Bram Lancee
email: ethnic@surrey.ac.uk

and bridging social capital for immigrant men in Germany

Keywords: Social Capital, Labour market, Immigrants, Longitudinal analysis, Germany, Inter-ethnic relations Social capital, labour market, immigrants, longitudinal analysis, Germany

The economic returns of bonding

The economic returns of bonding and bridging social capital for immigrant men in Germany

Introduction

One of the main challenges that Western countries are faced with is how to deal with the increasing share of immigrants and their descendants. The incorporation of immigrants into the labour market of the host society is of utmost importance to social cohesion. One of the approaches to explain labour market outcomes of immigrants is to use social capital theory.

Research that examines the relation between immigrants' social capital and its economic returns is scarce but growing steadily, for example with respect to employment [START_REF] Aguilera | The impact of social capital on labor force participation: evidence from the 2000 social capital benchmark survey[END_REF][START_REF] Kalter | Auf der Suche nach einer Erklärung für die spezifischen Arbeitsmarktnachteile von Jugendlichen türkischer Herkunft. Zugleich eine Replik auf den Beitrag von[END_REF][START_REF] Lancee | The economic returns of immigrants' bonding and bridging social capital. The case of the Netherlands[END_REF], income [START_REF] Mouw | Racial differences in the effects of job contacts: conflicting evidence from cross-sectional and longitudinal data[END_REF][START_REF] Aguilera | Social capital and the wages of Mexican migrants: new hypotheses and tests[END_REF], Aguilera 2005, Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra 2008), self-employment (Kanas et al. 2009b) and occupational status [START_REF] Sanders | Ethnic boundaries and identity in plural societies[END_REF]Nee 1996, Kanas et al. 2009a). The general conclusion is that social capital helps immigrants to make headway on the labour market. Recent discussions on social capital distinguish between 'bonding' and 'bridging' [START_REF] Putnam | Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American community[END_REF][START_REF] Burt | Structural holes versus network closure as social capital[END_REF]). Loosely defined, bonding refers to within-group connections, while bridging social capital refers to between-group connections. Distinguishing between different forms of social capital seems particularly important with regard to immigrants. For immigrants, especially social capital of the bridging type is expected to yield positive returns since it implies building much needed host-country specific capital [START_REF] Kalter | Auf der Suche nach einer Erklärung für die spezifischen Arbeitsmarktnachteile von Jugendlichen türkischer Herkunft. Zugleich eine Replik auf den Beitrag von[END_REF], Haug 2007[START_REF] Lancee | Turkish migrants and native Germans compared: The effect of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic friendships on the transition from unemployment to work[END_REF]. However, returns with respect to bonding social capital may not be that straightforward. Networks of immigrants are often characterized as isolated and therefore hindering economic integration (Portes 1998b). On the other hand, immigrants are repeatedly characterized as having a social network that is based on ethnic solidarity (see for example [START_REF] Sanders | Immigrant self-employment: the family as social capital and the value of human capital[END_REF], Sanders et al. 2002, Waldinger 2005).

It is often suggested that whereas bonding social capital is "to get by", bridging social capital is "to get ahead" (Putnam 2000, p. 23). This seems to hold for immigrants' social capital too (See for example Kanas et al. 2009b[START_REF] Lancee | The economic returns of immigrants' bonding and bridging social capital. The case of the Netherlands[END_REF]. However, previous studies predominantly rely on cross-sectional data. The major problem with cross-sectional data is that it cannot solve the problems of unobserved heterogeneity and reversed causality. One of the main challenges in estimating the effect of social capital is that of homophily: people connect with those who are similar to them (see for a review [START_REF] Mcpherson | Birds of a feather: homophily in social networks[END_REF], Mouw 2006). In the words of Mouw (2003, p. 869): '(…) if successful people prefer to socialize with other successful people, this would result in a correlation between friends' income and occupational status, even in the absence of a causal effect of social capital on labour market outcomes'. Many studies analysing the effect of social capital rely on cross-sectional data, or use longitudinal models that do not solve the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, estimates of social capital may be biased. There are only few studies on the economic incorporation of immigrants that analyze the impact of both bonding and bridging social capital simultaneously and none uses longitudinal data.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, I contribute to the field by analysing the economic returns of two main forms of social capital simultaneously for immigrants in Germany. Second, the paper better estimates the effect of social capital by making use of

Theory and hypotheses

Social capital refers to the resources that are potentially available in one's network. A social network can be considered a capital, which can produce returns in order to improve (economic) well-being. There is no commonly accepted definition of social capital. In this paper, I follow Lin (1999, p. 30) and see social capital as 'investment and use of embedded resources in social relations for expected returns'.

Bridging social capital

Bridging social capital is referred to as the building of connections between heterogeneous groups [START_REF] Schuller | Social capital: a review and critique[END_REF], or, in the words of Putnam (2007, p. 143) as 'ties to people "unlike" you in some important way'. In the migration literature, bridging social capital usually refers to contacts with natives (see, for example [START_REF] Putnam | E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century. The 2006 Johan Skytte prize lecture[END_REF][START_REF] Nannestad | Bridge over troubled water? Migration and social capital[END_REF], Kanas et al. 2009b[START_REF] Lancee | The economic returns of immigrants' bonding and bridging social capital. The case of the Netherlands[END_REF]. The advantage of bridging ties is that unique information and opportunities come into reach (Putnam 2000, p. 22). It is well established in the literature that for immigrants, contacts with natives are important cross-cutting ties (Portes 1998a[START_REF] Heath | Explaining ethnic minority disadvantage[END_REF], Haug 2008).

Bridging social capital, seen as bridging the ethnic divide is beneficial to immigrants because it provides access to host country specific resources. Moreover, it provides unique information about labour market opportunities. The idea of social capital being a capital -in the sense that investments yield positive returns -is based on the assumption that social relations connect people to valuable resources (see for example Flap and Völker 2004).

According to Nederveen Pieterse ( 2003), inter-ethnic relations help immigrants to get access to helpful resources beyond their homogenous ethnic networks. In other words, migrants with ties to the native population gain access to host-country specific resources.

There is ample evidence that for successful integration in the labour market of the host society, migrants need host-country specific skills [START_REF] Borjas | The economic of integration[END_REF][START_REF] Duleep | Immigrants and human capital investment[END_REF][START_REF] Friedberg | You can't take it with you? Immigrant assimilation and the portability of human capital[END_REF][START_REF] Zeng | Asian-Americans. Earnings disadvantage reexamined: the role of place of education[END_REF], Kanas and Van Tubergen 2009). The argument of the need for host-country specific capital is predominantly made with respect to human capital, such as educational attainment and language proficiency [START_REF] Chiswick | Immigrant earnings: language skills, linguistic concentrations and the business cycle[END_REF].

However, this argument is also central to bridging social capital: by building inter-ethnic ties, migrants realize access to resources that they have typically little of themselves. Contacts with natives hence help to make headway on the labour market because it implies getting access to much needed host-country specific resources, for example by getting help with applications, translating adverts, finding vacancies, or assistance on how to present oneself to employers [START_REF] Aguilera | Social capital and the wages of Mexican migrants: new hypotheses and tests[END_REF].

Furthermore, as [START_REF] Haug | Interethnische Freundschaftsbeziehungen und soziale Integration. Unterschiede in der Ausstattung mit sozialem Kapital bei jungen Deutschen und Immigranten[END_REF] points out, 'since (…) in Germany most employers are Germans, it is useful for immigrants to have contacts to Germans.' Because most employers are native residents it is helpful to have ties with natives. Moreover, since natives are, on average, higher educated and have better jobs themselves, they are more likely to be well informed and able to point to better jobs. Earlier studies indeed find that contacts with natives help immigrants to make headway on the labour market, both with respect to employment as well as occupational status (see, for example, [START_REF] Aguilera | Social capital and the wages of Mexican migrants: new hypotheses and tests[END_REF][START_REF] Kalter | Auf der Suche nach einer Erklärung für die spezifischen Arbeitsmarktnachteile von Jugendlichen türkischer Herkunft. Zugleich eine Replik auf den Beitrag von[END_REF], Kanas et al. 2009b[START_REF] Lancee | The economic returns of immigrants' bonding and bridging social capital. The case of the Netherlands[END_REF].

Hence, the first hypothesis reads: Bridging social capital positively affects both the likelihood to be employed and occupational status.

Bonding social capital

Bonding social capital is usually referred to as within-group connections. The underlying principle is that of network closure (Coleman 1990, Burt 2005). In the case of total closure in a network, all people are connected with one another. The clearest case of a network with a high degree of closure is probably the family [START_REF] Coleman | Social capital in the creation of human capital[END_REF]). In their "forms of capital" model for immigrant incorporation into the labour market, Nee and Sanders (2001, p. 388) emphasize the pivotal role of the family (see also [START_REF] Sanders | Immigrant self-employment: the family as social capital and the value of human capital[END_REF]. With respect to its returns, there are two competing arguments. On the one hand, bonding social capital may result in better labour market outcomes. The key advantage of closure in a network is superior information and a high degree of solidarity. As opposed to inter-ethnic ties, co-ethnic ties may profit from ethnic solidarity [START_REF] Sanders | Ethnic boundaries and identity in plural societies[END_REF]. Hence, the more closure in a network, the more likely the sharing and exchange of resources (Lin 2001, p. 66). There is evidence that, for immigrants, the main source of information on jobs is through relatives and friends, particularly those who belong to the same ethnic origin [START_REF] Zhou | Chinatown: The socioeconomic potential of an urban enclave[END_REF][START_REF] Waldinger | The making of an immigrant niche[END_REF][START_REF] Pichler | Migration, Community-Formierung und ethnische Ökonomie[END_REF], Menjivar 2000). Ethnic networks can function as a means to make headway on the labour market, since these networks rely on ethnic solidarity and enforceable trust [START_REF] Portes | Embeddedness and immigration: notes on the social determinants of economic action[END_REF][START_REF] Portes | Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: A conceptual overview[END_REF], Waldinger 1995). Nee and Sanders conclude (2001, pp. 389-90): '(…) especially for immigrants who do not possess substantial financial capital, the family (nuclear and extended) constitutes the most important capital asset. (…) The social capital embodied in family relationships promotes cooperation needed in realizing both economic and non-economic values.' Elliottt (2001, but see also [START_REF] Stainback | Social contacts and race/ethnic job matching[END_REF] finds that Latinos are more likely than natives to enter jobs by matching people and jobs through ethnic social networks. [START_REF] Patacchini | Ethnic Networks and Employment Outcomes[END_REF] find that ethnic networks in Britain increase the probability of finding employment.

On the other hand, immigrants' bonding social capital is characterized as isolated.

Consequently, if jobs are found through ethnic and family networks, they are likely to be inferior [START_REF] Nee | Understanding the diversity of immigrant incorporation: a forms of capital model[END_REF]. The argument is that resources accessed through a network of co-ethnics and family members do not provide unique information; they hence do not result in opportunities for upward mobility on the labour market. When being embedded into ethnic networks only, successful upward mobility may be impeded due to social obligations, pressure to conformity, or "downward levelling norms" [START_REF] Portes | a 'Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: A conceptual overview[END_REF]. Such mobility traps can consequently lead to ethnic segmentation or "downward assimilation" [START_REF] Portes | Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: A conceptual overview[END_REF]. The embedding into ethnic networks may prevent contacts with the host society and thus hamper integration (Haug 2007: 100). [START_REF] Lancee | The economic returns of immigrants' bonding and bridging social capital. The case of the Netherlands[END_REF] does not find an effect of family-based social capital for immigrants in the Netherlands with respect to employment and income. Elliott (1999) concludes that job referrals based on co-ethnic ties result in jobs that are paid worse for immigrants in the US.

It seems that bonding social capital may help to find a job; it however does not help to find a better job. Therefore, the second hypothesis is twofold: Bonding social capital positively affects the likelihood to be employed and secondly, for employed men, bonding social capital does not affect occupational status.

Data and measurement

Sample

For the measurement, I make use of the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (GSOEP), a panel study with a yearly questionnaire since 1984 (Wagner et al. 1993[START_REF] Sanders | Immigrant self-employment: the family as social capital and the value of human capital[END_REF], 2001and 2006 the survey included a module on social networks. Because of this, the panel used in this analysis is restricted to the years 1996-2007. The GSOEP oversamples immigrants and contains four immigrant sub-samples i with extensive information on migration history and specific questionnaire items. The initial response rate for the immigrant sample varied from 64.7 percent for Italians, to 70 percent for Turks. Response rates for subsequent waves were considerably higher.

As with all panels, the GSOEP is subject to attrition, which could bias the results [START_REF] Riphahn | Immigrant Participation in Social Assistance Programs: Evidence from German Guestworkers[END_REF]). The main sources of attrition were refusal and unsuccessful follow-up; special measures were taken to reduce attrition, such as contacting respondents again each year until all members of the household refused for two consecutive years (Kroh and Spieß 2008). The average attrition rate of the immigrant samples is 22%. (Haisken-DeNew and Frick 2005, p. 160). In the research sample, the attrition rate is 14.3% ii ; attrition was not People are classified as an immigrant if they are born outside Germany and do not have a German nationality iii . The sample is restricted to men because employment careers, as well as social networks differ substantially among (immigrant) men and women [START_REF] Hagan | Social networks, gender, and immigrant incorporation[END_REF][START_REF] Livingston | Gender, job searching, and employment outcomes among Mexican immigrants[END_REF]). The sample for the analysis of the likelihood of employment consists of all men aged eighteen till sixty-five. Those who are in school, performing military or civil service, or those retired earlier than age sixty-five are excluded from the sample. For the analyses of occupational status, the sample is furthermore restricted to people who work either full-time or regular part-time. Missing values are replaced with information available from earlier waves. In the years between the measurements of social capital items, respondents were given the last known value of this item (following [START_REF] Kalter | Auf der Suche nach einer Erklärung für die spezifischen Arbeitsmarktnachteile von Jugendlichen türkischer Herkunft. Zugleich eine Replik auf den Beitrag von[END_REF].

Method of estimation

One of the problems in empirical research on the effects of social capital is that of reversed causality. It may well be that more social capital results in better labour market outcomes, but it is also likely that a better position on the labour market results in more social capital (see Mouw 2006, for a recent review on the measurement of causality in social capital). That is, one could meet people just after finding a job, and this could result in a correlation between social capital and employment that is caused by employment, rather than by social contacts.

For that reason, indicators of social capital are lagged one year. By doing so, social capital is measured at an earlier point in time than employment and occupational status.

Another problem in cross-sectional research is the problem of unobserved heterogeneity: an effect can be due to enduring differences between people, rather than The random effects (RE) model assumes a randomly varying intercept, and the intercept is a draw from some distribution for each unit, and it is independent of the error for a particular observation (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). The advantage of the RE model is that it uses within-and between-individual information; hence also time-constant covariates be estimated. Moreover, the RE estimator is more efficient. Last, the logistic variant of the RE model does not require within-individual variation on the dependent variable and therefore makes use of the complete sample. The major drawback is that the random intercept is assumed to be uncorrelated with the covariates; it therefore cannot control for unobserved individual characteristics. Therefore, although RE models use the panel structure of the data, they do not solve the problem of unobserved heterogeneity [START_REF] Halaby | Panel models in sociological research[END_REF]).

Since FE and RE models have advantages as well as disadvantages, I estimate both.

A Hausman test is performed to see which model is to be preferred from a statistical point of view.

Measures

The likelihood of employment is measured as being fulltime or regular part-time employed, as opposed to being unemployed, looking for a job or not working. The occupational status is From these items, a construct called "Strength of family ties" is built. Reliability analysis (Crobach's alpha 1996: .82, 2001: .81) clearly shows that these items can be seen as underlying measures of a single construct. As a proxy for family network size, I also include the number of family members.

The following variables are included to measure bridging social capital. First, a variable containing the ties mentioned above which are classified as coming 'from the old/new Federal states iv . The second measure for bridging social capital is a construct labelled "Visiting native Germans at home". Every second year, respondents were asked whether they visited Germans at their home previous year (yes / no) and whether they received visits at home by Germans in the previous year (yes / no, Cronbach's alpha ranging from .80 to.87 across waves). The measures of social capital have to be seen in the light of some limitations. First, since social capital is not measured every survey year, but every five years (apart from "visiting native Germans", which is measured every second year), there is little withinindividual variation. This complicates the estimation of a causal effect. Partly, this is solved by estimating RE models, which use between-individudual information to obtain the estimates.

Nonetheless, when FE models do indicate a significant impact of social capital, this is strong support for the existence of a causal relationship. A second limitation concerns the diversity of social capital measures available in the GSOEP: the measures for bonding and bridging are not symmetrical. Unfortunately, there is no indicator available for network size of one's bridging social capital. Furthermore, bridging social capital is most likely underestimated when it concerns weak ties. There is consensus that the ties mentioned in name generator items (like the German friend item) are biased towards strong ties (see for example Van der Gaag and Snijders 2004). In that respect, weak ties in [START_REF] Granovetter | The strength of weak ties[END_REF] sense are not included fully, insofar they are not captured by the visiting Germans at home construct. Last, none of the items used can identify the tie's occupational position, or whether the person mentioned is ego's employer. It is therefore not possible to test whether socio-economic characteristics are bridged in addition to ethnicity.

Notwithstanding these limitations, I argue that the measures are a good proxy of bonding and bridging social capital. Although the indicators do not cover all family and coethnic ties, somebody scoring high on the measured bonding indicators is likely to do so on the ties that are not measured. Likewise, when a respondent mentions inter-ethnic ties among the three people whom he goes out with and meets often, and/or if he visits native Germans at their home, this is likely to be a good proxy for the contacts with natives in his network.

Control variables

The following control variables are included. The educational attainment of the respondent, as measured using the CASMIN scheme v . Furthermore, a dummy variable is included indicating whether or not the respondent attended school in Germany. I also control for German language proficiency, consisting of a scale of three items, measured every second year vi . The items included are "Language usually spoken" (German, mostly that of country of origin, equally), "Own opinion of spoken German", "Own opinion of written German". Furthermore, I control for the number of years of full-time working experience (also squared), the number of years since migration, marital status and the ethnic origin of the respondent. For the analyses of occupational status, a dummy for working part-time is included, as well as the number of hours worked per week. To control for differences across regions, dummies for the German federal states are included vii . These dummies intend to capture any regional factors affecting labour market outcomes, such as regional unemployment levels or job opportunities [START_REF] Constant | Labor market segmentation and the earnings of German guestworkers[END_REF]. Last, to control for a time trend, dummies for each survey year are included. In table 1, the descriptive statistics are presented. It was checked for multicollinearity, but this was not a problem.

<TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE>

Results

In table 2, model 1, a RE model is presented that predicts the likelihood to be employed.

Inter-ethnic ties increase the likelihood to be employed. The number of family members has a negative impact on employment, but the odds ratio is very close to one, indicating the effect size is almost zero. The other measures of social capital do not significantly affect the likelihood to be employed. Coefficients estimated with an RE model are based on within-and between-individual variation. This implies that the coefficient for inter-ethnic ties expresses the difference of having more versus less social capital (the between-individual variation), and acquiring more (or less) social capital over time (the within-individual variation). Although theoretically this is the best estimate because all information is used, it can be the case that the between-individual variation is biased by unmeasured personal characteristics (unobserved heterogeneity).

In model 2, a FE model is presented. The FE estimator is based only on withinindividual variation. Hence, only over-time changes in social capital are captured. This implies that respondents who do not report changes in their social capital do not influence the estimation of the coefficient. However, since these respondents do influence the standard error, they are included in the sample. The time-constant covariates are dropped, as they Therefore, the FE sample is different from the RE sample. However, as [START_REF] Halaby | Panel models in sociological research[END_REF] notes, estimating FE models is not throwing away information, but making use of the panel structure of the data. Moreover, to make sure that outliers do not drive the findings in the FE model, its standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping.

As can be seen in model 2, the coefficient of inter-ethnic ties remains significant and changes very little in size. Since this is a FE model, this effect is not due to unobserved differences between individuals that are time-constant. Furthermore, with respect to possible time-variant characteristics, the model controls for changes in marital status and working experience. Since the model includes dummies for each survey year, the effect is neither spurious with a time trend. In other words, it is not the case that the effect of inter-ethnic ties is due to, for example, changes in economic circumstances that occurred in the observation period.

To summarize, people that reported an increase in their inter-ethnic friends are more likely to be employed at a later point in time (FE and RE model); furthermore, people that have more inter-ethnic friends than others, are more likely to be employed the year after (RE model). The coefficient of inter-ethnic ties is slightly larger in the FE than in the RE model.

This can have three reasons. First, because the FE model only includes people for whom a change in the dependent variable is observed, the sample is different from the RE sample. If inter-ethnic ties indeed help finding a job, it seems likely that the effect is larger when a model is estimated including only those people that change their employment status. Second, the coefficient of inter-ethnic ties might be larger because the FE sample is selective viii , for example due to attrition [START_REF] Riphahn | Immigrant Participation in Social Assistance Programs: Evidence from German Guestworkers[END_REF]). When attrition is not random, it can bias the estimates. This would be the case when people that leave the panel are, for example, dominantly those that report a decrease in inter-ethnic ties and find employment afterwards.

Third, the coefficient could be larger because there are unobserved characteristics, like ability, that are not controlled for in the RE model. As discussed, both RE and FE models have its (dis)advantages. The similar results with regard to significance and effect size is, however, a good indicator for the reliability of the results. In table 3, the effect of indicators of social capital on occupational status is predicted. To make them comparable within the models, all covariates are standardized between zero and one. In addition to the variables that are included in the analysis of employment, I include three extra ones: working part-time, being self-employed and the number of hours worked in a week. In the RE model (model 4), it appears that only inter-ethnic ties affect occupational status. There is no effect of visiting native Germans. Hence, only the "strongest" inter-ethnic ties affect occupational status. Just as in the analysis of employment, diversifying one's network with inter-ethnic ties positively impacts occupational status. As hypothesized, high closure in one's family network and intra-ethnic ties is not associated with immigrants' occupational status. When estimating a FE model (model 5), the results are similar. Based on these models, we can conclude that having more inter-ethnic ties than other people results in a higher occupational status. Furthermore, acquiring more inter-ethnic ties over time results in a higher occupational status. The coefficient of inter-ethnic ties is slightly lower in the FE model. This is most likely because in the FE model all between-individual differences are controlled for; its coefficients are therefore not biased by unobserved heterogeneity.

It could be that the returns to social capital are different for the ethnic groups included.

Therefore, by including interactions with ethnic group and each of the indicators of social capital it was tested whether this was the case. None of the interactions appeared significant.

Furthermore, one could argue that the effect of social capital is different for people that attended school in Germany (Kanas and Van Tubergen 2009). However, none of the interactions between attending school in Germany and indicators of social capital appeared significant.

Conclusion

In this paper, I analysed the effect of bonding and bridging social capital on the likelihood of employment and occupational status for first-generation male immigrants in Germany. Based Using the isolation argument, I argued that bonding social capital is not associated with occupational status.

These hypotheses were tested with longitudinal data and by estimating both random and fixed effects models. Previous studies dominantly relied on cross-sectional data, which suffer from the problems of reversed causality and unobserved heterogeneity. By making use of longitudinal data, it was possible to estimate the effect of acquiring more social capital over-time, as well as the effect of having more social capital than others. Moreover, estimating fixed effects models ensure that the effects are not due to differences between people that are not controlled for (unobserved heterogeneity). Furthermore, indicators of social capital were measured one year before the labour market outcomes.

The findings partly confirmed the expectations. Having contacts with natives positively impacts both employment and occupational status. That is, immigrants who have more close friends that are native German (both over-time as well as in comparison with others) are more likely to be employed and have a higher occupational status the year after.

However, there is no effect of visiting Germans at home. Based on these findings, can we conclude that there is a causal effect of bridging social capital on labour market outcomes?

One has to keep in mind that only ethnic bridges are measured. Therefore, it might be the case that ties are bridging on the ethnic dimension, but bonding with regard to socioeconomic characteristics. McPherson et al. (2001, p. 415) suggest that bridging the ethnic divide is more important than bridging across occupations: 'Homophily in race and ethnicity creates the strongest divides in our personal environments, with age, religion, education, occupation, and gender following in roughly that order.' However, data on the socio-economic status of the ties would be desirable in order to describe the social composition of the networks. This way, one could examine if socio-economic variables are bridged in addition to ethnicity, and refine the results related to the resource argument. A second limitation that has to be mentioned is that only strong(er) inter-ethnic ties are measured. One therefore does not know whether the results are the same for people's entire network. Further research is needed that can also include people's weak ties.

As hypothesized, bonding social capital is not associated with occupational status.

Contrary to the expectations, however, also with regard to employment, immigrants in Germany do not profit from co-ethnic and family-based social capital. This supports the 'isolation' rather than the 'closure' argument: closure may indicate a high level of solidarity and enforceable trust, but it does not result in valuable information or support that is useful in finding a job. Since people in the sample are dominantly long-term immigrants, an alternative explanation might be the ongoing incorporation of immigrants in German society. Sanders (2002, p. 348) concludes: 'When social boundaries take on less of a gate-keeper function protecting ethnically generated resources and more of a bridging function encouraging greater intergroup association, the identity-preserving influence of ethnic boundaries is likely to decline'. Also [START_REF] Hagan | Social networks, gender, and immigrant incorporation[END_REF] concludes that, especially shortly after arrival, family-based and co-ethnic networks offer the resources needed to find jobs. Since the sample consists mostly of long term-migrants, it could hence be that bonding social capital did have its value in the past, but is no longer relevant after a substantial number of years in the host society.

Keeping in mind the conceptualization of bonding and bridging social capital, as well as the limitations of the data, it seems that in the case of male immigrants in Germany, whereas bridging is to get ahead, bonding is indeed to get by. ii The attrition rate is most likely lower because only the working age population is included.

F

iii Persons with a German nationality were not included because the construct "visiting Germans at home" was not asked in all waves to people with a German nationality. Furthermore, they were not included to make sure that the ties mentioned are measured as bridging and bonding in the same way for the whole sample. iv. This classification effectively separates native Germans and ethnic minorities. In one case it is less clear. Ties that belong to the second generation and have German citizenship could be classified as either 'from another country or as 'from the old/new Federal states'. In the followup question ('Do you come from the same country [as the person mentioned]'), it appeared that in 98% of the cases people indicate them to be from the same country as they are themselves (for people born in Germany but no German citizenship, this percentage is 93). That is, the country referred to is the country of origin. This is most likely the same when immigrants classify ties that belong to the second generation and with a German nationality.

  estimation methods that account for potential unobserved heterogeneity and reversed causality.

  specific ethnic group. However, attrition could be related to return-migration and consequently bias the sample towards long-term migrants. The fact that the average years of stay in Germany is just over 23 years indicates that the sample is indeed most representative for long-term migrants. In addition, the GSOEP 'foreigner' sample is in fact a guest worker sample of which the vast part is to stay for good. When one compares the research sample to the ethnic minority population in Germany, the classic guest worker groups are indeed overrepresented (Turks, Ex-Yugoslavians, Greeks, Italians, Spanish and Portuguese), the other groups are under-represented (Eastern Europe, EU Western, and non EU).

  International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI)[START_REF] Ganzeboom | A standard international socio-economic index of occupational status[END_REF], which summarizes the power, income and required educational achievement associated with the various positions in the occupational structure.Three variables are constructed to measure bonding social capital.[START_REF] Sanders | Immigrant self-employment: the family as social capital and the value of human capital[END_REF]In , 2001In and 2006 the GSOEP contains a module named 'social networks and persons to confide in'. In this module, people are asked to mention up to three people outside their household that are important to them. The introduction phrase reads: 'Now some questions about your friends and acquaintances: Please think of three friends or relatives or other people whom you go out with or meet often. Please do not include relatives or other people who live in the same household as you'. Ties are subsequently classified as 'Is from another country or is foreigner' or as 'Is from one of the old/new Federal states'. For ties classified as 'from another country or foreigner', it is asked whether the respondent comes from the same country as the person mentioned. If this is the case, the ties are included as bonding social capital.In 1996 and 2001, a module is available containing questions about people's relatives outside the household. Respondents are asked to indicate which family members they have and how strong their relationship is. The introduction phrase reads: 'Now a question concerning family members who don't live at home: Which ones and how many of the following relatives do you have?' Subsequently, respondents are asked 'For those relatives that you do have how close is your relationship?' (no relationship, fleeting, average, close, very close).

  provide any within-individual information. Logistic FE models require within-individual variation on the dependent variable. As a result, the number of observations is much lower.

  of access to host-country specific resources, I hypothesized that bridging social capital positively affects both outcomes. Furthermore, based on the argument of network closure I hypothesized that bonding social capital positively affects employment.

v

  The categories are slightly collapsed: included are inadequately/general elementary (originally separate categories), basic vocational, intermediate vocational/general (originally separate categories), general or vocational maturity certificate and tertiary education. Models were also estimated including parental education. This did not yield different results. vi Cronbach's alpha ranging from .83 to.86 across waves. vii Due to the low N in some of the states several categories are collapsed: Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia are collapsed in one category. viii However, the Hausman test favours the FE model. Furthermore, the standard errors of the FE model are robust. Page 25 of 25 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers ethnic@surrey.ac.uk Ethnic and Racial Studies

  because of having acquired social capital.Mouw (2006, but see also Halaby 1994) reviews the studies on social capital that aim to estimate a causal relationship, and is most favourable towards studies that apply fixed effects models.

	The fixed effects (FE) model estimates an intercept for each individual in the model.
	The FE model uses each variable's difference from its within-individual mean and hence can
	estimate only coefficients that have within-individual variation (Mouw 2006, Rabe-Hesketh
	and Skrondal 2008). The big advantage of the FE model is that it controls for all differences
	between individuals, thereby eliminating unobserved heterogeneity (Halaby 2004). The F r o disadvantage of FE models is that it is not possible to estimate time-constant covariates, such
	P
	e
	e r
	R
	e
	v i e
	w
	O n l
	y
	8

as ethnic origin. Another disadvantage is that, because FE models only use within-individual variation, they are -by definition-more sensitive to attrition. Last, in its logistic variant, individuals without variation on the dependent variable are excluded from the analysis since they don't provide information for the likelihood function.

Table 1 .

 1 Descriptive statistics sample.

	Tables and figures
			Sample employment	Sample occupational status
			Mean	SD	Mean	SD
	Inter-ethnic contacts		0.31	0.38	0.33	0.38
	Visiting native Germans at home	0.82	0.35	0.84	0.34
	Intra-ethnic contacts		0.62	0.39	0.61	0.39
	Strength of family ties		0.72	0.18	0.73	0.18
	Number of family members Control variables o German language proficiency r Years since migration	0.12 0.54 23.59	0.11 0.23 9.58	0.12 0.56 23.31	0.11 0.23 9.25
	Working experience fulltime in years P Weekly working hours	20.21 -	11.68 -	19.8 42.05	10.82 8.24
	Ethnic group Turkish (Ex-)Yugoslavian Greek	Percentage 36 e e 19 r 9		Percentage 36 18 9
	Italian		18		18
	Spanish/Portuguese Eastern Eur. (EU10) Other EU / Western Non EU Attended school in Germany Educational attainment Inadequately / General elementary Basic vocational Intermediate vocational, Interm. general General/Vocational maturity Tertiary education Marital status Single	6 2 R 6 4 e 33 v 39 i 37 11 e 4 9 w 10	7 2 7 3 36 36 39 11 5 9 9
	Divorced/Separated/widowed Married Part-time Self-Employed Number of observations Number of individuals		7 83 --5,493 954	7 84 2 7 4,017 n O l 788
	Source: GSOEP 1996-2007				y

Table 2 .

 2 Random and fixed effects logistic regression predicting the likelihood of employment among immigrant men inGermany, 1996Germany, -2007, odds ratios. , odds ratios.

	Model 1		Model 2
	Random effects	Fixed effects
	b	se	b	se

Table 3 .

 3 Random and fixed effects regression predicting ISEI-score among immigrant men inGermany, 1996Germany, -2007, standardized , standardized coefficients. models include dummies for each survey year and for the federal states. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests, robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual).(Hausman test between RE-and FE models significant at p<0.001) Source:GSOEP 1996GSOEP -2007. .

	Model 3		Model 4
	Random effects	Fixed effects
	b	se	b	se


Stigmatization, Space and Boundaries in De-industrial Burnley

Keywords: Stigma, Space, Whiteness, British National Party [BNP], Racism, class Space, stigma, racism, class, whiteness, BNP

Introduction

For Loic [START_REF] Wacquant | Territorial Stigmatization in the Age of Advanced Marginality[END_REF]2008), the urban processes of de-industrialization and the rise of post-Fordism, the weakening of the welfare state, and intensified economic polarization, mark the development of a new age of 'advanced marginality'.

Drawing on the case studies of Chicago's Black Belt and the 'Red Belt' of Paris, Wacquant argues that this phenomenon is characterized by, 'a dualization of the social and physical structure of the metropolis that has consigned large sections of 3 by 'racially' or 'ethnoracially'-defined 'others'. It is argued that in Burnley, areas primarily populated by 'scruffy whites' were also subject to such forms of denigration. Finally, the consequences and significance of forms of 'territorial stigmatization' will be considered within the context of 'advanced marginality' (Wacquant 2008). It will be claimed that this form of stigmatization informs notions of entitlement with regards to the allocation of resources. It operates upon a 'culturalist' sensibility [START_REF] Alexander | Imagining the Asian gang: Ethnicity, Masculinity and Youth after 'the Riots[END_REF]) which sees social inequality and marginalisation as a manifestation of cultural difference and dysfunction rather than an outcome of social, economic, and political processes. Wacquant (2008) suggests that since the 1980s, we have witnessed the intensification of economic inequalities. This has largely resulted from changes in the dominant system of production and the reluctance of the state to address the new forms of socio-economic polarisation these shifts have produced. For Wacquant, these new forms of inequality and polarisation are both reflected within and reproduced through increasingly distinct spatial formations, that exist within an emergent age of 'advanced marginality'. He defines 'advanced marginality as a, 'novel regime of sociospatial relegation and exclusionary closure ' (2008, p.2), Wacquant argues that these formations are subjected to forms of stigmatizationperpetuated by journalists, residents, and politicians. Such forms of spatial stigmatization have been recognised by a range of other academics (Skeggs, 2004;[START_REF] Bottero | Stratification: Social Division and Inequality[END_REF][START_REF] Watt | Respectability, Roughness and 'Race': Neighbourhood Place Images and the Making of Working-Class Social Distinctions in London[END_REF][START_REF] Sampson | Disparity and diversity in the contemporary city: social (dis)order revisited[END_REF]. In Skeggs' own research, for instance, she observed how, 'local areas were continually used as shorthand to name those whose presence was seen to be potentially threatening' (2004 p.112). For Wacquant, this stigma acts to repel investment, works to justify increased 'structural violence' from above such as institutional withdrawal, intensified surveillance and policing, as well as demoralizing and disuniting residents, further limiting prospects for social mobility. Wacquant states that this form of stigma falls most heavily upon areas that exhibit a combination of racial or ethnic difference and class inequality, whose residents have suffered most acutely from new forms of 'post-Fordist poverty' (Wacquant, 2008 p.237). This emphasis on how distinctions are made and boundaries drawn through space is important as it recognises space as both constituted by and constitutive of social relations and patterns of differentiation and group formation [START_REF] Massey | Space[END_REF][START_REF] Bottero | Stratification: Social Division and Inequality[END_REF][START_REF] Clayton | Thinking Spatially: towards an everyday understanding of inter-ethnic relations[END_REF]) Such a perspective enables us to see how, 'the spatial, itself a product of competing discourses, practices and power relations, has the capacity to constitute, constrain and mediate social distinctions including race' (Clayton, 2009 p.483). [START_REF] Wacquant | Territorial Stigmatization in the Age of Advanced Marginality[END_REF]2008) focuses on two distinct spatial formations to illuminate his argument: the 'hyperghetto' within the historic 'Black Belt' of Chicago in the United States, and the 'banlieues' of the Parisian 'Red Belt'. He defines the former as, 'a novel, decentered, territorial and organizational configuration characterized by conjugated segregation of race and class' (2008 p.3).

Stigmatization and socio-spatial polarization

For Wacquant, the 'hyperghetto' is characterized not just by its acute levels of violence, insecurity, and institutional 'desertification', but also by the way it exists as a 'specifically racial formation' (2008 p.182). In contrast, he argues that the multiethnic make-up of the French 'banlieue' means that here stigma is not 'linked The article also attempts to address Wacquant's failure to adequately consider the stigmatization faced by residents of predominantly white areas of 'relegation'. For Wacquant, a key feature of stigmatized areas is the existence of significant minority populations or 'phenotypically marked populations' (2008 p.168) While he recognizes the differing constitution of stigmatized areas, he still conceives of such formations as being primarily populated by 'racial' or 'ethnoracial' others, as such areas come to be associated with 'poverty and ethnic origin or postcolonial immigrant status' (2008 p.238). For Hartigan, this reflects the tendency, prevalent within the US, to associate blackness with poverty and whiteness with affluence. However, Hartigan observes how the residence of poor whites in stigmatized areas of Detroit, also led to acute forms of distinction and distancing. For him, such processes are evident in the epithet of 'white trash' which, 'designates ruptures of conventions that maintain whiteness as an unmarked, normative identity' (1997b p.46). Hartigan argues that to 'paint ghettos in uniquely colored terms'-as Wacquant does-serves to, 'delimit our attention to the disconcerting complexity and nuance of how race continues to matter, not only in the country's ghettos but in the political debates and the research agendas of those charged with objectifying these troubling sites ' (1997a p.340). As contemporary research on both sides of the Atlantic consistently shows, boundaries are drawn and negative attributes assigned not just to minority ethnic groups or spaces, but also to white groups and spaces seen to represent a threat-be it moral, cultural, physical, or social, evidenced in representations of 'white trash' and 'chavs' (Hartigan 1997a;1997b;2005;Newitz and Wray 1997;[START_REF] Haylett | Illegitimate Subjects?: abject whites, neoliberal modernisation, and middle class multiculturalism[END_REF][START_REF] Nayak | Displaced Masculinities: Chavs, Youth and Class in the Post-industrial City[END_REF][START_REF] Wray | Not Quite White: White Trash and the Boundaries of Whiteness[END_REF]Webster 2008). In this sense, 'geographies of difference...are not just imagined in terms of race, but they also incorporate territorial and class dimensions' (Clayton 2009, p.490). This is particularly significant in the UK context where, unlike the US, notions of an urban 'underclass' often focus more heavily upon white bodies and spaces [START_REF] Haylett | Illegitimate Subjects?: abject whites, neoliberal modernisation, and middle class multiculturalism[END_REF].

It is argued here that areas deemed both 'white' and 'Asian' in their nature were subjected to forms of 'territorial stigmatization' by interviewees.

'Stigmatypes' [START_REF] Wray | Not Quite White: White Trash and the Boundaries of Whiteness[END_REF]) such as 'chav' and 'white trash' alert us not just to the varied racial or ethnic constitution of the areas of 'advanced marginality', they also suggest that Wacquant may have taken his understanding of differentiation further, considering more fully the various representations of 'urban outcasts' and the sociospatial formations in which they reside. For instance, while Wacquant recognises that stigmatized areas are broadly associated with danger, degradation and moral degeneracy, such notions coalesce around particular themes and focus upon specific bodies. In this sense, not all residents of stigmatized spaces are equally burdened by disparate forms of stigma. Wacquant himself notes how the residents of 'relegated' neighbourhoods, make internal distinctions which include, 'the diversion of public opprobrium onto scapegoats, such as notorious "problem families" and foreigners, or drug dealers and single mothers' (2008 p.183). However, such distinctions-made both internally and externally-place particular weight on specific 'others', and the form this process of 'othering' will take differs in each context. In France, for instance, Wacquant observes how the male 'youths' of the banlieues, both 'native and foreign', carry special symbolic weight 'as the chief source of disorder, delinquency and ambient insecurity in the city' (2008 p.188). These figures remind us that stigmatization rests upon specific representations that operate within 'multiple registers of difference simultaneously' (Hartigan 2005, p.21). This is something which Wacquant, at times appears to overlook, evident in his assertion that in the case of the French 'Red Belt', class is more significant than 'race' in its formation (2008 p.5). As Hartigan states, the task of the analyst is not to attempt to assert which of 'race', class, and gender is more 'fundamental' or assumes primacy, but instead to see these social divisions as, 'a series of interlocking codes by which patterns of inequality are maintained and reproduced' (2005 p.9). Furthermore, as Wacquant himself acknowledges, aspects of 'advanced marginality', including 'territorial stigmatization', manifest, 'differently in different countries and/or types of urban environment as a function of the social and political history of which the city and its divisions are the theatre and the product' (2008 pp.248-49). It is these Wacquant is keen to stress that while 'territorial stigmatization' principally pertains to the labelling and denigration of specific areas, it does not simply have symbolic effects. He argues informs particular institutional practices which serve to, 'destabilise and further marginalise their occupants' (2008 p.240; see also [START_REF] Sampson | Disparity and diversity in the contemporary city: social (dis)order revisited[END_REF]. For Wacquant, the development and designation of these areas is linked to the sway that notions of the 'underclass' hold within the political imagination. This construction-of which 'territorial stigmatization' is an integral part-serves to 'sever' such areas and those residing within them, 'from the broader socio-political structures of caste and class domination of which it is both an instrument and a product' (2008 p.89). Instead, the explanation for the existence of such areas is seen to reside primarily in the cultural dispositions of the inhabitants. Such ideas lead to increased disinvestment, depressed property values, and avoidance by outsiders.

Wray, observes how 'symbolic boundaries', if they become widely-believed and established can lead to the solidification of 'social boundaries'. The latter are, 'embodied and materialised in our collective practices, our shared activities and our social institutions. Such practices, activities, and institutions give social boundaries extraordinary administrative power, authority, and legitimacy' (2006 p.14). The final part of this article considers then the significance of these negative forms of stigma.

It is argued that the symbolic boundaries identified by interviewees had social effects as they were the basis upon which claims to entitlement were evaluated.

Interviewees drew upon these stigmatizations as a means of asserting a cultural, moral and social distance that is highly spatialized through the invocation of 'geographies of roughness' and 'respectability' [START_REF] Watt | Respectability, Roughness and 'Race': Neighbourhood Place Images and the Making of Working-Class Social Distinctions in London[END_REF].

'Territorial Stigmatization' in Burnley

Burnley is a former textile-town, located in East Lancashire in the United Kingdom, approximately 30 miles north of Manchester. During the 1880s, the town prospered as one of the largest cotton producers in the world, however, by the 1930s the industry was in decline. This is reflective of broader shifts in manufacturing in the UK, and Burnley has suffered an additional downturn in local manufacturing in the last decade. Between 1999 and 2008 alone, the town lost 5,700 jobs in this sector, representing a decline of 48.3 per cent. In the same time period, 3,400 jobs were lost in total; a 9.4 per cent decline in the number of jobs in Burnley (Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.33). Annual Population Survey statistics estimate that in 2008, just 67 per cent of the working-age population in Burnley were in employment. This compares to a rate of 70.7 per cent in 2004 (Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.19).

The lack of employment opportunities has contributed to the population decline that Burnley has consistently been experiencing since 1991. The town had an estimated population of 88,200 in 2008compared to 90,600 in 1994(Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.3). Between 2001 and 2008, Burnley lost 2.46 per cent of its population, compared to an increase of 2.42 per cent across Lancashire (Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.12). A significant consequence of this population decline, as well as the poor quality of much of the town's housing stock, has been a weakening demand for housing. In 2004, 23.1 per cent of the town's housing stock was deemed unfit for dwelling (Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.16), while in 2008, 6.6 (Burnley Borough Council, 2010, p.56). In 2008 Burnley had the lowest average house price in England and Wales (Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.58).

The outcome of these interrelated transformations is that levels of deprivation within Burnley have increased in relation to the rest of the country. In 2007, Burnley was ranked as the 21 st most deprived of 354 local authority areas in England compared to 46 th in 2000. Additionally, 42 per cent of the town's Super Output Areas (SOAs) were within England's most deprived 20 per cent, compared to 35 per cent in 2004 (Burnley Borough Council, 2008, p.12)). This illustrates Wacquant's (2008) assertion that 'advanced marginality' does not refer to a point in time that has been arrived at, but rather an ongoing process that is intensifying. While Burnley as a whole exhibits significant levels of socio-economic deprivation-such as lower than average life expectancy and educational attainment, and higher than average rates of crime, incapacity, and unemployment-within the town itself there is wide differentiation. Indeed, Webster suggests that one of the most marked features of Oldham, Bradford, and Burnley is the, 'juxtaposition and transparency of deprivation and affluence between often-contiguous neighbourhoods within relatively small bounded areas' (2003 p.104). This reflects the uneven and complex effects of deindustrialization and economic restructuring, both between and within places. For instance, in the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme ward, in 2007 all four of the Super Output Areas (SOAs) ranked within the 10 per cent most deprived in the country (Burnley Borough Council 2008, p.12). Furthermore, within this ward the unemployment rate in 2007 was 9.4 per cent compared to just 0.7 percent in the (Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.29). Indeed, it was specific areas of the town, usually exhibiting the highest levels of socioeconomic deprivation that interviewees identified as particularly degraded and degenerate. However, before discussing such views in more detail it is necessary to provide a brief discussion of the methodological approach that generated the data for analysis.

(Insert Figure 1 [START_REF] Harris | Bitter north braced for another summer of hate[END_REF]. Following the 2004 local elections, 2,000 questionnaires were sent to addresses in the wards that had consistently registered the highest levels of BNP support over the previous two years. This elicited a response rate of just over 12 per cent. Anyone interested in participating was then asked to provide contact details, and these respondents, as well as those subsequently reached through snowball sampling, were interviewed. The interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewees and fully transcribed by the author, and then coded thematically using a word-processing programme. The sample included sixteen BNP supporters, sixteen non-BNP supporters, and two ex-BNP electoral candidates. The high number of BNP voters in the sample reflected a purposive strategy to engage with as many party supporters as possible. Nineteen men and fifteen women were interviewed. In keeping with the areas of BNP support at the time, those interviewed were drawn more heavily from the relatively more affluent, more homogeneously white wards of the town. However, the sample included individuals from the majority of the areas in the town, and displayed a degree of class heterogeneity while favouring those from the lower-middle and upper-working classes located in the outer-wards of Burnley. The following discussion focuses, primarily on the views of BNP voters, but also non-BNP supporters, examining how negative assertions about specific areas were constructed and articulated. BNP voters, in particular, offer an interesting insight into processes of stigmatization. While BNP supporters more frequently engaged in stigmatizing what were perceived to be 'Asian' and also 'scruffy white' areas [START_REF] Rhodes | It's Not Just Them, It's Whites As Well[END_REF], such views were not exclusive to BNP voters. However, it is true that in comparison 1). Through this spatial concentration a situation has emerged in which areas have become codified according to 'race' [START_REF] Report | Burnley Speaks, Who Listens? Burnley: Task Force[END_REF][START_REF] Webster | Race, Space and Fear: Imagined Geographies of Racism, Crime, Violence and Disorder in Northern England[END_REF][START_REF] Simpson | Oldham and Rochdale: race, housing and community cohesion[END_REF][START_REF] Phillips | The Problem with Segregation: Exploring the Racialisation of Space in Northern Pennine Towns[END_REF][START_REF] Clayton | Thinking Spatially: towards an everyday understanding of inter-ethnic relations[END_REF]. This tendency has been identified particularly 1 The 'Asian'/'Asian British' population of Burnley is primarily of Pakistani (5.6 per cent), Bangladeshi (1.6 per cent), and Indian (0.7 per cent) heritage. The term 'Asian' is hereafter used in the way that it was by interviewees in Burnley, who regularly used the terms 'Asian', 'Pakistani', and 'Muslim' interchangeably. within the smaller, de-industrialized towns of Lancashire and Yorkshire. This has resulted from historic patterns of settlement, experiences of racism, housing discrimination, wage disparity, and socio-economic deprivation that have adversely impacted upon minority ethnic communities, concentrating them in the poorest areas [START_REF] Webster | Race, Space and Fear: Imagined Geographies of Racism, Crime, Violence and Disorder in Northern England[END_REF][START_REF] Simpson | Oldham and Rochdale: race, housing and community cohesion[END_REF][START_REF] Phillips | The Problem with Segregation: Exploring the Racialisation of Space in Northern Pennine Towns[END_REF] Webster argues that as a consequence, in these locations there exist, 'perceptions of ethnic difference that are less amorphous, more visible, striking and contrasting than are found in larger more multicultural cities' (2003 p.102). This 'racialisation of space' [START_REF] Phillips | The Problem with Segregation: Exploring the Racialisation of Space in Northern Pennine Towns[END_REF] was present in the accounts of all of the white residents, not only BNP supporters. The Stoneyholme and Daneshouse ward was seen as the 'Asian' part of Burnley. One male BNP voter in his sixties stated that locally the area was referred to as the 'Khyber Pass', which is a mountain passage that links Pakistan and Afghanistan. The notion of 'Asian areas' also led to the construction of an asserted racialized 'ownership' of space, particularly apparent in the accounts of BNP voters. As one BNP voter, a female living on a suburban estate in one of the most affluent wards of town commented on the building of a recreation centre in Daneshouse and Stoneyholme, 'There's a new gym opened...all fantastic from the outside from what we can see, well to me it's all very elegant, its cost a lot of money but it's for Asians' (emphasis added).

It was the distinctive 'ethnoracial' demography of the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme ward on which the 'territorial stigmatization' of this area was based. In keeping with the key features of this form of stigma as identified by Wacquant, the area was seen as a site of social and cultural degeneracy, and the residents its agents. Statistically, the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme ward does exhibit disproportionately high rates of crime. However, as observed it also has the highest rates of unemployment and socio-economic deprivation in the town, and similarly deprived, predominantly white wards in Burnley, such as Trinity, are also characterized by high levels of crime (Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.86). However, it is clear that the association of the 'Asian' community with crime carried particular symbolic weight. This reflects how, 'A blemish of place is thus superimposed on the already existing stigmata traditionally associated with poverty and ethnic origin or postcolonial immigrant status' (Wacquant, 2007 p.67). An outcome of this was that Daneshouse and Stoneyholme came to be identified as a 'no-go area' for whites, a view widely, but by no means exclusively held by the interviewees. This was despite the fact that according to the 2001 census approximately one-third (34.3 per cent) of residents in the ward were white. One female BNP voter in her fifties living in an affluent suburb and working in a managerial position stated that Daneshouse and Stoneyholme was becoming a 'no-go area', describing the area as 'intimidating' and 'unsafe'. The following Labour supporter, in his thirties illustrates this point through his assertion that, I think its [Burnley] getting as well to no-go areas. I used to go out collecting money and I used to go into these areas and I would stick out an absolute mile, you go in and you would be the only one [white person] and it is intimidating...I wouldn't dream of walking around there at night now, you just wouldn't dream it. This association between the residents of the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme ward and crime was not the only way in which the area came to be negatively stigmatized; its perceived physical degradation was viewed as being linked to the 'cultural' practices of the 'Asian' residents. For instance, one BNP voter, a selfemployed male in his forties living in an affluent area of Burnley related an incident when he was working in Daneshouse and Stoneyholme, I was working with one of the builders that was there, one of my friends got clouted with a nappy that came out of the back window. Now in Pakistan they might throw nappies out of the windows and clean up later on but in England you don't do that, it's disgusting.

Another BNP voter, a male in his fifties living in a detached property on an affluent suburban estate bemoaned what he saw as the material degradation of Daneshouse and Stoneyholme; 'I will accuse Asians of not looking after their property...it's the old ghetto situation...more Asians come in and they get in that area and they don't look after the property, so very quickly it becomes slums'. Even where residents disavowed this association between 'race' and behaviour, negative stigmatizations were still often assigned due to the classed nature of the ward. The following quote from a Labour voter, a university-educated professional in her twenties living in one of the more affluent areas of Burnley, demonstrates this; 'I wouldn't move to Stoneyholme or Duke Bar…just because they're full of scrubbers and I don't mean black or white, I just mean they're full of scruffy people with scruffy ideas, dole dossers'. The quotes outlined in this paragraph demonstrate the role that notions of the visceral and 'disgust' play in the assertion of moral boundaries [START_REF] Sayer | The Moral Significance of Class[END_REF] It was also the identification of Daneshouse and Stoneyholme as a 'Muslim' area that informed the negative symbolism it carried. BNP voters in particular viewed traditional forms of Muslim dress, the persistence of 'foreign' languages, and the presence of mosques as evidence of the 'Asian' community's inherent difference and reluctance to integrate into mainstream society and accept the dominant cultural values of the nation. One BNP voter, a male, former semi-skilled worker in his early-60s, stated that he felt that the 'Asian' community was 'drip fed by the mosque', and that 'They want their own culture. They don't want to mix with us'. This sense of difference-alternately presented as a sign of perceived immutable difference or as indicative of an asserted refusal to integrate-was expressed most clearly in the account of a female, public-sector worker, who voted for the Liberal Democrats and lived in a privately-owned semi-detached property in a more affluent area. In attempting to explain the good relations she enjoyed with an 'Asian' 'Muslim' colleague at work, she stated how, 'she's not like an Asian, she's like we are'. Here, individual 'exceptions' were often drawn upon by the interviewees; however, this The notion of the 'Asian' area was the spatial formation through which concerns over 'self-segregation', crime, degradation, cultural difference, and anxieties around terrorism and insecurity coalesced. As argued above, 'territorial stigmatization' involves the identification not just of specific areas, but also specific figures associated with such locales, that are deemed to be particularly problematic. Here, the figure of the young 'Asian' 'Muslim' male held particular symbolic value, being seen associated with crime and violence. A female BNP voter in her fifties, living in an affluent area stated how, 'I've been stared at in a very intimidating way by particularly young Asians who I think are very violent, they're always fighting and I think its [Daneshouse and Stoneyholme] just not safe'. Such views relate closely to broader media and political discourses about the perceived increasing problem of rising 'Asian' criminality, particularly amongst young males. These ideas gained increased currency in the wake of the 2001 riots and have become more frequent features of contemporary public discourse [START_REF] Webster | Race, Space and Fear: Imagined Geographies of Racism, Crime, Violence and Disorder in Northern England[END_REF][START_REF] Alexander | Imagining the Asian gang: Ethnicity, Masculinity and Youth after 'the Riots[END_REF]). It is not only areas primarily populated by 'ethnoracial' groups that are subjected to forms of 'territorial stigmatization'. Deprived white areas are also identified as spaces of degradation and dysfunction (Hartigan 1997a;1997b;[START_REF] Haylett | Illegitimate Subjects?: abject whites, neoliberal modernisation, and middle class multiculturalism[END_REF]Webster 2008;[START_REF] Clayton | Thinking Spatially: towards an everyday understanding of inter-ethnic relations[END_REF]. As well as Daneshouse and Stoneyholme, poor white areas such as the Stoops social housing estate, Burnley Wood, and Accrington Road were also deemed 'problem' areas, viewed as the residences of 'scruffy whites'. For example, in explaining the deterioration of his former neighbourhood, one BNP voter, a self-employed tradesman in his early-40s made the following observation;

Degradation and Dysfunction: 'Scruffy white' areas

We had to get out because the area were going down…we just got out in time before the house prices really dropped…[it] used to be a nice area…but that's not the Asians because there's not a lot of them down there, a lot of it's the scruffy whites who've moved in (emphasis added). These 'scruffy whites' were often equated with minority ethnic groups, and were charged with criminality, drug and alcohol addiction, single-parenthood, benefit scrounging, and anti-social behaviour. Nayak observes how these traits coalesce in the construction of the 'chav', which bears close resemblance to the 'scruffy whites' identified in Burnley, symbolizing, 'fear of crime, economic displacement and loss of class respectability' (2006 p.824). One female BNP voter, living on a mixed tenure housing estate commented that, 'they did all Stoops up, but I mean that's white, it's not Asian, they just run it down. It didn't make any difference'. A retired financial sector worker in his seventies, who voted for the BNP and lived in one of the most affluent areas of Burnley made a similar comparison; 'its [Stoneyholme and Daneshouse] an enclave which is almost 100 per cent Asian, and then of course of the drug addicts who live there'. Similarly, a male BNP voter employed in a managerial position stated that while Stoneyholme had 'known' issues with drugs, Burnley Wood was also identified as a 'problem' area as, 'you've got the worse end of the white population living there'. Even those from more deprived areas-although less frequently or forcefully-still distinguished themselves from other poor whites.

An unemployed male living on incapacity benefits in social housing who voted for the BNP, distanced himself and his neighbours from the residents of Stoops, whom he labelled, 'bagheads', 'thieves', and 'pillocks'.

In the same way as the 'Asian ghettos', 'white estates' were also seen to be sites of various dysfunctional behaviours; promiscuity, drug and alcohol abuse, crime and anti-social behaviour were identified as the cultural practices through which 'scruffy whites' areas were identified. Interestingly, while across the sample of white residents issues relating to unemployment, absentee landlords, lack of opportunity, low wages, were mentioned, notions of cultural dysfunction remained preeminent. As mentioned, in the constructions of the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme area, the figure of the young, male 'Asian Muslim' carried particularly negative symbolic value. Young, 'scruffy white' males were also identified as particularly problematic prone to violence, benefit-scrounging, and identified with drug and alcohol problems. 'Scruffy white' single-mothers were also often portrayed as a problem, something which was not the case in relation to Daneshouse and Stoneyholme. For one BNP voter, a self-employed, upwardly mobile male in his 40s, the 'single-parent lasses with prams' represented the problems of laziness and welfare dependency that he identified as a key problem in low-wage economies such as Burnley. Similarly, for a male BNP voter in his early-thirties working in the lowpaid call-centre industry and struggling to maintain what he saw as a 'respectable' law abiding, house-proud lifestyle in a privately-owned property in one of the most deprived wards in Burnley, single-mothers were a particularly powerful symbol of the moral and cultural degeneracy seen to exist in 'scruffy white' areas. While he felt that areas such as Burnley Wood and Stoops had suffered from what he saw as a lack of investment and the perceived favouritism exhibited by the council towards 'Asian' areas, he saw the residents of poor white areas as contributing to their own marginalisation; Some people like young girls they've got a mindset where I feel that they've seen their mum, they know they can go down to the dole office and get benefits and if they become pregnant they jump the housing queue on the council register they can have 2,3,4,5 kids and get paid £350 a week off the state, and that's their mentality.

Interestingly, similarly to the 'Asian' areas, the Stoops estate-the scene of riots in the summer of 1992-was identified by a number of non-BNP voters as a 'nogo area'. As one manual worker, a Labour supporter who resided in a deprived, multi-ethnic area commented; 'Stoops…you don't walk down there, you don't go up there unless you know somebody up there, you know the area and they've seen your face around a bit, but no I wouldn't go up there, that's another place [like Stoneyholme] that I wouldn't go'. In the same way that 'Asian' ghettoes were deemed to be problematic areas, so too were white 'estates'. A powerful way in which notions of 'white trash', 'white underclass', and 'chavs' have been constructed within political, media, and popular discourses is through the association between these groups, council housing ,and 'problem estates' [START_REF] Haylett | Illegitimate Subjects?: abject whites, neoliberal modernisation, and middle class multiculturalism[END_REF]Skeggs 2004;[START_REF] Nayak | Displaced Masculinities: Chavs, Youth and Class in the Post-industrial City[END_REF][START_REF] Watt | Respectability, Roughness and 'Race': Neighbourhood Place Images and the Making of Working-Class Social Distinctions in London[END_REF]Webster 2008). This was reflected in the majority of the accounts of the white residents interviewed. Watt argues that a consequence of the large-scale privatization of council housing during the 1980s is that, Council housing has become a residual 'tenure of last resort' catering for the economically deprived and socially marginalised…This kind of stigmatising "underclass" discourse that conflates council housing with moral decline and criminality, dominates mass media and policy representations of council estates (Watt 2006, p.779). Indeed, [START_REF] Watt | Respectability, Roughness and 'Race': Neighbourhood Place Images and the Making of Working-Class Social Distinctions in London[END_REF] points out that housing tenure and residence have become one of the principle bases upon which social distinctions, particularly between the 'rough' and the 'respectable' are drawn. Skeggs too observes how notions of space have become a way in which expressions of class difference are most commonly articulated. She points out how within notions of social exclusion, particular emphasis is placed on 'geographical and spatial discourses'. Skeggs argues that, 'The highlighting, identifying and naming of "sink estates" as the "worst housing estates" provides evidence of an actual physical difference between the respectable and the unrespectable, the deserving and undeserving' (2004 p.89). Despite this however, it was clear that for many BNP voters in particular, symbolically 'white estates' were less threatening than 'Asian' ghettoes. This perhaps in part reflects the way in which poor whites are often located somewhere 'between' black minority ethnic groups and 'respectable' whites (Webster 2008), as well as how they were not The stigma associated with poorer white areas within Burnley appears then to endorse Wacquant's argument that, as in the case of the French banlieue, 'class' becomes more significant than 'race' as the basis for the stigmatization of these poor white areas. However, in reality is the interaction between whiteness and deprivation on which this form of representation rests and derives its potency. For Wray, the 'stigmatype' 'white trash', reflects this interaction as it, 'brings together into a single ontological category that which must be kept apart in order to establish a meaningful and stable symbolic order' (2006 p.3). For Haylett, the attention placed on 'abject' whites does not simply relate to the existence of deprivation but rather to the way in which they this category represents 'an ugly contradiction: abject and white' (2001 p.352). This is demonstrated through the following quote from a male BNP voter, in his sixties who had spent most of his life working in semi-skilled manual occupations. He retold a story of a local family exposed in the media for fraudulently claiming benefits. What gave this incident its significance for the interviewee, what most infuriated him was how such behaviour could have been committed by white people; 'they were laundering money doing drugs, and drawing all sorts of social and that you know. I mean I'm appalled, they're white people'.

The symbolic power of 'scruffy whites' then is the way that they, 'are seen to embody an unsettling mix of whiteness, 'working classness', and poverty' (Haylett 2001, p.353). Stigmatization and its effects it has been argued then that for those white residents that engaged most strongly in forms of 'territorial stigmatization', both 'Asian' and 'scruffy white' areas were subjected to negative forms of representation. Although sharing similar 'symbolic registers' (Haylett 2001, p.361), they, were stigmatized in differing ways and within these constructions particular figures such as the young, 'Asian' male, and the young white single-mother were assigned especially negative attributions. Similarly, ethnic markers such as religion, dress, and language played a much more significant role in the representations of perceived 'Asian' difference. However, what both forms of 'territorial stigmatization' share is how marginalisation was seen by the interviewees as resulting from the cultural characteristics of the residents of these areas, rather than as a result of forms of inequality and stratified social relations. [START_REF] Wacquant | Territorial Stigmatization in the Age of Advanced Marginality[END_REF]2008) views 'territorial stigmatization' as a central feature of discourses that seek to assert the existence of an identifiable, socially and culturally discrete, 'underclass'. For him, this deflects attention away from social, economic and political processes driving 'advanced marginality' in favour of a simplistic discourse that locates inequalities as resulting from dis-embedded cultural choices. As a result, 'the thematic of the "underclass" has hidden the political roots of the institutional implosion and material collapse of the ghetto, and it has contributed to accentuating the stigmatization and political isolation of its residents' (2008 p.89). The explanatory power granted to such discourses was reflected in the accounts of the interviewees. For instance, a male BNP voter, a self-employed tradesman in his Stoneyholme. For him, targeting resources at such places was counterproductive as, 'The problem is the way people are allowed to behave in those areas...and if you don't stop them behaving the way they always have, no matter how much money you throw at it, they will still end up in disrepair'. Symbolically, this became an important way through which individuals distanced themselves from such cultural practices, as deprivation was explained through perceived cultural difference. It was noticeable that those white residents who engaged less strongly, or resisted such forms of stigmatization were less likely to cast deprived areas as 'undeserving'.

As Wacquant argues, 'territorial stigmatization' does not only have symbolic effects, it also plays an active role in decisions over investment, resource allocation, and service provision. [START_REF] Sampson | Disparity and diversity in the contemporary city: social (dis)order revisited[END_REF] too observes how negative perceptions of an area and its perceived 'disorder', serve to further marginalise and stigmatize such locations heightening deprivation. However, extending the arguments of both Sampson and Wacquant, it has been argued that this process applies to areas that are racialized and classed as 'scruffy white' as well as those that are home to racial and ethnic 'others'. The tendency to see deprivation largely in terms of cultural difference and deficiency-prevalent amongst BNP voters in particular-lead many of the interviewees to dismiss the idea that resources should be allocated on the basis of 'need'; rather, they should be based on an earned, hierarchically-structured notion of 'entitlement', derived primarily through paid employment, the maintenance of property, and adherence to established social and cultural norms associated with 'respectability' [START_REF] Rhodes | It's Not Just Them, It's Whites As Well[END_REF]. One BNP voter, a self-employed tradesman living in an affluent area of Burnley bemoaned how, 'all these grants goes on these poor areas and it's the sort of folk who aren't working who are in them'. As Wacquant observes, at a time when rising unemployment and wage insecurity has increased through the process of de-industrialization, the retrenchment of state provision has served to intensify competition for resources. Consequentially, the bases of 'entitlement', such as secure and well-paid employment, are becoming more and more difficult to attain, especially for those residing in areas that have suffered most acutely through the uneven distribution of socio-economic deprivation. In places such as Burnley, with disproportionately low-levels of education, higher rates of unemployment, and depressed house prices, this contest for resources and 'respectability'-as well as the forms of stigmatization that inform such ideasbecome particularly pertinent. This contestation also has an inherently spatial dynamic., as, 'declining housing markets... trap residents in area-based ethnic and class immobility in ways that concentrate and heighten imagined geographies of fear, ethnic conflict and resentment' (Webster 2003 p.96). Similarly, the levels and variance of socio-economic polarisation within a limited local geography, serve to intensify processes of stigmatization and distancing in a context where depressed wages and house prices contribute to a strong sense of social insecurity.

'Territorial stigmatization' serves not only to marginalise the claims of specific areas, it also provides a means through which those that don't reside in such locations assert their own social, cultural, moral distance, encoded in the contrast between stigmatized areas and their own 'enclaves of respectability' (Watt 2006, p.794). In her study of Chicago's Beltway district, Kefalas observed how white residents, 'inscribe their class-based moral values into their physical surroundings as they fortify moral and symbolic boundaries against the social forces that threaten their way of life' (2003 p.5). Similarly, for the interviewees, neighbourhood was a means through which notions of 'respectability' and entitlement were articulated.

Claims were made on the basis, not of clearly identifiable, large collectivities, but instead for 'people like us'-those inhabiting a similar symbolic, and also, social space [START_REF] Bottero | Stratification: Social Division and Inequality[END_REF]. In contrast, deprivation was widely seen as resulting from the perceived possession of distinct sets of cultural values amongst poor communities. This was evident in the quote of a female Labour voter, a homeowner employed in a professional occupation. She stated how, 'the cultures in deprived areas aren't cultures and morals that I live by, I don't mean cultures as in 'Asian' versus something, I mean general living culture'. It is through this form of identification that symbolic and social boundaries elide, as forms of negative stigmatization not only represent inequality in a particular way but also play a part in its reproduction. This is especially significant in the current social, economic and political climate.

Ongoing processes of de-industrialization, rising unemployment, as well as the increasing retrenchment of public resources and services that have resulted from the UK collation government's Comprehensive Spending Review in October 2010, are likely to accentuate these forms of stigmatization and distancing. Indeed, such decisions, as Wacquant suggests, both rely upon 'territorial stigmatization' as a means of public justification, while simultaneously serving to reproduce the social inequalities that lead to their entrenchment.

  manner to a phenotypical or cultural marker'. Instead, it is based primarily on residence rather than being 'jointly spatial-cum-racial' as in the US (2008 p.181). Such differences illustrate for Wacqaunt the variations in territorial stigmatization across different national contexts. These differences are rooted in different demographics, regimes of governance and patterns of racial and class formation. Wacquant's differentiation between the neighbourhoods of 'relegation' in France and the US, informs then a central aim of this article; to elucidate more clearly the forms of representation that the territorial stigmatization of marginalised neighbourhoods exhibits within the UK context. Drawing on interviews with white residents in Burnley, particularly British National Party (BNP) supporters who made strong forms of stigmatization, this article examines how territorial stigmatization manifests itself and the forms it assumes.

  forms of representation that this article considers in more detail.

  -ward of Cliviger with Worsthorne (Burnley Borough Council 2008 p.7) (see Figure 1). Similarly, in Trinity in 2008, 35.4 per cent of the population were in receipt of some form of out of work benefits, compared to 10.3 per cent in Cliviger with Worsthorne

  here) Between June 2004 and March 2005, in-depth interviews were conducted with 34 white residents of Burnley aged between 18 and 76, as part of an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)-funded study examining the political breakthrough of the British National Party (BNP) in the town. In 2002, the BNP secured its first elected representatives in the UK since 1993 as the party received 9,984 votes. The following summer, with eight local councillors, the party briefly became the main opposition grouping following the 2003 local elections. At the beginning of 2011, the BNP still has two local councillors. Additionally, during the summer of 2001, whites, 'Asians', and the police clashed as a series of disturbances swept through the former textile-towns of Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley. These events have served to ensure that Burnley has been nationally identified as a key around segregation, racism, political extremism, and social cohesion. In 2002, an article in the Observer labelled the town, 'the unofficial racist capital of Britain'

  of the sample as a whole, they engaged in more overt and intense forms of negative attribution towards areas that were seen to be the location for distinct sets of 'troubling' behaviours. The material included therefore is not a representative account of the views held by white residents across Burnley; rather, it focuses especially upon those-primarily BNP supporters-that most clearly expressed sentiments of 'territorial stigmatization', considering how such views manifested and the nature that they assumed. Difference, Degradation, and Danger: The 'Asian' area One of the most visible aspects of the social landscape in Burnley is the high levels of segregation that exist along lines of ethnicity. While the 'Asian'/'Asian British' 1 population of Burnley comprises just 8.2 per cent of the total population according to estimates made in 2005 by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) (Burnley Borough Council, 2008 p.4), the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme ward has a majority-'Asian' population, with 63.9 per cent of residents belonging to black and minority ethnic groups according to the 2001 census. Just two of the town's other fifteen wards-Bank Hall and Queensgate-have 'Asian' populations exceeding 5 per cent, and both areas neighbour Daneshouse and Stoneyholme (see Figure

  but also a number of the other white residents interviewed, saw the area as the site of 'benefit-scroungers' and criminals, especially 'drug dealers'. As a female BNP voter in her twenties, living in a privately-owned property in an almost exclusively white, deprived ward stated, Have a look through the Burnley Express there's always somebody been stabbed...there's Asian men raping young girls, addicts given one last chance by the courts and it's a Paki, most of them are Asian or they're drug addicts.

  serve to destabilise the broader assumptions about 'Asian' communities. This justifies Wacquant's insistence on the importance of considering national variation in the forms and targets of territorial stigmatization. The representations of a number of the white residents interviewed reflected more widespread national anxiety about the 'problem' of Muslim communities and their perceived 'lack' of integration in the wake of the 2001 riots, 9/11, and the London Bombings of 2005[START_REF] Webster | Race, Space and Fear: Imagined Geographies of Racism, Crime, Violence and Disorder in Northern England[END_REF][START_REF] Alexander | Imagining the Asian gang: Ethnicity, Masculinity and Youth after 'the Riots[END_REF][START_REF] Mcghee | The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights[END_REF][START_REF] Phillips | The Problem with Segregation: Exploring the Racialisation of Space in Northern Pennine Towns[END_REF]).

  got Burnley Wood which is almost 100 per cent white, low quality because

  threat to nation and locality in the same way that 'Asian' communities were.

  early-forties living in a privately-owned property in one of the most affluent areas of Burnley equated the degradation of the Stoops estate and Daneshouse and

URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers ethnic@surrey.ac.ukEthnic and Racial Studies

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Association of American Geographers (AAG) Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., 12-15 April 2010. Thanks to the ESRC for funding this research, to the University of Manchester's Simon Fellowship scheme, and to the anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments and advice. Thanks also to Sarah Neal.