Oscar Barrera
email: odbarrera@gmail.com

Ana Leiva

Clara Martínez-Toledano
email: c.martinez-toledano@imperial.ac.uk

Álvaro Zúñiga-Cordero

Identity Social Inequalities

Colombia

Mexico

Álvaro Zúñiga

Lavih Abraham

María Ronald Alfaro-Redondo

Julia Blanco

Francesco Bogliacino

Nicolás Dvoskin

Ignacio Flores

Gustavo García

Amory Gethin

Kyong Mazaro

Thomas Piketty

à la diffusion de documents scientifiques

Keywords: Social Inequalities, Identity, and the Structure of Political Cleavages in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, 1952-2019

de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Introduction

This paper exploits existing electoral surveys to analyze the political representation of social inequalities since mid-twentieth century in six Latin American countries: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. With the end of Spanish rule, nearly all Latin American countries were divided by the same liberal-conservative cleavage [START_REF] Mainwaring | Party systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, decay, and collapse[END_REF]. The Liberals' ideological principles were anticlericalism, federalism and free trade, while Conservatives defended the Church and favored centralization and protectionism. Despite this common point of departure in the nineteenth century, contemporary Latin American party systems are very diverse and no longer reflect this traditional cleavage.

Among the six countries we have analyzed, Colombia is the only one in which the traditional cleavage survived into the twentieth century. Prolonged and intense interparty fighting forged strong identification with the two traditional parties, so that the two-party system only collapsed after the adoption of electoral reforms in the early 2000s.

The absence of political opportunities for outsiders contributed to the formation of leftleaning guerrilla movements in the early 1960s, among which the most powerful was the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,

FARC).

With the beginning of the 21st century, Colombia's political landscape experienced a profound transformation. The two traditional parties lost part of its hegemony in benefit of left-leaning political groups and the independent Álvaro Uribe consolidated a new right-wing political ideology. The position towards the FARC conflict represented class cleavages since the beginning of Uribism, which have persisted until today. The main problem of the country has remained corruption, especially among high-income and high-educated anti-Uribist voters, while for low-income and low-educated Uribist voters the armed conflict has been considered of greater importance, as they live in rural areas and have been more exposed to the violence.

Class cleavages are also prominent in Argentina and Chile. The hegemony of Peronism in Argentina, which has governed the country for almost four decades since the 1940s, has created a sharp division of the electorate between Peronists and anti-Peronists.

Although Peronism is well-represented across all classes and sectors of Argentinian society, the low-income and low-educated are persistently more prone to vote for Peronist candidates.

The pre-dictatorship political structure in Chile was characterized by the existence of three historical cleavages: Catholic-secular, class and urban-rural. Since the end of Pinochet's dictatorship in 1990, a fourth cleavage emerged splitting voters by their support or opposition to the dictatorship and dominating the previous historical conflicts.

The last decade has been a period of social unrest, due mainly to rising income concentration, market-oriented education, and dissatisfaction with the governing coalitions' responses to social demands. Political polarization has consequently increased, exacerbating class cleavages.

Costa Rica and Mexico have transitioned from two-party and one-party dominant systems to more fractionalized multi-party systems, respectively. The 1948 Revolution was the last violent political episode in the history of Costa Rica. The winning side established the National Liberation Party (Partido Liberación Nacional, PLN), of center-left social democratic orientation, which would become the hegemonic political party. The losing side reconstituted into a number of political parties and coalitions of center-right Christian democratic orientation that won the elections three times before its political heirs established the Social Christian Unity Party (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana, PUSC) in 1983.

The main political cleavage during the period was thus between PLN's supporters and its adversaries. Dissatisfaction with corruption scandals, the deterioration of the welfare state during the economic recession of the 1980s and the neoliberal turn of the PLN from socio-democratic to neoliberal policies, led to an increase in political dissatisfaction with traditional parties, the rise of abstention, a large shift of voters towards new parties and the emergence of competing pro-poor (i.e., PLN and PRN) and pro-rich parties (i.e., PUSC and PAC) since the 2000s.

Mexico's democratic transition during the 20th century has been a series of iterations of electoral fraud, opposition protest, and electoral reform, which have leveled the political playing field and opened new opportunities for electoral competition. The In-stitutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI), the hegemonic party inspired by the ideals of the Mexican Revolution, has decayed in benefit of new left-leaning parties and the conservative National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN). Nonetheless, as low-income low-educated PRI voters have moved both towards PAN and towards the left, the country has maintained during this process a reasonably stable "multi-elite party system", according to which higher education attainment is associated with higher vote for the left whereas, higher income is associated with higher vote for the PAN.

Peru had until mid-twentieth century multiclass electoral constituencies mobilized by oligarchic leaders that used clientelist networks. Strong class divisions in voting patterns did not emerge until the 1980s, after the rise of labor unions and urban social organizations in the 1970s. The strength of popular organizations however eroded by the end of the 1980s, in a context of deep economic crisis and political violence. This process gave room to a new type of personalist leadership, initiated by Alberto Fujimori, which has continued until the present. Peru thus presents volatile income and education cleavages since the mid-1990s. Indigenous issues have been gradually incorporated into the political process. They were initiated by Fujimori in the 1990s, who is of Japanese origin, and have continued during the presidential campaigns of Alejandro Toledo and Ollanta Humala in the 2000s, who are of indigenous origins. Ethnic cleavages have thus blurred class cleavages in the last three decades.

Argentina

Peronism and the Making of Argentina's Party System

With the declaration of independence in 1816 and the military defeat of the Spanish Empire in 1824, a prolonged period of civil wars led to the formation of the federal republic of Argentina. Between 1869 and 1914, the population grew about 338 percent 1 , due in part to a great migratory wave coming mainly from Italy and Spain. During the European wars of the first half of the twentieth century, Argentina also became an important supplier of meat and grains to the belligerent countries, thus reaching high levels of wealth and education, and a relatively egalitarian social structure. However, tensions rose due to workers' poor social conditions. Before 1930, the leader Hipólito Yrigoyen from the Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical, UCR) governed the country. Using an anti-oligarchy speech, he gained support from the middle class in urban and rural areas, and a share of the urban working class.

In the 1930s, a conservative elite governed the country under controverted cases of fraud and corruption. In 1943, the Colonel Juan Domingo Perón participated in the military coup that overthrew the conservative government of Ramón Castillo, and took the head of the Ministry of Labor. Perón embraced the pro-social and anti-oligarchy principles from Yrigoyen, while arguing that the UCR lacked legitimacy to defend the interest of workers [START_REF] James | Resistance and integration: Peronism and the Argentine working class, 1946-1976[END_REF]. In 1946, Perón won the elections with the newly created Labor Party, a political organization formed with the support of labor unions, the military, and the Catholic Church. In response, an anti-Peronist block was formed with the support of the United States, the electoral alliance La Unión Democrática (UD), composed of the UCR, the Socialist Party, the Progressive Democratic Party, the Communist Party, the Rural Society, and the Industrial Union. The UD accused Perón of being anti-democratic, which was the base of the anti-Peronist speech during his regime and after his fall.

While from the Ministry, Perón implemented generous social policies which strongly benefitted workers, from the presidency, he created a broad public health and education system, institutionalized the rights of workers and peasants, and encouraged the emergence of a class consciousness pushing workers to fight for their rights [START_REF] Coppedge | The evolution of Latin American party systems. Politics, society, and democracy: Latin America[END_REF].

In 1947, to run for the 1952 presidential election, he founded the Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista, PJ), which replaced the Labor Party. However, his separation from the Church in 1954 led to political tensions that ended up in a new violent military coup. Perón was forced to exile for about 20 years while the coup banned Peronism. This allowed the UCR and its political faction Integration and Development Movement (Movimiento de Integracion y Desarrollo, MID) to govern the country during the democratic periods (1958-1662 and 1963-1966). From the exile, Perón organized the resistance, which jointly with the prohibition of politics and the constitution of guerrillas groups led to a violent era that reached its peak (el Cordobazo) in 1969. Under this political crisis, in 1971 General Alejandro Lanusse, restored democracy and allowed the reestablishment of political parties, including Peronism. Perón returned to office in 1973, in the middle of a dramatic right-left ideological rift within the party, which triggered the Ezeiza massacre2 .

In 1976, two years after Peron's death, the country experienced a new military coup, during which numerous left wing activists from different parties (including Peronism) were tortured, killed or expelled from the country [START_REF] Conadep | Nunca Mas[END_REF]. The new military government adopted liberalization policies that caused a flood of imports and opened access to foreign loans, triggering a financial crisis.

The Falklands war accelerated the fall of the dictatorship and the country returned to a democratic regime in 1983. The anti-Peronist party UCR, directed by Raúl Alfonsín, won the elections. The new president refused to implement the austerity and liberalization policies advocated by multilateral institutions, but his at first heterodox policy attempts failed and resulted in hyperinflation (Huber and Stephens, 2012). In 1989, Carlos Menem became the first Peronist president after the dictatorship. During the 1990s, elections and civil liberties were institutionalized and macroeconomic stability was achieved for the first time in decades [START_REF] Calvo | Argentina: The persistence of peronism[END_REF].

In 1995, Menem was elected for a second term. As fears of hyperinflation faded, new issues, such as corruption and public accountability, became increasingly salient. A group of Peronists, who were against Menem, founded the center-left political coalition the Front for a Country in Solidarity (Frente País Solidario, FREPASO), which captured 30 percent of votes in the 1995 presidential election. FREPASO and the UCR undertook two strategic changes after 1995. First, they incorporated core elements of the neoliberal economic model, including fiscal balance, privatization, trade openness, and convertibility.

Second, in 1997, both movements formed the Alliance for Work, Justice and Education, which won the presidential elections in 1999 with Fernando de la Rúa.

Two years after the victory of Fernando de la Rúa, the Argentinian economy fell into a deep debt crisis. The unprecedented economic collapse, the successive resignation of two presidents, and a massive rebellion against the entire political elite led to the return of political instability. In 2003, the Peronist Néstor Kirchner was elected president. The Kirchners led the country for three consecutive terms: Néstor in 2003-2007, and his wife Cristina Fernández in 2007-2011and 2011-2015. Political turmoil nonetheless gave rise to a center-right force headed by Mauricio Macri, Let's Change (Cambiemos), who became the president of Argentina in 2015 with the support of few unions [START_REF] Carrera | Trade union movement and the attack from financial oligarchy: Argentine, 2016-2019[END_REF].

He was defeated by the Justicialist Party's candidate, Alberto Fernández, in 2019.

The Persistence of Class Cleavages in Argentina

Most Argentinians are loyal to one of two main political tendencies, either anti-Peronism or Peronism. In what follows, we study the relationship between several socio-economic factors and the Peronist vote for all presidential elections held between 1995 and 2019 (Figure 1) 3 . AB1 for data sources Scholars often characterize Peronism as a movement representing the working class, which was previously excluded from Argentina's electoral politics [START_REF] Lipset | The social bases of politics[END_REF].

Others view Peronism merely as a more electorally important successor to an existing working-class party, the Socialist Party [START_REF] Canton | Radicalismo, socialismo y terceras fuerzas en la Capital Federal: sus bases socio-espaciales en 1912-1930[END_REF], the UCR, or even as a multiclass movement [START_REF] Germani | Estructura social de la Argentina: análisis estadístico[END_REF].

We also find that the Peronist vote is more concentrated among lowest-educated and lowest-income voters, but with interesting variations over time (Figure 2). During the 1990s, in particular, Peronism received lower support from low-income and lower-educated voters, partly driven by the anti-popular policies adopted during Menemism (1995Menemism ( -1999) ) and by the well-structured anti-Peronist alliance between UCR and FREPASO. In this context, the interim Peronist president, Eduardo Duhalde, created an emergency conditional cash transfer and food program targeted to the poorest 20 percent citizens (Huber and Stephens, 2012).

The Kirchnerism terms of the 2000s came with a reduction in income inequalities. The Argentinian economy was performing well and the Peronist government extended social transfers, increased pension benefits, pushed up social benefits linked to the minimum wage, and increased the progressiveness of other social benefits. The government also strengthened unions and their bargaining power [START_REF] Vuolo | Asignación por hijo[END_REF]. As a result, Peronism gained back popularity. The peak was reached in the 2000s, when nearly 70 percent of the poorest half of voters and of primary-educated voters voted for the Kirchners4 .

Political stability ended in 2015, with the onset of an economic crisis triggered by the fall in commodity prices and the breaking of relations with the Peronist central union federation [START_REF] Lazar | Notions of work, patrimony, and production in the life of the Colón Opera House[END_REF]. As a result, popular support to the Peronists faded out, especially among lowest-educated voters, and Mauricio Macri, backed by an important share of unions, became president in 2015. In 2019, Peronists managed to gain back the support of low-income earners, due in part to a new economic crisis that disproportionately affected the most vulnerable groups in society. Despite these fluctuations, Peronism has clearly received enduring support from lowest-educated and low-income voters since the 1990s, which has contributed to the persistence of strong class cleavages in Argentina.

Peronism and Other Socioeconomic Cleavages

Although, as we have shown, education, income, and class are important socioeconomic variables determining party choice in Argentina, the Peronist vote is also divided along other lines. Public-sector workers, self-employed individuals and non-paid workers have been more prone to vote Peronists than private-sector workers and entrepreneurs, in line with what we observe in Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico, where civil servants tend to vote more for progressive parties. The Peronist vote is also stronger in urban areas, which reflects the large historical working class electoral base since the pro-worker policies of Perón (Table 1). Nonetheless, the increase in Peronist votes in rural areas, northern regions, and La Pampa explained the massive support for Peronists during the 2000s, while Peronist vote shares remained relatively constant in the Capital, in Cuyo, and in Patagonia 5 . After 2018, following the abortion debate, Peronism lost an important share of votes in the North, where the population is largely conservative and Catholic (Mallimaci, Giénez-Bélibeau, Esquivel, and Irrazábal, Mallimaci et al.). Our analysis, however, does not show significant variations in the Peronist vote in terms of age or gender 6 . Religion does not seem to be an important dividing variable either, even at times in which Peronist candidates such as Cristina Kirchner advertised their faith as a distinctive feature of reliability and good values 7 . Hence, education, income and class are the most important socio-economic variables explaining the structure of the Peronist vote in Argentina. 6 See online Appendix Table BA3 7 See online appendix Figure AA15 3 Chile

The Process of Re-democratization

Chile broke from Spanish rule in 1818 and sealed its political stability with the signature of the Constitution of 1833. Over the 19th century, the conservatives and liberals alternated in power and the economic elites had an important influence on the different governments. With the beginning of the twentieth century, several left movements appeared and a modern center-left alliance rose for the first time to power in 1938. In 1964, the centrist Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC, or DC) founded in 1957 formed a new government with the support of right-wing parties. This new party remained in power until 1970, after which Salvador Allende became the first president from the Socialist Party. Allende's government, marked by a deep economic crisis and hard negotiations with the opposition, ended with a military coup in 1973, instating Augusto Pinochet as military and political leader [START_REF] Collier | A history of Chile, 1808-2002[END_REF].

The dictatorship lasted nearly two decades and was characterized by the repression of left-wing organizations and trade unions, as well as economic reforms with a freemarket profile. Towards the end of the dictatorship, economic and political demands united several social actors. In 1988, a national referendum took place and the Chilean population denied Pinochet a new mandate, opening the way for the reestablishment of democracy in 1990 [START_REF] Bresnahan | Chile since 1990: The contradictions of neoliberal democratization[END_REF][START_REF] Ffrench-Davis | Economic reforms in Chile: From Dictatorship to Democracy[END_REF].

The regime left behind a fragile democratic system. In particular, the electoral system was binomial until 2013, 8 which implied that only two coalitions could realistically aspire to participate in the National Congress [START_REF] Riquelme | Voting power of political parties in the senate of Chile during the whole binomial system period[END_REF]. The byproduct was a system of consensus politics, and a two-bloc party structure: the center-left bloc Coalition of Parties for Democracy (or Concertación) supported the no-position in the referendum, while the right-wing bloc (Democracy and Progress, Democracia y Progreso) supported the continuation of Pinochet in office for another mandate [START_REF] Saavedra | Sociedad civil en dictadura: relaciones transnacionales, organizaciones y socialización política en Chile[END_REF]. The main parties in the center-left coalition were the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the Party for Democracy founded in 1987 [START_REF] Collier | A history of Chile, 1808-2002[END_REF]. The right-wing alliance consisted of the Independent Democrat Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI) founded in 1983, the heir of Pinochet, and National Renewal (Renovación Nacional, RN) founded in 1987, a more moderate right-wing party [START_REF] Huneeus | Derecha en el Chile después de Pinochet: el caso de la unión democrata independiente[END_REF][START_REF] Agüero | Chile: Unfinished transition and increased political competition[END_REF].

The center-left alliance nominated a consensus Christian-Democrat candidate, Patricio Aylwin, who won the 1989 election. During the 1990s and early 2000s, all presidents were from Concertación, including the socialist Michelle Bachelet. However, structural reforms were not implemented to combat high levels of economic inequality [START_REF] Flores | Top incomes in Chile: A historical perspective on income inequality, 1964-2017[END_REF], leading to social dissatisfaction, a decay in turnout and the consequent loss of absolute majority by Concertación. Bachelet's government faced the first major social conflict, the Penguins' Revolution, led by high school students demanding higher equality in the educational system [START_REF] Chovanec | The penguin revolution in Chile: Exploring intergenerational learning in social movements[END_REF].

In 2009, Chileans chose the first right-wing democratically elected government since 1958, led by Sebastian Piñera (RN). His government was also marked by protests of university students followed by secondary ones criticizing inequality in the educational system and its for-profit character [START_REF] Guzman-Concha | The students' rebellion in Chile: Occupy protest or classic social movement?[END_REF]. The social discontent, together with the replacement of the voluntary registry with compulsory voting by an automatic registration but voluntary voting system in 2012, led to a large fall in turnout (Contreras-Aguirre and [START_REF] Contreras-Aguirre | Jóvenes y participación electoral en Chile 1989-2013. analizando el efecto del voto voluntario[END_REF][START_REF] Bunker | The 2013 presidential and legislative election in Chile[END_REF]. In 2013, the center-left alliance moved further to the left, by incorporating the Communist party, and Bachelet came back to power [START_REF] Von Bülow | It takes two to tango: Students, political parties, and protest in Chile[END_REF]. She introduced important constitutional, educational, and fiscal reforms to deal with the social critics, but they were not sufficient for some factions of the left [START_REF] Alvarez | Cronología del movimiento feminista en Chile 2006-2016[END_REF]. The end of the binomial system in 2015 paved the way for the alliance's final breakup in the last electoral process in 2017 [START_REF] Bunker | La elección de 2017 y el fraccionamiento del sistema de partidos en Chile[END_REF]. The new coalition Broad Front (Frente Amplio) emerged to the left of The Force of the Majority (La Fuerza de la Mayoría), a continuation of Concertación, leading to a more polarized political structure.

Piñera won again the elections in 2017 and his government faced an even more salient unrest known as the Social Outbreak. The students' protests started in October 2019, triggered by the increase of the subway price and the movement rapidly spread to the rest of the society, leading to an agreement to change the constitution. The result from the October 2020 referendum was an overwhelming support (almost 80 percent) for rewriting the constitution by an entirely popular elected body.

Social Unrest and Political Cleavages during Redemocratization

In what follows, we analyze the changing relationship between party support and socioeconomic characteristics during the recent redemocratization process using electoral surveys from 1989 until 2019. 9 Figure 3 summarizes the election results by the most important parties during our period of analysis. On the left of the political spectrum is Concertación, representing the center-left, the Communist Party, the Humanist Party and since 2017 the Broad Front. 10 On the right is the alliance between RN and UDI (Figure 3). 11 9 See appendix Table BC1 for data sources. 10 The Humanist Party participated in the Concertación until 1993 and the Communist Party in 2013 and 2017. 11 To classify the parties, we use the coding proposed by Huber et al. (2012) for the 1989-2012 period, and the work by [START_REF] Bunker | The 2013 presidential and legislative election in Chile[END_REF][START_REF] Bunker | La elección de 2017 y el fraccionamiento del sistema de partidos en Chile[END_REF] for the most recent period. The pre-dictatorship political structure in Chile was characterized by the existence of three main historical cleavages, which created the so-called "three-thirds" structure (left, right, and center) in the political system until 1973 [START_REF] Scully | Reappraising the role of the center: the case of the Chilean party system[END_REF]. The first cleavage was defined by the religious conflict initiated in the second half of the 19th century that split political support into a clerical bloc and an anti-clerical bloc. In the beginning of the twentieth century, urbanization and industrialization fueled a clear class cleavage, which led to the emergence of left-wing parties and divided the political system along a leftright axis. Finally, the class cleavage extended to the countryside between 1950 and 1970, where the Christian Democratic Party solidified the political center [START_REF] Scully | Rethinking the center: Party politics in nineteenth-and twentieth-century Chile[END_REF].

Recent studies have challenged Lipset and Rokkan's "freezing hypothesis" that would imply that pre-dictatorship cleavages would be preserved [START_REF] Lipset | Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives[END_REF].

They have proposed instead a fourth democratic-authoritarian cleavage that splits voters by critics or apologists of the military regime, which dominates the previous historical conflicts. The critics argued that the need to end with the authoritarian regime (i.e., political and economic instability) did not justify the means (i.e., human rights violations and the suspension of democratic politics). The apologists instead believed that the ne-oliberal economic model developed during authoritarian rule deserved political protection [START_REF] Bonilla | Social or political cleavages?: A spatial analysis of the party system in post-authoritarian Chile[END_REF]. Other researchers document that there was a general process of dealignment between the 1990s and 2000s, marked by the decreasing association between political preferences on the one hand, and class, religion, and regime preferences on the other [START_REF] Bargsted | Social cleavages and political dealignment in contemporary Chile, 1995-2009[END_REF].

In line with these results, we do not find a strong division along the left-right axis by income nor education group after the dictatorship. Top-income earners have been slightly more likely to vote for the right, and this pattern has intensified in the last two elections.

Meanwhile, university graduates were somewhat more left-wing relative to the rest of voters in the 1990s but have progressively become less left-wing since the early 2000s (Figure 4). As the governing coalitions were unresponsive to social demands, political polarization increased [START_REF] Fábrega | Polarization and electoral incentives: The end of the Chilean consensus democracy, 1990-2014[END_REF]. Intermittent protests were staged throughout the period, culminating in the nationwide conflict in October 2019. This united the population around issues of social and economic inequality, exacerbating the class cleavage and thus aligning the vote by income and education, as shown in Figure 6.

The increase in polarization is also linked to the large fall in support for the DC. The weakening of Christian religious beliefs and the rapid process of urbanization have led voters to become less identified with the center ideology promoted by the DC and historically attached to Christianity and rural origins [START_REF] Herrera | Las bases sociales del Partido Demócrata Cristiano chileno[END_REF]. The religious cleavage has thus been reduced, and the support from the left comes from a wide base of believers and non-believers. 13The recent political polarization is most pronounced among the youth and those living in the center of the country (Table 2). The fall of around 30 percentage points of youth votes for the DC has been mostly divided between the two tails of the ideological spectrum, the left outside of Concertación and the right bloc. Left-wing parties within Concertación have also received a share of the young vote, but they still fare better among middle-aged and old voters. Historically, the north and the south have been associated with higher support for the left and the right, respectively. Support for the left has nonetheless considerably increased in the center in the last decade, the area that has seen the largest social unrest. (1944)(1945)(1946)(1947)(1948) [START_REF] Molina Jiménez | Democracia y elecciones en Costa Rica: Dos contribuciones polémicas[END_REF]. Among the social and political achievements of this period were the establishment of the Supreme Electoral Court of Costa Rica, the abolishment of the army, the end of racial segregation and women's suffrage. The outcomes of the war also included exile for the losers and the ban of communist parties to take part in elections (revoked in 1974). While we can only strictly define a two-party system from 1983 onwards, the alliances on the right constituted after the Civil War and the weakness of socialist parties contributed to the predominance of a bipolar party system since 1948 [START_REF] Sánchez | Cambio en la dinámica electoral en Costa Rica: un caso de desalineamiento[END_REF]. Interestingly, no political party has won the elections more than twice in a row, not even in the most dominant years of the PLN during the 1970s and 1980s. Hence, some have interpreted the political history of Costa Rica as an affair of a dominant party versus everyone else [START_REF] Alfaro Redondo | Divide y votarás[END_REF]. This institutional model however already started to deteriorate in the late 1970s, with the combination of economic factors (i.e., high levels of public debt, inflation, capital flight, etc.) and political violence in Central America. After the political pact between Calderón Fournier from the PUSC and his successor from PLN Figueres Olsen in 1995, which intended to continue the process of adjustment and reform of the State that started in the 1980s, social discontent mounted, breaking the basis that had supported the PLN in the construction of the Welfare State [START_REF] Vargas Cullell | Capítulo 1: la democracia amenazada[END_REF].

The erosion process of the 1990s thus revealed growing dissatisfaction with the political system as a whole, which translated first into an increase in electoral abstention in 1998, and then with the emergence of the Citizens' Action Party (Partido Acción Ciudadana, PAC) in 2002 in a process often called partisan dealignment [START_REF] Sánchez | Cambio en la dinámica electoral en Costa Rica: un caso de desalineamiento[END_REF]. As traditional parties converged towards the center in the 1980s and 1990s, the once centerleft PLN suffered the most (Raventós [START_REF] Vorst | Abstencionistas en Costa Rica: ¿Quiénes son y por qué no votan? Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica[END_REF]. In this context, PAC took the social democratic baton and attracted many intellectuals and prominent figures from the PLN and other parties. After two PLN governments, PAC won the election for the first time in history, as the PLN collapsed in the second round in 2014 [START_REF] Alfaro Redondo | Cultura política de la democracia en Costa Rica y en las Américas, 2014: Gobernabilidad democrática a través de 10 años del Barómetro de las Américas[END_REF]. Finally, the PLN finished third for the first time in 2018, when the PAC defeated the evangelical Christian National Restoration Party (Partido Restauración Nacional, PRN), founded in 2005. While support for non-established parties increased, and a candidate from a previously fringe party made it to the second-round vote in 2018, established parties have survived, and the party system has not collapsed, prompting some authors to favor the concept of realignment instead [START_REF] Perelló | Abrupt and gradual realignments: The case of Costa Rica, 1958-2018[END_REF].

A Multi-Class Party Cleavage

In what follows, we study political cleavages in Costa Rica since the 1970s until the present by classifying parties as left-wing (PLN, PAC, Broad Front) or right-wing (PUSC, PRN, Libertarian Movement, and other center-right parties). While the PLN has been a member of the Socialist International since the 1960s, it is arguable if it still remains a center-left party, especially after 2006 when Óscar Arias, usually associated with the so-called neo-liberal forces within the PLN, was reelected president for the second time [START_REF] Arias-Chavarría | Estado, neoliberalismo y empresarios en Costa Rica: La coyuntura del TLC[END_REF][START_REF] Martínez Franzoni | How did Costa Rica achieve social and market incorporation?[END_REF][START_REF] Wilson | When social democrats choose neoliberal economic policies: The case of Costa Rica[END_REF].

In the interest of historical consistency, we have considered the PLN as a left-wing party, but we show that our results are unchanged whether we consider PLN a left-wing party or not [START_REF] Coppedge | A classification of Latin American political parties[END_REF]Huber et al., 2012).

The leaders of the 1940s polarized the population into two major political forces.

Hence, the bipolar system between the 1950s and 1970s, was motivated by the tension between PLN and "anti-PLN (antiliberacionismo)" [START_REF] Sánchez | Cambio en la dinámica electoral en Costa Rica: un caso de desalineamiento[END_REF]. However, great fragmentation within the "anti-PLN" camp, prevented the system to become two-party based from the beginning. The socialist left could not take part in elections before 1974, which made the process not strictly competitive [START_REF] Vargas Cullell | Capítulo 1: la democracia amenazada[END_REF].

Therefore, the principal political cleavage of Costa Rica from 1948 through 2000 was between PLN's supporters and its adversaries [START_REF] Coppedge | The evolution of Latin American party systems. Politics, society, and democracy: Latin America[END_REF].

The hegemony of the PLN until the 1970s was partly due to a growing middle class of urban professionals and small coffee producers who relied on the state to support its production activities, strengthen the bureaucracy and expand public employment, and manage conflict in the rural sector and between capital and labor [START_REF] Martínez Franzoni | Good jobs and social services: How Costa Rica achieved the elusive double incorporation[END_REF]. In this process of "state colonization", successive goverments embarked in the project of developing the country, while simultaneously nurturing a faithful party base [START_REF] Vargas Cullell | Capítulo 1: la democracia amenazada[END_REF]. Hence, during the hegemonic period of PLN, the elites supported the left, because they benefited directly from the reforms undertaken by the party. This explains to a large extent why the party was slightly more supported by highest-income earners until the 1990s, while lower-income voters who did not benefit as much from these policies supported more the PUSC (Figure 8).

Dissatisfaction with the deterioration of the welfare state during the economic recession of the 1980s, the neoliberal turn of the PLN from socio-democratic to neoliberal policies and corruption scandals, led to an increase in political dissatisfaction with traditional parties, the rise of abstention (mainly among lower-income earners, see Raventós [START_REF] Vorst | Abstencionistas en Costa Rica: ¿Quiénes son y por qué no votan? Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica[END_REF]) and a large shift of voters towards new parties such as the Libertarian Movement and the PAC especially among highest-income earners, the PRN among lower-income earners, and the Broad Front among all classes, as shown on Figure 15.8.

The enlargement of the multi-party system thus resulted in a reconfiguration of the socioeconomic structure of the electorate with different competing pro-poor (i.e., PLN and PRN) and pro-rich parties (i.e., PUSC and PAC) since the 2000s. 14 The same findings are obtained when looking at the voting patterns by education (Figure 9). voting patters in terms of income and education, the second round in 2018 showed that the elites of PLN have lost control of their political base [START_REF] Cascante | Capítulo 2: perspectivas territoriales de la competencia partidista[END_REF].

The reconfiguration of the political landscape in the last two decades has also changed the dynamics of the vote along occupational, regional and religious lines. Left-wing education and economic elites vote strongly for PAC and are mostly composed of professionals, wage earners and public sector workers, many of which used to vote for the PLN (Table 3). Moreover, regional cleavages are key explanatory factors of voting in Costa Rica. The PAC vote is clearly urban, as since its first election in 2002 the party has never won in any of the peripheral provinces in the first round of presidential elections, not even in 2014 or 2018 when it went on to win the presidency (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, 2018). The PLN, on the other hand, has persistently made better scores in rural areas and in the lowlands until today, but a large share of its vote and that of PUSC has been captured by the conservative PRN in the 2018 last election (Table 3).

A protestant cleavage became very salient in the last 2018 presidential election. After a nonbinding sentence by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that recommended Costa Rica to approve same-sex marriage (Programa Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo Humano Sostenible, 2018), the Evangelical Christian PRN managed to finish first in the first round obtaining 73 percent of the protestant vote. 15 In contrast to Peru and Mexico, the politicization of ethnicity has been weak in Costa Rica and thus there are no strong ethnic divisions in voting patterns (Table 3). This analysis tells the story of two Costa Ricas: a prosperous, educated and modern one in urban areas of the center of the country who mainly supports PAC, and a loweducated and poor one on the coasts and along the borders, who support the old center left (PLN) and conservative parties (e.g., PRN). The challenges brought about by this geographical and social polarization will probably exacerbate with current levels of growing inequality. 15 See appendix Figure CC52.

Colombia

Colombia's Historical Two-Party System

Colombia became independent from Spain in 1810, obtaining full detachment from colonial rule after the Battle of Boyacá in 1819. After the Libertador Simon Bolívar died in 1830, the country set a two-party system (Conservative-Liberal) for more than 150 years [START_REF] Bushnell | The making of modern Colombia: A nation in spite of itself[END_REF]. The Liberals' ideals were anticlericalism, federalism, and free trade, while Conservatives defended the Church and favored centralization, and protectionism.

Inter-party violence was widespread during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, reaching its peak between 1948 and 1953, a period known as La Violencia. To pacify the country, the Conservative and Liberal parties agreed to the National Front (Frente Nacional, FN) deal, under which the presidency alternated every four years between 1958 and 1974, and parity in party representation across all government bodies was ensured. The FN's deal excluded radical civil sectors, peasants, workers and all those ideologically aligned with the left, and some of their most important demands, in particular land reform [START_REF] Delpar | Colombia: Fragmented land, divided society[END_REF]. Traditional parties represented the interests of the landed elites, who were ideologically closer to the right (Leal Buitrago and Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, 2010). The prolonged and intense fighting forged the public's strong identification with the two traditional parties so that bipartisan dominance persisted until the FN formally ended in 1974, and only collapsed in the early 2000s, after the adoption of the electoral reforms included in the 1991 constitution.

The absence of political opportunities for outsiders, combined with the lack of state presence in the Colombian periphery, the survival of Liberal rural guerrillas from La Violencia, and the inspiration from the Cold War, led to the formation of left-leaning guerrilla movements in the early 1960s. The most powerful was the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) [START_REF] Ayala Diago | Nacionalismo y populismo: anapo y el discurso político de la oposición en Colombia, 1960-1966[END_REF]. The guerrillas were backed by the Colombian Communist Party, which approved the thesis of the combination of all forms of struggle, establishing that armed conflict is inevitable and necessary as a factor in the Colombian revolution [START_REF] Escobar Escobar | Aportes sobre el origen del conflicto armado en Colombia: su persistencia y sus impactos[END_REF].

In the 1980s, the government was forced to negotiate with insurgents due to increasing violence in rural areas and repression of left-leaning supporters. As part of the peace talks, a fraction of the guerrilla formed a left-wing political movement, the Patriotic Union (La Union Patriótica, UP), to provide outsiders with a political platform to participate in politics. The 1991 constitution further consolidated the opening of the political system by allowing historically excluded groups (left-wing or religious movements, peasants, indigenous people, union workers, etc.) to participate in elections. In 2018, Iván Duque, the Uribist candidate from the CD, was elected president against the left-wing candidate of the new party Colombia Humana, Gustavo Petro, a dissident from the PDA. His victory resulted from divisions between anti-Uribist candidates, who failed to agree for the runoff despite their higher cumulated scores in the first round.

A New

Uribisim, Class Cleavages, and the Peace Process

In what follows, we will analyze the link between electoral behaviors and socioeconomic factors in Colombia using post-electoral surveys covering all presidential elections between 2002 and 2018 16 . To do so, we classify Colombian parties as right-wing if they have a conservative root on its statutes if Álvaro Uribe was a member or if the party was openly allied with an Uribist party, and as left-wing if they are openly anti-Uribist or if their programs included open support for the peace negotiation with the FARC (Figure 10). The Party of the U is considered to be Uribist when it was supported by Uribe and anti-Uribist after 2014 17 . 16 See online appendix Table DC1 for data sources 17 We use right-and left-wing labels to facilitate comparative analysis. However, these categories are not precise in the Colombian context as left/right labels are usually associated with criminal left/right groups. To what extent have positions towards the conflict represented class cleavages since the beginning of Uribism? The armed conflict was more salient for anti-Uribist voters, as they are strongly represented in rural areas where the guerrillas had most of their presence. In Uribe's view, the guerrillas were terrorist groups that constituted the primary source of Colombia's problems. Hence, more than 70 percent of those considering violence as the main problem in Colombia voted for Uribists from 2002 to 2010. However, those 19 See online appendix Figures DA2 andDA3. 29 who considered that violence was the main problem in Colombia began to believe that Santos' negotiation could succeed and voted for him in 2014. In contrast, for anti-Uribists corruption was the main problem of the country 20 .

Class divisions and the position towards the conflict are also aligned with generational, rural-urban, and sectoral cleavages. The anti-Uribist vote is highest among young, urban voters working in the public sector (Figure 12). In line with the voting patterns by income and education level, the dramatic drop in the difference in left-wing vote between urban and rural areas in 2014 can be associated to both the interest in rural areas to support the peace process and the great share of rural beneficiaries from social assistance policies. Generational and sectoral cleavages also reverted in 2014, as a large share of old and non-public sector voters shifted towards the left and voted for Santos. The ruralurban cleavage is not a recent phenomenon, as Colombian cities have historically been the strongholds of the independent vote outside of the Liberal-Conservative tradition [START_REF] Kline | Colombia: portrait of unity and diversity[END_REF]. Religion has also historically been an important dividing variable. The Conservative Party was allied with the Catholic Church to control the education system and privilege Conservative areas. Given literacy restrictions on the right to vote, only lifted in 1936, the uneven spread of literacy skills along partisan lines also unevenly broadened the electorate, thereby helping the Conservative Party in its pursuit of political hegemony [START_REF] Sanchez Talanquer | States divided: History, conflict, and state formation in Mexico and Colombia[END_REF]. This pattern reverted as education became more secular, and anti-Conservative voters gradually turned more educated. The Church and new religious groups thus consolidated their influence on the low-educated and low-income groups.

Even though left-wing candidates openly declare themselves to be atheists, they have gradually made their speech more flexible and avoided entering into the religious discussion. This explains why the difference in the left vote between non-religious and religious (mainly Catholics and Protestants) voters has progressively declined (Figure 13). Colombia also had a historical gender gap according to which women were more conservative than men. This division has been closed since 2014, due likely to gradual decline in religiosity and the introduction of new social issues in the political agenda that match with gender interests, such as abortion approval and gender violence. In contrast to other Latin American countries, finally, ethnic cleavages are weak in Colombia: Afro-Colombians, the largest ethnic minority, have only been slightly more left-wing relative to the rest of the population (Figure 13).

Mexico

Since its independence from Spain in 1821, the United Mexican States has had a long and rich political history that goes from two Empires in the 19th Century, to the one-party system by the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) and the first alternation of power after democratic elections in the 2000s [START_REF] Espinoza Valle | El deterioro de la democracia: consideraciones sobre el régimen político, lo público y la ciudadanía en México[END_REF]. The rule of the PRI as the hegemonic party of the twentieth century started at the end of the Mexican Revolution (1910)(1911)(1912)(1913)(1914)(1915)(1916)(1917). The initial aim of this armed conflict was to put an end to the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz . After Díaz left Mexico in 1911, elections were organized and Francisco Madero was elected president.

The PRI was created in 1929 as the direct heir of the revolutionary movement and immediately became the dominant party. Plurality of parties was only accepted with great limitations in the lower house of the Congress from 1963 onwards. Between 1946 and1976, the party exhibited its strongest authoritarian control over the electoral process.

As a result, repression and violence rose in the 1960s, which culminated in the infamous Tlatelolco Massacre of 1968[START_REF] Pinelo López | Las reformas electorales, causas y efectos como factor decisivo para la alternancia politica en Mexico[END_REF]. This period ended with the presidential election of 1976, the only election in Mexican history with a single candidate, José López Portillo.

Political plurality in Mexico was only confirmed with the electoral reform of 1977, which sought to include groups previously banned and promoted the creation of new political parties. However, the reform did not appease the public who was increasingly discontent with corruption and electoral fraud, setting the basis for a succession of strong left-leaning parties that would play a key role in the following decades [START_REF] Cantú | The fingerprints of fraud: Evidence from Mexico's 1988 presidential election[END_REF].

Two strategies exploited during the heyday of the one-party system deserve special attention. Firstly, many labor union leaders were themselves members of PRI (Baz-dresch and Levy, 1991). However, PRI lost the monopoly of support from labor unions in the 1980s, when technocrats who increasingly favored neoliberal reforms replaced the old guard of the party and unions began to lose influence within the PRI structure [START_REF] Garcia | Historia de la CTM 1936-2006[END_REF]. Secondly, the political establishment used the so-called para-state parties to project competitive elections while being controlled by PRI. Real opposition only came from the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) and the Mexican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Mexicano, PCM), both of which were illegal and persecuted until the electoral reform of 1977.

The creation of an independent body with the mandate of organizing elections in 1990 was followed by increasing transparency and competitiveness of the electoral process. In the subsequent elections, the PRI saw its share of votes decrease until finally losing the presidency to the PAN in 2000 (Figure 14) [START_REF] Klesner | The end of Mexico's one-party regime[END_REF]. Simultaneously, violence and drug trafficking dominated the 1990s, prompting some authors to call Mexico a "narcodemocracy" [START_REF] Patenostro | Mexico as a narco-democracy[END_REF]. Therefore, the quick recognition of the electoral results by PRI president Ernesto Zedillo, and the subsequent peaceful transfer of power, set up

Mexico's Multi-elite Party System

We now turn to studying the changing relationship between left-right party choice and socioeconomic characteristics during Mexico's transition from a one-party to a multi-party system since 1952. 22 The main parties on the right are the PRI and the PAN, while the main parties on the left are the PRD and more recently Morena (Figure 14). Although the PRI was initially a center-left party that drew inspiration from the ideals of the Mexican Revolution, its orientation can be considered as center-right in recent years [START_REF] Coppedge | A classification of Latin American political parties[END_REF]Huber et al., 2012). Since the late 1970s, a series of reforms indeed took the party to the center right, such as the privatization of state-owned companies and the reestablishment of relations with the Church. The party is still part of the Socialist International, but it is not currently considered socialist nor social democrat by most contemporary analysts. Despite Mexico's profound transformation from a one-party to a multi-party system since the 1970s, the country seems to have maintained during this process a reasonably stable multi-elite party system: higher education is associated with a generally greater propensity to vote for the left, whereas higher income is associated with slightly lower support for the left (Figure 15). This pattern is largely due to the PAN and left-wing parties being more popular among top-income earners and the highest educated, respectively (Figures 16 and17). The PRI's traditional base instead are the lower educated living in poor rural areas, and in recent years older voters who remember the years of the "Mexican miracle" . 23 The latter benefited from PRI support thanks to political clientelism and, more recently, to social programs such as Progresa. The education gradient weakened during the 1990s and 2000s with the decline in the PRI's vote share and the overall increase in support for the PAN and the left. The influence of the "useful" vote to oust the PRI after 71 years of political domination may have contributed to this tendency [START_REF] Klesner | The end of Mexico's one-party regime[END_REF]. Despite genuine electoral competition, however, alternation of power did not improve political satisfaction after fiscal and monetary orthodoxy failed to solve urgent problems such as jobs and poverty [START_REF] Crow | The party's over: citizen conceptions of democracy and political dissatisfaction in Mexico[END_REF]. Dissatisfaction reached its peak under the term of PRI president Enrique Peña Nieto (2012Nieto ( -2018) ) [START_REF] García Magos | López Obrador in democratic Mexico[END_REF]. As the left attracted unprecedented support in 2018, especially among the higher-educated and low-income earners, these last elections were marked by a return of the educational divide, at the same time as a reduction in the link between income and voting.

The Decadence of the PRI and the Rise of the Mexican Left

Support for the left in Mexico has increased from less than 10 percent in the 1970s to more than 50 percent in the 2010s. This transition coincided with a series of iterations of electoral fraud, opposition protests, and electoral reforms, which leveled the political playing field and opened new opportunities for electoral competition [START_REF] García Magos | López Obrador in democratic Mexico[END_REF]. The freedoms and opportunities brought about by democratization were responsible for the emergence of a figure like AMLO and his ascent to the presidency. To understand the drivers behind the rise of the Mexican left, it is useful to analyze other socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of voters (Table 4).

First, the left has managed to attract an increasing share of indigenous voters. 24 Recent studies have challenged the idea of an "indigenous vote" and its distinctiveness from other sociodemographic factors [START_REF] Sonnleitner | Participación, representación e inclusión política: ¿existe un voto indígena en México?[END_REF]. We document that indigenous voters have progressively shifted towards the left, reaching its highest level in 2018, when 74 percent of indigenous voters voted for Morena after AMLO's promise of more protection and security in indigenous communities.

Second, there has also been an increase in the support of farmers for the left in the 2010s. Poor farmers traditionally supported the PRI, based on patronage politics, and their vote share was still the greatest during the 2000s [START_REF] Díaz Cayeros | La geografía electoral de 2012. Center for US-Mexican Studies[END_REF]. Farmers went from being the biggest supporters of the PRI to being the biggest supporters of the left in the 2010s, with 71 percent of them voting for Morena. 25Third, the left has managed to attract votes from outside the National Capital, in particular in the North and South, the old strongholds of the PRI since the Mexican Revolution. The PRI is the only party that is proportionally stronger in rural areas, while both the PAN and the PRD have traditionally drawn most of their support from urban areas [START_REF] Díaz Cayeros | La geografía electoral de 2012. Center for US-Mexican Studies[END_REF]. However, strictly rural areas are only a small part of the vast Mexican population and links between rural, semi-urban, and urban areas are increasingly closer (FAO, 2018). While support for the left used to mainly come from the National Capital, the preference for the left in the North and the South surpassed that of the Center in the 2018 election.

Finally, growing support for the left has also come from a mobilized young population. Younger voters were slightly more supportive of the left in the 1990s, and the PAN in the 2000s, than of the PRI26 . Support for the left increased among all age groups in 2018, but this rise was most prominent among the young. Younger cohorts, born after the democratic transition and with no recollection of the hegemonic PRI, therefore seemed to have been particularly hostile to the preservation of the common practices of corruption and clientelism of PRI.

From Colonial Rule to Independence

The political history of Peru has been very turbulent and dates back to the almost 300 years of Spanish colonial rule, which gave rise to the economic, ethnic, and geographic divisions that characterize Peruvian society today. After its independence in 1821, the country took much longer than most Latin American countries to evolve towards a reasonably stable political and economic system, and faced alternating periods of democratic and authoritarian rule.

The 1823 Constitution assumed a culturally homogenous nation in which Spanish was the sole official language and Catholicism the sole official religion [START_REF] Stavenhagen | Universal human rights and the cultures of indigenous peoples and other ethnic groups: The critical frontier of the 1990s[END_REF].

Inspired by the ideals of the Enlightenment, liberators recognized the indigenous as citizens and attempted to provide them with the same rights as whites and mestizos (people of mixed descent). In spite of these declarations, the oligarchic republic that emerged in Peru after independence was based on restricted citizenship, slavery, forced labor, and ethnic discrimination.

The exclusion of a majority of the country from the life of the republic was a major source of the failure of state-building, and the need for integration remained the main theme of Peruvian politics over the twentieth century [START_REF] Crabtree | Toledo's Peru: Vision and reality[END_REF]. The lack of integration was also reflected in the limited political participation of the indigenous. The Electoral Law of 1896 restricted voting rights to male literates older than 21 or married male literates that had not reached that age, thereby excluding the majority of indigenous people, who were illiterate. According to the 1876 census, 58 percent of Peruvians were of indigenous origin [START_REF] Yashar | Contesting citizenship in Latin America: The rise of indigenous movements and the postliberal challenge[END_REF]. This amendment was included in the subsequent Constitutions and only modified in the 1979 Constitution that gave illiterates the right to vote for the first time in national and municipal elections.

The Emergence of the Multi-Party System

After independence, Peru and its neighbors engaged in intermittent territorial disputes and numerous brief aristocratic and authoritarian governments followed one another. It was only in the first decades of the twentieth century that left-wing ideologies emerged.

In 1924, Peruvian leaders exiled in Mexico founded the Peruvian Aprista Party (Partido Aprista Peruano, APRA): the movement led by Haya de la Torre drew its influences from the Mexican revolution and to a lesser extent from the Russian revolution. In 1928, the Socialist Party of Peru, later the Peruvian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Peruano, PCP), was founded under the leadership of José Carlos Mariátegui, himself a former member of APRA. The two parties were the first that tackled the social and economic problems of the country. Although Mariátegui died at a young age, Haya de la Torre was elected president twice, but prevented by the military from taking office.

In the 1950s and 1960s, two important right-wing parties were founded, Popular Action (Acción Popular, AP) in 1956 and the Christian People's Party (Partido Popular Cristiano, PPC) in 1966. Moreover, old members from APRA and the PCP gave birth to rebel political organizations. In 1959, in particular, a clandestine faction within the PCP emerged in Ayacucho, one of the nation's poorest departments, where until midcentury bankrupt landowners used Indians as slaves. This new political group aligned with the Maoist faction of the PCP and defended a new social order where peasant communities would have the same opportunities as people from urban areas in Lima [START_REF] Palmer | The Shining Path of Peru[END_REF]. It was not until the beginning of the 1970s that this faction became the PCP -Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and only in 1980 did it move to violence.

From Authoritarian Rule to Redemocratization

Peru's most recent transition to democracy occurred in 1980 after more than a decade of military rule. The candidate from the center-right AP, Fernando Belaúnde, served as president between 1980 and 1985. After a promising beginning, Belaúnde's popularity however eroded, due mainly to a prolonged economic crisis and the government's unsuccessful struggle to quell a radical guerrilla insurgency promoted by Sendero Luminoso.

Belaúnde's inability to reactivate the economy and stop the violence led to a rise in support for the APRA. After years of repression and clandestinity during the period of military rule, the oldest surviving party of Peru was finally legalized in 1980. In 1985, the leader of the APRA, Alan García since the death of Haya de la Torre, was elected president. His term was characterized by a continuation of the severe economic crisis, social unrest, and violence.

By 1990, many Peruvians had found in the independent candidate from the party Change 90 (Cambio 90), Alberto Fujimori, the transformation they were looking for. Fujimori was initially applauded for his aggressive economic reform program and for stepping up counterinsurgency efforts. Nonetheless, with the passing of time, he displayed increasing autocratic tendencies. He dissolved the legislature in 1992, launched a new constitution in 1993, which allowed him to run again and win in 1995, and engaged in military tactics to eradicate Sendero Luminoso incurring human rights abuses. Fujimori was reelected in 2000, but his government collapsed after revelations of electoral fraud and high-level corruption, forcing him to exile in that same year.

Peru then underwent a period of relative political stability, economic growth, and poverty reduction, led by Peru's first president of indigenous descent, Alejandro Toledo (2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006), the candidate from the center-left party Possible Peru (Perú Posible, PP). Former president García launched a political comeback and won the presidential race in 2006 against his left-wing opponent, Ollanta Humala, from the Peruvian Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Peruano, PNP). Economic growth continued under García, but it was not inclusive enough to improve the social conditions of Peru's poorest people. Humala moderated his stance to a more center-left position, and won the presidency in 2011 against the conservative Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori.

In 2016, the center-right bloc Peruvians for Change (Peruanos por el Kambio, PPK), led by Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, won against two other large blocs, the right-wing coalition Popular Force led by Keiko Fujimori and the left-wing coalition Broad Front (Frente Amplio). After some corruption scandals, Kuczynski announced his resignation in 2018 and his vice-president Martín Vizcarra took office. He dissolved the Congress in September 2019 and issued a decree for legislative elections to be held in January 2020. The election, one of the most divisive in Peruvian history due largely to the corruption scandals of current and previous members of the two right-wing coalitions, opened a new political era in the country [START_REF] Soldevilla | Perú: elecciones 2016: un país dividido y un resultado inesperado[END_REF]. Fujimorists lost most of their seats, while the APRA made the worst result in its history, failing to win a seat for the first time since 1963. Vizcarra was, however, impeached by the Peruvian Congress in November 2020 accused of corruption and a mishandling of the Covid-19 pandemic. Vizcarra's impeachment led to social unrest and Manuel Merino, President of the Peruvian Congress who succeeded him as president, resigned on November 15th. Francisco Sagasti was then elected President of Congress on the 16th and became President of Peru on November 17th.

Socioeconomic Cleavages during Redemocratization

The return to constitutional government in 1980 facilitated the institutionalization of procedures for participation in political life, and political parties -some new and some old -emerged from the years of military rule. In what follows, we will analyze how this process of redemocratization shaped political polarization along social dimensions using post-electoral surveys for all presidential elections held between 1995 and 2016. 27 FE1 for data sources. 28 There is some controversy with respect to the classification of APRA. We follow [START_REF] Planas | La democracia volátil: movimientos, partidos, líderes políticos y conductas electorales en el Perú contemporáneo[END_REF] and classify the party to the center left. Nonetheless, we carry the whole analysis excluding APRA and show that it barely affects the results. To categorize other parties, we use the classification of [START_REF] Marino | Vueltas y revueltas de la derecha peruana en el siglo XXI[END_REF].

Until the mid-twentieth century, Peru was mainly characterized by multiclass electoral constituencies mobilized by oligarchic leaders based on clientelistic networks [START_REF] Cameron | Democracy and authoritarianism in Peru: Political coalitions and social change[END_REF]. Strong class divisions in voting patterns did not emerge until the 1980s, following the rise of labor unions and urban social organizations. The strength of labor unions and popular organizations already eroded by the end of the 1980s, due to the deep economic crisis and political violence. This process gave room to a new type of personalist leadership initiated by Fujimori, which broke with traditional class-based voting patterns and continued with all other leaders until today [START_REF] Roberts | Neoliberalism and lower-class voting behavior in Peru[END_REF]. Peru thus presents strong divisions among education and income groups since the mid-1990s, but they have fluctuated, not persisting over time (Figure 19). The education gradient for right-wing parties has been quite stable throughout the whole period. Even though Fujimorism is a multi-class political coalition, it attracts relatively more the lowest-educated vote, while the other right-wing parties (PPC, UN, AP, PPK) are more popular among the highest educated (Figure 20). Fujimori did not attract massive support based on class solidarity, but on hard work and individual initiative [START_REF] Roberts | Neoliberalism and lower-class voting behavior in Peru[END_REF]. The education cleavage turned negative between 1995-2000 and 2006-2011 due mainly to a substantial reduction in support for Fujimorism after revelations of electoral fraud and corruption, to the benefit of the APRA, UPP, and GP, that happened among all education groups but was more pronounced among the lower educated.29 Following Humala's corruption scandals, in the 2016 election the education cleavage turned positive again, as the reduction in the left vote share was more intense among lowest-educated voters than among the highest educated. , 1995-2016 Voting differences between income groups have been more pronounced. Support for Fujimorism during the 1990s was nearly the same between top 10 percent and bottom 90 percent earners, but the lost in support since the 2000s was larger among top-income earners, who are better represented among the other right (Figure 21). Hence, the Fujimorist Popular Front became in 2016 the most important party among the low-educated and low-income electorate. Keiko Fujimori's success relied on political platform that emphasized significant measures to tackle violent crime and that distanced herself from the legacy of authoritarianism and graft of her father [START_REF] Soldevilla | Perú: elecciones 2016: un país dividido y un resultado inesperado[END_REF]. Taken together, recent fluctuations in class-based cleavages are largely determined by changes in the electoral behaviors of the lower educated and the poor, whose vote seems to be driven more by specific leaders than by party ideology.

The Recent Politicization of Ethnic Identities

When compared to neighboring and ethnically similar Andean countries like Ecuador and Bolivia, Peru appears as an exceptional case, characterized by the weak activism of nationally-organized indigenous movements and parties [START_REF] Yashar | Contesting citizenship in Latin America: The rise of indigenous movements and the postliberal challenge[END_REF]. Since redemocratization, indigenous issues have, however, been gradually incorporated into the political process, but their salience for party competition only recently emerged during the presidential campaign of Alberto Fujimori in 1990.

Although from Japanese origin, Alberto Fujimori managed to attract with a pro-ethnic and pro-poor discourse a substantial share of the poor indigenous and Asian vote in the 1990 presidential run-off elections against Mario Vargas Llosa, who symbolised the white Lima upper class [START_REF] Madrid | Ethnic proximity and ethnic voting in Peru[END_REF]. Fujimorism continued attracting a large share of the Asian vote, but the indigenous support shifted towards Alejandro Toledo in the 2001 election, when he became first elected president of Andean roots. He frequently used indigenous symbols and discussed issues relevant to indigenous voters during his presidential campaign. In line with Toledo, Humala also referred to ethnic issues during his campaign. Hence, the two presidential left-wing campaigns politicized ethnic divisions to attract more votes in indigenous areas [START_REF] Raymond | The politicization of indigenous identities in Peru[END_REF]. This strategy proved to be successful, as the share of votes towards Humala grew significantly after 2006 in the South, where the share of indigenous people is larger (Figure 22). 1953 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 1953 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 Difference between (% of women) and (% of men) voting left

After controlling for income, education, age, religion, employment, self-employment and marital status, occupation, perceived class, union membership, rural-urban location, region and ethnicity Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

-

FIGURE 1 :

 1 FIGURE 1: General elections in Argentina, 1995-2019

FIGURE 2 :

 2 FIGURE 2: The Peronist vote, income, and education in Argentina, 1995-2019

FIGURE 3 :

 3 FIGURE 3: Election results in Chile, 1989 -2017

FIGURE 4 :

 4 FIGURE 4: The left-wing vote, income, and education in Chile, 1989-2017

FIGURE 5 :

 5 FIGURE 5: Vote and income in Chile, 1993-2017

FIGURE 6 :

 6 FIGURE 6: Vote and education in Chile, 1989-2017

  The two sides of the Civil War were at the origin of the dichotomous political environment that dominated Costa Rican politics for the next five decades. The winning side, led by Figueres Ferrer, established the National Liberation Party (Partido Liberación Nacional, PLN), of center-left social democratic orientation, which would become the dominant political party. The losing side, led by Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, reconstituted into a number of political parties and coalitions of center-right Christian democratic orientation that won the presidential elections three times before establishing the Social Christian Unity Party (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana, PUSC) in 1983. The successful transfer of control to the center right in 1958 marked the beginning of a tradition of alternation of power that crystallized in the following decades (Figure 7) (Solís Avendaño, 2006).

FIGURE 7 :

 7 FIGURE 7: Election results in Costa Rica, 1953-2018

FIGURE 8 :

 8 FIGURE 8: Vote and income in Costa Rica, 1974-2018

  Political Dichotomy: Uribism vs. Anti-Uribism With the beginning of the 21st century, Colombia's political landscape experienced a profound transformation. The two traditional parties lost part of their hegemony in benefit of left-leaning political groups. In 2002, the independent Álvaro Uribe became president of the Republic by offering a new right-wing populism, economic liberalism and promoting a military confrontation to resolute the conflict against the FARC, known as Uribism. His main contenders were the liberal Horacio Serpa and an emerging party, the Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Alternativo, PDA), which represented the left-wing ideology and obtained the third position. Álvaro Uribe was reelected in the first round in 2006, beating the intellectual left-wing candidate Carlos Gaviria (PDA), who won 22 percent of the votes, the highest share of votes obtained by a left-wing party in Colombian history. In 2010, Juan Manuel Santos, Uribe's former Ministry of Defense and candidate of the Party of the Union (Partido de la Unidad Nacional, or Party of the U), was elected president with Uribe's support, against the intellectual progressive Antanas Mockus from the Green Party (Partido Verde). Santos differed from Uribe in his ideological approach to the conflict, he was not in favor of a military intervention and set up a third peaceful attempt to negotiate with the FARC. The negotiation precipitated Uribe to form a new right-wing movement, the Democratic Center (Centro Democrático, CD). The CD won the 2010 election and thus led Santos' government to the opposition, whereas the Party of the U turned more progressive. Santos ran for a second consecutive term in the 2014 election, winning against Óscar Iván Zuluaga (CD), the Uribist candidate, and the left-wing candidate Clara López (PDA). Santos signed a historic peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, thus ending almost 60 years of military confrontations.

FIGURE 10 :

 10 FIGURE 10: Election results in Colombia, 2002-2018

FIGURE 11 :

 11 FIGURE 11: The anti-uribist vote, income, and education in Colombia, 2002-2018

FIGURE 12 :

 12 FIGURE 12: The anti-uribist vote in Colombia, 2002-2018: public workers, new generations and urban areas

FIGURE 13 :

 13 FIGURE 13: The anti-uribist vote in Colombia, 2002-2018: non-religious, Afro-Colombians and women

a

  milestone in Mexican political history. The ghost of electoral fraud nonetheless came back after the 2006 and 2012 elections. 21

FIGURE 14 :

 14 FIGURE 14: Election results in Mexico, 1952-2018

FIGURE 15 :

 15 FIGURE 15: The social-democratic vote, income, and education inMexico, 1979Mexico, -2018

FIGURE 16 :

 16 FIGURE 16: Vote and education in Mexico, 1952-2018

FIGURE 17 :

 17 FIGURE 17: Vote and income in Mexico,1952-2018

Figure 18

 18 Figure 18 summarizes election results for the most important parties since 1995. Rightwing parties include the Fujimorists, the PPC, the Christian democratic alliance National Unity (2000-2008), the AP, and since 2016 the PPK. Left-wing parties include the Union for Peru (Unión por Perú, UPP), the PNP, Peru Wins (Gana Perú, GP), the PP, and APRA. 28

FIGURE 18 :

 18 FIGURE 18: Election results in Peru, 1995-2016

FIGURE 19 :

 19 FIGURE 19: The socialist / progressist vote, income, and education in Peru, 1995-2016

FIGURE 20 :

 20 FIGURE 20: Vote and education in Peru, 1995-2016

FIGURE 21 :

 21 FIGURE 21: Vote and income in Peru, 1995-2016

FIGURE 22 :

 22 FIGURE 22: The socialist / progressist vote by region, 1995-2016

FIGUREFigure AA18 -Figure AA19 -Figure AA20 -Figure AA21 -Figure AA22 -

 AA18AA19AA20AA21AA22 FIGURE 23: The ethnic cleavage in Peru, 2016

  Figure B3 -The income cleavage in Chile

Figure BA16 -Figure BA17 -Figure BA18 -Figure BA19 -Figure BA20 -Figure BA21 -Figure BA22 -Figure BA23 -Figure BA24 -

 BA16BA17BA18BA19BA20BA21BA22BA23BA24 Figure BA16 -Vote for the left among university graduates and topincome voters, after controls

Figure BB12 -Figure BB37 -

 BB12BB37 Figure BB12 -Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by social class

  Figure C1 -Election results in Costa Rica, 1953-2018

Figure D2 -Figure D3 -

 D2D3 Figure D1 -Election results in Colombia, 2002-2018

Figure D4 -Figure DA20 -

 D4DA20 Figure D4 -Vote for left-wing parties (Anti-Uribists) among non-religious voters, Afro-Colombians, and women in Colombia, after controls

Figure DA22 -

 DA22 Figure DA22 -Vote for left-wing parties (Anti-Uribists) among tertiaryeducated voters and top-income voters, after controls

  Figure DA23 -Vote for left-wing parties (Anti-Uribists) among topincome earners

FigureFigure E2 -

 E2 Figure E1 -Presidential election results inMexico, 1952Mexico, -2018

Figure EB22 -Figure EB23 -Figure EB24 -Figure EB25 -Figure EB26 -

 EB22EB23EB24EB25EB26 Figure EB21 -Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left among primaryeducated votersDifference between (% of primary educ.) and (% of other voters) voting left

  Figure F1 -Election results in Peru, 1995-2016

Figure F2 -

 F2 Figure F2 -Vote for Socialists / Progressives among tertiary-educated and top-income voters, after controls

Figure FB20 -Figure FB23 -Figure FB24 -Figure FB25 -Figure FB26 -Figure FC7 -

 FB20FB23FB24FB25FB26FC7 Figure FB20 -Vote for Socialists / Progressives among university graduatesDifference between (% of univ. graduates) and (% of other voters) voting Socialists / Progressives

TABLE 1 :

 1 The structure of political cleavages inArgentina, 2015Argentina, -2019

TABLE 2 :

 2 The structure of political cleavages in Chile, 2017 Modern political history of Costa Rica starts in the aftermath of the 1948 Civil War, triggered by the annulation of the elections results of February 1948. A group of rebels led by José Figueres Ferrer formed the National Liberation Army and successfully toppled the government of Teodoro Picado

	4 Costa Rica

TABLE 3 :

 3 The structure of political cleavages in CostaRica, 2010Rica, -2018

TABLE 4 :

 4 The structure of political cleavages in Mexico,

2018 7 Peru

Table AB1 -

 AB1 Survey data sourcesSource: authors' elaboration. WVS: World Values Survey, available from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. CSES: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, available from https://cses.org/. LAPOP: Latin American Public Opinion Project, available from https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php. Note: the table shows the surveys used in the paper, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

	Survey	Year	Source	Type	1995-99	Sample size 2007-11	2015-19
	Pre-electoral Age: 20-40	1995	World Values Survey, Argentina	Presidential	51%	1079	58%	48%
	Pre-electoral Age: 40-60	1999	World Values Survey, Argentina	Presidential	29%	1280	29%	31%
	Post-electoral Age: 60+	2007	LAPOP, Argentina	Presidential	19%	2896	13%	20%
	Post-electoral Post-electoral Meet end of the month: Very difficult meet the end of month 2011 LAPOP, Argentina 2015 LAPOP, Argentina Pre-electoral 2019 World Values Survey, Argentina Meet end of the month: Difficult to meet the end of month Meet end of the month: Just meet the end of the month	Presidential Presidential Presidential		3024 3056 1003	12% 33% 47%	15% 28% 49%
	Meet end of the month: Meet and save after the end of the month					9%	8%
	Subjective social class: Working class				53%		42%	88%
	Subjective social class: Upper/Middle class class			47%		58%	12%
	Education: Primary					36%		26%	27%
	Education: Secondary					42%		47%	34%
	Education: Tertiary					22%		28%	39%
	Employment status: Employed				50%		61%	56%
	Employment status: Unemployed				12%		16%	6%
	Employment status: Inactive				38%		22%	38%
	Interest in politics: Not at all						29%	33%
	Interest in politics: Somewhat						33%	26%
	Interest in politics: Great							28%	23%
	Interest in politics: Very great						11%	18%
	Marital status: Single					40%		49%	50%
	Marital status: Married/Partner				60%		51%	50%
	Occupation: Public worker							21%	19%
	Occupation: Private Worker						39%	34%
	Occupation: Entrepreneur							3%	3%
	Occupation: Self-employed							36%	43%
	Occupation: Non-paid worker						1%	1%
	Ethnicity: White							68%	55%
	Ethnicity: Mestizo							28%	36%
	Ethnicity: Indigenous							1%	1%
	Ethnicity: Black							1%	4%
	Ethnicity: Other							1%	5%
	Region: Capital and Great Buenos Aires				71%		38%	39%

Table AB2 -Complete descriptive statistics by decade

 AB2 authors' computations using Argentinian political attitudes surveys. Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by decade for selected available variables.

	Region: Pampa			18%	27%	30%
	Region: North			4%	22%	20%
	Region: Cuyo/Patagonia			7%	13%	11%
	Religion: No religion				11%	11%
	Religion: Catholic Religion: Protestant Religion: Other Church attendance : Never Church attendance : Less than monthly Church attendance : Monthly or more Church attendance : Weekly or more Locality size: Urban area Locality size: Rural area Sector of employment: Private Sector of employment: Public Self-employment status: Not self-employed Self-employment status: Self-employed Gender: Woman Gender: Man Union membership: Not union member Union membership: Union member Education Primary Secondary Tertiary Income Bottom 50% Middle 40% Top 10% Religious affiliation No religion Catholic Protestant Other Church attendance Never Source: Peronists 55% 51% 38% 55% 44% 34% 41% 35% 43% 40% 38% Less than monthly 40%	Non-Peronists 45% 49% 62% 45% 56% 66% 59% 65% 57% 60% 62% 60%	84% 16% 53% 47% 93% 7%	74% 9% 5% 65% 12% 10% 13% 89% 11% 88% 12% 79% 21% 51% 49%	64% 16% 9% 70% 8% 8% 14% 88% 12% 90% 10% 76% 24% 52% 48% 92% 8%
	Monthly or more	33%	67%
	Weekly or more	35%	65%
	Age
	20-40	49%	51%
	40-60	45%	55%
	+60	43%	57%
	Gender
	Woman	46%	54%
	Man	47%	53%
	Occupation
	Public worker	39%	61%
	Private Worker	34%	66%
	Entrepreneur	27%	73%
	Self-employed	38%	62%
	Non-paid worker	45%	55%
	Subjective social class
	Working class	57%	43%
	Upper/Middle	32%	68%
	Region
	Capital and Great Buenos Aires	54%	46%
	Pampa	33%	67%
	North	47%	53%
	Cuyo/Patagonia	53%	47%
	Rural-urban location
	Urban area	47%	53%
	Rural area	40%	60%

Table AB3 -The structure of political cleavages in Argentina, 2015-2019 (extended) Share of votes received (%)

 AB3 Source: authors' computations using Argentinian political attitudes surveys. Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by Peronists by selected individual characteristics in 2015-2019.

			Figure B1 -
		80%
		70%
		60%
	(%)	50%
	vote	40%
	popular	30%
	Share of	10% 20%
		0%
		1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014

Election results in Chile, 1989-2017

		Figure BA2 -
	35	Concertación/New Majority	Right bloc (RN, UDI)
	30	Other	Communists/Humanists/Broad Front
	25
	20
	15
	10
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	-20
	-25
	1989	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
		Source: authors' computations using official election results.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Chilean political parties in
		presidential elections between 1989 and 2017. The Communists are included with Concertación in 2013

and 2017, as they run together in the election, and the DC is included with Concertación in 2017, even though they run separately for the first time in that election.

Vote for the left among highest-educated and top-income voters in Chile, after controls

	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) educated voting left, after controls
	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting left, after controls
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for center-left/left-
	wing parties, after controlling for age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, employment and marital status,
	union membership, ethnicity and region. The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing
	parties that do not belong to the center-left alliance.

  Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union and National Renewal (right bloc), Christian Democracy, The Force of the Majority (heirs of Concertación, excluding the Communists) and the Communist Party, Humanist Party, the Broad Front and other left-wing parties by selected individual characteristics in 2017.

		Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal	Christian Democracy	The Force of the Majority (excl. Communists)	Communist Party/Humanist Party/Broad Front/Other left
	Education level
	Primary	48%	6%	27%	19%
	Secondary	45%	5%	23%	27%
	Tertiary	43%	4%	29%	24%
	Income group
	Bottom 50%	45%	5%	24%	26%
	Middle 40%	47%	6%	26%	21%
	Top 10%	51%	3%	31%	16%
	Region
	North	47%	2%	26%	25%
	Center	42%	5%	27%	26%
	South	51%	4%	25%	21%
	Age
	20-39	47%	2%	19%	33%
	40-59	44%	5%	29%	21%
	+60	42%	9%	34%	16%
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Table B1 -The structure of political cleavages in Chile, 2017 Share of votes received (%)

 B1

	Figure BA1 -
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1989	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17

Vote for the left by education level in Chile

	Figure BA2 -
	90%
	80%	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1989	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by education level. The
	left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left
	alliance.

Vote for the left by education group

	Figure BA3 -
	80%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by education group. The
	left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left
	alliance.

Vote for the left by income decile

	Figure BA4 -
	70%
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1993-99		2005-09					2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by income decile. The left
	is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left
	alliance.

Vote for the left by income group

	Figure BA5 -
	80%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by income group. The left
	is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left
	alliance.

Vote for the left by religious affiliation

	Figure BA6 -
	80%
		No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09		2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by religious affiliation. The
	left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left
	alliance.

Vote for the left by church attendance

		Figure BA7 -
	70%
	Never	Less than monthly	Monthly or more	Weekly or more
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
			2005-09
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by church attendance.

The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the centerleft alliance.

Vote for the left by home ownership

	Figure BA8 -
	100%
	90%		Renting	Owner
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1989	1993-99	2005-09
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by home ownership. The
	left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left
	alliance.

Vote for the left by employment status

	Figure BA9 -
	100%
		Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09		2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by employment status.

The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the centerleft alliance.

Vote for the left by region

	Figure BA10 -
	70%
	North	Center	South
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1989	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by region. The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left alliance.

Vote for the left by gender

		Figure BA11 -
	70%
			Woman	Man
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1989	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by gender. The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left alliance.

Vote for the left by marital status

	Figure BA12 -
	70%
		Single	Married/Partner
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by marital status. The left
	is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left
	alliance.

Vote for the left by occupational social class

		Figure BA13 -
	100%
	90%	Upper/Middle class Working class
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys. 2005-09	2013-17
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by occupational social
		class. The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the
		center-left alliance.

Vote for the left by ethnicity

	Figure BA14 -
	100%
	Not indigenous	Indigenous
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by ethnicity. The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left alliance.

Vote for the left by union membership

	Figure BA15 -
	70%
	Not union member	Union member
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys. 1989 1993-99 2005-09	2013-17
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by union membership.

The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the centerleft alliance.

Vote for the left by age group

	20-39	40-59	+60
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left/left-wing parties by age group. The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left alliance.

Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by education level

	60% 70% 80% 90%	Figure BB1 -Primary Figure BB2 -	Secondary	Tertiary
	70%
	50%
	60%
	40% 50%
	30% 40%
	30%
	20%
	20%
	10% 10%
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters belonging to the working class and the 0% 0% 1989 1993-99 2005-09 2013-17 1989 1993-99 2005-09 2013-17
	share of other voters voting for center-left/left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables. The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	left alliance.

Difference between (% of working class) and (% of other voters) voting left

After controlling for income and education

After controlling for income, education, age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, employment and marital status, union membership, ethnicity and region Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Concertación (excl. DC) by education level.

Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by education group

	Figure BB3 -
	80%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Concertación (excl. DC) by education group.

Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by income decile

	Figure BB4 -
	70%
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1993-99		2005-09					2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Concertación (excl. DC) by income decile.

Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by income group

	Figure BB5 -
	80%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Concertación (excl. DC) by income group.

Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by religious affiliation

	Figure BB6 -
	80%
		No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09		2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Concertación (excl. DC) by religious affiliation.

Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by church attendance

	Figure BB7 -
	70%
	Never	Less than monthly	Monthly or more	Weekly or more
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
			2005-09
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Concertación (excl. DC) by church attendance.

Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by home ownership

	Figure BB8 -
	50%
	45%		Renting	Owner
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1989	1993-99	2005-09
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Concertación (excl. DC) by home ownership.

Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by employment status

	Figure BB9 -
	50%
		Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09		2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Concertación (excl. DC) by employment status.

Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by region

	Figure BB10 -
	70%
	North	Center	South
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1989	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Concertación (excl. DC) by region.

Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by gender

	Figure BB11 -
	70%
			Woman	Man
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1989	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Concertación (excl. DC) by gender.

Vote for Concertación (excl. DC) by marital status

	70%
		Single	Married/Partner
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Concertación (excl. DC) by marital status.

Vote for Christian Democracy by age group

	55% 60% 60% 65%	Figure BB40 -20-39 Figure BB41 -	40-59	+60
	50% 55%
	45% 50%
	40% 45%
	35% 40%
	30% 35%
	30%
	25% 25%
	20% 20%
	15% 15%
	10% 10%
	5% 5%
	0% 0%	1989 1989	1993-99 1993-99	2005-09 2005-09	2013-17 2013-17
		Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Christian Democracy by age group.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by education level

		Figure BB42 -
	65%
	60%	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
	55%
	50%
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		1989	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
		Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by
		education level.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by education group

	Figure BB43 -
	70%
	65%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	60%
	55%
	50%
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by
	education group.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by income group

	Figure BB44 -
	60%
	55%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	50%
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by
	income group.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by religious affiliation

	Figure BB45 -
	65%
	60%	No religion	Catholic	Protestant
	55%
	50%
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09		2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by
	religious affiliation.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by church attendance

		Figure BB46 -
	55%
	50%	Never	Less than monthly	Monthly or more	Weekly or more
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		1989	1993-99	2005-09
		Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by
		church attendance.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by employment status

	Figure BB47 -
	60%
	55%	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
	50%
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09		2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by
	employment status.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by region

	Figure BB48 -
	60%
	55%	North	Center	South
	50%
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1989	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by
	region.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by gender

	Figure BB49 -
	60%
	55%		Woman	Man
	50%
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1989	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by
	gender.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by marital status

	Figure BB50 -
	60%
	55%	Single	Married/Partner
	50%
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by
	marital status.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by perceived social class

	Figure BB51 -
	50%
	45%	Upper/Middle class Working class
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by perceived social class.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by ethnicity

	Figure BB52 -
	65%
	60%	Not indigenous	Indigenous
	55%
	50%
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2005-09		2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by
	ethnicity.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by union membership

	Figure BB53 -
	60%
	55%		No union	Belongs to union
	50%
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1989	1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by
	union membership.

Vote for Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by age group

	Year	Survey	Source	Sample size
	1990	Encuesta CEP	CEP	1187
	1993	Encuesta CEP	CEP	1832
	1999	Encuesta CEP	CEP	1504
	2005	Encuesta CEP	CEP	20-39 1505	40-59	+60
	2009	Encuesta CEP	CEP	1505
	2013	Encuesta CEP	CEP	1437
	2017	Encuesta CEP	CEP	1424
		Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Independent Democratic Union/National Renewal by age group.

Table BC1 -

 BC1 Survey data sourcesSource: authors' elaboration. CES: Centro de Estudios Públicos, available from https://www.cepchile.cl/cep/site/tax/port/all/taxport_20___1.html/. Note: the table shows the surveys used in the paper, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

			1993-99	2005-09	2013-17
	Age: 20-39	70%	57%	50%	44%
	Age: 40-59	22%	30%	34%	35%
	Age: 60+	9%	13%	16%	21%
	Upper/Middle class	0%	50%	55%	67%
	Working class	0%	50%	45%	33%
	Primary	24%	24%	27%	21%
	Secondary	45%	54%	42%	44%
	Tertiary	31%	22%	31%	35%
	Employed	53%	51%	58%	57%
	Unemployed	9%	5%	6%	6%
	Inactive	38%	44%	36%	37%
	Renting a house	N/A	N/A	20%	N/A
	Owning a house	N/A	N/A	80%	N/A
	Single	22%	37%	49%	53%
	Married/Partner	78%	63%	51%	47%
	Not indigenous	N/A	N/A	93%	91%
	Indigenous	N/A	N/A	7%	9%
	North	N/A	11%	11%	12%
	Center	N/A	59%	62%	62%
	South	N/A	29%	27%	26%
	No religion	N/A	7%	12%	19%
	Catholic	N/A	75%	68%	61%
	Protestant	N/A	15%	16%	17%
	Other	N/A	4%	4%	3%
	Never	N/A	17%	21%	35%
	Less than monthly	N/A	40%	42%	37%
	Monthly or more	N/A	21%	19%	15%
	Weekly or more	N/A	22%	19%	13%
	Woman	N/A	52%	49%	50%
	Man	N/A	48%	51%	50%
	No union	N/A	0%	90%	94%
	Belongs to union	N/A	0%	10%	6%

Table BC2 -Complete descriptive statistics by decade Source: authors

 BC2 ' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys. Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by decade for selected available variables.

	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%

Table C1 -The structure of political cleavages in Costa Rica, 2010-2018 Share of votes (%)

 C1 ' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Costa Rican political parties by selected individual characteristics over the period 2010-2018.

	Private/mixed sector	28%	7%	34%	4%	6%	15%
	Public		28%	10%	37%	5%	8%	9%
	Ethnicity 100%
	White		33%	7%	31%	4%	6%	13%
	Mestizo	90%	29%	8%	35%	4%	5%	14%
	Indigenous	31%	6%	34%	2%	7%	11%
	Black & Mulatto Other 80%	25% 25%	5% 4%	38% 35%	2% 3%	5% 5%	18% 26%
	10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Source: authors0% 70%

Election results in Costa Rica by group, 1953-2018

	90% 100%	Figure CA1 -Left-wing parties Figure CA2 -	Right-wing parties	Personalists and others
	80%
	70%
	(%) 60%
	vote 50%
	of 40%
	Share 30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
						2014 2018
		Source: authors' computations using official election results.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Costa Rican political parties in
		presidential elections between 1953 and 2018.

The evolution of education

	Figure CA3 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary		Postgraduate
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by education level.

The evolution of education among top 10% earners

	Figure CA4 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary		Postgraduate
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows composition of the electorate by education level among top 10% earners.

The evolution of education among top 10% earners voting for left-wing parties

		Figure CA5 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10
		vote		vote		vote		vote		vote
		1970-78		1982-86		1990-98		2002-06		2010-18
		Primary		Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by education level among top 10% income earners
	voting for left-wing parties.

The evolution of education in Costa Rica

	100%	Figure CA6 -The evolution of occupation types Figure CA7 -
	100%
	90% 90%
	80% 80%
	70% 70%
	60% 60%
	50% 50%
	40% 40%
	30% 30%
	20% 20%
	10% 10%
	0% 0%	Primary 1970-78 1970-78	Secondary 1982-86 1982-86	1990-98 1990-98	Tertiary	2002-06 2002-06	Postgraduate 2010-18 2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Business owner/partner Wage earner	Self-employed
		Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by education level and its evolution over time since
		the 1970s. All represents the whole adult population, T10 refers to top 10% earners and T10 vote to top 10% Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
		earners voting for left-wing parties. Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by type of occupation.

The evolution of occupation types among top 10% earners

		Figure CA8 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10
		vote		vote		vote		vote		vote
		1970-78		1982-86		1990-98		2002-06	2010-18
		Business owner/partner		Wage earner		Self-employed
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by type of occupation among top 10% earners.

The evolution of occupation types in Costa Rica

	Figure CA9 -The evolution of occupations Figure CA10 -
	100% 100%
	90% 90%
	80% 80%
	70% 70%
	60% 60%
	50% 50%
	40% 40%
	30% 30%
	20% 20%
	10% 10%
	0% 0%
	1970-78 1970-78	1982-86 1982-86	1990-98 1990-98	2002-06 2002-06	2010-18 2010-18
	Business owner/partner Managers, scientists and intellectuals	Wage earner Technicians, professionals and admin Self-employed	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by occupation type. All represents the whole adult population, T10 refers to top 10% earners and T10 vote to top 10% earners voting for left-wing parties. Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by occupation.

The evolution of occupations among top 10% earners

		Figure CA11 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10	All	T10 T10
		vote		vote		vote		vote		vote
		1970-78		1982-86		1990-98		2002-06	2010-18
		Managers, scientists and intellectuals		Technicians, professionals and admin	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by occupation among top 10% earners.

The evolution of occupations in Costa Rica

	Figure CA12 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Managers, scientists and intellectuals	Technicians, professionals and admin	Others
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows composition of the electorate by occupation. All represents the whole adult
	population, T10 refers to top 10% earners and T10 vote to left-wing voters within the top 10%.

The evolution of sector of employment in Costa Rica

	Figure CA13 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
		Private/mixed sector	Public sector
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by sector of employment.

The evolution of sector of employment among top 10% earners

		Figure CA14 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	All	T10 T10 vote All	T10 T10 vote All	T10 T10 vote All	T10 T10 vote
		1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
		Private/mixed sector	Public sector
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by sector of employment among top 10% earners.

The evolution of sector of employment in Costa Rica

	Figure CA15 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Private/mixed sector	Public sector
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by sector of employment. All represents the whole
	adult population, T10 refers to top 10% earners and T10 vote to left-wing voters within the top 10%.

The evolution of religious affiliations in Costa Rica

	Figure CA16 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2002-06			2010-18
	Catholic	Protestant	Other	No religion
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by religion.

The evolution of ethnicity in Costa Rica

	Figure CA17 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2002-06		2010-18
	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Black & Mulatto	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by ethnic group.

Ethnic composition of top 10% earners in Costa Rica

		Figure CA18 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	All	T10	T10 vote	All	T10	T10 vote
		2002-06			2010-18
		White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Black & Mulatto	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by ethnic group among top 10% earners.

The evolution of ethnicity in Costa Rica

	Figure CB1 -
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Black and mulatto	Other
	0%
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. 1970-78 1982-86 1990-98 2002-06	2010-18
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by ethnic group. All represents the whole adult
	population, T10 refers to top 10% earners and T10 vote to left-wing voters within the top 10%.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by education level

	Figure CB2 -
	80%
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary		Postgraduate
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by education group

	Figure CB3 -
	80%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education group.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by income decile

		Figure CB4 -
	80%
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78			1982-86			1990-98		2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by income group

	Figure CB5 -
	90%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1990-98		2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by religious affiliation

	Figure CB6 -
	90%
	Catholic	Protestant	Other	No religion
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1990-98	2002-06		2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religious affiliation.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by church attendance

	Figure CB7 -
	100%
	Very religious	Religious	Less religious	Not religious
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2002-06			2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by frequency of church attendance.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by ethnicity

	Figure CB8 -
	100%
	90%		White	Mestizo	Indigenous
			Black & Mulatto Other
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by ethnicity.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by occupation

		Figure CB9 -
	90%
	80%	Managers, scientist and intellectuals	Technicians, professionals and admin	Other
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by occupation.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by type of occupation

		Figure CB10 -
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%	Business owner/partner 1982-86 1990-98	Wage earner 2002-06	Self-employed 2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by type of occupation.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by sector of employment

		Figure CB11 -
	80%
		Private/mixed sector
	70%	Public
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by sector of employment.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by location, 1970-2018

		Figure CB12 -
	90%
	80%	Urban area	Rural area
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1970-78	1982-86	2002-06	2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by rural-urban location.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by region

	Figure CB13 -
	80%
	Metropolitan Area SJ	Central-Urban	Central-Rural	Lowlands-Urban	Lowlands-Rural
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by region of residence.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by gender

	Figure CB14 -
	90%
	Woman	Man
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1990-98	2002-06
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by gender.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by union membership

	Figure CB15 -
	80%
	Not union member	Union member
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by union membership status.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by marital status

	Figure CB16 -
	100%
	Single		Married/Partner
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by marital status.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by perceived social class

	Figure CB17 -
	90%
	Upper/Middle class	Working class
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: authors' computations using Costan Rica political attitudes surveys. 1970-78 1982-86 1990-98 2002-06	2010-18
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by self-perceived social class.
	Working class includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class".

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left by age group

		Figure CB18 -
	10			20-40	40-60	60+
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06		2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by age group.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left among highest-educated and top-income voters, after controls

	Figure CB19 -
	15
	10
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) educated voting left, after controls
	-20
	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting left, after controls
	-25
	-30
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the relative support of university graduates and top-income voters for PLN / PAC / 1970-78 1982-86 1990-98 2002-06 2010-18
	Other left-wing parties, after controlling for age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, marital status,
	occupation, sector of employment, perceived social class, union membership, rural-urban location, ethnicity
	and region.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left among university graduates

		Figure CB20 -
	15
	10
	5
	0
	-5	Difference between (% of univ. graduates) and (% of other voters) voting National Liberation Party / Citizens' Action Party / Other left
	-10	After controlling for income
	-15
	-20	After controlling for income, age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, marital status, occupation and worker type, sector of employment, perceived social class, union membership, rural-urban
		location, ethnicity and region
	-25
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of other
	voters voting for PLN / PAC / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left among highest-educated voters

		Figure CB21 -
	25
	20
	15
	10
		Difference between (% of top 10% educ.) and (% of other voters) voting National Liberation Party /
	5	Citizens' Action Party / Other left
	0	After controlling for income
	-5	After controlling for income, age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, marital status, occupation and worker type, sector of employment, perceived social class, union membership, rural-urban
		location, ethnicity and region
	-10
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of other
	voters voting for PLN / PAC / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left among primary-educated voters

		Figure CB22 -
	15
		Difference between (% of primary educ.) and (% of other voters) voting National Liberation Party /
	10	Citizens' Action Party / Other left
		After controlling for income
	5
	0	After controlling for income, age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, marital status, occupation and worker type, sector of employment, perceived social class, union membership, rural-urban
		location, ethnicity and region
	-5
	-10
	-15
	-20
	-25
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary-educated voters and the share of other
	voters voting for PLN / PAC / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left among top 10% earners

	Figure CB23 -
	Difference between (% of top 10% earners) and (% of other voters) voting National Liberation Party /
	Citizens' Action Party / Other left
	After controlling for education
	After controlling for education, age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, marital status, occupation
	and worker type, sector of employment, perceived social class, union membership, rural-urban
	location, ethnicity and region
	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters
	voting for PLN / PAC / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left among voters with no religion

		Figure CB24 -
	20
		Difference between (% of no religion) and (% of other voters) voting National Liberation Party /
	15	Citizens' Action Party / Other left
		After controlling for income, education, age, gender, marital status, occupation and worker type,
	10	sector of employment, perceived social class, union membership, rural-urban location, ethnicity and
		region
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters with no religion and the share of other
	voters voting for PLN / PAC / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left among rural areas

		Figure CB25 -
	8
	6
	4
	2
	0
	-2
		Difference between (% of rural areas) and (% of urban areas) voting National Liberation Party /
	-4	Citizens' Action Party / Other left
	-6	After controlling for income, education, age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, marital status, occupation and worker type, sector of employment, perceived social class, union membership
		ethnicity and region
	-8
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting
	for PLN / PAC / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left among women

		Figure CB26 -
	20
		Difference between (% of women) and (% of men) voting National Liberation Party / Citizens' Action
	15	Party / Other left
		After controlling for income, education, age, religious affiliation, religiosity, marital status,
	10	occupation and worker type, sector of employment, perceived social class, union membership,
		rural-urban location, ethnicity and region
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	-20
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for PLN /
	PAC / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left among young voters

		Figure C27 -
	10	Difference between (% of aged 20-39) and (% of other voters) voting National Liberation Party /
		Citizens' Action Party / Other left
	5	After controlling for income, education, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, marital status,
		occupation and worker type, sector of employment, perceived social class, union membership,
		urban-rural location, ethnicity and region
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged 20-39 and the share of voters older
	than 40 voting for PLN / PAC / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for PLN / PAC / Other left among highest-educated and top-income voters

		Figure CC1 -
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%	Difference between (% of university graduates) and (% of other voters) voting left
	20%	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting left
	10%
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the relative support of university graduates and top-income voters for PLN / PAC / 0%
	Other left-wing parties, after controlling for age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, marital status, 1970-78 1982-86 1990-98 2002-06 2010-18
	occupation, sector of employment, perceived social class, union membership, rural-urban location, ethnicity
	and region.

Vote for PLN by education level

	Figure CC2 -
	70%
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary		Postgraduate
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by education level.

Vote for PLN by education group

		Figure CC3 -Vote for PLN by income decile Figure CC4 -
	80% 70%
		D1	D2	D3	Bottom 50% D4 D5	D6	Middle 40% D7 D8	Top 10% D9 D10
	70% 60%
	60% 50%
	50%
	40%
	40%
	30%
	30%
	20% 20%
	10% 10%
	0% 0%
	1970-78 1970-78	1982-86 1982-86	1990-98 1990-98	2002-06 2002-06	2010-18 2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by education group.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by income decile.

Vote for PLN by income group

	Figure CC5 -
	50%
	45%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by income group.

Vote for PLN by religious affiliation

	Figure CC6 -
	60%
	Catholic	Protestant	Other	No religion
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1990-98	2002-06		2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by religious affiliation.

Vote for PLN by religiosity

	Figure CC7 -
	60%
	Very religious	Religious	Less religious	Not religious
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2002-06		2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rica political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by religiosity.

Vote for PLN by ethnicity

		Figure CC8 -Vote for PLN by occupation Figure CC9 -
	100% 80%
	90% 70%	Managers, scientist and intellectuals	White Technicians, professionals and admin Mestizo	Indigenous Other
	80%			Black & Mulatto Other
	60%
	70%
	60% 50%
	50% 40%
	40% 30%
	30%
	20%
	20%
	10% 10%
	0% 0%
		1970-78 1982-86	1982-86 1990-98	1990-98	2002-06 2002-06	2010-18 2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by ethnicity. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by occupation.

Vote for PLN by sector of employment

		Figure CC10 -
	70%
	60%			Private/mixed sector	Public
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by sector of employment.

Vote for PLN by type of worker

		Figure CC11 -
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%	Business owner/partner 1970-78 1982-86	Wage earner 1990-98	2002-06	Self-employed 2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by type of worker.

Vote for PLN by location

		Figure CC12 -
	90%
	80%		Urban area	Rural area
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by rural-urban location.

Vote for PLN by region

	Figure CC13 -
	70%
	Metropolitan Area SJ	Central-Urban	Central-Rural	Lowlands-Urban	Lowlands-Rural
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by region of residence.

Vote for PLN by gender

		Figure CC14 -
	80%
	Woman	Man
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1990-98	2002-06
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by gender.

Vote for PLN by union membership

	Figure CC15 -
	70%
	Not union member	Union member
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by union membership status.

Vote for PLN by marital status

	Figure CC16 -
	80%
	Single		Married/Partner
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by marital status.

Vote for PLN by perceived social class

	Figure CC17 -Vote for PLN by age group Figure CC18 -
	70% 55%
	Upper/Middle class	Working class	20-40	40-60	60+
	60% 45%
	50%
	35%
	40%
	25%
	30%
	15%
	20%
	10% 5%
	2002-06		2010-18
	0% -5%
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. 1970-78 1982-86 1990-98 2002-06		2010-18
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by self-perceived social class. Working class Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class".

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PLN by age group.

Vote for PAC by education level

	Figure CC19 -
	50%
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002-06		2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by education level.

Vote for PAC by education group

	Figure CC20 -Vote for PAC by income decile Figure CC21 -
	60% 55%
	D1	D2	D3	Bottom 50% D4 D5	D6	Middle 40% D7 D8	Top 10% D9 D10
	50% 45%
	40% 35%
	30% 25%
	20% 15%
	10% 5%
	2002-06				2010-18
	0% -5%
	2002-06				2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by education group.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by income decile.

Vote for PAC by income group

	Figure CC22 -
	50%
	45%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by income group.

Vote for PAC by religious affiliation

		Figure CC23 -
	45%
	40%	Catholic	Protestant	Other	No religion
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		1990-98		2002-06
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by religious affiliation.

Vote for PAC by religiosity

		Figure CC24 -
	45%
	Very religious	Religious	Less religious	Not religious
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		2002-06		2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rica political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by religiosity.

Vote for PAC by ethnicity

	Figure CC25 -Vote for PAC by occupation Figure CC26 -
	60% 60%
	White Managers, scientist and intellectuals Mestizo	Indigenous Technicians, professionals and admin Black & Mulatto	Other Other
	50% 50%
	40% 40%
	30% 30%
	20% 20%
	10% 10%
	0% 0%
	2002-06 2002-06	2010-18 2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by ethnicity. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by occupation.

Vote for PAC by sector of employment

	Figure CC27 -
	45%
	40%
		Private/mixed sector Public
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by sector of employment.

Vote for PAC by type of worker

		Figure CC28 -
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%	Business owner/partner	Wage earner	Self-employed
		2002-06		2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by type of worker.

Vote for PAC by location

	Figure CC29 -
	90%
	80%	Urban area	Rural area
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by rural-urban location.

Vote for PAC by region

		Figure CC30 -
	40%
	35%	Metropolitan Area SJ	Central-Urban	Central-Rural	Lowlands-Urban	Lowlands-Rural
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		2002-06			2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC parties by region of residence.

Vote for PAC by gender

		Figure CC31 -
	45%
	Woman	Man
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		2002-06
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by gender.

Vote for PAC by union membership

	Figure CC32 -
	40%
	Not union member	Union member
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by union membership status.

Vote for PAC by marital status

		Figure CC33 -
	20%
	18%	Single	Married/Partner
	16%
	14%
	12%
	10%
	8%
	6%
	4%
	2%
	0%
			2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by marital status.

Vote for PAC by perceived social class

		Figure CC34 -Vote for PAC by age group Figure CC35 -
	40% 65%
		Upper/Middle Class	Working Class		20-40	40-60	60+
	35% 55%
	30% 45%
	25%
	35%
	20%
	25%
	15%
	10% 15%
	5% 5%
	0% -5%	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. 2002-06	2010-18
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by self-perceived social class. Working class Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
		includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class".

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PAC by age group.

Vote for PUSC by education level

	Figure CC36 -
	80%
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary		Postgraduate
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by education level.

Vote for PUSC by education group

	Figure CC37 -Vote for PUSC by income decile Figure CC38 -
	70% 70%
	Bottom 50% D1 D2 D3	Middle 40% D4 D5	Top 10% D6 D7	D8	D9	D10
	60% 60%
	50% 50%
	40% 40%
	30% 30%
	20% 20%
	10% 10%
	0% 0%
	1970-78 1970-78	1982-86 1982-86	1990-98 1990-98		2002-06 2002-06	2010-18 2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by education group.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by income decile.

Vote for PUSC by income group

	Figure CC39 -
	90%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1990-98		2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by income group.

Vote for PUSC by religious affiliation

	Figure CC40 -
	60%
	Catholic	Protestant	Other	No religion
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1990-98	2002-06		2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by religious affiliation.

Vote for PUSC by church attendance

	Figure CC41 -
	100%
	Very religious	Religious	Less religious	Not religious
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2002-06			2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by frequency of church attendance.

Vote for PUSC by ethnicity

			Figure CC42 -Vote for PUSC by occupation Figure CC43 -
	100% 60%
	90% 50%	Managers, scientist and intellectuals	White Black & Mulatto Other Mestizo Technicians, professionals and admin	Indigenous Other
	80%
	70% 40%
	60% 30%
	50%
	40% 20%
	30% 10%
	20%
	0% 10%	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	0%
		1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received PUSC by ethnicity. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by occupation.

Vote for PUSC by type of worker

		Figure CC44 -
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%	Business owner/partner 1982-86 1990-98	Wage earner 2002-06	Self-employed 2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by type of worker.

Vote for PUSC by sector of employment

		Figure CC45 -
	60%
		Private/mixed sector
	50%	Public
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
		Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by sector of employment.

Vote for PUSC by location, 1970-2018

		Figure CC46 -
	60%
	Urban area	Rural area
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by rural-urban location.

Vote for PUSC by region

	Figure CC47 -
	60%
	Metropolitan Area SJ	Central-Urban	Central-Rural	Lowlands-Urban	Lowlands-Rural
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received PUSC by region of residence.

Vote for PUSC by gender

		Figure CC48 -
	55%
	Woman	Man
	45%
	35%
	25%
	15%
	5%
	1970-78	1990-98	2002-06
	-5%
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by gender.

Vote for PUSC by union membership

	Figure CC49 -
	70%
	Not union member	Union member
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by union membership status.

Vote for PUSC by marital status

	Figure CC50 -
	70%
	Single		Married/Partner
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by marital status.

Vote for PUSC by perceived social class

	Year	Figure CC51 -Vote for PUSC by age group Survey Source Sample size
	60% 1976	LAPOP, 1976	LAPOP	1707
	1980	Upper/Middle class LAPOP, 1980	Working class LAPOP	20-40 280	40-60	60+
	1983	LAPOP, 1983	LAPOP	501
	1987	LAPOP, 1987	LAPOP	927
	50% 1990	LAPOP, 1990	LAPOP	597
	1995	LAPOP, 1995	LAPOP	505
	1999	LAPOP, 1999	LAPOP	1428
	2002	LAPOP, 2002	LAPOP	1016
	40% 2006	LAPOP, 2006	LAPOP	1500
	2012	LAPOP, 2012	LAPOP	1498
	2014	LAPOP, 2014	LAPOP	1537
	2018	LAPOP, 2018	LAPOP	1501
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		Source: authors' computations using Costan Rica political attitudes surveys. 1970-78 1982-86 1990-98 2002-06		2010-18
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by self-perceived social class. Working class Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys.
		includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class".

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PUSC by age group.

Table CD1 -Survey data sources

 CD1

		1970-78	1982-86	1990-98	2002-06	2010-18
	Age: 20-40	63%	74%	60%	57%	50%
	Age: 40-60	28%	23%	33%	32%	33%
	Age: 60+	10%	3%	6%	11%	16%
	Subjective social class: Upper/Middle class	27%	52%	56%		46%
	Subjective social class: Working class	73%	48%	44%		54%
	Education: Primary	67%	44%	39%	45%	38%
	Education: Secondary	25%	41%	42%	37%	45%
	Education: Tertiary	9%	13%	15%	12%	11%
	Education: Postgraduate	0%	2%	4%	6%	6%
	Employment status: Employed	58%	63%	54%	52%	48%
	Employment status: Unemployed	3%	1%	3%	5%	6%
	Employment status: Inactive	39%	36%	43%	42%	46%
	Marital status: Single	38%	35%	34%	38%	42%
	Marital status: Married/Partner	62%	65%	66%	62%	58%
	Occupation: Managers, scientists and intellectuals	10%	7%	17%	13%	13%
	Occupation: Technicians, professionals and admin	41%	41%	21%	14%	20%
	Occupation: Other	49%	51%	62%	72%	67%
	Ethnicity: White				50%	51%
	Ethnicity: Mestizo				29%	31%
	Ethnicity: Indigenous				3%	2%
	Ethnicity: Black & Mulatto				14%	14%
	Ethnicity: Other				5%	3%
	Region: Metropolitan area SJ	31%	33%		23%	30%
	Region: Central-Urban	14%	16%		12%	21%
	Region: Central-Rural	20%	18%		24%	16%
	Region: Lowlands-Urban	9%	10%		13%	13%
	Region: Lowlands-Rural	27%	23%		28%	21%
	Religion: Catholic			75%	73%	64%

Source: authors' elaboration. LAPOP: Latin American Public Opinion Project, available from https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php. Note: the table shows the surveys used in the paper, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

Table CD2 -Complete descriptive statistics by decade

 CD2

	Religion: Protestant				17%	17%	25%
	Religion: Other				1%	2%	1%
	Religion: No religion				6%	8%	10%
	Church attendance: Very religious Church attendance: Religious	PLN	PUSC	PAC	54% 18% ML	31% 12% FA	64% 22% PRN
	Church attendance: Less religious Church attendance: Not religious Education Rural / Urban: Urban area Primary Rural / Urban: Rural area Secondary Sector of employment: Private / Mixed sector Tertiary Sector of employment: Public sector Postgraduate Gender: Woman Income Gender: Man Bottom 50% Union membership: Not union member Middle 40% Union membership: Union member Top 10% Type of worker: Business owner / Partner Religion Type of worker: Wage earner Catholic Type of worker: Self-employed Protestant Other	40% 26% 20% 25% 32% 27% 25% 35% 24% 16%	53% 5% 47% 6% 14% 10% 54% 46% 6% 96% 8% 4% 12% 8% 76% 8% 16% 5% 3%	59% 27% 41% 34% 76% 40% 24% 46% 54% 46% 28% 34% 47% 3% 74% 36% 22% 20% 35%	12% 16% 57% 4% 43% 4% 80% 4% 20% 3% 52% 48% 3% 90% 5% 10% 4% 4% 75% 4% 21% 4% 2%	4% 53% 64% 4% 36% 6% 84% 8% 16% 5% 51% 49% 6% 5% 96% 5% 4% 6% 59% 5% 35% 3% 13%	9% 5% 15% 63% 17% 37% 9% 86% 7% 14% 53% 20% 47% 15% 5% 4% 6% 59% 39% 37% 28%
	No religion	17%	6%	40%	4%	16%	9%
	Religiosity
	Very religious	32%	7%	32%	4%	3%	17%
	Religious	32%	7%	37%	4%	8%	8%
	Less religious	25%	7%	31%	5%	9%	11%
	Not religious	16%	4%	42%	3%	14%	13%
	Occupation type
	Managers, scientists and intellectuals	12%	15%	42%	3%	6%	16%
	Technicians, professionals and admin	11%	14%	52%	0%	1%	14%
	Other	12%	7%	32%	0%	1%	37%
	Location
	Urban area	29%	8%	35%	4%	6%	12%

*

Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by decade for selected available variables.

Table CD3 -The structure of political cleavages in Costa Rica, 2010-2018 (extended) Share of votes (%)

 CD3 ' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Costa Rican political parties by selected individual characteristics over the period 2010-2018.

	Rural area Black & Mulatto	33% 25%	6% 5%	29% 38%	4% 2%	4% 5%	18% 18%
	Region Other	25%	4%	35%	3%	5%	26%
	Metropolitan Area SJ Source: authors	27%	10%	33%	2%	7%	13%
	Central-Urban	29%	6%	42%	4%	5%	8%
	Central-Rural	34%	6%	31%	6%	3%	14%
	Lowlands-Urban	33%	7%	27%	5%	6%	19%
	Lowlands-Rural	33%	5%	28%	3%	5%	21%
	Gender
	Woman	31%	7%	32%	4%	5%	16%
	Man	30%	7%	34%	4%	6%	13%
	Marital status
	Single	24%	6%	37%	4%	7%	14%
	Married/Partner	34%	8%	30%	4%	4%	14%
	Subjective social class
	Upper/Middle class	68%	7%	17%	5%	0%	0%
	Working class	68%	5%	12%	11%	0%	0%
	Age
	20-40	23%	7%	35%	5%	7%	17%
	40-60	32%	7%	32%	3%	5%	14%
	60+	45%	8%	31%	2%	2%	9%
	Worker type
	Business owner/partner	21%	10%	37%	4%	6%	14%
	Wage earner	28%	8%	34%	4%	7%	13%
	Self-employed	29%	7%	33%	5%	4%	15%
	Sector of employment
	Private/mixed sector	28%	7%	34%	4%	6%	15%
	Public	28%	10%	37%	5%	8%	9%
	Ethnicity
	White	33%	7%	31%	4%	6%	13%
	Mestizo	29%	8%	35%	4%	5%	14%
	Indigenous	31%	6%	34%	2%	7%	11%

Table DC3 -The structure of political cleavages in Colombia, 2018 Share of votes received (%)

 DC3 Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by Uribists, Petrists and Fajardists by selected individual characteristics in 2018.

	Weekly or more			31%			17%			10%
	Type of employment
	Public worker Private Worker 100%			23% 27%			24% 17%			13% 14%
	Entrepreneur Self-employed 90%			18% 28%			13% 18%			13% 10%
	Location
	Urban area 80%			25%			18%			12%
	Rural area			36%			17%			6%
	Region Caribbean 70%			23%			35%			4%
	Capital Andes (%)	60%			19% 32%			14% 11%			16% 12%
	East Pacific vote	50%			35% 21%			7% 27%			12% 6%
	Amazon and islands of			34%			18%			11%
	Ethnicity White Mestizo Indigenous 30% 40% Share			31% 25% 23%			14% 18% 33%			9% 3% 13%
	Afro-Colombian			22%			25%			6%
	Other	20%			25%			22%			10%
	Source: author's computations using Colombian political attitudes surveys.
		10%
		0%
		1952	1958	1964	1970	1976	1982	1988	1994	2000	2006	2012	2018

Table E1 -The structure of political cleavages in Mexico, 2018 Share of votes received (%)

 E1

	South		Figure EA1 -	12%		14%		69%
	Ethnicity White 100%			25%		30%		39%
	Mestizo Indigenous 90%			18% 6%		17% 14%		56% 74%
	Other Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. 19% 80%		28%		48%
	Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by PRI, PAN and Morena by selected individual characteristics in the 2018 70% election. of 50% vote 60% (%)
	Share	40%
		30%
		20%
		10%
		0%
		1952	1955	1958	1979	1994	2000	2006	2012	2018

Election results in Mexico by group, 1952-2018

		Figure EB1 -
	60%
	50%
	40%
		Left (PRD, Morena, Other left)
	30%	Right (PRI, PAN, Other right)
		Other
	20%
	10%
	0%
		Source: authors' computations using official election results. 1994 2000-06	2012-18
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Mexican political parties in
		presidential elections between 1952 and 2018.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by education level

	Figure EB2 -
	60%
		Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1979	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by education group

	Figure EB3 -
	60%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1979		1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education group.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by income decile

		Figure EB4 -
	60%
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1979				1994				2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by income group

		Figure EB5 -
	50%
	45%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		1979		1994	2000-06	2012-18
		Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by gender

		Figure EB6 -
	50%
	45%	Woman	Man
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		1979	1994	2000-06	2012-18
		Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by gender.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by marital status

		Figure EB7 -
	50%
	45%	Single	Married/Partner
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		1994	2000-06	2012-18
		Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by marital status.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by age group

	Figure EB8 -
	70%
	20-39	40-59	60+
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by age group.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by religious affiliation

	Figure EB9 -
	60%
	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06		2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religious affiliation.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by employment status

	Figure EB10 -
	60%
	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by employment status.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by self-employment status

		Figure EB11 -
	90%
	80%	Not self-employed	Self-employed
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		2000-06	2012-18
		Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by self-employment status.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by occupation

		Figure EB12 -
	30%
		Technicians, professionals and administrative
		officers
	25%	Commerce and services
		Managers, scientists and intellectuals
	20%	Agriculture, fisheries and forests
		Industry workers and supervisors
	15%	Other
	10%
	5%
	0%
		2000-06
		Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by occupation.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by union membership

	Figure EB13 -
	25%
	Not union member	Union member
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		1994
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by union membership status.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by perceived social class

	Figure EB14 -
	50%
	45%	Working class	Upper/Middle class
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. 1994 2000-06	2012-18
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by self-perceived social class.
	Working class includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class" and "upper class".

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by location

	Figure EB15 -
	60%
	Urban area	Rural area
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by rural-urban location.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by location size

	Figure EB16 -
	60%
	National Capital (Metropolitan area)	Large City	Medium City	Small City	Rural Area
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06		2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by location size.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by region

	Figure EB17 -
	60%
	North	Center West	Center	South
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06		2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by region of residence.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left by ethnicity

		Figure EB18 -
	15	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Other
	10
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	1979		1994		2000-06	2012-18
		Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by ethnicity.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left among university graduates and top-income voters, after controls

	Figure EB19 -
	Difference between (% of university graduates) and (% of other voters) voting left, after controls
	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting left, after controls
	-5
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. 1979 1994 2000-06	2012-18
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of other
	voters voting for left-wing parties, after controlling for age, gender, religion, employment, self-employment
	and marital status, occupation, perceived class, union membership, rural-urban location, region and
	ethnicity.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left among university graduates

	Figure EB20 -
	Difference between (% of univ. graduates) and (% of other voters) voting left
	After controlling for income
	After controlling for income, age, gender, religion, employment, self-employment and marital status,
	occupation, perceived class, union membership, rural-urban location, region and ethnicity
	-5
	1979	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of other
	voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left among highest- educated voters

	Difference between (% of top 10% educ.) and (% of other voters) voting left
	After controlling for income
	After controlling for income, age, gender, religion, employment, self-employment and marital status,
	occupation, perceived class, union membership, rural-urban location, region and ethnicity
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of other
	voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for PRD / Morena / Other left among young voters

	90% 100%	Figure EB27 -Difference between (% of aged 20-39) and (% of other voters) voting left Figure EC1 -
	80%	After controlling for income, education, gender, religion, employment, self-employment and marital status, occupation, perceived class, union membership, rural-urban location, region and ethnicity
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	5
	1979 0%	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. 1952-58 1979 1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged 20-39 and the share of voters older
	than 40 voting left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for PRI by education level

		Figure EC2 -
	100%
	90%	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1952-58	1979	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by education level.

Vote for PRI by education group

		Figure EC3 -Vote for PRI by income decile Figure EC4 -
	100% 100%
		D1	D2	D3	Bottom 50% D4 D5	D6	Middle 40% D7 D8	Top 10% D9 D10
	90% 90%
	80% 80%
	70% 70%
	60% 60%
	50% 50%
	40% 40%
	30% 30%
	20% 20%
	10% 10%
	0% 0%
	1952-58 1952-58	1979 1979		1994 1994	2000-06 2000-06	2012-18 2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by education group. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by income decile.

Vote for PRI by income group

		Figure EC5 -
	100%
	90%			Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1952-58	1979	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by income group.

Vote for PRI by gender

		Figure EC6 -
	100%
					Woman	Man
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1952-58	1979	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by gender.

Vote for PRI by marital status

		Figure EC7 -Vote for PRI by age group, 1970-2018 Figure EC8 -
	100% 45%
	90% 40%	Single	Married/Partner	20-39	40-59	60+
	80% 35%
	70% 30%
	60%
	25%
	50%
	20%
	40%
	30% 15%
	20% 10%
	10% 5%
	0% 0%
	1952-58	1979 2000-06	1994	2000-06 2012-18	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by marital status. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by age group.

Vote for PRI by religious affiliation

	Figure EC9 -
	70%
	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06		2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by religious affiliation.

Vote for PRI by employment status

	Figure EC10 -
	70%
	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by employment status.

Vote for PRI by self-employment status

		Figure EC11 -Vote for PRI by occupation Figure EC12 -
	50% 80%
		Managers, scientists and intellectuals
	45% 70%	Not self-employed Technicians, professionals and administrative officers Commerce and services	Self-employed
	40%	Agriculture, fisheries and forests Industry workers and supervisors
	60%	Other
	35%
	30% 50%
	25% 40%
	20% 30%
	15%
	20%
	10%
	5% 10%
	0% 0%
		2000-06 1979	2012-18 2000-06
		Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by self-employment status. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by occupation.

Vote for PRI by union membership

	Figure EC13 -
	100%
	Not union member	Union member
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1952-58	1994
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by union membership status.

Vote for PRI by perceived social class

	Figure EC14 -
	80%
	70%	Working class Upper/Middle class
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. 1994 2000-06	2012-18
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by self-perceived social class. Working class
	includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class" and "upper class".

Vote for PRI by location

	Figure EC15 -
	80%
	70%	Urban area	Rural area
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by rural-urban location.

Vote for PRI by location size

	Figure EC16 -
	70%
	National Capital (Metropolitan area)	Large City	Medium City	Small City	Rural Area
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06		2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by location size.

Vote for PRI by region

		Figure EC17 -
	80%
	North	Center West	Center	South
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06		2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by region of residence.

Vote for PRI by ethnicity

		Figure EC18 -
	60%
	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Other
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1952-58	1979	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PRI by ethnicity.

Vote for PAN by education level

		Figure EC19 -
	60%
		Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1952-58	1979	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by education level.

Vote for PAN by education group

		Figure EC20 -Vote for PAN by income decile Figure EC21 -
	60% 60%
		D1	D2	D3	Bottom 50% D4 D5	D6	Middle 40% D7 D8	Top 10% D9 D10
	50% 50%
	40% 40%
	30% 30%
	20% 20%
	10% 10%
	0% 0%
	1952-58 1952-58	1979 1979		1994 1994	2000-06 2000-06	2012-18 2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by education group. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by income decile.

Vote for PAN by income group

		Figure EC22 -
	50%
	45%			Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1952-58	1979	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by income group.

Vote for PAN by gender

		Figure EC23 -
	60%
					Woman	Man
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1952-58	1979	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by gender.

Vote for PAN by marital status

		Figure EC24 -Vote for PAN by age group Figure EC25 -
	60% 70%
	Single	Married/Partner
	50% 60%			20-39	40-59	60+
	50%
	40%
	40%
	30%
	30%
	20%
	20%
	10% 10%
	0% 0%
	1952-58	1979 2000-06	1994	2000-06 2012-18	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by marital status. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by age group.

Vote for PAN by religious affiliation

	Figure EC26 -
	70%
	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1952-58	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by religious affiliation.

Vote for PAN by employment status

	Figure EC27 -
	60%
	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by employment status.

Vote for PAN by self-employment status

		Figure EC28 -Vote for PAN by occupation Figure EC29 -
	80% 50%
			Managers, scientists and intellectuals
	70% 45%	Not self-employed	Self-employed Technicians, professionals and administrative
	40%		officers Commerce and services
	60%
	35%		Agriculture, fisheries and forests
	50% 30%		Industry workers and supervisors
			Other
	40% 25%
	30% 20%
	15%
	20%
	10%
	10% 5%
	0% 0%
		2000-06 1979	2012-18 2000-06
		Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by occupation.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by self-employment status.

Vote for PAN by union membership

	Figure EC30 -
	40%
	Not union member	Union member
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1952-58	1994
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by union membership status.

Vote for PAN by perceived social class

	Figure EC31 -
	80%
	70%	Working class Upper/Middle class
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. 1994 2000-06	2012-18
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by self-perceived social class. Working
	class includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class" and "upper class".

Vote for PAN by location

	Figure EC32 -
	60%
			Urban area	Rural area
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by rural-urban location.

Vote for PAN by location size

	Figure EC33 -
	70%
	National Capital (Metropolitan area)	Large City	Medium City	Small City	Rural Area
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06		2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by location size.

Vote for PAN by region

		Figure EC34 -
	60%
	North	Center West	Center	South
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by region of residence.

Vote for PAN by ethnicity

	Figure EC35 -
	60%
	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Other
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994		2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PAN by ethnicity.

Vote for PRD / Morena by education level

	Figure EC36 -
	60%
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by education level.

Vote for PRD / Morena by education group

	Figure EC37 -
	60%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by education group.

Vote for PRD / Morena by income decile

	Figure EC38 -
	60%
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06					2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by income decile.

Vote for PRD / Morena by income group

	Figure EC39 -
	50%
	45%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by income group.

Vote for PRD / Morena by gender

		Figure EC40 -
	60%
	Woman	Man
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by gender.

Vote for PRD / Morena by marital status

	Figure EC41 -
	60%
	Single	Married/Partner
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by marital status.

Vote for PRD / Morena by age group, 1970-2018

	Figure EC42 -
	70%
		20-39	40-59	60+
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by age group.

Vote for PRD / Morena by religious affiliation

	Figure EC43 -
	70%
	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06		2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by religious affiliation.

Vote for PRD / Morena by employment status

	Figure EC44 -
	60%
	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by employment status.

Vote for PRD / Morena by self-employment status

	Figure EC45 -
	80%
	Not self-employed	Self-employed
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by self-employment status.

Vote for PRD / Morena by occupation

		Figure EC46 -
	50%
		Technicians, professionals and administrative officers
	45%	Commerce and services Managers, scientists, intellectuals
	40%	Agriculture, fisheries and forests Industry workers and supervisors
		Other
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		2000-06
		Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by occupation.

Vote for PRD / Morena by union membership

	Figure EC47 -
	30%
	Not union member	Union member
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
		1994
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by union membership status.

Vote for PRD / Morena by perceived social class

	Figure EC48 -
	80%
	70%	Working class Upper/Middle class
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. 2000-06	2012-18
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by self-perceived social class. Working
	class includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class" and "upper class".

Vote for PRD / Morena by location

	Figure EC49 -
	60%
		Urban area	Rural area
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2000-06	2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by rural-urban location.

Vote for PRD / Morena by location size

	Figure EC50 -
	70%
	National Capital (Metropolitan area)	Large City	Medium City	Small City	Rural Area
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1994	2000-06		2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by location size.

Vote for PRD / Morena by region

	Figure EC51 -
	60%
	North	Center West	Center	South
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2000-06		2012-18
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by region of residence.

Vote for PRD / Morena by ethnicity

	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PRD/Morena by ethnicity.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by region

	70% 80% 45% 50%	PPC/AP/UN/PPK (Christian Democrats/Liberals) Change 90/Peru 2000/Force 2011/Popular Front (Fujimorists) Union for Peru/Possible Peru/PNP (Socialists, Progressives) Center Lima South Figure F5 -North Figure F6 -	East
	40%	Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA)
	60%
	35%
	50% 30%
	40% 25%
	30% 20%
	15%
	20%
	10%
	10% 5%
	0% 0%
		1995-00	2006-11 2016	2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income voters for selected Peruvian parties. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP / APRA / Other left) by region.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by detailed ethnicity

				Figure FA1 -
		90%
		80%	White	Mestizo	Quechua	Amazonia	Aymara	Black/Mulatto	Asian	Other
		70%
		60%
	(%)
	vote	50%
	of popular	30% 40%
	Share	20%
		10%
		0%
		1995		2000	2005		2010		2015
		Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP / APRA / Other left) by detailed ethnicity.

Election results in Peru by group, 1995-2016

		Figure FA2 -
	100%
		Center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP / APRA / Other left)
	90%	Center-right / right-wing parties (Fujimorists / Christian Democrats / Liberals)
	80%	Other parties
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1995-00	2006-11	2016
		Source: authors' computations using official election results.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Peruvian political parties in
		presidential elections between 1995 and 2016.

Composition of the electorate by education level

	Figure FA3 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1995-00	2006-11	2016
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by education level.

Composition of the electorate by religion

	Figure FA4 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		2016
	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by religion.

Composition of the electorate by ethnicity

	Figure FA5 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2006-11				2016
	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Black/Mulato	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by ethnicity.

Composition of the electorate by employment status

	Figure FB1 -
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%	Employed private	Employed public	Unemployed	Inactive
	1995-00		2006-11		2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by employment status.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by education level

	Figure FB2 -
	70%
		Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1995-00	2006-11		2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by education level.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by education group

	Figure B -
	80%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1995-00	2006-11	2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by education group.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by income decile (bars)

	Figure FB4 -
	80%
				D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5		D6	D7		D8	D9	D10
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by income decile.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by income decile (lines)

	Figure FB5 -
	70%
	1995-00	2006-11	2016
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1995-00	2006-11	2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by income decile.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by income group

	Figure FB6 -
	80%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1995-00	2006-11	2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by income group.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by religious affiliation

	Figure FB7 -
	40%
	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1995-00	2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by religious affiliation.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by church attendance

	Figure FB8 -
	70%
	Never Less than monthly Monthly Monthly or more
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2006-11	2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by frequency of church attendance.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by occupation

	Figure FB9 -
	100%
	90%	Private sector	Public sector	Unemployed	Inactive
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1995-00	2006-11		2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by occupation.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by employment status

	Figure FB10 -
	70%
	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2006-11	2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP
	/Other left) by employment status.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by location

	Figure FB11 -
	100%
	90%	Urban	Rural
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2006-11	2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by rural-urban location.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by detailed region

		Figure FB12 -
	70%
		North Coast	North Mountains	Central Mountains	Lima
	60%	South Coast	South Mountains	Jungle
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1995-00	2006-11		2016
		Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by detailed region.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by gender

	Figure FB13 -
	70%
		Woman	Man
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1995-00	2006-11	2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by gender.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by marital status

	Figure FB14 -
	70%
	Single	Married / Partner
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2006-11
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by marital status.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by perceived social class

	Figure FB15 -
	100%
	90%	Working class	Middle class
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. 2006-11	2016
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP
	/APRA / Other left) by self-perceived social class. Working class includes "lower class". Middle class
	includes "no class" and "upper class".

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by detailed ethnicity

	Figure FB16 -
	100%
	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Black/Mulatto	Other
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1995-00			2006-11
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by detailed ethnicity.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by main language spoken

	Figure FB17 -
	100%
	Spanish	Indigenous
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2011
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by main language spoken.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by main language spoken

	Figure FB18 -
	70%
		Spanish	Quechua	Aymara
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1995-00	2006-11	2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /APRA / Other left) by main language spoken.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by age group

	Figure FB19 -
	35	20-40	40-60	60+
	30
	25
	20
	15
	10
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	-20
	-25
	1995-00	2006-11		2016
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP /
	APRA / Other left) by age group.

Vote for Socialists / Progressives among highest- educated and top-income voters, after controls

  UPP / PP / PNP / GP / APRA / Other left), after controlling for age, gender, religious affiliation, employment and marital status, rural-urban location, ethnicity and region.

	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) educated voting Socialists /
	Progressivess, after controls
	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting Socialists / Progressives,
	after controls
	Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for center-left / left-
	wing parties (

Vote for Fujimorists by education level

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Peruvian Aprista Party by ethnicity. ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fujimorists by education level.

	70% 70%	White Figure FC8 -Primary Mestizo Indigenous Figure FC9 -	Black/Mulatto Secondary Other	Tertiary
	60% 60%
	50% 50%
	40% 40%
	30% 30%
	20% 20%
	10% 10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00 Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11 2006-11		2016 2016

Vote for Fujimorists by education group

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fujimorists by education group.

	Figure FC10 -
	70%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11	2016

Vote for Fujimorists by income group

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fujimorists by income group.

	Figure FC11 -
	70%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11	2016

Vote for Fujimorists by religious affiliation

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fujimorists by religious affiliation.

	Figure FC12 -
	70%
		No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11		2016

Vote for Fujimorists by gender

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fujimorists by gender.

	Figure FC13 -
	70%
		Woman	Man
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11	2016

Vote for Fujimorists by age group

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fujimorists by age group.

	Figure FC14 -
	70%
			20-40	40-60	60+
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11	2016

Vote for Fujimorists by region

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fujimorists by region.

		Figure FC15 -
	60%
		North	Center	Lima	South	East
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0%	2006-11				2016

Vote for Fujimorists by ethnicity

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fujimorists by ethnicity.

	Figure FC16 -
	80%
	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Black/Mulatto	Other
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0%		2016

Vote for Fujimorists by detailed ethnicity

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fujimorists by detailed ethnicity.

	Figure FC17 -
	60%
	White	Mestizo	Quechua	Amazonia	Aymara	Black/Mulatto	Asian	Other
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00		2006-11		2016

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by education level

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Socialists/Progressives by education level.

	Figure FC18 -
	70%
		Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11		2016

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by education group

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Socialists/Progressives by education group.

	Figure FC19 -
	60%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11	2016

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by income group

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Socialists/Progressives by income group.

	Figure FC20 -
	80%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11	2016

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by religious affiliation

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Socialists/Progressives by religious affiliation.

	Figure FC21 -
	70%
		No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11		2016

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by gender

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Socialists/Progressives by gender.

	Figure FC22 -
	70%
		Woman	Man
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11	2016

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by age group

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Socialists/Progressives by age group.

	Figure FC23 -
	80%
	70%	20-40	40-60	60+
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% 1995-00	2006-11	2016

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by region

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Socialists/Progressives by region.

		Figure FC24 -
	70%
	60%	North	Center	Lima	South	East
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0%	2006-11		2016

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by ethnicity

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Socialists/Progressives by ethnicity.

	Figure FC25 -
	40%
	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Black/Mulatto	Other
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	Source: authors0%		2016

Vote for Socialists / Progressives by detailed ethnicity

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Socialists/Progressives by detailed ethnicity.

	Figure FD1 -
	100%
	White	Mestizo	Quechua	Amazonia	Aymara	Black/Mulatto	Asian	Other
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% Bottom 50%		Middle 40%		Top 10%

Composition of income groups by ethnicity, 2000s

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by ethnicity in the 2000s.

	Figure FD2 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% Bottom 50%	White	Mestizo	Indigenous Middle 40%	Black/Mulatto	Other Top 10%

Composition of income groups by ethnicity, 2010s

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by ethnicity in the 2010s.

	Figure FD3 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% Bottom 50%	White	Mestizo	Indigenous Middle 40%	Black/Mulatto	Other Top 10%

Composition of income groups by employment status, 2000s

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by employment status in the 2000s.

	Figure FD4 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Employed Private Source: authors0% Bottom 50%	Employed Public	Unemployed Middle 40%	Inactive	Top 10%

Composition of income groups by employment status, 2010s

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by employment status in the 2010s.

	Figure FD5 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Employed Private Source: authors0% Bottom 50%	Employed Public	Unemployed Middle 40%	Inactive	Top 10%

Composition of income groups by education level, 1990s

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by education level in the 1990s.

	Figure FD6 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Primary Bottom 50% Source: authors0%	Secondary Middle 40%	Tertiary Top 10%

Composition of income groups by education level, 2000s

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by education level in the 2000s.

	Figure FD7 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Primary Bottom 50% Source: authors0%	Secondary Middle 40%	Tertiary Top 10%

Composition of income groups by education level, 2010s

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by education level in the 2010s.

	Figure FD8 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Primary Bottom 50% Source: authors0%	Secondary Middle 40%	Tertiary Top 10%

Composition of income groups by region, 2000s

  North Coast North Mountains Center Mountains Lima South Coast South Mountains JungleSource: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by region in the 2000s.

	Figure FD9 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%

Composition of income groups by region, 2010s

  North Coast North Mountains Center Mountains Lima South Coast South Mountains JungleSource: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by region in the 2010s.

	Figure FD10 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%

Composition of income groups by religion, 2010s

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by religion in the 2010s.

	Figure FD11 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% White	No religion	Mestizo	Catholic Indigenous	Protestant Black/Mulatto	Other	Other

Composition of ethnic groups by education level, 2010s

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of ethnic groups by education level in the 2010s.

	Figure FD12 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% White	Primary Mestizo	Secondary Indigenous	Tertiary Black/Mulatto	Other

Composition of ethnic groups by religion, 2010s

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of ethnic groups by religion in the 2010s.

	Figure FD13 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: authors0% White	No religion Mestizo	Catholic Indigenous Protestant	Other Black/Mulatto	Other

Composition of ethnic groups by employment status, 2010s

  ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of ethnic groups by employment status in the 2010s.

	Employed private Survey World Values Survey, Wave 3 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 1 Employed public Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2006 Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2012 Source: authorsYear 1995 2000 2006 2011 2016 Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2016/2017	Unemployed Source Sample size WVS 1211 CSES 1102 LAPOP 1500 LAPOP 1500 LAPOP 2647	Inactive

Table FE1 -Survey data sources Source: author

 FE1 's elaboration. WVS: World Values Survey, available from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. CSES: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, available from https://cses.org/. LAPOP: Latin American Public Opinion Project, available from https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php. Note: the table shows the surveys used in the draft, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

		1995-00	2006-11	2016
	Age: 20-40	67%	58%	56%
	Age: 40-60	29%	31%	35%
	Age: 60+	4%	11%	9%
	Subjective class: Not working class		53%
	Education: Primary	14%	18%	15%
	Education: Secondary	67%	46%	46%
	Education: Tertiary	19%	36%	39%
	Employment status: Employed	58%	65%	49%
	Employment status: Unemployed	7%	8%	18%
	Employment status: Inactive	36%	28%	34%
	Marital status: Married or with partner	60%	35%	28%
	Occupation: Employed private	0%	56%	41%
	Occupation: Employed public	0%	9%	7%
	Occupation: Unemployed	16%	8%	18%
	Occupation: Inactive	84%	28%	34%
	Language: Spanish	98%	87%
	Language: Indigenous	2%	13%
	Ethnicity: White		11%	11%
	Ethnicity: Mestizo		79%	60%
	Ethnicity: Indigenous		6%	20%
	Ethnicity: Black/Mulatto		3%	3%
	Ethnicity: Other		1%	6%
	Region: Lima	46%	34%	19%
	Region: North	23%	27%	28%
	Region: Center	8%	6%	6%
	Region: South	17%	22%	20%
	Region: East	6%	11%	26%
	Religion: No religion	7%	5%	5%
	Religion: Catholic	83%	79%	75%
	Religion: Protestant	6%	14%	17%
	Religion: Other	4%	2%	3%
	Church attendance: Never	5%		26%
	Church attendance: Less than monthly	19%		30%
	Church attendance: Monthly	33%		22%
	Church attendance: Monthly or more	43%		22%
	Rural-urban: Rural areas	7%	23%	40%
	Sector		14%	17%
	Gender: Man	50%	49%	51%

Table FE2 -Complete descriptive statistics by decade Source: authors

 FE2 ' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by decade for selected available variables.

		Fujimorists (Force 2011/Popular	Christian Democrats/Liberals	Socialists/Progressives
		Front)	(UN/PPK/AP)	(GP/PP/FAJVL)
	Education
	Primary	39%	36%	17%
	Secondary	39%	34%	16%
	Tertiary	25%	36%	23%
	Income
	Bottom 50%	39%	34%	16%
	Middle 40%	30%	35%	21%
	Top 10%	23%	37%	20%
	Religious affiliation
	No religion	23%	26%	33%
	Catholic	32%	36%	17%
	Protestant	41%	32%	19%
	Other	25%	35%	23%
	Age
	20-40	35%	35%	19%
	40-60	32%	34%	20%
	60+	31%	38%	14%
	Employment status
	Employed private	35%	35%	18%
	Employed public	21%	40%	23%
	Unemployed	30%	33%	23%
	Inactive	37%	35%	16%
	Region
	Lima	31%	38%	13%
	North	37%	33%	17%
	Center	25%	40%	27%
	South	27%	33%	29%

Table FE3 -The structure of political cleavages in Peru, 2016 Share of votes received (%)

 FE3 's computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by Fujimorists, Christian Democrats/Liberals and Socialists/Progressives by selected individual characteristics in 2016.

	East	38%	35%	16%
	Ethnicity
	White	37%	39%	9%
	Mestizo	34%	35%	17%
	Black/Mulatto	34%	39%	15%
	Other	47%	34%	10%
	Asian	63%	21%	15%
	Quechua	24%	29%	36%
	Aymara	20%	59%	21%
	Amazonia	24%	38%	24%
	Zamba	50%	43%	0%
	Source: author

INDEC, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de la República de Argentina.

In 1973, at Peron's reception at the airport the right-wing Peronists open fired against the left-wing Peronists.

See online appendix FiguresAA2 and AA3

See online appendix FiguresAA12 and AA13.

Under this system, parties and independent candidates group themselves into lists or coalitions. Each list can propose up to two candidates per electoral region, province, or other geographical unit. Votes are counted by list and unless the list with the majority of votes doubles the voting of the second majority, each of the two lists gets the candidate who got the majority of votes into office. Hence, the first and the second majority get equal representation whenever the first majority does not double the second. See[START_REF] Luna | Chile: are the parties over?[END_REF].

These results align with the exacerbation of the working-class cleavage towards the left in the 2010s (see appendix FigureBA24).

See appendix Figure BA21.

Note that some of these parties, in particular the PLN, have historically had multi-class electorates. We refer to them as pro-poor and pro-rich, as they have had a larger share of bottom-and top-income earners since the 2000s, respectively.

Inter-Regional Inequality Facility, "Policy Brief 2"(Technical Report, 2006).

BBC, "Mexico Faces Partial Recount in Presidential Election," BBC, July 5, 2012 (accessed October 2, 2020).

See appendix Table ED1 for data sources.

Persons of indigenous background are those who descend from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization. Persons of mestizo background are, instead, those who have both Spanish and indigenous descend

See appendix Figures EC45.

See appendix FiguresEC24 and EC41.

See appendix figures FC1 and FC17.

Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys. Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by decade for selected available variables.