Sélinde Van Engelenburg

Boriana D Rukanova

Wout Hofman

Hua Tan

Marijn Janssen
email: janssen@tudelft.nl2wout.hofman@tno.nl

J Ubacht

Y Tan

Aligning stakeholder interests, governance requirements and blockchain design in business and government information sharing

Keywords: blockchain technology, distributed ledger technology, governance, business, government, information sharing, access control, consensus mechanism

Governance requirements for systems supporting information sharing between businesses and government organisations (B&G) are determined by a high variety of stakeholders with often conflicting interests. These conflicting interests can hamper the introduction and scaling-up of ICT-innovations that change their roles and authorities. We address one such innovation: the introduction of blockchain technologies in the B&G context. Who can govern data and the system depends on several elements of the design of a blockchain-based system, particularly the data structure, consensus mechanism and network topology. Design choices regarding these elements affect who can make decisions and hence we call them blockchain control points. These control points require an explicit and well-understood relationship between the design decisions and the interests of stakeholders. Yet, the literature on blockchain technology and governance does not offer such insight. Therefore, we developed a framework to assess the alignment between stakeholders interest and blockchain design choices. This framework consists of three views and their interrelationships, 1) a stakeholder view providing insight into the tensions between stakeholder's interests and governance requirements, 2), a governance view on the rights concerning the data and the system, and 3) a blockchain control view describing how design decisions on the control points affect whether governance requirements are met and how parties can exercise their rights. Making these links explicit enables an understanding of how technical design choices can trigger organizational dynamics from the stakeholder view and vice versa. Based on the framework we formulate a research agenda concerning blockchain design choices and governance.

Introduction

The literature on information sharing between businesses and/or government organisations (B&G information sharing) describes various blockchain-based systems, ranging from supply chain management to information sharing to improve safety and security, and to e-government (e.g., [START_REF] Ølnes | Blockchain in government: Benefits and implications of distributed ledger technology for information sharing[END_REF][START_REF] Korpela | Digital Supply Chain Transformation toward Blockchain Integration[END_REF][START_REF] Van Engelenburg | Designing context-aware architectures for business-to-government information sharing[END_REF][START_REF] Segers | The use of a blockchain-based smart import declaration to reduce the need for manual cross-validation by customs authorities[END_REF][START_REF] Tian | An Agri-food Supply Chain Traceability System for China Based on RFID & Blockchain Technology[END_REF]). In these domains, various stakeholders are involved, with often conflicting interests. For example, it might be in the interest of businesses in a supply chain to share information to reduce the bullwhip effect and reduce costs [START_REF] Lee | Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect[END_REF][START_REF] Bray | Information Transmission and the Bullwhip Effect: An Empirical Investigation[END_REF]. Furthermore, the government might want to reuse the same data for risk assessment [START_REF] Hesketh | Weaknesses in the supply chain: who packed the box[END_REF]. However, businesses might only want to share data if it is secure and can only be controlled and accessed by the appropriate and identifiable parties [START_REF] Fawcett | Information sharing and supply chain performance: the role of connectivity and willingness[END_REF][START_REF] Lee | Information sharing in a supply chain[END_REF][START_REF] Hart | Power and Trust: Critical Factors in the Adoption and Use of Electronic Data Interchange[END_REF]. Parties like IT providers also have their interests. Hence, we view blockchain-based systems as complex socio-technical systems in which many stakeholders with divergent interests are involved.

In 2009, Satoshi Nakamoto [START_REF] Nakamoto | Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System[END_REF] combined several existing technologies to solve the double-spending problem for the cryptocurrency Bitcoin without an intermediary. He created the first example of what was later called blockchain or distributed ledger technology. Later on, blockchain technology was generalised to other application domains. Blockchain technology (BCT) has several features that can make it also useful for B&G information sharing: a high level of transparency, immutability and reliability.

In contrast to the more simple case of cryptocurrencies in which a transaction takes place between two parties that send and receive the currency, in the case of B&G information sharing, a diversity of types of transactions can occur in which multiple stakeholders are involved. Stakeholders that can play a diversity of roles and have different types of relationships. This leads to a complicated context that requires different technological design choices. For example, if BCT is used to support cryptocurrencies, usually all nodes can view and verify transactions and are anonymous [START_REF] Nakamoto | Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System[END_REF]. But when businesses want to reduce the bullwhip effect in supply chains, the data needs to be accessible only to a select number of identifiable parties to avoid disclosure of sensitive business data.

In the literature, some solutions in the domain of blockchain technology are provided that can help to deal with the different governance needs for B&G information sharing, e.g. the use of private networks or proof of authority as a consensus mechanism [START_REF] Ølnes | Blockchain in government: Benefits and implications of distributed ledger technology for information sharing[END_REF]. However, no framework exists that helps to assess the relationship between the design of the blockchain-based system on the needs for governance in the B&G information sharing domain and vice versa. Simultaneously, it requires looking at the entire technical design of the system to assess whether these needs are met and aligned with stakeholder interests. In this paper, we present a framework to provide insight into the relationship between blockchain design choices and governance for B&G information sharing. This insight can enable adaptive government and contribute to an agile government [START_REF] Janssen | Adaptive governance: Towards a stable, accountable and responsive government[END_REF][START_REF] Mergel | Agile government: Systematic literature review and future research[END_REF].

First, we provide an overview of the framework in section 2. Next, in section 3, we present the stakeholder view of the framework which provides insight into the complexities and dynamics of B&G information sharing. We illustrate this by a case of B&G information sharing in international trade. In section 4, we introduce the concept of governance requirements to make the rights of stakeholders explicit. In section 5, we present the blockchain control points and how different design choices affect which rights parties can exercise. In section 6, we show the use of the framework based on the case of TradeLens. Based on this, in section 7, we outline our research agenda for further research into the relationship between blockchain design choices and governance.

A governance framework for blockchain-based B&G information sharing

In this section, we present an overview of the proposed framework. The framework allows for systematically analysing the relationships between the stakeholder context of parties involved in B&G information sharing, the governance requirements stemming from this context and the blockchain design choices (see Fig. 1). Here, we present the relationships between the views of the framework. Governance as an abstract concept can be seen as all processes of social organization and social coordination [START_REF] Bevir | What is governance? In: Key Concepts in Governance[END_REF]. We use the term governance in the broad sense as processes of social organization and coordination that relate to blockchain-based B&G information sharing. We use the term governance requirements, as discussed later in this paper, in a more narrow sense as decision rights that parties should be able to exercise based on stakeholder dynamics and the design choices.

The first view of our framework is the stakeholder view where we classify the stakeholders in B&G information sharing and discuss their interests and potential tensions between them. The blockchain control view refers to blockchain control points. Control points enable parties to exercise power over other actors in a sociotechnical system and are often domain-specific [START_REF] Elaluf-Calderwood | Mobile Platforms as Convergent Systems -Analysing Control Points and Tussles with Emergent Socio-Technical Discourses[END_REF][START_REF] Rukanova | Emergence of collective digital innovations through the process of control point driven network reconfiguration and reframing: the case of mobile payment[END_REF]. We identified several control points for blockchainbased systems that are subject to design choices. By making design choices, different ways of governing the data and the system are enabled. Therefore, changes in configurations of design choices for these blockchain control points can also lead to a change in the power dependencies among the stakeholders involved.

It is difficult to systematically translate high-level dynamics between stakeholders into blockchain design choices, and vice versa. The needs for governance in B&G information sharing of the stakeholder view are complicated and often described based on high-level concepts. While considering governance in this way helps to reveal the high-level dynamics at play, it is difficult to translate to and from more low-level design choices for the information-sharing system.

Therefore, to allow for a systematic analysis of the interaction between design choices at blockchain control points and the stakeholder interests, we introduce another view of the framework, which relies on the concept of governance requirements. The governance requirements act as an intermediary between high-level governance considerations and low-level technical design choices. Governance requirements describe decision rights that parties should be able to exercise explicitly. The determination of the rights for the stakeholders involved starts in the stakeholder view and leads to agreements (e.g., specified in contracts). On the other hand, what rights parties can exercise depends on the technological design choices made. The framework shows this relationship by placing the governance requirements between the stakeholder and the blockchain control view.

The framework can be used in two ways: 1) a. analyze the stakeholder dynamics to come to an agreement and determine what governance requirements should be met and then b. identify the design choices that allow for meeting these requirements, and 2) a. determine the effect of certain design choices on the meeting of governance requirements, and b. determine the effects on the tensions between the stakeholders involved. The framework could be used at different stages of the design process. For example, relationships and interests among stakeholders can change, or external factors can force different design choices, e.g., in the case of new laws or regulations.

Stakeholders and complexity in the B&G information sharing domain

The B&G domain is fundamentally different from the cryptocurrency domain. To develop blockchain-based systems, the complexities and specificities of the B&G domain are key for understanding the design options. As indicated in Fig. 1, we identify four main stakeholder groups on a high level of abstraction (labelled by multiple ovals) that are relevant in the context of B&G information sharing:

1. Businesses (B), such as supply chain partners, are in the business stakeholder group. Their motivation to use blockchain technology is usually driven by a strive for competitive gains and economic benefits, and increasingly by social responsibility. 2. Government agencies (G) can act in different roles, e.g. as a regulator (Gr) or as a body supervising the activities of businesses (Gs). In their regulatory role, government agencies can issue laws and regulations or can adopt policies to stimulate developments by e.g. providing public funding. In their role of government supervision, governments are interested in receiving additional information from businesses to perform their supervision processes, such as customs risk assessment or compliance management. 3. Technology providers (T) refer to infrastructure and platform providers. These are providers of technical solutions to businesses and government and they are driven by their business model. Recently, this group also includes new actors (BC) that specifically provide blockchain infrastructures such as Hyperledger. 4. Standardization bodies (S) also play a role in the B&G domain. The growth in multiple blockchain-enabled solutions requires standardization for interoperability of blockchain-based systems and services.

Fig. 1 shows that these actors are interrelated. We show the primary relationship between government, business and technology providers as solid arrows labelled with a, b, and c respectively. The dotted arrows labelled d denote the secondary link of each of these stakeholders with standardization organizations. We also explicitly depict the link between technology providers and blockchain providers (arrow labelled e) as there can be conflicting and mutual interests between these parties as well. All of these links can be used to identify potential tensions. While the model is quite general and would apply to other cases as well, we illustrate it by using the example of international trade. Here, we see the complexity of the international supply chains that link many business actors. When goods are moved on a global scale, a diversity of governing authorities (e.g., customs) are involved when the goods cross national borders. Especially in a global setting, multiple levels of government, ranging from national, supranational (e.g., EU) to global (e.g., World Customs Organization) are involved. These governmental organisations exchange information with other governments and businesses.

In B&G information sharing, standardization plays a key role. International standardization bodies such as UN CEFACT play a crucial role in standardizing business documents and data sets. The World Customs Organization developed the World Customs Data Model. Currently, these standards focus on older means of information sharing, such as messaging and declarations. This means that innovative implementations take a lot of time before actual adoption.

The B&G information-sharing world is quite fragmented. Over the last decades, efforts have been made on the side of both businesses and governments to overcome such fragmentation and to allow for better information sharing. Recently, global digital trade infrastructures enabled by blockchain have emerged that allow government agencies to access (additional) business information from the supply chains, which is provided voluntarily [START_REF] Tan | Developing Large Scale B2B Blockchain Architectures for Global Trade Lane[END_REF]. While technically it is becoming increasingly easy to share information in the B&G domain, information sharing remains a complex issue [START_REF] Eckartz | A decision model for data sharing[END_REF]. Businesses and governments are extremely careful that key information is not accessible to parties that are not authorized to see it. In the B&G domain, parties are rarely anonymous, as is often the case with cryptocurrencies. For example, in purchasing contracts and subcontracting contracts, different parties will need to be named. Government agencies need to know which parties are filing import and export declarations, so these parties need to be registered to perform these operations. Linking these stakeholder dynamics to blockchain design choices directly is difficult. In the next section, we introduce the governance requirements as a way to link the two.

Governance requirements

We now turn to the governance requirements in our framework. These have two dimensions: 1) which parties should have control, and 2) the extent to which parties should have control. For the first, we turn to the work of Constantinides [START_REF] Constantinides | Perspectives and implications for the development of information infrastructures[END_REF]. He relies on work from the field of natural resource commons arrangements. This viewpoint is relevant, as the distributed nature of blockchain with the complexities of B&G information sharing will rarely lead to simple centralised governance arrangements. Constantinides [START_REF] Constantinides | Perspectives and implications for the development of information infrastructures[END_REF] views infrastructure resources, such as a database containing data, in a way analogous to natural resources, such as a forest containing trees. In our case, the main resource is the blockchain on which different types of data are stored. These can include transactions, smart contracts, events or documentation.

In some cases, the data in B&G information sharing is not stored in the blockchain itself, but the blockchain stores only hashes of the data, links to the data, or rules for controlling access to the data. This turns the databases that store the actual data into resources as well. Furthermore, if the data on the blockchain is encrypted, then the system for generating and sharing keys is also a resource, for example. Right to obtain access to data shared using blockchain

Constantinides [START_REF] Constantinides | Perspectives and implications for the development of information infrastructures[END_REF], based on the work of Ostrom [START_REF] Ostrom | How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action[END_REF], describes three types of rights, namely constitutional, collective choice and operational rights. Constitutional rights refer to who may or may not participate in making collective choices for the system [START_REF] Constantinides | Perspectives and implications for the development of information infrastructures[END_REF]. Collective choice refers to rights concerning users and components within the information system, and operational rights refer to those related to access to the information system and the data [START_REF] Constantinides | Perspectives and implications for the development of information infrastructures[END_REF]. In table 1, we describe how these types of rights can be applied in the case of a blockchain-based B&G information sharing system. It is important to note here that 'data shared using blockchain' can refer to data that is directly stored in the blockchain, as well as data that is stored elsewhere.

A governance requirement is a description of to what extent certain parties should have what rights. As the domain of B&G information sharing is complex due to multiple stakeholders with various interests, parties will often need to share rights and there will not be a single party that can make all decisions by themselves. For example, a consortium of parties might need to share the right to decide who can be a node in the network. The consortium in that case then shares exclusion rights concerning access to the system. The consortium might also decide that a carrier should have extraction rights, which is a governance requirement. To fulfil this requirement, the system needs to be designed such that the carrier can prevent or permit others to extract data. Whether this is the case, depends on the design choices described in the next section.

5

The blockchain control view

The blockchain control view connects design choices and governance requirements. First, we identify control points that can be used to control who can exercise what rights in the system. Then, we identify possible design choices for those control points. Next, we relate the effects of the design choices to the rights presented in table 1. Table 2 shows the control points and each design choice we identified. Some design choices can be combined, such as authenticated and encrypted data. The data structure control point refers to the form of the data stored in the blocks and whether the data that is to be shared is stored in the blockchain itself, or whether the blockchain is only used to share data stored elsewhere. An important effect of the choice of encrypting data is that someone with extraction rights requires a key to be able to exercise their rights. When only proofs of existence, links, or access control rules are stored for the data, then not only the rights over the blockchain components and the data in the blockchain will need to be considered, but also over the additional databases and the data that is stored there. Storing the actual data elsewhere, however, does provide new opportunities, for example, to remove the data.

The blockchain network topology control point refers to the arrangements concerning who can be a node in the blockchain network and how nodes are linked. Public and private refers to whether the network is publicly accessible or not. Of course, the main effect of design choices for the blockchain network topology is in the access rights to nodes. Whether a party can be a node, in turn, determines whether they can exercise other rights, such as contribution rights. Whether the network is homogeneous or heterogeneous can play a role in who has extraction rights as it affects what data they can store or receive.

The consensus mechanism also affects different rights. The consensus mechanism determines how a consensus is reached between parties about what blocks should be in the chain and who can add them and under which conditions. The choice for consensus mechanism thus directly affects contribution rights. For example, the parties that provide Proof of Work (PoW) can exercise contribution rights, while for Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) all nodes that do not send messages that are considered malicious by the other nodes can do so. Furthermore, the consensus mechanism determines who can decide who should be able to exercise contribution rights. In the case of BFT, this is 2/3 of the nodes and for PoW this is the nodes with 51% of CPU power [START_REF] Nakamoto | Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System[END_REF][START_REF] Lamport | The Byzantine Generals Problem[END_REF].

Table 2. Overview of control points and design choices in the framework

Control point Design choice Description

Data structure

Transparent

The data to be shared is stored on the blockchain without encryption

Authenticated

The data to be shared is stored on the blockchain. The party that adds the data encrypts it to authenticate it. Others can decrypt and verify their identity.

Encrypted

The data to be shared is stored on the blockchain. The party that adds the data encrypts it to keep it confidential from others. Only parties provided with a key can view the data.

Proof of Existence

A hash of the data to be shared is stored on the blockchain to prove it existed when it was added and make it possible to determine whether the data changed afterwards. The data itself is stored elsewhere.

Link to data A link to the data to be shared is stored on the blockchain. The link can be used to find the data stored elsewhere.

Access control rules

Rules for controlling access to the data that needs to be shared is stored on the blockchain. Parties are allowed to extract the data stored elsewhere based on these rules.

Blockchain network topology

Public

Anyone can be a node in the network.

Private

Only some parties can be a node in the network and have certain rights.

Homogeneous

All nodes store the same data and link in the same way to other nodes.

Heterogeneous

Nodes differ in the data that they store and/or the links they have to other nodes.

Consensus mechanism

Byzantine fault-tolerant

Relies on 'good' nodes not forwarding malicious messages to the rest of the network. Requires the network not to be public to avoid Sybil attacks. Proof of work/ space/ stake/ … Relies on nodes performing a certain task or having a certain property and the rest of the network checking this before accepting the blocks they add.

Proof of Authority

Only authorized nodes control who can add blocks to the blockchain.

Demonstration of the framework: the TradeLens case

We use an empirical case to demonstrate the use of the framework. In-depth knowledge of the development of TradeLens was gained by participatory research as part of the PROFILE 1 Horizon 2020 EU project. TradeLens2 is a global blockchain-enabled infrastructure driven by IBM and Maersk, that allows for sharing events and documents in international trade. Initial development and piloting started in 2015. In 2018, it was rolled out as a global commercial infrastructure. The goal of TradeLens is digitizing global trade [START_REF] Tan | Developing Large Scale B2B Blockchain Architectures for Global Trade Lane[END_REF]. Digitization and development of digital trade infrastructures such as data pipelines are aimed at overcoming fragmentation of the information passed through systems of supply chain partners and authorities, and overcoming inefficiencies in the exchange of paper documents [START_REF] Hesketh | Weaknesses in the supply chain: who packed the box[END_REF][START_REF] Klievink | Enhancing Visibility in International Supply Chains: The Data Pipeline Concept[END_REF][START_REF] Rukanova | Digital Trade Infrastructures : A Framework for Analysis[END_REF].

Stakeholder view: The stakeholder group for TradeLens includes various network partners and client groups, such as carriers, government authorities, shippers, and providers of financial services. TradeLens is intended to be open to other industry parties. But, carriers are competitors and therefore they do not want to provide their data to each other. Authorities are interested in access to business data to perform their customs risk assessment and to cross-validate the customs declaration data against business data.

Governance requirements: Considering the governance requirements, TradeLens is owned by IBM and MAERSK and, therefore, they hold the constitutional rights. As TradeLens is intended to be open to other industry parties, the collective choices are made by the TradeLens board, which includes IBM, Maersk and additional carriers. Businesses and government authorities who interact with TradeLens are granted operational rights. The operational rights are defined in data sharing specifications agreed upon by stakeholders. For example, TradeLens has access rights to be a node to provide its services, but by default does not have extraction rights to the data. Authorities only have extraction rights to relevant data. Also, it is required that carriers cannot extract each other's data.

Blockchain control view: For TradeLens, design choices were made to provide the parties involved with the ability to exercise their rights and to allow for scaling up the system. Regarding the network topology, the choice was made to rely on Hyperledger. The network consists of several private networks called channels. As a carrier can be a node, they can exercise their access right. Other parties that have access rights can become one as well. To meet the governance requirement that carriers cannot extract each other's data, the channels are reserved for single carriers in a private network. TradeLens has a node in each of these private networks, and the network is thus heterogeneous.

Regarding the data structure, initially, the design choice was to store documents on the blockchain and encrypt them to ensure that only the appropriate parties can extract them. Later, to enhance scalability, documents were stored off-chain and a link to the document plus a hash of the content of the document is stored on the chain. Authorities can use the link to determine where the data is stored and the hash of the retrieved document will be compared with the hash stored on the chain, to prove the document's content has not changed.

Several issues propagate from the stakeholder view through the governance requirements to the blockchain control view and vice-versa. We illustrate the interdependency between the views with two examples. The government has extraction rights to some documents. When the data was stored on-chain, they exercised that right by obtaining data from the blockchain and by obtaining a decryption key. However, when the data was stored off-chain, the documents need to be stored in an external document storage where they need to obtain them from. This triggers additional complexity in the stakeholder view. In particular, the question becomes who will provide the document store and how to ensure that the documents will not be deleted. In principle, TradeLens, other technology providers or the businesses themselves can host a document store. Momentarily, complexity is reduced by TradeLens offering the document storage themselves, with the agreement of the other parties. If in the future parties prefer to arrange their own document storage, this will trigger additional stakeholder dynamics, as additional negotiations and agreements on how the data storage would be handled would need to be made between TradeLens and these other actors.

One more example is related to illustrating the dynamics among different technology providers (represented with multiple (T) ovals in our framework in Fig. 1). In this case, we take a specific example of the creation of value-added services by other technology providers. TradeLens is a node but only has access rights and no extraction rights. This is similar to the role of a Port Community Systems (PCSs) for its members in the Netherlands (i.e. facilitating data sharing without extraction rights). TradeLens collaborates with the PCS in Rotterdam. The PCS has information about the container when the container arrives at the Port of Rotterdam. TradeLens has information about the route of the container and possible rerouting before it arrives at the port of Rotterdam. TradeLens and PortBase are collaborating to link their systems. An independent company which provides services for the planning of pick-up slots for barges arriving at the port of Rotterdam was able to arrange extraction rights to the data of the PCS and TradeLens to offer value-added services. They approached the relevant businesses that own the data that is held in TradeLens and the PCS and requested permission to see their data. Once the businesses gave permission, the independent company could access the data and provide the value-added services. This example shows how technology providers like third-party app providers can make use of platforms like TradeLens to create value-added services on top of the blockchain-based system. Therefore by detailing the technology (T) stakeholder group from the stakeholder view we can reason about the dynamics of actors involved in this group and how this relates to the blockchain design choices.

Directions for further research

The examples in section 6 illustrate how our framework enables manoeuvering back and forth from an abstract understanding of the domain and stakeholders to a detailed understanding of the dependencies between governance requirements, blockchain control points and design choices. This interplay allows us to gain insight into the dependencies within complex socio-technical systems based on a blockchain-based system.

We demonstrated the framework in a case from the global trade logistics domain. We identified examples of interdependencies between the components of the framework. As the relationship between the stakeholder interests, the governance requirements and the control points in the blockchain architecture were not addressed in the extant literature, we consider the framework as a starting point for future research. The framework provides a structured approach to identify interdependencies in other complex sociotechnical blockchain-based systems. Table 3 provides an initial overview of future research topics based on the interactions that we identified in the framework.

Conclusions

This paper presents a novel framework that provides a broad understanding of the link between governance and blockchain design choices. The key elements of this framework are considering various stakeholders and their conflicting and mutual interests in B&G information sharing, governance requirements and blockchain control points. Control points are important, but often not considered in the information system's design, whereas blockchain often is used to improve control and thereby creating trust.

The framework can be used to analyse the effect of design decisions. We demonstrate how technical design choices can trigger organizational dynamics at the stakeholder level and vice versa. The tensions and opposing interests of stakeholders result in blockchain design choices that influence how data is shared and rights can be exercised. The framework draws attention to relevant elements to analyse this interaction.

Although requirements like transparency and access control are clear, they can be realized in different ways, which influences design and governance. We demonstrate how they can be accounted for simultaneously when designing blockchain applications.

Our intention is not to present a complete framework. New control points and design choices that affect governance requirements might be found or developed and a lot of research still needs to be performed to get full insight into the relationship between the control points and governance. Rather, we present a framework that links control points and design choices to rights. This also can help to identify gaps in knowledge, for example by looking at what relationships are unknown or what governance requirements stakeholders have that cannot be met with the current design choices. Additionally, embedding new knowledge in the framework systemizes it and helps to translate it into a form that can be applied directly in B&G information sharing. Evaluation of the framework using empirical cases in other B&G domains is part of future research. This will lead towards the development of a robust conceptual framework that supports the design of blockchain architectures that align the stakeholder interests, the governance requirements and the blockchain control points.

Fig. 1 .

 1 Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed framework for systematically analyzing the relationship between governance in B&G information sharing and design choices in blockchain technology.

Table 1 .

 1 Different types of rights in blockchain-based B&G information sharing systems (adapted from[START_REF] Constantinides | Perspectives and implications for the development of information infrastructures[END_REF][START_REF] Ostrom | How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action[END_REF])

	Rights		Rights in a blockchain-based system for B&G information sharing
	Constitutional rights	Alienation	Right to determine who has what collective rights
		Removal	Right to remove parts of the blockchain-based system
			Right to determine how, when, and where parts of the
	Collective	Management	blockchain-based system can be used and choices on con-
	choice rights		trol points may be changed
		Exclusion	Right to determine who has what operational and removal rights and how these can be transferred
	Operational rights	Access Contribution	Right to access parts of the blockchain-based system (i.e., nodes, external databases or key management system) Right to store, revise or delete data shared using block-chain.
		Extraction

Table 3 .

 3 Future research topics based on interactions between views in the frameworkDetailing the technology stakeholders into blockchain infrastructure, blockchain solution and app providers and investigating: -possible scenarios regarding the distribution of rights among the technology providers and how they impact their business models; -the effects of the scenarios on user rights; -what the different scenarios are for adding value-added services (e.g. smart contracts or off-chain apps relying on blockchain data) and how these can affect the business models of technology providers and the user stakeholder group; -what are complexities for determining the true ownership of data in the stakeholder view and how does it affect the distribution of rights.Design choices → governance requirementsInvestigating the effects of design choices on management and alienation rights; The effect of combinations of design choices on governance requirements (i.e. encrypted data and BFT); For what governance requirements do we need to develop different architectures, because they cannot be met? Blockchain control points → design choices Which are additional control points and design choices? Which are additional effects of the current design choices?

	Interactions	Topics for further research
	Stakeholders →
	governance
	requirements →
	blockchain
	control points

https://www.profile-project.eu/

https://www.tradelens.com/

Acknowledgements

This research was partially funded by the PROFILE Project (nr. 786748), which is funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program. Ideas and opinions expressed by the authors do not necessarily represent those of all partners.

The authors would like to also thank Norbert Kouwenhoven for his contribution to demonstrating the framework in the TradeLens examples.


Jonathan Crusoe
email: jonathan.crusoe@liu.se

Anneke M G Zuiderwijk

Ulf Melin
email: ulf.melin@liu.se

Open Government Data Systems: Learning from a Public Utility Perspective

Keywords: Open Data, Open Government Data, Public Utility, System

des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Introduction

Public organisations openly share data over the Internet. Ideally, this data can be reused by anyone without restrictions. Data providers and data users organise as an Open Government Data (OGD) system by following the OGD principles (e.g., non-discriminatory data access and machine-readable data) [START_REF] Attard | A systematic review of open government data initiatives[END_REF][START_REF] Handbook | What is open data?[END_REF][START_REF] Tauberer | The 8 principles of open government data[END_REF]. The actors (people and organisations) work together for a particular purpose or conduct similar activities [START_REF]The Cambridge Dictionary[END_REF]. They believe that the OGD system will lead to benefits, such as increased transparency and improved government services [START_REF] Kucera | Benefits and risks of open government data[END_REF].

An OGD system consists of interacting subsystems, such as an ecosystem of data providers or an ecosystem of data users [START_REF] Harrison | Creating open government ecosystems: A research and development agenda[END_REF][START_REF] Ubaldi | Open government data -towards empirical analysis of open government data initiatives[END_REF]. These subsystems have their own rules, behaviours, and interactions [START_REF] Harrison | Creating open government ecosystems: A research and development agenda[END_REF][START_REF] Pickett | The ecosystem as a multidimensional concept: meaning, model, and metaphor[END_REF]. Events or changes in one subsystem can impact other subsystems [START_REF] Harrison | Creating open government ecosystems: A research and development agenda[END_REF][START_REF] Heimstädt | Conceptualizing open data ecosystems: A timeline analysis of open data development in the uk[END_REF]. The OGD system is dependent on infrastructure [START_REF] Davies | Open data : Infrastructures and ecosystems[END_REF]. The infrastructure help actors discover data through OGD portals [START_REF] Colpaert | The 5 stars of open data portals[END_REF][START_REF] Kalampokis | A classification scheme for open government data: towards linking decentralised data[END_REF] and enables the transfer of data between actors [START_REF] Jetzek | Data-driven innovation through open government data[END_REF]. The OGD system is also limited and enabled by laws, regulations, and licenses [START_REF] De Rosnay | Legal and institutional challenges for opening data across public sectors: Towards common policy solutions[END_REF].

While previous OGD research contains attempts to study OGD systems from a holistic perspective, such as ecosystem [e.g., 18], lifecycle [e.g., 21], and value network perspectives [e.g., 3], there are still three major issues related to the synthesis of a holistic perspective in OGD research. First, the OGD system is often treated as one system without subsystems and their interactions [e.g., [START_REF] Folmer | Walking the extra byte: A lifecycle model for linked open data[END_REF][START_REF] Lee | Building an open data ecosystem: an irish experience[END_REF][START_REF] Oliveira | What is a data ecosystem?[END_REF], which may cause the rules and behaviours of the subsystem to be lost or merged with other subsystems. Second, the extensive infrastructure is often abated (to make something less serious) by not being fully integrated into holistic perspectives of OGD systems [e.g., [START_REF] Crusoe | Why is it so challenging to cultivate open government data? -Understanding impediments from an ecosystem perspective[END_REF][START_REF] Dawes | Planning and designing open government data programs: An ecosystem approach[END_REF][START_REF] Van Schalkwyk | Viscous open data: the roles of intermediaries in an open data ecosystem[END_REF]. Third, the legal system tends not to be incorporated into holistic perspectives of OGD systems [e.g., [START_REF] Abella | The process of open data publication and reuse[END_REF][START_REF] Attard | Data value networks: Enabling a new data ecosystem[END_REF][START_REF] Crusoe | Why is it so challenging to cultivate open government data? -Understanding impediments from an ecosystem perspective[END_REF]. The legal system is one source of rules and impediments for the subsystems.

A holistic perspective that has dealt with vast, complex systems is the public utility perspective. Examples of public utilities include water supply and power supply [START_REF] Buchanan | Public utilities[END_REF]. A public utility is a large group of public service organisations that produce and manage a variety of products and services vital to modern life [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. Their system is based on an extensive infrastructure that helps them to create products or services at one location and distribute them to several customers [START_REF] Geddes | Public utilities. The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics[END_REF][START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. The government can be involved, oversee, or regulate this system that has to serve all customers without discrimination [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF].

We argue that knowledge about public utilities could help OGD researchers synthesise a holistic perspective of OGD systems and be informative about how to organise OGD systems. The objective of this study is to explore what we can learn from a public utility perspective when perceiving and organising OGD systems.

This paper contains the following sections. First, the research approach used to identify literature about OGD systems and public utilities is described. Second, a synthesised description of public utilities with two examples is presented. Third, OGD systems and public utilities are compared. Then, five lessons are presented. Fourth, a conclusion with limitations and future work is given.

Research Approach

This paper is based on an exploration of the literature using a hermeneutic literature review method with citation tracking and citation analysis (snowballing) [START_REF] Boell | A hermeneutic approach for conducting literature reviews and literature searches[END_REF]. The review aimed to synthesise two bodies of literature and develop an understanding of OGD systems, drawing on literature concerning public utilities. The result also includes generic concepts (comparative categories) that were used as common points of reference for the comparison between OGD systems and public utilities [START_REF] Rose | Comparing forms of comparative analysis[END_REF]. Next, the two phases of the review are described.

The first phase focused on exploring literature about public utilities. We used the keyword "public utility" with Google Scholar and Google to identify literature about public utilities' organisation and development from a holistic perspective. Google Scholar was used since the search engine has a good coverage and recall speed with a precision above-average for simple keyword searches [START_REF] Walters | Comparative recall and precision of simple and expert searches in google scholar and eight other databases[END_REF]. Google was used to identify sources that could contain relevant literature, such as online book shops or ResearchGate or synonyms to keywords. The keywords developed over time as new literature was identified. The keyword "public utility" was also combined with other keywords, such as "infrastructure" and "public administration". We identified literature by skimming their titles and abstracts, then, if needed, a quick internal search of the main text was done. In the case of books, if needed, reviews were read. In total, four books and two book chapters about public utilities were identified as relevant. Then, we mapped key ideas and insights about the topic by studying paragraphs and chapters to synthesise them, which resulted in a textual overview. Finally, we used the result to write this paper and as an input for the next phase.

The second phase focused on OGD systems, the comparative categories, and the comparison between public utilities and OGD systems. We used the keywords "open data" or "open government data" combined with "ecosystem", "lifecycle", and "value network". We skimmed the titles and abstracts to identify their relevance. If needed, their content was skimmed or quickly searched through to identify key ideas and insights about the topic. We considered studies to be relevant if they contributed to the understanding of OGD systems or the comparison between OGD systems and public utilities. In total, one book, one thesis, three reports, five empirical texts (e.g., OGD principles), four conference papers, and 19 journal articles about OGD were identified as relevant. We studied the relevant literature for key ideas and insights. We then compared the literature about OGD systems and public utilities to identify possible areas of comparison and create a list of the comparative categories. From this list, we selected the comparative categories "the system", "infrastructure", and "governance", as they relate to the problem described in the introduction. Also, the comparative category "the public" was included since the public (citizens) are important beneficiaries of both public utilities and OGD systems, while the comparative category "resource" was included because of its stressed and varied nature in the public utility literature. We then filled out each of the selected comparative categories for OGD systems and public utilities, which became the comparison. Lessons were drawn from each comparative category by identifying and analysing the comparison.

Public Utilities

This section presents the synthesis of the identified public utility literature, where two public utilities are described in detail. We define public utilities as "[...] the large group of public service organisations that exist to locate, produce or collect, transmit, distribute and/or process and store, a variety of products and services that are vital to modern life. These products and services are ubiquitous." [38, p. 5]. Public utilities are based on an extensive network structure that acts as a distribution system and is built from components with strong physical linkages. Organisations create products or services at one location and then distribute them over the network to several customers. The base infrastructure is often partly owned by the government, and, typically, there is a substantial sunk cost since the infrastructure is extensive [START_REF] Geddes | Public utilities. The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics[END_REF][START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. The infrastructure is often shared with other actors, and if not managed properly, could lead to congestion [START_REF] Geddes | Public utilities. The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics[END_REF].

The activities of public utilities can be divided into production, transmission, and distribution components (e.g., electricity: generating plants, high-voltage lines, and local power lines) [START_REF] Crandall | Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric Industry[END_REF][START_REF] Geddes | Public utilities. The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics[END_REF]. The governance of public utilities is complex. Governments are involved, oversee, or regulate public utilities, and the utilities have to serve all customers without discrimination within their market area [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. Regulations can help to enact standards to ensure reasonable service [START_REF] Thompson | Public utility economics[END_REF]. On the other hand, rigid standards can handicap utilities, such as when gas utilities went from illumination to cooking and heating [START_REF] Thompson | Public utility economics[END_REF]. The enforcement of standards is an important task for public organisations and can occupy a large portion of their time [START_REF] Thompson | Public utility economics[END_REF]. The income of public utilities can come from payments, stocks, bonds, and taxes [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. In this paper, the public refers to the end-users who use and benefit from the services and products in an everyday context.

Public utilities provide essential services necessary for modern life. Without them, there can be no cities and nations [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. They are often commonly found wherever people are living in villages, towns, and cities [START_REF] Thompson | Public utility economics[END_REF]. They are needed to support large populations, overcome the social consequences from the concentration of people, and allow cities to grow beyond their countryside [START_REF] Buchanan | Public utilities[END_REF][START_REF] Thompson | Public utility economics[END_REF]. In the past, when towns were generally small, public utilities were often simple, such as rivers and wells [START_REF] Buchanan | Public utilities[END_REF]. Over time, city development, urbanisation, industrialisation, and digitalisation have had a significant impact on public utilities' growth and development [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF][START_REF] Thompson | Public utility economics[END_REF]. Public utilities can form monopolies, which occur when a single firm can supply a market at a cost and price far lower than would be possible if several firms served the market [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF] or when there are natural limitations in supply or conditions of service [START_REF] Thompson | Public utility economics[END_REF].

Two common public utilities in any modern society are the water supply networks and electric power grids. We will present each public utility in detail to gain an in-depth understanding of their characteristics. Water Supply Networks are the most basic of public utilities. No town can survive long without a water supply for drinking, washing, and various industrial processes [START_REF] Buchanan | Public utilities[END_REF]. If the supply becomes polluted, disease and death can follow [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. A water supply network consists of the water source, collection, transportation, raw water storage, treatment, finished water storage, distribution, and process monitoring components [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. The monitoring could include identifying and fixing leaks [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF].

To give an example of the public utility: aquifer pumps [START_REF] Buchanan | Public utilities[END_REF] or watersheds provide water to reservoirs. Aqueducts, culverts, or large pipes then move the water in large quantities to populated areas. The water is treated or filtered to ensure consistent quality (e.g., remove dirt or kill bacteria) [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF][START_REF] Buchanan | Public utilities[END_REF]. The water is then distributed to households through local water supply networks where people can access the water with, for example, faucets, showers, or toilets [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF]. Water supply utilities are also regulated. For example, the American Safe Drinking Water Act sought to protect public health by regulating the nation's public drinking water supply. The act requires the American Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set national health standards, which they do in a three-step process. The EPA also proposes treatment techniques and monitor the water supply networks [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF].

The instant availability of electricity is assumed in the modern industry and domestic life. Electric power grids have become the largest public utility in modern societies. One of its greatest achievements is enabling lamps almost everywhere. Among the first power grids were pioneered as early as 1879 [START_REF] Buchanan | Public utilities[END_REF]. Electric power grids consist of four functional components: (1) power generation, (2) transmission of high voltage power, (3) distribution of low voltage power, and (4) marketing functions [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. To give an example of the public utility: electricity is generated by power plants [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF]. The electricity is sent to a substation where transformers increase its voltage, which allows it to travel long distances. The electricity travels over the high-voltage transmission grid to an area substation where it is stepped down to a lower voltage to be sent over the distribution grid. It is then distributed to homes and businesses [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF]. People access the electric grid through plugging an electric device's cable into an electrical outlet. The device could be a computer or a dishwasher [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF]. One major challenge with electricity is its behaviour (loop flow) to take all available routes to get from one point to another. If one line shuts down, the load is dispersed to all other lines, which can cause an overload that shuts down the entire grid [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. Another major challenge is that electricity cannot be economically stored. It needs to be used as it is produced. Consequently, the grid has to be monitored to ensure that the grid is always met demand and does not overload [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. Electrical power grids are also regulated. For example, Order 889 issued by the American Federal Energy Reliability Council (FERC) required all investor-owned utilities to participate in an open access same-time information system (OASIS) to make pricing and accessing processes more transparent [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF].

Comparison between OGD Systems and Public Utilities

This section first presents a summary of the comparison between public utilities and OGD systems (see Table 1). Then, each of the comparative categories is, in turn, presented with previous OGD research and their comparison and analysis to draw lessons learned. This section ends with an intermediate conclusion based on the comparison. The categories are the system, the public, infrastructure, resource, and governance.

The System

The system is concerned with how the system is holistically perceived as parts (e.g., elements and subsystems) and interactions. An OGD system has at least three ecosystems: data providers, (intermediate) data users, and end-users [START_REF] Ubaldi | Open government data -towards empirical analysis of open government data initiatives[END_REF]. Data providers are public organisations who share their data [START_REF] Attard | A systematic review of open government data initiatives[END_REF][START_REF] Dawes | Planning and designing open government data programs: An ecosystem approach[END_REF]. They often have natural monopolies on their data because of high fixed costs, low variable costs, and a small number of potential data users [START_REF] Heimstädt | Conceptualizing open data ecosystems: A timeline analysis of open data development in the uk[END_REF]. Data users can be developers, journalists, and researchers [START_REF] Safarov | Utilization of open government data: A systematic literature review of types, conditions, effects and users[END_REF]. They can take many different roles (e.g., data analyser or user experience provider [START_REF] Lindman | Business roles in the emerging opendata ecosystem[END_REF]) and can use data to either provide new enhanced data back into the OGD system or products and services to the public [START_REF] Davies | Open data, democracy and public sector reform. A look at open government data use from data[END_REF][START_REF] Lindman | Business roles in the emerging opendata ecosystem[END_REF]. End-users (the public) are any actor that uses the data directly by extracting facts or indirectly through using products and services provided by data users [START_REF] Davies | Open data, democracy and public sector reform. A look at open government data use from data[END_REF]. The data is often holistically perceived as a flow from data providers to data users and sometimes end-users [e.g., [START_REF] Davies | Open data, democracy and public sector reform. A look at open government data use from data[END_REF][START_REF] Lindman | Business roles in the emerging opendata ecosystem[END_REF]. OGD systems can also be perceived as a collection of elements, such as data audit, data access, and data use [START_REF] Dawes | Planning and designing open government data programs: An ecosystem approach[END_REF][START_REF] Lee | Building an open data ecosystem: an irish experience[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | Innovation with open data: Essential elements of open data ecosystems[END_REF]. OGD systems and public utilities follow the same basic pattern: (1) produce, (2) transmit and distribute, and (3) use products or services [e.g., 2, 25]. Both holistic perspectives attempt to identify and order key activities in the system following the logic of a chain or flow. OGD systems use the terminology elements, while public utilities use components. We will continue to use 'component' for both. However, OGD research focuses on actors (e.g., data providers and data users) with data flows [e.g., 1, 15, 37, 47, 52], while public utilities focus on objects and their systematic purpose (e.g., generating plants or high-voltage lines [START_REF] Crandall | Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric Industry[END_REF][START_REF] Geddes | Public utilities. The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics[END_REF][START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]). Previous OGD research tends to focus on the interaction between data providers and users [e.g., [START_REF] Harrison | Creating open government ecosystems: A research and development agenda[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | Innovation with open data: Essential elements of open data ecosystems[END_REF], while public utilities focus on a chain of objects and activities [START_REF] Crandall | Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric Industry[END_REF][START_REF] Geddes | Public utilities. The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics[END_REF][START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF].

The idea of key activities, actors, and objects seem to be a promising way to holistically perceive vast, complex systems where they start at the origin of the product (e.g., data, water, or electricity) and then continue to its distribution and transmission. The activities, actors, and objects as components can roughly be divided into nodes (e.g., weather data collection, water treatment, or power generation) and infrastructure (e.g., the Internet, aqueducts, or high-voltage grids). However, if we stay at nodes and infrastructure as a chain of components, behaviours, such as monopolies or infrastructure congestion, or needs to monitor the infrastructure can be lost. We combine the idea of components with the insight that OGD systems are known to consist of subsystems [START_REF] Harrison | Creating open government ecosystems: A research and development agenda[END_REF][START_REF] Ubaldi | Open government data -towards empirical analysis of open government data initiatives[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | Innovation with open data: Essential elements of open data ecosystems[END_REF] to get functional systems. This approach follows in McNabb's [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF] components of the water supply networks and functional components of electric power systems. A functional system is a collection of nodes with a similar purpose and similar key activities in the OGD system. The system is connected to other functional systems to organise as a data flow. The nodes can have relationships and interactions that will impact functional systems later down the chain.

The Public

The public is concerned with the availability and access of products, services, or data (resources) of the systems to the public. In OGD systems, data is provided under an open license that allows anyone to acquire it for free and use and distribute it without restriction [START_REF] Charter | International open data charter -principles[END_REF][START_REF] Handbook | What is open data?[END_REF][START_REF] Knowledge | The open definition[END_REF][START_REF] Tauberer | The 8 principles of open government data[END_REF]. OGD systems and public utilities both provide their resources to the public without discrimination (anyone has the right to access and use the resource). However, they differ on at least four points. First, OGD systems share data to anyone with an Internet connection [START_REF] Davies | Open data, democracy and public sector reform. A look at open government data use from data[END_REF], while public utilities serve the public in their market area [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. Second, the public interest in reusing OGD has been declared a myth [START_REF] Hellberg | The story of the sixth myth of open data and open government[END_REF], while public utilities are endowed by public interest [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. Third, the public has direct access to the data in OGD systems [START_REF] Knowledge | The open definition[END_REF], while the public has limited access to the infrastructure of public utilities, such as high-voltage grids and aqueducts [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF]. Fourth, in OGD systems, the data is free [START_REF] Knowledge | The open definition[END_REF], while in public utilities, the products or services can need payment (e.g., via tax or direct fees) [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF].

Some of the differences are likely a consequence of the rather immature age of OGD [START_REF] Ayre | Open data: What it is and why you should care[END_REF] in comparison to the ancient history of public utilities [START_REF] Buchanan | Public utilities[END_REF]. While the data might not be interesting, it is arguable that the products built with it are attractive [START_REF] Casellas Serra | The mapping, selecting and opening of data[END_REF]. The use of data requires certain technical skills and expertise [START_REF] Safarov | Utilization of open government data: A systematic literature review of types, conditions, effects and users[END_REF], which limits the development of these products to specialists. It is perceivable that OGD systems could follow in the steps of water supply networks or electric power grids. For example, data users could sell products that the public uses by plugging them into the data infrastructure. This situation is similar to how the public buys electrical devices and plug them into an electrical outlet or the water supply network (e.g., dishwashers) [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF]. However, in the case of OGD systems, the resource that powers the device would be free. This possibility would continue to build on the idea of data users as intermediaries [e.g., [START_REF] Heimstädt | Conceptualizing open data ecosystems: A timeline analysis of open data development in the uk[END_REF][START_REF] Janssen | Infomediary business models for connecting open data providers and users[END_REF], but stresses that the raw data might only be for specialists and that the products and services should be sought after by the public. Consequently, the foundational data flow of an OGD system can be perceived to start at data collection and end at the use of data-based products or services by the public in, for example, their homes and businesses.

Infrastructure

Infrastructure focuses on the use of infrastructure in the systems, but also how it is holistically perceived. OGD systems are dependent on an OGD infrastructure, where the Internet is one part [START_REF] Davies | Open data, democracy and public sector reform. A look at open government data use from data[END_REF][START_REF] Davies | Open data : Infrastructures and ecosystems[END_REF][START_REF] Handbook | What is open data?[END_REF]. However, there is no agreed definition of infrastructure for OGD systems [e.g., 10, 43], but it seems to be either specific artefacts and the Internet [e.g., [START_REF] Davies | Open data : Infrastructures and ecosystems[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | Innovation with open data: Essential elements of open data ecosystems[END_REF] or something that facilitates data exchange between actors or the use of the data [e.g., 29].

OGD systems and public utilities have in common that they holistically perceive infrastructure as a tool with a specific purpose or use. In OGD systems, infrastructure is heavy technical with a focus on its use by different actors [START_REF] Charalabidis | The World of Open Data[END_REF][START_REF] Davies | Open data : Infrastructures and ecosystems[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | Innovation with open data: Essential elements of open data ecosystems[END_REF], while in public utilities, infrastructure is a mixture of social and technical parts over a large area [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF][START_REF] Geddes | Public utilities. The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics[END_REF][START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. Previous OGD research perceives infrastructure as functional artefacts that can exist on the Internet [START_REF] Davies | Open data : Infrastructures and ecosystems[END_REF][START_REF] Jetzek | Data-driven innovation through open government data[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | Innovation with open data: Essential elements of open data ecosystems[END_REF], while public utilities perceive it as a distribution network [START_REF] Geddes | Public utilities. The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics[END_REF][START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF].

For the system category, we divided components into nodes and infrastructure. The idea to holistically perceive infrastructure as a distribution network seems to be promising for OGD systems, as the Internet can similarly be used to request and send data packages between locations [START_REF] Kurose | Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach Pearson International Edition 5th Edition[END_REF]. However, public utilities differ from OGD systems in how resources are supplied. Electricity and water, once in their infrastructure, are accessible to anyone who can use the infrastructure. On the other hand, for OGD systems, the data is first published on the Internet, then must be found [START_REF] Colpaert | The 5 stars of open data portals[END_REF][START_REF] Kalampokis | A classification scheme for open government data: towards linking decentralised data[END_REF], and, finally, it can be downloaded. Consequently, while the Internet is a clear psychical infrastructure (e.g., servers, routers, and fibre cables [START_REF] Kurose | Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach Pearson International Edition 5th Edition[END_REF]), OGD systems have two complementary infrastructure networks: data distribution and data discovery. The networks help to connect the nodes and functional systems and ensure that data can be found, transmitted, and distributed between them.

Resource

Resource is concerned with the properties of the central products, services, or data provided by or in the systems. In OGD systems, data is a resource (e.g., weather data [START_REF] Ayre | Open data: What it is and why you should care[END_REF]) that is shared to be used [START_REF] Lee | Building an open data ecosystem: an irish experience[END_REF], ideally, without direct cost. The data is a selection of facts people have paid attention to and collected and becomes information when people attribute meaning to the data [START_REF] Checkland | Information, systems and information systems: making sense of the field[END_REF]. Data has boundless uses, as it is not used-up in its process of being used. The data of OGD systems needs to be machine-readable, complete, primary, timely, accessible, non-proprietary, and interoperable [START_REF] Handbook | What is open data?[END_REF][START_REF] Knowledge | The open definition[END_REF][START_REF] Tauberer | The 8 principles of open government data[END_REF]. At the same time, the data, while anonymous, could be combined with other data to re-identify individuals, which then threatens peoples' right to information privacy [START_REF] Kulk | Brave new open data world?[END_REF].

The resources of OGD systems and public utilities are placed under standards and provided to be used by the public. However, data of OGD systems are large sets of heterogeneous resources (e.g., weather reports, crime reports, or postal codes [START_REF] Ayre | Open data: What it is and why you should care[END_REF]) that are intangible, recorded, and supposed to be interoperable with other data (e.g., blog posts and interactive maps [START_REF] Davies | Open data, democracy and public sector reform. A look at open government data use from data[END_REF]). The data requires interpretation by users to be used or understood [START_REF] Checkland | Information, systems and information systems: making sense of the field[END_REF] and has boundless reuses, where visualisations and mash-ups can help in the process [START_REF] Attard | A systematic review of open government data initiatives[END_REF]. The data can be used alone or in combination, which leads to a large set of possible uses based on its heterogeneity. The possible uses of a single dataset (e.g., weather) have limited applications, but together the application is vast. On the other hand, resources of public utilities are small sets of homogeneous resources (e.g., water, electricity, gas, transportation, communication [START_REF] Buchanan | Public utilities[END_REF]) that are physical, consumable, ubiquitous, and vital to modern life [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. These resources have a wide range of applications [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF][START_REF] Buchanan | Public utilities[END_REF].

The properties of the resources in public utilities impact the organisation of the utilities. For example, water supply networks have to identify and repair leaks [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF], while electric power grids have to monitor the grid to ensure that supply meets demand, and it does not overload [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. Similarly, anonymous data can be combined to re-identify individuals [START_REF] Kulk | Brave new open data world?[END_REF], while there is also a fear of misinterpretation and fraud [START_REF] Barry | Barriers to open data release: A view from the top[END_REF]. OGD systems need to be organised with consideration of the properties of data as a resource.

Governance

Governance covers both formal and informal processes and institutions that guide and restrain the collective activities of systems [START_REF] Keohane | Governance in a globalizing world[END_REF]. It is the internal and external exercise of direction, control, management, and policy-shaping of the components of the systems [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. In OGD systems, data is a common, shared resource that should be governed by data providers to ensure it has sufficient quality for use [START_REF] Jetzek | Data-driven innovation through open government data[END_REF]. For example, [START_REF] De Beer | Ownership of open data: Governance options for agriculture and nutrition[END_REF] suggest institutional cooperation, model frameworks, international agreement, and social certification to govern data ownership. The foundational flow of data from collection to use to function properly and realise the benefits of OGD needs to be coordinated [START_REF] Zuiderwijk | A coordination theory perspective to improve the use of open data in policy-making[END_REF], and so does the infrastructure [START_REF] Davies | Open data : Infrastructures and ecosystems[END_REF]. For example, published data need to be usable and discoverable by users, responsibilities between data providers and users need to be clear, and the process should follow standards [START_REF] Zuiderwijk | A coordination theory perspective to improve the use of open data in policy-making[END_REF]. This type of governance involves feedback and discussions between data providers and users [START_REF] Dawes | Planning and designing open government data programs: An ecosystem approach[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | A coordination theory perspective to improve the use of open data in policy-making[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | Innovation with open data: Essential elements of open data ecosystems[END_REF], licenses and principles [START_REF] Charter | International open data charter -principles[END_REF][START_REF] Handbook | What is open data?[END_REF][START_REF] Knowledge | The open definition[END_REF][START_REF] Tauberer | The 8 principles of open government data[END_REF], and legal and regulatory frameworks [START_REF] Ubaldi | Open government data -towards empirical analysis of open government data initiatives[END_REF]. Laws, policies, standards, and agreements have a bearing on OGD systems [START_REF] Van Schalkwyk | Viscous open data: the roles of intermediaries in an open data ecosystem[END_REF], which can limit and enable actors [START_REF] De Rosnay | Legal and institutional challenges for opening data across public sectors: Towards common policy solutions[END_REF]. Data protection laws must be followed by the actors, and the data cannot be linked back to individuals [START_REF] Lee | Building an open data ecosystem: an irish experience[END_REF]. Important legislation for OGD can relate to freedom of information, public sector information, data protection, data sharing, and statistics [START_REF] Lee | Building an open data ecosystem: an irish experience[END_REF].

OGD systems and public utilities are governing resources and regulated by laws. However, they differ on at least three points. First, OGD systems follow international principles and open licenses [START_REF] Berners-Lee | Star open data[END_REF][START_REF] Charter | International open data charter -principles[END_REF][START_REF] Handbook | What is open data?[END_REF][START_REF] Knowledge | The open definition[END_REF][START_REF] Tauberer | The 8 principles of open government data[END_REF], while public utilities follow national regulations and standards from many levels (e.g., federal, state, and local in the USA) [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF]. Second, OGD systems are more self-regulated with a focus on the interaction between data providers and data users (e.g., discussion and feedback) [START_REF] Dawes | Planning and designing open government data programs: An ecosystem approach[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | A coordination theory perspective to improve the use of open data in policy-making[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | Innovation with open data: Essential elements of open data ecosystems[END_REF], while public utilities have governance frameworks or organisations that can monitor, regulate, or enforce standards to ensure reasonable service (e.g., EPA for water and FERC for electricity) [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF][START_REF] Thompson | Public utility economics[END_REF]. Third, in OGD systems, data users are under no restrictions on their use or distribution [START_REF] Charter | International open data charter -principles[END_REF][START_REF] Handbook | What is open data?[END_REF][START_REF] Knowledge | The open definition[END_REF][START_REF] Tauberer | The 8 principles of open government data[END_REF], while in public utilities, the actors' operations and interactions can experience heavy involvement from governance organisations [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF][START_REF] Thompson | Public utility economics[END_REF].

While there are similarities between OGD systems and public utilities, they are different in how they approach governance. OGD systems have a focus on governance of production and the interaction between a data provider and a data user [START_REF] Dawes | Planning and designing open government data programs: An ecosystem approach[END_REF][START_REF] Jetzek | Data-driven innovation through open government data[END_REF][START_REF] Welle Donker | How to assess the success of the open data ecosystem[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | Innovation with open data: Essential elements of open data ecosystems[END_REF], while public utilities cover production to consumption where every actor can be directly or indirectly governed [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF][START_REF] Thompson | Public utility economics[END_REF]. The OGD system approach most likely leads to an increased perception of risks and need to build trust. However, when a system becomes vast and complex, reoccurring interactions between parties become difficult, which could be a reason for the governance organisational approach of public utilities. The use of governance organisations could help OGD systems be beneficial for the public, data providers, and data users, but can collide with OGD principles, such as unrestricted use and use by anyone. On the other hand, there are already organisations that seem to try to govern OGD systems, such as, the meeting that resulted in the eight OGD principles [START_REF] Tauberer | The 8 principles of open government data[END_REF] and the Open Knowledge Foundation [START_REF] Knowledge | The open definition[END_REF].

Are OGD systems a type of public utility?

OGD systems and public utilities are similar in their basic pattern, infrastructure, and relationship to the public. However, OGD systems provide a free, heterogeneous resource, ideally, to anyone, while not being endowed by the public. The OGD principles (e.g., unrestricted use and access to anyone), the properties of data (e.g., ability to combine and need for interpretation), and lack of interest are three characteristic problems that can be interpreted against viewing OGD systems as a type of public utility. On the other hand, public utilities vary a lot (e.g., airlines, trucking, telecoms, electricity, natural gas, and railroads [START_REF] Crandall | Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric Industry[END_REF][START_REF] Geddes | Public utilities. The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics[END_REF]) and are still considered to belong to the same type. Public utilities are vital to modern life [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF], while the benefits of OGD is more proclaimed than empirically tested [START_REF] Safarov | Utilization of open government data: A systematic literature review of types, conditions, effects and users[END_REF]. On the other hand, not all public utilities started as vital for society. For example, the electric power grids were introduced in the 19th century and partly or fully replaced heating and lighting based on the gas supply networks [START_REF] Buchanan | Public utilities[END_REF]. Today, data is arguably everywhere in modern life and vital for a modern society. It can be found at many locations (e.g., parliament minutes and governmental budgets [START_REF] Attard | A systematic review of open government data initiatives[END_REF]). OGD systems could be a replacement of existing data provision systems. We argue that if OGD systems overcome the three characteristic problems, OGD systems could become a public utility. We conclude that public utilities can teach OGD researchers about large-scale organisation and governance, and how vast, complex systems can be perceived.

The Lessons Learned

In this section, we present five lessons learned from the comparison and their implications for OGD research and OGD practice. The two initial lessons came from synthesising the holistic perspectives of public utilities and OGD systems to supplement the latter, the following two lessons are what public utilities taught us about organising OGD systems, and the final lesson gave us a possible future for OGD systems based on public utilities.

The first lesson is that an OGD system can be perceived as a collection of nodes (functional systems) connected by complementary infrastructure networks that together organise a foundational data flow. This perspective shifts the actorinteractions view in previous OGD research [e.g., 24, 48, 52] to a node-flow view similar to [START_REF] Lindman | Business roles in the emerging opendata ecosystem[END_REF]'s actor-flow view, but the focus is on infrastructure connecting nodes of activities, objects, and actors to enable the OGD system. This shift was enabled by the public utility perspective.

The second lesson is that the foundational data flow of an OGD system starts at data collections and ends where the public uses the data in an everyday context by plugging it into the data distribution network. This lesson adds to [e.g., [START_REF] Davies | Open data, democracy and public sector reform. A look at open government data use from data[END_REF][START_REF] Dawes | Planning and designing open government data programs: An ecosystem approach[END_REF][START_REF] Lindman | Business roles in the emerging opendata ecosystem[END_REF] by empathizing data collection, the needs for the data to have utility for the public, and the role of data users as specialists (similar to the intermediary view [e.g., [START_REF] Heimstädt | Conceptualizing open data ecosystems: A timeline analysis of open data development in the uk[END_REF][START_REF] Janssen | Infomediary business models for connecting open data providers and users[END_REF]). It also shifts the focus from the interaction between data providers and data users [e.g., [START_REF] Attard | A systematic review of open government data initiatives[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | Innovation with open data: Essential elements of open data ecosystems[END_REF] to how OGD systems work to provide benefits to the public and subsystems developing from and connecting to the foundational flow.

The third lesson is that OGD systems need to be organised with consideration to data's properties: combinability, interpretability, and boundless reusability. Water can leak from pipes, and electricity can overload grids [START_REF] Ascher | The works[END_REF], while data could be misunderstood or abused [START_REF] Barry | Barriers to open data release: A view from the top[END_REF][START_REF] Kulk | Brave new open data world?[END_REF]. This lesson is based on the need to interpret data [START_REF] Checkland | Information, systems and information systems: making sense of the field[END_REF] and the data's heterogeneous nature and ability to be combined.

The fourth lesson is that OGD systems need governance organisations that govern the whole system and not only the publishers and their interactions with users towards being beneficial for the public, data providers, and data users. OGD systems are based on principles [e.g., [START_REF] Charter | International open data charter -principles[END_REF][START_REF] Handbook | What is open data?[END_REF][START_REF] Knowledge | The open definition[END_REF][START_REF] Tauberer | The 8 principles of open government data[END_REF], licenses [e.g., 32], laws [e.g., [START_REF] Lee | Building an open data ecosystem: an irish experience[END_REF][START_REF] De Rosnay | Legal and institutional challenges for opening data across public sectors: Towards common policy solutions[END_REF][START_REF] Ubaldi | Open government data -towards empirical analysis of open government data initiatives[END_REF][START_REF] Van Schalkwyk | Viscous open data: the roles of intermediaries in an open data ecosystem[END_REF], and feedback loops [e.g., [START_REF] Dawes | Planning and designing open government data programs: An ecosystem approach[END_REF][START_REF] Zuiderwijk | Innovation with open data: Essential elements of open data ecosystems[END_REF] that are currently dispersed over different actors. Governance organisations can centralise the responsibility to enforce principles, licenses, laws, and feedback and oversee actors too, for example, help with trust and mitigate risks.

The fifth lesson is that OGD systems could be a replacement of existing data provision systems and become a public utility if it overcomes problems from the OGD principles, the properties of data, and the lack of public interest. Previ-ous OGD research has viewed OGD systems from many perspectives, such as ecosystem [e.g., 18], lifecycle [e.g., 21], and value network perspectives [e.g., 3]. If OGD systems are made into a public utility, it can include all of these perspectives. Ecosystem for the nodes and their interactions. Lifecycle for a node or two nodes and the interactions. Value network for the node-flow view. The public utility perspective also includes the notion of the public and empathise that the OGD systems exist to benefit the public. The public utility perspective is one approach that can help to synthesise a holistic perspective of OGD systems.

Conclusion

The objective of this study was to explore what we can learn from a public utility perspective when perceiving and organising OGD systems. The study used a hermeneutic literature review with a snowballing approach to identify 39 studies about the two topics. The topices were compared based on five comparative categories, which resulted in five lessons (see Sections 4 and 5). The review covers key literature but recognises that there is more research about OGD systems, data properties, and public utilities to be included. Not every identified comparative category was used in the comparison, such as economics (income and costs) and system purpose. The economic side of public utilities [START_REF] Mcnabb | Public Utilities: Old Problems, New Challenges[END_REF][START_REF] Thompson | Public utility economics[END_REF] is a promising avenue of future research that could help solve issues with economic sustainability for OGD systems [START_REF] Hossain | State-of-the-art in open data research: Insights from existing literature and a research agenda[END_REF]. At the same time, governance was identified in the public utility literature, but sparse in the OGD literature.

This paper contributes by showing that OGD research can learn for public utilities and has three implications for OGD research and OGD practice. First, OGD systems can be perceived from a node-flow view. This view contributes to the development of a holistic perspective of OGD systems that can help OGD researchers with model building, analysis, and data collection. OGD practitioners should work to identify and organise nodes (e.g., data collection or data processing) and match the OGD system with the needs of the public.

Second, governance and the properties of data needs consideration in the organisation of OGD systems. OGD researchers can study how to govern OGD systems and the implications of the properties of data on the organisation of the OGD systems. OGD practitioners should consider the properties of data in their work and the establishment of national governance organisations.

Finally, OGD systems could replace existing data provision systems and be made into a public utility. OGD researchers and OGD practitioners should discuss the role of OGD in everyday life of the public, which may challenge the OGD principles and underlying assumptions. The governance of OGD systems is a promising avenue of future research that could help practice deliver value, mitigate risks, and work together. The comparison between OGD systems and public utilities has also opened for the discussion and research into if OGD systems should be made into or is a type of public utility.

Table 1 .

 1 Comparison between OGD system and public utilities

	Comparative	Public Utilities	OGD System
	Categories
	The System	Objects or components with dis-	Actors' interactions or elements
		tribution and transmission [14, 22,	with data flows [1, 15, 37, 52].
		38]
	The Public	Served, costly products or services	Shared, free data, the public's in-
		endowed by the public and limited	terest in reusing the data is a
		access to the infrastructure [2, 38]	myth, and open access to the data
			source [16, 26, 32]
	Infrastructure Distribution networks of social	Technical, functional artifacts
		and technical parts over large ar-	(possibly on the Internet) for use
		eas [22, 38].	by different actors [10, 17, 29, 52]
	Resource	A small set of homogeneous, stan-	A large set of heterogeneous,
		dardised, public, physical, ubiqui-	standardized, public, intangible,
		tous resources that are vital to	recorded, interoperable data that
		modern life [9, 38].	needs interpretation [4, 5, 12, 16]
	Governance	Resource governance, regulated	Suggested resource governance,
		by law, governance organisations,	regulated by law, international
		and heavy involvement in the op-	principles, more self-regulation,
		erations of actors and their inter-	and unrestricted users [7, 11, 18,
		actions [38, 46].	23, 32, 36, 42, 45, 47, 48, 51, 52].