Sreeram V Ramagopalan

Uy Hoang

Valerie Seagroatt

Adam Handel

George C Ebers

Gavin Giovannoni

Professor Michael J Goldacre
email: michael.goldacre@dphpc.ox.ac.uk

Geography of Hospital Admissions for Multiple Sclerosis in England and Comparison with the Geography of Hospital Admissions for Infectious Mononucleosis: A Descriptive Study

Keywords: multiple sclerosis, infectious mononucleosis, hospital admissions, geographical distribution, England

ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

ABSTRACT

Objective: It is well recognised that variation in the geographical distribution of multiple sclerosis (MS) exists. Early studies in England have shown the disease to have been more common in the North than the South. However, this could be an artefact of inaccurate diagnosis and ascertainment, and recent data on MS prevalence is lacking. In the present study we analysed data to provide a more contemporary map of the distribution of MS in England, and, as infectious mononucleosis (IM) has been shown to be associated with the risk of MS, we compared the geographical distribution of IM with that of MS.

Methods: Analysis of linked statistical abstracts of hospital data for England between 1999 and 2005.

Results: There were 56,681 MS patients. The admission rate for MS was higher in females (22/10 5 ; 95% CI=21.8-22.3) than males (10.4/10 5 ; 95% CI= 10.2-10.5). The highest admission rate for MS was seen for residents of Cumbria and Lancashire (North of England) (20.1/10 5 ; 95% CI= 19. 3-20.8) and the lowest admission rate was for North West London residents (South of England) (12.4/10 5 ; 95% CI=11.8-13.1). The geographical distribution of IM and MS were significantly correlated (weighted regression coefficient (r(w))=0.70, p<0.0001). Admission rates for MS were lowest in the area quintile with the highest level of deprivation; and they were also lowest in the area quintile with the highest percentage of population born outside the UK. A significant association between Northernliness and MS remained after adjustment for deprivation and UK birthplace.

Conclusions:

Our results show the continued existence of a latitude gradient for MS in England and show a correlation with the distribution of IM. The data has implications for health-care provision, because lifetime costs of multiple sclerosis exceed £1 million per case in the UK, as well as for studies of disease causality and prevention.

INTRODUCTION

Multiple sclerosis (MS) is the most common disease of the central nervous system (CNS) to cause permanent disability in young adults of Northern European descent. [START_REF] Noseworthy | Multiple sclerosis[END_REF] On the basis of strong circumstantial evidence, MS is thought to be an organ-specific autoimmune disorder, but much remains to be understood about the initiation of the disease. [START_REF] Noseworthy | Multiple sclerosis[END_REF] MS seems unlikely to result from a single causative event; instead, the disease seems to develop in genetically susceptible populations as a result of environmental exposures. [START_REF] Ebers | Environmental factors and multiple sclerosis[END_REF] The most striking illustration of the importance of the environment in MS is its geographical distribution. [START_REF] Pugliatti | The worldwide prevalence of multiple sclerosis[END_REF] MS prevalence is high in Western Europe and North America, lower in Central and Eastern Europe, Australia and New Zealand and lowest in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. [START_REF] Koch-Henriksen | The changing demographic pattern of multiple sclerosis epidemiology[END_REF] Within regions of temperate climate, MS incidence and prevalence are thought to increase with latitude. [START_REF] Pugliatti | The worldwide prevalence of multiple sclerosis[END_REF] The clearest example of this effect is seen in Australia. The prevalence of MS in Hobart (South Australia) is 75.6 per 100 000 compared with a prevalence of 11 per 100 000 in Northern Queensland. [START_REF] Hammond | The epidemiology of multiple sclerosis in three Australian cities: Perth, Newcastle and Hobart[END_REF] The distribution of MS across England has not been investigated since the mid 1980s. [START_REF] Swingler | The distribution of multiple sclerosis in the United Kingdom[END_REF] Using all available data at that time, a gradient in prevalence was observed between Southern and Northern England. 6 7 However, it is not clear how reliable this map of MS prevalence is as methodological concerns have been raised, including differences in diagnostic criteria, meaning that different studies may not be directly comparable. [START_REF] Compston | McAlpine's multiple sclerosis[END_REF] Given that temporal changes in MS prevalence have occurred, [START_REF] Koch-Henriksen | The changing demographic pattern of multiple sclerosis epidemiology[END_REF] it would be useful to have a current map of MS across England. This may aid in understanding the aetiology of the disease, but equally importantly in facilitating the allocation of health care resources given that lifetime costs of MS exceed £1 million per patient in the UK. [START_REF] Mccrone | Multiple sclerosis in the UK: service use, costs, quality of life and disability[END_REF] As the risk of MS is increased in individuals with a clinical history of infectious mononucleosis (IM) as a result of EBV infection, [START_REF] Thacker | Infectious mononucleosis and risk for multiple sclerosis: a meta-analysis[END_REF][START_REF] Ramagopalan | Association of infectious mononucleosis with multiple sclerosis. A populationbased study[END_REF][START_REF] Goldacre | Multiple sclerosis after infectious mononucleosis: record linkage study[END_REF] we also compared the geography of MS with the distribution of IM.

In this study, we use data from an English national linked Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) database to answer three questions: 1) what is the distribution of admission for MS across England (using the geography of the NHS Strategic Health Authorities)?; 2) is the distribution of admissions for MS mediated by variations in admission thresholds across England?; and 3) is the geography of admission for MS correlated with that for IM in England?

METHODS

We analysed data on hospital admissions for MS using a file of linked hospital admission statistics, built from the English national Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) system by staff of the Oxford University Unit of Health-Care Epidemiology, covering all admissions to NHS hospitals in England in the seven years from April 1 1998 to March 31 2005 (population: 51 million). The English NHS Central Office for Research Ethics approved the study. We identified cases of MS as code G35 in the tenth revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). The English national linked HES database includes information about all people who are admitted to hospital (including day care as well as overnight stays). Using data linkage, we identified each person only once for MS, regardless of how many admissions each person had, and recorded their residence at first known admission for MS.

We show data mainly for the areas of the 28 English Strategic Health Authorities (as they were at the time covered by the data). We also analysed the data at the level of the 352 local authority (LA) areas and the nine Government Office regions. Admission rates were calculated using numbers of admissions for residents of each area as the numerators and the total resident populations of the area as the denominators. To adjust for differences in the age structure of different areas, age-standardisation was undertaken using the indirect method and the age-specific rates in five-year age groups in the English population as the standard. All rates are expressed per 100 000 population with 95% lower and upper confidence limits. Rates were calculated separately for males and females as well as both sexes combined.

We undertook the same calculations for hospital admissions for people with IM, motor neuron disease, Hodgkin's lymphoma and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma using the ICD codes B27, G12.2, C81, C82-85, respectively to identify them. We analysed the relationship between the length of hospital stays using a Pearson Correlation and performed a linear weighted regression to compare the admissions for IM and MS using MATLAB R2009a.

The admission rates by LA were analysed further by grouping them into Government Office Regions as those in Northern regions (the North East, North West, Yorkshire and The Humber regions), Midlands (East Midlands and West Midlands), the East of England region, South East (South East and London regions) and South West. The LAs were ranked according to the Index of Multiple Deprivation and grouped into quintiles of deprivation. The LAs were also ranked according to the percentage of the population 'born outside the UK'. People in England who were born outside the UK are predominantly non-white. We fitted a model to test the effect of quintile of deprivation, and quintile of people born outside the UK, on admission rated by region.

RESULTS

Hospital Admission for MS

Table 1 shows the admission rate for MS for both sexes per 100 000 resident population for each Strategic Health Authority area. There were 56 681 people (39 006 females and 17 562 males) admitted for MS to hospitals in England in the study period. This produced a national admission rate of 16.4 admissions per 100 000, 95% confidence interval (CI) = 16.2-16.5). This rate was higher in females (22 per 100 000; 95% CI=21.8-22.3) than males (10.4 per 100 000; 95% CI= 10.2-10.5).

Geography of Hospital Admission for MS

The highest admission rate for MS was seen from residents of Cumbria and Lancashire (20.1 per 100 000; 95% CI= 19. 3-20.8) and the lowest admission rate was from North West London residents (12.39 per 100 000; 95% CI=11.77-13.05). Geographical distributions were similar for males and females (supplementary table 1), with North West London residents having the lowest admission rate for both males and females, Cumbria and Lancashire residents having the highest admission rate for females and residents of Northumberland, Tyne & Wear having the highest admission rate for males. Figure 1 shows the data from table 1 and supplementary table 1 in map form. The data is shown as quintiles of geographical areas with the one-fifth of areas with the lowest rates shown in the lightest colour and the one-fifth of areas with the highest rates shown in the darkest colour.

Table 1-Admission rate for MS per 100 000 Residents in the Strategic Health Authorities of England

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

Length of Hospital Stay for MS

In order to assess whether there is any influence of the length of hospital admission on the geography of admission rates for MS, we compared the geographical distribution of MS for all people with an admission, all with at least one admission including overnight stay (i.e. excluding all day case care), all with at least one stay of 2 days or more, and all staying 3 days or more. Our reasoning was that, if geographical differences in admission rates for MS result from differences in clinical admission practice, rather than differences in MS prevalence, the geography of short-stay admissions (which may include admissions that are discretionary) might differ from that of longer-stay admissions (which probably reflects clinical illness that would warrant admission anywhere).

Admission rates in each of these different 'length of stay' categories significantly correlated with each other (minimum Pearson correlation=0.81 (when comparing stays of 3 days or more with all admissions, p=2x10 -7 ); maximum Pearson=0.99 (when comparing stays of 1 day or more with stays of 2 days or more, p<1x10 -30 , figure 2).

INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE

Number of admissions per person for MS

In order to further see if our results are related to thresholds for admission we took advantage of linked records to identify the number of admissions per patient in each geographical area. The England average was 1.96 spells per patient for MS (range 1.59-

3.18

). There was no correlation between number of admissions per patient and the standardised person-based admission rate per 100,000 population in the LAs (weighted regression coefficient (r(w))=0.06, p=0.73).

Hospital Admission for IM

Table 2 shows the admission rate for IM for both sexes per 100 000 resident population for each Strategic Health Authority area. There were 14 621 people (6450 females and 8156 males) admitted for IM to hospitals in England in the study period. This produced a national admission rate of 4.2 admissions per 100 000, 95% CI= 4.2-4.3). This rate was higher in males (4.8 per 100 000; 95% CI=4.7-4.9) than females (3.6 per 100 000; 95% CI= 3.6-3.7).

Geography of Hospital Admission for IM

The highest admission rate for IM was seen from residents of South Yorkshire (6.60 per 100 000; 95% CI Data in rank order of admission rates; Obs= observed number of people, Exp=expected number Geographical distributions of hospital admission rates for IM and MS were analysed for any potential correlations (Figure 3). Using data for both sexes combined, IM and MS were significantly correlated (r(w)=0.70, p<0.0001). The correlation was similar when studying just females (r(w)=0.69, p<0.0001) and slightly weaker when studying just males (r(w)=0.63, p=0.0003). This correlation was weaker when looking at the data when divided into the 352 local authorities (r(w) both sexes=0.47, p<0.0001) and stronger (but less significant) when divided into the 9 government office regions (r(w)=0.84, p=0.004) (supplementary tables 3 and 4).

As a control, we also investigated the geographical distributions of hospital admissions for motor neuron disease (MND), Hodgkin's lymphoma (HL) and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (NHL) for correlations with the geographical distributions of MS and IM.

Using data for both sexes combined, the correlation for MS with MND was significant (r(w)=0.41, p=0.03) but not significant with HL or NHL (r(w)=-0.26, p=0.18; r(w)=-0.2, p=0.3 respectively). The correlation for IM with MND was non-significant (r(w)=0.23, p=0.25), significant with HL (r(w)=-0.38, p=0.048) and non-significant with NHL (r(w)=-0.05, p=0.8).

INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE

Table 3-Relative Risk for MS Admission in each area, deprivation quintile and placeof-birth quintile; and relative risk for each factor after adjusting for the other two

Area

DISCUSSION

We present here the most up to date available map of the distribution of MS in England, using data from a single source. This method contrasts with previous work on the distribution of MS in England that used a compilation of data from different published studies and differing methods of case ascertainment. [START_REF] Swingler | The distribution of multiple sclerosis in the United Kingdom[END_REF] In general, our data indicates a gradient in the frequency of the disease between Southern and Northern England. This distribution is not related to lengths of hospital stay or number of admissions per patient, markers for disease severity and threshold for admission. The distribution of MS across England is also significantly correlated with the distribution of IM, especially in females. This correlation is not a general phenomenon as no significant correlation was seen with HL, NHL and a much weaker correlation was observed with MND. Early studies have suggested that MS is a disease primarily affecting those in a higher socio-economic status [START_REF] Russell | Multiple sclerosis: occupation and social group at onset[END_REF] , and therefore geographical findings could be confounded by socio-economic status.

However, taking account of deprivation indices had little effect on our results, highlighting that socio-economic factors do not appear to be a major influence on hospital admissions for MS.

The extent of geographical variation is fairly modest: at about 20% between highest and lowest region, it is considerably less than that found for, for example, coronary heart disease.

It is likely that some genetic differences exist between Northern and Southern English populations but this does not appear to be the main explanation behind regional differences in MS period prevalence. [START_REF] Swingler | The distribution of multiple sclerosis in the United Kingdom[END_REF] The similarities between the epidemiology of MS and IM were noted more than two decades ago [START_REF] Ascherio | Environmental risk factors for multiple sclerosis. Part I: the role of infection[END_REF] and we show for the first time that a correlation exists for the distribution of MS and IM in England. This correlation is stronger for females and indeed there is evidence to suggest that a history of IM may confer differential risk for MS depending upon gender. [START_REF] Ahlgren | A population-based case-control study on viral infections and vaccinations and subsequent multiple sclerosis risk[END_REF] Thus both genes and Epstein-Barr virus (EBV) are implicated in the geography of MS but sunlight exposure and associated vitamin D status are also likely to be a major influence for the association between latitude and MS period prevalence in England. [START_REF] Ebers | Environmental factors and multiple sclerosis[END_REF] Interestingly, HL was not associated with MS admissions, highlighting potential differences of EBV effects in IM and HL, and subsequent influences on MS risk.

MS imposes a significant burden on health-care costs, work-related productive capacity, quality-of-life, and life expectancy of those affected. An accurate understanding of epidemiological characteristics of MS may not only provide insights into possible disease causes and pathogenesis, but also have implications in health-care strategies, public health recommendations, and focus of research efforts. At present there are no effective vaccines or treatments targeting EBV, leaving vitamin D supplementation as the only available intervention that might result in a reduction in the prevalence of this often devastating disease. [START_REF] Ascherio | Vitamin D and multiple sclerosis[END_REF] There are limitations to our data. Many factors can influence MS admission rates.

Although we have attempted to control for this by studying length of stay and number of admissions per patient, clinical practice preferences may still exist in the threshold for admission, definition of relapses and type of treatment. There may also be differences in the availability of resources including numbers of specialist MS staff which can affect inpatient versus outpatient management. Furthermore, our data may imply more severe, rather than more prevalent, MS in the North of England, hence more hospitalisations.

Limitations of record linkage studies using routinely collected administrative data are well known, and include the facts that the data are limited to hospitalised patients and that information about some variables of potential interest, are generally unavailable. We did not have data at the level of individual people on ethnicity or socio-economic status, but did our best to control for this by analysing the aggregate level data for LAs. Accounting for the proportion of people born outside of the UK will exclude individuals with generally the lowest risk of MS, as the incidence of MS in second-generation migrant populations in the UK is on the rise. [START_REF] Dean | Age at immigration to England of Asian and Caribbean immigrants and the risk of developing multiple sclerosis[END_REF] Deprivation scores reflect the socio-economic status of the local community and may not wholly reliably reflect the status of individuals in our study within each community. We only analysed hospitalization for IM and thus we would underestimate milder cases of IM. However, it may also be that more severe cases of IM increase the risk of MS to a greater extent than milder cases.

In conclusion, the distribution of MS across England shows significant though modest variation, at least as measured by hospitalisation rates. The higher rates in the North than South of England persist; they are consistent with earlier findings from studies in different parts of the UK; and they are consistent with the more general finding across the world that MS prevalence increases with increasing distance from the equator in both hemispheres. The distribution in England is not a result of any simple known causative association. Some of the factors that may be implicated are increasingly recognisedexposure to solar radiation and perhaps late infection with EBV -and no doubt there are 20 other unknown factors affecting geographical profiles of hospitalisation. The reasons for the high period prevalence in the North of England need to be uncovered.

Figure 1 -

 1 Figure 1-Geographical Distribution of Hospital Admission for Multiple Sclerosis for a) females, b) males and c) both sexes

Figure 2 -

 2 Figure 2-Graph to show distribution of hospital admission rates by region according to length of hospital stay. Rank number refers to rank number of Strategic Health Authority in Table1.

Figure 3 -

 3 Figure 3 -Scatter plots for admissions per 100 000 for IM and MS in a) both sexes, b) females and c) males

Table 2 -Admission rate for IM per 100000 Residents in the Strategic Health Authorities of England

 2

				indirect
	Strategic Health Authority	Obs.	Exp.	rate per	95% Confidence interval
				100,000
	ALL ENGLAND	14 621	14 621	4.2	4.2	4.3
	South Yorkshire	595	380.7	6.6	6.1	7.2
	South West Peninsula	612	433.3	6.0	5.5	6.5
	Kent and Medway	628	459.6	5.8	5.3	6.2
	Trent	1031	761.5	5.7	5.4	6.1
	Dorset and Somerset	402	321.2	5.3	4.8	5.8
	Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire	768	617.0	5.3	4.9	5.6
	Essex	564	454.5	5.2	4.8	5.7
	North and East Yorkshire and Northern
	Lincolnshire	564	470.6	5.1	4.7	5.5
	County Durham and Tees Valley	404	346.6	4.9	4.5	5.4
	Northumberland, Tyne & Wear	480	418.0	4.9	4.4	5.3
	Hampshire and Isle of Wight	566	527.4	4.5	4.2	4.9
	Surrey and Sussex	712	693.1	4.3	4.0	4.7
	Shropshire and Staffordshire	442	433.7	4.3	3.9	4.7
	Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire	623	628.8	4.2	3.9	4.5
	Cheshire & Merseyside	680	704.3	4.1	3.8	4.4
	Cumbria and Lancashire	530	556.6	4.0	3.7	4.4
	Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire	438	468.0	4.0	3.6	4.3
	Greater Manchester	731	782.8	3.9	3.7	4.2
	Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and
	Rutland	441	477.6	3.9	3.5	4.3
	Coventry, Warwickshire, Herefordshire	408	442.2	3.9	3.5	4.3
	West Yorkshire	535	654.5	3.5	3.2	3.8
	Birmingham and the Black Country	581	715.8	3.4	3.2	3.7
	Thames Valley	477	640.2	3.1	2.9	3.4
	South West London	260	376.9	2.9	2.6	3.3
	North Central London	249	369.8	2.8	2.5	3.2
	South East London	294	452.0	2.7	2.4	3.1
	North East London	310	493.2	2.7	2.4	3.0
	North West London	296	541.0	2.3	2.1	2.6

Data in rank order of admission rates; Obs= observed number of people, Exp=expected number

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank colleagues at the University of Oxford for helpful comments.

FUNDING

This work was funded by the English National Institute for Health Research, the Multiple Sclerosis Society of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust [GRANT NUMBER 075491/Z/04]. SVR is a Goodger Scholar at the University of Oxford.

Geography of Hospital Admissions for MS Adjusting for Deprivation and Ethnicity

When looking at the five broad areas of England, the highest admission rate was in the North at 23% higher than the national average, and the lowest was the South East (Table 3). There was no consistent trend with deprivation: the lowest rates for MS in the five quintiles were in the first (least deprived) quintile and the fifth (most deprived) quintile.

Considering place of birth, as a proxy for ethnicity, the lowest admission rate for MS was in the quintile with the highest percentage of the population born outside the UK. The North of England remained the region with the highest rate after adjustment for deprivation and (presumed) ethnicity (Table 3). After adjustment of each factor for the other two, the four upper quintiles of deprivation had significantly higher levels of risk than the lowest quintile (ie high deprivation was associated with low risk of MS).

Adjustment also confirmed that the quintile with the highest percentage of the population born outside the UK had the lowest risk of MS.

COMPETING INTERESTS

The authors have no competing interests.

COPYRIGHT LICENSE

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Keywords: Secessionist Conflicts: Mobilization of the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen Diasporas Diaspora, Secessionism, Mobilization, Radicalization, Balkans, Caucasus diaspora, secessionism, mobilization, radicalization, Balkans, Caucasus

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Introduction

Scholars on civil wars and secessionism are increasingly interested in the relationship between diaspora mobilization and secessionist conflicts. Domestic level explanations do not sufficiently explain the onset, duration, and termination of civil wars. Starting in the 1990s studies asserted that international actors -such as kinstates, refugees, distant and regional powers, and international organizationsinfluence the course and outcomes of secessionism. Mounting empirical evidence demonstrated that conflict-generated diasporas -such as the Albanian, Armenian, Irish, Tamil, and Palestinian -helped to perpetuate conflicts. The growing pace of globalization created more opportunities for diasporas to establish viable linkages to their homelands via the Internet, global media, and inexpensive transportation.

Understanding diaspora mobilization with regard to secessionist conflicts became a theoretical necessity. This article assesses the impact of conflict-generated diasporas on secessionist conflicts by offering theoretical innovation in three ways. First, while a number of studies analyzed either diaspora politics or secessionism, this study combines both and focuses on diaspora mobilization vis-à-vis local elites. Secondly, case studies on diasporas and secessionist conflicts exist, but lack systematic comparison. This article derives common patterns for diaspora mobilization by comparing three different cases of conflict-generated diasporas -the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen -and their linkages to secessionist conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Finally, this study is the first to explore the timing and sequencing of transformative events during diaspora mobilization.

The overarching question addressed is: how do diasporas exert a radicalizing impact on the secessionist conflicts of their homelands? The study also examines I review the emerging literature on diasporas and conflicts and established accounts on external actors and internal conflicts. Then I explain the value of the transnational social movements literature for the study of diaspora mobilization, lay out the research design and introduce the cases. I argue that despite differences in diaspora communal characteristics and the secessionist conflict types, a common pattern of mobilization develops. Large-scale diasporic support for secessionism emerges only after independence is proclaimed by local elites. From that point onwards diasporas become engaged in a conflict spiral, and transnational coalitions are formed between local secessionist and diaspora groups. Depending on the organizational strength of the local strategic center and the diasporic institutions, these coalitions endure or dissipate. Diasporas exert radicalizing influences on homeland politics at two junctures -when grave violations of human rights occur in the homeland and when local moderate elites start losing credibility that they can achieve the secessionist goal.

Major theoretical accounts

The emerging scholarship on diasporas and conflicts goes back to Collier and Hoeffler's influential statistical study demonstrating that civil wars resist resolution if they are linked to large diasporas (2000). Stateless diasporas are more likely to remain involved with homeland politics as long as the nationalist struggle continues (Sheffer 2003). Diasporas generated by conflicts rather than by voluntary migration are especially likely to maintain a trauma of displacement and a myth of return that durably link them to a homeland territory (Scheffer 2003[START_REF] Lyons | Diasporas and homeland conflict[END_REF]. Diasporas -such as the Jewish and Armenian -may develop interests differing from those of the local elites in order to preserve their own diasporic identity (Shain 2002). Some authors of particular case studies (Albanian, Croatian, Ethiopian, Irish, Tamil) captured practices of diaspora engagement with internal conflicts.

Diasporas send labor remittances and humanitarian aid, recruit fighters, lobby homeland governments and international organizations, disseminate propaganda, stage demonstrations, and tap into resources of criminal networks (Byman 2001, Hockenos 2003).

The deficiencies of this literature, focused specifically on case studies, lead us to draw theoretical insights from more established accounts on external actors and internal conflicts. External actors intervene due to instrumentalist motives that include geopolitical interests, political and economic gains, military concerns, and gaining negotiating leverage (Heraclides 1990, Taras andGanguly 2006) (Heraclides 1990, Carment andJames 2000). Locked into domestic competition, leaders in states external to the conflict use their constituencies' ethnic ties to advance their domestic agendas and induce their states to intervene in the conflict (Saideman 2001). With their identity-based ties, kinstates are often bound in an interactive 'triadic nexus' with nationalizing states and minorities, where signals from one influence the behavior of others (Brubaker 1996, Jenne 2007). Moreover, in separatist and irredentist crises where the institutional constraints in the homeland are low, transnational ethnic ties become important for local actors to exploit (Carment et al. 2006).

Diasporas are identity-based actors like kin-states, but do they intervene in similar ways? Generational differences within diasporas matter, and both powerful individuals and institutions exert major influence. Thus, some scholars turn for theoretical leverage to scholarship on transnational and 'spirals' are used to pressure authoritarian regimes to adopt human rights change [START_REF] Keck | Activists Beyond Borders[END_REF]Sikkink 1998, Risse 1999). Local issues are reframed to appeal to global actors and vice versa (Bob 2005, Tarrow 2005). Coalitions and networks develop across borders (Della Porta et al. 2005). The opening of local and global political opportunity structures affects various types of mobilization [START_REF] Sikkink | Patterns of dynamic multilevel governance[END_REF]. Mechanisms-such as attribution of opportunity and threat, frame alignment and brokerage-concatenate in the transnational realm (McAdam et al. 2001, Tarrow 2005). A combination of injustice and hope becomes an important emotional referent for the launching of social movements (Aminzade and McAdam 2001). Fear and anger associated with war and repression often trigger the use of violence.

Few scholars of diaspora politics emphasize the particularistic identitybased character of diaspora mobilization in contrast to the universalistic solidarities binding other transnational social movements. They apply some building blocks of social movement theory to the identity-based character of diaspora politics (Wayland 2004, Smith andStares 2007). Adamson discusses causal mechanisms operating during diaspora mobilization. The term diaspora is used with Brubaker's (2005) understanding that diaspora is 'a category of practice, project, claim and stance, rather than as a bounded group.' A diaspora is not simply constituted of the number of immigrants of various generations, but only of those who pro-actively make claims about their descent. The term is also limited to include only ethnonational groups residing outside territories adjacent to the homeland, which Anderson (1998) calls 'long-distance nationalists'.

I adopt two more definitions. Secessionism is 'an attempt by an ethnic group claiming homeland to withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a part' [START_REF] Horowitz | Irredentas and secessions[END_REF] Serbia, Azerbaijan and Russia employed repressive practices respectively in Kosovo (1991-1999), Karabakh (1991-1994), and Chechnya (1991-2003).

The secessionist conflicts and diaspora characteristics differ significantly. -----TABLE 1 HERE -----

The independent variable is a 'response to transformative events in the homeland'. Under 'transformative events' social movement theory understands turning points in a social movement that follow a period of organizational work, but precede a 'take-off' of mobilization [START_REF] Hess | Repression, backfire, and the theory of transformative events[END_REF]. Considering social movements theory from the vantage point of identity-based politics, I argue that these transformative events relate to significant threats to diasporic identity -such as grave violations of human rights -or to threats to deeply entrenched diaspora interests -such as threats The study design is based upon a 'structured focused comparison' and the 'process tracing method' (George and Bennett 2004). Overarching questions are asked from the literature across cases, but the analysis is launched in line with a 'withincase' rather than 'across-case' comparison. Such methodology offers an alternative to research designs where the requirements for a 'perfectly controlled comparison' are not met, and is appropriate in designs where sequential logic-such as diaspora mobilization-is the subject of research. Hence, the process-tracing method is used to rule out alternative explanations and validate theoretical propositions at different steps of the mobilization process rather than only at its outset, as a comparative study utilizing Mill's methods would do. This work is based on evidence gathered from newspapers, archives, secondary accounts, and personally conducted semi-structured interviews selected through snowball sampling. mobilization. In an international environment still defined by information deficiencies across borders, diaspora entrepreneurs saw in the declaration of independence a solution that seemed natural, special and relevant to them, a realization of expectation. 5 In all three cases, they quickly claimed support for secessionism. 6

In the words of a Vienna-based Albanian activist, 'the [nationalist Democratic

League of Kosovo] LDK was finally saying what everybody wanted to hear and the Kosovo Albanians in the diaspora flocked to it' (Hockenos 2003).

Despite their initial opposition to secessionism, the two Armenian blocs quickly backed Armenia's and Karabakh's 1991 independence [START_REF] Panossian | The Armenians[END_REF]. Chechens in the former Soviet Union participated in the 1991 elections, thus creating irregularities since they did not permanently reside in Chechnya (Payin and Popov 1995).

One can argue that declaration of independence could have been an external Allegedly, he and Yeltsin ordered that demonstrations in support of Chechen independence be spared a brutal encounter with the authorities [START_REF] Lieven | Chechnya. Tombstone of Russian Power[END_REF]). Hence, identity-based emotional identification with injustice frames, followed by an attribution of opportunity to secessionism made diasporas engage in a conflict spiral. French singer Charles Aznavour became quickly involved in homeland affairs.

In the Chechen case, both the strategic center and diaspora organizations were weak and created loose transnational relationships. From the outset of independence Dudayev's regime did not enjoy the same domestic legitimacy as the other two secessionist movements due to electoral fraud, autocratic pressures, and inability to deliver internal security.

Preoccupied with holding his grip on power, Dudayev invested little effort in the diaspora. For instrumental reasons he still forged links with influential individuals, such as the Russian-based Yaragi Mamadayev, who owned the biggest construction company in Chechnya and is believed to have mobilized political support for Dudayev [START_REF] Lieven | Chechnya. Tombstone of Russian Power[END_REF]. Moreover, during the first two years after independence the Chechen mafia enjoyed a silent blessing from the authorities, and reached its peak of local influence in the first two years after independence (Gall and De Waal 1998). The diaspora was weak as well.

Chechens in Western Europe were few at the time. Chechens from Central Asia and Ukraine returned to Chechnya spontaneously rather than in an organized way [START_REF] Lieven | Chechnya. Tombstone of Russian Power[END_REF]. Primarily through charities, Sufi networks Chechen rebels (Trenin and Malashenko 2004). Family patriarchs told young men of Caucasian origin to fight in honor of the 'ancestral' homeland (Williams and Altindag 2005). Jihadi web-sites featured the death of 'martyrs' and stressed their Chechen origin (ibid). Wounded warriors enjoyed medical treatment in Turkey, most notably the Chechen propaganda Chief Movladi Ugudov (Trenin and Malashenko 2004).

In the Armenia/Karabakh case grave violations of human rights took place in 1992 when the Azeri army still had an upper hand in the conflict (ICG 2004). Paradoxically, the Armenian diaspora sent less than 200 Armenian fighters to Karabakh [START_REF] Panossian | The Armenians[END_REF]. The majority of external fighters came from Armenia, and some from Lebanon. Such behavior can largely be explained by Armenia's military involvement in the war, rendering military support from other sources less relevant. Nevertheless, some diaspora members sponsored the war effort, especially in 1992 when the Azeri army One can rightly argue that grave violations of human rights do not necessarily trigger massive radicalization in diaspora circles. Indeed, the 1988

Azeri pogroms against Armenians in suburbs of Azerbaijan's capital Baku left between 19 and 26 people killed, hundreds injured, and 14,000 refugees (De Waal 2003). The pogroms did not trigger diaspora political action, although they shocked it profoundly [START_REF] Libaridian | Challenge of Statehood[END_REF]).

The answer to this puzzle is that timing and sequencing of transformative events matter for diaspora radicalization. If grave violations of human rights take place prior to diasporas' engagement in a conflict spiral, they are less likely to have a radicalizing effect than if they occur in its aftermath. In the Armenian case, the diaspora did not understand the scope and direction of the nationalist movement in 1988, but was already collectively invested in Karabakh's independence in 1992. Diasporas further influenced the radicalization of local politics when they reacted to another transformative event affecting the outcome of secessionism. In the Kosovo case, this transformative event was the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement which did not include a solution for Kosovo, and so delegitimized LDK's non-violent strategy. In the Armenian/Karabakh case, this event was the 1994 cease-fire that ended the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although Armenia de facto won that war, its victory did not translate into a new international status for Karabakh. In the Chechen case, this transformative event was the end of the first Chechen war in 1996.

While the war ended with Russia's de facto defeat, Chechnya was not granted legal independence. In the aftermath of these events, local elites started losing credibility that they could achieve the secessionist goal.

---FIGURE 4 Bukoshi (2002) argued that he proposed the KLA to join efforts with the exiled government in order to receive funding and international legitimacy. The KLA rejected his proposition and started building its own networks, considering 'Rugova and company as traitors' [START_REF] Thaci | Former KLA Commander-in-Chief[END_REF].

The diaspora shifted its support from the shadow government to the KLA in 1998. Major voluntary contributions started flowing from the US, Canada, Australia, Germany and Switzerland. A single charitable event in New York, Michigan, California and Alaska raised USD 16,000-56,000 [START_REF] Judah | Kosovo. War and Revenge[END_REF]. Diaspora funds were often used to purchase cheap AK-47s from the black market. Procured arms helped guerillas within Kosovo to stage attacks on Serbian police stations. As Serbia deployed more military and paramilitary units, Albanian villagers fled and Serbian troops looted their houses. This tactic served as 'the most effective recruitment drive the KLA could have hoped for' (Sullivan, 2004).

Ethnic outbidding was possible as a mechanism emanating from a strong strategic center extending local political processes into the 34 introduction of Sharia Law [START_REF] Tishkov | [END_REF].

Conclusion

This article sought to deepen the understanding of how diasporas exert a radicalizing impact on secessionist conflicts in their homelands. I argued that despite differences in diaspora communal characteristics and the secessionist conflicts themselves, a common pattern of diaspora mobilization emerges.

Diasporas exert radicalizing influences on homeland politics at two specific junctures -when grave violations of human rights occur in the homeland and when local moderate elites start losing credibility that they can achieve the secessionist goal. How generalizable are these findings? As mentioned earlier, this study limited the scope of inquiry to conflict-generated diasporas linked to secessionist cases in the post-communist world, anchored in autonomous regions seeking self-determination from ethno-national federations. In this sense, these findings make narrow claims related to the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen cases.

Nevertheless, I maintain that these findings have relevance to a broader universe of cases. These numbers represent conservative estimates and incorporate multiple generations of migrants. Thus, they do not directly relate to the much narrower scope of this study's definition considering a 'diaspora' only those members of a community who make a diasporic claim. * Tölölyan, p.107.; ** Kosta, 2004, Sheffer, p.106.; *** Lieven, p.100, [START_REF] Kailani | Chechens in the Middle East[END_REF]Brauer, pp.387-400.

Web-links to Chronologies on the Secessionist Conflicts

  social movements, allowing to unpack the term 'diaspora' and to delineate patterns and mechanisms linking the local and the global: 'Boomerang effects'

'

  Transnational brokerage' builds on McAdam at al (2001) understanding that 'brokerage' is the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another or with other sites. 'Ethnic outbidding' takes place 'when parties or elites attempt to outdo each other, leading to a cycle of polarization that fuels extremism' (Adamson 2009). Research Design and Introduction of Cas Research Design and Introduction of Cas Research Design and Introduction of Cas Research Design and Introduction of Cases es es es

3

  Unlike the globally defined Armenian diaspora institutions, the Albanian ones are more specific to nation-states. Before 1990 their strongest presence was in the US, most notably the Pan-Albanian organization, Vatra(Hockenos 2003).The Chechen diaspora is the most recent and least institutionalized. Hostilities between Ottomans and Russians in the 19th century prompted Chechens to relocate to adjacent regions and territories of present-day Turkey, Jordan, Syria and Iraq(Kailani 2002, Shishani and Moore 2005). Large-scale emigration did not take place until Josef Stalin inaugurated forced Soviet Union in 1944, which left a large Chechen community in present-day Kazakhstan and a collective trauma associated with exile. During communism Chechens also moved to Russia. 4 Due to the wars of the 1990s, Chechens moved to the US and Western Europe, establishing some presence in Denmark and Germany. The Chechen diaspora in Moscow remained the most influential. Diasporic institutions were weak if at all formally organized. If the secessionist conflicts and diasporic characteristics are different, but patterns of diaspora mobilization are similar, then it is theoretically interesting to unpack the processes leading to this common mobilization. I do not aim to explain the radicalization of domestic politics by weighing the causal impact of diasporas' influences against other potential domestic or external factors, but to understand the process of diaspora mobilization and how it exerts radicalization influences on local politics. Hence, the dependent variable is 'diasporic radicalization impact'. I define it in line with McAdam et al.'s (2001) understanding of radicalization as the capacity to aid local actors to 'adopt more extreme political agendas and transgressive forms of Albanian diaspora exerted a radicalizing impact on the Kosovo conflict by aiding the violence-oriented Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1998-1999. The Armenian diaspora aided radical elements that ousted the more democratically oriented Armenian President Ter Petrossian from power in 1998. External Islamic elements aided the growth of radical Islamism in Chechnya in 1996-1999.

Process 1 :

 1 Diasporas Become Part of a Conflict Spiral I assert that despite their different make-up, all three diasporas reacted to secessionism, but did not cause it. Some individual diaspora members forged connections with local secessionists prior to the 1991 declarations of independence, but large-scale diaspora mobilization took place only in their aftermath. Weak linkages between the East and the West during the Cold War, and immigrant circles' lack of capacity to engage with secessionism prevented diasporas from pro-active involvement. Declaration of independence served as a focal point for mobilization and triggered two mechanisms: identity-based response to local frames of injustice and hope, and attribution of opportunity to secessionism.

  social, but little political interaction with their ethnic brethren prior to the end of communism. The US and UK-based Armenian diaspora offered humanitarian aid to victims of the 1988 earthquake in Armenia. Kosovo Albanian guest workers traveled freely between Yugoslavia and Western Europe. A product of the diaspora, future Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev spent most of his life in Estonia and Kazakhstan, and returned to Chechnya shortly before the declaration of independence.Nevertheless, linkages remained weak because the existing diaspora organizations were focused on issues other than secessionism. In the Armenian case, internal elite competition between Dashnaks and their opponents led each bloc to have its own Apostolic Churches, cultural and charity institutions[START_REF] Panossian | The Armenians[END_REF]. Their only point of unity -to resolve the Armenian national question within the confines of Soviet politics -was a strong common opposition to secessionism. Operating out of a traumatic diasporic identity, they claimed that secessionism could trigger hostilities with Russia, an age-old protector of Armenia, causing Turkey to intervene and initiate another Armenian genocide. Though linked with the homeland on the civil society level when supporting victims of the 1988 earthquake victims, the diaspora organizations were caught 'completely off-guard' by the 1988 explosion of the political movement in Karabakh[START_REF] Libaridian | Challenge of Statehood[END_REF].Atomization of diaspora circles in the Albanian case and loss of identity in the Chechen further discouraged diaspora members from a pro-active approach. Although Albanian hard-liners founded the Movement for Kosovo in armed revolt, many of its members died or were imprisoned[START_REF] Judah | Kosovo. War and Revenge[END_REF]. Unlike the Albanians or the Armenians, the Chechens had lost the salience of their identity. In the Soviet Union they underwent strong Russification with rapid assimilation of values, language and lifestyles, and pressures to integrate into the Soviet economy[START_REF] Payin | Chechnya from past to present[END_REF]. In Kazakhstan, the Chechens spoke their language primarily at home(Brauer 2002). In Turkey, they assimilated under the nationalist pressures of President Kemal Attatürk in the late 1920s. Their identity was surprisingly preserved in Jordan where nationalism was weak. But the Cold War divided Jordan from the Soviet Union and linkages between their Chechen populations were almost non-existent.One can argue that these findings may not represent the universe of cases, since the Cold War divide applied to other diasporas linked to the post-communist world, but their mobilization was more advanced. Ukrainians lobbied the US Congress and institutions to endorse Ukrainian independence despite fierce US opposition. Croatian diaspora funds sponsored the nationalist opposition in the 1990 republican elections (Skrbic 2007). Nevertheless, even in these cases diasporic support reacted to processes in the homeland. The diaspora did not mobilize for secessionism, local strategists reached out to the diaspora first. Locally proclaimed independence in 1991 became a focal point for diaspora Page 16 of 48 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers ethnic@surrey.ac.

  event without inducing diasporas to support secessionism. Yet, it became a transformative event because it triggered two mechanisms enabling the diasporas to enter a conflict spiral. First was the identity-based emotional response to messages of 'injustice', framed by local secessionists as measures to redress the political future of nations captivated by communist regimes. These messages were not necessarily targeted at long-distance diasporas, but were part of the overall mobilization strategies. Local elites promoted the right to national self-determination as a political alternative to communism. These messages resonated well with the conflict-generated diasporic identity locked into experiences of injustice. Armenians were anchored in the 1915 genocide, Chechens in their 1944 deportation by Stalin, and Kosovo Albanians in their exile from communism. However, as Gamson points out, 'injustice frames' cannot motivate for collective action alone unless they trigger powerful emotions(1992). In these cases, the emotional referent was hope for change that peaked across the former East-West divide in 1989-1991. As Aminzade andMcAdam argue, when reaction to injustice comes together with hope, social movements are likely to take place(2001).In these cases, an identity-based emotional identification triggered a second, instrumentally-based mechanism, attribution of opportunity to secessionism. AsMcAdam et al. (2001) claim, no opportunity would invite mobilization unless it is visible and perceived as such by potential challengers. Secessionism was seen in diaspora circles as the viable option to redress past injustices. In contrast to other East European countries like Slovakia, Bulgaria or Romania, where minority autonomy or integration were considered political alternatives, these options were ignored in these three cases. Even the two Armenian blocs, initially opposed to secessionism, supported it after 1991. Diaspora Albanians, who earlier associated with the Movement for Kosovo, saw an opportunity to pursue a long-cherished independence goal. Ruslan Khasbulatov, a power-broker of Chechen descent responsible for Russian President Boris Yeltsin's Chechen policy, saw in the new Chechen President Dudajev an ally against pro-Gorbachev elements in the central government.

(

  demonstrated that coalitions across borders can be short-lived or durable, depending on the actors' intensity of involvement and the common identity developed through collective action. Transnational coalitions were formed in all three cases of this study, but had different durations. They lasted from 1991-1997 in the Kosovo case, from 1991-1992 in the Armenia/Karabakh case, and from 1991-1996 in the Chechen case. Coalitions operating in the context of secessionism differ significantly from those built around universalist claims, because a common identity between diasporas and secessionist elites precedes the collective action, rather than is developed by it. Moreover, the mechanism of brokerage(McAdam et al 2001, Adamson 2009) was instrumental in making local secessionists secure tangible support beyond rhetoric. Depending on the strength of the strategic center in the homeland vis-à-vis major diaspora organizations, these transnational coalitions became more or less viable.The mediating unit in the brokerage mechanism is the strategic center linking networks in the homeland to the diaspora. I develop the term 'strategic designate not only secessionist elites, but power brokers who pursue secessionist or irredentist strategies out of different territories. In the Kosovo case, the strategic center was the shadow government, but it operated out of two countries. President Ibrahim Rugova was based in Kosovo, and Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi was in Germany. Focusing their efforts on receiving financial support for the shadow institutions and their nonviolent strategy, Bukoshi and other activists paid numerous visits to cultural societies, guest worker clubs, and provincial beer halls, where they formed LDK branches(Hockenos 2003). As a result, in 1992-1995 new LDK offices sprang up in the US, Canada, Australia, Turkey and European countries. In the Armenian case, the strategic center was based in Armenia, but maintained close links with Karabakh. Although Armenia refused to recognize Karabakh's independence, it established a better relationship with its leaders in 1992, intervened militarily on its behalf in the war with Azerbaijan, and reached out to the diaspora(De Waal 1996). The Armenian National Movement (ANM) government of President Ter Petrossian made a number of high profile appointments of Armenian-Americans, such as Foreign Minister Raffi[START_REF] Panossian | The Armenians[END_REF]. It also formed the Armenian Fund to channel diaspora contributions, including for infrastructural projects in Karabakh. The strategic center was based in the secessionist region itself only in the Chechen case.Dudayev forged relations primarily with Chechens in Russia.-----FUGIRE 2 HERE -----Instrumental reasoning bound these transnational coalitions. In the Kosovo case, the strategic center put little effort into converting already existing diaspora institutions for its cause, but built its own branches abroad. It remained strong vis-à-vis relatively weak diaspora institutions and became the center of a coalition aligned with its goals. This approach confirms Fair's observations that diaspora institutions formed specifically to support internal conflict become more effective than those formed around a broader scope of issues(Fair 2005). Old Albanian organizations like the US-based Vatra shifted attitude in support of Kosovo over time, but the banner of secessionism was new Albanian-American Civic League (AACL), linked to the LDK. The interest of its leader, former Congressman Joe DioGuardi, was initially to maintain his own political career with a meaningful cause abroad(Hockenos 2003).In the Armenian case, a weak transnational coalition emerged, since the strategic center was relatively weak vis-à-vis diasporic institutions. The ANM government wanted to take Armenia out of its post-Soviet isolation, and sought international contacts including with the diaspora. Government and diaspora interests started diverging early on in their collaboration. The first issue emerged with Armenia's refusal to officially recognize Karabakh in order to avoid being internationally implicated in irredentism. But the diaspora ARF considered Karabakh the place holding the true values of 'Armenianness', unlike Armenia proper, and accused the ANM of 'abandoning Karabakh'[START_REF] Panossian | The Armenians[END_REF]. Although the diaspora initially took a back seat in influencing policy, it established its own local parties in both Armenia and Karabakh. Dashnak-based organizations such as the Armenian General Benevolence Union, the Armenian Assembly of America, and the Armenian-

  figures from Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia(Hockenos 2003). It exerted

  territory(Anonymous 2007). Civilian efforts were more visible, expanding to include humanitarian aid, increased lobbying and major individual contributions(ICG 2004).

  HERE -----These transformative events started eroding the already established transnational coalitions. Alternative identity entrepreneurs reached out for diaspora support. Although all diasporas eventually exerted radicalization influences on homeland politics, the mechanisms through which they arrived there were different. In the Kosovo case ethnic outbidding took place (Adamson 2009), centered on a clash of strategies. After Dayton, LDK's leadership weakened domestically. A rift opened between President Rugova and Prime Minister Bukoshi, leading to internal competition for influence within diaspora circles and reduced contributions for the parallel structures(ICG 1998). KLA operatives used this rift to infuse their a change of strategy from non-violence to guerilla warfare.

  In the two other cases the strategic center was not strong enough to have a powerful transnational effect. The transnational coalitions dissipated through different mechanisms. In the Armenian/Karabakh case dissipation stemmed from a clash of interests between a weak strategic center and a powerful diaspora. The first move of diaspora withdrawal was in 1992, when the diaspora-appointed Foreign Minister Hovannisian resigned in opposition to governmental policies concerning Turkey. Locked into its traumatic identity, the Armenian diaspora insisted that Turkey's recognition of the 1915 genocide precede any rapprochement with Armenia. Further diaspora resentment followed ARF's ban as a political party in 1995 on the grounds that it was foreign-based and funded. This move boosted ARF's domestic and international reputation, following a well known effect: weak repression used against well-mobilized groups often boosts the reputation of the repressed. As a result, the ARF mobilized its wide international networks in a sustained anti-government campaign[START_REF] Panossian | The Armenians[END_REF]. Although major domestic factors such as internal party opposition, economic scarcities, and a militarized economy led to the successful 1998 palace coup against entrepreneurs did contribute to the radicalization of local politics. With their support, former fighters in the Karabakh war -most notably former Armenian President Robert Kocharian -entered office.In the Chechen case the already weak coalition dissipated through a clash of values between a secular Chechen diaspora and growing Islamism within the country. Shortly after the first war, Dudayev was assassinated and an Islamist opposition under Shamil Basayev picked up the banner of secessionism. Using a religious rather than ethno-national appeal, the strategic center attracted a growing body of Wahhabi fighters from Saudi Arabia, other Middle Eastern countries and Pakistan[START_REF] Murphy | Wolves of Islam[END_REF]. A shift of support from a nationality-based to a religious diaspora occurred for two reasons. Unlike Albanians or Armenians, Chechens lived primarily in Russia, and were vulnerable to repression. Targeted police interventions demolished offices of a Chechen cultural center, and backed other criminal groups, hence diminishing both civic and mafia influences[START_REF] Lieven | Chechnya. Tombstone of Russian Power[END_REF], RFE/RL 2002).Moreover, the secular values of a Chechen diaspora were challenged by radical Islamic ideas emanating from within Chechnya, most notably the

  Diasporas become a radicalization force only after engaging in a conflict spiral and influencing it by participating in four mobilization processes. First, they enter the conflict spiral after local secessionists proclaim independence. Although individual diaspora members may be connected to secessionists prior to the declaration of independence, diasporas endorse secessionism en masse only in its aftermath.Independence becomes a focal point for mobilization because it triggers mechanisms connecting traumatic parts of the diasporic identity to messages of injustice developed by the local elites. Secondly, local secessionists broker transnational coalitions with major diaspora organizations and influential individuals. These coalitions endure to varying degrees depending on the strength of the secessionist strategic center vis-à-vis the diaspora institutions. A third process is triggered by grave violations of human rights, which become a transformative event for diaspora mobilization. Exposed to large-scale violence through the international media, diasporas attribute threat to their traumatic identities. Diaspora entrepreneurs expand contention to a larger circle of participants and to transgressive practices. Finally, established transnational coalitions start to dissipate when local secessionists begin losing credibility that they can achieve the secessionist goal. Different mechanisms drive this process: ethnic outbidding and clash over strategy (Kosovo), clash over interests (Karabakh), and clash over values (Chechnya). As a result, diasporas switch their allegiance to more radical competitors.

  Figure 1

  . Affective motivations relate to

	self-esteem established through national, religious, or racial identification,
	historic or recently inflicted injustice, and humanitarian considerations
	F o r
	P
	e
	e r
	R
	e
	v i e
	w
	O n l
	y
	5

  While grave human rights violations radicalize diaspora politics, if they take place before a diaspora is mobilized in a conflict spiral, they are less likely to have a strong radicalizing impact. By being part of the conflict spiral, diaspora organizations and individuals become emotionally and financially invested in the desired political outcome, as in the Armenian case. A slightly modified variant is manifested in the case of the Sikh diaspora with regard to Khalistan. As Fair writes, diaspora support for the conflict peaked in response to the Indian army invasion of a major Sikh temple in 1984. But because the diaspora was not well mobilized to support the insurgents, the momentum was quickly lost(2007). Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, According to Tilly and Tarrow, claim-making is the 'claim bearing on someone else's interests, leading to coordinated efforts and programs, in which governments are involved, initiators of claims or third parties' (2007).7 'Contained contention' entails 'well established means of claim making' in episodic, public, and collective interaction with other claim makers. Goals are achieved through peaceful means. Politics becomes 'transgressive' when collective claims expand to include more extreme agendas, verbal and physical violence(McAdam et al, 2001).

	F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y than the Armenian, but still relatively weak with regard to its diaspora. The existence of two major poles could predict strong clashes of interests, as Shain observed in 2002. However, in many other cases, including Kosovo and Chechnya, the strategic centers were stronger than the diaspora institutions. For example, during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian center was strong and the diaspora institutions were weaker. Thus, local political processes were transplanted into diaspora politics. Grave violations of human rights and loss of credibility of local actors could be good predictors that diasporas will expand their transgressive contentious repertoire and that transnational coalitions may dissipate when facing more radical competitors. For example, the 2008 Israeli bombing of Gaza created a large-scale mobilization of the Palestinian diaspora. The moderate Palestinian Authority lost large-scale support in diaspora circles, while its radical Islamic competitor, Hamas, gained new support. The last two points relate to my policy recommendations. When grave violations of human rights occur in violent conflicts, and when local actors start losing credibility, international policy-makers largely focus on how to provide humanitarian aid to refugees, broker cease-fires, and support moderates. They pay little attention to the radicalization of diaspora politics in their own liberal states that occurs y BUKOSHI, BUJAR 2002 Former Prime Minister, Kosovo Shadow Government, y y y y y y simultaneously to peace-building initiatives. Creating policies to address the specific F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l ADAMSON, FIONA 2005 'Globalization, transnational political mobilization, and networks of violence', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol.18, no.1, pp.31-49. -------2009 'Mechanisms of diaspora mobilization, Paper presented at Simon Fraser University, October. AMINZADE, RON and DOUG MCADAM 2001 'Emotions and contentious politics', in Ron Aminzade et al. (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.14-50. ANDERSON, BENEDICT 1998 Spectre of Comparisons, London: Verso. ANONYMOUS 2007 Telephone interview with the author, 17 February. BOB, CLIFFORD 2005 Marketing of Rebellion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. BRAUER, BIRGIT 2002 'Chechens and the survival of their cultural identity in exile', Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 4 no.3, pp.387-400. BRUBAKER, ROGERS 1996 Nationalism Reframed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -------2005 'The "diaspora" diaspora', Ethnic and Racial Studies vol.28, no.1, pp.1-19. F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l F Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts Table 1 Major Diaspora Characteristics Diaspora Age Spread Size* Institutionalization High level: 6 F Classic: Prior to o r entrenched divisions between two major Armenian the modern period, large-Global ca 4 million * o r blocks. scale after 1915 P P e e r R e v i e l n y l O n O w e e r Albanian Modern: Early 20th century, mostly after 1989 Predominantly More than 1 Middle level: Primarily Western hemisphere million** as of the mid-1980s R e v i e w Chechen Predominantly Incipient: during communism Middle East and after 1989 Russia and former Soviet republics, Low level: little Ca institutionalization 420,000*** apart from Russia
	timing of clashing external influences on the conflict spiral could aid the overall
	Interview with the author, 7 October, Prishtina, Kosovo.
	peace-building effort.
	BUNCE, VALERIE 1999 Subversive Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University
	Furthermore, the strength of a strategic center and the strength of the diaspora
	Press.
	institutions matter in relationship to each other. A strong Armenian ARF and a weak Bibliography
	Armenian state resemble a strong Israeli lobby, AIPAC, and an Israeli state, stronger
	36 37 43

SHAIN, YOSSI 2002 'The role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation and resolution ', SAIS Review, vol.2, no.2, pp.115-144. SHEFFER, GABRIEL 2003