G A I L W I L S O N

Local Culture, Globalization and Policy Outcomes An Example from Long-Term Care

Keywords: globalization, local culture, local outcomes, long-term care

It is argued that the impact of globalization and global ideologies on social policy can depend on the ways that local cultures reinforce or combat global ideologies and pressures. The article discusses the importance of local policy factors in shaping responses to globalization, taking as an example the way in which global forces have affected outcomes for older people needing long-term care in one marginalized province of a rich country. Local political, economic and sociocultural factors can reinforce global pressures for neo-liberal policies and rising individualism and overwhelm the global ideologies of democracy and human rights (including gender rights and antiageism) that might lead to better outcomes for older people and their caregivers. In the New Brunswick province of Canada, traditional cultural values can be seen as one factor allowing politicians to make suboptimal social policy choices.

Introduction

The argument of this article is that local culture can be seen as a powerful mediator of the effects of globalization on local social policy, but not necessarily as a beneficial one. The aim is to contribute to discussion of the complex ways in which the forces of globalization interact with local cultural, gsp political and socio-economic conditions to produce policy outcomes, and in this example, an outcome that is suboptimal. An example of failure to implement the most cost-effective and potentially popular policy for long-term care of older people is set out. Although policy actors may see themselves as responding to local and national constraints (New Brunswick, Department of Finance, 2004), I suggest that a more accurate picture takes global forces into account. However, any analysis of policy must be aware of two points. First, the analysis or explanation may appear logical, but that is no reason to believe it is either 'true' or the only analysis that is possible in the circumstances. Second, even the most apparently coherent and stable policy situation can change. However, the lack of definitive answers need not be a barrier to analysis of interactions between local cultures, globalization and policy outcomes.

Globalization

Globalization may be a universal phenomenon but its manifestations are increasingly seen as diverse or even wrongly attributed. For example, [START_REF] Pierson | Post Industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare State[END_REF] sees challenges to the Welfare State as arising from post-industrialism rather than globalization. [START_REF] Jaeger | Pressures on State Welfare in Post-Industrial Societies: Is More or Less Better?[END_REF] replace 'crisis/challenge' with 'pressure' and argue that welfare expenditure increases rather than falls in response to pressures that are common to all advanced states. They do not support a direct causal link between globalization and welfare policy. However, the global triumph of liberal economics since 1991 has had its effect on public finances. Dominant models of transnationally approved economic policy imply free trade and the end of subsidies or protection for disadvantaged areas or industries, cuts in public expenditure, especially welfare expenditure, and the privatization of as many activities as possible. This policy ideology is backed up by pressure to conform from global organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and by fear of downgrading by global credit rating agencies (see later) if other policies are followed.

Global economic discourse also presents the costs of population ageing as a major challenge to state welfare. The rising cost of pensions is popularly seen as unsustainable and privatization as an essential way forward (World Bank, 1996). Rising health and long-term care costs are similarly seen as intolerable burdens, and private or non-profit services are meant to take over from the wasteful state. This fear of unmanageable costs arising from population ageing has been widely used as a justification for restructuring or attempting to cut back on welfare [START_REF] Jaeger | Pressures on State Welfare in Post-Industrial Societies: Is More or Less Better?[END_REF][START_REF] Pierson | Post Industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare State[END_REF]. For example, Paul Hewitt, Director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies Global Aging Initiative, sees 'the disparate pension and economic crises of major industrial nations converge to create a global depression from which no welfare state will emerge intact' (Hewitt, 2002: 8). On the other hand, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has long taken a less ideological approach and stresses lengthening the working life as a way of meeting the cost of population ageing, along with diversification of pension provision [START_REF] Asgeirsdottir | What Does the Future Hold?: Demography, Jobs and Public Finances[END_REF]OECD, 2001).

Although globalization has been accompanied by an increase in the total wealth of the world, and by rising incomes for very large numbers of people (World Bank, 1996), even in rich countries, the poor have often become relatively poorer, and disadvantaged regions relatively more disadvantaged. In Canada, all regions have benefited from the great increase in trade that followed the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 but Atlantic Canada has lagged behind on nearly all indicators. Within the regions the province of New Brunswick has been persistently low on indicators such as provincial share of GDP, productivity, urbanization and population growth, and high on unemployment and reliance on primary products [START_REF] Chalifoux | Regional Economies, Regional Economies Special Report Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, Industry Canada[END_REF][START_REF] Sharan | Sources of Differences in Provincial Earnings in Canada[END_REF]. [START_REF] Sassen | Deconstructing Labor Demand in Today's Advanced Economies: Implications for Low-Wage Employment[END_REF] has analysed the global processes that increase regional disparities within countries in terms of changes in the organization of the labour market, the growing insecurity of employment, the differentiation in regional capacities to generate profits, and the growing marginalization of areas outside cities (and, by implication, of rural areas and regions without major cities such as New Brunswick).

In federal states the impact of global discourse depends to some extent on how policies are devolved from centre to periphery. Beliefs in the virtues of the free market mean that, ideally, any disparities in ability to generate profits should not be ameliorated by subsidies or trade barriers. Hence, global ideologies of low public expenditure and of market freedom can help to increase regional inequalities by reducing safety nets provided by a federal state. In Canada, federal transfers (equalization payments) to deficit provinces rose fast before 1990 (from less than 2% of GDP in the 1960s to over 6% of GDP for Atlantic Canada in the 1980s) but fell back in the 1990s [START_REF] Chalifoux | Regional Economies, Regional Economies Special Report Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, Industry Canada[END_REF]. It was therefore possible for provincial policy makers to argue that in a marginalized province there was less tax revenue to spend on public goods and services than in a rich one. This meant that that there was no government money to improve long-term care, and that the service levels achieved in richer provinces were inappropriate. Statements such as 'this is a poor province' or 'we must live within our means' could be used as excuses for inertia (New Brunswick Telegraph-Journal, 2004). As Jeannot Volpe, the finance minister said in his 2004 budget speech, in an almost textbook example of liberal economic beliefs:

Unless we live within our means, we will not have the money to invest in the priorities that matter most to people . . . New Brunswick is at a financial crossroads. One road leads to annual deficits and increased debt. We do not want to go there. The other leads to continued balanced budgets, fiscal responsibility, and public investment in what matters most to New Brunswickers. (New Brunswick, Department of Finance, 2004) He went on to explain with pride that Standard and Poor's (www.standard andpoors.com) still rated the province at AA-, as in the previous year.

The argument to be presented is not that relative disadvantage in revenue raising capacity necessarily maps onto tolerance of inadequate services for frail seniors and/or failure to design and implement rational policies. There is no economic reason why this should be so, especially in a rich country. Nations still have freedom to pursue policies that do not conform to global orthodoxies [START_REF] Watson | Globalization and the Meaning of Canadian Life[END_REF]. As Held and McGrew have said, the national cultures that have emerged in the last 200 years are 'formidably important sources of ethical and political motivation'. When combined with new communication systems 'they can generate an awareness of difference … [which] often leads to accentuation of what is distinctive and idiosyncratic' (Held and McGrew, 2002: 29). In federal states with diverse histories and settlement patterns, local cultures can have their own local influences, especially if as Held and McGrew note, their distinctiveness is backed by political structures that defend difference. In the example to be presented, the strong local cultures of Atlantic Canada can be construed as interacting with global pressures to produce welfare outcomes that are suboptimal for taxpayers as well as for service users. The other important aspect of globalization and liberal economic orthodoxy is that globalization processes are not monolithic. Global economic outcomes and financial beliefs are opposed by global ideologies of equal rights and citizenship. Global discourses of individual rights (for women, minorities and seniors among others) might be expected to strengthen citizenship entitlements, and to work against the financial and economic processes that increase individual inequalities, but global ideologies of citizenship lack the administrative underpinning of enforcement agencies such as the World Bank or the World Trade Organization. Progress in developing and enforcing human rights policies has been slow, particularly where older people are concerned (United Nations [UN], 2002a, b). For example, the UN sponsored Madrid Plan on Ageing (UN, 2002a) is a set of principles with no mechanisms for implementation, or means of securing rights for older people, unlike the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW; see UN, n.d.). Similarly, the abuse of older people is deplored but the solution is seen more in terms of economic development for all than in any individual rights for older people (UN, 2002b). However, UN interest and exhortation is a beginning in terms of global policy discourse, and combined with the emphasis on gender rights and citizenship, can be expected to have a growing influence on policies for ageing populations in the future (see also [START_REF] Wilson | Globalisation and Older People: Effects of Markets and Migration[END_REF]. Interactions between global and local processes and ideologies will differ regionally, and over time, and the contradictions inherent within globalization processes make for instability and the possibility of change, even though economic forces have so far been stronger than ideologies of rights and citizenship. Policies for long-term care in New Brunswick had reflected neo-liberal market beliefs since the 1990s when responsibility for service provision was entirely handed over to private and non-profit providers. Global financial ideology indicated that public expenditure, particularly social expenditure, should be kept to a minimum, as all public sector activity was deemed inefficient [START_REF] Pierson | Irresistible Forces, Immovable Objects: Post-Industrial Welfare States Confront Permanent Austerity[END_REF][START_REF] Taylor Gooby | Introduction: Themed Section on Social Welfare and Social Democracy[END_REF]. Hence, taxes should be kept low to discourage the growth of state activities, and the private sector should be expanded. These beliefs had widespread public support as right-wing or centre-right governments (Conservatives or Liberals) have dominated the provincial legislature since the 1980s. However, the market for long-term care is a limited one at the best of times. In a disadvantaged region, the reality was that earnings were below the national average. Poverty in old age was more widespread, especially among older women, who often had not had the opportunity to take paid work in the past ( [START_REF] Van Den Hoonaard | The Widowed Self: The Older Woman's Journey through Widowhood[END_REF]. The income of pensioners was forecast to rise nationally [START_REF] Myles | Maturation of Canada's Retirement Income System: Income Levels, Income Inequality and Low Income Among Older Persons[END_REF], but it seemed certain that pensioners in New Brunswick would lag behind. The great majority were unable to finance their own home support, let alone nursing home costs. Even with increased payments by relatives, it appeared certain that long-term care providers would have to rely on state finance for the foreseeable future.

An Overstretched System

Although Canada is a country of immigration with relatively slow population ageing at national level, Atlantic Canada is ageing rapidly. In New Brunswick, which was a very small province of 750,000 people, the number of frail seniors was predicted to increase, with the over 80s, who are most likely to need care, doubling in the foreseeable future. At the same time the number of available family caregivers was due to fall, partly because of lower birth-rates, but also because of out migration to more prosperous regions by younger age groups [START_REF] Chalifoux | Regional Economies, Regional Economies Special Report Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, Industry Canada[END_REF][START_REF] Denton | Projections of the Population and Labour Force to 2046: The Provinces and Territories[END_REF]. The need for formal long-term care services was therefore expected to rise at the same time as the proportion of potential family caregivers fell. The provincial long-term care situation in 2003 and the policy options are now set out.

The two main services for frail seniors in the province were home support and nursing homes (Table 1). Both were locally funded. Home support provided in-home care (mainly housework, meal preparation and some shopping and personal care). The staff who worked for care agencies, either not-forprofit or for-profit, were supplemented by an unknown number who worked alone and were paid directly by clients or their relatives. 1 1 Seniors who could not be maintained at home, either because of frailty, or because care could not be provided by family or home support services, could be admitted to a nursing home (67 non-profit and 1 for-profit in 2003). In all, some 12,000 seniors needing care were subsidised by the provincial government in 2002-3 (see Table 1). In addition, only 800 approximately (or their relatives) were paying the full cost of their nursing home care. Nursing homes were widely viewed as a last resort. Quality of care was variable, but double or even quadruple occupancy of rooms was the norm. No legislation was envisaged requiring new homes to provide single rooms, let alone en-suite toilet facilities. Modern developments, such as residents' committees and mission statements on home-like environments and the empowerment of patients had been instituted, see for example Campobello Lodge Inc. Nursing Home ( 2004), but there was little evidence that they were having much success in improving the quality of life of residents. Regulations on minimum standards were widely ignored. 2 [START_REF] Richardson | State of Evidence-Based Care in Long-Term Care Institutions: A Provincial Survey[END_REF], working in Ontario, showed how few nursing homes were aware of best practice guidelines and how even fewer (21%) reported using them.

In comparison with the rest of the country, the province had an unusually high proportion of frail seniors living in rural areas and a low total expenditure on home support (though high on the short-term home care nursing service). This was reflected in unmet need. Nursing homes were full, with a provincial waiting list according to New Brunswick Family and Community Services of around 200 in 2003 (see also [START_REF] Gowan | Nursing Home Average Wait Two Months[END_REF]. In addition, between 10 percent and 30 percent, depending on the hospital catchment area and the time of year, of all hospital beds were occupied by seniors who could not be discharged because they could not be adequately cared for elsewhere (New Brunswick Department of Family and Community Services, 2004a; New Brunswick Telegraph-Journal, 2003). The presence of seniors unable to leave hospital and a waiting list for nursing homes indicated that the system was seriously overstretched.

As can be seen from Table 1, the highest number of seniors were assisted by home support, but the greatest cost for taxpayers arose from those who were in nursing homes. Table 2 reinforces this message but also brings in hospital costs. The average cost of a hospital bed was around CDN$606 per day. However, this was a misleading figure for seniors who remained in hospital because they had nowhere else to go. These patients were being maintained rather than treated, and their unit costs were below the average, but no exact figures were available.

Rationing of Services

Given the combination of rising need and near static finance, services had been rationed, both directly and indirectly. Financial and administrative systems acted as direct rationing devices. The provincial subsidy for home support had been frozen since 1997. During that time there had been small increases in the allowable wage rates for home support workers, but these increases had merely led to cuts in hours. As a result, the top rate of subsidy had covered 215 hours of home support per month in 1997, while in 2004 it purchased only 175 hours per month (a cut of nearly 20%). Assistance was only granted after two needs assessments, one for disability and one for finance. Both were slow and the financial needs form was particularly long and forbidding. However, indirect rationing, via the poor quality of the services offered by many of the providers, was the most powerful limit on service take-up. The main impact was on demand for home support, but problems of low pay and poor training for staff also applied to nursing homes. The work environment for home support made it very difficult indeed to provide a quality service. Many staff would have been better off on welfare benefits for the unemployed (see also [START_REF] Pupo | Caught in the Net: The Impact of Changes to Canadian Employment Insurance Legislation on Part-Time Workers[END_REF]. The problem was long standing and in 1999 the New Brunswick 'Health Services Review: Report of the Committee' (New Brunswick Health and Community Services, 1999) had noted that minimum hourly pay should rise to equal the amount that a single parent with two children would get on Income Assistance. The recommendation was not implemented. Low pay was made worse by lack of allowances or occupational benefits. In the predominantly rural area under study, mileages were high (up to 400 miles a week; [START_REF] Smith | A Comparative Study of Home Support Service Delivery[END_REF] and low paid staff were expected to cover the costs of getting to their clients. Vehicle mileage was not fully reimbursed, and often not paid at all. Staff also had to pay their own car insurance. They had no entitlement to holidays or sick pay, and they lost all earnings when a client died or went into hospital. In many agencies they were expected to pay for their own basic training, or at least share the cost. Agency staff turnover was running at an average of 50 percent per year but was much higher in some cases [START_REF] Smith | A Comparative Study of Home Support Service Delivery[END_REF]. Managerial support varied, but was often inadequate. [START_REF] Denton | Occupational Health Issues Among Employees of Home Care Agencies[END_REF] showed that all home support staff in their survey, including the managers and supervisors, scored above average on measures of stress and poor health. Unsurprisingly in such circumstances, complaints about home support workers were widespread among service users [START_REF] Smith | A Comparative Study of Home Support Service Delivery[END_REF], despite the fact that some agencies and some staff were highly valued. A further problem was that the provincial subsidy was paid on the basis of hours alone and did not allow for agencies' central running costs.

The official response was to recommend frail seniors and their carers to bypass the agencies and employ their own caregivers privately. This was a high-risk strategy. Such workers were rarely trained, there was no check on criminal records and they had no managerial supervision. Seniors frequently felt disempowered and unable to exercise full consumer control over their privately hired service providers (Aronson, 2002a, b;[START_REF] Wilson | Assembling Their Own Care Packages: Payment for Care by Men and Women in Advanced Old Age[END_REF]. Unless relatives were present, home support staff worked alone. Their employment increased the risk of elder abuse, both financial and physical, as evidenced by cases reported in local papers [START_REF] Chiarelli | Nearly 20 per cent of Seniors Abused[END_REF]Urquart, 2002).

A Technical Solution: Cost Effective Support for an Ageing Population

Faced with rising demand, the policy choice for the province was between building more nursing home beds (at an ever rising cost to the taxpayer), or providing better home support that would allow proportionally fewer admissions to the existing stock of institutional beds. Closures of home support agencies indicated a looming crisis, with more agencies likely to close unless the province raised the level of funding [START_REF] Llewellyn | Caught in a Relentless Squeeze between Low Wages and Burgeoning Demand, the Province's Home-Support Industry is in Crisis[END_REF][START_REF] Llewellyn | Home-Care Situation Critical, Says President[END_REF]. Frail seniors who could have been maintained at home by their relatives and neighbours if a little help had been available from services (see [START_REF] Penning | Self-, Informal and Formal Care: Partnerships in Community-Based and Residential Long-Term Care Settings[END_REF], and others who lived alone in isolated situations, were being forced into expensive nursing homes by the lack of good quality, reliable home support.

As shown by [START_REF] Hollander | Final Report of the National Evaluation of the Cost-Effectiveness of Home Care, Health Canada, Health Transition Fund[END_REF], a better (more highly paid, better trained, more stable) home support service would have both saved taxpayer's money and raised the quality of home support for frail seniors.

Although the crude unit costs in Table 2 exaggerate the difference in costs between the services (see also for methodological problems [START_REF] Bebbington | Resources, Needs and Outcomes in Community-Based Care: A Comparative Study of the Production of Welfare for Elderly People in Ten Local Authorities in England and Wales[END_REF][START_REF] Challis | Case Management in Community Care: An Evaluated Experiment in the Home Care of the Elderly[END_REF], the full study by Hollander and Chappell made it clear that failure to fund home support was a way of wasting taxpayer's money. Considered in terms of best use of expenditure in relation to unit costs, the clear priorities were to raise the number of allowable home support hours per month, and to raise the total subsidy for home support. In terms of popularity with service users (who wanted overwhelmingly to stay in their own homes), and their relatives who also favoured home care for cultural reasons (see later), the situation was more complex. Home support was a generally popular service despite the many complaints about quality. Nursing homes were not popular, but they were the last resort of the desperate, and there was a waiting list. There was no indication, either from government or voters, that a cost effective policy choice would prevail.

PROBLEMS WITH THE TECHNICAL SOLUTION: POLITICS

In a federal state with strong local jurisdictions, transfers from rich to poor areas can be more difficult than in a unitary state with the same regional inequalities. In the present case, economic inequalities appeared to have had a strong influence on perceptions of what was politically possible for the provincial government. The strong cultural tradition of provincial rivalries and opposition to transfers from centre to periphery might also be invoked [START_REF] Breton | A Fragile Social Fabric: Fairness, Trust and Commitment in Canada[END_REF]). An outright attempt to counteract the global tendencies that were concentrating growth and prosperity in the richest parts of the country and marginalizing others, therefore seemed very unlikely without major changes in federal and provincial political cultures.

PROBLEMS WITH THE TECHNICAL SOLUTION: SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS

As noted by [START_REF] Held | Globalization/Anti-Globalization[END_REF], the marginalization that can accompany globalization can act to reinforce local cultures. In New Brunswick the longterm lack of economic growth and absence of big cities had meant that migrants had not been attracted to the area. [START_REF] Denton | Projections of the Population and Labour Force to 2046: The Provinces and Territories[END_REF] predicted almost static population numbers till 2011 and a growing decline thereafter. Traditional social attitudes remained strong and had been much less challenged than in parts of the country where there were better employment opportunities for men and especially women, and where migration had led to cultural diversity. This was not to say that there had been no challenges and no change, but the global processes of economic marginalization appeared to have combined with a consciousness of being labelled by others as poor and backward, to reinforce pride in self-sufficiency and traditional values. The prevailing cultural ideology was one of 'rugged individualism' combined with a strong belief in community. [START_REF] Breton | A Fragile Social Fabric: Fairness, Trust and Commitment in Canada[END_REF] found that the Atlantic Provinces scored highest in Canada for feelings of being at home in the community and for obligation to help others. Hence individuals were ideologically expected to help each other in times of difficulty, but such collective action occurred within a framework of individual social activity, rather than shared political endeavour. The tradition of social solidarity was a strength in most contexts, but in terms of providing care for frail seniors it was not. A strong belief in family values meant that women were still publicly expected to act as family caregivers and their need for support services was underrated. For example, [START_REF] Jonsson | Policy Perspectives on Changing Intergenerational Relations[END_REF] showed that the welfare culture in the Maritime Provinces was closest to a Southern European model where women are expected to provide most care. This was true whether we are talking about formal (paid) care workers or informal (mainly family and friends) caregivers [START_REF] Hallman | Getting There: Mapping the Gendered Geography of Caregiving to Elderly Relatives[END_REF]. The traditional public discourse had spilled over on to paid caregivers who were variously defined as doing what could be expected of a daughter or doing simple housework. Neither of these definitions came near the work that was demanded of many home support workers, but as set out earlier, the job continued to suffer from low pay, lack of training and low social esteem [START_REF] Nugent | Understanding Home Support Labour in New Brunswick: The Human Costs of Care[END_REF].

The stress in the previous paragraph is on public morality because there were private discourses that did not assume family care (see [START_REF] Kemp | The Allocation of Responsibility for Later Life: Canadian Reflections on the Roles of Individuals, Government, Employers and Families[END_REF]. Also, global discourses on rights for women and gender equality existed, and had been institutionalized in ways that helped to reinforce citizenship rights for women of all ages (e.g. New Brunswick Advisory Council on the Status of Women). However, such bodies had limited campaign resources. They had not in 2003 been able to address the complex issues of equal citizenship rights for seniors and their caregivers. There was a growing understanding that more formal services were needed to support seniors whose families had moved away, and that women caregivers were having to combine caring with paid work, but cultural change was slow in the absence of dedicated pressure groups.

Conclusions

In the example chosen, a small province with rising need for long-term care for frail seniors was not only spending nearly one and half times as much money on nursing homes for less than half the number of users as home care (see Table 1), but was committed to increasing the imbalance. Since the nursing home sector relied almost entirely on public funding, (nearly 80% of all occupants were wholly or partly funded by public money), a policy of allowing new nursing homes to be built implied a long-term increase in the burden on the taxpayer. The cost effective option for many, if not most, frail seniors (see [START_REF] Hollander | Final Report of the National Evaluation of the Cost-Effectiveness of Home Care, Health Canada, Health Transition Fund[END_REF] was home support. Hence a rational policy would raise the quality and the extent of the home support services before allowing more nursing homes to be built. However, an expansion of home support needed direct funding, while contributions to nursing home patients were a long-term commitment that could be expected to increase more slowly. Hence, more beds met a popular demand for accommodation of last resort, but appeared to have low immediate costs. Taxpayers were being committed to future subsidies for a service that did not deliver quality of life to seniors and would not do so in the future, as long as multiple occupancy of rooms was the standard. Home support, which was the cost effective and rational policy option, was not a priority, despite the evidence from current statistics, future projections and research findings [START_REF] Hollander | Final Report of the National Evaluation of the Cost-Effectiveness of Home Care, Health Canada, Health Transition Fund[END_REF].

Three sets of influences working against the rational policy choice have been identified: political, economic and sociocultural. First, the history of federal-provincial relations has reinforced global tendencies for rich regions to become richer while the less well endowed are marginalized. The transfer of funds from rich to less prosperous provinces has not been popular in Canada [START_REF] Breton | A Fragile Social Fabric: Fairness, Trust and Commitment in Canada[END_REF]. However, there may be limits to how much inequality a rich democracy (outside the USA, where very few of the poor vote) can tolerate. Globalization also implies the spread of political demands for citizenship entitlements and gender rights. These demands could include better and more cost effective long-term care policies. An ageing population of voters and their caregivers (citizens) with growing service needs may make service expansion and improvement politically essential.

The economic outcomes of globalization have reinforced trends to below average incomes in marginalized regions, with corresponding relative reductions in provincial tax revenues. Small administrative units and small budgets restrict financial freedom. This in turn allows politicians and some policy analysts to present global ideologies that see public spending as unproductive and wasteful as inevitable or even rational. It is possible to argue that it is the neoliberal ideologies of globalization, not the economic outcomes that are the main causes of failure to protect the weakest regions and the weakest citizens. The political will to ensure equal citizenship across all regions has been sapped by the triumph of an ideology that sees market freedom and low taxation as ends in themselves, and that limits tariff protection and all types of public expenditure in the name of global financial orthodoxy [START_REF] Watson | Globalization and the Meaning of Canadian Life[END_REF]. In terms of individual rights, the neo-liberal discourse was strong and it was difficult to justify spending on collective needs. Policy makers could easily co-opt traditional cultural values of self-sufficiency and independence into global discourses of individualism and low taxation.

Finally, it was argued that marginalization could have the effect of slowing down changes in cultural ideologies. In the example, traditions of self-sufficiency and independence gave support to a global trend to individualism, and worked against collective action. Traditional self-sufficiency also emphasized the family unit and rested firmly on the labour of women. In policy terms, this labour was largely invisible until it was threatened by the global shift in the labour market opportunities for women [START_REF] Campani | Women Migrants: From Marginal Subjects to Social Actors[END_REF]. One reaction was to stress the importance of family care giving for frail seniors. However, the spread of global ideologies on gender rights and equal citizenship for women, combined with the number of women in the labour market, were slowly undermining ideologies of family care giving.

It has been argued that when looking at social policy at the regional level, the question becomes one of how strongly local historical, economic and sociocultural factors appear to reinforce or combat the outcomes and ideologies of globalization, and which aspects become dominant. In the example discussed, global ideologies and economic forces appeared to have acted mainly to reinforce traditional cultural values at the provincial level [START_REF] Macdonald | The Impact of a Restructured Canadian Welfare State on Atlantic Canada[END_REF]. Disadvantage and relative isolation had reinforced public reliance on local culture. Frail seniors had not been seen as citizens with equal social rights (see Health Canada, Division of Aging and Seniors, 2001;[START_REF] Morgan | Human Rights: A New Language for Aging Advocacy[END_REF]UN, 2002a,b) and the public morality on the importance of family care giving (however challenged by reality) had made it difficult to mount movements for better home care and more humane standards in nursing homes. Change appears inevitable in the future, but in the absence of developed campaigns for senior rights, caregiver rights, more public spending, and better regulation of the market in long-term care services, the outcome could as easily be more of the same as a shift to more rational policies. acknowledgements I am greatly indebted to Linda Nugent, Ellen Smith, Bev Weeks, members of the Fredericton Third Age Centre, and New Brunswick Department of Family and Community Services for help and support in writing this article, and to members of the Gerontology Department, St Thomas University, for their kind hospitality. notes 1. Home care (nursing in the community) was part of the federally funded health insurance system but was not a long-term care service and is not considered in this article. 2. 'Auditor blasts nursing home inspections. New Brunswick's 67 nursing homes may have the proper licence hanging on the wall, but Auditor General Daryl Wilson found a system where inspections were infrequent, facilities ignored past infractions, and got off without stiff penalties' [START_REF] Mchardie | Auditor Blasts Nursing Home Inspections[END_REF].

references On affirme dans cet article que l'impact de la mondialisation et des idéologies en faveur de la globalisation sur les politiques sociales peut être influencé par la façon dont les cultures locales renforcent ou s'opposent aux idéologies et aux pressions en faveur de la mondialisation. Cet article analyse l'importance des facteurs politiques locaux dans la préparation de réponses à la mondialisation, et présente à mode d'exemple la façon dont les forces de la mondialisation ont eu un impact sur les personnes âgées ayant besoin de soins de long terme dans une province marginalisée d'une nation riche. Les facteurs politiques locaux, ainsi que les considérations économiques et socioculturelles peuvent renforcer les pressions pour la mondialisation de politiques néo-libérales qui font surgir l'individualisme et qui écrasent les idéologies mondiales en faveur de la démocratie et les droits de l'homme, y compris les droits de genre et contre la discrimination en raison de l'âge, et qui pourraient donner de meilleurs résultats parmi les personnes âgées ainsi que pour ceux qui s'en occupent. Dans le Nouveau Brunswick, Canada, les valeurs culturelles traditionnelles pourraient être un élément permettant aux politiciens d'adopter de politiques sociales au dessous de leur niveau optimal.

resumen Cultura Local, Globalización y Resultados en las Políticas: Un Ejemplo de la Atención a las Personas a Largo Plazo

Se sostiene que el impacto de la globalización y las ideologías a favor de la globalización en las políticas sociales puede depender de la manera en que las culturas locales refuerzan o combaten las ideologías y presiones a favor de la globalización. El presente artículo estudia la importancia de los factores políticos locales en el diseño de respuestas a la globalización, tomando como ejemplo la manera en que las fuerzas globales han afectado los resultados en personas mayores que necesitan atención a largo plazo en una provincia marginal de un país rico. Los factores políticos y locales, económicos y socio-culturales pueden reforzar las presiones globales para las políticas neo-liberales haciendo surgir el individualismo, arrollando las ideologías globales a favor de la democracia y los derechos humanos (inclusive los derechos de género y contra la discriminación por la edad) que podrían dar mejores resultados tanto para las personas mayores como para quienes los atienden. En la provincia de Nueva Brunswick, en Canadá, los valores culturales tradicionales podrían ser un factor que permite a los políticos adoptar políticas sociales por debajo del nivel óptimo.

table 1

 1 Local government payments forlong-term care, 2002-3 In addition CDN$12.5m was paid out to 1980 residents of special care homes. No age break down was available for these homes, which were mainly for younger disabled people.Average cost for nursing homes included a share of capital costs, so average unit costs were rising as more expensive homes were being built. In future, the gap between unit costs of home care and nursing homes would increase as the plan forCDN$190m investment in new and refurbished homes between 2003 and 2006 was implemented (New Brunswick Department of Family and Community Services, 2004b).

	Type of service	Cost CDN$m	Numbers subsidized
	In home support	45.6	7164 seniors
	Nursing homes	122.0m	3100 approx. (out of 3900
			approx. total occupants)
	Source: New Brunswick Department of Family and Community Services (2003, personal
	communication).
	Note:

table 2

 2 Average unit costs per day of long-term care bytype, 2001-2

	CDN$

  MA, PhD, is Reader Emeritus in Social Policy and Ageing at the London School of Economics, UK. In 2002, she was Visiting Professor in the Department of Gerontology, St Thomas University, New Brunswick. Since 1987, she has researched and written about normal ageing in older men and women, mainly over 75. Her main interests have been in globalization with particular reference to gender, migration and identity in later life, access to health and social services and qualitative research methods. She is the author of Understanding Old Age: Critical and Global Perspectives (Sage, 2000); Community Care: Asking the Users (edited collection) (Chapman and Hall, 1995), and numerous academic and practitioner oriented articles. Please address correspondence to: Gail Wilson, Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, UK. [email: g.wilson@lse.ac.uk]

	biographical note
	gail wilson,

Wilson: Local Culture, Globalization and Policy Outcomes

Global Social Policy 6(3)


R U South

Regional Perspectives from South Asia

This issue of Global Social Policy sees the introduction of a new element -Regional Perspectives. The Regional Perspectives section is a space for our Regional Editors to report on key developments or issues from their regions of the world. The substance of each piece will vary according to the perspective of the Regional Editors from different parts of the world.

gsp

The last three decades have witnessed changes in the financing and provisioning of welfare services globally that have been influenced by a heightened role for markets. Whether in health services, education, pensions or other welfare provisions, the debate regarding the effectiveness of markets and states has assumed centre stage among researchers, activists and policy makers. The intensity and depth of these debates has varied across different regions of the world. In the South Asian region there have been fairly vibrant debates regarding the changing role of the state and effectiveness or noneffectiveness of markets. At the core, the values of equity, universality and quality have guided the debates surrounding the relative merit of state and markets in social sectors. The issue is indeed a complex one because most of the countries in the South Asian region were liberated from colonial rule during the first half of the twentieth century, after which they proceeded to build public welfare services. Among the various South Asian countries, India and Sri Lanka invested substantially in education and health while some of the others had made meager investments in these sectors. Until the 1970s, there was a commitment towards public investment in welfare services and the state was the main player across most South Asian countries. The investments made in welfare services were by no means small for these countries considering the competing demands made by 'productive sectors' like agriculture and industry.

Despite all the constraints, all of the South Asian countries did invest in social sectors but there was variability in terms of the extent of financing and provisioning of these services. Even before the public services could be consolidated most of these countries were affected by the world recession of the late 1970s and this directly affected investments in the social sectors that were considered 'unproductive'. The stagnation and decline of public expenditures affected institutional and manpower growth in the public sector and therefore could not keep up with increasing demands. This resulted in the further weakening of public services in most South Asian countries. There was considerable variation across countries in this region in terms of strengths and weaknesses in public services. While India and Sri Lanka had relatively stronger public services, Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh had weak financing and provisioning of public services. The weak base in welfare provisioning was further eroded during the 1980s and 1990s with the rise of markets and a strong critique of the state in the social sectors. What in effect happened was that market principles were injected into hierarchical paternalistic institutions that created huge problems of governance in terms of access and quality of services. The decades of the 1980s and 1990s witnessed stagnant or even declining public expenditures, growth of markets, introduction of market principles into public services and growing concerns regarding the accountability and effectiveness of social services.

There is much variation in the growth of markets in the social sectors across countries in the South Asian region. India has the largest market in the social sectors whether in health, education, infrastructure or others. If we take health as an example, the growth of markets has been largely confined to individual practitioners but institutions at the secondary and tertiary levels relatively less so, across most countries. Sri Lanka has some growth at the tertiary level in the form of large corporate hospitals, restricted to Colombo. India is the only country in the region that has a large private sector at all levels and there are corporate enterprises that have set up hospitals in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. Apart from the 'for profit' sector there has been a steady increase in the 'non-profit' sector during this period. There has been an increase in the quantum of foreign funding to the non-profit sector during the last three decades that has played a significant role in provisioning, advocacy, research and policy. The discourse has now shifted from state provisioning to public-private partnerships between the government and 'for-profit' and 'non-profit' organizations.

The trends in privatization of social services have raised an important issue regarding the decline in quality of public services, which in my view has not received adequate attention. After the initial euphoria over the efficiency of markets during the 1980s and 1990s, there have been many instances of market failures or only partial success in delivery of social services. There is evidence from different parts of the world that privatization has led to the exclusion of certain social groups from access to basic services. This evidence has resulted in a growing recognition of the importance of the state in delivery of social services and therefore the need to revitalize it. A number of reform initiatives, both externally and internally driven, have tried to revitalize public services with only partial success. Sri Lanka is the outlier in terms of strong public services and has withstood the onslaught of privatization. While Sri Lankans comment on the gradual decline of public services, it is in no way comparable to the other countries in the region. The other countries have started with a weak base and this has been further eroded during the last three decades. The reasons for this erosion must be analysed in terms of structures and processes. The structural reasons are largely related to inadequate public financing and the growth of markets both within and outside the public services. The social processes include the changes in the patterns of consumption and expression of demands of the different social groups. In some countries like Sri Lanka and India, the growth of middle classes has led to a shift in preferences from public to private services. This has created a 'demand' for the growth of markets while at the same time the 'exit' of the middle classes from public provisioning has led to its abdication, resulting in poor quality of services. In Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh, polarized between the rich and the poor, the state of public services is very weak and the scope for markets is small. Clearly the lesson to be drawn is that none of these countries can do away with public provisioning but given the political scenario markets are also here to stay. Given this scenario, social policy needs to be much more creative in redefining the role of markets and state in the provisioning of social services.

  baru is Associate Professor at the Centre of Social Medicine and Community Health at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Please address correspondence to: Rama V. Baru, Centre of Social Medicine and Community Health, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 110067, India.[email: rbaru2002@yahoo.co.uk]

Global Social Policy 6(3)


Most writers and readers interested in globalization operate within the English language. This is not surprising and reflects the English dominance in electronic communications and the network society more generally. Yet, if we are interested in global social policy in terms of how it impacts in Latin America, for example, much of the social science material will be in Spanish and Portuguese. It is as though the external world is an English one and the internal world

Globalization of/in Latin America

America. It is in no way to be seen as a review of the literature but just as a taster for GSP readers who recognize the limitations of a global view based on English eyes and ears only. For ease of presentation I will present these books in fairly conventional terms, reflecting the economic, political and cultural aspects of globalization respectively, before reflecting in more general terms on what might be gained from an 'off-centre' view of globalization and its discontents.

Latin America operates, most often, as a radical reference point for the critical theories of globalization. It is after all where the World Social Forum originated (Porto Alegre), where indigenous presidents nationalize the oil industry (Bolivia) and where neo-liberalism's most spectacular failure occurred (Argentina). However, it is a quite abstract signifier for all things radical rather than a complex economic, political, social and cultural reality. Latin America might contest the juggernaut of neo-liberal globalization, but it does not figure as an architect in its construction. Colonial forms of power and knowledge seem more prevalent today than ever. The coloniality of power constitutes the planet and its continental division (including 'Latin America', that is of course not a unity) and articulates it with the production of knowledge (including what we call 'globalization'). Another way of putting this is that globalization looks and feels different from the perspective of subalternity. I am not suggesting a simple alternative composed of local histories and knowledge we can counterpose to the new global knowledge/power but I do think we need to be alert to border thinking in a spatial as well as interdisciplinary sense.

Economic (Dis)articulation

Globalization has deeply affected the economic, political and cultural patterns of development in Latin America but it has done so in conjunction with national shifts in patterns of capital accumulation and political legitimation. During the first era of globalization Latinamerican national economic policies were congruent with those of the 'open' world economy then prevailing. Following the international capitalist crisis of the 1930s and the disruption caused by the second inter-imperialist war up to 1945, most countries in Latin America embarked on a more nationalist and self-reliant economic course, the so-called national-development model. However, by the late 1970s and certainly in the 1980s, it became clear that this model was not consistent with world trends but was beginning to break down in its own terms. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the perceived failure of the national-development model more generally led to a reintegration into the world economy. The social disintegration and industrial decline consequent on this turn has not translated into a new economic model that is sustainable and politically viable. That is, it is the political economic disintegration that most of Latin America is now in which frames much of the debate on the economics of globalization.

Crítica de la Globalidad is not just a critique of globalization, but also a proclamation on 'domination and liberation in our time' as the subtitle indicates. The story of globalization and its impact in/on Latin America is situated within a broad history of the Enlightenment and the emergence of the liberal state. The restructuring of capitalism in the post-war era is tracked meticulously as is its impact on society and the world of work. There is also a substantial chapter on Mexico's neo-liberal globalization and current crisis. It is particularly strong on analysing the relationship and tensions between the crisis of the neo-liberal model and the process of political democratization. It emphasizes the cultural aspects and refuses a simple rejection of globalization. What it seeks is a critical understanding of the complexity of the processes of globalization. Where it differs from the standard Northern approaches, I believe, is in its emphasis on the relationship between the capitalist centre (North) and its peripheries (South). While not explicitly couched in these terms, this text revives the radical tradition of the dependency approach of the 1970s as a specifically Latinamerican take on global development processes.

Neoliberalismo Globalizado is in the Latinamerican tradition of an extended political essay. It is much more critical in the everyday sense of the word in its demolition job on the economic of Hayek and Friedman and the logic of Popper. The emphasis is on the myth of the value neutrality of neo-liberal economics doctrine. Globalization is seen as simply the rolling out of neo-liberal expansionism. Argentina in the 1990s used a case study for the empirical rebuttal of the neo-liberal case for development along free market lines. In reality, of course, the collapse of actually existing neo-liberalism in Argentina 2001 would convince even the managers of globalization that the model could not continue to work as was. Where this book stops is at the level of the debate in terms of the globalization of society and the search for an alternative development model. While understandable from the viewpoint of someone in the sinking ship of Argentina Inc., the global managers of the system had since learnt the lessons and moved on to construct a post-Washington consensus that, while showing continuity with the orthodoxy, was more flexible and therefore more viable.

Both books, in different ways, display a particularly Latinamerican approach to globalization. Certainly many of the reference points -both in terms of proponents of globalization and its critics -are similar to those we find in Northern texts and debates. There is a certain mirroring of metropolitan debates and often the analysis is derivative. There are language issues, with authors accessing English and/or French sources in particular ways. For example, a Latinamerican author oriented towards the USA would pick up on different debates compared to one who had UK reference points. Why these texts are different is because the issues found in Mexico, Argentina or Brazil (not to mention Bolivia, Ecuador or Peru) are quite different to those prevailing in the North Atlantic. Thus, for example, the varieties of capitalism debates and the nuances of New Labour splits in the UK have little interest when one is taking up positions in terms of national economic survival. To my mind there is nothing yet available to match the originality and verve of the early dependency literature in the 1970s, with its advanced structural historical methodology (see [START_REF] Kay | Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment[END_REF]). Nationalism has still not been replaced by a coherent critical global approach to development and underdevelopment.

Political (Re)construction

The turn towards the world market in Latin America was carried out under the aegis of military dictatorship from the Chilean coup of 1973 onwards. For a long time, there was a belief that inter-nationalization required repression. The strong state pioneered the removal of the state from its role in regulating the free market. Many achieved that task by the 1980s when political re-democratization went into full swing. Now it is democratic and even progressive political regimes that impose the policies of neo-liberal globalization. This democratic consolidation is, however, incomplete in many ways, with presidentialism still prevalent and the rule of law at best partial. The nature of democracy in Latin America is hotly contested. While we live in a postauthoritarian era, the quality of democracy is thin at best. Democratic consolidation has been partial really insofar as democratic principles and procedures do not reach deep down into society. Nationalism can no longer be the hegemonic social force it was insofar as the economic model is irrevocably tied to globalization. Precisely what national democracy means in Latin America today is thus uncertain.

Bernardo Sorj's book on the unexpected democracy that Latin America actually got after the dictatorship is an original one. Fully cognisant of the most recent western literature on democracy, citizenship, political representation and so on, it is firmly grounded in the complex reality of Brazil today. It is a political essay but there is nothing 'light' about it. The basic argument is that democracy has become consolidated in Latin America even if it is not the democracy we expected. Globalization is not seen as something entirely new, a deus ex machina descending on a placid social scene. Rather globalization developed in an intensely conflictual relationship in countries riven by poverty, inequality and political authoritarianism. Nothing 'means' the same here as in Europe, for example, whether we are examining citizenship issues, the role of the non-governmental organizations (Sorj is particularly good on them) or even what modernity means. Sorj concludes that the new global agenda -free market on one side, human rights on the other -turns the debate away from the nation state as a means of economic regulation and political representation and sees therein the danger of right-wing populist resurgence reclaiming the mantle of the nation.

As even a casual observer in the North would know, there is an active counter-globalization movement in Latin America and not just in the famous forums of Porto Alegre. Resistencias Mundiales is part of a broad research and publishing initiative by the Latin American Social Observatory based at CLACSO (Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales -Latin American Social Science Council) easily accessed on the web (http://www.clacso.org). This book is largely designed to introduce the counter-globalization debates to Latin America, and so includes authors such as Samir Amin, Walden Bello, Alexander Cockburn, Francois Houtart and Ellen Meskins Wood. But the 'local' authors add a distinctive spin to a familiar story and the editors of 'From Seattle to Porto Alegre' are particularly good at 'grounding' the evolution of the counter-globalization movement in pre-existing struggles. A subsequent collection edited by [START_REF] Seoane | Palgrave, 2002) and Cultural Politics in Latin America (with A. Brooksbank Jones)[END_REF] focuses much more specifically on social movements in Latin America and how they are impacted by and impact on globalization. To put it at its most simple, not only does globalization look different from the South but so also does the 'movement of movements' that has emerged to contest its hegemony.

Latin America as a broad and contradictory continent plays an important role in the contestation of actually existing globalization. This is at the level of the World Social Forum but more importantly perhaps in terms of Brazil's role in leading Southern resistance to the World Trade Organization's neoliberalization drive. Current social upheavals in Latin America, and above all the re-emergence of indigenous culture and resistance in the Andean countries, point towards new and more complex forms of opposition and construction of alternatives in the future. There is a move beyond the global agenda in that neither in its pro-business or anti-capitalist guise has it that much to offer in terms of a practical alternative in Latin America. There is a greater emphasis on strengthening the state and developing coherent national development and constitution strategies. Western observers would need to move beyond romanticized notions of the Zapatistas as the first information guerrillas and harbingers of the next global revolution, to examine critically the region in terms of the complexity of its reservoirs of creativity in terms of combining national, social and cultural forms of surpassing globalization.

Cultural (Re)imagination

If the political economy of Latin America is inextricably bound up with development of the global system, the cultural life of Latin America has been much more independent and even precursory of global trends. There has been groundbreaking cultural activity in Latin America in relation to many 'contemporary' global cultural trends. Thus, for example, Jorge Luis Borges can conceivably be seen as an originator of postmodernism, something partially acknowledged by Foucault and Derrida at least. Post-colonial analysis has undermined the ontological security of the West, the margin figures as a key site of subversion, and even postmodernism can be seen as the revenge of the periphery. A specific Latinamerican contribution to the debates around the 'posts' (colonialism, modernism, structuralism) has been around the issue of hybridity. Latin America's much debated heterogeneity, its diverse logics of development and simultaneous temporalities make it a seemingly natural object for anti-evolutionists' postmodern reflection.

Néstor García Canclini is the foremost Latinamerican cultural critic/ anthropologist/sociologist who is best known in the North. Nevertheless, his Latinoamericanos Buscando Lugar en este Siglo, which is a bold programmatic statement for the continent, is not available in English. For García Canclini, the central tension of our era is 'between the promises of global cosmopolitanism and the loss of national projects' (p. 50). Latinamericans are becoming highly globalized as cultural agents, as migrants and as debtors. Regional integration projects are in crisis and each nation state is (re)negotiating its position in the world order. While the radical nationalist projectsin the political and cultural domains -have lost their purchase, nothing clearcut has come to fill the gap. With a transnationalized political economy and culture, national identity lacks effectiveness and legitimacy. For García Canclini the way forward lies in the construction of a 'critical latinamericanism' centred on the democratic participation of citizens, promoting the multicultural expression of our societies, and exploiting the possibilities contained within globalization. Globalization is not a subject but a process in which various actors can intervene. García Canclini's major work on 'Imagined Globalization' (García Canclini, 1999) has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the cultural political economy of globalization but, again, it remained in Spanish. In particular, through a detailed study of Latinamerican art and cultural industries, García Canclini explores the different modalities of globalizing, or, in other terms, going from European to US hegemony. Globalization was, for much of the 1990s, thought of as the inescapable destiny of modernity. We are now more driven to examine the variety of encounters and misencounters it provokes and facilitates. And, we do not all imagine globalization in the same way. For the company manager in São Paulo, Buenos Aries and Mexico City might well conceive of globalization in a direct and harmonious mode. However, for the multicultural migrant or artist, globalization appears in the imaginary as a tangential relationship. We may relate to those who speak the same language as us, practice the same disciplines as ourselves, or between countries focusing on the same problems. Circulation creates similarity but cultural differences are also generated and not as mere resistance to globalization's cultural reach.

Globalization has transformed the economics, political, social and cultural parameters of development in Latin America. The new global dimension challenges the cultural authority of the nation state. The state's ability to organize cultural identity is severely curtailed by the emerging global cultures. Not that we should overstate the global 'overdetermination' of local culture practices, as the work of García Canclini and many other cultural theorists in Latin America have demonstrated. Today's fragmented and de-territorialized cultural forms and processes make it very difficult to achieve a coherent national cultural policy. But, Latin America has always/already been a hybrid cultural formation. The sedimentation and intermingling of indigenous traditions, colonial forms and modern communication and educational patterns, have made Latin America what it is today. While globalizing forces are certainly impacting on and transforming local cultural forms and practices, we can expect syncretism and hybridization and something distinctly 'Latinamerican' to emerge at the other end.

Global Projects/National Histories

We can start summing up by exploring the distinction between the Spanish/ Portuguese/French terms 'Globalización/Globalizaçâo/Globalization' and 'mundialización/mondializaçâo/mondialization' that is lost in the simple English word 'Globalization'. The notion of 'worldness' gives a quite different inflection to our understanding and reading of the new global condition. Thus, Renato [START_REF] Ortíz | Mundialización de la Cultura [Globalization of Culture[END_REF] distinguishes between economic and technological innovation on the one hand, and a cultural worldness on the other. Neoliberal globalization is thus clearly conceived as a new western civilizing project and Latin America is destined to be 'globalized' in this sense. The local histories of Latin America are also part of another history of 'globalization' in which culture plays a dominant role and that is one that cannot be conflated with or subsumed under the cultural project of globalization. While the first is, indeed, the hegemonic disciplinary form of knowledge, it is constantly (and not least in Latin America) contested by other forms of knowledge and cultural development.

We do not need to buy into the whole 'cultural imperialism' approach to understand that the coloniality of power has a very real material effect when thinking about/in Latin America [START_REF] Mignolo | Local Histories/Global Designs, Colonality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking[END_REF]. Just by way of example we can mention two social science theories that originated in Latin America but which were then largely ignored and then co-opted and subsumed by western knowledge. The first was the concept of 'dependency' developed in the late 1960s as a Latin America counterpart to metropolitan theories of imperialism. While extremely fruitful as a lens through which to read the political economy of a dominated world region it only entered the western development debate when social theorists writing in English picked it up and ran with it. Another theoretical advance coming out of Latin America during that period was that of social 'marginality', which developed certain Marxist concepts around the notion of a surplus or a floating population beyond the 'reserve army of labour'. Current European interest in the concept of 'social exclusion' as an overarching paradigm for the social effects of globalization owes a lot to the concept of 'marginality' but by and large this is not acknowledged. This is not a nationalist point but a stress on Europe's non-uniqueness in terms of global history. Both of these theories and the broader relationship to our understanding of development are examined in detail by Cristóbal [START_REF] Kay | Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment[END_REF] in a book itself largely ignored by 'Latinamericanists', the area-study epitomizing the coloniality of power.

Latin America, as object of study and position from which to study, allows us to rethink, I would argue, the relationship between the global designs of globalization and national histories. It does so in ways that are much more fundamental than recent western debates on the exaggerated demise of the nation state and the need to 'bring the state back in'. It is not an essentialist perspective based on spurious notions of authenticity that compels us to confront the colonizing 'foreign' cosmopolitanism of the globalization discourse. Latin America was always/already modern and even postmodern avant la lettre in its mixed temporality and cultural hybridity and bricolage. It is not a simple-minded nativist or traditionalist reaction to modernism that is creating the current wave of contestation of actually existing globalization in Latin America. What is questioned is the notion of Europe (or North America) as the place of theory with Latin America as the place of practice. The decolonizing of knowledge is probably as urgent in the era of globalization as it ever was.

  R O N A L D O M U N C K Dublin City University, Ireland víctor flores olea and abelardo marin ˇa flores, Crítica de la Globalidad: Dominación y Liberación en Nuestro Tiempo [Critique of Globality: Domination and Liberation in Our Time]. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2000. 598 pp. ISBN: 9-68165-994-5. nÉstor garcía canclini, Latinoamericanos Buscando Lugar en este Siglo [Latin Americans Seeking a Place in the Century]. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2002. 120 pp. ISBN: 9-50126-405-X.

  ricardo j. gómez, Neoliberalismo Globalizado: Refutación y Debacle [Globalized Neoliberalism: Rebuttal and Debacle]. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Macchi, 2003. 216 pp. ISBN: 9-50537-601-4. josé seoane and emilio tadei (eds), Resistencias Mundiales de Seattle a Porto Alegre [Global Resistances: From Seattle to Porto Alegre]. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2001. 208 pp. ISBN: 9-50923-160-6. bernardo sorj, La Democracia Inesperada [The Unexpected Democracy]. Buenos Aires: Bononiae Libris, 2005. 120 pp. ISBN: 9-87218-021-0.

Munck: Globalization of/in Latin America