Eric Fruchart
email: eric.fruchart@univ-perp.fr

Patricia Rulence-Pâques

Rulence-Pâques Patricia

RISK JUDGMENT AND RISK TAKING 1 Mapping Risk Judgment and Risk Taking in Mountain Hiking: An Information Integration Approach

Keywords: mapping, risk, information integration, confidence frame, mountain hiking

Risk analysis is essential for promoting hiking-based tourism and for reducing the number of accidents. The objective of the present study was to map positions on risk judgment and risk taking, according to how 395 participants integrated three antecedents of the confidence frame (environment, team, and self). The participants filled out a questionnaire on risk judgment and another on risk taking. Each questionnaire was composed of eight scenarios that combined the three antecedents as information cues. A cluster analysis, repeated-measures analyses of variance, chi-square tests, and bivariate correlation analyses were applied to the questionnaire results. Three positions on risk were identified. The clusters' composition was related to the members' gender. A better understanding of information integration approaches may be useful for mountain hiking participants' safety.

RISK JUDGMENT AND RISK TAKING 2

Mapping Risk Judgment and Risk Taking in Mountain Hiking: An Information

Integration Approach

Mountain hiking has become increasingly popular over the last several decades in France. This activity is defined as hiking on official trails, non-official trails, small paths or terrain in a mountainous area [START_REF] Zürcher | Circumstances and causes of death of hikers at different altitudes: A retrospective analysis of hiking fatalities from 2003-2018[END_REF]. This type of outdoor activity in the mountains provides psychological and physical health benefits but also exposes participants to a risk of injury [START_REF] Kortenkamp | No Hiking Beyond this Point! Hiking Risk Prevention Recommendations in Peer-Reviewed Literature[END_REF]. The issue of safety is central in this mountain activity [START_REF] Vanpoulle | Accidentology of mountain sports: An insight provided by the systemic modelling of accident and near-miss sequences[END_REF]. Understanding the issue of risk is essential for reducing the number of accidents and for promoting hiking-based tourism [START_REF] She | An Exploration of Hiking Risk Perception: Dimensions and Antecedent Factors[END_REF]. With this objective, we sought to map how individuals mentally integrate various information cues when judging risk situations in mountain hiking and when deciding whether to risk engaging in this activity.

To investigate the issue of risk, researchers in psychology have looked at the relationship between risk judgment (i.e. risk perception) and risk taking [START_REF] Mills | Explaining Contradictory Relations Between Risk Perception and Risk Taking[END_REF]. In various domains, individuals' risk judgments can be a key underlying factor in their risktaking behaviour [START_REF] Schürmann | Mapping risk perceptions in dynamic risk-taking environments[END_REF]. A typical theoretical and empirical prediction is that risk judgment is inversely correlated with risk-taking behaviour: the greater the judged risk, the less likely people are to take it [START_REF] Reyna | Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy[END_REF]. However, other studies have found that risk judgment and risk taking are not correlated [START_REF] Brewer | Meta-analysis of the relationship between risk perception and health behavior: The example of vaccination[END_REF] or that risk judgment is positively correlated with risk taking [START_REF] Reyna | Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy[END_REF]. In sports psychology, for instance, [START_REF] Kern | Risk perception and risk-taking among skateboarders[END_REF] identified individual factors associated with risk judgment and risk taking among skateboarders. The researchers found that a higher level of judged risk is related to greater risk taking by skateboarders. The results of [START_REF] Kern | Risk perception and risk-taking among skateboarders[END_REF] study could usefully be applied to other physical activities, in order to improve our knowledge of risk judgment and risk taking. These various findings showed that individuals Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017580 may think about risk in different ways. The differences in the relationship between risk judgment and risk taking are not clear, and we reasoned that it would be useful to apply novel scientific approaches to better understand and explain this relationship [START_REF] Mullet | Cognitive processes involved in the assessment of health hazards' severity[END_REF]. One possible explanation for the contradictory results for the relationship between risk judgment and risk taking is the influence of individual factors [START_REF] Mills | Explaining Contradictory Relations Between Risk Perception and Risk Taking[END_REF]. Interindividual differences in risk components might be explained by the person's gender and level of experience. With regard to gender, risk-taking behaviour by recreational skiers and snowboarders is more prominent among males than among females [START_REF] Willick | Helmet Use and Risk-Taking Behavior Among Skiers and Snowboarders[END_REF]. The opposite difference in risk judgment was found by [START_REF] Reniers | Risk Perception and Risk-Taking Behaviour during Adolescence: The Influence of Personality and Gender[END_REF], since because men judged behaviours to be less risky than women did. With regard to the level of experience, [START_REF] Kern | Risk perception and risk-taking among skateboarders[END_REF] suggested that it influenced risk judgment: the level of experience among skateboarders was positively correlated with their risk taking. Experience pushes mountain hikers to engage in risk-taking [START_REF] Kortenkamp | No Hiking Beyond this Point! Hiking Risk Prevention Recommendations in Peer-Reviewed Literature[END_REF]. Gender and experience have been investigated with regard to either risk judgment or risk taking but not the risk judgment and risk taking at the same time. In various mountain sports and leisure activities, women judged activities to be riskier than men did, and non-experienced individuals judged activities to be riskier than experienced individuals did [START_REF] Demirhan | MOUNTAINEERS' RISK PERCEPTION IN OUTDOOR-ADVENTURE SPORTS: A STUDY OF SEX AND SPORTS EXPERIENCE[END_REF]. [START_REF] She | An Exploration of Hiking Risk Perception: Dimensions and Antecedent Factors[END_REF] found that females judged activities to be riskier than males did and that more experienced hikers judged activities to be riskier than less experienced hikers did. However, the influences of gender and experience on both risk dimensions (risk judgment and risk taking) in a given outdoor mountain activity have not previously been assessed in the same study.

A second possible explanation for the disparate findings on the relationship between risk judgment and risk taking relates to the methods used. [START_REF] Mullet | Cognitive processes involved in the assessment of health hazards' severity[END_REF] highlighted the limitations of correlational techniques for modelling of the two risk dimensions. Even though the identification of a correlation between risk judgment and risk taking was an effective tool, Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017580 it did not provide insights into the individuals' cognitive processes during the judgment of risk and risk taking [START_REF] Mullet | Cognitive processes involved in the assessment of health hazards' severity[END_REF].

Cognitive processes can be probed by applying information integration theory [START_REF] Anderson | Unified social cognition[END_REF]. This approach focuses on the way in which multiple stimuli are integrated into a judgment or a decision, i.e. how people combine various information cues and how people use cognitive algebra to process information in different situations. Cognitive algebra refers to the subjective values (or psychological considerations) that people give to stimuli.

These three rules can be additive, conjunctive or disjunctive, as illustrated by the following hypothetical situation. A person is presented with a set of four situations related to a mountain activity (defined by an individual's level of equipment and his/her level of competence) and then has to perceive the degree of risk. There are two levels of equipment (with or without appropriate equipment) and two levels of competence (low competence vs high competence). Once the levels of risk have been estimated, they are plotted as a factorial graph (see Figure 1). With an additive rule (Figure 1 This information integration approach has been already applied to various domains, such as health risks [START_REF] Muñoz Sastre | Relationship between Cigarette Dose and Perceived Risk of Lung Cancer[END_REF], mountain sport [START_REF] Fruchart | Mapping adults' and young athletes' views regarding how acceptable it is to use a nutritional supplement in sport[END_REF], and risks in mountain sport [START_REF] Chamarro | Risk Judgments in Climbers: The Role of Difficulty, Meteorological Conditions, Confidence and Appropriate Tools[END_REF][START_REF] Muñoz Sastre | Relationship between Cigarette Dose and Perceived Risk of Lung Cancer[END_REF]

studied

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017580 the manner in which smokers integrated their daily cigarette consumption and the cigarette's nicotine concentration, in order to understand the relationship between exposure and the judged risk of lung cancer. The researchers' main finding was that the judgment of the risk of cancer increased as the level of smoking increased. [START_REF] Fruchart | Mapping adults' and young athletes' views regarding how acceptable it is to use a nutritional supplement in sport[END_REF] investigated the way in which non-athletes, mountain athletes, and non-mountain athletes combined five informational cues (relatedness, autonomy, competence, risk taking, and weather conditions) when judging the degree of arousal and the degree of satisfaction experienced during mountain hiking. There were no differences between the three groups. In all three groups, the influence of relatedness and risk on the judgment of arousal differed from that on the judgment of satisfaction. [START_REF] Chamarro | Risk Judgments in Climbers: The Role of Difficulty, Meteorological Conditions, Confidence and Appropriate Tools[END_REF] looked at how climbers combined the available information on environmental conditions and personal resources when judging the risk to their safety. The researchers found that all the factors had a highly significant influence on risk judgment.

The information integration approach has also been used to map different judgment and decision positions in sport (e.g., [START_REF] Fruchart | Mapping judgment of well-being in sport[END_REF] and different views of risk in the health domain (e.g., [START_REF] Marco | Mapping children's and adolescents' judgment rules for assessing the risk of disease transmission from sick friends: Contagion[END_REF]. Fruchart and Rulence-Pâques (2020) mapped how adolescents, young adults, and middle-aged adults cognitively combined five elements when estimating the level of well-being in sport. The results showed that all five elements had a significant impact on the judgment of well-being. Two positions for the judgment of well-being were identified: both positions were characterized by different cognitive processes and different levels of judgment, and both were associated with the participants' age. Muñoz [START_REF] Marco | Mapping children's and adolescents' judgment rules for assessing the risk of disease transmission from sick friends: Contagion[END_REF] mapped the manner in which children and adolescents judged the risk of catching a disease from sick friends. They estimated the risk transmission in scenarios that were constituted from the type of contact, the type of disease, and the number of contacts. Six risk judgment positions were identified.

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The present study used the same scientific perspective to examine risk judgment and risk taking. The objective was to map people's positions on mountain hiking according to these two risk dimensions (risk judgment and risk taking), by identifying the manner in which the people cognitively integrate various factors. We considered three factors described in the literature on risk in mountain sports and which correspond to antecedents of the confidence frame in this setting (Males et al., 2015).

During adventure sports or mountain activities, individuals may be aware of immediate danger and they may develop a confidence frame. The latter is a type of "psychological bubble" used to cope with risk or to enjoy the sports situation (e.g., Houge

Mackenzie & [START_REF] Houge Mackenzie | The psychological experience of river guiding: Exploring the protective frame and implications for guide well-being[END_REF]. The confidence frame provides feelings of safety from risk and is often operationalized as an individual's confidence in his/her equipment, his/her knowledge and skills, and/or the knowledge and skills of other individuals with whom he/she performs the activity [START_REF] Apter | Motivational styles in everyday life: A guide to reversal theory[END_REF]. The development of this confidence frame may generate different levels of risk in these activities [START_REF] Kerr | Multiple motives for participating in adventure sports[END_REF]. Within a protective confidence frame, risk taking is experienced as exciting. Without a protective frame, people feel anxious and scared. Thus, Males, Kerr and Hudson (2015) proposed three antecedents of the confidence frame in the sports domain: self, team, and environment. Self may refer to previous experience and accomplishments in the activity considered. Team may concern the support provided by social relationships. Environment may reflect equipment that ensures a more favourable situation.

As mentioned above, the objective of the present study was to map positions on risk judgment and risk taking in mountain hiking by identifying the ways in which individuals cognitively combine the three antecedents of the confidence frame (environment, team, and self). We considered three hypotheses. The first was that several different positions on risk judgment and risk taking would be found (e.g., [START_REF] Fruchart | Mapping judgment of well-being in sport[END_REF].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017580 Depending on the cluster, the participants would combine or integrate the three antecedents of the confidence frame in different ways, and risk judgment and risk taking would be differently correlated [START_REF] Brewer | Meta-analysis of the relationship between risk perception and health behavior: The example of vaccination[END_REF]. The second hypothesis was that the composition of clusters of individuals would be linked to the individuals' characteristics, i.e., how often they went mountain hiking, and their gender (e.g., [START_REF] Fruchart | Mapping adults' and young athletes' views regarding how acceptable it is to use a nutritional supplement in sport[END_REF].

Method Participants

The participants were 395 students attending a university in France. There were 220 males (M age = 21.35, SD = 2.25) and 175 females (M age = 21.86, SD = 3.04). Participation was voluntary and not remunerated. After having obtained the dean's agreement, the two investigators contacted students, explained the study's objectives and procedures, and invited them to participate. When a student agreed to participate, a study appointment was arranged.

Each participant had to state the frequency with which he/she went hiking in the mountains (very rarely/sometimes/often).

Material

The material comprised two questionnaires (one on risk judgment and the other on risk taking). Each included a set of cards bearing a scenario, a question, and a rating scale. Each scenario was designed to have three within-subject factor: Environment (with vs. without appropriate equipment), Team (participation with inexperienced people vs. experienced people), and Self (No experience or knowledge vs. prior experience or knowledge). Hence, the 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design yielded 8 scenarios.

One typical scenario was as follows: "Jean Dubeut is on holiday in the mountains and is thinking about going for a mountain hike: this would involve more than 6 hours of walking, 1200 meters of climbing, steep slopes, sometimes loose terrain, and some narrow paths with a sheer drop on both sides. Jean is in good physical condition. He is not very well equipped for Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017580 this hike (no hiking boots, no hiking clothing, and no walking sticks). He will be hiking with people with experience of mountain hiking. Jean has already done difficult hikes in the mountains."

In the first questionnaire (risk judgment), the question below each scenario was: "If you were Jean Dubeut, how risky would you perceive the planned mountain hike to be?".

Beneath each question was an 11-point response scale, with "Not at all risky" indicated on the left and "Extremely risky" indicated on the right. In the second questionnaire (risk taking), the question below each scenario was: "If you were Jean Dubeut, to what extent would you take the risk of going on the mountain hike?". Beneath each question was an 11-point response scale with "Not at all" indicated on the left and "Absolutely" indicated on the right.

Procedure

The study was performed in accordance with the university's ethical standards. After the study had been approved by the dean, participants were tested individually in a room at the university. In line with Anderson's method [START_REF] Anderson | Unified social cognition[END_REF], the study comprised a familiarization phase and an experimental phase. In the familiarization phase, the experimenter explained the procedure to each participant. The experimenter informed the participant that his/her task was to read scenarios on a person's planned mountain hike and then perceive the degree of risk (questionnaire 1) or willingness to take the risk of going on the planned hike (questionnaire 2). During this phase, each participant was presented with three scenarios chosen so that the participant was exposed to the full range of stimuli. The objective of this phase was to make each participant as familiar as possible with the material and procedure. At the end of this phase, the participants could review their three answers and change them if wished. In the second (experimental) phase, all eight factorial design scenarios were presented to the participants. In contrast to the familiarization phase, the participants were not allowed to review or change their answers. Half of the participants were presented Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017580

with the risk judgment questionnaire first and the risk-taking questionnaire second. The other half were presented with the questionnaires in the reverse order.

Data analysis

Each participant's rating from the experimental phase of each questionnaire was converted to a numerical value expressing the distance between the point checked by the participant on the response scale and the left anchor (i.e. the point of origin). These numerical values were then subjected to graphical and statistical analyses.

To test our first hypothesis, we used a two-step cluster analysis (hierarchical and then non-hierarchical cluster analysis) to obtain a robust solution (e.g., [START_REF] Martinent | A Cluster Analysis of Affective States Before and During Competition[END_REF].

Firstly, a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward's linkage method with squared Euclidian distance measure was used to determine the number of clusters in the data from the agglomeration schedule coefficients and the dendrogram. A repeated-measure ANOVA with cluster membership as a between-subject factor, the three factors as independent variables, and estimated means as the dependent variables was performed to check whether the cluster solution was valid [START_REF] Aldenderfer | Cluster analysis[END_REF]. Secondly, we performed a k-means nonhierarchical cluster analysis by specifying the cluster solution. This clustering approach has been used to map individual different positions in the process of judgment in sport (e.g., [START_REF] Fruchart | Mapping adults' and young athletes' views regarding how acceptable it is to use a nutritional supplement in sport[END_REF].

Several separate repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted on the data from each cluster. Chi-square tests were used to establish whether cluster groups were associated with participants' gender and/or their level of experience in mountain hiking. Lastly, bivariate correlations between the data from each risk judgment cluster and the data from each risktaking cluster were computed using Pearson's r.

Results

Cluster analyses

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The results of the hierarchical analysis suggested that a four-cluster solution (K = 4) was tenable. A k-means cluster analysis of a four-cluster solution was then conducted. The four-cluster solution was similar for the two stages of the cluster analysis.

A repeated measures ANOVA with a Cluster x Risk x Environment x Team x Self, 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 revealed that the subgroups of four-cluster solution were significantly different (p < .05) with regard to all four factors: risk, F(3,391) = 253.72, p < .001, η² p = .66; environment, F(3,391) = 35.50, p < .001, η² p = .21; team, F(3,391) (= 79.74, p < .001, η² p = .17, and self, F(3,391) = 34.71, p < .001, η² p = .21. The independent variable cluster was significant, F(3,391) = 28.43, p < .001, η² p = .18. These results confirmed that a four-cluster solution was tenable.

Tukey's test revealed a significant difference (p < .001) between Cluster 1 (M = 4.83; SD = 0.06) and the three other clusters: Cluster 2 (M = 5.68; SD = 0.13), Cluster 3 (M = 5.21; SD = 0.05), and Cluster 4 (M = 5.64; SD = 0.08). It also showed significant differences between Cluster 3 and Cluster 2 and between Cluster 3 and Cluster 4. The difference between Cluster 2 and Cluster 4 was not significant (p = .999).

Repeated-measures ANOVAs and graphical analysis

Overall repeated-measures ANOVA

A first set of four repeated-measures ANOVAs (one for each cluster) was performed on the whole set of raw data. The design for each ANOVA was Risk x Environment x Team x Self, 2 x 2 x 2 x 2. The main results are summarized in Table 1 and the four clusters are depicted in Figure 2. The estimated mean ratings are on the y-axis. Each panel corresponds to one level of the Risk factor (risk judgment or risk taking). The two levels of the Self factor are on the x-axis. Each curve corresponds to one level of the Team factor.

For the 117 participants (30% of the total) composing Cluster 1, the mean risk judgment rating (M = 4.64, SD = 0.21) was slightly lower than the risk-taking rating (M = Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017580 5.00, SD = 0.19). In both panels of the Figure, the curves form a broad fan opening to the left -indicating that the participants in this cluster used a disjunctive rule for risk judgment and for risk taking.

For the 27 participants (7%) composing Cluster 2, the mean risk judgment rating (M = 5.52, SD = 0.69) and mean risk taking rating (M = 5.84, SD = 0.82) were not significatively different. The curves in the left panel (risk judgment) are parallel, indicating that the integration rule was additive. The curves in the right panel (risk taking) form a small fan opening to the left, indicating that the integration rule was disjunctive. Hence, the participants in Cluster 2 used an additive cognitive rule for risk judgment and a disjunctive cognitive rule for risk taking.

For the 179 participants (45%) comprising Cluster 3, the mean risk judgment rating (M = 6.17, SD = 0.14) was markedly higher than mean risk-taking rating (M = 4.25, SD = 0.19).

In both panels, all the curves are parallel -indicating that the participants in Cluster 3 used an additive rule for both risk judgment and risk taking.

For the 72 participants (18%) composing Cluster 4, the mean risk judgment rating (M = 4.37, SD = 0.43) was markedly lower than mean risk-taking rating (M = 6.91, SD = 0.29).

The curves in the left panel (risk judgment) are parallel, which indicates that the integration rule was additive. The curves in the right panel (risk taking) form a small fan open to the left, which indicates that the integration rule was disjunctive. As was seen in Cluster 2, the participants of Cluster 4 used an additive cognitive rule for risk judgment and a disjunctive cognitive rule for risk taking.

Risk judgment

A second set of four repeated-measures ANOVAs was conducted on the risk judgment data from each cluster (Table 2). The estimated mean risk judgment ratings for each variable and each cluster are shown in Table 3. All three factors were statistically significant (p <.05)

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017580 in each cluster. The Environment × Team × Self interaction was not significant in Cluster 1 (F(1,116)= 0.56, p = .455, η ² p = .00), Cluster 2 (F(1,26)= 0.01, p = .978, η ² p = .00) or Cluster 4 (F(1,71)= 3.08, p = .083, η ² p = .04). In Cluster 3, however, the Environment × Team × Self interaction was statistically significant, F(1,178)= 8.23, p <.005, η ² p = .04.

Risk taking

A third set of four repeated-measures ANOVAs was conducted on the risk taking data.

The findings of the ANOVAs performed on each cluster are presented in Table 4. The three factors were all statistically significant (p <.05) in each cluster. Table 3 shows the estimated mean risk-taking rating for each variable in each cluster.

In Cluster 1, the Environment × Team × Self interaction was significant, F(1,116)= 9.03, p <.003, η ² p = .07. The Environment × Team × Self interaction was not significant in Cluster 2 (F(1,26)= 0.55, p <.465, η ² p = .02) or Cluster 3 (F(1,178)= 2.87, p <.092, η ² p = .02).

In Cluster 4, the Environment × Team × Self interaction was significant, F(1,71)= 2.35, p <.001, η ² p = .16.

Correlation between risk judgment and risk taking

For each cluster, the correlation between the mean risk judgment rating and the mean risk-taking rating was computed. The threshold for statistical significance was set to p <.05.

In Cluster 1, the risk judgment was significantly and inversely correlated with risk taking (r = -.303, p < .001). In Cluster 2, the risk judgment was not significantly correlated with risk taking (r = -.349, p = .075). In Cluster 3, the risk judgment was significantly and inversely correlated with risk taking (r = -.292, p < .001). In Cluster 4, the risk judgment was significantly and inversely related to risk taking (r = -.594, p < .001).

Chi-square test

Table 5 shows the composition of each cluster in terms of the participants' gender.

The 2 (male/female) × 4 (cluster) Pearson's chi-square test was significant, χ²(3) = 18.23, p

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<.001. The 3 (very rarely/sometimes/often) × 4 (cluster) Pearson's chi-square test was not significant, χ²(6) = 8.14, p = 228.

Discussion

The objective of the present study was to map various positions on risk judgment and risk taking according to how the participants integrated three antecedents of the confidence frame (environment, team, and self). We had three starting hypotheses. The first was that there were several different risk positions, i.e. different participants integrated the three factors in different ways (e.g., [START_REF] Fruchart | Mapping judgment of well-being in sport[END_REF]. This hypothesis was confirmed because an analysis of the whole set of raw data from the two questionnaires revealed three positions about risk. The first position corresponded to Cluster 1, the second corresponded to Cluster 3, and the third position corresponded to Clusters 2 and 4.

(2) The second hypothesis was that the clusters' composition would be linked to how often the participants went mountain hiking and to the participants' gender (e.g., [START_REF] Fruchart | Mapping adults' and young athletes' views regarding how acceptable it is to use a nutritional supplement in sport[END_REF]. This hypothesis was confirmed in part; gender (but not hiking frequency) was associated with the cluster composition.

Our findings confirmed that the relationship between risk judgment and risk taking is complex [START_REF] Schürmann | Mapping risk perceptions in dynamic risk-taking environments[END_REF] for many reasons. Various factors (such as the antecedents of confidence frame) may impact people's connection with risk and may be cognitively combined by individuals when judging/taking risks. Some individual characteristics (such as gender) may influence the manner in which people integrate these factors for judging and taking risks. Our first overall analysis showed that the participants varied with regard to judging a risk and (hypothetically) taking a risk. The three different risk positions corresponded to (i) Cluster 1, (ii) Clusters 2 and 4, and (iii) Cluster 3.

Risk position 1 (Cluster 1): use of a disjunctive rule

For the first risk position, people used the same disjunctive integration rule for both

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risk judgment and risk taking. The risk judgment level was slightly lower than the risk-taking level. This position was more frequently endorsed by males than by females. This is consistent with the literature data in which males perceive activities to be less risky and are more likely to take risks than do females [START_REF] Reniers | Risk Perception and Risk-Taking Behaviour during Adolescence: The Influence of Personality and Gender[END_REF][START_REF] She | An Exploration of Hiking Risk Perception: Dimensions and Antecedent Factors[END_REF][START_REF] Willick | Helmet Use and Risk-Taking Behavior Among Skiers and Snowboarders[END_REF]. The lower the judged risk, the more likely the people were to take it. This position confirms the negative correlation between risk judgment and risk taking [START_REF] Reyna | Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy[END_REF].

Risk position 2 (Clusters 2 and 4): use of an additive rule for risk judgment and a disjunctive rule for risk taking

In the second risk position (Clusters 2 and 4), the rule used for risk judgment (additive) differed from the rule used for risk taking (disjunctive). The members of Cluster 2 judged mountain hiking to be sometimes risky and sometimes took risks. As suggested by [START_REF] Brewer | Meta-analysis of the relationship between risk perception and health behavior: The example of vaccination[END_REF], risk judgment was not linked to risk taking. The position in Cluster 2 was more frequently endorsed by males than by females. This result extents previous findings of gender differences in risk judgment and risk taking (e.g., [START_REF] Reniers | Risk Perception and Risk-Taking Behaviour during Adolescence: The Influence of Personality and Gender[END_REF][START_REF] Willick | Helmet Use and Risk-Taking Behavior Among Skiers and Snowboarders[END_REF], by stipulating the absence of a link between risk judgment and risk taking among males.

For the members of Cluster 4, the risk judgment level was clearly lower than the risktaking level. The less the estimated risk, the more likely they were to take it. This position confirms the negative correlation between risk judgment and risk taking [START_REF] Reyna | Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy[END_REF]. However, this correlation was stronger in this second position than in the first position.

The position in Cluster 4 was more frequently endorsed by males than by females, confirming that males had judged a low level of risk and therefore took risks more readily (e.g., [START_REF] Willick | Helmet Use and Risk-Taking Behavior Among Skiers and Snowboarders[END_REF].

Risk position 3 (Cluster 3): the use of an additive rule

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In the third risk position, people used the same (additive) integration rule for risk judgment and for risk taking. The members of this position judged mountain hiking to be very risky and so did not wish to risk engaging in this activity. We observed that the higher the estimated risk, the less likely people were to take it. This position was more frequently endorsed by females than males, confirming that females perceive the mountains to be more risky and take less risks than males do [START_REF] Reniers | Risk Perception and Risk-Taking Behaviour during Adolescence: The Influence of Personality and Gender[END_REF][START_REF] Willick | Helmet Use and Risk-Taking Behavior Among Skiers and Snowboarders[END_REF] The relationship between risk judgment and risk taking

Our results highlighted the existence of two different relationships between risk judgment and risk taking: negative relationship and the lack of a relationship [START_REF] Brewer | Meta-analysis of the relationship between risk perception and health behavior: The example of vaccination[END_REF][START_REF] Mills | Explaining Contradictory Relations Between Risk Perception and Risk Taking[END_REF][START_REF] Reyna | Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy[END_REF]. The positive relationship found among skateboarders was not identified in the present study [START_REF] Kern | Risk perception and risk-taking among skateboarders[END_REF]. In [START_REF] Kern | Risk perception and risk-taking among skateboarders[END_REF] study, a higher level of judged risk was correlated with greater risk taking. This might be because we studied adults and Kern et al. studied adolescents. Adolescents' and adults' views of risk may differ [START_REF] Frühauf | Does Age Matter? A Qualitative Comparison of Motives and Aspects of Risk in Adolescent and Adult Freeriders[END_REF]. Our study found a negative relationship between risk judgment and risk taking. Three types of negative relationship were identified:

(i) low risk judgment scores and high risk-taking scores (mainly concerning male participants), (ii) high risk judgment scores and low risk-taking scores (mainly concerning female participants), and (iii) intermediate risk judgment scores and slightly higher risk taking scores (mainly concerning male participants).

Although our results highlighted differences in ways of thinking about risk, one finding was consistent in all risk positions: the three antecedents of the confidence frame (i.e. This finding confirms that people who participate in adventure activities may take risks when they develop a confidence frame (e.g., Houge Mackenzie & [START_REF] Houge Mackenzie | The psychological experience of river guiding: Exploring the protective frame and implications for guide well-being[END_REF]. Our observation of several different risk positions suggests that the emergence of a confidence frame produces different views of risk during mountain activities [START_REF] Kerr | Multiple motives for participating in adventure sports[END_REF]. Our results extend earlier findings by emphasizing the different ways in which confidence frames are integrated into risk judgment and risk taking.

Our study has some limitations. Firstly, it was based on only three kinds of confidence frame antecedents (environment, team, or self); other factors should be investigated in the future (Males et al., 2015). Secondly, our three independent variables had only two modalities. In future research, all independent variables might include at least three modalities; this would facilitate identification of the cognitive rules used by the participants [START_REF] Anderson | Unified social cognition[END_REF]. Thirdly, a third dependent variable could have usefully completed our experimental design. Just as information integration theory has been used to investigate the acceptability of an act in sport [START_REF] Fruchart | Mapping adults' and young athletes' views regarding how acceptable it is to use a nutritional supplement in sport[END_REF], the acceptability of risk could also be studied. Risk acceptability is essential for understanding the complex construction of risk taking [START_REF] Tchiehe | Classification of risk acceptability and risk tolerability factors in occupational health and safety[END_REF]. Fourthly, given that adolescents and adults may differed in their approach to risk [START_REF] Frühauf | Does Age Matter? A Qualitative Comparison of Motives and Aspects of Risk in Adolescent and Adult Freeriders[END_REF], further studies should map the cognitive processes involved in risk judgment and risk taking by adolescents.

Our present results might could have implications for training coaches or mountain guides. For example, stories dealing with problematic, potential risky situations (such as those in the present study) could be incorporated into briefings before a mountain hike. The hikers could compare their projected risk judgment and risk taking with those of coaches or mountain guides. The hikers' answers could be the starting point for training programs

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017580

designed to reduce risky behaviours or to increase hikers' levels of confidence. Thus, our results show that using a confidence frame decreases the judged risk and increases the likelihood of risk taking. Moreover, this view of risk prevention might help to distinguish between hikers as a function of their view of risk and therefore to offer them an appropriate activity.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017580

  (a)), equipment and competence are given the same weight (i.e. the same importance): the two lines are parallel and rise from left to right. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the raw data would show that the equipment x competence interaction is not statistically significant. With a conjunctive rule (Figure 1(b)), the lines form a fan open to the right, and an ANOVA would show that the equipment x competence interaction is statistically significant. With a disjunctive rule (Figure 1(c)), the lines form a fan open to the left, and the ANOVA would again show that the equipment x competence interaction is statistically significant. With disjunctive or conjunctive rules, equipment respectively has more weight or less weight than competence.

  considered taking more risks in the mountains if they had appropriate equipment, if they were accompanied by experienced, competent people, and if they had prior experience.

	self, team, and environment (Males et al., 2015)) had a negative influence on risk judgment
	and a positive influence on risk taking. Individuals considered mountain hiking to be riskier if

they did not have appropriate equipment, if they were accompanied by inexperienced, noncompetent people, and if they had no practical experience or knowledge. Conversely, Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017580 individuals


Claudia Serban

published or not. The documents may come     Is Surprise Necessarily Disappointing?

1

Published in Surprise at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Linguistics, ed. Natalie Depraz and Agnès Celle, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 2019, p. 171-180 Is Surprise Necessarily Disappointing? Claudia SERBAN Toulouse 2 Jean Jaurès University, France

In his 1963 essay on « The Concept of Reality and the Possibility of the Novel », Hans Blumenberg describes the vision of reality that we find in Husserl's phenomenology as follows:

"The concept of reality as an 'open' context asserts the aesthetic quality of the novitas, of the surprising, unfamiliar element, while the 'guaranteed' reality does not really permit the unfamiliar and novelty […]. This transformation of the reality concept liberates that which is new from its dubious connotation; the terra incognita, the mundus novus become possible and act as a stimulation for human activity; to put it paradoxically: one can now expect surprise (die Überraschung wird erwartbar)". (Blumenberg 2001: 52-53) In Blumenberg's view, as one can see, Husserl's account of reality is particularly propitious to artistic (and especially literary and Romanesque) creation: once the openness of possibilities has been revealed, there is place for surprise. But how could surprise be expected? Doesn't this imply a plain contradiction? For surprise seems rather to be, precisely, an experience of the unexpected.

Moreover, Blumenberg's appreciation might appear to be somewhat surprising itself, insofar as the fact of undoubtedly attributing Husserl such an openness to novelty is rather problematic. Indeed, it would be difficult to speak, in a Husserlian perspective, of something like a "phenomenology of surprise" [START_REF] Depraz | Phenomenology of Surprise. Levinas and Merleau-Ponty in the Light of Hans Jonas[END_REF]. Quite the contrary, within the framework of Husserl's comprehension of experience, what might appear to be the closest avatar of surprise is, unexpectedly, disappointment (Enttäuschung).

My goal will therefore be to elucidate and analyze the conditions of possibility and the descriptions of surprise from a phenomenological perspective in order to decide of the sense and legitimacy of an "expectation of surprise". Firstly, I will show that the difficulty to inscribe surprise within experience otherwise than as an Enttäuschung comes from the fact that, in Husserl's view, the major feature of experience is concordance (Einstimmigkeit). Therefore, every event and every perception that does not correspond to the expectations prescribed by the concordance of experience will be lived or perceived as a conflict (Widerstreit), as the negation of that what is expected.

Furthermore, the fact that in the case of surprise, expectations are not fulfilled, but deceived or frustrated, seems to imply that any surprise is necessarily, in one way, disappointing. The unfolding of this complex reasoning will be the object of the second part of my inquiry. In a third moment, I will try to overcome this negative characterization of surprise without completely abandoning Husserl's method and description, by analyzing the specificity of the conflicts and discordances contained in experience, of which surprise seems to be an example. My intention will then be to show that conflict is as important and irreducible as concordance and that experience should rather be defined, in a more dynamic manner, as the intertwining of both. Consequently, the motivational link between the past and the future will need to be re-evaluated, in order to maintain a balance between the motivation of the past (expectation) and of the open possibilities of the future (free anticipation). Not only the position of surprise in time will then appear in a different light, but so will the intrinsic variety of its affective charge. Thus, a paradoxical expectation of surprise (like that stated by Blumenberg) becomes indeed conceivable.

Dissonance against Harmony?

What does it mean, precisely, that concordance has to be held (as in Husserl's view) for the major feature of experience? Let us take into consideration, to start with, an example: listening to a piece of music. But not any piece of music: I would like to briefly examine what happens when one listens to the second movement of Haydn's 94 th Symphony (created in 1792), when a sudden fortissimo chord interferes with the piano violins, and immediately afterwards, the music becomes quiet and peaceful again. It is this fortissimo that does not leave any trace and is not further repeated that justifies the nickname "Surprise" for this London symphony. And the German word for "surprise" might be here even more appropriated: Überraschung derives from the adjective rasch, which designates the sudden dimension of an event. In Haydn's symphony, but also according to a more general opinion, surprise is that what arrives suddenlyeven though, perhaps, not (necessarily) unexpectedly. In the particular case of Baroque music, the sudden musical event (like the fortissimo chord in Haydn's symphony) illustrates, as the musicologist Gilles Cantagrel puts it, "the ornament that embellishes the melodic line": "Such as the volutes that fracture the orthogonal lines of an architectural edifice, these accidents trouble the linearity of the discourse in order to enrich it […], they create a different movement in order to highlight the expressivity of dissonance, in order to suspend or accentuate the rhythmic flux, to draw attention, to provoke surprise" (Cantagrel 2008: 118). As this description marvelously suggests it, the condition for a genuine receptivity for surprise cannot be a mere lack of attention. Consequently, surprise has to respond to a certain expectation, even by deceiving it; and what is then deceived (as the example of Haydn's symphony shows it) is, more precisely, the spontaneous faith in resemblance, the expectation of the similar, of the homogenous. This example borrowed to the history of music describes perfectly, in my opinion, Husserl's account of experience as defined by concordance, such as it is presented, for instance, in the 1925 lecture Phenomenological Psychology: "In our experience, all the occasional and minor discordances eventually vanish into the harmony of concordance" (Husserl 1962: 60). According to this claim, surprise is not to be understood as an irremediable fracture within experience: as Haydn's symphony shows it, far from being destroyed by the irruption of discordance, the unity and continuity of experience can always be restored. This is why, for Husserl, concordance (Einstimmigkeit) is the distinctive feature of experience; as he puts it a bit further, "the extension of our concept of experience coincides with that of the concordant synthesis which grants its unity and therefore makes it precisely concordant" (Husserl 1962: 95). But this does not mean, on the other hand, that experience is nothing but concordance, or always concordant, insofar as "quite often and, on a larger scale, almost always, concordant experience does not remain concordant for a long time" (Husserl 1962: 124). This is what one of Husserl's favorite examples alternatively suggests: when a mannequin or a wax statue that I have previously taken for human persons are being perceived as what they truly are, this means that, at some point, there was a fracture, a shift in my perceptive experience; and still, illusion or discordance remains here simply local and temporary, insofar as it is essentially corrigible: it can always be neutralized and dissolved into a "higher harmony (Die Widerstreite im Einzelnen heben sich in einer höheren Harmonie auf)" (Husserl 1962: 119).

It is this manner of reintegrating discordance within the continuity of concordant experience that I wanted to hint at by evoking the function of ornament in Baroque music: the Baroque is fond of dissonance without questioning the reign of melody; therefore, there is always a higher harmony in the background of the musical accident, and it is this harmony that gives dissonance a meaning and a position. Reciprocally, the accident, the ornamentthe surprisehas mainly the function to enrich, to highlight the reigning harmony, exactly like an exception is called to confirm the rule.

What is at stake with this recuperation of what is novel and unusual can also be expressed in terms of continuity: "An experience is such only if it is without fractures (ungebrochen)" (Husserl 1962: 96, footnote 1). Insofar as experience rimes with continuity and concordance, surprise cannot have a legitimate place and a structuring role within it. It is true that there is no experience without any fractures, without any inner crises. But insofar as concordance is dominant, "no surprises" seems to be the very motto of experience in Husserl's perspective.

It is, indeed, this negative status of surprise, regarded solely as discontinuity and discordance, which explains its inevitable comprehension as disappointment (Enttäuschung). As long as surprise is regarded only as discordance, its effect can be described as a "fracture of certainty (Bruch der Gewissheit)" (Husserl 1962: 125) or a "fracture of familiarity (Bruch der Bekanntheit)" (Husserl 2006: 250). But this fracture is never as radical as one might think: novelty remains, for Husserl, a "modification of that which was already (Umwandlung dessen, was schon ist)" (Husserl 2006: 239). This double and ambiguous characterization relies upon two different models of temporality: if speaking of fracture or irruption (Einbruch) contributes to highlight the crucial place and function of the present that constantly renews itself, the more moderate term of modification places the gravity center of time in the past. It is what Husserl implicitly does while affirming, again in his 1925 lecture: "The infinite experience of the past world prescribes the resembling style of the future world. […] According to the sense of experience, one can only prefigure (vorzeichnen) the undetermined world to be by following the general style of the past world" (Husserl 1962: 70, footnote 1). As one can see, the considerable weight of the past goes together with the promotion of resemblance as a premise for continuity: from this point of view, what will be has to resemble that which already is. Thus, regarding novelty as a modification implies to presuppose, within experience, a motivation through resemblance. And this is precisely what concordance requires: a motivational link between the present and the past, a unity and coherence grounded on motivation. Furthermore, this motivational link will decide of the meaning and weight of any expectation that one might have regarding the future: "The coming of the future (Eintreten des Künftigen) is expected thanks to its resemblance (Ähnlichkeit) to the past" (Husserl 1966: 187).

Protention versus unexpectedness?

How could it then be possible to expect a surprise? How can surprise find its place in our experience? The alternative seems to be clear: either that which is expected resembles to that which has already been, or surprise arrives beyond and against any expectation. This alternative is eloquently expressed by Husserl in his Bernau Manuscripts on Time-Consciousness (1917-1918) in terms of a gradual grasp (Griff, in French, "prise", radix of "surprise"): "The grasp of novelty, and consequently that of the original present […], designates the climax of a firm grasp (ein Kulminationspunkt in der Festigkeit des Griffs). The newly grasped is fulfillment (Das Neuerfasste ist Erfüllung)" (Husserl 2001: 4). There is, as one can see, a clear correspondence between the appearing of novelty and the irruption of the original present: Husserl places himself here within the first temporal model mentioned above. On the other hand, the irruption of novelty is not passively undertaken, but actively taken into possession, insofar as novelty is also fulfillment: fulfillment of an intention (Meinung) that is oriented towards the future and can consequently be understood (in spite of all reluctances) as similar to a kind of expectation. It is what Husserl calls protention, and its consideration unveils a third temporal model, where the present is no longer to be conceived only as an instantaneous, fulgurating irruption of novelty or as a mere modification of the past, but has to be reshaped following "the form of protentional fulfillment" (Husserl 2001: 14) 1otherwise said, as that which responds by nature to a certain expectation, to an intention oriented towards the future.

Nevertheless, this new temporal model seems to involve in spite of everything a limit case, according to which the present, the "now" can also "occur (auftreten) without any protention"; that is, "the event can occur […] without any specific expectation" (Husserl 2001: 11). Of course, the absence of a specific expectation does not necessarily imply the absence of any expectation. This particular case of novelty is named here "event", and it might be quite tempting to conceive surprise precisely as an event (as, for instance, Dastur 2004), as something that occurs without any apparent cause and/or reason, like a comet or a lightning in the sky. But such an understanding of surprise would once again imply taking into account only the present moment, the one-dimensional point of the "now", and would tend to implicitly close or tighten the open horizon of the expectations of the future. The point of view of the punctual event could indeed, against all expectations, remain a static one: for how can one reinsert the event within the tissue of experience, if the event is precisely that which is supposed to irremediably tear it apart? Shouldn't we conceive surprise instead precisely as immersed within this tissue and within the horizon of expectations that constitutes its fabric, in order to fully acknowledge the temporal dynamics of experience?

Fulfillment or disappointment?

And yet, it is precisely when attempting to understand surprise in a dynamic and relational manner, by inscribing it within a horizon of expectations, that the most important difficulty will be encountered: within this framework that allows giving a certain consistency and meaning to the paradoxical expectation of surprise, it is rather the unfulfilled and not the fulfilled expectation that will give us the key figure of surprise, which will therefore be ineluctably understood as disappointment (Enttäuschung). The analysis of a basic example can give a hint of the reasons this vision of things is grounded on: I was expecting to see Mildred, but I meet Olivia instead. The 1 See also Husserl 2001: 185: "the more or less prefigured (vorgezeichnet) horizon of the future is generated by the constant and yet discreet protention according to the laws prescribing the emergency of expectation".

surprise of meeting Olivia is here simultaneously disappointment of not having met Mildred. But things can get more complicated: the surprise of meeting Olivia could be clouded by the even greater surprise of meeting also Adriana. There can indeed be different options for valuing a very same event, depending equally on the context and on previous events of the past. But for what reasons should surprise necessarily imply a part of disappointment? By characterizing surprise as an unfulfilled expectation and thus in terms of disappointment, we implicitly reiterate the distinction between fulfilled and unfulfilled intentions that Husserl elaborates in his Logical Investigations (1900)(1901), and according to which disappointment (Enttäuschung, also translated as "frustration") 2 is the opposite of fulfillment (Erfüllung). This implies, when it comes to expectations, that they can be either fulfilled or frustratedtertium non datur. But if this is the alternative, why shouldn't then surprise be grasped rather as fulfillment?

Husserl states that an expectation is always an expectation of somethingthat is, a specific expectation. To put it more rigorously, "every expectation is 'induction' " (Hua 1962: 137). Thus, expectation seems to be by nature an anticipation which foresees that which will be and thus exposes itself to disappointment or frustration, insofar as nothing ever really fulfills (all) our expectations. Understood as an induction, expectations are in a way always frustrated and never really fulfilled. But couldn't an expectation be without judgment, without specific anticipations, without any forecast? Such seem to be, for instance, the expectations that we have when looking through the window, at home or in a train: we expect to see something, but not necessarily a child riding a bicycle or three horses. We simply expect to see something, but not something in particular.

It is only when there is no fringe of indetermination left in an expectation that the alternative between fulfillment and disappointment is so strict. For highly determined expectations are often the symptom of a constant rationalization of what occurs, of a desire to constantly "hold" reality in one's hands (this is what the notion of grasp, Griff in German, previously suggested), in one's control, as if weakening the grasp or "letting it go" would mean accepting to be torn apart. It is why an impassibility to surprise can result from a trauma, as a strategy for preventing further traumaand this proves precisely that the "excessively surprising" can destroy the "possibility of surprise" (Romano 2007: 544).

If Husserl only conceives surprise under the negative figure of deception, it is insofar as he does not see expectation as intrinsically oriented towards fulfillment; quite the contrary, the "capacity for disappointment" is an "essential moment of expectation":

"Expectations can only be fulfilled by perceptions. According to their essence, they can also be, in any circumstances, frustrated (enttäuscht). Perception always brings something new (bringt ein 2 By J. N. Findlay, for instance, in his translation of the Logical Investigations.

Neues): it is its very essence. It is also true that the past consciousness can give it a prefiguration (Vorzeichnung): in this case that which is new occurs in conformity with something that is already known, that is already constituted for me as past. […] But obviously it is perception that firstly decides if that is the case, and novelty can defy any expectation". (Husserl 1966: 211) Husserl seems to suggest here that noveltyor the emergency of surprisenecessarily frustrates or defies any expectation. And yet, this description contains a quite visible ambiguity: on one hand, every perception seems to fulfill an intention or an expectation; but on the other hand, disappointment and frustration are equally a possibility for perception. The missing link between these two alternatives is, significantly, prefiguration (Vorzeichnung). Stricto sensu, prefiguration is required in order to speak of fulfillment. And still, the creative force of perception is most often stronger than prefiguration: that is why perception can be held for a production of novelty.

Therefore, on a general scale, there is always fulfillment, no matter what: even when we speak of disappointment, all we really have before us is an alternative fulfillment 3 . In Disappointment is defined here as "that which occurs instead of the fulfillment of expectative intentions" (Husserl 1972: 94): otherwise said, it is a frustrated expectation; and yet, from another point of view, it can also be considered as a deviant (or discordant) fulfillment. Nevertheless, this discordance is grasped by Husserl only negatively, as a conflict: in this perspective, disappointment expresses the very conflict of expectation and fulfillment, according to the typical scenario: I am expecting something and yet something else occurs. The example provided by Husserl in order to illustrate this point is particularly remarkable for its affective neutrality: it is that of a billiard ball that is first perceived as being red and turns out to be "not red but green", "not round but grumpy" (Husserl 1972: 94). What is here the source of the conflict? Precisely, "the 'suppression' of an anticipative intention, or expectation, by a new impression" (I expect to see a red surface and I see a green one), and "speaking of disappointment is just another way to put it" (Husserl 1972: 97). This is indeed an emblematic case of discordance: the continuity of perception is broken, and even if the fracture is not irremediable (for the concordance of experience is not forever lost), Husserl will not hesitate to extrapolate this fracture and project it on consciousness itself: confronted to discordance, "univocal consciousness explodes into a plurivocal one" (Husserl 1972: 102). One should indeed consider, according to Husserl, that the unity of the subject rigorously depends on the concordance of experience, and that the exposure to discordance (and to surprise) would eventually threaten to fracture the subject itself.

But why should every fracture and crisis be synonymous with chaos and dissolution? Ifas Kant states in the Critique of pure reason (a passage of 1781 the version Transcendental Deduction that Husserl most probably recalls) while envisaging the chaos (Gewühl) of sensations that would occur if cinnabar would constantly change color, shape and consistencythe omnipresence of surprise might ruin the unity and coherence of experience, the total lack of surprises could unexpectedly have the same effect. By stating this, I am implicitly adapting a reasoning that Husserl himself deploys in order to show that the harmony of experience is not to be understood as monotony: "if life was a monotonous existence, resembling a sound that is homogeneous and without any differences, no recollection would be possible. That is very significant" (Husserl 1966: 424). Between monotony and dissonance, the median way of harmony, that I have already evoked while considering Baroque music, requires acknowledging (while giving a more radical status and a constitutive position to discordance) that only rupture is really binding. Experience is a tissue of fractures in its positive structure, and not only from the negative point of view of privation. That is why Husserl can assert that "it is only where that which is given in experience is not uniform that an awakening (Weckung) can take place" (Husserl 1966: 425) that is, the awakening of consciousness itself as vigilant and open to that which occurs to it requires it to be open and receptive to surprises. And reciprocally, a lack of exposure to surprise will be the symptom of a deficient or deferred awakening of consciousness.

I arrive now to my conclusion, where I will face once again my initial questions: first of all, why should surprise be understood as disappointment? And what is the meaning of an expectation of surprise? In order to answer the first question, it is required to overcome the dominant affective neutrality of Husserl's descriptions of experience situations (neutrality that is naturally prescribed by the cognitive orientation of his analysis) and to take into account the "affective dynamism" (Husserl 1972: 366) that intrinsically rules experience. The ambiguity and indecision between fulfillment and disappointment dissipate only when the enlightening prism of affectivity and desire is adopted. In this new light, a very same event or encounter will manifest itself as fulfillment or disappointment according to its affective burden. If a friend invites me to see a theater play, I will perceive this as a pleasant surprise; but if the play is mediocre, my surprise will change into a disappointment. Similarly, I can be pleasantly surprised while receiving a gift and disappointed after having opened it. This transformation of surprise into disappointment can also be read as indicating that desire always exceeds that which is given to us. This is why surprise and disappointment go together without being identical.

The deficiency of the Husserlian analyses that have guided me here comes from conceiving surprise exclusively within the negative horizon of conflict, while neglecting its positive strength and impact in constituting experience. A compensation of this inconvenience can be obtained by taking into account Husserl's fruitful distinction between the "modalities resulting from conflict and those of open particularization" (Husserl 1972: 108). It will then appear that, besides the conflicts and discordances that lead to disappointment (to frustrated or unfulfilled expectations), experience also consists of a horizon of "open possibilities" (Husserl 1972: 108)

  this perspective, being open to surprise is simply being open to alternativesthat is, precisely, to open possibilities. I will have the opportunity to stress this point in my conclusion. But first, let us deepen and explore more thoroughly the opposition between fulfillment and disappointment. Announced for the first time in the Logical Investigations, this distinction is further elaborated by Husserl almost thirty years later, in Experience and Judgment (paragraph 21).

  which, precisely, create room for the emergency of surprise. Open possibility is indeed to be defined as the possibility that escapes motivation, anticipation or specific expectation. Therefore, the expectation of surprise consists in considering and acknowledging such openbecause wider than motivation and anticipationpossibilities of experience. Surprise does not exceed any expectation, insofar as our experience always has a certain affective color and always delineates itself on the background of open possibilities. From this point of view, surprise does not necessarily result from a lack of attention (as Heidegger suggests in Being and Time, § 69 a) ) by taking the univocal shape of the unexpected, and it does not accomplish the plain contradiction of intentionality 4 . Tertium datur, and experience is precisely the product of this (inclusive) logic of the third.

Ruud Welten prefers to speak of a "discordant fulfillment". SeeWelten 2011 : p. 146.