Ph.D Frederik Dhondt
email: frederik.dhondt@ugent.be

International Legal Discourse Between Disintegration and Integration. The Case of the Peaceful Succession Struggles, 1713-1739

Introduction

'France was never our enemy but under Lewis the Fourteenth; at which time she was a foe to the whole world. She seeks not universal Empire now, she does not invade the rights of her neighbours, she has done signal benefits to us since the regency of the late Duke or Orleans' (The Censor, December 1728 1 )

The period stretching from the Peace of Utrecht (11 April 1713) to the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740) is an exceptional interval of peace between European Powers. From the decease of Louis XIV (1 September 1715) to that of Emperor Charles VI (20 October 1740), an uncommon interlude of harmony fills the pages of Western history books.

Our discipline, legal history, accords a major place to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia as the 'terminus a quo' of a 'French age' of international law 2 . However, at that time, war waged on between France and Spain, the two major European powers of the moment 3 . From Louis XIV' accession to personal power in 1661 on, a balance in Europe could only be ephemerous 4 . We judge, with Heinhard Steiger 5 , that, although the system of free and equal sovereign states was clearly conceived in Münster and Osnabrück through the attribution of a 'ius territorialis' to all 300+ members of the Empire, it could only start to function well in the 1713 multilateral stability 6 .

After 1713, vacant successions, such as those in the duchy of Parma-Piacenza and the grand-duchy of Tuscany 7 in the present contribution, were a menace to the system, as they had been before 8 . Traditionally, such problems would have led to a big European war, as had been the case with the succession in the Palatinate (1688-1697). Not, however, in the Europe of "Walpole and Fleury 9 " or "Stanhope and Dubois 10 ". 1 Quoted in Jeremy Black, British foreign policy in the age of Walpole (Donald 1984) 176. 2 Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (De Gruyter 2000). 3 René Vermeir, In staat van oorlog : Filips IV en de zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1629-1648 (Shaker 2001). 4 John A. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714 (H.M. Scott and B.W. Collins eds, Longman 1999). 5 Heinhard Steiger, 'Rechtliche Strukturen der europäischen Staatenordnung 1648-1792' LIX Zeitschrift für ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 609-649. 6 On the specific legal technique to create a multilateral order on the basis of bilateral treaties, see Christina Marek, 'Contribution à l'étude du traité multilatéral' in Emmanuel Diez, Jean Monnier and Jörg. P. Müller (eds), Festschrift für Rudolf Bindschedler (Stämpfli 1980). 'the manner in which the alliance tried to settle the outstanding problems between all the western powers and to guarantee their thrones provides ample reason for describing the treaty as an early collective security agreement' ( The model of a 'second hundred years war 11 ' between France and Britain (1688-1815), from the coming to power of William III to the Battle of Waterloo, is thus false. In reality, France and Britain cooperated, rather than clashed. Their colonial rivalry in America was still nascent. European questions occupied the agenda 12 .

Historians have not yet found a satisfying explanation. The renowned French historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie pointed to the excellent personal relations between the protagonists in the small diplomatic society 13 . Richard Lodge saw them more as Spenlow and Jorkins in Dickens' David Copperfield 14 . However, facts often contradict apparently evident assumptions. The Franco-British bond was certainly stronger in the first half of this period, than in the last. British historian Jeremy Black goes so far as stating its demise from 1727 on 15 .

Was this a pure matter of unprincipled 'high politics'? Legal historians of the early modern era tend to focus on 'big names 16 ' such as Grotius, Rachel, Pufendorf, Wolff or Vattel 17 , or, in other words, on the take-over by the school of natural law, to the detriment of the medieval 'mos italicus' and the renaissance 'mos gallicus' 18 . We argue that our attention should shift away from what happened at (Protestant, German) academia, often more 'de lege ferenda', than 'de lege lata' 19 , to the actual legal practice in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. A more conceptual and sociological reading of diplomatic sources offers a more nuanced perspective 20 .

Approach

A legal praxeology of the trente heureuses

To correctly understand the workings of international law in eighteenth century, we need to broaden the normative perspective. International law primarily is the law of obligations consented to by sovereign states 21 . Thus, for the post-Utrecht period, we dispose of the ample treaty collections by Jean Dumont de Carelskroon, imperial historiographer and legal adviser (1666-1727) 22 , completed by the 11 J.M. Mattei, Histoire du droit de la guerre, 1700-1819: introduction à l'histoire du droit international : avec une biographie des principaux auteurs de la doctrine internationaliste de l'Antiquité à nos jours (PUAM 2006) Huguenot journalist Jean Rousset de Missy (1686-1762) 23 . In these volumes, we can find the explicitly agreed duties and obligations of states in the 'Society of Princes'24 . However, the observance of most of these treaty clauses was far from strict, leading certain researchers to doubt the efficacy of compounds between distrustful states 25 .

We argue that a legal historian should go further than a mere positivist fact-check of international engagements, or an academic genealogical exercise, backwards projecting contemporary international law in the past. Law is discourse. Law lives in society. Law reflects power relationships, and thus differences, between the members of that society. As a discourse, law serves as a vector to translate unilateral, political interests and make them acceptable to other states26 . The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called this exercise of finding the implicit guiding principles behind human action, a praxeology. Diplomats behave themselves according to a habitus, or collection of unifying moving principles. The jurists' role is then to change the nature of facts by attributing them a qualification: 'Faisant croire que c'est vrai à des gens qui ont le pouvoir de faire exister le vrai, c'est-à-dire les puissants, il peuvent rendre réel ce qu'ils disent27 '. Moreover, the fact that states are in a competition with each other does not exclude the possibility of a common discussion ground, in the form of the law: 'Autrement dit, pour qu'il y ait lutte dans un champ, il faut qu'il y ait accord sur les terrains de désaccords, sur les armes légitimes et légitimement employées dans la lutte, sur les critères mêmes du triomphe, ce qui fait qu'on peut apparemment parler d'une culture'28 .

A similar attention shift, away from the mere comparison of obligations and execution, has been proposed by the German historian Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, in her cultural or symbolic history of the Old Imperial constitution. Instead of asking our sources questions that cannot properly be answered, since they refer to a closed, autonomous system of legal norms, which did not exist in the minds of contemporaries, we should adapt our inquiries to mentality and cultural practices of our target period29 . Stollberg-Rilinger proposes a more complex grid of interpretation:

-positivist-legal (= published treaties) -concrete constitutional practice (= diplomatic practice, or politics) -theoretical-discursive (= academic explanation and systematisation) -symbolic-ritual (= through the explicit symbolic of power rituals, or through the implicit symbolic of everyday interaction) Stollberg-Rilinger's distinction is somehow mirrored in Jean de la Sarraz du Franquesnay's manual Le ministre public dans les cours étrangères (1731). Sarraz treats public law in a separate chapter of his relatively short (164 p.) work 30 . To start with, Sarraz explains why he treats public law at all, 'devant être supposé, pour parler vulgairement, que chacun sçait le métier qu'il fait'. In other words, public law is implicitly present and does not exist in the eyes of practitioners as a separate corpus of knowledge. The accession to this corpus runs on four ways: 1° celle des Ecoles publiques [...] Quoiqu'on sçache fort bien que ce que l'on y apprend là-dessus ne soit jamais capable de former seul un Ministre, il ne faut pas s'imaginer que ce moyen soit inutile; on y apprend la Théorie de ce droit; on y prend une idée précise de ce qu'il est par les définitions de son tout & de ses parties, par ses distinctions, divisions & sous-divisons & dans les théses publiques qui se soutiennent là-dessus ; on y apprend les fondements généraux & particuliers de la science speculative du droit public, quand on a déjà une tenture suffisante du droit de la Nature & des gens, dont la connoissance est si utile en tant d'occasions 2° la lecture des Traités qui se sont faits sur les diverses branches de cette science […] L'Allemagne est le pays du monde où l'on a le plus & le mieux écrit là-dessus ; il n'est guére de parties du droit public de l'Empire qu'ils n'ayent maniées sçavamment & l'on ne peut ignorer que le fond du droit public etant le même par tout & n'y ayant de différence que dans le plus ou le moins d'etenduë, que les usages locaux & les circonstances peuvent lui donner […] 3° celle de la réflexion, de la méditation & des conversations qu'on peut avoir avec des gens bien versés dans la connoissance de toutes les parties de cette science 4° la voie beaucoup plus parfaite que toutes les autres, c'est celle de la pratique : celle-ci est une école infaillible, dont toutes les décisions sont des règles ; les trois autres voies ou les trois premiers mettent le Ministre en etat de se bien conduire dans la 4°, où les connoissances reçoivent le sceau de leur achevement, par l'experience.'

We could not better illustrate Stollberg-Rilinger's structure. What is taught (1°), transmitted through oral dialogue (3°) and what is in the books (2°) can but give an impression of the role of law in practice. Consequently, we need an 'action theory', and not a 'theory of theories'. Rather than concentrating on the exact wording or systemic explanation of the words 'balance of power 31 ', or 'tranquility of Europe', we need to understand what they mean in context 32 .

Contemporary Sources

Dumont de Carelskroon and Rousset de Missy's treaty collections were of prime importance to diplomatic practitioners 33 . As repositories of obligations between states, they could serve as the starting point for the redaction of an argumentarium 34 . However, they were far from sufficient. International treaties constituted but one of several sources of law. As Rousset de Missy's Intérêts présens des puissances de l'Europe, a collection of pending legal quarrels between European states, 31 shows 35 , other legal systems constituted legitimate sources of law: feudal law, succession law and imperial law, often going back to medieval arrangements 36 .

Rousset's writings were used by diplomats, but circulated in the nascent European 'public space'. Behind the curtain of secrecy, however, practitioners put their own application in writing. The rich and vast diplomatic archives in France and Britain constitute our main sources. The 'bureaux des affaires étrangères', strongly reorganised under Louis XIV (1638-1715), had several 'premiers commis' 37 competent for every European region. Those experts in the diplomatic archives, where legally binding treaties were systematised, exercised considerable symbolic authority in the elaboration of policy. The advice of prominent bureaucrats as Antoine Pecquet sr. 38 and Nicolas-Louis Le Dran 39 shaped not only the verbal qualification of outstanding issues, but their resolution as well. Only the jurist brings legitimacy to monarchal acts.

The Peaceful Successions

The Italian Fiefs

The Spanish Succession and its consequences

The War of the Spanish Succession considerably changed the political map of Europe. Whereas, before 1700, Spain controlled the Southern Netherlands (present-day Belgium), Southern Italy (Kingdoms of Napels and Sicily), Northern Italy (Duchy of Milan, Tuscan 'praesidia' or harbours) and the isles of Sardinia, Mallorca and Menorca, in addition to its colonial empire, this bloc was torn in two parts. The Utrecht Peace treaty partitioned the lands of the ever-sickly Charles II of Spain (1662-1700). Philip V (1683-1746), grandson of Louis XIV of France, would rule Spain and the colonies. The Italian possessions (with the exception of Sicily) and the Southern Netherlands went to Emperor Charles VI of the Holy Roman Empire.

The legal basis of the Utrecht arrangement was a small revolution in European public law. Traditionally, royal succession was seen in terms of domestic law. Unwritten 'lois fondamentales', as in France (salic law/indisposability of the crown 40 ), testaments or solemn registered renunciation declarations before the highest court of the realm 41 were the only relevant categories in legal discourse. However, as those claims accumulated, it became increasingly clear that they could never satisfyingly 35 solve the quarrels between two as absolute opponents as the Bourbons and the Habsburgs, who would both gather coalitions against the other [START_REF] Le | Louis XIV et la Flandre, problèmes économiques, prétextes juridiques[END_REF] .

Imperial diplomat Franz Paul von Lisola (1613-1674) [START_REF] Baumanns | Das publizistische Werk des kaiserlichen Diplomaten Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola[END_REF] pointed to this problem in his pamphlet Bouclier d'Estat et de justice [START_REF] Paul Von Lisola | Bouclier d'estat et de justice contre le dessein manifestement découvert de la monarchie universelle, sous le vain prétexte des prétentions de la reyne de France[END_REF] : rules of private or domestic law could not apply between sovereign and equal monarchs, who had no judge. Kings can only negotiate, or go to war. Consequently, this led to partition treaties, concluded between Louis XIV and Emperor Leopold I (1640-1705) [START_REF] Bérenger | Une tentative de rapprochement entre la France et l'Empereur[END_REF] in 1668, between William III, the States-General and Louis XIV in 1697 and 1700 [START_REF] Legrelle | La Diplomatie française et la Succession d'Espagne[END_REF] . The validity of such a legal approach was not contested by the parties. Britain ultimately left the coalition against Louis to prevent a Habsburg hegemony.

The separation of the crowns of France and Spain, where Philip V was to install a 'secundogeniture' or junior branch of the Bourbon family, was essential. British jurists drafted Philip's renunciation declaration, whereby he forsook succession rights to the French throne for himself and his descendants. In spite of protest at the Parliament of Paris, his words were registered and superseded the French 'lois fondamentales' [START_REF] Baudrillart | Examen des droits de Philippe V et de ses descendants au trône de France, en dehors des renonciations d'Utrecht[END_REF] . Treaty clauses superseded internal norms and a beginning of normative hierarchy between international (horizontal, consensual) and national (vertical, hierarchical) came into being 2.1.2. Spanish revisionism Philip V of Spain wanted to restore Spanish power in the Mediterranean, unjustly shattered by the British, who allotted considerable parts of Italy to the Austrian Emperor, without however enabling him to dominate the navigation of the Mediterranean [START_REF] Mckay | Bolingbroke, Oxford and the defence of the Utrecht Settlement in Southern Europe[END_REF] . The Duke of Savoy, who before the War only controlled a buffer zone between France (Provence) and the Habsburg (Milan), was rewarded for skilfully swapping sides in the middle of the war. He became king of Sicily in 1713 [START_REF] Storrs | War, diplomacy and the rise of Savoy[END_REF] .

Philip allied himself to the Duke of Parma-Piacenza, Francesco Farnese (1678-1727), by marrying his niece Elisabeth (1692-1766). She would soon turn out to be one of the most turbulent queens in Europe [START_REF] Armstrong | The Termagant of Spain[END_REF] . Her uncle was unhappy with the Utrecht settlement and pleaded for a Spanish invasion. Bringing back Spain on the peninsula would balance the Austrians and give more freedom of action to the smaller Italian sovereigns [START_REF] Minister | often identified with the Spanish aggression of 1717 and 1718, was only an instrument of these policies (Émile Bourgeois, La Diplomatie secrète au XVIIIe siècle, ses débuts. II[END_REF] . Spanish prime minister, but foremost former Parmezan diplomat Guilio Alberoni, launched an attack on Sardinia (22 August 1717), at a time where the bulk of the Austrian forces were fighting the Turk on the Balkans [START_REF] Parvev | Habsburgs and Ottomans between Vienna and Belgrade[END_REF] .

Multilateral diplomatic response

In the meanwhile, four years after Utrecht, the normative weight of the horizontal elements in the treaty had become even heavier. The reason lay with internal French and British politics. At first, until Louis XIV' decease, French diplomacy oriented itself on better relations with the Imperial court, away from the Franco-British tandem. Conversely, the new Whig-government in Westminster tried the same. After all, the British sovereign George I (1660-1727) was a prince of the Empire, who had a lot to gain from a good understanding with Charles VI. However, this did not last long. Philip V contested his exclusion from the French throne. At Louis XIV' decease on 1 September his successor Louis XV was barely five years old. Hence, Philip of Orléans (1674-1723), who would assume the regency until Louis' majority at the age of 13, chose a foreign ally who needed external support himself [START_REF] Corvisier | Les régences en Europe : essai sur les délégations de pouvoirs souverains[END_REF] . Georg Ludwig, Duke-Elector of Hannover, inherited the British throne following the exclusion of the Catholic Stuart dynasty as a consequence of the 1688 Glorious Revolution. The 'Pretender' James Stuart (1688-1766), son of the late James II (1633-1701) travelled from one catholic continent court to another and was considered a serious menace to Britain's internal security. On 28 November 1716, France and Britain concluded a treaty of mutual guarantee at Palace Herrenhausen in Hannover, George's German residence.

The Italian case tested the alliance's for the first time. The Spanish attack had to be repelled. Charles VI could count on support from his colleagues. However, there could be no question of a reinforcement of Habsburg's position in Italy, which would make it too preponderant.

Autonomisation and Hierarchy:

The Quadruple Alliance's article V and its fall-out Philip V's legal pretension for the invasion was the securing of the succession in the Duchies of Parma-Piacenza and Tuscany for his son Carlos (°1717) born from his marriage with Elisabeth. The Farnese and de'Medici lines were not extinct yet, but Philip saw his manoeuvre as a preventive one. Emperor Charles considered these territories as imperial fiefs, meaning that they would return to him in case of vacancy (absence of male successors).

At the Treaty of London (2 August 1718) [START_REF] George | Treaty between[END_REF] , concluded between George I, Louis XV and Charles VI, Philip was both repelled and satisfied. His pretensions regarding Parma-Piacenza and Tuscany were accepted. The Duke-King of Savoy-Sicily was the main loser [START_REF] Dureng | Le Duc de Bourbon et l'Angleterre[END_REF] . While his island was invaded by the Spanish, he had to consent to exchange it for the poorer Kingdom of Sardinia, making the Emperor the sole master of Southern Italy In other words: at the extinction of the ruling male lines, Parma-Piacenza and Tuscany would receive a successor and be regarded as imperial fiefs by all the contracting parties. However, the qualification of 'Feudus masculinis' hides an essential modification. Don Carlos' designation as new sovereign is based on his descendence from Elisabeth Farnese… a woman! The feudal law of the Empire [START_REF] Freiherr | Das Recht der Reichslehen im 18. Jahrhundert. Zugleich ein Beitrag zu den Grundlagen der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung[END_REF] did not apply to this succession any more. In reality, the Emperor had to consent to the modification of the Italian fief's statute [START_REF] Heinhard | During the negotiations of the Italian intervention, the Imperial court repeatedly made a point of not conceding a modification of the internal rules, but to no avail[END_REF] .

War as 'ultima ratio'

Unsurprisingly, the execution of the clause, which put treaty law apart from, and above domestic law, was a tiresome and tedious work. From August 1718 to the effective investiture of Don Carlos (late 1731), more than thirteen years passed [START_REF]Résolution Imperiale pour l'Emancipation de la Tutelle de l'Infant d'Espagne don Carlos[END_REF] .

Philip V adhered to the Quadruple Alliance in 1720, but it took two more years for a European peace conference to open in the French city of Cambrai. It got well out of the starting blocks in 1724, to shatter again in the Spring of 1725, when Habsburg and Spain decided to get rid of mediation [START_REF] Dhondt | Law on the Diplomatic Stage: the 1725 Ripperda Treaty[END_REF] . However, the mechanism proved to be persistent.

Previous to the arrival of arbitration tribunals or permanent international courts, sovereigns possessed an array of tools to settle a dispute: Direct negotiation: linking the injury suffered to a compensation in another outstanding quarrel with the counterparty Third-party mediation: implying a delegation of authority over the negotiations and its dynamics to third parties, who can amend an initial demand conforming to their own wishes, or to those of the counterparty, to whom they might feel more inclined. This approach has two disadvantages: independence menaces his loyalty, dependence his credibility Retorsions or reprisals: mostly in maritime or trade cases, proportional measures to those suffered by the hands of the counterparty can be applied War: not the first option, since the preceding alternatives can be less costly. Postponing the solution of a political problem does not come without potential reputational losses, but avoids the disruption of trade and the mobilisation of the military, which has its repercussions on fiscal pressure. Nevertheless, war is considered a normal option of dispute settlement, in the absence of an authority above the sovereign partners in the state system [START_REF]L'imperfection du contrat international' Maxime Lefebvre, Le jeu du droit et de la puissance[END_REF] .

Congress, Rupture, Congress (1722-1729)

Since direct negotiations between Charles VI and Philip V were difficult, the second option was initially preferred. However, as France and Britain intervened in the first place on behalf of threatened Austria, they gradually changed positions in the run-up to the Congress. Once Philip had evacuated Sicily [START_REF] Philip | with British mediation[END_REF] (gain for the Emperor) and Sardinia (compensation for Victor Amadeus of Savoy), to adhere to the terms of the alliance 63 , the burden of execution of the famous article V fell on Charles VI.

Charles retarded the issuing of an expectative, or promisory letter to Don Carlos, on which the Spanish conditioned the opening of the Congress, until 1724. The Imperial Chancery, led by Vice-Chancelor Bishop Friedrich Karl von Schönborn (1674-1746 [START_REF] Lafage | Une famille allemande à la conquête du pouvoir dans le Saint Empire romain germanique, tome I : Les fondateurs. Tome II : Les héritiers (L'Harmattan[END_REF] ), tried to bypass the imposition of treaty language on what it considered to be an internal German and feudal affair, leading to the insertion of the word 'ligus' in its 1722 draft of the expectative. This term, designating the submission of a vassal to a specific sovereign, was unacceptable to France and Britain, who, in order to maintain the balance in Italy, insisted on Don Carlos' future independence and the introduction of Spanish garrisons in the main fortresses of the disputes territories, awaiting their rulers' death.

At this point, the Emperor created a complex package deal for the other European powers. Considering the elevation of the Italian successions to the European playing field, Charles VI decided to do the same for the Habsburg lands. The Emperor was tied to the conditions of a 'Pactum Mutuae Successionis', concluded in 1703 with his elder brother Joseph I (1674-1711) [START_REF] Frey | A Question of empire : Leopold I and the war of Spanish succession[END_REF] . In case Joseph would decease without male issue (which happened in April 1711, causing Charles to come back from Spain, where he fought Philip V), Charles' own children could only inherit before Joseph's daughters if they were male. In case Charles would only leave daughters, they would come second after Joseph's. Shortly after taking power, Charles VI issued a 'Pragmatic Sanction', which was slowly adopted by the provincial estates in the Habsburg lands. Instead of stopping the movement here, Charles took the issue to the international forum, and asked for recognition of this settlement [START_REF] Kunisch | Staatsverfassung und Mächtepolitik[END_REF] .

The French mediators wanted to keep this out of the Cambrai Congress, whose agenda was already overloaded with Italian frontier and investiture quarrels, blurring the main outstanding issues between Philip and Charles. However, another issue popped up. British and Dutch 67 disgruntlement with the flourishing East India trade at the port of Ostend in Charles VI' Belgian provinces [START_REF] Huisman | Octroy for Thirty Years to the East India Company in the Austrian Netherlands[END_REF] was so great, that the British -although in a position as mediator-menaced to bring this to the table as well 69 .

During the Congress, the role of France and Britain had become so blurred, that they lost credibility. When they pleaded the Spanish cause, they were accused of reneging their role of 'guarantees' of the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, contracted against Philip's aggression. In fact, they were helping Spain to modify the text and enlarge its scope. If, conversely, they advanced the Imperial quest for recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction, Spain felt they forsook their original mission of 'mediation', leading to specification and execution of the treaty, i.e. installing Don Carlos as an independent sovereign. As a result, the 1725 Ripperda Treaty between the Emperor and the King of Spain70 was a welcome wake-up call, which helped to clarify the negotiating positions.

In exchange for a fake promise to wed one of the two archduchesses to Don Carlos (and thus to give him a perspective on the Imperial Crown, which could not be wore by a woman), Charles obtained the recognition of his Pragmatic Sanction by his historically toughest adversary and considerable subventions. Needless to say, this course of action fell very badly with the other delegations at the congress, who saw the resurrection of Charles V' universal monarchy [START_REF] Charles | aussi étendues et aussi dangereuses à l'Europe en général et à notre pays en particulier que celles de Louis XIV[END_REF] .

The ensuing period of international tension saw the building-up of two blocs within the German Empire: one catholic and revisionist, on the axis Madrid-Vienna, with the aid of the Russian Tsarina, and a protestant, the other protestant and loyal to the Utrecht treaties, driven by the Elector of Hannover/King of Britain, supported by France 72 , which eventually agreed on paper to a military destruction of the port and harbour of Ostend 73 .

Paradoxically, the tensions between Spain and Britain grew stronger than those between Britain and the Emperor. Philip V reclaimed Gibraltar and menaced to retaliate on British contraband trade in violation of the 1713 Utrecht agreements. Consequently, the new French principal minister, Cardinal Fleury (1653-1743), approached the Imperial court. In the Parisian Preliminaries (31 May 1727 [START_REF]Preliminaries of Peace between Louis XV and Philip V[END_REF] ), a new call for a congress was issued. In exchange for prospects on the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction at the outcome of the new multilateral round, Charles dropped the Ostend Company, whose permission to trade was suspended for seven years.

Britain between Spain and Habsburg (1729-1733)

The Congress of Soissons (1728-1729 [START_REF] Höfler | Der Congress von Soissons[END_REF] ) eventually led to a separate Franco-British-Spanish treaty at Seville (9 November 1729 [START_REF] Philip | Treaty between Louis XV[END_REF] ), imposing Spanish garrisons in Italy. Emperor Charles VI being the only party not participating in the treaty, the Spanish court hoped for military action to enforce Don Carlos' rights, within four months after its conclusion. However, Britain nor France were willing to participate in it and hoped to 'extort 77 ' Vienna's assent by diplomatic means only. Another round of negotiations started, but this time Britain went alone to the Emperor78 , who had sent Austrian troops to seize Parma and Piacenza at Antonio Farnese's decease (20 January 1731). In exchange for British recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction, Charles VI repealed the Ostend Company's Imperial Patent (19 March 1731 79 ). Moreover, he promised to give Don Carlos at last the investiture of Parma-Piacenza and Tuscany. The Spanish prince effectively took possession of the former on 9 February 1732.

War ? (1733-1738)

'Fleury distribua généreusement les couronnes comme s'il se fût agi de hochets d'enfant [START_REF] Chaussinand-Nogaret | Le cardinal de Fleury: le Richelieu de Louis XV[END_REF] ' A coincidence, namely the decease of August the Strong, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland [START_REF] Sutton | The King's Honor and the King's Cardinal: the War of the Polish Succession[END_REF] , on 1 February 1733, brought new tensions to the international system. At this time, France allied itself to Spain, side-lining Britain and the Dutch Republic in a neutrality convention for the Austrian Netherlands (24 November 1733 82 ). For the first time in almost twenty years, a French army invaded Germany [START_REF]Louis XV against Charles VI[END_REF] and a coalition of Spain, Savoy and France attacked all of Habsburg Italy. Regardless of the pretensions of Louis XV' father-in-law Stanislas Leczysnki (1677-1766) on the Polish throne, France wanted the duchy of Lorraine. A historical left-over from the Carolingian middle-empire, this Imperial territory was a thorn in the eastern side of the country. The opportunity presented itself, as the contestation of the Habsburg presence in Italy and the vacancy in Poland offered ample bargaining possibilities.

Deserted by their maritime allies, Charles VI' senescent generals suffered defeat. All of Italy was lost. Consequently, the Emperor treated directly with France (Preliminaries of Vienna, 3 October 1735) [START_REF]Vienna between Charles VI and Louis XV, communicated to George II and the States-General[END_REF] . Britain and Holland fruitlessly presented their mediation, while France could count its bounty: in exchange for an untenable Polish throne [START_REF]On ne peut gueres imaginer de Motif plus frivole que celui que la Couronne de France emprunte de l'Election d'un Roi de Pologne[END_REF] , Fleury installed Stanislas (with an automatic reversion to France) in the duchy of Lorraine, whose duke, Francis Stephen (1708-1765 [START_REF] Zedinger | Monarch, Manager[END_REF] ), Maria Theresia's promised husband, was due to succeed to the last Grand Duke of Tuscany 87 . Conversely, to make up for the loss of Tuscany, Don Carlos was promoted King of Naples and Sicily, leaving Parma-Piacenza to Charles VI. Mediation could not have been effective in this context. For Spain, British mediation posed questions of 'confidence' and 'impartiality' 88 . As for the French side, Fleury's manoeuvring amounted to 'bamboozle 89 ' the British.

Again, the elaboration of the basic treaty took a couple of years. Not until 1738 were the final acts signed. The final legitimacy for the Italian territories changing sides was not feudal or imperial law anymore. Right of conquest and multilateral state consent ('convenance' [START_REF] Duchhardt | Balance of power und Pentarchie[END_REF] ) to international treaty were sufficient, as the following articles demonstrate: However, this should not obscure that Franco-British cooperation continued. Britain stayed aloof [START_REF]Le Roi a meme affecté une parfaite indifference pour la Pologne, qu'elle etoit trop Eloignée de luy pour la connoitre, ni pour se soucier de la connoitre[END_REF] from the continent, but was building up confrontation with Spain in the colonies [START_REF] Black | British neutrality in the war of the Polish succession, 1733-1735[END_REF] . When it came to tackling Philippe V's 'guardacostas', Britain sought to renew its defensive alliance with France, on the model of those contracted in 1717 and 1725 93 .

Conclusion

Regardless of whether this cascade of dispute resolution mechanisms served to 'postpone war, rather than to avert it [START_REF] Lodge | English Neutrality in the War of the Polish Succession: A Commentary upon Diplomatic Instructions[END_REF] ', diplomatic practice gives us insight in the operation of the European diplomatic system in three unusually quiet decades. 'Balance of Power' was a matter of interest politics. Its operation, however, was far more subtle than a mechanical reading of events would prove. The rhetorical device of legal language served to elevate treaty arrangements to a higher level, exerting a civilising normative pull on all actors and, thus, possibly making peace last further than its original power foundations.

  [START_REF] Pesendorfer | Osterreich--Grossmacht im Mittelmeer? : das Konigreich Neapel-Sizilien unter Kaiser Karl VI (1707/20-1734/35[END_REF] .Article V, which was to occupy European diplomacy for the coming twenty years, stated the following concerning Parma-Piacenza and Tuscany:'quia vero eo casu, quo Magnum Hetruriae Ducem, prout etiam Ducem Parmae Placentiaeque, eorumque successores, absque liberis masculis decedere contingeret […] ut Status feu Ducatus […] ab omnibus Partibus contractantibus agnoscantur & habeantur pro indubitatis Sacri Romani Imperii Feudis masculinis. Vicissim Sua Majestas Caesarea, per se, ceu Caput Imperii, consentit, ut si quando casus aperturae dictorum Ducatuum, ob deficientiam Haeredum masculorum, contingat, filius dictae Hispaniarum Reginae primogenitus […]'

'

  L'Empereur consent que le Roi, Beau-Pere de S.M.T.C. sera mis en possession paisible du Duché de Bar, & de ses Dépendances […] De plus, il consent que, dès que le Grand-Duché de Toscane sera échu à la Maison de Lorraine […] le Roi Beau-Père de S.M.T.C. soit encore mis en possession paisible du Duché de Lorraine & de ses Dépendances.' (art. I) 'Les Royaumes de Naples & de Sicile appartiendront au Prince qui en est en possession, & qui en sera reconnu Roi par toutes les Puissances qui prendront part à la Pacification.' (art. II)

  Derek McKay and Hannish M. Scott, The rise of the great powers 1648-1815 (Longman 1983) 115.

7 J.H. Jones, Great Britain and the Tuscan Succession Question, 1710-1737 (Vantage Pr 1999). 8 Alison Anderson, On the verge of war : international relations and the Jülich-Kleve succession crises (1609-1614) (Humanities Press 1999). 9 Paul Vaucher, Robert Walpole et la politique de Fleury (1731-1742) (Plon 1924). 10 Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, Le Cardinal Dubois, 1656-1723 ou une certaine idée de l'Europe (Perrin 2000).

  William C. Wohlforth and others, 'Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History' XIII EJIR 155-185.

32

Bern Rill, Karl VI. : Habsburg als barocke Grossmacht (Verlag Styria 1992) 138.

33

La Sarraz 129: 'ces Traités font un Code de Droit public & deviennent loix obligatoires pour tous les Etats qui y sont entrez'. 34 E.g. when the French plenipotentiaries arrived at Soissons for the congress in 1728, they asked for 'le Recüeil des Actes d'Utreck avec celuy de Rousset qui en est naturellem[en]t la suite […] la traduction du Grotius par Barbeyrac avec le T[rai]té de Pattyn sur le Commerce d'Ostende […] la suite des Mercures historiques après 1720' (Count Brancas-Cereste to Chauvelin, Soissons, 2 September 1728, AMAE MD France 499 f° 48r°.).

  Jean Rousset de Missy, Les intérêts présens des puissances de l'Europe, Fondez sur les Traitez conclus depuis la Paix d'Utrecht inclusivement, & sur les Preuves de leurs Prétentions particulieres (Adrien Moetjens 1733). 36 Heinhard Steiger, 'Völkerrecht versus Lehnsrecht ? Vertragliche Reglungen über reichsitalienische Lehen in der Frühen Neuzeit' in Matthias Schnettger and Marcello Verga (eds.), L'Imperio e l'Italia nella prima età moderna/Das Reich und Italien in der Frühen Neuzeit (Duncker & Humblot, 2006) 115-152. 37 Jean Baillou, Les Affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français; 1: de l'Ancien régime au Second Empire (Paris 1984), Jean-Pierre Samoyault, Les bureaux du secrétariat d'État des Affaires Étrangères sous Louis XIV (Paris 1971). 38 Antoine Pecquet, Discourse on the Art of Negociation (First published 1737, translated by Aleksandra Gruzinska and Murray D. Sirkis, Peter Lang 2004).

39

Christian Fournier, Nicolas-Louis Le Dran, 1687-1774, "homme de Mémoires" (Paris 2009).

40

Francis Garrison, 'Lois fondamentales' in Lucien Bély (ed.), Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime (PUF 2010) 735-757.

41

Delphine Montariol, Les droits de la reine. La guerre juridique de dévolution (1667-1674) (Toulouse 2005).

Jean Rousset de Missy, Supplément au Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens, contenant un recueil des Traitez d'alliance de paix, de trève, de neutralité (Janssons à Waesberghe 1739).

Lucien Bély, La société des princes XVIe-XVIIIe siècle (Fayard 1999).

Katja Frehland-Wildeboer, Treue Freunde ? : Das Bündnis in Europa 1714-1914 (Oldenbourg 2010).

Constanze Villar, Le discours diplomatique (L'Harmattan 2006).

Pierre Bourdieu, Sur l'État: Cours au Collège de France (1989-1992) (Seuil 2012) 425.

Ibid.

Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, Des Kaisers alte Kleider: Verfassungsgeschichte und Symbolsprache im Alten Reich (C.H. Beck 2008).

Jean de la Sarraz du Franquesnay, Le ministre public dans les cours étrangères (Aux dépens de la compagnie, 1731) 104-132.

Treaty of Peace between Charles VI and Philip V, Vienna, 30 April/1 May 1725, CUD VIII/2 XXXVI 106.

This treaty also allowed George II to obtain the investiture for the duchies of Bremen and Verden, which his father bought from Sweden in 1715, a transaction until then never ratified by the Emperor (28


I. "Balance of Power" between politics and law in history

The "Balance of Power", or the decentralised maintenance of stability between sovereign power centres, is one of the timeless metaphors for the theory of international relations. Indifferent whether we trace it back to Aristotle, to Polybius, to Islamic philosophy 1 or to the Italian quatrocento 2 , it still occupies the mind today. "Detached from ideology, universally applicable, independent from short-term state considerations, it stresses the essential, timeless and inescapable, in international affairs: power and power relationships", to paraphrase Ernst Haas' words 3 . It is linked to the realist (if we think of Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy 4 or Raymond Aron's Paix et guerre entre les nations 5 ), as well as to the interdependency-paradigm. Or, if we reframe it with Martti Koskenniemi's brilliant work: as well to apologists, as to utopists 6 . For the jurist, it explains how law can be derived from an anarchical society 7 inevitably characterised by the multiplicity of power centres 8 , "involved in such intimacy of interrelationship as to make reciprocal impact feasible 9 ".

The application of the concept to the eighteenth century, the "crossroads of international law", where medieval ideas of causa justa are abandoned, is a classic 10 . To quote 1 Derived from the al-Mîzân (balance) at the final ordeal. Livet, Georges:

the British historian Herbert Butterfield: "the eighteenth century looked back to the Roman Empire as a thing that must never be allowed to happen again. They realized [...] that there are only two alternatives: either a distribution of power to produce equilibrium or surrender to a single universal empire". Through its multiple representations in pamphlet literature, philosophy, and even music [START_REF] Hume | As a musical example, we can cite George Frederick Händel's 1713 celebration of the Peace of Utrecht: "Ode for the Birthday of Queen[END_REF] , it conquered public opinion as well 12 . However, "the Balance" has a histoire noire of derision. An eminent example of this is Heinz Duchhardt's (Univ. Mainz) criticism, expressed in the Journal of the history of International Law in 2000. According to this most renowned scholar of 18 th Century international relations, there was no such thing as an explicit conceptual "balance" in the treaty sources. Not even in the Peace of Utrecht, where it only figured in the British-Spanish, and the Spanish-Savoyan agreements [START_REF] Philip | Treaty between Queen Anne of Great Britain and[END_REF] . Duchhardt cited the Peace of Vienna between Emperor Charles VI (1685-1740) and King Philip V of Spain (1683-1746) as a rare example of a post-1713-treaty literally retaking the formula. Conclusion ? "[...] the political metaphor of the 18 th century did not at all succeed in being raised to the canon of the standard formulas of international law [START_REF]combinaisons, les aires de décence qu'il donne aux opérations les plus scabreuses, telles sont les conditions de son succès. Elles permettront aux adeptes de la philosophie d'applaudir avec une demi-inconscience aux pires scandales de la spoliation politique[END_REF] ", where amongst others the works of Evan Luard 15 and Wilhelm Grewe [START_REF] Grewe | Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte[END_REF] classified it.

Why should I thus claim precious academic time discussing a mere political or even metaphysical metaphor ? Randall Lesaffer (Univ. Tilburg) demonstrated five years later, in an article in the same journal, that Duchhardt's analysis was hasty and incomplete, pointing to at least five other treaties in the period concerned [START_REF] Lesaffer | Paix et guerre dans les grands traités du dix-huitième siècle[END_REF] . Peace Treaties, which Duchhardt examined, only tell us a part of the story, since treaties of alliance -bi-or multilateral-also reflect the underlying conceptions of the diplomatic actors. Moreover, to correctly appreciate the wordings of these formal documents, coming at the end of a negotiating process, the legal historian must venture into the archives of so-called "political" correspondence, "[afin d'] échapper aux systèmes préfabriqués d'explication historique, de retrouver les peurs et les joies d'un temps, de déchiffrer les hésitations et certitudes d'une civilisation, en restituant le tremblement de l'histoire 18 ".

At the occasion of this Forum of Young Legal Historians -putting "the law on stage"-I considered it appropriate to have a closer look at the diplomatic practice surrounding this so called "Ripperda"-treaty. During archival research, conducted in the State Papers Foreign, conserved at the National Archives in Kew 19 , and in the Additional Manuscripts Collection of the British Library, I came across the reports of British diplomats from Paris, Vienna and Madrid. They shed a new light on the topic. I aim to demonstrate two theses:

(1) Balance of Power is a legal principle, born out of political circumstance. It gets its directing power from memorial construction. The conceptual treaty history of the balance dated back to long before the Treaty of Utrecht 20 , and gained its force out of memorial accumulation. Tranquillité, libertés de l"Europe, balance... were synonyms for the rebuttal of universal monarchy. A club of great powers mended the system to fit the largest general denominator of interests. This is what Heinz Duchhardt called a droit de convenance in the beginning of his academic career 21 , but not much research has been done regarding it 22 . In the long run, it might be interesting to integrate this behavioural concept with French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's generalist schemes of habitus23 . Did the discursive community of diplomats have a legal habitus, rather than a proper theory ?

(2) This concept did not only serve internally, on the diplomatic (1), clothed by the veil of secrecy, but also as an external image, in the European public sphere (2). Or, as a model of representation with which the formal outcomes of relations between sovereigns ought to be in accordance. In other words, balance of power was not just a mere pretext or a mendable causa justa to wage war24 . In the beginning of the eighteenth century, it had a permanent and stabilising function in the international system: it delivered the framework to safeguard and amend peace treaties.

The representation of the balance Duchhardt quoted in art. III25 of the Ripperda Treaty made reference to the peace of Utrecht. The former treaty seemed to complete the latter peace agreement by ending the formal state of war between King Philip V of Spain (1683-1746) and Emperor Charles VI of the Holy Roman Empire (1685-1740). It is in this sense that we should understand French nineteenth-century scholar Arsène Legrelle's decision to take 1725 as the terminus ad quem of his monumental La diplomatie française et la Succession d"Espagne. The two pretenders to the vacancy on the Spanish Habsburg throne in 1700 finally came together a quarter of a century later 26 .

Article III of the 1725 Treaty served to create an appearance of bringing the situation into line with the Peace of Utrecht 27 . In reality, the secret clause to the Spanish-Austrian arrangement 28 projected a marriage between the Infant Don Carlos, eldest son of Queen Elisabeth Farnese (1692-1766), second spouse to Philip V of Spain 29 , and the Archduchess Maria Theresia, eldest daughter to Emperor Charles VI. In view of the exclusion of women at the election of a King or Emperor of the Romans, Carlos would find himself sitting on Charlemagne's throne 30 . Were Philip's last remaining son, the Infant Ferdinand, to decease, he would inherit the Spanish monarchy too 31 . Even worse, if the sickly Louis XV came to pass away before producing a legitimate male heir, the Spanish Bourbons could rule in Versailles, Madrid and Vienna. In other words, the spectre of Charles V' Monarchia Universalis rose again 32 !

II. Diplomacy and Legimitacy: the Ripperda Treaty (May 1725)

A. Forced to negotiate: Philip V and the lost territories It is hard to understand the scandal provoked by the Treaty of Vienna, named after the 18 th Century Dutch adventurer Jan Willem van Ripperda 33 , without having regard to the preceding international acts. As the Treaty recalled in its preamble, Charles VI and Philip V were both competing for the Spanish crown after the decease of Charles II of Spain in November 1700 34 . At that time, the young candidates (17 resp. 15 years old) symbolised the larger power struggle between the houses of Bourbon and Habsburg, who both wanted to 29 "Comme le mariage du Prince des asturies avec l"ainée des archiduchesses accomodoit peu les interets de la Reine Catholique, et ceux de l"infant Don Carlos, il est vraisemblable que cette Princesse a d"abord pris la resolution de faire tourner la negociation en faveur de son fils", N.A., SP, 80 Although the Franco-British cooperation was more nuanced 39 than the previous label suggests, the association of both powers was exceptional . It dominated any new initiative.

Both Philip and Charles were unsatisfied with the outcome of 1713, but had to acquiesce temporarily, due to the overwhelming European power consensus supporting it 40 . They never concluded a formal peace and kept on quarrelling about two territories: Spain and Italy. Charles kept a Spanish and Italian council at his Viennese court. He was "governed" by his Spanish favourites Rialp and Folch de Cardona. Philip silently aspired to climb on the French throne once the young Louis XV disappeared. Less silent was his ambitious spouse, the turbulent queen Elisabeth Farnese, female heir to one of Italy's most prominent noble families. Italy had been a theatre of Franco-Habsburg confrontation since Charles VIII's invasion at the end of the fifteenth century. During the War of the Spanish Succession, however, the Austrian Habsburgs replaced the Spanish branch in most of their dominions. Naples, Milan, Sardinia and the Toscan Presidia were held by Charles VI.

Neighbouring these Italian lands, the duchy of Parma and Piacenza, ruled by the childless duke Francesco Farnese (1678-1727), was to fall into Elisabeth's descendents, once his brother Antonio (1679-1731) disappeared without a legal male offspring. Thanks to dynastic intricacies 41 , she could also claim the Grand-Duchy of Tuscany, where it was very likely that the de'Medici-dynasty would die out with Cosimo III (1642-1723) and his childless son Gian Gastone (1671-1737). Both claims were refuted by the Emperor, who considered the territories to be masculine fiefs of the Holy Roman Empire, implying their return to the Emperor, who could then decide who to attribute the investiture 42 .

To complicate matters even further, the duke of Savoy had acquired the Isle of Sicily thanks to British mediation 43 , on the basis of an unilateral cession act by Philip V dating 10 June 1713. This document contained a right of reversion to the Spanish crown for the kingdom, which had been in the hands of the house of Aragon since 1282 44 .

Philip V manifested his discontent by bluntly invading Sardinia in 1717 45 , and Sicily the subsequent year. James Stanhope (1673-1721) 46 , principal minister of George I, and archbishop Guillaume Dubois (1656-1723) 47 , French envoy in London, mustered a coalition with the attacked powers Habsburg and Savoy. The Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, dating 2 August 1718 (N.S.) and signed in London, foresaw an exchange between 41 Elisabeth's great-grandfather Cosimo III de'Medici, grandduke of Tuscany (1590-1621) constituted the link with Gian Gastone de'Medici. The claims to the double duchy of Parma/Piacenza were founded on Elisabeth's position as a daughter to Odoardo Farnese (1666-1693), brother of both Francesco and Antonio, who died before he could accede to the throne. I refer to the Genealogies in annex. 42 The Emperor's competence to decide in these matters was not disputed by the other powers and recognized as such in the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, art. V ("Sacri Romani Imperii Feudus masculinis; Rousset de Missy, Jean: Les intérêts présens des puissances de l'Europe, Fondez sur les Traitez conclus depuis la Paix d'Utrecht inclusivement, & sur les Preuves de leurs Prétensions particulieres. Adrien Moetjens. La Haye, 1733 pp. 26, 61 (Parma-Piacenza) and 98 (Tuscany)). However, this decision, by nature, touched upon the European public order. Thus, Charles had to consult his colleagues, derived the legitimacy of his decision from them and was de facto bound by the general rules of the system. If Charles were to act without broader consent, his decision would be all but a paper one. (Steiger, Heinhard: Völkerrecht versus Lehnsrecht ? Vertragliche Regelungen über reichsitalienische Lehen in der Frühen Neuzeit. In: Steiger, Heinhard: Von der Staatengesellschaft zur Weltrepublik ? Nomos Verlag. Baden-Baden, 2009, pp. 233-266). As a result, the power to grant the investiture in Italy, although it ought to be less restrained than within the Empire, where the Peace of Osnabruck applied, fell into the same category of formal and ritual respect, but material decline. See Stollberg-Rillinger, Barbara: Le rituel de l'investiture dans le Saint-Empire de l'époque moderne : histoire institutionnelle et pratiques symboliques. In : Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine LVI (2009), pp. 7-29. 43 Savoy and Austria, the former changing the rich island of Sicily for the less interesting Sardinia 48 .

Philip V had no choice but to accede to the Treaty and to delegate his ministers to Northern France 49 . His fleet being destroyed by the British and both the Basque country and Catalunya invaded by the French, he sacked his principal minister Giulio Alberoni 50 . The Peace Congress of Cambrai 51 , which was called together in 1722, but had to delay its opening until 1724, served as a forum for the execution of the Quadruple Alliance.

B. The slow and potentially painful Congress of Cambrai

Legally, Philip's point of view was much firmer than one could expect. He still had to agree to the non-application of the reversion right concerning Sicily demanded by the Quadruple Alliance treaty, to which he was not a party 52 . Moreover, he still had not signed a peace treaty with Charles VI. 48 Treaty & Alliance between Charles VI, Louis XV and George I, 22 July O.S./2 August N.S., London, Du Mont : Corps universel diplomatique, VIII/1, nr. CCII, pp. 531-541. The legal construction of the treaty is trilateral, putting forward the conditions under which the Duke of Savoy and Charles VI should proceed to the exchange of Sardinia for Sicily and with a possibility for the States-General to adhere to it (which did not happen). Although the mechanism was analogous to that of the 1697 and 1700 partition treaties for the Spanish succession, which were elaborated between Louis XIV and William III, to be subsequently opened within a limited delay to the Emperor, the accession of Charles VI was to be expected. Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, although a victim of the Spanish invasion, did not spontaneously join the coalition. The reason is geopolitical: situated between France and Austria, Victor Amadeus did not see a reason to oppose the sole invasion of Sardinia in 1717. He started negotiations with Spain in order to divide the map of Italy to his advantage. Turin chose sides only when Sicily, attributed to in 1713 to raise its court to the status of a royal one, was invaded in July 1718. The de facto loss of control of Sicily made Sardinia the second best choice. 49 The unilateral renunciations called for by the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, whereby both monarchs gave up their claims to each other's territory 53 , did not constitute a binding international norm. In practice, they continued to carry the titles referring to the territories lost (Milan, Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, the Southern Netherlands in the case of Philip V; Catalunya for Charles) or never even controlled (Castille, Leon, in the case of Charles VI).

When the congress opened, the expectations were such that the Anglo-French mediators would be the enforcers of the general European order, which would be reflected in a "Treaty of Cambrai". No union between the crowns of France and Spain, peaceful settlement of the succession questions in Parma-Piacenza and Tuscany, legal remedies for a swift exchange of Sicily and Savoy and respect for the British trade privileges in Spanish America 54 . In addition to this, British and Dutch anger over the setting up of the Ostend Company, which traded with the Eastern Indies at the expense of other powers' merchants, would probably lead the Emperor to suppress it 55 From a legal point of view, the Dutch Republic denied the Emperor the right to start a commerce with the Indies from the Southern Netherlands, on the basis of art. V of the Spanish/Dutch Peace Treaty of Münster (30 January 1648), which forbade commercial undertakings in the Spanish Netherlands. These dispositions were confirmed by the Barrier Treaty of 15 November 1715 between Charles VI, George I and the States-General (Du Mont, VIII/1, nr. CLXXX, pp. 458-468). However, Charles' jurists claimed the natural law principle of mare liberum -nota bene developed by Hugo Grotius against the Spanish and British opinions of mare clausum-overruled private treaties between nations (e.g. Jean Du Mont de Carels-Kroon : La vérité du fait, du droit et de l'intérêt de tout ce qui concerne le commerce des Indes, établi aux Païs-Bas Autrichiens par octroi de Sa Majesté Impériale et Catholique. Mathieu Roguet. La Haye, 1723). On the subject and the role of the Flemish jurist Patijn and the continuous stream of pamphlets regarding the matter, see De Pauw, Frans : Het Mare Liberum van Grotius en Pattijn. Die Keure. Brugge, 1960. 56 Ernst Friedrich Graf von Windischgrätz (1670-1727), president of the Reichshofrat since 1714; Christoph Freiherr von Penterriedter (+ 1728), experienced Imperial diplomat, secretary to Eugen of Savoy at the Rastatt negociations, also present at Utrecht and Baden, former ambassador in Paris (1719-1722). 57 E.g. "Demandes de sa sacrée majesté Imperiale et Catholique", N.A., SP 78-174, ff. 48v-49r, 12°. Charles tried to sell the recognition of his Pragmatic Sanction as a necessary complement of his guaranty of the French, Spanish, British and Savoyard successions through the Quadruple Alliance and Philip's accession to that instrument. dating 19 April 1713 [START_REF] Turba | Die Pragmatische Sanktion[END_REF] , Charles wanted to avoid a foreign succession in the Habsburg hereditary lands. Having succeeded to his older brother Joseph, who -like himself-only had a female offspring, the risk was real that one of the princesses' spouses would come and seize power in Vienna.

C. The return to the "ancien sistéme" and the rupture of the Balance

Both Philip and Charles only stood to lose from a Franco-British mediated deal at Cambrai: Philip would have to accept another humiliation by France and British meddling in Italy and would probably not recuperate Gibraltar [START_REF]le Roy de la Grande Bretagne, embarassé par l"affaire de Gibraltar et de Port Mahon, bien loin de faciliter nôtre Paix avec l"Espagne, la traversoit, ainsi il nous étoit convenable de finir sans lui[END_REF] , Charles was about to see the lucrative Ostend Company, instrument of an ambitious policy to turn Austria from an exclusively territorial to a maritime power, sink to the bottom of the sea 60 . However, concluding a treaty with the "King of Spain and the Indies" could open the gates of America to his subjects [START_REF] Subsequently | when news of the Ripperda Treaty leaked[END_REF] . This happened, when dynastic coincidence blocked the workings of the diplomats. On 10 January 1724, Philip V suddenly abdicated in favor of his son, don Luis (°1707 out of the king's first wedding) 62 . However, on 31 August of the same year, Luis succumbed to the pocks. His father returned to government, after papal consultation. But the influence of Elisabeth Farnese grew: she pushed her husband to accept the crown.

The new year 1725 brought a grave abdominal colic to the young Louis XV (1710-1774), putting his life in danger. The Spanish Infanta María Ana Victoria (1718-1781) had been promised to the 14 year-old king in a double Franco-Spanish arrangement, involving don Luis and Mademoiselle de Beaujolais, the Duke of Orléans' daughter. Nevertheless, at the age of six, it was very unlikely the Infanta would be able to produce an heir in the short term. The Duke of Bourbon, prime minister, decided to send her back to Spain in February, for the sake of the dynasty. Subsequently, the enraged Spanish court [START_REF]La reine d"Espagne a pressé avec tant de soin ces epousailles dans l"esperance de lier tellement par là le Roy Trés Chrétien, que […] le Mariage de l"Infante ne pût pas[END_REF] decided to bypass the Congress. Since both Britain [START_REF] Farnese | offered the mediation to Britain alone after the sending back of the Infanta, but George I declined this offer (Coxe, William: Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole: Selected from his Correspondence and Papers, and connected with the History of the Times[END_REF] and France had proven to be unreliable when it came to direct Spanish interests, Elisabeth Farnese turned to the Emperor, her erstwhile direct opponent in Italy. At the Congress of Cambrai, "From apparent contempt and animosity, [the Imperial and Spanish ministers] were come at once to the greatest complaisance and intimate correspondence [START_REF] Marchmonth | [END_REF] ".

The relations of the Viennese court intrigues have come to us by the relations of British ambassador St-Saphorin 66 and du Bourg 67 , Louis XV' emissary. The mere fact that the two diplomats composed their insights together, points to the intimate relationship between both powers' targets and visions. Ripperda negotiated in secret with Prince Eugene of However, the necessity of the balance metaphor underlines its cardinal place in the Société des princes 75 of the moment. Consisting the most recurrent pretext for going to war in the 17 th Century, the diplomat who violated the principle, exposed himself to the wrath of all other European monarchies.

St Saphorin confirmed the centrality of the balance in his conversation with the Habsburg minister count Palm, explaining why a counterbalance of Austria an France made sense to him: "J"avoüe que la France est une Puissance formidable, et qu"il n"y a aucune comparaison entre les forces de l"Empereur, et celles d"aucune autre Puissance de l"Europe, prises separement comparativement avec celles de cette Couronne mais les extrémités où Elle a été reduite pour avoir voulû donner sous le Regne de Louis XIV l"essort à son ambition, et ce qu"Elle en souffre encore à present, luy ont appris, et apprendront à tous ceux qui voudront s"ériger en Dictateurs de l"Europe, les perils auxquels une pareille entreprise expose. Et tandis que cette couronne suivra des maximes aussi modérées et aussi saines que celles qu"Elle a observées depuis la mort de Louis XIV, il est bon qu"Elle soit dans un degré de puissance capable de retenir tous ceux qui voudroient troubler la tranquilité publique 76 ".

By plotting with the Emperor and writing a universalist plan to dominate Europe, the Spanish diplomacy actively undermined the transactions at Cambrai 77 . The Congress, as the expression of balance diplomacy, counted representatives from the lesser Italian princes. Among those, count Maffei, representing the king of Sardinia, who had his territory invaded by Spain in July 1718. Quoting British representatives Marchmont and Withworth 78 , "[he] looks upon the Balance of Italy to be render"d very precarious by this new agreement, and the abandoning entirely the interests of all the lesser Princes there; and consequently his Master"s security to be pretty much weaken"d by it [...] The mortification will scarce be personal. 79 " When the Congress broke apart, the Spanish diplomats Santistevan [START_REF] Domingo De Benavides Y Aragón | Les diplomates espagnols au XVIIIe siècle. Casa de Velázquez -Maison des Pays Ibériques[END_REF] and Beretti Landi 81 did not invite the French representatives. Doing this, they prolonged the exclusion strategy, 75 Bély, Lucien: La société des Princes, p. 18. 76 N.A., SP 80-55, St Saphorin to Townshend, Vienna, 11 May 1725, Private Letter, s.n., Ibid. 77 Cf. letter from the Earl of Marchmont and baron Withworth, having sounded out Spanish Extraordinary Ambassador and Plenipotentiary Santistevan on his knowledge of Ripperda's entertakings "nay he went so far as to suppose that the Queen of Spain herself was ignorant of it, but there are so many solid reasons to persuade us of the contrary, and these have been strengthened by so many circumstances which we have observed here, from the very beginning of this intrigue, that we cannot give any credit to what he has asserted", Cambrai, 16 th May 1725 N.S., N.A., SP 78-176, f. 160v-161r. Cf. also Count Morville, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the Imperial diplomat Fonseca: "pretty much out of countenance, when it was likewise observed to him, how little the dates agreed with the turn he endeavour"d to give this transaction in his harangues." (Ibid., f. 164r) 78 Alexander Hume Campbell, 2 nd earl of Marchmont (1675-1740) and Charles Baron Withworth (1675-1725) were both experienced diplomats, but not first rank. 79 Ibid., ff. 163v.-164r.

aiming at a division in the mediating couple. To no avail, since the British ambassadors extraordinary Marchmont and Withworth withheld their agreement [START_REF]Great Britain and France continue firmly united for preserving the Peace of Europe[END_REF] .

And what better mark of the importance of representations and symbols to our Balance-phenomenon, than the downgrading of the festivities at the Imperial representative Penterridter's residence, to a "handsome entertainment as usual, instead of a solemn feast [...], with their families in their plain liveries; no mask of distinction as to the occasion, not so much as a health drunk on the good conclusion of the treaty and not the least mention made of it in all their discourse 83 ."

The British representatives concluded their description of the final symposia at Cambrai by pointing to the necessity of informing the Duke of Newcastle of these "Trifles". "Everything is material in such a crisis, when the eyes of the Publick are on each step 84 ". Few days later, the Congress was no more 85 . Europe prepared itself for the building-up of two power blocks, threatening to set the continent ablaze from the Baltic to the Mediterranean 86 .

III. Conclusion: the image of the balance in legal doctrine

The Balance of Power did matter to the community of contemporary diplomats. Citing the Ripperda Treaty as an example of its discursive power [START_REF]An association supporting a possible application of Bourdieu's group analysis[END_REF] , is relevant. Not as regards its application, since the treaty without any doubt tried to undermine the European system, but with respect to the opinion iuris between the monarchs on its vigour.

Much more than the Peace Instruments of Westphalia, the Treaties of Utrecht can be considered to be the true "naissance" of this political concept, consequence of the legal liberty and equality of states [START_REF] Jouannet | Emer de Vattel et l'émergence doctrinale du droit international classique[END_REF] . If the mainstream 19 th century doctrine is to be labelled "Positivist [START_REF] Koskenniemi | The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: the rise and the fall of international law, 1870-1960[END_REF] ", since it adhered to the balance as a way of coordinating formal legal state acts, it derived this framework from the predecessor's treatises in the 18 th century 90 .

Starting with Christian Wolff (1679-1750) [START_REF] Wolff | Christian: Ius gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum[END_REF] , the balance came in the perimeter of legal doctrine. The Swiss scholar Emer de Vattel (1714-1767), considered the continent to be bound by the common rules of international society, although he was writing in the middle of the wars initiated by Frederick the Great of Prussia. The balance was classified in Book III, within the "causes justes de la guerre". One could thus see it as an argument easy to twist and turn one side or another. However, this rule should be interpreted in the light of the events that preceded Vattel's work.

"L"Europe fait un système politique, un Corps, où tout est lié par les relations & les divers intérêts des

Nations, qui habitent cette partie du Monde. Ce n"est plus, comme autrefois, un amas confus de pièces isolées, dont chacune se croyait peu intéressée au sort des autres, et se mettait rarement en peine de ce qui ne la touchait pas immédiatement. L"attention continuelle des souverains à tout ce qui se passe, les ministres toujours résidents, les négociations perpétuelles, font de l"Europe moderne une espèce de république, dont les membres indépendants, mais liés par l"intérêt commun, se réunissent pour y maintenir l"ordre et la liberté […] On entend par là une disposition des choses, au moyen de laquelle aucune puissance ne se trouve en état de prédominer absolument, et de faire la loi aux autres [START_REF] Vattel | Le droit des gens[END_REF] . […] Il est plus simple, aisé, et plus juste […] de former des confédérations, pour faire tête au plus puissant et de l"empêcher de donner la loi" Vattel saw the balance as a integrated, perpetually managed system of negotiation and amendment, just as the episode described above indicates. In order to obtain the realisation of their wishes, Europe's monarchs had to conform to common expectations and to a common discourse. These patterns resided in formal treaties (pacta sunt servanda [START_REF] Mckay | who label the Franco-British alliance 39 For the evolution of British foreign policy towards a realignment with Austria after 1727: Black, Jeremy: George II, sir Robert Walpole and the collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance 1727-1731[END_REF] ), but they were but one of the many instruments to express the droit public de l"Europe, which needed to influence behaviour outside of solemn, but incidental moments of reconciliation after a major crisis.

I would like to conclude on this third representation of the balance : first in diplomacy as a political-practical system, secondly in public opinion as a legitimate title, and finally in international doctrine as the framework of norm-creation. Far from being a "chimère", the Balance of Power was so strong a norm on the international stage, that even those who violate her, like the Spanish and Viennese courts, advocated her and needed to conform their ambitions to this commonly accepted discourse. In this sense, it was as normative as many concepts of contemporary international law [START_REF]Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Matters[END_REF] . Frederik Dhondt Ph.D.-fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO)

Legal History Institute, Ghent University (Belgium) Frederik.Dhondt@UGent.be

Annex 1 :

 1 Simplified Genealogy of the Farneses in the Duchy of Parma/Piacenza Annex 2: Simplified Genealogy of the de'Medici in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany

  Ripperda was dismissed. He fled to the British ambassador William Stanhope's apartment, but was arrested there (in violation of international law, which accorded the privilege of inviolable asylum to the residences, see Réal de Curban: La Science du Gouvernement, t.5 p. 106). After eighteen months of detention in the Alcázar of Segovia, he escaped via Britain to Morocco. On the tumultuous life of Ripperda, see Campbell, John : Memoirs of the Duke of Ripperda: first embassador from the States-General to His Most Catholick Majesty, the Duke and Grandee of Spain; afterwards Bashaw and Prime Minister to Mully Abdalla, Emperor of Fez and Morocco, &c. Containing a succinct account of the most remarkable events which happen'd between 1715 and 1736. John Stagg & Daniel Browne. London, 1740; Syveton, Gabriel: Une cour et un aventurier au XVIIIe siècle. Le baron de Ripperda. Paris, 1896; van der Veen, Sytze : Spaanse Groniger in Marokko: de levens van Johan Willem Ripperda (1682-1737). Bert Bakker. Amsterdam, 2007. a second branch in Madrid 35 . Thirteen years later, a separate Spanish house of Bourbon was installed in the Spanish Kingdoms[START_REF] Bérenger | La question de la succession d'Espagne au XVIIe siècle[END_REF] . The main clauses of the Peace of Utrecht, which consisted in reality of multiple bilateral agreements, were written by France and Great Britain 37 , who co-managed European affairs during what Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie has called "les trentes heureuses[START_REF] Roy Ladurie | L'Ancien Régime. T. 2: l'absolutisme bien tempéré (1715-1770[END_REF] ". In a period stretching from 1713 to Frederick the Great's invasion of Silesia in December 1740, no major European war occurred.

	-55, Common Relation of St. Saphorin and du Bourg to Charles
	Townshend, secretary of state for the Northern Department, Vienna, 11 May 1725, s.n.
	30 This happened with Maria Theresia's husband, Franz Stephan of Lorraine. See Zedinger, Renate : Franz
	Stephan von Lothringen (1708-1765). Böhlau Verlag. Wien, 2008.
	31 "Riperda parle ouvertement du marriage de Don Carlos comme d"une asseurée, et il dit que le Prince des Asturies est
	Etique, et qu"il ne peut pas vivre, l"on voit à quoi celà prepare…" (N.A., SP 80-55, St-Saphorin to Charles Townshend,
	private letter, Vienna, 11 May 1725, s.n.). Don Ferdinand (the later Ferdinand VI of Spain) was considered to
	be in a feeble state of both mind and body (Bély, Lucien : Les relations internationales en Europe, XVIe-
	XVIIIe siècles. PUF. Paris, 1992 3 p. 455.
	32 Bosbach, Franz : Monarchia universalis. Ein politischer Leitbegriff der frühen Neuzeit. Vandenhoeck &
	Ruprecht. Göttingen, 1988 p. 64.
	33 Johan Willem de Ripperda y Diest (1690-1737). A plenipotentiary for the Republic at the Congress of
	Utrecht, Ripperda converted himself to Catholicism as Dutch ambassador in Madrid (1715-1718) and served
	Philip V afterwards, rising to the position of most potent minister thanks to his achievements in Vienna. In
	December 1725,

34

Maquart, Marie-Françoise: Le dernier testament de Charles II d'Espagne. In: Bély (dir.) : La présence des Bourbons en Europe, XVIe-XXIe siècles. PUF. Paris, 2000 pp. 111-123. found

  McKay, Derek : Bolingbroke, Oxford and the defense of the Utrecht settlement in Southern Europe. In: English Historical Review LXXXVI (apr. 1971) pp. 264-284. Promise by treaty in art. XIV, Treaty of Peace & Alliance between Queen Anne of Great Britain and Philip V of Spain, 13 July 1713, Ibid., p.396. 44 Art. II, Instrumento de la Cession del Reyno de Sicilia, hecho por el Serenissimo Duque de Anjou como Rey de España a Victor Amadeo Duque de Saboya por el y sus Descendientes masculinos per perpetuamente, 10 June 1713, published in Du Mont : Corps universel, VIII/1, nr. CLXII, pp. 389-392. 45 More in particular for this question, see Mongiano, Elisa : "Universae Europae Securitas" I trattati di cessione della Sardegna a Vittorio Amedeo II di Savoia. G. Giappichelli Editore. Torino, 1995. Philip launched the invasion while the Austrian army was occupied fighting the Ottomans on the Balkans, see Parvev, Ivan: Habsburgs and Ottomans between Vienna and Belgrade (1683-1739). Columbia University Press. New York, 1995 pp. 168-176. 46 James 1 st Viscount Stanhope, see Williams, Basil: Stanhope. A Study in Eighteenth-Century War and Diplomacy. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1932. 47 Guillaume Cardinal Dubois, rose from humble origins to de facto prime minister during the Regency, see Aujol, Jean-Louis: Le Cardinal Dubois, ministre de la paix. Éditions du bâteau ivre. Paris, 1948; Chaussinand-Nogaret, Guy. Le Cardinal Dubois, 1656-1723 ou une certain idée de l'Europe. Perrin. Paris, 2000; Thomas, Jean Pierre : Le Régent et le cardinal Dubois ou l'art de l'ambiguité. Payot. Paris, 2004.

  Philippi V. Regis hispaniarum accessio iterata, & per plenipotentiarum suum, ad Tractatum sive Concordatum Londini 2. Augusti cujusdem anni initum extensa, Den Haag, 17 February 1720, Du Mont: Corps universel diplomatique, VIII/2, nr. XI, p. 26. 50 1664-1752. Giulio Alberoni made his career as a diplomat for the Dukes of Parma, came to Spain with the French general Vendôme during the War of the Spanish Succession and arranged Philip's wedding with Elisabeth Farnese (1715). In 1717, he is created a Cardinal, just before the invasion of Sardinia. See Moore, George: Lives of Cardinal Giulio Alberoni and the Duke of Ripperda and Marquis of Pombal, three distinguished political Adventurers of the last Century exhibiting a View of the Kingdoms of Spain and Portugal during a considerable Time of that Period. J. Rodwell. London, 1814². 51 We refer to Lingens, Karl-Heinz : Kongresse im Spektrum der Friedenswahrenden Instrumente des Völkerrecht. In: Duchhardt (Hrsg.): Zwischenstaatliche Friedenswahrung in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit. Böhlau. Köln, 1991 pp. 205-226. Lingens bases his research on the archival records kept at the Quai d'Orsay (presently La Courneuve, Archives Diplomatiques), Alfred Braudrillart's Philippe V et la Cour de France Didot. Paris, 1890, t. 2-3 and Ottocar Weber's Die Quadrupel-Allianz vom Jahre 1718. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Diplomatie im 18. Jahrhundert. Wien, 1887. The present intervention studies adds British diplomatic sources to this. Philip acceded to the Quadruple Alliance, which served as a Preliminary Peace, by the Treaty of The Hague, 17 February 1720, Ibid., VIII/2, pp. 26-27.

52

Art. VI, Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, Du Mont : Corps universel diplomatique VIII/1, nr. CCII, pp. 531-533.

  . At Cambrai, the Austrian plenipotentiaries Windischgrätz and Penterriedter 56 asked the European sovereigns to recognize the Emperor's Pragmatic Sanction 57 . By this document 53 Renunciation by Charles VI, Vienna, 16 September 1718 (in execution of the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance of 2 August 1718, cf. supra); Renunciation by Philip V (at the occasion of his accession to the Quadruple Alliance, San Lorenzo, 22 June 1720). 54 Treaty of Navigation & Commerce between Queen Anne of Great Britain and Philip V, Utrecht, 28 November O.S./9 December N.S. 1713, Du Mont: Corps universel diplomatique, VIII/1, nr. CLXIX, pp. 409-422; Hatton, Ragnhild: George I. Yale University Press. New Haven, 2001² p. 273. 55 Starting 1714 an extended in 1722, the Company (mainly run by foreigners) was destined to develop economic activity in the Austrian Netherlands. See Hertz, Gerald B., England and the Ostend Company. In: English Historical Review XXII (April 1907), pp. 255-279; Huisman, Michel: La Belgique commerciale sous l'empereur Charles VI: la Compagnie d'Ostende: étude historique de politique commerciale et coloniale. Lamertin. Bruxelles, 1902 XII + 555 p. The opening of the Spanish market in America went against the British commercial dominance agreed at Utrecht (e.g. Asiento or privilege for the introduction & sale of black slaves in Spanish America, Madrid, 26 March 1713, Du Mont : Corps universel diplomatique VIII/1, nr. CXXXIX, pp. 330-337).

"a system of dispositions, that is of permanent manners of being, seeing, acting and thinking"… "a set of acquired characteristics which are the product of social conditions" Bourdieu, Pierre: Habitus. In: Hillier and Rooksby (eds.): Habitus: a sense of place. Ashgate. Aldershot, 2005 p. 43 and 46.

Mattei, Jean-Mathieu: Histoire du droit de la guerre, 1700-1819 p. 377.

CTS XXXII, p. 44: "ad constituendum duraturum in Europa aequilibrium ea visa fuerit ut pro regula statuatur ne Regna Galliae et Hispaniae, ullo umquam tempore, in unam eandemque personam, nec in unam eandemque lineam coalescere unirique possent"

Legrelle, Arsène : La diplomatie française et la Succession d'Espagne: 1659-1725. Pichon. Paris, 1892, vol. IV pp. 738-771. Although Legrelle particularly enjoys painting a black picture of the German and Dutch interests in the War of the Spanish Succession, his primary source-work in the Quai d'Orsay and in Madrid remains excellent.

For an overview of older works on Utrecht, see Duchhardt, Heinz : Gleichgewicht der Kräfte, pp. 41-68. However, one should complete it with the masterly cultural-anthropological study by Lucien Bély, incorporating insights from contremporary social sciences (Bély, Lucien : Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV. Fayard. Paris, 1990 905 p.).

28 Du Mont, Jean : Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens, v. VIII/2, nr. XXXVI, pp. 106-113 (Peace Treaty, 30 April 1725), XXXVII, pp. 113-114 (Treaty of Alliance, 30 April 1725), nr. XXXVIII, pp. 114-121 (Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, 1 May 1725). The attentive reader will remark the absence of a marriage clause in the published treaties. The union between Maria Theresia and Don Carlos was agreed on secretly and reported as such to the Commons by Horatio Walpole (1678-1757), ambassador in Paris and brother of Britain's Prime Minister Robert Walpole (Pearce, Edward : The Great Man: sir Robert Walpole, Scoundrel, Genius and Britain's First Prime Minister. Jonathan Cape. London, 2007 p. 231).

Bérenger, Jean: Le conflit entre les Habsbourg et les Bourbons (1598-1792). In: Revue d'histoire

The abdication episode is a symptom of Philip V's recurring mental disorder. The King vacillated between dark depression (during which he pretended to be dead, or to be a frog) and moments of frenetic

Savoy-Carignan 68 and Court Chancelor Ludwig Philip Graf Sinzendorf 69 , but most of his transactions were leaked in court gossip 70 .

In his separate very private letter, relating amongst others a vivid discussion with the Viennese minister Count Palm, St-Saphorin stressed the importance of the union between the crowns of France and Britain for the safeguarding of the system. Doing otherwise, would give lead to an Austro-Spanish hegemony, which would be detrimental to the general tranquillity and -of course-to Britain in particular.

These two letters explains us in particular why the balance did matter in the eighteenth century, contrary to what has been suggested in our introduction. The reference to the balance in art. III as "duraturum in Europa aequilibrium [...] ut pro regula statuatur, nè Regna Galliae & Hispaniae [...] unirique possent 71 " is not exactly one of observance of Utrecht's rules. Who could tell this better than Sinzendorf ? When asked by Saint Saphorin whether his manoeuvre would not bring "de l"ombrage à l"Europe, the Court Chancelor replied "il seroit bon que nous fussions réunis avec l"Espagne; car par là les choses seroient remises dans l"ancien sistéme 72 ". In other words, Sinzendorf was satisfied to have constructed an entangling alliance, possibly restored a dynastic encirclement of France 73 . "Ils veulent chercher à exciter de tous côtés des differens, afin de tenir, comme le dit fort plaisamment le marquis de Breille 74 , boutique ouverte de mediations." 70 "Nous nous sommes prévalus de l"esprit singulier qui régne parmi les ministres italiens, pour les mettre tous en mouvement ; ces messieurs, dont le principal but est de ramasser des nouvelles pour écrire à leurs cours, et parmi lesquels nous n"en connoissons aucun qui soit assés prudent pour distinguer ce qu"ils doivent taire d"avec ce qu"ils doivent dire…" (N.A., SP 80-55, Vienna, 11 May 1725, Common Relation, ibid.). 71 Du Mont: Corps universel diplomatique, VIII/2, nr. XXXVI, p. 106. Philip V formally abandoned his rights of succession to the French throne by a unilateral declaration on 5 November 1712 (Du Mont, VIII/1, nr. CXXXVI, pp. 310-312). Throughout his reign, there was discussion about their validity, since it was publicly known the monarch eyed the French throne, occupied by a monarch without heir until 1729 and the birth of a Dauphin.

During the 1719 invasion of Spain by a French army (as a collective reprisal for the invasion of Sicily the past year), Philip V inundated the French armies with leaflets asserting his rights to the French throne (Kamen, Henry: Philip V of Spain p. 126). Already during the negotiations ending the War of the Spanish Succession, Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Torcy (1665-1746), Louis XIV's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, held the declaration, drafted by jurists from the University of Oxford, to be contrary to the French lois fondamentales (see Baudrillart, Alfred : Examen des droits de Philippe V et de ses descendants au trône de France, en dehors des renonciations d'Utrecht. In : Revue d'histoire diplomatique III (1899), pp. 161-191, 354-384