Kirszbaum

Yaël Thomas

Patrick Brinbaum

Thomas Kirszbaum

Yaël Brinbaum

Patrick Simon

Esin Gezer

THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS IN FRANCE: THE EMERGENCE OF A SECOND GENERATION

Keywords: immigrant child, immigrant family, demography, education, labour market, discrimination, citizenship, poverty, deviant behaviour

The UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, in Florence, was established in 1988 to strengthen the research capability of the United Nations Children's Fund and to support its

Special Series on the Situation of Children in Immigrant Families in Affluent Societies

The series supports and complements the UNICEF Innocenti Insight on ‗Children in Immigrant Families in Eight Affluent Countries: Their Family, National and International Context' and includes the following papers: The findings presented in this series are based on data derived from sources of the countries' respective national statistical offices. In several cases, the basic estimates reported have been calculated directly by the national statistical offices on behalf of the country study teams. In other cases, microdata have been provided by the national statistical offices, and specific estimates have been calculated by the country experts.

The results reported represent the best estimates possible on the immigrant population as derived from official statistical sources. Given the fluid nature of the migration phenomenon, it is not possible to know precisely the extent to which the coverage is representative of the whole population of interest or is fully comparable across the countries studied. In general, the number of undocumented arrivals and undocumented residents is more difficult to measure through routine data collection processes, and the country researchers did not specifically address this segment of the immigrant population. Undocumented immigrants and their families may or may not be covered in some of the country analyses.

The country studies have been reviewed as individually indicated by national experts, by members of the international research team, including UNICEF IRC, and by the series editor.

The project has been supported by contributions to the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre by the Government of Sweden and the Swiss Committee for UNICEF and by a contribution by the Government of Spain to UNICEF for policy advocacy and partnerships for children's rights.

INTRODUCTION

France has experimented with different ways of defining who is French by birth and with various rules for attributing or withdrawing French nationality. During the last 20 years, although the approach to citizenship has still been a subject of much debate, the keystone has remained steadfast: children of immigrants born in France may obtain French citizenship if they reside in France until they reach the age of majority.

Much research has been devoted to the current version of the French model of integration. The recurring riots in impoverished suburbs in recent years are the most tangible evidence of the importance of the issues. Researchers are now stressing the paradoxes inherent in a model that ignores the difficulties of inclusion through social struggle by successive waves of immigrants and that masks chauvinism and racism under a veneer of universalism.

Our aim in this report is to address issues in this debate in France. We first provide a brief historical perspective. We then sketch out the major demographic characteristics of immigrant groups in France, especially children and families, based on the most recent nationwide data source available, the 1999 family history survey (see Table 1). We also outline the legal and conceptual framework governing naturalization among immigrants and children of immigrant origin. We combine analysis of statistical data and a review of the recent literature in France to examine the social and economic well-being of the children of immigrants and the social environment in which they are growing up, including schooling, access to employment, and ethnic and racial discrimination.

RECENT PATTERNS IN IMMIGRATION

Within a few decades starting in the 1940s, the countries of origin of immigrants to France changed considerably. The post-war years marked the end of the predominance of Italian and Spanish immigration and inaugurated a fresh cycle of post-colonial immigration. Starting in 1947, French Muslims from Algeriathe formulation used at the time to describe these peoplewere allowed to settle freely throughout metropolitan France. By the early 1950s, an additional 200,000 French Algerians had joined compatriots who had stayed in France after fighting in World War I. This trend grew after the independence of Algeria in 1962. By the end of the 1960s, Algerians had become the main immigrant community in the country.

For years, the Government continued to treat immigration as a transitory phenomenon [START_REF] Weil | La France et ses étrangers: L"aventure d"une politique de l"immigration de 1938 à nos jours[END_REF]. The first assistance programme for immigrants was undertaken among Algerians at the end of the 1950s. The programme largely consisted of building special housing and providing help to single men working in the industrial sector. Yet, the women and children were never far away and soon began to cram into shantytowns in and around major cities.

The government decision to demolish the shantytowns in the 1960s was the first stage in moving immigrant families into mainstream social housing [START_REF] Bernardot | ‗Chronique d'une institution: La Sonacotra (1956-1976)[END_REF], Simon 1998a).

In the early 1960s, immigration from Portugal peaked and then, during the next decade, declined to low levels. More than 700,000 Portuguese settled in France during this period.

The men were rapidly joined by their wives and, sometimes, their children born in Portugal.

The number of immigrants from Morocco and Tunisia rose during this same period because of the special ties these countries had with France.

A sea change in immigration policy occurred in 1974 when the Government decided to suspend immigration by low-skilled foreign workers. The spectre of immigration was such that the Government also considered suspending family reunification, but this was recognized as a right in 1976. The principle was consecrated by the Council of State in 1978 through a ruling that, -like French nationals, foreigners usually resident in France have the right to live a normal family life‖ (Rude-Antoine 1992). In 1977, a law was passed to provide financial assistance to immigrants wishing to return to their countries of origin, but the policy failed; few immigrants applied [START_REF] Richard | Partir ou rester? Destinées des jeunes issus de l"immigration étrangère en France[END_REF].

Apart from seeking to control immigration, the new policy adopted in the 1970s stressed the necessity for immigrants intending to stay in the country to become an integral part of French society. This aspect of the policy was never formally implemented. Instead, the desire for immigration control, combined with security concerns, led to a spate of police operations aimed at preventing clandestine immigration. However, the operations also sought more generally to control delinquency. This created confusion in people's minds between immigration and delinquency. When a socialist administration came into office in 1981, it attempted to break with this logic by supporting a more liberal approach, including legalizing the status of undocumented immigrants, recognizing the equal rights of immigrants in the workplace and the right of immigrants to set up associations, and repealing measures designed to prevent foreigners with ties in France from staying. However, the Government quickly reverted to a policy of control. When a right-wing administration was elected in March 1986, it adopted more restrictive measures, for instance by limiting the categories of foreigners entitled to residence permits or to protection from expulsion.

The same pattern was repeated over the next few years: the left would repeal some of the restrictive measures passed by the right, and, when the right returned to power, it would reestablish the measures and seek to tighten them. This was the case of a 1993 law that restricted family reunification and imposed severe penalties on undocumented families. Marriage between French citizens and foreigners was controlled; the rights of spouses of French citizens to live in France were restricted; people who had arrived in France as children were no longer allowed to stay after they had reached the age of majority; undocumented foreigners were no longer entitled to social security benefits, and so on. The left eventually succeeded in modifying some of these measures, but was unable to reverse the tendency towards encroachment on the rights of foreigners and their children [START_REF] Lochak | ‗L'intégration comme injonction: Enjeux idéologiques et politiques liés à l'immigration[END_REF].

Generally, none of the restrictive measures adopted in the 1970s succeeded in reversing the flow of immigrants. Immigration diminished, but then stabilized beginning in the mid-1970s.

The average annual net flow of immigrants arriving in France was still above 100,000 persons [START_REF] Héran | Le temps des immigrés: Essai sur le destin de la population française[END_REF].

According to the classic definition by the sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad, in 1979, an immigrant is -basically a work force, and one that is provisional, temporary and in transit‖ [START_REF] Sayad | ‗Immigration et conventions internationales[END_REF]). However, around that time, although there continued to be a demand for migrant workers in various sectors of the economy and although work exemptions were still granted especially for citizens of some former French colonies in Africa, labour force immigration, largely male, gave way to settlement through family reunification as the main motive for immigration. Asylum requests also rose significantly (Cour des comptes 2004).

The share of immigrants in the population remained fairly stable. By the early 1980s, the labour force participation rate among the foreign population was lower than the corresponding rate among native French, illustrating the transformation of the immigrant population as a labour force and the irreversible nature of the settlement process as immigrants established families in France [START_REF] Marie | L'Immigration en France dans les années quatre-vingt dix : nouvelle donne pour l'emploi et nouveaux enjeux de société[END_REF].

Immigration from Turkey began in earnest in the early 1970s and then intensified during the Kurdish crisis in the 1980s. Immigration from sub-Saharan Africa also sharply increased during the new century. The most recent immigrant flows have originated in China, South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and Eastern Europe, although the numbers are small in comparison with the numbers of the earlier arrivals.

SIZE AND ORIGIN OF THE POPULATION OF CHILDREN IN IMMIGRANT FAMILIES

In 1982, there were around 4.0 million immigrants in the country. In 1999, there were about 4.3 million. The increase in the 1980s and 1990s, 6.8 per cent, was slightly below the 7.8 per cent growth in the entire population over the period [START_REF] Boëldieu | ‗La proportion d'immigrés est stable depuis 25 ans[END_REF]. Immigrants represented around 7.4 per cent of the total population during these years. Immigration rose somewhat in 1999-2004, and, by 2005, a total of 4.9 million immigrants were residing in metropolitan France (Table 2). This was 8.1 per cent of the population [START_REF] Borrel | ‗Enquêtes annuelles de recensement 2004 et 2005: Près de 5 millions d'immigrés à la mi-2004[END_REF]. Sources: Census of 1982Census of , 1990Census of , 1999Census of and 2004Census of -2005. . Since the end of the 1970s, family reunification has benefited wives (often young adults) more than children [START_REF] Borrel | ‗Enquêtes annuelles de recensement 2004 et 2005: Près de 5 millions d'immigrés à la mi-2004[END_REF]). Among the immigrants arriving between 1946 and 1990 who were still in France in 1999, nearly one in four (23 per cent) had come to France before the age of 10. Only 17.9 per cent of the immigrants in France between 1974 and 1990 were under 10 years of age when they arrived [START_REF] Borrel | Les origines des Français[END_REF]. This explains the ageing of the immigrant population since 1990.

In 1982, women accounted for only 46 per cent of the immigrant population. By 2004, they had become the majority within immigrant groups residing in France for less than 30 years. The 30-year threshold corresponds to the period during which immigration for family reunification has been more important than labour force immigration [START_REF] Borrel | ‗Enquêtes annuelles de recensement 2004 et 2005: Près de 5 millions d'immigrés à la mi-2004[END_REF]. In 2006, 60 per cent of all residence permits issued for African immigrants were granted to women. The corresponding shares were 66 per cent for South East Asia and 68 per cent for Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union [START_REF] Agalva | ‗Nouveaux détenteurs et détentrices d'un titre de séjour: Des trajectoires familiales et professionnelles contrastées[END_REF]. Today, 54 per cent of all new residence permits are granted to women.

The age structure of the immigrant population reflects the characteristics of the trends in immigration and thus varies according to the countries of origin of the immigrants. More than half the Italian immigrants (54 per cent) are over 65 years old. The corresponding share is only 4 per cent among sub-Saharan Africans, 21 per cent of whom are under age 25 [START_REF] Borrel | ‗Enquêtes annuelles de recensement 2004 et 2005: Près de 5 millions d'immigrés à la mi-2004[END_REF]. Given the ageing among immigrants who arrived during the earlier immigration inflows, the proportion of Italian and Spanish immigrants is gradually decreasing. In 1999, the two groups together accounted for slightly more than 16 per cent of the total immigrant population, whereas they still represented 25 per cent in 1982 and over 20 per cent in 1990.

Algerians now form the largest immigrant community (13.7 per cent in 2005), followed by the Moroccans (12.5 per cent) and the Portuguese (11.5 per cent). The Portuguese are gradually losing ground, however, to immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa (10.8 per cent). The size of this last population group rose by 43 per cent between 1990 and 1999 and 45 per cent from 1999 to 2005, representing the sharpest increases in those years [START_REF] Borrel | ‗Enquêtes annuelles de recensement 2004 et 2005: Près de 5 millions d'immigrés à la mi-2004[END_REF].

Estimates derived from an aggregate of the first annual census surveys carried out in France confirm these new trends. In 2004-2005, 1.7 million immigrants living in the country had come from member states of the European Union (the EU-25). 1 This had also been the case in 1999. The number of immigrants from Eastern Europe outside the EU increased sharply, by 37 per cent. North African immigrants totalled 1.5 million in 2004-2005, or 220,000 more than in 1999 (a 17 per cent rise), largely from Algeria and Morocco (more than 100,000 each). Immigrants from other parts of the world totalled 1.4 million (compared with 1.1 million in 1999 and 850,000 in 1990) and represented 29 per cent of the immigrant population in mid-2004, compared with 20 per cent in 1999. For the most part, these immigrants came from Asia (48 per cent, of which 16 per cent from Turkey) and sub-Saharan Africa (40 per cent). Sub-Saharan Africans totalled 570,000 in mid-2004, a 45 per cent increase in relation to 1999. Of the immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, seven in ten have come from countries that were once administered by France [START_REF] Borrel | ‗Enquêtes annuelles de recensement 2004 et 2005: Près de 5 millions d'immigrés à la mi-2004[END_REF].

Child immigrants, that is, 0-to 17-year-olds of foreign citizenship born in foreign countries, make up only a residual portion of immigration. Recent research has therefore focused on the study of the second generation, which we define here as all persons born in France who have at least one immigrant parent [START_REF] Simon | ‗France and the Unknown Second Generation[END_REF][START_REF] Borrel | Les origines des Français[END_REF][START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF].

The distribution of this second generation by the countries of origin of the parent or parents of each individual (no matter the age or citizenship of the individual) reflects immigration history in France. Second-generation Italians are by far the largest second-generation community (22.6 per cent of the total), followed by second-generation Algerians (14.1 per cent) and second-generation Spanish (12.9 per cent). Although the Moroccan and Portuguese immigrations are more recent, the second generation in these groups already constitutes a considerable share (9.1 and 10.4 per cent, respectively).

The breakdown of origins by second-generation age category (the 0 to 17 and the 18 or above categories) also illustrates the passage from one immigration wave to another. While secondgeneration Italians and Spaniards represent nearly half the 18 and over category, they have been largely overtaken in the 0 to 17 category by the second-generation Algerians, Moroccans, Portuguese and sub-Saharan Africans. The second-generation sub-Saharan

African and Turkish populations are beginning to emerge, and their numbers will increase rapidly in years to come [START_REF] Borrel | Les origines des Français[END_REF].

Second-generation children represent 17.3 per cent of all children, while 82.7 per cent of children are living in families with no immigrant parents ( 3) represented only 6.1 per cent of the total, while children whose parents originated from European countries outside the EU represented a mere 3.6 per cent of the total. Crossing the country of origins of the parents and the ages of the children provides another indication of the composition of immigration flows over time (Table 4). Thus, the proportion of 0-to 4-year-olds is lower than average among families in which at least one parent is European (20.1 per cent). This is especially the case of children of Italian or Spanish origin (around 13 per cent of all under-5-year-olds). In contrast, the proportion of children in this age group is higher among recently arrived and therefore presumably younger immigrants: 25.4 per cent in the case of children of sub-Saharan African or Asian origin. The share in the case of children of Turkish origin is 27.6 per cent. There is no significant difference in the distribution by age between children of immigrants and children of native-born parents. The share of 0-to 4-year-olds is slightly smaller among immigrants, while the share of 15-to 17-year-olds is larger. This may reflect a shift in the profile of immigrants. The immigrants involved in earlier flows may have tended more often to arrive in France along with the families they had already acquired in their countries of origin. However, this explanation is not corroborated by the distribution of the children of immigrants according to the country of birth of the children because over 85 per cent of all children of immigrants have been born in France (Table 5). In mid-2004, 2 million immigrants were French nationals (40 per cent of all immigrants), usually through naturalization or marriage with a French spouse. There were 407,000 more French national immigrants in 2004 than in 1999 (when the share had been 36 per cent of all immigrants), or an average increase of 74,000 per year. However, there were still more immigrants of foreign nationality (2.9 million), and these increased by 210,000 (by 8 per cent) between 1999 and 2004. Of the 3.5 million foreign nationals living in France in 2004, slightly under 3 million had been born outside France, while 550,000 had been born in France. Among the foreign nationals, 450,000 were children 0-17 whose parents were foreign born, that is, they were the children of immigrants as defined in the census. The number of foreigners 18 or older has risen less sharply, by 145,000 [START_REF] Borrel | ‗Enquêtes annuelles de recensement 2004 et 2005: Près de 5 millions d'immigrés à la mi-2004[END_REF].

Women immigrants are more likely to have French nationality than men (42 versus 37 per cent). The greater number of older women from Italy or Spain who were able to obtain French nationality largely explains this difference. The rate of acquisition of French nationality varies greatly according to country of origin. Among the 15 most representative countries of immigrant origin, the nationality acquisition rate is above 50 per cent for Italy, Poland and Spain, which are three of the early immigration countries, and 78 per cent for Viet Nam. At the other end of the spectrum is China (18 per cent), Mali (21 per cent) and one EU country, the United Kingdom (12 per cent) [START_REF] Borrel | ‗Enquêtes annuelles de recensement 2004 et 2005: Près de 5 millions d'immigrés à la mi-2004[END_REF]).

On reaching adulthood, the offspring in France of immigrants are rarely tempted to return to the country of origin of their parents. This is true particularly of second-generation Algerians; it is less true of their Portuguese or Spanish counterparts [START_REF] Tribalat | Faire France: Une grande enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants[END_REF]. The children of immigrants who have become naturalized French are also less likely to return to the country of origin of the parents. Whereas the birth and residence abroad of part of a sibshipthe group of children produced by a pair of parentsmay encourage the parents and children to return, birth in France, which characterizes the second generation, favors a lasting stay in France [START_REF] Richard | Partir ou rester? Destinées des jeunes issus de l"immigration étrangère en France[END_REF]).

We Whether or not the parents of children of immigrants are mixed (one native French and one immigrant parent) is also an indicator of the composition of immigration flows over time.

The older the immigration flow, the higher the rate of mixed parentage. However, the duration of the immigration flow is not the only active element in the formation of parental unions. Social and family networks, pressure exerted by parents and the group, cultural and religious barriers, and the reticence among members of the majority community to form unions with immigrants all combine to limit mixed parental unions. There are also contradictory expectations within society, which, for example, promotes the development of unions with immigrants to accelerate the inclusion process.

CURRENT NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP POLICY

In France today, most residence permits are granted because of family relationships. In the most common cases, the immigrant applicant is married to a French citizen, seeks to join another family member through family reunification, or has other family ties in France.

French nationality law is one of the most open in Europe. The foreign spouse of a French national may claim French nationality after two years of marriage (three years if the foreign national has not resided in France for at least one year following the marriage). French nationality is obtained one year after the claim has been registered unless the registration is refused or opposed. Among the spouses of French nationals, 90 per cent are naturalized in this way. Although the Government does not publicize the procedure and the application process takes a long time, more than 70 per cent of the applications are accepted. Naturalization is doubtless favoured by the traditional French disregard for dual nationality [START_REF] Weil | La République et sa diversité: Immigration, intégration, discriminations[END_REF].

France has experimented with various ways of identifying who is French by birth. as well as with numerous rules for attributing or withdrawing French nationality. No other nation has changed its nationality laws to such an extent, to the point of a national obsession [START_REF] Favell | Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain[END_REF][START_REF] Weil | Qu"est-ce qu"un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution[END_REF].

The ius soli, the right (ius) of citizenship based on birth within the national territory (soli), became law at the end of the 19th century largely because the ius sanguinis, the right conferred because of a blood relationship (sanguinis) to a citizen, was insufficient to make up the country's demographic deficit.

While a 1927 law opened the way to a surge in naturalizations and marriages among immigrants, a racist attitude towards nationality prevailed that was based on the hypothesis that there were different degrees of assimilability across immigrant groups. This attitude was still widespread after the liberation during World War II. This led to reduced recognition for the rights of certain categories of French citizens, namely, women, Muslims and the recently naturalized [START_REF] Weil | Qu"est-ce qu"un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution[END_REF].

The debate over the rights of foreigners and the issue of immigration became extremely politicized beginning in the mid-1970s, but especially in the early 1980s, when the far right increased its space on the political stage [START_REF] Viet | La France immigrée: Construction d"une politique[END_REF]. The tension that arose between an immigration policy of welcome and inclusion and a policy aimed at immigration control has worsened since then, and the policy aimed at control is hindering the inclusion of immigrants and their families (Cour des comptes 2004[START_REF] Lochak | ‗L'intégration comme injonction: Enjeux idéologiques et politiques liés à l'immigration[END_REF]).

The tightening of entry conditions for asylum and for family reunification has been partly responsible for an increase in the number of undocumented immigrants, recently estimated at around 300,000 individuals (Heran, 2007). Immigrant children and the children of immigrants face difficulties if government policies adversely affect their parents [START_REF] Costa-Lascoux | ‗Filiations et dépendances institutionnelles: Les secondes générations[END_REF]. These effects became obvious in the case of the children of undocumented immigrants and the children of asylum seekers [START_REF] Breyer | ‗Les sans-papiers et leur droits d'avoir des droits: Une approche par l'éthique de la discussion[END_REF]. Thus, the children of asylum seekers are sent to school and quickly become socialized, but this is associated with constant uncertainty about the status of their parents, who live in fear of a negative finding by the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons [START_REF] Barou | ‗Les enfants des demandeurs d'asile, entre désir d'intégration et crainte d'expulsion[END_REF]).

Asylum also involves categories of children and teenagers who have arrived unaccompanied in France to flee war or political persecution or for various other reasons and who are without legal representation. Since the 1990s, these children have been classified as unaccompanied foreign minors. They are subject to two contradictory principles, namely, a policy of exposing and controlling undocumented immigration, as well as laws aimed at the protection of children. Child protection workers clash frequently with representatives of other services that treat the minors as undocumented aliens. The children are often refused guardians. Their under-age status is questioned, and they are sometimes victims of police violence in holding areas. Many are deported. It is difficult to estimate the number of unaccompanied foreign minors (usually given at 2,500 to 5,000), but the social services have observed a sharp increase recently, mainly from China, Morocco and Romania (Hommes et migrations 2004).

The trend towards greater control over immigration flows in recent decades is reflected in naturalization rights. In France, people who have not been born in France, but who have been living in France since a young age and have completed their schooling in France are not automatically entitled to French nationality at the age of 18.

In the 1970s and 1980s, some French were aghast to discover that, by a special provision known as the dual ius soli (double jus solis), children born in France to Algerian immigrants were considered French by birth and that, moreover, these children could not refuse French citizenship. 3 The children were also subject to national military service in both Algeria and France. The idea propagated by the far right that foreigners represented a threat to national identity was the basis of a draft amendment to the French nationality code that was presented in 1986 [START_REF] Brubaker | Citoyenneté et nationalité en France et en Allemagne[END_REF]. According to the proposal, the automatic right to French citizenship at birth among children of Algerian descent would be withdrawn, along with the automatic right to citizenship at age 18 among children born in France to nationals of other countries.

The project failed for various reasons. However, it resurfaced in another form in a 1993 law that obliged young people born in France to make a declaration of intent between the ages of 16 and 21 if they wished to acquire French citizenship [START_REF] Ribert | Liberté, égalité, carte d"identité: Les jeunes issus de l"immigration et l"appartenance nationale[END_REF]. During implementation, serious flaws in the law were discovered, particularly because of the number of people who, believing they were already French, failed to carry out the procedure. Immigrant parents frequently committed errors by declaring the nationality of their children as French by birth, although the children were considered foreign until they reached majority. Others had no idea their children were already French [START_REF] Tribalat | Faire France: Une grande enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants[END_REF]. Prior to 1993, a child could acquire French citizenship without asking for it or wanting it. After 1993, a child could remain a foreign national without asking for this or wanting it [START_REF] Weil | Qu"est-ce qu"un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution[END_REF]. The Government was running the risk of making young people stateless who had no ties to the countries of origin of their parents.

The 1993 law had another effect. Especially because of the tone of the public discourse, second-generation Algerians felt that the law was directed against them, although most of them were already French citizens by birth because they were the main beneficiaries of the dual ius soli [START_REF] Weil | Qu"est-ce qu"un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution[END_REF].

A left-wing administration elected in 1997 intended to return to a strict ius soli among all children born in France of one foreign parent. These children would be allowed to obtain French citizenship at the age of 18 if they were still resident in France and had lived in France during their teens. However, the new law retained the provision of the 1993 law requiring a declaration of intent to become French. It did not reestablish the right of parents to declare their children French while the children are still minors and powerless to agree or disagree.

Following 15 years of intense debate, the logic of ius soli was firmly reestablished. Nearly all children born in France of foreign parents continue to acquire French nationality if they are in France during their teens. Only an average of 100 young people a year decline French nationality between the ages of 17 and a half and 19 [START_REF] Weil | Qu"est-ce qu"un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution[END_REF]. Only French-born Turks form an exceptional case, with an above-average refusal rate among the second generation [START_REF] Simon | ‗La crise du modèle d'intégration[END_REF]. This exception has arisen because of the strong community structure among Turkish immigrants and their close ties with their country of origin [START_REF] Irtis-Dabbagh | Les jeunes issus de l"immigration de Turquie en France: Etat des lieux, analyse et perspectives[END_REF].

The nationality issue differs among the second generation and among immigrants who have arrived in France at a young age, called the ‗generation and a half' in the literature in North America (Portes 1996). This 1.5 generation is obliged to follow the lengthy and more uncertain naturalization procedure [START_REF] Simon | ‗France and the Unknown Second Generation[END_REF]. It is rare for people in this group to obtain French nationality while they are minors, and less than 50 per cent of this generation acquires French citizenship by the age of 30 [START_REF] Richard | Partir ou rester? Destinées des jeunes issus de l"immigration étrangère en France[END_REF]).

DATA ANALYSIS AND LITERATURE REVIEW: INCLUSION AND OTHER SOCIAL ISSUES

Definitions and methodological clarifications

There is a trend in the sociological research on immigrants and children to stress differences among children by generation with respect to the arrival of the children in the country of settlement. Thus, immigrants who have arrived in France as adults would be classified as the 1.0 generation, and those who have arrived at a young age would be classified as the 1.5 generation. Children born in France of two immigrant parents would be children of the 2.0 generation, while the children born in France of mixed native and immigrant couples would be the 2.5 generation. The 3.0 generation would represent the children born in France of parents of immigrant origin born in France [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗Au coeur du parcours migratoire; les investissements éducatifs des familles immigrées: Attentes et désillusions[END_REF]Kieffer 2005, Meurs et al. 2006).

However, there are few statistical resources that supply relevant data on the circumstances among children of immigrants in France and fewer still that are amenable to the distinctions drawn in the sociological taxonomy based on immigrant generations [START_REF] Simon | ‗France and the Unknown Second Generation[END_REF]. Statistics widely used until 1990 mostly covered foreign citizens or an administratively constructed population that was not pertinent from a sociological point of view and, above all, was inadequate for use in following the trajectories of immigrants over time [START_REF] Simon | ‗Nationalité et origine dans la statistique française: Les catégories ambiguës[END_REF]). Since 1990, the census has recorded information on variables related to the nationality and countries of birth of individuals. The census category ‗immigrant' is defined as all persons who have been born abroad and who are foreign nationals. The definition of immigrant used in the census thus covers all first-generation immigrants whether they have arrived as adults or children. It excludes citizens, and it excludes children born in France to immigrants, that is, the second generation [START_REF] Simon | ‗La question de la seconde génération en France: Mobilité sociale et discrimination[END_REF].

The census classifications present an additional difficulty. Foreigners are not all immigrants because, in most cases, the children born in France to foreigners legally remain foreigners until they come of age. Whereas children born in France of foreign parents should, in theory, be declared in the census as ‗French by acquisition' (français par acquisition), we have observed a trend among census responders to declare these children French, often by error.

Nearly two thirds are spontaneously and simply declared French by birth. It is therefore impossible to use census data to estimate the number of children of immigrants or to follow the trajectories of their childhoods in France [START_REF] Simon | ‗La question de la seconde génération en France: Mobilité sociale et discrimination[END_REF].

These shortcomings in the statistical apparatus go some way to explain the lack of quantitative research on the situation of the children of immigrants. The geographic mobility and social integration survey (Mobilité géographique et insertion sociale) carried out by the National Institute for Demographic Studies in 1992 was the first notable exception [START_REF] Tribalat | De l"immigration à l"assimilation: Enquête sur les populations étrangères en France, with B. Riandey and P[END_REF]. However, it only covered immigrants from specific countries of origin and did not provide an exhaustive overview of the situation in the labour market among immigrants or their children.

These gaps have begun to be addressed through the use of other statistical resources (Silberman andFournier 1999, Richard 2004) 2005). It involved interviews with 380,000 respondents aged 18 or over. The survey was bridged with the 1999 census. It sought to integrate the census data and questions relative to the country of birth of the respondents and their parents. The database used for the survey is the only resource likely to provide the information on France required for this study on children in immigrant families.

Nonetheless, there are several important limitations to the database. All the variables from the census and the survey are merged. Thus, the family survey uses a concept called children of migrants (descendants de migrants), a category covering individuals born in France of at least one parent born abroad, but without distinction between foreign citizens and French nationals born abroad. However, the French themselves account for a large share of the immigrant population born in the former French colonies and possessions, as much as 50 per cent in the case of Algeria. Of 6.7 million children of migrants whose origins we know, 4.5 million are children of immigrants and 2.2 million are children of expatriate French citizens.

Moreover, because of the age restriction on the respondents (18 or over), the children of immigrants were not identified directly, but through interviews with one of the parents (the respondents). Few variables were collected on children (who were not the main focus of the survey). Among the children of the second generation, there is thus no distinction possible between a child who has one foreign-born immigrant parent and a child who has two such parents. In other words, we consider the second generation as a composite of the 2.0 and 2.5 generations in the sociological taxonomy. In 1999, the second generation so defined represented 7 per cent of the French population, similar to the share of the first generation (the 1.0 and 1.5 generations in the taxonomy), namely, the immigrants themselves, at 7.4 per cent [START_REF] Borrel | Les origines des Français[END_REF].

For the purpose of our study, the children of immigrants are therefore defined as the children of all the respondents to the family history survey who are immigrants (that is, people born as foreign nationals in foreign countries) or whose partners are immigrants (whether the two in each pair are married or not and whether they are both the biological parents or not).

Wherever possible during our study, we have examined countries of origin according to whether the children have been born to two immigrant parents of the same country of origin (case 1) or to an immigrant parent and a parent who is French by birth (case 2). We have then broken down these two cases by country of origin according to the rules laid down by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies. We have not taken children born of two immigrant parents of different origins into account (case 3, a small share) because it has not been possible to define this single category in the available data. Children born of two parents who are French by birth (case 4) are not, by our definition, children of immigrants.

Family environment

Size and structure of the family

The proportion of one-parent families is almost the same and even slightly lower among children with at least one immigrant parent (11.3 per cent) relative to native French families (12.3 per cent) (Table 6). The highest share of children of immigrants living in one-parent families occurs among children in families of African origin (14.2 per cent). 4 Among these children, the highest shares are in families of sub-Saharan African origin (18.4 per cent), although some of these data may also reflect errors in entering information for the survey. In a sign that family structures may sometimes be resistant to the erosion in the traditional family profile in French society, the share of the children of Asian and European immigrants who live in one-parent families is lower than average. The share of one-parent families in households where at least one parent is an African immigrant is thus about 2.5 times higher than the corresponding share in families with at least one immigrant parent from Cambodia, Italy, Lao PDR, Portugal, Spain, or Turkey.

As expected, families with at least one immigrant parent are generally larger than native French families. While 25.2 per cent of French families have one child at home, only 17.8 per cent of the families of immigrants are in this situation. Conversely, families with four children or more account for less than 10 per cent of non-immigrant families, but almost a quarter of immigrant families. The corresponding share among families of sub-Saharan African origin is 43 per cent, the highest share among all the groups under study.

These results reflect the fact that immigrant families overall show higher fertility rates. Nonetheless, more than three quarters of immigrant families (76.2 per cent) have three or fewer children, and, at least among certain groups, the trend is towards national average fertility rates (see [START_REF] Borrel | ‗La vie familiale des immigrés[END_REF]. Thus, we observe a similar structure in European immigrant families and native French ones. Indeed, families with four or more children are less frequent among European immigrants than among the native French. This is especially so among families from southern Europe. Only 6.1 per cent of families with an immigrant parent from Italy have four children or more. The corresponding shares are 7.8 and 6.8 per cent, respectively, for families with an immigrant parent from Portugal or Spain.

Educational attainment among parents

Our analysis of educational attainment is based on the classifications widely used in France.

By applying an aggregate of the various types of French diplomas and their foreign equivalents, we may distinguish four broad levels of educational attainment:

No qualification: This corresponds to no schooling at all or to dropping out of education at the end of primary school (five years, usually 6-11 years of age) or middle school (four years, usually 11-15 years of age). These correspond to levels As one might expect, educational attainment is considerably more limited among immigrant fathers than among native fathers; 48.7 and 26.6 per cent, respectively, have no qualification (Table 7). The gap is almost as large, again to the advantage of the French fathers, in the case of vocational diplomas. The gap narrows at the general secondary and tertiary levels. The African group is disparate. The proportion of fathers of North African origin without any qualification is higher than the average among immigrant fathers. This is so especially among Moroccan fathers, almost two thirds of whom (64.9 per cent) have no qualification. There are also fewer tertiary diplomas (around 12 per cent) in the North African group. Meanwhile, there are two distinct education profiles among sub-Saharan African immigrants: those with no qualification (40 per cent) and those with tertiary diplomas (30.7 per cent). The latter share is higher than the corresponding share among French fathers and fathers in other immigrant groups such as fathers from Portugal or Turkey. We know that many sub-Saharan Africans come to France to complete university degrees. However, these student flows are increasingly going to other countries such as Canada (especially French-speaking Quebec), the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

Similar contrasts may be found in the Asia group. The share of fathers without qualifications is highest among the Turks, at 76.1 per cent, but only 26.1 per cent among the Vietnamese, which is on a par with the share among French fathers. Only 3.4 per cent of Turkish fathers have higher education diplomas, while the share is 32.8 per cent among Vietnamese fathers.

The gap between the children of immigrants and native French children is greater in the case of mothers with no qualification than in the case of fathers with no qualification. More than half the children of immigrants have mothers with no qualification, and fewer immigrant mothers than immigrant fathers have tertiary diplomas. The gap between immigrants and the French in tertiary education is also greater among mothers than among fathers.

Among mothers as among fathers, there are substantial differences according to origin. The share of no qualification is especially high among the mothers of children of immigrants from Morocco, Portugal and Turkey, whereas it is quite loweven below that of French mothersamong the mothers of children of immigrants from the EU-15 (excluding Italy, Portugal and Spain), European countries outside the EU-15, and the Americas and Oceania. The attainment of tertiary education among mothers is highest in these last three groups.

These statistical averages, whether for fathers or mothers, conceal a trend towards a convergence of the levels of educational attainment between immigrants and the native French. An analysis across age categories shows that immigrants who arrived in France less than 10 years ago are more highly qualified than the immigrants who preceded them [START_REF] Borrel | ‗Enquêtes annuelles de recensement 2004 et 2005: Près de 5 millions d'immigrés à la mi-2004[END_REF]). However, sharp differences still exist among immigrant groups depending on origin.

While the share of people with no qualification has fallen among all immigrant groups, it remains high among recently arrived immigrants from Portugal and Turkey [START_REF] Safi | ‗Le devenir des immigrés en France: Barrières et inégalités[END_REF]. We must also distinguish the level of education of immigrants according to age upon arrival in France [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗Au coeur du parcours migratoire; les investissements éducatifs des familles immigrées: Attentes et désillusions[END_REF]. Immigrants who arrived in France when they were 10 or above show a larger share of people with no qualification, but also a larger share of people in France to obtain a higher education. Individuals arriving when they were under 10 show educational levels that are comparable with those of second-generation children [START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF].

Parental employment

Data are not collected in the census on the number of hours worked by the parents of the children in our sample. However, we are able to indicate the share of people in employment at the time of the family history survey, as well as the share who are unemployed or economically inactive, that is, outside the labour market.

The rates of economic inactivity and of active unemployment are considerably higher among parents in immigrant families than among native-born French parents, and they are higher among mothers than among fathers in immigrant families (Table 8). The gap with the native French is 14.4 per cent among the fathers of the children of immigrants (28.2 versus 13.8 per cent) and 22.4 per cent among the mothers (50.3 versus 27.9 per cent). Undoubtedly, the share of unemployed or inactive mothers among the mothers of the children of immigrants from Africa is generally high. The highest share occurs among the mothers of children of immigrants from Morocco, and the corresponding shares for North Africa are higher than those for sub-Saharan Africa. The share of the mothers of the children of immigrants from Turkey who are unemployed or inactive is much higher that the corresponding share for Lao PDR or Viet Nam. In the case of Viet Nam, the difference between fathers and mothers is considerable (a gap of 29.9 per cent); the difference between fathers and mothers is still greater in the case of Morocco (32.9 per cent) and Turkey (44.1 per cent).

Labour force participation also depends on age at arrival in France. For instance, the majority of North African mothers who have arrived as adults have never participated in the labour market, while those who have arrived at a younger age are active in the labour market. The latter reflect the cultural model of the country of settlement [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗Au coeur du parcours migratoire; les investissements éducatifs des familles immigrées: Attentes et désillusions[END_REF]).

Significant differences in labour force participation are also evident between the parents of children with two immigrant parents and the parents of children with mixed French and immigrant parents. The mixed couple effect is greater among mothers than among fathers. The rate of unemployment and inactivity among fathers falls from 35.4 per cent if both parents are immigrants to 20.1 per cent if one parent is French. Among mothers, the corresponding drop is sharper, from 63.3 to 34.6 per cent. It seems from Table 8 that the gender gap is somehow equivalent to the gap associated with immigrant status given that mothers in mixed French and immigrant couples are slightly less likely to be unemployed or economically inactive than fathers in immigrant couples. The mothers of the children of immigrants from Lao PDR and European countries outside the EU-15 appear to be exceptions. Finally, labour force participation rises spectacularly among the mothers of children of immigrants from North Africa, particularly Morocco and Tunisia.

Family socioeconomic status: housing

There is a direct correlation between overcrowding in housing and family size. Overall, only 18.6 per cent of native French children live in overcrowded conditions compared with 48.7 per cent of the children of immigrants (Table 9). However, this last figure hides a considerable gap depending on whether the couple is mixed (32.5 per cent) or composed of two immigrant parents (61.1 per cent). The contrasts are similarly great according to the origins of the immigrants. While 28.6 per cent of the children of immigrants from Europe live in overcrowded conditions, the share rises to 60.4 per cent for Africa and 57.5 per cent for Asia. Among the children of immigrants from these two continents, only a majority of the children in the case of Viet Nam live in housing that may be considered moderate in terms of overcrowding.

There is a correlation between overcrowding and the incidence of home ownership. Those immigrant groups among which overcrowding is more common are also characterized by lower rates of homeownership. The homeownership rates associated with the children of immigrants generally are far below the corresponding rates among native French children, but the rates are even lower with respect to the children of immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, the rates are higher with respect to the children of immigrants from Italy, the other EU-15 countries and Viet Nam even in relation to native French children. The Cambodians are the only immigrant group showing a relatively high rate of both homeownership and overcrowding.

The language spoken at home

The 1992 geographic mobility and social integration survey found that only 20 per cent of all immigrants used their native language exclusively with their children. The proportion rose to 26 per cent among Moroccans and 56 per cent among Turks, only 7 per cent of whom spoke French to their children. At the opposite extreme, 54 per cent of sub-Saharan African immigrants spoke only French to their children, as did 37 per cent of Spanish immigrants and 35 per cent of Algerian immigrants (Simon 1996a). Nearly all young people with two immigrant parents understood the native language of their parents.

In 1999, only a few years after the mobility and integration survey, the family history survey observed a general decline in the use of immigrant languages from one generation to the next. The retransmission of Arabic, Berber and Portuguese as common languages had fallen by more than half within one generation, for example [START_REF] Héran | ‗La dynamique des langues en France au fil du XXème siècle[END_REF].

Many North African families have two levels of communication: the parents communicate in their native tongue, while their children speak French among themselves. Children also play the role of linguistic and cultural intermediaries between their parents and schools, the police, the tax office and other institutions. The parents thus depend on their children's practical knowledge [START_REF] Zehraoui | ‗Processus différentiels d'intégration au sein des familles algériennes en France[END_REF]. This illustrates Sayad's comment (1994a) about children allowing their migrant parents to exist in the public space.

The exclusive use of the native immigrant language is rare in households with one native French parent and one immigrant parent, which is a typical family environment among the children of immigrants. In the early 1990s, only 28 per cent of the children of mixed couples in the Algerian group understood the immigrant language. This compared with 49 per cent in the Portuguese group and 70 per cent in the Spanish group (Simon 1996a). In 1999, only 34.9 per cent of children with mixed parents were speaking a language that was not French regularly at home, whereas 79.6 per cent of children with two immigrants parents were doing so (Table 10). However, the tendency to maintain the use of a foreign language or to use French varies considerably according to country of origin, age at arrival in France and gender [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗Au coeur du parcours migratoire; les investissements éducatifs des familles immigrées: Attentes et désillusions[END_REF]. The use of French is most widespread among immigrants from southern Europe, among whom it may be the only language spoken at home in approximately 75 per cent of the mixed families. If both parents are immigrants, 57.2 per cent of Italians, 76.7 per cent of Portuguese, and 65.3 per cent of Spanish families speak their native languages in the home.

The share of children who speak a language at home that is not French rises to 70.1 per cent among mixed Franco-Turkish families, although exogamy is not widespread among Turkish immigrants. The loss of its colonies in South East Asia by France at an earlier date and the consequent loss in familiarity with French may explain why 55.2 per cent of mixed-couple Vietnamese continue to maintain the use of their own language at home.

The African group falls midway between the European and Asian groups. The incidence of foreign language use in the home is not much greater among children in this group than among children in the European group if both parents are immigrants or if the parents are mixed. We have observed that, if both parents are immigrants, fewer families of African origin speak a foreign language compared with families of Portuguese origin. This propensity of the African group is more or less the same as that of the Spanish group. This is doubtless a consequence of the familiarity with French in the former French colonies in Africa.

The use of a foreign language in the home is still the norm if both parents are immigrants.

Clearly, given the above trends, we should not expect this practice to be the norm among the next generation. The rate of mixed marriages increases among the second generation, and, over time, as we see above, the language of the country of settlement tends to replace the language of the country of origin among offspring in immigrant groups.

Family origin and the issue of two cultures

A considerable body of work has queried the possibility of reconciling the traditional family structures and values imported from foreign societies and the nuclear family structure and the values centred on individualism in French society. Research has focused largely on families of North African origin, particularly Algeria.

In a well-known book, [START_REF] Todd | Le destin des immigrés: Assimilation et ségrégation dans les démocraties occidentales[END_REF] hypothesizes on the anthropological distance between the endogamous communitarian structure typical of the extended family in North Africa and the egalitarian, individualistic concepts evident in the typical family in France. Todd concludes that the capacity of the country of settlement to assimilateobvious because of the large number of exogamic unions in Francehas gradually limited the reproduction of the North African model within France.

Most studies take a less radical view on the recomposition of immigrant families, including families of North African origin, after contact with the society in the country of settlement. These studies conclude that, rather than a shift in models, the family adaptation process is dynamic and has the potential to take many forms. Immigrant families may embrace, transform, or suppress the cultural heritage they have imported, although they rarely break totally with this heritage (Rude-Antoine 1997). Immigrants often try to recreate a cultural framework that is similar to their own to preserve their psychological identity [START_REF] Nathan | ‗La migration des âmes[END_REF].

In fact, we are witnessing the emergence of a new culture that is neither entirely that of the country of origin nor entirely that of the country of settlement (Guénif Soulaimas, 2000;[START_REF] Moreau | ‗Culture de l'entre-deux et survie psychique du migrant[END_REF].

Immigrants are sometimes considered the subjects of their own lives rather than the products of their cultures of origin. Individual immigrants tend to reproduce their cultures of origin in the country of settlement, but, within themselves, these cultures are constantly modified through exchanges with the new environment [START_REF] Camilleri | Stratégies identitaires[END_REF], Lavallée et al. 1991[START_REF] Camilleri | Psychologie et culture[END_REF]. The mutations in family structures in the societies of origin should also be taken into account. Indeed, colonization caused the first modern transformation in the indigenous social and family structures of many of these societies through rural exodus, schooling, the formation of local elites by colonial powers and so on.

Immigration was a natural extension of this process [START_REF] Sayad | La double absence: Des illusions de l"émigré aux souffrances de l"immigré[END_REF].

Studies of North African families in France have provided numerous examples of the complexity of the dynamics at play. To understand the relationships the families have with the standards, values and cultural models of their new societies and those of their countries of origin, one would have to observe the social trajectories of each family member, correlated by age, level of schooling, socio-professional status, gender and length of stay in France. Generally, Algerian immigrant families are not particularly closed in upon themselves, but experience exchanges and confrontations with their new environment [START_REF] Zehraoui | ‗Processus différentiels d'intégration au sein des familles algériennes en France[END_REF]. Some of the families pursue processes that already began in their countries of origin, the transition from an extended to a nuclear family, for instance, while others seek to foster equality in gender relationships, but within a traditional framework (Rude-Antoine 1999). Some studies have shown that women are frequently more attached to their traditions on arrival, but, over time, become less traditional than their husbands, who frequently remain tied to patriarchal values [START_REF] Camilleri | ‗Evolution des structures familiales chez les Maghrébins et les Portugais de France[END_REF]). The North African family is therefore not an exclusively prescriptive environment that demands a traditional view of roles and status; it is influenced by change, and tradition faces resistance by family members [START_REF] Guénif Souilamas | Des "beurettes" aux descendantes d"immigrants nordafricains[END_REF].

The issue of women's independence and the conflicts that women may generate with their husbands is also raised in sociological studies on sub-Saharan African immigrant families [START_REF] Nicollet | Femmes d"Afrique noire en France: La vie partagée[END_REF]). These also stress the diversity of family organizational models [START_REF] Barou | ‗Familles, enfants et scolarité chez les Africaines immigrées en France[END_REF][START_REF] Poiret | Familles africaines en France[END_REF][START_REF] Tribalat | Faire France: Une grande enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants[END_REF].

Psychosocial studies in the early 1980s revealed an identity dilemma among the second generation of immigrant origin that is often described using bipolar terms, such as ‗dual attachment' or ‗identity opposites', or as a source of tension and identity crisis [START_REF] Camilleri | Stratégies identitaires[END_REF], Malewska-Peyre 1982). Some of these studies examine the distance secondgeneration offspring may establish towards their parents [START_REF] Zaleska | ‗Identité culturelle des adolescents issus des familles de travailleurs immigrés[END_REF][START_REF] Vinsonneau | ‗Etudes comparatives des modalités d'intériorisation de quelques représentations négatives dans les populations de pré-adolescents, d'adolescents et d'adultes immigrés[END_REF].

Children in immigrant families from North Africa interiorized the condescending manner with which their French peers and French institutions treated the parents in these families [START_REF] Streiff-Fénart | ‗A propos des valeurs en situation d'immigration: Questions de recherche et bilan des travaux[END_REF]. They maintained a distance from the traditional values of their parents by ironizing about the habits of their parents and scoffing at newly arrived immigrants still infused with old ways [START_REF] Lepoutre | Coeur de banlieue: Codes, rites et langages[END_REF]. The situation of fathers whose role as providers has been eroded by the new environment and economic change also takes on singular meanings among the second generation in North African immigrant groups, and this may contribute to an identity crisis that may also affect daughters [START_REF] Duret | Les jeunes et l"identité masculine[END_REF][START_REF] Guénif Souilamas | Des "beurettes" aux descendantes d"immigrants nordafricains[END_REF].

Children of immigrants combine and prioritize their cultural orientations in a variety of ways; sometimes these are contradictory (Guénif Souilamas 2000, Autant-Dorier 2004). The popular idea that young women of North African origin assimilate more readily has been questioned in surveys [START_REF] Tribalat | Faire France: Une grande enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants[END_REF][START_REF] Guénif Souilamas | Des "beurettes" aux descendantes d"immigrants nordafricains[END_REF][START_REF] Flanquart | Croyances et valeurs chez les jeunes Maghrébins[END_REF]). The second generation in families of North African origin tends to adopt a conservative position on family values and sexual matters, but modern values concerning free unions and sexual equality [START_REF] Streiff-Fénart | ‗A propos des valeurs en situation d'immigration: Questions de recherche et bilan des travaux[END_REF]. Young men will take advantage of the independence allowed them by French society, while showing little inclination to abandon the advantages of traditional North African values that favour men [START_REF] Camilleri | ‗Evolution des structures familiales chez les Maghrébins et les Portugais de France[END_REF].

Young North African women face constraints imposed on them not only by their parents, especially their fathers, but also by their brothers, who tend to appoint themselves guarantors of the old order. Young Portuguese girls encounter similar problems. Families of Portuguese and North African origin are much closer in their concern about chastity among young women [START_REF] Zaleska | ‗Identité culturelle des adolescents issus des familles de travailleurs immigrés[END_REF]. However, parental authority seems to be less restrictive among the Portuguese group towards mixed marriage. In this, Portuguese and Spanish families resemble French families more than North African ones. Mixed unions with the native French are becoming increasingly frequent in the Portuguese and Spanish communities.

Traditional matrimonial practice greatly influences the choice of partner among the children of North African immigrants not in terms of arranged marriages, which are disappearing, but because of the later age of marriage, especially among young women [START_REF] Tribalat | Faire France: Une grande enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants[END_REF]. If, as claimed, North African mothers are frequently more modern than North African fathers, the mothers nonetheless continue to raise their daughters in the traditional manner [START_REF] Boukhobza | ‗Le paradoxe des mères migrantes[END_REF]. Parents may no longer expect their child to marry a cousin, but they still exert pressure on children to marry Muslims. Young women are thus constrained in their choices, and endogamic unions are common [START_REF] Flanquart | ‗Un désert matrimonial[END_REF].

The issue of marriage likewise crystallizes conflicts in the sub-Saharan African group between women in the second generation and parents who put pressure on them to maintain ties with the communities of origin. However, like parents in the North African group, sub-Saharan African parents construct a marriage model in migration that is not a strict replica of the original [START_REF] Quiminal | ‗Les jeunes filles d'origine africaine en France: Parcours scolaires, accès au travail et destin social[END_REF].

Young Turkish men and women appear to be subject to the power exercised by their immigrant communities over marriage unions by the practice of importing sons-and daughters-in-law from Turkey. The marriages are not always desired by the young people, and this leads sometimes to violent intra-family conflicts (Petek-Salom 1999).

The issue of the transmission of family memory is important among some immigrant groups.

A survey carried out over several years in a secondary school in the Paris suburbs found that family memory is not transmitted as such, but is acquired in day-to-day interactions among family members who have no explicit intention to transmit [START_REF] Lepoutre | Souvenirs de familles immigrées[END_REF]. Nonetheless, there are important variations in the relationship to family history depending on social factors internal to the families and on external, contextual and historical factors.

North Africans, unlike other immigrants, do not represent a diaspora. Immigration among them is not generally accompanied by memories of exile or a history of collective trauma. If we consider that the transmission of family and collective history is vital to the construction of a community identity, then the transmission among young people of North African origin appears often to be negative for it is frequently placed within a backdrop of notions of social and geographic inferiority [START_REF] Sicot | ‗Quelle transmission culturelle pour les jeunes des quartiers de relégation?[END_REF].

Educational attainment among young adults

Like their native French counterparts, only a small minority of young foreign-born adults aged 18-24 are still in the education system. Among these families, the share of young men in higher education is the same as the share among young French men (45.1 and 44.8 per cent, respectively; see Table 11). The corresponding difference is greater between young foreign-born women and young French women (43.1 and 49.5 per cent, respectively).

Among young people still in the educational system, the contrasts are greater between those who go on to higher education (whether academic or professional) and those who go directly into professional or technical branches, usually viewed as less prestigious. Some 56.6 per cent of young native French men and 65.8 per cent of native French young women go to university after reaching age 18 compared with 50 per cent of young foreign-born men and 56.9 per cent of young foreign-born women. As in the previous cases, these gaps cover substantial variations according to the origin of the young people. Far more young foreign-born with European origin attend university (64.1 per cent of young men and 78.5 per cent of young women) relative to young foreign-born with African origin (45.9 and 46.9 per cent, respectively) or Asian origin (55.7 and 54.7 per cent).

Within regions, there are also considerable differences. For instance, 72.2 per cent of young men and 61.3 per cent of young women of South East Asian origin attend university compared with 37.6 per cent of young men and 9.8 per cent of young women of Turkish origin.

Obstacles to the inclusion of new arrivals in the regular school system

Official figures are issued for the total number of students newly arrived in France (élèves nouvellement arrivées en France). There were 37,967 such students in the 2002/03 academic year and 39,100 the following year. It is difficult to quantify this mobile population, however. The population is extremely varied in origin. By nationality and in decreasing order according to numerical importance, the most common groups are Moroccans, Turks, Africans, the category ‗other countries', Algerians and Portuguese (DEP 1995). This reflects the general pattern of immigration to France since the early 1980s.

Special provisions have existed since the early 1970s with the stated aim of including the population of newly arrived immigrant students rapidly into the normal school system. This principle of the rapid transfer of new immigrant students was confirmed in ministerial circulars in 1986 and 2002, although an emphasis was then also placed on combatting illiteracy and acquiring French language skills (fluency in the French language and literacy being necessary for access to mainstream schooling).

In practice, the status of the children of immigrants as students depends on whether they are French or foreign nationals, whether they are speakers of French or of another language and whether they or their parents are asylum seekers, beneficiaries of family reunification, holders of long-term work permits, and so on. Education services themselves tend to sort candidates according to age, official residence status, linguistic proficiency and other criteria.

The 2002 ministerial circular specifies that, up to the age of legal majority, the documented or undocumented status of students is not a matter of concern in the national education system (Cour des comptes 2004). Nonetheless, comments by national education authorities suggest that undocumented status is a barrier to rapid access to schooling if there are no places available and that, even if there is no shortage of places, the type of schooling offered to these students may often be inappropriate. For many of these students, the educational system has been compared to an obstacle course [START_REF] Boulot | Les immigrés et l"école: une course d"obstacles[END_REF]).

Some regional education authorities (académies) have responded to the recent rise in the number of these students by opening new facilities, notably middle schools. Some of the new arrivals are assigned to special transitional classes, which, in 2001, included 475 introductory classes and 329 integrated remedial classes at the primary level and 627 admission classes at the secondary level (Zoïa et al. 2004). Whether a student needs special classes is determined through evaluations that take account of proficiency in French, but also educational attainment, experience-based skills and student interests. If special schooling is deemed necessary, the student is enrolled in one of two sorts of classes: special classes with fewer students and normal special classes. The students advance as language proficiency improves. Many commentators draw attention to the marginal status of special classes within schools and the lack of interest among some members of the teaching profession more generally in the educational problems of newly arrived students [START_REF] Berque | L"immigration à l"école de la République[END_REF]. The students are the subject of numerous preconceptions and misconceptions. Their difficulties in French are frequently equated with intellectual shortcomings or a limited potential for academic success.

The emphasis in evaluations on proficiency in French to the detriment of other educational attainments results in inappropriate streaming and the grouping of students who are not French speakers into classes with low achievers. This often means that, when the transition is made to the regular school system, these students are placed in classes for children with special needs (Zoïa at al. 2004).

The share of newly arrived students in the regular educational system is increasing, although how rapidly this is occurring is difficult to gauge because some of the available data are incomplete. However, it seems that the time that typically elapses before newly arrived students are transferred to regular classes exceeds the targets set by the ministry: 31.5 per cent of students in a special class in 2002/03 had also been in one in the previous school year, and the share was rising (Cour des comptes 2004). Large local variations have also been observed. The number of newly arrived students placed in non-special classes from the outset is relatively larger in some regional school districts (Zoïa et al. 2004).

For newly arrived students aged 16 or above, schooling usually focuses on the teaching of skills widely in demand on the labour market (Cour des comptes 2004). The great difficulty experienced by these students in obtaining access to education and the overwhelming concentration of these students in vocational or apprenticeship courses demonstrate that schools as institutions are guiding these students towards unskilled jobs that have traditionally gone to immigrants (Zoïa et al. 2004).

Educational performance: social reproduction versus aspirations to social mobility

The difficulty of constructing relevant and reliable categories for the analysis of conditions among the children of immigrants is partly responsible for the lack of consensus on educational performance among this group [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗The School Careers of Ethnic Minority Youth in France: Success or Disillusion?[END_REF]. In the 1960s and 1970s, researchers who controlled for socioeconomic variables concluded that the children of immigrants performed no worse than the children of the native French [START_REF] Clerc | ‗Les élèves de nationalité étrangère[END_REF][START_REF] Gratiot Alphandéry | ‗Le retard scolaire des enfants de travailleurs immigrés en France[END_REF][START_REF] Courgeau | ‗Les enfants nés à l'étranger[END_REF]. Some later researchers, after controlling for the socioeconomic characteristics of families, found that the children of immigrants showed higher levels of success [START_REF] Mondon | ‗Quelques aspects de la scolarisation des enfants étrangers à partir des statistiques[END_REF]). After they had controlled for socioeconomic variables, other researchers reverted to the earlier finding that the differences were insignificant or concluded that the children of immigrants performed less well [START_REF] Boulot | Les immigrés et l"école: une course d"obstacles[END_REF]Boyzon-Fradet 1988, Thélot and[START_REF] Thélot | ‗Compétences en français et carrières scolaires des élèves étrangers en France[END_REF]. [START_REF] Vallet | ‗Les élèves étrangers ou issus de l'immigration dans l'école et le collège français: Une étude d'ensemble[END_REF] published the first systematic and incisive analysis of educational performance among children of foreign origin in French secondary schools. The 1989 student panel with which the authors were working could not be used to construct pertinent categories for analysis of this population. The authors therefore used indirect variables (proxies) to distinguished students by status and origin. They found that nearly half of all students of foreign origin had repeated at least one year in the elementary school system compared with only a quarter of French children. By the end of primary schooling, fewer than 3 per cent of young French pupils, but more than twice this proportion of their peers who were of foreign origin had left the general education system and entered special remedial classes. Among first-year entrants in middle school, nationwide tests revealed large differences between students of immigrant origin and their French peers. By the end of the four years of middle school, only one third of all students of foreign origin and nearly half the French students were selected for entry into the general secondary curriculum, that is, the most direct path to the baccalauréat (see elsewhere above). Though the disparities differ depending on the criteria used to identify the population of students of foreign origin, these students clearly run a high risk of academic failure, assignment to the least difficult streams of the educational system and early school leaving. Vallet and Caille also showed, however, that, at equivalent social characteristics and family backgrounds, these students made more progress through the years of secondary schooling as measured by success rates in completing the baccalauréat.

The 1995 student panel supports these findings. Moreover, it includes, for the first time, data on the country of birth and nationality of students and their parents. An analysis of the data on second-generation children in education shows that they are facing early difficulties in elementary school and have higher rates of repetition [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗D'une génération à l'autre; les aspirations éducatives des familles immigrées: Ambition et persévérance[END_REF]. They clearly underperform at secondary level relative to their French peers, although the discrepancy is reduced by the end of the lower secondary cycle [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗La scolarité des enfants issus de l'immigration au sein du secondaire: Echecs ou réussites? Retour sur un paradoxe[END_REF].

In line with Vallet and Caille's analysis (1996), this disadvantage is explained almost entirely on the basis of the social background and level of educational attainment among the parents.

In upper secondary school, the children of immigrants are more concentrated in the vocational tracks, but they are also more likely to attend the general and technological tracks than are native French children with similar backgrounds, as [START_REF] Vallet | ‗Les élèves étrangers ou issus de l'immigration dans l'école et le collège français: Une étude d'ensemble[END_REF] show. However, their success is moderate since they are more often channelled towards the technological track rather than the general one, which is less prestigious and provides a less certain route to higher education [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗D'une génération à l'autre; les aspirations éducatives des familles immigrées: Ambition et persévérance[END_REF].

Finally, educational attainment differs according to social class, country of family origin and gender, although social inequalities are the strongest factor. The children of immigrants are more likely to leave secondary education with no qualification (two times more likely than their French peers) and less likely to complete a baccalauréat [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗La scolarité des enfants issus de l'immigration au sein du secondaire: Echecs ou réussites? Retour sur un paradoxe[END_REF]. However, if we control for social background, we find that they experience more failures, as well as more successes. This polarization highlights the apparent paradox in the divergent conclusions of previous research.

On the one hand, children of North African origin encounter more difficulties during their school careers because of family and school environments. Their failures are more frequent in vocational careers they enter, but hoped to avoid. Boys are more numerous in this less successful group. On the other hand, relatively more of the boys graduate from secondary school relative to their peers with similar backgrounds. They seem to be motivated by higher aspirations and their persistence in remaining in academic tracks. Girls are more successful.

Children of Portuguese origin show a high dropout rate, but they tend to gain access more quickly to the labour market after vocational training or an apprenticeship (in line with their aspirations). Moreover, a relatively larger share obtains a baccalauréat [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗La scolarité des enfants issus de l'immigration au sein du secondaire: Echecs ou réussites? Retour sur un paradoxe[END_REF]. Their educational aspirations and choice of educational track have an impact on their educational trajectories and school experiences. Theorists of social reproduction would argue that the educational attainment of the children of immigrants is determined by the social characteristics of their parents. The characteristics of immigrant parents are generally negative. The parents have had little schooling. A quarter have no education beyond primary school. Most are unskilled manual workers. A large share of mothers -50 per cent of all immigrant mothers and 70 per cent of North African mothersare not economically active. Unemployment is between two and three times higher among these people than among the native French population. The children of immigrants who receive all their education in France generally reach much higher levels of educational attainment than their parents did in the countries of origin [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗Au coeur du parcours migratoire; les investissements éducatifs des familles immigrées: Attentes et désillusions[END_REF]Werquin 2004, Simon 2007).

Lainé and Okba ( 2005) have used the generation 98 survey conducted by the Centre for Research on Education, Training and Employment in 2001 to produce new analyses of educational trajectories and orientations. Their results suggest the existence of an ethnicorigin effect that influences the level of educational attainment and that cannot be explained uniquely by family characteristics or parental social status. They identify academic failure as a major characteristic of young people of North African origin. The share of these youth who leave the school system with no qualification -43 per cent for young men and 27 per cent for young womenis 2.7 times higher than the corresponding share among the children of the same age who have native French fathers. Young men of southern European origin are more likely, all else being equal, to follow short technical courses. They are less likely to follow courses leading to vocational or academic diplomas at the secondary level, and they are less likely to leave the school system with no qualification. However, the analysis does not include control variables for family characteristics or for the young person's date of arrival in France.

The data of the family history survey that we have used for this study offer insights into the second generation of Moroccan, Portuguese and Turkish origin [START_REF] Simon | ‗La question de la seconde génération en France: Mobilité sociale et discrimination[END_REF]. Secondgeneration students of Turkish origin more frequently leave education with no qualification (more than 46 per cent; the national average is 24 per cent). Although the educational levels among the Turkish second generation are higher than those of the previous generation, university education remains rare. Entry to higher education is not much more frequent among the second generation of Portuguese origin, who prefer instead to follow short vocational courses. Among the Portuguese group, the frequency of early exit from the educational system is comparable to the national average, and it is higher than the national average if one controls for social background. In contrast to these two groups, the second generation of Moroccan origin reaches relatively high levels of attainment, close to the national average. Indeed, the rate of access of this group to the mainstream curriculum is actually higher than the national average, while the group is underrepresented in vocational courses, which represent the characteristic orientation for children in the lower social categories. However, these results depend greatly on the trajectories of children of mixed French and Moroccan parentage. In access to the baccalauréat and higher education, these children in mixed families perform above the national average, whereas, if both parents are Moroccan, the level of attainment of the children is much closer to that of the second generations of Portuguese and Turkish origin.

Second-generation women of Turkish origin still face significant gender inequalities in education, although the disparities have narrowed greatly relative to the previous generation [START_REF] Simon | ‗La question de la seconde génération en France: Mobilité sociale et discrimination[END_REF]. Meanwhile, relatively weak gender inequality and other inequalities working to the advantage of women are observed among similar women in the Moroccan and Portuguese groups. This contrasts clearly with the situation of their immigrant parents and probably reflects a differential investment in children by families that depends on the sex of the child. Whereas boys are more easily oriented towards short educational careers or early school leaving for employment, girls see school work as a possible means to achieve independence from their families. This interpretation is consistent with the results of other, more qualitative studies that have pointed out the educational success of girls of immigrant origin, particularly North African origin [START_REF] Zéroulou | ‗La réussite scolaire des enfants d'immigrés: L'apport d'une recherche en termes de mobilisation[END_REF][START_REF] Hassini | L"école: Une chance pour les filles de parents maghrébins[END_REF][START_REF] Guénif Souilamas | Des "beurettes" aux descendantes d"immigrants nordafricains[END_REF]. A sharp contrast between boys and girls in the expectations of parents with respect to education has also been noted in the case of children of sub-Saharan African origin. While difficulties at school may lead boys to envisage leaving the educational system and entering the labour market, this transition is postponed as long as possible for the girls. The double imperative of remaining longer in the parental household and remaining in school creates conditions for better educational performance. Paradoxically, the constraints associated with the reproduction of the family model within an immigrant group contribute indirectly to the higher educational attainment achieved among young girls of sub-Saharan African origin [START_REF] Quiminal | ‗Les jeunes filles d'origine africaine en France: Parcours scolaires, accès au travail et destin social[END_REF].

Immigrant parents and their children generally maintain higher aspirations than native French people in the same social category. However, whereas the Portuguese prefer vocational courses, the North Africans tend towards longer academic courses. These high ambitions appear to favour educational success among the children, though not always following the trend. Thus, many students of Portuguese origin make choices about schooling that diverge from the expectations of their parents by favouring higher education. Youth of North African origin adopt the ambitions of their parents, but modify them to take account of the reality of their schooling, which is dominated by vocational and technological courses [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗D'une génération à l'autre; les aspirations éducatives des familles immigrées: Ambition et persévérance[END_REF].

The gap between aspirations and experience is a source of frustration, notably in families of North African origin. In the highly competitive school system, these discrepancies are amplified by the limited educational and cultural resources of the parents and by the difficulties arising from the unfamiliarity of the parents with the French school system. Many immigrant parents also have serious difficulties speaking French and often interact awkwardly with the schools. This offers background to the frustration expressed by the students questioned in 2002 as part of the 1995 panel [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗D'une génération à l'autre; les aspirations éducatives des familles immigrées: Ambition et persévérance[END_REF]. Only 17 per cent of the children of immigrants of Portuguese origin felt they had been unfairly streamed, but, among children in the North African group, the share was 25 per cent, and it was higher still, 42 per cent, if the children had been steered towards a vocational course.

Urban segregation and school segregation

The support of immigrant parents may be a factor in the educational success of the children, but is it able to offset the inequalities generated by the school system? Educational performance among immigrant groups provides indirect evidence on the extent of the equality of opportunity in the school system, that is, educational performance may be inhibited by segregation and discrimination according to immigrant origin.

A simple indicator of segregation is the distribution of students of foreign origin across schools. Such students represented 7 per cent, on average, of the primary school population in 1998-1999, but, in problem schools classified as priority education areas (zones d"éducation prioritiaires), they accounted for 22 per cent of the student body compared with only 5 per cent in non-problem schools [START_REF] Dpd | Direction de la programmation et du développement)[END_REF].

According to the most recent panel (panel 95, in 1998), 7 per cent of the pupils in native French families are enrolled in a priority education area middle school, while the corresponding share of children in immigrant families is 30 per cent. Among the latter, children of North African origin are more highly concentrated in these schools compared with children in families of Portuguese origin (37 and 12 per cent, respectively) [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗Les scolarités des enfants d'immigrés dans le secondaire: Des aspirations aux orientations[END_REF].

To carry out research on segregation in middle schools in the Bordeaux regional education system, [START_REF] Felouzis | ‗La ségrégation ethnique au collège et ses conséquences[END_REF] constructed an indicator based on the first names of students. He found that a small number of schools contained a large share of the students of North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish origin and that these students were concentrated in the worst problem schools. The study concluded that levels of segregation are much higher according to immigrant origin than according to social origin or educational underachievement.

Other research has shown that schools tend to reproduce the social divisions of local urban settings and may accentuate these divisions. Many parents deploy strategies to maximize the opportunities open to their children by seeking to circumvent place-of-residence restrictions on enrolments so their children may enjoy what is perceived as better schooling. There is thus a schooling market driven by representations of school quality and by the expectations of parents [START_REF] Broccolichi | ‗Espaces de concurrence et circuits de scolarisation: L'évitement des collèges publics d'un district de la banlieue parisienne[END_REF]Henriot-van Zanten 1997, Dubet 1999). A clear relationship appears to exist among the size of the immigrant component of school populations, school reputation and parental strategy (Henriot-van Zanten 2006). There are signs that families of immigrant origin are also embracing a consumer approach to the selection of schools, though the placeof-residence restrictions more often operate to their disadvantage [START_REF] Payet | ‗Mixités et ségrégations dans l'école urbaine[END_REF].

The response of schools to the choice strategies practised by parents involves instituting streaming and selection methods to implement internal segregation so as to limit the loss of the best pupils to public or private schools with better reputations. This means that students are guided towards low-ability classes on the basis of country of origin [START_REF] Payet | Collèges de banlieue: Ethnographie d"un monde scolaire[END_REF][START_REF] Barthon | ‗La ségrégation comme processus dans l'école et dans la ville[END_REF][START_REF] Debarbieux | Le désordre des choses, vol. 2 of La violence en milieu scolaire[END_REF]. The term ‗indirect discrimination' may be appropriate for describing this practice if there is no identifiable intention to harm a particular category of students (Lorcerie 2003a). In addition, there are contextual effects related to school quality that, research has shown, vary considerably across schools and across neighbourhoods (Vincent et al. 1992[START_REF] Rhein | Division sociale de l"espace et inégalités de scolarisation[END_REF][START_REF] Oberti | ‗Différentiation sociale et scolaire du territoire: Inégalités et configurations locales[END_REF].

The establishment of priority education areas was intended to correct these and other inequalities by allocating financial resources and staff to encourage smaller class sizes and provide specific support programmes in disadvantaged schools, which are identified, in part, according to the share of students of foreign origin. However, evaluations of this positive support have concluded that the impact is uncertain [START_REF] Meuret | ‗L'efficacité de la politique des Zones prioritaires dans les collèges[END_REF][START_REF] Moisan | Les déterminants de la réussite scolaire en zones d"éducation prioritaires[END_REF][START_REF] Bénabou | ‗Zones d'éducation prioritaires: Quels moyens pour quels résultats?; Une évaluation sur la période 1982-1992[END_REF].

Parental strategies, the school selection process, the streaming into special classes and indirect discrimination have a direct influence on the quality of educational outcomes [START_REF] Laacher | ‗Réussite au baccalauréat: Français et étrangers en Ile-de-France[END_REF]. Combined with direct discrimination and the inequalities in social and family capital, these factors are reflected in the educational trajectories and outcomes among children of immigrants [START_REF] Simon | Les discriminations ethniques dans la société française[END_REF]).

Significant research has been devoted to refuting the thesis that schools are oblivious to ethnic differences (Lorcerie 2003b, Perroton 2000a). Ethnicity forms an essential dimension of the experience of teachers and pupils alike [START_REF] Payet | Collèges de banlieue: Ethnographie d"un monde scolaire[END_REF]. References to ethnicity occur in relations between the school and families and in the judgements teachers make about students [START_REF] Perroton | ‗Ambiguïtés de l'ethnicisation des relations scolaires: L'exemple des relations école-familles à travers la mise en place d'un dispositif de médiation[END_REF][START_REF] Zirotti | ‗Pour une sociologie phénoménologique de l'altérité: La constitution des expériences scolaires des élèves issus de l'immigration[END_REF], Lorcerie 2003b). The attribution of ethnic characteristics to students by teachers is often countered by suspicions of injustice among students who are also then tempted to use ethnicity in their opposition to the school [START_REF] Rinaudo | ‗L'imputation de caractéristiques ethniques dans l'encadrement de la vie scolaire[END_REF][START_REF] Payet | ‗Expérience collégienne et origine ethnique: La civilité et la justice scolaires du point de vue des élèves français et des élèves étrangers ou issus de l'immigration[END_REF][START_REF] Debarbieux | ‗Le construit -ethnique‖ de la violence[END_REF]. This adds ethnic dimensions to some of the violence that occurs in schools [START_REF] Debarbieux | ‗Violence et ethnicisation dans l'école française[END_REF].

Youth and the labour market

Labour force participation rates are 48.4 per cent among young French men and 41.2 per cent among young French women (Table 12). The rates fall to 44.1 per cent among young foreignborn men and 34.5 per cent among young foreign-born women. Young foreign-born adults between 18 and 24 years of age are more likely to be outside the educational system and to be economically inactive. This is the case of 10.9 per cent of young foreign-born men compared with 6.8 per cent among young native French men. The gap is greater among young women, among whom the corresponding rates are 22.5 and 9.3 per cent, respectively. There are variations across immigrant groups. Young foreign-born women with European origin show a higher labour force participation rate (38.5 per cent) than their African (32.9 per cent) or Asian (33.1 per cent) counterparts. Similarly, 68.4 per cent of young foreign-born men with South European origin participate in the labour force compared with only 29.2 per cent of young men in the ‗other Africa' group and 18.6 per cent of young men in the ‗other Europe' group. Only 16.7 per cent of young men in the ‗other Europe' group and 23.5 per cent of young women in the ‗other Africa' group are employed, compared with 56.0 per cent of young women in the South of Europe group. Among the Turkish group, 62.5 per cent of the young men are employed compared with only 27.7 per cent of the young women.

Differential unemployment explained by discrimination

A large body of research has established that children of immigrants are at a disadvantage compared with native French children [START_REF] Richard | Partir ou rester? Destinées des jeunes issus de l"immigration étrangère en France[END_REF][START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗Au coeur du parcours migratoire; les investissements éducatifs des familles immigrées: Attentes et désillusions[END_REF]Werquin 1997, 1999;[START_REF] Canaméro | ‗Chômeurs étrangers et chômeurs d'origine étrangère[END_REF][START_REF] Dupray | ‗Quelles discriminations à l'encontre des jeunes d'origine maghrébine à l'entrée du marché du travail en France?[END_REF][START_REF] Frickey | ‗Les débuts dans la vie active des jeunes après des études supérieures[END_REF][START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF]Silberman andFournier 1999, 2006). The results of these studies are consistent with many qualitative observations that identify mechanisms of discrimination in access to training courses, public service assistance in job searches and the private sector labour market (Aubert et al. 1997[START_REF] Noël | ‗La face cachée de l'intégration: Les discriminations institutionnelles à l'embauche[END_REF][START_REF] Bataille | Le racisme au travail[END_REF][START_REF] Beaud | Retour sur la condition ouvrière: Enquête aux usines Peugeot de Sochaux-Montbéliard[END_REF]. While differences in educational success are explained largely by social origin and parental educational attainment, this is not true in the labour market, where differential results among groups must in part be attributed to the effects of discrimination [START_REF] Silberman | ‗Les secondes générations sur le marché du travail en France: Une pénalité ethnique ancrée dans le temps[END_REF]. In the ranking of the reasons given by youth of immigrant origin for stigma and injustice, the perception of racism is closely associated with the issues of labour market success and unemployment [START_REF] Galland | ‗Jeunes: Les stigmatisations de l'apparence[END_REF]. [START_REF] Silberman | ‗Les secondes générations sur le marché du travail en France: Une pénalité ethnique ancrée dans le temps[END_REF] use two waves of the surveys of the Centre for Research on Education, Training and Employmentgeneration 92 and generation 98to examine the conditions of labour market access among various groups of young people over 10 years (1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003). Thanks to a brief phase of economic expansion, the cohort that left school in 1998 entered the labour market under generally more favourable conditions than the 1992 cohort. Among young people of both sexes whose parents were born in France, the level of unemployment had declined overall three years after they had left school. Young people who were children of immigrants participated in this general trend, but there were large differences across immigrant groups. Young people of North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish origin showed much higher unemployment, nearly double in some cases, than the reference population (the group with French parents). The difference relative to the reference population was smaller, though marked, among the South East Asian group. Among the children of immigrants in the Portuguese group, there was practically no difference. For this reason, [START_REF] Silberman | ‗Les secondes générations sur le marché du travail en France: Une pénalité ethnique ancrée dans le temps[END_REF] speak of an ethnic penalty for the North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish groups.

Despite the limitations of the data set, which does not distinguish the descendants of immigrants from the descendants of French nationals born abroad, [START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF] are able to use the results of the family history survey to show that the second generation has serious difficulties finding work. Like their parents, though to a lesser degree, secondgeneration youth experience higher unemployment (between 1.5 and 2.0 times higher) than native French youth, and the risk of unemployment remains significant among youth of mixed parentage. However, the disadvantage is not identical among all groups. As in [START_REF] Silberman | ‗Les secondes générations sur le marché du travail en France: Une pénalité ethnique ancrée dans le temps[END_REF], [START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF] find no significant difference in the results between the second generation of southern European origin and the offspring of the native French. Between the native French and the second generation of North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish origin, however, the differences are substantial even if one controls for personal characteristics such as educational level, social origin and family size. [START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF] also show that possession of French nationality has no major effect on the risk of unemployment among children in various immigrant groups. They find that the length of residence in France has an effect. This confirms the results of other studies [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗Au coeur du parcours migratoire; les investissements éducatifs des familles immigrées: Attentes et désillusions[END_REF]Werquin 1999, Richard 2004), but, because it is the same across all groups irrespective of origin, it cannot explain the differences between groups. [START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF] are unable to find evidence to confirm the popular hypothesis that boys encounter more discrimination than girls. They do find that, as other research has suggested, the level of economic inactivity is particularly high among young women of North African origin and young women of Turkish origin (see [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗Des parcours semés d'embûches: L'insertion professionnelle des jeunes d'origine maghrébine en France[END_REF][START_REF] Dupray | ‗Quelles discriminations à l'encontre des jeunes d'origine maghrébine à l'entrée du marché du travail en France?[END_REF][START_REF] Frickey | ‗Les débuts dans la vie active des jeunes après des études supérieures[END_REF].

In an environment of labour market discrimination, public sector employment may represent a refuge for groups at risk. [START_REF] Silberman | ‗Les secondes générations sur le marché du travail en France: Une pénalité ethnique ancrée dans le temps[END_REF] examine the proportion of young people of North African and sub-Saharan African origin in public sector employment compared with young people of Portuguese origin, and they find no evidence of a penalty that might indicate job discrimination. [START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF] suggest, however, that access to civil service jobs is characterized by persistent inequalities (see also [START_REF] Fougère | ‗L'emploi public s'est-il diversifié? Sexe, niveau d'étude, origine sociale et origine nationale des salariés de la fonction publique[END_REF]. In addition to the examinationbased recruitment procedure that favours individuals with sociocultural profiles that are less common among the children of immigrants, there are numerous legal restrictions on the access of foreigners to civil service jobs [START_REF] Calvès | Renouvellement démographique de la fonction publique de l"État: Vers une intégration prioritaire des Français issus de l"immigration?[END_REF][START_REF] Peres | ‗L'accès aux fonctions publiques des jeunes d'origine immigrée[END_REF][START_REF] Geld | ‗Une forme méconnue de discrimination: Les emplois fermés aux étrangers[END_REF]. Although levels of public sector employment do not differ greatly between the offspring of immigrants and native French offspring, the children of immigrants are more likely to have less secure work contracts in subsidized jobs in non-competitive sectors [START_REF] Viprey | ‗L'insertion des jeunes d'origine étrangère[END_REF]. The children of immigrants have more difficulty obtaining fully tenured civil service positions, regardless of their nationality and qualifications. Among men aged 18-40, only 4 per cent of French nationals of immigrant origin are tenured civil servants compared with 11 per cent among the native French; among women, the respective shares are 6 and 18 per cent [START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF].

Measured by the incidence of subsidized jobs, part-time work, short-term contracts, apprenticeships and so on, job insecurity affects young adults of North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish origin more than young adults in other groups. Whereas the offspring of the native French experience the least job insecurity (19 per cent of all jobs among the group), it affects more than a quarter of the North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish groups. The second generation of Turkish origin appears particularly vulnerable: 36 per cent of young women and 41 per cent of young men have insecure jobs [START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF].

Qualifications offer little protection

It is known that the main determinant of differences in unemployment rates across groups is educational attainment. This is so especially because of shifts in production that have massively reduced the share of unskilled jobs, while the skill requirements for rank-and-file jobs have tended to rise.

The analysis by [START_REF] Silberman | ‗Les secondes générations sur le marché du travail en France: Une pénalité ethnique ancrée dans le temps[END_REF] of the two cohorts, 1992 and 1998, shows a generalized inflation in qualifications over the period. The share of young people leaving secondary schooling with no qualification fell from 33 to 19 per cent between the two cohorts. Thus, among the 1992 cohort, a large share of young people in the Portuguese group were still leaving the non-academic streams with no qualification (40 per cent of boys and 31 per cent of girls), but the proportion fell sharply in the next cohort. These young people seem to have been affected by the general trend towards fewer low-level jobs, upskilling, and, particularly, the expansion in vocational training. The Portuguese group already had a considerable presence in the vocational streams, and this increased over the period. The Portuguese group was being oriented more and more towards higher education and, over the period, overtook the North African group in this indicator.

Among the North African group, meanwhile, a significant share, notably of boys, was still leaving school with limited qualifications. Youth in the North African group were still not participating fully in the general shift towards vocational courses, where they are now outnumbered by the Portuguese group, but also, in some areas, by the more recent sub-Saharan and Turkish immigrant groups. The North African group is also not benefiting fully from the general growth in the number of young people obtaining intermediate and degreelevel qualifications in post-secondary education. This group shows a persistent preference for mainstream curricula, reflecting its strong academic ambitions [START_REF] Brinbaum | ‗Au coeur du parcours migratoire; les investissements éducatifs des familles immigrées: Attentes et désillusions[END_REF], but there are now also signs of a lack of success and stagnation in other areas that contrast with the expansion in the upper reaches of the qualifications hierarchy. [START_REF] Silberman | ‗Les secondes générations sur le marché du travail en France: Une pénalité ethnique ancrée dans le temps[END_REF] show that, even under improving conditions, the least well qualified are losing ground to young people with intermediate or higher vocational qualifications and that, in this respect, the North African group is still relatively disadvantaged. Moreover, they show that, three years after entering the labour market, young men and women of North African origin holding a baccalauréat or higher degree were still paying a heavy immigrant penalty. They suggest that this penalty is the result of statistical discrimination, which operates as follows. In conditions of imperfect information, potential employers recruit according to the perceived average characteristics of the group to which candidates belong; hence, they tend to apply these characteristics to all individuals in the group, including the most highly qualified. Because the North African group presents unfavourable average characteristics, potential employers systematically show more negative expectations. Along with any discrimination of a more directly racial nature, this may explain the penalty suffered by the highly qualified children of immigrants.

The inequality in labour market returns to educational qualifications according to the origin of young people is confirmed by [START_REF] Simon | ‗La question de la seconde génération en France: Mobilité sociale et discrimination[END_REF], who uses the data set of the family history survey to examine conditions among the 18-40 age group of Moroccan, Portuguese and Turkish origin relative to the national average (see also [START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF]. He finds that people of Moroccan or Turkish origin who have attained higher educational qualifications show high unemployment rates relative to other groups at the same qualification levels. Unemployment among the second generation of Turkish origin is twice the national level among the same age groups. Despite their high level of educational qualifications, the second generation of Moroccan origin also faces difficulties in gaining access to the labour market. Meanwhile, the second generation of Portuguese origin seems to be relatively well protected and shows unemployment rates comparable with the national average. In the case of the Moroccan and Turkish groups, the disparities are larger among the 1.5 generation (people who themselves were immigrants at a young age), who show unemployment rates close to the rates among their immigrant parents. The fact of receiving part of their education and socialization in France has therefore not had the effect of improving the employability of these immigrants.

The above results are based on averages among groups. However, in the citéslarge social housing projectsbetween 1990 and 1999, unemployment rates rose more rapidly than the country averages because the majority of the categories affected by the deteriorating labour market conditions, particularly immigrant groups and youth, were living in the cités [START_REF] Le Toqueux | ‗Les ZUS: Forte progression du chômage entre 1990 et 1999[END_REF]. After controlling for selected variables, including place of residence, age group, family status, family size, national origin and educational attainment, the National Observatory of Sensitive Urban Areas found that area of residence has a residual effect on unemployment among men and among women living in neighbourhoods officially designated as part of sensitive urban areas (zones urbaines sensibles) [START_REF] Onzus | Rapport 2004, Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville[END_REF]. In 2003, unemployment among individuals who possessed a secondary school diploma, a vocational diploma, or equivalent qualification was 17.7 per cent in these areas compared with an average 8.7 per cent for metropolitan France; the respective shares were 10.8 and 6.0 per cent for intermediate qualifications and 11.0 and 7.6 per cent for higher level qualifications (INSEE 2003). Between 2003 and2004, the share of highly qualified jobseekers rose by 4.3 per cent among individuals with intermediate and higher level qualifications living in sensitive urban areas compared with 2.0 per cent nationally, although the overall share of job-seekers living in these areas fell by 1.6 per cent over the same period as a result of the upturn in the French economy [START_REF] Onzus | Rapport 2004, Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville[END_REF].

To democratize the French education system (la démocratisation scolaire), a goal was set in 1985 of raising the secondary school completion rate (baccalauréat) to 80 per cent among each age group (80% d"une generation au bac). A survey in neighbourhoods containing cités and large immigrant populations captured the disillusionment and disappointment among young people living in these neighbourhoods with respect to the efforts at educational democratization [START_REF] Beaud | au Bac, Et après?: Les enfants de la démocratisation scolaire[END_REF]. While there had been an overall increase in educational attainment and, in some cases, opportunities for upward social mobility, many young people were still failing to advance to university and were paying a high psychological cost. A survey among youth of North African origin who had grown up in the same neighbourhood in a municipality near Lyon found that most who had achieved professional success had left the neighbourhood [START_REF] Santelli | ‗Les jeunes de banlieue d'origine maghrébine: Entre galère et emploi stable, quel devenir?[END_REF].

Social trajectories: mobility or exclusion?

The conditions for entry into the labour market have become more difficult for young people generally [START_REF] Chauvel | Le destin des générations: Structures sociales et cohortes en France au XXe siècle[END_REF]), but the children of immigrants are especially affected on account of their social origin, their limited personal networks and the discrimination they face. Nonetheless, educational attainment among the children of immigrants is generally higher than that of their parents [START_REF] Meurs | ‗The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France[END_REF]. The trajectories of labour market inclusion followed by members of the second generation are differentiated by origin, however, notably because of the selective nature of the discrimination acting particularly on young people in the North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish groups. For example, it has been shown that intergenerational mobility was on a generally upward trend among the children of immigrants beginning in the 1980s, but that, among youth of North African origin, many were trapped in persistent poverty [START_REF] Borkowski | ‗L'insertion sociale des immigrés et de leurs enfants[END_REF]). The educational difficulties and high unemployment experienced by these young people seem to lend credibility to the notion that their opportunities for social mobility are more limited [START_REF] Simon | ‗La question de la seconde génération en France: Mobilité sociale et discrimination[END_REF].

Research indicates that the type of jobs to which these young people have access changes considerably across generations, but that, if one allows for the general trend in educational attainment and in employment, there is also evidence for the reproduction in occupational status among immigrant groups [START_REF] Simon | ‗La question de la seconde génération en France: Mobilité sociale et discrimination[END_REF]. Similar to their parents, the children of immigrants are overrepresented in low-skill jobs and in sectors that are more exposed to fluctuating economic conditions [START_REF] Tanay | ‗Les salariés étrangers: Loin des secteurs porteurs et des positions valorisées[END_REF]; see also [START_REF] Gaymut | ‗Les débuts dans la vie active des jeunes immigrés et des jeunes d'origine étrangère[END_REF]Parant 1996, Silberman and[START_REF] Silberman | ‗Les enfants d'immigrés sur le marché du travail: Les mécanismes d'une discrimination sélective[END_REF].

Meanwhile, the marked occupational segregation characteristic of the first generation has declined among the second generation, but there is still selective specialization. Thus, the analysis by [START_REF] Lainé | ‗Jeunes de parents immigrés: De l'école au métier[END_REF], which is based on data of the generation 98 survey, shows that, while these young people are working in somewhat different sectors relative to their parents, they also tend to specialize in certain areas of activity, particularly at the start of their working lives. Lainé and Okba compare the jobs held by young people of immigrant origin with those held by adult immigrants aged 35 or older. They find that the intergenerational discontinuity is greatest among young women of immigrant origin who are concentrated in administrative occupations in the services sector. However, young women in the North African group have become more specialized in the industrial sector and in unskilled jobs relative to young women in the southern European group, who are strongly specialized in sales, personal services and administration. [START_REF] Lainé | ‗Jeunes de parents immigrés: De l'école au métier[END_REF] do not find that there is specialization in the industrial sector among young men of North African origin. This represents a major discontinuity with the occupational profiles of their fathers. Instead, these young men favour employment in services, notably social services, but also in low-skilled occupations such as cleaning and caretaking. The administrative services sector (in administration, banking, insurance, the civil service) and teaching and training attract relatively few young men of North African origin.

There is also continuity among the children of immigrants from southern Europe. These tend to find jobs in construction and in the industrial sector. Because many of these young people have jobs in construction even though this is not so predominant in the training they receive, their example supports the hypothesis that there are immigrant niches in the labour market that are founded on social networks. The overrepresentation of youth of North African origin in the social services sector must be viewed in light of the ambitious policy the Government implemented in 1998-2001 through the introduction of employment schemes (emploisjeunes) among these youth. The subsidized employment schemes were aimed at offsetting weaknesses in social capital among youth of North African origin. Significant numbers were thus attracted into social work even though this choice of occupation was not obvious given the type of education these youth had received.

Because the unemployment rates among fathers of North African origin are three times the rates among their Portuguese counterparts and because most of the mothers are not economically active, the families are limited in their ability to use networks to help their offspring gain access to the labour market [START_REF] Silberman | ‗Les enfants d'immigrés sur le marché du travail: Les mécanismes d'une discrimination sélective[END_REF]. The theory of segmented assimilation, according to which the social capital of individuals is a factor in their inclusion in the labour market, thus seems more useful in analysing the case of children in the Portuguese group than the case of children in the North African group [START_REF] Portes | ‗The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants[END_REF]. [START_REF] Safi | ‗Le processus d'intégration des immigrés en France: Inégalités et segmentation[END_REF] has shown that the Portuguese in France, but also Asians and Turks, follow the segmented assimilation model more closely. Strong community ties and greater socioeconomic success are more characteristic of these groups than of the North African group or the sub-Saharan African group. However, as Safi points out, one outcome is to slow the acculturation of the former groups, particularly the Asians and the Turks (see also [START_REF] Dubet | ‗Trois processus migratoires[END_REF].

Socialization and identity

Socialization and the hypothesis of an inner city sub-culture

Socialization among the second generation of Algerian, Portuguese, or Spanish origin is comparable to that among their native French peers. When they join associations, it is invariably to practice a leisure activity; they rarely join religious or community associations.

Similarly, only a small share of the children of Portuguese immigrants, who are said to have closer ties with the Portuguese community, join such associations [START_REF] Tribalat | Faire France: Une grande enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants[END_REF].

Relationships with people of the same origin living in the same neighbourhood play only a limited role in socialization among immigrant minority youth [START_REF] Tribalat | Faire France: Une grande enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants[END_REF]. Such relationships are important only among 18 per cent of young people with two Algerian parents and 11 per cent of young people with two Portuguese parents (half as frequently as the preceding generation). Young people with mixed French and immigrant parents typically maintain relationships only with their French peers.

Nonetheless, young second-generation Algerians or Portuguese living in neighbourhoods with a dominant non-immigrant population tend not to have community relations at all, unlike their peers living in immigrant neighbourhoods. The share of second-generation Algerian youth who socialize within their communities rises from 7 per cent in nonimmigrant neighbourhoods to 11 per cent in neighbourhoods populated by immigrants of diverse origin and to 35 per cent in neighbourhoods with immigrants of the same origin. The shares are similar among young people in the Portuguese and Spanish groups. Still, even in non-immigrant neighbourhoods, the share of neighbourhood relations with native French is lower among young second-generation Algerians (about a third) than among their Portuguese or Spanish counterparts (around half).

More than other groups, the North African group tends to live within immigrant communities or immigrant areas, which explains their more limited social relationships with French people who are not of immigrant origin. The cités are products of residential segregation and form a relatively hermetic environment that fosters relationships formed early in childhood with peers [START_REF] Duret | Anthropologie de la fraternité dans les cités[END_REF][START_REF] Bordet | Les jeunes de la cité[END_REF][START_REF] Rinaudo | L"ethnicité dans la cité[END_REF]. Although young people use an ethnic jargon to distinguish themselves, ethnic identity does not appear to be a determining factor in the formation of social networks [START_REF] Lepoutre | Coeur de banlieue: Codes, rites et langages[END_REF][START_REF] Streiff-Fénart | ‗A propos des valeurs en situation d'immigration: Questions de recherche et bilan des travaux[END_REF]. Nonetheless, though mixed ethnicity is the norm in relationships, the separation between young people is fairly hermetic in terms of sexual relationships. Flirting, a vital component of juvenile social behaviour, is excluded, and, to meet with boys, most girls are obliged to hide in a private space or leave the cités [START_REF] Lagrange | Les jeunes, le sexe et l"amour[END_REF][START_REF] Vaissière | ‗Les socialibilités adolescentes dans les quartiers difficiles[END_REF]. [START_REF] Streiff-Fénart | ‗A propos des valeurs en situation d'immigration: Questions de recherche et bilan des travaux[END_REF] points out that the literature on the social practices of young people who live in the cités vacillates between two extremes. The optimistic school of thought sees the youth sub-culture in the cités as a means used by youth to identify their space and as evidence of cultural and artistic dynamism (Lepoutre 1997, Boucher andVulbeau 2003). In a classic description of what he called la galère (the galley), [START_REF] Dubet | La galère: Jeunes en survie[END_REF], who might be said to represent the pessimistic school of thought, refutes the existence of such a sub-culture in the cités and, instead, stresses the blend of social disintegration and exclusion that produces in the cités the excess of violence that he qualifies as rage.

In a survey carried out in cités in Hauts-de-Seine, a department in the western suburbs of Paris, [START_REF] Kokoreff | La force des quartiers: De la délinquance à l"engagement politique[END_REF] demonstrates the inherent difficulties in any generalization. He believes that suburban youth (jeunes de banlieue) as a category do not exist. Youth in the cités are not all galériens (galley slaves), but are also participants in the school system and holders of temporary jobs who oscillate between periods of activity and periods of inactivity.

Only the galériens make a career of petty delinquency (délinquance peu spectaculaire) and shady business, usually involving the sale or purchase of cannabis. Like Dubet, Kokoreff claims that determining who the galériens are is difficult because youth in the cités shift often among roles that are extremely porous, reflecting the chronic instability in which they live.

Interpretations of delinquency among young people in the cités also vacillate between two extremes. At one level is the discrepancy between the existence of cultural inclusion and the lack of economic inclusion among young people because of deterioration in the labour market, racial discrimination and criminalization by the police and the legal system [START_REF] Dubet | Quartiers d"exil[END_REF][START_REF] Villechaise | ‗La banlieue sans qualités: Absence d'identité collective dans les grands ensembles[END_REF][START_REF] Mucchielli | ‗Délinquance et immigration en France: Un regard sociologique[END_REF][START_REF] Beaud | Violences urbaines, violence sociale[END_REF][START_REF] Sicot | ‗Conflits de culture et déviance des jeunes de banlieue[END_REF]. According to [START_REF] Sicot | ‗Conflits de culture et déviance des jeunes de banlieue[END_REF], studying the purely ethnic component of delinquency remains a taboo among researchers because of the explosive nature of the subject in the French political context. On another level (this is Sicot's stance), the cultural conflict theory should be used to understand the meaning of these aberrations, but without attributing to ethnic minority youth a culture that is inappropriate. Rather, culture among youth in the cités is devalued. This leads to tensions and strong feelings of injustice, which, in turn, neutralize dominant moral standards and generate an attitude of us against them.

Several studies stress that ethnic minority youth are overrepresented in the prison population, especially youth of North African origin, and explain this through reference to specific psychological conflicts, relational context, or repressive institutions (Moumen-Marcoux 1998, [START_REF] Zanna | ‗L'entrée en délinquance de mineurs incarcérés: Analyse comparative entre des jeunes -d'origine française‖ et des jeunes -d'origine maghrébine‖[END_REF]Lacombe 2005, Jobard and[START_REF] Jobard | ‗La couleur du jugement: Discriminations dans les décisions judiciaires en matière d'infraction à agents de la force publique (1965-2005)[END_REF].

Schiff (2002) suggests that young people in the North African and sub-Saharan African groups who are usually living in the suburbs see the cités as places with which they collectively identify, while being pessimistic about the opportunities for inclusion. In contrast, youth in new immigrant flows from Sri Lanka and Turkey, for example, avoid identifying too much with the places where they live and embrace other values around work, money and leisure time. Their relationship with French society is thereby less problematic.

Affirmations of identity and the feeling of national belonging

In the political and normative version, the French model of integration attempts to neutralize any collective recognition of immigrant origins. The aim is to transform immigrants into French citizens within a generation by providing access to nationality and by limiting the transmission of immigrant identities and practices, thereby preventing the reproduction of the specificities inherited through immigration. In this respect, the concept of a second generation is in contradiction with the ideal of assimilation expounded in the French model. The agents of inclusion are the schools, social institutions and the army. These are supported through social scientific theory in France, which is wary of ethnic identity, tending to view it as an imposed assignment of identity [START_REF] Simon | ‗La question de la seconde génération en France: Mobilité sociale et discrimination[END_REF].

The emergence of second-generation North Africans as collective actors in the mid-1980s represented the first significant challenge to the convention of ethnic invisibility in the public space. La marche des beurs (the march of the beurs)a movement among the second generation of Algerian origin (beurs in French slang)showed that French North Africans who were demanding a new type of citizenship, that is, the possibility of maintaining the diversity of individual identities and cultures in a common political framework, could become a political force (Wenden 1987[START_REF] Bouamama | La citoyenneté dans tous ses états: De l"immigration à la nouvelle citoyenneté[END_REF]). However, this appearance in the political arena was short-lived because young people of North African origin were unable to express their demands beyond a call for the end of racism and for improvements in living conditions in poor suburbs [START_REF] Lapeyronnie | ‗Assimilation, mobilisation et action collective chez les jeunes de la seconde génération de l'immigration maghrébine[END_REF]. Instead of helping to construct an identity momentum, the beur movement rapidly split into numerous small local groups, the demands of which were based on politics rather than identity, while the leaders drifted into local or national political careers [START_REF] Dubet | Quartiers d"exil[END_REF]. Moreover, many of the groups established by militant second-generation North Africans appeared motivated more by a desire for inclusion in the workforce rather than for collective action with political aims or demands linked to identity [START_REF] Baillet | ‗Jeunes d'origine maghrébine dans l'espace associatif et politique[END_REF]. Nonetheless, although these second-generation ethnic minorities are less likely than their native French counterparts to register to vote or take part in elections, French North Africans began to attract the attention of established political parties interested in finding new votes [START_REF] Brouard | Français comme les autres? Enquête sur les Français issus de l"immigration maghrébine, africaine et turque[END_REF]Tiberj 2005, Geisser 1997).

Qualitative studies on the children of immigrants, particularly second-generation North Africans, show that these people encounter persistent difficulties in expressing their collective identity. Individually, especially the young appear to be caught between a propensity to remember the origins of their parents and a refusal to accept these origins as the main component of their identity [START_REF] Guénif Souilamas | Des "beurettes" aux descendantes d"immigrants nordafricains[END_REF]. Whenever ethnic agents emerge at all, they usually resist the abstract universalism imposed on them by those in society who suspect them of being merely unable to follow the dominant social norm [START_REF] Boubeker | Les mondes de l"ethnicité: La communauté d"expérience des héritiers de l"immigration maghrébine[END_REF]. Thus, ethnicity is rarely considered a point of departure for inclusion, but, rather, the result of a lack of adaption to the dominant society and a failure to deconstruct the community of origin. In this perspective, ethnicity involves a newly invented identity composed of borrowings from the contemporary society in the country of settlement and an imagined past in a community that has ceased to exist [START_REF] Roy | ‗Ethnicité, bandes et communautarisme[END_REF].

The relationship these young people have with Islam is symbolic of this process. The increasing visibility of Islam in the public spacedemands for mosques, women who wear hijab (veils or other body coverings), the establishment of the French Council of the Muslim Faith, and so onhas been accompanied by a trend towards secularism among immigrants from Muslim countries [START_REF] Streiff-Fénart | ‗A propos des valeurs en situation d'immigration: Questions de recherche et bilan des travaux[END_REF]. A survey conducted by the Centre for Political Research at Sciences Po has found that religious practice is weakening among young people of North African origin, especially Algerians, who represent the oldest North African immigration flow in France. A convergence of religious practice among immigrants and the native French is occurring among the second generation. Thus, 25 per cent of secondgeneration Algerian youth said they did not follow a religion, which is close to the average among the French population [START_REF] Brouard | Français comme les autres? Enquête sur les Français issus de l"immigration maghrébine, africaine et turque[END_REF]. The Islam that is practised by the majority of young Muslims is secular, tolerant and inclusive. In the private sphere, these values are frequently combined with other social principles, such as gender equality. Young people of the second generation or who have immigrated to France and done their schooling in France consider Islam part of their family and cultural heritage, but are not generally strict religionists, and the religious prescriptions they do follow are not necessarily the most obvious ones [START_REF] Césari | Musulmans et républicains: Les jeunes, l"islam et la France[END_REF][START_REF] Flanquart | Croyances et valeurs chez les jeunes Maghrébins[END_REF].

Even young women wishing to wear hijab claim their right to be both French and Muslim [START_REF] Venel | Musulmans et citoyens[END_REF]). These young women often attend schools veiled, and many are now being seen among the middle class [START_REF] Khosrokhavar | ‗L'universel abstrait, le politique et la construction de l'islamisme comme forme d'altérité[END_REF]. Their entry into politics has been accompanied by the emergence of a movement among young women that is called Ni putes ni soumises (we are not whores, nor are we submissive) that, through feminist solidarity and campaigns against the violence of men in the cités, has extended and renewed the image of the daughters of immigrants as leaders in the struggle for the freedom and equality of women in the country [START_REF] Streiff-Fénart | ‗A propos des valeurs en situation d'immigration: Questions de recherche et bilan des travaux[END_REF].

Only a small, mostly male minority adheres exclusively to the umma (community of believers). Suffering from a sense of exclusion, these young people are recruited in marginalized neighourhoods. In religious associations, they find the social contacts that they need and that social workers cannot provide [START_REF] Bouzar | ‗Islam et reconstruction identitaire des jeunes en difficulté[END_REF].

Nonetheless, the borders between fundamentalism and secularized Islam are not hermetic, and the many paths into and out of fundamentalism demonstrate the weaknesses of redemptive Islam [START_REF] Césari | Musulmans et républicains: Les jeunes, l"islam et la France[END_REF].

Whereas the movements among young people of North African origin that are aimed at highlighting and manifesting the identity of the community are well known to the media and to researchers, similar movements among second-generation Portuguese are less well known because they are less visible. Second-generation Portuguese took an active part in the demonstrations in 1980s, but Portugal's accession to the EU and the cultural policy of the Portuguese Government that was targeted specifically at these people changed the dynamics. There are many new cultural associations for second-generation Portuguese, and multiple identitiesnational, dual national and Europeanhave been recognized and embraced [START_REF] Pingault | ‗Jeunes issus de l'immigration portugaise: Affirmation identitaire dans les espaces politiques nationaux[END_REF][START_REF] Barre | Identités multiples en Europe? Le cas des lusodescendants en France[END_REF].

The sentiments of national identity among all children of immigrants, not only the Portuguese, reveal the decline of a model according to which belonging to a nation, as expressed by the legal ties of nationality, dominates all other ties, religious, political, or cultural, the expression of which is restricted to the private sphere. The second generation has freed itself from sentiments of nationality. A survey among teenagers who had been affected between 1994 and 1998 by the law requiring young people to request French nationality suggests that nationality, whether French or foreign, is no longer an important component of identity. Certainly, the young interviewees generally agreed that they needed French identity cards to gain access to the same opportunities as the French, but they had few illusions about the egalitarian nature of French society. These young people are neither completely French, nor, because they have been born in France, are they really foreigners; they often see themselves as midway between the two. Nonetheless, they do not seem torn between the two; they have disassociated identity and nationality [START_REF] Ribert | Liberté, égalité, carte d"identité: Les jeunes issus de l"immigration et l"appartenance nationale[END_REF]. Nor is this a characteristic specific to children of immigrants. While the path to national identity is usually longer among them, the decline in sentiments of nationality is a general phenomenon among youth in France, among whom this decline is more evident than it is among other young Europeans [START_REF] Galland | ‗Les jeunes, l'armée et la nation[END_REF].

The debate over the French model of integration

The French model of integration is often represented as the historic realization of a concept of citizenship involving a direct relationship between the individual and society and based on a political contract that banishes all cultural, ethnic and identity issues from the public domain and relegates them to the private sphere [START_REF] Schnapper | La communauté des citoyens: Sur l"idée moderne de nation[END_REF]. However, historians and sociologists have stressed the paradoxes inherent in a model that ignores the inclusion of successive waves of immigrants by means of social struggle and that hides chauvinism and racism under a veneer of universalism, while focusing on a specifically French notion of integration [START_REF] Noiriel | ‗Petite histoire de l'intégration à la française: L'insertion des immigrants dans la société française est-elle, comme on le prétend, le produit d'une politique spécifique à la République?[END_REF][START_REF] Sayad | ‗Qu'est-ce que l'intégration?[END_REF]).

Much research has been devoted to the debate on the current version of the French model of integration, ethnic and racial discrimination, the destabilization of secularism because of the emergence of French Islam, the colonial legacy and the history of slavery [START_REF] Amiraux | ‗There Are No Minorities Here: Cultures of Scholarship and Public Debate on Immigrants and Integration in France[END_REF][START_REF] Simon | ‗La crise du modèle d'intégration[END_REF]. The riots that have been recurring in impoverished French suburbs in recent decades are the most tangible evidence of the importance of the issues in this debate. Some observers have emphasized that the violence has targeted French republican institutions [START_REF] Body-Gendrot | Les villes face à l"insécurité: Des ghettos americains aux banlieues francaises[END_REF][START_REF] Lapeyronnie | ‗Contre-monde: Imitation, opposition, exclusion[END_REF], Wieviorka 1999, Lagrange and Oberti 2006). These institutions, they claim, are the focus of anger among young people because the institutions are unable to provide real content to the professed value of equality or satisfy the social aspirations of the second generation in immigrant groups who have been ghettoized. They refer to the quasi-colonial administration of neighbourhoods and to abusive police practices as two of the reasons for the violence.

An equal number of studies point the finger more directly at segregation as the cause of the urban crisis [START_REF] Maurin | Le ghetto français: Enquête sur la ségrégation urbaine[END_REF][START_REF] Donzelot | ‗La ville à trois vitesses: Gentrification, relégation, péri-urbanisation[END_REF]). Yet, because of restrictions on the collection of statistics based on ethnicity, acquiring concrete information on the specific distribution of ethnic groups is problematic in France. Quantitative studies of segregation usually rely solely on statistics on immigrant groups according to country of origin, with additional distinctions between the EU and the rest of the world [START_REF] Champion | ‗Les quartiers -en convention‖[END_REF]. Consequently, data on ethnic concentrations in residential areas are approximate [START_REF] Lelévrier | ‗Politique de la ville et regroupements d'immigrés[END_REF]. Some studies have therefore taken the category immigrant into account. These show that immigrant workers of Portuguese and Spanish origin live apart from immigrants as a whole, whereas immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, Turkey and South East Asia each represent 40-50 per cent of the populations in separate, highly concentrated blocks in immigrant areas [START_REF] Simon | Les immigrés et le logement: Une singularité qui s"atténue[END_REF].

The National Observatory of Sensitive Urban Areas estimates that 18.3 per cent of all immigrants live in sensitive urban areas that have a high concentration of social difficulties (ONZUS 2004; see elsewhere above). Numerous indicators show that sensitive urban areas are characterized by a high incidence of poverty [START_REF] Aldeghi | ‗Les aspects territoriaux de la pauvreté et de la précarité dans la société française contemporaire[END_REF]. However, money or material poverty and underprivileged social classthe overrepresentation of blue-collar workers, clerical workers and the economically inactiveare not the sole explanations for the disadvantage of the inhabitants of these areas. Inhabitants of sensitive urban areas are exposed to numerous other social risks, including lack of regular employment, academic failure, health problems, insecurity and poor transportation infrastructure, that reflect inequalities in the opportunity to access effective services in education and training, employment, transportation, health care and culture [START_REF] Choffel | ‗Une approche statistique des quartiers de la politique de la ville[END_REF]Le Toqueux 1997, Fitoussi et al. 2004).

Recent research has attempted to shed light on the differential discriminatory treatment, whether systemic or indirect, to which ethnic minority youth are subject in various areas of local government policy. Social housing, health care, law enforcement, the legal system and the army, as well as schooling and access to employment (see elsewhere above), have all been studied from this angle [START_REF] Kirszbaum | ‗Les discriminations raciales et ethniques dans l'accès au logement social[END_REF][START_REF] Carde | ‗Les discriminations selon l'origine dans l'accès aux soins[END_REF][START_REF] Body-Gendrot | Police et discriminations raciales: Le tabou français[END_REF][START_REF] Jobard | ‗La couleur du jugement: Discriminations dans les décisions judiciaires en matière d'infraction à agents de la force publique (1965-2005)[END_REF][START_REF] Bertossi | Les couleurs du drapeau: L"armée française face aux discriminations[END_REF].

The controversy over the French model appears to have arisen mainly because of the scope and extent of discrimination. The slow response of the authorities and of French society in coming to grips with the issue of discrimination has been widely discussed [START_REF] Fassin | ‗L'invention française de la discrimination: Le racisme comme inégalité illégitime[END_REF]. The subject of ethnic discrimination was first addressed only at the end of the 1990s under pressure from the EU [START_REF] Calvès | ‗Il n'y a pas de race ici: Le modèle français à l'épreuve de l'intégration européenne[END_REF]. The restrictions on the development of the statistics on ethnicity that would facilitate the measurement of discrimination, as well as the persistence of institutions in drawing attention to the alleged disadvantages and social and cultural specificities of the victims of discrimination, serve to maintain the confusion between the logic of inclusion and integration and the fight against discrimination (Streiff-Fénart 2002, Simon and[START_REF] Simon | ‗Les politiques anti-discrimination et les statistiques: paramètres d'une incohérence[END_REF].

The policy of integration is hardly free of paradoxes. Institutional practice is often in contradiction with the principle of avoiding public recognition of individual ethnic communities or differentiating among people according to ethnic origin. The urban policy of reliance on community associations in poor ethnic minority neighbourhoods, the allocation of social housing in these neighbourhoods and the use of second-generation ethnic minority youth as mediators are all symbolic of the contradictions [START_REF] Joseph | ‗Le bien commun des villes[END_REF][START_REF] Epstein | ‗Les élus locaux et l'intégration des immigrés[END_REF][START_REF] Kirszbaum | ‗Les immigrés dans les politiques de l'habitat: Variations locales sur le thème de la diversité[END_REF]). The vocabulary used in government policy, which makes ‗children of migrants' a policy category, reinforces the designation of an identity that is not otherwise officially recognized (Simon 2000a). The success of urban policies in focusing their approach to inclusion on neighbourhoods and communities might lead one to suppose that the sole function of the approach is to target ethnic groups that the universalist French model refuses to name. Thus, urban policy statements frequently contain the term discrimination positive territoriale (positive discrimination based on location), which refers to the preferential treatment given to residents of poor minority neighbourhoods, especially young people, so as to compensate for the disadvantages and suffering caused by segregation, while avoiding the need for ethnic or racial classifications (Calvès 1998, Rudder and[START_REF] Rudder | ‗Affirmative action et discrimination justifiée: Vers un universalisme en acte[END_REF]. The efficiency of this policy in promoting the socioeconomic status of individuals has yet to be proven, and, some say, discrimination positive territoriale is not the instrument for righting the inequalities suffered by poor ethnic minorities [START_REF] Kirszbaum | ‗La discrimination positive territoriale: De l'égalité des chances à la mixité urbaine[END_REF]).

CONCLUSIONS

The French model of integration is often presented as the result of a concept of citizenship based on a direct relationship between the individual and society, a type of political contract that banishes all cultural, ethnic and identity issues from the public domain and relegates them to the private sphere.

Yet, in practice, there has been a tension between government efforts aimed at the inclusion of immigrants and government efforts aimed at controlling immigration. This tension tends to highlight rather than diminish the cultural, ethnic and identity issues involved in the phenomenon of immigration. Recurrent urban riots focused on socioeconomic disadvantages among various groups of immigrant youth and the demands among young middle-class women to be allowed to wear hijab in classrooms are only two of many examples of ways in which identity among the second generation is distinct from sentiments of national identity.

With respect to the second generation, it is no longer credible to claim that national identity dominates all other identitiesreligious, political, or culturalin the public space.

French institutions may be partly responsible for this confusion. They have been unable to provide real content to the professed value of equality or satisfy the social aspirations of the members of the second generation who have become segregated in the cités. More generally, French institutions have failed to confront head on the differential discriminatory treatment, whether systemic or indirect, faced by many second-generation children and youth in access to schooling and employment. This failure represents a serious indictment of the French model.

Research has shown that, while immigration is a dynamic process of adaptation and while immigrants may accept, transform, or reject their own cultural identity during this process, they rarely succeed in breaking entirely from it.

For all these reasons, it may be appropriate for identities that are not associated with French nationality to be taken into consideration within the French model.

  Review of the Circumstances among Children in Immigrant Families in Australia by Ilan Katz and Gerry Redmond The Children of Immigrants in France: The Emergence of a Second Generation by Thomas Kirszbaum, Yaël Brinbaum and Patrick Simon, with Esin Gezer The Situation among Children of Migrant Origin in Germany by Susanne Clauss and Bernhard Nauck The Situation of Children in Immigrant Families in Italy: Changes and Challenges by Letizia Mencarini, Emiliana Baldoni and Gianpiero Dalla Zuanna Children in Immigrant Families in the Netherlands: A Statistical Portrait and a Review of the Literature by Helga A. G. de Valk, Kris R. Noam, Alinda M. Bosch and Gijs C. N. Beets Children in Immigrant Families in Switzerland: On a Path between Discrimination and Integration by Rosita Fibbi and Philippe Wanner The Situation of Children in Immigrant Families in the United Kingdom by Heaven Crawley

Table 1 : Basic Data on Children in Immigrant Families, France, 1999

 1 Source: Family History Survey Database,INSEE, 1999.

	number and per cent of children
	Parental origin	Total, number	0-4	Age at last birthday, % 5-9 10-14 15-17	Birthplace, %
					24.2	15.1	13.4	86.6
	Cambodia	24,550	17.1	22.7	37.3	22.9	9.8	90.2
	Lao PDR	28,345	20.1	26.8	30.1	21.3	6.7	93.3
	Viet Nam	27,725	22.4	24.6	28.0	24.9	9.4	90.6
	Other Asia	57,390	27.9	32.7	27.3	12.0	18.4	81.6
	America, Oceania	61,915	28.8	32.0	25.4	13.8	21.2	78.8
	Other	8,775	27.6	35.2	25.5	11.7	7.8	92.2

Table 2 : The Immigrant Population by Size and Origin, France, 1982, 1990 and 1999

 2

	number and per cent
	Population group	1982 Number	%	1990 Number	%	1999 Number	%	2005 Number	%
	All	54,295,612	-	56,651,955	-	58,518,395	-	60,876,136	-
	Immigrants	4,037,036	7.4	4,165,955	7.4	4,306,232	7.4	4,930,000	8.1
	Algeria	597,644	14.8	555,715	13.3	574,208	13.4	677,000	13.7
	Morocco	367,896	9.1	457,456	11.0	522,504	12.1	619,000	12.5
	Tunisia	202,564	5.0	207,127	5.0	201,561	4.7	220,000	4.5
	Sub-Saharan Africa	122,392	3.0	275,182	6.6	400,000	9.3	530,000	10.8
	Italy	570,104	14.1	483,695	11.6	378,649	8.8	342,000	6.9
	Spain	471,968	11.7	397,126	9.5	316,544	7.3	280,000	5.7
	Portugal	638,492	15.8	599,661	14.4	571,874	13.2	565,000	11.5
	Turkey	121,212	3.0	168,359	4.0	174,160	4.1	225,000	4.6
	South East Asia	124,420	3.1	158,075	3.8	159,750	4.0	160,000	3.2
	Other	820,344	20.3	863,559	20.7	997,249	23.1 1,312,000	26.6

Table 3 )

 3 . Children with at least one immigrant parent from a European country now represent less than one third (32.4 per cent) of all children of immigrants. This reveals the ageing and decline in the Italian and Spanish immigration flows; children 0 to 17 who are of Italian or Spanish origin currently represent only 4.6 and 4.7 per cent, respectively, of all children of immigrants. The inflow of Portuguese began later (half the Portuguese immigrants living in France in 1999 had arrived between 1967 and 1976), and the children of Portuguese immigrants are now the largest contingent of offspring among European immigrants (13.4 per cent). Children whose parents originated from another of the EU member states at the time (the EU-15; see the note to Table

Table 3 : Children according to the Origin of Their Parents, France, 1999

 3 Immigration from Morocco occurred slightly later (50 per cent of the immigrants arrived after 1977), and the children in this group are the most numerous among all children of immigrants. The children of sub-Saharan African origin are the third largest group (13.4 per cent, the same share as the children of Portuguese origin). The flow of immigration from sub-Saharan Africa has been one of the most dynamic recently (more than 43 per cent arrived between 1999 and 2004), and the relative proportion of the offspring of this group among all children of immigrants will rise significantly over the next few years.Immigrants from Asia are generally among the most recent arrivals in France. Three quarters have immigrated since 1976, and one quarter have been settled in France for 10 years or less. Children from the Asia group now represent only 12.7 per cent of the total. Children with at least one Turkish parent are the largest group (5.9 per cent). The shares of children with at least one parent from former French possessions in South East Asia, namely, Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam are each below 1.5 per cent.

	number and per cent of children
	Parental origin	Number	%
	All children	12,266,640	-
	In non-immigrant families	10,143,475	82.7
	In immigrant families	2,123,165	17.3
	Europe	657,455	32.4
	Spain	96,275	4.7
	Italy	92,770	4.6
	Portugal Other EU-15 a	271,200 123,880	13.4 6.1
	Other Europe	73,330	3.6
	Africa	1,041,330	51.4
	Algeria	326,525	16.1
	Morocco	336,570	16.6
	Tunisia	106,720	5.3
	Other Africa	271,515	13.4
	Asia	257,505	12.7
	Turkey	119,495	5.9
	Cambodia	24,550	1.2
	Lao PDR	28,345	1.4
	Viet Nam	27,725	1.4
	Other Asia	57,390	2.8
	America, Oceania	61,915	3.1
	Other	8,775	0.4
	Source: Family History Survey Database, INSEE, 1999.
	a. EU-15 = member states of the EU before 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
	Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

One parent or both parents in the families of a majority of the children of immigrants have come from Africa (51.4 per cent). Children with at least one parent from one of the three main North African countries of origin represent 38 per cent of all children of immigrants (16.6 per cent from Morocco, 16.1 per cent from Algeria and 5.3 per cent from Tunisia). Half the parents who had emigrated from Algeria and Tunisia and were living in France in 1999 had arrived in the early 1970s; only one quarter had arrived before 1961-1962

[START_REF] Borrel | Les origines des Français[END_REF]

.

Table 4 : Age of Children

 4

	Parental origin	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-17
	In non-immigrant families	23.0	28.2	30.4	18.3
	In immigrant families	22.4	28.0	30.3	19.3
	Europe	20.1	27.5	32.2	20.1
	Spain	12.9	25.4	38.3	23.2
	Italy	13.0	23.3	36.5	27.2
	Portugal	21.6	28.6	30.5	19.3
	Other EU-15	25.7	29.2	29.1	16.0
	Other Europe	23.8	28.7	30.1	17.4
	Africa	22.7	27.5	30.1	19.7
	Algeria	21.3	27.4	29.9	21.3
	Morocco	22.9	25.1	30.0	21.2
	Tunisia	19.4	26.4	31.3	22.8
	Other Africa	25.4	29.8	30.1	14.7
	Asia	25.4	30.4	27.3	16.9
	Turkey	27.6	33.0	24.2	15.1
	Cambodia	17.1	22.7	37.3	22.9
	Lao PDR	20.1	26.8	30.1	21.3
	Viet Nam	22.4	24.6	28.0	24.9
	Other Asia	27.9	32.7	27.3	12.0
	America, Oceania	28.8	32.0	25.4	13.8
	Other	27.6	35.2	25.5	11.7

, France, 1999, per cent of children Source: Family History Survey Database, INSEE, 1999.

Note:

The age is the age as of the last birthday.

Table 5 : Children of Immigrants, by Parentage and Place of Birth, France, 1999

 5

	per cent of children
	Parental origin	Mixed parents (one French and one immigrant)	Birthplace Foreign country France (second generation)
	Children of immigrants	43.5	14.1	85.9
	Europe	68.0	13.0	87.0
	Spain	83.6	4.6	95.4
	Italy	80.7	8.5	91.5
	Portugal	55.5	7.2	92.8
	Other EU-15	76.1	28.1	71.9
	Other Europe	63.5	23.5	76.5
	Africa	31.3	14.6	85.4
	Algeria	40.6	14.5	85.5
	Morocco	23.2	12.9	87.1
	Tunisia	35.0	7.6	92.4
	Other Africa	28.5	19.6	80.4
	Asia	24.7	13.2	86.8
	Turkey	12.8	13.4	86.6
	Cambodia	20.9	9.8	90.2
	Lao PDR	18.1	6.7	93.3
	Viet Nam	44.7	9.4	90.6
	Other Asia	44.8	18.4	81.6
	America, Oceania	59.5	21.2	78.8
	Other	-	7.8	92.2

Source: Family History Survey Database,

INSEE, 1999.

  . Examples are the generation 98 survey conducted by the Centre for Research on Education, Training and Employment in 2001 and a life-course study, the life history survey (Histoire de vie), conducted by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies in 2003. The family history survey (Etude de l"histoire familiale) carried out by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies and the National Institute for Demographic Studies is the most important of the new statistical resources that may be used specifically to study the children of immigrants (see Family History Survey Database; see also Lefèvre and Filhon

Table 6 : Children according to Family Structure, France, 1999

 6

	per cent of children
	Parental origin	Two-parent family	One-parent family	One child 0-17 at home	Two children 0-17 at home	Three children 0-17 at home	Four or more children 0-17 at home
	In non-immigrant families	87.7	12.3	25.2	43.1	21.8	9.8
	In immigrant families	88.7	11.3	17.8	32.8	25.6	23.8
	Europe	92.8	7.2	24.5	44.0	23.3	8.1
	Spain	92.9	7.1	24.5	44.8	23.9	6.8
	Italy	92.2	7.8	26.4	44.8	22.6	6.1
	Portugal	93.1	6.8	25.0	43.4	23.8	7.8
	Other EU-15	92.8	7.1	20.2	44.4	25.3	10.1
	Other Europe	91.6	8.4	27.2	43.9	18.6	10.3
	Africa	85.7	14.2	13.9	26	25.7	34.4
	Algeria	85.5	14.5	16.3	29.7	26.9	27.0
	Morocco	89.4	10.5	12.8	25.3	27.2	34.6
	Tunisia	85.4	14.6	14.2	23.2	27.9	34.7
	Other Africa	81.6	18.4	12.2	23.6	21.2	43.0
	Asia	90.6	9.4	15.9	29.2	31.3	23.5
	Turkey	92.1	7.9	12.8	27.0	33.6	26.5
	Cambodia	92.2	7.8	14.5	26.1	32.9	25.7
	Lao PDR	92.8	7.2	12.8	23.8	29.7	33.6
	Viet Nam	91.6	8.4	20.8	35.7	28.2	15.2
	Other Asia	85.0	15.0	22.0	34.7	28.2	10.5
	America, Oceania	85.7	14.3	18.8	41.7	25.0	14.5
	Other	98.0	2.0	22.3	43.4	27.6	6.8

Source: Family History Survey Database,

INSEE, 1999.

  1 and 2 of the International Standard Classification System of Education Levels. Two-year vocational diploma: These are the qualifications acquired with two years of training after collège (middle school) and include the certificate of professional aptitude (Certificat d"aptitude professionnelle) and the technical school certificate (Brevet d"études professionnelles), the latter being a higher qualification. This corresponds to level 3C of the International Standard Classification System of Education Levels.Tertiary education diploma: This is acquired at university or in a grande école; university diplomas are also divided into academic or professional qualifications. This corresponds to level 5 of the International Standard Classification System of Education Levels.

	Secondary education diploma: This corresponds to the baccalauréat at the end of
	secondary school (lycée). This qualification is required to enter a university or a grande
	école (higher education establishments involving competitive entrance). There are three
	kinds of baccalauréat: general (academic), technical (specialized technical training) and
	professional (vocational). The baccalauréat corresponds to level 3A or 3B of the
	International Standard Classification System of Education Levels.

Table 7 : Children according to the Educational Attainment of the Parents, France, 1999

 7 Source: Family History Survey Database,INSEE, 1999. There are significant differences among immigrant fathers according to origin. The educational levels of European immigrants and the native French are more similar to each other relative to immigrants from Africa and Asia, although the share of European immigrants without any qualification is higher than the corresponding share among the native French. The educational levels of individuals from Italy, Spain and, especially, Portugal are far lower than the levels among individuals from other European countries. For instance, 54.5 per cent of the children of immigrants from Portugal had fathers with no qualification, but this was true of only 15 per cent of the children of immigrants from EU-15 countries excluding Italy, Portugal and Spain. The ‗other EU-15' group also has a far greater number of fathers who have tertiary education with respect to the native French. These data indicate that recent European immigration has largely consisted of highly qualified people and professionals.

	per cent of children
			Father				Mother
	Parental origin	No qualification	Vocational	General secondary	Tertiary	No qualification	Vocational	General secondary	Tertiary
	In non-immigrant families	26.6	38.9	12.0	22.6	30.4	29.8	15.6	24.2
	In immigrant families	48.7	22.9	9.5	18.8	54.9	18.3	10.9	15.9
	Europe	39.4	31.0	9.6	20.1	41.9	24.1	13.4	20.6
	Spain	35.7	38.2	11.1	15.0	41.2	31.0	11.2	16.6
	Italy	43.6	34.0	8.2	14.3	40.8	28.3	14.1	16.9
	Portugal	54.5	33.5	5.1	6.9	58.3	26.5	8.2	7.0
	Other EU-15	15.0	22.6	13.4	49.0	17.5	14.8	19.0	48.7
	Other Europe	22.7	22.5	19.7	35.0	24.2	16.1	25.2	34.5
	Africa	54.7	19.7	8.9	16.7	63.1	16.2	8.7	11.97
	Algeria	57.2	24.0	6.4	12.4	64.9	18.1	7.6	9.4
	Morocco	64.9	16.9	6.7	11.5	70.2	14.4	7.0	8.5
	Tunisia	50.4	28.1	9.9	11.7	60.5	14.2	10.4	14.9
	Other Africa	40.0	14.7	14.6	30.7	53.8	17.0	11.5	17.7
	Asia	57.3	16.5	10.9	15.4	64.6	13.0	10.8	11.5
	Turkey	76.1	14.8	5.8	3.4	81.0	12.0	4.0	3.0
	Cambodia	56.2	13.1	10.3	20.5	70.6	10.8	8.2	10.4
	Lao PDR	46.9	33.9	8.0	11.1	64.0	24.0	8.4	3.7
	Viet Nam	26.1	18.3	22.8	32.8	40.7	15.9	20.9	22.5
	Other Asia	37.8	13.0	17.3	31.9	39.5	8.8	23.0	28.7
	America, Oceania	22.4	15.9	12.7	49.0	25.9	10.2	19.8	44.1
	Other	9.7	10.8	15.3	64.3	27.3	12.8	14.6	19.8

Table 8 : Children according to Unemployment and Economic Inactivity of the Parents, France

 8 gaps vary according to the origin of the immigrant parents. The rate of unemployment and economic inactivity among the fathers of children of immigrants of European origin is close to that of fathers of native French children, though this is less so in the case of children of immigrants of Portuguese and Spanish origin. The fathers of the children of immigrants of African origin are more likely to be unemployed or economically inactive. The highest share in this category is among the fathers of the children of immigrants from Algeria. Turkish and Vietnamese fathers are at opposite ends of the range in Asia.

	Parental origin	Father unemployed or inactive	Mother unemployed or inactive	Immigrant parents Father unemployed or inactive Mother unemployed or inactive	Mixed French and immigrant parents Father unemployed Mother unemployed or inactive or inactive
	In non-immigrant families	13.8	27.9	-	-	-	-
	In immigrant families	28.2	50.3	35.4	63.3	20.1	34.6
	Europe	14.4	31.0	19.8	33.5	12.2	30.0
	Spain	12.1	29.4	26.1	42.6	10.2	27.0
	Italy	15.6	35.5	32.5	45.7	12.4	33.6
	Portugal	13.0	27.3	15.0	28.3	11.6	26.4
	Other EU-15	15.1	33.2	23.8	41.5	12.9	30.9
	Other Europe	19.8	38.0	27.5	36.1	16.1	39.0
	Africa	38.1	61.6	41.7	72.2	31.3	40.2
	Algeria	43.3	62.2	49.4	75.2	35.6	45.2
	Morocco	38.0	70.9	41.7	82.0	26.8	36.6
	Tunisia	35.5	63.6	40.8	79.1	27.1	37.1
	Other Africa	33.0	48.3	34.3	53.2	30.3	36.9
	Asia	27.8	58.6	29.7	65.5	22.4	38.5
	Turkey	32.6	76.7	32.0	79.8	36.2	56.7
	Cambodia	24.8	42.3	27.6	45.9	15.1	28.9
	Lao PDR	27.4	35.5	31.5	33.6	9.6	43.8
	Viet Nam	9.5	39.4	10.9	41.8	8.0	36.5
	Other Asia	27.9	48.4	30.6	65.6	25.0	29.4
	America, Oceania	18.7	38.9	27.0	44.0	14.7	35.6
	Other	15.4	32.4	-	65.7	15.4	31.7

, 1999, per cent of children Source: Family History Survey Database, INSEE, 1999. These Similar contrasts exist among mothers. The rate of unemployment and economic inactivity among the mothers of the children of immigrants of European origin is only 2.1 per cent higher than the corresponding rate among mothers of native French children. Mothers of children of immigrants from Portugal represent an exception because fewer of them are unemployed or inactive relative to mothers of native French children. Their labour market behaviour is similar to that of mothers in Portugal. The other categories have weaker relationships with the job market.

Table 9 : Children according to Family Homeownership and Housing, France, 1999

 9

	per cent of children
	Parental origin	Family-owned home	Overcrowded housing
	In non-immigrant families	57.8	18.6
	In immigrant families	35.6	48.7
	Europe	56.3	28.6
	Spain	61.2	22.6
	Italy	64.5	24.2
	Portugal	51.3	36.6
	Other EU-15	63.1	18.0
	Other Europe	46.7	30.3
	Africa	22.0	60.4
	Algeria	25.5	55.3
	Morocco	20.6	63.1
	Tunisia	24.5	64.3
	Other Africa	18.4	61.4
	Asia	35.4	57.5
	Turkey	21.7	67.2
	Cambodia	52.7	58.3
	Lao PDR	40.3	50.3
	Viet Nam	63.1	36.8
	Other Asia	40.7	50.4
	America, Oceania	43.9	32.8
	Other	49.1	27.7

Source: Family History Survey Database,

INSEE, 1999.

Table 10 : Children of Immigrants, by Parentage and Language Used at Home, France

 10

	,

Source: Family History Survey Database,

INSEE, 1999.

Table 11 : Young Foreign-born Aged 18-24 in Education, France, 1999

 11

	per cent of young adults
		Young men		Young women
		In any education In tertiary education In any education In tertiary education
	Natives	44.8	56.6	49.5	65.8
	Foreign-born	45.1	50.0	43.1	56.9
	Europe	44.1	64.1	47.4	78.5
	South of Europe	24.0	60.9	29.5	85.2
	Other EU-15	54.6	70.0	56.1	79.1
	Other Europe	70.2	62.1	63.4	72.8
	Africa	47.1	45.9	43.3	46.9
	Algeria	38.7	43.8	40.6	50.3
	Morocco	42.3	48.4	40.6	45.8
	Tunisia	51.7	55.3	36.3	71.1
	Other Africa	60.4	43.5	51.2	42.5
	Asia	39.7	55.7	35.1	54.7
	Turkey	26.0	37.6	15.4	9.8
	South East Asia	24.3	72.2	57.1	61.3
	Other Asia	55.6	58.9	51.2	71.5
	Other	51.2	32.9	54.1	47.6
	Source: Family History Survey Database, INSEE, 1999.

Table 12 : Young Foreign-born Aged 18-24 in the Labour Market, France, 1999

 12

	per cent of young people
	Parental origin	Young men Working Not in school, not working Working Not in school, not working Young women
	Natives	48.4	6.8	41.2	9.3
	Foreign-born	44.1	10.9	34.5	22.5
	Europe	45.7	10.2	38.5	14.2
	South of Europe	68.4	7.5	56.0	14.6
	Other EU-15	31.1	14.4	34.3	9.6
	Other Europe	18.6	11.2	16.7	20.0
	Africa	41.7	11.2	32.9	23.8
	Algeria	47.8	13.5	36.1	23.2
	Morocco	46.5	11.3	37.1	22.4
	Tunisia	45.9	2.4	34.8	28.9
	Other Africa	29.2	10.4	23.5	25.3
	Asia	49.9	10.4	33.1	31.8
	Turkey	62.5	11.6	27.7	56.9
	South East Asia	63.0	12.7	38.6	4.3
	Other Asia	35.8	8.6	38.3	10.4
	Other	36.9	12.0	36.7	9.2

Source: Family History Survey Database,

INSEE, 1999.

The EU-25 consists of the member states of the EU before January

2007: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

We note that repatriates are counted in the Algerian group. The same is true of all groups from former French colonies or protectorates, among which mixed parentage mainly describes a union between a French-born parent and a French repatriate from the former colony. Thus, in these cases, the shares of children in families with mixed parents are larger than they would have been had we been able to make a distinction between repatriates and immigrants.

According to the dual ius soli, all persons born in France to at least one parent born in France is French by birth. This specific provision was aimed at obliging third-generation foreign citizens in France to become French even if they then rejected French citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Nonetheless, it was mainly applied to the offspring of Algerian immigrants after the independence of Algeria given that these offspring were born in France to parents who had been born in Algeria when that country was officially a French department and therefore native French soil.

The data are similar for children in families of Asian originexcluding Cambodia, Lao PDR, Turkey and Viet Nam (15 per cent)and children in families from America and Oceania (14.3 per cent), but we do not have more precise information on these relatively small groups.

advocacy for children worldwide. The Centreformally known as the International Child Development Centregenerates knowledge and analysis to support policy formulation and advocacy in favour of children, acts as a convener and catalyst for knowledge exchange and strategic reflections on children's concerns and supports programme development and capacitybuilding.

Innocenti

The Centre collaborates with its host institution in Florence, the Istituto degli Innocenti, in selected areas of work. Core funding for the Centre is provided by the Government of Italy and UNICEF. Additional financial support for specific projects is provided by governments, international institutions and private sources, including UNICEF National Committees, as well as UNICEF offices involved in collaborative studies.

For further information and to download or order this and other publications, please visit the IRC website at <http://UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, Florence, on 6 June 2008. Thanks to Krystyna Horko and Godfrey Rogers for translations of original material. Eva Jespersen (formerly of UNICEF IRC) and Donald Hernandez (formerly University at Albany, State University