David De Cremer
email: ddecremer@rsm.nl.

Eric Van Dijk

On the near miss in public good dilemmas: How upward counterfactuals influence group stability when the group fails

Keywords: Public good dilemmas, counterfactuals, negative affect, exit, near miss effect

In two studies we investigated the impact of degree of collective failure in a public good dilemma (near miss vs. large miss) on group members' negative reactions (negative affect, attributions of responsibility for the failure, and intention to leave the group). The results show that upward counterfactual thinking has more impact on members' negative responses when experiencing a near miss rather than a large miss.

In Experiment 1, the results show that in the case of a near miss (and not a large miss), negative affect and attributions of responsibility were higher when otherfocused counterfactuals rather than self-focused counterfactuals were elicited.

Negative affect was found to mediate the effect on attributions of responsibility.

Experiment 2 replicates these findings on a wider range of negative responses and reveals that the effect of counterfactual thought on willingness to leave the group in the case of a near miss is mediated by attributions of responsibility.

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma:

How Upward Counterfactuals Influence Group Stability When the Group Fails

In our daily lives, we frequently encounter situations in which our personal interests are at odds with the collective interest (see [START_REF] Komorita | Social dilemmas[END_REF][START_REF] Weber | A conceptual review of decision making in social dilemmas: Applying a logic of appropriateness[END_REF]. The dilemma of providing public goods represents such a situation of conflict and its essence rests in the circumstance that provision of the public good is contingent on the combined contributions of individual group members, whereas the individual's consumption of the public good is not related to his/her contribution. Thus, people may enjoy the benefits of the public good even if they do not contribute to its provision. As a result, people may be unwilling to contribute and the collective may fail to provide the public good. How do people deal with failure feedback in public good dilemmas?

Prior research has, for example, revealed that a history of collective failure generally induces individual group members to defect (e.g., [START_REF] Messick | Solving social dilemmas[END_REF][START_REF] Schroeder | The actions of others as determinants of behavior in social dilemmas[END_REF]; but see De [START_REF] De Cremer | Reactions to group success and failure as a function of identification level: A test of the goal-transformation hypothesis in social dilemmas[END_REF], and induces people to opt for a structural change by installing a leader or a sanctioning system (e.g., [START_REF] Samuelson | Individual and structural solutions to resource dilemmas in two cultures[END_REF][START_REF] Samuelson | Inequities in access to and use of shared resources in social dilemmas[END_REF]. Despite these important insights it is surprising to see that social dilemma research has not focused yet on the psychological impact of collective failure for the individual group members (i.e., how they interpret and emotionally experience group failure). We think it is important to explicitly address such psychological reactions because for the group it directly raises the question of how group stability can be maintained after facing failure (cf. [START_REF] Van Vugt | Why autocratic leadership might fail in solving public good dilemmas: The importance of group stability[END_REF]. How badly will people feel about having failed as a group? Will they blame others for the failure? Will they blame themselves? And how will these feelings and

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 6 interpretations affect group stability, which depends strongly on people's decision to possibly leave their group? Indeed, if too many people exit, the group may in the end have insufficient resources to meet the threshold for providing the public good (e.g. if too many citizens leave then it will become increasingly difficult to collect sufficient contributions to establish public facilities).

To answer these questions, we will draw on insights derived both from the literature on affect, and on the cognitive processes that underlie affective reactions to negative outcomes, in particular on the literature on counterfactual thinking.

Specifically, we will (a) focus more on which cognitive processes influence people's responses as a function of negative feedback, (b) examine the emotional consequences of receiving negative feedback information, and (c) investigate how these combined effects may impact on the willingness of group members to leave their group. We will investigate how counterfactual thinking explains people's reactions to failure feedback and whether missing out on the provision of the public good by a small margin (i.e., a near miss) or by a large margin (i.e., a large miss) affects the influence of counterfactual thought.

Counterfactual Thinking and Type of Collective Failure

Recent social dilemma research has revealed that after failure feedback, group members display strong negative affect (assessed by anger and irritation) which undermines group stability by inducing group members to leave the group (see [START_REF] Stouten | All is well that ends well, at least for proselfs: Emotional reactions to equality violation as a function of social value orientation[END_REF][START_REF] Stouten | Violating equality in social dilemmas: Emotional and retributive reactions as a function of trust, attribution, and honesty[END_REF]. To understand the workings of failure feedback in a more comprehensive way we develop an approach in which we identify the cognitive strategies that group members use to make sense of failure, and postulate how these cognitive processes consequently influence affect and attributions.

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 7

One cognitive process that is of specific relevance to understanding people's reactions to collective failure in social dilemmas is counterfactual thinking.

Counterfactual thinking refers to the idea that people can cognitively simulate how a present situation could have been different [START_REF] Roese | Counterfactual thinking[END_REF]. Counterfactual thinking is strongly related to causal reasoning (e.g., [START_REF] Kahneman | Propensities and counterfactuals: The loser that almost won[END_REF][START_REF] Spellman | The relation between counterfactual and causal reasoning[END_REF], and thus to attributions of responsibility.

Interestingly, research has shown that if people fail in achieving a goal, or miss out on an opportunity to obtain positive and favorable outcomes, they often engage in upward counterfactual thinking. That is, they mentally simulate under which conditions the outcome could have been better [START_REF] Markman | The mental simulation of better and worse possible worlds[END_REF][START_REF] Roese | Counterfactual thinking: An overview[END_REF][START_REF] Sanna | Antecedents to spontaneous counterfactual thinking: effects of expectancy violation and outcome valence[END_REF]. Importantly, this type of counterfactual thinking elicits negative affect [START_REF] Markman | The mental simulation of better and worse possible worlds[END_REF][START_REF] Roese | Counterfactual thinking[END_REF][START_REF] Roese | Counterfactual thinking: An overview[END_REF], which subsequently evokes attributions of responsibility (i.e., who is to be blamed for the failure and why I feel so bad; [START_REF] Wells | Mental simulation of causality[END_REF]. Judgments of blame thus arise as a function of immediate negative affect (cf. [START_REF] Haidt | The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment[END_REF].

A first important assumption that we make in the present paper is that this negative affect (and resulting attributions of responsibility) will particularly be outward focused; i.e., directed towards the others. Research has shown that people are strongly motivated to think positively about themselves and create self-serving judgments and evaluations. This tendency makes that people attribute failures to external factors and successes to their own actions [START_REF] Baumeister | The self[END_REF][START_REF] Roese | Better, stronger, faster: Self-serving judgments, affect regulation, and the optimal vigilance hypothesis[END_REF][START_REF] Weiner | An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion[END_REF]Wong & Weiner, 1981). Based on these insights, we postulate that negative feelings should lead particularly to a kind of upward counterfactual thinking that "allows" people to be self-serving. In other words, they

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 8 will be particularly motivated to mentally simulate the failure situation in such a way that it is easier to blame others for the failure rather than themselves.

It is important to note, however, that self-serving evaluations are not always that easy to make (despite the general inclination to think in self-serving ways, [START_REF] Roese | Better, stronger, faster: Self-serving judgments, affect regulation, and the optimal vigilance hypothesis[END_REF]. Therefore, we argue that negative affect will lead to evaluations that others in the group (rather than oneself) are to be blamed, but particularly so when the type of upward counterfactual facilitates self-serving attributions. The literature to date (at least to our knowledge) has not examined whether upward counterfactuals may differ in how they facilitate versus inhibit self-serving evaluations. In the present research, we introduce a distinction between self-focused counterfactuals versus other-focused counterfactuals. In the case of other-focused counterfactuals, group members may mentally revise the existing situation by thinking what the others in the group (and not they) should have done to achieve a better outcome. In the case of selffocused counterfactuals, group members engage in counterfactual thinking that includes thinking about how they themselves (and not the others in the group) should have acted to achieve a better outcome.

We expect that other-focused counterfactuals will enhance attributions of responsibility to others, increase negative affect towards these others and will lead to a greater willingness to leave the group. When a self-focus counterfactual is salient, however, it is more difficult to make self-serving judgments and people will be less likely to derogate others by experiencing less negative affect towards those others, attribute less responsibility to them and be less motivated to leave the group.

A second important assumption that we make is that upward counterfactual thinking is more likely to occur when one fails with a small relative to a large margin [START_REF] Miller | The counterfactual fallacy: Confusing what might have been with what ought to have been[END_REF][START_REF] Kahneman | Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives[END_REF]. For example, Kahneman and

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 9

Tversky (1982) showed that people are more likely to engage in counterfactual thinking when they miss their plane by narrow rather than wide margins, so that they feel worse when having missed the plane by 5 minutes rather than by 30 minutes.

Thus, upward counterfactual thinking should emerge particularly when the group just misses out on achieving the threshold.

This idea of "near miss" is very relevant to understand the exact impact of our distinction between self-focused and other-focused counterfactuals. In particular, we argue that when a specific type of counterfactual is activated (i.e., other-focused)

affective reactions and willingness to leave may be more intense when the contributions fall just below the threshold for provision than when they fall well below the threshold. If so, this would mean that affective reactions and behavioral intentions may not always become more negative the lower the contributions are.

Specifically, we argue that in the case of a near miss group members should be more likely to evaluate who is responsible [START_REF] Brockner | An integrative framework for explaining reactions to decisions: Interactive effects of outcomes and procedures[END_REF]Wong & Weiner, 1981). As a consequence, we expected the predicted difference between selffocused counterfactuals and other-focused counterfactuals to be more pronounced in the case of a near miss than in the case of a large miss. Moreover, in the case of a large miss, people will more easily reason that all group members bear some responsibility (i.e., diffusion of responsibility) relative to the situation of a near miss where people will be more motivated to find out whose fault it was. Under the latter conditions, the counterfactual manipulation should thus have a stronger effect on group members' responses.

In sum, in the present research, we focus on the interactive effect between type of failure feedback and counterfactual thinking by arguing that the type of counterfactual thought (i.e., other-focus counterfactual versus self-focus

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 10 counterfactual) will exert a stronger influence on group members' responses (i.e., negative affect, attributions, and willingness to leave the group after a near miss than after a large miss.

Experiment 1

In Experiment 1, we test the prediction that in the case of a near miss negative affect (i.e., anger and irritation) and attributions of responsibility to the other group members will be higher when other-focused counterfactuals are activated relative to self-focused counterfactuals. In the case of a large miss, less difference in negative affect and attributions of responsibility is expected between both counterfactual thought conditions.

Our main dependent measures in Experiment 1 are negative affect and attributions of responsibility. We assess negative affect by using the most representative anger-related emotions used in social dilemma research: irritation and anger. Irritation and anger are strongly related and both emotions are included in the category "anger" (which reflects negative feelings toward others; [START_REF] Russell | Fuzzy concepts in a fuzzy hierarchy: varieties of anger[END_REF]. The strong connection was also demonstrated in recent social dilemma research that showed that violations of social and fairness norms lead group members to experience anger-related emotions as assessed by a combined score of anger and irritation [START_REF] Stouten | Violating equality in social dilemmas: Emotional and retributive reactions as a function of trust, attribution, and honesty[END_REF]. Irritation and anger have been described as emotions that are elicited in reaction to what others have done, or, in other words, as outwardfocused emotions (see [START_REF] Barclay | Exploring the role of emotions in injustice perceptions and retaliation[END_REF]. In light of our prediction that self-serving counterfactuals should facilitate the emergence of negative reactions in the case of a near miss, these specific emotions thus seem particularly relevant.

With respect to our second outcome variable, attributions of responsibility, we assess the extent to which individual group members evaluate the others in the group

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 11 as responsible for the failure. Building upon the idea that negative affect motivates causal evaluations [START_REF] Wells | Mental simulation of causality[END_REF]; see also research showing that angerrelated emotions are related to the emergence of attributions; [START_REF] Smith | Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion[END_REF][START_REF] Smith | Appraisal components, core relational themes, On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 31 and the emotions[END_REF][START_REF] Weiner | Pity, anger, and guilt: An attributional analysis[END_REF], we argue that negative affect shapes the evaluations of who is considered responsible for the collective failure. Therefore, it follows that the interactive effect between failure feedback and counterfactual thought on attributions of responsibility will be mediated by negative affect in such a way that affect will underlie the effect of counterfactual thought on attributions of responsibility in the near miss condition and less so in the large miss condition (i.e., moderated mediation; [START_REF] Preacher | Addressing moderated mediation hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions[END_REF].

Method

Participants and design. Eighty-one undergraduate students (33 men and 48

women, average age = 20.87 years, SD = 2.57) participated voluntarily and were each paid 7 Euros. They were randomly assigned to a 2 (Failure feedback: Near miss vs.

Large miss) x 2 (Counterfactual: Self-focused vs. Other-focused) between-subjects factorial design.

Experimental procedure. After participants arrived at the laboratory they were seated in separate experimental cubicles. They were not able to see one another and each participant's cubicle contained a computer, a table, and a chair. All instructions were given via the computer. At the start of the instructions, participants were informed that they were part of a four-person group and that a number would identify each group member: 1, 2, 3, or 4. In reality, all participants were assigned the number 3.

Introduction to the public good dilemma. Participants were first told about the nature of the task. They were told that each of the four group members possessed an

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 12 endowment of 100 chips. Each chip was said to be worth 5 Euro cents.. They were informed that the group as a whole had to contribute a certain number of chips in order to obtain the public good (i.e., the threshold). No exact threshold was specified.

Participants were told that the threshold was somewhere between 180 and 300 chips.

Some degree of uncertainty with respect to the threshold was introduced to prevent participants to chose the simple rule of equality (which would make it hard to believe that the group would fail with a large margin) and to increase the probability that participants could also assign some blame to their own actions (and not only to the others). Participants were told that if contributions met or surpassed the threshold that the total amount contributed by the group would be multiplied by two and then divided equally amongst all group members, regardless of their contribution. The amount one decided not to contribute would accrue totally to oneself. However, if the group would not succeed in surpassing the threshold, then all the money contributed would be lost.

The participants learned that the total earnings would be paid at the end of the study.

Then, participants decided how many chips they wanted to contribute. After this, the failure feedback manipulation was introduced. In the near miss condition, participants were told that the group was 4 chips short of surpassing the threshold. In the large miss condition, participants were told that the group was 52 chips short of surpassing the threshold.

Thereafter, the counterfactual manipulation was introduced. In both conditions, participants finished a sentence and thought about if for a while (they were asked to write down their thoughts on a piece of paper that was lying next to the computer). In the Then, the dependent measures of Experiment 1 were solicited. All measures were responded to on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). First, to check the effectiveness of the failure feedback manipulation, participants were asked to indicate the extent in which the group just missed out on achieving the public good.

Thereafter, participants' negative affect was assessed by asking them to what extent they felt "angry", and "irritated". These items were combined to form one average negative emotion score (r = .81, p < .001). Subsequently, participants were asked to what extent they perceived the others to be responsible for the failure.

Results

Manipulation checks. To check the validity of the counterfactual manipulation, we conducted an inter-rater reliability analysis. Two judges independently coded whether the participants (depending on the experimental condition that the participants were allocated to) either completed the sentence describing how they themselves could have improved the outcome or how the other groups members could have achieved a better outcome. The judges agreed that all participants correctly followed the instructions.

A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the failure feedback manipulation check revealed only a significant effect of Failure feedback, F(1, 77) = 38.67, p < .001, 2 = .33, showing that participants in the near miss condition indicated that they just missed out on providing the public good relative to those in the large miss condition (Ms = 5.57 vs.

2.72, SDs = 2.19 and 1.87; respectively).

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 14 Mediation analysis. To test whether negative affect mediated the interactive effect of Failure feedback and Counterfactual on attributions of responsibility of failure, we conducted an additional regression analysis in which we followed the recommendations of [START_REF] Baron | The moderator mediator variable distinction in social-psychological researchconceptual, strategic, and statistical consideration[END_REF]. We included the previously described independent variables and the responsibility score as dependent variable. Negative affect was added as an additional predictor in the final step of the regression. As we

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 15 have shown that our independent variables affected the covariate negative affect and the dependent measure attributions (see our earlier analyses) we further demonstrated that negative affect in the regression significantly affected attributions of responsibility for the failure ( = .70, t = 7.41, p < .001). Moreover, entering negative affect rendered the interactive effect of Failure feedback and Counterfactual on attributions of responsibility non-significant ( = .41, t = .69, p < .50).

As a test of mediation, researchers (e.g., MacKinnon et al., 2002) have recommended to directly test the significance of the mediated effect. We used a bootstrap method, developed by [START_REF] Preacher | Addressing moderated mediation hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions[END_REF], which allows for a formal test of moderated mediation. Specifically, we estimated whether negative affect mediated the effect of Counterfactual on attributions of responsibility in the near miss condition but not in the large miss condition. In accordance with our predictions, Failure feedback was treated as a moderator of the relation between Counterfactual and negative affect. Our effect estimates are based on 5000 bootstrap samples.

The moderated mediation analysis clearly supported our hypothesis: the indirect effect of Counterfactual on attributions of responsibility, via negative affect, was significant in the near miss condition (z = 3.11, p < .005), but not in the large miss condition (z = -.67, p < .50). Importantly, the bootstrap results for this indirect effect showed that this Beta estimate was significantly larger than 0, which again supports our mediation hypothesis.

Experiment 2

As expected, the results of Experiment 1 showed that our participants experienced stronger negative affect and perceived the others in the group as more responsible for the collective failure when other-focus counterfactuals were made accessible relative to self-focus counterfactuals. Importantly, this pattern of findings

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 16 only emerged in the case of a near miss. Further, the moderated mediation analysis indicated that negative affect mediated (at least partly) the effect of counterfactual thought on attributions of responsibility for failure in the near miss condition.

This study is the first to show that the magnitude of failure feedback matters significantly in affecting members' affect and attributions of responsibility as a function of the type of counterfactual that is activated. In Experiment 2 we wanted to replicate these effects to enhance the validity of our novel findings and to introduce some methodological improvements.

In Experiment 1, we assessed negative affect in general, but it is fair to note that this general affect measure does not allow us to draw any inferences about whether one felt negatively toward oneself or toward the others. This distinction can be important for a variety of reasons. First, the mediation analysis reported in Experiment 1 suggests that general negative affect accounted for participants' judgment that the others in the group were responsible for the failure situation.

Although this result suggests that the general negative affect score most likely served as a proxy for negative affect toward the others, we need to test whether general negative affect and negative affect towards others yield the same pattern of results.

Second, making a distinction between negative affect towards self and the others also allows us to test in a more direct way whether participants engage in a self-serving strategy, and thus would blame the others more for the failure than themselves.

Therefore, in Experiment 2, in addition to assessing negative affect in general (as in Experiment 1), we assessed both negative affect toward oneself and toward the others.

Another modification is that in Experiment 2 we also assessed participants'

willingness to leave the group or not. Whereas negative affect and blaming others in the group (our other dependent measures) may already be considered as a threat to

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 17 group stability, the main threat to stability arises when group can actually leave the group [START_REF] Van Vugt | Why autocratic leadership might fail in solving public good dilemmas: The importance of group stability[END_REF]. Receiving the option to leave the group or not is important in light of the effects that upward counterfactuals may have on group stability. In fact, a recent study by [START_REF] Parks | \retrospection in social dilemmas: Thinking about the past affects future cooperation[END_REF] revealed that upward counterfactuals in a social dilemma might be beneficial as they promote future cooperation. In the present paper we maintain, however, that when it comes to group stability, the effects of upward counterfactuals may not be that positive.

Specifically, we posit that upward counterfactuals may increase the willingness to leave the group. Therefore, we predict that individual group members may be more willing to leave the group when an other-focused counterfactual is accessible rather than a self-focused counterfactual, but particularly so in case of a near miss.

Finally, in Experiment 2, we also explore whether negative affect in general, negative affect toward self and others, and attributions of responsibility underlie the predicted interactive effect between failure feedback and counterfactual thinking on willingness to leave the group. First of all, following insights that affect and their subsequent evaluations (i.e., attribution of responsibility in the present research) lead to action tendencies [START_REF] Ellsworth | Appraisal processes in emotion[END_REF], we suggest that once people have made sense of the situation and attributed responsibility of failure, they decide on their actions. Second, based on our findings of Experiment 1 that participants' attributions were caused by their negative affect, we expect that primarily attributions of responsibility (which should be shaped first by negative affect) will account for the interactive effect between counterfactual thought and failure feedback on willingness to leave the group. The impact of the different proposed mediators will be tested by employing a multiple mediation analysis [START_REF] Preacher | Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in simple and multiple mediator models[END_REF].

Method

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 18

Participants and design. One hundred and twenty-three undergraduate students (32 men and 91 women, average age = 20.39 years, SD = 1.74) participated voluntarily and were each paid 7 Euros. They were randomly assigned to a 2 (Failure feedback: near miss vs. large miss) x 2 (Counterfactual: Self-focused vs. Otherfocused) between-subjects factorial design.

Experimental procedure. Participants arrived at the laboratory and the procedure was identical to the one used in Experiment 1. At the end of the experiment, the dependent measures were solicited and they were answered on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). To check for the effectiveness of the failure feedback manipulation the same question as in Experiment 1 was used. Further, participants' negative affect (i.e., anger and irritation) was assessed. First, anger and irritation in general (r = .61, p < .001) were assessed. Second, participants were asked how angry and irritated they felt with themselves (r = .58, p < .001). Third, participants were asked how angry and irritated they felt towards the others (r = .60, p < .001).

Thereafter, the same responsibility question as in Experiment 1 was asked. Finally, participants were asked to what extent they wanted to leave the group.

Results

Manipulation checks. To check for the validity of the counterfactual manipulation, we conducted an inter-rater reliability analysis. As in Experiment 2, two judges independently coded whether the participants either completed the sentence describing how they themselves could have improved the outcome or how the other group members could have achieved a better outcome. The judges agreed that all participants correctly followed the instructions.

A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the failure feedback manipulation check revealed only a significant effect of Failure feedback, F(1, 119) = 81.61, p < .001, 2 = .14, showing

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 19 that participants in the near miss condition indicated that they just missed out on achieving the public good relative to those in the large miss condition (Ms = 5.96 vs. Negative affect towards self. A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the affect score toward oneself revealed only a significant interaction effect, F(1, 119) = 7.40, p < .01, 2 = .06 (see Table 2 for means). As predicted, the difference between participants in the selffocused counterfactual condition versus the other-focused counterfactual condition was significant in the near miss condition, F(1, 119) = 6.08, p < .05, but not in the large miss condition, F(1, 119) = 1.85, p > .17.

2.75,

Negative affect towards the others. A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the affect score toward others revealed, first of all, a significant main effect of Failure feedback, F(1, 119) = 5.72, p < .05, 2 = .05: Participants in the large miss condition reported higher negative affect with the others than those in the near miss condition (Ms = 4.11 vs.

3.47, SDs = 1.52 and 1.51; respectively). Also, a significant interaction emerged, F(1, 119) = 6.16, p < .05, 2 = .05 (see Table 2 for means). As predicted, the difference

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 20 between participants in the self-focused counterfactual condition versus the otherfocused counterfactual condition was significant in the near miss condition, F(1, 119) = 6.23, p < .05, but not in the large miss condition, F(1, 119) < 1, p > .32.

To examine in greater detail whether negative affect was more strongly expressed towards the others than towards oneself (i.e., representing a self-serving tendency that participants blamed the others more for the group failure), we created a new dependent measure by subtracting the negative affect score towards oneself from the negative affect score towards the others. A positive sign would indicate a more self-serving display in a way that after failure more negative affect is displayed toward the others rather than to oneself, whereas a negative sign would indicate the reversed effect. In line with our prior reasoning, we thus expected that more selfserving displays (i.e. blaming others more) would be found when an other-focused counterfactual was induced relative to a self-focused counterfactual, but particularly so after a near miss.

A 2 x 2 ANOVA on this difference score revealed, first of all, a significant main effect of Failure, F(1, 119) = 5.53, p < .05, 2 = .04: Participants in the large miss condition reported stronger negative affect than those in the near miss condition (Ms = 1.96 vs. 1.20, SDs = 1.88 and 1.94; respectively). The positive sign thus indicated that a self-serving tendency was present, but particularly so when the group failed by a large margin. In line with our predictions, we also found a significant interaction, F(1, 119) = 16.18, p < .001, 2 = .12 (see Table 3 for means). Interestingly, simple effects showed that in the near miss condition participants in the other-focused counterfactual condition showed a stronger self-serving tendency than those in the self-focused counterfactual condition, F(1, 119) = 14.81, p < .001, whereas this difference in the large miss condition was marginally significant, F(1, 119) = 3.24, p < .08.

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 21

Other's responsibility for failure. A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the responsibility score revealed, first of all, a significant main effect of Failure feedback, F(1, 119) = 12.63, p < .01, 2 = .10: Participants in the large miss condition felt more that the others were responsible for the failure than those in the near miss condition (Ms = 5.64 vs. 4.76, SDs = 1.17 and 1.59; respectively). Also, a significant interaction emerged, F(1, 119) = 5.29, p < .05, 2 = .04 (see Table 2 for means). As predicted, the difference between in the self-focused counterfactual condition versus the otherfocused counterfactual condition was significant in the near miss condition, F(1, 119) = 6.06, p < .05, but not in the large miss condition, F(1, 119) < 1, p < .45.

Willingness to leave.

A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the willingness to leave score revealed, first of all, a significant main effect of Feedback, F(1, 119) = 6.30, p < .05, 2 = .05: Participants in the large miss condition wanted to leave more than those in the near miss condition (Ms = 4.75 vs. 4.05, SDs = 1.33 and 1.79; respectively). Also, a significant interaction emerged, F(1, 119) = 6.41, p < .05, 2 = .05 (see Table 4 for means). As predicted, the difference between participants in the self-focused counterfactual condition versus the other-focused counterfactual condition was significant in the near miss condition, F(1, 119) = 6.04, p < .05, but not in the large miss condition, F(1, 119) = 1.20, p < .28.

Exploratory analysis: Mediation. We also wanted to explore which variable actually mediates the Failure feedback x Counterfactual interaction on willingness to leave. For this purpose we had to consider several potential mediators. Although the Baron and Kenny approach appears useful (i.e., enter all proposed mediators in the final step in the regression), this approach is subject to a number of important limitations when it comes to assessing the importance of multiple mediators, leading

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 22 Preacher and Hayes (2008, p. 882) to note that "We regard the causal steps approach of little utility in the multiple mediator context."

The use of multiple mediators may lead to problems of interpretation if different mediators overlap in content [START_REF] West | Toward understanding individual effects in multicomponent prevention programs: Design and analysis strategies[END_REF]. It has, however, important advantages, relative to the simple mediator First, it is possible to determine to what extent a specific variable mediates the failure feedback x counterfactual thought interaction on willingness to leave, conditional on the presence of other possible mediators in the model. Second, it decreases the risk of biased parameter estimates, as would result if multiple mediation hypotheses were tested with a set of simple mediator models [START_REF] Judd | Process analysis: Estimating mediation in treatment evaluations[END_REF]. Third, and, of central importance to the present study, including several mediators in one model allows us to assess which mediator is most impactful.

We conducted a multiple mediation analysis, using a bootstrap approach taken from [START_REF] Preacher | Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in simple and multiple mediator models[END_REF] including the previously described independent variables and the willingness to leave score as dependent variable. Our effect estimates were based on 5000 bootstrap samples. This analysis showed that only attributions of responsibility for failure in the regression significantly affected willingness to leave ( = -.37, t = -3.79, p < .0001), but not negative affect in general ( = -.12, t = -1.29, p < .20), negative affect towards others ( = .24, t = 1.71, p < .10), or negative affect towards self ( = .10, t = .74, p < .47).

Having established by means of multiple mediation testing that only attributions of responsibility for failure significantly mediates the failure feedback x counterfactual thought interaction on willingness to leave, we proceeded by formally testing moderated mediation by means of the same bootstrap method that was employed in Experiment 1 [START_REF] Preacher | Addressing moderated mediation hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions[END_REF]. We estimated whether attributions

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 23 of responsibility for failure mediated the effect of counterfactual thought on willingness to leave in the near miss condition but not in the large miss condition. In accordance with our predictions, failure feedback was treated as a moderator of the relation between counterfactual thought and negative affect. Our effect estimates are based on 5000 bootstrap samples.

The moderated mediation analysis clearly supported our hypothesis: the indirect effect of counterfactual thought on willingness to leave the group, via attributions of responsibility for failure, was significant in the near miss condition (z = 1.96, p = .05), but not in the large miss condition (z = -.87, p < .39). Importantly, the bootstrap results for this indirect effect showed that this Beta estimate is significantly larger than 0, which again supports our mediation hypothesis.

General Discussion

Taken together, the present studies consistently show that the type of counterfactual thinking significantly influences members' affect, attributions and decision-making responses, but only so when the group fails to further the collective interest by a small margin. Prior social dilemma research did not devote much attention to the impact of collective feedback on how group members make sense of a failure situation and how this sense-making process influences their immediate reactions. Using insights from the counterfactual literature we explored the idea that the margin by which the group fails in furthering the collective interest matters in how people make sense of the situation at hand and influences their subsequent responses.

Summary of Findings and its Implications

Overall, across two experiments, our results showed that in the case of a near miss our counterfactual manipulation had a significant impact on people's negative

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 24 affect, attributions of responsibility and willingness to leave the group, whereas this was not the case after a large miss.

The type of upward counterfactual. To investigate the influence of upward counterfactual thought in a public good setting, we designed a new type of counterfactual manipulation. We employed a manipulation that either facilitated or inhibited people's tendency to engage in self-favoring assessments and responses.

Participants either engaged in counterfactual thought reflecting upon how the outcome could have been different when the others in the group (other-focused counterfactual)

or when they themselves (self-focused counterfactual) would have acted differently.

This difference in reference of the counterfactual (self vs. other) shaped people's negative affect and attributions in different ways.

In Experiment 1, under conditions of a near miss, we found that general negative affect was stronger when other-focused counterfactual thinking rather than self-focused counterfactual thinking was elicited. This effect was replicated in Experiment 2 and, moreover, the same pattern of results was found when the negative affect one felt toward the others (rather than the general negative affect measure) was the dependent variable. These findings imply that, in the case of a near miss, negative affective responses were influenced by our counterfactual manipulation in such a way that they were self-serving. In fact, the overall tendency seemed to be that participants in our studies particularly blamed the others for the near miss rather than themselves.

Indeed, the negative affect score was higher in the other-focused than in the selffocused counterfactual conditions. Also, additional analyses in Experiment 2 using the difference score between negative affect toward others and oneself demonstrated that negative affect was always displayed in a stronger way towards the others than

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 25 towards oneself, but particularly so when in the case of a near miss an other-focused counterfactual relative to a self-focused counterfactual was activated.

We did not ask the participants what they expected the threshold to be. reasonable assumptions, this would make our data even more impressive in the sense that we observed that, especially in the other-focused conditions, participants blamed themselves less after a near miss than after a large miss.

On a related note, the pervasiveness of this self-serving attribution strategy may lead one to wonder whether the refusal to attribute failure to one's own behavior goes hand in hand with a tendency to attribute the failure of the group to structural features such as the difficulty of the threshold that needed to be surpassed. In the current settings we introduced some uncertainty in the provision threshold to allow for internal attributions of blame. But of course, this uncertainty could also allow for external attributions to the threshold level which could further facilitate self-serving attributions. It might thus be that under conditions of a near miss and self-focused counterfactuals people have higher estimations of the threshold to justify to

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 26 themselves that they did not do more in terms of contributions (see also Wit & Wilke, 1998).

The magnitude of collective failure. Our findings demonstrated that the effect of counterfactual thought was moderated by the type of collective feedback offered.

These results thus point out that to understand the experience of collective failure feedback it is important not only to focus on the valence of the feedback (i.e., "did we succeed or not?"), but even more so on the magnitude of failure (near vs. large miss).

Indeed, our results provided evidence for an intriguing observation that a large miss is not necessarily worse than a near miss. In fact, depending on the margin of collective failure, group members' upward counterfactual thinking influenced (near miss) or did not influence (large miss) their negative reactions. As we pointed out earlier, in the case of a large miss all group members will be perceived as somewhat responsible (i.e. diffusion of responsibility) whereas in the case of a near miss group members will be less likely to take some part of the blame and be more motivated to search for the one member responsible, which allows counterfactuals to shape the blaming process.

What drives what? Our findings also provided some interesting insights with respect to how people arrive at attributions of failure and decisions to leave when a near miss situation is encountered. One common observation in the literature is that little is known about the underlying processes that shape people's responses when the group fails in furthering the collective interest. Experiment 1, first of all, showed that, negative affect shaped attribution judgments. In the near miss condition, participants felt more irritated and angry when other-focused counterfactuals rather than selffocused ones were activated, and this led people to attribute more responsibility of failure to the others in the group. Experiment 2 further showed that attributions of

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 27 responsibility explained participants' willingness to leave in the case of a near miss.

Thus, in the case of a near miss, stronger negative affect is experienced when otherfocused rather than self-focused counterfactuals are activated and these affective responses drive attribution judgments, which, in turn drive decision-making.

In this context, it is interesting to note that Experiment 2 showed thatin the case of a near missparticipants were less willing to leave the group when they had generated own-focused counterfactuals. A possible reason for not wanting to leave the group is that one wants to take constructive action to further the group's interests.

This interpretation accords with the suggestion of [START_REF] Parks | \retrospection in social dilemmas: Thinking about the past affects future cooperation[END_REF] that upward counterfactuals may be beneficial for the group, although the current findings thus

show that this beneficial effect requires a self-focus.

In Conclusion

The current investigation demonstrates the importance of identifying the type of upward counterfactual thought group members can engage in when failing to establish a public good. Specifically, our results show that the impact of these types of counterfactual thought depends on the margin of collective failure -a near miss revealing different effects than a large miss. As such, our results emphasize the importance to focus in greater detail on how people interpret failures to further the collective interest and how the affective and cognitive processes involved set the agenda for future decisions.

  in the Public Good Dilemma 3 Running Head: ON NEAR MISSES IN THE PUBLIC GOOD DILEMMA On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma: How Upward Counterfactuals Influence Group Stability When the Group Fails A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 5

  self-focused condition, participants finished the following sentence: The group would have been able to get a better outcome if you [italics added]….. In the other-focused A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT On Near Misses in the Public Good Dilemma 13 condition, participants finished the following sentence: The group would have been able to get a better outcome if the others [italics added] ….

  in the Public Good Dilemma 34

  Contribution. On average, participants contributed 53.20 chips (SD = 20.31). A 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed no significant effects of Failure feedback, F(1, 77) < 1, of Counterfactual, F(1, 77) < 1, or of the Interaction, F(1, 77) < 1. 1

	Negative affect. A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the negative affect score revealed, first of
	all, a significant main effect of Counterfactual, F(1,77) = 4.13, p < .05, 2 = .05:
	Participants in the other-focused counterfactual condition reported higher negative
	affect than those in the self-focused counterfactual condition (Ms = 4.26 vs. 3.56, SDs
	= 1.70 and 1.51; respectively). Also, a significant interaction emerged, F(1, 77) =
	9.57, p < .005,

2 = .11 (see Table

1

for means). As predicted, the difference between participants in the self-focused counterfactual condition versus the other-focused counterfactual condition was significant in the near miss condition, F(1, 77) = 12.99, p < .001, but not in the large miss condition, F(1, 77) < 1, p > .45.

Attributions of responsibility.

A 2 x 2 ANOVA on participants' evaluation of how responsible they regarded the others in the group for the failure revealed only a significant interaction effect, F(1, 77) = 6.59, p < .05, 2 = .08 (see Table

1

for means). As predicted, the difference between participants in the self-focused counterfactual condition versus the other-focused counterfactual condition was significant in the near miss condition, F(1, 77) = 6.05, p < .05, but not in the large miss condition, F(1, 77) = 1.35, p > .24.

  SDs = 1.92 and 2.03; respectively).

	Contributions. On average, participants contributed 50.00 chips (SD = 39.21). A
	2 x 2 ANOVA revealed no significant effect of Failure feedback, F(1, 119) < 1, p >
	.66, of Counterfactual, F(1, 119) < 1, p > .87, or of the Interaction, F(1, 119) = 1.13, p
	> .28. 2
	Negative affect. A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the affect score revealed a significant
	interaction effect, F(1, 119) = 5.40, p < .05,

2 = .04 (see Table

2

for means). As predicted, the difference between participants in the self-focused counterfactual condition versus the other-focused counterfactual condition was significant in the near miss condition, F(1, 119) = 5.48, p < .05, whereas this was not the case in the large miss condition, F(1, 119) < 1, p > .36.

Table 1

 1 Negative Affect and Attribution of Responsibility for Failure as a Function of FailureFeedback and Counterfactual (Experiment 1) Note. Higher scores indicate higher levels of negative affect and attributions of responsibility. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

	Dependent
	Variable

Table 2

 2 Negative Affect, Negative Affect towards Self, Negative Affect towards others and Attribution of Responsibility for Failure as a Function of Failure Feedback and Note. Higher scores indicate higher levels of negative affect, negative affect towards self, negative affect toward others, and attributions of responsibility for failure.

	Counterfactual (Experiment 2)
	Dependent		Failure Feedback
	Variable	Counterfactual	Near Miss	Large Miss
	Negative Affect	Self	3.18 (1.70)	4.32 (1.46)
		Other	4.12 (1.59)	3.97 (1.38)
	Negative Affect	Self	2.68 (1.26)	1.92 (1.18)
	towards self	Other	1.84 (0.93)	2.36 (1.26)
	Negative Affect	Self	2.98 (1.55)	4.29 (1.57)
	toward others	Other	3.94 (1.32)	3.92 (1.46)
	Attribution of	Self	4.33 (1.66)	5.77 (1.23)
	responsibility for	Others	5.20 (1.39)	5.51 (1.12)
	failure
	Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

Table 3

 3 Difference Score Negative Affect as a Function of Failure Feedback and Note. Higher scores indicate higher negative affect toward others. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

	Counterfactual (Experiment 2)
	Dependent		Failure Feedback
	Variable	Counterfactual	Near Miss	Large Miss
	Difference score	Self	.30 (1.92)	2.37 (1.86)
		Others	2.10 (1.51)	1.56 (1.84)

Table 4

 4 Willingness to Leave as a Function of Failure Feedback and CounterfactualNote. Higher scores indicate higher levels of willingness to leave. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

	(Experiment 2)
	Dependent
	Variable

Including contributions in the first session as a covariate did not change the results.

Again, including contributions in the first session as a covariate did not change the results.


Marieke L Fransen
email: m.l.fransen@uva.nl

Ad Bob M Fennis

Th H Pruyn

Kathleen D Vohs

Ad H Th

Pruyn

When Fit Fosters Favoring: The Role of Private Self-Focus

Keywords: regulatory focus, regulatory fit, private self-focus, persuasion, compliance

The present research extends work on the 'the value from fit' principle by showing that regulatory fit effects on persuasion and behavioral compliance are stronger for people high, as opposed to low, in private self-focus. Previous research has shown that people high in private self-focus are strongly affected by external information. In the current work, we demonstrated that people high (versus low) in private self-focus are more persuaded by information that matches (versus mismatches) activated self-knowledge.

A C C E P T E D

M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 2

When Fit Fosters Favoring: The Role of Private Self-Focus

The past two decades have seen an explosion of work on the role of regulatory fit in behavioral compliance, preference formation, attitude change, and persuasion (e.g., [START_REF] Cesario | Regulatory fit and persuasion: Transfer from 'feeling right[END_REF][START_REF] Florack | How advertising claims affect brand preferences and category-brand associations: The role of regulatory fit[END_REF][START_REF] Lee | Bringing the frame into focus: The influence of regulatory fit on processing fluency and persuasion[END_REF]. This work consistently shows that framing a persuasive message in congruence with consumers' regulatory focus enhances persuasion, and promotes compliance. Although recent studies have targeted underlying mechanisms that may explain why regulatory fit fosters persuasion (e.g., [START_REF] Hong | Be fit and be strong: Mastering self-regulation through regulatory fit[END_REF][START_REF] Lee | Bringing the frame into focus: The influence of regulatory fit on processing fluency and persuasion[END_REF][START_REF] Wang | The role of regulatory focus in preference construction[END_REF], it remains unclear under which circumstances regulatory fit effects are likely to occur. In social science, it is almost certainly never the case that an effect happens across all situations and for all people. Hence, it is important to ask what individual characteristics or particular circumstances alter the persuasiveness of regulatory fit and why.

Departing from prior research, we propose and demonstrate in the present research that regulatory fit effects on persuasion are stronger for people with high private self-focus because these people are especially affected by external information that is relevant for the self [START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Accepted Manuscript When | The nonconsciousness of self-consciousness[END_REF]. Private self-focus increases the activation of selfknowledge, thereby boosting the impact of information that fits or misfits with one's activated self-knowledge (i.e., regulatory focus).

Regulatory Fit

Regulatory Focus Theory [START_REF] Higgins | Beyond pleasure and pain[END_REF] proposes that there are two distinct mechanisms that regulate judgments and behavior, labeled promotion and prevention focus.

When people are concerned with their ideal self, they are said to adopt a promotion focus.

This focus prompts an eager strategy in the pursuit of hopes, wishes, and aspirations. People with a promotion focus are especially sensitive to the presence or absence of positive outcomes. In contrast, when people are concerned with their ought self, they are said to adopt

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 3 a prevention focus, which entails vigilant strategies to fulfill duties, obligations, and responsibilities. A prevention focus is concerned with the presence or absence of negative outcomes. These self-regulatory strategies are independent of each other and can coexist simultaneously. A promotion or prevention focus can be momentarily activated by situational factors [START_REF] Idson | Distinguishing gains from nonlosses and losses from nongains: A regulatory focus perspective on hedonic intensity[END_REF], and people tend to have a chronic predominant orientation focus on which they rely in most situations (e.g., [START_REF] Higgins | How self-regulation creates distinct values: The case of promotion and prevention decision making[END_REF].

Research suggests that people in a promotion orientation are especially focused on information relating to the achievement of success (i.e., positive outcomes), whereas those in a prevention orientation are focused on avoiding failure (i.e., negative outcomes; [START_REF] Higgins | Self-discrepancies and biographical memory: Personality and cognition at the level of psychological situation[END_REF]. People with a promotion focus are more motivated and perform better when they use eager goal pursuit strategies aimed at positive outcomes whereas people with a prevention focus are more motivated and perform better when they use vigilant goal pursuit strategies aimed at preventing negative outcomes (Forster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998;[START_REF] Shah | Performance incentives and means: How regulatory focus influences goal attainment[END_REF]. These results are in line with the principle that [START_REF] Higgins | Making a good decision: Value from fit[END_REF] has termed 'value from fit' (see also [START_REF] Avnet | How regulatory fit affects value in consumer choices and opinions[END_REF][START_REF] Higgins | How self-regulation creates distinct values: The case of promotion and prevention decision making[END_REF][START_REF] Higgins | Value from regulatory fit[END_REF]. This principle holds that people experience regulatory fit when they use goal pursuit strategies that match their (current) focus orientation, which in turn increases the perceived value of their behavior.

The previous findings are relevant to attitude change and persuasion because messages advocating values or viewpoints can focus on either the negative outcomes that could happen by not acting upon the message or the positive outcomes that could happen by complying with the message. Emphasizing negative outcomes that can be averted fits with a prevention oriented state whereas stressing positive outcomes that can be achieved fits with a promotion focus.

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 4

Indeed, previous research has established that people are more persuaded when outcomes are framed so that they align with people's current regulatory focus as compared to outcomes that are not framed in alignment with people's regulatory focus (e.g., Cesario, Grant et al., 2004, Study 2;[START_REF] Florack | How advertising claims affect brand preferences and category-brand associations: The role of regulatory fit[END_REF][START_REF] Lee | Bringing the frame into focus: The influence of regulatory fit on processing fluency and persuasion[END_REF]. However, we maintain that these effects of regulatory fit are a function of individuals' self-focus.

Relating regulatory fit and private self-focus

Recent research by [START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Accepted Manuscript When | The nonconsciousness of self-consciousness[END_REF] shows that people with high (versus low) private self-focus are more influenced by external information because private self-focus increases sensitivity and responsiveness to those aspects of the environment that are relevant to the self.

General theories on self-awareness (e.g., [START_REF] Duval | A theory of objective self-awareness[END_REF] state that people have the ability to focus their attention on objects and events in the external environment or on themselves (i.e., self-focus), and that people can and do switch between these spheres. It is generally agreed that the process of focusing on one's self has a public and a private dimension (e.g., Fenigstein, Sheier, & Buss, 1975;[START_REF] Franzoi | The experience of self-awareness and its relation to level of self-consciousness: An experiential sampling study[END_REF]. Public self-focus is characterized by the awareness of oneself from the imagined perspective of others whereas private self-focus is characterized by attentiveness to one's inner states, personal history, and specific features of the self. People with high private self-focus think frequently about themselves, scrutinize their behavior, and reflect on their thoughts. Moreover, people high in private self-focus are quick to make self-descriptive statements and are sensitive to changes in their internal state [START_REF] Mueller | Self-awareness and access to material rated as self-descriptive or nondescriptive[END_REF][START_REF] Scheier | Self-directed attention, awareness of bodily states, and suggestibility[END_REF]. In contrast, people with low private self-focus are less likely to scrutinize or be sensitive to their personal motives or states. Private self-focus can be activated by situational demands but is also a dispositional characteristic of individuals.

Theories on private self-focus suggest that attention to the internal, personal aspect of one's self results in self-evaluation (e.g., [START_REF] Duval | A theory of objective self-awareness[END_REF][START_REF] Scheier | Self-directed attention and the comparison of self with standards[END_REF].

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 5

Such self-evaluation is expected to instigate a self-regulatory process aimed at reducing discrepancies between one's current state and an internal norm or standard. From this perspective one could assume that people with high (versus low) private self-focus are less prone to external information because they are focused on their internal norms and values. Yet

Hull and colleagues [START_REF] Hull | The organizational functions of the self: An alternative to the Duval and Wicklund model of self-awareness[END_REF][START_REF] Hull | Selfconsciousness and the processing of self-relevant information[END_REF][START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Accepted Manuscript When | The nonconsciousness of self-consciousness[END_REF] forwarded a different perspective by emphasizing the role of information processing under conditions of high private self-focus. These authors propose that private self-focus relates to the encoding of information in terms of its self-relevance. According to this theorizing, a state of high private self-focus enhances the processing of self-relevant stimuli by activating knowledge about the self [START_REF] Geller | Cognitive consequences of self-awareness[END_REF].

Germane to the current research, [START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Accepted Manuscript When | The nonconsciousness of self-consciousness[END_REF] found that the behavior of people high in private self-focus is more influenced by external primes than is the behavior of people low in private self-focus. [START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Accepted Manuscript When | The nonconsciousness of self-consciousness[END_REF]experiment 3) showed that high private selffocused participants performed better on a cognitive task after an implicit success prime but worse on the same task when given an implicit failure prime, whereas the performance of people low in private self-focus was unaffected by the primes. These effects suggest that people high in private self-focus are prone to encode external information as self-relevant.

In accordance with these findings, we start with the notion that high private self-focus renders people susceptible to external information. Yet it would not be adaptive for people to walk around open, porous, and readily influenced by any and all environmental information; hence, we argue that not all information is considered self-relevant for people high in private self-focus. Rather, we propose that people high in private self-focus will particularly mark external information that fits with previously stored or activated self-knowledge (e.g., one's regulatory focus) as relevant. When the activated self-knowledge, instigated by a state of high private self-focus, fits with incoming information it will have a greater impact than when

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 6 there is no fit. Translated into the current research this would imply that, in contrast to low self-focused people, appeals framed in promotion terms will be readily perceived as selfrelevant to high self-focused people with a promotion focus and appeals framed in prevention terms will be readily perceived as self-relevant to high self-focused people with a prevention focus. Hence, we hypothesized that the effect of regulatory fit on persuasion is moderated by private self-focus. High private self-focused people (dispositional and situational) will be more affected by information that is congruent (versus incongruent) with their regulatory focus than will people with low private self-focus. We tested our notions in two experiments.

Experiment 1

Experiment 1 was designed as a first test to assess whether people are more persuaded by a message that fits their regulatory focus than when a message does not fit their regulatory focus and to test the moderating role of private self-focus. More in particular, we hypothesized that these effects would be stronger for participants with dispositionally high (versus low) private self-focus because these participants were expected to be highly affected by external self-relevant information (i.e., information that fits with their current orientation focus).

Design and Participants

The experiment used a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (message framing: promotion-framed vs. prevention-framed) x 2 (private self-focus: high vs. low) between-subjects design. One hundred thirty-one college students (41 female) with a mean age of 22 years (SD = 3.08) participated in exchange for 6 Euros or partial course credit.

Procedure

Participants were told that the experiment consisted of several unrelated parts. After responding to demographic questions, dispositional private self-focus was measured and either a promotion or prevention focus was induced by exposing them to promotion-based

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 7 advertising slogans or prevention-based advertising slogans, respectively. Subsequently, participants were asked whether they would be willing to help a charity that expressed either prevention-related or promotion-related values in their message.

Independent Variables

Private self-focus. Private self-focus was measured using the Private Self-Consciousness scale originally developed by [START_REF] Fenigstein | Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory[END_REF][START_REF] Vleeming | Assessment of private and public selfconsciousness: A Dutch replication[END_REF]. This scale measures stable individual differences in private self-focus. Participants rated a total of 10 statements (e.g., 'I reflect on myself a lot' and 'I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings') on a five-point Likert scale (1 = extremely uncharacteristic, 5 = extremely characteristic). To obtain an index of dispositional private self-focus, we averaged the scores on the items (α = .74) and used the median (3.4) to classify participants either as high or low in private self-focus.

Regulatory focus. Situational regulatory focus was activated by exposing participants to four brand logos of different product categories (i.e., cars, clothing, facial cosmetics, and airlines). These four logos were accompanied by either promotion-based slogans (i.e., 'Its Your Goal!', 'Fits Your Ambition', 'Retains Your Youth', 'Straight to your Dreams') or prevention-based slogans (i.e., 'Your Safety is Our Priority', 'Fits your Responsibility' 'Prevents Aging', 'Smooth & Safe'; for a similar procedure see [START_REF] Aaker | I' seek pleasures and 'we' avoid pains: The role of selfregulatory goals in information[END_REF][START_REF] Fransen | Be all you can be: The influence of advertising slogans on regulatory focus and consumer spending behavior[END_REF]. During exposure, participants were asked to provide their opinion on three statements regarding the brand logos and the slogans (e.g., 'the slogan is well formulated') in order to keep their attention on the brands. No time limit was given.

A pretest was conducted to test whether the slogans activated the corresponding regulatory focus. Participants (N = 36) were exposed to the advertising slogans, described above, and subsequently responded to three different items, which were labeled as 'personal choices' [START_REF] Pham | Ideals and oughts and the reliance on affect versus substance in persuasion[END_REF]. Participants were asked to choose one of two statements that

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 8 anchored opposite ends of seven-point scales. The items started with 'I would prefer to…'.

Participants indicated which option they would prefer to perform at this moment in time (e.g., 'take a trip around the world' vs. 'pay back my loans'). Participants' mean ratings were used as an index of regulatory focus ranging from 1 (emphasis on ideals) to 7 (emphasis on oughts). Hence, higher scores indicate a stronger prevention focus and lower scores indicate a stronger promotion focus. As expected, participants who were exposed to the preventionbased advertising slogans scored higher on this measure (M = 3.06, SD = 0.84), indicating a relative emphasis on oughts compared to participants who saw the promotion-based slogans (M = 2.44, SD = .34, F(1, 34) = 8.0, p < .01).

Message framing. Participants were instructed to read the description of an existing but unfamiliar charitable organization (G.S.A.P.; General Society for African Projects) that expressed its goals either in eager terms, aimed at realizing desirable outcomes (e.g., 'Our main aim is to make sure that children can go to school so they can learn how to read and thus realize their ambition and dreams'), or in vigilant terms, aimed at avoiding failure (e.g., 'Our main aim is to make sure that children can go to school so we can prevent illiteracy and a lack of education and thus forestall unemployment'). Participants were randomly assigned to the promotion-framed or prevention-framed information.

Dependent Variable

To measure compliance with the request to support the charity, participants were asked whether they would 1) like to receive more information about the charity, 2) leave their email address so they could be contacted when the charity needed help in the future and 3) be willing to help the charity by distributing flyers. Agreement with each of these requests was scored (0 = no, 1 = yes) and summed to arrive at an overall index of compliance (α = .82).

Results and Discussion

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 9

We expected that participants would offer more help to a charity whose values were stated in a manner that corresponded with their current orientation state and that this interaction effect would be moderated by participants' private self-focus. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant interaction effect between regulatory focus and message framing (F (1, 123) = 10.12, p <.01, η p 2 = .08). The means showed that participants in the promotion focus condition showed more compliance when the charity was framed in promotion-related values (M = .55, SD = 1.06) than when it was framed in prevention-related values (M = .15, SD = .62). In contrast, participants in the prevention focus condition showed more compliance when it was framed in prevention-related values (M = .32, SD = .84) rather than promotion-related values (M = .06, SD = .35).

Moreover, the results yielded the predicted three-way interaction among regulatory focus, message framing, and private self-focus (F(1, 123) = 5.20, p < .05, η p 2 = .04),

indicating that the interaction between regulatory focus and charity framing was more pronounced for participants with high private self-focus than for participants low in private self-focus 1 . In line with expectations, the two-way interaction between regulatory focus and message framing was significant for participants high in private self-focus (F(1, 64) = 10.20, p = .002, η p 2 = .14) but was not significant for participants low in private self-focus (F < 1).

To probe the two-way interaction effects for high vs. low private self-focus participants, a series of simple main effect analyses were conducted. Results indicated that among 1 For reasons of readability, median splits are reported throughout the two studies. However, please note that multiple regression analysis with private self-focus as a continuous predictor (centered), regulatory focus and message focus as dichotomous predictors (dummy-coded), and interaction terms reflecting the two-way interaction between regulatory focus and charity framing, and the three-way interaction between regulatory focus, charity framing and private self-focus, yielded similar significant results (two-way interaction: ß = .49, p < .001; three-way interaction: ß = .24, p < .05).

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 10 participants high in private self-focus, a situationally-activated promotion focus resulted in more compliance with the promotion-framed charity message (M = .60, SD = 1.10) than with the prevention-framed charity message (M = .10, SD = 45; F(1, 123) = 5.98, p < .05, η p 2 = .05). Conversely, participants high in private self-focus with a situational prevention focus were more compliant in response to a prevention-framed charity message (M = .83, SD = 1.11) than to a promotion-framed charity message (M = .06, SD = .25), (F(1, 123) = 9.74, p < .01, η p 2 = .07). In contrast, for participants with low private self-focus, fit versus nonfit between situationally-activated focus orientation and message framing did not affect compliance rates (both Fs < 1, figure 1).

<<< Insert Figure 1 about here>>>

The present findings provide a first empirical demonstration of our hypothesis that private self-focus moderates the effects of outcome-based regulatory fit. High private selffocused individuals were more affected by external messages that fit with their regulatory focus than were low private self-focused individuals. These results offer initial support for the notion that the focus on one's private self activates self-knowledge (i.e., one's regulatory orientation), which renders information that matches with this knowledge highly influential.

The next experiment extends these findings to overt behavior, rather than behavioral intentions.

Experiment 2

The aim of this experiment was to extend the findings of the first experiment in several ways. First, we focused on actual monetary donations as the dependent variable, rather than behavioral intentions. Actual behavior is too seldom the focus of psychological experiments, in part because it is difficult to pin down [START_REF] Baumeister | Psychology as the science of selfreports and finger movements: Whatever happened to actual behavior?[END_REF].

Hence, to obtain results on a measure of behavior indicates that the hypothesized effect is

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 11 robust and reliable. Second, the present experiment measured participants' trait regulatory focus rather than the state manipulation of regulatory focus that was employed in the first experiment. This change goes toward construct validity by attempting to find converging evidence using state manipulations as well as trait assessments. Third, a private self-focus manipulation was used to establish that the previously found results also hold when private self-focus is momentarily induced.

Design and Participants

Our predictions were tested in a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (message framing: promotion-framed vs. prevention-framed) x 2 (private self-focus: high vs.

low) design with regulatory focus and private self-focus as between subjects variables and message framing as a within subjects variable. Fifty-three undergraduate students ( 26females; M age = 20.94, SD age = 2.80) participated in exchange for partial course credit and 6

Euros.

Procedure

Upon arrival at the laboratory participants were told that the experiment consisted of several unrelated parts. They responded to demographic questions, after which their predominant regulatory focus was measured. Subsequently, private self-focus was manipulated and participants read messages about two charities. One of the charities was framed in promotion-related terms and the other in prevention-related terms. Finally, participants were asked if they would like to donate money to either one or both charities.

After data collection was complete, the money raised during the experiment was donated to the charities.

Independent Variables

Private self-focus. To activate situational private self-focus, we used a procedure developed and validated by [START_REF] Fenigstein | Self-attention, concept activation, and the causal self[END_REF]. Participants in the high private

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 12 self-focus condition were instructed to write a story using the following words (target words italicized here): 'I', 'this morning ', 'park', 'candy', 'myself', 'walking', 'lamp', 'forgetting', 'me', 'throwing', 'solve', 'glove', 'case', 'shampoo', 'my', 'never', 'face', 'alarm clock', 'alone', 'bike'. In the low private self-focus condition the target words were replaced by the words 'he', 'himself', 'his', 'him', and 'together'.

Regulatory focus. We used the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire [START_REF] Higgins | Achievement orientations from subjective histories of success: Promotion pride versus prevention pride[END_REF], which is comprised of six promotion-items and five prevention items to establish participants predominant focus. Participants indicated on 5-point scales how frequently specific events had occurred in their lives (ranging from 'never or seldom' to 'very often'). The reliability of the promotion construct was satisfactory (α = .66). The original prevention items did not reach a satisfactory reliability level (α = .55). Based on a factor and reliability analysis, we decided to drop one of the prevention items ('not being careful enough has gotten me into troubles at times') thereby increasing Cronbach's alpha to .63. A factor analysis with the remaining items resulted in the two expected constructs (eigenvalue promotion = 2.34, eigenvalue prevention = 2.0). Further, Pearsons' Correlation between the two constructs was not significant (r = .028, p = .84), indicating that the two factors, as expected, reflect distinct constructs. A procedure developed by [START_REF] Cesario | Regulatory fit and persuasion: Transfer from 'feeling right[END_REF] subsequently assessed whether participants were predominantly promotion-or prevention-focused. To this end, difference scores were calculated between the mean scores on the promotion items and prevention items, with the resulting median score (.33) used to classify participants as either predominantly promotion or prevention-focused.

Message framing. Participants were informed that a group of researchers were supporting two different charities, G.S.A.P (the same organization as used in the previous experiment) and Nepal Pariwar, and that they were looking for donators. (Both charities exist and have the goal to stimulate educational programs in third world countries.)

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 13

One of the charities was framed in promotion-related terms whereas the other charity was framed in prevention-related terms. The framing of the charities was randomized; half of the participants read the information about G.S.A.P. in a promotion frame (e.g., 'Our main aim is to make sure that children can go to school so they can learn how to read and thus realize their ambition and dreams') and the information about Nepal Pariwar in a prevention frame (e.g., 'Our main aim is to make sure that children don't have to go to school in an unhygienic and unsafe environment'), and vice versa.

Dependent Variable

After reading the persuasive messages, participants were asked whether they wanted to donate any part of their participation renumeration to one or both charities. Participants were free to donate whatever amount they wanted (as well as none at all). The amount of money donated to either charities served as the dependent measure.

Results and Discussion

We tested two main hypotheses. First, that participants would donate more money to a charity that was framed in terms that corresponded to their dispositional regulatory focus than a charity that was framed in a manner that mismatched their regulatory focus. Second, that this effect would be moderated by situational private self-focus. Hence, a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (message framing: promotion-framed vs. prevention-framed) x 2 (private self-focus: high vs. low) ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor was conducted. Order of presentation of the charities was also included as an independent variable to control for any potential confounding effects. As expected, we found an interaction effect between regulatory focus and charity framing (F(1, 45) = 6.26, p < .05, η p 2 = .12). Participants with a predominant promotion focus donated 1.68 Euro (SD = 1.51) to the promotion framed charity (approximately $ 2.13) and 1.13 Euro (SD = 1.22) to the prevention framed charity (approximately $ 1.43). Conversely, participants with a predominant prevention focus donated

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 14 1.55 Euro (SD = 1.69) to the prevention framed charity (approximately $ 1.96) and 1.07 Euro (SD = 1.26) to the promotion framed charity (approximately $1.35).

In line with predictions, a significant three-way interaction between regulatory focus, charity framing, and private self-focus qualified the two-way interaction (F(1, 45) = 6.78, p < .05, η p 2 = .13). Replicating the results of experiment 1, the two-way interaction between regulatory focus and message framing was significant only for participants high in private self-focus (F(1, 23) = 7.79, p = .01, η p 2 = .25), and not for participants low in private selffocus (F < 1). Additional simple main effect analyses confirmed that for participants high in self-focus, a predominant promotion focus elicited higher monetary donations to a promotion framed charity (M = 1.91, SD = 1.69) than to a prevention framed charity (M = .1.02, SD = 1.16), (F(1, 45) = 4.96, p < .05, η p 2 = .09). Conversely, high private self-focus participants with a predominant prevention focus donated more money to the charity when it was framed in prevention terms (M = 1.88, SD = 2.03) rather than promotion terms (M = .65, SD = 1.09), (F(1, 45) = 8.63, p < .01, η p 2 = .16). In contrast, regulatory fit did not affect charitable behavior among participants with low private self-focus, both Fs < 1 (figure 2). No significant main effect or interaction effects with order of charity presentation was observed (all ps > .15)

<<< Insert Figure 2 about here>>>

The findings of this experiment corroborate and extend the results of the first experiment by showing that people donate more (real) money to a charity when its message is framed in terms that are congruent (versus incongruent) with their dispositional orientation focus, and that this effect is contingent on a private self-focus state. Moreover, the results generalized to a situation in which participants' private self-focus was manipulated instead of measured. In addition, the predicted effects are observed regardless of whether regulatory

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 15 focus was situationally manipulated (as in experiment 1) or measured as a chronic trait (as in the current experiment).

General Discussion

Our main objective with the present experiments was to delineate when regulatory fit results in increased persuasion and behavioral compliance and when it does not. In two experiments, we found support for the hypothesis that effects of regulatory fit on persuasion and behavior occurred among people with high private self-focus and was absent among those with low private self-focus. Specifically, we found that participants high in private self-focus with a promotion focus were more willing to help (experiment 1) and donate to charity (experiment 2) when the charity's message was described in eager terms (aimed at attaining positive outcomes) rather than vigilant terms (aimed at preventing negative outcomes). The opposite was found among people high in private self-focus with a prevention focus; they were more persuaded when the message was described in vigilant terms.

Whereas previous research has shown effects of regulatory fit on preferences, attitudes, persuasion, and memory, the present experiments are the first to show actual (donating) behavior as a function of outcome-based regulatory fit (cf. [START_REF] Baumeister | Psychology as the science of selfreports and finger movements: Whatever happened to actual behavior?[END_REF]. People donated more money to a charity that was framed in such a way that it fit their regulatory focus than when the charity was framed in a nonfit manner.

Notably, the present experiments are the first to reveal the moderating role of private self-focus in regulatory fit effects. We found that the effects of regulatory fit on persuasion were stronger among people with high private self-focus compared to people with low private self-focus. The effect of private self-focus was so powerful that we observed no effect of regulatory fit on persuasion among participants in a state of low private self-focus (although

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 16 aggregating over different levels of private self focus still showed the effects of fit on persuasion in line with previous research).

The current results should be viewed through the lens of their potential strengths and drawbacks. Toward the strength side, we used validated and established procedures to manipulate regulatory focus (Experiment 1) and private self-focus (Experiment 2), which increases confidence in our findings although we acknowledge that the experiments did not adopt manipulation checks for the procedures. Also, that we observed similar results using measures of dispositional preferences for behaving as well as situational manipulations speaks to the robustness of the observed effects. There is a potential concern that both experiments were conducted in the domain of charity behavior, which might limit the generalizability of our results. One could argue, for instance, that a high private self-focus might amplify the use of active self-relevant information (i.e., one's regulatory focus) particularly for decisions and judgments that are less self-relevant. Further research could examine this possibility by including situations in which the benefits are to a greater and lesser extent relevant to the self.

Self-Relevant Processing Theories

The present results are in line with the work by Hull and colleagues [START_REF] Hull | The organizational functions of the self: An alternative to the Duval and Wicklund model of self-awareness[END_REF][START_REF] Hull | Selfconsciousness and the processing of self-relevant information[END_REF][START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Accepted Manuscript When | The nonconsciousness of self-consciousness[END_REF] in suggesting that people high in private self-focus are highly influenced and affected by external information because it is considered to be selfrelevant. [START_REF] Hull | Selfconsciousness and the processing of self-relevant information[END_REF][START_REF] Higgins | How self-regulation creates distinct values: The case of promotion and prevention decision making[END_REF] argued that a state of high private self-focus activates selfknowledge, which instigates a process of self-relevant encoding. In line with this theorizing, we found that high self-focused people, as opposed to low self-focused people, were especially affected by external information that fits with their activated self-knowledge (in this case, their current orientation focus). Hence, when private self-focus is high, people are especially influenced by information that is congruent with their current orientation focus.

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

Moreover, the present results shed new light on the concept of private self-focus.

Previous research on private self-focus mainly has emphasized the self-regulatory process instigated by a state of private self-focus. This line of reasoning states that high private selffocus activates a self-regulatory process aimed at reducing discrepancies between one's current state and an internal norm or standard. In accordance with Hull and colleagues, we showed that a state of high private self-focus is related not only to discrepancy-reducing selfregulation but also entails a qualitatively different way of information processing aimed at rendering external information self-relevant.

This viewpoint is also consistent with the active-self account recently proposed by [START_REF] Wheeler | Understanding the role of the self in prime-to-behavior effects: The active-self account[END_REF]. Wheeler and colleagues (2007) argue that the selfconcept plays a vital, central role in priming effects. According to their model, moderators of general priming effects, such as private self-focus [START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Accepted Manuscript When | The nonconsciousness of self-consciousness[END_REF], operate by more than simply affecting construct accessibility. Rather, changes in the active self-concept are key to how external information guides behavior. When external information is (actively) related to the self, as opposed to when it is not related to the self, it exhibits larger effects on behavioral outcomes because people use this information as a basis for evaluation and decision making.

Accordingly, it is not merely awareness of oneself but rather the self-relevant information processing aspect of private self-focus (viz., high self-focused participants in the current studies) that explains the effects of external information on behavior. A recent study by [START_REF] Wheeler | Does selfconsciousness increase or decrease priming effects? It depends[END_REF] further argued that it is especially the selfreflective dimension, rather than the state awareness dimension, within the construct of private self-focus that accounts for the influence of external information on behavior under conditions of high private self-focus.

Conclusion

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 18

It is perhaps paradoxical that the message of this research is that focusing people on themselves can lead them to respond more favorably to external persuasive attempts. One may think, a priori, that people who focus their attention on the environment, rather than themselves, would be highly compliant because they are aware of and therefore may be more susceptible to external information. Instead, we found the opposite. It was high private selffocused people who responded strongly to external persuasion attempts that match with their activated self-knowledge. This finding contrasts with the intuitive, possibly even cynical, notion that when people focus on themselves they become egocentric and therefore disinterested in information from the external environment, such as persuasive messages. The current work demonstrates that getting people to focus on themselves, in just the right circumstances, can pave the way to persuasion and behavioral compliance.

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 23 Framing: Promotion Framing: Prevention

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. Helping behavior as a function of regulatory focus, message framing, and private

Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. Charity donations as a function of regulatory focus, message framing, and private

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

When Fit Fosters Favoring 19