Michael T Schmitt
email: mschmitt@sfu.ca]

Simon Fraser

Justin J Lehmiller

Allison L Walsh

The Role of Heterosexual Identity Threat in Differential Support for Same-Sex 'Civil Unions' versus 'Marriages'

Keywords: union, gay and lesbian, identity threat, same-sex marriage, social identity

Although US citizens generally oppose the legal recognition of same-sex marriages more than civil unions, the reasons for this opposition remain unclear. In two experiments, we presented participants with one of two hypothetical state laws legally recognizing same-sex partnerships. The laws differed only in the label applied to those partnerships (i.e. civil union or marriage). Across both studies, participants expressed less support for same-sex marriages relative to civil unions. In addition, participants considering the marriage law found it more threatening to heterosexuals' rights and social status than did those reading the civil union law, and this threat partially mediated the effect of the relationship label on support for the law. Thus, consistent with social identity theory, opposition to the same-sex marriage label is, in part, due to perceived threats to heterosexual identity.

differentiation. Starting with Denmark in 1989, 20 countries have adopted legally recognized same-sex 'civil unions' or 'domestic partnerships'. In some countries the rights granted in these partnerships are virtually identical to marriage, but in many cases they offer only a portion of rights typically afforded to married couples. Regardless of the degree to which they fall short of equality for same-and different-sex couples, these partnerships are legally separate from marriage and go by a different name.

Legally sanctioned same-sex partnerships remain a controversial issue. In the US, many efforts to extend the rights of same-sex partners have met with fi erce resistance from the political elite. In this article we consider one important aspect of the same-sex relationship debate: how does the label applied to same-sex partnerships affect support for their legality? That is, does support for these relationships depend on whether they are referred to as 'civil unions' or 'marriages'?

Public opinion data fi nd that US citizens are more supportive of civil unions than same sexmarriages [START_REF] Cauchon | Civil unions gain support. USA Today[END_REF]. However, such research typically confounds the relationship label with the amount of rights granted to the partners involved. Thus, we do not know the extent to which the relationship label itself, independent of the rights granted to samesex couples, affects support for recognition of same-sex partnerships. Indeed, we suggest that attending to the symbolic implications of the relationship label, not only the expansion of rights, is critical to understanding support for the recognition of same-sex relationships. Following a social identity approach [START_REF] Tajfel | The social identity theory of intergroup behavior[END_REF], we suggest that the degree to which a relationship label is perceived as threatening to the collective identity of heterosexuals should affect support for its legality.

Support for same-sex civil unions and marriages in the US

In the US, recent public opinion polls indicate greater support for same-sex civil unions than marriages [START_REF] Brewer | Same-sex marriage and civil unions[END_REF]. For instance, results of a national 2004 Gallup poll suggest weak support for same-sex marriages (33%), but relatively stronger support for civil unions (54%; [START_REF] Cauchon | Civil unions gain support. USA Today[END_REF]. Similarly, a number of politicians have expressed a preference for civil unions by supporting legislation that would prohibit same-sex marriages, but would not necessarily preclude the possibility of recognizing these relationships under another name (e.g. 2004 Presidential candidate John Kerry; [START_REF] Farhi | Kerry again opposes samesex marriage[END_REF]. For example, when asked about legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell said, 'I don't have any trouble with the concept … If we can address those concerns without marriage, then I am open to the concept' (emphasis added; [START_REF] Yardley | In Connecticut, shifting ground on gay civil unions[END_REF].

Although it seems clear that 'civil unions' currently receive greater support than 'marriages' in the US, research has yet to examine the psychological underpinnings of this preference. Certainly, opposition may stem from people perceiving (with some accuracy) that the recognition of gender-neutral marriages grants more legal rights and protection to gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender people than the recognition of civil unions, as civil unions typically provide only a subset of the benefi ts that different-sex marriages provide. In the United States, Maine, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and Washington have created legal unions for same-sex couples that offer only a subset of the rights of marriage. Therefore, the relative opposition to same-sex marriage may partially refl ect a heterosexist opposition to the greater rights it could provide to same-sex partnerships.

Public opinion research does not rule out this explanation, as this research does not control for inferences about the strength of the law based on the relationship label. Thus, existing data does not offer much evidence as to the effect of the relationship label independent of inferences about the rights granted to same-sex couples.

In the present study we consider the intriguing possibility that the relative lack of support for marriage might also be due to its symbolic implications, independent of its increased legal protections. Interestingly, Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, and California have created legal same-sex unions that are explicitly defi ned as providing equal access to all the rights and responsibilities of marriage, but have chosen to label these 'unions' as something other than marriage. In the US, only Massachusetts recognizes gender-neutral marriage.

We adopt a social identity approach [START_REF] Tajfel | The social identity theory of intergroup behavior[END_REF] to addressing this issue and posit that the marriage label threatens the identities of heterosexuals more than the civil union label. That is, we suggest that weaker support for samesex marriage laws, relative to civil unions laws, is partially due to increased perceptions of a threat to the heterosexual ingroup posed by the marriage label, and the motivation to protect that group identity.

Social identity and same-sex relationships

According to social identity theory (SIT; [START_REF] Tajfel | The social identity theory of intergroup behavior[END_REF] people's social category memberships constitute important aspects of selfdefi nition. Further, SIT assumes that people are motivated to perceive valued ingroups as positively distinct from relevant outgroups. One of SIT's central contributions is the notion that ingroup status is not a function of the absolute prestige, resources, or power enjoyed by the high status group, but is a relative judgment based on comparisons between the ingroup and other groups that are salient or relevant in context. In other words, the status of outgroups has implications for the ingroup identity. Thus, individuals who perceive an outgroup threat to the positive distinctiveness of a valued ingroup identity will take advantage of opportunities to protect their ingroup's distinctiveness (for a review see [START_REF] Jetten | Intergroup distinctiveness and differentiation: A meta-analytic integration[END_REF]. For members of high status groups who perceive their higher status as legitimate, attempts by lower status groups to improve their status are likely to be met with social competition, or deliberate attempts to maintain the status boundaries between groups [START_REF] Abrams | Perceptions of male homosexuality: An application of social identity theory[END_REF][START_REF] Branscombe | The context and content of social identity threat[END_REF][START_REF] Turner | Social status, cognitive alternatives, and intergroup relations[END_REF].

Following this line of reasoning, heterosexual people are likely to experience the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships as a threat to their social identity. This threat should arise because legally sanctioned same-sex relationships serve to decrease the status difference between heterosexuals and homosexuals, as homosexuals stand to gain rights that they did not previously have. Thus, despite having no implications for the rights granted to heterosexual couples in an absolute sense, extending rights to same-sex couples threatens the relative status advantage enjoyed by heterosexuals. Overall, heterosexuals appear to feel entitled to their higher status position, expressing relatively negative attitudes toward homosexuals (e.g. [START_REF] Kite | Sex differences in attitudes toward homosexual persons, behaviors, and civil rights: A meta-analysis[END_REF] and stigmatizing them as abnormal or immoral (e.g. Pew Research Center, 2003). Thus, when same-sex relationships are offered the same legal recognition that different-sex relationships currently receive, heterosexual people are likely to resist this threat to their privileged identity.

By threatening the relatively advantaged status of heterosexuals, both same-sex marriages and civil unions represent a threat to heterosexual group identity (even though they have no effect on the 'absolute' status of heterosexual people). However, we propose that same-sex marriages represent a greater threat to the positive distinctiveness of heterosexual identity, even if only on a symbolic level. By describing both same-sex and different-sex partnerships with the same term, the marriage label implies that the different types of relationships are similar and undermines the distinctiveness of the heterosexual group identity. In contrast, even if identical rights are granted to same-sex couples through civil union legislation, heterosexual people can maintain some sense of positive distinctiveness by creating a separate label for same-sex relationships, and keeping the more traditional and valued term for themselves. Thus, assuming that heterosexual people are invested in their heterosexual group identity, they are more likely to support a law recognizing same-sex civil unions over a law recognizing same-sex marriages because the marriage label represents a greater threat to heterosexual identity.

The present research

The goal of the present research was to examine whether, all else equal, the label applied to samesex relationships affects support for their legality. Thus, in two experiments we presented participants with one of two different versions of a hypothetical state law that would legally acknowledge same-sex relationships and provide same-sex couples with the same rights and protections that different-sex couples currently receive. The only thing that differed between the two laws was the label applied: 'marriage' versus 'civil union'. We then measured participants' support for the law, as well their beliefs about various forms of threat that same-sex relationships may pose.

Although our primary interest was in heterosexual threat (in line with SIT), we also examined other forms of threat that could serve as plausible alternative mediators, such as threats to the institution of marriage, threats to the functioning of society, and threats to 'the family'. We examined these other forms of threat because they are reasons people commonly cite for not supporting gay marriage (e.g. Pew Research Center, 2003), and are clearly evident in public discourse on the issue of same-sex marriage. For instance, in a 2004 radio address by President George W. Bush, he states that, 'If courts create their own arbitrary defi nition of marriage … the institution is weakened'. Moreover, he refers to marriage as 'the basis of an orderly society' and states that 'changing the defi nition of traditional marriage will undermine the family structure' [START_REF] Longley | Bush backs gay marriage ban amendment; Blames 'activist' judges for changing meaning of marriage[END_REF]. The implication of these comments is that same-sex marriage threatens society, families, and the institution of marriage itself. A similar case for these forms of threat could be drawn from current social psychological theorizing on values and prejudice. That is, several studies have demonstrated that a belief that gays and lesbians violate family values is associated with anti-gay prejudice (e.g. [START_REF] Haddock | Stigma and sexual orientation:Understanding prejudice against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals[END_REF][START_REF] Vescio | Family values and antipathy toward gay men[END_REF]. Thus, such studies would seem to suggest that a threat to values, particularly family values, would affect support for recognition of same-sex relationships.

Hypotheses

We predicted an effect of the relationship label such that same-sex civil unions would receive stronger support than same-sex marriages (Hypothesis 1). Additionally, we predicted that the same-sex marriage law would be perceived as more threatening to heterosexuals than the civil union law (Hy-pothesis 2). Lastly, we predicted that perceptions of heterosexual threat would mediate the association between relationship label and support for the law (Hypothesis 3).

We did not advance specifi c hypotheses regarding the other types of threat assessed (i.e. threat to society, family values, and the institution of marriage), but included them for two reasons. First, these threats are representative of the content of public discourse opposing same-sex marriage. Second, these forms of threat could serve as potential alternative mediators of the hypothesized effect of the label on support for the law.

Experiment 1

We conducted Experiment 1 as a general test of the above hypotheses. When examining the effect of experimental condition, we controlled for participants' levels of anti-gay prejudice. Participants with negative attitudes toward gay and lesbian people are likely to be more opposed to both civil unions and same-sex marriages than less prejudiced participants because both types of partnerships expand the rights of people in homosexual relationships. Because our goal was to examine the differential support for civil unions and marriages due to the label used, rather than the expansion of rights, we chose to partial out a source of variance common to both types of relationships. Additionally, controlling for variance in anti-gay prejudice, a variable we assumed would affect support for both types of partnerships, increases statistical power to detect the effects of a rather subtle manipulation [START_REF] Frigon | Analysis of covariance: a proposed algorithm[END_REF].

Method

Participants Participants were heterosexual psychology students at a university in Indiana (N = 115; 67 males, 48 females) who chose to participate in this study for credit in a general psychology course. Students signed up for participation through an internet site where this study was listed among many others. The sample was predominately European American (86.1%), with few participants indicating that they were African American (2.6%), Asian American (7.0%), or Hispanic American (2.6%). On average, participants were 19 years old (SD = 1.30).

Materials and procedure Working independently, participants completed the study in small groups. After receiving informed consent, we presented participants with a hypothetical Indiana state law that would allow for legal recognition of same-sex relationships and provide same-sex partners with all of the same rights and protections that different-sex married partners currently receive. Participants received one of two different versions of the law (see appendix). The two laws differed only in the specifi c label applied to the relationship: 'civil union' versus 'marriage'. The rest of the information was virtually identical (the only exception being that the couple members were referred to as 'spouses' under the marriage law and 'partners' under the civil union law) and informed participants of various rights and benefi ts that would be afforded to same-sex couples under the new law.

In reality, the Indiana state legislature has been far less accepting of same-sex relationships than the laws read by participants. In 1997, Indiana legislators passed a law banning gay marriage (Indiana Code 31-11-1-1). In 2005, Indiana legislators passed an amendment to the state's Constitution barring same-sex couples from marriage and similar legal structures such as civil unions. To become law, the amendment would have to be approved again in the 2007-2008 legislative session and then by Indiana voters. Across the US, 26 states have passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, and 43 have laws that defi ne marriage as 'between a man and a woman'.

Although the two experimental conditions specifi ed laws that were identical in the rights they granted, it is still possible that participants would infer that the marriage law had greater consequences for the rights of same-sex couples than the civil union law. To ensure that any effects of the manipulation were due to the label itself and not differential perceptions of the amount of rights granted, we included a measure of the extent to which the laws were perceived as granting equal rights to same-sex partners. After reading about the law, participants responded to the question 'How much will this law expand the rights of homosexuals?' on a scale ranging from 'will not expand homosexual rights at all' (1) to 'will expand homosexual rights greatly' (7).

Participants then completed the dependent measures in the order described below. Unless otherwise noted, participants responded to questionnaire items using a 7-point scale. For most scales, the endpoints ranged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). However, where appropriate, the endpoints differed to refl ect the content of the statement (e.g. very negative to very positive). Overall scores for the measures were obtained by reverse-scoring where appropriate and averaging the individual item scores. After completing all questionnaires, participants were fully debriefed.

Support for the law Participants rated their support for the law by indicating their agreement or disagreement with the following statements: 'I am in support of this law', 'I would be willing to vote for legislators who supported this law', and 'Overall, how do you feel about this law?' (α = .97).

Perceived threat Participants rated the extent to which the laws present a threat to society ('This law would create societal problems', 'This law would be good for society', and 'This law threatens the very fabric of society'; α = .86), heterosexuals ('This law threatens heterosexual rights', 'Does this law threaten the rights of heterosexuals?', and 'Does this law protect or threaten civil rights?'; α = .83), family values ('This law is harmful to families and children', 'This law is inconsistent with family values', and 'Does this law protect children or harm children?'; α = .89), and the institution of marriage ('I think this law would change the defi nition of marriage in a negative way', 'I think this law would positively affect the institution of marriage', and 'Does this law harm or strengthen the institution of marriage?'; α = .92). We also included items assessing threat to participants' personal relationships ('I think this law might negatively affect any marriage I might have now or in the future', 'This law would be a good thing for romantic relationships I might have', and 'This law would do no harm to me personally'; α = .56). A principal components factor analysis of all of the threat items yielded a two-factor solution explaining 68% of the total item variance. All of the items assessing threats to society, family values, and the institution of marriage as well as one of the personal threat items loaded on a single factor (all factor loadings > .50). In contrast, the heterosexual threat items and two of the personal threat items loaded on the other factor (all factor loadings > .60). The only item to load on more than one factor at a level greater than .40 was one of the personal threat items. Because the personal threat items did not load consistently on one of the factors, it is diffi cult to determine their meaning. For that reason, and because these personal threat items do not clearly map onto threats to heterosexuals as a group, we dropped these three items from the primary analyses.

Anti-gay prejudice Anti-gay prejudice was assessed with [START_REF] Herek | Heterosexuals' attitudes toward lesbians and gay men: Correlates and gender differences[END_REF] Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men Scale (α = .96). Sample items from this measure include 'I think male homosexuals are disgusting' and 'Lesbians are sick'.

Demographic items Participants also completed a standard demographic questionnaire that included items assessing sexual orientation, gender, age, and ethnicity. The few participants who did not indicate that they were heterosexual were not included in the analyses.

Results and discussion

Preliminary analyses We fi rst wanted to rule out the possibility that participants inferred that the marriage law and civil union law differentially extended the rights of same-sex couples.

Importantly, responses to the question about the amount of rights granted were not related to experimental condition (F(1, 113) = 1.28, p = .261). Participants perceived both the marriage law (M = 6.29, SD = 1.08) and the civil union law (M = 6.02, SD = 1.51) as greatly expanding the rights of same-sex couples. Therefore, we can be reasonably confi dent that any effects due to the manipulation were a result of the relationship labels and not inferences about the amount of rights granted by the laws.

In the analyses that follow, we controlled for participants' levels of anti-gay prejudice. However, in order to satisfy the assumptions of the analysis of covariance approach, the relationship between the covariate and dependent variables must be independent of condition [START_REF] Frigon | Analysis of covariance: a proposed algorithm[END_REF]. Importantly, anti-gay prejudice did not differ signifi cantly across conditions (F(1, 113) = 0.17, p = .681), nor did it signifi cantly interact with experimental condition to predict support for the law or any of the measured forms of threat. Given the lack of interactions, anti-gay prejudice appears to be accounting for variance in support for recognizing samesex relationships per se, regardless of the label applied to those relationships.

Effects of label on support for the law Consistent

with Hypothesis 1, participants differed in their favorability toward the two laws (F(1, 112) = 7.91, p = .006) (Eta-squared = .07). Specifi cally, participants showed signifi cantly less support for the marriage law (M = 3.62, SE = 0.18) than the civil union law (M = 4.33, SE = 0.18). Anti-gay prejudice was negatively associated with support for the law (p < .001) (Eta-squared = .63).

Perceptions of threat

We next examined whether the label affected participants' perceptions of threat. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, perceptions of heterosexual threat marginally differed across experimental conditions (F(1, 112) = 3.50, p = .064) (Eta-squared = .03). As shown in Table 1, heterosexual threat tended to be higher in the gay marriage condition (M = 3.01, SE = 0.15) than the civil union condition (M = 2.61, SE = 0.15). However, the other types of threat assessed were not affected by the experimental manipulation. Thus, threats to society (F(1, 112) = 2.35, p = .128), family values (F(1, 112) = 0.25, p = .618), and the institution of marriage did not differ by condition (F(1, 112) = 0.91, p = .342), nor did a composite measure consisting of all three of these forms of threat (F(1, 112) = 1.37, p = .244). In all of the above analyses, anti-gay prejudice was a signifi cant covariate, being positively related to perceptions of threat (p < .001).

Mediational analyses

We next examined whether perceptions of threat mediated the effect of the relationship label on support for the law, using procedures outlined by [START_REF] Baron | The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations[END_REF]. The fi rst and second criteria required to demonstrate mediation are effects of the independent variable on both the dependent variable and the mediator. Both of these criteria were met for heterosexual threat. Specifi cally, experimental condition signifi cantly predicted support for the law (the dependent variable; B = -.70; t(112) = -2.81, p = .006) and marginally predicted heterosexual threat (the hypothesized mediator; B = .40; t(112) = 1.87, p = .064).

To meet the third criterion, the mediator must predict the dependent variable controlling for the effects of the independent variable. When we examined the effect of heterosexual threat on support for the law when relationship label was simultaneously taken into account, heterosexual threat was indeed a signifi cant predictor of support for the law (B = -.38; t(111) = -3.58; p < .001), such that higher levels of threat were associated with less support. Finally, meeting the fourth criterion, the effect of relationship label on support for the law was reduced when controlling for heterosexual threat (B = -.55; t(111) = -2.28, p = .024). Results of a Sobel test corroborated these fi ndings by indicating that the mediated effect was marginally significant (z = -1.66, p = .097). 1 In sum, the results of Experiment 1 were supportive of our hypotheses. First, consistent with public opinion research, participants preferred the civil union law to the marriage law. Second, in line with predictions based on social identity theory, heterosexual threat partially mediated this effect. However, the statistical test for mediation was only marginally signifi cant. Thus, in an attempt to provide more defi nitive support for our hypotheses, we refi ned our research materials and conducted a second study.

Experiment 2

The primary limitation of Experiment 1 was that the items used to measure heterosexual threat were narrowly limited to perceptions of threats to heterosexuals' rights and did not directly ask about heterosexual identity per se. Therefore, in Experiment 2 we measured the threat to heterosexual group identity more directly, specifi cally in terms of the status and identity of heterosexuals as a group. Aside from this important change to the measurement of our hypothesized mediator, Notes: Differing subscripts indicate within-row signifi cant differences (p < .05 or less), except for threat to heterosexuals, where differing subscripts indicate within-row marginally signifi cant differences (p < .07). Values in parentheses are standard errors. All values are controlling for anti-gay prejudice. The scales for all measures ranged from 1 (strongly disagree/very negative) to 7 (strongly agree/very positive).

the design and materials were similar to those used in Experiment 1.

Method

Participants Heterosexual undergraduates at a university in Indiana (N = 218; 112 males, 106 females) participated for credit in a general psychology course. The sample was predominately European American (84.4%), with few participants indicating that they were African American (6.4%), Asian American (5.5%), Hispanic American (1.8%), or 'Other' (1.8%). On average, participants were 19.58 years old (SD = 1.42).

Materials and procedure

After receiving informed consent, we presented participants with a manipulation that was identical to that used in Experiment 1 (see appendix). Thus, participants read either the same-sex marriage law or the same-sex civil union law. Again, to ensure that any effects of the manipulation were due to the label itself and not to differential perceptions of the amount of rights granted, participants were asked 'How much will this law expand the rights of homosexuals?' on a scale ranging from 'will not expand homosexual rights at all' (1) to 'will expand homosexual rights greatly' (7).

Participants then completed the dependent measures in the order described below. As in Experiment 1, participants responded to all questionnaire items using a 7-point scale. After completing all questionnaires, participants were fully debriefed.

Support for the law Participants completed the same three-item measure of support for the law used in Experiment 1 (α = .99).

Perceived threat Relying on the same items used in Experiment 1, participants rated the extent to which the laws present a threat to society (3 items; α = .87), family values (3 items; α = .87), and the institution of marriage (3 items; α = .92). Participants also completed a new measure of the extent to which the laws threaten heterosexuals that focused more on threats to the social status of heterosexuals than heterosexuals' rights ('This law harms the social status of heterosexuals', 'This law strips heterosexuals of their rightful place in society', 'This law threatens heterosexuals', 'This law is harmful to heterosexuals'; α = .93). Lastly, because the meaning of the personal threat items administered in Experiment 1 was unclear, they were not included in the second study. A principal components factor analysis of all of the threat items yielded a two-factor solution explaining 77% of the total item variance. All of the items assessing threats to society, family values, and the institution of marriage loaded on one factor (all factor loadings > .60), while only the heterosexual threat items loaded on the other factor (all factor loadings > .80). No items loaded on more than one factor at a level greater than .40.

Other measures Anti-gay prejudice was assessed with [START_REF] Herek | Heterosexuals' attitudes toward lesbians and gay men: Correlates and gender differences[END_REF] Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men Scale (α = .97). Additionally, participants completed the same demographic items administered in Experiment 1.

Results and discussion

Preliminary analyses Responses to the question about the amount of rights granted were not related to the experimental condition (F(1, 216)= 1.10, p = .295). As in Experiment 1, participants perceived both the marriage law (M = 6.39, SD = 1.00) and the civil union law (M = 6.25, SD = 0.99) as greatly expanding the rights of same-sex couples. Therefore, any effects due to the manipulation are likely to be a result of the relationship labels themselves and not inferences about the amount of rights granted by the laws.

In the analyses that follow, we controlled for anti-gay prejudice. Anti-gay prejudice was not related to the experimental condition (F(1, 216) = 0.03, p = .869). Additionally, as in Experiment 1, anti-gay prejudice did not interact with the experimental condition to predict support for the law or any of the relevant forms of threat assessed. 2 Effects of label on support for the law Consistent with predictions, participants differed in their favorability toward the two laws (F(1, 215) = 7.99, p = .005) (Eta-squared = .04). Participants were signifi cantly less supportive of the marriage law (M = 4.03, SE = 0.09) than the civil union law (M = 4.41, SE = 0.09). Anti-gay prejudice was a signifi cant covariate and was negatively associated with support for the law (p < .001) (Eta-squared = .79).

Perceptions of threat

In line with our predictions, perceptions of heterosexual threat differed across experimental conditions (F(1, 215) = 6.62, p = .011) (Eta-squared = .03). As shown in Table 2, heterosexual threat was higher in the marriage condition (M = 2.86, SE = 0.10) compared to the civil union condition (M = 2.49, SE = 0.10). In contrast, threats to society (F(1, 215) = 1.17, p = .280), and family values (F(1, 215) = 2.19, p = .140), did not differ by condition. However, threat to the institution of marriage (F(1, 215) = 3.58, p = .060), and a composite measure consisting of the three alternate forms of threat were marginally greater in the marriage condition relative to the civil union condition (F(1, 215) = 3.11, p = .079). As a covariate, anti-gay prejudice was positively related to all of the measures of threat (p < .001).

Mediational analyses Next, we examined whether perceptions of threat mediated the impact of relationship label on support for the law. First, experimental condition signifi cantly predicted both support for the law (the dependent variable; B = -.38, t(215) = -2.83, p = .005) and heterosexual threat (the hypothesized mediator; B = .37, t(215) = 2.57, p = .011).

Second, when we examined the effect of the relationship label on support for the law when heterosexual threat was simultaneously taken into account, heterosexual threat signifi cantly predicted support for the law (B = -.36; t(214) = -6.21, p < .001), such that higher levels of threat were associated with less support. Finally, when controlling for heterosexual threat, the effect of the relationship label on support for the law was reduced (B = -.24; t(214) = -1.94, p = .053). Results of a Sobel test corroborated these fi ndings by indicating that the mediation was signifi cant (z = 2.38, p = .018). Thus, heterosexual threat was at least partially responsible for participants' reduced support for the same-sex marriage law relative to the civil union law.

Next, because some of the other forms of threat assessed differed marginally across conditions, we also examined the possibility that these threat measures could serve as alternative mediators of the observed effect. However, results of Sobel tests were only marginally signifi cant for both threat to the institution of marriage (z = 1.84, p = .066) and the composite threat measure (z = 1.75, p = .081). Thus, the evidence obtained for heterosexual threat as the mediator appears to be more conclusive than that obtained for these other forms of threat. 3

General discussion

We employed a novel approach to addressing the issue of why same-sex civil unions are preferred over same-sex marriages. That is, Notes: Differing subscripts indicate within-row signifi cant differences (p < .05 or less). Values in parentheses are standard errors. All values are controlling for anti-gay prejudice. The scales for all measures ranged from 1 (strongly disagree/very negative) to 7 (strongly agree/very positive).

rather than relying exclusively on survey results and correlational data, we conducted two experiments testing a social identity theory explanation for differential support for civil unions and marriages. Overall, our hypotheses were supported. In both studies, support for same-sex civil unions was higher than support for samesex marriages, mirroring effects found in recent public opinion polls [START_REF] Brewer | Same-sex marriage and civil unions[END_REF]. This fi nding is particularly important because we obtained it even when controlling for the amount of rights granted by the laws. Thus, this is the fi rst evidence of which we are aware indicating that the relationship label itself affects support for same-sex relationship legislation, independent of the amount of rights granted to same-sex partners.

Importantly, we also found that participants presented with the marriage law perceived more threat to heterosexuals than participants presented with the civil union law. Further, our results in both studies indicate that heterosexual threat partially mediated the effect of the relationship label on support for the law. None of the other forms of threat assessed could mediate this association.

These fi ndings offer support for one of SIT's [START_REF] Tajfel | The social identity theory of intergroup behavior[END_REF]) core contributions-the contention that people are motivated to achieve a positive social identity vis-a-vis relevant outgroups. In terms of absolute rights and privileges, the marriage law would not harm heterosexual people. Nonetheless, our participants found the marriage law more threatening to heterosexuals than the civil union law, because, as SIT would suggest, ingroup identity results from intergroup comparisons. Compared to the civil union law, the marriage law is more threatening to the positive distinctiveness of the heterosexual group identity by elevating same-sex relationships to the same level as different-sex ones. Other theoretical perspectives assume that threat [START_REF] Duckitt | Differential effects of right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on outgroup attitudes and their mediation by threat from and competitiveness to outgroups[END_REF] and symbolic aspects of intergroup relationships [START_REF] Kinder | Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life[END_REF] are important predictors of discrimination and intergroup attitudes. However, SIT is unique (except where incorporated into other perspectives, e.g. [START_REF] Stephan | An integrated threat theory of prejudice[END_REF] in its assumptions that ingroup identity results from and is constructed through intergroup comparisons, and that intergroup discrimination results not just from attitudes toward the outgroup (prejudice) but also from the motivation to protect ingroup identity.

Our results suggest that the US public may be relatively more supportive of same-sex civil unions in part because they are less threatening to heterosexual identity than same-sex marriages. This contention is bolstered by the fi nding that none of the other types of threat assessed in this study mediated the association between relationship label and support for the law. SIT may therefore prove to be a useful framework for understanding people's support for or opposition to recognizing same-sex relationships. Indeed, our results suggest that identity concerns do play a role in understanding differential support for marriage and civil union laws.

Limitations and future directions

There are multiple strengths of the present study. For instance, this is the fi rst study to show that the relationship label itself can affect support for granting equal rights to same-sex couples. Even when controlling for the amount of rights granted to same-sex couples, we found that the marriage label elicited less support than the civil union label. However, it is important to note that in the 'real world', the rights attached to these two labels typically are not equivalent. Thus, although they cannot account for the effects observed in our studies, perceptions of the amount of rights granted could indeed explain some of the differential support for marriages compared to civil unions.

Second, this study provides one of the fi rst experimental investigations into the issue of why same-sex civil unions are preferred over samesex marriages. Testing predictions derived from SIT, we found evidence for a novel and nonobvious explanation for the label effect-that the marriage label threatens heterosexual identity despite posing no threat to heterosexual people in absolute terms. Confi dence in our theoretical explanation is bolstered by lack of support for plausible alternative mediators, as none of the other forms of threat were signifi cantly affected by the label. Finally, this research addresses an important and controversial issue that is at the center of ongoing political debate.

However, there are also a few limitations to this work. First, our samples only included undergraduate college students at a Midwestern university. Thus, the extent to which these fi ndings might generalize to more diverse samples is a question for future research. Along the same lines, our results cannot speak to the views of gays and lesbians on their preference for different labels, which may be an interesting avenue for further inquiry. Indeed, some gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals may object to legalized same-sex partnerships, particularly same-sex marriages, to the extent that they view the institution of marriage itself as being fundamentally heterosexist [START_REF] Lannutti | For better or worse: Exploring the meanings of same-sex marriage within the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered community[END_REF].

Although we did fi nd some support for our hypothesized mediation, heterosexual threat did not appear to fully mediate the association between relationship label and support for the law. Of course, tests for mediation are fairly conservative, and mediated relationships may not be reliable for a variety of reasons (Haslam & McGarty, 1998, p. 259). However, given that we did not obtain convincing evidence for mediation by other forms of threat, heterosexual threat appears to be the most promising explanation for differences in support for same-sex marriages versus civil unions. An important direction for future research, then, is to expand upon the measurement of heterosexual threat to further examine its potential role in affecting support for same-sex relationship legislation.

Finally, it is clear that the label applied to legally recognized same-sex relationships is only one factor affecting support. In our data, antigay prejudice accounted for a large portion of the variance in support for both same-sex marriage and civil union laws. Importantly, though, the effect of the label was independent of antigay prejudice. In other words, the differential support for marriages and civil unions was not isolated or even exaggerated among the more prejudiced participants. This suggests, perhaps, that the bias against the marriage label involves subtler forms of prejudice that are not tapped by the measure of blatant anti-gay prejudice we used. Indeed, our results suggest that in addition to studying the consequences of negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians, researchers should also attend to the attitudes toward and perceptions of heterosexual identity.

In conclusion, the results of these two experiments contribute to our understanding of why heterosexual people tend to favor same-sex civil unions over marriages. Consistent with predictions derived from social identity theory, our results suggest that the marriage label itself is experienced by heterosexuals as threatening to their identity and that this threat may lead to decreased support for same-sex marriage laws. Public opinion polls fi nd lukewarm support for civil unions, suggesting some erosion in the perceived legitimacy of existing inequalities in rights granted to people of different sexual orientations. However, as long as heterosexuals as a group remain motivated to protect their privileged status, it appears that they prefer to address these inequalities by creating separate labels to assert the distinctiveness and superiority of heterosexuality.

Notes

1. We conducted additional analyses to test for mediation by heterosexual threat while controlling for the other types of threat. In these analyses heterosexual threat still signifi cantly predicted support for the law. Consistent with the main analysis, a Sobel test for mediation by heterosexual threat was marginally signifi cant. 2. Although not a central variable in our analyses, we also assessed religious fundamentalism with [START_REF] Altemeyer | Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and prejudice[END_REF] scale. We examined whether experimental condition interacted with religious fundamentalism in predicting our dependent measures of interest.

As was the case for our measure of anti-gay prejudice, no signifi cant interactions emerged. 3. We conducted additional analyses to test for mediation by heterosexual threat while controlling for the other threats assessed.

In analyses controlling for the other threats, heterosexual identity threat remained a signifi cant predictor of support for the law and a Sobel test for mediation by heterosexual threat was signifi cant.

Table 1 .

 1 Experiment 1: Support for the law and threats by experimental condition

		Same-sex marriage law	Civil union law
	Variable	n = 58	n = 57
	Support for the law	3.62 a (0.18)	4.33 b (0.18)
	Threat to heterosexuals	3.01 a (0.15)	2.61 b (0.15)
	Threat to society	4.56 a (0.14)	4.26 a (0.14)
	Threat to family values	4.27 a (0.15)	4.17 a (0.16)
	Threat to marriage	4.57 a (0.16)	4.36 a (0.16)
	Threat composite	4.47 a (0.12)	4.26 a (0.13)
	(society, family, & marriage)

Table 2 .

 2 Experiment 2: Support for the law and threats by experimental condition

		Same-sex marriage law	Civil union law
	Variable	n = 110	n = 108
	Support for the law	4.03 a (0.09)	4.41 b (0.10)
	Threat to heterosexuals	2.86 a (0.10)	2.49 b (0.10)
	Threat to society	3.95 a (0.09)	3.82 a (0.09)
	Threat to family values	3.78 a (0.10)	3.56 a (0.10)
	Threat to marriage	4.52 a (0.11)	4.24 a (0.11)
	Threat composite	4.05 a (0.08)	3.86 a (0.08)
	(society, family, & marriage)

Acknowledgement

Study 1 was conducted as part of the third author's Honors Thesis in the Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University.

Appendix

Same-sex marriage law (same-sex civil union law)

Imagine that the state legislature has passed a new law granting legal recognition of same-sex marriages (same-sex civil unions). This samesex marriage law (same-sex civil union law) will provide to couples in same-sex marriages (same-sex civil unions) ALL the rights and benefi ts provided to couples in heterosexual marriages. Because of the equality provided to same-sex couples, this law is considered very strong. Please carefully read and consider the information below, as you will be asked about it in the following pages.

Below are some of the many rights and benefi ts provided to same-sex married couples (same-sex civil unions) under this new law:

-Filing joint income tax returns to enjoy tax benefi ts for married couples (couples).

-Inheriting from a deceased spouse (partner) if he or she lacked a valid will.

-Receiving social security, Medicare and disability benefi ts for spouses (partners).

-Receiving veteran's and military benefi ts for spouses (partners), such as those for education, medical care, or special loans.

-Obtaining health insurance and other benefi ts through a spouse's (partner's) employer.

-Receiving wages, workers' compensation, and retirement benefi ts for a deceased spouse (partner).

-Taking family leave from work to care for your spouse (partner) or a spouse's (partner's) child during an illness.

-Taking leave from work if your spouse (partner) or one of your spouse's (partner's) close relatives dies.

-The right to visit your spouse (partner) in the hospital.

-Making medical decisions for your spouse (partner) if he or she becomes unable to express wishes for treatment. Making burial or other fi nal arrangements.

-Filing for step-parent adoption of a spouse's (partner's) children.

-Right for the couple to jointly adopt children.

-Protection under existing divorce laws regarding the equitable division of property, spousal or child support, child custody, and child visitation.


Wendy L Morris Mcdaniel

Stacey Sinclair

Bella M Depaulo

Wendy L Morris
email: wmorris@mcdaniel.edu

No Shelter for Singles: The Perceived Legitimacy of Marital Status Discrimination

Keywords: discrimination, housing, legitimacy, marital status, singles

Providing the fi rst empirical evidence of discrimination against singles, participants in multiple experiments favored married couples over various types of singles and failed to recognize such differential treatment as discrimination. In four experiments, undergraduates and rental agents read descriptions of multiple applicants for a rental property and chose one. The applicant pool, varying across experiments, included a married couple and different types of singles. Although the applicants were similar on substantive dimensions, participants consistently chose the married couple over the singles and explicitly stated that the applicants' marital status infl uenced their choice. In Experiment 5, participants read examples of housing discrimination against singles and other more recognized stigmatized groups. Participants rated discrimination against singles as more legitimate than discrimination against virtually all of the other groups.

Singlehood is becoming increasingly common. In fact, in the year 2005, singles (i.e. divorced, widowed, and always single people) represented 41% of adults 18 and older, and households consisting of married couples became a minority (US Census Bureau, 2006). Elsewhere, we have argued that despite the increasing number of adults choosing to be single, American society values marriage and married couples so highly that being single is a stigmatizing condition [START_REF] Depaulo | Singled out: How singles are stereotyped, stigmatized, and ignored, and still live happily ever after[END_REF]DePaulo & Morris, 2005a, 2005b[START_REF] Depaulo | Singled out: How singles are stereotyped, stigmatized, and ignored, and still live happily ever after[END_REF]; see also [START_REF] Byrne | Caught in the cultural lag: The stigma of singlehood[END_REF]. The current research is the fi rst to examine empirically whether singles are subject to an outcome typically associated with being stigmatizeddiscrimination. In particular, this research focuses on housing discrimination against single people and the perceived legitimacy of such discrimination.

It has been argued that Americans uncritically accept an ideology of marriage and family that glorifi es marriage as the most important peer relationship, an essential key to a meaningful life, and an indication of personal maturity (DePaulo & Morris, 2005a). Marriage is often viewed as a normative developmental milestone (e.g. [START_REF] Neugarten | Adaptation and the life cycle[END_REF], one that most people generally want and expect to achieve [START_REF] Depaulo | Undergraduate students' views on marriage and singlehood[END_REF]. Similar to the Protestant Work Ethic, the ideology of marriage and family presents marriage as an important goal that can be achieved by anyone who works hard enough at fi nding that special someone. These beliefs about the perceived value and accessibility of marriage suggest that anyone who is not married may be called into question, particularly when beyond the age at which being married is normative.

To the extent that this interpretation of the ideology of marriage and family is correct, singles should be considered a stigmatized group. Singlehood can be defi ned along two dimensions. When operationalizing singlehood one could use a strict legal defi nition whereby anyone who is not legally married would be considered single. This is the defi nition most often used by the Census Bureau. However, such a defi nition overlooks the possibility that unmarried people who are in romantic relationships might differ from uncoupled people in the way they are perceived by others. Instead, one could use a social defi nition of singlehood whereby anyone who is not coupled (married or otherwise) would be considered single. Although one can conceive of relationship status as a continuum with married people on one end and people who are currently not in romantic relationships at the other end, it is informative to draw a bright line between individuals who are married and various types of singles. Consistent with the ideology of marriage and family, the former group should be treated and evaluated more positively than the latter group.

Consistent with the notion that singles are stigmatized, recent research has demonstrated that singles are indeed the targets of negative stereotypes (e.g. [START_REF] Conley | Gender, relationship status, and stereotyping about sexual risk[END_REF]DePaulo & Morris, 2005a[START_REF] Depaulo | Singled out: How singles are stereotyped, stigmatized, and ignored, and still live happily ever after[END_REF]Hertel, Schütz, DePaulo, Morris, & Stucke, in press). For example, singles are assumed to be less responsible, mature, and well-adjusted than married people [START_REF] Etaugh | Effects of age, sex, and marital status on person perception[END_REF]Morris, DePaulo, Hertel, & Taylor, in press).

Do singles also experience discrimination? The press has recently noted instances of housing discrimination against singles (North Dakota Fair Housing Council Press Release, 2000). A Michigan judge ruled that landlords could deny rental properties to unmarried, cohabitating couples if the landlord held religious beliefs against unmarried cohabitation. This ruling, in effect, allowed landlords to violate the state's fair housing act that prohibits marital status discrimination ('Michigan', 2000). The Virginia Housing Development Authority, which provides loans to economically disadvantaged homebuyers, has a 'family rule' which discriminates against unrelated people applying to buy a house together ('Couple', 2000). Singles are also often denied the opportunity to live in neighborhoods zoned for 'single family' use. (Unmarried America, n.d).

In order to examine whether singles experience discrimination without the confounds that can occur in actual rental situations, we examined housing discrimination against various types of singles in the lab, recruiting both rental agents and undergraduates as participants. Thus, the fi rst question we address is whether people prefer leasing properties to married couples versus singles when presented with equally qualifi ed applicants.

To the extent that singles are targets of housing discrimination, the next question is whether people perceive discrimination against singles as legitimate. Although the media has begun to acknowledge discrimination against singles (e.g. [START_REF] Conlin | Unmarried America[END_REF]Fox, 2004;[START_REF] Motro | The state of the unions: Single and paying for it[END_REF], most states do not have laws protecting singles from discrimination. Given the negative stereotypes of singles, the lack of efforts to protect this group from known inequities, and the broad societal support for marriage (DePaulo & Morris, 2005a), we hypothesize that people will perceive discrimination against singles as legitimate and fair.

Summary of hypotheses and experimental design

The fi rst four experiments test the hypothesis that people discriminate against singles in the context of housing. Participants (undergraduates and adults working in rental agencies) were asked to imagine themselves as landlords and choose between two or three potential tenants. In all of these experiments, we expected participants to favor a married couple over various types of singles. The last experiment examines whether people view discrimination against singles as legitimate. Specifi cally, we hypothesize that even obvious examples of discrimination against a single person will not be recognized as such.

Experiments 1, 2, 3, & 4

Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 will be presented together because of their similar methods and results. In all of these experiments, participants read descriptions of possible tenants and chose to whom they would rent a house. Undergraduates served as participants in Experiments 1, 2, and 4; adults working in rental agencies participated in Experiment 3. In Experiment 1, the choices were a married couple, a single man, and a single woman. In case the married couple was favored because they had two sources of income, all of the choices in subsequent experiments were pairs of people with two sources of income. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants' choices consisted of pairs of people-a married couple, cohabiting romantic partners, and a pair of opposite sex friends. In Experiment 4, the choices were a married couple and cohabiting romantic partners. To examine whether people would even favor a married couple who had not demonstrated as much long-term relationship stability as a cohabiting couple, the length of marriage in Experiment 4 was manipulated (six years vs. six months) while the cohabiting romantic partners were always described as having been together for six years.

Method

Participants Undergraduates participated in Experiments 1, 2, and 4 in return for US$5 (Experiment 1) or course credit (Experiments 2 and 4). In Experiment 1 (N = 84; 37 men, 47 women), 63% of the participants were Caucasian, the median age was 19, and 20 participants reported being in a romantic relationship while 64 were single. In Experiment 2 (N = 107; 53 men, 54 women), 69% of the participants were Caucasian, the median age was 18, and 37 participants reported being in a romantic relationship while 70 were single. In Experiment 4 (N = 97; 13 men, 84 women), 72.9% of the participants were Caucasian, the median age was 21, and 46 participants reported being in a romantic relationship while 51 were single.

Participants in Experiment 3 were 54 adults (33 men, 21 women) working in rental agencies. Eighty-one percent of the rental agents were Caucasian and their median age was 33.5. Thirty-six of the rental agents were married or engaged while 19 were single. The rental agents participated in return for the possibility of winning a free lunch.

In all of our studies, we explore whether the participants' own relationship status is related to their perceptions and judgments of other people. When the sample consisted of college students, of whom few are married, we compared students who are in romantic relationships to those who are not in romantic relationships. When the sample consisted of older adults, of whom most are married, we compared adults who are married or engaged to those who are not legally married. Thus our working defi nition of singlehood varied depending upon the part of the singlehood continuum in which most of the participants fell.

Procedure and Materials

Participants were asked to imagine themselves as landlords and read descriptions of two or three potential tenants. Their pool of choices included a married couple, a single woman, and a single man (Experiment 1); a married couple, an unmarried cohabiting romantic couple, and a pair of opposite sex friends (Experiments 2 and 3); a married couple and a cohabiting couple who had each been together for six years (Experiment 4a); and a married couple who had been married six months and a cohabiting couple who had been together for six years (Experiment 4b).

In all experiments, the age range of the potential tenants was held constant (i.e. 'in their 30s') to control for the possible assumption that married people are older than singles. Each description included the applicant's job, a hobby, how they heard about the property, and why they found the property appealing. These descriptors were crossed with tenants' relationship status in a between-participants design such that relationship status was the one variable that differed by experimental condition. The order in which participants read about the applicants was counterbalanced. Below is an example of one of the descriptions:

John and Emily are in their thirties and married. They are both high school teachers and they enjoy playing card games in their free time. John and Emily found the ad for the house on a bulletin board of a local coffee shop and they were glad to learn that the house has a large yard.

After reading the descriptions of two or three potential tenants, participants were asked to choose to whom they would prefer to lease the house and to explain their decision in an openended format. Participants then rated each of the potential tenants on eight 7-point scales assessing positive and negative qualities associated with good and delinquent tenants. These scales assessed how irresponsible tenants would be in terms of keeping the house clean, damaging the house, being noisy, paying their rent on time, and breaking the lease. Participants' ratings on these scales were coded such that higher numbers indicated more negative qualities. We created a delinquency composite from the mean of the eight ratings (Experiment 1: alpha = .84; Experiment 2: alpha = .71, Experiment 3: alpha = .90, Experiment 4: alpha = .82). Participants also predicted the amount of time they thought each applicant would want to stay in the house.

Results

Did participants discriminate against singles?

To test the hypothesis that most participants would choose the married couple over the single applicants we conducted chi-square tests. All four experiments supported our hypothesis. Participants overwhelmingly favored the married couple over all of the various types of singles; 61 to 80 percent of the participants chose the married couple. See Table 1.

Did participants have negative views of singles?

To examine whether participants assumed that singles were more likely to have negative qualities, the composite assessing participants' evaluations of each potential tenant's qualities was entered into a 3 (type of applicant) × 2 (participant gender) × 2 (participant relationship status) analysis of variance (ANOVA) in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. In Experiment 4, the length of marriage (six months or six years) was also a factor and there were only two types of applicants-a married couple and cohabiting romantic partners. Because undergraduate participants in Experiments 1, 2, and 4 were unlikely to be married, participant relationship status referred to whether or not the participants were in romantic relationships in these experiments. Because participants in Experiment 3 were older, in this experiment participant relationship status could refer to whether or not participants were married (or engaged). In all four experiments, participants rated married couples signifi cantly more positively (i.e. less likely to be delinquent) than almost all of the various types of singles (see Table 2). The only exceptions were that the single woman was perceived almost as positively as the married couple (Experiment 1) and the cohabiting couple was perceived just as positively as the married couple if they had been together longer than the married couple (Experiment 4b). In all of these experiments, there were no signifi cant main effects or interactions involving the gender or relationship status of participants. The same ANOVA designs described above were conducted with the predicted length of stay as the dependent variable. In every experiment but one, participants assumed the married couple would want to remain in the house longer than the various types of singles. The only exception was Experiment 4b in which the cohabiting couple had been together longer than the newlywed married couple. In this experiment, participants thought that the two couples would want to stay in the house an equal length of time (see Table 2).

Given that participants in almost every experiment assumed that married people would stay in the house longer and be less delinquent than the various types of single tenants, one might wonder whether these differing perceptions of married and single applicants were driving the participants' choices. We addressed this question using multinomial logistic regression. The preferred choice of applicant was the criterion variable; the three delinquency ratings and the three expected lengths of stay were all entered as potential predictors. 1 These analyses did not yield consistent results. In Experiments 1, 2, and 3, whether participants chose the single over the married couple was related to their beliefs about how delinquent the applicants would be (all ps < .057). However, the fi ndings were not consistent across the three experiments in terms of which applicants' delinquency ratings were the signifi cant predictors (e.g. the delinquency ratings of the single applicant, the delinquency ratings of the married couple, or both). Perceived length of stay did not signifi cantly relate to participants' choices in Experiments 1, 2, & 3 (all ps > .06). In Experiment 4, however, delinquency ratings did not signifi cantly relate to choice (all ps > .29), and perceived length of stay only did so when the cohabitating couple was together longer than the married couple (p < .05).

What rationale did participants provide to explain why they chose the married couple? If perceived delinquency and length of stay do not consistently account for participants' choice, why did participants overwhelmingly choose the married couple over various types of singles?

To get insight into this question, we analyzed participants' responses to the open-ended item asking why they made the choice they did. We fi rst created a coding scheme to incorporate all of the reasons mentioned. 2 Two research assistants then coded the data by assigning participants a 1 if they mentioned a reason and a 0 if they did not mention that reason. Reliabilities between coders (alpha) were .86, .88, .73, and .77 for Experiments 1 through 4, respectively.

Finally, the number of times each of the reasons was mentioned was entered into a betweenparticipants ANOVA with type of applicant chosen as the independent variable. Across all four experiments, there was one explanation that was signifi cantly more likely to be mentioned when participants chose the married couple rather than any of the alternatives. Most of the participants who chose the married couple stated that they did so simply because the married couple was married (see Table 3). In fact, in Experiments 3 and 4, this was the only explanation that differed between people who chose the married couple and those who chose the alternatives. There were a couple of additional explanations given in Experiments 1 and 2 and these will be described below.

Experiment 1 Participants who chose the married couple were more likely to explain their choice by mentioning that two incomes are better than one (20%) than did participants who chose the single woman (0%, p < .05, d = .45) or the single man (0%, p = .09, d = .39) (F(2, 81) = 3.08, p = .05). Of course, the presence of other applicants with two incomes did not prevent participants from selecting the married couple over the various forms of singles in subsequent experiments. Participants who chose the married couple were also more likely to mention the benefi ts of renting to people who might have children (20%) than did participants who decided to lease the property to either the single woman (0%, p < .05, d = .45) or the single man (0%, p = .09, d = .39) (F(2, 81) = 3.08, p = .051). While many participants who chose the married couple explained their choice by mentioning the benefi ts of leasing to people with children, people who chose the single applicants were more likely to mention the disadvantages of leasing to people who might have children.

Participants who chose the married couple were less likely to mention the disadvantages of leasing to people who might have children (0%) than did those who chose the single man (40%, p < .001, d = 1.15) or the single woman (13%, p < .05, d = .45) (F(2, 81) = 14.09, p < .001). Although participants who chose the single man and woman were more likely to explain their choice by mentioning the disadvantages of leasing to people who might have children, married people were still strongly preferred by the majority of the participants.

Experiment 2 Participants were more likely to mention the stability of the relationship between the applicants if the chosen applicants were married (52%) than if they were unmarried but romantically involved (14%, p < .01, d = 0.54) or if they were friends (0%, p < .005, d = 0.58) (F(2, 104) = 7.45, p = .001). However, in Experiment 4 equating the apparent stability of the applicants' relationship did not prevent preference for the married couple. Participants who chose the married couple were also more likely to explain their choice by saying that the chosen applicants would be more likely to pay the rent (44%) than did participants who chose the cohabiting, romantic couple (14%, p < .05, d = 0.43) or the friends (0%, p < .05, d = 0.50) (F(2, 104) = 5.01, p < .01).

Summary of results

It is clear that people discriminate against singles when making rental decisions. In Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4, participants, including the ones who actually worked at rental agencies, overwhelmingly chose to lease properties to the married couple over the different types of single applicants even though there were no substantial differences between the applicants. Although participants assumed that most of the single applicants were more likely to be delinquent tenants than the married couple and leave the rental property sooner, the married couple was even preferred over alternatives who were not perceived as signifi cantly more delinquent or more likely to leave the rental property sooner. Moreover, no specifi c delinquency or length of stay ratings consistently related to choice across experiments. When participants were asked to state why they made the choice they did, they rarely mentioned perceptions of delinquency or how long they expected the applicants to stay in the house. Instead, participants often explicitly stated that the applicants' marital status infl uenced their choice. Thus, it appears that participants were perfectly comfortable using the applicants' relationship status as a basis for their decisions, to the detriment of the singles.

Experiment 5

Having shown in Experiments 1 through 4 that participants discriminate against singles, we were interested in learning how people view this type of discrimination. Because participants mentioned marital status as if it were an appropriate way to choose among applicants in Experiments 1 through 4, we hypothesized that unfair treatment of a single person would be perceived as legitimate.

Method

Participants Ninety-three undergraduate students (20 men, 73 women) volunteered to participate in return for extra credit in a psychology course. Forty-four of the students were in romantic relationships and 49 were not. The median age in the sample was 20. Information about the participants' ethnicity was not collected. These participants were drawn from the same population as those in Experiments 1, 2, and 4.

Procedure and materials

In this betweenparticipants experiment, each participant read one of six scenarios describing an instance of housing discrimination. In each scenario, the landlord chose a member of a non-stigmatized group over a member of a stigmatized group who was willing to pay more rent (i.e. a married person was chosen over a single person even though the single person offered to pay more rent, a Caucasian was chosen over an African American, a man over a woman, a straight person over a homosexual person, a thin person over an obese person, or a younger person over an elderly person). Thus, the independent variable was the type of discrimination. Below is an example of a scenario describing discrimination against a single person:

A landlord is hoping to find someone to rent a house. The landlord has shown the house to many people and has narrowed down the choice to 2 potential tenants. Both of the applicants have steady jobs and their current landlords described them as very good tenants. One of the applicants has offered to pay a slightly higher rent each month.

The tenant who has offered to pay higher rent is single. The landlord prefers to lease houses to married people and decides to accept the married person as the tenant.

After reading the scenario, participants were asked to list reasons why the landlord might have decided to choose one person over the other. Participants then rated how legitimate they believed the landlord's decision to be on six 9-point scales. These scales measured the extent to which participants thought the landlord's decision was prejudiced, legitimate, justifi able, reasonable, as well as how reluctant they thought the landlord might be to explain the decision publicly, and how comfortable the participant would feel making the same decision. Their responses were coded such that higher numbers indicated greater perceived legitimacy, then averaged (alpha = .91). Participants also responded to the question, 'To what extent do you think the chosen person would be a better tenant than the person who was not chosen?' Finally, participants were asked to recall which person offered to pay more money. All participants passed this manipulation check.

Results

Was discrimination against a single person perceived as more legitimate than other types of discrimination? A 2 (type of discrimination: single vs. other) × 2 (participant gender) × 2 (participant relationship status) ANOVA tested the hypothesis that discrimination against a single person is perceived as more legitimate than other types of discrimination. In support of our hypothesis, this analysis yielded a main effect of type of discrimination (F(1, 85) = 33.08, p < .001, d = 1.25). Discrimination against singles was rated as more legitimate (M = 5.71) than discrimination against the other fi ve groups (M = 3.46) . Men rated all types of discrimination as more legitimate (M = 5.20) than did women (M = 3.97) (F(1, 85) = 9.86. p < .005, d = 0.68).

In order to determine whether the six specifi c types of discrimination differed from each other in terms of perceptions of legitimacy, a one-way between-participants ANOVA was conducted with six levels of the type of discrimination as the independent variable. There was a main effect of type of discrimination (F(5, 89) = 14.08, p < .001). Pairwise comparisons revealed that discrimination against a single person (M = 5.37) and an elderly person (M = 4.75) were both seen as more legitimate than discrimination against an African American (M = 2.60, both ps < .001), a homosexual person (M = 2.97, both ps < .005), a woman (M = 3.10, both ps < .01), and an obese person (M = 2.74, both ps < .001). There were no signifi cant differences within each of these two clusters of groups. There was also no interaction between gender and type of discrimination and no effects of participants' relationship status in either of these analyses.

Did the participants agree with the landlord's discriminatory decision? Participants were more likely to agree with the landlord's choice of tenant if they read about discrimination against singles (M = 5.68) versus the other fi ve types of discrimination (M = 4.97) (F(1, 85) = 12.92, p < .005, d = 0.78). Men were more likely to agree with the landlord's choice (M = 5.52) than were women (M = 5.13) (F(1, 85) = 3.99, p < .05, d = 0.43).

In order to determine whether the six specifi c types of discrimination differed from each other in terms of whether participants thought the landlord made the right choice, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with six levels of type of discrimination as the independent variable. There was a main effect of type of discrimination (F(5, 89) = 2.14, p = .068). Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants were more likely to think the landlord made the right choice if the target of discrimination was a single person (M = 5.47) than an African American (M = 4.85, p < .05), a woman (M = 4.90, p < .05), a homosexual person (M = 4.92, p < .05), an elderly person (M = 5.00, p < .10), or an obese person (M = 5.07, p < .10). There were no signifi cant differences among the non-singles. In addition, there was no interaction between gender and type of discrimination and no effects of participants' relationship status in either of these analyses.

What rationale did participants provide to explain the landlord's decision? In order to analyze participants' responses to the open-ended question about why the landlord might have chosen one applicant over the other, we used the same technique described in Experiments 1 through 4 (reliability between coders: alpha = .88). 2 In the open-ended responses, participants were more likely to attribute the decision to prejudice or stereotyping when the target of discrimination was a member of one of the five culturally recognized stigmatized groups (38%) than when the target was single (10%) (F(1, 91) = 8.31, p = .005, d = 0.60). It is interesting to note that although participants' attributions to prejudice or stereotyping were negatively correlated with perceived legitimacy of the landlord's decision when the target was a member of one of the five culturally recognized groups, (r(63)= -.43, p < .001), this correlation was no longer signifi cant when analyses only included single targets, (r(30)= -.12, p = .52). The difference between these two correlations was signifi cant (p < .05). Therefore, it appears that people do not associate prejudice or stereotyping with making an illegitimate decision when they read about discrimination against singles even though they do so for other types of discrimination.

In addition, participants were more likely to mention that the chosen person would preserve the property better than the person who was discriminated against if they read about discrimination against singles (50%) versus the other types of discrimination (17%) (F(1, 91) = 10.54, p < .005, d = 0.68). Similarly, participants were more likely to think that the chosen person would stay in the rental property longer if they read about discrimination against singles (73%) versus the other types of discrimination (29%) (F(1, 91) = 13.87, p < .001, d = 0.78).

Summary of results

In support of our hypothesis, discrimination against singles was perceived as more legitimate than other more recognized forms of discrimination. Consistent with this, when asked to explain the landlord's choice, participants were less likely to recognize that the landlord may have used stereotypes when they read about discrimination against singles compared to other types of discrimination.

General discussion

In Experiments 1 through 4, undergraduates and rental agents strongly preferred to lease to a married couple over a single woman, a single man, a cohabiting romantic couple, and a pair of opposite-sex friends. This discrimination against singles cannot be explained by the assumption that married people are older than singles because age and other potentially relevant demographics (e.g. occupation) were held constant.

There were, however, some differences in the perceptions of the married couple, as compared to most of the other applicants. On a composite tapping potential delinquency, married couples were perceived as signifi cantly less worrisome than the single man, the pair of friends, or the cohabiting couple (except when the cohabiting couple had been together longer than the married couple). The assumption that singles are more likely to be delinquent than married couples is generally consistent with the stereotypes found in past research, such as the belief that singles are less responsible and mature than married people [START_REF] Etaugh | Effects of age, sex, and marital status on person perception[END_REF]Morris et al., in press).

It is interesting to note, though, that for all groups, the mean delinquency ratings were below the midpoint, suggesting that none of the applicants were viewed as terribly likely to cause problems. In addition, the delinquency ratings of the single woman (Experiment 1) and the cohabiting couple who had been together longer than the married couple (Experiment 4b) were not signifi cantly different from those of the married couple, yet participants still strongly favored the married couple in those experiments. Finally, no specifi c type of delinquency rating (e.g. of single person or married couple) consistently related to tenant choice over and above the other measures. As such, it is safe to say that presumed delinquency on the part of single people relative to married people was not the sole reason for preferring married applicants.

In fact, in all four experiments, the reason most often offered for preferring the married couple was simply that they were married. Thus participants felt perfectly comfortable basing their decision on the marital status of the applicants. If the preference for married couples over single applicants was not consistently related to the perception that singles were more delinquent than married people, why might participants have exhibited such a strong preference for married couples? Consistent with the ideology of marriage and family, it is possible that participants chose married tenants based on implicit, positive attitudes about married people and implicit, negative attitudes about single people [START_REF] Ritter | Implicit attitudes about married and single people[END_REF]. Future research could examine whether discrimination against singles is related to implicit attitudes.

If we had manipulated the race or gender of the tenants, it is inconceivable that participants would have unabashedly admitted that they chose a White person because of his or her race or a man because of his gender. In Experiment 5, we sought to examine the acceptability of discrimination against singles by comparing perceptions of this form of discrimination to perceptions of discrimination against groups recognized as stigmatized, such as African Americans. When the target of discrimination was a member of a group culturally recognized as stigmatized, participants cried foul, but they rarely did so when the target of the discrimination was a single person. When people read about discrimination against singles, they perceived it to be relatively legitimate and failed to recognize that stereotypes or prejudice might have affected the landlord's decision.

When the results of these experiments are taken together, there appears to be quite a paradox. Participants in Experiments 1 through 4 showed a strong and consistent tendency to choose the married couple over all types of singles, even though they were similar on all substantive dimensions. Moreover, all but one of the eight effect sizes calculated to compare the use of relationship status as a rationale for selection for married versus single applicants were medium or large [START_REF] Cohen | Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences[END_REF]. Despite the size and consistency of preference for married applicants over similarly qualifi ed single applicants, participants in Experiment 5 did not recognize this practice as discriminatory.

It is also striking that relationship status did not seem to infl uence the degree to which participants recognized discrimination against singles as such. In all five experiments, we examined whether participants' own status as currently in a romantic relationship or not (Experiments 1, 2, 4, 5) or married/engaged or not (Experiment 3) moderated their decisions or perceptions. It never did. Single participants were just as likely to practice discrimination as were coupled participants, and just as likely to perceive discrimination against a single person as legitimate. One could argue that singles' participation in, and lack of acknowledgment of, discrimination against their group provides evidence of system justifi cation [START_REF] Jost | A decade of system justifi cation theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo[END_REF]) and the uncontested nature of the ideology of marriage and family [START_REF] Depaulo | Singled out: How singles are stereotyped, stigmatized, and ignored, and still live happily ever after[END_REF]DePaulo & Morris, 2005a[START_REF] Depaulo | Singled out: How singles are stereotyped, stigmatized, and ignored, and still live happily ever after[END_REF].

Moreover, it may be the case that most singles are unaware of their disadvantage [START_REF] Byrne | Caught in the cultural lag: The stigma of singlehood[END_REF][START_REF] Morris | The effect of stigma awareness on the self-esteem of singles[END_REF]. When [START_REF] Byrne | Caught in the cultural lag: The stigma of singlehood[END_REF] analyzed data from a nationally representative sample, the Midlife Development in the United States survey (MIDUS), they found that singles were no more likely than married people to think they had ever been discriminated against when trying to rent or buy a house. This was true when controlling for such factors as age, race, cohabiting status, formerly married status, income, education, sexual orientation, physical appearance, etc. These perceptions singles hold are in stark contrast with the large effect sizes we have found showing a strong preference for married couples over various types of singles.

Why is it that singles do not recognize that they may have been targets of housing discrimination? According to [START_REF] Major | Antecedents and consequences of attributions to discrimination: Theoretical and empirical advances[END_REF], treatment of individuals is only considered discriminatory if that treatment is perceived as unfair as well as group-based. Discrimination against singles may not meet these two criteria in the minds of singles. As demonstrated in Experiment 5, single and coupled people alike feel that discrimination against singles is signifi cantly more legitimate than discrimination against most other groups. Furthermore, it is not clear whether singles think of themselves as a group given how many different subcategories of singles there are (e.g. people who are divorced, widowed, coupled but unmarried, and people who are not in romantic relationships), and the fact that marital status is not a permanent characteristic. As diffi cult as it is to recognize instances of personal discrimination [START_REF] Crosby | The denial of personal discrimination[END_REF], it might be that much more diffi cult for singles if they do not perceive mistreatment as unfair or group-based.

Furthermore, if people assume that most adults will not be single for long but will end up married, then discrimination against singles might seem more legitimate because it is only a temporary situation, even a rite of passage of sorts. Future research could explore the possibility that participants might perceive discrimination against singles as less fair if they are aware of the fact that today's Americans spend more years of their adult lives single than married.

Could it be that participants are simply recognizing truths about singles versus married people and, thus, making accurate decisions by choosing the married couple? We contend that this is not the case. The assumption that married people are more stable does not adequately consider the fact that 43% to 46% of marriages end in divorce or separation [START_REF] Schoen | Timing effects on divorce: 20th century experience in the United States[END_REF]. In other words, stability on the part of married people is certainly not guaranteed. Moreover, participants still preferred married applicants when their relationship was portrayed as equally, or even less, stable than that of cohabitating applicants in Experiment 4. Perhaps, as [START_REF] Byrne | Caught in the cultural lag: The stigma of singlehood[END_REF] have argued, perceptions of singles have not caught up with today's reality. Today, single women can support themselves fi nancially and marriages are just as likely to end in divorce as happily ever after. Conceivably, it is less risky than it used to be to lease properties to singles and perhaps more risky than it used to be to lease properties to married couples.

Even if stereotypes of singles do contain a grain of truth though, it is clear from Experiment 5 that people object to stereotyping when they consider discrimination against more publicly recognized stigmatized groups. People seem to recognize that regardless of whether stereotypes refl ect real group differences or not, group stereotypes do not justify discrimination against any particular individual member of a group. When evaluating discrimination against groups other than singles in Experiment 5, participants who believed that the decision was based on stereotypes tended to believe that the decision was illegitimate. When evaluating discrimination against singles, though, the correlation between perceived stereotyping and perceived legitimacy did not differ from zero. Stereotyping singles is not considered objectionable.

It could be argued that people are more accepting of discrimination against singles than other stigmatized groups because marital status is perceived to be controllable in ways that race and gender are not. [START_REF] Rodin | Derogation, exclusion, and unfair treatment of persons with social fl aws: Controllability of stigma and the attribution of prejudice[END_REF] found that more prejudice was attributed to someone who discriminated against a target whose stigma was beyond his or her control than someone who discriminated against a target with a controllable stigma. However, we have some preliminary data that speak against this possibility; we conducted a replication of Experiment 5 in which participants only read about discrimination against people whose stigmas could potentially be perceived as controllable [START_REF] Morris | Does the perceived controllability over marital status infl uence how discrimination against singles is perceived?[END_REF]. Participants in this experiment read about housing discrimination against a single person, an obese person, or a homosexual person and reported how much control they thought the person had over his or her marital status, weight, or sexual orientation, in addition to the perceived legitimacy of the landlord's decision. Participants believed that marital status was more controllable than sexual orientation and, consistent with the results of Rodin et al., they also viewed discrimination against a single person as more legitimate than discrimination against a homosexual person. However, despite the fact that participants thought targets had no more control over their marital status than their weight, participants still thought discrimination against a single person was more legitimate than discrimination against an obese person. This fi nding suggests that presumed controllability over the stigma of being single does not entirely account for the acceptance of discrimination against singles relative to other types of discrimination. Of course, additional research on this question needs to be done.

Our preferred explanation is that perceptions and treatment of married and single people follow from an ideology of marriage and family that is pervasive in American society. The ideology, as described by DePaulo and Morris (2005a), unreservedly values marriage and maintains that married adults are more valuable, important, and worthy than single adults. The results of Experiment 5 support the notion that people do not seem to question whether the ideology is true, nor do they recognize that there might be something wrong with assuming that married people should be favored over singles.

As with any experiment that relies on role-play methodology and undergraduate samples, the generalizability of our results could be questioned. In order to increase the external validity of our results, we asked adults working in rental agencies to choose their preferred tenants. Experiments 2 and 3 were identical except for the fact that the former experiment included college students and the latter included rental agents. A chi-square test for independence compared the results of these two experiments. While both college students and rental agents chose to lease homes to married couples signifi cantly more often than to cohabiting romantic partners or friends, the bias exhibited by college students was greater than that of rental agents (χ 2 (2, N = 153) = 6.45, p < .05). However, it is important to note that although the rental agents exhibited a smaller bias, their preference for married couples over singles remained statistically signifi cant and large (61% of rental agents chose the married couple when they had three choices). It is possible that rental agents have had more experience with singles in the specifi c context of housing and this experience has weakened their negative evaluations of singles. Or perhaps, the bias that rental agents show in favor of married couples is smaller because they are aware of laws that prohibit discrimination based on marital status. However, despite such laws, the rental agents in this experiment demonstrated a strong preference for married couples over singles.

The data collected from rental agents in Experiment 3 also allowed us to test whether the choices rental agents make depend upon their own marital status or age. Exploratory data analyses found that the distribution of their choices between the three applicants did not vary as a function of these demographic characteristics of the rental agents. Thus it appears the tendency to choose married couples over singles is consistent across single, married, older, and younger rental agents. Of course, the ultimate test of external validity would be to observe how rental agents actually respond to real applicants whom they think are married or single. This method could be a fruitful avenue for future research.

Although we have focused on housing discrimination, the ideology of marriage and family suggests that many other types of discrimination may also affect singles. For example, there appears to be a 'marriage bonus' for men in the workplace. According to various correlational studies, married men make more money and are offered more frequent promotions than single men even when controlling for factors such as performance and seniority [START_REF] Antonovics | Are all the good men married? Uncovering the sources of the marital wage premium[END_REF][START_REF] Bellas | The effects of marital status and wives' employment on the salaries of faculty men: The (house) wife bonus[END_REF][START_REF] Budig | The wage penalty for motherhood[END_REF][START_REF] Keith | The social context and resources of the unmarried in old age[END_REF][START_REF] Toutkoushian | Racial and marital status differences in faculty pay[END_REF]. Furthermore, there is anecdotal evidence that employers, assuming singles have fewer obligations outside of work, often expect singles to work longer hours than married employees without full compensation [START_REF] Burkett | The baby boon: How familyfriendly America cheats the childless[END_REF][START_REF] Davis | Working without a net: The bachelor as a social problem[END_REF][START_REF] Depaulo | Singled out: How singles are stereotyped, stigmatized, and ignored, and still live happily ever after[END_REF]. Some have also argued that singles have diffi culties when applying for adoption or in vitro fertilization [START_REF] Millbank | Every sperm is sacred? Denying women access to fertility services on the basis of sexuality or marital status[END_REF]. While this list paints a grim picture of singles as the frequent targets of discrimination, the correlational and anecdotal nature of the evidence may leave unanswered questions. In the future, we hope to use controlled experiments to examine whether singles are the targets of these other types of discrimination and explore perceptions of discrimination against singles in these domains as well.

Notes

1. The correlations between the delinquency ratings and the estimated lengths of stay for each applicant were calculated in all four experiments to rule out collinearity. The average correlations collapsing across all of the experiments were as follows: married couple: r = -.25; cohabiting couple: r = -.33; friends: r = -.24; single woman: r = -.32; single man: r = -.37. Therefore, the delinquency ratings and the perceived lengths of stay in the house for each applicant were not extremely redundant. 2. The full list of reasons can be obtained by contacting the fi rst author.

Table 1 .

 1 The number of participants who chose each type of applicant

	Experiment	Number of people who chose each type of applicant		χ 2
		Married couple	Single woman	Single man
	Experiment 1	59 (70%)	15 (18%)	10 (12%)	51.93**
		Married couple	Cohabiting couple	Friends
	Experiment 2	86 (80%)	13 (12%)	8 (8%)	106.90**
	Experiment 3	28 (61%)	11 (24%)	7 (15%)	16.22**
		Married couple (6 years)	Cohabiting couple (6 years)
	Experiment 4a	37 (79%)	10 (21%)		15.51**
		Married couple (6 months)	Cohabiting couple (6 years)
	Experiment 4b	35 (71%)	14 (29%)		9.00*

* p < .005; ** p < .001. Note: Eight people said they did not have enough information to choose in Experiment 3.

Table 2 .

 2 Delinquency ratings and predicted length of stay in house (in years) for each type of applicantExperimentDelinquency and length of stay for each type of applicant F

		Married couple	Single woman	Single man
	1 Delinq.	2.57 a	2.82 a (d = 0.41)	3.36 b (d = 1.21)	17.18***
	stay	3.62 a	2.19 b (d = 1.29)	1.93 b (d = 1.52)	33.96***
		Married couple	Cohabiting couple	Friends
	2 Delinq.	2.38 a	3.22 b (d = 1.44)	3.55 c (d = 1.68)	42.15***
	stay	3.62 a	1.89 b (d = 1.98)	1.27 c (d = 2.68)	109.14***
	3 Delinq.	2.53 a	2.84 b (d = 0.69)	3.05 b (d = 0.74)	3.91*
	stay	2.29 a	1.86 b (d = 0.71)	1.47 c (d = 1.07)	8.61***
		Married couple (6 years)	Cohabiting couple (6 years)
	4a Delinq.	2.56 a	3.16 b (d = 0.93)	9.31**
	stay	3.66 a	2.13 b (d = 1.47)	23.17***
		Married couple (6 months)	Cohabiting couple (6 years)
	4b Delinq.	2.87 a	2.98 a (d = 0.15)	0.25
	stay	3.24 a	3.22 a (d = 0.01)	0.001

* p < .05; ** p < .005; *** p < .001. Notes: d = effect size for comparison with married couple. Cells in the same row that do not share superscripts reliably differ from each other at p < .05.

Table 3 .

 3 Percentage of participants who gave relationship status as the rationale for their choice

	Experiment		Participants' choice for tenant		F
		Married couple	Single woman	Single man
	1	42% a	13% b (d = 0.50)	0% b (d = 0.63)	5.47*
		Married couple	Cohabiting couple	Friends
	2	68% a	43% b (d = 0.37)	13% b (d = 0.63)	6.38**
	3	61% a	20% b (d = 0.77)	0% b (d = 1.11)	6.85**
		Married couple (6 years)	Cohabiting couple (6 years)
	4a	84% a		10% b (d = 1.70)	32.54***
		Married couple (6 months)	Cohabiting couple (6 years)
	4b	63% a		21% b (d = 0.81)	7.66**

*p < .01; **p < .005; ***p < .001. Note: d = effect size for comparison with people who chose the married couple. Cells in the same row that do not share superscripts reliably differ from each other at p < .05.