Denis Trček
email: denis.trcek@fri.uni-lj.si

Jose J Gonzalez
email: josejg@uia.no

Understanding the Importance of Proper Incentives for Critical Infrastructures Management -How System Dynamics Can Help

Keywords: Critical infrastructures, Policies, Management, Modeling and simulation

Computer and information systems are now at the core of numerous critical infrastructures. However, their security management is by far not a trivial issue. Further, these systems, by their very nature, belong to the domain of complex systems, where system dynamics (SD) is an established method, which aims at modelling such systems, their analysis and understanding. Further, on this basis it enables simulation of various policies to properly manage complex systems. More precisely, through understanding of the basic elements of the whole mosaic and their interplay, proper incentives can be tested. And this is important, because proper incentives can lead to the desired patterns of behavior of such systems, which may often be counter-intuitive. Therefore this paper presents a novel approach by using SD for managing critical infrastructures (more precisely the internet) when it comes to security related incentives. Based on already developed archetypes it provides a template model that bridges these conceptual models with concrete models that are suited to particular environments, and enable quantitative simulations.

Introduction

Proper incentives that are implemented through policies or regulation are very vital for complex systems management as they often lead to counterintuitive or even unwanted consequences. History provides many such examples. In 1920, the US government implemented very strict alcohol production, distribution and consumption prohibition legislation. The effects were at least surprising. Strong alcoholic drinks started to flourish (in particular gin), as they were easier to transport and sell secretly than weak alcoholic drinks (for the same effect for consumers). Before this legislation, pubs were almost exclusively visited by men. But when illegal market appeared women often accompanied men at the selling spotsand so they started to consume alcohol, too. But probably the most unwanted effect was that black market became increasingly controlled by the mafia. Consequently, its power increased, and the mafia became and remained a very strong player due to this source of income even after 1933 when President Roosevelt banned the legislation of alcohol prohibition [START_REF] Bastable | Great Secrets of History[END_REF]. This is by far not the only case of an incentive which has resulted in completely unwanted consequences. Some recent incentives that are likely to result in unwanted effects (based on evidence and lessons learnt in the respective field) are those by the US government where flooding-prone areas are declared as safe despite the evidence of the contrary (being stimulated by a wish to picture "normal" conditions in an endangered areas) [START_REF] Horowitz | New Orlean's New Flood Maps: An Outline for Disaster[END_REF].

Now getting to critical infrastructures, in particular communicationscomputer and information systems security incidents are a consequence of interplay of numerous inter-related factors. Among those factors human based ones are often at the core of related problems. And proper policiesmore precisely, proper incentivesmay have a strong impact as to the desired outcomes here as well. One widely known example is the case of ATMs security in the banking sector. When it came to a dispute between a customer and a bank because of a fraud, the burden of proof was put on the banks in the US case, while in Europe, the burden was put on customers. Counterintuitively, the final result was that the overall ATM security was better in the US than in Europe (and all this at lower costs). The core of reasoning was that banks are easier to put appropriate prevention measures in place due to their knowledge and economic power. Put another way, those who should knew better and have more power in their hands should be primarily in charge [START_REF] Anderson | Security Engineering[END_REF].

Therefore proper incentives are clearly important and they should be carefully studied. As this is easier said than done (one should think only about experimenting with various incentives in real, large scale, environments), appropriate methods that could provide steps into the right direction are much desired. Put another way, to foster aligned incentives it is much desired to have tools for their verification, or at least for playing with associated scenarios to figure out what the unwanted effects of these incentives could be. And this is the main contribution of this paper that is focused on critical infrastructures management, more precisely, cybersecurity. The paper builds on System Dynamics (SD) that has a long and proven track record in various areas of complex systems, including their management. Not only that it enables understanding of complex dynamic systems in a very intuitive way (which is very fine for non-experts), it also enables their modeling and validation (to support with scientific rigor appropriate decision making procedures and management).

This paper presents further steps in the direction of using SD to improve critical infrastructures systems security through aligned incentives. Therefore in the second section the basics related to incentives are given. In the third section the further extension of archetypes is given that results in a template model, which can be adapted to particular cases in a quantitative way. Discussion comes next, being followed by conclusions in the fourth section. The paper is concluded by references.

2

Understanding the Battlefield Landscape

Traditional economics and security relationship was pointed at already years ago in the pioneering papers written by Anderson and Moore [4 -7]. Summing up the main messages of these works is as follows:

─ With current IT technology, attacks are easier than defense. Suppose that a software solution has 1,000 bugs, and for each of those the MTBF is 1,000 hours. Suppose further that a defending user of this software wants to patch it as much as possible and invests 10,000 hours in testing per year. In one year the defender will therefore find (on average) 10 bugs. On the other hand, the attacker can afford only 1,000 hours of testing per year, and will therefore find (on average) only 1 bug. Now one can easily calculate the low odds that this last bug will be one of those 10 ones discovered by the defender. ─ Asymmetric information, as applied to ordinary economics by Akerloff, is playing its role also in case of IT solutions [START_REF] Akerlof | The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism[END_REF]. Suppose an experienced vendor offers 10 good security assuring products at 200.-EUR each, while another option are 10 weak security products at 100.-EUR each. Clearly, a vendor can (or is likely able to) tell the good from bad, but buyers cannot. According to Akerloff, users are rational (which is often not the case cases in reality) giving the starting price at 150.-EUR based on the assumption that they are going to get with equally probability a good or a bad product. At this price the seller is motivated to sell only the weak product, so the spiral of negative market selection process is started. ─ Network externalities effects stimulate, among others, producers to get on market as soon as possible, which put a pressure on extensive security testing. Thus "get on the market first and do the fixing later" is often a dominant strategy to enable the "get big fast" effect. Further, due to the reinforcing loop of these effects, the winner takes it all situation starts and the landscape becomes more and more uniform. Further, security is often a barrier in usability terms, so even when it is available, the product is configured by default in a rather moderate way. As a consequence, the increasing proportion of systems is becoming susceptible to the same kinds of attacks, so any kind of "epidemics" becomes a natural threat.

To remedy this kind of situation Anderson and Tyler propose avoiding the principle of misaligned incentives, which relate to allocation of security risks. Put simply, those that are most responsible (or in a privileged position) for providing security are usually the least affected by negative consequences. As already mentioned, one typical example where the testing of this claim proved as correct is ATM and credit card frauds.

Based on the above described lessons learned, the following non-technical countermeasures have been proposed: ─ Ex ante regulation instead of ex post liabilitysimply put, involved entities ae liable for their products and services [START_REF] Moore | The Economics of Cybersecurity: Principles and policy options[END_REF]. ─ Related information disclosureinvolved entities should be stimulated to disclose security related information, ranging from found bugs (which is already happening [START_REF]Making Security Measurable[END_REF]) to aggregated or estimated loss figures (which is yet to be implemented on a wider scale). This issue is closely related to enabling cyber insurance for taking appropriate precautions that would result in better and more consistent data statistics.

An interesting variant of this idea is liability in case of Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Here in case of a copyright infringement an internet service provider (IS) is not automatically liable. However, it becomes liable if, upon notification, it does not remove or block the distribution of copyrighted material [START_REF] Moore | The Economics of Cybersecurity: Principles and policy options[END_REF]. ─ Accreditation and education level requirementssoftware engineers and programmers should become subject to accreditation requirements and related procedures. It is rather surprising that the essence that runs at the heart of today's critical infrastructures (i.e., software) can be designed and implemented by virtually anyone. Something like this is unimaginable in other important domains like medicine, jurisprudence, and civil engineering, to name a few [START_REF] Gonzalez | Proper incentives for proper IT security management -A system dynamics approach[END_REF].

There are likely other options for counter-measuressee, e.g., [START_REF] Arief | Understanding Cybersecurity from Its Stakeholders' Perspective. Security and Privacy[END_REF][START_REF] Arief | Understanding Cybersecurity from Its Stakeholders' Perspective -Defenses and Victims, Security and Privacy[END_REF]. And to further identify them it helps to ask oneself the following question: "Which are the motivations for people that would stimulate them to act in a way that would improve security of the internet?"

System Dynamics and Evaluation of Proper Management Policies

System dynamics (SD) is now an established research and application method that has a proven track record in many areas. As briefly described in [START_REF] Trček | Information systems security and human behavior[END_REF], system dynamics addresses people, processes, material and information flows by emphasizing the importance of feedback loops. These feedback loops are the major cause for the behavior of (mainly non-linear) dynamic systems.

The modelling starts with a qualitative stage where basic variables are identified and linked accordingly. Through iteration stages the model is improved and the above mentioned causal loops emerge in more and more refined form (consequently, these models are also referred to as causal loop diagrams). As to the links among variables, they have positive polarity if an increase (decrease) of causal variable results in an increase (decrease) of the consecutive variable. But if the output variable is decreased (increased) by an increase (decrease) of the input variable, the polarity is negative.

To obtain models that can be simulated one must transition from causal loop diagrams, where one does not distinguish between different kind of variables, and stockand-flow models. In the stock-and-flow model version, variables are divided into auxiliary ones and accumulators (also referred to as levels or stocks), where levels play special roles in a system. First, they are the source of inertia. Second, they constitute a kind of primitive memory within the systeman aggregate of past events. Third, they serve as absorbers, and decouple inflows from outflows.

The causal loop diagram is developed provides a holistic view of the system, and enables a better understanding of the basic principles of its functioning. As indicated above such a causal loop model is usually further elaborated to obtain a quantitative stock-and-flow model. In a stock-and-flow model concrete relationships between variables are established through the introduction of appropriate equations. The model at this stage is ready for calibration based on real data, and use for system simulation and policies derivation.

In order to provide additional insights into incentives issues, and enable appropriate counter-measures that would improve critical communications infrastructure security, appropriate conceptual and template model(s) would be useful. This has been shown to be the case with many other areas addressed by SD like market penetration of a product, infections spreading, and so on. Now as to conceptual modelsfor our particular domain two key system archetype models have already been developed [START_REF] Gonzalez | Proper incentives for proper IT security management -A system dynamics approach[END_REF]. However, archetype models are a special category of causal loop diagrams [START_REF] Senge | The Fifth Discipline[END_REF][START_REF] Wolstenholme | Towards the Definition and Use of a Core Set of Archetypal Structures in System Dynamics[END_REF]. They are purely qualitative models with an intention to provide only the basic understanding of the core of a phenomenon at hand. But in order to obtain a quantitative model (that is usually at the top of the agenda) one still needs to fill the gap with so called template models, which identify not only the core variables (factors), but also the related complementary variables, and the nature of the involved variables.

The Template Model Preliminaries

Now which could be the main motivations of people when it comes, in general, to ensuring security of the internet? Among the main motivation groups are those about avoiding bad reputation (being an unreliable partner, a partner causing damage …), those about avoiding penalties (being charged, being arrested, being disconnected from the internet ...), and those that are about preventing unnecessary or excessive costs (how much to invest in security in order to not to invest too much). This is, of course, not the exhaustive set of possibilities, but it is sufficient to enable derivation of the desired template model.

The Template Model

In line with the above described reasoning, there are four lines along which the needed SD template model is to be built: The first one is the core of the problem, which is the lifecycle of vulnerabilities and related threats. The second line is the actions line, which is actually in close interplay with the third line, the line of incentives (policies) that are at the core of the analysis. The fourth line is the "final judgment line", i.e., the line that quantifies the success of implemented incentive (policies) in terms of financial gain or loss. Now the explanation along the horizontal lines follows that sticks with the internal logic of the observed system(s). The vulnerabilities line starts with vulnerabilities production rate. These are vulnerabilities that are a side product of each system design and they remain silent as potential vulnerabilities until they become discovered. Depending on their discovery rate, the appropriate proportion of potential vulnerabilities becomes a recognized fact, i.e., vulnerabilities with an active damage potential. As an active vulnerability is in principle not an isolated one, this active vulnerability typically leads to additional (cascaded) vulnerabilities. These latter vulnerabilities are usually not immediately recognized; therefore they fill the accumulation of the potential vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities line ends with the sink of active vulnerabilities that are eliminated due to being fixed or becoming irrelevant (e.g., when the technology is changed). The next line is actions line, where aggregated effects of incentives (from the third, policy line) play the key role. Aggregated drivers are linked to appropriate flows and actually "turn into reality" the dynamics of the observed system (note that for a better clarity only the links for aggregated driver are given). Depending on how successfully we manage the key rates (i.e., the vulnerabilities discovery rate, the vulnerabilities exploitation rate and the vulnerabilities fixing rate) the extent of exploited vulnerabilities is obtained. And using according financial weights the total security cost (that is due to exploits) is obtained. A cautious reader may see that the total security costs could be obtained by taking into account also costs of organizational requirements, informal pressures, and so on (indicated, but not further detailed in the model).

Discussion

The above template model per se is still a qualitative onebut with a difference from its archetype counterparts. are driving the phenomenon at hand within the community. Second, it serves as a building block that can be turned straightforwardly into a full-blown quantitative model, which can be testedand tuned accordinglybased on real data. Actually, such template models (although they are referred to as template models here for the first time) are crucial parts of system dynamics arsenal. This arsenal contains not only basic models (like, e.g., the core logistic curve model) but also their more elaborated variants (like, e.g., the Bass Diffusion Model) [START_REF] Sterman | Business Dynamics[END_REF]. And this latter is actually a kind of a template model.

The reason for such step by step approach is rather evidentevery model needs to be fine-tuned to a specific case with particular variables. But getting real data to obtain quantified cyber-security models is not a trivial taskon the contrary. So making security measurable is high on the agenda for quite some years. Although the situation is still not an ideal one, it should be stated that some notable advancements have been done in this area, mostly due to MITRE Corp. initiative called Making Security Measurable MITRE Corp. [START_REF]Making Security Measurable[END_REF].

We anticipate that right at this point template models will provide additional advantage. Their elaboration within the community (as this is normally the case) is expected to result in one or more stable representatives, where it will be clearly visible, which variables (still) need to be collected, what the nature of these variables is, and how they can be tested for consistency. Not to mention that such situation would be already very close to automation of related processes, including testing of incentives.

Conclusions

It is known for a long time that cyber security is not just a matter of technical issues, but at least as much a matter of issues that include economics elements and agents' motives. These issues are all subject to incentives, and when properly aligned, these incentives may result in effective (although often counterintuitive) consequences that lead to improved security of targeted systems at lower costs. One typical example is the case of ATM frauds as a result of different incentives in the US and EUwhile in the first case the burden of proof was put on banks, in the second case it was put on customers. But surprisingly, US banks had lower frauds number, and the total security costs was lower.

The above instructive case is the main motive behind this paper that is about aligned incentives for improving cyber-security. By using system dynamics we have extended the related artefact models with a template model that fills the gap towards quantitative models, which can be calibrated with real data, so the incentives can be verified accordingly. By doing so proper alignment of incentives is enabled through testing of various policies and their consequences before being implemented in reality.

Fig. 1 .

 1 Fig. 1. The template model with the layered factors and their interdependencies

First, it enables deeper understanding of all variables


Yanling Lee

Kenji Watanabe

Wei-Sen Li
email: li.weisen@ncdr.nat.gov.tw

Keywords: Business Continuity Plan (BCP), Regional Digital Preparedness, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), Big Data, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

In March 2015, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) enforced during the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. The SFDRR does not just succeed spirits and values of the Hyogo Framework for Action, but also leads the world entering a new phase of disaster risk reduction through stakeholders at national, regional and global levels. Among all regions around the world, the Asia-Pacific is the most vulnerable to natural hazards and climate changes. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is critical concerned in terms of national security, economic quality growth, environmental sustainability and people's livelihoods. For regional consideration, a large-scale disaster could direct and indirect impact more than one countries due to the damaged or interrupted supply chain. Therefore, regional efforts on DRR have been a focal issue. After the 2011 Great Japan Earthquakes and Tsunami, an emergent global trend of developing strategy to strengthen global value chain or supply chain resilience via business continuity planning (BCP) approach engages the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the multinational or international corps to limit interruption and enhance cross border manufacturing, trade and investments. Base on the practical DRR project implementations and experiences over the years, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) identifies several key factors to promote disaster resilience in business sectors. The SFDRR also encourages innovation, science and technology DRR approaches i.e. big data and open day can help sharing the value-added information on enhancing capacity building of SMEs' disaster resilient capacity via decent risk communication tools for raising the risk awareness and level of digital preparedness. This paper describes to what extend the business sectors involved in and how to safeguard the cross-border trade and investments with safer and smarter regional strategies in the digital age with large-scale disasters.

Enhancing Regional Digital Preparedness on Natural

Hazards to Safeguard Business Resilience in the Asia-Pacific 1 High Vulnerabilities of Natural Hazards in the Asia-Pacific

Asia is one of the most competitive marketplaces in the world. Within the region, the struggle on compromising profits on supply chain interruption while disasters. Thus, the fruitful profits come from the significant economy growth via highly supply chain integrated operations in the region of high vulnerabilities and exposures to natural hazards of Asia. From 2003-2013, the annual economic loss reach up to some US$68 billion in the Asia-Pacific Region [1]. The critical issues drawn by the average loses call upon the action plans for enhancing disaster resilience at regional level. Disasters not just adversely impact people's livelihoods, but also could interrupt regional or even global business operations, due to the direct impact on commodity shortage. In today's highly globalized and regionalized integration on production activities, more and more business units take advantages to governing global value chains for pursuing ultimate profitability, i.e. to navigate cross-border business networks of public and private sectors to coordinate the manufacturing, operations, financing, marketing and logistics on multiple product line suppliers and subcontractors in order to outreach the end consumers in various parts of the world. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is one of a kind Asia-Pacific economic forum target to uphold the regional economic growth and prosperity. Twenty-one APEC member economies occupied 44 percent of global trade ($16.8 trillion) and 53 percent of world real GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms ($35.8 trillion) created by 40 percent of world population (2.7 billion people) [2], (see Fig. 1).

Regional and Global Efforts on Promoting Business Continuity Since 2011 in the Asia-Pacific

Business Continuity Plan (BCP) is not an emergent idea in business management. A conventional BCP usually copes with threats of financial crisis, information interruptions and manufacturing accidents, instead of natural hazards. Learning experiences from the 2011 Great Japan Earthquakes and Tsunami, and the Floods in Thailand that clearly identify high vulnerabilities in business sectors and reminds business owners to develop traditional business continuity plan and include adverse impacts caused by natural disasters. Though interruptions, originated from business operations, cash flows or inconsistency of information, have been taken into serious consideration, but those setbacks are listed as daily-basis check-up items and most business units has plans to respond to the emergency by Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs). However, after a major disaster, chain effects of business interruptions would probable affect the whole supply chain domestically or even internationally. For example, the severe floods in Thailand caused ripple effects of business interruptions to automobile production line and PC manufacture activities in the Asia-Pacific. Likewise, the 2011 earthquakes and tsunami in Japan also brought down ICT industry and auto parts. Counting casualties and losses aftermath, economic loss exceeded 1.7 Billion Yen (equal to 3.4 % GDP of Japan), death toll number (or missing) around twenty thousand, direct loss (including damaged households, manufacturing utilities, highways and bridges). Beside the tangible damage and losses in Japan, it strongly impact the global markets of the supply chain interruption, especially from global supply chain viewpoint. In the 2011 earthquakes, the semi-conductor manufacturing and automobile industries were severely affected and interrupted in the Tohoku read in Japan. The consequences shown on the declining production in car industry. Comparing the number of car manufactured from February of 2011 (800,000), March (400,000) and April (290,000), the supply chain interruption shows the impact of the large-scale disaster toward Japan's global strategy on highly integrated operations. It may attributes to the declining of car productivity in Thailand (19.7 %), in the Philippines (24.0%), and in Indonesia (6.1%). Likewise, manufacturers involved in the global value chain such as computer, smartphone and ICT device faced shortage of essential chips produced or supplied by Japan.

Therefore, a trend of enhancing preparedness for private sector by adding new elements to BCP has become an essential issue of disaster management. In 2012, International Organization for Standardization has introduced the ISO 22301 as a new standard to regulate disaster management activities for business operations. An APEC survey conducted by the Asia Disaster Reduction Center shows that over 79% of companies including large corporations and SMEs that these companies neither didn't have nor know business continuity plans (BCPs), (see Fig. 2) [START_REF]A Better Understanding of the Current Status of BCP Adoption and the Level of BCP Awareness among Private Sector SMEs in the APEC Region[END_REF]. From observation of the trend, obviously, the business owners think that the governments ought to take a major proportion of disaster management and responsible to help them reduce losses and overlook certain obligations shouldered by the business owners themselves. To better enhance the whole society disaster resilience, how to motivate active participation and border engage the involvement from private sectors are the essential backbone supporting to succeed the public-private partnerships. BCP with factors of natural hazards is an ideal vehicle to transport concepts of disaster risk reduction, capacity building and emergency preparedness to business operations via robust preparation.

The main purposes to introduce BCP to business are:

1. Raise businesses' awareness and knowledge to develop disaster reduction/disaster preemptive mechanisms and responding teams. 2. Establish a process to help business develop tailor-made plan for solving foreseen challenges. 3. Help individual company in quickly resuming operation to strengthen business competitiveness and keep promises to clients and employees. More and more industries and corporations taking it seriously of the impacts brought by natural disasters as risks and threats to their employees, suppliers and customers after the 2011 earthquakes and tsunami in Japan. Hence, both public and private sectors recognize the importance of BCP, which can help formulating plans on the potential risks and scenario to further identifying internal, and external vulnerabilities with disaster risk awareness while disasters to ensure the business continuity, industry development and economies sustainability.

Primary Targets for Introducing Business Continuity

Australia and Thailand co-host the 2010 "APEC Workshop on Public Private Partnerships and Disaster Resilience" address the need to develop a whole society approach on enhancing disaster resilience and outline the common objectives with scope of collaborative partnerships.

After the Great East Japan Earthquakes and Tsunami in 2011, the Asia Disaster Reduction Centre (ADRC) survey on 267 large and small-medium enterprises within 17 APEC member economies shows the averaged statistic of 67% -"Don't know about BCP" or "Don't have BCP". Exclude the large enterprises, the percentage for SMEs' jumps high to 83% [4]. With limited BCPs availability, the high disaster risk ranking of the economic activities, business operations and product manufacturing in the disaster-prone areas show the vulnerability of global supply chain while natural hazards. Without proper BCPs in positon to go through risk identification, preparedness, emergency response and business resumption phases, disaster can lead the situations toward business and supply chain interruptions and even cease to exist. Compare with those enterprises with BCPs, the quicker recovery from the disaster can quick resume the business operations, which contribute to the regional supply chain connectivity to uphold the regional economic sustainability. However, with limited risk awareness, local knowledge and disaster risk reduction capacity building or training program, business units tend not to prepare in advance. In views of business continuity after disasters, this research depict how to define the information source and utilize the communications tools (ICTs) to better raising the general risk awareness and enhancing disaster resilience as well as encouraging the public and private sectors to develop BCPs for managing risk or impact.

SMEs make great contributions to the national, regional and global economy and trade. Nevertheless, the SMEs are fragile in nature that hampered global supply chains and business operations while natural disasters especially large-scale ones. From coverage of news media, the repeating reports of SMEs' losses occupied headlines year after year. It highlights to some extent the natural disasters impact SMEs in great deal and induce severe supply chain interruption and aftermath economic losses.

A few tangible existing facts confirm the importance of disaster resilience to the SMEs' operations. Firstly, direct impacts of disasters can stop the whole or partial production lines' operations due to the facilities damages, raw materials contaminated or even workforce casualties. Secondly, accompany by the inconvenient situations for SMEs to recover while interruption on water/ electricity supply and transportations/ logistics occurred. Thirdly, indirect impacts on slow economic and livelihood recovery to some extent cripple business operations especially SMEs'.

Without doubts, flexibility is the key strength of SME to rapidly adapt to the changes of competitive marketplace. SMEs, compared to the large corporations, have relatively little and limited finical support, knowledge and human resource to cope with the risk and exposure to natural hazards. In global economic lifecycle, SME is the fundamental unit to contribute to the local community incomes and regional business economic growth. By reviewing other issues related to disaster management on public private partnership (PPP), disaster resilience and emergency preparedness, it is shown a common trend and demands of SME on mitigating potential disaster risk. As consequence, BCP is an ideal approach to linkage among business people, key stakeholders and disaster managers jointly to work on improving disaster resilience.

The ten easy steps for building up SME's BCP, developed base on ISO22301 Business Continuity Management Standard System, have been introduced to the Asia-Pacific region since 2012 by training workshops and document circulation. The ten steps are composed [START_REF]Guidebook on SME Business Continuity Planning[END_REF] Recent projects of business resilience and global chain resilience, conducted by APEC Small and Medium Enterprises Working Group (SMEWG) and APEC Transportation Working Group (TPTWG) respectively, emphasize importance of applying data and information for achieving smarter investments and building up safer trade environment. For twenty-one member economies of APEC to share the synergies of economic prosperity, regional capacity building and public-private partnership, it is vital to broadly adopt the big data and open data information sharing on emergency preparedness approach to concrete solid and sound foundation for global value/supply chain resilience to artery connect and support business and economic activities in the Asia-Pacific region.

Digital preparedness is a cornerstone of evidence-based DRR approach, which offers value-added knowledge for emergent response while decision-making, process from big data and open data to information intelligence. However, there are technical and policy barriers for developing countries to utilized crowdsourcing, ICTs or Internet of Things (IoT) technology to build up an analytical database and integrated systems with proper telecommunication tools for cross-border BCPs or regional emergency preparedness from data collection to applications, especially for a cross-border or large-scale disasters. Taking into account of the diverse social-economic data sets of demographic characteristics, economic activities, educational background, gender, level of public awareness etc., it is essential to carefully interpret and identify the social vulnerability with gaps for enhancing regional capacity building as a whole society. These parameters from social science perspectives help capacity building at community level and reshaping actionable information from "big data and open data" approach for sustainable economic and business activities.

Best Practices on Digital Preparedness in Taiwan through Public-Private Partnership

Taiwan is a highly disaster-prone country and how to mitigate disaster risk is an essential issue catching attentions from both government and the public. However, due to extreme weather events and potential large-scale earthquakes, risk exposures to land and population increase and become more diverse than ever. In past two decades, the Ministry of Science and Technology has been investing resources on fundamental scientific and technological researches related to characteristics of natural hazards and knowledge for disaster management that helps to pave the basis developing disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness. Nowadays, emerging technologies speed up the telecommunications development and shorten the lead time from data to deliverable messages in the digital age. In information age, big data and open data not just facilitate trades and business, but also benefit disaster management as a whole.

In case of the lessons learnt from the 2011 Great Japan Earthquakes and Tsunami, specific big datasets can provide a dynamic view on human behaviors and reactions to the shakings and warnings as well as the traffic flow in different phases. From Predisaster to post disaster phase, from data to reliable information or message is critical for raising public awareness. An updated information with better risk communication approaches can mitigate the disturbance while emergency respond and level up the quality DRR assessments with higher public awareness of emergency situations. Applying open data principles to big data, it will enhance social preparedness and resilience. Since 2013, Taiwan has introduced the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) to standardize disaster information for dissemination though multiple channels. Google Crisis Map is one of the platforms in building up the last mile to connect people living in Taiwan and one of the easy access tools to adopt in sending the demanding information in times of disasters. Later, in 2016, five system operators of the fourth-generation (4G) telecommunications officially join to provide the Cell Broadcasting Service (CBS) to mobile phone users. It is an innovative approach to facilitate raising public awareness and ensure wide coverage of the dissemination of information during emergency with in time collaborations among public and private sectors.

In 2009, Typhoon Morakot brought record-breaking rainfalls which caused massive floods and large-scale landslides in the southern Taiwan. The tremendous casualties and losses pushed forward a restructure of disaster management framework and the full commitment of improving emergency operation via information integration. The improvement on meeting the quality information demands for decision-making required to tackle of what we have been exposed to when Typhoon Morakot strike -no adequate collaborations and synergies among respective governmental agencies and authorities at all level to disseminate and interpret the just-in-time effective integrated information for proactive emergency preparedness and response.

One of the key reasons for formulating an integrated information framework on decision-making support is that too many existing individual systems operated independently by each government authority and provided only fragment of information in different time span. Hence, an efficient coordinated emergency preparedness and re-sponse countermeasure cannot be deployed in time without the holistic views and pictures of the real situations and the impact assessments on Typhoon Morakot prior to the disasters hit. To cope with the incompatibility of data sets, file structures and valueadded information via the social media related to typhoons, floods and precipitationtriggered landslides, the remedial countermeasures request decisive decisions to acquired and incorporated science and technology efforts for integration -'one Taiwan one respond'. The evidence-based emergency operation needs the implementation of applying improved numerical ensemble models to forecast trajectories and rain of typhoons, producing potential risk maps of inundation for scenario simulation, integrating real-time monitoring data for further decision making. All the outcomes and collective verified information are displayed on GIS-Web-based platform for discussion and decision-making at all level of the government authorities and Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs). Without doubts, big data is the core behind the scene to support the emergency preparedness and operations.

In recent years, the scope of information sharing has extended from central to local governments and NGOs to help enhancing information preparedness at grassroots levels. For local governments, delayed or inadequate information hampers and slows down the process of decision making. Information dissemination and sharing from central to local governments fill in the gap of miss-links information and provides a common operation picture to bring meaningful discussions-speak on the same page. Collaborations with NGOs on helping them to allocate resources in advance, governments can benefit from receiving the NOGs feedbacks as the reliable on-site data source for information and data collection. The mechanism of big data integration is shown in Fig. 3[6]. It is always a challenging question to answer -how many and where are people staying -or -when will the next destructive earthquakes hit? For the number of the affected people, through an averaged estimation of population distribution, allocating population proportional to floor areas based on census statistics and taxation data could calculate it. However, it presents a static status of population distribution but real time facts, which does not fully reflect people's dynamic movements in urban districts or national wide around the clock while disasters. As scenario analysis for seismic risk reduction in urban areas, locations, population density and distribution are the key factors, which shape the strategic approaches on how to mitigate possible casualties claimed by a large-scale earthquake.

To resolve the situation, National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction (NCDR) collaborated with the Chunghwa Telecom (CHT), a major telecom service provider occupies 37.90% of the mobile service in Taiwan [START_REF]BC Strategies to early resumption[END_REF], to tracing mobile signals for collecting numbers of mobile users at specific grids to estimate population distribution pattern. The scope of the pilot project covers three major metropolitan areas in north Taiwan, Taipei City, New Taipei City and Keelung City with numbers of population at 2,695,007, 3,959,855 and 373,721 respectively. The CHT provides data updates three times; at 9 am, at 3 pm and 9 pm; every day that roughly reflects dynamic characteristics of urban population flow and allocation pattern in the urban area as illustrated in the Fig. 4. In the case of the 2011 Great Japan Earthquakes and Tsunami, Using proper big datasets can facilitate interpret human behaviors and reactions to provide more comprehensive pictures and views to the shakings, warnings efficiencies and the traffic flow situation in different phases of disasters. From Pre-disaster to post-disaster phases, big data and open data approach can deliver just in time message to maintain the effective and efficient risk communication with higher level of public awareness through public private partnership to deploy emergency response effort and to deliver quality DRR assessments if situations.

APEC for a studies conclude the emergent needs to adopt big data and open data approach on large scale disaster with cross-border view of digital preparedness while emergency. To include whole society from public sectors to private industries and general publics, a comprehensive picture for emergency response using real time big data and open data is vital to succeed the collaborative interoperability operations from adopting DRR strategies, BCPs, deploying emergency relief missions and mitigating losses for sustainable economic growth and human security. A disaster-prone region, regional capacity building programs and training on BCPs and promoting big data and open data approach can ensure safer and smarter cross-border trades and investments in the booming economies of Asia.

The core value of the key objectives on enhancing digital preparedness against natural disasters is the real-time information sharing and interoperability with crossborder capacity building on crosscutting demands with synergies. The objectives are shown as below:

1. To picture the capacity building among APEC member economies in adopting big data and open data approach to build up a foundation for information sharing mechanism; 2. To interpret on-demand big data and open data through a region-wide survey to further identify shortfalls, challenges and opportunities that public and private sectors concerned the most; 3. To promote big data and open data approach to provide safer marketplace and enhance global supply chain resilience through quality BCPs, transparent real-time risk information disclosure and resilient critical infrastructure protection plan in position; 4. To formulate a collaborative real-time focal point network and mechanism on sharing cross-border big data and open data on better emergency preparedness to facilitate integrated actions and capacity building on DRR at regional level as a whole society.

Introducing science-and-technology based sharing mechanism through ICTs to enhance BCPs and digital preparedness on DRR is a global trend as the SFDRR highlighted in the third WCDRR. Without doubts, a solid backbone support via ICTs can benefit the stakeholders with synergy in all phases of disaster management from mitigation, preparedness, response to recovery in the Asia-Pacific region.

Fig. 1 .

 1 Fig. 1. APEC Twenty-one member economies

Fig. 2 .

 2 Fig. 2. Survey of adoption and awareness of BCP by the ADRC

Fig. 3 .

 3 Fig. 3. Integration mechanism of big data [6].

Fig. 4 .

 4 Fig. 4. Population distribution based on the CHT data

Fig. 5 .

 5 Fig. 5. Updates on Typhoon displayed on 7-ELEVEN LCD Panel

  Case studies from the recent large-scale disaster in the Asia Pacific clearly identify the emerging demands on big data and open data application in time of disasters for emergency preparedness. As a whole society from public services, private industries and general publics, a verified reliable information through the revolution concept of big data and open data is critical for formulating the dynamic DRR strategies and BCPs, deploying emergency relief missions, ensuring global supply chain resilience and maintaining quality growth and livelihoods security. Asia is one of the disaster-prone region, cross-border capacity building and training program, scenario-based drills and exercises on big data and open data on enhancing disaster-resilient manufacturing, trade and investment can direct benefit both of the regional economic sustainability and of human security.

	8. Be financially prepared.
	9. Exercise makes your plan functional.
	10. Ongoing review and improvement.
	4	Integrated Big Data Sets for Coordinating Digital
		Preparedness for Natural Hazards
		:

8 Conclusion to Move Forward -Enhancing Digital Preparedness on Natural Hazards for Sound and Smarter Investments

  The cross-border movements of goods, services and workforce grow rapidly and rather dynamically in the Asia-Pacific. The natural disaster warnings and alerts from big data and open data approach can provide the best and holistic common pictures to effectively integrate the information flow with partnership between public and private sectors to mitigate the impacts. For particularly note, the newly emerging technology accelerate the development of telecommunications technology and shortens the lead time of data processing and information dissemination. Wide coverage of disaster related information dissemination contributes by social media, 7-Eleven chain store, smartphone, MNO etc. In the digital age, big data and open data approach plays the key role in saving lives, securing livelihood, facilitating trade and investments, enhancing business resiliency in operations, raising disaster risk awareness for better emergency preparedness, formulating business continuity plan, maintaining resilient global supply chain, protecting critical infrastructure and safeguarding tourism industries.


Jaziar Radianti
email: jaziar.radianti@uia.no

Towards European Dimensions of City Resilience

Keywords: City Resilience, Resilient Dimensions, European Dimension of Resilience, Disaster Resilience

Disaster resilience is becoming more important and raises the highest concerns worldwide, including in Europe. Cities have a vital role for resilience because a majority of the population resides in the cities. Despite the recognition of the importance of city resilience, there is no strong consensus what city resilience is and its dimensions, and how the resilience concept should be transferred into management practice in the cities. In this paper, we conduct a survey of EU sectorial approaches in terms of EU-funded projects related to climate change and critical infrastructure, where urban or city resilience are in focus. The goal is to obtain an overview of how the resilience concept is interpreted, used, and applied in different EU sectors or in cross-sectorial areas. The aim of this paper is to devise a set of schemes on components that should exist as pillars for supporting the European dimension of city resilience. The paper presents three models derived from the concepts, definitions, and applications in different EUfunded research projects. How "urban" resilience has been considered in the European context so far, and how a "resilience backbone" for Europe can be established, are among the issues examined in this paper.

Introduction

Disaster resilience is becoming more important and raises the highest concern worldwide, especially in Europe, where resilience is a top priority and a subject to an active campaign, putting city and community resilience in the core [START_REF]Building Resilience to Disasters in Europe: Connect and Convince to Reduce Impct of Vulnerability[END_REF]. The frequently cited definition of resilience from UNISDR suggests it as "The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions" [START_REF]UNISDR: UNISDR Terminoology on Disaster Risk Reduction[END_REF]. Currently, however, the city resilience as a unit for analysis is still not well defined. Besides, there is no single, agreed-upon definition. The network of 100 Resilient Cities, for instance, defines urban resilience as "the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, business, and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience." The example of the chronic stress in urban areas can originate from critical infra-structure problems (such as inefficient public transport system, food shortages); cli-mate change (water scarcity, heatwaves)

or social problems such as a high rate of unemployment. In Europe, the needs to incorporate resilience into the city plan are evident [START_REF]EEA: Urban adaptation to climate change in Europe[END_REF][START_REF]EEA: Adaptation in Europe -Addressing risks and opportunities from climate change in the context of socio-economic developments -European Environment Agency[END_REF][START_REF] Swart | Europe Adapt to Climate Change: Comparing National Adaptation Strategies[END_REF], as more and more cities have formulated their city resilience strategies such as in London [START_REF]Greater-London-Authority: Managing risks and increasing resilience[END_REF], Copenhagen [START_REF]City-of-Copenhagen: COPENHAGEN Climate Adaptation Plan[END_REF], or Rotterdam [START_REF] Van Peijpe | Rotterdam: Climate Change Adaptation Strategy[END_REF]. Despite the development of resilience networks worldwide or at European level, there is no strong consensus what city resilience is and its components or dimensions, and how far resilience con-cept has entered, and been interpreted and implemented in different policy areas. Besides, ideas on how to subsume resilience into management practices are still vague, as diverse problem areas require different definitions of resilience, and in turn, result in various designs of practicing it (See Resilient Cities Series on various urban resilient strategies and experience worldwide.). How the European dimension should inter-act in the city resilience context adds complexities of how this concept should be discerned. One way to understand the fragmented discussions and approaches to resilience in various sectors in Europe is by conducting a desk survey of EU funded projects as done in this paper. This paper examines various resilience conceptual and practical point of view with respect to climate change and critical infrastructure, with urban or city resilience in the core. The goal is to obtain an overview of how the resilience concept is interpreted, used and applied in different EU sectors or a cross-sectorial area. The main contribution of this paper is to devise a set of schemes identifying components that should serve as pillars of a city, that can further be a backbone for supporting European resilience. The paper presents three models derived from the concepts, definitions, and applications in different EU-funded research projects.

In Section 2 we describe how cities have been represented and projected within EU policies. In Section 3 we propose methods to extract concepts and applications of resilience in different EU-funded research projects. Section 4 summarize "keywords" collected from general definitions of resilience, filtered from EU project literature and proposals on working definitions of different resilience dimensions elaborating the proposal to strengthen the EU dimension of city resilience, and then is followed by a discussion in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and summarizes the findings in this article.

Existing City Elements in EU Policies

There are various programs, initiatives and policies to provide a vision for "cities" in Europe. We identify that urban areas have been projected as Green Cities, as Open Cities, as Resilient Cities, as Innovative Cities and Creative Cities. By recognizing this, we ensure that the contribution of this article can be relevant and fills the gap between existing policies and approaches to the cities in Europe. In the next section, we summarize the perspective on Green Cities, Open Cities, Innovative-Creative Cities, and Resilient Cities-which is this paper's focus. Green Cities represent ideas, policies, initiatives and projects within sustainable urban mobility environmentally friendly cities targeting zero CO2 emissions (See http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/urban/urban_mobility/; ELTIS, http://www.eltis.org/, and CIVITAS, http://www.civitas-initiative.org/). Thus, the focus lies upon measures and policies on controlling urban pollution, improving the air quality, promoting urban sustainability and intelligent mobility, and increasing the amount of green spaces in cities. The use of environmentally friendly transport and sustainable products is highly emphasized. The establishment of targets and limits for different pollutants can be used as a tool to control air quality, as well as waste management and urban wastewater treatment. Initiatives at city level have been started; for example, the Covenant of Mayors (www.covenantofmayors.eu) aims to significantly limit CO2 emissions. Energy efficiency for mobility, and other areas that consume significant amounts of energy have been introduced.

Open cities focus on how to make buildings, cities and environments more agefriendly (to all age groups) (See EU policy for active and healthy ageing http://ec.europa.eu/eip/ageing/actiongroup/index/d4). In addition, open cities also focus on the implementation of EU integration policies (See EU policy for integration, (https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration), since cities are responsible for a wide range of services provided to migrants, and they play a major role in shaping the interaction between migrants and the society that welcomes them. Rome is a unique example (See EU and Roma (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/) of this case.

Innovative and creative cities highlight the richness and diversity of European cultures as a part of EU's aim for smart, sustainable and inclusive cities and stimulus for dynamism, creativity, and social inclusion. Resilient cities. emphasize how to make cities in Europe more resilient against unexpected events. In April 2013, the EU strategy on adaptation to climate change also committed to making Europe more climate resilient. The effects of climate change will have far-reaching consequenes across Europe, and climate adaptation is needed to protect people, buildings, infrastructure, businesses, and ecosystems. We have seen that policy, strategy and actions have been proposed or formulated. However, there is still a lack of clarity regarding how city resilience is operationalized and serves as a backbone across Europe. An EU-funded project Smart Mature Resilience (SMR) is an example of a project extending city resilience toward overall European resilience. In this paper, relevant concepts that can be useful to extend city resilience into over-all European Resilience are gathered, using the method explained in Section 3.

Methods

A desk survey was conducted to examine how resilience was applied and used in different EU sectors and to extract necessary elements that can be adapted for shaping the city resilience. The search targeted projects related to Critical Infrastructure (CI) and Climate Change (CC). Systematic mapping study was applied, encompassing the examination of relevant EU policies, EU funded project deliverables, and corresponding journal articles [START_REF] Budgen | Using mapping studies in software engineering[END_REF][START_REF] Kitchenham | Systematic literature reviews in software engineering -A systematic litera-ture review[END_REF][START_REF] Kitchenham | Using mapping studies as the basis for further research-a participant-observer case study[END_REF]. Catalogues of FP7 and H2020 projects were examined, i.e., The following procedure was performed when searching for relevant EU sectorial projects: 1) Identifying projects where the resilience issues are very likely to be addressed, both under FP 7 and Horizon 2020 calls; 2) Filtering project titles and abstracts using keyword "resilience"; and then "city" or "urban"; and lastly using "critical infrastructure", "protection", or "climate change"; 3) manual filtering by going through the project websites to verify if the identified projects were relevant, e.g. if the project actually is about resilience, or only mentioned it as a part of another irrelevant context; 4) examining more closely the project reports and deliverables to be included in the review. In total, 13 projects related to Environment (Climate Change) FP7, 18 projects under Secure Societies FP 7 calls, 3 projects under Climate Action environment H2020 and 4 projects under Secure Societies H2020 were re-viewed. In total, we looked at 170 documents (reports, deliverables and scientific reports of each project, if any). We created a framework for review prior to examina-tion, organized the relevant information into the framework and extracted further content that potentially can contribute shaping understanding of city resilience. In this paper, we only present the most important elements of resilience found in our survey, i.e. the synthesis of the resilience definitions has been applied in various unit of analysis in different research projects, and resilience elements that are transferred into three models of resilience dimensions in Section 4.

4

City Resilience Dimensions and Definition

Resilience Dimensions and Definitions

Note, the goal of this section is not to discuss deeply the various definition of resilience in the literature. We rather try to identify the unit of analysis when the resilience concept is applied, which is then called "dimensions" in this paper. Through the review efforts, we have collected and filtered different definitions of resilience both from different authors and projects' operational definition that have been cited in the selections of EU project deliverables.

There is a batch of definitions, with many coming from the same sources, and some try to adapt in accordance with the context (i.e. resilience to what? for example, the resilience to flooding). The definitions compiled in this section are presented as the collection of main keywords that are frequently used and become the main essence of the resilience concept. We extract the main concepts from the definitions and try to find the occurrence of a set of keywords in all identified definitions from literature, to un-derstand the common words describing resilience. We present two collections of keywords summarized in two charts in Fig. 1: the left figure is the keywords derived from CI literature and the right figure derived from CC literature. We collected 111 definitions from CI literature and 58 definitions in CC literature. From the charts, we have seen that the terms ability/capability, adapt, recover, absorb, change, and resists are the most popular words to capture resilience (to hazards, disturbances, unexpected events, abnormal situations). The following terms have been used in the literature as a unit of analysis when applying resilience concept:  Urban/ city resilience. The terms such as space or spatial resilience are also found to refer to a city or urban area. It also covers urban built infrastructure resilience.  Ecological, socio-ecological resilience.  Critical infrastructure, smart grid, technical, communication resilience [START_REF] Mclean | Developing A Resilience Framework[END_REF][START_REF] Lange | Losses and consequences of large scale incidents with cascading effects[END_REF][START_REF] Tilsner | Deliverable: D2.2: Desktop Study -Contingency Planning Methodologies and Business Continuity[END_REF][START_REF] Mäki | Factors Contributing to CI Vulnerability and Resilience[END_REF][START_REF] Pursiainen | Towards Testing Critical Infrastructure Resilience[END_REF].  Cyber-security resilience [START_REF] Choras | Comprehensive Approach to Increase Cyber Security and Resilience[END_REF].  Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) resilience [START_REF] Breivik | D2.3 Critical Event Parameters[END_REF][START_REF] Endregard | D2.2 Reference Set of CBRN Scenarios[END_REF][START_REF] Endregard | D2.2 Reference Set of CBRN Scenarios[END_REF].  Economic resilience [START_REF] Pursiainen | Towards Testing Critical Infrastructure Resilience[END_REF].  Organisational/ local government resilience [START_REF] Rigaud | Conceptual approach to resilience of local governments[END_REF].  Community/ societal resilience/ public/ neighbourhood resilience [START_REF] Kuhlicke | Social capacity building for natural hazards: A conceptual frame[END_REF][START_REF] Tapsell | Social vulnerability to natural hazards, CapHaz-Net FP7 Project[END_REF][START_REF] Kuhlicke | Resilience: A capacity and a myth: Findings from an in-depth case study in disaster management research[END_REF][START_REF] Kuhlicke | Toward More Resilient Societies in the Field of Natural Hazards: CapHaz-Net's Lessons Learnt[END_REF].  Individual resilience, psychosocial, psychological resilience [START_REF] Seynaeve | Pycho-Social Support in situations of Mass Emergency: A European policy paper concerning different aspects of psycho-social support for people involved in major accidents and disasters[END_REF],

The summary of this tentative definition of each dimension is shown in Table 1. Note that these definitions are squeezed out of a cluster of definitions on a specific unit of analysis or dimension. In other words, the definitions have been grouped and categorized before they are merged and extracted, both definitions stemming from CI and CC literature. Table 1. The Summary of the Definition of each Resilience's dimension.

Definitions

Urban or City Resilience consists of a mixture of resilient built-in environments, resilient design, resilient citizens, and resilient organisations. Resiliently built environments should be designed, located, built, operated and maintained in a way that maximizes the ability of built assets, associated support systems (physical and institutional) and the people that reside or work within these built assets, to withstand, recover from, and mitigate the impacts of extreme natural hazards and human-induced threats. The citizens in the city should be able to handle and respond to unexpected situations resulting from malfunctioning CIs, changes of social, economic and environmental stresses, and also be proactive during a crisis and have the ability to recover by themselves. The organisations at the city level have the capacity to support any transformations by rapid changes taking place in urban key areas. CI resilience: Resilient infrastructure can resist damage and loss of function, absorb, adapt to, or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event, can quickly restore its continuity and support the city's CI-based services. It also covers the ability and reliability of the CIs to cope with the potential damage from extreme weather events, and the capacity to manage the CC impacts on the variability in the available resources.

Community and Social Resilience refers to the capacity of individuals, communities or societies potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, be flexible, and bounce-back by resisting or changing behaviour, taking-up innovations, organising itself to continuously exist, reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This capacity also covers the capability to combat social vulnerability, enhance perceived risk and sense of responsibility, and learn from the previous hazards. This capacity can be improved through education and training. Socio-ecological system Resilience can be interpreted in two ways: The time it takes for recovering to a quasi-equilibrium state following a disturbance ('engineering resilience' or 'elasticity'), or the capacity of ecosystems to absorb disturbance without collapsing into a qualitatively different state that is controlled by a different set of ecological processes. It is the ability to learn from catastrophic events and to adapt reactively and proactively to changing environmental conditions, to learn what disturbance, inherent discontinuities, and uncertainties that can be tolerated so that the system can be adapted and adjusted so that it still functionally persists.

Organisational Resilience covers all management capacities such as planning, leadership, training, experience, and information management. It includes the capacity to improvise, innovate and expand the operations between impact and early recovery and the capability to conduct a proper risk assessment and risk management.

Local Government Resilience is the capability of an organisation to coordinate and sustain on multiple levels, a multi-stakeholders platform to promote disaster risk reduction. It also includes the capability to engage local communities and citizens in disaster risk reduction activities; the capability to strengthen the institution, capacities and implement practical disaster risk reduction actions; and the capacity to implement tools and techniques for disaster risk in the prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. Individual Resilience is a person's own resilient capabilities; the adaptive capacity of individuals to react or adapt positively to hazards or unexpected events.

Economic resilience is the capacity to reduce direct and indirect losses, maintaining functions such as continuous production. It is also the ability of society to adapt to the impacts of e.g. climate change, and damages from hazards which also depend on wealth in addition to society, culture, norms, and practices. It should be able to maintain economic vitality and meet climate targets.

CBRNE resilience is the capability of the responders to detect CBRNE events, to respond and to recover from occurring incidents.

It is worth to mention that we also found the terms "Holistic resilience" and "Pan-European" resilience. However, the notions of these two terms are not fully well defined as units of analysis. Yet, in this paper, we argue that to attach cities onto future European resilience backbones, resilience in all abovementioned dimensions should be accomplished, which then can be considered as holistic resilience. When a holistic city resilience is transmitted, replicated and referred as a role model across regions and nations, then Pan-European resilience will gradually be attained. Note, as the essence of this article, is exploration; at this point, we do not propose a single new definition of city resilience. We are also aware of the scientific literature on resilience [START_REF] Carpenter | From Metaphor to Measurement: Resilience of What to What?[END_REF][START_REF] Walker | Resilience thinking[END_REF][START_REF] Walker | Perspectives on resilience to disasters across sectors and cultures[END_REF][START_REF] Holling | Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems[END_REF][START_REF] Holling | Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience[END_REF][START_REF] Adger | Social and ecological resilience: are they related?[END_REF][START_REF] Adger | Vulnerability[END_REF][START_REF] Adger | Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity. Cli-mate Change[END_REF][START_REF] Adger | New indicators of vulnerability and adaptive capacity[END_REF][START_REF] Folke | Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems analyses[END_REF], but we only focus on reports and works on resilience that have been applied for EU research projects. We utilize the aforementioned synthesized definitions and related concepts to propose three upcoming models of European dimensions of resilience in the next sub-section.

Model of Resilient Dimensions

As mentioned earlier, concepts and relevant elements of resilience in the literature were collected, categorized and grouped. In this section, we have synthesized some findings from the literature and try to propose them as a model of resilient dimensions. Frequently used concepts and definitions to describe resilience are reused for proposing three different models containing elements to achieve European City Resilience.

1. Model of Capacity: ensuring all elements in a city, country, and Europe (actors, entities, environment, physical buildings, and infrastructures) are resilient. In this model, the crucial issue is capacity needed in different resilience dimensions. 2. Model of Adaptive and Risk Governance: Ensuring that risks, institutional arrangement, tasks, and responsibilities are distributed across sectors, actors, entities, and in different resilience dimensions, and geographical boundaries. 3. Model of Networking and Learning: ensuring that spread of resilience across dimensions, entities, actors and geographical boundaries are granted through networking, learning, and sharing circles.

The dimensions incorporated in these three proposed resilient models are based on the lists that have been identified earlier in Section 4.1. The models are shown in Figures 2-4. It is essentially an interaction of resilience of different components of the city's system that eventually will be reflected as overall city resilience. In this model, the local government organisations are central as transition hubs towards resilience within the different dimensions of a city. All three models encompass the same elements. In the left side, there is an arrow depicting the efforts for establishing holistic resilience as we have defined earlier in Section 4.1. The three blocks in the middle represent different levels of governance: city level, national level, and international level. They also represent different stages of resilience: in the preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation, as these emergency management stages are highly related to resilience. The ellipse above each block represents the continuous process of designing frameworks for managing, implementing, monitoring and improving resilience in each emergency management stage. During the desk survey, various themes linked to resilience has been explored such as public-private partnerships [START_REF] Mclean | Developing A Resilience Framework[END_REF][START_REF] Costa | Governance Indicators for (Un)succcesful MSPs[END_REF][START_REF] Carmona | Deliverable 4.1: Working paper: Risk perception and risk cultures in Europe[END_REF], socio-ecological environments [START_REF] Crowe | The Turas Project: Integrating Social-Ecological Resilience and Urban Planning[END_REF] and vulnerabilities [START_REF] Kuhlicke | Social capacity building for natural hazards: A conceptual frame[END_REF][START_REF] Tapsell | Social vulnerability to natural hazards, CapHaz-Net FP7 Project[END_REF][START_REF] Kuhlicke | Resilience: A capacity and a myth: Findings from an in-depth case study in disaster management research[END_REF][START_REF] Kuhlicke | Toward More Resilient Societies in the Field of Natural Hazards: CapHaz-Net's Lessons Learnt[END_REF], multilevel governance, adaptive governance, social capacity, risk governance, risk communication and education, collaboration, mutual learning from experience, interdependencies between critical infrastructures, mobilization of social capitals, collaborative decision making, and more. In our models, we map necessary elements and their interactions found in the literature above and locate them in these three frameworks. These elements are represented by small arrows, which link different blocks of governance levels. We will explain further each specific model in the next sub-sections. Model of Capacity highlights the capacity as a prerequisite for transforming resilience from cities to Europe. In this model, the capacity refers to the ability to receive, hold or absorb unexpected events in all elements (individuals, private and public entities, physical environments, buildings, and infrastructures) in a city, country, and Europe. Capacity is apparently an important notion that to a certain degree captures the essence of resilience, as also seen in the charts in Fig 1 . In model 1, the capabilities to withstand hazards should be developed in each unit listed on the left side of Fig. 2. The role of local government in the city level is very central and functions as glue for the resilience of other units. The numbered arrows in Fig. 2 show the resilience elements linking cities, nations, and Europe. The number of each arrow represents the following ideas:

1. Representing the capacities that should be built and nurtured in each dimension. The arrow 1 is located in the "preparedness" column as these capacities are instituted in the cities, which can be unique from place to place depending upon each city's risk pictures. Examples of capacities found in the literature are summarized in the capacity matrix (see Table 2). 2. Representing the continuous interaction process between a local government with the community and the individual in all disaster phases: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. The local government educates community and individuals about disaster preparedness and risk perception. Individuals develop self-resilience, ability to collaborate with neighbours and community, or even provide support to the local government. Community can help mobilizing resources and communicate among important entities in crisis. 3. Capability to understand CI dependencies, interdependencies and cascading effects within and across the sectors. The arrow 3 is linked through the national and European level, as CI services such as power supply and energy production, transportation, water are often closely link to the national government and can encompass several European cities. The failures at providing CI services can result in cascading disasters across other services that rely on this specific service, which geographically can spread beyond the national border, e.g. between cities nearby the national border. Alternatively, the water pollution in a city, for instance, with time will probably cross the national border. Accordingly, arrow 3 also depicts the capacity to deal with these three governance levels with respect to CIs. 4. The capability of the national government to support economic resilience through various robust, supportive regulations where cities may be affected, especially the business entities. 5. Training and personnel exchanges across geographical boundaries as a part of a preparedness plan to increase the capability of local government in emergency management and resilience building. It can be enhancing the capability to coordinate with national government as well as other European cities especially when dealing with larger scale or cross-boundary of disasters. 6. The capability of the national government to support the local government with necessary regulations, and to convey the EU strategies and guidelines such as "EU Domestic action on resilience" into action at the city level. This element will support further the city's preparedness, as represented by the arrow 6. 7. The capability of national government to follow the development at the EU level and to bring local initiative and interest into EU policies; capacity to make international agreement in the area of resilient cities; capability to harmonise resilience policy with other EU member states.

We notice mutuality or reciprocal relations between each dimension in terms of capacity; and therefore, a matrix of resilience capacity is introduced here, which is again derived from elements extracted from literature identified in Section 2. The capacity matrix mentioned in point 1 (Table 2) shows the required capabilities in different dimensions, (from, to or within the dimension itself). The heading "Capacity from Dimension" in the left part of the Table illustrates the capacities needed in different resilience dimensions included in model 1. The heading "To Dimension" in the upper part of the table represents the intended focus or application area of the resilience capacity building. For example, the box linking OLGR (Organizational/ Local Government Resilience) dimension column and UR (Urban Resilience) dimension row, contains "Regulations, resilience budget, technology". It is read as the capacity of organization or local government to provide regulations, resilience budget and technology that will strengthen the resilience of the urban environment.

Model of Adaptive and Risk

Governance. This second model in Fig. 3 captures the adaptive governance, risk governance, and multilevel governance. The upwards arrow on the left side represents the actors and networks in each corresponding resilience, while the right arrow dimension captures the notion of risk governance, and multilevel governance at a different level. Governance is basically a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated, and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest (CGC). Risk governance looks at the complex networks of actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk information is collected, analysed and communicated, and how management decisions are taken. Multilevel governance refers to a creative process in which both authority and policy making influences are shared across multiple levels of government. Similarly to the Fig. 2, the numbered arrows (Fig. 3) depict relevant elements found in the literature with respect to governance. The number of each arrow represents the following ideas: Public-public Partnership are ways to deal with the risk, which will be further discussed in the third model. 6. Representing facilitation for international agreement with respect to governance and shared responsibilities, particularly if the risks will involve international networks. International agreements, cooperation between nations, regional, and local networks. One of the networking models discussed in the literature is public-private partnerships (PPP) where the aim is to establish a kind of cooperation with respect to financing, constructing, renovating, managing and maintaining important infrastructures for society. The partnerships are keys for implementing multilevel governance where the numbers below refer to the numbered lines in Fig. 4 especially in facing of an escalated unexpected event, which is too big to be handled by local resources. 8. Facilitation from the national government for international networking, e.g. through various regulations, or training on agreement making and diplomacy.

The three models proposed earlier suggest different elements as capacity, governance, and learning-networking which have been extracted from different EU funded research projects to improve resilience. The elements of resilience presented in this paper is exploration in nature but to be able to be applied as a part of the city resilience, the applicability of each element in the city level should be validated so that they are accepted as valid component of resilience, and a backbone of European resilience.

Conclusions

In this paper, we summarize elements from various EU projects to contribute to-wards the area of Resilient Cities and propose a "resilience backbone" for Europe. Our contributions are twofold. First, we summarize and synthesize the definition of resilience in different dimensions found in the CI and CC literature to ensure that current approaches to resilience are captured in our EU sectorial approach review. Second contribution is the proposal to tie together different elements of resilience found in the literature, which can be incorporated as parts of a city resilience framework. We have proposed three different models of European City Resilience, i.e. Model of Capacity, Model of Adaptive and Risk Governance, and Model of Net-working and Learning. These provide an overview that can be used as input to opera-tionalize further the resilience concept. These three models and each component are intertwined and will contribute to the spread of the city resilience building to the state, and European level. Eventually, the European backbones for resilience are fully es-tablished, and resilience of a city can be measured.

As the identification of elements of European backbones for resilience is based on literature, for the next step, the triangulation with other parallel efforts such as experts' opinion collections in a series of workshops can be a method to harmonize and confirm the results from this literature review.

Fig. 1 .

 1 Fig. 1. Common Keywords of Resilience Definitions cited in EU-CI Literature (left) and EU-CC Literature (right).

Fig. 2 .

 2 Fig. 2. Model 1: Resilience Dimensions and Capacity

1 .

 1 The arrangement of risk and responsibility sharing among various local stakeholders at different dimensions. The arrow 1 is located in the "preparedness" column as an arrangement in a city can be established in and between different actors in different dimensions of resilience. The common interest could be the basis for this, with the common goal to increase preparedness. 2. Participations among actors in different groups (city, national, European levels) and communications among them on the arrangement as represented by each arrow in each governance level covers all different identified stakeholders, in various stages of emergency management. 3. Risk perception, and sharing of responsibilities among local actors and stakeholders to minimize the potential negative impacts of the risks. 4. Trust to the regulatory framework for governance. 5. Risk perception, communication and sharing of responsibilities with national stakeholders and international stakeholders to minimize the potential negative impacts of the risks. Governance, Multilevel governance, Public-private partnership (PPP) and

Fig. 3 .

 3 Fig. 3. Model 2: Resilience dimensions and governance

Fig. 4 .

 4 Fig. 4. Resilience Dimension and Learning-Sharing Network

Table 2 .

 2 Capacity matrix UR: Urban Resilience; FSER: Flood, Socio-Ecological Resilience; CIR: Critical Infrastructure Resilience; CR: Cyber Security Resilience; CBER: Chemical, Biological, Explosive Resilience; ER: Economic Resilience; OLGR: Organisational/ Local Government Resilience; CSPNR: Community, Cultural, Public, Neighbourhood Resilience; IPPR: Individual, Psychosocial; Psychological Resilience

: 1 .

 1 Networking between local government and CI stakeholders-providers as well as economic entities through PPP. The partnership is voluntary but enforceable commitments between public authorities and private enterprises, which can be short-term or long-term. The partnerships are essentially founded on the principle of sharing the same goal in order to reduce risk and gain mutual benefit. Good partnerships comprise the integration of activities, shared vision, consensus, negotiation, participation, collective action, representation, inclusion, accountability, volunteerism, and trust. 2. Public-public Partnership (PuP), where the focus is the partnership between public authorities and citizens in general, aiming at strengthening resilience through community engagements. It is represented by arrow 2. The form could be the community helping the local government through resource mobilization, or the local government updating and educating the community with respect to the resilience practices and actions. 3. Local community networks for emergency preparedness. These are kind of self-organized communities, between neighbourhoods, special interest groups and other local organizations initiated by and for the community. It is represented by arrow 3 that links the CSPNR and IPPR columns. 4. PPP in CI areas at European level, as represented by arrow 4. In this case, in the literature, CIs often have interdependencies with other CIs, which are sometimes located geographically outside a country. Failure in one component or one CI can result in cascading failures in all other CI components or other CI sectors in other countries. Therefore, PPP does occur not only locally, but also nationally and internationally within the European region. 5. Facilitation from the national government to the local administration for networking with national actors. It connects economic sectors at local and national levels. The networking is intended for strengthening economic entities and businesses in various levels of government. 6. International and European resilient city networks, best practice sharing, as so far have been promoted through e.g. Durban Adaptation Charter [40], Mayor Adapt [41], world mayors council [42], Compact of Mayors [43]. 7. Networking with national actors for emergency preparedness to increase resilience

Acknowledgments

This article is based on the author's contribution to a report for Smart Mature Resilience (SMR) project. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 653569