Irena Baclija

Marjan Brezovsek

Miro Hacek

Positive discrimination of the Roma minority The case of Roma local councillors in Slovenia

Keywords: local council, local representatives, local self-government, policy-making

In its Constitutional Charter, Europe, as a multicultural society, advocates and guarantees the protection of minorities and emphasizes the establishment of the conditions for preserving cultural diversity. The protection of minorities is especially important, given the large number of different nationalities that have often not only settled within the boundaries of their motherlands but also coexist on common European territory. One of the most problematic concerns here is the displaced Roma community. The rights of the Roma minority are regulated by each individual country within its legislative borders but always in compliance with the related EU guidelines. The purpose of the article is to provide an in-depth evaluation of the current state of the Roma's participation at the local level in Europe, and specifically in Slovenia. The authors thereby seek to identify how the Roma question is being resolved, based on an empirical analysis of opinions of decision-makers at the local level.

once every few years to select representatives who will then take decisions on the voters' behalf. The term participation means being involved in decision-making and other activities in the area of social life. In most cases, the term relates to the concept of political participation, which [START_REF] Nie | Political participation[END_REF] 1) defined as 'those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or actions they take'. We can divide forms of public participation into two broad categories: formal and informal. 'Public participation may be formal, meaning its form has been prescribed by a law, or informal, meaning the public decides independently the form of participation it will take' (Bowman and Thiebach, 1994: 65).

Most often, public participation takes the form of participation in elections. There are also other forms such as participation in referendums, political demonstrations and election campaigns, political party or pressure group memberships and civil disobedience. In addition to these forms of political participation, other forms exist that are less politically charged, such as participation in public exhibitions and public debates. In today's changing world and helped by the rapid development of information technology, new informal forms of public participation have emerged, such as:

• organized groups of citizens (environmentalists, denationalization claimants etc.) forming networks aimed at influencing the development of policies;

• groups of citizens drafting laws or commenting on draft laws;

• grassroots lobbying; and

• people using new technologies (the Internet) to make suggestions or participate in debates.

New forms of informal participation usually emerge when the existing channels of influence become insufficient. The form they take and whether they result in new mechanisms for influencing decision makers depends on the ingenuity and motivation of the interested individuals and groups. Stec (1994: 133-317) explained the forms of informal public participation using brief case studies and emphasized that, in the short term, forms of informal public participation produce more tangible and rapid results. This is particularly important when rapid action is required to prevent irreversible damage. However, for long-term and final solutions to problems, the forms of formal and informal participation must be complementary to, and aligned with, each other. Some distinguish between conventional and unconventional political participation (see Brezovsek, 1995: 200;Makarovic, 2002: 70).

Unconventional participation arises when groups that are in a worse position cannot satisfy their conflicting aspirations through the election process, and thus recourse to more forceful actions such as protests, demonstrations, riots, murders or armed revolutions/ (Brezovsek, 1995: 200).

Unconventional participation differs from conventional participation, in particular, in the use of force and coercion.

Therefore, groups in an underprivileged situation, or discriminated against in some other way, need the extra protection of their rights to be able to function in society. Nationally mixed societies or societies with one (and often several) national minorities must provide additional official forms of political participation for minorities. Allowing for the informal political participation of minorities is by itself not enough and can result in their long-term exclusion from decision-making processes. Especially vulnerable are those minorities that do not have a motherland to act as their patron and, through mediation and interventions, provide a favourable atmosphere for preserving and developing the national culture that links a minority to its motherland. The Roma minority is such a minority. Our starting point is the assumption that, to ensure its rights, it is mandatory to provide the Roma minority with an appropriate form of political participation to enable its adequate representation in local and state decision-making bodies and guarantee the implementation of appropriate policies that, instead of being just theoretically conceived projects without any tangible results, would bring real benefits to the Roma minority.

In the past 13 years, the democratic processes underway in central and eastern Europe have dispelled two illusions -or false assumptions -about the representation and participation of the Roma in public life. The first is that Romani concerns can be effectively addressed and their rights promoted within the ordinary political process by individuals (who are not necessarily Roma) in publicly elected bodies. The second is that a token number of Roma in the policy-making bodies can make a difference in policy formation and implementation for the Roma. While it cannot be claimed that the Roma minority is not represented in state or locally elected bodies, 1 it will be assumed that the inclusion of the Roma minority in the existing forms of political participation is insufficient and ineffective, despite the introduction of some forms of so-called 'positive discrimination'. However, one should also wonder whether such acts of positive discrimination, such as quotas and special committees, are a valid temporary solution for strengthening Romani political participation. Or rather, as was concluded at a roundtable of the Project on Ethnic Relations in 1998 in Budapest, that the Roma must increase their political representation through existing mechanisms to the point where they are participating on the same basis as other political groups.

THE ROMA MINORIT Y IN EUROPEAN SOCIET Y

In Europe, the Roma are a minority that extends beyond the boundaries and responsibilities of any single country. Especially since EU enlargement, it has become obvious that the Roma are neither a small population nor do they face the usual problems experienced by minorities. 2 Although the actual size of the Roma population in Europe is unknown, it is estimated that may have as many as 10 million members. This is based on estimates made by 11 European countries according to which the number of Roma totals between 2.7 and 5.6 million in those countries. The Roma population in Europe has increased considerably since the accession of 10 new member countries (in May, 2004) when the European Roma minority was estimated to have grown by an additional 1.5 million, thereby representing the biggest ethnic minority in Europe (European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2004).

The situation in Europe is also reflected in Slovenia. Between 7,000 and 10,000 members of the Roma ethnic community are estimated to live in Slovenia with the actual number still not established, mainly because of difficulties in carrying out the census and providing access to all the Roma living in Slovenia and the significant problem of the so-called 'erased'those individuals who were not granted citizenship after Slovenia's independence in 1991. There are approximately 19,000 'erased' people in Slovenia, and many of them could be of Roma origin. The most frequent contact with the Roma is maintained by the Centres for Social Work, which in 2003 recorded 6,264 Roma in Slovenia, while in the 2002 census, only 3,246 people declared themselves to be members of the Roma minority (see Table 1).

The relatively small share of Roma populations in Slovenia (only 0.5% of the total population) in comparison with other central and eastern European countries (in Hungary estimated at 4.5% of the total population, 4.8% of the total Slovak population) has probably led to the fact that most if not all international comparative studies on Roma populations in Central and Eastern Europe have excluded Slovenia from their studies and statistics. 3 This has generally resulted in unpublicized Romani issues in Slovenia, along with a lack of comparative studies in this field.

Some issues encountered by Roma and non-Roma are common to all countries where a Roma minority lives. The basic problem, seen mostly from the top-down approach, is that information about the number of Roma in every country and even every community is not accurate enough.

A more accurate estimate of the number of the Roma population is needed to further regulate socioeconomic and legislative fields, to ensure a level of protection of the Roma minority that is comparable to that provided to other minorities. For the Roma minority this is especially important because, for historical reasons, there are extreme differences between individual Roma communities in terms of their traditions, specific way of living and the level of their socialization and integration with the environment. This makes implementing common policies at the European and national levels very difficult, supporting the tendency to regulate the Roma question at the local level. However, certain characteristics occurring to larger or smaller degrees can be noted in all local Roma communities. Namely, the Roma are a poorly educated population with low employment levels, poor housing conditions and an underdeveloped adjacent infrastructure. Their difficulties can be divided into the following main problem areas: upbringing and education problems; employment; housing and infrastructure; and the problems of participating in the formulation of public policies of local and national significance. It is the solution to the problems of participation in national and local policy-making processes that needs to be included in further regulation of the Roma question. Perhaps no principle is more essential to the success and legitimacy of initiatives to alleviate the concerns of Romani communities than that Roma themselves should be centrally involved in developing, implementing and evaluating policies and programmes. The basic democratic principle that individuals should have a say in how they are governed requires nothing less, and pragmatic considerations counsel the same approach. The importance of minority participation in public affairs is specifically provided in paragraph 35 of the Copenhagen Document, which requires participating states to 'respect the right of persons belonging to national minorities to effective participation in public affairs, including participation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of such minorities' (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, High Commissioner on National Minorities, 2000).

In addition, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) directives dictate that its members strenuously and conscientiously ensure that the rights of the Roma are exercised. In its reports, the OSCE is especially aware of the importance of including the Roma in the policymaking process at the local level. The roles of local government and civil organizations are important in this respect; some of the most impressive programmes launched in recent years have been undertaken at local levels, frequently on the initiative of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). But local governments have also blocked promising initiatives; some have even sought to institutionalize anti-Roma discrimination through exclusionary policies. It falls on national authorities to ensure that the Roma enjoy the fundamental right to equality both in law and in fact, irrespective of the division of jurisdiction within the state. While the principle of equality requires protection against discrimination, it also entails proactive policies and special measures to ensure equality of opportunity. This is especially relevant for the Roma, who have been excluded from opportunities and otherwise disadvantaged for so long -indeed, for generations. Considering these problems, we may draw the conclusion that political challenges in the field of so-called 'Roma problems' include acknowledgement of the Roma minority, an adequate census of the Roma population, the appropriate inclusion of the Roma in policy decisionmaking, the accessibility of financial resources, and the cooperation of local communities.

A great diversity of issues that Roma communities encounter makes it hard to address them all with single policy. Our research does not present an alternative solution to these problems. Instead, it provides an in-depth analysis of a mechanism that could represent the first step towards building cooperation between the Roma and decision makers at the local level -i.e. the introduction of a Roma councillor in municipal councils in Slovenia. In the framework of the European directives and recommendations, Slovenia has responded to the problems of the absence of, or inappropriate, inclusion of the Roma in political decision making. Although these changes are overdue (noting that Article 64 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (1991) foresees a special law that will address Roma issues effectively) and not implemented at the national but the local level, they are quite bold in comparison with other central and eastern European countries. Changes to the legislation have granted the Roma -as a specific group -the possibility that in those municipalities with a larger number of Roma residents they have compulsory representation through their own representatives in the municipal council. Therefore, in each of these municipal councils there is a minimum of one councillor of Romani origin (hereafter: Roma councillor). This form of positive discrimination was considered the most appropriate by decision makers in Slovenia.

In the light of this and considering that no research has been carried out on this subject in Slovenia or elsewhere in Europe, our research posed the following research question: How has the introduction of Roma councillors improved the Roma minority's political participation in Slovenia?

Legislation regulating the Roma's status

International legislation Especially important for the position of the Roma in Europe are international legal documents that contribute to improving their position and preserving their identity. Therefore, the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Security and Co-operation and the Central European Initiatives have adopted some anti-discrimination directives and recommendations. The umbrella European document dealing with discrimination and racism (including discrimination against the Roma minority) is Article 13 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) and the ensuing directives that are binding on all members. Particularly important for the Roma minority is Directive 2000/43/EC: 'implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin' (the 'Race Directive'). Although many member countries had codified anti-racist and anti-discrimination mechanisms and sanctions before the so-called Race Directive was adopted, this did not apply to all countries. Among the important documents regulating the Roma's status are the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe; the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages and the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, along with Council of Europe references to, and resolutions on, the position of the Roma in Europe. The inclusion of minorities (including the Roma) in decision-making processes in the European space is extremely important for creating an international environment that will represent the interests of all residents of Europe.

Slovenian national legislation Regulation of the legal position of the

Roma community in Slovenia began in 1989, when constitutional amendments contributed to a provision being adopted whereby the Roma's legal status would be regulated by law. This laid the legal foundations for regulatory and protective measures and, at the same time, it meant that because of its specificity, regulation of the Roma community did not have equality with the regulation and protection of the country's two constitutionally acknowledged minorities, i.e. the Italian and Hungarian minorities (National Council of the Republic of Slovenia, 1995). The Slovenian Constitution thus distinguishes between the two largest ethnic minorities, Italian and Hungarian, and the 'autochthonous' Roma minority, granting the latter fewer special minority rights (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 1991). 'Their rights are not nearly as protected as the rights of the Italian and Hungarian ethnic groups' [START_REF] Peric´ | Insufficient: Governmental programmes for Roma in Slovenia[END_REF]. A crude but telling comparison is in the length of Articles 64 and 65 of the Slovenian Constitution: Article 65, addressing the status and rights of the Roma, is one of the shortest in the Constitution, simply stating the following: 'The status and the rights of Roma communities living in Slovenia shall be such as determined by statute.' By comparison, Article 64 of the Slovenian Constitution recognizes a whole range of rights pertaining to the Hungarian and Italian ethnic minorities, regardless of their numbers, including but not limited to the official use of language and education in mother tongue, and direct representation at the local level and in the National Assembly [START_REF] Peric´ | Insufficient: Governmental programmes for Roma in Slovenia[END_REF]. However, 16 years after the newly independent Slovenia adopted its Constitution, a law on the Roma has still not been adopted.

The question remains as to why the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia defines the Roma as an autochthonous minority, although they are considered a national minority in the opinion of the majority of experts; moreover, they also do not have the position of a national minority but rather the status of a special ethnic community or a minority with special ethnic characteristics (their own language, culture and other ethnic characteristics). It is because of these so-called special ethnic characteristics that the decision makers decided on regulation that is separate from both the Italian and Hungarian minorities in the so-called Roma Act. The Roma Act sparked a lot of public debate in Slovenia in 2006 after the government announced that it was soon to be published. However, so far the contents of the act remain unknown to the public and the speculation suggests that it does not bring any additional rights to the Roma minority. It is expected that the act will merely bring together all provisions concerning the Roma minority found in other legal documents and the government will realize the constitutional provision through this action.

THE LACK OF ROMA REPRESENTATIVES IN THE POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Similar to other minorities, the Roma are considerably under-represented in political decision making. At the national parliamentary level, for example in the Czech Republic, where the Roma is the biggest minority, only one of the 200 members of parliament is Roma; the same goes for the Bulgarian parliament. There are no Roma representatives in the Slovakian or Hungarian parliaments, while in the Romanian parliament there is a single Roma representative in a place reserved by law for the Roma minority. Also, no member of parliament in Slovenia declares themselves a Roma. In order to improve the position of the Roma minority, some countries have established a counselling body at the national level in which representatives of the Roma minority cooperate. As Kállai and Törzsök (2005) stated, there are many Romani political parties in central and eastern Europe (although not in Slovenia); however, their participation in representative bodies has mostly been limited to the local level. They have been unable to muster sufficient electoral strength for parliamentary representation at the national level. The participation of Romani parties and associations in national elections has merely played a symbolic role, serving as a political manifestation of Romani identity and an expression of the desire to participate in electoral processes.

Germany, for example, takes care of its minorities through several national bodies: the German Institute for Human Rights, the National Monitoring Office and the Office for Promoting the Implementation of Ethnic Guidelines under Article 13. Considering that in Germany there are approximately 70,000 to 100,000 Roma, it is surprising that there is not one single Roma representative in the above-mentioned bodies. While Germany has addressed the Roma minority issue in many documents, the Open Society Institute ( 2002) has recommended the following:

Build trust among minority communities through confidence building and partnership programmes involving State institutions and Roma organizations and by including duly-elected minority representatives in decision-making on the development and implementation of policies that affect them.

In Spain, there is no official institution or body that takes care of or is responsible for minorities, equality or discrimination. The Spanish government has formulated a national Roma policy, but it has been seriously criticized by Roma representatives. Besides the deficiencies of that programme, the main reason for resisting the umbrella policy was the exclusion of Roma from its conception and implementation. Only a handful of Roma representatives are working in the field of the national project. The result of this lack of inclusion of the Roma population in elaborating the programme is primarily poor knowledge of the living conditions of the Roma minority as well as inappropriate solutions to issues from the fields of participation, political life, protection and discrimination (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, High Commission on National Minorities, 2000).

In Romania, so-called Roma experts have been appointed in several mayors' offices. They are to take care of implementing the National Programme on Roma and to draw attention to any irregularities. However, the initiative fell down in the area of the expertise and partiality of these 'experts' who were appointed by the only Roma political party, because the appointment process was alleged to be non-transparent and questionable. Many such policies, designed by individuals with commendable intentions but little appreciation of Romani culture, have been inappropriate. Plainly, too, programmes designed without Roma involvement are likely to lack legitimacy within the communities they are meant to serve; after centuries of being subjected to assimilation policies, many Roma understandably tend to regard with scepticism Roma policies developed by non-Roma. Equally, the active engagement of the Roma is essential if states are to avoid fostering or perpetuating a pattern of dependency (European Commission, Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs , 2004).

Ensuring the Roma minority's political participation in Slovenia

Historical documents reveal that Roma lived in the territory of Slovenia even before the 15th century while, from the 17th century onwards, more detailed and frequent documents and publications regarding the Roma in Slovenia can be found. It is believed that Roma migration to Slovenia came in three separate waves. Ancestors of the Roma who live in the Prekmurje region (north-east Slovenia) came from Hungary, ancestors of the Roma who live in the Dolenjska region (south Slovenia) came from Croatia (or other ex-Yugoslav countries) and a small community of Sinits came from Austria (Council of Europe, 2004). The Roma who came to Slovenia from ex-Yugoslav countries are, according to Jud Nirenberg of the Regional Roma Participation Programme in Budapest, causing the significant growth of Roma populations. He argues that Roma refugees have created something of a socioeconomic crisis for Slovenia, which is the most ethnically homogeneous state of the former Yugoslavia [START_REF] Latham | Roma of the former Yugoslavia[END_REF]. One cannot agree with this particular assertion because there is no obvious evidence to confirm this. However, Slovenia was clearly the most ethnically homogeneous state in the former Yugoslavia and, as such, it may encounter more difficulties when embracing other nationalities.

Although Roma are traditionally nomadic populations, today there are two primary areas of their inhabitation in Slovenia: the Prekmurje and Dolenjska regions. These two large Romani communities have been dealing with quite different problems. Ancestors of the Roma in the Prekmurje region inhabited this territory earlier than those in the Dolenjska region, resulting in their higher social status, better integration in society and, to some extent, better living and housing conditions. Longer cohabitation with the majority population has brought fewer tensions in everyday life as well as a better status (especially as regards citizenship). On the other hand, the Roma community in the Dolenjska region has not had the necessary time or resources to establish itself as a homogenous pressure group. There is a general assumption that the Roma in the Dolenjska region came and are still coming (fleeing) from ex-Yugoslav republics; therefore they have a lower financial and education status, which often results in having to take other measures to survive.

This great difference in the characteristics of both communities makes the formulation of national policies on Roma issues problematic and insufficient. What is acceptable for the Dolenjska region might be too dated for the Prekmurska region and vice-versa. Although we are critical of the somewhat slow governmental (non)action when addressing the Roma problem, it should be noted that the Slovenian government did act in accordance with many international recommendations. Especially given that the European Commission states the importance of cooperation in joint policy-making:

The effective participation of Roma ought to be ensured at the earliest stages of policy-making, programme design, implementation and evaluation. As has been stressed repeatedly by actors involved both in implementing and developing projects and policies, Roma involvement at all stages is key to the real impact and sustainability of initiatives. (European Commission, 2003).

Further, the recommendation of the OSCE, which encompasses legislative, judicial as well as police and security systems, the election system and political participation of Roma, includes an appeal based on recent analyses to member countries to support the development of the Roma minority by enabling them to participate in decision making at all levels about Roma issues or to adopt any necessary documents referring to the Roma minority. Apart from that, the minority should have access to all-important information concerning the Roma. The recommendations also refer to the motto 'think globally -act locally' since implementation of the national (or even European) strategies at the local level is extremely important. Without effective mechanisms at the local level such strategies are bound to fail. This specifically applies to Roma issues, which are quite specific compared with those of the local communities in which they live. Therefore, also in Slovenia, inclusion in the processes of policy formation at both national and local levels is extremely crucial for the provision of equal representation of all citizens. While some individual members of the Roma community were included in political life decades ago, 4 unlike some other countries of the European Union, in Slovenia there is no Romani political party and, according to Joz ˇek Horvat-Muc, the President of the Roma Association of Slovenia:

it would be unwise to establish one, mainly because politics for Roma is something . . . that is, political parties would cause more damage than positive action. Politics is politics and, as for the European circumstances, even the non-Roma cannot manage it too well, let alone the Roma. (cited in [START_REF] Mladina | [END_REF] Therefore, Roma councillors remain the only visible and influential link between the Roma community and policy making of local significance, and this makes them very important. What remains to be seen is how they have been working since their appointment and how they cooperate with relevant local political actors. That is why we carried out and analysed structured interviews with all Roma councillors and the mayors of those municipalities with at least one Roma councillor in the municipal council, as prescribed by law.

ANALYSIS OF THE INSTITUTION OF THE ROMA COUNCILLOR IN SLOVENIA

Analysis of structured interviews with Roma councillors

Relevant data from Roma councillors themselves had to be collected to evaluate the current state of affairs regarding the practicalities of how Roma councillors actually work. For the purpose of the analysis we were interested in the opinions of all Roma councillors in Slovenia, mainly as an indicator of the actual functionality of introducing Roma councillors. Nineteen Roma councillors participated in the interviews, 5 which means that the whole observed population was interviewed. The Roma councillors were interviewed between October and December 2004.

To evaluate the work of the Roma councillors, we first needed to identify the difficulties faced by the Roma community. Since the problems are seen from very different perspectives by the Romani councillors and experts from the field, in the first part of the structured questionnaire we asked about the most important problems individual Roma communities are facing. The most frequently stated problem was the inadequate public utilities infrastructure and the non-regulated acquisition of land on which the Roma live. Moreover, many Roma councillors highlighted the problems of electricity, roads and drinking water.As we can see,all of these problems are closely interconnected and represent both a cause and an effect. For example,the regulation of public utilities would only be possible through the regulation of land ownership. Because of the consistent indications of all the problem areas mentioned in all the interviews it can be concluded that the problems do not affect only part of the Roma community, but exist in virtually all Roma communities in Slovenia. In another set of answers to the first question, the problem of the low level of education of the Roma population is revealed along with the poor employment possibilities and lack of interest of communities in the problems faced by Roma communities. The answers somewhat mirrored the picture of whole European Roma populations as recorded in recent research conducted by UNDP/ILO in Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic (again Slovenia was not part of the survey).

In the second part of the questionnaire we wanted to collect information on cooperation between the municipal council and the Roma councillor. The municipal council is the highest decision-making body for all matters within a municipality. Within its remit it adopts the municipal statute, decrees and other municipal acts, environmental and other plans for development of the municipality, the budget and the annual financial statement. Within the council, a Roma councillor is equal to that of any other elected councillor (there are seven to 45 councillors, depending on the number of inhabitants of the municipality). He can propose resolutions, participate in agenda setting and work independently.

In the municipal council one also finds working bodies (commissions and committees) that deal with specialized matters within the remit of the municipal council and that give opinions and put forward proposals. In connection to this, many municipal councils have established so-called 'Roma committees' or 'Committees for Roma issues', comprising three or more councillors. These specialized committees address issues connected to Roma communities in special sessions, later presented at a session of the municipal council. The acceptance of these proposals are not compulsory, nor is the establishment of the committee; however, our research revealed that it may have a positive influence on Roma councillors' work.

Because of the important role of the municipal council in the decisionmaking process and the determination of policies, we were especially interested in whether municipal councillors also discuss Roma questions at the sessions and, further, how frequently they discuss them (and if not, why not). It was established that in 69 percent of municipal councils, councillors had allegedly discussed Romani questions. The Roma councillors who said that their municipal council did not discuss the Roma's problems specifically stated that (1) their initiatives never make their way on to agendas;

(2) the councils discuss Roma problems but the discussion is off the record and not written down in the minutes; and (3) there is no interest from other councillors in discussing their problems. Moreover, it is significant that in at least three municipal councils there is the already mentioned Roma Commission. However, even in those municipal councils where discussion of Romani problems takes place more or less regularly, according to the Roma councillors the responsiveness of other councillors is still quite poor. With the use of our open-ended questionnaire we managed to encompass wider causes of the lack of cooperation between municipal councils and the Roma councillors; frequently, this depends on the party membership of the other municipal councillors (according to the Roma councillors, councillors from the Slovenian National Party are especially non-cooperative), some councillors display a marked prejudice towards the Roma community and, in some cases, there is an expressed ignoring of it along with noncooperativeness by the entire municipal council. This may be illustrated by two answers from mayors to the question: 'How important is the presence of a Roma councillor in your local council':

He is quite unimportant for the constructive debate; however, because of his physical presence we are aware that there are Roma issues we have to deal with. His presence is important, but something should be done about educating Roma councillors. The Roma councillor in our council is barely literate and besides that he is not a representative of all Roma in our community. Some voted for him and some against.

At the time of our survey, the first four-year mandate of the Roma councillors was underway following the amendment to the Act and the municipal statutes. Therefore, in the structured questionnaire we were also interested in whether during this time the municipal council had adopted any resolution that would mean a considerable shift towards a solution of the Roma question. Although some Roma councillors did not know the term 'resolution' or were not acquainted with its meaning, we can conclude that in 12 municipalities at least one resolution had been adopted since the introduction of a Roma councillor, which considerably contributed to a solution to the Roma question in a positive direction (no respondent told us they had adopted a resolution that would mean a marked shift in a negative direction). In the remaining seven cases, there were no resolutions that, according to the Roma councillors, would have resulted in a considerable shift in a positive direction.

Considering the specific relationship of the Roma councillor with his electorate as was perceived in the test interview, and to gather relevant data to outline to what extent Roma councillors actually represent the will of those voting for them, an additional question was posed to our respondents. Namely, what is their relationship with the Roma community since they were elected and vice versa? As it turned out, the level of the Roma community's identification with their own Roma councillor is debatable. The Roma community is not homogenously distributed across the municipality but is partly dispersed in hamlets and villages. As a result, Roma are divided into so-called clans or family branches that are often opposed or even hostile to one another. In such cases, it is very difficult if not impossible to appoint a single representative for all the Roma living within a community. Besides that, one can observe that many Roma councillors are not a rom baro or the 'big man', meaning that the Roma who ran for office were on some occasions not the informal leader of the group. Namely, in a Roma community an individual becomes increasingly powerful with old age, with a large family, a good reputation and with an established relationship with formal authorities (police, social workers, court officials). This excludes many competent young Roma from leading their community. Mirga and Georghe (1997) stated similar findings in their analysis when they researched elective patterns of the Roma minority in Siklósnagyfalu, Hungary. Their starting point was the assumption that the process of transition in eastern and central Europe has brought the Roma minority 'unprecedented opportunities to become active subjects of politics and policies directed toward them'. The conclusions of the research are surprisingly similar to ours. 6 Statements about threats of violence made by the Roma community to their elected Roma councillor are not rare. As Sutherland (1986: 97) concluded in her observation of Romani life in America, 'one of the most apparent characteristics of the Roma is that they are almost constantly involved in conflict with each other, a factor that masks their equally intense solidarity as a group'.

It is also necessary to emphasize the poor knowledge and disrespect of the basics and mechanisms of local democracy. Most Roma do not acknowledge local elections as a legitimate way of electing their representative, preferring instead the traditional way of electing an informal leader (through personal assertion, experiences, initiation rituals etc.) who frequently is not a candidate at the local elections. According to 17 percent of the interviewed Roma councillors, their relationship with the Roma community deteriorated after their election, 44 percent of them claimed that their relationship remained unchanged, while 39 percent said that their relationship even improved.

To illustrate, one Roma councillor expressed the following in an interview (about what improved after he was elected):

Nothing major, they (the municipality) promise a lot, but do little instead. I am important just because there are eight councillors in opposition and eight in position, so my vote prevails. And truthfully, nothing is better. Everybody thinks, let them (Roma) kill each other, they have their representative. And I stay in the middle because members of the Roma community are threatening me when nothing is done and, on the other hand my hands are tied, the state and the municipality are a brick wall . . . In the third part of the survey, we were primarily interested in how the Romani councillors could improve their cooperation with the municipal council in order for Roma issues to be resolved more easily and quickly, because we were also interested in their perceptions of disturbing actors in the policy-making process and how they rate the introduction of the Roma councillor mechanism. There was a range of answers to the question: 'What would you change to improve the efficiency of actions of the municipal council in the field of resolving Roma questions?' Most called for a boost to informal communications, either with the mayor, councillors or even with other NGOs. The need for additional resources was also expressed. Roma councillors desperately need access to an office, computer, the internet etc.

Roma councillors see those actors who participate in the formulation of Romani policies, as well as the Roma community, as an obstacle to improving the current state of addressing Romani problems. According to 31 percent of the respondents, the greatest obstacle to establishing better cooperation of the Roma community with other locals is the Roma community itself. In their opinion, the reasons lie in criminal, non-adaptable behaviour, a lack of education and a poor financial situation, mainly reflected in conflicts between the Roma and other locals. According to the Roma councillors, the main obstacle to improving cooperation equally involves: (1) the state, because it is not addressing Roma problems at the national level; (2) the mayors who, according to the Roma councillors, in some municipalities simply do not listen to the Roma councillors; and (3) other locals who with their prejudices hinder the normal inclusion of the Roma in the local community. Interestingly, according to the Roma councillors, the municipal councils themselves do not present an obstacle to the improvement of cooperation, while one Roma councillor even pointed to himself as being the biggest obstacle to cooperation, because he was illiterate and therefore unfit for the job.

At the end of the questionnaire we wanted the Roma councillors to evaluate their work and give opinions on whether the situation in the field of Roma problems in the municipality has improved since their election. According to the previous answers, which more or less defined the current situation of resolving Roma problems as inappropriate and deficient, surprisingly, the majority approved of the introduction of the mechanism of the Roma councillor. The Roma councillors evaluated their work very positively. However, it cannot be established whether some policies (on the building of infrastructure, land acquisition, education etc.) were formed as a consequence of their work or were already in progress before their appointment and would have been implemented irrespective of the introduction of Roma councillors. Those Roma councillors who thought that since the introduction of Roma councillors the solution to Roma issues had deteriorated had specific comments about their municipality and its decision makers.

Analysis of structured interviews with the mayors of Slovenian municipalities

Mayors represent the executive body of a municipality. They are elected directly at general elections and have the right to propose the budget, the annual financial statement, ordinances and all other acts within the competence of the municipality to the municipal council. Mayors call and run municipal council meetings. Besides the mayor, each member of the municipal council can put forward ordinances and other municipal acts, with the exception of the budget and financial statement. Mayors are the guardians of legality and can withhold the issuing of an act of the municipal council if they think it is illegal or non-constitutional. Mayors also run the municipal administration, which is their most important responsibility.

The importance of the role of mayors, their influence on the work of the municipal administration and on cooperation with the municipal council was the reason why, for the purposes of the research, structured interviews with all mayors (20) of municipalities that have a Roma councillor were also carried out. Like the interviews with the Roma councillors, the interviews with the mayors were anonymous. Questions posed to the mayors were composed so that they would show their opinion or relationship to the same problems or phenomena as presented in the interviews with the Roma councillors. This way of collecting information enables insights into the same area from the points of view of both key actors, which allows a further analysis of the opinions.

All the mayors' answers to the question 'Do you discuss Roma problems in your municipal council (if yes how often, if not why not)?' were affirmative, which means that in all municipal councils Romani issues are, according to the mayors, more or less frequently discussed. In municipalities that have a Roma Commission working within the municipal council, these problems are put on the agenda of the municipal council less frequently, but they are regularly discussed at Commission meetings. Although all municipal councils discuss Roma issues, 70 percent of the mayors thought this body inappropriate for resolving Roma problems. In connection to this, the predominant opinion of the majority is that the state should approach these problems more rigorously with unified programmes at the national level, different inter-municipal coordinations and additional financial aid. While those mayors who answered that the municipal council is a body that is only partly appropriate for decision making about Romani problems think that the state should take the lion's share of responsibility, they also agreed with the regulation of matters of local importance in an appropriate and legally appointed body, namely the municipal council. To illustrate two opposite points of view on this matter, one of the interviewed mayors argued:

I think that the local councils are absolutely not the adequate body to address problems that Roma populations encounter. This should be a matter for the state . . . I absolutely expect help from the state.

While another answered:

Of course it is adequate! I don't see any other body or institution that could do this job better and more easily.

As presented here, one can conclude that the mayors do have very distinct points of view. This may be (it cannot be firmly established since the interviews involve absolute anonymity) a result of the already mentioned polarization of Roma populations between the two communities in the Prekmurje and Dolenjska regions. It might be assumed that more rigorous answers come from the Dolenjska region, where there is tense cohabitation between the Roma minority and the majority population, also resulting in poor cooperation in the decision-making field.

Regardless of opinions on the (in)appropriateness of the municipal council for resolving Roma questions, the mayors think that the municipal council in their municipalities is mostly suitably responsive to Roma questions. A considerable number of mayors estimate the responsiveness of their municipal council as neither good nor bad -they claim that the municipal councils respond to the Roma problems in the same way as to all the other problems in the municipality. Two respondents estimated the responsiveness of their municipal council as very poor because of the bad relationship between the Roma and other locals and the assumption made by other locals that the Roma receive extremely high levels of social aid.

We were then interested in the mayors' opinions about the presence of the Roma councillor in their municipal council. As it turns out, half of the mayors see the presence of the Roma councillor in their municipal council as important or even very important, while on the other hand a third of them estimate that the presence of the Roma councillor does not mean any essential shift towards a resolution of Romani problems. Low education, illiteracy, poor knowledge of the basics of the operations of local democratic systems, the inability and even lack of interest of Roma councillors are mentioned as major obstacles to mutual cooperation and the consequent resolving of Romani problems. In the conclusion of the interview we were interested in which actors, according to the mayors, presented the greatest obstacle for better cooperation between the Roma community and other locals. It was established that the mayors see the biggest 'culprit' for the poor cooperation between the Roma and other locals as the Roma themselves, along with the state, which, with its poor financial help and deficient legislation, is seen as hindering the process of Roma integration with local communities.

A COMPARISON OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE T WO SETS OF ACTORS

Since both the Roma councillor and the mayor can personify either confrontation or cooperation between the Roma community and other actors in the local community it is imperative to analyse the structured interviews of the two sets of actors together. When comparing both sets of interviews, there is a striking disproportion in answers to the question of whether Roma issues are actually discussed in the municipal councils. While the mayors unanimously claim that their municipal council discusses Roma problems, only some of the Roma councillors agree with this. The cause of such a difference may also lie in a lack of cooperation in the work of the municipal council by some Roma councillors or in them having been deliberately misled by the mayors (see Table 2).

Comparing the opinions of both groups of respondents on how the municipal councils respond to Roma questions, it can be established that the majority (32%) of Roma councillors tend to express a poor level of responsiveness by the municipal council, but in general there are no significant differences in the two groups' opinions. It is interesting that in response to the question 'Have you adopted a conclusion which meant a significant shift in solving Roma questions in a positive or negative direction during your mandate', again the mayors homogenously reported the adoption of at least one (and as a rule even more than one) conclusion that has considerably contributed to a solution to Roma problems in a positive direction (see Table 3).

Yet the same question was answered negatively by up to seven Roma councillors. The reason for this discrepancy is unknown; maybe it lies in their poor knowledge of the work of the municipal council or a lack of information. The difference in answers is undoubtedly too large and shows certain anomalies in the operations of the municipal council or -more likely -in the poor communication between the actors. One indicator of potential difficulties could be that the Roma councillors see the need for a change in communication with other councillors, the mayor and the municipal administration.The mayors, however, share the opinion that the Roma councillors should not be treated differently from other councillors and that the introduction of Roma councillors itself is a sufficient form of positive discrimination.

When we compare answers to the question 'Which actor in your opinion presents the biggest obstacle to the provision of better cooperation of the Roma community with other locals?', we find that both the Roma councillors and the mayors see the Roma community and its negative behaviour vis-à-vis other locals as the main obstacle. As many as 47 percent of the mayors have this opinion, together with 31 percent of the Roma councillors. Further, the Roma councillors estimate that the state (18%), the locals (18%) and the mayor (18%) also present obstacles; meanwhile the mayors estimated that, apart from the Roma community, the main obstacles are the state (35%) and the locals (9%). Not surprisingly, the mayors do not identify themselves or the municipal administration they represent as an obstacle to the provision of better cooperation, while at the same time they blame the state, which in their opinion does not do enough to resolve Roma problems.

If we summarize the analyses of both sets of interviews, the conclusion can be drawn that the Roma councillor mechanism is, in the eyes of local political actors, a tool that is somehow not 'falling into place'. Perhaps a second longitudinal analysis after several mandates of Roma councillors would produce a more varied picture of the implementation of this mechanism.

CONCLUSION

Constructive and effective communication and cooperation are the preconditions for mutual respect. That is why extra effort should be made for the purpose of including the Roma minority more actively in decisionmaking processes, especially if the consequence of policy implementation is important for their lives and work. However, it is only possible to achieve this kind of functioning by including the Roma's elected representatives at all levels of power. Ideally, the mechanisms or an institution that would guarantee such functioning would suit the specifics of the individual country and their Roma community. This would guarantee the optimum inclusion of the underprivileged in the existing system. The effectiveness of the systems introduced could be measured by several criteria: (1) the scope of the early involvement of the Roma in Roma-related policy formation; (2) the extent to which the process is broadly representative; (3) transparency; and (4) the involvement of the Roma in implementing and evaluating Roma-related programmes.

Five years after the election of the first Roma councillors in Slovenia, the initial successes and obstacles are revealed, as faced by both the Roma councillors and the mayors of the municipalities where the law made the introduction of Roma councillors compulsory. The provision of the law, which lists those municipalities that have to implement the Roma councillor in their statute (the statute of a municipality is by its nature independent), has been publicly debated. It is highly questionable how the legislators decided which municipalities had the 'quota' of Romani population to be obliged to carry this out. The main argument is that: (1) Roma are in their nature nomadic and often move; (2) the exact number of the Roma population in Slovenia is unknown; (3) there should be a census (for example 15% of total municipal populations should be Roma) as a threshold for obliging the municipality to introduce a Roma councillor. This anomaly should be addressed and amended.

Another conclusion may be drawn from the opinion frequently expressed by Roma councillors that issues need to be addressed together. The representatives of the Roma minority wish to meet in an assembly at the national level. Therefore, many councillors see the solution as involving periodical meetings of all Roma councillors at the national level (it should be mentioned here that such meetings have already occurred).

However, in the short period since the introduction of Roma councillors the need for additional or auxiliary forms of positive discrimination has presented itself. Such further positive discrimination would enable the (even) better cooperation of the Roma councillors with other decision makers at the local level. One can draw a parallel when comparing the only two countries in the territory of central and eastern Europe (Slovenia and Hungary) that do enable the political participation of the Roma minority at the local level through mechanisms of positive discrimination. For example, Hungary guarantees the 13 'historic' minorities living in Hungary (including Roma) the right to establish local and national self-government. On this basis, the minority can establish elected bodies that act in the field of education and culture and have a veto over issues in those fields at the local level. Mostly this self-governing body may request information, submit proposals, initiate measures and file complaints (Kállai and Törzsök, 2005). This, however, differs significantly from the Slovenian local Roma councillor. Both mechanisms provide the much-needed framework for Romani political activism, making room for opportunities to modify the current legislation to make the system more effective. In many surveys, Roma leaders have stressed the importance of local governance, which would create more realistic possibilities for increasing the political capital of the Roma, as a relatively young political nation. Or, as one of the interviewed Roma councillors expressed:

Well, we Gypsies are a special kind of people, we are together all the time. I can say that lots of things are better now, since I have been the councillor. I am there at the core of the decision making, I can propose many things. For example I can read the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia and see what tenders we can apply for. In those municipalities where the Roma community has got their own councillor, you can see progress in the cooperation of the municipal administration. And before all Roma in the municipality directly addressed the municipal administration, but now I can intervene as a middleman.

The first step towards ensuring the (more) equal representation of the Roma autochthonous minority in Slovenia has been taken through the legally prescribed minimum representation of the Roma in municipal councils. Slovenia has addressed this issue in the same way as many other ex-Yugoslav countries. As [START_REF] Edwards | New Roma Rights Legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Positive, Negative or Indifferent?[END_REF] concluded in her article on Roma minority in Bosnia:

So long as the Roma do not have equal access to and involvement in all realms of life within Bosnia, including importantly in the political process, they will remain marginalized. Minority rights legislation is but a minor advance forward for an economically, socially, politically and ethnically insignificant group in Bosnia.

So the question of how to further regulate this problem remains open. Who is competent to regulate Roma problems and are they doing their job efficiently? The task of a democratic country is to enable the cooperation of all citizens and modify the existing mechanisms in line with their users and facilitate the more efficient participation of all citizens.

Notes

1 In most parliaments of central and eastern Europe, at least one Romani representative has been elected on the party list of a mainstream party. In some instances, such as in Romania, the Roma have a single reserved seat. In local politics, the Roma have secured even more representatives. 2 The authors use the term 'Roma problem' to refer to the specific problems of low education levels, high unemployment rates, poor housing conditions, etc., that affect the Roma minority in Slovenia and at the same time do not affect, with all the stated elements, any other marginalized group or minority in Slovenia. The term is not used with a negative connotation. in informal, but powerful, extended family structures . . . [T]he relative absence of formal structures in the Romani community has been an obstacle to participation in the modern bureaucratic structures that increasingly characterize government and public administration. Thus, the community faces the challenge of building formal structures of representation and participation. The present generation of Romani leaders comes from contrasting backgrounds . . . On one side are those who have little or no formal education or training but have risen within traditional communities by virtue of their everyday struggles on behalf of their people. On the other side [are] a handful of mostly younger activists who are products of the majority education system and have emerged as successful professionals or politicians but at the same time have retained or rediscovered their Romani identity' [START_REF] Mirga | The Roma in the Twenty-First Century: A Policy Paper, Project on Ethnic Relations[END_REF].

  BACLIJA ET AL. • POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION OF THE ROMA MINORIT Y

  3 The UNDP/ILO Survey in 2001 included Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania (United Nations Development Program, 2002); in 2002 the National Democratic Institute and Open Society Institute only included Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania (National Democratic Institute and Open Society Institute, 2002); the Project on Ethnic Relations focused solely on Slovakia and Hungary (Project on Ethnic Relations, 2001). 4 In 1996, the Roma founded the Association of Roma Societies of Slovenia, today called the Association of the Roma of Slovenia, which not only brings together the Roma associations but all Roma. The political power of the Roma minority has also increased along with the foundation of the Association of the Roma of Slovenia. 5 Structured interviews were carried out in the following municipalities: Cankova, Kuzma, Crensovci, Murska Sobota, Crnomelj, Dobrovnik, Turnisce, Kocevje, Krsko, Novo mesto, Lendava, Puconci, Metlika, Semic, Rogasovci, Tisina, Trebnje, Sentjernej and Beltinci. 6 'The Roma are a traditional people, whose leadership has typically been vested

Table 1

 1 Roma population in Slovenia 1953[START_REF] Makarovic | Politicna participacija v desetletju demokratizacije' (Political participation in a decade of democracy)[END_REF]

	Year	1953	1961	1971	1981	1991	2002
	Roma population in Slovenia	1663	158	951	1393	2259	3246

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of

Slovenia (2006)

.

Table 2

 2 Do you discuss Roma issues at municipal council meetings?

		Mayors	Roma councillors
	Yes	19	13
	No	0	7
	Total	19	20
	Note: N = 39.

Table 3

 3 Did the municipal council adopt any kind of resolution or decision which in your opinion represents a significant shift towards the resolution of Roma questions?

		Mayors	Roma councillors
	Yes	19	12
	No	0	8
	Total	19	20

Note: N = 39.


Anne Phillips

Sawitri Saharso

The rights of women and the crisis of multiculturalism

à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

policy -the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden -practices varied and were rarely codified in any explicit way. 2 Yet however modest the policies, there was, until recently, a wide body of opinion across Europe claiming that cultural and religious diversity was now part of the fabric of life, and arguing that it was inappropriate (in the stronger versions, inequitable and unfair) to require migrants to abandon all aspects of their cultural heritage in favour of the conventions of the new society. Typically, those arguing this also believed that immigrant associations and networks should play an important mediating role between individuals and the state.

Disenchantment with these broadly multicultural ideals dates mostly from the mid-1990s, when multiculturalism began to be blamed for failures of economic and social integration, as evidenced in significant variations between ethnocultural groups in the take-up of educational opportunities, in differential employment rates, differential crime rates, and continuing high levels of residential segregation. The later focus on multiculturalism as impeding political integration was more closely linked to fears of Islamistinspired assassinations and terror attacks, fears given graphic confirmation in the destruction of the World Trade Centre in 2001, the Madrid bombings in 2004, the two London bombings in 2005, and the murder of Dutch film director Theo Van Gogh in 2004. A typical article in the British press in 2005 described 'these British bombers' as 'a consequence of a misguided and catastrophic pursuit of multiculturalism'; while a contribution to an online discussion forum described them as 'the children of Britain's own multicultural society' whose actions smashed the multicultural consensus 'to smithereens' (cited in Modood, 2007: 12). A number of commentators have noted the discrepancy in this, for the young men recruited for suicide missions were not, on the whole, living ghettoized lives of cultural conservatism or economic marginalization, and it would be difficult to specify the 'multicultural' policies that supposedly encouraged them in their political and religious beliefs. Our starting point for this issue is a further discrepancy. The fears of terrorism are, at their most basic, fears about the activities of young men. But as these feed into attacks on 'misguided versions of multiculturalism', the critique of minority cultures and religions is played out largely on the bodies of young women.

We argue in this issue that the rights of women have come to play an important role in the current retreat from multiculturalism. When we consider what is most commonly offered, in both popular and policy discourse, as evidence of a conflict over fundamental values, we find issues relating to the treatment of girls and women figuring large: women wearing hijab; girls subjected to genital cutting; young people forced by their families into marriage with unknown and unwanted spouses; young women murdered by family members for behaviour said to offend principles of community honour. The repudiation of homosexuality by leading Muslim clerics is sometimes cited as a further example of the conflict of values, but somewhat less so. This may be because it can be more readily assumed that 'we' in the majority group all support gender equality, but not so easily asserted that 'we' all regard homosexuality as fine. Migrants to Denmark now have to sign a contract stating that they accept the principle of gender equality, and recognize that female circumcision and forced marriage are illegal in Denmark. As the articles in this special issue indicate, there are broadly similar trends elsewhere.

When countries draw up their list of the core values that must not be sacrificed to the requirements of cultural sensitivity, they refer, as one might expect, to values such as democracy and toleration. But they almost always also include the equality of the sexes in a prominent position. Attitudes towards women are taken as especially significant in exposing the gap between majority and minority cultures, and degrees of integration are sometimes measured by degrees of assent to women's rights. It is typically argued, moreover, that previous practices of multiculturalism have encouraged public officials to turn a blind eye to the ill-treatment of women. Part of the shift from the now discredited multiculturalism is therefore to a more interventionist state (although outside the integration agenda, this may coincide with a reduction in state intervention). Those committed to the principle of gender equality are called upon to be more assertive than in the past in challenging the misogynist practices of minority cultural groups.

To varying degrees in the different countries, these arguments have shaped public policy. Governments have become more proactive in identifying and addressing problems of forced marriage, 'honour' killing, or culturally sanctioned abuses of children; and tackling violence against women in minority cultural groups has become a more visible part of the political agenda in many countries in Europe. In recent cases regarding the wearing of the hijab, where violence towards women is hardly at stake, the arguments also commonly revolve around the status of women and girls. Headscarf bans are partly defended in terms of sustaining the public neutrality of state institutions (as in the French legislation that bans the wearing of conspicuous symbols of religious affiliation at school). However, there is nearly always a subsidiary argument that represents any requirement for women to cover their heads as a particularly pernicious example of unequal treatment, or defends a hijab ban as protecting young women from the coercion of their parents and peers.

Part of our objective, in this issue, is simply to draw attention to the role played by the rights of women in the current crisis of multiculturalism, a role that has gone largely unnoticed in academic commentary. Ten years ago, contestations around multicultural policy mostly proceeded without any mention of either gender or sexual violence. People debated the different bases for cultural claims, the relationship between individual and group rights, the balance between common citizenship and respect for diversity, or the nature and limits of toleration, but largely pursued these without reference to gender concerns. To give just one example, a substantial index to the influential collection Ethnicity and Group Rights (edited by Shapiro and Kymlicka, 1997) includes no entry for sex or sexual violence, three entries for gender, and only half a dozen for women (Gays fared slightly better). In two essays specifically devoted to toleration -a topic that might be thought to throw up particularly vexed questions about the treatment of girls and women -there is only a passing reference to clitoridectomy, and no apparent recognition that the toleration of cultural difference might be especially problematic as regards women's rights.

That this is now less likely owes much to feminism: to the work of Gita Saghal and Nira Yuval-Davis (1992), Susan Moller [START_REF] Okin | Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions[END_REF][START_REF] Okin | Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?[END_REF][START_REF] Okin | Mistresses of Their Own Destiny": Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit[END_REF] and Ayelet [START_REF] Shachar | Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights[END_REF], who drew attention to the potential sacrifice of women's rights and interests in the pursuit of certain policies of multiculturalism; and to the political interventions of women's non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially those drawn from women in minority cultural communities, who were often sharply critical of multiculturalism.

There is now a substantial body of literature exploring the damage that can be done to women in minority groups when the societies they live in adopt multiculturalism, the main argument being that multicultural policies shore up the power base of the older men within the community and encourage public authorities to tolerate practices that undermine women's equality. Feminist analysis of the risks has significantly refocused the debate, to the point where it is hard to imagine a sustained discussion of multiculturalism that now proceeds without any reference to gender or sexual violence.

Analysis of the backlash, however, has fallen back from this high. We hear a lot about the presumed failures of integration or supposed divergence of values driving the current retreat from multiculturalism, yet there has been little focus in the academic literature on what politicians or journalists commonly offer as the main example of value divergence -the presumed disagreements about women's rights. Abuses of girls and women figure high in the daily chit-chat through which people represent or misrepresent minority cultures, as in accusations that 'they' don't encourage their girls to continue in education, that 'they' punish sexual transgressions in females while tolerating similarly transgressive behaviour in males, that 'they' expect their wives to be docile and submissive, or don't allow women to work outside the home. As the articles in this issue demonstrate, the preoccupation with oppressive gender relations in minority cultural groups is also increasingly evident in policy initiatives across Europe, where there is now a considerable amount of legislation and intervention designed to protect the rights of girls and women in minority groups.

Our first aim in this issue is thus to draw attention to the centrality of gender in current discourses around multiculturalism and open up the discussion about why this should be so. We do not take the preoccupation with women's rights at face value, for we are well aware that principles of gender equality can be employed to promote a more restrictive immigration agenda, or deployed in ways that feed stereotypes about minority groups. The endorsement of gender equality as a defining feature of European polities is, at one level, very much to be welcomed. When, however, the rights of women figure as a marker of a modern liberal society, one of the key things differentiating such societies from 'traditional', non-western, illiberal ones, this encourages a stereotypical contrast between western and non-western values, and represents (all) migrants as less likely than those long established in Europe to accept the equality of the sexes.

This can operate as a cover for racist prejudice. Feminists have noted that when those in an ethnocultural minority insist on the need to defend 'their' practices and traditions, they invoke highly contested versions of these practices and traditions, and often defend ones that have been particularly harmful to women. This can be read as a kind of falsification or reification of tradition. But the falsification of tradition also occurs when those in an ethnocultural majority talk of protecting girls and women from the harmful practices of 'their' culture, and accept without question that the practice at issue is indeed a custom of the minority group. When something like forced marriage, for example, or honour killing is described as a 'cultural practice', this dignifies with the term 'practice' behaviour that may be widely condemned by cultural and religious leaders, and shunned by most members of the cultural group. Depending on how it is framed, the concern with women's rights and protections can then become a proxy for attacks on minority groups. The principal effect may be to demonize minority cultural groups rather than improve the condition of women within them.

The recognition that multiculturalism may entail risks for minority women can then easily become squared with a belief that multiculturalism is (intrinsically) bad for women. With this in mind, our second aim in this issue is to explore the ambiguities and tensions in current invocations of gender equality, recognizing and exploring the sometimes disingenuous role played by women's rights, but without turning this into an apologia for practices harmful to women. Keeping these two elements continually in mind has been a central -and often difficult -part of our project. We have no wish to add to the criticisms and misrepresentations of minority groups, yet are aware that our work could have precisely this effect because it focuses -as do the critics of multiculturalism -on harmful practices associated primarily with minority groups. Selecting out genital cutting, honour killing, and forced marriage clearly does little to enhance the general appreciation of minority cultures. Avoiding these issues, however, is not the answer. When public authorities intervene to protect women's rights, it is important that they do so in ways that are sensitive to cultural identities and interests, respect women's autonomy, and do not give hostages to fortune in their attacks on cultural diversity or stereotyping of cultural groups. It is also important that they do intervene, and that the interventions are effective.

Analysing the perverse role played by notions of gender equality and the rights of women is not, in itself, enough, for there are also substantive issues of violence against women that need to be addressed and it is important to identify where public policy can make a difference, and what kinds of policy work best. How, that is, can public agencies most effectively intervene against practices that are harmful to women, without in the process adding to stereotypical representations of minority groups? In our answers to this question, we have generally opted for a strategy of comparison, asking, for example, to what extent patterns of domestic violence really do vary between majority and minority households; and how different policymakers in different countries approach the issues. One important question that surfaces through a number of the contributions is whether it is helpful to pursue what might be described as culturally specific policies, ones recognized by everyone as targeted at specific minority groups, or better to address such matters as genital cutting and honour related violence under the more general umbrella of violence against women. One finding -at least for some of the countries in our study -is that new coalitions are emerging between women's organizations partly as a consequence of the central role of gender equality in debates about multiculturalism; where this happens, it promises to open new space for a resolution of the dilemmas we address.

Though we believe that our approach has been beneficial in recognizing the often ideological role played by women's rights in discrediting multiculturalism whilst simultaneously stressing the urgent need for interventions against harms to women, we remain conscious of our vulnerability to critique. The contributors to this special issue of Ethnicities are overwhelmingly drawn from majority ethnocultural groups, and while we pay considerable attention to the work of minority women's NGOs, drawing, in some of the articles, directly on interview material, we can hardly claim to represent minority women's voices. As regards the issues we address here, it goes without saying that the discussion would benefit from representation of a wider range of experiences, for everyone speaks from a particular location -cultural, social, historical -and where we speak from matters a great deal. This is not, however, to say that we should silence ourselves until that wider representation of experiences and locations is achieved: that would suggest an inward looking and parochial feminism, very much at odds with ideas of global solidarity. Majority group members -male as well as female -have both a right and a responsibility to speak out against gender injustices wherever they find them; and there is no privileged position that gives some the right to speak and not others. What we need, however, is critical reflexivity, an awareness of the particular preoccupations likely to be associated with particular locations, and a willingness to reflect critically on these. Substantively, this can lead in unexpected directions. In our preliminary discussions, for example, we became aware that some of us were more reluctant to make arguments that could be twisted against minority cultural groups than might be the case if we were, say, Kurdish women in Germany or Moroccan women in France, battling against oppressive forces in our own community. We had to learn not to focus so exclusively on the misrepresentations and cultural stereotypes that we ended up almost denying that there was a problem. We had to learn from those more directly engaged in tackling problems of violence against women to rebalance the two sides.

Our third aim in this issue is to contribute to the comparative analysis of the ways in which the gender story is being played out in redefinitions of national identity in Europe. Much of the theoretical literature addressing the relationship between feminism and multiculturalism originates from Canada and the USA, and has been driven by North American concerns. Much of the comparative literature developing typologies of multiculturalism in Europe suffers from a lack of attention to gender. The articles in this issue analyse developments in seven European countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. The selection is not comprehensive (apart from anything else, these are all northern and western European countries), and the comparison is not systematic, in the sense of covering identical sets of data. But even within these limitations, we can begin to identify a typology of countries. Interestingly, this differs from the more standard typologies deployed in Europe, precisely because it focuses on gender.

There is, by now, a substantial literature in the political sociology of immigration and citizenship that proceeds through comparing national examples across Europe (e.g. Bodeman and Yurdakul, 2006;Joppke and Morawska, 2003;[START_REF] Koopmans | Contested Citizenship: Political Contention over Migration and Ethnic Relations in Western Europe[END_REF]. Inspired by the work of Rogers [START_REF] Brubaker | Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany[END_REF], this literature usually differentiates between countries with an ethnic or a civic conception of the nation, and more recently, those with a multicultural conception, and considers how the differing understandings of nationhood inform a country's immigration and integration policies. In this literature, Germany commonly figures as the classic example of a country with an ethnic conception of the nation, France embodies the civic conception, while the UK and the Netherlands represent the multicultural. One of the major research questions is then how significant these differences really are: for example, does the subsequent movement in Germany away from jus sanguinis, and in France away from jus solis, mean there is now less to choose between these two in their understandings of citizenship? 3 Is there a process of convergence, as all parts of Europe become less multicultural? Or, to the contrary, a process of convergence as all become more multicultural?

When we take gender as the centre of attention, other kinds of question come into focus, and other patterns of differentiation take shape. Consider the Scandinavian countries -Denmark, Norway, Sweden. These have not figured especially large in the standard typologies, perhaps because they fall within the civic rather than ethnic conception of nationality, but have until recently remained relatively homogeneous in their ethnic composition. Yet these are the countries that stand out as having a particularly strong gender equality mission, reflected in the high proportions of women in elected office, and social welfare regimes that provide substantial public funding for the typically feminized work of care. With the rights of women becoming an increasingly central trope in the debates on multiculturalism, these countries move into greater prominence -although to markedly different effect.

Denmark became, of course, a household name for its seeming refusal of multicultural sensitivity through the so-called cartoon affair; but for anyone working on gender issues, has long been especially interesting (not to say, infamous) for the severe restrictions on family reunification introduced as part of a programme to combat forced marriages. Norway, not normally seen as especially multicultural in its policies or practices, has concluded that bans on hijab are a form of sex discrimination; unusually, therefore, it has employed principles of gender equality to defend the wearing of headscarves rather than attack it. Sweden's commitment to gender equality has been instrumental in putting honour crime firmly on the political agenda, and there has been a shift from a simpler 'multicultural' stance, with the courts initially willing to consider cultural arguments in mitigation of honour killing, to a perception that such arguments worsen the nature of the crime. The material gathered here marks a first stage in making sense of these differences, and we have not attempted to generate anything like a complete alternative typology. But just as the categorization of welfare regimes had to be significantly revised after feminists drew attention to the missing gender agenda (Lewis, 1993), so too can we anticipate that typologies of citizenship will have to be significantly revised when the role played by gender is more fully acknowledged.

One aspect that already comes out from our studies is the difference between countries in terms of the nature and involvement of minority women's NGOs. Mobilization in Belgium and Germany, for example, turns out to be unexpectedly strong; this cuts across one common view of German immigrant associations as excessively oriented around homeland issues and loyalties because of their relative exclusion from participation in German politics (Koopmans et al., 2005: 126-34).This seems to be less the case for women's organizations. In the UK, the fact that women's NGOs so often anticipated government and the media in identifying problems of forced marriage or honour crime has helped turn what might otherwise be a politics of cultural stereotyping in more positive directions. In Belgium, mobilization around gender issues seems to confound the expected contrast between a more francophone, civic republican Walloon, and a more corporatist, multicultural Flanders. In all cases, the prospects for effective defence of women's rights seem to be significantly enhanced where there are a range of women's organizations proposing and testing out a variety of approaches and initiatives, and getting sufficient access to policy circles to contribute to the debates. Recent UK legislation providing greater civil protection against forced marriage provides a good illustration of this.

The articles in this special issue represent part of a larger project, which ran from 2004-2006, and was funded by the Nuffield Foundation in the UK. It came out of our recognition that the rights of women were becoming entangled with both the media and policy debates on multiculturalism, that policies and debates were being transported from one country to another, and that there were very similar flash points across Europe regarding such matters as hijab, forced marriage, honour crime, or female genital cutting (FGC). It was difficult, however, to put together a coherent picture of what was happening, both because the primary source material (policy documents, legal judgments, media reports) was mainly available only in the national languages, and because people were still at a relatively early stage in theorizing these developments. We organised two conferences, a preliminary workshop in London in 2005, followed by a larger conference in Amsterdam in 2006, and commissioned a number of country studies (of which this special issue of Ethnicities represents a selection) as well as some more thematic debates.

Our final list of participants for the second conference, including people making panel contributions as well as those preparing country studies, were: Haleh Afshar, Sabine Berghahn, Anja Bredal, Gily Coene, Moira Dustin, Martin Frank, Halleh Ghorashi, Aisha Gill, Zenia Hellgren, Barbara Hobson, Elizabeth Holzleithner, Riva Kastoryano, Chia Longman, Anne Phillips, Baukje Prins, Petra Rostock, Sawitri Saharso, Birte Siim, Hege Skjeie, Martine Spensky, Sabine Strasser, and Julia Szalai. We are very grateful to all participants, particularly those involved in the second conference. We are also very grateful to Avigail Eisenberg and Birgit Sauer for providing detailed comments and suggestions on the articles. Drawing on the material produced for the conference, Moira Dustin produced a summary account of the main legislative and policy initiatives across Europe, identifying factors that threaten to undermine initiatives to protect minority women, and approaches that enhance their effectiveness. This report, Gender Equality, Cultural Diversity: European Comparisons and Lessons [START_REF] Dustin | Gender Equality, Cultural Diversity: European Comparisons and Lessons[END_REF] is available on request from LSE Gender Institute, or can be downloaded from the Institute's website.

Notes

1 Although analysts have noted that the state proved more willing than the rhetoric might suggest to engage with citizens through their ethnocultural associations (see [START_REF] Kastoryano | Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany[END_REF]. 2 The main exception being the gradual codification of land, language, and political representation rights for the Sami people. For an overview of cultural and political rights in nine European countries, see [START_REF] Lister | Gendering Citizenship in Western Europe: New Challenges for Citizenship Research in a Cross-national Context[END_REF]

Germans to obtain German nationality, while making it more difficult for ethnic Germans. In France, meanwhile, the cultural requirements for obtaining French citizenship have been made heavier in recent years (see Koopmans et al., 2005, Lister et al., 2007).

 [email: s.saharso@utwente.nl]