even if it is indeed for transporters). It is problematic for the daily and effective functioning of public transportation (the achievement of a successful co-production of the service). In the following lines, I will not try to be exhaustive as for what the "management of fraud" does. On the contrary, I will focus on a specific activity among these related (rather than dedicated) to fraud, which is likely to be very fruitful to think about moral standards. By a transporter, there are actually a great number of activities that care more or less about fraud: marketing, communication, tickets and fare design, prevention… I would however rather try to shift the reader's attention beyond these activities related to fraud, that is, to the control work. The reason for this step forward makes me come to the point of the paper. It is to adopt another perspective on deviant acts such as fraud. The perspective I would like to endorse is not backwards and explicative, as it is often the case for such acts; rather, it tries to follow and describe the regulation from the constituted deviant act. Control work, from this point of view, can show how restricted the explicative and backwards look is.

The opposing perspectives can be shown up at two levels. A "science" level, which deals with the understanding of social disorder, of deviance (in particular fraud); a "field" level, whose purpose is the effective reducing of fraud. I will begin with a review of the former and try to highlight what could be seen as a narrow understanding of the role of moral standards, regarding fraud. I will try to point out the fact that this theoretical approaches only advance a limited understanding of fraud or deviance in general. Rather, they appeal for a broadening of the conception of moral standards as well as social order.

From this broadening of the perspective, I will turn to the latter level and use my field experience as a controller to contrast perspectives on fraud, regarding moral standards and social order. The analysis of a control interaction will illustrate that moral standards can be considered in another way. They may be more relevant and useful as tools for a regulation of social order, that takes place from the reporting. I will finally conclude by opening to the debate some questions about the "good" scale to look at the advanced relation between moral standards and social order, and putting on the scene a "meso" scale of social order that could account for the design of moral tools and their use regarding the social regulation.

1/ The explication of fraud by morality

When discussing fraud, it is rather frequent to hear speeches that put the emphasis on a lack of morality of evaders. From educated or uneducated people, inside or outside the firm, it is often said about evaders something like: "those people have no respect, no moral standards."

It is worth noticing such commentaries apply more usually to migrant or young populations (respectively from native or older people), which can either be considered as "different" (that is: not sharing the same moral standards).

These daily words are surprising, at first, because it is very easy to "discover" that fraud refers to many things, among which moral standards stand. One could try to put these speeches aside by considering them as a spontaneous understanding of the fraud phenomenon; rejecting the implicit conceptualization of daily interactions, one could then consequently turn to the existing scientific work on fraud. But except the characteristic extrapolation of the importance of moral standards, no decisive difference can be found between scientific and "street-level" speeches. Rather, I found that many scientific works are based on a similar perspective on fraud (or more generally deviance) and its relation to morality. I will try to sketch this perspective by referring to different researches. The criterion of choice of these works from different fields is their connection to the issue of fraud (their approach of fraud must try to connect this social disorder1 to moral standards). I will confront them and show that despite their paradigmatic differences, their homogeneity is to be found in the way they articulate social (dis)order and moral standards: the articulation they promote places moral standards as a way to prevent social rules breaking.

Then I will widen the object of review by referring to the sociology of deviance, which interests more for deviance and social order in general. I will shed the light on the view it seems to be characteristic of, as a scientific field. I finally will discuss this characteristic view and introduce the major issues it avoids or let unquestioned.

A perspective broadly used to explain social (dis)order

Economics

One aim of economics is to design explicative models of resources and products allocation. Some work has been done in experimental economics, about the underground economy (that is a specific tax evasion). I refer here especially to Nadia Joubert's research at the GATE. 2 In her individual and collaborative work3 , she tries to build a model to explain evasive behaviors.

She asserts that since its emergence in the seventies, the economic fraud theory has not taken into account the "disutility" caused by the entrance into the underground economic system.

According to her, the other authors argued a perfect substitutability between underground and regular work hours. On the contrary, she sees reasons to assume underground work brings people some disutility. She proposes then to add a "psychological cost" to the model of participation. The psychological cost results of the existence of a "stigmata", which expresses the "opprobrium heaped on fraud dissimulation".

We can see in this stream of economic research that, even if the term "moral standards" is not used, it is referred to something equivalent, which is described as a consensus over a certain way to behave. To not respect this consensus has a psychological cost that works as a barrier between official and underground work. The perspective of experimental economics on fraud clearly chooses to look backwards. What is important always lies before the rule breaking, and the correct understanding of fraud is to be found by isolating some causes. Here, one cause of the rule breaking that one could deduce from the model is the inadequate level of public "opprobrium". For each individual, it is considered that, under a specific level of opprobrium (or psychological cost) and all other things being isolated, the individual will choose to enter the underground economy.4

Management sciences

When they try to deal with the difficult issue of fraud, management sciences are generally concerned with technology, opportunity or structuring features. For instance, in the Financial Analysts Journal you can read a survey that underlines the tie between the composition of the board (origin, independence of the members…) and the occurrence of corporate fraud (Uzun, Szewczik & alii, 2004). It is possible, too, to find work on the interaction between auditors and managers, through a game theoretical approach (Matsumura and Tucker, 1992); or, as well, a research on the difference in the costs and benefits that could account for the differences in fraud committing (Gerety and Lehn, 1997). The role of available information for the detection of fraud is also often claimed (Morton, 1993).

My purpose is not to draw the list of existing work on fraud. I would like to suggest that directly operational matters or techniques to reduce fraud are often chosen in priority. Authors that look forward to connect moral standards and fraud are not many. It is possible however to find some. "Accounting education" (Titar, Braun & alii, 2004) may be exemplar of the way to care about moral stand ards that probably participates in a broader movement. For maybe a decade now, the world of business (scientists as well as executives and teachers) has been focusing on the importance of ethics, and then on the opportunity to promote moral standards in order to impulse fair behaviors (Chapman, 1998).

"Accounting education" precisely insists on the importance of values, to avoid making of accounting only a technical matter. The authors suggest the role moral standards can play in influencing behaviors, especially by students who have no insight on the consequences of their decisions. Here again, we meet a backwards perspective, since the authors propose to use moral standards before the fraud committing, to try to prevent it.

Sociology

Transporters have done a lot of work to understand the reason(s) of fraud. Sometimes they have hired sociologists to analyze, describe and comment the fraud they could observe.5 But most of the surveys do not take the moral aspect into account -or at least, do not focus on it.

One rare example I could find is Sébastian Roché (Roché, 2003), who works on the general category of "incivilities". He has tried to give transporters a few clues about youth's fraud, putting on the scene the question of morality. His purpose was to introduce moral standards as a way to explain fraud generalization in this age category: "to attack somebody goes against moral principles; so does not fraud." It is easy to see how close to the economics' and management sciences' vision S. Roché is. It is not a question of scientific methods or product; but they let moral standards6 intervene as something that resists the breaking of the rule, and then can prevent it. As well, he is close to the management researches I have sketched, since he places moral standards as a way to influence behaviors.

Sociology of deviance

It seems interesting at this point of the review to enlarge the scale, since sociology has maybe more worked on the general category of deviance than on the specific case of fraud (though it is in itself already very large). The sociology of deviance actually offers a disciplined and specialized frame to understand the breaking of a rule, which cannot be found in economics or management sciences. A general overview of the study of deviance enables to point out the crystallization of this type of perspective, and gives a stronger base to my up-to-now selective insights.

My purpose is not to focus on details, but to try to shortlist the major theories of deviance that endorse what I have called the "backwards" perspective. In his synthesizing book The sociology of deviance, Albert Ogien distinguishes two main streams of theorization of deviance: the causal and the comprehensive one (Ogien, 2002) 7 . The first one tries to explain deviance by factors that determine (or at least increase the probability of) deviant behaviors; moral standards are one of them. The authors that propose causal theories analyze moral standards as a constraint for individuals, which determine the committing of a deviant act.

The absence or presence of moral standards can be situated either "in" the individuals (the criminological tradition8 looking for a specific kind of individuals with a higher propensity for crime) or in society (a social organization favorites or not the strength of moral constraining9 ; social inequalities prevent individuals from social integration and then from adhesion to moral standards (Blau, 1982)*).

As for comprehensive theories, they view more than one possible set of moral standards. The continuous evolution and transformation of society (Thomas, 1966)*, the differential learning and interpretation of rules -among which moral standards (Sutherland's theory of "differential association", Sutherland and Cressey, 1966)* 10 , the existence of "subcultures" with specific values (Cohen, 1955)*: they all offer a representation of deviance where several moral standards compete (or at least have to co-exist). But they still consider that moral standards determine individual behaviors following their social group "membership".

Issues of the backwards perspective

As this short review shows, many research works look backwards. In economics, management sciences or sociology, authors trying to find a relationship between moral standards and fraud (e.g. deviant acts) mainly care about the fraud committing (e.g. the rule breaking). They see moral standards as a matrix for social order, according to which individuals decide of their acts, and whose absence (by the individual or in society) makes fraud easier (or costless for economics). They hardly take anything into account aside from the breaking of the rule and its explanation.

Such a perspective implies some difficult questions about morality and social order. It seems important to come back on its implicit conceptions of morality and social order. The point is not to answer questions that go far beyond my abilities, but to make clear that several conceptions can exist. Without deciding once for all in favor of such or such conception, I would like to contrast the perspective on fraud that I described and reviewed with another view on the relationship between moral standards and social order.

Morality

Even if the conception of morality that emerges from this review is not completely homogeneous, it gives moral standards a transcendental status insofar as it deals with values that exist on their own (sometimes in competition with other values) and determine individual behaviors. 11 It also seems however possible to give morality a pragmatic status: moral standards would be what they are done. Sykes and Matza (Sykes and Matza, 1957)* advance 10 One question raised by the theory is that of the uniqueness of a set of moral standards. I would argue that learning and interpretation transform a rule or a referential value. Here, we do not face one set of values, but several ones. 11 I may counterbalance this assertion by underlying that comprehensive theories already nuance t he transcendental status, since they introduce the problematic of learning vis -à-vis values and moral standards.

in the direction by underlying the active positioning and the rationalizing of delinquents.

Their "techniques of neutralization" seem, in my opinion, to open an instrumental perspective on moral standards. This perspective mechanically entails a questioning about the construction of moral standards. But how interesting this question may ever be, it appears to be too difficult to answer now, and it seems more reasonable to remain on the instrumental perspective: wherever moral standards come from, whatever their origin and validity be, they can be used and manipulated.

Social (dis)order

The works described also have in common the way they do interest in social order or disorder.

They let think that social disorder and social order can not be thought together. I can suggest that this is explained by their very focus on the rule breaking. If the rule breaking is first, then social order was already assumed, even implicitly, and the rule breaking is the sign of the disorder.

Jean-Daniel Reynaud (Reynaud, 1993) develops a theory on regulation which places rules (laws as well as moral standards) as the central social fact. He insists too that regulation is a social stake, which makes its approach interesting to me. Actually, using Reynaud's regulation theory enables to adopt another perspective on fraud and to make a step further (beyond the committing). The point is not anymore only the breaking of the rule (as a climax after which nothing more l ooks interesting), but the regulation, the agreement on another rule. 12 These two movements regarding moral standards and social order are of importance for the understanding of fraud. My thesis is that the relationship between moral standards and fraud is not only that described before, that often prevails in daily as well as in scientific understandings of the phenomenon. The backwards perspective is not the only possible, and maybe not the more pertinent. It actually is likely to lead to difficult questions such as the origin of these moral standards, the reason for their transcendence or their performativity, and so on. Another way to look at moral standards and social order could be to analyze how they can be used, in regulation intent.

In the following example I will illustrate and develop these views by introducing moral standards as tools for a micro-regulation.

2/ A specific way to look at fraud and moral standards together: the case of bus control work

Bus control work is a good example of the utility of a perspective shifting My research subject deals with fraud management by public bus transportation systems. I have had the opportunity to do much field observation, in various circumstances. I should say this was a double opportunity. First, because it gave me an access to speeches on fraud, which I already have referred to. But most of all, it was for me the occasion to observe and understand the specific relation between controllers and fare evaders. This relationship is particularly well-fit to put on the scene social order and moral standards.

The micro-sociological look seems to be very helpful to put a shed on the regulation work that takes place by the occasion of reporting. This reporting task is actually very often considered as a basic task: it would consist in establishing a fine. Obviously, it would be a little bit complicated sometimes, because it requires collecting personal data and a signature -which could be very difficult if the fare evaders would not cooperate. But that would not change anything about the fact that reporting is only a matter of proceedings… Much work has been done about service relationship since the funding book by Goffman. All these researches have contributed to show at least the very complexity of service relationship. 13 I assume that reporting should be considered as well as a complex set of tasks, since it involves too relational (at least interactional) aspects. For this reason it would be well adapted to use a micro-sociological approach, which has proved to be convenient for the observation of public interactions (Goffman, 1973).

Proceedings are not enough to account for what really matters about control and reporting.

Social order is obviously at stake (clients' behaviors do they fit with the rules of the transportation system?). But the point is not only to establish a rule breaking (it would then be proceedings); it is also to find an agreement about social order (social order can also be seen in the agreement of the evader: a/ to be categorized as an "evader"; b/ to receive a fine).

Social order refers to multiple points of views, because it refers to multiple rules. Opposing disorder to order (as soon as one rule has been broken) hides the respect of and the negotiated agreement on other rules. The use of my data is twice. On the one hand, interviews introduce the evader-side of the interaction, whereas on the other hand, my long-term field observations (mainly participative) enable me to understand the controller's point of view. I will however mainly focus, as for moral standards, on the latter. My purpose is actually to point out the tool status of moral standards in a control encounter. It is based on my data, and they let me tell only which relationship a controller can make between moral standards and social order. 15 Interviews will however be referred to: they can give clues about the way evaders can perceive the use of moral standards by controllers. 16 At last, results from my direct observations have enabled me to sketch the frame of a control encounter and the usual course of this type of interaction. I do not view this frame as valid 14 Fraud is a disturbing subject, and I had to be cautious in the production of data. Even for interviews I sometimes witnessed refusals (even due to my tape recording). 15 The interaction I will analyze seems however to be significant from this point of view: it is obvious that the controller tries to convince the evader by referring to moral standards. I hope that, despite the bad quality of recording, the example will clearly illustrate the point of my argument. 16 One methodological issue I had about the tool status of moral standards is to find a criterion to distinguish between "believers" and "non-believers". I had no means to be sure of the conviction of an evader or of a controller when he refers to a moral standard. I only can say that I have used moral standards several times as tools, and not in order to express my intimate conviction. I then suppose that other controllers as well as evaders can do the same. As I have said before, my purpose is not to bring discredit on the transcendental dimension of moral standards (which I am not able to do), but to suggest another perspective. outside the Parisian suburb; but by the two transporters I have observed, the situations of control were comparable.

The use of moral standards by control work

What controlling means

A control encounter, as it generally takes place 17 , can be described as follows. A controller team (at least four) enters a bus to control its passengers. 18 Controllers then check passengers' tickets -which means they establish a first contact with passengers by looking at their tickets.

At this time, the great majorities of encounters are characterized by their physical dimension: controllers especially deal with flows of people, and w hen a situation is regular, the communication can be very brief. 19 As soon as they have traced a border between regular and irregular situations, controllers focus on the latter. The encounters then progress very differently. The purpose is actually very different from the checking. Controllers' aim is now to settle a relationship that guarantees a correct progress to reporting. In some cases, however, the outcome of the encounter is not a fine. Generally, according to my own observations and experience, controllers can appreciate the relevance of reporting on their own. For instance, homeless people are hardly reported, because controllers know it is useless. Elder people too are "forgiven", as controllers say, because of their age and although their situation is as much irregular as that of other people. 20 I will develop specific aspects of the interaction later. I would like now to insist on the instrumental dimension of the relationship for a controller (and probably for evaders). The relationship has one cause (a rule breaking) and one purpose (solve the rule breaking). The legal planned solution for fare evasion is the payment by the evader of a fine (which is supposed to compensate the transporter for the prejudice). But the tie between evasion and compensation is not as mechanical as it could seem. There is no a priori reason for an evader 17 By « generally », I mean a strong similarity among different transportation systems. The similarities are: legal frame and tacit rules (among which moral ones); physical frame of the transportation system (public space, station, bus design…), payment (fare and tickets design). 18 There are two main ways to control a bus: 1/ controllers can enclose it as it stops, control walking out people, then enter the bus and control the other people; 2/ or they can walk in the bus at a bus stop, and control people in the bus as it goes. The difference is the degree of closure of the bus they allow, which determine to a great extent the kind of ambiance they settle in the bus and the relationships they will have with passengers. 19 With the great majority of passengers, the interaction can be sum up in a few words that announce the control ("Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to check the tickets, thank you for showing your tickets") and ensure a minimum civility for the encounters ("Thank you" "Have a good day"…). 20 We can notice the work of Michael Lipsky on street-level bureaucracy precisely accounts for this kind of decisions (Lipsky, 1983) that adapt bureaucratic rules.

(that did not accept the payment rule) to accept the principle of a fine (whatever you call it: compensation or punition…).

However, controllers are supposed to report. And even if they can sometimes decide not to do it, they have to account for their work. And the common traditional indicator for control work is the number of fines. 21 This aspect of controllers' work is very important because it explains the instrumental dimension of the relationship that settles by the control encounter. It entails another look at the interaction (a strategic one) 22 and raises the question of the tools at disposal for controllers to manage the relationship.

The coercive means to manage the interaction

Control is often seen as a repressive occupation. Such a view is at least partly true. The mission of reporting is anyway rather repressive… The question then is: to achieve a repressive aim, do controllers use repressive tools? A first answer is yes. Controllers actually receive a public delegation of authority, which gives them the legal right to write down the identity references of any evader.

In the case when it is not enough, that is, when evaders do not admit controllers' authority, laws authorize controllers to decide to ask a police officer to come. The powers of police officers being broader, they are able to enforce the controllers' action. Laws so have planned coercive proceedings to manage the interaction and help controllers to succeed in sanctioning evaders.

But field observation shows that the coordination between policemen and controllers is difficult: policemen do not always come directly, because they often have other priorities.

Moreover, a controller quickly learns that the "police" tool is not a means to use too frequently… Police intervention actually takes much time and often goes against the intent of a transportation system: it produces immobility! For these two main reasons, the coercive tools controllers have at their disposal are not that efficient to produce the results they expect. In most of the cases the relationship by control encounters does not work automatically. Controllers have then to turn to other tools, which give them the ability to manage the interactio n and make the evader accept the fine.

Communication and the definition of the situation

21 Sometimes, controllers are also expected to have a good fine "quality", which means that effective payment is taken into account, be it in situation or later (post-check for instance…). 22 The strategic dimension is all the more present since evaders too can have a strategic attitude, in order to escape the fine. Such a dimension is by the way part of a dramaturgical approach.

Communication is not a tool for the management of the interaction, but it is a necessary condition of its possibility. Controllers and evaders need a common code to communicate. I will not develop the basic aspects of communication 23 ; I will rather have interest for the "definition of the situation" (Goffman, 1973). The definition of the situation raises a very simple question. This concept comes from Goffman's dramatur gic sociology, and develops the idea that a successful interaction needs a common definition of the situation. 24 In my field experience, I can find lots of interactions when effective communication was impossible, because of a fundamentally opposite definition of the situation. A precise definition of fraud exists by the legal texts, but it appears not to be known 25 . In fact, legal texts are hardly used in the interactions. Instead of the legal definition, a moral definition is often used, be it implicitly or explicitly. The moral definition of the situation can suggest the breaking of a moral rule by the controllers, which makes their action illegitimate. For instance, as a controller I was once shouted at by someone who believed I was reporting on an elder woman: "Don't you shame reporting on this elder woman?!" 26 On the other hand, the definition of the situation can point out the breaking of the rule by evaders, who have then to be punished. People sometimes spontaneously propose such a moral definition of their behavior. I can refer to the case of an elder woman who wanted to pay a fine, in order to remain coherent with her schoolteacher experience: "I have taught children for years that it is not good: Then I mustn't do it either." People interviewed too, often spontaneously define fraud as bad, even if they have committed it. 27 They did generally not refuse the fine legitimacy (even if they sometimes questioned the utility of such a system:

"I got a fine, well that means I did not buy a ticket… If I did not buy a ticket, that's because I do not have the money to buy it… Then I won't have more money to pay the fine…").

A moral definition of the situation is not frequently spontaneous. Sometimes, a controller can try to introduce such a definition. Such a tactical operation requires a great subtlety and cautiousness. Controllers generally avoid doing it. The aim of such an operation actually is to influence the definition of the situation and let the evader agree on a moral definition of the 23 I consider questions of language, social proximity of interlocutors and so on, as irrelevant in the paper. But they are of course important issues for transporters. 24 An efficient illustration of the assertion can be found on the scene. Comedies as a theatrical genre give us plenty of misunderstanding, especially mistaken identity… 25 Which goes against a French adage, claiming that "nobody should ignore law"… 26 In fact, the woman had come to pay her son's fine… 27 « Spontaneously » has to take into account my labelling as representative for the institution. Their moral definition of the situation appeared sometimes very conventional, in the sense it did not have an impact on their decision. So spoke one of them: "Well it is not bad, but I did not have my tickets [on me] … I say … Well, I don't mind!" situation. But the danger of it is to suggest an unacceptable presentation of the evader 28 , on which the interaction could focus. It could then provoke a conflict and make disappear any possibility of a successful relationship. We arrive here at the point where social order is precisely problematic: is a violent conflict a solution, is it a sign of social order? I think it is not. Would it be the case, transporters would call it an expensive social order. 29 A point must be developed. What I call a moral definition of the situation can be very indirect.

Morally defining the situation not necessary requires saying: "you are immoral", or: "your behavior is not moral" : that would be a rude use of the moral standards, with the flaws I have just underlined. What I call a moral definition of the situation can be surreptitiously evoked by the controller. A frequently used technique of controllers is not to focus directly on the rule breaking, but rather on the definition of the situation of transport: what does it mean to be transported? From what can it be brought closer? 30 The legitimacy of the outcome If a satisfying definition of the situation has been found (has been adopted by both interlocutors), then remains the question of the outcome of the control encounter. I have said controllers usually are expected to produce fines of "quality". Such an outcome requires to have defined correctly the situation (with the help of moral standards). I mean by "correctly", that the evader then agrees to cooperate and eventually to pay his fine. We return then to the border question: how do these moral standards work? Where does their performativity come from? 31 It is interesting to figure out that different outcomes are often witnessed. The evaluation of controllers is very often made from the number of reports they wrote. It is then mechanical to think of moral standards as tools to enable the reporting. But my observations showed me that the use of moral tools could be linked to another aim of the controllers' action. As I suggested 28 One of the results of the interviews was precisely related to the "figure" of the fare evader. It appeared this figure was part of a network of figure which worked as "social spectres", and from which interviewed evaders tried to distinguish themselves. These words are eloquent: "No I don't feel like an evader… an evader… Well an evader! There are plenty of worse evaders than I! Sincerely… Oh my god! Maybe they are not reported… and they are not cooperative… or they are even violent… when it happens… Well I don't know. But I think there are worse ones than I… I am no outlaw anyway… Then, I committed fare evasion… Well I do not smoke, I do not drink, hum, I do not take drugs!" 29 Such a conception of social order, that is an extremely repressive one, leads to vicious circles of repression, which are especially characterized by a high rate of work accidents and rising number of controllers in a team. 30 The illustrating interaction I will account for shows an example of it. 31 This question I would like to think a little bit more about in my conclusion, which remains however too much difficult for such a paper. before, it can be very fruitful to operate a shift of the look from the rule breaking in itself to regulation as the stake.

The control work can then appear differently. Controllers actually often decide not to report when an interaction has passed well. Or even they decide to report, but the fine is cheaper…

The interpretation of such outcomes can be twice. In the first case, the evader has suggested a definition of the situation that convinced the controller not to report on him. We are back in the first case: the fine i s at stakes. In a second case, the point is the agreement on a definition of the situation in itself. It is a piece of evidence of a certain social order, since two people have agreed in a public space about a way to define a rule breaking.

The question is then: is it sufficient for controllers? On the one hand, the answer is no, since it produces no fine. But on the other hand, my experience of control work tells me the condition of success for control should be found in the long term. Then to focus only on the fine and the specific rule breaking is too narrow, because it hides social order in the making. An outcome such as the one I described, with no fine, is maybe a way to progress towards social order. It is obviously difficult to say towards which social order it progresses; but it is difficult not to see it is social order (micro, punctual and framed by an interaction). The use of moral standards has enabled a common definition of the situation, and then an arrangement, which is the sign of a certain social order, even punctual, even not structural.

An illustrative interaction 32

I had attended the following interaction as a direct observer. In my opinion it shows very good the subtlety of the use of moral standards as tools. In this case, the controllers faced a resisting evader, which did not accept the legitimacy of the fine, since he had already received one in the subway. Legally, a subway fine is not equivalent to a bus ticket. Sometimes however, controllers do not give two fines in the same day. But the first controller had decided not to be indulgent, probably because of the behavior of the other passengers (they had forced out the bus and there had been some struggle).

For this reason, the evader has been still and has remained on his seat, but the atmosphere is tense (or at least, the controllers were nervous). The aim of the first controller is clearly to report; he does not consider another solution. He needs then to impose a definition of the situation which would mechanically imply a fine for the evader. His colleague then comes to help him to do it (the technique of alternative). In the interaction, we can try to review the different tools they use to convince the evader.

At first, the first controller tries to justify the fine by referring to the legal frame (with no success). The evader reasons in a pragmatic way, which does not oppose the legal reasoning, but shows its impossible application. The controller remains however very quiet, and does not develop another argument. At the end of their interaction, the failing is clear: "You remain on your position, I remain on mine". The importance of the definition of the situation is well stressed.

It is as well important for the second controller. As for it, he is very explicit. He does not hesitate to urge the evader on communication: "Communicate! Communicate"; and also clearly points out the necessity to adopt a common definition of the situation: "Understand! Understand!" or "If we take for granted that you are right [that fraud is not the point since he already has got a fine]."

From the beginning of his interaction with the evader, he shows that he wants to shift the debate (at this point, this is now an official opposition) from the only question of the fine to that of social order. Given the evolution of the situation and the behavior of the evader, the first aim is to convince him to cooperate. 33 The 2 nd controller tries to be conciliating: "We would like to be comprehensive with you".

His first intents to define the situation go in two directions. A pragmatic one, arguing: it would be more convenient for everybody if he accepted just to give an identity card; it would be cheaper for him to cooperate ("You will have additional fees"). The controller then tries to convince the evader is showing him the paper on which is written the corresponding legal rule. 34 The two tries both fail.

We can observe finally his referring to a moral definition of fraud. He actually claims for a parallel between shop buying (bread) and transport using. The parallel is very frequently used.

It is tactically interesting because it suggests a similarity between: the type of economic good (bread and transport are both frequently consuming "products"); the type of obligations between the producer and the consumer (in both cases, there is no written and negotiated contract, but a conventional way to contract).

The point is everybody (including the evader) respects the conventional contract between the backer and the client. The evader is then expected to respect it when he uses transports, but he did not. And the implication of this argument introduces moral standards in the sense everybody would call such a behavior "a theft" at the backer's, and it creates then proximity between fraud and theft. The evader is then forced to take position vis-à-vis a "universal" moral standard.

Although this tool (elaborated with a moral standard) works usually well, it does not in this interaction. The evader insists (from the very beginning to the end) actually on his point of view, which counters the controller's tool. His argument can be sum up this way: I was forced to evade because I had to go back to mine, and I had no money. This constraint makes he had no choice, and his evasion was not volunteer. His opposite definition of the situation makes it impossible to try to repair the trouble caused by the evasion, it gives no possibility to find an agreement.

At last, controllers call the police. The evader has no paper on him. He is brought to the police station: this way ends what is considered as an unsuccessful control encounter. We can witness as well the use of moral standards (with no success), and the fail in the research of an agreement. The question about the outcome of the interaction is: does it show social order or disorder? It shows at least an attempt towards social order.

3/ Conclusion

Another perspective, towards an object for management sciences?

To try to conclude this paper, whose main utility is to emphasize a way to question the relationship between social order and moral standards, I will not go on with the debate raised by the interaction. I would rather draw the consequences of the new perspective developed in the case of control. I have tried to show how the understanding of the relation between moral standards and social order could be enriched by looking beyond the rule breaking, where much scientific work on this question focuses backwards on it (in a generally causal perspective).

My purpose is not to suggest a renewal of the deviance analysis. Such a possibility is not even clear. It is anyway limited by my ignorance. I would rather say that I look forward to the emergence of moral standards as a real object for management sciences. In my opinion, this can be justified in two directions. First, the interactional approach of moral standards I have used was more centered on action and its instruments than on explanation and its concepts.

Moreover, as I have underlined it since my introduction, the issue of behaviors' regulation involves firms (e.g. public transporters). Despite some detours, regulation was the major problematic of the paper. Anyway, it was raised in the frame of their economic activity. The questions were then: which tools bear the regulation; and can moral standards in particular be part of a set of tools for regulation? Management sciences, as far as I know, do not have much interest in moral standards as tools to be designed for regulation. Their insights on moral standards actually consider them mostly as given, exogenous ideals. These ideals should be targeted (because they are moral standards) or be paid more attention (because they are moral standards). Most of the works in management sciences that claim to deal about moral standards focus on the ways to design ethical organizations (Bartlett, 2003; Jones, 1995), or the necessity to progress towards an increased and sustainable attention for the moral aspects of organizational matters (Nixon, 1994; Water & Bird, 1987). The status of moral standards in management sciences often seems to be that of un-deconstructible objects (Feldman, 1998), and some authors deplore that moral theory often reasons abstractly, instead of trying to take real values and behaviors into account (Bartlett, 2003).

Theoretical orientations for a "meso" understanding of moral standards

One of the results of the analysis of the case of bus control seems however precisely to be a meso 35 understanding of moral standards appears to be a stimulating research direction. In my paper, micro was opposed to macro and I suggested the former to escape the difficult questions of the latter. It seems to me that such a dichotomy does not help that much. On the contrary, it seems useful to point out the play of organizations: they use moral standards and constantly pursue a certain social order (whose definitive definition is at stakes). Such a program would require orienting a little differently the research and the theoretical base. A good image of it could be the shift from a "definition of the situation" to a "frame analysis" (Goffman, 1991) 36 . It is about collective and solid objects, rather than ephemeral and punctual ones. 37 Authors like Desrosières, Douglas, and Foucault then seem to be really relevant 38 . They actually do not oppose the interactional approach, but are necessary 35 I place « meso » between the micro level (that of interactions) and « macro » level (that of a whole society). A "meso" level should involve institutions, and then economic organizations. 36 His thesis is that « every definition of the situation is based on principles that structure events -at least social events -and our own involvement as subjects. The term "frame" designates these basic elements. The expression "frame analysis" then, from this point of view, appeals to the study of the organization of experience." (P.19, in the French edition). 37 And maybe this is a choice to account for the « transcendental » dimension that disturbed me. 38 E.g. Desrosières, 1993 ; Douglas, 1986 ; Foucault, 1970. They respectively interest in such solid and collective objects: numbers and statistics; justice and fairness; discourses. complements to it, as Ian Hacking shows it (Hacking, 2004). The purpose is not to leave the interactional approach, but to better account for it by introducing an institutional level.

In my opinion, such a program for the understanding of moral standards and social order by the "meso" entrance could especially benefit from two streams in management sciences. They have not, up to now and as far as I know, thought about moral standards. But they fit well with the directions proposed for the study of moral standards as objects for management sciences. First, the organizational side of moral standard could be connected with the theoretical frame of the institutional sociology. 39 Powel and DiMaggio's theoretical frame is still of great utility for management sciences (Charreire and Huault, 2002). As Acquier and Aggeri suggest it (Acquier and Aggeri, 2005), attention to practices (for the case of control, for instance the way controllers refers to moral standards) is not antagonist with an institutionalist approach -on the contrary, it is necessary, according to their point of view. 40 Attention to practice well characterizes the second direction too. It deals with the tool status that I underlined for moral standards. Philippe Lorino's research work points out the necessity to question the place of activity in organizations. With the help of the theory of activity and semiotics especially, he tries to show the "instrumental genesis of collective action" (as for social order: regulation). 41 An institutional approach on the one hand and an instrumental approach on the other hand so form a basic frame for the study of moral standards and their relation to social order. I think it could be a fruitful way to begin the study of moral standards and social order in management sciences.

  Micro-sociology leads to a second shift. It is based on the role moral standards can play in the research of an agreement about social order, as I have just sketched it. Endorsing a microsociological approach entails a reflection about the "how" of the relation. Then moral standards can receive a new status: the tool status.The data collectedI have collected data by my stay at a transportation network. I was expected to do a typology of evasion and evaders on the network; which gave me the opportunity to observe and interact much with controllers and evaders (separately or together). The data I have collected are of several types. I have: a/ interviewed evaders (6 interviews of one hour each); b/ directly observed control work (2 weeks); c/ participated in control work (3 months). Interviews were written down, and I mention them because they sometimes explicitly refer to the encounter between controllers and evaders. From the observation work I wrote a day-to-day journal. It was very difficult to record interactions, given the conflict situations I attended. 14

I have considered fraud in general. The focus on the matter of fraud in bus transportation systems especially would have restricted the amount of available work.

Group of Economic Analysis and Theory, CNRS.

I refer here to her working papers at the GATE: e.g. "Is undeclared activity really affected by tax system? A micro-econometric analysis on individual Canadian data"[START_REF] Nadia | Is undeclared activity really affected by tax system? A micro-econometric analysis on individual Canadian data[END_REF], & "Taxation, neighbourhood effects and labour supply in the underground economy"[START_REF] Bernard | Taxation, neighbourhood effects and labour supply in the underground economy[END_REF].

The point is not to criticize some economic models that are far more complicated than the image I have drawn of them. One could obviously claim for a deeper attention to such or such variable; but these models enrich progressively from each other, and the work of Nadia Joubert alone clearly shows a will to make the understanding progress step by step. But the focus on an economic model enables me to picture a way to make connections between moral standards and fraud.

For my previous survey, I was mandated for a sociological work, to describe fraud and people committing fraud on a specific transportation network.

However they call it. Even if I am conscious that the distinction between the terms is of importance and deserves anyway to be discussed, I take for granted that "opprobrium" and "moral principles" refer to the same kind of object that our network has chosen to call "moral standards".

From now on, my quotations of authors in sociology of deviance will be extracted from Ogien's book. I will indicate by a star (*) the fact that I write about an author using Ogien's work.

Sociology of deviance and criminology are not the same disciplines, but they have influenced each other since their emergence.

The question of constraining is a matter of performativity of an abstract concept. For Braithwaite, a solution could be to restore corrective procedures based on a positive shaming (Braithwaite, 1989)*.

The major point in Reynaud's approach of social order, according to me, is his dynamic understanding of social order. Using the term "regulation", I will especially insist on the dynamic approach of social order.

I refer here especially to Jeannot and Joseph (dir.) (1998).

Please refer to the annexes to get a transcription of the interaction (a part of it could be recorded).

The controllers have probably taken into account the fact that some people had already forced out; in the context, a report is anyway difficult, but it becomes crucial not to let the whole bus go. The point is to show controllers have a real action, in order to be seriously considered, for the next times…

It can be noticed the first controller does not use such a resource; he only speaks about the rule.

Mary Douglas, calling herself a follower of Durkheim, belongs precisely to the institutional thinkers.

They write such an attention is not enough followed by institutionalist researchers. In our opinion, it is fundamental.

Lorino and Teulier (dir.) (2005). See also[START_REF] Lorino | Comptes et récits de la performance[END_REF].

Annexes: Transcription from the interaction recorded

The circumstances of recording were difficult because of the environment (several reporting, noise…); the translation is as exact as possible, but it was not easy to find an equivalent to the familiar register of the evader…

The interaction takes place in a bus. The control has already begun, and there has been a forcing out by some passengers. The evader of this interaction has not tried to force out, but he does not want to cooperate and be reported. He is with some friends. Two controllers will try to convince him during this interaction, one after the other (which is a technique of alternative, for the case when a relationship starts in a wrong way).


Jean-Baptiste Suquet
email: suquet.jean-baptiste@wanadoo.fr

How to produce a representation of fraud in urban transportation? Between knowledge for the system and knowledge about the system

published or not. The documents may come

How to Produce a Representation of Fraud in Urban Transportation? Between Knowledge for the System and Knowledge about the System

Jean-Baptiste Suquet

Introduction

For my pre-PhD research work 1 , I was expected to produce a representation of fraud on the network of a bus public transportation system of the Parisian suburb. The relation between organizations and knowledge immediately stood at the chore of my interest. On the one hand, I had to make visible something from the environment of the transporter. The relationship between a firm and its environment has been for a long time a major issue of mana gement sciences, but the transporter did not have in mind to think about it. On the other hand, I was, as every researcher, interested in the way the knowledge I had produced would be used.

In the first part of the paper, I will come back on the way I have tried to draw a picture of fraud. Then I will go beyond the first stage of knowledge production, and evoke the way the picture was used by the transporter. To account for this, I will use the concept of fraud management system. I want so to have a global approach of the set of activities related to fraud. I also want to insist on the systemic dimension of organization. 2 Then I will try to think about the relation between a management system and knowledge. 3 During my research work, I was not involved into the management system, which gave me the opportunity to clearly distinguish the fraud management system from the knowledge I was asked to produce, as I will explain it. I could then observe the way the system reacted to the knowledge I brought.

In a second part of the paper, I will sketch a conceptual frame to analyze the reactions of the fraud management system. This frame will to a large extent appeal (even implicitly) to a tradition of management sciences regarding knowledge and organizations. It mainly comes from the work of the Centre de Recherche en Gestion (CRG) and of the Centre de Gestion Scientifique (CGS).

I will finally try to show how this tradition can be used to account for the relation between knowledge and organizations. The issue can be broadened to be related to larger questions of 1 In France, it takes a few steps to become a real researcher. Before the PhD in itself (3 years), it is required to have a year of initiation to research work, which ends with the presentation of a first research work. The paper is about such a research work. 2 I would not say a management system is exactly the same as an organization. It can be shown yet that each organization has a management system, and that a management system supposes an organization. We will then refer to both as equivalent in the paper. 3 In the paper, I will define knowledge as a set of propositions that are labelled as "true". This set of propositions is related to a specific topic. Such an acceptation of knowledge is merely a "codified" one. I justify it by the scientific aim of my research. I have obviously encountered "tacit" knowledge, but the knowledge I have produced was codified. epistemology for management sciences. I will so open up to the question of action and science by evoking the epistemological project for management sciences proposed by Hatchuel.

1/ The research work by the transporter

In the first part of the paper, I will sketch to the reader the main features of my research work by a transportation system in summer 2003. The purpose of the connection was a survey on the characteristics of fraud (fare evasion and fare evaders) on the transportation system of this Parisian suburb.

The survey has been the opportunity to remain by the transporter and to acquire some experience about their action regarding fraud. I stayed six months on the whole for this particular research. I was disciplinary oriented towards management sciences; I had then interest for paying attention to the evolutions of the way to manage fraud.

Finally, my focus was twice. First, as it had been contracted for my research, it was to improve knowledge about evasio n and evaders on the network. Then, it was to have a simultaneous look at the way evasion and evaders were managed by the transporter. I will try to account for this twice purpose of the research work by exposing: the way the research happened to be constructed; the direct results of the work; the indirect results of the work (that is the way the direct results reveal the management system).

a/ The expectations and the kind of work

The transporter had in mind to improve its knowledge about fraud on the ne twork. What improvement meant was very vague. Considering the kind of knowledge they wanted me to create, the expectations of the transporter were not very precise. But the point was to make perceptive the relevant information the transporter could not get access to.

An overview was the first step, in order to list and sort out the different kinds of information the transporter had at their disposal. From this overview, I had to underline the main lacks and questions I had noticed. I could then design a research plan to produce further information.

Finally, information had to be well fit with the needs of the fraud management system. But I was not in charge of a critical audit of the management system. To be very clear on that essential point, I can tell a significant anecdote. As we were negotiating the research work, there had been a misunderstanding. I had proposed to make part of the project a critical management look. The transporter refused it, which almost meant the end of the project. I finally withdrew my proposal and accepted to focus on collecting information about fraud. I find this story very important because it really showed what the transporter expected (or did not expect) from the research. He wanted to receive a kind of knowledge that enabled a more efficient or relevant functioning of his management system. At that time, I represented it to myself as an "input" knowledge (that is: knowledge to make the system work as it is).

b/ The different methodologies and the reason of their choice

At first, as I have just explained it, I had not thought about a real methodological frame. The status of the research work (a pre-PhD research) as well as the very discovery of what fraud was, were good reasons not to have any idea about the way to make sense with fraud. 4 The choice of the relevant methodology was then related to the results of the precedent used one, on the one hand, and to the evolution of my object, on the other hand.

Statistics

The first source of information was the control data base. The work consisted in computing the data and producing some statistics about numerous aspects of control work as well as the characteristics of reported people. The advantages of a statistical work were triple. First, they were at immediate disposal. Then the data represented a huge amount of information. And finally, they were indeed an already formalized and systematized view of fraud. All these advantages made the data base a precious source of information for me, which enabled me to draw a first solid description of fraud on the network.

The database was designed by the transporter to account for the control and payment activities, about two years before my arrival. As I began my statistical work, the data were hardly used. 5 The database represented however a huge amount of information related to very diverse aspects of fraud: the age of reported people, the elapsed time before the payment of a fine, the kind of identity paper used for reporting, the number of fine for a same people… My purpose with the database was not very systematic. I had not the skills to produce a model of fraud (in the econometric sense of it). Rather, I have tried to produce much non-systematic knowledge about fraud. The aim was to use the database in order to let emerge a representation of fraud. I then more concentrated on average and disparity for the main aspects of fraud as represented in the database.

Control encounters

The statistical work had the great advantage to propose a solid view on fraud. But it was no real answer to the important questions about fraud related to the people not being reported 6 , and the qualitative aspects of fraud. 7 For these valuable reasons, the second step of my "inquiry" brought me on the field.

It was a work of direct observation. I followed controllers during around two weeks, trying to understand: the way they worked (which aim for their work? which product is expected? ...), the way they make the contact (what kind of relationship it is about? can we identify some rules of civility? …), and the way they understand evasion (what are the main fare evasion behaviors? why do people commit fraud? …).

The methodology for this work was ethnographic, in the sense that I was immerged in a group with its own culture, practices and understanding of the world. That was however a limited ethnography, if I mean by "limited" the fact that the group's existence was restricted to the control activity. Such an ethnographic perspective has been promoted for a long time in management sciences, in order to shed a light on the real functioning of organizations (Riveline, 1983). I used it in order to underline the real practices and understandings of controllers about fraud, assuming they were an important source of information. 8 It was also a good opportunity to discover fraud "in the making" and to make observations about the behavior of evaders in public space (so to say an ecological approach of the phenomenon in public space, rather than a quantitative one in an abstract space).

Evaders' interviews

6 They precisely represented the major issue for the transporter, from an economic point of view at least. The transporter used to consider that real fraud was in fact three times equivalent to the calculated rate of reported people. 7 For example, the database cannot account for the violence of a control encounter. The conflict dimension of a control encounter can have for the transporter important consequences (injuries at work for instance). 8 Ergonomics have already pointed out the difference between prescript and real work. In the case of control, the practices and understandings of controllers were not available on their missions' descriptions. The controller manager could not precisely describe them, and anyway, I considered they were the more relevant people to speak about control (I adopted then a rather ethnomethodological perspective, by turning to the members).

The third -and last -step of the research work consisted in going still closer to the evader.

The second method had granted an access to the field, but in the controllers' perspective. 9 The purpose of interviews was to discuss with people having committed fraud, and to try to give access to their "living" and own understanding of the reporting and of their fare evasion committing.

We proposed them the following "communication contract". Since they had been reported and had yet up to now not paid for their fine, we could cancel their fine if they accepted to discuss and exchange with me about fraud. The place of discussion was free; the interviews were half-directed: I tried actually to put on them the less pressure I could. 10 The biases were however significant. I interviewed only a certain kind of people. They had been reported. They had not paid for their fine. They considered somehow the reporting as a matter of importance (since they were interested by the canceling of their fine whereas 70% of reported people do not ever pay for their fine). All these points made the people interviewed non representative. I considered however their point of view was of great importance, because it was an opportunity to counterbalance the other points of views already put on the scene.

c/ The main results (related to the expectations)

I will briefly sketch the main results of the research work, in its successive steps. The point is not to focus on them, but to underline the kind of knowledge that was produced for the transporter, and the way it was used by the transporter.

Statistics

The results of the statistical work were of interest. They witness a great complexity of the object of fraud, but enabled at the same time to make some regularities clearer. The effects of the statistical work were not many. They were mainly used as a "picture" of the network and its fraud, at a certain time.

The transporter especially considered this knowledge improvement as a way to give information to the new comers among the controllers. This attitude could be understood by 9 Going along with the controllers and observing their work had made people assimilate me with controllers. For this reason, and because control and reporting are conflict, I had been forced onto a side of the "war", which had therefore excluded me from the other: that of evaders. 10 I organized the interviews by paying attention to the theoretical work thinking interviews as a negotiation on the world understanding (Grosjean & Thibault, 2001) or as a situation of communication. I paid much attention to the latter by organizing the frame of the interviews with the help of Hyme's SPEAKING (Bachmann, Lindenfeld & alii, 1981). I used it as well for the account of the interviews.

referring to Nonaka's work about the creation of knowledge (Nonaka, 1994). Knowledge is viewed as more or less formalized (tacit / codified) and socialized (individual / collective), and the point is then for managers to ensure the evolution towards a codified and collective knowledge.

I do not criticize Nonaka's model of knowledge, but I think such an approach can be relevant when the codification of knowledge enables a better socialization of it. In the case of the transporter, the knowledge was mainly tacit, but it was shared. A codification of an already shared knowledge appeared not to be very relevant. 11 It appears then that the main effective results of statistics were to picture punctually the fraud on the network. Several aspects w ere of interest, some questions were raised (about the relevant categories or schemes to analyze fraud especially). But the statistical work was never viewed by the transporter as an eventual systematical tool to promote. It was a punctual way to better fit the fraud management system with its environment.

Control encounters

By observing control encounters I tried to draw some usual scenarios of control and reporting.

They enabled me to propose a flexible model of reporting as a sequenced interaction and made clear the key features of it. Moreover, I underlined some dimensions of control and reporting, such as violence and conflict especially.

Once more, it appeared that such a kind of knowledge was of interest for the management, and not that much for controllers, who had a tacit understanding of what I explained. The use of this knowledge was actually very restricted, all the more so as the dimension of conflict and violence were denied.

Evaders' interviews

The interviews were very productive, because the y brought much new information. They made connections with the point of view of evaders, which enabled to address topics such as the motivation or the feelings (fear, anger, shame…) of evaders. These topics were not accessible by the controllers' or the database entrances.

The interviews were a means of completing the picture of fraud. This brings us back to the case of statistics. It proves to be a punctual improvement of knowledge. Their utility and eventual uses are yet not really obvious.

The difference with the other results (statistics and control encounters) lies in the consequences of this improvement of knowledge. As I will try to show it in the next paragraphs, whereas statistics and control encounters analysis had had no consequences for the fraud management system, the insertion of the evader's point of view impacted the functioning of the system.

d/ The "boomerang" effects (related to the main results)

Which step has made the management system evolve?

I would like to stress some indirect effects of the knowledge production I have just described.

As for the statistics work and for the control encounters observation, it is difficult to find one.

Obviously, people found interest in my statistics, and one or two of them even asked me to keep on producing some key numbers for them. As well, controllers reacted to the violent understanding of control, for instance, or discussed some of the scenarios' technical aspects.

But these micro effects were followed by no concrete evolution of the fraud management system.

On the contrary, the interviews had a concrete consequence. They made the transporter more aware of the importance of the evader; that is of the relational aspects of fraud management. I was then proposed to keep on my research work with experimentation on a specific way to deal with fine payment. The point was precisely to take the relational dimension of fraud management into account, and to propose then another kind of relation to the evader that had been reported: contact them, try to have a personal attention for their case, think about a solution to a recurrent problem of fraud… 12

Behind each specific step, the continuity of a reflection

There is one point I would like to come back on. I insisted much on the interviews' impact. I think this has to be counterbalanced. The interviews actually were determinant in the 12 This was the project of experimentation. The reader has already guessed this was not all so easy, and the intent had to face many obstacles. Currently, there has been as far as I know no institutionalization of the project. Experimentation has not proved to be very efficient in regard of the means the transporter could accept to involve. But I really insist on the fact it was decided to exp eriment. This can be considered as a concrete effect of the knowledge production.

knowledge they provided to the transporter. But as I have noticed before, they are the third step of my progressive approach of the object of fraud. I mean that a relational understanding of fraud could already be guessed in the questions raised by the statistical work or the control encounter observations. It is somehow artificial to separate the steps of a continuous reflection. I could have mentioned especially that the encounters observation had been a premise for a relational understanding of fraud. I had actually used Goffman's model of the service relation to analyze the interactions between evaders and controllers. Goffman notices that in some cases, the service relation can be based on a misunderstanding. 13 Such a view was of great help to become aware of the necessity to integrate the evader's point of view.

To conclude, the separation I have artificially operated has however its utility. It was supposed to show the homogeneity and the contribution to the improvement of knowledge of each research step. From this point of view, and even if it has its origin in the other approaches of fraud, the last step has undoubtedly had more concrete effects on the fraud management system. I would like to address this difference in the second part of the paper.

2/ System of knowledge and meta-knowledge

In this second part of the paper, I will try to account for the different impact of the knowledge improvements. I will first try to introduce the reasons to explain the variable impact of a knowledge improvement. I will especially show the notion of improvement is not sufficient to account for the effect of knowledge. Then, I will try to sketch two main aspects of what constitutes a system of knowledge (the tools and the places of a system of knowledge), and suggest how such a concept can account for the effects of my research by the transporter. a/ The interactional approach of deviance and the necessity of a meta-level for knowledge.

An interactional frame to criticize the results of the research work

The interactional understanding of deviance considers deviance as well as a result of a deviant act, as that of the institutional activity. 14 Kitsuse and Cicourel for instance (Cicourel and Kit suse, 1963) wrote a note about the production of police statistics, where they show how far the figures supposed to reflect the deviant activity should be above all used as indicators of the police activity… I had noticed such a danger in my statistical wo rk. 15 The point is not then to question the validity or the truth value of any figures. I already addressed this issue. 16 In fact, I rather need to understand why the improvement of knowledge had no effect on the fraud management system. 17 It is interesting h owever to use the interactional deviance perspective to stress the role of the transporter in the production of the figures. They are not the only pure reflect of evasion; they are too that of the transporter's activity. 18 Then the use of the database is actually not neutral. It does mean, on the contrary, that I based my own look at the phenomenon on the hypothesis and categories that were used to design the information tool. 19 There is a danger of circularity of the produced knowledge on fraud.

The same kind of conclusion can be drawn from the observation of control encounters. I have mentioned Goffman's frame for service relation. He pointed out the fact the psychiatrist and the patient were trapped in an institutional definition of each other, that constrained the former to understand the latter as a patient, and to interpret every behavior from him as a sign of mental illness (Goffman, 1968).

Fraud can introduce the same kind of trap, in the sense that a controller interprets every behavior and word of an evader as a strategy related to the fine. In this case again, the hypothesis (and the knowledge that goes with these hypothesis) belongs to the situation of 14 Given they opposed causal theory of deviance that all assumed the institutions only noticed the deviant behaviours, the interactional authors generally more focus on the active role of institution in the constitution of deviance. Their theory however is supposed to take both sides into account. 15 For instance, the fraud rate could be sometimes hundred times as high from one bus station to another (200 meters distance). That seemed to be explained by the positioning of controllers (for whom the choice of a bus station is decisive for control and reporting). In that sense, the controllers' work had a major influence on the figures of fraud. The latter did not account anymore for fraud as a result of people's deviant behaviour. 16 The question was of importance for my research report (Suquet, 2003). I referred to Desrosières approach of statistical artefacts. He goes beyond the opposition between convention and reality. He endorses the "objectivation" capacity of statistical artefacts regarding the world. 17 One way to answer could be to consider there was no new information in the results. It would be yet surprising, since nobody had tried to produce information from the database. 18 This is all the more obvious in the present case since the database's input are the controllers' fines and activity reports. 19 Hatchuel and Weil (Hatchuel and Weil, 1992) had interested in expert systems (supposed in the seventies to be the universally rational solution). Their critique dealt in particular with the "forgetting" of the knowledge dimension on which these systems were based. Most of the time, a form of knowledge was given a greater place, and another was forgotten. In my opinion, their work clearly shows the impossible neutrality of a formalized system of knowledge, even if this impossible neutrality is quickly forgotten… control (that is in great part to the institutional proceedings). The same issue of circularity appears for the second step of my research.

It is easy then to understand why such knowledge had no real effect. It could not, because it was produced from the basic hypothesis of the fraud management system. Far from a knowledge improvement, there has been to a large extent knowledge mimesis or repetition.

Obviously, it cannot be denied there has been at least an update, or a quantitative increase in knowledge. That can have an effective utility for the management system.20 But it can have little impact on the fraud management system.21

A meta-level of knowledge

We have seen there is a criteria to distinguish knowledge performativity on a given management system. The criteria lies in the position of the knowledge relatively to the basic hypotheses of the system analyzed. 22 The reflection of Paul Watzlawick goes in this direction.

He tries to build a systematic understanding of what enables a change (Watzlawick, 1975). He starts from mathematical theories (the theory of groups and the theory of logical types), and tries to apply what they can teach us to the daily situations. As for me, I will try to apply it in my turn to another kind of object: a management system. That means I shift from relationships to organizations.

The following quotation shows how Watzlawick's theory of change can fit with the research description I have done. It can precisely suggest a systematic understanding for the kind of distinction I had made regarding the specific research work by the transportation system:

"Group theory provides us with a model to think the kind of change occurring inside a system that remains unchanging in itself. The theory of logical types do not focus on what happens inside a class, that is between its members, but provides us with to examine the relationship between a member and its class, as well as the particular transformation that constitutes the passage from a logical level to the superior one. If we accept to make that basic distinction between these two theories, we can deduce from it the existence from two kinds of change: the first one takes place inside a given system which remains unchanged; the other modifies the system itself." 23 Watzlawick uses the notion of system that organizes coherence between elements (belonging to the same group) and sees two possibilities for a given system: change or permanence. He does not indicate the concrete lever to switch from a given logical level to the superior one. I will try to precise it later.

So it seems possible to use his formalization of the change, and apply it to the results of the research by the transportation system. The fraud management system had evolved in different ways (permanence or change) following the kind of knowledge produced. The first kind of knowledge was constituted by elements of the existing basic knowledge of the management system, which it already used for its functioning. The second kind brought exterior elements, which enabled a change of the system because it constrained a passage to the superior logical type.

The formalization of Watzlawick is all the more interesting as it seems to shed a certain light on reflections in management sciences about the relation of an organization to its environment. It could be a good way to distinguish two means for a management system to react to knowledge about its environment. As interesting as it may be, it is yet not sufficient.

It gives no clue about the concrete features of a management system that account for its permanence or change. I will now try to sketch the main ones.

b/ Tools of knowing, places for knowing

It is a matter of importance, at this point of the paper, to try to isolate the main elements of the management system that give to see more precisely: what a management system is constituted with; and what the elements are which play a role in its evolution (permanence or change). I will try to stress the tools first, and then what I will call the "places" of a system. I can not ensure there are absolutely no other elements in a management system. However I think this is a first strong definition of a management system. Tools and places in a given organization can respectively refer to technological and social sub-system, which are the main features of Emery and Trist work on organizations (Charreire & Huault, 2002). 24 Tools of knowing 24 Their work on organizations at the Tavistock Institute is well known. He brought new insights into the theory of organizations. Furthermore, except for theories focusing on psychoanalyst understanding of organizations, technological (instruments, proceedings…) and social aspects (actors, communities…) in their broad sense can however be connected to a great many theories. The reader can refer to Bernoux's sociology of organizations (Bernoux, 1985).

I would like to have here a broad definition of a tool in organization. Moisdon calls "management tools" the management techniques that show formalization of organized activity (Moisdon, 1997). 25 My definition of tools will also involve the objects to perform organized activity. A good example of it can be found in the work of Denis Bayart, who studies the constitution of a statistical tool (Bayart, 1995). 26 Tools can obviously be a way to produce knowledge. But it can be interesting too to look how far tools are produced by knowledge. Bayart convincingly shows the control cards are a materialization of knowledge that gets embedded into an object for use. As well, Moisdon recalls the traditional understanding of management tools as tools for conformation. It seems easy then to point out the knowledge which the conformation results from. 27 Tools then produce knowledge from knowledge (inside the same group)

The point can be stressed by referring to the distinction between meta-knowledge and knowledge. Tools alone often only produce knowledge, and do not give access to the metaknowledge they were made of. Desrosières has shown how statistical tools are less and less questioned, although they were a pure theory at first. He explains it by an institutional work that inscribes this theory into reality by the means of "solid" objects (Desrosières, 2000).

My purpose is here to suggest a view to the reader, which can explain the permanence of the management system. The example of statistical objects is from this point of view efficient, since it makes the connection to the permanence of the fraud management system (the statistical part of it) I have described.

To conclude with tools, I must however evoke their possible role in the evolution of a management system. Moisdon sees actually them as means to learn about reality. This is in favor of a possible meta-knowledge production by tools. I do agree with such a view, but it is important to notice Moisdon deals with the introduction of new tools: this was hardly the case 25 Moisdon means formalization of what organized activity is, will or should be. The complete definition says: "We will use this denomination every time we will encounter a set of arguments and knowledge that formally connect a number of organizational variables, be it quantities, prices, quality levels, or any other parameters, and that are aimed at conducting the investigation for classical management acts which can be classically put together: to forecast, to decide, to control." 26 Bayart means with objects "material, concrete or graphical forms". The statistical tool he studies is a graphic representation (control cards) designed from a statistical rule, and used to control the production quality. See Bayart, 1995. 27 Foucault has followed such a direction in his research work. A good example of it is his first study of the history of sexuality (Foucault, 1994).

for t he transportation system. Moreover, Moisdon himself has recently underlined the difficulty to learn with tools (Moisdon, 1995). 28

Places for knowing

The concept of "place" refers to the work of the ethnographer Jeanne Favret-Saada. She has actually worked on witchcraft by the French country about thirty years ago (Favret-Saada, 1977). Her purpose was to create scientific knowledge about the controversial phenomenon. She however faced difficult methodological issues. As a scientific (and a stranger), she wit nessed the impossibility to talk about her theme of research. People pretended not to know anything about it, or even not to be involved in it: other people believe in it… She understood witchcraft was a system of relationships and of discourses, in which a certain number of positions existed. The concept of place tries to account for the position in such a system. She realized the witchcraft system had a strong permanence and closure. There was no place for a scientific researcher (as well as for journalists…). She finally succeeded in getting access to knowledge about witchcraft, but only by experiencing the already existing places of the system… thanks to lucky circumstances and to her long term presence. Again, I do not want to try to show that an evolution of a system of places is not possible. It would be as vain as for tools. But the concept of a system of places can partly explain the rigidity of a management system. For instance, the research by the transporter can be better understood with the concept of place.

So to say, the third step of the research consisted in suggesting a new place in the fraud management system. As I have tried to stress it, there was no place for the evaders in the system. The integration of a new place was a means to make the system evolve. Integrating a place for evaders supposed to accept their discourse and the associated knowledge. It also necessitated to think more about the connections between payment department and evaders for instance. This is probably one of the reasons for which experimentation was decided, whereas the steps one and two of the research had no "meta" effect. This second part of the paper has helped to better show what happened with the created knowledge, by the transporter. It is important to make a clear distinction between two levels of knowledge. Meta-knowledge and knowledge do not have the same impact on a management system. Tools and places constitute a management system. They produce knowledge and can account for knowledge regulation. They actua lly appear to be mediums of permanence and of change. I have mainly insisted on the permanence effects, in order to draw a parallel with the research work described in the first part.

Conclusion

I have outlined a frame to account for the differences of knowledge performativity on the fraud management system. The frame insists on the importance of taking into account the knowledge already embedded in the management system. It can be found through a critical look at tools as well as at places. The next step seems to insist on the critical role of the researcher.

Critics and management sciences

The point is not ideology. Whereas critics can easily be assimilated to ideological discourse, the critical look I suggest here mustn't be understood in the same way. It rather deals with stressing eventual roundabouts and supporting a reflexive attitude. Many authors insist on the importance of the critical look at organizations. 29 But I am not interested here in only critical streams of research. 30 To draw on the parallel with the research work done by the transporter, I want to insist on the constructive aspects of a research in management sciences. Authors like Lorino (Lorino, 2005) or David (David, 2002) for instance, have insisted on the importance for researchers to care of the meta-level in a constructive orientation. The former has used it in a pragmatist way to help a firm organizing one its process; the latter appeals Peirce's notion of abduction to create new ways of thinking.

It seems they indicate a good way to connect knowledge and research for organizations.

Towards an epistemology of management sciences? The epistemology of action

Some authors in management sciences have looked forward to develop a systematic view on this ambiguity of management sciences. Acknowledging management sciences have a problematic epistemology -and in fact a need for a unified epistemology (Cohen, 1997), Hatchuel thinks about an epistemological project for management sciences (Hatchuel, 2002).

His project carries on the management sciences tradition I stressed in the introduction. This tradition insists on the role of artifacts and knowledge in organizations (Charue-Duboc, 1995; Moisdon, 1997). It has also thought about the relationship between an organization and a researcher (Girin, 1990), so introducing the relational dimension of knowledge dynamics.

Hatchuel as for him proposes to analyze organizations by focusing simultaneously on relationships and sets of knowledge. 31 The simultaneity of the look enables a researcher to reveal the way an organization works. For an organization has a purpose of action, Hatchuel says each one is based on what he calls a "metaphysics of action". 32 His epistemological project then clearly stands for a critical production of knowledge of the researcher. The purpose is to play a role in the knowledge dynamics of organizations, in order to help them to evolve. Isolating a metaphysic of action enables an organization not to remain embedded in its own knowledge. Management sciences, which are traditionally viewed as discourses for knowledge, then become discourses for collective action. Remains that, if the criterion is the impulse for collective action, my research work was not really successful… 31 It is not strictly equivalent to my approach through tools and places. It seems however that corresponding is possible. I have actually insisted on the fact tools and places were organized in a system, which leads to the relations. Furthermore, I have shown how every tool or place was related to a set of knowledge. Without leaving behind the tools and places' approach, it appears to be possible to endorse Hatchuel epistemological project. 32 It is interesting to notice the metaphysics consists in "meta" knowledge on physics…

Such a concept is by the way really questioning. Two years later, the question (of the correct definition of my research object) remains open.

The transporter had no accounting habits, and they used to compute only a few ratings about fraud. Generally, a rate of reported fraud (number of reported people / number of controlled people) and a control rate (number of controlled people / number of estimated passengers) were calculated, after several criteria (which bus line, times, bus station?…).

Even for the new comers, it can be questioned, since they are well socialized by the work group… Maybe it can be understood by interpreting the codification of knowledge as an empowering of the managers, who else have no means to influence and control the work group.

Goffman thinks about the relation between the mental patient and the psychiatrist, in the context of a mental institution.

If the transporter has asked for a survey on evasion and evaders on the network, if there is no evidence of uselessness, I must consider it has its own utility for them.

I deal with impacts that cannot be mistaken with current functioning (functioning as it is).

I do not advance such a criteria as necessary. Paul Duguid for instance[START_REF] Paul | The art of knowing": social and tacit dimensions of knowledge and the limits of the community of practice (Information society (forthcoming)[END_REF]) could probably convincingly explain the stability of the management system by the lack of consideration for the "critical" tacit knowledge.

See[START_REF] Paul | Changements : paradoxes et psychothérapie[END_REF], p.28. Please notice that I use the French edition. I translated again, from French into English. But I do not guarantee the strict equivalence with the original text from Watzlawick.

A systemic approach of organizations can account for the rigidity of a management system, since tools are numerous, and they never change all together. The innovation of one tool has then to be put in relation to the permanence of the other tools.

I do not think to over-interpret Sabina Stan's as well as Jonathan Larsson's contributions by saying they endorse too a critical perspective, at a different scale. Transparency is not only a matter of quantity of information (e.g. "improvement of knowledge"), but should be analyzed as a way to organize (socially, cognitively) knowledge.

I can take the example of the « critical studies » stream of research, which bases its reflection on authors like Foucault, Derrida, and so on.


Martine Miquel
email: martine.miquel@versailles.inra.fr

Ghassen Trigui

Alain Trubuil

Bertrand Dubreucq
email: bertrand.dubreucq@versailles.inra.fr

Imaging and Quantitative Analysis of Size and Distribution of Spherical Bodies, e.g. Embryonic Oil Bodies

. Image acquisition was followed by a detailed statistical analysis of OB size and distribution during seed development in the four dimensions (x, y, z, and t).

Materials and Reagents

1. Plant material a. Arabidopsis thaliana plants, wild type or mutant or transgenic plants.

b. Developing siliques between 6 and 11 days after pollination of plants grown in a greenhouse under the following conditions (13 h of light, diurnal temperature of 25 °C, and nocturnal temperature of 17 °C), and irrigated twice per week with mineral nutrient solution.

2. Nile Red (a neutral lipid stain, at 2 g/ml final in acetone) (Sigma-Aldrich, catalog number:

Notes:

i.

The Nile Red stain is highly fluorescent when associated with neutral lipids.

Nevertheless you can bleach it if using too high laser power for excitation.

According to our experience, reducing the laser power to its minimal value and laser excitation to 10% of laser power is far enough for excellent observation and preserves fluorescence for up to one night.

ii.

As the fluorescence signal is usually very strong, you can decrease the pinhole's size to 0.7 Airy to reduce the thickness of the optical section.

iii.

Increasing scanning speed as well as using bidirectional-scanning mode will speed up acquisition.

C. Quantitative analysis 1. Obtain images at a similar location from 3 different embryos for statistical analysis. f. The 3D distance transform of this binary image is computed (a value is given for each pixel of the image according to its distance to the border of the closest object in the vicinity).

g. The maximum of the distance function produces the "marker image" i.e. the centre of the segmented quasi-spherical filled object. The complement of the distance transform (CDT), with the marker image is used to create the "watershed lines": the watershed algorithm expands the markers (like inflating a balloon) toward increasing value of the CDT. The watershed lines represent the boundaries separating the objects. Finally, the watershed lines are subtracted from the binary image to obtain separated and individualized objects ("segmented image"). The image of separated objects is then converted to a spread sheet document where each item in the spread sheet is a labeled object volume.

  this study an inverted LEICA SP2-AOBS spectral confocal laser microscope (Leica Microsystems) equipped with an HCX PL APO CS 40 x 1.25 objective and a multiline argon laser was used. 2. Forceps (Dumont No.5) (Sigma-Aldrich) http://www.bio-protocol.org/e1369 Vol 5, Iss 1, Jan 05, 2015 2 3. Scalpel (11 P, blade) (Swann Norton) 4. Glass slides or glass-bottom dish, cover slips 5. Binocular (Nikon Corporation, model: SMZ1000) (Champigny sur Marne with a led ring -

2 .Video 1 .

 21 Add a small volume (between 20 and 30 µl) of Nile Red solution and cover with a cover slip. Remove embryos from the seed teguments by gently pressing seeds between the slide and cover slip with the rounded end of the handle of the scalpel and observe after 30 min of incubation in the dark at room temperature (see Video 1). Dissecting embryos out of Arabidopsis developing siliques Note: You can use a 60% (v/v) glycerol solution or 0.4 % (w/v) of low melting agarose as mounting medium for your staining solution to better immobilize the embryos for long observation periods. B. Confocal microscopy 1. Find appropriate embryos and adjust the focus on cotyledon edges using a 40x objective.2. Set optical parameters to optimize signal to noise ratio. http://www.bio-protocol.org/e1369 Vol 5, Iss 1, Jan 05, 2015 3 a. Excitation laser: the argon laser is set at 10% of 488 nm for Nile Red excitation. b. Emission band of 550 to 650 nm. c. Capture the images (90 to 100 optical sections of 0.16 µm thickness) with a 40x/1.25 oil objective and 8x digital zooming. Each section is the average of two scans conducted at the resolution of 512 x 512 pixels with a spatial resolution of 0.09 mm x 0.09 mm x 0.16 µm in the x, y, z referential.

2 .

 2 Analyze the images using the following pipeline: a. The crude image stacks present several characteristics that disturb direct automated counting of the oil bodies (Figure1). To circumvent this problem, the procedures for image segmentation by watershed and data extraction were implemented in AVIZO ® FIRE in a semi-automated pipeline. A specific module (WshedBinSeparate) has been developed in TCL language (Tool Command Language). The outline of the procedure is described in Figure2. A movie shows the sequence of operations (Video 2).

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. 2D/3D view of an image stack with various problems preventing direct use in image analysis. A. Images with high noise; B. Non homogenous objects in size; C. Variable grey levels; D. Objects with touching edges.

Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. Image analysis pipeline. A. Generating binary images with double thresholding; B. Generating watershaded images; C. Individual labelling of objects and 3 D rendering. The segmentation chain in Avizo (left) and the resulting images (right).

Video 2 .

 2 OB image processing pipeline b. The WshedBinSeparate module allows segmentation of oil bodies images stacks by watershed methods. c. The input image is a 3D stack in grey scale. The images are first de-noised with a Gaussian filter using ND-SAFIR. Two thresholding operations are then performed with threshold values manually indicated by the operator. The best value is chosen by visual test of various threshold values. d. The high threshold allows the detection of large objects without worrying about overor under-estimating them but without consideration of small objects. e. The low threshold allows the detection of small objects without worrying about the over-or under-estimation of the large objects. The images are combined to produce a thresholded "binary image".

Acknowledgments

This work was funded by INRA and, in particular, by the divisions BAP (Plant Biology and Breeding) and MIA (Applied Mathematics and Informatics) for G. Trigui's Ph.D. This work was adapted from Miquel et al. (2014).