Laurent Fedi
email: laurent.fedi@kedgebs.com

Ali Cheaitou
email: acheaitou@sharjah.ac.ae

Patrick Rigot
email: patrick.rigotmuller@mu.ie

Application and analysis of the IMO taxonomy on casualty investigation over 20 years of marine events in the Russian Arctic

Keywords: risk analysis, Arctic navigation, maritime claims, POLARIS, Russia, IMO Casualty Investigation Code

The Arctic Ocean is simultaneously rich in terms of hydrocarbons and rare earth and highly sensitive to human activity. Due to the remoteness of the multiple production areas, the development and use of rail roads would be too costly and hard to pay-back, hence the use of maritime transport appears as the main profitable solution.

Yet hydrocarbons fields, mines and human activities are not equally spread around the Arctic. As an evidence, the Russian Federation and Norwegian coast are highly developed with ports such as Sabetta for LNG or Novy for crude oil and also Murmansk as a regional hub for Russia and Kirkenes for Norway.

Concomitantly, former years witnessed an exponential increase in the amount of cargo shipped along the Russian shores in line with the requirement of the President of the Russian Federation and his target of 80 million tons shipped by 2024.

These parameters, combined with the ice melting, may increase the density of traffic in the coming years and consequently the number of accidents and the corresponding number of claims. Until now, few maritime claims within the Russian Arctic have been analyzed and reported in the literature. However, when one investigates different sources of information, it appears that around 140 claims occurred with different layers of severity between 1991 and 2011.

Based on a 20-year observation period and following the standardized IMO taxonomy on casualty investigation, we classified these claims by level of severity, frequency of occurrence, geographical area and time period.

Our results stress the fact that most existing studies underestimate the severity of the claims occurring in the Russian Arctic. Finally, we call for a greater reporting of maritime events and compliance with the IMO risk classification tool to better understand accidentology in this risky zone.

Introduction

Over the last two decades, the North East Passage has become a matter of increased scientific interest, in particular thanks to the capabilities and economic potentials of the famous Northern Sea Route (NSR) compared to the Suez Canal Route (SCR) and Panama Canal [START_REF] Faury | La Route Maritime Nord : complément ou concurrent des routes conventionnelles ?[END_REF][START_REF] Kiiski | Feasibility of Commercial Cargo Shipping along the Northern Sea Route[END_REF][START_REF] Pruyn | Will the Northern Sea Route ever be a viable alternative?[END_REF]. The impacts of global warming do not spare the Arctic Ocean as a whole (IPCC, 2018;[START_REF] Melia | Sea ice decline and 21 st century trans-Arctic shipping routes[END_REF] and ice-free covered areas are more and more frequent especially during summer. Moreover, the Russian Arctic remains a developing area rich in raw materials such as oil and gas [START_REF] Faury | The Northern Sea Route competitiveness for oil tankers[END_REF][START_REF] Humpert | Arctic shipping: an analysis of the 2013 northern sea route Season[END_REF][START_REF] Faury | Best maritime transportation option for the Arctic crude oil: A profit decision model[END_REF] attracting investments notably in port infrastructures [START_REF] Gritsenko | Policy environment analysis for Arctic seaport development: the case of Sabetta (Russia)[END_REF] sustained by an ambitious export policy from the Russian government over the 2030 horizon (Ministry of Energy of the [START_REF] Federation | Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030[END_REF].

The NEP is composed of the Norwegian sea and for the Russian part of the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea (Vostochno-Sibirskoye) and the Chukchi Sea mainly constitute the Russian Arctic. Regarding the NSR more specifically, it extends for around 3,000 miles (4,800 km) and it is governed by the specific rules of the 'Merchant shipping code of Russian Federation' (NSRA, 2012). Opened since 1991 [START_REF] Pruyn | Will the Northern Sea Route ever be a viable alternative?[END_REF][START_REF] Zhang | Is the Northern Sea Route attractive to shipping companies? Some insights from recent ship traffic data[END_REF], the NSR is managed by the 'Northern Sea Route Administration' (NSRA)1 that monitors and grants the navigation in the NSR waters. Sailing along the NSR is generally feasible during summer season, from July to November (ABS, 2014) while icebreaker assistance is often necessary. The recent years have clearly shown greater volume handled by Russian Arctic ports located along the NSR (NSRA, 2018;[START_REF] Sarc | Arctic Search and Rescue Capabilities Survey[END_REF]. Around 20 million tons were handled in 2018 with a majority LNG products [START_REF] Staalesen | Shipping on Northern Sea Route up 63 percent[END_REF]. In 2019, 31.5 million tons were carried along the NSR compared to 19.7 in 2018 and 10.7 million tons in 2017 (NSRA, 2019). This increasing traffic is mainly due to the development of oil and gas projects in the Russian Arctic (Marchenko, 2014a) such the Yamal LNG plant and the Prirazlomnaya platform. Consequently, maritime traffic should progressively grow in the next decade [START_REF] Iudin | The Russian Sea Areas and Activity Level Up to[END_REF] not only in terms of liquid or dry bulk but also for passengers (FoU, 2016).

Nevertheless, the rise of maritime traffic in the NEP is not exempt of current and future challenges especially regarding maritime safety. Scholarship (Marchenko, 2012a;[START_REF] Marchenko | Russian Arctic Seas: navigational conditions and accidents[END_REF][START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF] and few professional reports (FoU, 2016) have highlighted the accidentology patterns in this zone. However, the picture provided is fragmented and not following the standards of the IMO Casualty Investigation Code classifying maritime events. This absence of appropriate classification combined to a long-trend underreporting limit the understanding of marine claims in the Russian Arctic.

Based on a 20-years observation, we classified claims that occurred in the Russian and Norwegian Arctic by level of severity, frequency of occurrence, geographical area and time period. The contribution of the paper is to provide a deeper knowledge and understanding of marine accidentology in the Russian Arctic that still appears as a 'black box' while this region is deemed to welcome more maritime activities in the coming years.

After this introductive part, Section 2 reviews the existing literature on marine accidentology in the Russian and Norwegian Arctic. The methodology of the research is explained in Section 3 followed by the analysis of maritime events which is contemplated in Section 4. An in-depth discussion is engaged in Section 5 while some conclusions and recommendations are addressed in Section 6.

Marine accidentology in the Russian Arctic: a literature review

Knowledge of marine claims at international level

Marine claims are regularly reported through public and private institutions. At international level, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is unifying the rules on safety, security and environmental protection of shipping industry, provides a database called 'Global Integrated Shipping Information System' (GISIS) with a dedicated portal to 'marine casualties and incidents'2 . This database is maintained by IMO Member States and following the 2008 Casualty Investigation Code [START_REF] Imo | Resolution MSC.255[END_REF]. Entered into force in 2010, this mandatory instrument sets out that 'investigation and proper analysis of marine casualties and incidents can lead to greater awareness of casualty causation and result in remedial measures, including better training, for the purpose of enhancing safety of life at sea and protection of the marine environment.' That is why IMO member states must notify casualties when they occur and submit their 'final marine safety investigation report' to the IMO (Chapter 14, Part II). These reports must comply with a standardized format and content with regard to provided information. At European level, the same policy is implemented pursuant to Directive 2009/18/EC and European member states associated with Iceland and Norway, also notify casualties occurring in waters under their sovereignty or caused by their flag ships (EU Parliament, 2009) through the 'European Marine Casualty Information Platform' (EMCIP)3 . Furthermore, private bodies such as the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI), insurance companies such as Lloyds or ALLIANZ, regularly publish reports stating an accurate overview on the key trends of the worldwide maritime accidentology. The recent reports have underlined the lowest record of shipping losses with only 46 in 2018 compared to 207 in 2000 pointing out positive responses to safety challenges thanks to better ship design, technology, port operations and updated charts (ALLIANZ, 2019). As a consequence, one observes fewer claims on an international scale (IUMI, 2018).

Knowledge of marine claims in the Russian Arctic: a black box?

While global or regional statistics are now relatively accessible notably online and accurately commented, they usually provide limited data on accidents occurring in Arctic and particularly in the Russian Arctic. Justifications are numerous although they mainly lie in the fact that maritime traffic is not yet very developed in the Arctic Ocean compared to other traditional maritime areas owing to difficult and risky sailing conditions [START_REF] Lasserre | Polar seaways? Maritime transport in the Arctic: an analysis of shipowners' intentions II[END_REF][START_REF] Fu | Towards a Probabilistic Model for Predicting Ship Besetting ice in Arctic Waters[END_REF][START_REF] Haavik | Remoteness and Sensework in Harsh Environment[END_REF]. A large combination of hazards, linked to weather conditions, icebergs, ice presence and thickness for most of the year, very cold temperature, shallow waters, lack of up-to-date charts [START_REF] Pastusiak | The problem of the availability of nautical charts and publications on the Northern Sea Route[END_REF], remoteness, few navigational aids and search and rescue (SAR) infrastructures (Fedi et al., 2018a;[START_REF] Sarc | Arctic Search and Rescue Capabilities Survey[END_REF][START_REF] Østreng | Shipping in Arctic waters: A comparison of the Northeast, Northwest and trans polar passages[END_REF], represents huge challenges for ships and their crew [START_REF] Montewka | Towards a Probabilistic Model of a Ship Performance in Dynamic Ice[END_REF]. Scholars and some bodies have evaluated risks both for the Arctic circle [START_REF] Baksh | Marine transportation risk assessment using Bayesian Network: application to Arctic waters[END_REF]FoU, 2016;[START_REF] Marchenko | Maritime activity in the high North -the range of unwanted incidents and risk patterns[END_REF][START_REF] Kum | A root cause analysis for Arctic marine accidents from 1993 to 2011[END_REF]AMSA, 2009) and for the Russian Arctic more specifically [START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF][START_REF] Vihanninjoki | Arctic Shipping Emission in the Changing Climate[END_REF]ABS, 2014;Marchenko, 2012a[START_REF] Marchenko | Russian Arctic Seas: navigational conditions and accidents[END_REF]Marchenko, , 2014)).

These specific operational conditions and underlying risks exist even more substantially in the Russian Arctic and then along the Northern Sea Route (NSR). This area is indeed characterized by adverse variable weather conditions aggravated by persistent ice cover even in summer (AMSA, 2009;ABS, 2014). These ice features vary among ice massif or concentrated ice, drifting ice-pack that make sailing difficult, hazardous and unpredictable (Marchenko, 2012a[START_REF] Marchenko | Russian Arctic Seas: navigational conditions and accidents[END_REF](Marchenko, , 2014;;[START_REF] Abbassi | Risk analysis of offshore transportation accident in Arctic waters[END_REF].

The underreporting is the second key reason of the knowledge gap on Russian Arctic accidentology [START_REF] Goerlandt | An analysis of wintertime navigational accidents in the Northern Baltic Sea[END_REF][START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF] insofar as one can assume that states unequally comply with the IMO Casualty Investigation Code, the Russian Federation in particular and some events are not reported or few data are provided in the relevant databases. The consultation of the GISIS clearly shows this concern. One assumes that its root cause lies in the states' negligence and in the flaws of the Casualty Investigation Code provisions which only requires notification to the concerned parties in case of 'marine casualty' (art. 5.1) and conducting a 'safety investigation' for 'very serious marine casualty' (art. 6.1). It means that investigation as regards simple 'marine incident' and 'serious casualties' are not mandatory even if recommended by IMO (art.17.1). In terms of reporting, member states must make their investigation reports available to the public and submit them to IMO while there are no sanctions in case of non-or underreporting. Nevertheless, some reports have been published but providing a limited period of analysis and uncompleted geographical scope that hindered appropriate evaluation of accidentology in certain locations [START_REF] Grabowski | Human and organizational error data challenges in complex, large-scale systems[END_REF]. This is the case of the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA, 2009) that identified 293 claims over the 1995-2004 timeframe. Furthermore, ALLIANZ has yearly made a focus on casualties/incidents since 2016 [START_REF] Allianz | Safety and shipping review: an annual review of trends and developments in shipping losses and safety[END_REF][START_REF] Allianz | Safety and shipping review: an annual review of trends and developments in shipping losses and safety[END_REF][START_REF] Allianz | Safety and shipping review: an annual review of trends and developments in shipping losses and safety[END_REF][START_REF] Allianz | Safety and shipping review: an annual review of trends and developments in shipping losses and safety[END_REF] and has emphasized an increase of claims compared to their general decline in other regions [START_REF] Allianz | Safety and shipping review: an annual review of trends and developments in shipping losses and safety[END_REF]Fedi et al., 2018a;2018b). However, it is noteworthy that these professional studies provide a general picture on Arctic marine accidentology whereas they are silent with regard to the Russian Arctic [START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF]. One cannot determine what kind of claims occurred in the Russian Arctic that finally appears as a 'black box'. The AMSA ( 2009) report underlined this gap that has been recently completed thanks to some scholars. [START_REF] Marchenko | Russian Arctic Seas: navigational conditions and accidents[END_REF]2014) listed 90 accidents throughout the 1990-2010 period with a focus on the different key areas and demonstrated that floating ice was a determining factor of casualties. [START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF] analyzed a complementary period covering the last two decades and more specifically between 2007 and 2018 and reported 30 marine claims which represents more than 73% of casualties. To the best of our knowledge, this was the first research applying the IMO taxonomy on marine claims.

The Table 1 summarizes the different published studies and research dealing partially or totally with marine accidentology in Arctic and Russian Arctic. This obviously illustrates that data are currently discontinued, fragmented and not fully standardized. In addition, the scarce data on marine accidentology within the Russian Arctic has been often coupled with approximate terminology regarding claims. As a matter of fact, one observes that professional reports such as the ones made by ALLIANZ, AMSA (2009) or FoU ( 2016) have been generally vague on those marine claims by concurrently referring to the notion of 'incidents' or 'accidents' since they do not refer to the appropriate 2008 IMO taxonomy [START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF]. Obviously, this current weakness that applies to other general reports [START_REF] Ladan | Data Sources for Quantitative Marine Traffic Accident Modeling[END_REF] involves some confusion with regard to the standardization of claims occurring in the Russian Arctic, hiding their acuity level and then their clear understanding [START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF].

Methodology

The research design of this paper is mainly qualitative and policy-oriented. After considering the existing studies and research on accidentology in the Russian Arctic, we combined data coming from different sources in order to include in our study the maximum possible number of marine claims. This cross-collection searching is justified by the fragmented data provided by existing sources of information and in line with other studies in maritime accidents (Luo and Shin, 2019). We notably used the different reviews on safety and shipping from ALLIANZ, from the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI), the IHS Markit database, the IMO GISIS and marine investigation reports from CLARKSONS. Once events were identified, we categorized them pursuant to the appropriate terminology provided by the IMO Casualty Investigation Code [START_REF] Imo | Resolution MSC.255[END_REF]. According to this code, there are two fundamental categories of maritime events: 'incident' or 'accident' / 'casualty' depending on their severity level. The definitions stated in the Casualty Investigation Code are as follows:

"A marine incident means an event, or sequence of events which has occurred directly in connection with the operations of a ship that endangered, or, if not corrected, would endanger the safety of the ship, its occupants or any other person or the environment. It does not include a willful misconduct that is to say a deliberate act or omission, with the intention to cause harm to the safety of a ship, an individual or the environment."

"A marine casualty" means an event, or a sequence of events, that has resulted in seven different cases as described in Table 1 and which has occurred directly in connection with the operations of a ship. It does not include a willful misconduct. Marine casualties are divided into two subnotions: "serious casualty" which involve a fire, explosion, collision, grounding, contact, heavy weather damage, ice damage, hull cracking, or suspected hull defect, etc., resulting in: immobilization of main engines, extensive accommodation damage, severe structural damage, such as penetration of the hull under water, etc., rendering the ship unfit to proceed, or pollution (regardless of quantity), and/or a breakdown necessitating towage or shore assistance. A "very serious marine casualty" involves the total loss of the ship or a death or severe damage to the environment". To sum-up, the lowest level of gravity belongs to 'marine incidents' (MI) and the highest to 'very serious marine casualties' (VSC) as shown in Table 2.

Accidents analysis and taxonomy

Ice risk fundamentals

In the Russian and Norwegian Arctic as well as in the Arctic Ocean, the ice extent changes on a yearly basis as illustrated in Figure 1 below. The concerned months showing the lowest and the highest ice extent are usually September and March.The most important change of ice coverage is concentrated in the periods between May and August and between October and December.

Data collection analysis

We collected the vessel name, its deadweight, year of construction, date and location of the event (i.e. latitude and longitude) and determining factor. We noticed that 18 events did not report their latitude and longitude while the location of events must be reported. The data collection enabled us to identify 145 events that occurred throughout the 1991-2011 period as illustrated in Table 3. In essence, the majority of these events are 'marine casualties' and not being mere incidents shows an obvious level of severity. We categorized 6 marine incidents (MI), 100 serious casualties (SC) and 36 are very serious casualties (VSC). To sum-up, one observes the following breakdown:

-MI only represents 4.8% -SC accounts for 69.6% -VSC is worth 25.5 % If one takes a closer look as regards the most recurrent SC, it appears that machinery damage or failure such as lost rudder or fouled propeller, constitutes the most recurrent accident with 52 48 claims (33.31%) while wrecked or stranded ship and fire/explosion represent, both, the second most frequent SC (9.6%) and lead to 12 and 6 total losses respectively (Table 3).

Damage or failure to machinery leads to only one total.

The third category lies in Hull damage with 13 events (8.9%) and two total losses. Furthermore, collision represents the fourth category with 10 claims (6.9%). It is noteworthy that one reports 37 total losses out of 145 events meaning that VSC represents 25.5% of the total. Concerning the typology of vessels involved in claims, one notices the high number of fishing vessels and trawlers as shown in Table 4. They represent more than the half of identified events. It has to be stressed that they mainly face casualties (97.5%). All size of fishing vessels is concerned while they specifically account for 67.5% of the total losses (25 out of 37).

From a global approach, as stressed by table 4, General Cargo vessels represent 11.72% of the claims and tanker count for 10.32%. this result is in line with the main activity of the Arctic, raw materials exploitation. Other ship typologies are fewer since they are not much operated along the NSR such as passenger or cruise vessels even if they would be more numerous in the long run (FoU, 2016). Source: The Authors, 2020

It is observed that the youngest ship is 3 years old while the oldest is 50. Table 5 summarizes the average age of each ship category involved in claims. With 29.7 years old, the tug vessels show the oldest average followed by research vessels (28.5), icebreakers (27.5), fishing vessels (24.9), reefer (24.4), general cargo vessels (22.9) and tankers ( 22) and Others (21.7). Although less represented in our sample, passenger ships, also show a medium average age. Source: The Authors, 2020

If one considers the average age of the 143 concerned ships at the time of their claim, it is relatively high with more than 20 years old (Figure 2). Besides, looking at figure 2, it appears that half of the vessel of the fleet analysed (exception for passenger sand bulk) are more than 20 years old. This graph also highlights the fact that, as explained by numerous articles, the fleet of icebreakers has to be renewed, especially since it is the backbone for a safe navigation.

Another element that can explain the high number of claims involving fishing vessels is the age of the fleet. If the youngest vessel was 3 years, the oldest one was 50 years. The Arctic development is mainly due to the exportation of raw materials such as minerals or crude oil. If a median and maximum age of 24 years and 36 years respectively tankers may represent a risk for the environment as they are at the third position in term of number of claims just after the bulk carrier (Table 3). As explained above, gathering data within the Russian Arctic is complicated and even more when dealing with the NSR as it can be seen on Figure 3.

As previously explain, over the 145 claims, 18 do not have precise location, hence, we were able to map 127 claims. In this map, it clearly appears that both NEP extremes represent the lion share in term of maritime activity during the period analysed. In the map the eastern part is more subject to claims with 63% of them than the western. This result may be the consequence of the Sakhalin fields exploitation and of the fishing activity on the North-Pacific, potentially the king crab.

Discussion

The analysis of identified claims showed an overwhelming predominance of 'marine casualties' and more precisely 'serious casualties' (SC) pursuant to the classification laid down in the 2008 Casualty Investigation Code. With roughly 73% of SC and 23% of VSC, it is assumed that the existing reports underestimated and did not describe accurately the exact nature of claims that occurred in the Russian Arctic. The FoU report (2016) that provided a valuable overview of risk patterns in the High North mainly referred to the notion of 'unwanted incidents'. ALLIANZ reports are used to mentioning the combined terminology of 'incidents/accidents' whereas listing accurate typology of claims [START_REF] Allianz | Safety and shipping review: an annual review of trends and developments in shipping losses and safety[END_REF][START_REF] Allianz | Safety and shipping review: an annual review of trends and developments in shipping losses and safety[END_REF]. Even though [START_REF] Marchenko | Russian Arctic Seas: navigational conditions and accidents[END_REF] highlighted and described numerous 'accidents' that occurred in the Russian Arctic from 1990 to 2010, the appropriate IMO taxonomy was not used. This lack or non-utilization of the Casualty Investigation Code is surprising insofar as this instrument is mandatory since 2010 and its purpose aims to universally categorize maritime claims all around the world. [START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF] initiated the appropriate categorization of claims within the Russian Arctic and our study emphasized this preliminary work that already identified 75% of SC over the 2004-2017 period.

Our results are in line with this evaluation showing that marine casualties were the most frequently reported. While our analysis encompasses the 1991-2011 timeframe, it shows similarities regarding the determining factors. Machinery damage or failure and ship wrecked are the top two casualties caused by harsh operating conditions and particularly by ice which represents the key factor. Fire explosion and hull damage are the third and fourth most frequent claims. Recent statistics of the Murmansk Maritime Rescue Coordination Center stressed these principal causes (FoU, 2016) confirmed by ALLIANZ reports (2016-2019) from a broader perspective for the Arctic Circle. Ice drifting, ice jet or forced overwintering lead to most machinery and hull damage and shipwrecks (Marchenko, 2012a[START_REF] Marchenko | Russian Arctic Seas: navigational conditions and accidents[END_REF](Marchenko, , 2014b)).

It is important to emphasize the high average age of ships having faced casualties and especially those that foundered. According to our analysis, they had roughly 25 years old at the time of their casualty. While an old ship is not necessarily a poorly maintained ship, studies have shown that they have reduced structural resistance and particularly against ice (Marchenko, 2014b).

The fishing vessels accidentology that we collected is particularly questioning insofar as it involved the highest level of SC and VSC. Nonetheless, fishing vessels are numerous in the area, totaling around 2.5 thousands, and they are 'especially old and worn out' (FoU, 2016). Furthermore, the claims affecting nuclear-powered icebreakers is also a worrying situation. While we only identified three events, one unclassified event and two SC including one collision (M/S Taymyr in 2011) and one explosion/fire (M/S Arktika in 2007). Although the latter was taken out of service in 2008 and huge investments for the construction of new Russian nuclear icebreakers, the current fleet is really aging as well as the world icebreaker fleets (AMSA, 2009). Then, it raises the question of their safe operating conditions. In addition, one observes that tankers and bulk carriers regularly face SC. Their presence in the Russian Arctic and along the NSR seems rationale since commodities such as oil products and dry bulk constitute the main cargoes shipped in this area (NSRA, 2019;[START_REF] Faury | The Northern Sea Route competitiveness for oil tankers[END_REF]. Nevertheless, as regards tankers, one notices their high average age (22 years) combined with severe accidents such as hull damage, collision, fire and explosion that represents possible sources of oil pollution [START_REF] Konygin | Oil Tanker Transportation[END_REF][START_REF] Tikka | Tanker Design Considerations for Safety and Environmental Protection of Arctic Waters: Learning from Past Experience[END_REF] and negative impacts in fragile areas [START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF][START_REF] Johannsdottir | Systemic risk of maritime-related oil spills viewed from an Arctic and insurance perspective[END_REF][START_REF] Amsa | Status on Implementation of the AMSA 2009 Report Recommendations[END_REF]. Concerning container ships, one reported a unique claim. It illustrates that the NSR does not constitute an attractive zone for container segment at this stage [START_REF] Cariou | The feasibility of Arctic container shipping: the economic and environmental impacts of ice thickness[END_REF][START_REF] Sarrabezoles | Arctic shipping insurance: towards a harmonisation of practices and costs?[END_REF].

With regard to the limitations of the study, as already explained, our investigation does not cover the 2012-2019 period insofar as other studies already provided some findings on accidentology in the Russian Arctic over the last decade [START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF]). In addition, the identified claims do not pretend to constitute a complete database on marine accidentsincidents. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, this investigation is one of the most quantitatively important on the Russian Arctic.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the current IMO marine casualties and incidents database (GISIS) should provide the accurate and relevant information on Arctic accidentology whatever the concerned areas are. However, this is not the case insofar as the current IMO legal framework on reporting is not coercive enough [START_REF] Imo | Resolution MSC.255[END_REF]. IMO members are only bound to notify casualties and investigate VSC and even if they are deemed to publish their investigation reports, they are never sanctioned in case of absence of notification and reporting. As a consequence, the global database is not adequately alimented and the IMO does not publish statistics on maritime accidentology thanks to its database. Although there is no legal requirement that constrains IMO to publish statistics, a greater transparency is desirable to promote and to encourage states to maintain the GISIS marine casualties and incidents database.

Considering the current critics on transparency addressed to IMO and shipping industry as a whole (Lister et al., 2015;[START_REF] Fedi | Les Principaux Enjeux et Impacts du Code Polaire OMI[END_REF]InfluenceMap, 2017;[START_REF] Monios | Environmental Governance in Shipping and Ports: Sustainability and Scale Challenges[END_REF], an evolution seems necessary in the short run.

On the contrary, the Directive 2009/18 EC imposes stronger requirements at EU level since the occurrence of all types of events (incident or casualty) and all investigation reports must be notified by EU member states to the EMCIP platform. [START_REF] Fedi | Les Principaux Enjeux et Impacts du Code Polaire OMI[END_REF][START_REF] Dalaklis | The future of Arctic shipping business and the positive influence of the international code for ships operating in polar waters[END_REF], our analysis reveals the perceived gaps which need to be overcome.

It is recognized that the availability of accurate and regular data on marine accidentology eases their analysis (Luo and Shin, 2019;Oltedal and Mc Arthur, 2011;[START_REF] Hassel | Underreporting of maritime accidents to vessel accident databases[END_REF] and the elaboration of appropriate statistics that underwriters search prior to cover shipping risks. However, these statistics are still limited for the Arctic area (Kiski, 2017;[START_REF] Sarrabezoles | Arctic shipping insurance: towards a harmonisation of practices and costs?[END_REF][START_REF] Gold | Transiting the Northern Sea Route: Shipping and Marine Insurance Interests[END_REF] and leading to extreme prudence of insurance companies regarding risk insurability in Arctic waters notwithstanding the Polar Code adoption (Fedi et al., 2018). In addition, regarding the Russian Arctic, a greater accessibility of data should allow a better understanding of this zone that is facing a growing traffic (FoU, 2016). Consequently, it would enable public and private stakeholders to define the best policies and measures on risk management for mitigating marine casualties in this singular area.

Conclusion

This paper aimed to shed a light on maritime claims that occurred in the Russian Arctic over the 1991-2011 period. Around 160 events were both reported and analyzed. While this does not constitute an exhaustive database, our evaluation can be considered as one of the most quantitatively important records on the Russian Arctic so far and represents a valuable source of information for further investigation especially for a global analysis over the last three decades .

These preliminary results clearly showed a high number of serious casualties compared to incidents. This obviously confirms that the Russian Arctic remains a very risky area and justifies why the Russian government set out specific sailing requirements along the NSR and planned other measures notably improving the existing SAR infrastructures and creating new ones (FoU, 2016). Nevertheless, it raises the question of the compliance with the NSR regulations and the likelihood consequences of increased traffic in this zone. In 2017, the NSR administration faced some breaches of its rules (NSRA, 2017). Furthermore, some reports have underlined bad statistics in Arctic circle as a whole while the global statistics have shown significant improvements with the best figures ever recorded (ALLIANZ, 2019; IUMI 2018).

It can be reasonably expected that the entry into force of the Polar Code should improve these negative statistics insofar as it requires a stronger operational adaptation of ship and crew in terms of safety requirements and related risk management (DNV-GL, 2017). Indeed, the different mandatory rules on crew certification, ship ice class, polar water operational manual and voyage planning are designed to reduce risk occurrence and then accidentology in Polar areas. However, the implementation of the Polar Code must not exclude the compliance of the Casualty Investigation Code that has been neglected so far. As explained, a greater reporting is obviously needed quantitatively and qualitatively for a better understanding of the Russian Arctic accidentology.

Figure 1 :

 1 Figure 1: Arctic ice extent 1991-2014

Figure

  Figure 2: minimum, median and maximum age of vessels victim of claims

Figure

  Figure 3: map of claims

Table 1 . Marine accidentology in Arctic and Russian Arctic

 1

	Source	Timeframe	Zone	Number of	IMO
				reported claims	taxonomy
	AMSA report	1995-2004	Arctic Circle	293	No
	2009
	ALLIANZ reports	2006-2019	Arctic Circle	588	No
	2016-2019
	Marchenko 2012	1990-2010	Russian	90	No
			Arctic
	FoU Rapport,	2010-2015	Arctic -High	1702	No
	2016		North:	(40 for Russia)
			Russian
			Norwegian,
			Icelandic,

Table 2 . Taxonomy of marine incidents and casualties Taxonomy Marine incident Marine casualty

 2 [START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF] and IMO Resolution MSC.255[START_REF] Imo | Resolution MSC.255[END_REF] 16May 2008

			Serious casualty	Very serious casualty
	Definition -Endangers the	-Fire	-Total loss of the ship
	safety of the ship,	-Explosion	-Death
	its occupants or	-Collision	-Severe damage to the
	any other person	-Grounding	environment
	or	the	-Contact	-Loss, presumed loss or
	environment		-Heavy weather damage	abandonment of a ship
			-Ice damage
			-Hull cracking
			-Suspected hull defect
			-Material damage to a
			ship
			-Stranding or disabling of
			a ship
			-Material damage to
			marine infrastructure
			-Severe damage to the
			environment
	Source: based on (

Table 3 : Synthesis of maritime events 1991-2011

 3

	Number of incident or	Number of	Number of	Number of
	casualty		marine	Serious	Very
			incident	Casualty	Serious
	Type of event		(MI)	(SC)	Casualty
					(VSC)	/
					Total loss
	Machinery	damage	-	48	1
	/failure
	Wrecked/ stranded ship	-	14	12
	Fire/explosion		-	14	6
	Foundered		-	-	15
	(sunk/submerged)
	Hull damage (holed,	-	13	2
	crack, structural)
	Collision		-	10
	Miscellaneous		7
	Contact		-	2
	Missing		-		1
	Sub-TOTAL		7	101	37
	TOTAL			145
		Source: Authors (2020)

Table 4 . Typology of involved vessels and related accident taxonomy

 4

	Typology of	Number of	Number of	Number of	Percentage*
	ships*	Marine Incident	Serious	Very
		(MI)	Casualty (SC)	Serious
				Casualty
				(VSC) -
				Total loss
	Fishing vessel /	2	54	25	55.86%
	trawler / fish
	factory
	General cargo	1	10	6	11.72%
	Tanker	1	13	1	10.34%
	Reefer	2	7	2	7.59%
	Bulk carrier	-	6	1	4.83%
	Tug	-	2	1	2.07%
	Icebreaker	1	2	-	2.07%
	Passenger ship	-	3	-	2.07%
	Research vessel	-	1	1	1.38%
	Others	-	3	-	2.07%
	TOTAL	7	101	37	100%

Table 5 . Average of vessel age Typology of vessel Number of claims

 5

	Total loss	Average
		age

  The non-compliance with this principle notification can lead to financial penalties. In addition, the reports have to be published and publicly available. Accordingly, on observes a stronger transparency and detailed reports are annually provided by the European Maritime Safety Agency 4 (EMSA) in accordance with Regulation n°100/2013(EU Parliament, 2013). However, EMSA reports do not include the Russian Arctic. The situation could be improved through the future 'Compendium of Arctic Shipping Accidents' (CASA) with the aim to collect statistics on marine claims occurring in Arctic Circle and including Russia(PAME, 2017;[START_REF] Fedi | Mapping and analysis of maritime claims in the Russian Arctic based on POLARIS System[END_REF]. An embedded question is whether the concerned states of the Arctic Council will "play the game" or not. This database that was deemed to start by the end of 2019 is not yet implemented. Looking at the current fragmented information on Arctic accidentology, and the existence of numerous claims just for Norway with more than 1630 claims just the 2012-2015 timeframe, the launch of CASA appears as a pressing need. If this platform was duly and regularly maintained in accordance with the IMO taxonomy, it would allow a stronger knowledge and understanding of the Arctic area and then enables stakeholders to set up relevant measures and policies. Public and private policy makers such as Arctic states, classification societies, shipowners and underwriters are certainly the first concerned. Even if a stronger safety awareness is emerging in the High North including Russia(FoU, 2016) with progressive responses at structural level through the development of infrastructure and at operational level thanks notably to the adoption of the Polar Code

http://www.nsra.ru/en/glavnaya/celi_funktsii.html

https://gisis.imo.org/Public/MCI/Default.aspx

http://www.emsa.europa.eu/emcip.html

http://www.emsa.europa.eu/accident-investigation-publications/annual-overview.html


Patrick Rigot-Müller
email: patrick.rigotmuller@mu.ie

Laurent Etienne

Olivier Faury

Scott Stephenson

Ship routing and scheduling for the assembly of a LNG plant in the arctic: a decision support system

Keywords: ship routing and scheduling, arctic shipping, supply chain planning

The construction of a Liquid Natural Gas plant in Yamal, Russia, required the assembly of modules transported from yards in Asia. In early stages of such projects, the feasibility of on-time shipping plans is a critical area of risk assessment, in particular in the arctic where accessibility is limited by ice and vessel supply. By describing the modelling and implementation of a Decision Support System designed to create optimal shipping plans, this paper contributes to show the relevance of the Northern Sea Route for industrial projects in the arctic and to illustrate the role of risk mitigation tools.

Introduction

The construction of a Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) plant in the Yamal peninsula, Russia, is a one-of-a-kind logistic case. LNG plants liquefy natural gas, originally in gaseous state, to allow for worldwide distribution in LNG vessels. The Yamal plant modules were assembled under extreme weather conditions, after being transported by sea to the port of Sabetta, from five manufacturing yards located in China, Indonesia and the Philippines. Operations in this plant started in December 2017 after the completion of the first LNG train. It was the first time that the Northern Sea Route (NSR) was used with such intensity on an industrial project, with more than 20 passages thought the Bering Strait. The Yamal region, and more broadly the Russian Arctic, has been identified as an important part of Russia's effort to replace maturing west Siberian oil and gas fields and support Russia's ongoing pivot towards Asian energy markets [START_REF] Stephenson | The work of networks: Embedding firms, transport, and the state in the Russian Arctic oil and gas sector[END_REF]. As a result, the region recently has seen significant Russian and foreign investment in new pipelines and maritime transport infrastructure such as ice-class LNG tankers and coastal searchand-rescue stations (Stephenson, 2017;Buxiadé Farré et al., 2014).

In early stages of such complex construction projects, the feasibility of on-time shipping plans, under a number of resources limitations and technical constraints is a critical area of risk assessment, in particular in the arctic where accessibility is limited by ice and scarce vessel supply. According to [START_REF] Carvalho | Tactical capacity planning in a real-world ETO industry case: An action research[END_REF], the academic literature presents a research-practice gap with a lack of studies on the application of decision support tools to address capacity planning problems in real-world Engineering-To-Order settings. This paper investigates the following research questions: what is the relevance of the NSR in industrial projects, in terms of costs and on-time delivery? And what role can have a Decisions Support System (DSS) for supply chain planning in Engineering, Production and Commissioning (EPC) projects delivered by sea? To do so, we describe the modelling and implementation of a ship routing and scheduling DSS developed for the Yamal case.

Description of the problem

The project was carried out by Yamal LNG, a joint-venture between Novatek (51%), Total (20%), CNPC (20%) and the Silk Road Fund (9.9%). Yamal LNG selected in May 2013 the consortium Yamgaz, which was in charge of the LNG plant Engineering, Production and Commissioning (EPC). The project was officially launched in December 2013 and the first plan module was ready for sailing away in August 2015. Some 144 modules in total were expected to be shipped, approximately 70% of these from three yards in China, and the remaining 30% from two yards in Indonesia and the Philippines. A fleet of 20 vessels was available, in majority in time charter contracts, however only two of those were of class Arc7, allowing for navigation in the arctic in winter. Furthermore, these two project-specific vessels, ordered in 2014 would be delivered in January and April 2016, after the beginning of the shipping operations. The limited availability of Arc7-class vessels for this project was perceived as a potential bottleneck of the project. Furthermore, some of the vessels could not access some of the shipyards due to draft constraints.

Soon after the project launch, the project teams raised concerns about the project risk assessment in relation to the shipping capabilities, and envisaged the use of the NSR as an alternative for risk mitigation and cost minimisation. The DSS described in the this paper aims to answer to these questions.

As illustrated in figure 1, the modules were shipped from Asia (here represented as node 1) and could reach Sabetta (node 3) directly via Suez or navigating through the NSR, or alternatively be transhipped in the Modular Intermediate Storage Yard at the Port of Zeebrugge, in Belgium (node 2). Each module had an expected production date and an expected date of arrival on the assembly site. About 30% of the modules had other modules as predecessors, requiring a strict synchronisation of deliveries between those. Routes between nodes are oriented and will be represented as indicated in figure 1, where each arc be either a Loaded or Ballast route.

The ports located in Indonesia and the Philippines (representing 30% of modules produced) were treated as if they were located in node 1 with an extra loading time when a voyage required a call in one of these ports. This modelling choice may penalise some optimal solutions (typically, a shipment with modules from Indonesia and Philippines only will have a voyage duration a few days shorter than the one used in the model). However, since only 30% of the modules were produces there, it seemed an acceptable assumption for the purpose of the model. In the model parameters, it is possible to allow or disallow these modules to use the NSR (the latter being the default choice).

Up to the tool development the shipping plans were built manually, which would not allow for a systematic control of the shipping constraints, neither for scenarios testing in a situation of recurring hypothesis changes. Typically, the vessel fleet and the modules' attributes (quantity, size, predecessors, production yards and requirement dates) could change from one planning version to another, requiring recurrent redesigns of shipping plans.

Figure 1 -Shipping routes and main ports

Literature review

Shipping optimisation problems Shipping Optimisation Problems are well known in the academic field. Recent reviews and shipping optimisation problems classifications can be found in [START_REF] Christiansen | Ship routing and scheduling: Status and perspectives[END_REF][START_REF] Christiansen | Maritime Transportation[END_REF][START_REF] Christiansen | Ship routing and scheduling in the new millennium[END_REF] and [START_REF] Christiansen | Ship Routing and Scheduling in Industrial and Tramp Shipping[END_REF]. [START_REF] Christiansen | Ship routing and scheduling in the new millennium[END_REF] define four classes of shipping optimisation problems: 1) Liner shipping problems concern strategic planning issues such as Liner network design, or more strategic/tactical planning problems such as fleet deployment. 2) Industrial and Tramp shipping problems may concern strategic planning issues (fleet size and composition) or tactical planning issues (cargo routing and scheduling or inventory routing in supply chains). Remaining problem classes are more problem-specific 3) sailing speed, bunkering and emission problems and 4) offshore logistics, lightering and stowage problems.

Given the requirements to identify optimal shipping plans, our model is therefore a cargo routing and scheduling problem for project shipping. According to [START_REF] Christiansen | Maritime Transportation[END_REF], routing is the assignment of a sequence of ports to a vessel and scheduling the assigning of times (or time windows) to the various events on a ship's route (usually short termdays or weeks). Our case fits within 'project shipping' problems, a less explored sub-class of Industrial and Tramp shipping problems. [START_REF] Christiansen | Ship routing and scheduling in the new millennium[END_REF] identify one reference in this category [START_REF] Fagerholt | Routing and scheduling in project shipping[END_REF], and four references concerning a DSS implementation. Furthermore, one reference considers precedence constraints, one soft-time windows (Fargerholt, 2000(Fargerholt, , 2001) ) and one considers split deliveries [START_REF] Lee | Industrial ship routing problem with split delivery and two types of vessels[END_REF], but there is no identified paper covering all these constraints altogether. Halvorsen-Weare (2013) address LNG distribution, but not the plant construction. Strategic ship routing and scheduling problems in shipping are solved in a number of ways, including Mixed-Integer Programing, Linear Programing, Set Partitioning, Heuristics, Simulation and expert opinion. Tactical routing and scheduling problems in industrial and tramp shipping are solved using approaches such as set partitioning, mixedinteger and integer programming and heuristics [START_REF] Christiansen | Ship routing and scheduling: Status and perspectives[END_REF]. Fagerholt et al. (2013) solve their project shipping problem using a tabu search heuristic.

Arctic Shipping

The field of NSR shipping has been recently analysed in terms of feasibility and economic relevance for bulk shipping by [START_REF] Cariou | Relevance of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for bulk shipping[END_REF], for Oil shipping by Faury and Cariou (2017) and for containers by: Zhao et al ( 2016), Zhang et al (2016a[START_REF] Zhang | Is the Northern Sea Route attractive to shipping companies? Some insights from recent ship traffic data[END_REF], [START_REF] Lin | Ship routing and freight assignment problem for liner shipping: Application to the Northern Sea Route planning problem[END_REF] and [START_REF] Lasserre | Case studies of shipping along Arctic routes. Analysis and profitability perspectives for the container sector[END_REF]. Authors did not find however work covering the area of heavy goods: this paper will cover this sector.

The navigation along the NSR is impacted by three main typologies of factors: climatic, geographic and legal, which are strongly related to each other. The climatic factor is the changing thickness and extent of ice during the year and is hardly predictable on a daily basis. This level of unpredictability renders the navigation in this area highly complex and implies the use of specific vessels. The geographic factor refers to the low depth of the Russian shore (for example, Sannikov Strait with a depth of 13m) and the poor density of infrastructures such as repair yards, ports or icebreakers. Insurance companies consider these elements as potential risk catalyser [START_REF] Fédi | The impact of the Polar Code on risk mitigation in Arctic waters: a "toolbox" for underwriters?[END_REF]. Finally, the Polar Code (IMO, 2017) and the NSR administration (NSRA, 2017) provide a legal framework and impose the use of vessels with an ice class.

According to [START_REF] Doyon | Perceptions et strategies de l'industrie maritime de vrac relativement à l'ouverture des passages arctiques[END_REF], the NSR may not be a competitor to the Suez Canal Route. Most of the cargo using the NSR are made of flows coming from or designated to a Russian port [START_REF] Doyon | Perceptions et strategies de l'industrie maritime de vrac relativement à l'ouverture des passages arctiques[END_REF] and deal with oil and gas. The NSR needs to manage at least 40 million tons to be profitable (Arctic Council, 2009;[START_REF] Kiiski | Long-term dynamics of shipping and icebreaker capacity along the Northern Sea Route[END_REF]. This quantity of cargo is needed to maintain infrastructures such as ports and icebreakers. [START_REF] Grigoriev | Oil and gas: Russian arctic offshore[END_REF] stressed that most of the oil and gas field under exploitation are situated on the western shore of the Russian arctic between the Kola peninsula and the Yamal peninsula. [START_REF] Stephenson | The work of networks: Embedding firms, transport, and the state in the Russian Arctic oil and gas sector[END_REF], shed a light on the coming necessity to exploit the eastern fields in the future. The lack of infrastructures and among them ports updated are one of the main reason why shippers do not use the NSR and insurance companies are reluctant to insure vessels sailing in these areas. Aware of this challenge, the Russian government decided to update some ports such as Murmansk and created others such as Sabetta. The objective of the Russian Federation is to export between 133 and 153 million Tons by 2030 (Russia Strategy, 2030).

The port of Sabetta, which will export firstly the production of the Yamal LNG plant with a production capacity of 16.5 million tons per year and secondly the 18 million tons coming from "Arctic LNG-2" project1, is one of the pillars of the Arctic development in Russia. The concretization of such a project necessitated an investment of USD 27 billion and to invest in 17 ARC 7 LNG vessels dedicated with a unit cost of USD 350 Million (Clarksons, 2018).

Hence, the NSR and more broadly the arctic region is highly sensitive to ice conditions from a technical point of view and, since first of January, by the Polar Code. However, as it is a region with untapped resources, the Russian government is making massive investments to develop infrastructure such as ports and plants and these should be the corner stone of its development in the future.

Model Description

As illustrated in figure 2, the designed solution is a strategic and tactical routing and scheduling model, with a heterogeneous vessel fleet (attributes: length, width, draft, ice class, costs, and charter contract). Hard time windows are applied for production dates at loading ports (no shipment before production), shipping routes and time-charter vessels availability. Flexible time windows are applied at delivery ports. The model considers multiple loads on vessels, split loads (loads can be transhipped), and synchronization of deliveries among cargoes (precedence constraints at delivery point). Stowage constraints are dealt in their majority in a pre-processing phase. The problem is solved with an Integer Programming model minimizing real shipping costs and inconvenience costs for delays. Time is considered using discrete modelling. This was made possible by considering only three ports (nodes) in the problem. A user-interface allows sequential runs of the model for different time windows, taking into consideration on-going, and already planned shipments. Results are presented in tables and Gantt charts. Exchange of information with the main stakeholders were carried out through meetings and workshops. This paper will focus on describing the modelling approach and illustrating results rather than establishing its mathematical formulation, which can be done in 23 equations.

Model Constraints

The model constraints ensured that all modules must leave ports and arrive at destination, that modules leave after their production date, that modules arrive within a predefined maximum allowed advance or delay. We also ensured that transhipped modules would only leave Europe after their arrival, plus a transhipment duration. Synchronicity of modules at arrival was ensured by allocating to each module up to five predecessors and forcing the module's arrival date to be higher than the predecessors' ones. We also checked that the sum of the length of modules on-board of the vessel fit in the vessels' deck length. Moreover, 'short' modules (which length is smaller than the minimum vessel's width) are rotated by 90 degrees: in such cases, the 'on-board' length is actually the module's width. All modules with 'on-board width' larger than 50% of the smallest vessel's deck width occupy both sides a the deck, otherwise they would be considered 'thin' modules and allocated to the vessel's left or right side during pre-processing stage, as indicated in figure 3.

Figure 3 -Modules' on-deck allocation rules

Ice constraints ensured that the vessel would not leave the departure port towards Sabetta if it will not be able to return before the end of the allowed navigability period. These periods are calculated in the pre-processing stage. Navigability conditions are defined according to the Polar Operational Limit Assessment Risk Indexing System (POLARIS) as mentioned in the Polar Code (IMO. 2016). Arctic sea ice concentration and thickness of the 25 last years were downloaded from the European COPERNICUS marine repository ARCTIC_REANALYSIS_PHYS_002_003 dataset [START_REF] Von Schuckmann | The Copernicus Marine Environment Monitoring Service Ocean State Report[END_REF]. The POLARIS risk index values are computed for different ship ice classes and aggregated for each day of the year. Figure 4 depicts the POLARIS risk index maps for a IA vessel navigating the NSR (purple line). Red and orange area indicates that the ship should not navigate in this area. In green zones, ship can navigate freely. In yellow areas, the ship would require an icebreaker escort. The left map illustrates one selected day in winter showing that, in the median case scenario, a IA ship cannot navigate whereas on the right map, in summer, a IA ship can travel the NSR without an icebreaker escort. A flow conservation constraint applied in all three nodes (Asia, Europe and Sabetta) ensures that at all times a vessel must have left the node before returning, and that only after returning it would be allowed to leave it again. We also added constraint that ensure that charter vessels are used during their availability period, and port constraints ensuring that, in Europe and Sabetta, vessels arrive when ports quays are unoccupied and that vessels' drafts allow them to call in ports. A final constraint forbids the 30% of modules that not in China to use the NSR route, as they are too far from node 3.

Results

Relevance of NSR

The execution of the model showed the relevance of the NSR to achieve better delivery times for the plant assembly. Figure 5 and tables 1 and 2 illustrate and compare the model results for three scenarios. In all three the same data and parameters are used, excepted that in the first scenario the NSR is open for modules produced in China, and in the second the NSR is closed for all forthcoming shipments. In the second scenario the model minimises total costs by significantly postponing one module. Consequently, in the third scenario, we impose a limited maximum delay on that specific module and the tool proposes a module reallocation ensuring an earlier end of the project, as shown in table 1. This reallocation comes to an added total cost as shown in table 2. Strategic and tactical planning for risk assessment and mitigation Consistently with [START_REF] Fagerholt | A computer-based decision support system for vessel fleet schedulingexperience and future research[END_REF], the DSS implementation showed that from a practitioner's perspective diverse, realistic solutions were as relevant as optimal ones. Satisfying solutions would not be defined solely by optimality on costs and average delay, but also by a trade-off on which modules to delay, requiring coordination with engineering teams. The planning level remaining strategic and tactical, focused in feasibility checks and overall delay risk mitigation. The weekly approach used did not allow for a use at the operational level. Due to high number of data, variables and constraints, the analysis and interpretation of the tool's results required a good level of expertise about both the project and the model.

The study also illustrates the interest of the modelling process as promoting early customer-supplier coordination: the tool served as a coordination facilitator, allowing an improved communication and the constitution and sharing of the project database for shipping activity.

Conclusion

This paper describes and proposes a solution to a routing and scheduling problem not addressed yet in the literature. It discusses practical considerations related to the use of a DSS by practitioners in complex projects, another topic less considered in the literature.

The model proved the shipping project's feasibility with the resources available and illustrated, from a logistics perspective, the relevance of the NSR for industrial projects in the arctic region, reducing in our case the number of shipments by 20%, the average delay per module of 33% and anticipating the delivery of the last module by 84 days. This is the first known project to use the NSR in such a large scale.

Given the recent developments of infrastructure in the Russian arctic, we expect that this work may contribute to the understanding of the relevance of the NSR and the importance of strategic and tactical planning in complex EPC projects in the Russian arctic region.

Figure

  Figure 2 -Modelling approach

Figure 4 -

 4 Figure 4 -POLARIS Navigability risk assessment in winter march 1 st (left) and summer September 16 th (right) for a IA Vessel transiting on the NSR

Figure 5 -

 5 Figure 5 -Illustration: Gantt charts for three scenarios. Routes: yellow=direct via NSR, purple= direct via Suez, green=Asia-Europe, Blue=Baltic

Table 1 -

 1 Shipping KPIs: performance ratios of plans with NSR open and closed

Table 2 -

 2 Shipping KPIs: cost ratios of plans with NSR open and closed

http://tass.com/economy/990028