Lydia Assouad

Amory Gethin

Thomas Piketty

Juliet-Nil Uraz

Ishac Diwan

Dalia Ghanem

Clara Martínez-Toledano

1

This paper draws on political attitudes surveys to document the evolution of political cleavages in light of inequality dynamics in Algeria (2002-2018), Iraq (2005-2018), and Turkey (1991-2018). We investigate how social divides and ethno-religious conflicts shape voting behaviors in these three countries through their interaction with the voting system and the structure of inequalities. Our findings suggest that identity-based voting remains highly interconnected with social disparities and does not offer extensive explanatory power on its own, except in the extreme case of the Iraqi sectarian political system. Socioeconomic factors play a differentiated role depending on the historical and institutional context and have increasingly been at the heart of popular mobilizations outside of the electoral arena.

Introduction

Shaken by civil wars, interstate conflicts and intifada for several decades, the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region seems to find its unity around the predominance of violence.

To explain such a political turmoil, a common view consists in reducing all conflicts in the region to their ethno-religious dimension. A cultural divide between Sunni and Shia Islam and/or between ethnic communities would devastate the area. The rivalry of states, affiliated to either Shia Iran or Sunni Saudi Arabia, in the context of heightened tensions around hydrocarbon resources as much as clientelism and corruption would foster the role of nonstate actors defined along clear identity lines (Wehrey, 2017). At first sight, several phenomena seem to corroborate this view. Lebanon and Iraq adopted sectarian systems to ensure peaceful democratic transitions after deadly civil wars (Salibi 1988;[START_REF] Traboulsi | A History of Modern Lebanon[END_REF][START_REF] Marr | The Modern History of Iraq[END_REF][START_REF] Dodge | Beyond Structure and Agency: Rethinking Political Identities in Iraq after 2003[END_REF]. Power sharing arrangements between the various religious and ethnic communities took the form of quota or seat allocation in both governments. More generally, political Islam resurfaced in the region, after decades of ban and underground activism. It managed to quickly generate mass appeal with the arrival in power of openly religious parties, such as the FIS in Algeria, the AKP in Turkey, or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt [START_REF] Willis | The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History[END_REF][START_REF] Bozarslan | Histoire de la Turquie: De l'empire à nos jours[END_REF][START_REF] Zürcher | Turkey: A Modern History[END_REF][START_REF] Masoud | Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt[END_REF]Corstange and Masoud 2016;Cammett and Jones Luong 2014).

This view however appears quickly limited and overlooks the electoral competition process.

Ethno-religious claims were quite absent from the different waves of mass protest that shook the region since almost a decade. From the Arab Springs of 2011 to the 2019-2020 streets demonstrations in Algeria, Lebanon, or Iraq, without forgetting the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul in 2013, popular uprisings uniting different social groups called for further democratization and fairer redistribution of national income, without clear identity stance, at least at their start (Gerges, 2013[START_REF] Jazayeri | Identity-based Political Inequality and Protest: The Dynamic Relationship Between Political Power and Protest in the Middle East and North Africa[END_REF][START_REF] Jabar | The Iraqi Protest Movement: From Identity Politics to Issue Politics[END_REF]Assouad, 2020). Given these massive social contestations, it became important for policymakers and scholars alike to understand whether underlying inequality dynamics had redefined political conflicts in socioeconomic terms. Is the salient anti-elite discourse revealing a new role for class-based voting? And retrospectively, did the socioeconomic dimension ever disappear behind the identity vote?

The focus on religious and ethnic rivalries, at the expense of social was probably supported by the low levels of wealth and income inequalities described by standard international estimates in most MENA countries, like official GINI indexes. In 2011, the Lebanese or Egyptian official GINI indexes were below 0.35 for example, meaning that both countries were as egalitarian as the most egalitarian countries in history such as Scandinavian countries in the 1980s. These low levels have recently been questioned by a growing literature emphasizing the limits of survey based estimated and the existence of large measurement errors in existing inequality statistics [START_REF] Van Der Weide | Is inequality underestimated in Egypt? Evidence from house prices[END_REF]Alvaredo et al. 2018;[START_REF] Alvaredo | Measuring Inequality in the Middle East 1990-2016: The World's Most Unequal Region?[END_REF][START_REF] Moshrif | Income Inequality in the Middle East[END_REF]). According to these new figures, MENA would rather be one of the most unequal regions in the world, reaching inequality levels close to those observed in Brazil or South Africa: the top 10 percent receiving around 65 percent of the total regional income since 1990, six times as much as the bottom 50 percent. During the same period, only about 40 percent went to the top 10 percent in Western Europe (Blanchet et al., 2019). These extreme levels of inequality are thus likely to have affected the structure of political conflicts, with unclear effects on the identity-vote. Adopting a multidimensional perspective for studying how cleavages intertwined, while departing from an orientalist bias, seems therefore key for understanding political dynamics in the region.

Looking at individual level data, this paper documents how social polarization in terms of income and education have interacted with the evolution of political cleavages in three countries of the Middle East over several decades: Turkey , Iraq (2005[START_REF] Iraq | Clientelism: Factionalism in the Allocation of Public Resources in Iraq after 2003[END_REF] and Algeria (2002Algeria ( -2018)). Drawing on opinion surveys, we follow the methodology developed by [START_REF] Piketty | Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality and the Changings Structure of Political Conflict. Evidence from France, Britain and the US, 1948-2017[END_REF] and which was first applied to the US, the UK and France. The goal of this paper is to document the multidimensional aspect of political cleavages in these three countries by paying a specific attention to income and education, but also to age, gender in addition to the ethno-religious identity. To do so, we built systematic times series on socioeconomic determinants of voters over election cycles using simple measures of inequality. This paper belongs to a multi-country project that creates comparable and homogenous series on political cleavages across time and spaces (Gethin et al. 2021;[START_REF] Uraz | Political Cleavages and Social Inequality in the Middle East: Turkey, Iraq and Algeria 1990 -2019[END_REF]. In particular, the parameter of interest is the differences in voting behaviors between comparable deciles: the top 10 percent and the bottom 50 percent (the richest vs. the poorest, the most educated vs. the less educated and so on).

We restricted the analysis to the cases of Algeria, Iraq and Turkey due to data quality and availability. The overall methodology developed by [START_REF] Piketty | Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality and the Changings Structure of Political Conflict. Evidence from France, Britain and the US, 1948-2017[END_REF] is based on the use of postelectoral survey, that is individual micro-data with information on votes, educational levels and income. In the absence of such exit polls in the region, we use three opinion surveys: the World Value Survey (WVS), the Arab Barometer and the Comparative Study of Electoral System (CSES). While our results should be taken with great care given important issues of survey misreporting and comparability, our work finds its place in a recent trend of the literature that invites to not discard the MENA in survey research [START_REF] Benstead | Survey Research in the Arab World: Challenges and Opportunities[END_REF][START_REF] Cavatorta | Revisiting the Islamist-Secular Divide: Parties and Voters in the Arab World[END_REF][START_REF] Tessler | Survey Research and the Study of Politics in the Arab World[END_REF]. We hope that our results can contribute to quantitatively document electoral cleavages in these three countries, and spur further data collection efforts in a region severely affected by lack of data transparency.

These three countries, with radically different recent histories, present various institutional configurations, but face similar types of social and political tensions. Algeria has a strong executive regime with a limited power left to the parliament. Iraq set up a semi-federal parliamentary system based on an ethno-religious sharing of the power in the early 2000s.

Turkey, by contrast, has a long-established multiparty system that may have represented a potential leading democratic model in the region, but recently experienced a strengthening of its executive [START_REF] Cammett | A Political Economy of the Middle East[END_REF].

Four main findings emerge from our analysis. First, income plays a differentiated role on voting divides but remains a meaningful determinant. In Algeria and Turkey, voting patterns for the incumbents display cross-class features uniting both poorest and richest voters, which may explain the stability of their respective ruling parties. In Iraq, the extremely strong sectarian dimension of the vote used to override intra-sect inequalities, questioning the relevance of income in voting behaviors, until the recent reconfiguration of the anti-sectarian opposition and mass mobilizations outside of the electoral arena.

Second, we find that ethnic minorities tend to exhibit higher level of social disparities than the main ethnic group and always have a differentiated voting behavior, pointing towards contextual interactions between identity-based vote and ethnic inequalities. The Kurds in Turkey and the Berbers in Algeria have been significantly less supportive of the incumbent over the period, with a clear class dimension in the first case only: the Kurds being significantly poorer. In Iraq, the alignment of the vote with the ethno-religious identity, triggered by the sectarian mode of governance, mirrors strong inequalities between communities that however reverted over time: the Kurds became richer than the historically privileged Sunni and the majoritarian Shia.

Third, other dimensions of identity, such as religiosity and age, echo changes in the structure of social inequalities and translate into political cleavages. In Turkey, the salient religious divide has to be understood as part of a broader cultural cleavage, which opposes voters with different education levels, in a context of historical support of the secular republic among the most educated. In Iraq and Algeria, the potential of a generational cleavage requires special attention given the social and economic exclusion of the youth. Youth discontent seems to have mostly channeled through abstention in the two countries.

Lastly, the recent mass protests invite to pay specific attention to alternate modes of political participation than the vote such as protestation and abstention. In Iraq and Algeria, the two street movements that started in 2019, as well as the last elections turnout, exhibit new interclass and cross-sectarian dynamics. This paper makes three main contributions. First, we extended and adapted a framework developed for Western democracies to low-and middle-income countries, which historically experienced authoritarian surges and inference of the army in politics. No country of the MENA region had ever been studied in this systematic and comparative perspective. We made an innovative use of standardized survey data that are easily updatable with future data releases.

Second, we adopt a party system approach that favors comparative perspective but has been relatively less mobilized in MENA studies. We assume that political cleavages are well captured by electoral outcomes and party choices declared by respondents.

Third, we provide an empirical perspective that may confirm or challenge existing analysis developed in sociopolitical studies of the vote in these three countries. For Turkey, our results corroborate a large literature looking at the social base of the AKP. For Iraq, they suggest that we need to pay a special attention to the social and ethnic characteristics of voters that supported lists with anti-system discourse, beyond the traditional secular opposition. For Algeria, our results invite to reconsider the initial ideological differences between the FLN and the RND that attracted both sides of the income distribution as well as the strong identitydimension in the Berber vote. This paper adds to the literature on the development of crony capitalism in the Middle East and its political economy consequences [START_REF] Cammett | A Political Economy of the Middle East[END_REF]Diwan, Malik and Atiyas, 2019). This literature has quantitatively documented various mechanisms through which the economic liberalization turns of the 1980s-1990s have fueled a reinvention of the clientelist and populist features presents in most MENA regimes [START_REF] Buğra | New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationships between Politics, Religion and Business[END_REF][START_REF] Gürakar | Politics of Favoritism in Public Procurement in Turkey: Reconfigurations of Dependency Networks in the AKP Era[END_REF][START_REF] Rijkers | All in the Family: State Capture in Tunisia[END_REF]Diwan and Haidar, 2020). In particular, our findings confirm how blurred borders between private and public capital have allowed the institutionalization of rent-seeking behaviours and the set-up of distributive policies along identity lines, ensuring a cross-class support for the incumbents. The redefined alliances between the government, the powerful security apparatus, and an emerging business bourgeoisie, which temporarily replaced post-independence social contracts, appear to have become more fragile with the widespread of the discontent among all social groups. This paper also contributes to the literature pointing the relevance of electoral studies in the region. While most MENA countries hold regular elections since several decades, little is known on the evolution of the social composition of political party electorate or the role of party competition in the regime changes from an historical perspective (Hinnebush, 2017). An orientalism bias has made of the MENA a region aside in comparative politics and reflects on the limited studies available on the programmatic positions of political parties [START_REF] Cavatorta | Political Parties in the Arab World: Continuity and Change[END_REF]2020). This paper relates to the studies stressing the importance of party competition in the Middle East despite concerns around electoral irregularities, for showing approval or opposition to the regime by the mean of abstention [START_REF] Miguel | Elections in the Arab World: Why Do Citizens Turn Out?[END_REF]Buttorff, 2019) or for distributive politics purposes [START_REF] Lust | Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East[END_REF][START_REF] Blaydes | Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt[END_REF][START_REF] Cammett | A Political Economy of the Middle East[END_REF][START_REF] Wuthrich | National elections in Turkey: People, Politics, and the Party System[END_REF]Corstange, 2016;[START_REF] Blaydes | Distributive Politics in the Middle East[END_REF].

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 to 4 present country-specific analysis and are structured in a similar way: they include a summary of recent history politics before turning to the main cleavages identified. Section 5 concludes.

Turkey

With its long history of democratic rule, Turkey is considered as a specific case in the MENA landscape. The political predominance of a ruler openly claiming its Islamic identity since 2002 has been questioning a transition to identity politics. Standing as the party of the left behind of the republican era, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) invites to adopt a renewed cross-cleavages perspective in which socioeconomic determinants keep playing a major role.

In this section, we first draw an overview of the Turkish political landscape, starting with the first multiparty elections of 1946. Then, we question the salience of a religious divide in a republic shaped by state secularism. The need of integrating other dimensions leads us to identify a rising "inverted" class divide, with low-income and less-educated voters shifting towards right-wing parties since the early 1990s. Finally, we turn to the inescapable ethnic and regional features of Turkish cleavages, reflecting on the socioeconomic disparities behind the 'Kurdish question'.

A Multiparty System Challenged by New Players

Turkey became an independent nation-state in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

The new regime, led by Mustafa Kemal, implemented a set of radical and authoritarian nation-building policies to create a secular and westernized nation. Despite the set-up of a representative body and universal suffrage, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) was the only party ruling until 1946. Political opposition and minority movements were heavily repressed, preventing any multiparty system until the start of the Cold War [START_REF] Zürcher | Turkey: A Modern History[END_REF].

The first free and fair elections of 1950 marked the success of an opposition party that managed to rally the private sector and rural discontent. The original matrix of Turkish politics was born: on one hand, the old establishment, represented by the state-founding party CHP, nationalist, urban, secular, and interventionist, thereby often positioned on the left of the political spectrum; on the other hand, the previously excluded rural pious and the conservative bourgeoisie, corresponding to the center-right, the culturally dominated "periphery" [START_REF] Mardin | Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?[END_REF]. Three decades of alternations between the CHP and its challenger followed.

The military constitutes a third major actor of Turkish politics. Two direct coups, in 1960 and 1980, and two indirect ones by means of memorandum in 1971 and 1997 led to government changes, notably preserving the secular aspect of the state [START_REF] Hale | Turkish Politics and the Military[END_REF]. The 1980 coup, in a context of increasing street violence between far-right and far-left activists, may have been the one with the longest-lasting effect. All previously existing parties, including the CHP, were banned from the political scene and a new electoral law introduced a crucial electoral threshold, preventing any extreme to get into the parliament. The state ideology was redefined towards a "Turkish Islamic Synthesis' to unite both Islamism and Turkish nationalism in a broad right bloc [START_REF] Kaya | Secularism and State Religion in Modern Turkey: Law, Policy-Making and the Diyanet[END_REF].

The 1980s paved the way to a multiparty system split in between three to four main actors, governing altogether through coalitions. The center-right, while internally divided, concentrated the majority of votes (Figure 1). The center-left split between a socialdemocratic branch and a more traditional one until the reborn CHP replaced them as main challenger. This equilibrium was broken in 1995 when an Islamic party crossed the 10 percent electoral threshold and became the first party in terms of vote share. At the same time, Kurdish parties, representing the country's main ethnic minority, entered the electoral arena. These two "structural fears" of the Republic, namely ethnic division and political Islam, had until then aligned within the left-right divide prevailing during the Cold War (Özerdem and Whiting, 2019).

Despite military interventions and the successive bans of the Islamic parties, another Islamic party, the AKP captured all discontent votes in 2002, on the aftermath of the country's most severe economic crisis up to date [START_REF] Pamuk | Uneven Centuries: Economic Development of Turkey since 1820[END_REF]. Against all expectations, the conservative party ruled by Erdoğan, the successful mayor of Istanbul, managed to remain in power until today, opening an unprecedented period of one-party dominance since 1946. During its first years in power, the AKP managed to present itself as the party that will integrate the country into the EU while initiating a notable open-policy dialogue with the Kurdish dissidents.

Continuing a set of institutional and structural reforms initiated ahead of its mandate, the first terms of the party were marked by relatively "high-quality growth" but these improvements quickly reversed [START_REF] Acemoglu | High-Quality versus Low-Quality Growth in Turkey -Causes and Consequences[END_REF].

The disappearance of any EU adhesion prospects, coupled with economic difficulties and geopolitical changes in the region following the Syrian War and the Arab Springs led the AKP to gradually shift towards a combination of ultra-nationalism and political Islam. 2015 announced the first loss of majority for the incumbent, which had to ally with far-right nationalists. This initiated an authoritarian drift that was further accentuated by the failed putsch attempt of 2016. A referendum in 2017 institutionalized the shift to a strong presidential system and the Kurdish question was militarized in light of the fight against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS).

A New Role for the Religious Cleavage in the Secular Republic?

The advent of an Islamic party as the major incumbent in the oldest secular republic of the Middle East raised debates on the potential rise of the role of religion in voting behavior. Yet, data suggest that the increased support for Islamic parties was not concomitant with an increase in religiosity [START_REF] Livny | Trust and the Islamic Advantage[END_REF]. While religiosity, captured through self-description as religious, does have an impact on vote choice, Figure 2 points to the persistence of a religious divide preceding AKP's electoral success. Since 1991, religious voters have consistently been more likely to vote for right-wing parties than non-religious voters by 25 to 35 percentage points after controls.

The mainstream center-right thus already captured the more religious and conservative part of the electorate. Moreover, the AKP initially claimed its affinities with Christian-Democratic parties and incarnated a moderate approach in a fragmented Islamic landscape that did not unite under his umbrella [START_REF] Hale | Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey[END_REF]. Research paying specific attention to parties' discourses and practices equally reveals that Islamic parties have not been emphasizing religious matters in electoral campaigns before getting access to power [START_REF] Wuthrich | National elections in Turkey: People, Politics, and the Party System[END_REF].

The perceived increase in the importance of the religiosity dimension may denote a mutation of "Islamic identity", aligned with interests in economic liberalization. Far from the traditional vision of the rural pious, the modern devout would instead cultivate such identity, giving him access to business and social connections relying on interpersonal trust schemes.

Islamic business associations notably played a major role in the empowerment of new entrepreneurs [START_REF] Yavuz | Islamic Political Identity in Turkey[END_REF][START_REF] Buğra | New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationships between Politics, Religion and Business[END_REF]. The interaction of religiosity with other socioeconomic dimensions, and the subsequent intra-elite conflict between the secular apparatchik and an openly devout new business elite, may be key for understanding Turkish dynamics.

The Rise of "Inverted" Class Cleavages?

Political analysts quickly noticed the AKP's singular ability to rally diverse electoral bases such as the "poor and the pious" from rural areas and the rising liberal bourgeoisie of central Anatolia, amplifying an electoral bridge initiated by the Islamic parties throughout the 1990s.

The AKP success, which initially allowed the party to rule without joining any coalition, would not have been possible without also gaining the support of poor workers and especially of the gecekondu ("built at night"), poor urban dwellings resulting from the massive internal migration movement in the 1960s [START_REF] Bermek | The Rise of Hybrid Political Islam in Turkey[END_REF].

What clearly appears in Figure 3 is that the AKP scored more than 40 percent in all income quintiles, except the highest one. The AKP confirmed its comparative advantage among lowincome groups over time, despite an apparent lack of changes in the high level of income inequalities throughout the 2000s, which even further increased since 2013 [START_REF] Alvaredo | Measuring Inequality in the Middle East 1990-2016: The World's Most Unequal Region?[END_REF]. Regarding top-income voters, data suggests an intra-elite conflict with roughly equal support for the CHP and the AKP among the economic elite. 3 Several factors can contribute to explain this cross-class success.

On the one hand, the AKP could leverage on the "Islamic trust advantage" built by previous movements and their strong ties with social civil organizations (Cammett and Luong, 2014).

The discredit of all mainstream parties, due to several major financial crises in the 1990s and to their perceived collusion, arguably also helped the AKP to impose itself as a coalition of both globalization losers and winners. The greater fiscal discipline and the unprecedented low levels of inflation may have pleased the exporting small and medium enterprises as much as the poorer workers.

On the other hand, the factors having fueled the growth, namely a massive credit expansion and a boom in the construction sector, renewed clientelism schemes beyond religious networks. The Housing Policy benefited many low-income dwellings while public procurement contracts and credit lending facilities went to politically connected firms [START_REF] Gürakar | Politics of Favoritism in Public Procurement in Turkey: Reconfigurations of Dependency Networks in the AKP Era[END_REF]Bircan and Saka, 2019). The AKP might also be a political reply to a longlasting rural-urban divide. The poor urban workers kept being associated to their rural roots and differing values and practices, especially their religiosity. The poverty reduction and the real estate boom under AKP rule coincided with an upward mobility of this working class, which may have translated into a new generation of politicians proud of their rural origin (Erman, 2017).

Strikingly, highest-educated voters have also consistently been less supportive of the incumbent, and more supportive of the CHP, than the lower educated since the early 1990s (Figure 4). The effect of education appears to be highly robust to controls and strong enough to revert the impact of religiosity.4 Such-defined "intellectual elites" therefore seem to relate more to the Kemalist tradition of secularism. Education was indeed at the core of Kemal's modernization reforms, which initiated a long-lasting cultural cleavage in the country (Assouad, 2020;[START_REF] Sakalli | Secularization and Religious Backlash: Evidence from Turkey[END_REF].

The education divide also recently took a generational dimension when the AKP put an end to the marginalization of religious schooling [START_REF] Lüküslü | Creating a Pious Generation: Youth and Education Policies of the AKP in Turkey[END_REF]. Interestingly, the youth voted less for the AKP than older voters, but controlling for education significantly reverses this trend starting in 2015. 5 While the party may have lost the young graduates that were overrepresented in the 2013 Gezi Park protest, it did not get massively rejected by the new generation at large, despite a rising youth unemployment rate. Moreover, contrasting with other MENA countries, Turkey exhibits an extremely high level of electoral participation including among the youth.

All in all, the AKP appears to have been much more popular among low-income and especially lower-educated voters since the 1990s, while top-income and higher-educated voters have been more supportive of the CHP. While partially congruent to the religious cleavage, this divide appears to have a strong socioeconomic dimension. This class cleavage differs significantly from that observed in other Muslim-majority countries studied, such as Pakistan where the secular left has historically been supported by low-income voters and by the poorer Sindhi ethnic group [START_REF] Gethin | Social Inequality and the Dynamics of Political Ethnolinguistic Divides in Pakistan, 1970-2018[END_REF]).

The Regional Cleavage and the "Kurdish Question" Turkey's landscape is clearly divided between the richer West Aegean coast and the urban centers of Istanbul and Ankara, on one side, and the historically most deprived Eastern and Southeastern regions, on the other, where the majority of Kurds live. 6 As a consequence, the Kurdish question is often framed as a "class cleavage" (Hakan [START_REF] Yavuz | Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey[END_REF] and encompasses long-lasting regional inequalities that take as much an income than an educational dimension.

While Kurdish dissent took different shapes, between demands for cultural recognition and quest for self-determination, its qualification as a proper political matter is a recent phenomenon. Until the mid-1990s, the cleavage took the form of alternate phases of 'tacit' coexistence or self-reinforcing cycles of state repression and escalation of violence [START_REF] Barkey | The Transformation of Turkey's Kurdish Question[END_REF]. The first unilateral ceasefire of the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in 1993 and the abandonment of its separatist quest paved the way for openly Kurdish political parties to emerge in the electoral arena. Yet, Kurdish parties were successively banned, despite major electoral gains in Southeastern regions. The AKP's arrival to power in 2002 led to an interesting change in regional voting patterns.

By sharing a somewhat similar history of state repression than Kurdish parties, the AKP attracted the more pious and socially conservative electorate of the Southeastern regions.

Moreover, its first terms represented a noticeable exception of recognition of Kurdish subidentity that led the party to gain significant political support among the two predominantly Kurdish regions. 7The reversal of the regional and international context however put an end to this parenthesis in 2015. The empowerment of the Syrian Kurdish organization in the fight over ISIS led to the resurgence of Kurdish ethno-nationalism [START_REF] Kaya | The Kurdish Question[END_REF]. In line with these changes, our findings suggest that Kurdish speakers have massively voted against the AKP in the past decade, with a peak in 2015. In that year, they were less likely to support the incumbent by almost 50 percentage points after controls (Figure 5). 8At the same time, a new Kurdish party, the Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), appeared as a threatening electoral opponent in 2015, by adopting an inclusive radical left stance [START_REF] Kaya | The Potentials and Challenges of Left Populism in Turkey: The Case of Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP)[END_REF]. For the first time, Kurdish MPs were entering the parliament as a party, while the HDP succeeded in being not exclusively supported by the Southeast region.9 Overall, the Turkish ethno-regional cleavage remains deeply rooted in socioeconomic inequalities but is not fully frozen. The Kurds supported ruling parties when those met both their cultural and social demands, while Kurdish parties managed to federate votes beyond their ethnic group when adopting inclusive platforms.

Iraq

The first democratic elections of Iraq took place in 2005, in a country still under US occupation and devastated by a heavy economic and humanitarian toll. The new regime adopted an unprecedented identity-based mode of governance, equally sharing the power between the different ethnic and religious groups. Since then, rising protests and fragmentation of ethno-sectarian blocks have been questioning the future of Iraqi governance.

In this section, we first introduce the major institutional changes that followed the US-led invasion of the country in 2003. We document the prominence of the sectarian divide in voting patterns by looking at the votes of the main ethno-religious Iraqi groups. Considering the effect of income on the vote, we question whether intra-sect inequalities challenged this cleavage over the period, paying a specific attention to the social reconfiguration of the opposition. The lack of strong additional divides beyond the sectarian one, in a context of rising abstention, leads us to analyse the signs of a governance crisis that seems to surpass both social and ethno-religious cleavages.

A Democratic Transition Shaped by Ethno-Religious Sectarianism

Iraq found its modern territorial form after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Britain administered the country after World War I and the country only became fully independent in 1932. Under the influence of Pan-Arabism, promoted by the Egyptian Nasser, a coup overthrew the monarchy in place in 1958 and established a nationalist republic under military ruling. Social and agrarian reforms were implemented, backed by one of the most prominent communist party of the Middle East. In 1968, the Ba'ath Party took power and imposed a secular dictatorship. Quickly embodied by its leader Saddam Hussein, the Baathist regime signed the political dominance of Sunni Muslims from central Iraq over poorer Shia and incarnated an Arabic nationalism hostile to the Kurdish part of the population [START_REF] Dawisha | Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation[END_REF].

While the first decades were marked by significant improvement in human development outcomes, the two Gulf Wars (with Iran 1980Iran -1988 and the annexation attempt of Kuwait in 1991), followed by ravaging international economic sanctions, let the country devastated. The US-led invasion in 2003, supposedly to prevent nuclear armament, ended unravelling the former regime. The post-2003 period instituted a profound institutional reconfiguration and opened an era of extreme violence. The disbanding of the Iraqi army and the systematic de-Ba'athification of the institutions put more than half a million of Iraqi out of work and let to an insurgency in Sunni areas. The conflict quickly turned into all-out civil war between violent militia, often aligned with tribal and religious interests. Political violence and insecurity remained an inherent part of the Iraqi landscape until today10 [START_REF] Marr | The Modern History of Iraq[END_REF].

A sectarian mode of governance, sharing power equitably between the various ethnic and religious groups of the countryprimarily Sunni, Shia, and Kurd, but also Turkmen and Christianemerged under the aegis of the US. This system, the muhasassa, appeared as the preferred way to end the capture of power by a politico-military minority. All communities united in apparently monolithic blocks and only few secular parties imposed themselves in the political landscape. With the Baath party banned and its former members prohibited from standing for the elections, all main players were former opponents to Saddam's regime, either organized in exile or clandestinely.

Despite tensions and a new war in 2014 due to ISIS expansion over the North-West of the territory, the Islamic-dominated system has been remarkably stable since 2005, and elections held continuously. This normalization let a greater place for intra-group competition over time. The higher demographic weight of Shia led their coalitions to gain the highest vote share, while Sunni Arabs initially boycotted the electoral process (Figure 6). Yet, the quotasharing system ensured that the government would be made of coalitions, with a turning allocation of positions among the three groups. Secular and anti-sectarian alliances also took a growing importance. United against the autocratic drift of the Shia Prime Minister Al-Maliki, the secular list Al-Iraqiya notably arrived first in the 2010 elections but rallied mostly Sunni votes.

Political elites gradually moved from fractionalization to collusion around power-sharing, while popular discontent increasingly transcended identity boundaries. Growing streets protests aroused throughout the country, and primarily in Shia areas since 2015 [START_REF] Costantini | The Iraqi Protest Movement: Social Mobilization Amidst Violence and Instability[END_REF]. Moving from demands for basic services provisions, the social movement quickly denunciated the failures of the state at large, questioning the legitimacy of its identity mode of governance. For the first time, the anti-sectarian stance deeply resonated in the Shia political bloc in the elections of 2018 and a new coalition managed to reshuffle the cards, reflecting this call for out-of-the-system alliances. Yet, record abstention as much as sustained protests since October 2019 have been questioning the ability of the 2003 regime to reinvent itself [START_REF] Dodge | Sectarianization and De-sectarianization in the Struggle for Iraq's Political Field[END_REF].

Spatial Inequalities and Sectarian Voting

More than three decades of conflicts severely deteriorated Iraqis' social conditions. With infrastructures and institutions in tatters, poverty has been exploding in an economy dominated by the resource curse (OPHDI, 2017). The salient security issue of the post-2003 era and poor governance further delayed any improvement of the situation for a population still lacking basic services (World Bank, 2014). No significant reduction in either poverty or income inequality has then been observed throughout the period. The twin crisis of 2014, the worsening of economic conditions due to the collapse of oil prices and the resurgence of violence with the rise of ISIS, cancelled all the progress made in poverty reduction since the civil war [START_REF] Krishnan | Losing the Gains of the Past: the Welfare and DistributionalImpacts of the Twin Crises in Iraq 2014[END_REF]. The share of the population under the national poverty line stagnates around 20 percent and is estimated to have increased by at least 10 percentage point in 2020 as a result of the global pandemic (UNDP, 2020). This extreme poverty is however unevenly distributed over the territory, which impacts ethnic inequality. Despite the lack of ethnic census, government statistics of 2010 estimate around 65% of Iraqi population to be Shia and 35% Sunni, while the share of Kurds, mainly Sunni, ranges between 15 to 20 percent. The three main ethno-religious groups largely concentrate in defined areas: the North is mostly Kurdish, the Centre Sunni and the South of the country Shia (Figure 7). 11 Regional inequalities however reverted over time. While Shia and Kurdish provinces have been historically the most deprived, the latter experienced a reversal of fortune. 12 After having suffered from state repression and ethnic cleansing campaigns, the Kurdistan region benefited from a rather peaceful and prosperous time, under a de facto autonomy regime since 1991 institutionalized with the 2005 semi-federal constitution [START_REF] Natali | The Kurdish quasi-state: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq[END_REF]. In contrast, the succession of conflicts had a more pronounced spatial divergent effect, at the expense of the Sunni North-West. Increasing geographical disparities deepened the ethnic cleavage that took the form of an independence referendum for the Kurdistan Region in 2017, whose legality was rejected by the federal government. United as opponents to Saddam's regime, the alliance between Kurdish and Shia has been increasingly questioned with the war against ISIS [START_REF] Mcevoy | Power-Sharing Challenges: From Weak Adoptability to Dysfunction in Iraq[END_REF].

The sectarian feature of the Iraqi system leads by construction to extremely high regional cleavages. The regional variable captures almost perfectly the ethno-religious divide (Figure 8). Yet, decomposing Iraq within three major groups occupying distinct territories remains a simplified misrepresentation. Mixed provinces, such as the capital Baghdad or the disputed province of Kirkuk, remain important, and only one-third to one-half of Iraqi 11 See appendix maps.

governorates are demographically dominated by a single community. The geographical decomposition of political outcomes also confirms that inter-sectarian votes exist beyond support for secular and anti-sectarian coalitions. Kurdish votes, nonetheless, display a dissimilar pattern, with almost no national list interfering in the Kurdish political scene. 13 What Place for the Income Gradient in a Sectarian Vote?

Decomposing the vote along the income dimension confirms the importance of regional and sectarian disparities: controlling for ethno-religious identity almost completely cancels the effect of income on the vote between 2005 and 2014. 14 Yet, the sectarian divide is not going without deep intra-sect inequalities. A poverty mapping exercise by district notably reveals that pockets of extreme poverty are side by side with islands enriched by oil windfalls, including within regions predominantly populated by one sect [START_REF] Vishwanath | Where are Iraq's Poor: Mapping Poverty in Iraq[END_REF]).

This might be partly due to a supply side shortage. The fall of Saddam Hussein regime came along with the ban of the former socialist pan-Arabism ideology. Few parties openly identified themselves on a left-right spectrum or aimed at gathering poor voters in the post-2003 era. Secular coalitions, which adopted a more socialist tone, struggled finding an effective cross-sectarian resonance and initially appealed more to richer Iraqi. 15 The sectarianization of Iraqi politics also coincided with a struggle over oil resources and their redistribution, that notably channeled through public sector appointment (Al-Mawalwi, 2019). Civil servants are much richer, while the poor are concentrated in informal jobs. In a country often ranked in the world top ten corrupted countries, patronage defined on an ethnoreligious base kept playing a prominent electoral role [START_REF] Iraq | Clientelism: Factionalism in the Allocation of Public Resources in Iraq after 2003[END_REF]. The civil war that tore apart the country after 2003 and the close links between politics and militia lastly made of the sectarian vote a matter of security (Haddad, 2020a).

It is only in 2018 that poorer voters became significantly more supportive of anti-sectarian lists, when the alternative took the form of an unprecedented alliance between the secular 13 See appendix Figures BB5. 14 See appendix Figures BC1, BC2, andBC3. communists and a faction of Islamic Shia, the Saadrists (Figure 9). Decried as a tactical alliance with no future, this coalition revealed the importance of the interactions between leftists and Islamic movements on social grounds (Robin-D'Cruz 2019). By redefining the boundaries of the "anti-sectarian" camp suddenly prone to incorporate Islamic components, this novel coalition may have reintroduced a class cleavage while transforming the social composition of the opposition.

At the same time, the 2018 elections illustrated how a system based on sectarian lines failed to equally benefit all members of a same sect. It is in the mostly Shia province of Basra that social protests started mid-2015. Demonstrators held their own Shia leaders accountable for the worsening of public services and lack of electricity in one of the most oil-rich governorates, despite religious tensions revived by the war against the Sunni Islamic State [START_REF] Haddad | From Existential Struggle to Political Banality: The Politics of Sect in Post-2003 Iraq[END_REF]).

An Absence of Alternate Cleavages in a System in Crisis?

Decades of conflicts severely damaged public institutions and infrastructures in Iraq, especially education and healthcare that used to be ranked near the top of the region in the late 1970s. The collapse of the Iraqi educational system could have then impacted the political choices of Iraqi. Nonetheless, as for income, education does not seem to impact voting patterns after having controlled for ethno-sectarian dynamics. 16The absence of a salient education divide may however relate to the continuous and massive exodus of the former educated middle class. Initiated during the war decades, the brain drain further amplified with the sectarian violence and the deBa'athification process, leading to their potential disappearance in Iraq demographics nowadays [START_REF] Sassoon | The Brain Drain in Iraq after the 2003 Invasion[END_REF]. Interestingly, anti-sectarian lists were initially more supported by higher-educated voters (Figure 10). Yet, by reinventing themselves, anti-sectarian alliances managed to diversify their electorate beyond the former elite of the Saddam regime.

Moreover, inequalities in access to schooling partly overlap with a generational effect in one of the youngest countries in the world. 17 Youth and women are equally excluded from the labour force while the succession of conflicts led to a massive share of internally displaced persons that still accounts for one out of ten Iraqi, a majority of women and children concentrated in poor urban areas (UNDP, 2014). Yet, one does not observe the emergence of new striking cleavages along age or gender dimensions. 18 Social discontent, rather than channeling through votes for anti-sectarian lists, may have however mostly expressed itself in the form of abstention, especially high among young and female voters. Strikingly, while boycott aligned with Sunni identity at first, refusing to cast a vote may have become the clearest cross-sectarian and cross-class mode of political expression. 19 Trust deficit towards the government equally jumped across all social and ethnoreligious groups (Figure 11). In 2018, the predominantly Shia-populated southern region was not only exhibiting the highest level of political activism but also the highest share of respondents reporting a total lack of confidence in the government, surpassing for the first time the score of the Sunni middle-north region.

To some extent, the rising abstention and continuous protests movements may invite to conclude that the anti-sectarian lists are not necessarily perceived by discontent voters as incarnating an opposition to a political system that little mirrors the evolution of social cleavages [START_REF] Jabar | The Iraqi Protest Movement: From Identity Politics to Issue Politics[END_REF]. These lists are not preferentially more supported by most politically active voters, nor by the ones that expressed no trust in the government since 2014.20

Algeria

Algerian politics is still dominated by the state-party that ruled the country after the independence, the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN). Yet, the country was the first one of the Arab World to launch multiparty elections at the end of the 1980s but the attempt quickly failed. Since 2019, massive mass protests, the Hirak, have been 17 United Nations Development Program, Iraq Human Development Report, (UNDP, 2014) 18 See appendix Figure BC9. 19 See appendix Figure BD1 andBD4.

profoundly shaking the regime, questioning the potential transformation of the regime's social base.

We first look at the sociospatial disparities of the country in the presence of an important minority group geographically concentrated, the Berbers. In the absence of strong regional divide in the political scene, we turn to the decomposition of the electorate along the income gradient. We identify an original cross-class alliance incarnated by a formal two-party ruling that unite both the half poorer and the richest earners. The massive abstention of the youth leads us to put in perspective the importance of the generational cleavage. We lastly turn into the other dimensions of abstention and political activism in light of the massive protests that shake the regime since 2019.

From Post-Colonial Authoritarianism to an 'Electoral Autocracy'

Algeria gained its independence from France in 1962. The new regime, deprived of its former French and Algeria-born European bureaucrats, replaced them with trusted war veterans, enshrining from the start the deep connections between the State and the military [START_REF] Stora | Histoire de l'Algérie depuis l'Indépendance 1962-1988[END_REF]. The FLN that had united revolutionary dissidents during the independence war (1954)(1955)(1956)(1957)(1958)(1959)(1960)(1961)(1962), imposed itself as the new state party. It established an authoritarian system promoting state socialism and Arabic nationalism which prevailed for almost three decades, until nationscale riots forced the regime to adopt governance reforms in 1988.

Calling for ending corruption in a context of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, the popular unrest was met by the adoption of a new constitution that paved the way for a democratization process, raising hope in the whole Arab world. The experience was however cut short when a fundamentalist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) won the first pluralist elections of 1991, triggering military intervention [START_REF] Peyroulou | Histoire de l'Algérie depuis 1988[END_REF].

With the National Assembly dissolved and the FIS banned, the military took effective control of the country. State repression coupled with a violent radicalization of part of the Islamists triggered a decade of bloody civil war. It was only after this "Black Decade" that a second democratization turn happened. In 1999, Bouteflika, a long-standing FLN member backed by the military, was elected president. He would remain in place for nearly two decades, relying on a new pro-government coalition between the FLN and a technocratic movement, the Democratic National Rally (Rassemblement National Démocratique, RND) [START_REF] Mcdougall | A History of Algeria[END_REF].

The political landscape in Algeria remained dominated by the alliance of the FLN and RND despite no strong popular backing in general elections (Figure 12). The extremely high vote shares going to other marginal parties did not translate into the allocation of parliamentary seats. 21 While the multiparty electoral system was preserved during the civil war, relatively fairer elections only took place after 2002, and kept being blamed for only perpetuating a status quo with limited democratization [START_REF] Aghrout | Algeria: Reforms without Change?[END_REF]. A contested constitutional modification, ruling out presidential terms' limits in 2008, also strengthened the executive.

The Arab Spring wave in 2011 had relatively little repercussions in Algerian politics.

Consumption subsidies, pay rises for civil servants, and youth unemployment schemes mitigated the protests [START_REF] Volpi | Algeria versus the Arab spring[END_REF][START_REF] Algeria | The Price of Stability in Algeria[END_REF]. New political parties were legalized but stayed aside the parliament due to the electoral threshold. Non-fundamentalist Islamic parties also federated in 2012 but did not manage to replicate the success encountered across the region [START_REF] Ghanem | The Decline of Islamist Parties in Algeria[END_REF]2019). Overall, the opposition remained weak and divided, and abstention strong, exceeding 50 percent over the period.

Instead, located riots had an increased role in the political agenda in a context of worsening socioeconomic conditions. They gained an unprecedented national dimension in February 2019, following the announcement of Bouteflika's candidacy for a fifth mandate (Karthala, 2019). Despite the president's renunciation and the organization of new elections massively boycotted, the so-called Hirak protests were still mobilizing a year after it started, with unclear political consequences at the time of writing [START_REF] Volpi | Algeria: When Elections Hurt Democracy[END_REF].

Spatial Disparities and Ethnic Cleavages in Algeria

Algeria is a middle-income country, which relies mostly on its reserves of hydrocarbon and gas, all located in its Southern part. The coast, while representing only 4 percent of the country's surface, concentrates almost half of inhabitants and companies. This massive coastal settlement has come with important spatial disparities, especially between the north and the poorer south [START_REF] Khaoua | Ecodevelopment in the Euro Mediterranean Partnership: Cases of Coastal Territories of Algeria and Morocco[END_REF]. 22 However, while new regional claims have been taking a growing importance in the 2010s in the form of movements against unemployment and youth marginalization in the South, they do not seem to have found an echo in the electoral arena with no major distinct party representing the distinct interest of the South.

The picture is quite different when turning to the Berber-populated region of Kabylia, in the North of the country. The Berber, or self-named Amazigh, represent about a quarter of the Algerian population. Distinct by their language and culture, they were initially not recognized by the newly independent state that promoted the Arabization of the country. The so-called "Berber question" reached the political scene in 1980 when popular uprisings took place in Kabylia. Although contained to that region, this first large-scale unrest endorsed socioeconomic and democratic requests at large.

No regional or ethnic Berber political party was launched with the introduction of multiparty elections in 1991. Instead, two of the main secular opposition parties, the Socialist Forces Front (Front des forces socialistes, FFS) and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie, RCD), were more successful in the region, even if they did not incorporate any ethnic claim in their platform (Figure 13). The Kabyle vote appears as a contestation vote that may be explained by the potential exclusion from power and clientelist networks organized by the government. Mountainous and densely populated, Kabylia used to be highly rural and remaining rural spots encounter important unemployment rates [START_REF] Willis | Politics and Power in the Maghreb[END_REF]. However, contrary to the Kurds in Turkey, the Algerian "ethnic question" does not have a clear class dimension, as Kabylia does not appear to be significantly poorer or richer than the rest of the country. 23

A Renewed Cross-Class Alliance in a Two-Party Ruling System

Since the end of the Black Decade, two parties, the FLN and the RND, have been effectively running the country, despite apparently opposite ideological stances. The FLN had historically 22 See appendix maps. a strong socialist component while the RND initially incarnated a new liberal economic view, uniting technocrats behind the structural adjustment reforms defended by the International Monetary Fund [START_REF] Hamadouche | Power and Opposition in Algeria: Toward a Protracted Transition?[END_REF]. The income gradient of these two parties reflects this divide. The FLN seems to have been relatively more successful among lowincome voters, while the RND has appealed to higher-income voters (Figure 14). The same is observed with respect to education. 24 The difference however disappeared at the end of the period and may denote the increase perception of collusion between the two parties.

Such pattern recalls the characteristics of so-called neopatrimonial states with cartel ruling, in which blurry frontiers between politics and the economic sector foster clientelistic loyalties among a socially diverse electorate (Eisenstadtn 1973). On one hand, the regime adopted a strong welfare component since the 1970s and kept with high level of spending and redistributive policies with respect to MENA standards, ensuring poverty reduction [START_REF] Eibl | Social Dictatorships: The Political Economy of the Welfare State in the Middle East and North Africa[END_REF]. The distribution of the hydrocarbon rent went through housing or interest rate subsidy and important state employment. On the other hand, the RND also constitutes the party of the new entrepreneurs and globalization, as liberalization in the 1990s led to a rapid expansion of the private sector and marked a new stage for the crony capitalism system [START_REF] Belguidoum | Transnationational Trade and New Types of Entrepreneurs in Algeria[END_REF]. Each party within the ruling cartel therefore attracted a side of the income distribution, reconcilingor making disappearclass cleavages, thus contributing to maintaining the political status quo.

The Relevance of a Generational Cleavage

The Algerian population is very young, with more than 40 percent aged below 25. The youth is one of the most fragile groups of the country, with an unemployment rate two to three times higher than the national average over the period. In the absence of socio-economic opportunities and the decline of targeted policies that became too costly after the drop in oil prices in 2014, almost two-third of the youth reported having thought about emigrating from Algeria in 2019 (Unicef, 2019). 25 In this context, the relationship between the youth and the regime has been especially scrutinized (L. [START_REF] Thieux | Algerian Youth and the Political Struggle for Dignity: Evolution, Trends and New Forms of Mobilisation[END_REF]. Young Algerians were one of the main actors of the 1988 riots and they sizably joined Islamist armed groups during the civil war [START_REF] Willis | The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History[END_REF]. The historical legitimacy of the FLN taken from its participation into the independence war, as in many post-colonial rulings, also tends to fade away among the new generations. The youth has thus displayed a significant rejection of the regime party, while older voters have been much more likely to support the FLN, except in 2017 (Figure 15). This relative surge in the youth's support to the FLN should nonetheless be interpreted with care. The results are mostly driven by increased abstention, with less than a fifth of voters younger than 35 declaring having voted in the 2017 legislative elections, in a context where aggregate turnout reached only 35 percent. 26

A Discredited Electoral System

The extremely high abstention over the period casts doubts on the ability of the multiparty system to capture discontent and echoes the continuous call to boycott election made by part of the opposition (Buttorff, 2019). While presidential elections present a higher turnout, the appointment of presidential candidates does not reply to a party system mechanism. The ruling parties (FLN, RND) and some opposition parties back the candidate endorsed by the military. The incumbent therefore faced almost no real challengers and with the notable exception of 2019 was re-elected with more than 80 percent of votes.

Abstention, together with street protests have then been seen as a renewed form of political participation in Algeria since the early 2000s [START_REF] Hamadouche | Abstention in Algeria: Another Form of Political Protest[END_REF]. In fact, political activism, as captured by the share of respondents having signed a petition or attended an organized demonstration, has been increasingly invested by the more disadvantaged social strata over time (Figure 16). Civil movements have also been seen as potential ways to bring the democratic opposition together with an increasing participation in various forms of civil society beyond political parties and labor unions [START_REF] Northey | Civil Society in Algeria, Activism, Identity and the Democratic Process[END_REF]. As the movement of the unemployed in the South of the country, the Hirak movement claimed its independence from any political parties [START_REF] Hamadouche | The Face to Face Hirak-Power: The Crisis of Representation[END_REF].

By a striking parallel, Iraqi and Algerian 2019 protests took place in rentier states, that avoided their own Arab Springs in 2011, but were increasingly fragilized by the drastic decline in their oil revenues. The two movements, adopting an anti-elite and anti-corruption rhetoric, revealed that high inequality levels have become part of political conflicts.

Transcending existing cleavages and displaying interclass and intersect dynamics, they appear as momenta susceptible to reverse previous equilibria, letting the future of both regimes uncertain.

Conclusion

This paper extends a comparative methodology initially developed in [START_REF] Piketty | Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality and the Changings Structure of Political Conflict. Evidence from France, Britain and the US, 1948-2017[END_REF] to three countries of the Middle East and North Africa region. Creating simple measures of inequality along different dimensions, we investigated whether one could relate the divides observed in voting patterns to some aspect of social and income inequality.

In Turkey, we identified that the salient religious divide preceded the arrival in power of the current incumbent. Taken on its own, the religious cleavage does not explain how the AKP rose to power and managed to predominate for almost two decades in the secular republic.

The need of integrating other dimensions, such as education and income, leads us to identify a rising "inverted" class divide, with low-income and lower-educated voters shifting towards right-wing parties since the early 1990s. The ethnic conflict around the Kurdish minority, which translated into strong regional voting patterns over the period, encompasses tremendous spatial disparities. All in all, the role of socioeconomic determinants in the Turkish setting seems especially accurate, despite the apparent move to identity politics.

In Iraq, we found a strong persistence of the sectarian voting that goes beyond existing intrasect inequalities. Nonetheless, this cleavage might have been recently questioned by the reconfiguration of the opposition that became more inclusive in the last elections. Moving from an alliance of secular parties with an over-representation of Sunnis Arabs, the antisectarian lists were equally supported by the poorer Shia in 2018. However, the diversity of the social composition of the opposition might relate to its lack of unity and extreme fragmentation. The absence of alternate political cleavages beyond the sectarian one may explain why popular discontent has rather channelled through abstention, which became the clearest cross-sectarian mode of political expression.

In Algeria, contrarily to the two other settings, socio-spatial diversities do not overlap with the geographical concentration of an important ethnic minority, the Berbers. The Berbers supported a well-identified part of the opposition over the period, suggesting the relevance of an identity vote. They however did not adopt separatist requests. Moreover, we identify that the power structure of the FLN, the state-party that ruled the country since the independence, may have been recently reinvented. The system now displays an original cross-class alliance, exemplified by an actual two-party ruling which unites both the half-poorer and the highincome voters. However, the massive abstention throughout the period called for further investigating the socioeconomic determinants of the discontent part of the population. While rejecting the existing party competition system, increasingly socially diverse protestors massively took the streets since February 2019.

Figure AC1 -Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties among top-income voters

Difference between (% top 10%) and (% bottom 90%) earners voting centre-right After controlling for education, age, gender, employment status, region, religiosity Difference between (% top 10%) and (% bottom 90%) earners voting Islamic After controls Difference between (% top 10%) and (% bottom 90%) earners voting AKP After controls Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners voters and the share of other voters voting for centre-right (DYP/ANAP) and Islamic (RP/FP) parties before 2007 and for the AKP after that date, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure AC5 -Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties among upper-class voters

Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) upper class Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners After controlling for income After controlling for income, education Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and voters that identified as upper class and the share of other voters supporting right-wing and Islamic parties. In 2015, the upper class is defined as those who declared several forms of capital accumulation (residence, property, bonds, savings).

-

Figure BC2 -Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among top-income voters

Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting secular lists

After controlling for region, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.

Figure BC6 -Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among highesteducated voters

Difference between (% of top 10% educ.) and (% of bottom 90% educ.) voting for secular and antisectarian lists After controlling for region, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethnoreligious identity.

Figure BC8 -Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among lowesteducated voters

Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) educated voting secular lists After controlling for region, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% voters and the share of top 50% voters in terms of education voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethnoreligious identity.

Figure BC10 -Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among women

Difference between (% of women) and (% of men) voting secular lists After controlling for region, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controls.

Figure BC11 -Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among voters experiencing significant economic difficulties

Difference between (% of those experiencing significant economic difficulties) and (% of other voters) voting secular

After controlling for region, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters who declared experiencing significant economic difficulties and the share of other voters voting for the secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.

Figure BC12 -Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among politically active voters

Difference between (% of politically active) and (% of other voters) voting secular lists After controlling for region, religion, language

After controlling for region, religion, language, income, education Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of politically active and the share of other voters (defined as having already signed and/or attended a demonstration) voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controls.

Figure BC14 -Vote for Shia Islamic lists among Southern Iraq voters

Difference between (% of voters in Southern Iraq) and (% of other voters) voting Shia Islamic lists After controlling for income After controlling for income, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters in Southern Iraq and the share of other voters voting for Shia Islamic lists, before and after controlling for income and ethno-religious identity.

Figure BD12 -Turnout among top-income voters

Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners having voted in the last elections

After controlling for region, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters who declared having voted in the last elections, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.

Figure BD13 -Turnout among low-income voters

Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) earners having voted in the last elections After controlling for region, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% voters and the share of top 50% voters in terms of income who declared having voted in the last elections, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.

Figure BD14 -Turnout among highest-educated voters

Difference between (% of top 10% educ.) and (% of bottom 90% educ.) having voted in the last elections

After controlling for region, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of lowest 90% educated voters who declared having voted in the last elections, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.

Figure BD15 -Turnout among lower-educated voters

Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) educated having voted in the last elections

After controlling for region, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% educated voters and the share of other voters who declared having voted in the last elections, before and after controls.

Figure BD16 -Turnout among young voters

Difference between (% of aged below 25) and (% of aged 25+) having voted in the last elections After controlling for region, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged below 25 and the share of older voters that declared having voted in the last elections.

Figure BD17 -Turnout among women

Difference between (% of women) and (% men) having voted in the last elections After controlling for region, religion, language Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men that declared having voted in the last elections.

Source: authors' computation using subnational decomposition of the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index from the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (University of Oxford).

Note:

The Muldimensional Poverty Index is an international measure of acute poverty that identifies deprivation across health, education and living standards. Note: The Muldimensional Poverty Index is an international measure of acute poverty that identifies deprivation across health, education and living standards. The population vulnerable to multidimensional poverty is defined by experiencing 20 to 33.3% intensity of deprivation.

Map B4 -Socio-spatial disparities in Iraq in 2018

Map C1 -Geographical distribution of vulnerability to multidimensional poverty in Algeria in 2012

Source: authors' computation using subnational decomposition of the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index from the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (University of Oxford).

Note:

The Muldimensional Poverty Index is an international measure of acute poverty that identifies deprivation across health, education and living standards.The population in multidimensional poverty is defined by experiencing at least 33.3% intensity of deprivation.

Figure 2 -

 2 Figure 1 -Legislative election results in Turkey, 1987-2018

Figure 4 -

 4 Figure 4 -The educational cleavage in Turkey, 1991-2017

Figure 5 -

 5 Figure 5 -The Turkish-Kurdish cleavage in Turkey, 1995-2018

Figure 7 -

 7 Figure 7 -Geographical distribution of main ethno-religious groups in Iraq

Figure AA11 -Figure AB2 -Figure AB3 -

 AA11AB2AB3 Figure AA11 -Composition of income quintiles by education level, 2018

Figure

  Figure AB4 -Vote for centre-right parties and AKP by education group

Figure

  Figure AB8 -Vote for centre-right parties and AKP by religiosity (practices)

Figure AB12 -

 AB12 Figure AB12 -Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by language

Figure

  Figure AB14 -Vote for centre-right parties and AKP by age group

Figure AB17 -Figure AB19 -Figure AB20 -

 AB17AB19AB20 Figure AB17 -Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties by gender

Figure AB25 -

 AB25 Figure AB25 -Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by income quintile

Figure AB31 -Figure AB32 -Figure AB33 -Figure AB34 -

 AB31AB32AB33AB34 Figure AB31 -Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties among highesteducated religious voters

Figure AC2 -Figure AC3 -

 AC2AC3 Figure AC2 -Vote for selected parties among low-income voters

FigureFigure BC1 -

 BC1 Figure BB25 -Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by income group

Figure BC3 -Figure BC4 -Figure BC5 -

 BC3BC4BC5 Figure BC3 -Vote for Sunni Islamic lists among top-income voters

Figure BC7 -

 BC7 Figure BC7 -Vote for Shia Islamic lists among lowest-educated voters

  Figue BC9 -Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among young voters

Figure BC13 -

 BC13 Figure BC13 -Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among voters not trusting the government

Figure BD5 -Figure BD10 -

 BD5BD10 Figure BD5 -Abstention by political activism

Map B1 -

 B1 Geographical distribution of multidimensional poverty in Iraq in 2017Source: authors' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University). Note: The map shows the geographical time-evolution of the Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI). The SHDI is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards.

  ' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University). Note: The Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards. Source: authors' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University). Note: The Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards.

Figure CC2 -Figure CC4 -

 CC2CC4 Figure CC2 -Vote for FLN among young voters

Figure CD4 -Figure CD7 -

 CD4CD7 Figure CD4 -Decomposition of abstention by political activism

Map C2 -

 C2 Geographical distribution of muldimensional poverty in Algeria in 2012Source: authors' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University) Note: The map shows the geographical time-evolution of the Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI). The SHDI is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards.

  ' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University) Note: The Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards. Map C4 -Socio-spatial disparities in Algeria in 2002 Source: authors' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University) Note: The Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards.

The regional cleavage in Iraq, 2005-2018 Vote for Shia Islamic lists by region

	0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2004 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10	2004 2006 Figure 8 -North-Eastern Iraq (Kurdistan region) 2005 2008 2010 Figure 9 -	2010 Middle-Northern Iraq 2012	2014 Baghdad 2014	2018 Southern Iraq 2016 2018

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by region. In 2018, Shia Islamic Lists received 53% of votes in Southern Iraq, compared to 0% in North-Eastern Iraq. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among low-income voters in Iraq, 2005-2018

  Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners and the share of top 50% earners voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity. In 2018, low-income voters were more likely to vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by 3 percentage points. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.

		Figure 10 -
	30%
		Diff. between (% of bottom 50% earners) and (% of top 50% earners) voting secular / anti-sectarian
	25%	After controlling for region, religion, language
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		2004	2005	2010	2014	2018

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group in Iraq, 2005-2018

	Figure 11 -
	80%
	70%		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014		2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group. In 2018, 22% of the 50%
	least educated voters supported secular or anti-sectarian lists. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.

Trust deficit towards the government by region in Iraq, 2005-2018

			Figure 12 -
		80%
			Middle-Northern Iraq	Baghdad	North-Eastern Iraq (Kurdistan region)	Southern Iraq
		70%
	(%)	60%
	votes	50%
	of
	Share	40%
		30%
		20%
		10%
		0%
		2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world). Note: the figure decomposes distrust expressed towards the government by region. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.

Legislative election results in Algeria, 2002-2017

		Figure 13 -
	20%	National Liberation Front (FLN)		Democratic National Rally (RND)
	18%	Islamic parties		Secular Opposition (FFS / RCD / PT)
	16%	Other parties / Independents
	14%
	12%
	10%
	8%
	6%
	4%
	2%
	0%
		2002	2012	2017

Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the main parties or groups of political parties in legislative elections held in Algeria between 2002 and 2017. FFS: Front des forces socialistes; RCD: Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie; PT: Parti des travailleurs.

Vote for the secular opposition by region / language in Algeria, 2002-2017

  Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular opposition parties (Front des forces socialistes, FFS and Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie, RCD) by region. In 2017, 11% of Kabyle voters supported the secular opposition, compared to 6% of other voters. In 2002, speaking Amazigh at home is taken as a proxy as the regional decomposition is not available.

			Figure 14 -
	20
	15			Kabylia / Amazigh		Rest of Algeria
	10
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	-20
	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Vote for FLN / RND and income in Algeria, 2002-2017

  Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the ruling parties (Front de libération nationale, FLN and Rassemblement national démocratique, RND), before and after controls. In 2002, top-income voters were less likely to vote FLN by 6 percentage points.

		Figure 15 -
	60%	Difference between (% of top 10% earners) and (% of bottom 90% earners) voting FLN
		After controlling for education, age, region, language, gender
	50%	Difference between (% of top 10% earners) and (% of bottom 90% earners) voting RND
		After controlling for education, age, region, language, gender
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		2002	2012	2017

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

The generational cleavage in Algeria, 2002-2017 Vote for FLN by age group

	Figure 16 -
	70%
	60%	Below 25	25-34	35-54	55+
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2002	2012		2017

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Liberal Front (FLN) by age group. In 2002, 27% of voters aged below 25 voted for the FLN, compared to 48% of those aged over 55.

Political activism by income group in Algeria, 2002-2017

		Figure AA1 -
	100%
	90%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1991	1995	1999	2007	2011	2015	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
	Note: the figure shows the share of individuals declaring having already attended a demonstration or signed a petition by income
	group. This share grew from 22% to 33% among the poorest 50% between 2002 and 2017.

Composition of the electorate by education

		Figure AA2 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1991	1995	1999	2007	2011	2015	2018
		Primary		Secondary		Tertiary
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by education level.

Composition of the electorate by age

	Figure AA3 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1991	1995	2011	2015	2018
	Below 25	25-35	35-45	45-60	Above 60
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by age group.

Composition of the electorate by region

		Figure AA4 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%	Istanbul 1995	2007	Central Anatolia (Ankara) 2011	Aegean Region 2015	2018
		Marmara Region		Black Sea Region	Mediterranean Region
		Eastern Anatolia		South Eastern Anatolia
		Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by region. No data available in 1999.

Composition of the electorate by language

	Figure AA5 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1991	1995	1999	2007
	Turkish	Kurdish	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by language. No data available in 1991 and 1999.

Composition of the electorate by political activism

	Figure AA6 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	None	Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration at least once
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by degree of political activism (defined as having
	already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration). No data available after 2007.

Composition of income groups by language, 2007

	Figure AA7 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Turkish		Kurdish	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by language in 2007.

Composition of income groups by language, 2018

	Figure AA8 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Turkish		Kurdish	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by language in 2018.

Composition of income quintiles by region, 1991

	Figure AA9 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Istanbul		Central Anatolia (Ankara)	Aegean Region
	Marmara Region		Black Sea Region	Mediterranean Region
	Eastern Anatolia		South Eastern Anatolia
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by region in 1991.

Composition of income quintiles by region, 2018

	Figure AA10 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Istanbul		Central Anatolia (Ankara)	Aegean Region
	Marmara Region		Black Sea Region	Mediterranean Region
	Eastern Anatolia		South Eastern Anatolia

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by region in 2018.

Composition of income quintiles by education level, 1991

	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Primary		Secondary	Tertiary
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by education level in 1991.

Figure AB5 -Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by education group

		Figure AB6 -
	50%
	45%	Bottom 50%		Middle 40%	Top 10%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		1991	1995	1999	2007	2011	2015	2018
		Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by education group.

Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by education group

		Figure AB7 -
	60%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1991	1995	2007	2011	2015	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-lef-parties (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by education group.

Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by region

	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%	Eastern and South Eastern Anatolia 1991 1995 1999	Istanbul 2007	2015	2018
		Central Anatolia and Black Sea region	Aegean and Mediterranean coast
		Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by region.

Figure AB15 -Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by age group

		Figure AB16 -
	45%
	40%	Below 25	25-34	35-44	45-59	60+
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1991	1995	1999	2007	2011	2015	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP
	after that date, by age group.

Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by age group

	80%
			Below 25	25-35	35-45	45-60	60+
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1991	1995	1999	2007	2011	2015	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by centre-left parties (SHP/ DSP) and the CHP by age group.

Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by income group

	60% 60%	Q1 Figure AB26 -Bottom 50% Q2 Q3 Middle 40% Q4 Figure AB27 -	Q5 Top 10%
	50% 50%
	40% 40%
	30% 30%
	20% 20%
	10% 10%
	0% 0%
		1991 1991	1995 1995	1999 1999	2007 2007	2011 2011	2015 2015	2018 2018
		Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by income quintile. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date by income group.

Vote for centre-right parties and AKP by income group

	Figure AB28 -
	45%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1991	1995	1999	2007	2011	2015	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right parties (DYP/ANAP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by income group.

Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by income group

		Figure AB29 -
	18%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	16%
	14%
	12%
	10%
	8%
	6%
	4%
	2%
	0%
	1995	1999	2007	2011	2015	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-left parties (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by income group.

Vote for Kurdish parties by income group

	Vote
	80%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Kurdish parties by income group.

for Islamic parties and AKP by income quintile

	90%
		1991	1995	1999	2007	2011	2015	2018
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1991	1995		1999	2007		2011	2015
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by income quintile.

Vote for Kurdish parties in Southeastern Anatolia

	70%	Figure AC6 -Difference between (% of South Eastern Anatolia region) and (% of other voters) voting for Figue AD1 -
		Kurdish parties
	60%	After controlling for language
		After controlling for income, education, age, employment, language, religiosity
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10 10%
	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017
	0% Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Southeastern Anatolia residents and the share 1995 1999 2007 2011 2015 2018
	of other voters voting for Kurdish Parties, before and after controlling for other variables. No data are
	available before 2007. The Kurdish minority is predominantly located in the South Eastern region.

Vote for Kurdish parties by position on a left-right scale

		Figure AD2 -
	80%	Left	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Right
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1995			1999			2007			2011	2015	2018
		Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Kurdish parties by the self-assessed position of voters on a left-right scale.

Vote for Islamic and AKP by position on a left-right scale

		Figure AD3 -
	100%
	90%	Left	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Right
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1995			1999			2007		2011		2015	2018
		Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties (RP/FP) and the AKP by the selfassesed position of voters on a left-right scale.

Vote for centre-left and CHP by position on a left-right scale

			Figure AD4 -Abstention by age group 1995 1999 2007	2011	2015	2018
	Left Education: Primary 25% Education: Secondary Education: Tertiary	1 Below 25	2	3	4 64% 25-35 27% 9%	5	6 65% 35-45 26% 9%	7	8 57% 45-60 34% 9%	9	Right 49% 39% 60+ 12%	49% 38% 12%	42% 45% 13%	36% 44% 20%
	Age: 18-24				25%		22%		20%		21%	18%	18%	17%
	Age: 25-34				27%		26%		29%		32%	27%	24%	23%
	Age: 35-45 20% Age: 45-60				21% 19%		24% 17%		25% 18%		22% 18%	20% 22%	21% 22%	24% 24%
	Age: 60+				9%		10%		8%		8%	14%	15%	12%
	Gender: Man				50%		50%		51%		50%	45%	51%	44%
	Employment status: Employed			42%		42%		42%		39%	27%	35%	39%
	Employment status: Unemployed 15% Employment status: Inactive			9% 49%		4% 54%		10% 48%		6% 55%	10% 63%	8% 57%	6% 54%
	Region: Aegean				24%		4%				13%	5%	13%	13%
	Region: Black Sea				13%		12%				12%	8%	9%	10%
	Region: Central Anatolia				13%		17%				16%	20%	17%	15%
	Region: Eastern Anatolia 10% Region: Istanbul				4% 22%		18% 14%				9% 14%	4% 21%	8% 18%	7% 19%
	Region: Marmara				8%		24%				13%	13%	14%	13%
	Region: Mediterranean				10%		11%				13%	11%	11%	12%
	Region: South Eastern Anatolia			6%		0%				10%	18%	11%	10%
	5% Language: Kurdish						1%		0%		8%	14%	11%	8%
	Language: Other						1%		0%		3%	2%	1%	1%
	Language: Turkish						98%		100%		89%	84%	88%	91%
	Perceived social class: Working class				21%		23%		31%		28%
	Perceived social class: Lower middle class				27%		36%		38%		45%
	0% Perceived social class: Upper middle class				43%		26%		26%		21%
	2011 Perceived social class: Upper class Turnout: Did not vote Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys. 2015 9% 14% 5% 24% Turnout: Voted 76% Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voted in the last elections by age 6% 2018 7% 9% 93% 91% Interest in politics: Not at all interested 29% 23% 34% 33%	7% 93% 24%
	group and its evolution over time. No data available before 2011. Interest in politics: Not very interested 23% 18% 26%	28%			23%
	Interest in politics: Somewhat interested		38%		46%		32%		30%			39%

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-left (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by the selfassessed position of voters on a left-right scale.

Table B2 -Complete descriptive statistics by year

 B2 Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by year for selected available variables. The decline in the share of non-religious respondents is due to inconsistencies across data sources and should not be interpreted as an overall rise in religiosity in Turkey.

	Interest in politics: Very interested Political activism: None Figure BA1 -	10% 85%	13% 85%	8% 84%	8% 87%		14%
	Political activism; Having signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration 100%	15%	15%	16%	13%
	Religiosity: Non-religious person Religiosity: Religious person 90%	25% 75%	22% 78%	19% 81%	17% 83%	12% 88%	12% 88%
	Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys. 80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005		2010	2014		2018

Composition of the electorate by education level

	Figure BA2 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Primary		Secondary	Tertiary
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by education level.

Composition of the electorate by age

	Figure BA3 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Below 25	25-35	35-50	Above 50
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by age group.

Composition of the electorate by region

	Figure BA4 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010		2014
	North-Eastern Iraq (Kurdistan region)	Middle-Northern Iraq	Baghdad	Southern Iraq
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by region.

Composition of the electorate by linguistic group

	Figure BA5 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Arabic	Kurdish	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by language. No data available in 2018.

Composition of the electorate by political activism

	Figure BA6 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	None	Signed a petititon and/or attended a demonstration at least once
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by degree of political activism (defined as having
	already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration).

Composition of income quintiles by language, 2004

	Figure BA7 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Arabic		Kurdish	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by language in 2004.

Composition of income quintiles by language, 2014

	Figure BA8 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Arabic		Kurdish	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by language in 2014.

Composition of income quintiles by region, 2004

	Figure BA9 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	North-Eastern Iraq (Kurdistan region)	Middle-Northern Iraq	Baghdad	Southern Iraq
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by region in 2004. Middle-Northern Iraq is
	predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.

Composition of income quintiles by region, 2018

	Figure BA10 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%		Top 10%
	North-Eastern Iraq (Kurdistan region)	Middle-Northern Iraq	Baghdad	Southern Iraq
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of income quintiles by region in 2018. Middle-Northern Iraq is
	predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.

Composition of education groups by region, 2004

	Figure BA11 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%		Top 10%
	North-Eastern Iraq (Kurdistan region)	Middle-Northern Iraq	Baghdad	South-Eastern Iraq
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of education groups by region in 2004. Middle-Northern Iraq is
	predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.

Composition of education groups by region, 2018

	Figure BA12 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	North-Eastern Iraq (Kurdistan region)	Middle Northern Iraq	Baghdad	South-Eastern Iraq
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of education groups by region in 2018. Middle-Northern Iraq is
	predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.

Composition of income groups by political activism, 2005

	Figure BA13 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration at least once	None
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by political activism (defined as having already
	signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration) in 2005.

Composition of income groups by political activism, 2018

	Figure BA14 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration at least once	None
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by political activism (defined as having already
	signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration) in 2018.

Composition of income quintiles by employment sector, 2010

	Figure BA15 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
		Private sector		Public sector
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by employment sector in 2010.

Composition of income quintiles by employment sector, 2018

	Figure BA16 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Private sector Middle-Northern Iraq Baghdad	Public sector North-Eastern Iraq	Southern Iraq
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of income quintiles by employment sector in 2018.

Income composition of Iraqi regions, 2004

	Figure BA17 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Middle-Northern Iraq	Baghdad	North-Eastern Iraq	Southern Iraq
	Bottom 50%		Middle 40%	Top 10%
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of income groups by region in 2004.

Income composition of Iraqi regions, 2018

	Figure BB1 -
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of income groups by region in 2018.

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by education group

	Figure BB2 -
	30%
			Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by education group.

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group

		Figure BB3 -
	60%
			Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group.

Vote for Sunni Islamic lists by region

	Figure BB4 -
	70%
	North-Eastern Iraq (Kurdistan region)	Middle-Northern Iraq	Baghdad	Southern Iraq
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Sunni Islamic lists by region. Middle-Northern Iraq is
	predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by region

		Figure BB5 -
	100%
	North-Eastern Iraq (Kurdistan region)	Middle-Northern Iraq	Baghdad	Southern Iraq
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-sectarian lists by region. Middle-Northern Iraq is
	predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.

Vote for Kurdish lists by region

		Figure BB6 -
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%	North-Eastern Iraq (Kurdistan region)	Middle-Northern Iraq	Baghdad	Southern Iraq
		Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. 2004 2005 2010		2014
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Kurdish lists by region. Middle-Northern Iraq is
		predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by language

	Figure BB7 -
	40%
			Arabic	Kurdish
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
				in
	2018.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by language. No data available

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by language

		Figure BB8 -
	60%
				Arabic	Kurdish
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by language. No data available in 2018.

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by age group

	Figure BB9 -
	35%
	Below 25	25-35	35-50	50+
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by age group.

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by age group

	Figure BB10 -
	60%
	Below 25	25-35	35-50	50+
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by age group.

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by gender

	Figure BB11 -
	30%
				Woman	Man
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by gender.

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by gender

	Figure BB12 -
	60%
				Woman	Man
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by gender.

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by degree of religious practices

	Figure BB13 -
	35%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by degree of religious practices.
	Bottom 50% denotes highly religious (regular practices) and top 10% denotes none or hardly no religious
	practices.

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by degree of religious practices

	Figure BB14 -
	70%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. 2005 2010 2014	2018
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-sectarian lists by degree of religious practices.
	Bottom 50% denotes very religious (regular basis) and top 10% denotes none or hardly no religious
	practices.

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by political activism

		Figure BB15 -
	40%	None	Having signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration at least once
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by political activism degree measured as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration. No data available in 2004.

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by political activism

		Figure BB16 -
	90%
	80%	None	Having signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration at least once
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. 2004 2005 2010	2014	2018
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by political activism
	degree measured as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration. No data available in
	2004.

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by wealth index

	Figure BB17 -
	35%
	Significant difficulties	Enough for Savings
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by wealth index.

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by wealth index

	Figure BB18 -
	80%	Significant difficulties	Enough for Savings
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by wealth index.

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by level of confidence in the government

	Figure BB19 -
	60%
	Great	Some	Limited	Abolutely none
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by confidence expressed in the
	government.

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by level of confidence in the government

	Figure BB20 -
	80%
	70%	Great	Some	Limited	Absolutely none
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010		2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by confidence expressed in the government.

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by interest in politics

		Figure BB21 -
	40%	Not at all interested	Not very interested	Somewhat interested	Very interested
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
		Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by interest declared in politics.

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by interest in politics

		Figure BB22 -
	80%
	70%	Not at all interested		Not very interested	Somewhat interested	Very interested
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by interest declared in
	politics.

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by income quintile

	Figure BB23 -
	40%
			Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014		2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by income quintile.

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by income quintile

		Figure BB24 -
	80%
	70%		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014			2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by income quintile.

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by income group

	40%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2004	2005	2010	2014	2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by income group.

  Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voted in the last elections by region. Middle-Northern is predominantly Sunni. Baghdad is mixed. Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.

		Figure FBD1 -Abstention by region Figure FBD2 -Abstention by age group Figure FBD3 -Abstention by education group Figure BD4 -Abstention by income group
	80% 90% 70% 70% 60% 70%	Middle-Northern Iraq Below 25	Baghdad 25-35 Bottom 50% 35-50 North-Eastern Iraq (Kurdistan region) 50+ Bottom 50% Middle 40% Middle 40% Top 10%	Top 10% Southern Iraq
	70% 60% 60% 50% 60%
	40% 60% 50% 50% 50%
	50% 40% 40% 40%
	40% 30%
	30% 30% 30%
	30%
	20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
	10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
	0% 0% 0% 0% 0%	2004 Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. 2005 2010 2004 2005 2010 2004 2005 2010 2004 2005 2010 2005 2010 2014	2014 2014 2014 2014	2018 2018 2018 2018 2018
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voted in the last elections by age group. Results have been reweighed to match official abstention rates. Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voterd in the last elections by education group. Results have been reweighed to match official abstention rates. Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voted in the last elections by income group. Results have been reweighed to match official abstention rates.

Table B1 -Survey data sources Source: authors

 B1 ' elaboration. Note: the table shows the surveys used, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

	Year 2004 2006 2011	Survey Shia parties World Values Survey World Values Survey Arab Barometer	Source WVS WVS WVS parties Sunni Share of votes received (%) parties parties Kurdish Secular	Sample size 1 Other 2 2
	2013 Overall vote share World Values Survey 49,53%	26,45%	14,65%	WVS 3,11%	6,26%	1
	2019 Education level Arab Barometer			Arab Barometer	2
	Primary		51%	29%	10%	2%	7%
	Secondary		44%	25%	21%	6%	5%
	Tertiary		52%	17%	21%	3%	7%
	Education group
	Bottom 50%		51%	29%	10%	2%	7%
	Middle 40%		46%	25%	19%	4%	5%
	Top 10%		52%	17%	21%	3%	7%
	Income decile
	D1		75%	3%	17%	2%	3%
	D2		68%	11%	13%	3%	6%
	D3		64%	13%	13%	5%	6%
	D4		60%	16%	14%	5%	5%
	D5		54%	21%	16%	4%	5%
	D6		40%	36%	15%	3%	6%
	D7		40%	36%	15%	3%	6%
	D8		38%	38%	11%	4%	9%
	D9		33%	42%	13%	3%	9%
	D10		28%	47%	20%	0%	4%
	Income group
	Bottom 50%		64%	13%	14%	4%	5%
	Middle 40%		38%	38%	14%	3%	8%
	Top 10%		28%	47%	20%	0%	4%
	Employment status
	Employed		45%	29%	17%	4%	5%
	Unemployed		62%	22%	9%	2%	5%
	Inactive		53%	24%	13%	3%	7%
	Gender
	Woman		50%	27%	13%	2%	8%
	Man		49%	26%	16%	4%	5%
	Marital status
	Not Married		47%	32%	11%	2%	7%
	Married		50%	25%	16%	3%	6%
	Age
	Below 25		51%	32%	8%	3%	6%
	25-35		50%	26%	15%	3%	6%
	35-50		51%	25%	16%	3%	5%
	50+		45%	23%	18%	4%	9%
	Region
	Middle-Northern Iraq	23%	17%	20%	27%	13%
	Baghdad		58%	5%	28%	6%	4%
	North-Eastern Iraq	2%	90%	2%	0%	6%
	Southern Iraq		75%	0%	17%	1%	6%
	Religion

Table B3 -Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2005 (january)

 B3 Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in january 2005.

	Sunni	5%	77%	6%		5%		8%
	Shi'ite	73%	0%	18%		2%		7%
	Other	31%	0%	69%		0%		0%
	Confidence in government	Shia	Kurdish	Secular	Sunni
	Great	46% parties	32% parties	19% parties	0% parties	Other	2%
	Some Overall vote share	43% 42,40%	36% 23,00%	14% 12,10%	1% 16,50%	6,00%	6%
	Limited Education level	57%	17%	18%		2%		5%
	Absolutely not Primary	59% 45%	13% 25%	9% 10%	14%	11%	7%	8%
	Interest in politics Secondary	39%	22%	16%	19%		5%
	Not at all interested Tertiary	51% 39%	16% 16%	15% 17%	23%	4%	5%	14%
	Not very interested Education group	46%	31%	9%		4%		10%
	Somewhat interested Bottom 50%	43% 45%	38% 25%	13% 10%	14%	3%	7%	4%
	Very interested Middle 40%	63% 40%	12% 23%	21% 14%	18%	3%	5%	2%
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Top 10% 39% 16% 17%	23%		5%
	Income decile
	D1	30%	25%	15%	24%		7%
	D2	43%	20%	11%	18%		8%
	D3	39%	19%	15%	17%		8%
	D4	46%	17%	13%	15%		9%
	D5	51%	15%	11%	13%		10%
	D6	47%	18%	12%	16%		7%
	D7	43%	22%	13%	19%		4%
	D8	43%	22%	13%	19%		4%
	D9	40%	32%	10%	15%		4%
	D10	43%	27%	12%	15%		4%
	Income group
	Bottom 50%	42%	19%	13%	18%		8%
	Middle 40%	43%	23%	12%	17%		4%
	Top 10%	43%	27%	12%	15%		4%
	Employment status
	Employed	38%	25%	14%	20%		3%
	Unemployed	44%	10%	15%	19%		12%
	Inactive	46%	23%	10%	13%		8%
	Gender
	Woman	46%	25%	11%	12%		7%
	Man	39%	21%	13%	21%		5%
	Marital status
	Not Married	38%	28%	12%	16%		6%
	Married	44%	21%	12%	17%		6%
	Age
	Below 25	39%	26%	13%	15%		6%
	25-35	43%	22%	11%	19%		5%
	35-50	44%	22%	12%	15%		7%
	50+	42%	24%	12%	18%		5%
	Region
	Middle-Northern Iraq	3%	11%	25%	46%		15%
	Baghdad	56%	1%	19%	21%		2%
	North-Eastern Iraq	0%	99%	0%	0%		1%
	Southern Iraq	90%	0%	6%	1%		3%
	Language

Table B4 -Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2005

 B4 authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2005.

	Arabic	56%	1%	13%	30%	0%
	Kurdish	27%	71%	0%	1%	1%
	Other	60%	Share of votes received (%) 16% 19% 5% Share of votes received (%)	0%
	Religion Sunni Shi'ite Other Confidence in government Great Some Limited Absolutely not Interest in politics Not at all interested Not very interested Somewhat interested Very interested Overall vote share Education level Primary Secondary Tertiary Education group Bottom 50% Middle 40% Top 10% Income decile D1 D2 Source: Shia parties 1% 91% 0% 60% 62% 28% 7% 49% 42% 44% 42% 42,37% 41% 46% 35% 41% 45% 35% 24% 36% D3 48%	58% 0% 85% 32% 22% 24% 8% 18% 25% 22% 15% Kurdish parties 22,16% 22% 17% 38% 22% 19% 38% 18% 11% 5%	5% 6% 15% 4% 7% 18% 25% 18% 10% 11% 13% Secular parties 24,72% 28% 21% 24% 28% 21% 24% 40% 24% 22%	29% 1% 0% 1% 3% 18% 53% 11% 14% 14% 28% Sunni parties 5,25% 5% 6% 3% 5% 6% 3% 3% 1% 10%	7% 3% 0% 3% 6% 11% 6% 4% 9% 8% 2%	Other 5,50% 4% 10% 0% 4% 9% 0% 15% 27% 15%
	D4	48%	10%	23%	13%		5%
	D5	54%	13%	22%	12%		0%
	D6	51%	19%	29%	0%		0%
	D7	54%	8%	34%	5%		0%
	D8	47%	20%	33%	0%		0%
	D9	54%	15%	31%	0%		0%
	D10	62%	7%	20%	11%		0%
	Income group
	Bottom 50%	42%	11%	26%	8%		13%
	Middle 40%	51%	15%	32%	1%		0%
	Top 10%	62%	7%	20%	11%		0%
	Employment status
	Employed	44%	25%	25%	5%		1%
	Unemployed	27%	15%	22%	9%		27%
	Inactive	43%	21%	25%	5%		6%
	Gender
	Woman	42%	25%	24%	5%		4%
	Man	43%	20%	25%	6%		7%
	Marital status
	Not Married	44%	20%	26%	2%		8%
	Married	42%	23%	24%	7%		4%
	Age
	Below 25	48%	19%	28%	0%		5%
	25-35	47%	21%	20%	5%		7%
	35-50	33%	24%	27%	9%		6%
	50+	41%	25%	25%	6%		3%
	Region
	Middle-Northern Iraq	13%	6%	59%	3%		18%
	Baghdad	74%	2%	15%	9%		0%
	North-Eastern Iraq	0%	96%	0%	4%		0%
	Southern Iraq	93%	1%	6%	0%		0%
	Language

Table B5 -Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2010

 B5 ' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2010.

	Arabic	58%	1%	34%	6%	0%
	Kurdish	5%	90%	1%	4%	0%
	Other	0%	0% Share of votes received (%) 7% 0%	93%
	Religion Sunni Shi'ite Other Confidence in government Great Some Limited Absolutely not Interest in politics Not at all interested Not very interested Somewhat interested Very interested Overall vote share Education level Primary Secondary Tertiary Education group Bottom 50% Middle 40% Top 10% Income decile D1 D2 Source: authorsShia parties 15% 81% 15% 47% 69% 29% 12% 71% 55% 32% 31% 41,84% 50% 37% 28% 49% 36% 28% 67% 42% D3 37%	41% 3% 73% 43% 20% 11% 25% 13% 11% 22% 52% Kurdish parties 20,32% 16% 26% 18% 17% 25% 18% 7% 21% 22%	29% 10% 12% 4% 7% 47% 42% 10% 24% 33% 10% Secular parties 7,67% 7% 9% 9% 7% 9% 9% 5% 9% 11%	4% 5% 0% 5% 4% 8% 5% 6% 11% 2% 3% Sunni parties 7,52% 8% 7% 8% 8% 7% 8% 4% 9% 7%	11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 16% 0% 0% 11% 3% Other 22,65% 19% 21% 37% 19% 23% 37% 18% 19% 23%
	D4	43%	24%	7%	6%	21%
	D5	40%	23%	7%	6%	24%
	D6	30%	22%	7%	7%	34%
	D7	34%	22%	6%	7%	30%
	D8	50%	22%	5%	9%	13%
	D9	46%	22%	8%	11%	13%
	D10	32%	18%	10%	9%	32%
	Income group
	Bottom 50%	46%	19%	8%	6%	21%
	Middle 40%	40%	22%	6%	9%	23%
	Top 10%	32%	18%	10%	9%	32%
	Employment status
	Employed	42%	21%	9%	9%	19%
	Unemployed	62%	5%	4%	3%	27%
	Inactive	39%	22%	7%	7%	25%
	Gender
	Woman	39%	23%	5%	8%	25%
	Man	45%	18%	10%	7%	20%
	Marital status
	Not Married	33%	28%	7%	6%	27%
	Married	46%	17%	8%	8%	21%
	Age
	Below 25	36%	30%	6%	6%	23%
	25-35	39%	22%	8%	7%	24%
	35-50	46%	14%	7%	7%	25%
	50+	47%	15%	12%	11%	15%
	Region
	Middle-Northern Iraq	14%	5%	15%	19%	47%
	Baghdad	74%	2%	9%	7%	7%
	North-Eastern Iraq	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%
	Southern Iraq	76%	0%	4%	1%	18%
	Language

Table B6 -Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2014

 B6 Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2014.

	Arabic	54%	0%	11%	7%	29%
	Kurdish	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%
	Other	41%	0% Share of votes received (%) 0% 32%	26%
	Confidence in government			Anti-
	Great	34% Shia	33% Kurdish	3% Sectarian	4% Sunni	26%
	Some	53% parties	21% parties	3% parties	5% parties	19% Other
	Limited Overall vote share	43% 36,33%	14% 20,21%	8% 20,39%	7% 8,88%	29% 14,19%
	Absolutely not Education level	33%	22%	9%	17%	19%
	Interest in politics Primary	40%	12%	22%	12%	14%
	Not at all interested Secondary	28% 30%	8% 33%	10% 18%	15% 4%	40% 15%
	Not very interested Tertiary	39% 36%	22% 27%	8% 20%	9% 4%	23% 12%
	Somewhat interested Education group	50%	22%	7%	4%	17%
	Very interested Bottom 50%	36% 40%	32% 12%	9% 22%	4% 12%	20% 14%
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Middle 40% 32% 29% 19%	6%	14%
	Top 10%	36%	27%	20%	4%	12%
	Income decile
	D1	46%	5%	24%	10%	14%
	D2	48%	10%	19%	4%	19%
	D3	44%	7%	24%	8%	17%
	D4	33%	11%	20%	19%	17%
	D5	31%	12%	22%	20%	16%
	D6	36%	14%	23%	11%	16%
	D7	35%	30%	23%	0%	13%
	D8	32%	32%	17%	7%	13%
	D9	32%	36%	13%	10%	9%
	D10	27%	45%	19%	0%	9%
	Income group
	Bottom 50%	40%	9%	22%	12%	16%
	Middle 40%	34%	28%	19%	7%	13%
	Top 10%	27%	45%	19%	0%	9%
	Employment status
	Employed	26%	32%	22%	4%	17%
	Unemployed	33%	25%	22%	9%	10%
	Inactive	42%	14%	20%	11%	14%
	Gender
	Woman	41%	16%	21%	8%	14%
	Man	33%	23%	20%	9%	15%
	Marital status
	Not Married	34%	28%	17%	7%	14%
	Married	38%	16%	22%	10%	14%
	Age
	Below 25	36%	25%	20%	5%	13%
	25-35	40%	21%	18%	9%	12%
	35-50	34%	16%	20%	14%	16%
	50+	36%	19%	25%	6%	14%
	Region
	Middle-Northern Iraq	46%	5%	8%	22%	18%
	Baghdad	38%	0%	30%	4%	27%
	North-Eastern Iraq	0%	87%	12%	0%	1%
	Southern Iraq	53%	1%	40%	0%	6%

Table B7 -Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2018

 B7 Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2018.

	Religion
	Sunni	25%	39%	11%	15%	10%
	Shi'ite	51%	0%	36%	0%	12%
	Other	25% Feels	0%	53%	0%	22%
	Confidence in government
	Great	42%	10%	12%	18%	18%
	Some	33%	30%	12%	10%	14%
	Limited	29%	24%	26%	14%	7%
	Absolutely not	40%	16%	23%	6%	16%
	Interest in politics
	Not at all interested	39%	13%	21%	6%	21%
	Not very interested	30%	25%	23%	17%	5%
	Somewhat interested	35%	34%	16%	4%	10%
	Very interested	42%	11%	22%	13%	11%
	Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

close to no party Did not vote in the last elections

	Overall sample share	51,71%	55,15%
	Gender
	Woman	53%	59%
	Man	51%	51%
	Age
	Below 25	52%	63%
	25-35	53%	58%
	35-50	51%	52%
	50+	53%	45%
	Education group
	Bottom 50%	51%	54%
	Middle 40%	52%	57%
	Top 10%	54%	51%
	Income group
	Bottom 50%	53%	54%
	Middle 40%	58%	56%
	Top 10%	45%	46%
	Employment status
	Unemployed	56%	51%
	Employed	46%	50%

Table B8 -Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2018

 B8

		Figure CA1 -Legislative election results in Algeria (share of seats), Figure CA2 -
	60% 100%			2002-2017
	55% 90%	FLN	RND	Islamic Parties	Secular Opposition: FFS/RCD/PT	Other
	50% 80%
	45% 70% (%)
	20% 25% 30% 30% 40% parliamentary 50% 35% 40% seats 60%
	10% 10% Share 15% of 20%
	0% Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. 0% 5% 2002	2012		2017
	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
	Source: authors' computations using official election results.
	Note: the figure shows the share of parliamentary seats received by selected groups of Algerian political
	parties in legislative elections between 2002 and 2017.

Composition of the electorate by age

	Figure CA3 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2012		2017
	Below 25	25-34	35-54	55+
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by age group.

Composition of the electorate by region

	Figure CA4 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2002		2012
	Alger	Eastern Highlands	Middle Highlands	Western Highlands
	North Eastern Region	North Middle Region	North Western Region	South Region
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by region. No data available in 2002.

Composition of the electorate by language

	Figure CA5 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2002	2012	2017
	Arabic or Algerian dialect	French or other	Amazight
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by language. No data available in 2017.

Composition of the electorate by political activism

	Figure CA6 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	None	Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration at least once
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by degree of political activism (defined as having
	already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration).

Composition of income quintiles by language, 2002

	Figure CA7 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
		Amazight		Arabic
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by language in 2002.

Composition of income quintiles by language, 2012

	Figure CA8 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
		Amazight		Arabic
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by language in 2012.

Composition of income quintiles by region, 2012

	Figure CA9 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Alger	North Eastern region	North Middle region	North Western region
	East Highlands	Middle Highlands	Western Highlands	South region
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of income quintiles by region in 2012.

Composition of income quintiles by region, 2017

	Figure CA10 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Alger	North Eastern region	North Middle region	North Western region
	East Highlands	Middle Highlands	Western Highlands	South region
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of income quintiles by region in 2017.

Composition of income quintiles by region (coastline vs hinterland), 2012

	Figure CA11 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
		Coastline	Hinterlands
	Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in the coastline wilayats (Jijel, Skika, Annaba, El Taref,
	Chlef, Tipasa, Boumerdès, Tizi Ouzou, Bejaia, Tlemcen, Témouchent, Oran, Mostaganem and Alger) and
	the hinlerland ones in 2012.

Composition of income quintiles by region (coastline vs hinterland), 2017

	Figure CA12 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
		Coastline	Hinterlands
	Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in the coastline wilayats (Jijel, Skika, Annaba, El Taref,
	Chlef, Tipasa, Boumerdès, Tizi Ouzou, Bejaia, Tlemcen, Témouchent, Oran, Mostaganem and Alger) and
	the hinlerland ones in 2017.

Composition of income quintiles by region (Kabylia), 2012

	Figure CA13 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Kabylia	Other regions of Algeria
	Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in Kabylia compare to the rest of Algeria in 2012.

Composition of income quintiles by region (Kabylia), 2017

	Figure CA14 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Kabylia	Other regions of Algeria
	Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in Kabylia compare to the rest of Algeria in 2017.

Composition of income quintiles in Kabylia by provinces (wilayah), 2012

	Figure CA15 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1		Q2			Q3		Q4	Q5
	Tizi Ouzou	Bejaia	Bouira	Jijel	Mila	Setif	Skikda	Bordj Bou Arreridj	Boumerdès
	Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in Kabylia decomposed by its wilayah in 2012.

Composition of income quintiles in Kabylia by provinces (wilayah), 2017

			Figure CA16 -
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%	Tizi Ouzou	Bejaia	Bouira	Jijel	Mila	Setif	Skikda	Bordj Bou Arreridj	Boumerdès
			2002				2012		2017
		Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in Kabylia decomposed by its wilayah in 2017.

Composition of employment by gender

	Figure CA17 -
	80%
		Woman	Man
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2002	2012	2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of individuals employed by gender in the Algerian adult population and its
	evolution over time.

Composition of employment by age

	Figure CA18 -
	40%
		Below 25	25-35	35-55	55+
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012			2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of individuals employed by age in the Algerian adult population and its
	evolution over time.

Socially active voters by income group

	Figure CB1 -
	50%
	45%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. 2002 2012	2017
	Note: the figure shows the income groups distribution of the respondents affiliated with a civil society
	organization (including labor unions and religious groups, excluding political parties membership) in the
	Algerian adult population.

Vote for FLN by education group

	Figure CB2 -
	25%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012		2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by education group.

Vote for RND by education group

	Figure CB3 -
	25%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012		2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the RND by education group.

Vote for secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by education group

	Figure CB4 -
	25%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012		2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by education group.

Vote for Islamic opposition parties by education group

	Figure CB5 -
	50%
	45%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2012		2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by education group.

Vote for FLN by region

		Figure CB6 -
	40%
		North Eastern Region	North Western Region East Highlands	Alger
	35%	North Middle Region	Middle Highlands	South Region
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		2012			2017
		Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN parties by region. No data available in 2002.

Vote for FLN by region (coastline vs hinterlands)

	Figure CB7 -
	40%
	Coastline	Hinterlands
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012	2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN parties by region. No data available in 2002.

Vote for FLN by region / language (Kabylia vs non-Kabylia)

	Figure CB8 -
	18%
	16%	Kabylia	Other parts of Algeria
	14%
	12%
	10%
	8%
	6%
	4%
	2%
	0%
	2002	2012	2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN parties by region. In 2002, speaking Amazigh at home is taking as a proxy as the regional decomposition is not available.

Vote for RND by age group

		Figure CB9 -
	16%	Below 25	25-35	35-55	55+
	14%
	12%
	10%
	8%
	6%
	4%
	2%
	0%
		2002		2012	2017
		Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the RND by age group.

Vote for secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by age group

	Figure CB10 -
	25%
		Below 25	25-35	35-55	55+
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012		2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by age group.

Vote for Islamic opposition parties by age group

	Figure CB11 -
	25%	Below 25	25-35	35-55	55+
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002		2012		2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by age group.

Vote for Islamic opposition parties by religious practice

		Figure CB12 -
	50%
	45%	Bottom 50% (very religious)	Middle 40%	Top 10% (non religious)
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		2002	2012	2017
		Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by degree of
		religiosity, measured by religious practices.

Vote for FLN by religious practice

		Figure CB13 -Vote for FLN by income quintile Figure CB14 -
	45% 40%
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	40% 35%	Bottom 50% (very religious)	Middle 40%	Top 10% (non religious)
	35% 30%
	30%
	25%
	25%
	20%
	20%
	15%
	15%
	10% 10%
	5% 5%
	0% 0%
		2002 2002		2012 2012		2017 2017
		Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by degree of religious practices. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by income quintile.

Vote for FLN by income group

		Figure CB15 -Vote for FLN by income quintile Figure CB16 -
	50% 60%
			Bottom 50% 2002	Middle 40% 2012	Top 10% 2017
	45%
	40% 50%
	35% 40%
	30%
	25% 30%
	20%
	15% 20%
	10% 10%
	5%
	0% 0%
	Q1	2002	Q2	Q3 2012	Q4	2017	Q5
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by income group. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by FLN by income quintile.

Vote for ruling parties (FLN/RND) by income quintile

	Figure CB17 -
	60%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2002		2012		2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN and the RND by income quintile.

Vote for ruling parties (FLN/RND) by income group

		Figure CB18 -
	60%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN and the RND by income group.

Vote for ruling parties (FLN/RND) by income quintile

	Figure CB19 -Vote for RND by income quintile Figure CB20 -
	20% 20%
	Q1	2002 Q2	Q3	2012	Q4	2017 Q5
	18% 18%
	16% 16%
	14% 14%
	12% 12%
	10% 10%
	8% 8%
	6% 6%
	4% 4%
	2% 2%
	0% 0%
	2002 2002		2012 2012		2017 2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN and the RND by income quintile. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the RND by income quintiles.

Vote for RND by income group

		Figure CB21 -Vote for RND by income quintile Figure CB22 -Vote for secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by Figure CB23 -
	25% 16% 14%	Bottom 50% 2002 Q1 Q2	Middle 40% income quintile 2012 Q3	Q4	Top 10% Q5 2017
	20% 14% 12%
	12% 10%
	15% 10%
	8%
	8%
	10% 6%
	6%
	4% 4%
	5%
	2% 2%
	0% 0% 0%
	Q1	2002 2002	Q2	Q3 2012 2012		Q4	2017 2017	Q5
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the RND by income group. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by RND by income quintile. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by income quintiles.

Vote for secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by income group

	Figure CB24 -
	30%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012	2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the opposition secular parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by income group.

Vote for Islamic opposition parties by income quintile

	Figure CB25 -
	25%
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002		2012		2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by income quintiles.

Vote for Islamic opposition parties by income group

	Figure CB26 -
	45%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012	2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by income group.

Vote for FLN by gender

	Figure CB27 -
	40%
		Woman	Man
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012	2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by gender.

Vote for FLN by religiosity (self -description)

	Figure CB28 -
	40%
		Non religious	Religious
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012	2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by religiosity (measured by self-description
	as religious or non religious).

Vote for FLN by political activism

		Figure CB29 -
	45%
	40%	None	Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002		2012	2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by political activism.

Vote for FLN by wealth index

	Figure CB30 -
	45%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012	2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by wealth index (measured by the perception of the respondent of how much his household income covers his expenses).

Vote for FLN by interest in politcs

	Figure CB31 -
	40%
	Not at all interested	Not very interested	Somewhat interested	Very interested
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002	2012		2017
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by interest expressed in politics.

Vote for FLN by membership in civil society organizations

		Figure CC1 -
	20
					Not engaged	Engaged in civil society
	15
	10
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by membership in civil society organizations (excluding political parties memberships). No data available in 2014.

Vote for ruling parties (FLN / RND) among low-income voters

  Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners voters and the share of other voters voting for the FLN and the RND.

	Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) earners voting FLN
	After controlling for education, age, region, language, gender
	Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) earners voting RND
	After controlling for income, age, region, language, gender
	Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

lowest-educated voters

  Difference between (% of bottom 50% educ.) and (% of top 50% educ.) voting FLN After controlling for age Difference between (% of bottom 50% educ.) and (% of top 50% educ.) voting RND After controlling for age Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% voters and the share of top 50% voters in terms of education voting for the FLN and the RND, before and after controlling for age.

	Figure CD1 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2012	2017

Decomposition of abstention by age group

  authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by age groups. No data available in 2002.

	Figure CD2 -
	90%
	Below 25	25-35	35-55	55+
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: 0%	2012		2017

Decomposition of abstention by education group

  authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by education group. No data available in 2002.

	Figure CD3 -
	90%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: 0%	2012	2017

Decomposition of abstention by income group

  authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by income group. No data available in 2002.

	100%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: 0%	2012		2017

Map C5 -Socio-spatial disparities in Algeria in 2018

	Year	Survey	Source	Sample size
	2002	World Values Survey	WVS	1
	2013	Arab Barometer	WVS	1
	2019	Arab Barometer	WVS	2

Table B1 -Survey data sources Source: authors

 B1 ' elaboration. Note: the table shows the surveys used, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey. Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by year for selected available variables.

	Table B2 -Complete descriptive statistics by year
			Share of votes received (%)
				Islamic	Secular
		FLN	RND	opposition	opposition	Other
				(Hamas/MRN)	(FFS/RCD)
	Overall vote share	35,28%	8,23%	17,20%	3,33%	35,96%
	Gender
	Woman	40%	11%	15%	3%	32%
	Man	32%	6%	19%	3%	40%
	Age
	Below 25	27%	10%	20%	4%	40%
	25-35	32%	9%	17%	2%	40%
	35-55	40%	8%	17%	4%	30%
	55+	48%	4%	12%	2%	35%
	Education group
	Bottom 50%	45%	7%	15%	3%	29%
	Middle 40%	27%	10%	20%	3%	40%
	Top 10%	19%	6%	16%	3%	56%
	Income decile
	D1	31%	7%	7%	2%	53%
	D2	37%	7%	14%	2%	39%
	D3	41%	7%	18%	3%	31%
	D4	41%	7%	18%	3%	31%
	D5	39%	8%	21%	3%	29%
	D6	37%	8%	25%	4%	26%
	D7	37%	8%	25%	4%	26%
	D8	38%	12%	24%	4%	23%
	D9	32%	15%	17%	3%	33%
	D10	31%	14%	20%	5%	29%
	Income group
	Bottom 50%	38%	7%	15%	3%	37%

Table B3 -Complete structure of the vote in Algeria, 2002

 B3 authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2002. Vote shares have been reweighed so as to match exactly official election results.

	Middle 40%		36%		11%	22%	4%	27%
	Top 10%		31%		14%	20%	5%	29%
	Employment status				Share of votes received (%)
	Employed Unemployed Inactive Marital status Not Married Married Language Arabic or Algerian Dialect French or Other Tamazight Interest in politics Not at all interested Not very interested Somewhat interested Very interested Political Activism None Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration Rural / Urban Index Urban Rural Overall vote share Gender Woman Man Age Below 25 25-35 35-55 55+ Education group Bottom 50% Middle 40% Top 10% Income decile D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 Source: FLN 17,35% 47% 47% 34% 39% 33% 76% 59% 34% 28% 56% 45% 52% 56% 57% D6 50%	35% 34% 37% 34% 37% 37% 25% 25% 35% 34% 39% 34% 37% 32% 38% 33%	RND 6,86% 20% 15% 22% 18% 25% 6% 12% 19% 35% 8% 14% 12% 6% 15% 6%	10% 5% 7% 9% 8% 8% 27% 2% 5% 10% 8% 7% 8% 9% 9% 7% opposition Islamic 9,27% 5% 10% 5% 7% 13% 2% 6% 11% 6% 2% 5% 1% 6% 3% 8%	18% 15% 17% 21% 14% 19% 4% 10% 14% 19% 23% 8% 17% 17% 19% 15% opposition Secular (FFS/RCD) 4,96% 6% 13% 16% 9% 10% 8% 10% 10% 8% 20% 14% 12% 9% 11% 21%	4% 2% 3% 3% 3% 1% 4% 18% 1% 4% 5% 4% 3% 5% 4% 3% Worker's Party (PT) 4,96% 14% 7% 15% 16% 11% 2% 4% 16% 20% 5% 6% 7% 16% 10% 5%	35% 44% 35% 32% 37% 35% 39% 45% 46% 33% 24% 48% 35% 38% 30% 42%	Other 56,60% 8% 8% 9% 10% 9% 5% 8% 10% 3% 10% 16% 17% 8% 3% 10%
	D7	56%		15%	1%	10%	9%		9%
	D8	44%		11%	1%	15%	15%		14%
	D9	32%		16%	6%	13%	28%		5%
	D10	25%		28%	10%	8%	14%		15%
	Income group
	Bottom 50%	53%		11%	3%	13%	9%		11%
	Middle 40%	45%		12%	4%	15%	14%		9%

Table B4 -Complete structure of the vote in Algeria, 2012

 B4 authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2012. Vote shares have been reweighed so as to match exactly official election results.

	Top 10% Urban	25% 44%	28% 18%	10% 8%	8% 10%		14% 10%		15% 10%
	Employment status Rural	53%	16%	7%	9%		10%		5%
	Employed Unemployed Inactive Marital status Source: FLN 32% 37% 62%	25% 14% 11% RND	11% 2% 6% Islamic opposition Share of votes received (%) 11% 12% 9% Secular opposition (FFS/RND)	13% 18% 6% Worker's Party (PT)	Other	9% 17% 6%
	Not Married Overall vote share	42% 25,99%	17% 14,91%	6% 15,34%	10% 7,56%	17% 2,15%	33,68%	8%
	Married Gender	50%	17%	9%	10%		5%		8%
	Region Woman	61%	10%	6%	9%	2%		11%
	Alger Man	39% 58%	14% 13%	7% 5%	15% 9%	3%	5%	12%	20%
	East Highlands Age	49%	19%	14%	5%		11%		1%
	Middle Highlands Below 25	61% 65%	9% 9%	0% 1%	4% 7%	2%	12%	15%	14%
	North Eastern Region 25-35	46% 52%	30% 11%	8% 5%	4% 7%	3%	9%	19%	2%
	North Middle Region 35-55	32% 60%	14% 13%	3% 5%	22% 11%	3%	14%	8%	15%
	North Western Region 55+	61% 64%	15% 11%	6% 6%	5% 7%	1%	10%	10%	4%
	South Region Education group	54%	13%	5%	14%		8%		7%
	Western Highlands Bottom 50%	39% 58%	28% 11%	26% 7%	0% 9%	2%	4%	12%	3%
	Language Middle 40%	62%	12%	3%	8%	3%		11%
	Arabic or Algerian Dialect Top 10%	49% 53%	17% 16%	8% 5%	8% 13%	5%	10%	9%	8%
	Tamazight Income decile	18%	15%	2%	38%		14%		13%
	Turnout D1	74%	4%	2%	14%	0%		6%
	Did not vote D2	37% 68%	20% 7%	5% 2%	16% 16%	0%	16%	6%	6%
	Voted D3	49% 53%	17% 14%	8% 3%	9% 7%	2%	9%	19%	9%
	Interest in politics D4	52%	12%	7%	10%	1%		15%
	Not at all interested D5	52% 59%	13% 13%	3% 5%	10% 14%	0%	12%	8%	10%
	Not very interested D6	46% 62%	17% 12%	7% 4%	12% 11%	1%	10%	9%	8%
	Somewhat interested D7	46% 63%	20% 11%	13% 4%	6% 8%	2%	8%	11%	7%
	Very interested D8	20% 62%	53% 9%	14% 3%	12% 9%	2%	0%	14%	0%
	Political Activism D9	72%	8%	2%	5%	3%		10%
	None D10	53% 62%	14% 12%	6% 4%	10% 9%	3%	10%	10%	8%
	Signed a petition and/or Income group
	attended a demonstration Bottom 50%	37% 61%	22% 10%	10% 4%	11% 12%	1%	11%	11%	9%
	Rural / Urban Index Middle 40%	65%	10%	3%	8%	2%		11%

Table B5 -Complete structure of the vote in Algeria, 2017

 B5 authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2017. Vote shares have been reweighed so as to match exactly official election results.

	Top 10%	62%	12%	4%	9%	3%	10%
	Employment status
	Employed	59%	14%	4%	10%	3%	10%
	Unemployed Inactive Marital status Not Married Married Region Alger East Highlands Middle Highlands North Eastern Region North Middle Region North Western Region South Region Western Highlands Turnout Did not vote Voted Interest in politics Not at all interested Not very interested Somewhat interested Very interested Political Activism None Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration Source: Feels	50% 61% 55% 61% 58% 58% 48% 72% 55% 60% 33% 63% 63% 57% 62% 57% 66% 42% 61% 55%	11% 11% 12% 12% 13% 9% 17% 10% 12% 12% 9% 12% 12% 11% 4% 16% 13% 12% 11% 13%	3% 7% 4% 6% 8% 10% 6% 4% 1% 5% 13% 10% 2% 13% 5% 5% 6% 5% 5% 5%	9% 8% 7% 10% 7% 11% 14% 4% 18% 1% 30% 0% 4% 9% 8% 10% 6% 8% 6% 14%	3% 2% 2% 3% 4% 2% 3% 2% 2% 4% 0% 6% 5% 3% 1% 4% 2% 9% 2% 4%	21% 10% 17% 9% 10% 9% 12% 7% 12% 18% 15% 7% 14% 7% 18% 8% 6% 25% 13% 8%

close to no party Did not vote in the last elections

	Overall sample share	58.05%	79.23%
	Gender
	Woman	57%	77%
	Man	53%	76%
	Age
	Below 25	74%	92%
	25-35	65%	84%
	35-55	51%	76%
	55+	42%	58%
	Education group
	Bottom 50%	53%	76%
	Middle 40%	55%	77%
	Top 10%	62%	79%
	Income group
	Bottom 50%	55%	74%
	Middle 40%	50%	76%
	Top 10%	42%	74%
	Ethno-regional identity
	Living in Kabylia	54%	75%
	Non living in Kabylia	57%	69%

Table B6 -Structure of no response and abstention in Algeria, 2019

 B6 Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of respondents by selected individual characteristics in 2019.

See appendix Figure AB2.

See appendix Figure AB31.

See appendix Figure AC3.

See appendix maps and figure AA17.

See appendix Figure AB7.

Notice that not all Kurds speak Kurdish as first language, so that our results are likely to underestimate this divide.

See appendix Figure AC6.

According to the Iraqi Body Count, the outbreak of the civil war in 2006 and 2007 led to more than 25K civilian death per year, but more than 4K of annual deaths were still registered until 2018.

See appendix Figures BC7 and BC8.

See appendix Figures BC12 and BC13.

See appendix Figure CC3.

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Map A7 -Geographical distribution of the very religious population in Turkey