David Ambrosetti

THE DIPLOMATIC LEAD IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND LOCAL ACTORS' VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING TERMS OF A SOCIAL POSITION

Inspired by interactionist and constructivist sociology, this paper focuses on the UN Security Council (UNSC) as an arena with its own social rules and bureaucratic routines. It presents the informal position that UNSC diplomats delegate to specific members of the UNSC, the position of "leader," when dealing with specific dossiers. Indeed, a change occurred during the 1990s and the early 2000s in how UNSC diplomats considered the task of leading a UN peace operation, notably in regards to the use of offensive military. The analysis of this change is documented with empirical material concerning the French leading position in the African Great Lakes region, from Rwanda in 1993 to DRC in 2003. A second instance of diplomatic leadership considered is the leading role assumed by the British authorities in Sierra Leone (1991Leone ( -2002)). The new "leadership" role calls upon UN diplomatic leaders to better protect the credibility of "their" peace operations. It sheds a light on the importance of deterring or incentive messages embedded in routine UNSC decisions, and how routine practices may change when facing critical situations.

INTRODUCTION

The crisis in Côte d'Ivoire after the November 2010 elections held under the auspices of the UN brought some commentators to point out the leading role played by France in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and Opération Licorne on the ground, whether with suspicion or appreciation. i When it appeared that former president Laurent Gbagbo was contesting the elections, the UNSC and the international forces there (blue helmets and French troops) opted for a firm military response. This event can be analyzed from various standpoints. In this paper, we examined a change that has occurred during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s on how the UNSC diplomats have considered the task of leading a UN peace operation and on the use of offensive military means to support peace operations. In terms of France assuming a leading position in a French-speaking African country, the UN mission deployed in Côte-d'Ivoire was not novel. ii Yet, this practice was not business as usual in 2010. The French learned from their experience in the African Great Lakes region, from 1990 to 2000.

Between the DRC and Côte-d'Ivoire, the notion of the diplomatic leading position in the UNSC changed.

France was the UNSC member with the strongest bilateral involvement in the Rwandan armed conflict between 1990-1994, which included the rapid deployment of troops (opération 'Noroît') and military trainers (Détachement d'assistance militaire et d'instruction 'Panda'). As armed confrontation and ethnic-oriented political violence escalated in Rwanda, the UN launched a peace operation (mission des Nations Unies au Rwanda, MINUAR) in 1993. France was the informal leader of the UNSC in Rwanda. Such external involvement could not prevent the internal military and political dynamics from falling into three months of genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, preceded by a "politicide" against Hutu politicians, journalists and activists rejecting the radical ethno-nationalist anti-Tutsi Hutu Power ideology.

The genocide claimed some 800,000 lives. This experience eventually affected the position the French delegation held within the UNSC concerning armed conflict management in French-speaking Africa. Despite the subsequent armed conflicts that devastated the African Great Lakes region (Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi), French military and diplomacy went through a nine-year retreat after Opération Turquoise had deployed in the summer of 1994 in Rwanda and Eastern Zaire. This retreat came to an end with a cautious diplomatic return to the DRC in 2001/2002, followed by a new military operation, the Frenchled European Union operation, Artémis, in the spring of 2003.

The French diplomatic leading position vis á vis French-speaking Africa, first assumed, then lost, then recovered, provides us with a view of the everyday work of UNSC members; and with an analytical prism for interpreting the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations. iii The interest of the issue for African security is unquestionable. Whether in 1994 or 2012, the UN has been a central actor in conflict resolution in Africa. Since the beginning of the 2000s, it has reached an unprecedented level of activity in peacekeeping operations, iv particularly in Africa: in 2009, an average of sixty percent of UN Security Council's deliberations addressed African issues and seventy percent of the UN blued helmets were deployed in Africa. v UN peace operations have long been under scrutiny by social scientists and international relations scholars (IR). vi These studies frequently question the curtailed and challenging implementation of the UNSC resolutions in the field; they look for answers in UN organizational features, vii or in local actors' political and military strategies. viii We adopt a different perspective inspired by interactionist sociology. In this approach, the focus shifts to the UNSC as a situated arena of repeated interaction between fifteen diplomatic delegations (and UN secretariat's officers and other guests invited to speak at the UNSC table). We track specific positions held by UN diplomats in this arena of interaction. This approach allows us to trace the informal, bureaucratic position of actors in specific cases as a collectively The paper has six sections. First, we address the theoretical and methodological implications of this research for constructivist IR theory. Second, we outline what we mean by the "leadership" role and how it has traditionally been framed at the UNSC. We then explore three different situations that affect diplomatic leadership at the UNSC and their relation with local belligerents and violence. The first situation occurs when protective bilateral relationships exist between a UNSC member state and a country in turmoil prior to a UNSC involvement. We look then at how these relationships evolve when brought into the UNSC diplomatic arena. Fourth, we look at a second situation, when peace operations are under way. We highlight the deterring or incentive nature of the messages that the UNSC sends to the local belligerents through its routine decision-making. Fifth, we look at the third case where UN peacekeeping operations face critical situation on the ground with high international media coverage. Finally, we claim that such critical moments in Rwanda in 1994 and in Sierra Leone in 2000 have reflected a normative change concerning the way UNSC members have conceived of and assessed the leadership role in UN peacekeeping operations since the early 2000s.

As mentioned above, these three situations and the normative change presented in the paper result from the analysis of two instances of diplomatic leadership and their effects on local actors. First, the Rwandan conflict (1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994); and second, the Sierra Leonean conflict (1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002). DRC (ex Zaire) is only of interest as a follow-up to the multilateral diplomatic process that started in 1993 for the Rwandan conflict.

DIPLOMATIC PRACTICES AND ROLES: AN INTERACTIONIST

SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

This research has two theoretical and methodological implications. The first is to focus on the UNSC as a particular arena of interaction, with its own social rules, norms and routines, enacted and reproduced by inter-individual everyday interactions. The second concerns the empirical importance of one informal leading position that UNSC diplomats collectively delegate to the leading actor when dealing with specific dossiers. When this position existswhich is not necessarily always the case (according to different degrees of "delegation") -it is a rather technical, bureaucratic role that is poorly institutionalized. This informality can cast doubt on its political significance. In the sequences studied below, however, the role of the leadership position provides us with insights into diplomatic dynamics inherent in the UNSC's work.

What can be learned from the study of situated political interactions within the UN Security Council? Can we find more than a succession of tactical moves from rational, goaloriented diplomats serving member states' foreign policies? The answer lies in what IR theory terms as constructivist ontology: interactions within the UNSC take part in the social construction of international political reality. They reproduce and (re-)mould social institutions, rules and norms. The norms represent shared ideas and mental categories, ix whereby actors define their practices towards others, define their interests, and even define the identities and roles they acknowledge of one another. x Constructivist and critical approaches have challenged the neorealist mainstream on international politics and security studies. xi They have inspired a great number of studies dealing with international security, interventions and peacekeeping operations. Two main trends, however, within this literature do not correspond to what I intend to do with the present research.

First, constructivism and critical IR theory have often been mobilized in large debates about current liberal interventionism as a whole. Some applaud the apparently unstoppable diffusion of ideas of humanity and human solidarity among international politics practitioners worldwide, xii as well as and the victory of Western supposed liberal political preferences. xiii Others have warned against processes aimed at "securitizing" control over "human surplus" to the benefit of the global capitalist system, xiv or against the edification of a quasi-imperial international system that deprives intervening states any political strategy to the benefit of international bureaucracies and transnational NGOs. xv Such broad debates exceed the scope of the present study.

The second difference is methodological. Although grounded in the same ontological assumptions as interactionist sociology, IR constructivist accounts of international intervention and peacekeeping often turn into macro-sociological analyses or macro-histories of ideas, rather than an examination of concrete interactions between clearly identified individuals. xvi They apply the mechanisms unveiled by interactionist sociologists (from the Chicago school notably) to the states as if they are "individual" actors, similar to the unitary state actor assumption that informs much of realist IR theory. xvii The reified state is socialized, while seeking prestige or at least peer acknowledgement. This is supposed to explain how states happen to share similar norms, how they construct their own identities, xviii and how they strengthen or weaken their own self-esteem and "ontological security". xix Rather than the anthropomorphized state, we prioritize inter-individual interactions and their effects. xx We argue that processes of identity and role formation, norms diffusion, etc. do not necessarily occur within a state at once, but rather occur within specific groups, and spread across states through inter-individual interactions. In this sense, international politics is also constituted by arenas of situated interaction. Inter-individual interactions need to be examined through in-depth direct observation to ascertain regularities or changes in the reality they co-constitute on a day-to-day basis. xxi In what follows, we intend to circumscribe the fractions of international political reality that are specifically constructed within the UNSC among the diplomatic delegations in the course of their everyday interactions. This does not mean that the UNSC is an island, isolated from larger international political dynamics. We do claim, however, that the interactions of UNSC members must be understood on their own merits. xxii As a result, the present study supports the recent "practical turn" in the social sciences, xxiii and notably in IR and security studies. xxiv Admittedly, massive ethnographic observations on its members' practices do not apply very well to the UNSC, due to the existing barriers that limit access to them. But when the opportunity to overcome these barriers and to observe the day-to-day UNSC work arises, some specific "logics of practice" become evident. The leader, as an informal but precise social position within the UNSC, opens a window into how the interaction among individuals is a specific context shapes norms.

THE UNSC DIPLOMATIC LEADER IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

In the summer of 2002 the author had the opportunity for a ten-week internship period within the UNSC alongside the French delegation; and was in charge of some of the African issues then discussed at the UNSC table (Sierra Leone, DRC, Bissau-Guinea, and Somalia). As this participatory observation period was rather short, the detection of some specific social positions assigned to, or claimed by, UN diplomats, was prioritized. Such roles could then support further theoretical and empirical research. Individuals hold various identities (belongings to multiple well-defined groups) and social positions (or roles) among these groups. Such identities and roles are necessarily attached to normative prescriptions, that is, to collective expectations that are socially positively sanctioned. Each failure to meet these expectations may generate some doubt within the group concerning the ability of the current holder of the role: it can lead to the loss of this position. xxv Such processes remain difficult to grasp, though, since social positions (and the collective expectations attached to them) are not systematically formalized (textually, legally, or bureaucratically), nor necessarily formulated with words. They often remain informal, embedded in implicit knowledge, or what Giddens called the "practical consciousness" of the practitioners. xxvi Within the 2002 UNSC, it is the role played by the British concerning the Leonean case that brought the author to investigate this particular role of "leader" in the UNSC.

Through this position, one or several delegations are informally granted a driving position in the negotiation and decision-making process concerning a particular issue, and at a particular moment (leaders can change).

The term "lead" is actually directly taken from the indigenous diplomatic lexicon in the UN; it was often discussed among colleagues dealing with the Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo dossiers ("on DRC, we [the French delegation] had the lead," xxvii "the UK had the lead on Sierra Leone,"). More sociological evidence was gathered by observing the daily social division of multilateral labor and the particular roles and tasks assumed by these leading delegations prior to any consultation with Sierra Leone or the DRC.

The precise moment when the delegations were speaking during private consultations and public meetings, and the kind of arguments and concerns they broached, were not accidental.

There was a pervasive form of influence at stake in the course of the interaction and in the achievement of preliminary tasks that were collectively expected.

Experts who keep a close eye on international conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations often mention this leading position. In some cases, single dossiers of conflicts are at stake. xxviii Others mention diplomatic leading positions referring to specific thematic issues, cutting across different conflicts and regions, such as Canada's leading position on Human Security in the UN during the late 1990s, or the United Kingdom's on the Kimberley process for controlling "blood" diamonds. Still others stress how the existence of an active diplomatic leading role within a multilateral arena bodes well for the efficiency of the actions to be adopted. xxix Authors working on multilateral negotiations (commercial ones, for instance) show a great familiarity with this position and the entrepreneurial conception it connotes, xxx notably on the formation of coalitions, xxxi or on the importance of individual leaders in foreign policy. xxxii This obviously differs from an IR perspective on global leadership, such as that about American power, xxxiii or about hegemonic order and the global political economy. xxxiv Leadership in the present case study concerns a diplomatic delegation, that is, a limited number of persons in a delimited arena of regular interaction, about limited issues.

First, the members of the Council often expect a deeper involvement in a dossier of conflict when a leading delegation has previously advocated for it and has overcome reluctances among its peers on the Council to put the new dossier on the agenda (this is a nonwritten rule among UNSC members). They also usually expect leadership from any UNSC member liaised to the state in turmoil (such as a former colonizing power still active in the region, a regional political ally, etc.).

The leadership position presupposes practices such as a special monitoring of the situation, the drafting of resolutions or presidential statements (at the very least), the constant negotiation with UNSC delegations (particularly the main financial contributors to the UN peace operations budget), discussions with the Secretariat services (when discussing operational options and available means or the appointment of UN representatives and senior staff in the field), and working with troop contributing states. No official prerogative stems from this informal position. Yet, the member assuming the leadership position should inspire some confidence among its colleagues when suggesting a line of action. In the consultation room, the leading delegation usually speaks immediately after the President. Equally, it is the first to congratulate its partners when a decision is reached and announced during public sessions. This position does not amount by itself to a politically dominant position, which would inspire competition among UNSC members. It is a purely bureaucratic informal role. In many instances, such as when dealing with the most peripheral conflicts (in the Africa of the 1990s), leading positions were finally held by default and under the friendly pressure of permanent members. In other cases, permanent members were involved from the very beginning (France for Rwanda from February 1993 to the start of the genocide on April 6, 1994, and for Côte d'Ivoire in the 2000s); they sometimes share this position with close partners to the UN (such as the U.S. with the U.K. and Norway concerning Southern Sudan in the 2000s). xxxv If a delegation has successfully petitioned the UNSC to act in a country facing a security threat (for its political stability and/or for the stability of the region), the delegation will want to preserve its influence at the UNSC. The leading delegation will likely have already demonstrated familiarity with the dossier, the type of challenges involved, as well as a demonstrated ability to be heard locally, to have some local levers of action, while not alienating the Council from local actors. In turn, the leading delegation will harness new multilateral resources from the UNSC: material (human, military), organizational, legal (mandates), and symbolic ones (international legitimacy). This might help reduce the domestic pressure on this country regarding the financial burden and the politically expensive military operations associated with peacekeeping. But multilateralization should not appear to change strategic preferences or to engender a loss of control of the local political game.

The objective of preserving diplomatic influence in the UN may intersect with the prospect of impacting local events and local political hierarchies. At least three different situations deserve attention, in order to properly appreciate the relation between how a diplomatic delegation is liaised with the political-military forces of the conflict locally (outside the UNSC) and how it will behave as a leader at the table of the Council. Starting with the situation in 1990-1994 Rwanda, we first examine the impact of a pre-existing protective relationship, between a UNSC member state, in this case France, and its partner, the Rwandan regime before July 1994.

MOBILIZING THE UNSC IN SITUATIONS OF PRE-EXISTING PROTECTIVE

RELATIONSHIPS WITH LOCAL REGIMES

In this section, we scrutinize the process whereby UNSC members ask the Council to address particular topics. As mentioned above, there is often one sole delegation that plays a decisive role in forcing a particular issue onto the UNSC agenda. For this delegation's colleagues, such efforts reveal some interest and some pretension to sway the course of the UNSC future actions toward this situation. This is particularly the case when close relations already exist between the two states, like in privileged "zones d'influence" that are well acknowledged among UNSC members. The cases we study in this paper stress different kinds of relations between such pre-existing zones of influence and UNSC's mobilization of a dossier.

Rwanda 1990-1994

The notion of a zone of influence describes the UNSC's involvement (March 1993) in the armed conflict in Rwanda between the (Northerner Hutu-led) regime of Juvénal Habyarimana and the (exiled Tutsi-led) rebellion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In 1993, the French delegation asked for a UNSC intervention in a country whose regime's ties with the French Presidency were well known. xxxvi The "patron and client" relationship is often used to describe this kind of relationship, which is aimed at exchanging military and political protection (from the patron) with diplomatic, commercial, and other geopolitical advantages (from the client). France and postcolonial Francophone Africa is a good fit for this concept, although other external powers were also involved. xxxvii These ties were all the more obvious when President François Mitterrand's advisors for military and African affairs almost immediately assented to president Habyarimana's request for help in October 1990;

Opération Noroît mobilized up to six hundred soldiers and military advisers. xxxviii After more than two years of bilateral military involvement without any durable improvement, the Élysée palace asked its UN delegation to advocate for the Rwanda dossier within the UNSC. A UN peacekeeping operation was an acceptable solution, as long as it could stop the rebellion's progress and foster a political agreement that would not marginalize the Habyarimana regime to the benefit of its enemies. xxxix

Sierra Leone 1991-2002

A zone of influence by a member of the UNSC does not always translate to an UNSC involvement. Following military assaults against its army by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (composed with elements of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the rebel movement that was led by Charles Taylor against Samuel Doe's regime in Liberia), in April 1991 the Sierra Leon regime of Joseph Momoh alerted the UNSC. The U.S. and the U.K. delegations were then considered the most interested ones, because of their historical, economic and diplomatic ties with, respectively, Liberia and Sierra Leone. They would, however, only deal with the Liberian issue at the UNSC table in 1993, sidelining the Sierra Leonean case for a long time. xl One element counted in the UNSC ability to remain uninvolved in Sierra Leone. In the wake of Charles Taylor's invasion of Liberia on Christmas Eve 1989, a military force had been deployed; ECOWAS (the Economic Community of the West African states) agreed to launch the ECOMOG military operation, mainly Nigerian forces that were friendly to Doe's regime. This (limited) patronage benefited from a post-Cold War context where regional organizations were encouraged by the U.S. and its close Western partners to respond to threats and to act as "subcontracting" security providers. This did not provoke too much trouble among other UNSC members. Within the UNSC, the U.S. and the U.K. convinced ECOWAS to expand its operation, as the Liberian conflict was spilling over into Sierra Leone. They also provided the ECOMOG with (limited) bilaterally material support. xli ECOMOG, however, found it hard to deal with the RUF and particularly with the political instability and military coups in Freetown (in 1992, then in 1997). Sierra Leone gained stronger coverage and diplomatic visibility because of its deepening instability and violence. This was particularly the case when indiscriminate violence originated from the Nigerian troops themselves. Indeed, ECOMOG engaged in combat in Freetown after the May 1997 coup that was fomented by mutineers from the Sierra Leone army who had allied with the RUF. The U.S. and U.K. delegations in the UNSC were progressively brought in to more firmly handle the dossier and get more involved in the day-to-day mediation process.

DAY-TO-DAY MESSAGES TO THE LOCAL ARMED GROUPS AS UN OPERATIONS ARE UNDER WAY

Local military-political leaders keep a close eye on international interventions and their outcomes, be they directly concerned by the intervention (and linked in one way or another to the international interveners), or totally external to it. In the latter case, they were eager to vet what is internationally acceptable and possible. Diplomatic and military leaders cannot ignore the importance of the messages they collectively send to these armed groups through their interventionist practices. xlii The UNSC, as a whole, tended to interpret the escalation of political violence exclusively in terms of power-sharing arrangements among belligerents. French-led efforts to exert pressure on the Rwandan "parti unique" (the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement, MRND) for a multiparty system (1992) and for peace negotiations with the RPF in Arusha (Tanzania) were, therefore, normal practices. Even in the evolving zero sum situation where violence and mass murders from Hutu-Power extremists against Tutsi civilians was evident, France promoted power sharing. xlvii The UNSC continued to defend the Arusha agreement (August 4, 1993), hoping that the current marginalization of the Habyarimana clan would hasten an internal, peaceful political transition. It thus underplayed the increasing violations of the agreement, the worrying signals about the preparation for mass murders, and the climate of general political violence against civilians. xlviii Rwanda was even elected as a new member of the UNSC in January 1994, to encourage it to carry on with the transition. This could not happen without electoral support from the Francophone states among the group of the African states in the General Assembly. It also required the preliminary support of the UNSC members.

The message the UNSC sent was a sort of "the situation can go on this way; it does not really worry us so far." It, however, indifferently applied to the moderate politicians as well as to the extremist forces in the MRND and the Coalition pour la défense de la République extremist party (CDR) that were working at spoiling the transition and were prepared for mass slaughter. The UNSC had sent poor deterrent messages to the Rwandan, Hutu-led political parties and their own extremist forces.

UNSC Irresolution in Sierra Leone

Unlike the French authorities in Rwanda, the U.S. and the U.K. kept a prudent distance from the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean dossiers; partly because there were no firm patron-client relationships between these governments. As well, immediate action from outside Africa was not needed because of ECOMOG. The modest multilateral (UNSC) management of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean dossiers, nonetheless, supposed increasing relations with local actors. Apparently, although collectively acknowledged as the most influential delegations locally, the U.S. and U.K. delegations could not afford -or they had no interest -to liaise deeper with local actors in such a post-Cold War (and post-Mogadishu) African context. In accordance with the International Monetary Fund, xlix they prioritized general elections in both countries before any deeper UN involvement. In the 1997 elections in Liberia, U.S.-backed Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf lost. In Sierra Leone, Western-and Nigeria-backed Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (a former UNDP officer supporter of the SLPP party) won the 1996 presidential election, partly thanks to the international pressure on the former junta, notwithstanding the existing defiance between Kabbah and the Sierra Leonean military leadership. l Constant hesitations, however, affected the UNSC action. The instability among the army boded ill for a resolute UN deployment, as the governmental partner facing the RUF rebels could implode at any moment. As well, any UN action would have to placate the ECOWAS and the Nigerian-led force deployed since 1990 in the Mano River region. Subsequently, painful military reactions were assumed by the ECOMOG, first after the May 1997 coup, then after the RUF launched a new offensive towards Freetown in December 1998 -January 1999. According to Paul Richards, in order not to be political marginalized, while hiding in the forests at the end of December 1993, the RUF increased atrocities in the wake of military defeats. It amplified this strategy as international actors were advocating for general elections in 1996 (leading to the infamous campaigns of amputations). li The RUF thus won a seat at the table of negotiations for a peace deal under the UN auspices. The Lomé Agreement (July 7, 1999) intended to turn the RUF into a respected ruling partner in an extended interim government. One would be mistaken to think that the U.S. and the U.K. delegations did not fully assess this message and its possible perverse effects. But the Lomé agreement resulted from two constraints: first, the difficulty ECOMOG had managing the situation militarily, while open to the scrutiny of the UNSC and its concerns for the loss of civilian lives; and second, the absence of an offensive instrument for the UN secretariat, preventing it from launching a more robust operation in the middle run alongside the chosen local partner, President Kabbah. Once the peace deal was signed, nevertheless, the U.K. delegation took a more resolute lead on the UN mission (UNAMSIL).

It carefully sidelined the ECOWAS-Nigerian leadership and worked at isolating and marginalizing the RUF combatants in UNAMSIL. This resulted in the May 2000 crisis.

As we will now see, the 1990 failures in UN peacekeeping operations made the UNSC members progressively acquiesce to a modified model of diplomatic leadership in UN peace operations at the beginning of the 2000s. This model praised the capacity of the leading delegation to rescue diplomatically and even militarily "its" UN peace operation, when visibly threatened, in order to protect UN credibility.

"LEADERSHIP" IN CRITICAL SITUATIONS: DIPLOMATIC FAILURE IN

RWANDA AND SUCCESS IN SIERRA LEONE

When a UN peacekeeping operation faces a situation collectively judged as "critical", one needs to envisage simultaneously the kind of relationships previously established between specific UNSC delegations and local actors, the forms of the UN involvement in the lead-up to the crisis, and the role assumed by these UNSC delegations. The practical lessons regarding the crisis' outcomes for them and for the UN as a whole also deserve attention.

In Rwanda, the armed conflict never was a critical concern for UNSC members. The French Presidency and the military assumed what they routinely deemed a stabilizing role (regime protection and military training provided to new recruited "soldiers," among them some future militiamen and génocidaires), and a mediation role in the short run. Along with a climate of indifference and self-censorship by the UNSC, this prevented the French from impeding the genocide.

The French diplomats within the UNSC made two decisive mistakes concerning Rwanda. On the one hand, because of the previous involvement of some French military officers on the ground alongside the Rwandan army loyal to Habyarimana, French diplomats in New York felt the political sensitivity of Rwanda in Paris and thus did not act proactively to block the path to genocide. On the other hand, they depended too much on a hypothetical fall-back position, which was a rapid reaction from the UNSC members in case this "French" dossier went severely wrong. As we know, despite a hundred-day genocide that devastated the country and claimed more than 10,000 lives per day during the first weeks under the nose of a ill-equipped UN peacekeeping mission deployed in the country, a rapid deployment never came.

The UN failure in Rwanda has been extensively studied. In part, it had to do with Africa losing its strategic value for most of the Western diplomats in the UN; lii and with the U.S. -UN military defeat in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, just two days before the UNSC authorization for a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (MINUAR). Kofi Annan, then Deputy Secretary-General in charge of peacekeeping operations, carefully relayed Madeleine Albright's messages: the UN had to avoid new images of U.S. financed UN blue helmets engaged in costly military defeats in conflicts deprived of any strategic interest, if it were to preserve the (indispensable) support of the U.S. Congress (30% of the whole peace operations budget at that time). If the UN could not marshal the material, logistical and doctrinal means to succeed on the field, or at least to avoid a media-covered and humiliating defeat, it would better not to act at all and remain out of sight on the ground. liii This is what the Secretariat obtained from the UN mission in Rwanda, without any reaction in the UNSC during the first weeks of the genocide.

With the U.S. and UN withdrawals from Somalia and the shameful UN inaction in the heart of the Rwandan genocide, worrying messages were sent by the UN to entrepreneurs of violence: If they want to kick out the international forces so to carry on violent projects, they should target directly and in the most visible manner these forces, and particularly Western personnel, as Mohammed Farah Aideed's men did in Somalia in June and October 1993. Indeed, intervening states in these peripheral conflicts rarely shared the kind of high-valued interests that drive their massive and durable military actions in other parts of the world, whatever the human costs are (Vietnam, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). In Rwanda, the day after President Habyarimana's assassination on April 6, 1994, the Garde présidentielle rallied Colonel Théoneste Bagosora's plan for the constitution of a new government faithful to the Hutu-Power extremist ideology and killed in the cruelest manner the moderate Prime Minister (Agathe Uwilingiyimana) and ten of the Belgian blue helmets who were protecting her. Because the UN Secretariat opposed any firm Belgian military response to the killers, the latter chose to quit the MINUAR, depriving the UN force of its offensive backbone. liv According to military that were in the field at the time, there was no doubt that a perverse lesson had been carried over from the UN failure in Mogadishu. lv The American delegation had sought to avoid humiliation and pushed the UN to more carefully select where it should intervene and when it should withdraw. This was applied to Rwanda. As the President had been killed and the fighting had resumed, the UNSC, and in particular the delegation that asked to involve the UNSC in this situation, had to recognize their impotence and quit (as the U.S. did in Somalia in March 1994), despite the diffusion of the genocide, rather than keep on with their mission which would plunge the UN deeper into an inextricable situation. Importantly enough, in the U.S. delegations' eye, such withdraw would also teach signing parties of peace agreements that they could not rely on a UN support and presence unless they were willing to comply with what they had agreed upon. lvi Obviously, such a "lesson" did not work in a context of genocide.

The UNSC member states, however, particularly the leading one, could harness by themselves the required means for intervening, with chances of success, in order to restore minimal conditions for resuming UN peace activities. lvii This is precisely what occurred in Sierra Leone after the May 2000 crisis. At this time, around 500 UNAMSIL personnel were abducted by discontented RUF commanders in different parts of Sierra Leone. Whereas the U.S. immediately advocated for a withdrawal, Tony Blair's government chose to come to the rescue of "his" UN mission under siege and to avoid a new fiasco. Indeed, the U.K. delegation progressively had become involved as an active leader of this mission beginning in 1999. lviii It thus demonstrated to the other UNSC members that an intrusive and robust intervention, first from national forces and then UN peacekeepers under its diplomatic lead, might provide stabilization. Indeed, conditions were particularly favorable. Means were made available from London, from the Guinean army, then from the U.S. and the international donors. And the challenges to overcome were relatively low: a small territory, and a relatively weak rebel group with increasingly exhausted combatants. lix The Sierra Leone regime had benefited from foreign support, notably the U.K.-led reform of the security sector provided by the British/International Military Assistance Training Team. It simultaneously remained under international scrutiny in order to ensure that the UNSC-supported action would not indirectly favor particularly violent or destabilizing political practices or strategies from President Kabbah and his regime. During the UNSC public meeting on May 16, 1994 (which finished late at night), the Ambassador of New-Zeeland, Colin Keating -who had previously chaired the April 21 UNSC meeting when resolution 912 (that shamefully reduced the MINUAR staff) had been adopted, pronounced unusually severe words against the Rwandan regime. He thus indirectly contested the UNSC choices to which he and his colleagues had previously agreed. lxii In the same evening, the Czech Ambassador, Karel Kovanda, recalled his previous statement (made on May 8) that genocide was going on in Rwanda. He thus openly disregarded the taboo previously promoted by the U.S. delegation against the use of the "g-word."

The debates about a UN mandate for Turquoise engendered many criticisms and suspicions from the delegations of Brazil, China, New-Zealand, Nigeria and Pakistan. lxiii The operation only won a UNSC mandate thanks to firm U.S. support. This did not prevent the UNSC members from doubting the French authorities' ability to keep a grip on the local actors, as their previous local partners were out of power and Paul Kagamé, the coming Rwandan president, proved himself the master of security (and insecurity) issues in the region. lxiv To accurately measure the consequences of the French Rwandan experience in the medium term, one needs to observe the course of the diplomatic interaction within the UNSC during another crisis, partly linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide: the so called "refugee crisis" in the autumn of 1996 and the rebellion that toppled President Joseph Mobutu Sese Zaire in 1996 revealed one fact: the genocide in Rwanda (which will be progressively interpreted as one of the most shameful, costly failures for the UN, in terms of image and credibility) lost the French delegation its previously routine leading position concerning the Great Lakes and Francophone Africa at the UNSC table. It made it easy-to-grasp arguments against the French call for immediate action in Zaire/DRC. Thwarted by this experience, the French military leadership itself categorically opposed any bilateral military intervention, in the Great Lakes region. lxvi The crisis in Zaire was also an opportunity to weigh the consequences of a reluctant diplomatic leader, in this case the U.S., when no UN operation was already deployed. For domestic and diplomatic reasons, the U.S. diplomats to the UN worked at avoiding any UN military response in the region, and manifestly preferred to lean on local military strongmen (Ugandan Yoweri Museveni and Rwandan Paul Kagamé), then considered as "New African Leaders," to install domestic and regional political order. lxvii The U.S. delegation also helped to marginalize the French delegation by championing another potential leading delegation concerning the military operation to come, the Human Security-advocate, Canada. UNSC members (including the French) supported the project of a Canadian-led multilateral military operation aimed at protecting the refugees and civilians in Eastern Zaire. lxviii This operation (named Assurance) was finally abandoned. lxix Yet, thousands of Hutu Rwandan refugees who had refused to go back home were killed by the Rwanda army and the AFDL rebels. Rwanda could then take partial control of mineral resources in the region. lxx The French military came back to the region in spring 2003, with operation Artémis (limited to the city of Bunia, Ituri); but this time under the auspices of the European Union. A few months before, the French delegation (led by Ambassador Jean-David Levitte) had renewed their collectively-acknowledged leading role to the UNSC on this very dossier. The role was exerted very prudently and in close cooperation with the Americans and the British.

Artémis reflected the European Policy for Security and Defense policy of more aggressively intervening overseas. lxxi It also affirmed the responsibility of the leading UNSC delegation to gather the political will and the military means for coercive action. In this case, instability and visible large-scale violence against civilians was spreading in Bunia and the region, and the MONUC (the UN Mission in DRC) first appeared incapable of stopping it.

The violence occurred immediately after international actors and the UN had negotiated the withdrawal of the Ugandan military forces previously occupying Bunia. This violence thus directly challenged the UN. Undoubtedly, things are complex in the huge territory of the DRC and the regional war that spread in 1998 reflected that complexity. Attempts to meet security concerns both for the regime and for civilians in close relation with the new internationallysupported president, Joseph Kabila, remained fragile. Artémis, nevertheless, offers an arresting point of comparison with the British leading role in Sierra Leone.

In Sierra Leone, the progressive firm British leadership undoubtedly originated in a particular context in British internal politics, as well as in regard to the UN department for peacekeeping operations (DPKO) relationship with the U.S. administration. The newly appointed UN chief of peacekeeping operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, started his mandate with new confidence and ambition after five years of decline in UN peace activities. He would keep this Sierra Leone case in mind during his mandate. Yet, this change primarily embodies in how UNSC members conceived the diplomatic leadership on UN peace operations, and the practical norms attached to this informal position. This normative change concerned the new political costs when UN is visibly militarily humiliated, and the necessary firm involvement of the diplomatic leader to avoid such situations. Naturally, in an interactionist approach, there is no reason for such normative change to remain indefinitely. New political contexts; in the U.S., in the UN, or in African regions in turmoil, may inspire new ways of approaching diplomatic leadership within the UNSC. Nonetheless the collective caution concerning the credibility of the UNSC supported peacekeeping missions have led to a normative change strengthening the leadership role.

CONCLUSION

Intense media coverage at the apex of an international crisis and outbreak of large scale violence should not restrict the assessment of international action to only the "crisis" moment.

The everyday political practices that led-up to the crisis need as much attention.

A focus on the more regular practices from international peacekeeping and security managers is all the more relevant when international actors have already liaised with local political and military forces, or when targeted states have existing international interventions and programs. Crises and outbreaks of violence do often occur in the middle of peacekeeping routines, reconstruction programs, or third-party mediation processes. The impact of these interventions, nonetheless, must be assessed from the perspective of both the local actors in war-torn areas and to political-military leaders elsewhere. And, of course, the impact of the interventions must also encompass what domestic constituencies in the intervening state think about them and how intra-organizational politics shape, or are being shaped, by these interventions.

Multilateral conflict management propels different logics of collective acknowledgement and legitimization among peers within the UNSC. The leading role assumed by a specific UNSC delegation on a specific dossier embodies some of these logics.

It reflects that fact that multilateral interactions are not necessarily separated from the prior bilateral relations between external interveners and local political and military forces. Indeed, multilateral operations can often provide resources as to extend a bilateral engagement between a UNSC member and a partner state in turmoil. The French lead on Rwanda in 1993-1994 facilitated UN peacekeeping operations, which compensated for the erosion of previously mobilized bilaterally resources. But new resources can also transform the current conflict situation in an unexpected way. It may expose current positions of influence within the UNSC to rapid transformations at the expense of the holders of these positions. Indeed, the French delegation lost its leading position on Great Lakes. The UNSC decision-making about Rwanda and its follow-up in Zaire/ DRC, as well as the progressively firm leadership assumed by the United Kingdom on the Sierra Leon dossier from 2000, reveal some lessons that have been learned since the end of the 1990s by delegations keen to remain in tune with their colleagues in the UNSC, and particularly with the U.S. Congress.

One of the important lessons we learn from the interactionist approach is the importance of protecting international peacekeeping operations from being discredited in the eyes of local actors, who are tempted to renege on what they previously promised. As well, domestic constituencies of the main backers of peacekeeping operations need to be reassured.

In the 2000s, the protection of the credibility of peacekeeping operations required that the diplomatic leaders, when clearly identified in the UNSC, commit important material and political means to avoid highly visible military humiliation and political drawbacks. In these critical situations, more than ever, UN peacekeeping operations leaned on the diplomatic actors who had supported and led the broader multilateral responses to Africa's multifaceted crises. This obviously applied to the most recent French involvement in Côte d'Ivoire. This is not to say that every single UN military response in the 2000s has necessarily been efficient. Think of MONUC in DRC or UNAMID in Darfur. But when a diplomatic leadership was clearly assumed for a UN mission in the UNSC, it consisted at least in avoiding any military humiliation on the ground with large scale media coverage.

Finally, from a methodological point of view, what we call "lessons" did not stem from well defined strategic plans but from practical adjustments entrenched in the day-to-day interaction among the UNSC delegations, particularly among the permanent members' diplomats. Disclosing such practical adjustments requires the observation of precise arenas of interaction, followed by an inductive reasoning of what was observed. Deduction of political effects and outcomes from overall power positions on a global scale, alone, will offer on an incomplete position of how peacekeeping works.

  acknowledged and sanctioned position attached to specific social rules and collective expectations among UNSC diplomats. The result is a new intersubjective norm. The role of leader in the UNSC has witnessed two changes. The first is how UNSC diplomats have conceived of the relations they should keep with local belligerents who carry out violence. The second is the conditions under which UNSC diplomats should themselves resort to military solutions or actions. We use the term of normative change in this regard, pointing to different collective expectations of what is appropriate, what should be done We look at the changing French diplomatic leading role concerning the Rwandan conflict, and the consequences of this case for international conflict management on the conflict in Zaire/DRC begun in 1996. A second case of peacekeeping, the Sierra Leonean conflict from 1991 to 2002 under British leadership, confirms the change in the leadership norm in the UNSC for international peacekeeping. The potential political significance of the informal position of the UNSC diplomatic leader was first revealed during observations by the author's stay within the UNSC alongside the French delegation in 2002.

  Yet, in their everyday work, with its own routine and selective urgencies, they do not always spend the same energy deciphering what precise messages they are sending, to whom, and with what consequences. UNSC Indifference and Genocidal Politics in Rwanda: The Handcuffed French "Leader" The profound indifference reigning in the UNSC regarding Rwanda encouraged the French ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, to bring the French presidency's views of the conflict to the UNSC table. xliii President Habyarimana was perceived as trustworthy by the international aid community. xliv And the French delegation was the most influential delegation within the UNSC on Francophone African matters. xlv But this influential position also resulted from the support and levers France got from African actors. In 1993, the French delegation was cautious in gaining the support of the states of the region: Rwanda and Uganda (despite president Museveni's links with the Rwandan rebellion) were officially asking for a UN peace operation. The main inhibitor to the French delegation was the concern of the U.S. Congress for runaway UN peacekeeping budgets. xlvi France used its military support for the U.S. led UNITAF and UNOSOM II operations in Somalia in 1992-93 to gain support. Apart from the U.S. concern, the French demand provoked no collective surprise or negative reactions.

  In the UN, the U.K. leading role in[2000][2001][2002] was reflected in various indications, such as the intense diplomatic statements from the U.K. delegation concerning Sierra Leone, the key persons appointed to the UNAMSIL leadership (the Nigerian ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji as the chief of the mission and the British Alan Doss as his main deputy and UNDP resident coordinator), or the UNSC public meeting organized by British ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, then chairing the Council, on July 18, 2002, which was dedicated to the Mano River region's crises. lx We claim below that this British success in Sierra Leone reflects a normative change concerning how UNSC members have collectively conceived of the leadership role in peacekeeping operations since the early 2000s. "LEADERSHIP" AND NORMATIVE CHANGE: PROTECTING UN MISSIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL DISCREDIT Some of the U.S. preferences in the heart of critical moments in UN operations, such as the Rwandan genocide, or the May 2000 crisis for the UNAMSIL finally inspired operational recommendations in the 2000 Brahimi report on reforming UN peacekeeping operations. lxi But they are rarely presented sociologically as a change occurring first in the informal social rules supporting the position of diplomatic leader to the UNSC. Indeed, the intersubjective understanding of the role of the leader had changed. The belated, UN-endorsed French Operation Turquoise (22 June-22 August 1994) reflects, after six weeks of inaction (and the decision to withdraw almost all the MINUAR contingents on April 21), an understanding of this new model of leadership. It inspired much sarcasm and criticism regarding previous French action and inaction. Some challenged the French as an impartial and locally respected protection of civilians.

  Seko in May 1997. In August 1996, Mobutu's imploding regime faced an armed uprising in the eastern provinces contiguous to Rwanda. Political tensions were high in South and North Kivu among different populations over land rights and citizen rights. The influx of tens of thousands of Hutu Rwandan refugees after the genocide in Rwanda into camps around Goma and Bukavu exacerbated the situation. These tensions turned into a more organized rebellion when the Rwanda and Uganda supported Alliance des forces démocratiques de liberation (AFDL) attacked the Hutu refugee camps in Zaire (DRC). Rwanda and Uganda sought to overthrow the then sick president Mobutu and to remove the threat of Hutu armed groups (notably composed of former génocidaires and their families) settled next door. lxv

i

  See Thomas J. Bassett, and Scott Straus, "Defending Democracy in Côte d'Ivoire. Africa Takes a Stand", Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (2011): 130-140. ii Daniel Bach, "France's Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Necessary Condition to Middle Power Status in the International System", in Africa and Europe: From Partition to Interdependence or Dependence, ed. Amadu Sesay (London: Crom Helm, 1986), 75-85; Maja Bovcon, "France's Conflict Resolution Strategy in Côte d'Ivoire and its Ethical Implications", African Studies Quarterly 11, no. 1 (2009): 1-24; Pierre Lellouche, and Dominique Moisi, "French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization", International Security 3, no. 4 (1979): 108-133; "René Otayek, La Libye face à la France au Tchad: Qui perd gagne ?", Politique

lvii David Ambrosetti, "Beyond the 'Norm Entrepreneur' Model: Rwanda, Darfur, and Social Sanction among UN Diplomats", Global Society 24, no. 2 (2010)