Claire Beaugrand

The Middle East and North Africa and the global trend towards multiple citizenship

Introduction

Dual or multiple citizenship 2 can be defined as the legal status of an individual who concurrently holds the citizenship of more than one state. Since the inception of the concept of nationality understood as the legal-political bond linking an individual to a sovereign territorial state and until recently, states have proved to be naturally reluctant to accept dual membership or dual allegiance.

They have tried for a long time to limit or prohibit it, but also conveniently ignored it when they themselves created such situations in the pursuit of their own interests.

Studying the question of dual state affiliations calls for the distinction between principle and practice.

In practice, fairly early into the 20 th century, jurists recognised that dual citizenship is "a fact" that "objectively… cannot be avoided" but only "remedied" -through bilateral conventions (Boulbès, 1958:82, 85). 3 Furthermore, since states enjoy a virtually unrestricted liberty to shape their laws of nationality and do not adhere to the same rules, "multiple nationality has in practice become the norm rather than the exception" (Boll, 2007: xviii). Later, in the 2000s, social scientists also seized the subject and linked the same inevitable rise of dual citizenship to the increased international trade, heightened mobility of individuals and lesser occurrences of inter-state wars, concluding that "dual citizenship has become a commonplace of globalization" (Spiro, 2016:3). The practices of individuals, who cross borders, marry foreigners and multiply transnational links, have in effect constantly challenged the states' hostility towards dual allegiance. Moreover, the states' own public 1 I would like to thank Stephen Wise de Jong, who assisted me in the research for this article within the framework of the scheme A2I (Access to Internships) at the University of Exeter in June 2019. His hard work and inputs represented an invaluable contribution to this chapter. [START_REF]Dual Citizenship in Global Perspective, From Unitary to Multiple Citizenship[END_REF] In this article, for the sake of clarity, I don't distinguish between dual (the concurrent holding of two nationalities) and multiple (the concurrent holding of more than two nationalities). I equally don't enter into the long debate about the distinction between nationality and citizenship. I am fully aware of the polysemy of both terms and contend here that 'nationality' refers to the international and formal aspect of state membership (in particular in relation to other states) while 'citizenship', defined as the possession within a particular state of civil and political rights as well as obligations, stresses more its national and actual aspect -the contents of these rights varying across states. I adopted the expression "dual citizenship" rather than "dual nationality" as it seems to prevail in the literature in English on the topic. 3 Translations are all mine. interests and domestic agendas, above all, the evolution of the juridical status of women and their enfranchisement, also largely trumped the principle of disallowing dual citizenship.

Generally unable to avoid situations of dual nationality, states are therefore obliged to adapt and take principled stances, signalling either their rather newfound indifference or their sustained suspicion towards the status. The official recognition of dual citizenship depends on the state's position within the international economy and strategic balance of power and on the state's position vis-à-vis its immigrants and/or expatriates community. Cast in a constructivist light, this recognition or absence thereof, when explicit, is a rhetorical act with incentivising goals for states to showcase themselves either as norms-setting (involving individual choice in nationality matters, like the US) or valuesupholding (like the loyalty to the nation).

At this point, a clarification ought to be made regarding the uncertainty surrounding the distinction between states recognising dual citizenship and those that do not. This recognition is not always crystal-clear and ought to be inferred not only from the letter but also from the practice of nationality regulations, themselves compounded with the provisions of other legal texts, such as the constitution,4 the electoral code, the civil service code or the labour code. 5 Taken together and despite being more often than not contradictory they reflect the state's acceptance6 of or, on the contrary, suspicion towards bi-nationals. Scholars who established regional (usually European Union7 or OECD countries) or global typologies8 have had to grapple with the difficulty to uphold the "assumption that state practice toward multiple nationality is nuanced and cannot be categorised in black and white terms" (Boll, 2007:51). Some state practices or "general attitudes towards multiple nationality" have proved impossible to categorize and described as "inconsistent". 9 When gathering very large datasets, this state's general attitude, inferred from a range of legislations and actual legal practices, has proved difficult and cumbersome to assess and, in lesser-known cases in Africa or the Middle East, has been cursorily researched. With few notable regional exceptions (Brand, 2006; Perrin, 2014; 2016) or single-country studies tackling the issue (El-Khoury, Melkar and Thibaut Jaulin (2012) on Lebanon, Davis (1996) on Syria), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has surprisingly received little attention in the growing research of dual citizenship despite the importance of international and transnational population movement within and through the region. 10 The Western-centric dimension of the studies on dual citizenship has epistemologically gone hand in hand with normative representations, underpinned by power relations between receiving and sending states, or in other words, Western countries and other regions of the world. Dual citizenship has often been equated with liberal political values, among others the enfranchisement of women, the capacity of expatriate communities to collectively carry weight and negotiate rights with the state of origin -in particular voting rights, a form of personal freedom to choose one's own national affiliation or the recognition of a right to "expatriation". When looking at the global picture of dual citizenship diffusion, the MENA countries, in general, have often been portrayed as holdouts, along with Asian countries. Tanja Brøndsted Sejersen, who identifies regional patterns in the expansion of dual citizenship, notes that "the percentage of countries allowing dual citizenship in Asia [in which she includes the Middle East] is extremely low compared to the other three continents" (2008:536). Based on the analysis of thirteen Middle Eastern countries, 11 she further found that 31% of the sample allowed dual citizenship (that is five of them, including Israel and Turkey), as compared to 63% in the Americas, 61% in Europe or 50% in Oceania -and 23% in the whole of Asia. 9 India or the Netherlands are cases in point. 10 While concomitantly seminal works were produced on the topic of citizenship, see Butenschøn, Davis and Hassassian (2007). 11 The thirteen countries surveyed include: Iran, Oman, Qatar classified as countries never allowing dual citizenship; Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates are classified as countries where dual citizenship is "allowed with treaty nations" while Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, along with Israel, Turkey are classified as countries where dual citizenship is "allowed for the majority of the population" according to Table 1 (2008:532).

Seen from afar, the perception that the Arab states are lagging behind can be readily attributed to the lingering interstate tensions, the ethnic and patriarchal understanding of nationality and what has been referred to as democratic deficit in the region. On the second point, Brøndsted Sejersen explains that "in countries where citizenship is only conferred through the father, the occurrence of dual citizenship is smaller than in countries where citizenship is inherited from both parents" (2008: 539) -the prevalence of paternal jus sanguinis being often the case in Arab countries. 12 Regarding the absence of democracy, the position towards dual citizenship has been linked to the type of regime (Rhodes and Harutyunyan, 2010; Whitaker, 2011; Mirilovic, 2015) with authoritarian countries said to have a conception of citizenship closer to subjectness and a pronounced willingness to control the loyalty of their nationals. While remaining sceptical about the notion of "loyal citizen" as supposedly constructed in the "generally poorer, authoritarian states of the global South" (2006:10), Laurie Brand, who studied the relations of the states of Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Jordan with their citizens abroad, acknowledges nevertheless the role that the domestic political situation plays on the state attitude towards emigrants: "part of the definition of political opening or liberalization is a gradual process of institution-related recognition that repressive/exclusivist politics as usual will no longer work" so that this liberalisation process triggers an "automatic response by the state also to change its behavior toward expatriates, or the expatriates themselves [to] take action to force the state to deal with them on changed bases " (2006:18). Yet, despite the validity of these two correlations (paternal affiliation and regime type) as explanatory factors of the failure to recognise dual citizenship, they sometimes verge on stereotypes in the case of the MENA region seen as persistently lacking both democracy and gender equality.

Dropping teleological assumptions, this article seeks to nuance this picture and complement it with other factors as they emerged from the latest researches on the topic. It looks qualitatively into the dynamics of dual citizenship allowance in the MENA, focusing on the trends followed by sixteen Arab countries. 13 Methodologically, it is based on the comprehensive collection and review of the existing legislation, recent reforms and current debates regarding multiple citizenship in the MENA, as well as the latest legal analyses as complementary secondary sources. The article chooses to focus on a particular region to paradoxically show the diversity of national approaches and contradictory trends, across time and place, in order to eventually debunk, in the words of Delphine Perrin, "the essentialist conceptions associating the legal framework of nationality […] with an Arab and/or Muslim culture" (2016:3).

Analysed in details, the attitude and practices of dual nationality in these countries have not necessarily been defined primarily by the states' hostility but also marked sometimes by pragmatism leading to its toleration and sometimes by ethnically-conscious ideological considerations leading to its outright promotion. Moreover, the source of multiple citizenship seems to matter: most of the MENA countries display a general reluctance to naturalisation -being one source of dual nationality; yet most have also tended to condone the acquisition of a foreign nationality by their nationals, thereby reasserting influence over the resources of expatriates and over expatriates as resources, and following the prevailing global norms. 14 This corroborates the conclusion of Vink at al., who find no significant correlation between regime types and dual citizenship allowance, but rather insist on the role of a "modern diaspora governance where expatriates are increasingly viewed as part of a community that continues to contribute to political and economic development of sending state" (2019: 377). Based on this, it appears that within the region, the resource-rich but emigrant-poor oil monarchies stand out. Yet, this article argues that they do not stand out as much as 'holdout' or lagging behind countries as states promoting what I venture to call a new "select citizenship" in a context when citizenship is commodified and "degraded" (Spiro, 2016:2), as a result of it being easy to obtain. 13 The countries include: the five North African countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt), the six GCC countries, Yemen, Iraq and the Levant countries of Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Some countries are studied in more depth than others, the ones currently in a state of war or transition having received less attention (Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya). I excluded the Palestinian National Authority, since it has been at best a quasistate, with no real sovereignty to enact a policy towards expatriates and even less possibility to have an immigration/naturalisation policy. Finally I left aside the non-Arab states like Turkey and the cases of Israel, based on the idea of the Aliyah and the Islamic Republic of Iran in a clear standoff with the international community.

14 Vink et al. ( 2019) talk about 'transnational norm diffusion', Spiro (2017) about 'norm cascade'. This article will, firstly, present the global trend towards the toleration of multiple citizenship as it has been studied with a strong Western-centric focus, before reflecting, secondly, on the conclusions that can be drawn from the MENA region and in particular from the special case of the oil-rich Gulf monarchies that seem to withstand the global normative pressure.

I. Towards a Global Toleration of Multiple Citizenship

As about an end to the 'legal unity of husband and wife' or in other words, the disjoining of women's citizenship from that of their spouses, allowing the former to retain their original nationality upon marriage. 15 The trend identified by Hammar led gradually to legal changes -exemplified by the fact that the aforementioned "Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality" was eventually updated in 1997 so as to allow each country to decide on the issue of dual citizenship for itself, shifting from hostility to a form of neutral attitude. Since then, many studies (Faist and Kivisto 2007; Sejersen 2008; Mirilovic 2015; Spiro 2016), have documented the undeniable spike in the number of states tolerating citizenship that "increased in the last half century from one-third to threequarter of states globally" (Vink et al., 2019: 362). 16 The Western-centric History of the De-Territorialization of Citizenship 15 Harpaz and Mateos argues along the same lines in a recent article identifying married women, and immigrants and their native-born children as instrumental in changing the attitudes towards dual citizenship (2018:846). 16 Harpaz and Mateos (2018: 846) provide the following figures: " in 1990, less than a third of countries in Europe and the Americas tolerated it; by 2010, it was accepted by almost four-fifths of those countries."

The history of dual citizenship is one of a shift from the states' strong disfavour and rejection towards a general acceptance. According to Spiro, "[it] necessarily focuses on the United States. Dual nationality is a by-product of migration" (2016:4). Most of the authors who studied how the evolution of the understanding of citizenship led to the toleration of multiple citizenship (Birtek: 2017, Spiro: 1997, 2016) indeed stress the fact that the issue of dual nationality arose with prominence in the relations between European sending countries and the US in the context of increasing migration between territorially bounded states.

Until then, the condition of sedentariness that characterized the feudal and early modern periods was associated with 'perpetual allegiance' (Spiro, 2017:623-24). Individuals were considered bound to the sovereign on whose territory they were born, on a permanent basis. This rendered multiple ties of loyalty unthinkable and the transfer of allegiance only possible in case of the conquest of lands and change of sovereign. With the emigration to the US, representing an important loss of manpower for military purposes "states clashed in their claims over people […] In the face of sustained US pressure, important European states moved to recognise transfers of nationality through the mechanisms of expatriation, extinguishing original nationality upon naturalization in the United States" (Spiro, 2016: 4-5). 17 States tried to impose an exclusive relation with their members -which, at the time, seemed alien to the logic of empires in other parts of the world where citizenship was often thought, when it was at all, along racial and ethnic bases (Butenschøn, 2007). Dual Citizenship has been viewed with suspicion within the Western-dominated international community, dual nationals representing a "constant source of international tension" 18 (Spiro, 1997: 1413) and a potential source for "treason, espionage and other subversive activities'" (Harpaz and Mateos, 2018:845).

Spiro dates the gradual shift from the concept of perpetual allegiance to some form of elective citizenship to a 1967 decision of the US Supreme Court that recognised citizenship as a right not to be easily dispossessed from (2016:56). For him, three international factors explain this decision: the 17 Even this recognition witnessed setbacks when for instance, in 1889, the needs of national Defence in France led to the de facto end of the liberation from the French nationality and national duties upon acquiring a new one. (Boulbès, 1958: 77). 18 Spiro notes how "one state attempted to protect its citizen from mistreatment at the hands of another state claiming the same individual as its own" -which is still the case in diplomatic and judicial rows when states don't recognise dual citizenship and apply the lex fori principle denying consular protection.

human rights revolution, the lesser importance of manpower as a basis for state power in the context of military mechanization and the Cold War whose bipolar ideology helped dismantle the old-world notion of loyalty and dampen rivalry within the Western camp.

The end of the twentieth century then earmarked the beginning of a new indifference to dual citizenship: while the UK had dropped restrictions on dual nationality in 1948, other countries moved in the same direction, France in 1973, Canada in 1976 and Mexico in 1998, when some 200,000

Mexican-born U.S. citizens were retroactively conferred Mexican citizenship -1.5 million following since then "without much notice, on Capitol Hill or elsewhere" (Spiro, 2016:73). "Dual citizenship is here to stay. […] [It] serves the American interests" (Spiro, 2016: 6). Dual citizens pose no political threat, they create no societal costs but on the contrary they ease naturalisation and integration. From a theoretical point of view, this attitude of states' indifference towards a fact on the ground that proved difficult to contain, marks the decoupling of the twin concepts of citizenship and territory as being intimately linked and coextensive (Ragazzi, 2015). Yet while the US is indeed important in norm setting, its dominant history of citizenship conceptualisation glosses over nuances brought by other regions of the world -and in particular those where colonisation rendered more complex the concepts of allegiance, sovereign and emigration. Harpaz and Mateos (2018: 844) rightly note that current research on dual citizenship "does not capture the diversity of contexts in which dual citizenship appears outside Western Europe and North America."

De-Centring the Field: Adding the Perspective of Sending Countries

This methodological bias has been somehow addressed by de-centring the fieldaway from the dominance of receiving countries, through recognising the perspective and agency of sending countries. 19 Researches have acknowledged that the latter were facing distinct political dynamics and normative challenges (Brand, 2006 on MENA; Itzigsohn, 2007 on Latin America; Manby, 2014 on Africa). Sending states, many of them the products of colonisation and influenced by the international normative context in which they operated upon independence, have also come to realise that dual citizenship was serving their interests.

Like European states in the nineteenth century, they once equated emigration with abandonment, and often opted, upon independence, for terminating the nationality of those who left the country and voluntarily acquired a new one. However, a new mode of governing diasporas also emerged in sending countries. Firstly dropping their ambitions for economic autarky, these countries came to reconceive emigrants as a "kind of natural resources" (Spiro, 2016: 89) on which to maintain or reassert influence. By making it easier to retain original citizenship in order to cultivate emigrants' loyalty and ties to their country of origin, sending states respond to the basic economic concern of maintaining a certain level of remittances20 or investment back into the countries. Secondly, the emigrants' involvement in the politics of the country of naturalisation, has come to be seen as an opportunity for the states to possibly foster their interests or embellish their reputation abroad. Finally, pressure has come from the diasporic communities themselves to force states to change their attitudes towards dual citizenship (Brand, 2006: 18; Manby, 2014: 178-79). Emigrants with important financial leverage or in significant numbers ended up bargaining the terms of citizenship with their countries of origin, what Spiro calls the "investor citizenship phenomenon" (2016: 91). These three factors are further reinforced by the material aspects of globalisation that involved increased and sustained mobility but also closer communication with the homeland via social media.

Methodological Focus on the Middle East: Deconstructing the Teleological Approach

Yet while this shift in academic focus away from dominant receiving states is welcome, most studies still conceive the general trend towards the acceptance of dual nationality across the globe in a teleological way. Researches do not only observe the trend but encourage it in a prescriptive and normative way. Peter Spiro makes the case for "embracing dual citizenship" (2016: 111-130) by recasting it as a "Human Right" (2016: 8) stemming from societal changes towards better gender equality and also freedom of choice. Just like the idea of citizenship itself that originated in Europe and spread worldwide, the toleration of multiple citizenship is conceived as a "spreading" phenomenon that will engulfs all the states.

Yet these global approaches on the diffusion of dual citizenship assume a form of homogenous (Western-centric) understanding of citizenship and gloss over contradictory dynamics simultaneously at work that interweaves racial, ethnic, and class politics into citizenship politics. It also seems to ignore, under the general principles, some evolutions and debates affecting negatively the rights of binationals -being gradually the object of securitization, in countries that nevertheless recognise dual nationality. 21 This article methodologically follows the approach of Erin Aeron Chung on citizenship, who states:

"Rather than begin with the assumption that citizenship is universal, democratic, and inclusive, research on citizenship in non-Western contexts highlights how citizenship -as a legal status, symbol of national and/or ethnic identity, institution, and practice-is contingent" (2017: 446). Furthermore, when studying in details the toleration of multiple citizenship in the MENA region, it identifies a reality exhibiting concurrent contradictory trends, which warrants a contextual approach taking into consideration interactions with emigration states as well and setbacks in the universal application of the principle of dual nationality.

The various countries of the Arab world offer analytical laboratories that range from the rather early recognition of dual nationality on ethnic and ideological bases (Gadhafi's Libya or Baathist countries)

or for economic or political reasons linked to historical relations with emigration countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria) to total exclusivity of nationality on the basis of welfare benefits cum loyalty and gradually a classist understanding of it (Arab Gulf States) or a soft reluctance based on nationalist considerations (Yemen, Egypt).

A common characteristic is that all the MENA countries keep restrictive legislations and practices towards naturalisation making the provisions for dual nationality fairly asymmetrical and designed for nationals acquiring nationalities abroad rather than foreigners applying for naturalisation. Moreover, the regional political earthquake that represented the popular uprisings of 2011 and the subsequent return of the authoritarian pendulum, which put nationality and citizenship back on the research agenda in the region, 22 showed that the seemingly "unidimensional" trend towards permitting dual citizenship might also encounter setbacks.

II. The Middle East: A Nexus of Contradictory Trends

Janus States: Cultivating Emigration and Limiting Naturalisations

Most of the MENA countries have followed the general trend of softening their position of disallowing multiple citizenship just as did labour-sending countries studied in other regions, in order to keep ties with their diasporas. Yet, with regard to naturalisation, while renouncing a previously held foreign nationality is not always a requirement in most Arab countries, the rate of citizenship acquisitions remains generally low 23 -making this other source of possible dual nationals scarce.

To start with, a special mention ought to be made here of citizenship systems of heavily ideological regimes: authoritarian countries with pan-Arab beliefs, such as the case of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 24 as well as Baathist Iraq 25 or Syria 26 did take a different approach to nationality by distinguishing ethnically between Arabs and non-Arabs, 27 making it easy if not 22 Beaugrand and Geisser, 2018;Butenschøn and Meijer, 2017. 23 It is important to note here that most of the national annual statistics do not include the numbers of naturalised people; they are sometimes published in the Official Gazetteer as was the case in Lebanon for the 30 June 1994 naturalisation decree taken by Rafic Hariri or in Kuwait where list of names are to be found in the press as well. 24 The Article 8 of the Law 18 of 1980 Pertaining to the Decrees of the Nationality Act distinguishes between Arabs and non-Arabs. For any Arab defined as "One who is affiliated by nationality to any Arab(ic) country" in article 2, who "enter the Libyan territory and wishes to acquire such nationality, the 'Arabic nationality' understood in article 1 as "the nationality of the citizens of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" is a right (my emphasis). Yet article 8 further states that "a person holding the Arabic Nationality shall lose his nationality, if he voluntarily acquires a foreign nationality, unless permitted to do so by the General People's Committee for Justice" foreign being understood here as non-Arab. 25 Under the Baathist regime, a new Law 5 Granting the Iraqi Nationality to the Arab was passed in 1975 whose article 1 stated: "The Minister of Interior may grant the Iraqi nationality to any Arab subject applying for, if he has attained his majority and having good conduct and reputation, without restriction to the conditions of naturalization stipulated in pare 1 of Article 8 of the Iraqi Nationality Law No. 43 of 1963, (as amended).

Palestinians shall be exempted therefrom unless a law or legislative resolution shall be issued contrary thereto." 26 According to Davis (1996:39) "The current legislation leads to the absurdity in that the Law allows a foreigner, as well as a Syrian émigré citizen, who is naturalized into Syrian Arab citizenship to retain their previous foreign citizenship, while compelling a citizen of the Syrian Arab Republic who married a foreign citizen who emigrated abroad and was naturalized into a foreign citizenship to lose his citizenship." 27 Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco still provide to different degrees for privileged access to citizenship for those of Muslim religion and/or Arab origin (Manby, 2014:180) -to which one should add Jordan and most of the GCC states.

automatic for Arabs to obtain their citizenships without renouncing their previous one, 28 while imposing loss of citizenship to their nationals obtaining foreign (understood as non-Arab) citizenship abroad. The Western-led transition period in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and the will to reintegrate the international community in the late period of Gadhafi's rule over Libya made the two countries adopt, in 2006 and May 2010 respectively, nationality laws aligned with the majority of Arab states, allowing dual nationality 29 -even though the debate has remained heated in post-2011 Libya as for the holding of public positions for dual nationals. 30 The embracing of ethnic-based (Arab) dual nationality has often been overlooked and clearly contradicts linear version of the diffusion of dual nationality.

Lebanon, as for it, is a country famous for its vast expatriate diaspora -starting even from before the creation of the state itself, and known since then as mahjar. 31 This diaspora encompasses Lebanese who migrated to the Western hemisphere under the Ottoman Empire and mostly lost track with the Levant, adopting the nationality of their new faraway country; it also includes newer waves of emigrants to Western Africa and the Gulf since the mid-twentieth century, who have often been able

to retain their nationality. 32 The current Nationality Law governing, among others, cases of dual 31 Laurie Brand notes the significance of this émigré population not only for its important financial resources but also as part of the complex Lebanese identity -Lebanon being pictured as "a bird with two wings, resident and expatriate (ta'irah bi-jinahayn, al-muqim w-al-mughtarib)" (2007:7).

32 "According to article 3 of the Law of 31 January 1946, an absence of five consecutive years is reason for the withdrawal of nationality" (El-Khoury and Jaulin, 2012:19n71) but this seems to be possible to restore.

arrêté 15/S mentions that citizenship can be withdrawn when acquiring another citizenship only if the government has previously given its agreement to acquire a second citizenship, which was seen as a way to avoid escaping Lebanese jurisdiction."

The authors further explain this latter point (2012, 17-18):

"Requiring permission to relinquish present nationality and acquire foreign nationality seems to serve the double purpose of ensuring that nationals forsaking their nationality have fully complied with all their duties, and somehow of discouraging them. Authorization or permission in Lebanon is issued by a presidential or ministerial (i.e. by the Council of Ministers) decree according to the different provisions, but all agree that without such decree the acquirer of foreign nationality must be treated as a national. 33 If the nationality law under which the person intends to naturalise prescribes loss of previous nationality to complete the procedure, the naturalisation inevitably aborts." (Our emphasis)

While the initial provision seemed to be aimed at avoiding that Lebanese citizens took on another nationality in the context of the general conception of the exclusiveness of nationality, 34 it has paradoxically been de facto allowing it. Yet while the dual nationality is rather widespread among Lebanese who acquire a nationality abroad, the possibility for naturalised foreigners to be recognised as dual nationals is very limited since the naturalisation process itself is gripped by paralysis. Because the naturalisation of foreigners in Lebanon depend on a discretionary decision of the executive, "Lebanon's immobilisme and its sensitive demographic balance deeply affect [the] process (naturalisation decrees tend to stall, carry large numbers, stir political unrest, and end up contested in administrative courts, as is the case with the infamous decree issued in 1994), as well as the longawaited amendment to recognise maternal ius sanguinis." (El-Khoury and Jaulin, 2012: 1). Zahra alBarazi concludes "that naturalisation is not an option at all in Lebanon, the state which arguably has the most delicate demographic balance, where a foreigner may become Lebanese only through marriage to a male citizen" (2017: 13n50).

33 Article 8(1) of the 1925 Law, and Article 18 of the Law of 31 December 1946. The authorization of the Head of State is a prerequisite for the recognition of the new nationality; otherwise, Lebanese authorities would still consider the acquirer of foreign nationality as Lebanese. 34 The only exception was the permission to acquire the US nationality without prior authorization, as permitted by the Gouraud-Knabenshue agreement (15 November 1921) signed between the French Mandate authorities and the US, which renewed the American-Ottoman treaty of August 1874 (El-Khoury and Jaulin, 2012:5, 18-19n63).

Jordan nationality law No 6 of 1954 (1987), also provides 'asymmetrical' provisions with regard to multiple citizenship. Article 17(a) explicitly allows it: "A Jordanian who acquires the nationality of a foreign State may retain his Jordanian nationality unless he renounces it in accordance with the provisions of this Law." However, the articles dealing with naturalisation 35 stipulate that the naturalised person should "renounce his nationality of origin" (art.4) and "relinquish any other nationality possessed by him at the time of application" (art.5). As Laurie Brand suggests (2006: 21-22; 2007:4-5), this attitude of the Jordanian state should be understood in the context of the composition and the destination of the Jordanian expatriates: the majority of the Jordanian community abroad was of Palestinian origin and settled, particularly, if not exclusively, in the Gulf region. Owing to the highly restrictive Gulf state policies regarding naturalisation (as will be seen below), the Hashemite Kingdom did not have to suspect that these West-Banker Jordanians would acquire a new nationality and pledge new loyalty. Likewise, owing to the interdiction for them in the Gulf to own immovable property or to set up their own business (a 51% stake of any business having to be coowned by a Gulf national), the Hashemite Kingdom did not have to fear that monies would not be sent back home as remittances. As a matter of fact, dual citizenship, in Jordan affects a minority who migrated to countries where permanent settlement is possible and, as a result, the acquisition of nationality more likely to happen. This makes it less salient an issue than in other countries of the Maghreb whose majority migrants went to Europe, where citizenship has been increasingly an option.

Like Lebanon and Jordan, Egypt's migrations, while fairly diverse, have been largely to authoritarian states of the global South, with important communities in the culturally similar Arab world 36 and in particular the Gulf region. Yet, contrary to the previously studied Levantine countries, Egypt, despite its need for economic remittances and the unlikely naturalisation of Egyptian expatriates in the Gulf, has remained firm in its reluctance to relinquish control over multiple nationality and keeps asking its 35 Article 4 for the naturalisation of "any Arab who has resided continuously in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for not less than 15 years" and article 5 for royal nationality granting. 36 See Roussillon, Alain (1985) Contrary to these three countries, the question of dual nationality is posed in different terms in the Maghreb countries, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, whose emigration has been overwhelmingly to the culturally different Western European democracies. 38 The historical legacy of settler colonialism, that includes the ex nihilo creation of citizenship as identity definer replacing religious allegiance, has played an important role in the attitude towards dual citizenship. Upon independence, these three sovereign countries designed their nationality laws so as not to grant nationality to settlers who may keep their original nationality and work against their national interests. 39 Thus, the constraints placed on naturalisation and the limited application of the jus soli principle are an important legacy of the settlers' presence.

37 See for instance the list of authorisations delivered in the Official Gazette in Walaa, Ali "All you need to know about Egyptian nationality law amendments" Egypt Today, 17 October 2018. https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/59108/All-you-need-to-know-about-Egyptian-nationality-lawamendments [accessed 10 September 2019]. 38 We rely here on the excellent work by Delphine Perrin (2016). 39 Until the 2005 reform, Algeria was requiring foreigners to repudiate their original nationality upon naturalisation.

Yet, as for the acquisition of a foreign nationality by nationals is concerned, the law has proved more accommodating: with the exception of Tunisia that disallowed multiple allegiance until 1975, 40

Morocco and Algeria's legislation remained silent as for the requirement to choose between nationalities when acquiring a new one. This is, according to Perrin, because they both thought of the national bond as indissoluble. The Moroccan King, as Commander of the Faithful, continues to adhere up until today to the regime of perpetual allegiance that pervaded the nineteenth century practicenationality being thought as the belonging to a community of faith, while the Algerian regime sees the belonging to a homogenous national community as inalienable. More broadly, in the three Maghreb countries, the permanence of the national link is conceived in similarly sacred terms. "This sacralization carries with it a form of hostility towards multiple nationality, but it also ensures its foundations since multiple allegiances derives precisely from the constancy of the original belonging despite other affiliations" (Perrin, 2016:3).

From then on, Perrin notes two legal evolutions that affected positively the number of bi-nationals.

First, the end of the "legal unity of husband and wife" 41 and the granting to women the right to pass on their nationality. 42 Second, the opening of the door for bi-national spouses and children 1963, article 30, para. 3, rescinded in 1975 (Perrin, 2016 : 4; 17n11), according to which the person who voluntarily acquires another nationality or renounces his/her Tunisian nationality must leave the Tunisian territory. It is interesting to note here that the clause was rescindedhereby signifying a tacit acceptance of dual nationality, just two years after France did it in 1973, at a time when Spiro notes the shift from Western countries towards this type of toleration. 41 The female national getting married with a foreigner would lose her nationality upon her request only in Morocco. In Algeria, the 1970 reform put an end to the automatic acquisition of the Algerian nationality upon marriage by a female foreigner. 42 This follows in the footsteps of Egypt in 2004. Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and the Gulf states have all resisted the legal trend. 43 Perrin (2016:6) notes that Morocco has introduced a discriminatory article (art. 19-5) enabling the children of Moroccan mothers (not fathers) of mixed couples to keep only one nationality, i.e. renounce their Moroccan nationality, upon reaching 18 years of age (until 21). She sees it as a result of the pressure exercised on Morocco by the Netherlands endeavouring since 2005 to have the third generation of Moroccans living in the country to drop their Moroccan nationality -a request to which Morocco is firmly opposed due to the perpetual conception of nationality.

and Tunisia (2010) when strict gender equality was applied with respect to the passing on of nationality to children born in or outside the country.

Initially only opposed to dual citizenship for settlers, the legislation of the three Maghreb countries has, in the face of social evolutions, such as mobility, mixed marriages and women empowerment, evolved in a way that would produce more cases of dual nationals. Yet, as Perrin (2016) argues, this is no "embracing" of the principle of dual citizenship or acceptance of the nationals' diversity, because limits are placed, first, on the opportunities for naturalisations and, second, on the rights of dual nationals themselves. Like in the Levant and Gulf countries, acquiring a Maghreb countries' nationality is rather difficult: jus soli applies in very rare cases, and the conditions of naturalisations are very stringent 44 so that the source of dual citizenship in the case of foreigners acquiring a Maghreb nationality are very limited.

Finally, as other legal texts than the nationality laws also shape the state's attitude towards dual citizenship, 45 Perrin notes the Algerian hostility towards French-Algerians, seen as opportunists, spoiled and privileged in terms of mobility, 46 appeared in the 2016 constitutional reform when dual nationals were clearly excluded from high positions within the state apparatus (presidency, positions of responsibilities among civil servants). These subtle obstacles are to be linked to the 2005 nationality law reform:

"By allowing foreigners to obtain Algerian nationality without renouncing their original nationality and by removing political incapacities for naturalised people, [the nationality law] marked a real and new opening towards would-be Algerians. The Constitutional reform constitutes a step backwards for 44 According to Perrin (2016: 9), the application of jus soli in Algeria and Tunisia is "residual"; in Morocco, children born in Morocco of parents themselves born in Morocco (after independence) or of fathers stemming from a Muslim and Arab-majority country can claim Moroccan nationality. As for the naturalisation, they are very few in Algeria, as the administrative judge shuns from pronouncing them; it is even more so in Morocco.

Finally naturalised have to wait a probation period of five years -except in Algeria since 2005, in order to enjoy their full rights of citizenship, and can be stripped of their nationality when other nationals cannot.

45 Another example of the limits placed on dual nationals is the practical limitation on external voting rights: while Algerians and Tunisians abroad have been able to vote for decades, Moroccans abroad have had limited opportunities to vote in national elections despite the legal dispositions enfranchising them and reinforced in 2011 in the constitutional reform. 46 This hostility was particularly salient when the French Consulate in Algiers announced in 2005 that hundreds of thousands of Algerians had requested French citizenship -a process called "reintegration"/ re-acquisition allowed by the French Constitution. "Algeria-French dual citizenship is not only linked to immigration to France. It is also widespread among residents in Algeria" (2014:236).

these new Algerians as well as the formalisation of the hostility towards Algerians [taking a new nationality] […]. By refusing to withdraw [the latter's] nationality, the Algerian regime seeks to encourage them [or those among them willing to participate in the economic and political life of the country at a high level] to voluntary renounce their foreign nationality" (Perrin, 2016:13).

This example corroborates what Link at al. (2019: 367) identified as "a form of 'competitive signalling' 47 that helps a state 'look more democratic, inclusive'" through dual citizenship extension.

It also shows, in a context where dual nationality is widely accepted, how states -including receiving states-maintain practises that reveal their distaste towards certain bi-nationals.

Select Citizenships

Among the MENA countries, the only set of states that unequivocally prohibit dual nationality are the six petro-monarchies forming the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC (Bahrain -with ambiguities, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). In all these states, the laws set out explicitly that when a national acquires a foreign nationality, his/her nationality is lost and when, conversely -no matter how rarely, a foreigner is naturalised, he/she must renounce his/her nationality of origin. 48 The letter of the law, however, sometimes remains silent or inexplicit as for when dual nationality is obtained by birth, since it often only refers to naturalisation as an act of volition. 47 Based on Turcu and Urbatsch (2015:414). 48 1) Article 9 of the Bahrain Citizenship Law of 1963: "A Bahraini citizen may lose his nationality if he voluntarily acquires another nationality or renounces his Bahraini nationality and His Majesty issues an order to withdraw his nationality. The loss of nationality would also apply to under-aged children." The wording of the paragraph leaves some scope for interpretation as it makes the loss of nationality dependent upon a Royal Order.

In the context of repression against any political opposition, the practice has tended to recognise dual nationality (and in particular the keeping of the Bahraini one) so as to be able to prosecute political opponents: in the case of prominent political exiles (called the Thirteen), like Abdul Hadi al Khawaja (Danish citizen) or Abduljalil al-Miqdad (Swedish citizen) the lex fori principle prevailed and they were tried and sentenced as Bahrainis. A 2012 call by the Ministry of Interior asked dual nationals to check their legal status so as to prevent "some Bahraini citizens holding foreign nationalities [from] using their status to protect themselves from legal or civil pursuits". This strict application of single national affiliation has often been interpreted as highlighting "the state's understanding of the exclusivity of their (sic) nationality" (Albarazi, 2017:7). In a context of mass migration from around the world (when foreigners often outnumber nationals, in proportion reaching 90% in Qatar or the UAE), the prohibition of dual citizenship work along with the very stringent naturalisation requirements 49 and sometimes a permission system for women to marry foreigners (like in Oman) to give the clear signal of a tight state control over the citizen body, its evolution and shaping. This tight control over size and composition of the citizenry has to do both with political loyalty in the context of pyramidal patronage networks and generous economic provisions. According to Abdulhadi Khalaf ( 2012) "Gulf citizenshipor rather a Gulf passportbecame a key providing access to the comforts of oil revenues. The "passport" is no longer merely a document for facilitating the movement of people across borders, but rather it became a necessary means of achieving benefits."

While the context of mass inward migration matters, the exclusiveness of allegiance is also to be understood with historical hindsight. Contrary to the principle of perpetual allegiance in pre-modern states' Europe, that attached sedentary residents to a territorial sovereign, tribes of the Arabian Peninsula were bound to their particular tribal leader or sheikh but also paid tributes (zakat) to rulers of market (port or oasis) cities where they sold their products and where trade routes operated. This is the understanding of loyalty-based sovereignty that Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud tried to impose in order to maximize territorial gains when borders were drawn. Yet, this concept of fluid and thus shifting allegiance to a ruler has gradually been turned against tribes upon introduction of the territorial modern state, with derogatory discourse often crystallising on the question of dual nationality as a acquiring the permission, the government still retains the right to revoke the person's Saudi citizenship in accordance with Article 13." 6) Article (11) of the Emirati Federal Law 17 for 1972 Concerning Nationality and Passports: "Nationality by naturalization may not be given to a person unless he renounces his original nationality. Article 15 (C.) stipulates: "Nationality of the country shall be lost from any person enjoying such nationality in the following cases: C. If he has adopted, voluntarily, a nationality of another country." 49 In most of the GCC countries (Saudi Arabia excepted), the duration of legal residency required to be considered eligible for naturalisation is twenty years (25 in Bahrain, 30 in the UAE), reduced to fifteen years when of Arab descent (7 years in the UAE). Other conditions pertaining to religion, language, good conduct, economic circumstances apply in addition sometimes to yearly quotas (for instance art. 17 of the Qatari law), making the process of naturalisation limited to very few select individuals and unthinkable for the majority of long-term residents. Naturalisations often remain a fait du prince.

sign of dubious loyalty. 50 "Bedouins have been suspected of collecting passports from more than one country to ensure their mobility and to maximise state advantages" (Beaugrand, 2015: 26). In Kuwait, for instance, dual citizenship (izdiwaj al jinsiyya) can be ground for deprivation of nationality and the suspicion directed towards the so-called tribal populations to be holding dual nationality is often used to disqualify their political claims.

In the Gulf States, the issue of dual nationality is often debated in such intra-GCC tribal terms. The allowance of dual citizenship between the six petro-monarchies does not seem to have ever been on the agenda of the regional institution -even before the Qatar crisis of June 2017 that tore apart the bloc. Brøndsted Sejersen (2008: 532-33) "The prevailing laws at the time stipulated that, in every Gulf country, only citizens could participate in these economic activities. As a result, in many families, you can find siblings and relatives holding citizenship from all six of the GCC countries. There are a number of senior Gulf businessmen who hold citizenship from multiple Gulf countries at the same time, as a means of allowing them to participate in business ventures that are limited to only citizens." (2012) Thirdly, when it comes to dual citizenship with other countries -especially Western ones with jus soli, 53 the principle of forcing bi-nationals to renounce one of the two citizenships remains the same (except sometimes for the female spouse). In certain cases, individuals from the GCC states may acquire "illegal dual citizenship" if the country where nationality is acquired (usually by birth) does not require renouncement of previous citizenships. Spiro (2016:77-78), analysing "dual-citizen terrorists" some of them being "nominal U.S. citizens", notes for instance the case of Yaser Hamdi, born to Saudi parents in Louisiana while his father worked on an oil rig there, relocated to Saudi Arabia in infancy, […] [who] didn't even know he was a U.S. citizen when apprehended on the battlefield in Afghanistan in late 2001." Finally, a last trend ought to be underlined: like other economic elites of the Middle East, Gulf elites have invested in the so-called "citizenship by investment schemes," taking advantage of naturalization facilities against investment in cash or real estate to mitigate the risks associated with political unrest or diversify their investment portfolios. 54 This conforms to the conclusion of Harpaz and Mateos (2018: 850) who noted that dual citizenship has led to the "consolidation of a Westernized global elite while deepening internal inequalities" as dual citizenship gives "non-Western elites dramatic advantages over their co-nationals who do not have access to a second citizenship" -even in the case of the tiny Gulf citizenries. This trend towards the commodification of nationality has been documented (Abrahamian, 2015; Beaugrand, 2015; Shachar, 2017; Bauböck, 2018): from "citizenship by investment" in the fiscal 53 Mixed marriages have tended to be limited in number because of state's family policy to marry among nationals, be it through permission system (to marry foreigners) or financial incitements (like the halving of state allowances in case of marriage with a foreigner). 54 Albert Galea, "Kuwait to implement reform revealing citizen's dual nationalities: many reported as buying into IIP [Individual investor Program]" Malta Independent, 15 January 2019 https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2019-01-15/local-news/Kuwait-to-implement-reform-revealingcitizen-s-dual-nationalities-many-reported-as-buying-into-IIP-6736202104 [accessed 10 September 2019]. havens of the Caribbean, such as St Kitts and Nevis or the Dominican Republic, it has reached European countries, like Cyprus, Malta, Austria and Bulgaria with other countries offering schemes where investments is linked to granting rights of residency. Through the acquisition of these EU citizenships, access is given to the Schengen Area as well as visa facilitation around the world in addition to free access to 160 countries with which the EU has agreements. Nationality has become a real business with private companies (like Henley and Partners) advising wealthy individuals on how to obtain several passports to ease their life and mobility, as well as governments on how to attract high-net-worth individuals and global investors. "Passports will be [for some] more like credit cards, each offering different interest rates or rewards programs" writes Spiro (2016:150).

It is against this recent background of the commodification and, as a consequence, degradation of citizenship that the GCC resistance to allowing dual citizenship ought to be reframed. For sure, oil monarchies are unconcerned by remittances or any ensuing pressure from the diaspora community, since they have no significant population of nationals abroad. There is arguably another reason for them to contradict the worldwide trend of "embracing" dual citizenship and at least in principle hold on to the strict exclusiveness of nationality: it is the idea to keep its intrinsic value by keeping it rare, following the Latin proverb Omnia rara cara. Spiro argues "dual citizenship is not an issue anymore because citizenship itself had been degraded"; "it tends to hollow out citizenship as a defining meaningful community on the ground" (2016: 2; 9). He further states: "As dual citizenship becomes more commonplace, the United States becomes a community of second choicers " (2016: 135). This is to the very idea that citizenship is devaluated by either being on sale or too readily available that (smaller) Gulf States react aiming only at first-class quality. This has become particularly visible in the frenzy deployed to establish nationality rankings, hierarchies and classifications turning nationalities into objects of admiration and desire or in contrary of low quality products. In particular, the performance of the UAE has been standing out lately: in 2018, the UAE ranked as "best nationality in the Arab world" by the firm Henley and Partners (QNI Quality of Nationality Index) and as having the "most powerful passport in the world" (Passport Index). 55 In a sense, the maintaining of an exclusive membership, to be compared with cases like Luxemburg or Monaco, also unambiguously forbidding dual citizenship, is a way to brand the country's citizenship as select. To pursue Spiro's metaphor (2016:10) "Nationality first established a kind of parent-child relationship between sovereign and subject, a product of nature and hence indissoluble. The succeeding regime of exclusivity more resembled marriage-voluntary and terminable, but also singular. We may be moving toward a paradigm in which citizenship is more like membership in a club or civic association, in a class of affiliation that does not necessarily constrain other attachments", there seems to emerge a type of citizenship comparable to select gentlemen's club.

Conclusion

In the global quantitative studies documenting the diffusion of dual citizenship worldwide, the MENA region is often portrayed if not caricatured as lagging behind as patriarchal and jus sanguinis based.

While this is certainly part of the story, this detailed study showed that this is only so: the other part of the story is that the acceptation of dual nationality is far from linear, following the supposedly liberal example set by the American and European states, but a complex one. It is to be understood in the light of different and context-based understandings of citizenship and various interplays with former colonial states or other dominant economic powers. What appeared prominently in this study is that while MENA states have usually accepted dual citizenship for their nationals seeking a new one abroad -while sometimes attenuating the effects by placing constraints on by-nationals, they generally see its application to foreigners applying to their nationality with suspicion. Finally, while the diffusion of dual nationality is seen as irresistible, the Gulf States have consistently formally resisted it, as a way to preserve the intrinsic value of their own nationality, as legitimising tool of the domination of the few.

  respectively. Since independence, Tunisia had recognised the right for Tunisian women to pass on their nationality to their children born to a foreign father in Tunisia. In the 2000s context of international campaign for gender equality, legislation changed in Algeria (2005), Morocco (2007) 43 40 Law 63-7 of 22 April

  Palestinians are excluded from the provisions of these laws in Iraq and Libya but not Syria, based on the ideological ground of the return to Palestine.29 Article 9 (4) of the Iraqi nationality law of 2006. In Libya, article 5 of the Nationality Law 24 for 2010/1378 On The Libyan Nationality (28 May 2010) stipulates that a Libyan citizen can obtain permission from the Libyan government to acquire a foreign nationality and tacitly recognises it in its article 11 allowing for children of a Libyan mother who is married to a non-Libyan father to obtain Libyan citizenship. 30 "Libya's dual divide: Ex-patriates Aren't Welcome in the "New Libya"", The Tripoli Post, 28 January 2012. Another article notes: "The Tripoli-based Administrative Control Authority (ACA) [concerned with state-sector employees] has issued a statement reminding all state bodies of the 2010 regulation (No 24) that prohibits Libyans with dual nationalities from holding any top state positions'" in Zaptia, Sami, "Libya: ACA reminds of regulation prohibiting Libyan dual nationals from holding top positions" Libya Herald, 9 December 2017.

citizenship dates back to 1925 and was issued by the French High Commissioner in Lebanon (Arrêté 15 on Lebanese Nationality). The exhaustive study carried out by El-Khoury and Jaulin (2012:4) states: "The main provisions of arrêté 15/S have not changed since 1925. Jus sanguinis through patrilineal affiliation remains the sole principle for the attribution of citizenship […] Regarding dual citizenship, 28 [Accessed 10 September 2019].

  for the case of Egyptians in Iraq. Egyptians are also present in Jordan in lowskilled employment. citizens to request an authorisation from the Ministry of Interior. 37 This might be explained mainly by nationalist and socio-political reasons and the self-interest of the Egyptian regime navigating through difficult power relations vis-à-vis other Middle Eastern states (and patrons), as demonstrated by Gerasimos Tsourapas (2019). As a matter of fact, article 10 of the Law No 26 of 1975 Concerning Egyptian Nationality stipulates that:"An Egyptian may not acquire a foreign nationality except after obtaining a permission therefor, to be issued by decree of the Minister of Interior. Otherwise, he shall continue to be regarded in all cases as Egyptian from all points of view, unless the Council of Ministers decide to strip him of the nationality according to the provisions of article 16 of the present law.

An Egyptian who acquires a foreign nationality shall forfeit the Egyptian nationality, if he has been permitted to obtain the foreign nationality." Moreover, citizens with dual nationality do not perform military service and cannot enrol in military and police academies or run for office in Parliament or presidency -as was made notorious in the presidential elections of 2012 with the disqualifying of the Egyptian Salafi candidate Abu Ismail.

  Article 5 of the Royal decree 38 issuing Nationality Law of 2014: "a person may not hold Omani nationality along with the nationality of another country unless a Sultan's Decree authorizes it." 4) Article 11(5) of the Law 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of Qatari nationality: "By an Emiri decision, Qatari nationality may be removed from a Qatari national if such person: 5. acquires the nationality of another country". 5) Article 11 of the Saudi Arabian Citizenship System: "No Saudi citizen is allowed to obtain a foreign nationality without prior permission of the Council of Ministers. If a citizen obtained a foreign nationality before

	Toumi, Habib "Bahrain urges dual citizenship holders to verify legal status" Gulf News, 8 April 2012.
	https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-urges-dual-citizenship-holders-to-verify-legal-status-
	1.1005615 [accessed 10 September 2019].
	2) Article 11 of the Kuwaiti 1959 Nationality Law: "a Kuwaiti national shall lose his Kuwaiti nationality if he
	becomes voluntarily naturalized according to the law of another state."
	3)

  distinguishes a group of countries that do not allow dual citizenship in general but only have special allowance because they have "reciprocal agreements with other countries under which dual citizenship is allowed" citing the case of Argentina with South American countries -adding "other such agreements exist between Gulf States." Yet, in the GCC, the only provision that exists today is that of "Economic Citizenship" meaning that economic discriminatory measures have been lifted (freedom of movement, work and residence, right of ownership, inheritance and will, the freedom of engagement in economic activity and free movements of capital) 51 -which seems to have suffered a setback since the June 2017 "Qatar crisis." No Gulf states ever officially granted this right understood in political senseas shown by reports of Saudis or Qataris obliged to choose between their nationalities in the Kuwaiti press.52 The reality may rather be one of unofficial tolerance (especially in the ambiguous Bahraini case) as expressed by Khalaf, himself deprived of his Bahraini nationality in 2012:50 Other transnational tribes like the Dawasir living on the Eastern coast of Saudi Arabia are famous for crossing the bridge to vote in Bahrain.51 See "The GCC Common Market and Economic Nationality" on the webpage of the GCC.

	https://www.gcc-sg.org/en-
	us/CooperationAndAchievements/Achievements/EconomicCooperation/TheGCCCommonMarketandEconomic
	nationality/pages/Home.aspx [accessed 10 September 2019].
	To be noted some provisions of the of the Emirati law towards Arabs of Omani (Bahraini or Qatari -probably
	rescinded now) descent in the case of the Maddha enclave.
											Omani
	citizenship	revoked	for	10	dual	nationals",	Gulf	News,	14	February	2016.
	https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/oman/omani-citizenship-revoked-for-10-dual-nationals-1.1672172 [accessed
	10 September 2019].

52

"29 dual-nationality citizens renounce Kuwaiti citizenship -Hold on to Saudi, Qatari nationalities", Arab Times, 20 August 2016. http://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/29-dual-nationality-citizens-renounce-kuwaiticitizenship-hold-saudi-qatari-nationalities/ [accessed 10 September 2019]. Al Mukrashi, Fuhad, "

In Australia, the constitution bars dual nationals from being members of parliament. As a result, many of them had to resign in November 2017, with some of them being "unsure" about their status as dual nationals.

See for instanceBrand (2010: 81-85) for an overview of the enfranchisement of expatriate communities. See also the hotly debated question, in the US but not only, of the possibility for dual nationals to hold public offices like member of parliament or president. Another example is Egypt, where the Salafi candidate Abu Ismail was disqualified in the 2012 presidential elections, after a media and judicial controversy surrounding his mother holding a US passport.

The term to describe the states' stance towards dual citizenship, in large-number quantitative studies, have thus oscillated between 'acceptance'[START_REF] Blatter | Acceptance of Dual Citizenship: Empirical Data and Political Contexts[END_REF], 'allowance'[START_REF] Alarian | Dual Citizenship Allowance and Migration Flow: An Origin Story[END_REF], 'toleration'(Vink et al., 2019), or the more normative 'embracing'[START_REF] Spiro | Embracing Dual Nationality[END_REF].

See Thomas Faist (2012);Randall and Weil (2002);[START_REF] Bauböck | Acquisition and Loss of Nationality[END_REF].

See Blatter et al. (2009) for a discussion of the existing typologies.

Out of the sixteen countries studied here (see below for the selection criteria), ten allowed the nationality transmission through the father only: these are the seven countries of the Arabian Peninsula (the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, and Yemen), along with the Levant countries of Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. In many cases, the mother can pass her nationality if the father is unknown.

Turkey, the Philippines, South Korea and several Central American nations dropped restrictions to dual citizenship throughout the 1990s and early

2000s.

Studies showed that "dual-citizenship-allowing sending states experience significantly more migration than dual-citizenship-forbidding-sending states"(Alarian and Goodman, 2016:133)

See for instance the debate around the deprivation of citizenship targeting dual nationals and citizens with an immigrant background[START_REF] Mantu | Terrorist' Citizens and the Human Right to Nationality[END_REF].

Al Serkal, Mariam A. "UAE is 'best nationality in Arab World'" Gulf News, 22 April 2018, https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/top-rank-uae-is-best-nationality-in-arab-world-1.2209362# [accessed 10 September 2019]; "UAE now has the most powerful passport in the world" The Independent, 2 December 2018.


Claire Beaugrand

Toby Jones

Madawi Al-Rasheed

Adam Hanieh

Neha Vora

Nathalie Peutz

John Willis

Ahmed Kanna

L'émergence et l'avenir des études aréales sur le Golfe

réfléchir de façon spéculaire sur les études du Golfe et de la Péninsule arabique a été l'organisation par Rosie Bsheer et John Warner d'une table ronde le 22 avril 2013, marquant l'anniversaire du lancement des pages dédiées à la Péninsule arabique sur le site électronique de

L'émergence et l'avenir des études aréales sur le Golfe

Réflexions à partir de perspectives croisées Kanna, Ahmed, Amélie Le Renard, and Neha Vora (2020) [Draege and Lestra, 2015] qui n'a vu dans l'émergence fulgurante des études sur les États du Golfe arabe (Arab Gulf States) que le seul résultat des financements et de la pléthore de moyens dépensés par les pays du CCG pour promouvoir leur image dans les pays occidentaux pourvoyeurs de sécurité, il est intéressant de noter que dans les deux textes qui nous intéressent, la question de l'institutionnalisation de la recherche est traitée de façon dépassionnée, tout comme celle de l'influence des financements sur l'agenda de recherche. 13 Pour poursuivre plus loin la réflexion amorcée par les deux textes sur la constitution et la déconstruction du champ d'études du Golfe tel qu'il émerge dans l'université anglo-saxonne il pourrait ainsi être heuristique de le mettre également en perspective avec le champ des études iraniennes, qui à l'Ouest a avant tout été le fait de la diaspora.

En conclusion, bien que cela ne soit pas leur but avoué, et malgré leur caractère très asymétriques (l'un très érudit, l'autre très ambitieux dans son désir de décentrement), ces deux textes ne manquent pas d'interroger sur la définition du champ distinct, le « Golfe et la Péninsule arabique », apparu dans l'université anglo-saxonne et qui fait désormais l'objet d'un discours historiographique.

  Beyond Exception. New Interpretations of the Arabian Peninsula. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 153 p. Onley James & Gerd Nonneman (2020) « The Journal of Arabian Studies and the Development of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies », Journal of Arabian Studies, vol. 10 n°1, p. 1-50.Deux études, parues l'une et l'autre en 2020, prennent explicitement pour objet la constitution du champ récent des études aréales sur le Golfe et la Péninsule arabique(Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies). Produites par des universitaires dotés d'une longue expérience de la région, elles dressent le bilan du développement des études dites « du Golfe » en en esquissant de possibles voies d'avenir. Ce faisant, elles invitent, incidemment, à une réflexion historiographique sur la mise en récit de l'émergence de ce champ qui interroge à la fois ses acquis, ses silences et ses lacunes. De sorte que cette lecture croisée ne visera pas tant à faire une recension détaillée et précise des deux textes discutés qu'à dégager, à partir d'eux, la délinéation progressive des contours d'un champ désormais suffisamment autonome pour produire un discours critique sur lui-même. État a conduit à véhiculer des images caricaturales de dirigeants bienveillants et de nationaux ultra-riches passifs à opposer aux migrants surexploités.savoir» [p. 134]. Ironiquement, dans un débat assez nord-américain, ils omettent assez largement, en dépit de leur appel à le faire en dernière page, de prendre en considération les productions intellectuelles émanant de la région elle-même ou de régions extra-occidentales, comme le fait l'article de JAS (incluant, par exemple, les travaux produits en Inde).Au-delà de ces différences, un rapprochement clair peut néanmoins être fait entre ces deux textes qui dessinent, tous deux, un récit historiographique des études du Golfe, vu depuis leurs champs disciplinaires respectifs. Le croisement de ces perspectives divergentes permet néanmoins de tirer deux enseignements quant à la définition du champ et de noter un impensé ou une piste de recherche pour le futur.Avant tout, une remarque préliminaire d'ordre chronologique s'impose : de façon assez consensuelle, les études institutionnalisées du Golfe et de la Péninsule arabique, revendiquées comme telles -et dont la dénomination même a évolué et demeure instable jusqu'à aujourd'hui -, 6 représentent un phénomène récent. Outre la table ronde organisée par Jadaliyya en 2013 sur ce thème précisément, les deux textes qui nous intéressent représentent des tentatives pionnières pour apporter une vision d'ensemble sur le champ. A cet égard, l'ouvrage Beyond Exception est d'ailleurs moins convaincant dans ses velléités de rupture et de refonte radicales du champ et ses pratiques que dans son analyse fine de recherches aréales en pleine évolution. Il montre en effet comment ces approches n'ont cessé de se diversifier, d'élargir le spectre des « migrants » étudiés 7 ou de rendre plus complexes les catégories de « citoyens » 8 , brouillant ainsi les catégories structurantes du champ pour les considérer, au contraire, comme poreuses et en constante interaction. Palestine and the Gulf States, que les études du Golfe n'auraient proprement commencé qu'avec la guerre du Golfe de 1991 : c'est en effet à cette occasion que les spécialistes du Moyen-Orient auraient été sollicités pour expliquer une crise survenue « au milieu de nulle part » pendant la torpeur de l'été 1990 et se seraient ainsi réinventés, -donnant à la profession un profil sociologique particulier. Cette conclusion, Zahlan la tire de son analyse de la politique coloniale britannique qui, d'après elle, visait à séparer le Golfe du reste du monde arabe en contrôlant la gestion de ses affaires étrangères. Si l'historien koweïtien Talal al Rashoud conteste cette vision d'un isolement à proprement parler, au vu des circulations importantes entre étudiants et spécialistes de l'enseignement supérieur entre le Golfe et ses soeurs arabes, Égypte, Palestine, Irak, 9 la vision de Zahlan semble devoir faire sens depuis le monde universitaire du Royaume Uni -ou des États-Unis où se constituent ces études aréales. Les pays du Golfe ont souvent été étudiés dans la nébuleuse moyen-orientale ou dans le vaste concept de Golfe incluant les pays frontaliers que sont l'Irak et l'Iran.Cela conduit à notre premier enseignement quant aux contours de ces études aréales : malgré la centralité de cette question, 10 les deux publications semblent évacuer, partiellement seulement, la question de la définition du champ et de son découpage géographique. En effet, toutes deux optent naturellement pour la formulation de « Péninsule arabique », incluant le Yémen. Et, si les travaux et les centre d'études consacrés au Yémen sont abondamment cités dans l'article de JAS, il n'en va pas de même dans l'ouvrage collectif où l'invocation de la Péninsule semble avant tout une pétition de principe -même si les modalités de l'insertion du Yémen dans les rapports de domination capitaliste et impérialiste, qu'ils entendent mettre au jour, auraient pu servir de cas d'école pour illustrer ces processus transnationaux, et plus encore, pour rendre encore plus complexe la domination capitaliste et impérialiste qu'ils dénoncent. Comme ne manque pas de le souligner Steven Caton, anthropologue spécialiste du Yémen [2020], la domination qu'exerce les pays du Conseil de Coopération du Golfe (CCG) sur leur voisin méridional, si elle est largement passée sous silence, n'en demeure pas moins largement impérialiste. L'inclusion du Yémen dans les études dites « de la Péninsule arabique » n'est pas toujours allée de soi et mérite d'être historicisée pour saisir tout le sens épistémologique qu'elle sous-tend en rompant avec la proéminence géopolitique dans la définition de ce champ aréal. En effet, dans un article de 2002 11 , la politiste américaine Sheila Carapico mit au jour de façon flagrante le caractère purement politique de la dénomination de « Golfe ». Avec un sens aigu de la formule, Carapico majeure des deux textes discutés, qui soulignent avec force l'inscription récente des études de la Péninsule et du Golfe dans l'univers maritime de l'océan Indien (Indian Ocean Studies). Les éditeurs de JAS la datent de la décennie 2010 [p.10] alors que les co-auteurs de Beyond Exception saluent la tendance dans leur partie « From Area to Ocean ». Ils y voient une prise de distance avec les approches trop centrées sur l'État-nation, défini territorialement, qui postulent « des relations de pouvoir top-down » et ainsi « effacent la présence des migrants au sein de la société » [p.12] et homogénéise le corps citoyen. Selon ces derniers, la production scientifique des deux dernières décennies, en pensant le Golfe dans sa relation avec les régions d'origines des migrants a remédié 10 Vu de l'Occident, les contours des études du Golfe se sont précisés au sein de l'ensemble plus vaste qu'était le Moyen-Orient arabe, -les tentatives plus tardives pour imposer un découpage centré autour d'une Asie de l'Ouest Publié par l'institut universitaire européen de Florence (European University Institute), en 2002 puis repris dans un chapitre d'ouvrage collectif[2004].à cette double invisibilisation permettant aux chercheurs de « questionner les projets étatiques qui s'efforcent d'effacer le multiculturalisme » [p.12]. L'ouverture du champ des études du Golfe aux Indian Ocean Studies qui s'est affirmée en particulier en histoire avec d'importantes conséquences sur le reste des sciences sociales et notamment sur les études migratoires a été théorisée magistralement par l'historien Fahad Bishara. « Un changement radical s'est opéré dans la recherche sur le Golfe, qui cherche à l'arracher de sa place de recoin délaissé de l'histoire du Moyen-Orient pour le rendre au monde de l'Océan indien auquel il a historiquement appartenu » écrit-il. « Une histoire océanique du Golfe permet aux historiens de s'inscrire contre les discours nativistes qui ont envahi la sphère publique dans les États du Golfe. »[Bishara, 2020: 397-398]. Reconnaître l'historicité des liens et offrir des approches nuancées et complexes de la migration centrées sur les acteurs que sont les migrants, permet ainsi aux chercheurs et chercheuses de déconstruire l'évidence du principe d'exclusion sur lequel sont bâties les sociétés du CCG et qui se fonde sur le mythe d'une population autochtone (native) qui deviendra celle des ayant-droits.Pourtant, dans l'analyse des approches qui ont contribué à la définition du champ et au dessin de ses frontières, force est de constater un impensé commun aux deux textes, sans leur en faire d'ailleurs grief. Cette absence, c'est celle, présente et pesante du voisin iranien, en dépit de liens forts entre les deux rives 12 , qui fait l'objet d'un autre champ aréal construit de façon parallèle et hermétique. A part une brève citation du travail d'Amin Moghadam sur la diaspora iranienne à Dubaï(Beyond Exception, [p.18]) et la mention de quatre centres couvrant les études du Golfe persique et de l'Iran, dont l'un à l'Université de Haifa et l'autre à celle de Princeton, les deux publications n'abordent qu'assez peu la question encore inexplorée du rapport avec ce champ qui entretient des relations complexes avec l'université occidentale -et auquel pourtant certaines conclusions sur les causes géopolitique des découpages académiques de Carapico pourraient s'appliquer. Si dans le texte de Carapico, le Yémen était le marigot (backwater) de la région, l'Iran apparaît, pour filer la métaphore, comme une zone de marécages. On voit là encore comment les représentations en portraits inversés et projections de soi ont conduit de façon subreptice à la singularisation et à la caractérisation de la région, ou d'une partie, comme spécifiquement la rive sud du Golfe, à la fois opulente (excluant le Yémen) et arabe (Arab Gulf states). Au rebours de la littérature journalistique mais aussi académique

	années 2000 et désormais longue de quelques vingt années. Soucieux d'engager collectivement un
	effort personnel de réflexivité, les trois auteurs dressent également, dans leur introduction, un état
	de l'art du champ qui embrasse large. Cette revue de littérature sert ainsi de point de départ à leur
	réflexion critique qui entend justement prendre de la distance avec un champ d'études aréales
	qu'ils estiment construit sur des prémisses qui reproduiraient l'altérité foncière de la région en
	l'érigeant en espace « exceptionnel » produisant du « sensationnel » [p. 3]. Distinguant parfois
	confusément les productions purement scientifiques des représentations journalistiques [p.4], ils
	identifient la source de cette exotisation dans le recours persistant aux oppositions orientalistes
	simplistes (modernité/tradition ; oppression/émancipation des femmes) auxquelles ils ajoutent
	de nouveaux stéréotypes, tels que « l'hypermodernité et l'inauthenticité » [p. 1]. Ils dénoncent,
	entre autres et à raison la prédominance conceptuelle du modèle rentier, dont la
	théorie de l'
	avant la publication de l'étude
	ethnographique de Neha Vora sur la diaspora indienne de Dubaï, Impossible Citizens : Dubai's
	Indian Diaspora. Beyond Exception rend ainsi compte des conversations intellectuelles que les auteurs
	ont eues autour, précisément, de leur expérience de recherche sur la région commencée dans les

1

C'est pour célébrer les dix ans du Journal of Arabian Studies (JAS) que les deux éditeurs de la revue, l'historien James Onley et le politiste et spécialiste de relations internationales, Gerd Nonneman, tous deux basés à Doha, publient un long article rétrospectif du champ et de la revue. Ce dernier se donne pour tâche de retracer, sur la base d'une recension exhaustive des travaux marquants sur la région et des institutions établies pour s'y consacrer, l'histoire de l'émergence du champ d'études du Golfe et de la Péninsule arabique. On y apprend que, constitué historiquement, dès le 18 e siècle, 2 à partir des travaux d'archéologues, d'historiens et de linguistes, le champ s'est peu à peu élargi pour couvrir l'intégralité des disciplines des sciences humaines et sociales dans les années 1970. A cette date, il n'occupe néanmoins qu'une position marginale au sein des études sur le Moyen-Orient ; et ce n'est que dans les années 2000 que cette subdivision des études moyen-orientales perd son caractère périphérique, pour finalement « atteindre sa masse critique » et, pourrait-on dire, sa maturité, dans les années 2010 [p. 1]. Les trois auteurs du livre Beyond Exception sont représentatifs de cette décennie de floraison des études du Golfe en Europe comme aux États-Unis. Les ouvrages Femmes et espaces publics en Arabie Saoudite de la sociologue Amélie Le Renard et Dubai, the City as Corporation de l'anthropologue Ahmed Kanna, paraissent la même année, en 2011, soit deux ans D'après Gerd Nonneman et James Onley, les recherches sur le Golfe et la Péninsule, région particulièrement préservée et hors d'atteinte des voyageurs occidentaux, ont d'abord été le fait d'explorateurs et exploratrices -diplomates, administrateurs, savants -, dont la profession était largement hybride. Pour eux, c'est l'organisation au Royaume-Uni, en 1969, de conférences portant spécifiquement sur la région dont les communications seront publiées dans des ouvrages collectifs interdisciplinaires, qui permet aux premiers « spécialistes » du Golfe de créer un espace de débat académique. Son caractère demeure néanmoins embryonnaire. Tant et si bien que Rosemarie

Zahlan [2012]

, chercheuse palestinienne et historienne des pays du Golfe, soutient dans son ouvrage posthume, écrit : « Le Golfe est l'endroit où les intérêts américains prévalent », il « désigne spécifiquement la partie orientale de l'Arabie où la plupart du pétrole brut arabe est extrait et exporté... Le Golfe a été construit, en image et en réalité, par les gouvernements du CCG et leurs patrons extérieurs

» [2004, 22-23]

. Cette image est celle du contraste : « Le Golfe est silencieux, le non-Golfe est bruyant. La politique intérieure du Golfe est domestiquée, tandis que celle du Yémen est sauvage. Le Golfe est pacifié ; la périphérie est turbulente. Le Golfe est un intérêt américain vital ; le Yémen est un marigot

» [2004 : 17]

. On voit comme ce jeu de portraits inversés met au jour les représentations occidentales et les projections de soi par les pays du Golfe, qui dérivent insidieusement des conclusions de la théorie de l'État rentier. En outre, pour Carapico, rapprocher les études du Golfe et celles sur le Yémen (Yemeni Studies) permet de dépasser le mythe de l'isolationnisme arabe, notamment en examinant les liens profonds et durables avec l'Asie et l'

Afrique [2004 :11]

-dans une démarche s'intéressant à la base plutôt qu'au sommet. De fait, cette démarche visant à l'élargissement de la région, initiée, entre autres, par l'article pionnier de Carapico s'est poursuivie et étendue par la suite. C'est là une convergence ((South)West Asia) étant encore balbutiantes, en particulier le terme SWANA (South West Asia and North Africa) qui se veut un terme décolonial pour désigner la région de l'Asie du Sud-Ouest et de l'Afrique du Nord et vise à remplacer les termes Moyen-Orient, Proche-Orient, Monde arabe ou Monde islamique qui sont vus comme ayant des origines coloniales, eurocentriques et orientalistes. 11

Le rapprochement entre les deux textes peut paraître insolite voire incongru, car ils n'ont, de fait, absolument aucune vocation à dialoguer. Asymétriques dans leur format (article et livre), ils le sont également dans leur angle disciplinaire et dans leurs ambitions. Pourtant, qu'ils soient issus de la génération formée au Royaume-Uni partie ensuite rejoindre les institutions du Golfe pour en asseoir la réputation internationale, ou qu'ils représentent la nouvelle garde postcoloniale de l'université occidentale, ces auteurs retracent ou écrivent une « histoire » de la construction sociale des savoirs sur le Golfe -histoire dans laquelle ils entendent jouer, ou avoir joué, un rôle essentiel. Au sein de cette narration, nous concentrerons notre attention sur un point particulier, le récit fait en creux 3 du dessin des contours géographiques et institutionnels des études aérales « du Golfe » -les deux textes ne thématisant que sélectivement cette définition.L'article du JAS se situe dans la perspective d'une histoire longue. Il déroule une litanie encyclopédique de données factuelles et établit une « mise en scène chronologique », mêlant listes de noms d'auteurs et d'universitaires, de projets de recherche, d'ouvrages majeurs et de développements institutionnels qui ont marqué la production de savoir en sciences humaines et sociales sur la région depuis les XVII-XVIII e siècles. Attentif en particulier aux questions patrimoniales et archivistiques, il consacre, sans distinction, une bonne partie de son inventaire érudit aux écrivains et initiatives issus de la région elle-même 4 -y compris celles qui, dans les dernières décennies, émanent des États du Golfe, de leurs financements et de leurs entreprises de construction nationale. L'article, dépourvu de conclusion autre que le bilan des dix ans de la nouvelle revue, n'affiche aucune ambition théorique : il se cantonne à son rôle de recension complète de la production de connaissances scientifiques sur le Golfe et la Péninsule arabique. A l'inverse, la conclusion de l'ouvrage à trois mains Beyond Exception paraît extrêmement ambitieuse. Elle ne cache pas ses prétentions de refonte des études du Golfe -telles que pratiquées dans l'université occidentale où ils se situent tous trois -et dont la tendance à l'exceptionnalisation, aurait servi à occulter les rapports de domination capitaliste et impérialiste et contribué à hiérarchiser les objets (ou régions) d'études[p. 130]. Au contraire, les auteurs appellent 5 de leurs voeux une anthropologie décolonisée, qui aurait rompu avec le mythe de l'université (occidentale) comme « site présumé de la démocratie et du libéralisme » [p. 125], et qui pourrait ainsi envisager le Golfe et en particulier ses nouveaux campus (y compris les branches d'universités étrangères), comme le centre (possible) d'une « production alternative de 3 En gardant à l'esprit la remarque de Michel de Certeau sur l'écriture de l'histoire, et ici plus modestement, l'écriture, non-historienne, d'une histoire particulière, « L'écriture disperse dans la mise en scène chronologique la référence de tout le récit à un non-dit qui est son postulat »[1975: 107], cité dansPELLETIER [2017 : par.21].4 En incluant le sous-continent indien et quelques occurrences sur l'Iran. 5 Sur la base, largement, de l'analyse du scandale public de 2018 autour des abus au travail survenus au sein de la revue d'anthropologie HAU.

La controverse nationaliste autour de la dénomination politique entre Golfe persique et Golfe arabique est bien connue. Elle est un classique de la diplomatie de la République islamique iranienne, presque un passage obligé en début d'entretien avec les diplomates qui la représentent. Elle est aussi martelée symboliquement sur la rive occidentale du Golfe, comme à Koweït où la longue corniche porte le nom de Golfe arabique. Mais au-delà de ces revendications nationalistes de part et d'autre des rives du Golfe, le but de cet essai est bien plutôt de penser comment les études du Golfe ont défini le territoire duquel elles entendent parler.

Incluant outre les migrants occupant les professions les plus dévalorisées, les « migration banale » (mundane migration) mais aussi le groupe des expatriés du Golfe.

Diversité étudiée du point de vue du genre, du statut et de la perspective socio-ethnique.

Intervention à la London School of Economics, intitulée « How Modern Education Forged an Arab Nationalist Identity in Kuwait», 26 février 2020.

Qu'il suffise de citer l'ouvrage de Fariba Adelkhah[2012].

Gardant à l'esprit les rapports de force systémiques qui existe dans la production des savoirs, mais aussi le fait que les fondateurs d'institution (institutional builders) ne sont pas toujours les intellectuels qui animent et façonnent le champ, comme le montre[START_REF] Lockman | Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism[END_REF] dans le cas des études du Moyen-Orient aux États-Unis.


Michel Buffa

Antoine Vidal-Mazuy
email: antoine-vidalmazuy@univ-cotedazur.fr

Quentin Plet
email: quentin.plet@etu.univ-st-etienne.fr

Web Audio Modules: Swiss knife for audio plugin developments on the Web Platform

We propose to present in this demo a large set of web audio plugins (aka web audio modules), real-time effects (most classic audio effects, tube guitar amplifier simulations, etc.), instruments (synthesizers, samplers,) along with an open source DAW (wamstudio) and a real time collaborative host called sequencer.party. Web Audio Modules (WAM) is a standard for developing Web Audio plugins and hosts first proposed in 2015, that recently had a major update in 2021 for its 2.0 version.

Web Audio, Web Midi, Web Assembly

Introduced in 2012 by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the Web Audio API reached the "Recommendation" status in June 2021 (Official Standard). This JavaScript API allows the developer to manipulate a set of "Audio Nodes" that process or produce sound and that can be connected to form an "audio graph". Audio Nodes process the sound in the audio thread, and the algorithms used cannot be changed, only parameter changes are allowed. The recent addition (2018) of the AudioWorklet node provided a solution for implementing custom low-level audio processing running in the audio thread [START_REF] Ren | Using Faust DSL to develop custom, sample accurate DSP code and audio plugins for the Web browser[END_REF]. Furthermore, it became possible to cross compile existing C/C++/Rust/Domain Specific Language code to WebAssembly, a byte code representation supported by web browsers, facilitating the port of existing DSP code to the web platform.

Over the years, lots of high-level audio effects and instruments have been developed using a combination of such audio nodes. Also, the WebMidi API, recently supported by all Major browsers, mobile and desktop ones, brings MIDI support to the browser and combined with Web Audio it became possible to control instruments using external devices (midi piano keyboard, control surfaces, pads etc.).

Web Audio Modules: VST for the Web

In Another concern was performance. The WAM framework uses an original design for handling the communication between plugins and host applications that do not rely on the low-level parameter management provided by the Web Audio API. The main reason for that is to allow high performances in the case where both a DAW and plugins are implemented as AudioWorklets. At the time the WebAudio API has been designed, AudioWorklets did not exist and some use cases could not be taken into account. Indeed, if the DAW is built using AudioWorklet nodes for processing audio, then some parts of the code run in the high priority / audio thread. Then, if a WAM plugin is associated with a given track in a DAW project (Figure 1), and if the plugin is itself built using an AudioWorklet node, it also has custom code running in the audio thread. The WAM framework has been designed to handle this particular case and will enable DAW/plugins communication without crossing the audio thread barrier. Let us take one example: while playing, a MIDI track sends notes to a virtual instrument plugin, and changes some of the parameters of this plugin at the frequency rate. Remember that a DAW can have multiple tracks associated to dozen of plugins, and each plugin can have dozens of parameters.

The WAM framework detects this case, and will seamlessly use Shared Array Buffers and a ring buffer, without crossing the audio thread barrier. No need to send events from the control/GUI thread, that would have been mandatory if the Web Audio API audio node parameter management was used. To sum up, the WAM framework streamlines the creation of plugins and host applications and enables highly efficient communication between hosts and plugins.

A video of WAMs in action is available online 1 . Today, a WAM community Github repository proposes dozen of plugins (Figure 3: effects, instruments, utility plugins), an open source DAW called wam-studio 2 (Figure 1) is being proposed as a demonstrator for WAM plugins [START_REF] Buffa | WAM-studio, a Digital Audio Workstation (DAW) for the Web[END_REF], and a real-time collaborative host called sequencer.party 3 is a great showcase for the WAM standard (Figure 2). We propose to demonstrate the WAM ecosystem at the conference, using an electric guitar [START_REF] Lebrun | From blues to rock to jazz: three different Web Audio tube guitar amplifier simulator plugins[END_REF], microphones, midi controllers, pads for controlling a WAM sampler (Figure 4) etc.

3.

Figure 1 :

 1 Figure 1: Wam-Studio, an open source DAW, written to showcase Web Audio Modules.

  2015, Jari Kleimola and Olivier Larkin proposed the Web Audio Modules (WAM)[START_REF] Kleimola | WebAudioModules[END_REF], a standard for Web Audio plugins and DAWs. The 2.0 version of Web Audio Modules has been released in 2021 as a group effort by a large set of people[START_REF] Buffa | Web Audio Modules 2.0, an open Web Audio plugin standard[END_REF] and since then, multiple plugins and hosts have been published, mostly as open source and free software. WAM 2.0 comes with a SDK, an abstract API, several open source repositories with dozen of plugins, tutorials, and two hosts for demonstrating the capabilities of WAMs. When we designed WAM 2.0 we wanted to support as many development workflow as possible, from the simple web developer who code on plain JavaScript, the React developer used to build his applications, to the C/C++ developer who is used to pro DSP development and who will cross compile his existing code to WebAssembly and reuse a minimal set of features from the WAM SDK.

Figure 2 :

 2 Figure 2: sequencer.party: a collaborative online host. All you see are WAM plugins.

Figure 3 :

 3 Figure 3: some WAM plugins developed by the community.

Figure 4 :

 4 Figure 4: a WAM sampler that can be MIDI controlled, used freesounds.org for finding samples.