Brian Lickel
email: lickel@usc.edu

Toni Schmader

Mathew Curtis

Marchelle Scarnier

Daniel R Ames

Vicarious Shame and Guilt

Keywords: guilt, interdependence, shame, social identity, stereotypes Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

Participants recalled instances when they felt vicariously ashamed or guilty for another's wrongdoing and rated their appraisals of the event and resulting motivations. The study tested aspects of social association that uniquely predict vicarious shame and guilt. Results suggest that the experience of vicarious shame and vicarious guilt are distinguishable. Vicarious guilt was predicted by one's perceived interdependence with the wrongdoer (e.g. high interpersonal interaction), an appraisal of control over the event, and a motivation to repair the other person's wrongdoing. Vicarious shame was predicted by the relevance of the event to a shared social identity with the wrongdoer, an appraisal of self-image threat, and a motivation to distance from the event. Implications for intergroup behavior and emotion are discussed.

that feelings of self-condemnation can sometimes result from acts committed by others. Given that the emotional reactions that we have to the wrongdoings of other group members are relevant to both intragroup and intergroup relations, it is surprising that no theoretical framework has been developed of the antecedents and consequences to distinguish vicarious shame and guilt. The importance of drawing such distinctions is critical if one assumes that each emotion will have unique behavioral consequences: as we will describe, guilt may elicit more approach related behaviors designed to repair the situation, whereas shame may elicit more withdrawing behaviors designed to distance oneself from the situation.

Although the factors that distinguish vicarious shame and guilt have not been empirically investigated, some theorists have suggested that these emotions can be experienced for another's misdeeds [START_REF] Morris | Nonmoral guilt[END_REF][START_REF] Ortony | The cognitive structure of emotions[END_REF][START_REF] Tangney | Self-conscious emotions[END_REF][START_REF] Weiner | An attributional theory of motivation and emotion[END_REF]. Intergroup researchers, meanwhile, have examined guilt reactions to ingroup bias (e.g. Doosje, [START_REF] Doojse | Guilty by association: When one's group has a negative history[END_REF][START_REF] Iyer | White guilt and racial compensation: The benefits and limits of self-focus[END_REF]McGarty et al., in press). Doosje et al. (1998), for example, showed that under certain conditions, Dutch students feel guilty for their country's past history of colonization in Indonesia, and perhaps as a consequence, feel motivated to provide reparations to the people of Indonesia. Furthermore, research on the black sheep effect (e.g. [START_REF] Eidelman | Derogating black sheep: Individual or group protection[END_REF][START_REF] Marques | The 'black sheep effect': Extremity of judgments towards ingroup members as a function of group identification[END_REF] suggests that individuals derogate group members who fail to comply with the norms of the group. This past research demonstrates that people have emotional and behavioral reactions to the negative behaviors of ingroup members. However, because none of this research has examined both shame and guilt, the conclusions yielded about the general nature of vicarious emotion are limited. The goal of the present paper was to test a model that distinguishes between vicarious shame and guilt felt for another's wrongdoing. Rather than focus on one particular type of group in one type of context, our model is intended to generalize to a variety of groups and situations.

The nature of shame and guilt

Traditional emotion research has often assumed that shame and guilt are more similar than different (e.g. C. A. [START_REF] Smith | Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion[END_REF]. However, more contemporar y perspectives argue that these two emotions differ in terms of the motivations they evoke and their associated appraisals (e.g. [START_REF] Hong | A study of the comparative structure of guilt and shame in a Chinese society[END_REF][START_REF] Niedenthal | If only I weren't' versus 'If only I hadn't': Distinguishing shame and guilt in counterfactual thinking[END_REF][START_REF] Smith | The role of public exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt[END_REF][START_REF] Tangney | Are shame, guilt, and embarrassment distinct emotions[END_REF][START_REF] Wicker | Participant descriptions of guilt and shame[END_REF]. For example, guilt predicts approach-related responses meant to repair the damage that was caused by the guilt-eliciting event, and in fact several studies indicate that guilt is particularly linked to a desire to confess, apologize, or atone for one's own wrongdoings (e.g. [START_REF] Tangney | Are shame, guilt, and embarrassment distinct emotions[END_REF][START_REF] Wicker | Participant descriptions of guilt and shame[END_REF]. Shame, on the other hand, appears to be more strongly linked to responses aimed at insulating oneself from negative evaluation. Thus, rather than facilitating reparative actions, feelings of shame provoke a desire to hide, disappear, or escape [START_REF] Tangney | Shame and guilt in interpersonal relationships[END_REF][START_REF] Wicker | Participant descriptions of guilt and shame[END_REF].

In addition to being distinguished by their correspondent motivations, shame and guilt also seem to differ with respect to how an individual interprets a transgression with respect to the self [START_REF] Tangney | Self-conscious emotions[END_REF]. Feeling guilty for one's own wrongdoing is often associated with a focus on the specific controllable behaviors that led up to the wrongful event, whereas feeling ashamed involves a more global emphasis on what that event seems to imply about the dispositional qualities one possesses [START_REF] Tangney | Self-conscious emotions[END_REF][START_REF] Wicker | Participant descriptions of guilt and shame[END_REF]. For example, individuals who recall a guilt experience are more likely to have the counterfactual thought, 'If only I had acted differently', whereas those who recall a shame experience are more likely to think, 'If only I were a different type of person' [START_REF] Niedenthal | If only I weren't' versus 'If only I hadn't': Distinguishing shame and guilt in counterfactual thinking[END_REF]. Similarly, individuals perceive that they have more control over situations that they recall as guilt experiences as compared to shame experiences [START_REF] Wicker | Participant descriptions of guilt and shame[END_REF]. Shame, however, in comparison to guilt, involves a greater feeling of self-consciousness and a fear that one will be rejected by others (R. H. [START_REF] Smith | The role of public exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt[END_REF][START_REF] Tangney | Are shame, guilt, and embarrassment distinct emotions[END_REF][START_REF] Wicker | Participant descriptions of guilt and shame[END_REF].

Vicarious shame and guilt

Given the dominant conceptualization of shame and guilt as self-conscious emotions, it is not surprising that existing research has focused almost exclusively on people's experience of these emotions after they have committed a blameworthy action themselves. Indeed, previous research suggests that shame and guilt are unique among negative emotions in that both typically involve high appraisals of personal responsibility for a negative event [START_REF] Manstead | Cognitive appraisals and emotional experience: Further evidence[END_REF][START_REF] Smith | Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion[END_REF]. Our work is a departure from this past research in that we suggest that actual personal causality for a negative event is not necessary to experience shame or guilt. We use the terms vicarious shame and guilt to refer to instances in which a person who is not the proximal agent of a wrongdoing experiences these emotions.

Our basic premise, that the emotional lives of individuals are shaped by their association with others, is a premise shared with many prior researchers (e.g. [START_REF] Mackie | Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context[END_REF][START_REF] Smith | Social identity and social emotions: Toward new conceptualizations of prejudice[END_REF]. For example, social psychologists have examined how people 'pick up' and experience the same emotion of those with whom they are in close physical proximity (e.g. [START_REF] Hatfield | Emotional contagion[END_REF][START_REF] Miller | Empathic embarrassment: Situational and personal determinants of reactions to the embarrassment of another[END_REF], as well as how people may experience positive and negative feelings as a result of their social identity or association with successful or unsuccessful others (e.g. [START_REF] Cialdini | Self-presentation by association[END_REF][START_REF] Tajfel | Social identity theory of intergroup behavior[END_REF][START_REF] Tesser | Toward a self-evaluation maintenance model of social behavior[END_REF] or may experience vicarious dissonance from the acts of others [START_REF] Norton | Vicarious dissonance: Attitude change from the inconsistency of others[END_REF]) At a basic level, we agree with others who have suggested that our social groups are included as part of our self-identity (e.g. E. R. [START_REF] Smith | An in-group becomes part of the self: Response time evidence[END_REF], and thus the behaviors and attributes of other group members have implications for the self. Much of the existing theory and research on how individuals are affected by their groups presumes that the impact of the group on the self will be greater to the extent that one's association to the group is strong. In fact, there is some evidence that vicarious shame and guilt reactions are stronger in China, a collectivist culture, than in the United States, an individualist culture [START_REF] Stipek | Differences between Americans and Chinese in the circumstances evoking pride, shame, and guilt[END_REF].

However, a consideration of associationstrength alone does not lead to predictions about the degree to which shame versus guilt is likely to occur. Given the appraisals that are proposed to distinguish shame from guilt experiences, we considered whether there were distinct aspects of social association that might be linked to appraisals of behavioral control over the wrongdoer (thus evoking vicarious guilt) versus appraisals that the event is a threat to one's image (thus evoking vicarious shame). Drawing upon group theory and research (e.g. [START_REF] Brewer | Superordinate goals versus superordinate identity as bases of intergroup cooperation[END_REF][START_REF] Hamilton | Perceiving social groups: The importance of the entitativity continuum[END_REF][START_REF] Krech | Theory and problems of social psychology[END_REF][START_REF] Lewin | Resolving social conflicts[END_REF][START_REF] Prentice | Asymmetries in attachments to groups and their members: Distinguishing between commonidentity and common bond groups[END_REF][START_REF] Rabbie | Categories versus groups as explanatory concepts in intergroup relations[END_REF]Tönnies, 1998;[START_REF] Wilder | Categorical and dynamic groups: Implications for social perception and intergroup behavior[END_REF], we highlight two dimensions of social associations that might play a role in activating these appraisals in response to another's wrongdoing. One dimension is the extent to which individuals are associated by a sense of shared identity. The second dimension is the extent to which individuals are associated by being interpersonally interdependent with one another. Past research, such as Prentice et al., 1994, assumed that these two dimensions might refer to distinct types of groups (which they contrasted as common identity versus common bond groups). In our analysis, we assume that some degree of interpersonal interdependence and some degree of shared identity are present in any social association. Thus, we view these as dimensions, rather than types, of social association.

The term 'shared identity' is used to refer to the degree to which a social association is perceived to reflect a deep and immutable aspect of identity that is common to two or more people and is often used by social perceivers to make causal inferences about their behavior. People may sometimes feel a sense of shared identity with others based on only minimal features (e.g. [START_REF] Tajfel | Experiments in intergroup discrimination[END_REF]. However, groups based on shared gender, ethnicity, religion, and kinship often seem to involve high levels of shared identity perhaps because these attributes are often seen as essential features of the individual (e.g. [START_REF] Allport | The nature of prejudice[END_REF][START_REF] Haslam | Essentialist beliefs about social categories[END_REF][START_REF] Hirschfeld | Do children have a theory of race?[END_REF][START_REF] Rothbart | Category labels and social reality: Do we view social categories as natural kinds[END_REF][START_REF] Yzerbyt | Stereotypes as explanations: A subjective essentialistic view of group perception[END_REF]. Because perceptions of a shared social identity are a source of self-identification and esteem, people are invested in maintaining a positive reputation of their social identities and are loath to have negative stereotypes about their groups confirmed [START_REF] Tajfel | Social identity theory of intergroup behavior[END_REF].

Distinct from the shared identity of a group, 'interpersonal interdependence' refers to the degree to which individuals are perceived to have high levels of social interaction, possess joint goals, and have shared norms of behavior (e.g. Gaertner & Shopler, 1998[START_REF] Hinsz | The emerging conceptualization of groups as information processors[END_REF][START_REF] Lewin | Resolving social conflicts[END_REF][START_REF] Lickel | Varieties of groups and the perception of group entitativity[END_REF][START_REF] Rabbie | Categories versus groups as explanatory concepts in intergroup relations[END_REF][START_REF] Wilder | Categorical and dynamic groups: Implications for social perception and intergroup behavior[END_REF]. An important aspect of interdependent associations is that the associated persons have the opportunity for shared communication and influence over one another's thoughts and behaviors. Examples of highly interdependent associations include business partners, close friends, and sports teammates. Thus, highly interdependent associations involve close contact and communication between individuals, although any other connection between them might be arbitrary. Strong identity-based associations involve stable aspects of perceived similarity among individuals although those individuals may or may not have highly interdependent relationships with one another.

We argue that these different dimensions of association are important to understanding the degree to which a person feels vicarious shame or vicarious guilt because of another's transgression. When an individual engages in some wrongful behavior, one's perceptions of interdependence with that person are hypothesized to be associated with one's appraisals of having control over the occurrence of the event, which in turn are associated with the degree of guilt and reparative motivations. In contrast, the degree to which the person's behavior is seen as relevant to a group identity or reputation shared in common with the perpetrator should relate to an appraisal that the event is a threat to one's own self-image, which in turn should be associated with the degree of shame and distancing motivations. We should make clear that, in some cases, there is a high level of both interdependence with the wrongdoer and a sense that the behavior reflects negatively on a shared identity. In such cases, people may feel both shame and guilt for the group member's actions. As an extreme example, we might imagine that the parents of a high school student who takes a gun to school and kills several classmates might feel guilty because they believe that they should have known about and been able to prevent their child's behavior, whereas they might feel ashamed because they fear that their own 'flesh and blood' is morally flawed. However, though shame and guilt may co-occur, we believe that even in these instances, the emotions are separable.

The present study was designed to test the hypotheses described above. The goal of this study was to disentangle shame-and guiltrelated constructs by assessing people's experiences with multiple group memberships in which there is likely to be some variation in the perception of shared identity as well as interdependence. In particular, we selected three group memberships that, based on past research (e.g. [START_REF] Haslam | Essentialist beliefs about social categories[END_REF][START_REF] Lickel | Varieties of groups and the perception of group entitativity[END_REF], we expected would differ in their degree of interdependence and shared identity. Specifically, family and friendship groups should be fairly high in interdependence compared to ethnic groups. Furthermore, although all three groups might involve some degree of shared identity, we thought that a sense of shared identity (particularly, an essentialized identity) was more typical of family and ethnic associations than of friendship groups. Participants recalled a time when a member of each of these groups did something that made them (the participants) feel ashamed or guilty. We examined the degree to which variation in their ratings of interdependence and the relevance of the event to a shared identity predicted their appraisals of the event, their emotional reactions, and their behavioral motivations.

Methods

Participants and procedures

Participants were 187 undergraduate students who participated for course credit. Participants were asked to recall and make ratings of three distinct events in which they felt ashamed or guilty for the actions of a family member, a friend, and a person who they do not know well but who happened to share their ethnicity (order was counterbalanced across participants). Participants were instructed to spend five minutes writing about the event and to describe what happened, who did what, and how the event made them feel. Of the 187 participants, 22 were excluded because one or more of the three events recalled was coded as being self-caused, rather than caused by someone else. Thus, responses of 165 participants were analyzed. After each event, participants completed ratings of their emotions, motivations, appraisals, and association related variables.

Measures

Shame and guilt ratings Participants' emotional reactions to each event were assessed with 23 emotion words (rated from 1 = Not at all, 9 = Very intensely). Factor analyses of these emotions utilizing maximum likelihood estimation with varimax rotation yielded distinct clusters of shame and guilt emotions that were consistent across each of the target groups (family, friend, ethnicity). On the basis of these factor analyses, we created separate composites of guilt items (guilty, regret, remorse) and shame items (ashamed, embarrassed, disgraced, and humiliated) for each event. The guilt composite (␣ = .76 for family, ␣ = .76 for friend, ␣ = .76 for ethnic group) and the shame composite (␣ = .82 for family, ␣ = .78 for friend, ␣ = .82 for ethnic group) were reliable for all three events. Other emotions were included as fillers; results for these emotions can be obtained from the first author.

Appraisals and motivations Behavioral control

was assessed with four items: 'I could have prevented this event from occurring', 'I felt I should have done something to prevent the event', 'I'm afraid I may have encouraged the person to do what they did by something I did or said', and 'I felt responsible for the event occurring'. The measure of image threat was assessed with three items 'I felt that the event reflected poorly on me', 'I felt that people would make judgments about the type of person I am based on the event', 'I was afraid that this person's behavior would be viewed as indicating something about the person I am'. Distancing was assessed with three items, 'I wanted to be completely unassociated with the person who caused the event', 'I felt like I wanted to disappear from the situation', and 'At the time, I remember thinking that I didn't want to be associated in any way with the person who caused the event'. Reparative motivations were assessed four items, 'I tried to do something after the event to make it better', 'I felt I should do something after the event to make it better', 'I had a lot of ability to repair the impact of the event after it occurred', and 'I felt I should apologize for what happened'. All items were rated from 1 (strongly disagree) -9 (strongly agree).

A factor analysis using maximum likelihood estimation with varimax rotation yielded a fourfactor solution for each of the groups (family, friend, ethnic group) indicating that items designed to assess behavioral control, image threat, event repair, and distancing were distinct constructs. With some variation, these measures were fairly reliable across target group: behavioral control (␣ = .62 for family, ␣ = .57 for friend, ␣ = .62 for ethnic group); image threat (␣ = .82 for family, ␣ = .81 for friend, ␣ = .83 for ethnic group); reparations (␣ = .78 for family, ␣ = .83 for friend, ␣ = .78 for ethnicity); and distancing (␣ = .87 for family, ␣ = .84 for friend, ␣ = .73 for ethnicity).

Association related variables Interdependence and shared identity questions were examined via factor analyses with maximum likelihood estimation and varimax rotation. For all three events, items designed to assess interdependence and shared identity fell on two distinct factors. Perceived interdependence was assessed with three questions rated on a 9-point scale (␣ = .68 for family, ␣ = .78 for friend, ␣ = .86 for ethnicity): 'To what degree is the person who caused the event someone that you interact with', 'To what degree do you have influence or control over this person and his/her behavior', and 'How well do you know the person who caused the event?' Identity relevance was assessed by two items 'I felt like this person's behavior was confirming negative conceptions that other people might have about the reputation of my family [or friendship group, or ethnic group]', and 'Was the event at all related to people's negative beliefs or preconceptions about the reputation of your family [or friendship group, or ethnic group]?' (rated on a 9-point scale, 1 = no, 9 = yes) that were fairly reliable (␣ = .66 for family; ␣ = .52 for friends; ␣ = .60 for ethnicity).

Results

Descriptive statistics on variables

Table 1 is a summary of mean ratings for each of the three target groups and results of oneway repeated analyses of variance (ANOVAs) testing differences among the three groups. These descriptive statistics revealed significant variation among ratings for the three different groups. For example, events involving either family or friends had higher ratings of interdependence, appraisals of control, feelings of guilt, and a desire to make repairs compared to events involving an ethnic ingroup member. Events involving an ethnic ingroup member, in contrast, were rated as highly relevant to the group identity and evoked a desire to distance oneself from the situation.

Hierarchical linear modeling analyses

Although the mean differences described above are informative, our more specific intention was that by asking participants to rate three different groups, we would have created variance in ratings of interdependence and the potential for the event to be relevant to a shared identity that should be predictive of variance in their ratings of other shame and guilt related constructs in our model. However, because each participant rated three different groups, their ratings were not independent of one another (i.e. ratings of group were nested within subject). To account for the lack of independence in participants' ratings, we used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM; [START_REF] Raudenbush | HLM 5: Hierarchical linear and nonlinear modeling[END_REF] to test the hypothesized relationships among the variables in the model nested at the within-subject level. In the following analyses, each variable was standardized (z-scored) and entered (person centered) as predictor or outcome variables in a hierarchical maximum likelihood estimation procedure. For these analyses, models were specified with a random error term for predictor variables when analysis of variance components revealed significant variability. The resulting standardized scores are comparable to standardized regression coefficients in leastsquares regression techniques. Relationships from this series of analyses are summarized in Figure 1.

Appraisal, emotion, and motivation results

Initial analyses demonstrated that ratings of shame and guilt were somewhat related (␥ = .37, p < .001); as were appraisals of behavioral control and image threat (␥ = .16, p < .05); while distancing and repair motivations were not (␥ = .06, p > .10). Next, models were tested in which behavioral control and image threat appraisals were entered simultaneously as predictors first of shame, then of guilt. These analyses supported our predictions that image threat (␥ = .39, p < .001), rather than behavioral control (␥ = .04, p > .10), predicts shame, whereas behavioral control (␥ = .31, p < 001), but not image threat (␥ = .10, p > .10), predicts guilt. In a second pair of analyses, shame and guilt were entered simultaneously as predictors first of distancing, then of repairs. Consistent with past work on self-caused shame and guilt, distancing was uniquely predicted by shame (␥ = .50, p < .001), but not guilt (␥ = -.01, p > .10). Repair was predicted by guilt (␥ = .36, p < .001), but only weakly by shame (␥ = .11, p = .07) (a follow-up contrast of the coefficients in HLM indicates that the coefficients for guilt and shame were significantly different, p < .05.) Taken together, these results support the notion that there are two distinct profiles of appraisal, emotion, and motivation that distinguish experiences of vicarious shame from experiences of vicarious guilt.

Lickel

Social association variables as predictors of shame and guilt related constructs

We next examined the degree to which interpersonal interdependence and the relevance of the event to social identity uniquely predicted these two emotion profiles. Importantly, an initial analysis showed that perceptions of identity relevance and interdependence were orthogonal (␥ = -.03, p > .10). The first set of analyses, in which the two association variables were entered as predictors of appraisals, confirmed that identity relevance was a significant predictor of image threat (␥ = .32, p < .001), but interdependence was not (␥ = .05, p > .10). Furthermore, interdependence predicted behavioral control (␥ = .43, p < .001), but identity relevance did not (␥ = .05, p > .10).

Separate HLM analyses revealed that identity relevance was a stronger predictor of shame (␥ = .31, p < .001, than was interdependence (␥ = .08, p < .05) (a follow-up contrast of the coefficients in HLM indicates that the coefficients for identity relevance and interdependence were significantly different, p = .052). In contrast, interdependence was a significant predictor of guilt (␥ = .12, p < .001), but identity relevance was not (␥ = -.05, p > .10). Finally, a third set of analyses revealed that identity relevance had a positive relationship to distancing (␥ = .20, p < .001), whereas interdependence had a negative relationship to distancing (␥ = -20, p < .001). Interdependence was, as hypothesized, a predictor of repairs (␥ = .33, p < .001), but identity relevance was not (␥ = .04, p > .10).

To summarize, the preceding analyses each examined the relationship of people's perceptions of the identity relevance of the event and their interdependence to the wrongdoer to each of the other variables in our framework. Consistent with our model, ratings of identity relevance (and not interdependence) positively predicted shame related constructs, whereas ratings of interdependence (and not identity relevance) positively predicted guilt related constructs.

Discussion

The results of this study provide support for our hypothesis that vicarious shame and guilt are distinct emotional reactions predicted by unique appraisals of events and by different aspects of one's association to a wrongdoer. People felt guilty for another's wrongdoing to the extent that they had a highly interdependent association with that person and felt that they should have been able to control his or her actions. In contrast, people felt ashamed for another's wrongdoing to the extent that they felt that the person's behavior was relevant to a social identity that they shared in common with the wrongdoer and appraised the other person's behavior as a negative reflection on themselves. In turn, each emotion predicted a unique behavioral response. Whereas guilt predicted a desire to make amends for another's wrongdoing, shame predicted a desire to distance oneself from the situation and the wrongdoer. Importantly, one's interpersonal bonds with a wrongdoer had little or no relation to how ashamed one felt for that person's behavior, and the degree to which the person's actions tarnished the group's reputation had little or no relation to feelings of guilt.

The research presented here advances our current understanding of shame and guilt as self-conscious emotions as well as our understanding of appraisals important in regulating intragroup and intergroup interactions. First, with respect to emotion theory, our studies represent the first systematic investigation of the appraisals that underlie why someone might feel ashamed versus guilty for the actions of others. Although other studies have explored how people respond to wrongs committed by fellow ingroup members (e.g. Doosje et al., 1998;McGarty et al., in press), our research is unique in its intent to map the terrain of vicarious shame and guilt in a way that is not tied to specific social associations or types of wrongdoing. Furthermore, our framework provides a platform for future research by describing vicarious shame and guilt at four levels of analyses: aspects of social association, self-related appraisals, emotional experience, and motivation.

It is also worth noting that this study represents some of the strongest evidence to date that shame and guilt are associated with distinct motivations. For example, even in groundbreaking work on the distinctions between these emotions, [START_REF] Tangney | Are shame, guilt, and embarrassment distinct emotions[END_REF] did not find clear evidence that guilt included a greater desire to make amends for a personal wrongdoing than did shame. One possible reason for this lack of clarity is that past work has often measured distancing and repair as opposite ends of a single dimension, rather than as orthogonal motivations. Our data suggest that these may be very different motivations and should be studied independently.

In addition to advances in emotion research, the model presented here may also advance our understanding of the relationship of the self to the group. Most research on group behavior and perception has developed around one of two assumptions about the nature of groups. One set of theories has been developed for groups that are social categories defined largely by a shared characteristic or group label (e.g. [START_REF] Haslam | Essentialist beliefs about social categories[END_REF][START_REF] Park | Measures and models of perceived group variability[END_REF][START_REF] Turner | Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory[END_REF]. A second set of theories has been developed for groups that are close interacting groups that are characterized as having high degrees of communication, cooperation, and mutual influence [START_REF] Cartwright | Group dynamics[END_REF][START_REF] Smith | Attachment to groups: Theory and management[END_REF][START_REF] Levine | Small groups[END_REF]. In our present work, we have conceptualized shared identity and interdependence as separate dimensions of social association rather than as mutually exclusive types of groups. Furthermore, the results show that articulating these dimensions of social association can have important implications for how members of groups perceive and respond to the behavior of their fellow ingroup members. To our knowledge, this is the first study to explicitly compare how these two dimensions of association predict intragroup and intergroup processes (but see [START_REF] Hamilton | Perceiving social groups: The importance of the entitativity continuum[END_REF][START_REF] Hogg | Studying social processes in small groups[END_REF][START_REF] Sedikides | Intergroup cognition and intergroup behavior[END_REF], for a discussion of the advantages of inclusive frameworks for studying groups).

Limitations and future directions

The study we presented relied on a narrative recall approach to studying emotion. The narrative approach has the benefit of assessing a wide variety of events that are personally meaningful to participants. Even so, this retrospective nature of this approach does limit some of the conclusions we can draw about causation and does not allow us to pull apart the temporal sequencing of these component processes. For this reason, we did not feel we could adequately test mediational hypotheses in these cross-sectional studies. Again experimental studies will be needed to test mediational claims and examine these emotions on-line.

In addition, we have constrained our analysis to events for which individuals have felt a fairly strong and memorable emotional reaction to another's behavior. Because of this, we are somewhat limited in drawing conclusions about what factors are necessary to experience an emotional reaction in the first place. We can speculate, however, that certain other appraisals are required to activate a vicarious shame or vicarious guilt experience. The first step, we believe, is that the individual assigns responsibility for the negative event to another individual with whom they are somehow associated. Second, the individual must perceive the event to be negative or discrepant with goals that he or she holds. Other factors, such as the intentionality of the act may also influence these initial appraisals and should be investigated in future work.

We believe that one important issue for future work will be to integrate what is known from the literature on people's affective reactions to the more global and historical wrongdoings (such as a history of colonialization) of their groups (e.g. Doosje et al., 1998;[START_REF] Iyer | White guilt and racial compensation: The benefits and limits of self-focus[END_REF]McGarty et al., in press-for a recent edited volume on the topic see [START_REF] Branscombe | Collective guilt: International perspectives[END_REF] with other work on people's shame and guilt reaction to specific acts of ingroup members (e.g. Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, in press; Schmader & Lickel, in press). Clearly, our current framework is directed primarily toward explaining how people react to specific acts by other members of their group. Future work should compare how people make sense of specific acts (such as a White American observing another White American act in a racist way) with more global and historical events (such as the institutionalized history of racism in America). Nonetheless, we agree with the arguments of [START_REF] Iyer | White guilt and racial compensation: The benefits and limits of self-focus[END_REF] that research on group-based guilt will be advanced most productively when researchers attempt to identify the importance of distinctions between guilt and other emotions, such as sympathy, shame, and anger. We believe that the framework we present in this paper is a useful step in this direction.

In addition to its applicability to situations that are typically the focus of social identity and intergroup relations research, we are also interested in the application of our framework to other settings such as workplace or intimacy groups. For example, parents clearly may be blamed for the actions of their children (e.g. [START_REF] Lickel | A case of collective responsibility: Who else was to blame for the Columbine High School shootings?[END_REF], but surprisingly little research has examined parents' emotional reactions to their children's transgressions. Likewise, in romantic relationships, feelings of vicarious shame and guilt for one's partner may play a role in predicting relationship satisfaction and duration. We believe that the findings reported here represent a starting point for these investigations.

In conclusion, shame and guilt are intriguing emotions that have only recently come under focused empirical inquir y. Likewise, investigations of how the self is shaped through group memberships have recently flourished. However, much of the recent work that has been done on how groups affect the self has focused on how groups impact more on cognitive processes of the self (e.g. [START_REF] Sedikides | Intergroup cognition and intergroup behavior[END_REF][START_REF] Smith | An in-group becomes part of the self: Response time evidence[END_REF]. Less work has examined the impact of groups on the specific emotions that people experience. It is our hope that the framework developed here will encourage additional research that integrates theory on emotion and group processes.

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure1. Summary of a series of hierarchical linear modeling analyses testing the relationships among variables (Note: Hypothesized relationships are indicated by solid lines. The implied model was not tested in its entirety simultaneously and is presented for its heuristic value of concisely summarizing relevant results).

Table 1 .

 1 Mean ratings in main study variables for each of the three target groups

	Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2)

Notes: Means within row not sharing the same subscript differ significantly (p < .05). Response scales ranged from 1 to 9.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by a National Science Foundation Grant #BCS-0112427 awarded to the first and second authors and a faculty small grant awarded to the second author from the University of Arizona Foundation.

We thank Greg Willard, Shawn Williams, Jonah Firestone, Heather Gangestad, Amy Baesler, Shawna Boggie, Jill Endres, Emily Bacal, Lorena Bravo, Chris Davis, Calli Payne, Jessica Pishney, Cynthia Wallentin, and Ali Winkler for their invaluable help with collecting and coding these datasets. We also wish to thank Shelly Gable, John Nezlak, and Tom Denson for their statistical advice and Mark Zanna, Jeff Greenberg, and Michael Johns for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Biographical notes


William W Maddux
email: w-maddux@kellogg.northwestern.edu

Ynn B Maril

Brewer

Gender Differences in the Relational and Collective Bases for Trust William W. Maddux

Northwestern University

Marilynn B. Brewer The Ohio State University

A variety of research suggests that men and women differ in their interdependent orientation: whereas women tend to be more relationally interdependent, men tend to be more collectively interdependent (e.g. [START_REF] Gabriel | Are there 'his' and 'hers' types of interdependence? The implications of gender differences in collective versus relational interdependence for affect, behavior, and cognition[END_REF]. The current study sought to investigate differences in interdependence within the domain of trust. In particular, the authors predicted that men would tend to trust individuals based on whether or not they shared group memberships. On the other hand, women were predicted to trust those who shared direct or indirect relationship connections. Results from an online trust-dilemma game supported these predictions. Implications for our understanding of the impact of gender on social identity and self-representation are discussed.

keywords gender, self-construal, social identity, trust

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

2005 Vol 8(2) 159-171 MEN and women differ. Such a statement would strike most people as intuitively obvious. That gender differences are believed to be relatively ubiquitous is underscored by the fact that the topic is well-picked fodder for popular culture and the entertainment media; gender conflicts are often explored in sitcoms, reality TV shows, comedic and dramatic movies, and stand-up comedy. However, results from psychological research indicate that there may be some basis for the widespread belief that men and women differ. Empirical evidence suggests that gender differences exist across a variety of psychological domains, including emotion, cognition, behavior, and language use (for a review, see [START_REF] Deaux | Gender[END_REF].

Although it is clear that gender impacts a variety of domains, recent research is beginning to uncover some of the specific psychological foundations of how men and women differ. One primary area of interest is self-representation. For example, in a review of the literature [START_REF] Cross | Models of the self: Self-construals and gender[END_REF] proposed that a number of G P I R previously documented gender differences could be explained in terms of differences in self-construals: while men may have more of an independent construal of self, women may have more of an interdependent construal of self. Within this framework, an independent self-construal accentuates self-related features and excludes the influence of others in the self-schema, whereas an interdependent selfconstrual represents inclusion of others in the self [START_REF] Aron | Inclusion of other in the self scale and the structure of interpersonal closeness[END_REF][START_REF] Brewer | Who is this 'we'? Levels of collective identity and self-representations[END_REF][START_REF] Markus | Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation[END_REF]. [START_REF] Cross | Models of the self: Self-construals and gender[END_REF] reviewed a variety of evidence in support of this hypothesis. For example, they noted that while women often describe themselves more in terms of relationships with others, men have a stronger tendency to describe themselves in terms of separateness from others (e.g. [START_REF] Pratt | Reasoning about the self and relationships in maturity: An integrative complexity analysis of individual differences[END_REF]. In addition, women tend to rate themselves more highly on self-related dimensions concerning interdependence, while men rate themselves higher on independent dimensions (e.g. [START_REF] Zuckerman | Confidence and aspirations: Self-esteem and self-concepts as predictors of students' life goals[END_REF]. Finally, Cross and Madson cited evidence that in terms of conversational norms, women prefer talking about relationships, while men prefer discussing less personal topics such as sports and politics (e.g. [START_REF] Aries | Close friendships in adulthood: Conversational content between same-sex friends[END_REF].

Additional research has extended the idea of gender differences in self-construals from the individual level to the collective level. For example, [START_REF] Baumeister | What do men want? Gender differences and two spheres of belongingness: Comment on Cross and Madson[END_REF] proposed that a sense of belongingness is a fundamental human need (cf. [START_REF] Baumeister | The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation[END_REF], and thus having a sense of connectedness to others is essential psychologically for both men and women. However, Baumeister and Sommer proposed that men and women differ in the way in which they satisfy this need. While men may indeed be more independent than women, at the interdependent level men may also place a greater importance on group memberships and large collectives. In other words, in terms of the way in which people feel a sense of interdependence with others, women may be more relationally oriented, men may be more collectively oriented [START_REF] Baumeister | What do men want? Gender differences and two spheres of belongingness: Comment on Cross and Madson[END_REF]. [START_REF] Gabriel | Are there 'his' and 'hers' types of interdependence? The implications of gender differences in collective versus relational interdependence for affect, behavior, and cognition[END_REF] obtained a variety of support for the existence of gender differences in relational versus collective interdependence. In one study involving a diaryreading paradigm, women showed better selective memory for relational items in the diary, while men showed better memory for collective items. In another study, women were found to be more likely to put their own personal desires aside for a friend, while men were more likely to sacrifice for a group [START_REF] Gabriel | Are there 'his' and 'hers' types of interdependence? The implications of gender differences in collective versus relational interdependence for affect, behavior, and cognition[END_REF]. In addition, similar gender differences have been found to impact the subjective importance of different types of groups [START_REF] Seeley | Circle of friends or members of a group? Sex differences in relational and collective attachment to groups[END_REF]. For women, group importance is mainly determined by the degree to which the group fulfills relational needs, while men place a greater importance on the collective identity that groups offer. 1 The existence of gender differences in interdependence is consistent with the idea that there are two distinct types of selfrepresentations that operate in social contexts. More specifically, [START_REF] Brewer | Who is this 'we'? Levels of collective identity and self-representations[END_REF] postulated that there are two different levels of 'social selves': a relational self and a collective self. In this framework the relational self concerns self-representations derived from one's relationships with specific other people ('I am a father'). In terms of gender research, the idea of the relational self corresponds closely to Cross and Madson's conception of the interdependent self-construal that predominates for women. On the other hand, the collective self is constructed from one's identity as derived from memberships in groups ('I am a Cubs fan'). This idea of the collective self seems to correspond more closely to the collective-interdependent nature of men. Thus, in terms of [START_REF] Brewer | Who is this 'we'? Levels of collective identity and self-representations[END_REF] conception of social selves, the relational self seems the more salient type of social self for women, while the collective self is the more salient type of social self for men.

It is important to point out that the above research has focused primarily on the selfconstrual of women in Western cultures (i.e. the United States, Canada, Australia, Western Europe). Although interdependent self-construals have also been shown to be particularly salient for individuals from East Asian cultures [START_REF] Markus | Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation[END_REF], to date there is little research on the similarities of the interdependent selfconstruals of Western and East Asian women; however, there is evidence for some overlap, specifically concerning emotional relatedness with significant others [START_REF] Kashima | Culture, gender, and self: A perspective from individualism-collectivism research[END_REF]. However, other areas of potential overlap remain unexplored, and it remains to be seen whether universal gender differences exist in other psychological domains relevant to self-construals.

The way in which one construes the self is of importance primarily because of the tremendous influence that the self has on a host of psychological processes. The self has been shown to be a major organizing factor for the type of thoughts we have about ourselves and others, what information we pay attention to and what information we ignore, how we feel about and evaluate ourselves, with whom we choose to compare ourselves, and how we choose to present ourselves to others (for a review, see [START_REF] Baumeister | The self[END_REF]. Thus, whether one's dominant self-construal is independent or interdependent, or whether one's salient social self tends to involve relationships or collective memberships, these construals of self have the potential to have a great impact on how we deal with almost any type of situation in daily life.

Overall, then, there is growing evidence that gender differences impact the way in which people feel a sense of interdependence with others and define their ingroups. Compared to men, women place more emphasis on relationships and interpersonal connections, while men are more likely to emphasize more depersonalized group memberships and the importance of group identity. Importantly, these gender differences in interdependence have been shown to impact a variety of psychological variables, including self-representation, selective memory, and group attachment.

Consequences for depersonalized trust

If there are indeed reliable gender differences in relational and collective interdependence, these differences should also manifest themselves in situations where men and women must decide whether or not to trust other people, particularly strangers. Although the concept of trust has always been an integral aspect of research in social psychology, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in trust as a central psychological construct. Of particular interest to social psychologists is the role of trust in contexts and institutions where participants must decide whether or not to cooperate with others with whom they have no personal knowledge or history of interpersonal relationship. Such 'depersonalized trust' is essential for the creation and maintenance of many forms of economic exchange, organizations, and social and political institutions.

There are at least two possible bases for trusting strangers. First of all, shared category membership may become a basis for depersonalized trust [START_REF] Brewer | Ethnocentrism and its role in interpersonal trust[END_REF][START_REF] Buchan | Swift neighbors and persistent strangers: A cross-cultural investigation of trust and reciprocity in social exchange[END_REF][START_REF] Macy | The evolution of trust and cooperation between strangers: A computational model[END_REF][START_REF] Yamagishi | The group as the container of generalized reciprocity[END_REF]. As a consequence of shifting psychologically from the personal to the collective level of identity, one may be less likely to distinguish the interests of other ingroup members from those of oneself, leading to increasing trust toward fellow ingroup members. Hence, simply knowing that an otherwise unknown person is a member of a salient ingroup may be sufficient to engender trust as a default assumption. A second route involves sharing a network of interpersonal relations with others. Individuals may trust others if they know (or believe) that they are directly or indirectly connected to each other through mutual friendships or acquaintances [START_REF] Coleman | The foundation of social theory[END_REF]. In other words, we may trust a stranger if we believe that the person is potentially a member of a generalized exchange network of relationships [START_REF] Yamagishi | Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan[END_REF].

Given these distinctions in the basis for depersonalized trust, if men are more collectively interdependent than women, men should be more likely to trust individuals who share ingroup membership, regardless of personal relationship connections. By contrast, if women are more relationally interdependent, then women should tend to trust individuals who are likely to share a direct or indirect network of relationships, and ingroup/outgroup distinctions should be less important. We tested these predictions in an online, real-time money allocation game that provided an engrossing, meaningful trust-related situation.

The present research

The current study employed a modified form of the allocator/dictator game devised by [START_REF] Kiyonari | A comparative study of trust and trustworthiness using the game of enthronement[END_REF]. In this game, participants make online decisions about whether to accept a 'sure-thing' payment of US$3 from the experimenter, or an unknown allocation from a stranger (who had ostensibly been given US$11 to distribute as he or she wished). Since actual monetary payments were involved and participants were told that their payment at the end of the experiment depended on the outcomes of their decisions, this paradigm provides a compelling test of participants' willingness to place faith in a stranger based on minimal information about another person's social group memberships or potential relationship connections.

This paradigm has previously proven to be a reliable method for investigating cross-cultural differences in depersonalized trust [START_REF] Yuki | Cultural differences in relationship-and group-based trust[END_REF]. For example, Yuki and colleagues (2005) showed that although American participants trusted ingroup members more than outgroup members (regardless of the presence of crossgroup relationship connections), Japanese participants showed no differences in trust toward ingroup members and outgroup members who had a potential cross-group relationship connection. Since a variety of research has demonstrated that Japanese are more relationally oriented than Americans (e.g. [START_REF] Markus | Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation[END_REF][START_REF] Yuki | Intergroup comparison versus intragroup cooperation: A cross-cultural examination of social identity theory in North American and East Asian cultural contexts[END_REF], the current study sought to explore similar gender effects in this paradigm. Although no gender differences emerged in Yuki et al.'s (2005) American sample, we hypothesized that priming both men and women with interdependence could potentially activate pre-existing gender differences in an American sample. Previous research has sometimes found it necessary to prime the interdependent self in order to induce interdependent cognition for American participants [START_REF] Brewer | Who is this 'we'? Levels of collective identity and self-representations[END_REF].

Thus, in the current research we first presented American men and women with one of two types of primes designed to activate interdependence with others; in other words, the primes served to activate the 'social self '. 2 Subsequently men and women then participated in an online, allocator/dictator game that measured how much they trusted a variety of targets whose personal identity was unknown. One target was an ingroup target, identified as a student at the same university as the participant. A second target, representing a crossgroup relationship target, was identified as a student at an outgroup university where the participant had earlier indicated that he or she had an acquaintance. A third target, representing a basic outgroup target, was identified as a student at a university where the participant did not indicate knowing anyone. In reality, all targets were fictitious and were used as part of the cover story to create a realistic setting for trust decisions. Participants performed one trial with each target, the order of which was randomly determined.

Based on the collective-interdependent nature of men, we predicted that men would show the highest level of trust for the ingroup target, and significantly less trust for both outgroup targets. Based on the relationshipinterdependent nature of women, we predicted that the presence of a cross-group relationship would increase trust for an outgroup member more for women than for men. We expected women to show high levels of trust for both the ingroup and cross-group relationship target, and significantly less trust for the outgroup target. Thus, our paradigm had a 2 (version of interdependent prime) ϫ 2 (participant gender) ϫ 3 (type of target) mixed factorial design, with prime and gender as betweensubjects variables, and type of target as a withinsubjects variable.

Method

Participants

Participants were 147 students (79 males, 68 females) at Ohio State University. All participants were citizens of the United States. Participants were recruited from the introductor y psychology subject pool, and voluntarily signed up in return for partial course credit and a monetary payment. The experimental requirements indicated that in order to be eligible for the experiment, participants had to have acquaintances at other Big Ten universities (the conference of universities that includes Ohio State University). Four participants (two males and two females) gave at least one incorrect response on one of the manipulation checks, and their data were excluded from further analysis. This left the data from 143 participants (77 males, 66 females) for formal analysis.

Priming materials

Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two scenarios designed to prime interdependence. One scenario involved a stor y about playing a round of miniature golf with a group of friends, and a second scenario involved a story about attending a baseball game. For both scenarios, participants were instructed to circle all the pronouns in the story, and then were asked several questions about the content of the story (e.g. what was the story about?, what type of words did you circle?) as part of the cover story that the experiment concerned 'verbal ability and memory'. Both versions contained 21 plural pronouns (us, we, our). These scenarios were designed to prime an interdependent frame of mind [START_REF] Brewer | Who is this 'we'? Levels of collective identity and self-representations[END_REF].

Procedure

Participants were shown into the lab and seated at a computer terminal. A female experimenter explained that they would be participating in two separate experiments. Participants were instructed to complete the first paper-andpencil experimental packet, after which they were to turn on their computers to complete the second experiment on judgment and decision-making. The experimenter then told participants they were free to begin, at which time she left the room.

Participants then completed one of the two independent priming packets as part of an experiment on 'verbal ability and memor y', which was in actuality the priming phase of the experiment. Following this priming phase, participants turned on their computers and began the main trust experiment. The instructions on the screen explained that the second study was an online decision-making game in which they would be interacting with other participants in a real-time, money allocation situation. It was explained that participants would be paid for their participation in the experiment, as well as receiving partial course credit. Participants were initially asked to enter the names and universities of all acquaintances they had at Big Ten universities. The computer then paused for a few seconds, and as part of the cover story, the instructions indicated that the computer was connecting to an online network. In reality, the computer did not connect to any network, and was simply programmed to wait 20 seconds before continuing.

The main instructions then began by reiterating that the experiment was concerned with judgment and decision-making, and that it was being conducted in conjunction with students from other universities. Participants were told that some conditions involved making decisions with other Ohio State students, while other conditions involved decisions with students from other universities, who were performing the experiment at the same time, but in a different location. The decision task involved dividing a fixed sum of money (US$11) between two paired individuals. Participants were told that one person would be randomly assigned the role of the allocator (the person who decides how much to give to each person), and the other would be assigned the role of the recipient. The allocator's task was ostensibly to decide how much of the money he/she would keep for himself/herself, and how much to give to the other participant. There were no rules for the monetary division, and the allocator was supposedly allowed to divide up the money however he/she chose. Participants were told that their final payment was to be based on the amount of money they received (or kept) during this decision-making task. The instructions indicated that each participant would only know one thing about the other person-the university he or she was attending.

The computer then paused and the instructions indicated that it was randomly being determined which person would play the role of allocator, and which person would be the recipient. However, the computer always assigned participants to the role of the recipient, while the ficticious partner was always assigned the role of allocator. The instructions explained that the recipient had to choose between two options in the game: the exit option of a 'sure thing' (receiving US$3 from the experimenter), or the option of taking whatever money the allocator decided to give him/her. The instructions also indicated that this choice had to be made before the other partner's choice was disclosed. In reality, of course, the allocator never made a decision. We were simply interested in whether participants chose to take this unknown allocation of money, or whether they took the sure thing. Thus, the decision to accept the allocator's allotment involved giving up $3, with the risk of winding up with less (or no) money allocation. 3 The computer paused while the instructions indicated that the participant's partner was now being chosen, then randomly selected either an ingroup target, a potential relationship target, or an outgroup target. If the computer selected the ingroup target, the instructions indicated that the allocator was a student from Ohio State. If the potential relationship target was chosen, the computer indicated that the allocator was from another university, but that our records indicated that this was a university at which the participant had an acquaintance. If the outgroup target was chosen, the computer said that the allocator was from another university, and that our records indicated that the participant did not know anyone at that university. 4 Once the allocator target was chosen and identified, participants were instructed to make their choice, either the sure-thing payment of $3, or taking whatever amount the allocator had given them. This yes/no decision was our behavioral measure of whether participants trusted the target individuals or not. Following the decision trial, participants were asked three follow-up questions. First, participants were asked, 'To what extent did you trust the allocator to make a decision that was favorable to you?' (1 did not trust at all, 5 completely trusted ). Next participants were asked, 'How much money do you think the allocator gave you?' Participants were asked to enter an amount in US dollars, from $0 to $11. Finally, as a manipulation check to insure participants were paying attention to the instructions, participants were asked to 'please indicate what university the previous allocator was from'. The computer then provided two options: Ohio State or another university. Participants were asked to mark the correct response.

Following completion of the first trial, the instructions stated that there were to be two more decision trials. Participants were told that their final payment would be based on the decision made on one trial, and that this critical trial would be randomly selected at the end of the experimental session. This was done in order to motivate participants to maximize their possible reward for each trial independently of the others. The choice paradigm was then repeated over two more trials. All participants performed one trial for each target type, i.e. once with an ingroup target, once with a potential relationship target, and once with an outgroup target, with the order varied randomly across participants. Following each decision trial, participants were again asked to indicate their trust for the target, the amount of money allocated by the target, and the allocator's university.

After these questions, the computer indicated that one trial would be randomly selected and that participants would receive payment based on the outcome of that trial. However, the computer always chose the second decision trial as a basis for payment. Participants were paid the $3 if they had chosen the sure-thing option on trial 2, and they were paid $4 if they had chosen to forgo the sure thing and take the partner's allocation. Following payment, participants were probed for suspicions about the cover story, debriefed about the true nature of the experiment, and thanked for taking part.

Results and discussion

Online decisions

Initial analyses were carried out on participants' decisions for each of the three different target allocators. These decisions were subjected to several successive nonparametric analyses to compare targets. 5 An initial Cochran's Q test indicated that participants' decisions whether to accept the allocator's division of the money differed significantly across the three target conditions, with participants taking the ingroup target's allocation 89% of the time, the relationship target's allocation 83% of the time, and outgroup target's allocation 75% of the time (Q(2) = 20.15, p < .001).

Individual McNemar tests on the comparisons for specific targets showed that compared to the ingroup target, participants were less likely to accept the allocator's decision and more likely to take the sure thing for the relationship target ( 2 (143) = 4.53, p = .035), and for the outgroup target ( 2 (143) = 16.69, p < .001). In addition, participants were also significantly less likely to accept the allocator's decision and more likely to take the sure thing for the outgroup target compared to the relationship target ( 2 (143) = 4.70, p = .030).

These results indicate that participants were most willing to give up the sure-thing option when the target was an ingroup member, less likely with the potential relationship target, and least likely when the target was an outgroup member. Thus, willingness to forgo a sure thing in favor of an allocation from an unknown person was clearly sensitive to both types of information; that is, whether the target was an ingroup or outgroup member and whether the target was potentially part of an indirect relationship network. However, contrar y to expectations, this decision was not affected by gender; men and women did not differ in their likelihood of forgoing the sure thing option in favor of the allocator's decision for any of the three targets (ingroup target: men = 88%, women = 90%; relationship target: men = 84%, women = 82%; outgroup target: men = 73%, women = 77%, all ps > .22).

However, results on the trust ratings and expectations of monetary awards did support predictions. A 2 (version of interdependent prime) ϫ 2 (gender) ϫ 3 (target type), mixedfactorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on trust ratings, with target as a within-subjects variable, and participant gender and type of prime as between-subjects variables. The results indicated a main effect for target type (F(2, 496) = 33.70, p < .001, 2 = .328), such that most trust was shown toward the ingroup member, and least trust toward the outgroup member, consistent with the pattern of choice decisions. However, this main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between target type and gender (F(2, 278) = 4.80, p = .009, 2 = .033). 6 A series of pair-wise comparisons was carried out to decompose the differences in trust toward specific targets. Within-gender comparisons indicated that men trusted the ingroup target significantly more than both the potential relationship target (F(1, 76) = 33.61, p < .001, 2 = .301), and the outgroup target (F(1, 76) = 44.45, p < .001, 2 = .353), while there was no significant difference in trust for the potential relationship target compared to the outgroup target (p > .46). Thus, men trusted ingroup members more than outgroup members.

However, for women, trust was greater toward the ingroup target than the outgroup target (F(1, 65) = 24.91, p < .001, 2 = .277), but women also trusted the potential relationship target more than the outgroup target (F(1, 65) = 8.97, p = .004, 2 = .121). There was no difference in trust for the ingroup target and potential relationship target for women (p > .25). Thus, women trusted the ingroup target and the potential relationship target more than the outgroup target.

Cross-gender comparisons indicated no differences in trust toward the ingroup and outgroup targets (ps > 21). However, women were significantly more trusting of the potential relationship target than were men (F(1, 141) = 11.16, p = .001, 2 = .073). Thus, these results support our predictions that the presence of a cross-group relationship would increase trust more for men than for women. While there were no gender differences in trust toward ingroup and outgroup members, women trusted the potential relationship target significantly more than did men. In fact, for women, there was no significant difference in trust toward the ingroup member and the potential relationship target (see Figure 1).

We also analyzed the amount of money participants expected to receive from each of the three allocators. Results of these analyses mirrored those of allocator trust (see Figure 2). A 2 (version of interdependent prime) ϫ 2 (gender) ϫ 3 (target type), mixed-factorial ANOVA was conducted on these data, with target as a within-subjects variable, and participant gender and type of prime as betweensubjects factors. A significant main effect emerged for target (F(2, 278) = 11.94, p < .001, 2 = .079), such that the most money was expected from the ingroup member, and the least from the outgroup member. This main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between target type and gender (F(2, 278) = 3.37, p = .036, 2 = .024), indicating that the expected money differed depending on participants' gender. No differences emerged based on type of prime, so further analyses were again collapsed across primes.

As with the trust analyses, pair-wise comparisons indicated that men expected more money from the ingroup target than the potential relationship target (F(1, 75) = 11.45, p = .001, Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2) 166 Figure 1. Amount of trust per target as a function of relationship type and participant gender (1 don't trust at all, 5 trust completely).

Amount of Trust

Allocator

Trust Males Females 2 = .132), and more money from the ingroup target than the outgroup target (F(1, 75) = 23.50, p < .001, 2 = .239). There was no difference between the potential relationship target and the outgroup target (p > .26). For women, expected money did not differ between the ingroup target and the potential relationship target (p > .84). However, a difference in expected money did emerge between the ingroup target and the outgroup target (F(1, 64) = 10.62, p = .002, 2 = .142), and there was a marginal difference between the potential relationship target and the outgroup target (F(1, 64) = 3.96, p = .051, 2 = .058).

Finally, cross-gender comparisons of the expectation ratings indicated no differences between men and women in trust toward the ingroup targets (p > .98), although women expected marginally more money from the outgroup target than men did (F(1, 141) = 3.15, p = .078, 2 = .022). However, as predicted, women also expected significantly more money from the potential relationship target than men (F(1, 141) = 6.72, p = .011, 2 = .046). These results were essentially identical to those on the trust rating measure.

To summarize, although the predicted differences did not emerge on our behavioral measure, self-report measures did reveal the expected pattern of trust. Compared to men, women were significantly more likely to trust an outgroup member who shared a potential crossgroup relationship connection. In addition, for women the level of trust toward an ingroup member and toward an outgroup member with a cross-group relationship connection did not differ; however, men trusted ingroup members significantly more than outgroup members regardless of cross-group relationship connections. This same pattern also appeared on the

Expected Money

Males

Females measure of the amount of money participants expected from each target. Men expected significantly more money from ingroup members than from outgroup members. Women expected no differences in money from an ingroup member and an outgroup member with a potential cross-group relationship, but significantly less money was expected when the outgroup member had no relationship connections. These results indicate that trust for men was largely dependent on sharing group memberships, while trust for women depended more on sharing relationship links.

General discussion

The main goal of the present research was to investigate the impact of gender differences in interdependence within the domain of trust.

The results from an online, allocator/dictator trust game largely supported our predictions based on the idea that women are more relationally interdependent and men are more collectively interdependent. For men, trust (and expected money) was highest for ingroup members compared to outgroup members. However, the presence of a potential crossgroup relationship increased trust (and expected money) more for women than for men. This potential cross-group relationship connection was sufficiently meaningful for women that no differences in trust emerged toward the ingroup target and the potential relationship target. The fact that even a potential relationship connection with an outgroup member increased trust to the level of an ingroup member is striking evidence that relational interdependence is particularly salient for women. Thus, cross-group relationships had a greater impact on trust for women, while the categorical distinction between ingroup and outgroup was more important for men.

Although the predicted pattern of trust did not emerge on our behavioral measure-the decision to take or forgo a sure-thing option of $3-we believe this is not overly problematic, primarily because such a decision is a relatively indirect measure of trust. In the current paradigm participants were instructed and encouraged to maximize their monetar y reward for the online decisions. Thus, not only was trust not made particularly salient for the decision trials, but any gender differences in trust may have been masked by other influences, particularly differences in preferences for risky decision-making.

For example, a variety of research suggests that men are more likely, across a variety of domains, to make more risky decisions than women (e.g. Sorentino, Hewitt, & Raso-Knott, 1992;[START_REF] Weber | A domain-specific risk-attitude scale: Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors[END_REF]; for a review, see [START_REF] Byrnes | Gender differences in risk taking: A meta-analysis[END_REF]. Thus, although women may have actually trusted the relationship target more than men (as evidenced on the self-report measures), women's decreased tolerance for risky decisions may have inflated their preference for choosing the safer, sure thing option, eliminating any gender differences that may have existed. This explanation is supported by the fact that compared to men, women actually expected to receive significantly more money from the potential relationship allocator, but nevertheless did not decide to give up the sure thing more often than men. Thus, it is quite likely that women simply had a higher threshold for deciding to give up the safe option.

In addition, we would argue that the selfreport measures of trust and expected money are more reliable than the behavioral measure because they directly and explicitly assess participants' level of trust toward targets, as well as their expectations for others' behaviors. The fact that these self-report measures replicated earlier research using the same paradigm [START_REF] Yuki | Cultural differences in relationship-and group-based trust[END_REF] is additional evidence for their reliability and validity. Finally, it is important to note that the allocator/dictator game was an effective way to create an engaging and meaningful situation in which to assess trust and expected monetary allocations toward a variety of targets-a paradigm likely to be more diagnostic of trust compared to paradigms where participants are merely asked to imagine how they would respond.

Overall, the current results offer support for different types of interdependence for men and women. The research also extends previous findings into a new domain, that of trust. Decisions concerning whether or not to trust strangers are important in a variety of areas of ever yday life, including the creation and maintenance of many forms of economic exchange, social relationships, and political institutions. In social exchange situations, it is important to know what types of information or minimal social cues will lead one person to expect to be able to trust another. To the extent that there are cultural and gender differences in the bases for depersonalized trust, coordination of trust may require an understanding of those differences.

Our results also offer additional evidence for the existence of two distinct types of social selves, a relational self and a collective self [START_REF] Brewer | Who is this 'we'? Levels of collective identity and self-representations[END_REF]. While the relational self refers to the inclusion of relationships within one's self-representation, the collective self concerns the inclusion of group identity and group memberships as part of the self. We assume that both men and women need and value both relational connections with others and group memberships, but that they differ in which level of social self is most salient or accessible. That trust for women seems to depend largely on direct and indirect relationships is consistent with the idea that the relational self is the predominant type of social self for women. The finding that trust for men was mostly dependent on the categorical, ingroup/ outgroup distinction suggests that the collective self may be the more salient type of social self for men.

It is likely that gender differences in the social self are influenced by socialization norms and culturally specific role expectations as individuals grow up (cf. [START_REF] Eagly | Sex differences in social behavior: A social-role interpretation[END_REF]. For example, there is evidence that among children and adolescents, female play-groups tend to emphasize interpersonal interactions, while male playgroups emphasize teams and large groups (e.g. [START_REF] Benenson | Age and sex differences in dyadic and group interaction[END_REF].

Although most research has focused on socialization and self-construal of women in the West, differential socialization of males and females may be very similar across cultures. In a large study involving respondents from five different countries, [START_REF] Kashima | Culture, gender, and self: A perspective from individualism-collectivism research[END_REF] found a pancultural gender difference in relational interdependence. Across all cultures, women scored higher than men on a scale assessing emotional relatedness of the self with significant others, providing support for the idea that gender differences in interdependence may be relatively ubiquitous, and not specific to Western cultures.

It is also noteworthy that the current results show an interesting parallel with results from our previous research concerning cross-cultural differences in depersonalized trust [START_REF] Yuki | Cultural differences in relationship-and group-based trust[END_REF]. As was true for women in the current study, in our earlier experiments the presence of a potential cross-group relationship increased trust more for Japanese than for Americans within the same allocator/dictator paradigm used in the present study. This earlier study showed no gender differences within the Japanese sample, although there was a nonsignificant trend (p = .18), with Japanese women showing more trust toward the relational target than Japanese men.

However, despite the parallel between cultural differences and gender differences in self-construal, it is not necessarily the case that effects of culture and gender on trust stem from the same underlying processes. After all, the meaning of interpersonal relationships is culturally embedded, and it is possible that Asian and Western women may differ qualitatively in the way in which they are interdependent. Although emotional interdependence with significant others has been shown to be similar across cultures [START_REF] Kashima | Culture, gender, and self: A perspective from individualism-collectivism research[END_REF], it remains to be seen how much overlap there is in interdependent self-construal in other relevant domains, such as cognition, motivation, and behavior.

Thus, although East Asians (both men and women) and American women have been shown to be sensitive to cross-group relationships as a basis for trusting a stranger, this trust may reflect ver y different expectations or assumptions in the two cases. Future research should continue to explore the nature of culture and gender differences in relational and collective interdependence, and the way in which the foundations of interdependent orientation may be similar or different depending on gender and culture.

Notes

1. It should be noted that some research has demonstrated main effects for the primary importance of relational interdependence over collective interdependence across genders [START_REF] Gabriel | Are there 'his' and 'hers' types of interdependence? The implications of gender differences in collective versus relational interdependence for affect, behavior, and cognition[END_REF]. In addition, other results have shown that men are concerned with both relational and collective interdependence (e.g. [START_REF] Seeley | Circle of friends or members of a group? Sex differences in relational and collective attachment to groups[END_REF]. However, we have maintained the current terminology emphasizing relative differences between genders since findings consistently show an interaction between gender and type of interdependence, with women being more relationally and less collectively oriented than men. 2. Two types of primes were used in order to be able to generalize our findings across primes regardless of idiosyncratic content of each particular prime. Participants received only one of the two primes. 3. It is important to note that the allocator supposedly only knew the university identity of the recipient; he/she was not supposed to be aware of the sure-thing option [START_REF] Kiyonari | A comparative study of trust and trustworthiness using the game of enthronement[END_REF]. 4. For both outgroup targets, the specific university membership of the allocator was not mentioned in order to avoid the effects of specific stereotypes unique to each university. 5. Results of the online decisions were the same regardless of the type of prime participants were given, so reported analyses are collapsed across both types of primes. 6. There was also a marginally significant three-way interaction involving target, gender, and version of the prime. The gender ϫ target effect was somewhat stronger for participants who had seen the golfing prime stor y than the baseball game stor y. Nonetheless we have collapsed across the versions of the prime because the overall interaction pattern was the same for both.

Maddux & Brewer gender and trust 167 Figure 2 .

 1672 Figure 2. Expected money per target as a function of relationship type and participant gender (US$0 to US$11).

Acknowledgment

This research was supported by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation.