Katharina Holzinger
email: holzinger@sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de

Methodological Pitfalls of Convergence Analysis

The study of cross-national policy convergence has become highly popular in political science. The academic popularity of the topic significantly increased in the 1990s. There is an ever-growing body of research that investigates the occurrence and the underlying driving forces of policy convergence. Notwithstanding these efforts, we still have a limited understanding of the extent and causes of policy convergence. Both conceptual and methodological heterogeneity impose important restrictions on the comparability of the empirical findings.

Whether a study finds convergence, divergence or persistence of policies depends very much on the measurement concepts used. As an abstract statement, this seems trivial. However, Seeliger (1996) has already pointed to the fact that, in empirical convergence analyses, little attention is paid to these problems. This contribution presents a selection of the many methodological problems one is confronted with in convergence analysis. It focuses on the convergence of policies. However, similar problems may arise with respect to the convergence of institutions, culture, habits, etc. Furthermore, this contribution focuses on problems of measurement, leaving aside problems of explaining convergence. The problems will be illustrated using data from the research project 'Environmental Policy Convergence in Europe' (ENVIPOLCON). 1

Problems of measurement of similarity

The measurement of policy convergence faces a number of problems, relating both to 'policy' and to 'convergence'. Usually, policy convergence is broadly understood as an increase in policy similarity over time. This raises two questions. First, how can the 'similarity' of policies be measured? Second, how is its 'increase over time' conceptualized? I start with problems of measuring the similarity of policies before coming back to problems related to measuring convergence.

Comparing policies

If we talk about cross-national policy convergence, we are usually referring to a certain policy field or to a single policy measure in a certain policy area. This policy (field) potentially exists in several countries, and the question is whether it has become more similar in the observed countries and time period. However, policy fields and single policies are highly complex subjects, encompassing many dimensions that can be compared in order to assess their similarity. In the literature, we generally find a broad list of policy dimensions on which convergence might occur, including, for instance, policy output or content, policy style or process, as well as policy outcomes (Bennett, 1991: 218). Another differentiation is suggested by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 349-50), which includes 'policy goals, structure and content; policy instruments or administrative techniques' (see also Heichel et al., 2005: 831).

With respect to methodological questions, one important distinction is between policy output and policy outcome. In the former we are interested in comparing political measures as such, whereas in the latter we are interested in comparing their effects, such as the effects of a certain policy measure on unemployment levels. Outcome data are often easily available, usually in metrical form and often in time series, and are directly comparable. Comparing output data over time and countries, however, poses more problems. Therefore, I will concentrate on policy output data here, in order to show the additional complications in comparing similarity. The methodological problems discussed later on, however, arise with both output and outcome data.

A policy field, such as industrial policy, agricultural policy, internal security policy or environmental policy, consists of a large number of policy measures. Assessing the similarity of a policy field implies a comparison of the composition of the whole field: Does the same policy field in two countries consist of a similar number and type of policy measures? Assessing the similarity of single policy measures implies, for example, asking about the existence of such a measure, the exact goals pursued with it, or the instruments used. Thus, to assess policy similarity, one can compare not only the policy repertoire of a country but also the presence of certain policies, the instruments used, and sometimes the exact metrical setting of the policy (such as a tax or

a limit value). Which dimensions of a policy measure are present and important will vary across policy fields.

For the purpose of this contribution, I use data on environmental policy measures that were collected to investigate convergence effects on three different policy dimensions, namely, the presence of a policy, the policy instruments applied, and the exact settings of these instruments. The three dimensions vary with respect to the 'extent' of their similarity, as well as with respect to the quality of the data: the presence of a policy represents a low level of similarity and can be measured only with categorical data (yes/no); employing the same instruments represents a higher degree of similarity, also measured by categorical data (type of instrument); and the same setting of a policy implies the highest extent of similarity that can be expressed by metrical data.

To assess the similarity of policy fields, some form of aggregation of single policy measures is needed. Moreover, for the assessment of single policy measures it is necessary to aggregate the various dimensions compared. How deeply similarity will be analysed is, of course, a matter of the research question. For some purposes it is sufficient to compare the similarity of a policy field by looking only at its composition of single measures. For other purposes, such as regulatory competition research, data on the exact setting of certain parameters, such as taxes, might be needed. For still other purposes it might be necessary to aggregate several dimensions of a policy measure. The last purpose poses the problem of aggregating different kinds of data, such as categorical, ordinal and metrical, within one similarity scale. In the case of the data used for exemplification here, aggregation has taken place at the level of dimensions of policy measures, of single policies composing the environmental policy of a country, and of countries. The method used will be developed further below. So far, my goal has been simply to point to the general problems in comparing policy fields or policy measures and assessing their similarity.

Assessing the similarity of policies in the case of non-existence of a policy

A second general problem confronts any study of policy convergence: assessing the similarity of policies in the case of non-existence of a policy. At first sight this may seem to be a very specific technical problem. However, decisions about how to deal with this can dramatically change the results of convergence analysis.

What is the problem here? Assume that we want to know whether a certain policy in a number of countries has converged over a given period of time. We need to compare the policies in these countries for at least two points in time. Whereas at the second point in time (the end of the period) such a policy exists in all or most countries, at the first point in time (the start of the period) only a few countries already have such a policy and others follow only later. If we compare two countries from the set where one has the policy and the other does not, it is obvious that they should be rated as dissimilar at that point in time. However, how should we assess two countries neither of which has the policy yet? Are they similar or dissimilar?

At first sight one is tempted to say that they are similar in that they do not have a policy. However, does it make sense to talk about policy similarity in the absence of policies? Moreover, if one thinks of the metrical dimension of a tax or limit value, the problem becomes more sophisticated. If countries are rated fully similar only when their limit values are exactly equal and less similar when their limit values are different, how can one rate them as equally similar when they do not have a value at all? It would be more natural to rate them as most dissimilar -although it is definitely not possible to assign a metrical value to them.

Although philosophically there is no true answer to this problem, in practice there is a better and a worse answer. This will be shown using the environmental policy data set. This data set consists of 40 policy measures in 24 countries whose similarity is assessed at four points in time (1970,1980,1990,2000). The data given in Table 1 relate to the dimension presence of policy.

The table shows the aggregated data for the similarity of all 40 policies in all 24 countries at four points in time, measured as percentages of 'complete' similarity (that is, all 40 policies exist in all 24 countries). Additionally, it gives the data for convergence, that is, the change in similarity within each of the three decades. In version 1, pairs of countries are rated dissimilar when neither yet has a policy; in version 2 these country pairs are rated similar.

The table shows that the similarity of policies is clearly overestimated in version 2. In 1970, most countries did not yet have much of an environmental policy, thus most of them are 'similar'. In version 2, similarity is higher in 1970 than in the subsequent decades, so there is almost no convergence, and even divergence, over time. This does not at all fit the picture if one looks at the development of environmental policies in the 24 countries over the past 30 years: the countries have adopted more and more environmental policies and therefore their policy repertoire has become ever more similar. Version 1 describes the development much better: similarity of the policy repertoire increases for each point in time, and there is thus substantial convergence. One should be aware, however, that here lies a serious problem for any kind of convergence analysis, given the drastic difference in the results, which can be seen in Table 1.

Measurement of convergence

Various notions of convergence have been developed that imply different conceptions of measurement. The most basic notion is the concept of so-called σ-convergence. According to this concept, the degree of convergence increases with the extent to which the policies of different countries have become more similar over time. Thus, convergence is the decrease in standard deviation from time t 1 to t 2 and can be measured using the coefficient of variation (see Botcheva and Martin, 2001: 5;Holzinger and Knill, 2004: 30;2005: 776;Martin and Simmons, 1998: 753f.).

In addition to σ-convergence, various concepts to assess the degree of cross-national policy convergence have been applied (for an extensive discussion, see Heichel et al., 2005: 831ff.). The concept of β-convergence measures the extent to which laggard countries catch up with leader countries over time, implying, for instance, that the former strengthen their regulatory standards more quickly and fundamentally than the latter. By contrast, γ-convergence is measured by changes in country rankings with respect to a certain policy. According to this approach, convergence increases with the extent to which country ranks change over time. Finally, δ-convergence measures the change in the distance of a given policy from a certain reference policy, e.g. the policy of the best-performing country in a set. This concept presupposes that policies can be unambiguously rated as better or worse, which is of course not always easy to assess.

The concepts of σ-, β-, γand δ-convergence imply different definitions and hence reference points for assessing changes in policy similarity over time. Depending on the type of convergence investigated, empirical results might be interpreted very differently. Evidence of σ-convergence, for instance, does not necessarily mean that there is also γ-convergence or δ-convergence. Evidence of β-convergence does not imply that there must also be σ-convergence: the fact that laggard countries change more fundamentally than leader countries is not a sufficient condition for a decrease in variance across all countries. It is therefore hardly surprising that we arrive at partially different assessments with regard to the degree of convergence, depending on the concrete concept applied.

Problems of σ σ-convergence

I shall focus on some difficulties with the most common approach, namely σ-convergence. The classic measurements are the variation coefficient for assessing changes in similarity, and the movement of the mean over time for assessing the direction of convergence whenever the policies concerned allow for such a judgement (Holzinger and Knill, 2005: 777). I start with an example of policy development in order to show the problems of the coefficient of variation and then go on to another example in order to show the problems with the development of the mean as a measure for direction. Finally, I will turn to another problem inherent in convergence analysis: saturation effects.

Figure 1 shows the policy development for industrial discharges of zinc into surface water. To illustrate the policy development, Figure 1 displays the regulations for eight countries that form a 'regulatory corridor', that is, they comprise the maximum and minimum limit values among the whole 24country sample for each point in time. The sample seems gradually to converge toward stricter standards in 2000. However, the coefficient of variation (Table 2, perspective 1) reveals a clear pattern of divergence throughout the whole period under study. This result is strikingly different from the optical impression.

An important reason for divergence as expressed by the coefficient of variation is to be found in the number of new policy adoptions during the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, the range of values and their variance changed significantly over time. But, even if only those countries for which a value already existed in the previous time period (Table 2, perspective 2) are taken into account, no clear tendency of σ-convergence can be observed.

A second reason for the difference between the impression from the graphical depiction of limit values and the coefficient of variation is the latter's sensitivity to outliers. The picture of divergence in the national regulation of industrial discharges of zinc is modified if we analyse the variation by an alternative instrument: box-plots. Box-plots display the variation of all values in one box for each point in time. Each box includes 50% of all values; the upper and the lower quartiles delimit the box on both sides. Outliers and extreme values are displayed separately. This way, they do not influence the length of the box. The line across the middle of each box is the median. The length of the box represents the degree of variation: the longer the box, the less similar the values on this variable. Decreases in the length of a box can be interpreted as an occurrence of σ-convergence.

Figure 2 applies this instrument to the case of zinc regulation. Whereas, for the first periods under investigation, both the box-plot analysis and the coefficient of variation indicate divergence, the interpretation offered by both instruments points in different directions for the last period. The left-hand side of Figure 2 indicates a clear trend of policy convergence during the 1990s for the core group of countries (the box is much shorter in 2000). In 2000 there is an obvious outlier (Mexico), which is responsible for the impression of divergence when the coefficient of variation is used as an indicator. The The next example shows that the development of the mean can be very misleading as well. The development of the mean limit value for coliform bacteria in bathing water is as follows: 1000 per 100 ml (1970), 5500 (1980), 7167 (1990), and 8000 (2000). The mean clearly indicates that limit values have become less strict over time: the more coliforms permitted, the laxer the standard. This is again in sharp contrast to the impression one gets from looking at the graphical display of the developments for all countries. Figure 3 is a bar chart of the limit values for all countries. It exhibits a clear convergence towards a standard of 10,000 coliforms per 100 ml in 2000 (the black bars). Some countries had already introduced this standard earlier (the UK, France, Greece, Portugal, Spain); others introduced it only in the decade before 2000 (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland). Some now use a stricter standard of 1000 or 2000 coliforms per 100 ml (Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Slovakia). In contrast to the expectation raised by the development of the mean, only two countries lowered their standards, namely Finland and Sweden (from 1000 to 10,000). Together with the introduction of a very lax standard of 20,000 by Romania during the 1980s, this obviously accounts for the increase in the mean in 1990 and 2000. In 1970, only two countries had a standard -the strict value of 1000 in Finland and Sweden. The increase in the mean in 1980 follows from the introduction of the 10,000 value in Denmark and the UK. Thus, the overall increase in the mean is the result of wide variation in this limit value (which is a consequence of scientific uncertainty in this matter). Nevertheless, there is clear convergence to the top: in 1970, only two countries had any standard, whereas, in 2000, 11 countries applied the 10,000 standard, 5 applied a stricter one and only 1 country applied a laxer one. The development of the mean gives an inadequate impression of the direction of convergence.

The examples show that both the coefficient of variation and the mean as standard measurement concepts for σ-convergence have a number of problems. First, both are sensitive to outliers and extreme values and can thus give a false impression of what actually happened. Second, they cannot account very well for 'newcomer' countries, that is, countries that do not have a policy from the start. Newcomers may increase the variation in limit values, despite the fact that early adopters are converging and that more countries are adopting a policy, which can itself be interpreted as convergence. Third, and this has not been made explicit so far, the coefficient of variation and the mean are measures that can be used only with metrical data. Other dimensions of policy convergence, such as the adoption of a policy in ever more countries or the growing similarity of the instrument used, cannot be grasped with these measures. Thus, the aggregation of several dimensions of a policy in order to have a more adequate measurement of convergence is impossible with these concepts too.

A new measurement concept for σ σ-convergence

Within the ENVIPOLCON project, a more refined measurement concept of σ-convergence has been developed that can overcome these weaknesses of the classic approach (see [START_REF] Holzinger | The Impact of International Institutions and Trade on Environmental Policy Convergence in Europe[END_REF]. Since the figures presented in Table 1 and in later examples are based on this new approach to the measurement of similarity and σ-convergence, it will be briefly introduced here. The 'pair approach' is based on the comparison of policy changes across a number of countries. If the direction of convergence is not of interest, the most direct approach to convergence measurement is to compare each country individually with each other country in the sample. The pairwise comparison is the basic starting point for the study of σ-convergence. The units of analysis are country pairs and not single countries. Consequently, the concept of convergence implies an increase in policy similarity between a certain pair of countries over time. The use of country pairs or dyads is new to the study of policy convergence, although it is common in other research areas, such as the study of international conflict [START_REF] Kinsella | Conflict Emergence and Escalation in Interactive International Dyads[END_REF][START_REF] King | Proper Nouns and Methodological Propriety: Pooling Dyads in International Relations Data[END_REF].

The pair approach involves several advantages for the study of σ-convergence. First, the pair approach comprises any shift of convergence or divergence between all pairs of countries. This way, sensitivity to outliers and newcomers is avoided. Second, it can be used for both categorical and metrical data. Thus, using the pair approach, the various dimensions of policies can be integrated into one measure. Third, since it is not based on aggregate figures, such as the coefficient of variation, it allows for the use of a convergence variable as the explanandum in a quantitative model.

How is pairwise similarity calculated? If a policy is present for both countries, they get a score of 1 (similarity), otherwise a score of 0 (dissimilarity). The same applies if both countries use the same instrument. For the setting dimension, a normalized metrical score from 0 to 1 is applied, based on differences between the limit values of country A and country B, leading to a similarity scale between 1 (limit values are identical) and 0 (country pair with the most dissimilar setting values). For all other values, gradual similarity is assessed by weighting the distance between two settings with the maximum distance for each item and for each point in time. These scores can subsequently be aggregated over the dimensions of a single policy, over all policies and over all countries of the sample. This way we get the overall similarity of the policy field at one point in time. The score can then be expressed as a percentage of the maximum score for complete similarity of all policies in all countries. Finally, convergence is expressed as the change in similarity within a decade. These measures for similarity and convergence are given in Table 1 and in further tables below.

The saturation effect

There is one more problem that is inherent in any analysis of convergence: the saturation effect. If convergence of policies takes place in a certain group of countries and a given period of time, this process has its natural endpoint when all countries are fully similar with respect to all policies (or a single policy). During the process, if a number of countries from the sample already have fully similar policies, they cannot converge any further. That is, the potential for further convergence within the whole group shrinks. The more similar policies already are, the more the potential for further convergence decreases within the respective group. In short, over time, saturation takes place.

Since policies and countries that are already fully similar cannot converge any further, convergence of the other countries is underestimated if we do not take into account the saturation effect. To avoid this, policies that have become completely similar for a country pair A and B in an earlier period and remain stable in the subsequent period should be excluded from the policy sample in the calculation of subsequent convergence. That is, the aggregated convergence score for this pair is weighted not by the number of all policies but by the number of policies that are not yet fully similar.

The environmental data set can be used to show the difference in the results when the saturation effect is controlled for. It is to be expected that the saturation effect is greater in later periods -given that there is a general convergence trend. Policy convergence for the presence of policy dimension is .09 for the 1970s, .20 for the 1980s and .51 for the 1990s if the saturation effect is controlled for (see Table 1, version 1). If the saturation effect is not controlled for, the respective figures are .09, .17 and .35. Thus, there is in fact not much difference in the 1970s -the convergence figures are almost the same. In the 1990s, however, there is a clear difference: convergence rises from 0.35% to 0.51%.

Selection problems

In this section I turn to the problems of sample selection. This is, of course, a general problem not specific to convergence analysis. In fact, case selection is more important in qualitative research because the number of cases is often small (King et al., 1994: 115ff.). However, selection problems also arise in quantitative studies, and thus also in quantitative convergence analysis. Seeliger (1996: 289ff.) has pointed to the fact that in empirical convergence studies the problem of sample selection is often neglected.

In the analysis of cross-national policy convergence, several kinds of samples are of interest: the selection of policy fields, the selection of the single policies that comprise a policy field, the selection of countries, and the selection of time periods. Policy fields will be chosen according to research interest, and selection becomes important whenever several fields are to be compared. Similarly, the selection of countries may correspond to a region that is the focus of the project, or it may correspond to a sample that represents the world or a region. Single policies comprising a policy area are usually not a 'census' but a sample, and the same is true for time periods or points in time chosen for measurement. Especially with respect to time periods, data availability often plays a role in the selection process. It is rarely possible for a given policy field and a given group of countries to obtain data for the full time period over which the policy exists in at least one of the countries. Moreover, random selection in order to achieve representative samples will often be impossible too. This is especially true for policies for which no 'full list' exists. I will present some examples showing how sensitive convergence analysis can be to even minor changes in the sample.

Country sample

Table 3 gives the coefficient of variation of three environmental policy measures for two points in time, 1990 and 2000. The change in the coefficient indicates convergence or divergence of these policies among a group of countries that have such a policy. The three policies are the sulphur content of gas oil and NO x (nitrogen oxides) and HC (hydrocarbon) emissions from passenger cars. The table shows that taking away only one or two countries from the samples of 17 and 14, respectively, may affect the direction of policy change. For the sulphur content of gas oil, there seems to have been clear convergence of policies if Bulgaria is removed from the sample. Including Bulgaria changes the picture completely, because Bulgaria is an outlier in 2000. For the emissions from passenger cars, the full sample seems to have converged between 1990 and 2000. Removing Hungary and Ireland results in divergence for the remainder of the countries. Hungary and Ireland were outliers in 1990 and caught up during the 1990s. Thus, small changes in the group can have large effects on the results of convergence analysis.

Time period

The time frames of convergence studies are of 'paramount importance' (Seelinger, 1996: 296) for the interpretation of their results. For the environmental policy convergence project, a time period of 30 years was chosen, which is longer then usual in convergence analysis. In this case the time period covers almost the full span of the history of environmental policy, which began in most countries in the late 1960s; it comes close to a census. Table 4 shows the variation in the extent of convergence if each of the three decades, two 20-year periods or the full period of 30 years are observed.

The table indicates that convergence was lowest during the 1970s and highest during the 1990s, with the 1980s in-between. Accordingly, the first 20year period shows less convergence than the second one. The whole 30-year period shows less convergence than the 1990s and also less than the second 20-year period (1980s and 1990s). Thus, convergence clearly increased over the three decades. The selection of a different time period, e.g. only the period between 1980 and 2000 or only the 1990s, would obviously lead to a different impression of the amount of environmental policy convergence than would the full time span.

In the above example, the time period is represented by four points in time. This allows for four cross-sectional analyses of similarity or several cross-sectional analyses of convergence over various periods (see Table 4). Although yearly time series data might seem more attractive, their use can be problematic in convergence analysis. This depends very much on the object of convergence analysis or, more precisely, the dependent and independent variables. For some variables -for example when economic growth is the dependent variable and investment the independent variable -yearly data may be easily available and there may be sufficient variation over time in order to apply time series analysis sensibly. When the dependent variable is 'policy output', however, data will usually have to be collected first, which the available resources do not always permit. Moreover, policies do not change on a yearly basis and therefore there is not enough variance over time for a yearly time series. A time span of 5 or 10 years is much more appropriate here. If the time period observed is not very long, time series analysis is impossible.

The selection of policy measures

The 40 policy measures chosen for the assessment of environmental policy convergence are a non-representative and non-random sample. Drawing a random sample is impossible because environmental policy measures are an open list ('the universe of cases is not clearly specified', King et al., 1994: 125).

The selection of the sample was guided by theoretical interest. The main explanatory factors to be tested were the effect of international institutions and the effect of regulatory competition on the extent of environmental policy convergence. For this reason an equal number of policies were selected for which an obligatory international policy exists and for which such an international policy does not exist, as well as an equal number of policies that are trade related and that are not trade related. It was expected that stronger convergence would occur for obligatory international policies and for traderelated policies. It was also expected that convergence would be most pronounced with respect to the dimension of presence of policy, and least pronounced with respect to the setting dimension. international harmonization exists (.44) and it is lowest for the settings dimension of policies that are not trade related (.05). The pattern fully 'converges' with the theoretical expectations: obligatory policies converge more than nonobligatory policies; trade-related policies converge more than non-traderelated policies; and the presence of policy dimension converges more than the instruments and the settings dimensions. This is, however, not the point to be made here. The pattern of subgroups makes clear that the extent of convergence varies greatly across policy measures. The researcher has to be very cautious: each arbitrary (and non-random) selection of policies might yield very different results and any generalizations are problematic.

In general, problems of selection will be severe in convergence analysis. In many instances, we will have only small numbers of cases (countries or policies) or short time periods, there will be problems of data availability, time series data will not be available or cannot be used in a sensible way, and random selection will be impossible. The above examples have shown how great the effects of minor changes in the samples can be. This makes it very important to reflect carefully on the selection of time frames, countries and policies in designing convergence research and to keep these problems in mind in interpreting its results.

Conclusion

Because policy convergence is a growing field of research in political science, it is important to point to a number of methodological problems arising in the measurement of convergence. The measurement of convergence includes as a first step the measurement of similarity and as a second step the measurement of convergence. With respect to the first step, I have dealt with the difficulties of comparing policies and of measuring and aggregating various dimensions of policies. I also discussed a new method to deal with these problems: the pair approach. With respect to the second step, I discussed four conceptions of convergence. I demonstrated some problems with the most common conception, σ-convergence, related to the use of the coefficient of variation and the mean. The pair approach can avoid these problematic effects. Some of the methodical problems discussed here, such as the problems of selection, are of a general nature. Other problems, however, are specific to policy convergence analysis. First, there is the problem of assessing the similarity or dissimilarity of policies in situations where some countries do not yet have a policy. I have shown that the decision to rate them as similar has severe effects on the result: it can even eliminate convergence in highly converging policy fields. Second, there is some kind of saturation effect. The more policies have already converged, the less potential remains for further convergence. If this is not taken into account, convergence in later periods of time will be underestimated.

Taken together, there are many pitfalls when measuring convergence. These problems may lead the researcher to overestimate or underestimate convergence effects. It is even possible to see divergence with one kind of measurement and convergence using another, or to see convergence to the top or bottom where another measure produces the opposite result. The use of appropriate conceptions of convergence and appropriate measures and indicators of similarity and convergence, as well as the careful selection of time periods, and country and policy samples, is of paramount importance for future convergence research. To make results comparable, these methodological questions have to be discussed more explicitly among convergence researchers.

Notes

Funding of this research by the European Commission within the fifth framework programme on socioeconomic research is gratefully acknowledged.

1

The ENVIPOLCON research team includes the universities of Konstanz, Nijmegen, Hamburg, Berlin (Free University) and Salzburg.

Figure 1

 1 Figure 1 Limit values for zinc emissions into surface water, 1970-2000 (mg/litre).

Figure 2

 2 Figure 2 Industrial zinc discharges in surface water, 1970-2000 (mg/litre).

Figure 3

 3 Figure 3 Development of limit values for coliforms in bathing water, 1970-2000 (per 100 ml).

Table 1

 1 Assessment of policy similarity in the case of non-existence of policies

		Policy similarity		Policy convergence
		1970 1980 1990 2000	1970s 1980s 1990s
	Presence of policy
	-version 1	.03	.12	.30	.65	.09	.20	.51
	Presence of policy
	-version 2	.82	.73	.67	.74	-.09	-.06	.07

Table 2

 2 Limit values for zinc emissions into surfacewater, 1970-2000

	Coefficient of variation	1970	1980	1990	2000
	Perspective 1	.00	.54	.64	.18
	Perspective 2		.63	.95	.95
	N	2	5	1 0	1 6

picture of different interpretations is confirmed, irrespective of the selected convergence perspective. Whereas the left-hand side of the figure includes all available values for each point in time with the number of countries changing over time (perspective 1), the right-hand side of the figure is based on perspective 2, taking into account only those four countries that had already established a standard in 1980 (the value for Belgium is missing in 2000). The figure shows that these early adopting countries had already converged during the 1980s.

Table 3

 3 Effects of country selection

	Convergence or

Table 4

 4 Table 5 shows that convergence varies greatly over the various subgroups of policies. It is highest for the presence of policy dimension of policies for which Selection of time period

	2 8 4	European Union Politics 7(2)
				Presence
			All policies	of policy	Instruments Settings
		1970s	.10	.09	.16	.06
		1980s	.18	.20	.21	.10
		1990s	.37	.51	.36	.18
		1970s and 1980s	.14	.14	.19	.08
		1980s and 1990s	.28	.36	.29	.14
		1970s to 1990s	.22	.27	.24	.12

Table 5

 5 Selection of policy measures

		Obligatory	No obligatory
		international international Policy is	Policy is not
	Dimension	policy exists	policy exists	trade related	trade related
	Presence of policy	.44	.20	.32	.19
	Instruments	.40	.13	.31	.08
	Settings	.18	.07	.14	.05

European Union Politics 7(2)


Bernard Steunenberg
email: steunenberg@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

EU policy process national policy coordination transposition

Turning Swift Policy-making into Deadlock and Delay

National Policy Coordination and the Transposition of EU Directives

Bernard Steunenberg

Leiden University, The Netherlands

A B S T R A C T

Most member states of the European Union (EU) have some difficulty in transposing EU directives. Despite the obligation to comply with EU law, member states are often slow to adopt national policies implementing directives. In this paper I analyse this problem by focusing on the coordination of transposition in the domestic policy arena. Coordination is approached as a game in which one or more higher-level players decide on policy when lower-level players are unable to make a decision. Based on the model developed in the paper, lower-level players sometimes appear to have discretion in shaping the policy transposing a directive. Furthermore, if a single player coordinates the transposition process, the implementing policy differs from the policy specified by the directive. However, a decisionmaking process with more than one higher-level player can result in deadlock, leading to a literal transposition of a directive. Moreover, deadlock between the deciding players may delay the transposition process. Both mechanisms are illustrated by two cases of decision-making on EU directives in The Netherlands: the cocoa and chocolate products directive and the laying hens directive. The analysis shows that the framework developed in this paper contributes to the understanding of transposition.

Introduction

When the European Union (EU) adopts a new directive, this directive needs to be transposed into national law before it can be implemented. Without proper transposition, a directive is not integrated into the national legal system, creating the risk that the policy specified is partly or incorrectly implemented. Despite their obligation to comply with EC law, most EU member states appear to have some difficulty in transposing directives. 1 Even though the Stockholm European Council (2001) stressed the importance of full transposition and agreed that all member states have to reduce their transposition backlogs to less than 1.5% of the total number of directives in 2002, most member states, including the largest ones, have not yet met this target. 2 Furthermore, using a sample of directives to be transposed by The Netherlands, Mastenbroek (2003: 384) found that transposition was delayed for 42% of the directives, with an average delay of about one year (in one case, the delay was more than six years after the agreed deadline). More recent work indicates that delays in transposition seem to be widespread among the member states [START_REF] Berglund | Mass Production of Law: Routinization in Transposition of European Directives[END_REF][START_REF] Kaeding | Determinants of Transposition Delay in the European Union[END_REF][START_REF] König | Troubles with Timeliness: Explaining Trends in Transposition Delay[END_REF].

Why do member states sometimes have difficulty in adopting EU policy that has already been agreed on? This paper answers this question by focusing on the issue of transposition in relation to national policy coordination. A number of studies have tried to explain why member states differ in their transposition success. A recent large-scale study by [START_REF] Falkner | Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor?[END_REF][START_REF] Falkner | Complying with Europe? The Impact of EU Minimum Harmonization and Soft Law in the Member States[END_REF] identifies 'different worlds of compliance' rooted in the cultural and political characteristics of the member states as the main cause of delays in transposition. Another approach was developed by Siedentopf and Ziller (1988), and later by Pappas (1995), which stresses the importance of administrative capacity and national coordination for compliance. Other authors have argued that problems with transposition are the result of a 'misfit' between the directive and the existing policy [START_REF] Héritier | Leaders" and "Laggards" in European Clean Air Policy[END_REF][START_REF] Duina | Explaining Legal Implementation in the European Union[END_REF][START_REF] Börzel | Why There Is No "Southern Problem": On Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the EU[END_REF] or domestic administrative institutions [START_REF] Knill | European Policies: The Impact of National Administrative Traditions[END_REF][START_REF] Knill | Coping with Europe: The Impact of British and German Administrations on the Implementation of EU Environmental Policy[END_REF]. This 'misfit' requires adaptation in the domestic area, which leads to delay or misapplication of community law. A more actor-oriented perspective develops arguments about the role of domestic opposition in the implementation of the directive, and especially different views among the decisive domestic actors about the preferred regulatory regime. This opposition may arise from different visions that domestic actors have on how to reform their domestic policy [START_REF] Héritier | Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking[END_REF] or different preferences by veto players [START_REF] Haverland | National Autonomy, European Integration and the Politics of Packaging Waste[END_REF][START_REF] Haverland | National Adaptation to the European Union: The Importance of Institutional Veto Points[END_REF][START_REF] Dimitrova | The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union: An Impossible Quest?[END_REF]. Delays, according to this line of argument, reflect the domestic opposition to the implementation of the directive. Furthermore, differences in domestic interests may lead to 'legislative' or 'bureaucratic' drift, since lower-level policy actors may deviate from the policy specified in the directive.

In this paper I follow this line of research and use an actor-oriented approach to transposition. An important question that arises is who the relevant domestic players are. The answer to this question depends on the national legal system and the extent to which this system gives policy-making power to different political and administrative actors, either through constitutional provisions or through existing legislative delegation. Consequently, decision-making on transposition is not uniformly organized in all member states and for all directives but consists of processes at different levels in which various actors play a role. This diversity is illustrated by some recent findings on transposition. In Spain, for example, for only 11% of the directives currently in force, the government passed a law through the national parliament in order to comply with the directive's requirements (Steunenberg and Voermans, 2005: 132). More than 80% of the directives were transposed through either government decrees (40%) or ministerial orders (42%). For The Netherlands, similar proportions are reported by [START_REF] Bovens | The Influence of European Directives on the Dutch Legislature[END_REF]. Finally, in Austria, the federal government transposed 41% of EU directives through federal law and 59% through government decrees in the period 1995-2003[START_REF] Müller | Delors' Vision and the Sobering Reality of Europeanizing the Legal Order: An Austrian Perspective[END_REF]. Although this percentage is lower than in The Netherlands and Spain, again most of the directives were transposed through lower-level legal instruments. Often, the relevant players are not actors within the member state's legislative process but administrative players who implement directives through lower-level legal instruments.

These relevant players have their own views on how an EU directive should be implemented. Given their different preferences, it is the policy coordination mechanism that will determine the impact domestic players have on transposition (see also Kassim et al., 2000). Therefore, I focus on coordination, which is modelled as a game with two distinct levels: at one level, players have to propose how to transpose a directive; at another and hierarchically higher level, players decide when lower-level players have failed to agree. In this way, decision-making is conceptualized as a multi-level process in which the higher-level players resolve potential conflict between the lower-level players. The framework used in this paper builds on [START_REF] Dimitrova | The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union: An Impossible Quest?[END_REF], who model transposition as a decision by the government taking account of the preferences of (at least) two domestic political groups. However, here the assumption that transposition is the outcome of legislative decision-making is dropped. Transposition is modelled as a two-level game in which lower-level players try to transpose a directive first before higher-level players make a move. A related study by [START_REF] Franchino | A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union[END_REF] models the decision to delegate policy-making to the member states at the EU level. Even though he also includes an executive stage in EU policymaking, the approach taken here differs from this study in several important aspects. Whereas Franchino assumes that national administrations have the same preferences as national governments, I include the possibility of different preferences between these groups of actors. Furthermore, his model seeks to determine the discretion offered by a directive, whereas this paper aims to understand the domestic response to a directive.

The paper is structured as follows. I first develop an analytical framework to analyse national decision-making and the way in which coordination helps to resolve disagreement among the various players. The analytical framework is then applied to two cases of decision-making on EU directives in The Netherlands, which confront the basic logic of the approach with empirical data. The focus on The Netherlands is useful because this country, like several other EU member states, has cases of transposition with multiple coordinating players as well as cases in which only one (administrative) player coordinates transposition. However, based on the policy-specific approach taken in this paper, any context could be used to explain transposition as long as the key factors are identified.

The use of case studies is particularly helpful in this context owing to the fact that the derived hypotheses require detailed information such as the identification of players, the main political issue at stake, the preferences of players, the contents of the policy specified in the directive and the range of legally feasible policy options (for a further discussion see [START_REF] Pahre | Formal Theory and Case Study Methods in EU Studies[END_REF]. The cases selected cover both single-player (cocoa and chocolate products directive) and multi-player coordination (laying hens directive). The relevant players in each case, together with their preferences, were established in interviews in which the experts were asked to identify the main issues, the players involved and the positions of these players. 3 Official publications, including the proceedings of the Dutch parliament, have been used in order to validate the judgements of the interviewed officials. In concluding this paper, I discuss how national policy coordination contributes to our understanding of transposition in the broader discussion of compliance in the EU literature.

Transposition as a problem of domestic coordination: Towards a model

Transposition is by no means a mechanical process. A directive is the starting point for drafting a national implementing measure, but it usually requires additional interpretation. The extent to which this is necessary depends on the contents of the directive. A directive may provide for certain different options or leave open how specific targets have to be achieved. In addition, it may contain ambiguous provisions resulting from intergovernmental bargaining at the EU level. Franchino (2004: 286-91) studied the various degrees of specificity of directives and found that directives sometimes provide member states with substantial discretion, especially when implementation requires specialized and technical knowledge.

This discretion allows member states to choose from a range of policies that could be implemented domestically. Following Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2000: 216), these policies are called sustainable policies. However, if a domestic policy outside the range of sustainable policies is selected, the Commission will challenge the member state for not transposing or for incorrectly transposing a directive into national law. 4 Depending on the national legal system, directives are transposed in different ways, including statutory law, government decrees and ministerial orders (for an overview, see Asser Instituut 2004: 24-5; [START_REF] Steunenberg | De omzetting van Europese richtlijnen: Instrumenten, technieken en processen in zes lidstaten vergeleken[END_REF]. Naturally, a statutory law or act needs to be approved by parliament. Sometimes parliament adopts a general authorization law that allows the government to transpose all directives (for example, the European Communities Act in the UK) or a list of directives (for instance, the lois d'habilitation in France). In this context, often a 'call back' procedure is used in which parliament has to approve the adopted measure, by either explicit or implicit approval. Other member states, such as Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands, employ specific delegation clauses, which give nonparliamentary actors the authority to adopt implementing measures in some policy area. These measures, which include government decrees and ministerial orders, are typically prepared by administrative actors within national ministries or implementing agencies. Parliamentary acts regulating the delegation to these actors are often general or cover a large part of a policy area (Steunenberg and Voermans, 2005: 43-5). They provide administrative actors with substantial power, sometimes including the possibility to transpose any directive in a field, long before a directive is passed. Therefore, at the stage of transposition, governments have limited choice over the procedure to be applied.

The variations in decision-making procedure indicate that different players can be involved in transposition processes. In this paper, I therefore use the notion of policy-specific players who formally or informally have the authority to affect the outcome of decision-making: they may have the right to draft a proposal (agenda-setting power), or they may need to support a proposal individually or collectively (veto power) [START_REF] Tsebelis | Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartism[END_REF]Steunenberg, 1996: 314-16). Players are not restricted to 'formal' players in the national legislative process (Tsebelis, 2002: 19) but include those with informal power as well. This notion of players relates to the concept of 'factual veto points', as developed by Héritier (2001: 12), which refers to players with de facto decision-making power.

Emphasizing the importance of coordination -by either political or administrative players -I approach transposition as a process taking place at two distinct levels, each with different players: lower-level and higher-level (or coordinating) players. The lower-level players try to decide on a measure transposing a directive. These players could be civil servants in the ministerial units preparing a ministerial order or ministers drafting a statutory law. The higher-level players become involved when the lower-level players have not been able to reach agreement on how to transpose a directive or on certain issues of it. Depending on the procedure used, these players can be different ministries overseeing the transposition process, different administrative bodies involved in the transposition process, cabinet ministers who share responsibility for the policy area involved, or different coalition parties in parliament that need to support the adoption of transposing legislation.

Looking at the two-level structure in the decision-making process, the question arises of why higher-level players do not make decisions themselves and avoid delegation. However, deviations from the most preferred policy do not necessarily imply that higher-level players prefer to make these decisions themselves [START_REF] Horn | The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector[END_REF][START_REF] Epstein | Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers[END_REF]. First, higher-level players delegate decision-making because they do not have the time, capacity and expertise to make policies on a large number of different issues. Refusing to delegate and holding on to their power inevitably leads to ineffective policies with outcomes that are politically harmful or to no policy at all. Clearly, avoiding such outcomes provides the motivation for higher-level players to involve lower-level players in the policy process. Second, in the context of statutory law, delegation is best understood as providing the administration with policy-making power for a broad range of issues. It underscores that higher-level players are not very interested in each and every detail of a policy and prefer to make a 'go' or 'no-go' decision with regard to the final proposal. Without going any deeper into the reasons for delegation, I will discuss now how existing coordination mechanisms affect transposition.

All players are assumed to have single-peaked, spatial preferences over outcomes in terms of domestic policy. These preferences imply that each player prefers a specific and unique policy. The position equating to this policy is called a player's ideal point. Moreover, the further away an alternative policy is from this ideal point, the less it is preferred. The ideal point is labelled L i for a lower-level player, i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n} and H i for a higher-level player, i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., m}. Furthermore, I assume that at each level one of the players (the agenda-setter) has the authority to put a proposal to the other players, who decide whether to accept or to reject the proposal. The need to reach an agreement on the implementing instrument is represented in terms of veto power for each of the participating players: only if both actors accept the proposal, and thus refrain from using their veto power, is a policy adopted.

The game is structured as follows. The lower-level player with agendasetting power proposes an implementing measure to the other lower-level players. These players decide whether to accept or to reject the proposal. If all lower-level players accept the proposal, a policy is adopted. Given such agreement, the higher-level players need only to approve the policy. However, if the lower-level players do not agree, the higher-level agenda-setter puts a proposal to the other higher-level players, who then decide whether to accept or to reject the proposal. Finally, the European Commission decides whether to challenge the implementing measure by starting an infringement procedure. I assume that the domestic players prefer to avoid being challenged by the Commission since they would lose face domestically as well as internationally.

The various stages of the game are illustrated in Figure 1. Following this sequence of play, and assuming that players have complete and perfect information, the concept of sub-game perfectness can be used to identify the equilibrium, which depends on the set of sustainable policies and the specific players' preferences.

The power of the higher-level player

How will the domestic players transpose the directive? If lower-level players have to decide on an implementing policy, the first issue is whether sustainable policies exist, that is, policies that will be permitted by the Commission.

As illustrated in Figure 2, all points between d and d ¯are sustainable policies (and form the set of sustainable policies D), which include the policy specified by directive d. Furthermore, sustainable policies are not necessarily symmetrically distributed around d. The directive may suggest a minimum level of regulation (as in the case of the laying hens directive), or the wording in the directive may be interpreted in only one way. Consequently, the distances between d and its minimum and maximum values may vary.

The second issue is whether both lower-level players prefer some alternative to the point of reference, that is, the policy proposed by the higher-level players. I start with a model with only one higher-level player and relax this assumption later. If the higher-level player is not constrained in making a choice, as in Figure 2(a), this player will set the policy equivalent to his or her ideal position as the implementing policy, that is p = H 1 . This policy is part of the set of sustainable policies and will not be challenged by the European Commission. Furthermore, this policy is the higher-level player's best choice from the set of policies this player prefers to the directive d. This set, which I will call the higher-level player's set of preferred policies, includes all policies between directive d and the player's point of indifference h 1 (d).

The higher-level player's choice for the implementing policy of p = H 1 renders it difficult for the lower-level players to select an alternative. 5 Lowerlevel players are able to make a proposal only if policies exist that are jointly preferred to the higher-level player's preferred policy. This is the case if the individual preference sets of the lower-level players overlap. For the configuration in Figure 2(a), those sets do not overlap since p is found between both players. Whereas player 1 wants a change to the left of p, player 2 prefers a change to the right. This configuration makes lower-level decision-making impossible.

A similar problem arises for the configuration presented in Figure 2(b), in which all players prefer a policy that is substantially different from the directive. Being constrained by the set of sustainable policies, the higher-level player's best choice is policy p = d ¯, which is both a sustainable and a preferred policy. Furthermore, the lower-level players prefer some alternatives to p. These alternatives are found in the lower-level players' set of preferred proposals, which are equal to the interval between p and 1(p) in Figure 2(b). Since veto player 1 wants a smaller deviation from policy p than veto player 2 does, player 1's individual preference set is more restrictive and thus determines the elements of this set. Although preferred proposals exist, these policies do not overlap with the set of sustainable policies. Consequently, no policies exist that are both sustainable and preferred by the lower-level players. Again, lowerlevel decision-making is impossible and the higher-level player decides.

The analysis indicates that the higher-level player decides the implementing policy if the lower-level players are divided over this policy (condition 1) or if they cannot draft a preferred proposal that is also a sustainable policy (condition 2). The higher-level player also decides the implementing policy if the directive equals his or her ideal point (condition 3). In these instances, the lower-level players do not affect the implementing policy. Using these conditions, the following expectation can be formulated with regard to the power of the higher-level player: under each of three conditions mentioned, the higher-level player selects an implementing policy closest to his or her most preferred position (Hypothesis 1). Although I have used only one player, a similar result holds for cases with more than one higher-level player. In that case, condition 3 has to be substituted by the necessary condition that the directive should not divide the higher-level players (see Propositions 1Ј and 1A in the Appendix).

If these conditions are not present, other outcomes occur. These are discussed in the following section.

Discretion to lower-level players

Although coordination may lead to a policy implemented by the higher-level player, this outcome is not common. If policies exist that are sustainable, preferred by the higher-level player and preferred by all lower-level players, the lowerlevel players will transpose a directive. These policies are called feasible policies because they satisfy each of these three conditions. In the preference configuration presented in Figure 3, feasible policies are found between d and H 1 .

If feasible policies are available to the lower-level players, the question is which policy will be made. For the moment, I assume that player 1 is the agenda-setter, and player 2 has the possibility of rejecting the proposal. Making his or her best choice, player 1 chooses interpretation d, which is accepted by player 2, approved by the coordinator and not challenged by the Commission. This outcome is a literal interpretation of the directive. A different outcome is found if player 2 and not player 1 is the agenda-setter: this player would propose interpretation L 2 . The directive is now transposed in a non-literal way through a domestic policy equal to player 2's most preferred position.

Generally, lower-level players often adopt the policy that transposes a directive. This occurs if the lower-level players prefer an implementing policy that differs from the one preferred by the higher-level player (negation of condition 1) and can draft a preferred proposal that is also sustainable (negation of condition 2), while the directive does not equal the higherplayer's most preferred position (negation of condition 3). Using these new, necessary conditions, I define decision-making situations in which the lowerlevel players have discretion. The degree of discretion depends on the size of the set of feasible policies. With regard to the outcome, as indicated by Proposition 2 in the Appendix, the following expectation can be formulated: under the three conditions mentioned, the lower-level players transpose a directive and adopt an implementing policy closest to the most preferred position of the lower-level agenda-setter (Hypothesis 2).

Multi-player coordination

Another mechanism is multi-player coordination, which has more than one higher-level player. Here, I will use an example with two higher-level players, H 1 and H 2 . The Appendix presents a result for every possible number of players. Since multi-player coordination is the more general case of singleplayer coordination, it includes results similar to Hypotheses 1 and 2, which I will not discuss further (see the Appendix for details). However, multiplayer coordination also allows a third outcome, which was not possible under single-player coordination. This possibility is based on preference configurations such as the one presented in Figure 4.

In Figure 4 the higher-level players are divided over the issue of how to transpose the directive. Whereas player 1 prefers a change to the left, player 2 wants a change to the right. Although sustainable policies exist, the domestic players disagree on transposition and are unable to make a decision to deviate from d. This creates a situation of deadlock in which the higherlevel players initially are unable to decide on a domestic policy and eventually agree on a literal transposition of d (see Proposition 1B in the Appendix).

This result, which is typical for multi-player coordination, leads to the expectation that if higher-level players are divided on a directive, the directive is transposed in a literal way (Hypothesis 3). It specifies a proposition by Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2000: 215-16, 222), who suggest that any division between players leads to a literal transposition. However, the model proposed in this paper indicates that this outcome is typical for multi-player coordination: it mainly occurs if higher-level players have to make a decision and are divided. A difference in views between the lower-level players does not necessarily lead to this outcome since a decision is made by the higher-level players in this case. Literal transposition as a result of deadlock can be associated with delay in the transposition process. Because the higher-level players prefer changes in opposite directions, they may hinder swift decision-making. Some players may postpone their decision to the very last moment, whereas others may try to resolve the existing deadlock by redefining the issues at stake, adding new issues, linking the issues with other decision-making processes, or trying to change the preferences of the opponents (Héritier, 1999: 16-17). In the end, and if these attempts are not successful (which would otherwise change the decision-making situation), opposing preferences lead to a literal transposition. This process suggests an additional expectation: if higher-level players are divided, transposition is delayed (Hypothesis 4).

Having discussed the main features of both coordination mechanisms, I now turn to two empirical cases of transposition in which these mechanisms play a role. Although in both cases domestic players were divided on how to transpose certain aspects of the directive, the processes and outcomes of transposition were rather different.

Cocoa and chocolate products directive

The first case concerns a directive on cocoa and chocolate products adopted by the Council and the European Parliament on 23 June 2000 (European Parliament and Council, 2000). The goal of this directive is to create common rules for the composition, specification, packaging and labelling of cocoa and chocolate products. One of the main issues was whether chocolate may contain other natural vegetable fats [START_REF] Bailer | Nash versus Schelling? The Importance of Constraints in Legislative Bargaining[END_REF]. The use of vegetable fat was heavily contested because the chocolate industry in the member states followed different traditions. Producers in the UK and Ireland had been using vegetable fats other than cocoa in the production of chocolate. Chocolate producers in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and The Netherlands did not use these ingredients. Fearing competition from the larger manufacturers in the UK, these countries opposed the use of fats other than cocoa. After years of preparation, the European Commission released its proposal to change the ingredients of chocolate in April 1996 [START_REF] Commission | Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Relating to Cocoa and Chocolate Products Intended for Human Consumption COM(95)722 final[END_REF]. Despite the opposition of The Netherlands, which voted against the common position in the Internal Market Council of 28 October 1999, the directive was adopted one year later. Since August 2003, chocolate in the EU may contain natural vegetable fats up to an amount of 5% of its total weight. Furthermore, the sales names of chocolate were harmonized and strictly regulated by the new directive.

The chocolate directive was transposed in The Netherlands using two government decrees, as illustrated in Figure 5 the existing Commodities Law, which provides the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport with the authority to propose decrees on food safety, which have to be approved by the cabinet. In making a decree, the minister, who is an independent agent within the Dutch context, has the lead and is politically responsible for the adoption of the proposal. The minister is therefore de facto the deciding player. Transposition was completed in June 2002 with the adoption of the second decree. Despite strong opposition in the preparatory process, the transposition process was finalized more than a year before the deadline. The relevant players were the ministries involved in the procedure of changing the decrees based on the Commodities Law. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport had the lead, and consulted the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 6 The Directorate on Food and Health Protection of the Ministry of Health prepared the decree and can therefore be regarded as the lower-level agenda-setter. The Ministries of Agriculture and Economic Affairs are the other lower-level players. Being politically responsible for the making of the decree, the Minister of Health is the only higher-level player. This setting makes the transposition of the cocoa and chocolate products directive an example of singleplayer coordination as presented earlier.

The relevant domestic players did not take a strong stand on the use of other vegetable fats and were more interested in how strict the rules would be on the sales names, definitions and characteristics of chocolate products. The Ministry of Health was concerned about food safety and whether the packaging of chocolate products would provide sufficient information about ingredients to consumers. Economic Affairs and Agriculture aimed at establishing a level playing field for chocolate products in the Union. Economic Affairs in particular had a strong preference for having uniform rules regarding chocolate products. This meant that both Economic Affairs and Health preferred clear and unambiguous rules on the sales names, definitions and ingredients of chocolate products. The Ministry of Agriculture, however, held a less pronounced view on this since it was concerned with the position of the industry, which was divided over the directive. The positions of the domestic players in the transposition process are illustrated in Figure 6.

The directive explicitly prohibited additional national regulations that could hinder the free circulation of chocolate products under the sales names mentioned in the directive. Article 4 of the directive states that, for these chocolate products, 'Member States shall not adopt national provisions not provided for by this Directive'. This prohibition, as well as the exact wording used in the text, limits the possibilities for member states to reinterpret some of the directive's provisions. Consequently, the set of sustainable policies is narrowly defined. This set is indicated by the grey area in Figure 6, where d represents the contents of the directive.

Because the lower-level players -the departments within the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Health -were divided over the implementing policy, the configuration presented in Figure 6 corresponds to the situation described by Hypothesis 1. This hypothesis predicts that the lowerlevel players would accept the policy proposed by the higher-level player, which is the Minister of Health. The Minister's best policy choice, p = d ¯,

which is located at the upper boundary of the set of sustainable policies, is the expected outcome. This theoretical outcome, which slightly deviates from the literal content of the directive, is confirmed by the empirical outcome. The government decree actually deviated from the original text of the directive on some issues concerning sales names and labelling of chocolate.

During the transposition process the Ministry of Health noted that some product descriptions in the directive were not mutually exclusive, which would allow some products to be labelled in two different ways. This applied to, for example, the definitions of milk chocolate and family milk chocolate in the annex of the directive, which used overlapping percentages of cocoa solids. The ministry differentiated between these two products by also defining the maximum amount of dry cocoa solids in family milk chocolate (see Article 13 of the government decree on cocoa and chocolate). In addition, the ministry observed that Article 3 of the directive did not clearly indicate how to determine the percentage of total dry cocoa solids to be presented on the label of chocolate products. After consulting the Commission, and in accordance with an opinion of the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs, the percentage was interpreted as the amount of cocoa solids in the chocolate content of a finished product (Minister of Health, 2001: 10).

These adaptations in the implementing measure indicate that the transposition of the directive was not carried out in a literal way but took some of the concerns of the higher-level player into account. This observation is in line with the framework developed in this paper. In addition, the transposition of this directive was not delayed and was finished more than a year before the actual deadline. It shows that strong opposition against the directive during the legislative process, which was fuelled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, did not preclude the Ministry of Health from transposing the directive on time. The issues that played a role during transposition differed from the ones that played a role during the EU legislative process. Once the decision was taken to allow vegetable fats in chocolate other than cocoa, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lost interest and did not participate in the domestic decision-making process, and the interventions by other players focused on sales names and the labelling of chocolate products.

Laying hens directive

The second case discussed here is a directive on the protection of laying hens, which was adopted by the Council on 19 July 1999 (Council of the European Union, 1999). The goal of this directive was to provide minimum standards for the keeping of laying hens, especially with regard to the use of cage systems. The directive introduced new and higher minimum standards for cage systems, including more space, a separate space or 'nest', perches, and litter to allow for pecking and scratching. Systems satisfying these standards are called 'enriched' battery cages. The directive also set higher requirements in terms of space in existing battery cages. Moreover, the so-called 'unenriched' battery cage systems could no longer be brought into service after 1 January 2003 and will be prohibited from 1 January 2012 onwards. The Minister of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, Laurens Jan Brinkhorst (D66), aimed to transpose the directive by government decree (see Figure 7). The existing Health and Welfare Law for Animals provides the minister with the conditional authority to decide on the issues related to the welfare of animals, including how they are kept. A proposed measure has to be presented to parliament and, if parliament does not respond within one month, the measure comes into force. This call-back procedure differs from the procedure used for transposing the cocoa and chocolate products directive, in which the Minister of Health had unconditional decision-making authority.

In the case at hand, parliament responded by indicating that it preferred the rules transposing the directive to be introduced by law. Owing to the unexpected fall of the second Kok cabinet in April 2002, this dossier was taken over by the new State Secretary of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, Berend Jan Odink, who was a member of the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the first Balkenende cabinet. Disagreement within the LPF led to the fall of that government in October 2002 and new elections in January 2003. Although the State Secretary at first preferred to amend the initial decree on the keeping of laying hens (Minister of Agriculture, 2002), he decided to withdraw his predecessor's proposal and make a new decree, which was adopted in May 2003 (see Figure 7). Again, parliament used its authority to require that the government introduces these rules by law. The Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality in the second Balkenende cabinet, Piet Veerman (CDA), who served in the same post in the previous cabinet, discussed the proposal with parliament. The law adopting the second decree on the keeping of laying hens was eventually approved by parliament on 31 March 2004. It came into force on 19 May 2004, more than two years after the deadline.

The relevant players were, first of all, two departments within the Ministry of Agriculture: the Department of Legal Affairs, which was responsible for transposing the directive, and the Policy Department, which prepared the Dutch position during the preparation of the directive and was involved in the negotiations at the EU level (the Department of Animal Production and Welfare in the Directorate of Agriculture of the Ministry). The Minister of Agriculture can be regarded as the agenda-setting player among the lower-level players. The higher-level players were primarily the political parties supporting the government. Based on the three cabinets that dealt with the laying hens directive, these parties included the Labour party (PvdA), the Liberals (VVD) and D66 in the second Kok cabinet, the Christian Democrats (CDA), the LPF and the Liberals in the first Balkenende cabinet, and the Christian Democrats, the Liberals and D66 in the second Balkenende cabinet. The involvement of these higher-level players makes the transposition of the laying hens directive an example of multi-player coordination as distinguished in the theoretical model.

The domestic players were divided regarding the level of protection of laying hens. On the one hand, the departments within the Ministry of Agriculture as well as Minister Brinkhorst agreed to ban battery cage systems. In the coalition agreement of August 1998, the government already announced that it preferred to ban battery cages, most preferably in the context of the EU. However, if agreement at the EU level were not feasible, the cabinet was prepared to take unilateral measures to ban these systems in The Netherlands (Dutch Parliament, 1998: 59). Based on the possibilities offered by the directive, the departmental actors as well as the minister thus preferred a high level of protection by banning all battery cage systems, including 'enriched' cages as mentioned in the directive. This position was supported by the Labour Party and D66. The Greens and the Socialist Party, which were part of the opposition, also preferred a ban.

On the other hand, the Liberal Party did not support a ban of 'enriched' battery cage systems. According to this party's position, the minister had not transposed the directive correctly. Furthermore, by setting higher standards than demanded by the directive, the proposed rules would damage the laying hens sector by increasing competition from farmers in other European countries (Dutch Parliament, 2002: 3). This position was also supported by the Christian Democrats, the LPF and the SGP (the Reformed Protestant Party, one of the smaller Christian parties). The responsible cabinet members -State Secretary Odink (LPF) and Minister Veerman (CDA), respectively -favoured a literal transposition of the directive without setting higher standards. In their view, the laying hens sector had to decide whether it wanted to keep 'enriched' battery cages or use alternative free-range systems. The preferences of the main actors are illustrated in Figure 8.

With regard to the alternative systems, the directive laid down only minimum conditions in terms of housing, food, water and care of hens, frequently using words such as 'at least' in describing these conditions. Providing a minimum level of protection, the set of sustainable policies is thus asymmetric, as indicated by the grey area in Figure 8: although lower standards are not allowed, member states can introduce higher levels of protection. The cocoa and chocolate products directive, in contrast, provided a strict regulatory framework from which member states were not allowed to deviate. A set of sustainable proposals allowing the introduction of higher standards and the opposing preferences of the governing parties in the second Kok and the second Balkenende cabinets correspond to the situation described by Hypothesis 3. 7 Since the directive is still located in the interval between the ideal positions of these higher-level players (although at the lower bound), they are expected to adopt a literal interpretation. In addition, because the players are in a situation of deadlock, the transposition process is expected to be delayed (Hypothesis 4).

Liberals

The prediction of Hypothesis 3 -literal transposition -is supported by the empirical outcome because parliament accepted the new decree, which includes the option of 'enriched' battery cages. With the support of the LPF, Minister Veerman passed the bill to implement the decree through parliament. In a crucial vote on an amendment to ban 'enriched' cage batteries, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals and the LPF voted against, whereas the amendment was supported by D66 and the Labour Party.

Furthermore, as predicted by Hypothesis 4, transposition was substantially delayed in this case: The Netherlands did not transpose the directive until more than two years after the deadline. This delay was mainly shaped by the divide between the Christian Democrats, the LPF and the Liberals on the one hand and the Labour Party and D66 on the other. This twice led to an initiative to discuss the decree on laying hens in parliament: the Liberals and the Christian Democrats, together with the SGP, required the first decree to be discussed in parliament; the Labour Party wanted parliament to consider the second decree. Two initiatives on the same issue are unusual and substantially delayed the transposition process. In addition, preparing a government decree takes time owing to administrative consultations, including the obligatory advice of the State Council. That the State Secretary as well as the Minister in the Balkenende cabinet decided to introduce a new decree further slowed down the process. In this respect, the elections and the subsequent government reshuffle hardly affected delay. If all relevant players had preferred the first decree, the directive would have been transposed in November 2001, thus meeting the deadline.

Conclusions

The goal of this paper is to show how domestic actors interact to shape transposition. A first finding is that single-player coordination is better capable of adapting a directive to domestic preferences than is multi-player coordination.

Multi-player coordination is defined as a mechanism in which two or more higher-level players decide on how a directive will be handled. Differences in view between these higher-level players lead to political deadlock, that is, a situation in which opposing interests do not permit any other decision than a literal transposition of the directive (see also Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000: 214-18). This situation is illustrated by the cumbersome transposition of the laying hens directive, which took almost five years to be implemented, thus delaying implementation for more than two years past the official deadline.

Single-player coordination does not suffer from the drawback of deadlock and provides more opportunities for a non-literal transposition, which allows domestic players to adapt the directive to their preferences. The dynamics of single-player coordination are illustrated by the cocoa and chocolate products directive. The Minister of Health had the lead in this process, which was concluded in less than two years and more than one year ahead of the official deadline. There was no delay despite the fact that some domestic actors in The Netherlands -and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -were very much against this directive. Furthermore, the directive was transposed in a non-literal way, satisfying a stricter level of regulation, which was preferred by the higher-level player.

Both coordination mechanisms allow lower-level players to draft an implementing policy, which provides these players with discretion. The analysis shows that the degree of discretion available to the lower-level players is a result of the existence of sustainable policies that will be approved by the higher-level players. Moreover, it also depends on whether all lower-level players prefer certain policies. If sustainable policies are limited, or one of the higher-level players prefers a policy close to the one specified in the directive, lower-level players' leeway will be limited. This indicates that the degree of discretion lower-level players have is not equal to the degree of discretion provided by the directive (that is, the range of sustainable policies). Lowerlevel discretion is thus further shaped by national coordination mechanisms.

The empirical analysis in this paper also illustrates that, depending on the case, different domestic actors need to be regarded as relevant players. In this paper an actor is considered as a player if he or she, formally or informally, has authority to decide on a policy. Players then have de facto power. In the case of the laying hens directive, the relevant players included the Minister of Agriculture, departments within the ministry and the main political parties in parliament. This corresponds with some claims that national political parties -sometimes taken as national legislative veto players -play an important role in transposition (see, for instance, [START_REF] Treib | EU Governance, Misfit, and the Partisan Logic of Domestic Adaptation: An Actor-Centered Perspective on the Transposition of EU Directives[END_REF][START_REF] Mbaye | Why National States Comply with Supranational Law: Explaining Implementation Infringements in the European Union 1972-1993[END_REF][START_REF] Giuliani | Europeanization in Comparative Perspective: Institutional Fit and National Adaptation[END_REF]. However, most directives do not require the introduction of a statutory law or parliamentary approval based on the conditional delegation of policy-making power. In the case of the chocolate and cocoa products directive, the required changes could be unconditionally introduced by government decree. In this case, the relevant players are administrative actors, including some departments from other ministries, and not national political parties.

The mechanisms of single-player and multi-player coordination are thus linked to the extent to which the transposition of a directive requires changes in the existing national legal system. If the contents of a directive require the adoption of only one or more 'lower-level' instruments (such as ministerial orders or government decrees), transposition could take place within the framework of single-player coordination. A minister in political systems with a weak core executive, or the prime minister in other systems, could resolve potential conflict between lower-level players. Problems of deadlock and delay may not arise. However, if a directive requires the introduction of new law, multi-player coordination seems to be inevitable, especially if the government is based on a coalition. Consequently, deadlock and delay are possible.

The findings in this paper resemble the approach that understands delay as the result of 'misfit' between EU and domestic policy [START_REF] Héritier | The Accommodation of Diversity in European Policy-making and Its Outcomes: Regulatory Policy as a Patchwork[END_REF]Risse et al., 2001: 6-9). In contrast to this approach, however, the analysis in this paper suggests that delays resulting from a 'misfit' in terms of opposing preferences disappear when players' preferences change. There are several ways of producing preference changes and thus resolving the problem of deadlock. One way is extensive deliberation between these players, which may change preferences. Another possibility is issue linkage, which increases the possibilities of exchange among domestic actors and could lead to mutually preferred solutions. At the same time, issue linkage may also complicate transposition (Falkner et al., 2004: 465-6). A third option is to redefine the relevant players in the decision-making process, which could, for instance, be done by moving a dossier to another group of actors (for example by involving an advisory committee). The last possibility is to postpone discussion until some major political changes take place, such as new elections.

In a more general way, the paper shows that European policy-making, to the extent that it concerns directives, does not end at the last stage of the legislative process in the Council of Ministers. After adoption, directives are further shaped by the member states when they are put into national rules. In this process, and within the limits of Commission oversight, domestic actors can adopt an interpretation that somewhat deviates from the directive. In this way, EU policy-making is best described as a long chain of mutually dependent decisions that cuts across multiple levels of government. Despite this complexity, the current literature on the EU tends to emphasize the EU legislative stage in which policy is shaped by the interactions between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. However, from a policy perspective, such a view is insufficient and does not show how the ambitions formulated in Brussels are transformed and implemented in the national and sometimes regional and local administrations of the member states. The approach proposed in this paper can help to disentangle and clarify these complex processes and their outcomes.

Notes

I thank the interviewed government officials for their willingness to participate in the research project on which this paper is based. An earlier version of this paper was presented as a Jean Monnet Lecture at the Free University of Berlin and at the 33rd Joint Sessions of ECPR, 14-19 April 2005, in Granada, Spain. I appreciate the helpful comments of the participants. Furthermore, I am grateful to Antoaneta Dimitrova, Karen Anderson and the anonymous referees of this journal for their suggestions.

1 The obligation to comply is found in Articles 10 and 249 EC. Based on EU case law, directives take precedence over national law, they are binding as to the result to be achieved in the member states, and they take direct effect if the provisions are unconditional and sufficiently precise (Kapteyn and Verloren van Themaat, 1998: 326-31, 535-7). Moreover, national governments are, in some circumstances, liable for the damage to private parties resulting from late or improper transposition of directives (Kapteyn and Verloren van Themaat, 1998: 564-9). 2

See the various Commission scoreboards on internal market directives at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/score/index_en.htm, which includes the internal market directives in force, or the overview by the Secretariat General of the European Commission at http://europa.eu.int/ comm/secretariat_general/sgb/droit_com/index_en.htm#transpositions, which contains all directives including those that are no longer in force. Based on the latter source, the average backlog was 2.3% on 10 January 2005, and 20 of the 25 member states did not comply with the Stockholm target. 3

In this way, it is possible to specify the key factors that, according to [START_REF] Ganghof | Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis[END_REF], are the main issues in empirical veto player studies. See Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman (1994), [START_REF] Stokman | Winners and Losers in the European Union[END_REF], [START_REF] Selck | Between Power and Luck: The European Parliament in the EU Legislative Process[END_REF], [START_REF] Thomson | The EU Decides[END_REF] for other empirical studies using expert opinions in handling these issues. 4

The Commission uses various instruments to challenge member states and impose compliance. On the one hand, the Commission can start an infringement procedure and bring a case to the European Court of Justice. The Commission needs to defend its claim that a member state deviated from EU law, and a member state may challenge the Commission's judgement. On the other hand, the Commission often uses 'soft' enforcement mechanisms such as inspections, reviews and auditing protocols. In combination with 'naming and shaming', these mechanisms can be rather effective in limiting the range of policy alternatives to member states. See [START_REF] Börzel | Guarding the Treaty: The Compliance Strategies of the European Commission[END_REF] for a further discussion of the Commission's compliance strategies. 5

See the Appendix for the special case of a single lower-level player. The Appendix is not included in the printed version of this paper and can be found on the EUP website at http://www.uni-konstanz.de/eup/issues.htm or at http://steunenberg.bestuurskundeleiden.nl. 6

Interestingly, the Directorate-General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for development aid, played a prominent role in shaping the Dutch position in the Union's legislative process. The ministry strongly opposed the idea of allowing other vegetable fats than cocoa in the production of chocolate to protect cocoa farmers in developing countries. However, when it came to transposition, this ministry was no longer interested in the directive and, according to several government officials, did not play a role in discussions. 7

I disregard the decision-making under the first Balkenende cabinet because this cabinet's period of government was too short to decide on the laying hens directive.

Figure 1

 1 Figure 1 Domestic transposition: The sequence of moves.

Figure 2

 2 Figure2The power of the coordinator.

Figure 3

 3 Figure3Lower-level discretion.

Figure 5

 5 Figure 5 Transposition of the cocoa and chocolate products directive in the Netherlands.

Existing

  Health and Welfare Law for Animals (Gezondheidsen welzijnswet voor dieren) Government decree of 2 November 2001 including rules on the keeping of laying hens (Government decree on laying hens), Staatsblad 2001 (545) In force: to be determined by government decree Withdrawal27 May 2003 including rules on the keeping of laying hens (2003 Government decree on laying hens), Staatsblad 2004 (40) In force: 19 May 2004 Law of 21 April 2004 including the arrangement of the coming into force of the 2003 government decree on laying hens, Staatsblad 2004 (201) In force: 19 May 2004

Figure 7

 7 Figure 7 Transposition of the laying hens directive in the Netherlands.

( a )

 a Period before July 2002 (second Kok cabinet) (b) Period after July 2002 (first and second Balkenende cabinets) * coalition partner with the Christian Democrats and the Liberals in the first Balkenende cabinet. ** coalition partner with the Christian Democrats and the Liberals in the second Balkenende cabinet.

Steunenberg Turning Swift Policy-making into Deadlock 3 0 1 (a) Divided lower-level players (b) All lower-level players oppose the directive

	1(p)			d	p	h 1 (d)	2(p)	d d
		L 1			H 1	L 2
		set of sustainable policies
		higher-level player's set of preferred policies
		li i
	1's set of preferred proposals		2's set of preferred proposals
	d	d	p = d ¯		h 1 (d)	1(p)	2(p)
				H 1		L 1	L 2
	set of sustainable policies	lower-level players' set of preferred proposals
		higher-level player's set of preferred policies

Steunenberg Turning Swift Policy-making into Deadlock 3 0 7

  Preferences of the domestic players on the cocoa and chocolate products directive.

		d	Minister of Health d d
	leniently defined rules on names and ingredients	Ministry of Agriculture	Ministry of Health Ministry of Economic	strictly defined rules on names and ingredients
			Affairs
	Figure 6

European Union Politics 7(3)