Eric Kaufmann

The dominant ethnic moment Towards the abolition of 'whiteness'?

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade and a half, the study of the American white majority has blossomed into a major academic endeavour. So-called 'White Studies' provided an important service in opening up a 'hidden' field of study that remained neglected as recently as the early 1990s. However, in this debate, I suggest that while the study of whites and white racial systems is important, the White Studies approach possesses little heuristic value for scholars attempting to explain majority responses to multicultural politics. 'Whiteness' is a colloquial term used by local actors to describe the lived reality of dominant ethnicity as it appears from the 'inside' of American society. Scholars should be more critical, comparative and discerning than their subjects: 'white' is the particular racial boundary marker that distinguishes dominant ethnic groups from subaltern ones in a small proportion of the world's nations. Whiteness informs, but does not constitute, dominant ethnicity and we should not mistake the content of group boundary markers for the essentials. Particular cultural markers are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for ethnicity.

The position I advance goes further, claiming that White Studies suffers from a number of serious flaws that should lead us to question whether this approach can continue to advance the frontiers of knowledge in the wider sphere of ethnic and racial studies. These flaws include: (1) a constructivism that fails to recognize the cognitive and social processes that underpin social 'reality'; (2) an excessive emphasis on ethnic boundaries as opposed to ethnic narratives, thereby overstating the degree of malleability possible in ethnic identity; (3) a tacit belief in white exceptionalism, which overemphasizes the ideological character of whiteness and deifies whites; (4) an elision of dominant ethnicity and race; and (5) a threefold parochialism in terms of place, time horizon and the role of race in ethnic studies. The first four flaws lead to problematic interpretations of the American context, while the final omission greatly hinders the usefulness of the whiteness paradigm outside the United States. This article therefore begins by examining the American case and then moves to consider the international arena.

An alternative to White Studies that avoids its pitfalls and helps us to better comprehend the rising sociopolitical forces of our time is the emerging study of dominant ethnicity. Grounded in a less reductionist, more international and more nuanced analytical context, I believe the dominant ethnicity approach provides the best way forward for understanding majority-group and dominant minority movements. Dominant ethnicity cannot encompass everything, and needs to be complemented by a racial studies perspective that can address problems that lie beyond the scope of ethnic studies. However, I contend that the study of dominant ethnicity provides the most useful perspective for understanding the recent upsurge in anti-multicultural politics in the West.

Social construction

This article takes a critical realist approach [START_REF] Bhaskar | A Realist Theory of Science[END_REF][START_REF] Archer | Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach[END_REF]Bader, 2001: 252) as its starting point, and stresses the importance of mutually understood concepts for the advancement of human knowledge. This approach rejects the use of subjects' constructions as the basis for scholarly categories unless those constructions afford us a useful way of understanding social reality. Our social reality is ultimately constructed by the way we process sense-impressions, but it is a fallacy to move from this accurate observation to the post-structuralist conceit that concepts are simply power-driven paradigms without empirical referent. Physicists have shown that the colour spectrum is simply a continuum of wavelength with no natural breaks. Yet anthropologists have shown remarkable crosscultural agreement over colour. We all have a name for 'blue' as a colour in a way that we do not for 'blue-green' (Dawkins, 2004: 31). Much the same could be said about many objects from trees to chairs. Does the same cross-cultural 'auto-focus' apply to concepts like ethnicity or race? Clearly not, or we would not face problems of contested concepts. On the other hand, the wide degree of social scientific agreement over concepts that prevents us from publishing ethnic studies articles in the American Economic Review illustrates that we agree on far more than we care to acknowledge. The question, therefore, is the degree to which the social world represents a break with that of the natural. Elsewhere, I claim that there is no complete break, but rather a gradation of conceptual fuzziness that increases as one moves from the 'hardest' of natural sciences to, say, literary criticism [START_REF] Kaufmann | The Sensory Basis of Historical Analysis: A Reply to Post-Structuralism[END_REF]. In terms of scholarly concepts in our field, I am relatively optimistic: there is a sound empirical substrate of auto-constructed reality with which to work.

Let us be more specific. In this debate, I use the term 'ethnic group' or ethnie to refer to a named, imagined, human community, many of whose members believe in a myth of shared ancestry and place of origin [START_REF] Smith | National Identity[END_REF]. Ethnic groups are imagined communities because, contra the primordialists, they must be larger than a face-to-face gemeinschaft. Cultural markers, like language, religion, customs and phenotype (or 'race') are used by ethnies to demarcate their boundaries, thus ethnic groups need to possess at least one (but no more than one) diacritical marker. Dominant ethnic groups are ethnies that are dominant within a particular nation state or sub-state nation (i.e. Japanese in Japan, Scots Protestants in Scotland). Race, on the other hand, refers to communities or categories marked out by phenotypical differences. This holds despite widespread disagreement over where racial boundaries lie. Racial categories can exist within an ethnic group, i.e. skin-colour differences within the Hindu (caste), Italian (North-South) or Jewish (Ashkenazi-Mizrahim) ethnies; or they can transcend ethnic groups (i.e. 'whites' in Europe, North America and elsewhere). This is not to reify these genetically problematic categories, but merely to acknowledge their importance to the actors that apprehend them. 1 Meanwhile, nations are integrated, modern communities of territory and history that have political aspirations. States, by contrast, are political units that have a monopoly on the use of force within their particular bounded territory.

White Studies

The origin of White Studies, as David Roediger notes, lies in the pre-Civil Rights period in the perceptive analyses of African-American writers such as W.E.B. DuBois and James Baldwin. Developing from roots in critical race theory in the 1970s, and drawing upon the insights of these earlier African-American scholars, White Studies addressed an often-neglected aspect of American ethnic and race relations: the majority group [START_REF] Roediger | The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class[END_REF]Delgado and Stefancic, 1997). As Ashley Doane astutely put it, the ethnic and racial identity of the dominant group remained 'hidden' and dominant group members were able to set the academic agenda, which focused on the study of what they deemed strange, problematic or exotic. Nowhere was the equation of 'ethnic' with 'minority' clearer than in the title of Donald Ramsey Young's American Minority Peoples (1932) [START_REF] Doane | Dominant Group Ethnic Identity in the United States: The Role of "Hidden" Ethnicity in Intergroup Relations[END_REF]Doane, 2003: 7).

Work based on the White Studies approach spans not only theory, literary and cultural studies, but also law and citizenship [START_REF] Haney-Lopez | White by Law: The legal constructions of Race[END_REF][START_REF] Smith | Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History[END_REF], history [START_REF] Roediger | The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class[END_REF][START_REF] Roediger | Towards the Abolition of Whiteness[END_REF], anthropology [START_REF] Gallagher | Color-Blind Privilege: The Social and Political Functions of Erasing the Color Line in Post Race America[END_REF], sociology [START_REF] Doane | White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism[END_REF] and political science (Perea, 1997). A number of points of unity are apparent. First, a focus on the previously neglected contours of the majority white group. Second, a treatment of the American past that emphasizes the oppression experienced by those deemed to be 'non-white' rather than the myth of American universalism. Third, a shared constructivist approach to white identity that focuses on shifts in the definition of whiteness across time and place. Fourth, a belief in white exceptionalism: namely, in the idea of whiteness as a politically motivated hegemonic ideology that is independent of normal processes of collective identification. Finally, an elision of the racial 'white' and ethnic 'WASP' (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) categories that are seen as coterminous elements of an evolving racial power structure. These principles inform a politics of deconstruction that seeks to expose the constructed foundations of white hegemony in the United States. A corollary of this is that the whiteness perspective can help to expose and resist policies of liberal neutrality that might undermine support for collective rights policies such as affirmative action and bilingual education. Though White Studies has focused on the American case, this discourse is increasingly making its presence felt outside the American context, as is evident in the work of British writers such as Alistair Bonnett and Stuart Hall (Bonnett, 2000).

THE AMERICAN CONTEXT

In order to properly evaluate the claims of White Studies scholars, we need to begin with the American context. There is no question that discussion of the majority group was a major lacuna in American discussions of race and ethnicity. The focus on minorities partly stemmed from Eurocentric constructions of the immigrant or non-white 'other' as a social problem. It partly arose because the dominant WASP group could not see itself as 'ethnic' since it viewed the nation as coterminous with its own identity. However, another major reason for the 'hiding' of dominant group identity was an ideological insistence among the post-war ancestors of today's neoconservatives: the 'consensus' historians and intellectuals. They believed that the United States was, unlike European nations, an exceptional 'universal' nation that had never had an ethnic core [START_REF] Lipset | The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective[END_REF]. In fact, as White Studies scholars correctly point out, there was an ethnic/racial component to the American nation based on white Anglo-Protestant superiority and the need to assimilate immigrants along anglo-conformist lines. However, I will argue that this process is more accurately described as ethnic rather than racial.

The role of boundary construction

Another commonplace of White Studies writing is the idea that various European ethnic groups 'became' white, partly by accepting the racialized social structure of American society in which non-Caucasians were excluded. The Irish Catholics are cited as the classic example of this. Noel Ignatiev and David Roediger (among others) claim that the Irish 'became' white by arguing for their rights as whites (rather than as Americans) and that this collusion became manifest in major left-wing institutions such as the American Federation of Labour and the Democratic Party [START_REF] Roediger | The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class[END_REF][START_REF] Ignatiev | How the Irish Became White[END_REF]. Roediger and others certainly make a convincing case that American society became more inclusive of the Irish after the Civil War, whilst maintaining rigid segregation along racial lines, but does it really make sense to speak of the Irish 'becoming white'? I would argue that this is an example of where scholars need to distance themselves from their subjects' colloquial terminology. The term 'white' was occasionally used to differentiate non-WASP (or 'new') European immigrants from established groups, and some European immigrants, such as the Italians in Louisiana, did experience a withdrawal of civil rights [START_REF] Roediger | Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality and the "New Immigrant" Working Class[END_REF]. 'White' was also occasionally used by dominant group members to refer to themselves. Yet for the most part, it was dominant WASP ethnicity that counted. 'White' was one of many different colloquial names for the dominant ethnic group, most often used in the south, where there were few white ethnics to problematize the white/WASP distinction. For instance, terms like 'American', 'old American', 'native American', 'Yankee' or 'Protestant' were at least as common as 'white' -especially north of the Mason and Dixon line where there were fewer blacks and more white ethnics. This emerges in community studies such as Yankee City [START_REF] Warner | Yankee City: The Social Life of a Modern Community[END_REF] or the Lynds' Middletown [START_REF] Lynd | Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American Culture[END_REF]. In Herman Lantz's account of a 1950s coal community (presumably in Ohio or Pennsylvania), a 'native' Protestant woman lamented: I don't think that parents . . . care for their children marrying foreigners, but they can't do much about it . . . there is more intermarriage between the natives and foreigners today than there was in the olden time. You see, today there soon won't be any true American because they marry up with these foreigners. (Lantz, 1958: 57-8, emphasis added) A broader sense of 'Caucasian' whiteness did exist among a majority of Americans, but only as a secondary identity. It did not stir the imagination as strongly as ethnicity, though it mattered greatly when it came to social interaction, citizenship and civil rights. The important point to take from this is the semantics of the term 'white.' It could refer to major phenotypical distinctions, i.e. the 'Caucasian' racial group, or it could be used as one of a number of terms for the dominant ethnic group. In both cases, there was a psychic and material payoff to being included as 'white.' Yet the two usages never blended into one in the popular mind, and their conflation by scholars working in the White Studies mode is a misrepresentation of the historical record. Thus the term 'white' meant something quite rigid when applied to the Chinese in California in 1882 or southern blacks in the 1920s. By contrast, Benjamin Franklin's exegesis on the 'tawny' Germans in the 1750s or talk of the non-whiteness of southern and eastern Europeans around 1900 lacked the same degree of concreteness and social combustibility.

After all, if whiteness is a mere construct, why didn't white Anglo-Protestants 'construct' black Anglo-Protestants as 'American' in order to mould an anti-Catholic alliance (the pre-World War II Republican Party notwithstanding)? Certainly the Catholic population was a large and growing force, hence much more threatening to WASP power than the African-Americans, and so it would have made more sense for white Protestants to join forces with a group untainted by 'Popery'. The answer, surely, is that socially 'real' limits to identity construction were placed on WASPs by the way we process colour impressions and by pre-existing racial identities (however weak). These were more powerful than religious bonds in the American case, which meant that white ethnics would always have greater mobility than even long-resident non-whites. This is true in many societies, but not in every society, as Donald Horowitz makes clear when commenting on how the Islam-Christian ethnic divide overpowers the racial divide between white and black Moors in Mauretania 2 [START_REF] Horowitz | Ethnic Groups in Conflict[END_REF].

An overly constructivist interpretation of whiteness places a great deal of emphasis on shifts in boundaries, hence White Studies scholars claim that the Irish became white after the 1860s when the Democratic party courted them as part of the class of free white labourers (Roediger, 1991: 170). But why is the 1860s such a turning point? Irish Catholics were greatly overrepresented in the bottom rungs of society and in the prison population well into the 20th-century. So much so that they earned a special mention in the eugenics-inspired 1911 Dillingham Commission report [START_REF] King | Making Americans: Immigration, Race and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy[END_REF], Their religion was deemed a threat to the Republic until the late 1920s and they had no hope of joining the WASP elite based in the eastern universities, government and business [START_REF] Baltzell | The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America[END_REF]. Prohibition and Klan revival reinforced their second-class status and, even in 1928, there was little chance of an Irish-Catholic such as Al Smith reaching the nation's highest office. Only with McCarthyism and Kennedy's election in 1960, as well as the social changes of the 1960s could an Irishman represent the all-American type. Even then, Irish actors such as John Wayne had to adopt WASP surnames to serve as 'all-American' archetypes.

In this sense, we need to interrogate the obsessive focus on boundaries (the spatial dimension of ethnicity) at the expense of collective narratives and iconography (the temporal dimension of ethnicity). Could it not be said that the Irish only really became 'white' after 1960 or 1965? Alternatively, one could adopt a minimum definition of inclusion and go back to the abolition of the penal laws in the late 18th-century as the defining moment, if Catholic voting and citizenship are the keys to 'whiteness'. This highlights the multilevel nature of social inclusion, and the need for a more nuanced approach to questions of exclusion/inclusion.

What actually happened is that the Irish, who were always considered part of the broader 'white' race (even if poor cousins or 'white chimpanzees'), became equal and this was occasionally expressed using the term 'white'. This exposes the slipperiness of the 'white' concept, which alters its meaning according to the disparate ideas expressed by the various historical actors who utter this colloquialism. Surely scholars need to take a critical step back and differentiate its 'racial' and 'ethnic' meanings.

The previous discussion focused on what I believe are some of the limitations of an excessively constructivist, boundary-focused approach and the semantic conflation of two very different uses of the term 'white.' This raises the question of whether whiteness is malleable material in the hands of ideologues. In much of the literature on whiteness, we get the sense that whiteness is a hegemonic signifier with no relationship to the signified referent of white identity. This reflects some of the tenets of discourse analysis, which emphasizes the ways in which discursive strategies pave the way for rule by consent [START_REF] Laclau | Hegemony and Socialist Strategy[END_REF]Fairclough, 1989: 34). This strategy opens the way for the claim that whiteness can be abolished [START_REF] Roediger | The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class[END_REF][START_REF] Ignatiev | How the Irish Became White[END_REF]. If white Americans could only understand that they are wearing the Emperor's New Clothes, they would wake up from their hegemonic stupor.

Notice that the White Studies argument turns on the notion that whiteness is a free-floating text. If only things were so simple. Here we need to return to a bit of critical reality: people's racial distinctions are real, even if there is little genetic basis to them. Just as people see discrete colours of the physical rainbow despite an electromagnetic continuum, we need to accept that they see colours (albeit with fuzzy boundaries) in the human rainbow despite a genetic continuum [START_REF] Dawkins | Race and Creation[END_REF]. This, much more than legal-technical distinctions, constitutes the social 'reality' of race. My ethnic background includes a quarter Chinese and a quarter Latin American, but I pass as white in both Europe and North America. Some of my cousins, with the same mixture, do not pass as white on either continent. What is happening is that people's pre-conscious 'auto-focus' tunes me in as white and my cousins as non-white.

Certainly matters might be different if White-Asian-Latinos were hegemonically scripted as 'non-white', but this kind of legal-technical detail has only occasionally mattered. We know that some individuals who 'appeared' white but had African ancestry were disenfranchised on the basis of the 'one drop rule' in certain southern states [START_REF] Haney-Lopez | White by Law: The legal constructions of Race[END_REF].

But many white southerners have African ancestry and the vast majority successfully hid this through most of American history. In effect, the sting of non-whiteness (notably in the realm of politico-economic rights) largely applied to those who could not pass as phenotypically 'white'.

The same is true in cases outside the United States: Roediger may be right that Malcolm X may have been considered 'white' in the West African context, but it is a much bigger claim to say that West Africans did not physically distinguish between Malcolm X and George Wallace. We see this today in the attitude of the Nigerian government toward the light-skinned Colin Powell, whose views they disagree with, but whom they consider to be part of their wider racial group in a way that Donald Rumsfeld is not. Meanwhile, in South Africa under apartheid, Japanese businessmen may have been granted a 'white' designation on their identity cards, but this classification must surely be kept distinct from wider social meanings of the term 'white'. This is not to deny some role for social construction when it comes to racial identity: those who are physically 'in-between' are to some extent up for grabs and can be excluded by the dominant group, but even here, a distinction is often made between the 'in-betweens' (i.e. South Italians) and the definite 'other' (i.e. black) racial group. Even if there were no subconscious basis for racial distinctions, we would still need to account for the historical power of racial collective representations. For instance, statues, film, portraits and photos all encode white iconic elements. To use Durkheimian terminology, these collective representations create a pathdependent 'social fact' -independent of power considerations -that is tied to white identity and not easily dislodged. This flags up some of the limitations of the boundary approach favoured by White Studies scholars, whereby boundaries shift rapidly in response to changing power constellations.

Whiteness as ideology

Is the white American myth-symbol complex an ideology? Only if we define ideology so broadly as to include all human cultural constructions and to thereby lose its lexical potency. Certainly, I would argue that narratives of both WASP dominant ethnicity and the more diffuse 'white' racial identity are analytically distinct from universalist ideologies of scientific racismthough the latter influenced the former from the late 19th-century until the mid-20th century (longer in the deep south). A lot of the argument turns on whether a Foucauldian or Gramscian logic operates, whereby an instrumental motive underlies white social constructions. Considerations of wealth, power and prestige are certainly important when it comes to explaining ethnic leadership or people's choice of identity. No doubt these motives made the choice of whiteness an easy one for the antebellum Irish.

However, people's identities also stem from romantic and traditional considerations [START_REF] Smith | The Ethnic Revival[END_REF][START_REF] Ozkirimli | Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction[END_REF]. Cultural-historical traditions are predominantly anchored to non-instrumental motives. Leaders of such identity movements are often motivated by a yearning for authenticity, meaning or solidarity during periods of modern social upheaval. Their identity constructions are constrained both by a group's fund of available myths, symbols and memories and by the degree to which their constructions resonate with their target populations. Such resonance is only likely to be achieved when leaders appeal to elements within the repository of collective representations that have been handed down, in Durkheimian fashion, from generation to generation. In the American case, romantic currents of thought that glorified the pioneer, yeoman farmer and the symbols of rural America (including the Protestant church and schoolhouse) were arguably central to WASP ethnonationalism [START_REF] Smith | Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth[END_REF].

The picture for the wider white American racial group is less clear. Traditions of how Europeans differed from the non-'white' world were hazier and even non-existent for some peasant immigrants. Therefore, the mass-cultural material that united all European-origin groups together as 'whites' (vaudeville, blackface, dime novels, film) leaned more heavily on negative stereotypes of the 'other' than in the WASP case, where romantic nationalist ideals were important. Instrumental considerations also bulked larger for white ethnics, who had a great deal to gain from their 'associate membership' in white America. Yet this does not invalidate the fact that whiteness was a real identity as well as a flag of convenience. There already existed a tradition of (pan-ethnic) white American identity that has grown more coherent over the past two generations through inter-faith marriage, 'white flight', cultural differentiation and growing racial diversity. Ideology per se was never the whole story and is less important for whiteness today than ever before.

White exceptionalism

This points to a major inconsistency in the White Studies approach: its belief in white exceptionalism. Other racial categories are relatively authentic, but WASP and white are not; other groups are 'cultural', but WASPs or whites are culturally barren; other groups look to identity politics for culturalhistorical reasons, but WASPs and whites do so for purely instrumental considerations. In asserting these patterns, White Studies scholars are perpetuating the very myth of white exceptionalism that led to the 'hiding' of white identity in the first place! This myth echoes the ancient Greek usage of the term ethnos or barbaroi whereby only cultural outsiders were considered 'ethnic.' This scholarly mindset has a very long pedigree in the United States. It explains why the term 'WASP' had to be coined by a Jewish-American outsider like Saul Bellow in the 1950s.

We should not deify white people. In the annals of human history, the strong politico-economic performance of light-skinned peoples is short, dating from no earlier than 1600. When whites lose their superior politicoeconomic position in the world, they will no longer receive reverential treatment in the developing world and will not be accorded the same status within western societies. Already, white Protestants in the United States are not viewed the same way they were only 50 years ago, and are occasionally seen as more 'backward' than the relatively urbanized, northern and successful white Catholics and Jews. This pattern is a harbinger of the future, when the urban American elite will be more racially hybrid than the traditionalist, economically precarious inhabitants of small-town and provincial America.

I am not joining the Polyanna-ish chorus of those who see an end to race in America [START_REF] Roediger | Colored White: Transcending the Racial Past[END_REF]. Even with a hybridized elite, those with dark skins will face an uphill struggle to gain equality in their society. But power and wealth will become increasingly divorced from narratives of white authenticity, and we may well see a struggle between the purveyors of white nationalism (with their provincial base) and the modern, hybrid elite of the cities. Even the digestion of all white ethnics is problematic. Here I note that extremist groups like the Ku Klux Klan have opened their gates to southern and eastern European groups, once derided as 'beaten breeds', but have not embraced even the blondest of Jews. As a result, I would contest the increasingly popular notion that the boundaries of whiteness will easily expand to include lighter-skinned Hispanics and Asians (Alba, 1990: 312;Gans, 1994: 588-9).

Racial whiteness and wasp ethnicity

At this point, we need to specify the difference between the white racial category, which is a pan-ethnic group, and the dominant WASP ethnic group, with its frontier narrative and rural-Protestant symbolism. These two are elided by White Studies scholars, but must be kept distinct. WASP ethnicity was a much richer construct and was more central to American national identity than the white racial category. Whiteness has well-defined boundaries, but is much more symbolically confused and opaque than WASPness. It lacks the 'native' authenticity that WASPness possessed, which makes its connection to nationalism problematic. Immigration led WASPs to employ both immigration restriction and anglo-conformity to retain ethnic boundaries. This was partially successful, but got stuck when Catholics and Jews failed to adopt the Protestant faith in sufficient numbers. WASPs might have contented themselves with a slower rate of assimilation and the maintenance of dominant minority status from the 1950s onward, but they did not.

Why? The reasons for the decline of the WASP had little to do with an instrumental expansion of dominant group boundaries in the face of a threat from peoples of colour. The latter were too weak to pose any real challenge to WASP hegemony in the 1950s and early 1960s. Instead, the primary dynamic of change was liberalism: anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism waned during the mid-20th-century while American society became increasingly 'loose-bounded' (Bellah and Greenspahn, 1987). The trans-sectarian process that swept diverse American cities also affected homogenous locales from Oregon to the northwest of England. Elsewhere, I argue that when the WASPs began to lose their hegemony in the mid-20th-century, all minorities -religious and racial -improved their politicoeconomic position (Kaufmann, 2004a). There was no point at which reformers argued, 'Let us relax our religious boundaries while leaving racial lines in place.' White identity always existed as a pan-ethnic category that mattered greatly for the boundaries of exclusion at the most basic levels of participation (labour, voting) in the United States. This racial identity did not, however, define the nation or determine who could lead, represent or narrate the nation -this being the preserve of the dominant WASP ethnic group. With a few exceptions, C. Wright Mills and Digby Baltzell were correct that the American power elite, presidents, congressmen, captains of industry, military and academic leaders, were WASP well into the 1950s [START_REF] Mills | The Power Elite[END_REF][START_REF] Baltzell | The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America[END_REF]. The decline of the WASP sparked a transitional period in which the white pan-ethnic group gained in importance. Liberalism, the subsequent reality of inter-ethnic marriage and urbanization started this shift, and the rise in the power and demographic strength of non-Europeans reinforced it. Even so, the coincidence of white identity with liberalism was merely momentary. 1960s liberalism leveled inter-faith barriers among whites, but simultaneously helped transcend the colour line that defined white identity, leading to a sharp rise in inter-racial marriage.

This time, it is less clear that white identity will tango with liberalism. White identity could embrace Catholics and Jews because these people fit in with whites' gestalt-psychological colour perceptions and their preexisting white collective representations. Catholics and Jews were already nominal members of the white racial group in the days of anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism, but Asians and most Hispanics are not even associate whites. A downplaying of religious identity and change of surname could even create an 'all-American' WASP out of a Catholic such as Rita Hayworth or Jew such as Kirk Douglas. This is unthinkable for an Asian or most Hispanics. On the other hand, Hayworth and Douglas's co-ethnics were not part of the dominant WASP ethnic group and, in the pre-1970 period, we need to distinguish between general white racial membership and the more exclusive and powerful WASP dominant ethnicity.

White exceptionalists have elided the distinction between racial whiteness and ethnic WASPness for some time. Consider the excellent work of Thomas Gossett. This historian, like most of his colleagues in the 1950s and early 1960s, assumed that narratives of Anglo-Saxon origin and superiority in the United States were not ethnic but 'racial' 3 [START_REF] Gossett | Race, The History of an Idea in America[END_REF]. But are myths of genealogical origin 'racial'? Myths of origin and narratives of uniqueness define ethnic groups. Greeks look back to their classical and Byzantine ancestors, Turks to their central Asian forebears, Ukrainians to the Cossacks, Arabs to the Bedouins, Zulus to Shaka's original clan, the French invoke the Gauls and Franks, and Chinese hark back to the Chin and Han dynasties. All assert the positive qualities of their (supposed) ancestors. What is the difference between these constructions and 19thcentury Anglo-Americans tracing their ancestry to supposedly superior, westward-wandering Anglo-Saxons? Only a patronising or parochial view of other ethnic groups could lead to Gossett's belief that, while others were exotically ethnic, WASPs were engaging in a racial power game. No, when we speak of Anglo-Protestant and now 'white' identity, we are not dealing with exceptional gods, but ordinary mortals who see the world as others do and have the same needs (and weaknesses).

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The previous discussion has touched mainly on criticisms of the White Studies approach to American ethnic relations. In the process, I have spoken of the need to distinguish race from ethnicity, and to balance a constructivist approach based on shifting boundaries with a historicist approach that takes mytho-symbolic path-dependence more seriously.

Limitations of time and place

In this section, I argue that the White Studies approach has developed a number of limitations that derive from its American focus and methodological assumptions. The first concerns a parochialism in time, illustrated by White Studies' focus on the recent past of white power, which extends through to the post-civil rights context. This gives rise to a belief in white omnipotence when in fact a much simpler explanation is that we are living through a (temporary) period of light-skinned civilizational success that produces a 'psychic wage' for whites. Already, the once unassailable WASPs have given way to non-denominational 'whites' in the American power structure, and the racial hybrids are coming up behind them. When civilization was centred around the Mediterranean, China and India, lightskinned people were often enslaved and viewed as barbarians. This is why the word 'slave' is derived from the Slavs who were the source of slaves in the Byzantine and the Ottoman empire. Alistair Bonnett and others are correct to point out that racial pseudo-science led to a hardening of racial boundaries, but this edifice was not constructed ex nihilo. It was rooted in a growing racial self-awareness that was bolstered by the strong politicoeconomic performance of north-western Europe. In the broad span of historical time, a few centuries is not much. Civilizations rise and fall and the dominance of light-skinned peoples is but one act in the long drama of human history. The loss of white prestige will make pretensions of white supremacy sound as hollow as ideas of Islamic superiority do today.

Perhaps more important than the limited time horizon of White Studies is its restricted appreciation of how ethnic dynamics operate outside the United States. This leads to an over-specification of the role of race in ethnic conflict and thereby hinders the applicability of ideas of whiteness outside the American context. One of the hallmarks of White Studies' thinking is its belief that the advantageous politico-economic position of whites in the United States is the result of a hegemonic ideology of white racism. No one can dispute the fact that scientific racism was a force in shaping American immigration policy in the 1920s -a policy that was not reformed until 1965. But was phrenology and eugenics central or was pseudo-science simply a legitimating device used by an anxious WASP ethnie that felt itself under siege from non-WASP immigrants? 'The nobility and dedication of the [racial] scientists ought not to obscure their human frailty', wrote the great American ethnic historian Oscar Handlin. 'Beyond the impressive array of tables and charts, set apart by the elaborate formality of their procedures, were men groping for an explanation of their condition' (Handlin, 1957: 111-12).

Here a glance outside the American context can yield a great deal of insight. The experience of Australia, Canada and Scotland suggests that racial concerns were secondary to ethnic considerations. Canada and Australia did bar non-white immigrants, but their ethnonationalists were mostly concerned with non-British immigrants (Palmer, 1975). In Scotland, a famous report from the Church of Scotland in the mid-1930s warned of the 'menace to the Scottish race' of continued Irish immigration. However, the term 'race' was a cover for ethnic and sectarian anxiety, used because scientific racism was deemed a more acceptable argument for restriction than religious bigotry [START_REF] Bruce | Sectarianism in Scotland[END_REF]. Today, far-right parties in Europe from Flanders (Vlaams Blok) to France (Front National), Holland (Pim Fortuyn List) to Austria (Freedom Party) and most countries in between are primarily driven by the immigration restriction issue. Can 'whiteness' help us in understanding these processes? I am skeptical. Most immigration-restriction politics is less concerned with instrumental politics or demonic visions of the 'other' than with maintaining the congruence of a particular ethnie and 'its' nation state. This has its roots in the Herderian, völkish conception of the nation which has only a tenuous connection to modern scientific racism. Most nations were constructed on the basis of a pre-modern ethnic core that provided the foundation myths, emblems and symbolic boundaries for the modern nation state. [START_REF] Smith | The Ethnic Origins of Nations[END_REF]. In several other cases, such as the United States (WASP), Guyana (Creole) and Mexico (Mestizo), the dominant ethnic group formed after political independence (or revolution). Thus ethnicity and nation become ontologically and organically connected. In the minds of ethnonationalists, newcomers bring different cultural markers that need to be assimilated or rejected in order to remove the dissonance between ethnic group and nation.

Race or ethnicity?

Race only becomes central to ethnic conflict in specific cases, and recent large-scale comparative research shows that phenotypical differences are much less powerful than linguistic ones in explaining ethnic violence [START_REF] Vanhanen | Domestic Violence Related to Ethnic Heterogeneity, Economic Development and Democracy[END_REF]. This is because most neighbouring ethnic groups look like each other. As noted at the outset, ethnic groups, by definition, require at least one diacritical marker to distinguish them from their neighbours. Race can serve as a marker of ethnicity, but will only do so in cases where groups come together as a consequence of long-distance migration (i.e. Mauritius, United States) or where such groups abut a major phenotypical boundary (e.g. the Himalayas or southern Sahara).

In cases where there are phenotypical differences, these may form central features of ethnic differentiation and, where one group dominates, they will tend to assert the superiority of their 'race'. Tutsi dominance over Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi; Arab dominance over Africans in Sudan, Chad or pre-1974 Zanzibar; Japanese dominance over the Ainu in Hokkaido: these are all instances of dominant ethnicity based on racial distinctions. The underlying sources of these 'racial' conflicts have to do with local ethnic dynamics rather than the broad racial classifications of racist ideologues. Certainly 'whiteness' plays no role.

In the western hemisphere, ideology has been more important in affecting the treatment of particular visible minorities (in some cases majorities) such as the Native Indians and Africans. This is because lines of culture and 'race' often cross, leading to racial divisions within cultures (i.e. black and white Brazilians) and transnational racial groups (i.e. Native Indians throughout Latin America). Meanwhile, the indigenousness of the Native Indians complicated a simple 'nativist' response to minorities on the part of white criollo dominant groups. This means that there is more scope for broader racial studies approaches in the western hemisphere, about which I shall say more later. Even so, once the new states of the Americas were set up, criollo settler dominant ethnies formed and could respond in 'nativist' ethnic terms to new immigrants who threatened the imagined congruence of dominant ethnic group and nation.

In the United States, we see this in the case of the Native American/ Know-Nothing Party of the 1840s-60s and the multi-million member Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s (both were primarily northern, anti-Catholic movements). These shared a concern with the decline of the WASP dominant ethnic group. They were more concerned with the rise of Catholic power than they were with the exoticism of the 'new' immigrants from southern and eastern Europe or the 'old' racial minorities. Defending WASP America against the polyglot cities was the primary concern of congressional immigration restrictionists and was illustrated by the fact that the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, which privileged racial 'Nordics' (including Irish and Germans), was superseded by pro-WASP legislation in 1929 that allocated 50 percent of the quota to Britain and excoriated Irish and German ethnic organizations as unpatriotic and self-seeking [START_REF] Higham | Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925[END_REF][START_REF] Higham | Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925[END_REF]).

Likewise, in Canada, the primary concern of the dominant British-Canadian group as late as the 1960s was to encourage British immigration and discourage Catholic immigration. This was not because the Irish and French were not considered 'white'. It was because the dominant ethnic group in the country wished to solidify its position. The same concerns inform the Singapore government's selective immigration policy, which favours Chinese immigrants over Indians and Malays. In Vietnam and Malaysia, 'Native' Vietnamese and Malay attitudes to the Chinese are reversed, but for the same reason: dominant ethnicity.

Many postcolonial states are ethnically divided and internal migration raises similar issues to those of international immigration. For example, in Assam in north-eastern India, native Assamese express antipathy to Bengali and other in-migrants who greatly outnumber them in their homeland. In Northern Ireland, the formerly high fertility rate and eastward migration of the Catholic community has been a major ingredient in the Protestant 'siege mentality'. Indeed, fear of being 'swamped' in one's homeland is not limited to Enoch Powell or Margaret Thatcher: Philippine Muslims, Melanesian Fijians, Lebanese Christians, native-born South African blacks and numerous others express similar fears. This leads to an obsession with the census and with symbolic conflicts such as which language should be declared 'official' (Horowitz, 1985: ch. 4, 5). Both of these concerns have clear resonance in the European and American cases.

Another nation state that reflects the American experience is Jordan. As with the United States's present-day pan-ethnic 'whites', Jordan's dominant group is a pan-ethnic coalition of Transjordanian tribal groups, whose main shared identity is that they are not Palestinian immigrants. They maintain their hold on power by gerrymandering electoral boundaries and invoking their indigenous, 'native' rights as the dominant ethnic group. Throughout the Persian Gulf, immigrants who are not members of the dominant tribal-Arab ethnic groups face restrictive citizenship regimes -not because of their appearance or because they are irrationally feared, but because they are not part of the dominant ethnic group that views the nation as 'its' organic possession.

In Europe and North America, the physical appearance of most immigrants differs from that of the dominant ethnic group, but not always. In Austria, 'invisible' East European immigrants are the main irritant for ethnonationalists. Likewise in Greece and Italy, where one would be hardpressed to racially distinguish an Albanian immigrant. I am not convinced that the dynamic behind these cases differs greatly from cases where immigrant and 'native' look different. I am also unconvinced that such cases differ from the postcolonial cases described above. Pejorative stereotypes and racist fantasies can exacerbate tensions, but these conflicts have more to do with the desire of dominant ethnic groups to render ethnic and national boundaries congruent through immigration restriction or cultural assimilation.

It is important to distinguish between raw antagonism based on simple ethnic conflict and situations where historically charged stereotypes or Freud's 'narcissism of minor differences' (e.g. Albanians in Greece, Jews in pre-war Europe) play a role [START_REF] Goldhagen | Hitler's Willing Executioners[END_REF]. Demeaning stereotypes of the Albanians in Greece, for example, add a negative charge to ethnic relations between the two groups. These stereotypes have historical roots and do not attach with the same force to North African immigrants. Nevertheless, the basic issue for ethnic Greeks in Greece is a slippage in the congruence of ethnie and nation. Furthermore, neither the ethnic conflict nor the ethnic stereotypes have much to do with Greek ideas of 'whiteness'.

On the whole, therefore, a whiteness approach is too inflexible and parochial to allow us to understand the mechanisms that are driving antiimmigrant and anti-multicultural policies in the West. Following the analytical path laid by White Studies will, in the end, result in a partial and decontextualized explanation that inflates the importance of racial markers, racial power systems, racial fears of the 'other' and racial ideologies. Instead, I favour a more concerted attempt to interrogate the ethnic groups that claim national legitimacy and authenticity. 4 This means that greater attention must be paid to mapping the contours of dominant ethnicity within nations (Kaufmann, 2004b).

The dominant ethnicity paradigm

The dominant ethnicity approach recognizes that dominant ethnic groups are intimately linked to nations through shared foundation myths, boundary symbols and collective memories. This forms a centrepiece of Anthony Smith's work on the ethnic origins of nations, but Smith fails to specify what happens when the modern nation takes over from its pre-modern ethnie [START_REF] Kaufmann | Dominant ethnicity" and the "ethnic-civic" dichotomy in the work of Anthony D. Smith[END_REF]. Dominant ethnies do not simply die, but live in the shadow of the nation state they created. We need to know more about how dominant ethnic groups such as the Japanese in Japan, French in France or pure laine Quebecois in Quebec narrate their ethnic identities, which have until recently been inseparable from their national identities. This is the research agenda that lay behind my recent edited collection on this topic (Kaufmann, 2004b).

Smith's concept of the 'core ethnie' (1986) and later, 'dominant ethnie' (1991) is one starting point for analysis that concentrates on the ethnicity in dominant ethnicity, i.e. the cultural and ontological aspects of dominant ethnicity. A second heuristic emerges in the literature arising from [START_REF] Schermerhorn | Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research[END_REF] more politico-demographic approach, which distinguishes between dominant majorities and minorities. This more explicitly examines the dominant aspect of dominant ethnicity. Donald Horowitz picks up on this thread when discussing ethnic power systems, especially in the postcolonial context [START_REF] Horowitz | Ethnic Groups in Conflict[END_REF].

Key to this discussion, therefore, are two ideas: indigenousness and power. 'Native' indigenousness provides the legitimating concept that aligns ethnicity with territory. Meanwhile, raw political power enables an ethnic group to achieve dominance within a multiethnic state. The right combination of both is necessary for a group to emerge as incontestably dominant. Thus in Guyana, the Creolized Africans emerged as the dominant ethnie because they could claim to be more 'native' than Asian Indians (descendants of indentured labourers who arrived after them) or European settlers. Meanwhile, their more rapid absorption into the culture of the colonists favoured them in the colonial power structure, while the more 'indigenous' Caribbean Indians did not have enough political power to contest Creole dominance (St. Hilaire, 2001).

We need to comprehend dominant ethnicity because it is increasing in importance in our time. This is so for two main reasons. First, the increase in global migration and cultural exchange, together with the rise of liberalcosmopolitan norms among university-educated populations, is driving an ever-growing wedge between dominant ethnic groups and 'their' nations in the West. Nations -even if minorities like the Scots or Catalans -speak in terms of an inclusive, 'civic' nationalism rather than ethnonationalism. This means that nations are being separated from dominant ethnic groups, which are increasingly aware that their corporate existence is distinct from that of the state. This raises real identity problems that can express themselves in immigration restrictionist and anti-multicultural politics.

Second, outside the West, dominant ethnicity is increasingly salient because the end of the Cold War has prompted a collapse of postcolonial state unity. Nehru's India, Nyerere's Tanzania, Nkrumah's Ghana and Tito's Yugoslavia have succumbed to ethnic politics. Dominant ethnic groups such as the Hindus of India, Akan in Ghana or Serbs of the former Yugoslavia face internal ethnic challenges while dominant ethnic parties increasingly appeal to a narrow ethnic base.

In the West, the growing divergence between dominant ethnies and 'their' ever more civic nations has heightened ethnic self-awareness among dominant groups such as the English in Britain, Portuguese in Portugal or 'Anglo-Celts' in Australia [START_REF] Johnson | The Dilemmas of Ethnic Privilege: A Comparison of Constructions of "British", "English" and "Anglo-Celtic" Identity in Contemporary British and Australian Political Discourse[END_REF]. They increasingly realize that they are not the nation, and that the 'white' box (without prefix or suffix) on equal opportunities monitoring forms is a living, sub-state ethnic category. Some dominant ethnic groups may refer to themselves as 'white', or as having only a national (non-ethnic) identity, but we should treat such statements with caution. Loose talk of the English in Wales or Scotland as 'white settlers' or Protestant migration within Northern Ireland as 'white flight' needs to be similarly interrogated.

We need to probe deeper and understand why dominant ethnies behave as they do. Dominant ethnic groups often face the choice of an expansive or a restrictive ethnic strategy. An expansive strategy opts for power over culture/identity. For example, the Czarist-Soviet and Ottoman empires pursued territorial aggrandisement at the expense of their ethnic particularity -something that numerous Russian Slavophile intellectuals bewailed [START_REF] Figes | What is Russia?[END_REF]. This strategy had material benefits for the Russian and Turkish ethnic elites who ran these empires, but posed a threat to the integrity of the dominant ethnic group by fraying the vertical bonds between the ethnic elite and masses. Conversely, a second option is retrenchment, which maintains ethnic boundaries through immigration restriction and cultural purification (as with the attempt by romantic cultural nationalists to substitute invented words based on native roots for foreign borrowings). A restrictive strategy such as little Englandism or little Turkism often involves an inward-looking mode that foresakes growth (i.e. Empire) for cultural particularity. A 'third way' is the one favoured by the United States throughout much of its history: to maintain ethnic boundaries through assimilation rather than restriction.

National territories are ethnic homelands, thus national decisions affect dominant ethnic groups. Multiculturalism and civic nationalism may be opposing political theories, but they share a common indifference to the ethnie-nation link. Both relativize ethnicity and de-centre the dominant ethnie, thereby threatening its political dominance and its 'indigenous' connection to the ethnic homeland. These processes also weaken the dominant ethnie's control over cultural and personnel flows into the homeland. Finally, the cosmopolitan ethos of western liberal multiculturalism has the potential to transgress and corrode ethnic boundaries through large-scale inter-marriage. Taken at once, it spells disaster for ethnic dominance, hence it is not surprising that dominant ethnic processes explain most of the resistance to multiculturalism in the West. These processes are more about ethnic anxieties than racial fears.

Race is the principal marker that distinguishes dominant ethnics in the West from recent immigrants, though both religion and language are also important. In some cases (i.e. Greece), race is not even a marker of difference. Moreover, race itself is not so significant: the potential mass migration of East Europeans is almost as much of a concern to dominant ethnonationalists as immigration from the developing world. No major European dominant ethnic group will dissolve itself within a 'white' identity as has occurred in the United States. This is not because East Europeans are not considered 'white', but because they are not considered part of the dominant ethnic group. Ideological discourses of racism and stereotypes of the 'other' are certainly linked with social inequality, but they do not power the anxieties that drive 'Fortress Europe'. In short, dominant ethnic groups do not fear the cultural difference of the 'other' so much as the foreigner's potential to disrupt a perceived ethno-territorial continuity.

THE ROLE OF RACIAL STUDIES

Where does this leave White Studies? Earlier, I argued that ethnicity cannot explain everything. This is particularly true when studying intra-ethnic or supra-ethnic conflict or when we are dealing with properties of societies that are arrayed along a continuum, but still count. These characteristics apply with force to race and status -which vary within societies but do not always constitute clear boundaries for social action. In the tropics and subtropics (Latin America, much of Africa, India and Southeast Asia), and even within the western diasporas of peoples of tropical origin, light skin is associated with higher social status, but does not neatly align with caste or racial group boundaries. Meanwhile, ethnic origin myths go back to European (i.e. Hindus),Turkic (i.e. Indian Muslims) or Semitic (i.e. Somalis, Lemba) ancestors. This has real consequences for human behaviour: population geneticists have recently demonstrated that higher castes in India have a significantly more European genetic profile than lower castes [START_REF] Bamshad | Genetic Evidence on the Origins of Indian Caste Populations[END_REF].

Why is this the case and what can be done about it? Pierre Van den Berghe, in trying to explain the preference for light-skinned women across a large sample of major civilizations, suggests that light skin is associated with fertility since a woman's skin lightens at the peak of the reproductive cycle and darkens with age. On the other hand, the two exceptions in Van den Berghe's model, Moorish Spain and the 25th Nubian dynasty of Egypt, show that social prestige may override the sociobiological imperative (Van den [START_REF] Van Den Berghe | Skin Color Preference, Sexual Dismorphism[END_REF]. Also, it is unclear that preferences in females automatically translate into a status system based on light skin. The rise of western racism (over and above the prestige factor of light-skinned success post-1600) also has a role to play in elevating the white ideal in our time and a White Studies approach can illuminate some of these dynamics. This would need to involve more emphasis on the political mechanisms whereby ideologies of whiteness are translated into institutional rules. A racial studies perspective is also required in order to make sense of pan-ethnic movements like Negritude, White Supremacy or perhaps pan-Arabism, which are not easily encapsulated within ethnic studies approaches.

CONCLUSION

This article argues that the concept of dominant ethnicity is a much more useful tool than whiteness when it comes to understanding majority responses to multiculturalism and immigration. I have pointed to what I believe to be a number of serious omissions in the White Studies approach, namely: (1) a constructivism that fails to recognize the cognitive and social processes that underpin social 'reality'; (2) an excessive emphasis on ethnic boundaries and the scope for identity construction, which underplays the importance of ethno-historical narratives and pathdependency; (3) a tacit belief in white exceptionalism, which overemphasizes the ideological character of whiteness and deifies whites; (4) an elision of the concepts of dominant ethnicity and race; and (5) a threefold parochialism in terms of place, time horizon and the role of race in ethnic studies. The first four problem areas afflict existing White Studies approaches to American ethnic and race relations, while the latter casts doubt on the external validity of the White Studies perspective beyond the American case.

This does not mean that White Studies has led us down a blind alley. White Studies shone a much-needed light on areas that were crying out for examination. The empirical studies inspired by the whiteness approach form a rich, well-researched and innovative body of work. The writing of David Roediger is especially pioneering and is rooted in detailed analysis and solidly researched labour and social history. My argument is only that the time has come to place White Studies in its proper context. At a time when dominant ethnicity is becoming an increasingly prevalent feature of social and political life in all parts of the world, the White Studies approach cannot take us much further. Moreover, its tendency to both deify and castigate whites, combined with its more headline-grabbing statements (i.e. 'abolishing whiteness') tarnishes the political aim of eradicating the real ethnic and racial inequalities that exist in the present day. In this sense, the politics of White Studies often seems at odds with its methodology.

Notes

1 Medical research suggests that racial and ethnic categories are not unimportant as predictors of genetic disease, but that there is far more variation within than between different ethnic and racial groups [START_REF] Pearce | Genetics, Race, Ethnicity, and Health[END_REF]. Dawkins adds that genetic variation within humans that is attributable to 'racial' divisions hovers at no more than 6-15 percent [START_REF] Dawkins | Race and Creation[END_REF]. 2 Likewise, one sometimes observes African or Native-Indian-Canadian Orangemen on parade in Belfast. An Irish Catholic would hardly be accorded similar status! 3 The elision of the two is clear in the shift of title between his PhD dissertation, 'The Idea of Anglo-Saxon Superiority in American Thought, 1865-1915' (1953)


David Mccrone

Never has there been such interest in the English question as there is today. It is easy to lose count of the number of scholarly as well as journalistic

published between 2000 and 2003. What most of these have in common is a willingness to problematize 'Britain'. In truth, one can trace this to a seminal article in the Journal of British History by a New Zealander, John Pocock, in 1975 entitled 'British History: a plea for a new subject' (perhaps it took a 'foreigner' to point that out). Pocock's point was that hitherto what one got was mainly English history (the Scots, the Irish and the Welsh had their own sub-disciplines), and rarely a genuine and interactive history of the four nations of these islands and how they related to each other. This genre of writing was given a fillip by Linda Colley's influential book, Britons: forging the nation, 1707-1837, published in 1992. It is interesting and significant that these are mainly 'history' books, although the stimulus for much of this is essentially the political, social and cultural issues of today. In this short review, my argument is as follows: that problematizing 'Britain' is the result of three sets of challenges that pushed through to the surface of life in these islands, although their roots go much deeper. These challenges are (in no particular order of importance): the constitutional anomaly of the British state; growing racial and ethnic diversity; and the issue of Europe. The first of these is conventionally expressed as the rise of 'nationalism' in Scotland and Wales, a feature of the last 25 years, but in truth embedded in the curious anomaly that since 1707 there has been a single British parliament, that the UK was a unitary rather than federal state despite the fact that it contained four territories -England, Scotland, Wales and (since 1921) Northern Ireland. The attempt to resolve the constitutional anomaly culminated in the setting up of devolved governments in the non-English territories in 1999. The second challenge to Britain, but especially to England where most settled, was growing ethnic diversity following the immigration of people from the black and brown Commonwealth in the post-war years. If the first challenge generated a literature on multinationalism and constitutional change, the second created one on multiculturalism and ethnic relations, literatures which, by and large, did not touch each other. The final challenge to what it meant to be British (but above all, English) came from Europe, or more precisely, the UK's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. All three challenges have generated something of an explosion in writing, both scholarly and popular. Sometimes, key books span the divide, such as Tom Nairn's The Break-Up of Britain, in 1977, andPaul Gilroy's There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack, in 1987. What has also helped this debate along is its politicization, namely, the mobilization of political parties around these challenges. Sometimes, all three intersect, notably on the right of the political spectrum, where issues of 'nationalism'/devolution, race and ethnicity, and 'Europe' become the dominant motifs of the Conservative right -they are 'against' all three. Little wonder, then, that one finds a rich vein of writing (and broadcasting) stretching from reactionary rants through to popular histories and scholarly treatises.

Much of this work focuses down on what it means to be English. England is something of an 'unimagined community' (1996). 2 This needs a bit of explanation. Why not 'British'? In truth, it often is, but my argument is that the core-people of these islands -residents of England are 85 percent of the UK population -are at the sharp end of this identity crisis. The Scots, and to a large degree, the Welsh, have less of a dilemma. Usually, they treat being British as something of a supranational, a state, identity. They are Scots or Welsh in terms of their 'nationness', their nationality if one prefers, and British in terms of citizenship. For the English it is not so simple. In a previous article in this journal [START_REF] Mccrone | Who Do You Say You Are? Making Sense of National Identities in Modern Britain[END_REF], I explored these identity conundrums, and quoted this observation from the journalist Anthony Barnett: What is the difference between being English and being British? If you ask a Scot or a Welsh person about their Britishness, the question makes sense to them. They might say that they feel Scots first and British second. Or that they enjoy a dual identity as Welsh-British, with both parts being equal. Or they might say. 'I'm definitely British first'. What they have in common is an understanding that there is a space between their nation and Britain, and they can assess the relationship between the two. The English, however, are more often baffled when asked how they relate their Englishness and Britishness to each other. They often fail to understand how the two can be contrasted at all. It seems like one of those puzzles that others can undo but you can't; Englishness and Britishness seem inseparable. They might prefer to be called one thing rather than the other -and today young people increasingly prefer English to British -but, like two sides of a coin, neither term has an independent existence from the other. (Barnett, 1997: 292-3) A few years, and a large research programme 3 on, I am not so sure. Certainly, the account carries for the Scots and the Welsh. Asking people to relate their Scottishness and Welshness to their Britishness is usually construed as asking them to relate national to state identity, and to be sure, there has been a firming up of the former over the latter, though it is by no means the case that they have ceased to call themselves British. The English, on the other hand, seem more likely than before to use the descriptor 'English', especially with regard to sport (witness the outbreak of English flags during recent football tournaments), to landscape, history and heritage. Matters of politics, governance and social affairs, including 'race' relations, are, by and large, deemed to be 'British' ones. Put more sharply, it seems that there are different agendas in the different territories of the UK. The most obvious difference is the one (or ones, rather) in Northern Ireland, where being 'British' is most clearly a trigger for one's political and cultural affiliations. If you call yourself British, then much of your identity can be construed from that. In Scotland, it is a lot more complex and unpredictable. Put simply, claiming to be 'British' can be a reference to a multiplicity of allusions: having a British passport, a fact of constitutional life, a statement of political Unionism, a claim to a liberal, and multicultural, civic identity, or even a synonym for English [START_REF] Kiely | Birth, Blood and Belonging: Identity Claims in Post-devolution Scotland[END_REF]. In Wales, it is probably much the same, with the added nuance that the Welsh can claim to be historically the true Brits who retreated from the invading Angles and Saxons in the 4th-century AD behind Offa's dyke. Most commonly, the Scots, Welsh and Irish are lumped together as 'Celts' (Coll gives us a whole chapter in his book), but this is a term of dubious value, whether in its strong -racial -sense, or its weak -cultural -one, as if the rise of nationalism in these territories is the outcome of inherent, genetic differences, rather than a reaction to politico-cultural processes. 4 The real dilemma, however, lies with the English. If Barnett is correct, they tend to confuse English and British, because they are in demographic terms the core-people of these islands. Others argue that there is a Pandora's Box conundrum for the English. Bernard Crick argued in his book National Identities: the constitution of the United Kingdom (1991) that if the English asserted that they were English rather than British, the game was up, that one couldn't hold the UK together if only a minority thought they were British. In other words, he argued, the English submerged their national identity to hold the British state together. A more political and contemporary variant of this argument holds that Englishness is actually socially and politically dangerous. The then British Home Secretary, Jack Straw, observed in a radio programme: 'The English are potentially very aggressive, very violent and of course we have used that propensity to subjugate Ireland, Wales and Scotland and then we used it in Europe and without Empire' (Kumar, 2003: 255). This is surely a highly dubious statement to make on a number of grounds: it implies an almost inherent, genetic propensity, and it is also very dubious history. If one were to substitute 'the Germans' or 'the French' or 'the Americans' then there would have been an outcry of some magnitude. While it may give some nationalists in Ireland, Scotland and Wales some comfort to think of their countries as 'internal colonies' of England, this is something of a discredited notion in terms of evidence [START_REF] Mccrone | Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation[END_REF].

Leaving aside dubious notions of 'innate aggression', what are the key questions that distil around notions of nationality and identity in these islands? The first question one might ask is whether there is a confusion of British and English, and if so, why, and with what effect. We might also ask: when did Englishness arise in popular form, assuming that, following Colley, one identifies the emergence of Britishness around Protestantism and warfare from the 18th-century? Finally, if, over time, fewer people choose to call themselves British, will the British state continue? We might in this review interrogate the three main books with a view to seeing how well or badly they tackle these issues.

Of the three, Richard Weight's Patriots: National Identity in Britain, 1940Britain, -2000, is the most weighty (an excusably bad pun) only in the sense that it runs to well over 800 pages. Throughout, he is aware that Britain does not equal England, but it is perhaps the least satisfactory of the three books. Part of the problem is his tendency to rush in where angels (Angles?) fear to tread. Thus, in his introduction, he asserts that after Scotland's wars of independence in the 14th-century, it was only nominally independent from England; that British national identity was largely a Scottish creation; and repeats the calumny that the kilt was invented by an Englishman. 5 He is not exactly comfortable with social science concepts; witness this extraordinary comment: 'The most fashionable theory in social science is Benedict Anderson's idea of 'imagined communities'. This is a subtle reworking of the Marxist idea that nationalism is an ideology developed by capitalists to distract the working classes in the world from their revolutionary date with destiny' (p. 16). What he has written, however, is a fairly orthodox and largely descriptive history of Britain in the second half of the 20th-century. Throughout, he tries to remind himself that Britain is more than England, and absolves himself by saying that the reader would find it too tedious if he made the distinction all the time. This is odd, given that the whole point of the book is exactly that, to write an account of the interweaving of national identities.

The thesis of Weight's book is spelled out at the outset: 'This is a book about why the people of Britain stopped thinking of themselves as British and began to see themselves as Scots, Welsh and English who happened to belong to a state called Britain . . .' (p. 1). The implications are: that they have indeed stopped thinking of themselves as British; that they have only begun to consider themselves Scottish, Welsh and English; and that the British state is something of an accident -all highly dubious contentions, and not at all supported by academic research. The book runs through the gamut of 50 years of 20th-century history: the Second World War, the peace and the welfare state, the 1960s and cultural change, Mrs Thatcher and her aftermath. It is structured around 11 chronological characterizations, starting in the 1940s and ending in 2000: warriors, citizens, viewers, shoppers, swingers, nationalists, sceptics, strikers, hustlers, tunnellers, and modernizers. All in all, it is a fairly useful example of the genre: descriptive modern history with a focus on the cultural and political. The trouble, however, lies with the genre itself: how can one simply describe in the expectation that this alone will explain such complex processes. To be sure, such histories simply cannot ignore or downplay England, and so the book shapes up, conventionally, as England-plus. The non-English get walk-on parts as and when they are deemed to matter to the core. To be sure, Weight is by no means alone in this. Simon Schama's (2000-02) three-volume account only wheels on the Scots, Irish and Welsh when they impact on England. In other words, there can be no show without the English Punch. Weight is fairly optimistic about the British future, judging that it has a lot of mileage in it yet. If nothing else, 'The four nations will maintain a contemporary bond through culture and trade, both of which are oiled by a common language' (p. 734). Divorce, as such, seems out of the question, and yet the core of his argument is that seamless Anglo-British identity is effectively redundant.

Robert Colls sets himself a more manageable task: to give an account of the English, rather than of their history. It is, he says, 'a history of who they were, written from the perspective of the twenty first century', but above all, 'how the English have thought about themselves' (p. 2). The book belongs in the vein of cultural histories, less concerned with chronology and more with the underlying values and ideas of the English, and how they have thought about themselves. The difficulty with that is that they do not articulate what they think about themselves, and so the author has to interpret the runes for us. This is difficult, because there is not a great deal to go on. The non-English get their familiar walk-on roles in the saga, lumped together in this case into a chapter on 'the Celts'. Colls struggles both to distinguish England from Britain, and to incorporate the non-English into his conception of Britain. This, in large part, is 'England-plus' history. At the same time, one has to read England opaquely, to see it dimly and darkly in the recesses of 'Britain'. The book has two parts. The first deals with English national identity as a political ideology; in other words, how the state (and nation) were constructed from Anglo-Saxon times, and burgeoned as England effectively took over, in his view, Wales, Ireland and Scotland. Of these, Colls argues that while the English relationship with Scotland was key (co-founders of the 1707 Union), that with Ireland was critical (it left the Union in 1921). The bulk of the first part is devoted to examining how the British state developed at home and abroad, the making of political/state identity. In contrast, the second part of the book is concerned with the 'organic' and 'affective' English homeland, the cultural flesh rather than the political shell. This works less well because it is difficult to judge why one should consider some aspects -the English gentleman -more significant than others. The book finds itself in something of a dilemma, which he never quite resolves. In his conclusion, Colls spells it out:

To have talked of an English state would not have done justice to the way political power was shared amongst a British elite. To have talked of a British nation would not have done justice to the actual feelings of the four nationalities who made up that nation. To have talked of four co-equal nationalities would have failed to recognise England's overarching dominance, and too much talk of that would have missed the very real multinational success of Great Britain. So, for over 300 years, the people of these islands have been uncertain. (p. 377) One might retort that it is the English of these islands who are uncertain, for identity talk is common practice among the Scots, Welsh and Irish, who can talk for Scotland, Wales and Ireland happily and usually at inordinate length.

Like the cobbler who thought there was nothing quite like leather, it will come as no surprise that the reviewer finds Kumar's sociological account, The Making of English National Identity, by far the most convincing. This is because he is able to bring to bear a conceptual toolkit, as well as his experience as a non-white Brit, to the issue of being English. He comments that an alternative title might have been: 'the enigma of English national identity, that is, why is English national identity seemingly so strange?' Unlike the other two authors, Kumar wishes to locate the modern origins of Englishness in the late 19th-century. This is at odds with the more conventional view, espoused by both Weight and Colls, as well as others, that Englishness owes its origins in the pre-modern period, as early as the 8thor the 13th-century, when 'the people' began to emerge as a significant force in the land, if only to provide tax revenue for the monarch. For example, Adrian Hastings in his attempt to rehabilitate religion as one of the key dimensions of nationalism observes:

Early forms of nationalism related to states already in existence, their defence, glorification or expansion. England . . . was the quintessential example of this, but Scotland already in the 14th century provides another example: the wars of liberation to rescue the Scottish state from English dominance produced a recognisable nationalism. In this case, a state preceded the nationalism but the nation may rather have followed it. (1997: 27-8) One does not have to perform mental gymnastics to accept that modern forms of nationalism, notably associated with the franchise, were of a different order. The point remains that some popular form of national identification is likely to have predated the Union of Scotland and England, if only because it is hard to see just how and why Englishness would have emerged in the late 19th-century, almost 200 years after the emergence of Britishness.

What Kumar is especially good at is locating England and Britain in the exploits of missionary or imperial nationalism. He observes: 'Like many other imperial nations such as the Russians, the Austrians and the Ottomans, the English could not see themselves as just another nation in a world of nations' (p. x). This is a highly perceptive comment, because all of those nations have had something of a crise d'identité following the end of Empire. Such was the coterminosity of nation, state and empire that when the latter ended, the core had no readily worked out account of who they were, how they had got there, and where they were going next. In short, failing to have a debate about national identity is not some kind of quaint, forgetful eccentricity, but the result of a structural failure. Claims that it is too dangerous even to mention the subject runs the risk of allowing political extremes to capture the terms of the debate.

The nub of Kumar's argument is that England had something of a mission civilatrice, an imperial quest carried by 'a nationalism that finds its principle not so much in equating state and nation as in extending the supposed benefits of a particular nation's rule and civilization to other people' (p. 31). The parallels with France are unmistakable, an irony, given that the capacity of each nation in the last half-century to define itself visà-vis the other. 6 The role of empire is curiously underplayed in both Weight and Colls, for it helps us understand the attenuated nature of being British, and the ease with which those who did not live in these islands but in far-flung parts of the Empire had aspects to being British -in an echo of Rome, civis Britannicus sum. Indeed, the British imperial exercise involved English, Scots and Welsh equally, and their contribution to Empire cannot be disaggregated into its 'national' components. Being an imperial white gave easier access to being British, but we now know that non-white peoples, black or brown, had different and complex relationships to Britishness, depending on how much or how little cultural capital they were able to accumulate. Ultimately, being British meant having a passport, citizenship, and this helps to explain why non-white people in the UK are much more likely to call themselves British than English [START_REF] Modood | Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage[END_REF]. We may as yet not understand this, whether it is because they do not want to do so, or because they are excluded from so doing. For example, in his television documentary White Tribe (2000), the writer Darcus Howe encountered the senior Conservative politician Norman Tebbit who, when Howe spoke of 'we English', corrected him with the words: 'No, Darcus. We are British, but I am English', implying that the former was a civic identity and the latter an ethnic one. If things are changing, then perhaps they do so slowly.

The propensity of non-white Brits to be 'British' rather than 'English' has led some, such as the journalist Yasmin Alibhai-Brown ('Who do we think we are? Imagining the new Britain ', 2001), to express hostility to constitutional change and devolution in Scotland and Wales on the grounds that this might leave Britain in the possession of the English who took an ethnic, and possibly a more reactionary, view of belonging. 7 Kumar would retort that, in practice, English and British are thoroughly (con)fused, or, rather, 'so interfused as to be indistinguishable' (p. 156), although how he would make sense of the undoubted willingness of people in England to describe themselves as English is not clear. There are a number of possibilities: that the terms English and British are so interchangeable that it is merely a matter of chance, and choice, as to which is used; that popular sentiment, especially associated with sport and football, forefront English over British; that it is some sort of reaction to devolution in these islands such that 'the English question' needs to be resolved. This question is a variant of what came to be known as the West Lothian question, namely, that Scottish MPs at Westminster have a say in domestic English matters such as health and education when they themselves have none in such matters in their own constituencies, which are governed by the Scottish parliament. Finally, being 'English' might well be tapping in to a strain of right-wing sentiment which has chauvinistic overtones, both against 'foreigners' and 'Europe', for we know from survey evidence that those who describe themselves as English rather than British have distinctly right-of-centre views on both cultural and social matters [START_REF] Heath | Is the English Lion about to Roar? National Identity after Devolution[END_REF]. Thus, the differential between the selfidentified 'unambiguously English' and 'unambiguously British' with regard to attitudes to immigration and ethnic minorities is significant. For example, 70 percent of the former think immigrants take jobs from people born in Britain, compared with 37 percent of the latter (Curtice and Heath, 2000: 168), suggesting that those who choose to describe themselves as English tend to be right-wing.

Kumar accepts that Britishness, at least in its imperial form, has long been in decline, and that traditional notions of Englishness face challenges from three quarters: from revived Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalism; from immigration and resulting multiculturalism; and from threatened integration into the European Union project. The problem for the English is that they have come belatedly to accept that they are English (as opposed to British), and are, as we speak, still working through the implications of this. Hardly a month goes by without some prominent politician or luminary asking the English question, fumbling towards what the distinction might be between state (British) and national (English) identity. 8 What makes Kumar's book a much more satisfying account of English identity is that it is informed by social scientific ideas. There is a facility with concepts such as nation, ethnicity and identity that suffuse his narrative account of Englishness such that it has an analytical framework quite lacking in the more descriptive histories of Weight and Colls, who struggle along trying to identify the content of being English. Kumar shows with some elegance that all identities depend upon 'othering', knowing who one is not; that the specific content of identity matters far less than where the boundaries between 'us' and 'them' begin and end. Indeed, there might even be a case for writing a book on being English (or anything else for that matter) in terms of variant 'others', as seen both from inside out, and outside in, as it were. What the French think of the English, and how this is refracted through an acceptance or rejection of such images would possibly make for an insightful account. Be that as it may, there is an argument for social scientists making a much more serious input to public discussions of identities than hitherto. It is gratifying that matters of territorial identity are beginning to be subject to a wide range of discussion and debate, from popular histories and scholarly analyses, as well as political tracts. Identities should be treated as claims made in key social contexts, issues of cultural register as and when these matter. In truth, we have hardly scratched the surface in understanding issues of ethnicity and identity in these islands, and much remains to be done.

Notes

1 In writing about England, it seems important to be explicit as to where this reviewer stands. When I go to England from Scotland, I feel I am going to a foreign country. This may seem an odd, even a slightly rude, thing to say: after all, 'foreign' has a somewhat pejorative tone in the English language (interesting in itself). By this I mean that, as a Scot, I find the neighbours perfectly friendly and interesting, and rather reserved. To continue the metaphor, living next door to someone reminds you of what you have in common: shared practices and routines, but not necessarily the intimacies and meanings associated with them. Now and again, you are caught out by assuming there are more shared understandings than are actually there, as if you commit some social faux pas. For example, I recall spending an evening in a Danish pub talking to a prominent English novelist about identity. I mentioned that I could not understand the reticence of English people, unlike the rest of us on the island, to talk about what it meant to be English. The novelist replied testily that it was like asking people about their religion and sex lives, something they were very reluctant to do. The moral of the tale: because you live next door to someone, you can take too much for granted. , 1984), even though all evidence is to the contrary [START_REF] Ferguson | The Identity of the Scottish Nation: An Historic Quest[END_REF]. 6 Compare, for example, the mutual and pejorative stereotypes of 'the Frogs' and 'Les Rosbifs'. 7 The evidence from Scotland seems to suggest that non-white people have a greater propensity to use the descriptor 'Scottish', usually in hybrid form such as 'Scottish Muslim'. Why this should be so is not as yet properly understood. 8 See, for example, the debate in the political magazine Prospect [START_REF] Prospect | Rediscovering Britain[END_REF], which sets its tone by saying that 'the British have traditionally had a rather weak sense of identity'. One is tempted to ask whether the editor understands the distinction between British and English.

DAVID