Sjoerd F Pennekamp
email: s.f.pennekamp@uva.nl

Bertjan Doosje

Sven Zebel

Agneta H Fischer

The Past and the Pending: The Antecedents and Consequences of Group-Based Anger in Historically and Currently Disadvantaged Groups

Keywords: domain relevance, emotions, past, reparation

Two studies investigated the role of domain relevance in the experience of group-based anger among disadvantaged groups using structural equation models. In the fi rst study, Surinamese people to whom the slavery past was more relevant made stronger attributions of outgroupblame and experienced more anger. This effect was above and beyond the infl uence of group identifi cation. In the second study relevance of women's status position in society predicted outgroup-blame and group-based anger. In both studies domain relevance and anger were predictive of the tendencies to engage in action demanding reparation, as well as of the desire for the outgroup to engage in reparation. The role of domain relevance for intergroup emotions is considered.

On July 1 2002, a large group, mainly Surinamese people of African descent, gathered in the Oosterpark in Amsterdam in the Netherlands. It is a long awaited day, as a statue will be revealed commemorating the slavery past. Because of the high fences securing the offi cial ceremony, the event turns into a small riot. Not being able to be part of the opening gives rise to intense emotions of anger and outrage in the people present. Many people claimed it reminded them of the way the Dutch had mistreated their ancestors during slavery. This example shows that people can experience intense emotions for past events in which the ingroup was victimized, even though this event is appraised in the present. The present research investigates how group members appraise important identity-related issues, both historical and current, when the group is victimized, and how these appraisals predict their levels of group-based anger toward the relevant outgroup. We will show that the relevance one places in the domain in which the group is victimized has important consequences for the appraisals that are made and the subsequent experience of anger, above and beyond identifi cation with the ingroup. In two different samples we examine the antecedents and consequences of group-based anger directed at the outgroup blamed for the injustice. In the fi rst sample we investigate the anger Surinamese experience toward the Dutch regarding the slavery past, and how this is related to action tendencies. In the second study we focus on a more current societal issue, namely how women perceive sexism, and how this leads to anger and action tendencies directed toward men.

Intergroup emotions

In recent years, research on the emotional consequences of group membership has made important progress, inspired by E. R. [START_REF] Smith | Social identity and social emotions: Toward a new conceptualization of prejudice[END_REF] see also [START_REF] Mackie | Intergroup relations: Insights from a theoretically integrative approach[END_REF] intergroup emotions theory (IET). Combining insights from both appraisal theory (Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), as well as selfcategorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), IET explicated why people experience emotions based on social or group-based identity concerns. Indeed, research has shown that emotions based on group membership play an important role in the way people perceive and react to other groups [START_REF] Branscombe | Collective guilt: International perspectives[END_REF][START_REF] Doosje | Guilt by association: When one's group has a negative history[END_REF][START_REF] Dumont | Social categorization and fear reactions to the September 11th terrorist attacks[END_REF]; see Mackie & Smith, 2002 for an overview). For example, [START_REF] Mackie | Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context[END_REF] showed that greater collective support of one's opinion led participants to report stronger feelings of groupbased anger and a stronger tendency to move against the outgroup. Other research [START_REF] Doosje | Guilt by association: When one's group has a negative history[END_REF] has shown that even events that have happened in the far past can elicit emotions in people, simply because of their membership to the group that acted as a perpetrator in a historical injustice.

In these studies appraisals have been shown to be important predictors of group-based emotions. In the present research we focus on the role of different appraisals when one's group has been or still can be perceived as the victim of another group's deeds. In particular we investigate the role of domain relevance, a primary appraisal [START_REF] Lazarus | Emotion & adaptation[END_REF]. In addition we investigate two secondary appraisals, outgroupblame, and the extent to which a person places the injustice in a historical perspective.

Relevance of the group, and relevance of a domain

In most appraisal theories the relevance of an event for the person is an important prerequisite for emotions to occur (e.g. [START_REF] Frijda | The emotions[END_REF][START_REF] Lazarus | Emotion & adaptation[END_REF]Scherer et al., 2001). [START_REF] Lazarus | Emotion & adaptation[END_REF] sees the relevance of an event to a person's goals as the starting point of the appraisal process. Individual differences in the relevance of a domain or issue have been shown to be important in other fi elds of research as well, such as attitudes [START_REF] Krosnick | The role of attitude importance in social evaluation: A study of policy preferences, presidential candidate evaluations, and voting behavior[END_REF][START_REF] Petty | Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to attitude change[END_REF]; for an overview see [START_REF] Johnson | The effects of involvement on persuasion: A meta-analysis[END_REF]) and personal goals (e.g. [START_REF] Cantor | Life tasks and daily experience[END_REF][START_REF] Lavallee | Impact of personal goals on self-regulation processes elicited by daily negative events[END_REF]. What these literatures indicate is that people who are more involved in a certain issue will process information regarding these issues more extensively, have stronger opinions about these issues and are more affected by events related to these issues. This is for example evident from the Elaboration Likelihood Model [START_REF] Petty | Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to attitude change[END_REF], in which issue involvement (i.e. personal relevance) is given a central place. In turn these issues may be more accessible because people have given them more thought [START_REF] Fazio | Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: Determinants, consequences, and correlates of attitude accessibility[END_REF]. Another good illustration of individual differences in the relevance of certain domains is offered by the work on the contingencies of self-worth [START_REF] Crocker | Contingencies of self-worth in college students: Theory and measurement[END_REF]. This work shows that people differ in the domains on which they base their self-esteem. People are consequently more affected by successes and failures in self-relevant domains. The fact that relevance has such a central place in these literatures suggests that it is important to consider this factor in studying group emotions as well.

To most researchers of group emotions, identifi cation with a group has so far been a suffi cient measure of relevance. The reasoning that when the group is important to a person, matters concerning the group will be important to this person too is implicit in this research. Indeed, a number of studies report on the different emotional experience between high and low identifi ers with the group (e.g. [START_REF] Doosje | Guilt by association: When one's group has a negative history[END_REF][START_REF] Mackie | Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context[END_REF].

However, identifi cation usually refers to the general importance of the group to a person, yet belonging to a group encompasses a large range of domains a group is involved in (McGarty & Bluic, 2004). We argue here that a more specifi c measure of the relevance of a domain to a person's (social) identity might function better in explaining the intensity of emotions and associated action tendencies. Some high Dutch identifi ers might derive pride from the national soccer team, whereas others might derive their pride from the paintings by the Dutch masters. Some groups have evolved around a certain theme that is relevant to its members, such as fan clubs and sport clubs. The domain that these groups revolve around will be highly relevant to most members of this group. In such groups, group identifi cation and domain relevance will be closely linked.

However, in other more broad social categories, such as gender or nationality, group members are more likely to vary in the extent to which they perceive certain domains as relevant to their group identity. Consequently, the link between the domain relevance and group identifi cation will be less strong. Research by Sellers and his colleagues on racial identity [START_REF] Sellers | Multidimensional inventory of black identity: A preliminary investigation of reliability and construct validity[END_REF] has given attention to the individual differences in the meanings identities have to group members. In their inventory of Black identity, they not only include the centrality of a certain identity (i.e. identifi cation), but also the ideologies people endorse in relation to their identity. These ideologies in turn infl uence their perception of group membership [START_REF] Sellers | The role of racial identity in perceived racial discrimination[END_REF]. Besides ideologies, individuals may also differ in the importance they place on more specifi c domains. Indeed, it has been found that interest in the domain of soccer, and not national identifi cation, is predictive of the intensity of the schadenfreude that is experienced toward a rival team after a soccer championship [START_REF] Leach | Malicious pleasure: Schadenfreude at the suffering of another group[END_REF]. Thus, it is not the identifi cation with the national group per se that renders the performance of one's own and other teams relevant, but one's concern or interest in a specifi c game as well.

In the present research we extend the model derived from IET by adding relevance as a predictor of the appraisals, as well as of the group-based emotions that are experienced; we expect relevance to be more predictive of the emotions than identifi cation.

Secondary appraisals

When something is relevant to a person's group identity, one will engage in further appraisals. The assignment of blame might be an important appraisal in eliciting anger, when an event has negative consequences for the group. [START_REF] Weiner | An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion[END_REF] showed that attributing blame for a negative event to another person gives rise to anger. In a similar fashion appraising another person as being accountable for a negative event has also been shown to be important in eliciting anger (e.g. [START_REF] Kuppens | The appraisal basis of anger: Specifi city, necessity and suffi ciency of components[END_REF][START_REF] Smith | Appraisal components, core relational themes, and the emotions[END_REF]. A study by [START_REF] Doosje | Attributions for the negative historical actions of a group[END_REF] showed that blame is also relevant at the intergroup level. They demonstrated that current members of a historical perpetrator group were less likely to blame their group for a negative historical event than current members of the victim group, in particular when they were highly identifi ed. Because victims of a historical injustice are likely to blame the perpetrator group, they are likely to experience anger regarding this past. Considering outgroup-blame may thus be important in both historical and current injustices.

Although outgroup-blame seems to be a likely appraisal when considering a historical injustice, not all group members may fi nd these issues important today, and thus may not appraise the event in terms of anyone's blame. Indeed, people differ in the extent to which they place past events in a historical perspective. Members of a perpetrator group are generally more likely to place negative historical events in a historical perspective than members of a victim group, especially if they are highly identifi ed (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). A study by [START_REF] Zebel | Guilty by association, and with dissociation: The interplay between involvement and identifi cation[END_REF] also showed that high identifi ers placed negative past ingroup behavior more in a historical perspective than low identifi ers, which lowered feelings of guilt. We believe that the relevance a certain domain has to a person will infl uence the extent to which people are likely to place an injustice in a historical perspective, that is, the extent to which they attribute it to situational characteristics (e.g. moral values) that existed in the past. This makes it an external attribution, in which the injustice is attributed to the situation back then, which will lead participants to experience less anger. Relevance will be a negative predictor of historical perspective, because people to whom the slavery past is relevant still consider the injustice to be important in present times. In the present research we expect that Surinamese participants who identify more strongly with their Dutch identity are more willing to appraise their slavery past in a historical perspective. A cause for this might be the fact that they belong to both the perpetrator and the victim group. As a consequence, they are likely to experience less anger toward the Dutch.

The present study investigates the appraisals of two groups regarding the past of their group or their current group status. We predict that the relevance of the slavery past among Surinamese people (Study 1) or of women's current position in society among women (Study 2) directly predicts group-based anger and is associated with stronger outgroup-blame 1 and, in Study 1, a less historical perspective. We also predict that appraising outgroup-blame will lead to more intense feelings of anger, whereas placing the events in a historical perspective will decrease these feelings. Finally we hypothesize that feelings of anger will lead the participants to experience stronger tendencies to engage in own actions to demand reparation from the outgroup and stronger support for the outgroup to engage in reparatory action.

Study 1

The fi rst group in which we test our predictions regarding the antecedents and consequences of group-based anger are Surinamese people living in the Netherlands. Surinam is a former colony of the Netherlands, which became independent in 1975. The Dutch practiced slavery in Surinam until 1873. Before and right after Surinam became independent large groups of Surinamese immigrated to the Netherlands. Today people of Surinamese descent are one of the largest non-native groups living in the Netherlands. Although, as described in the introduction, a monument commemorating the slavery past has been unveiled, no formal excuses regarding the Dutch role in slavery have been made.

Method

Participants The participants in this study were 138 people of Surinamese descent, currently living in The Netherlands. These people were recruited at different locations, including a gym, a school for adult education and a church in a big city in the Netherlands. There were 72 women and 49 men; 17 participants did not indicate their sex (mean age = 37.36, SD = 13.66). The majority of these participants were born in Surinam (74%). An item measuring the extent to which they had frequent contact with native Dutch people showed that only 5% did not have frequent contact with native Dutch people.

Procedure and materials

Participants were asked if they wanted to participate in a study about the Dutch slavery past in Surinam. If they agreed to participate, they received a questionnaire, which could be fi lled in directly or could be taken home and be returned later to the researchers. All questions were answered on 5-point Likert scales (1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree) unless mentioned otherwise.

Measure of identifi cation

The fi rst part of the questionnaire was about the extent to which participants identifi ed with their Surinamese and Dutch identities. These questions were taken from [START_REF] Leach | Collective self-defi nition and self-investment: A two-dimensional framework of group identifi cation[END_REF]. Participants indicated their agreement with nine statements for each of the identities. These statements differed only in subject (Surinamese/Dutch, α = .87 and α = .91, respectively). An example of a statement is 'Being [Surinamese] forms an important part of the way I see myself'.

Relevance of the slavery past

The fi rst set of appraisal items was the personal relevance of the slavery past (α = .78). This scale consisted of two dimensions, which were combined because of their high correlation. Four questions asked whether they thought the slavery past was still personally important and three statements concerned the extent to which people still discussed the slavery past with others (e.g. 'I regularly think about the slavery past').

Secondary appraisals

After participants fi lled in the fi rst part of the questionnaire they were told that in the remainder of the questionnaire, 'Surinamese people' would mean people who descended from Surinam and who are currently living in the Netherlands, and by Dutch people we would refer to people whose ancestors are from the Netherlands. This was important because otherwise the two groups could be confused because they are both part of the Dutch society.

Outgroup-blame was measured with three items (α = .83; e.g. 'Present-day Dutch people can still be held responsible for the slavery past'). Subsequently historical perspective was assessed with four items (α = .65; e.g. 'Slavery can be seen in a historical perspective').

Group-based anger Next participants were asked to which extent they felt angry about the slavery past and the Dutch role during slavery (α = .87), using the following question: 'When you are confronted with the slavery past and the Dutch role during slavery, to what extent do you experience the following emotions . . . '. After which they rated the emotions: 'anger', 'irritation', 'frustration', and 'moral outrage'.

Here and in the remaining variables answers were given on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all ) to 5 (very much).

Action tendencies

The last set of questions involved the action tendencies people felt in relation to the slavery past. Four statements asked whether they themselves would initiate behavior to demand reparation for the slavery past (reparation demands, α = .82; e.g. 'I would sign a petition which asks for more attention to the slavery past'). Finally, participants indicated how strongly they would support four possible initiatives (e.g. an offi cial excuse) that could be undertaken by the Dutch government as a form of reparation for slavery (support for outgroup reparation, α = .75).

Results

Factor analyses First we conducted factor analyses to test whether the variables represent discrete constructs. The factor analyses were done in three parts, for reasons of clarity. 2 All factor analyses were done using maximum likelihood extraction and oblimin rotation. The factors were selected using the Kaiser criterion unless mentioned otherwise. 3 The fi rst analysis included both identifi cation scales and the relevance items. This analysis was important because it could show that Surinamese identifi cation, and the relevance of the slavery past are discrete constructs. The analysis yielded a six factor solution. Inspection of the scree-plot though, showed that the point of infl exion was after three factors. Therefore we conducted another factor analysis asking for a three factor solution. This resulted in separate factors for both identifi cation scales and the relevance scale. The factor analyses thus confi rmed our assumption that relevance and (Surinamese) identifi cation are distinct constructs.

A second factor analysis was done to see whether historical perspective and outgroupblame were distinct constructs. As expected this analysis yielded a two factor solution. Although these factors were signifi cantly correlated in the oblimin rotated solution, the correlation was only moderate (r = -.30, p = .001). This indicated that historical perspective and outgroup-blame are distinct constructs. The last factor analysis was done with the anger items and the items measuring the two forms of action tendencies. Unexpectedly the analysis yielded a two factor solution. One factor consisted of the anger items. The second factor contained all items measuring action tendencies, both reparation demands and support for outgroup reparation. This might be explained by the fact that the items of these variables all center around the reparation of a historical injustice. When we asked for a three factor solution however, the predicted three factors resulted. The high correlation between these variables might have made it diffi cult to separate the two factors. Because these factors clearly differ in the target that should perform behavior to result in reparation, we chose to treat these two forms of action as separate variables in our analysis.

Structural equation model

The means of the variables used in this study are given in Table 1. The correlations between the variables can be found in Table 2. We used EQS 6.1 software [START_REF] Bentler | EQS structural equations program manual[END_REF] to test our model for group-based anger regarding the Dutch role in the slavery past among the Surinamese. The fi rst model included our hypotheses regarding the infl uence of Surinamese identifi cation on the appraisal of relevance. In addition, it included the effects of relevance on the secondary appraisals outgroupblame and historical perspective, as well as its direct infl uence on anger. It also incorporated the effects of the secondary appraisals on anger, and the role of anger in predicting the action tendencies. The two action tendencies were allowed to correlate. Our exploratory predictions regarding the infl uence of Dutch identifi cation on historical perspective taking were also included in the model.

The hypothesized model resulted in poor fi t. The chi-square was signifi cant (χ 2 (18) = 89.86, p < .001). Other fi t indices also indicated poor fi t, the comparative fi t index (CFI) = .73, the goodness of fi t index (GFI) = .88 and the root mean-square error of approximation(RMSEA) = .17 (see [START_REF] Hu | Cutoff criteria for fi t indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives[END_REF]. Lagrange Multiplier test suggested adding paths from relevance to both action tendencies. Adding these paths strongly increased the model fi t. That is, the chi-square was weakened, indicating a better fi t (χ 2 (19) = 26.51, p = .034), as was the ratio χ 2 / df = 1.40, which is lower than 3 (as suggested by [START_REF] Kline | Principles and practice of structural equation modeling[END_REF]. Other indicators also show good fi t (CFI = .96, GFI = .95, RMSEA = .07). This model is shown in Figure 1.

As expected, Surinamese identification is a significant predictor of the relevance of slavery. Relevance in turn is the most important predictor in the model, predicting both outgroup-blame and historical perspective, anger and the action tendencies. In line with our expectations, the relationship between relevance and outgroup-blame is strongly positive, whereas the relationship between relevance and historical perspective is negative. This shows that the Surinamese, for whom the slavery past is more important, blame the Dutch more for their role in this past and are less likely to see the slavery in a historical perspective. Interestingly, Dutch identifi cation predicts historical perspective. All appraisals have direct effects on the intensity of the anger regarding the Dutch role in the slavery past. As expected, outgroup-blame is a good positive predictor of the anger, whereas historical perspective functions as a negative predictor of anger. The effect of relevance seems to be partially mediated by the two secondary appraisals, especially outgroup-blame, but remains a signifi cant predictor of anger.

The extent to which one wants to engage in reparation demands or supports the outgroup to undertake reparation is predicted by both relevance and anger. As expected on the basis of IET, anger is a positive predictor of the tendency to engage in action to demand reparation. Relevance though, is a stronger predictor of reparation demands. Support for outgroup reparation shows a similar pattern, though here the relationship is less strong. Both relevance and anger lead to support for the outgroup to repair the injustice done. Both forms of action are correlated.

Alternative models

We tested two alternative models. In the fi rst one we excluded relevance, and considered whether Surinamese identifi cation could predict the secondary appraisals. No direct paths from identifi cation to either anger or the action tendencies were included in this model. The remainder of the model was similar to the one described above. This model resulted in poor fi t, with a highly signifi cant chi-square (χ 2 (13) = 47.46, p < .001). Other indicators also showed poor fit (CFI = .82, GFI = .92, RMSEA = .14). We tried to improve this model by including direct paths from Surinamese identifi cation to anger as well as the action tendencies, making it similar to the role relevance played in the model described above. Including these paths increased the fi t. However, the chi-square was still highly signifi cant (χ 2 (10) = 30.71, p < .001). The other indicators also showed poorer fi t (CFI = .89, GFI = .94, RMSEA = .12). Because these alternative models are not nested in the model we propose, their fi t indices cannot be compared directly. It is possible, however, to compare these models derived from the same sample on the base of a predictive fi t index, such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC; see [START_REF] Kline | Principles and practice of structural equation modeling[END_REF]. The model with the lowest value on this index is preferred above the others. We therefore compared the models on this index. The model we propose including relevance (AIC = -4.29) indeed had a lower score on this index than both the alternative models we tested (respectively AIC = 21.46 and AIC = 10.71). This indicates that the model as presented in Figure 1 is preferred above the alternative models.

Discussion

In general, the model confi our hypotheses regarding the antecedents and consequences of group-based anger regarding the slavery past. Adding paths from relevance to the two action tendencies resulted in a model with a good fi t. As expected, relevance of the slavery past more so than Surinamese identifi cation was predictive of the secondary appraisals that were made, and in part of the anger that was experienced. The secondary appraisals were also predictive of group-based anger. Anger in turn, together with relevance, could predict the strength of the action tendencies that were experienced. This also corroborates earlier research on groupbased anger (e.g. [START_REF] Mackie | Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context[END_REF].

Perhaps most striking in our results is the central role played by relevance, although most of the relations between this variable and others seem to be quite clear. The fact that it is, together with the secondary appraisals outgroup-blame and historical perspective, predictive of anger follows from work on the antecedents of personal anger. In fact, [START_REF] Lazarus | Emotion & adaptation[END_REF] considers relevance and blame (or accountability) as being part of the core relational theme of anger. More interesting perhaps are the relations between relevance and the action tendencies. Although anger is also important in explaining the action tendencies, relevance seems to play a considerable role here. In other words, anger is only partially mediating the effects of relevance on action tendencies. Especially, the relation between relevance and reparation demands is strong.

A methodological reason for this relation might be that both domain relevance and reparation demands contain items measuring behavior in relation to the issue of slavery. Another point might be that relevance not only measures 'motivational' relevance, but also a more cognitive aspect of this relevance, comparable to attitude strength. From the attitude literature it is known that personal relevance can in some cases predict the behavior of people [START_REF] Krosnick | The role of attitude importance in social evaluation: A study of policy preferences, presidential candidate evaluations, and voting behavior[END_REF].

Interestingly, participants who identifi ed more strongly with their Dutch identity were more likely to place the slavery past in a historical perspective. This refl ects fi ndings in the fi eld of group-based guilt, in which it is found that high identifi ers become more defensive when confronted with a negative history of their group (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). The fact that our participants belong to both the historical perpetrator and victim group makes this fi nding even more intriguing. Perhaps living in the country of the former perpetrator and identifying with this group leads one to temper the relevance of the slavery past and makes one less affected by it. In fact, in conducting this research, different people indicated that they didn't want to place emphasis on the slavery past because the future was more important to them. The fact that respondents participated voluntarily does not seem to have led to a biased sample. The mean levels of relevance and Dutch identifi cation were around the scale mid-point and the scores on these variables covered the full range of the scale. For Surinamese identifi cation the mean is higher, but here too scores covered the full range of the scale.

In the second study we wanted to investigate non-overlapping victim and perpetrator groups, for which it is clear that members of the victim group are less likely to identify with the perpetrator group. Women and men, for example, can be considered mutually exclusive groups, in which case it is less likely for members of the victim group (i.e. women, as they can be seen as victims of gender discrimination) to identify with the perpetrator group (i.e. men). In this case, we do not expect the historical appraisal to be important. Apart from being a replication of Study 1, we aim to test this notion in Study 2, in which we investigate the appraisals and emotions of the victim group women toward men.

Study 2

In the second study we test our predictions regarding the antecedents and consequences of group-based anger on Dutch women. Women as a group clearly differ from Surinamese in the sense that they don't overlap the outgroup considered here, men. The domain used here to elicit anger also clearly differs. Whereas slavery is something that has happened in the distant past, women still hold a lower status position in society compared to men.

One might argue that relevance is less likely to play a role in the perception of women's position in society, than in the case of slavery. Slavery ended over a century ago. It may be required to fi nd this past relevant to still experience emotions about this issue. In the case of women, the injustice is enduring, and it is thus more likely that women have had negative experiences themselves, eliciting anger [START_REF] Swim | Everyday sexism: Evidence for its incidence, nature, and psychological impact from three daily diary studies[END_REF]. We will test this empirical question in the following study.

Method

Participants The participants were female students from the University of Amsterdam who participated in a mass testing session in return for course credits. In total, 140 students participated. Their mean age was 21.21 years (SD = 4.35). Ethnicity was not recorded for 12 participants, of the remaining participants, 83% had at least one native Dutch parent (for 75% both parents were Dutch natives), and only 3% indicated that they had lived in the Netherlands for less than 4 years.

Procedure and materials Participants were seated behind computers in a large computer room. In the session they participated in several other experiments as well. The participants were told we were interested in their views on sexism in the current society. 4 The participants fi lled out the questionnaire; after they had fi nished all the experiments, they received a booklet containing a debriefi ng.

Identifi cation

The fi rst scale was a measure of gender identifi cation, which consisted of the same nine items as in Study 1 (α = .90). Participants indicated their agreement with nine statements (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; these scales are used throughout the experiment except when mentioned otherwise).

Relevance of status position

The second scale was intended to measure the relevance for the participants of societal issues concerning women (α = .85), this scale consisted of the same seven items as in Study 1.

Secondary appraisals Next followed the appraisals women made for sexism. The fi rst three items asked whether they thought men were to blame for the existence of sexism (α = .62; e.g. 'Men are responsible for the unequal treatment of men and women'). Next were three items asking whether the participant thought that sexism could be seen in a historical perspective (α = .66; e.g. 'Sexism slowly ceases to exist').

Emotions After the appraisals we asked the participants which emotions they felt when they thought about the low status position of women in society. We asked the same four angerrelated emotions as in Study 1: anger, irritation, frustration and moral outrage (α = .91).

Action tendencies

The last part of the questionnaire measured the action tendencies felt by the participants in relation to sexism in current society. The fi rst three items asked whether the participants felt a need to do something about the position of women in society themselves (reparation demands, α = .68; e.g. 'I would make a donation to organizations that try to improve the position of women in society'). Subsequently we asked the participants whether they thought men should contribute more effort to the equal rights and treatment of women (support for outgroup reparation, α = .81; e.g. 'Men can contribute more to the improvement of the position of women in society').

Results

Factor analyses Again we conducted factor analyses to check whether our variables indeed represent distinct constructs. The fi rst factor analysis was done on the gender identifi cation items and the relevance items. This yielded a four factor solution, although inspection of the scree-plot showed a point of infl exion after two factors. A second factor analysis in which we asked for a two factor solution resulted in separate factors for the identifi cation and the relevance scales. So again we show that identifi cation and relevance (of women's position in society) are distinct variables. A second factor analysis was done on the secondary appraisal items. Again this yielded a two factor solution with historical perspective and outgroup-blame as distinct factors (the correlation between these factors in the oblimin rotated solution was again moderate r = .27, p = .002). The last factor analysis was done on the items measuring anger and the action tendency items. This time the expected three factor solutions resulted. The anger items made up one factor, the support for outgroup reparation items made up the second factor, and the last factor consisted of the reparation demands items. After factor analyses it can thus be concluded all variables in our analyses represent distinct constructs.

Structural equation model

The means of the variables used in this study are represented in Table 1. The correlations between the variables can be found in Table 3. We tested a path model consistent with our hypothesis, extended with the paths between relevance and anger and the action tendencies, found in Study 1. Gender identifi cation was predictive of domain relevance. Relevance predicted the secondary appraisals outgroup-blame and historical perspective as well as the anger and action tendencies that were experienced. The secondary appraisals both were predictive of anger. Anger predicted both action tendencies, which were again allowed to correlate.

This resulted in a model of moderate fi t (χ 2 (10) = 25.66, p < .001). Other indicators also showed moderate fi t (CFI = .92, GFI = .94, RMSEA = .11). The main reason for this modest fi t was the path running from historical perspective to anger. Results showed that this path could not be signifi cantly distinguished from zero. The Wald test for model modifi cation confi rmed that this variable could be dropped from the model without worsening the fi t. We tested a second model without historical perspective all together, which resulted in good fi t. The chisquare was no longer signifi cant (χ 2 (6) = 11.67, p = .069). Other indicators also showed good fi t (CFI = .97, GFI = .97, RMSEA = .08). This model is shown in Figure 2. Gender identifi cation was a strong predictor of the extent to which the participant found it relevant to think about the position of women in society. This relevance in turn predicted both outgroup-blame and anger. Outgroupblame again also had a direct path to anger. So again, domain relevance infl uences the extent to which one is likely to blame the outgroup and experience anger directed at this group. Both anger and relevance are predictive of the extent to which one is likely to engage in action to improve the position of women in society. The path between relevance and reparation demands is less strong than in the fi rst study. Anger and relevance also predict the extent to which outgroup action to equalize the status positions is supported. Again the two reparation variables were correlated.

Alternative models

We tested the same two alternative models that might account for our data as in Study 1. In the fi rst we excluded relevance so that identifi cation would predict the appraisals, again no direct path to anger and the action tendencies was included. The remainder of the model was similar to the one described above. This resulted in a poor fi tting model, the chi-square was highly signifi cant (χ 2 (5) = 26.70, p < .001). Other indicators also showed poor fi t (CFI = .80, GFI = .93, RMSEA = .18). In the second model we included paths running from identifi cation directly to anger and the action tendencies. This improved the model and increased its fi t, however the chi-square was still signifi cant (χ 2 (2) = 7.21, p = .027). Other indicators also showed increased fi t (CFI = .95, GFI = .98, although the RMSEA = .14 was still quite large). Again when we compared the models on the basis of their predictive fi t, the model we proposed had a lower score on this index (AIC = .32) than both of the alternative models (respectively AIC = 16.70 and AIC = 3.21). This indicates that the model we presented in Figure 2 is preferred above the alternative models.

Discussion

We were able to replicate most of the fi ndings of the fi rst study. Again results confi rmed our hypotheses regarding the important role of domain relevance in eliciting group-based anger above and beyond identifi cation. Relevance was a good predictor of anger, both directly and through outgroup-blame. Anger in turn, together with relevance, was a good predictor of the action tendencies that were experienced and the extent to which people supported action by the outgroup. As in Study 1, relevance could better predict the subsequent emotional experience than identifi cation. The relation between these two variables was somewhat stronger than in Study 1, but testing of alternative models showed that removing relevance from the model resulted in poorer fi t. Outgroupblame, together with relevance, predicts anger. Being able to replicate important parts of our model in two different groups on two different issues greatly adds to the external validity of our fi ndings. It shows that group-based emotions are an important part of the group experience in both past and present.

However, there were some important differences between the path model regarding the slavery past shown in Study 1, and the model explaining women's reaction to their low status position shown here. The main difference with the fi rst study was that historical perspective failed to be a predictor of anger. A reason why historical perspective failed to be a good predictor could be that the low status of women in society is still very contemporary. Indeed, recent research has shown that women still experience sexism on a regular basis [START_REF] Swim | Everyday sexism: Evidence for its incidence, nature, and psychological impact from three daily diary studies[END_REF]. Not surprisingly, anger was the emotion most reported by the women in reaction to being subjected to sexism. Putting sexism in a historical perspective is thus more unlikely than in the case of slavery, also because these identities were non-overlapping. Women might be more likely to attribute sexism externally to other characteristics of the situation, such as to test diffi culty or even internally [START_REF] Stangor | Reporting discrimination in public and private contexts[END_REF]). An alternative explanation for the fact that historical perspective failed to predict anger is that the anger in Study 2 was measured in relation to sexism in current society. The historical perspective women have on sexism could therefore have played less of a role, whereas this appraisal would have been more important if we would have investigated the emotions that are felt about sexism in relation to the past. In a broader sense one could argue that when the emotions regarding an issue in the past or present are studied, it is important to take into account appraisals that relate to the same time period.

General discussion

We examined the antecedents and consequences of group-based anger in historically and structurally disadvantaged groups. The results of these two studies show strong support for our hypotheses. In two studies we were able to show that for both historical as well as currently enduring injustices, domain relevance predicted group-based anger above and beyond group identification. In the first study we showed that relevance together with outgroup-blame and historical perspective predicted the anger that was experienced toward the Dutch in relation to the slavery past. Anger, together with relevance, could predict the extent to which Surinamese people were willing to engage in action asking for reparation of the slavery past. Anger also predicted the extent to which they supported behavior aimed at reparation from the outgroup. In the second study we replicated the fi ndings from Study 1 to a large extent.

Here also relevance was a strong predictor of outgroup-blame and anger. Anger in turn had the hypothesized effect on the action tendencies and the support for reparation.

Experiencing anger toward the perpetrator outgroup might serve a functional role. Indeed, as the work on group-based guilt has shown, and as we show here for anger, these emotions are related to the willingness to repair or demand reparation for the harm that is done [START_REF] Branscombe | Collective guilt: International perspectives[END_REF]. At the interpersonal level, guilt has been shown to function as a relationship enhancing emotion (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherthon, 1994). Expressing guilt signals that one cares about the other and harm that is done. Anger in this case might serve a similar function for the person or group who has been harmed. Anger might signal that one cares about the relationship (i.e. relevance) and that one is motivated to seek reparation for the injustice restoring the relations between the groups. In research on the emotions expressed in negotiations [START_REF] Van Kleef | The interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiation: A motivated information processing approach[END_REF] anger is given a more strategic role. Anger signals that one has high limits causing negotiation partners to make larger concessions. We have shown that anger not only predicts the action tendencies of group members themselves, but it is also predictive of support for the outgroup to repair the injustice.

In this research we have extended the IET model by adding domain relevance as a predictor of secondary appraisals and group-based emotions. The role of relevance in eliciting group-based emotions has so far been largely overlooked (but see [START_REF] Mcgarty | Refi ning the meaning of 'collective' in collective guilt: Harm, guilt, and apology in Australia[END_REF][START_REF] Nieweg | When the downfall of a rival group elicits pleasure: Social identifi cation and domain interest as determinant of intergroup schadenfreude[END_REF]. The importance of considering individual differences in domain relevance has been shown in other fi elds of research, such as attitudes [START_REF] Johnson | The effects of involvement on persuasion: A meta-analysis[END_REF]. However, research in the area of group-based emotions has up to now mainly used group identifi cation as a proxi of the relevance of the domain (but see [START_REF] Sellers | Multidimensional inventory of black identity: A preliminary investigation of reliability and construct validity[END_REF]. We argue that especially when one is investigating broad social categories, identifi cation might be too distal to be of infl uence for the specifi c domain in which emotions are expected to occur. As already stated in the introduction, identifi cation might mean different things to different people, for instance because different norms are associated with the identity [START_REF] Mcgarty | Refi ning the meaning of 'collective' in collective guilt: Harm, guilt, and apology in Australia[END_REF]. Taking domain relevance and other secondary appraisals into account, one might be able to overcome these different views on the group.

Being able to replicate the same process regarding the factors eliciting group-based anger, and the subsequent effects of this emotion on the action tendencies over two groups adds to the external validity of our fi ndings. However, there are also some limitations to the studies presented here. Both investigate broad social categories in which relevance might be more likely to play a role in eliciting emotions than in smaller groups. In smaller groups, which may even have evolved around a domain important to all members, identifi cation and relevance might serve similar functions and might be harder to distinguish. Future research might further examine the link between identifi cation and relevance in other groups.

Another limitation of our research lies in its correlational nature. Doing correlational research limits the extent to which one can make causal claims about relations between variables. By presenting a model and suggesting possible causal relations between variables, we do not mean to imply that the order suggested here is fi xed. As explained in the introduction we derived this order from earlier work on emotions in general and group emotions in particular. Although the emotions here are represented as a stepwise process starting with identifi cation and ending with a tendency to engage in action, this process may be less clear in every day life.

The present research investigated the role of domain relevance in predicting the appraisals and anger that were felt for past as well as pending injustices. We have demonstrated that the relevance of a domain to a person's social identity could predict the secondary appraisals and subsequent emotions people experience above and beyond their identifi cation with the group. These fi ndings contribute to the fi eld of intergroup emotions and shows the importance of domain relevance for group-based emotions, as well as the combined infl uence of emotions and relevance for action tendencies.

Notes

1. Although Surinamese people in the Netherlands are also Dutch, we will treat the Dutch as an outgroup here because we look at these identities from a historical perspective, in which Surinamese can be seen as members of the historical victim group, whereas the Dutch are the historical perpetrator group. 2. We also conducted a factor analysis on all items included in Studies 1 and 2. This yielded similar results as the ones described here. For reasons of interpretability we chose not to include this analysis here. 3. Only on the factor analyses on the items measuring identifi cation and domain relevance in both studies did the results from the Kaiser criterion and the scree-plot differ. This was mainly due to the fact that our measure of identifi cation contained different subscales (see [START_REF] Leach | Collective self-defi nition and self-investment: A two-dimensional framework of group identifi cation[END_REF]. Because we do not make use of these subscales, we chose not to include these results here. 4. The study also contained a manipulation. This manipulation only affected one of the seven variables used here and thus is not mentioned in the rest of this paper.

Biographical notes

sjoerd f. pennekamp is a graduate student in social psychology at the University of Amsterdam. His research interests concern intergroup behavior in general, and intergroup emotions, intergroup communication, and identifi cation processes in particular.

bertjan doosje is an associate professor in social psychology at the University of Amsterdam. He does research on emotions in intergroup relations, psychological consequences of terrorism, and on partner preferences.

sven zebel is a post-doc in social psychology at the University of Amsterdam. His research interests include perpetrator-victim intergroup relations, group-based and collective emotions, intra-and intergroup insults, and components of group identifi cation.

agneta h. fi scher is a professor in social psychology at the University of Amsterdam. Her research generally concerns the infl uence of social context on specifi c emotions such as the social functions of negative emotions, the infl uence of social cues on emotion regulation, and emotional contagion.

Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. Structural Equation Model: Study 2. Antecedents and consequences of group-based anger in women. Standardized parameter estimates are shown, all pathways are signifi cant, p < .05.

Table 1 .

 1 Means and standard deviations of variables inStudies 1 and 2

		Study 1	Study 2
		M (SD)	M (SD)
	Surinamese identifi cation	4.24 (0.70)	......-
	Dutch identifi cation	3.14 (0.84)	......-
	Gender identifi cation	......-	5.55 (0.85)
	Domain relevance	3.09 (0.85)	5.05 (1.01)
	Outgroup-blame	2.81 (1.27)	4.09 (1.05)
	Historical perspective	3.17 (0.98)	3.88 (1.09)
	Anger	3.45 (1.14)	3.29 (1.46)
	Reparation demands	3.39 (1.13)	4.27 (1.39)
	Support for outgroup reparation	3.99 (0.92)	4.89 (1.10)

Note: Variables in Study 1 are measured on a 5-point scale; variables in Study 2 are measured on a 7-point scale.

Table 2 .

 2 Correlations between variables in Study 1 (N = 138)

	Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	1. Surinamese identifi cation	-	.02	.36** .31**	-.09	.22*	.38**	.26**
	2. Dutch identifi cation		-	-.01	.23**	-.18*	32** -.02	.05
	3. Relevance (slavery past)			-	.43**	-.19*	.32**	.66**	.42**
	4. Outgroup-blame				.. ..-	-.20*	.39**	.52**	42**
	5. Historical perspective					.-	-.32** -.20*	-.16 †
	6. Anger						.. ..-	.46**	.42**
	7. Reparation demands							... ...-	.65**
	8. Support for outgroup reparation							. .	... ...-
	** p < .001; * p < .05; † < .10.

Figure 1. Structural Equation Model: Study 1. Antecedents and consequences of group-based anger in Surinamese. Standardized parameter estimates are shown, all pathways are signifi cant, p < .05.

Table 3 .

 3 Correlations between variables in Study 2 (N = 140)

	Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	1. Gender identifi cation	-	.56*	.16 †	-.05	.32**	.22*	.34**
	2. Relevance (sexism)		-	.23**	-.19*	.39**	.40**	.36**
	3. Outgroup-blame			..-	-.21*	.38**	.29**	.32**
	4. Historical perspective				..-	-.11	-.16 †	-.32**
	5. Anger					..-	.44**	.35**
	6. Reparation demands						...-	.47**
	7. Support for outgroup reparation							...-

**p < .001; * p < .05; † p < .10.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by a NWO/VIDI grant 2623051 granted to the second author. We would like to thank Martijn van Zomeren, Gerben A. van Kleef and two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper and Hanae Beghiyl, Mark Brandes, Nadia Elhanci Elamrani and Maarten W. Rijksen for their help in collecting data for Study 1.


Robyn K Mallett
email: mallett@virginia.edu

Janet K Swim

The Infl uence of Inequality, Responsibility and Justifi ability on Reports of Group-Based Guilt for Ingroup Privilege

Keywords: group-based guilt, inequality, ingroup responsibility, justifi ability, men, Whites, women

Although members of several social groups report feeling guilt because of their group's actions, average reports of group-based guilt tend to be quite low. We investigate three antecedents of group-based guilt derived from research on social justice and interpersonal emotion. We fi nd that Whites, men and women perceive inequality, responsibility and justifi ability of group differences to the same extent. Moreover, each factor is a key antecedent of guilt for Whites, men and women. We also fi nd an interaction between justifi ability and responsibility such that reports of group-based guilt increase as perceptions of ingroup responsibility increase and justifi cations for group differences decrease. Given the benefi cial consequences of group-based guilt for intergroup relations, it is important to understand what factors lead to group-based guilt.

Although some individuals report feeling guilt because of their group's actions, average reports of group-based guilt are often quite low [START_REF] Swim | White guilt: Its antecedents and consequences for attitudes toward affi rmative action[END_REF]). Yet, when experienced, group-based guilt can motivate benefi cial social action including apology for past acts committed by ingroup members [START_REF] Doosje | Consequences of national ingroup identifi cation for responses to immoral historical events[END_REF] and majority group member participation in collective action on behalf of disadvantaged social groups [START_REF] Mallett | Seeing through their eyes: When majority group members take collective action on behalf of an outgroup[END_REF]. Research has yet to clarify exactly why reports of group-based guilt tend to be low, but it has established that at least two factors are critical antecedents of guilt at the group level (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2003). First, there must be an apparent inequality between groups which could be the result of long-term disadvantage or of a onetime critical incident. Second, the ingroup must be seen as responsible for the inequality. Some research also indicates that justifi cations for inequality may reduce feelings of group-based guilt [START_REF] Miron | Collective guilt as distress over illegitimate intergroup inequality[END_REF].

Past research has routinely assessed potential antecedents of group-based guilt in isolation, thereby failing to provide a complete picture of the relative strength of key antecedents. Moreover, the majority of past research has examined feelings of guilt in only one group at a time, leaving unanswered the question of whether relations among the antecedents and groupbased guilt differ between social groups. We synthesize the existing research by simultaneously examining three antecedents of group-based guilt in Whites, men and women.

Antecedents of group-based guilt

Perceived inequality

Research on social justice and interpersonal emotions reveals that personal feelings of guilt can result when people perceive that they are over-benefi ted or have harmed another person [START_REF] Austin | Participants' reactions to 'equity with the world[END_REF][START_REF] Baumeister | Guilt: An interpersonal approach[END_REF][START_REF] Sprecher | The relation between inequity and emotions in close relationships[END_REF][START_REF] Walster | Equity and social justice[END_REF][START_REF] Walster | Equity: Theory and Research[END_REF]. Similarly, group-based feelings of guilt can result from perceived or actual intergroup inequality (Branscombe et al., 2003), of which there is ample evidence (e.g. [START_REF] Anderson | Racial differences in stress-induced cardiovascular reactivity and hypertension: Current status and substantive issues[END_REF][START_REF] Russo | Women's mental health: Research agenda for the twenty-fi rst century[END_REF][START_REF] Swim | Sexism and racism: Old-fashioned and modern prejudices[END_REF][START_REF] Turner | Connections between racism and mental health[END_REF]. Data supporting the connection between perceived inequality and group-based guilt exists for a variety of groups, including Whites' reports of group-based guilt for White privilege and Black disadvantage [START_REF] Swim | White guilt: Its antecedents and consequences for attitudes toward affi rmative action[END_REF], Germans' reports of guilt for enacting genocide against the Jews [START_REF] Rensmann | Collective guilt, national identity, and political processes in contemporary Germany[END_REF], and men's reports of guilt for privileges they have over women [START_REF] Schmidt | Gender inequality and the intensity of men's collective guilt[END_REF].

The present research tests three hypotheses related to this well-established antecedent. First, we predict that the more a group difference is perceived to be important and advantageous to the ingroup, the more likely individuals will be to report group-based guilt. We assume that people will be able to recognize that a group difference exists when it is brought to their attention. But even when faced with examples of group differences that favor the ingroup, some individuals may not report group-based guilt. To uncover when perceived inequality is related to guilt, we assess the magnitude of perceived inequality by measuring the perception that a group difference is important and provides an advantage to the ingroup [START_REF] Lerner | The justice motive in human relations: Some thoughts on what we know and need to know about justice[END_REF]. Although women may acknowledge that they are more likely to receive assistance with car trouble than men, if women do not perceive that vehicular assistance is important or that it gives women an advantage over men, then they may not feel particularly guilty about that group difference. In contrast, if Whites perceive their greater likelihood of having an economic safety net than Blacks is important and advantageous, they might report feeling group-based guilt.

Second, we hypothesize that perceived inequality will uniquely predict reports of groupbased guilt above and beyond perceptions of responsibility and justifi ability. Third, we test whether perceived inequality is a key antecedent of group-based guilt for members of three different social groups. To our knowledge, ours is the fi rst research to examine the antecedents of group-based guilt among members of a disadvantaged group (i.e. women). We expect that perceptions of inequality will infl uence reports of guilt to the same extent across groups. It is possible, however, that the strength of the association between perceived inequality and guilt will vary by group membership-particularly if perceived inequality resulting from ingroup privilege is construed in the larger social context. For example, to the extent that women's advantages are tied to their dependency on men (e.g. being helped by men) or to traditional gender roles that maintain the existing social order (e.g. being awarded child custody), women may perceive that a group difference produces little inequality because it comes at a cost to women. Or it could lead to the assessment of inequality having less of an impact on women's group-based guilt. Therefore, the impact of perceived inequality on feelings of group-based guilt might differ depending on the group under consideration.

Perceived responsibility

Consistent with past research we predict that the more the ingroup is perceived to be responsible for their privileges, the more likely people will be to report group-based guilt. Personal guilt results when people accept responsibility for an action or inaction that caused another to suffer [START_REF] Estrada-Hollenbeck | Avoiding and alleviating guilt through prosocial behavior[END_REF][START_REF] Hoffman | The contribution of empathy to justice and moral judgment[END_REF], and group-based guilt results when people accept ingroup responsibility for harm infl icted on the outgroup (Branscombe et al., 2003;[START_REF] Branscombe | The measurement of collective guilt[END_REF][START_REF] Iyer | Racial wrongs and restitutions: The role of guilt and other group-based emotions[END_REF]. We conceive of responsibility as being composed of both accountability for creating a group difference, which implies that responsibility is in the past, and accountability for maintaining a group difference, which implies that responsibility continues to the present day. Feelings of group, but not personal responsibility, are positively related to reports of group-based guilt for both minimal groups [START_REF] Doosje | Guilty by association: When one's group has a negative history[END_REF] and a variety of existing social groups [START_REF] Branscombe | Antecedents and consequences of collective guilt[END_REF].

We test two hypotheses related to perceptions of ingroup responsibility. First, we test whether ingroup responsibility predicts feelings of group-based guilt above and beyond perceived inequality and justifi ability. Existing research that measures or manipulates group-based guilt generally confounds inequality and responsibility. For example, items from Branscombe and colleagues' (2004) collective guilt acceptance scale invokes group responsibility and resulting inequality in the same statement, 'I feel regret for my group's harmful past actions toward other groups'. Determining the extent to which guilt results from ingroup responsibility versus perceived inequality would further clarify the construct of group-based guilt. Discovering the unique predictive ability of responsibility is an especially worthy goal considering that not all research has found that accepting responsibility is necessary to feel guilt. For instance, [START_REF] Hoffman | The contribution of empathy to justice and moral judgment[END_REF] describes two guiltproducing situations, the innocent bystander and the virtual transgressor, where the individual is not necessarily responsible for a transgression but feels guilt anyway. Although Hoffman did not consider group-based guilt, his analysis indicates that responsibility may not play as essential a role as other research indicates.

Second, we test whether perceived ingroup responsibility is perceived to the same extent across groups and has the same relation with guilt for Whites, men and women. As with perceived inequality, we expect that perceptions of responsibility will infl uence reports of guilt to the same extent across groups, but it is also possible that the strength of the association between responsibility and guilt will vary by group membership. For example, because gender differences, more so than racial differences, may be attributed to biological imperatives and the socially accepted complementarity of group roles, assessments of responsibility may differ or responsibility may play less of a role in predicting gender-based guilt than race-based guilt.

Perceived justifi ability

Most discussions of group-based guilt do not include assessments of the justifi ability of group differences as a required antecedent, but research on social justice suggests that justifi cations for group differences could infl uence the level of guilt experienced [START_REF] Lerner | The justice motive in human relations: Some thoughts on what we know and need to know about justice[END_REF][START_REF] Montada | Justice and emotional reactions to the disadvantaged[END_REF][START_REF] Tyler | Social justice in a diverse society[END_REF]. At the individual level, guilt results if an act violates personal standards for justice or morality [START_REF] Harder | Further validation of the shame and guilt scales of the harder personal feelings questionnaire[END_REF][START_REF] Monteith | Self-directed versus other-directed affect as a consequence of prejudice-related discrepancies[END_REF][START_REF] Roseman | Cognitive determinants of emotions. A structural theory[END_REF], and at the group level, perceived justifi ability of group differences reduces the overall experience of guilt [START_REF] Branscombe | Interpreting the ingroup's negative actions toward another group: Emotional reactions to appraised harm[END_REF]. Based upon this research, we anticipate that perceived justifi ability will be an important antecedent of group-based guilt.

We test two hypotheses relevant to perceptions of justifi ability. First, since past research has rarely considered perceptions of justifi ability, we test whether justifi ability uniquely predicts feelings of group-based guilt when perceived inequality and responsibility are also assessed. Second, we test whether perceived justifi ability is perceived to the same extent and has the same relation to guilt across three different social groups. Similar to perceived responsibility, beliefs about innate gender differences and gender roles may be used to legitimize gender group differences [START_REF] Glick | Hostile and benevolent sexism: Measuring ambivalent sexist attitudes toward women[END_REF]. Thus, justifi cations generated for gender may be perceived as more credible than justifi cations generated for race and may therefore have more infl uence in diminishing feelings of gender-based guilt.

Interactions between perceived inequality, responsibility and justifi ability

The above analysis indicates that perceptions of inequality and ingroup responsibility will increase feelings of group-based guilt and that perceptions of justifi ability will decrease feelings of group-based guilt. It is possible that the three antecedents are additive, such that more inequality and responsibility and less justifi ability produce the most guilt. Alternatively, if any of the three factors are necessary conditions to experience guilt, then they should interact with the others over and above their additive effects. Below we outline possible patterns of interactions that might emerge.

Perceived inequality may be a necessary antecedent of group-based guilt, as it might fi rst be necessary to decide that a group difference exists before assessing responsibility or justifi ability. Even if a group difference is acknowledged, responsibility and justifi ability may not strongly infl uence group-based guilt unless the difference is perceived to be important and advantageous. For instance, if women perceive that being less likely than men to pay for a romantic evening is not important or advantageous, whether or not women perceive that they are responsible for the difference or that it is justifi able, they may not feel particularly guilty. Thus, perceived inequality and perceptions of responsibility and justifi ability may interact such that as perceptions of inequality increase, perceptions of responsibility and justifi ability are stronger predictors of group-based guilt.

When group differences are perceived to be important and advantageous, perceived justifications may diminish the impact of responsibility on feelings of group-based guilt. For example, if women perceive that women receiving custody of children after a divorce is justifi ed because of innate gender differences in the ability to nurture and parent, then women's perceptions of responsibility for receiving custody may have less infl uence on guilt than if receiving custody was not perceived to be justifi ed. Thus, we may fi nd a three-way interaction between inequality, justifi ability and responsibility such that group-based guilt only occurs when group differences are perceived to produce inequality, are unjustifi ed and the ingroup is perceived to be responsible.

Goals of the present research

With the goal of better understanding what factors lead to feelings of group-based guilt, we asked participants to read descriptions of several group differences that favored their ingroup. For example, women read examples of group differences that favored women and men read examples of group differences that favored men. Participants rated the extent to which they perceived that each difference was important and advantageous (i.e. extent of inequality), that their group was responsible for creating and maintaining each difference (i.e. extent of responsibility), that each difference was justifi able, and that they felt group-based guilt for each difference. First, we tested whether the three groups perceived the antecedents and group-based guilt in the same manner. Second, we tested whether the relations between the antecedents and group-based guilt differed by group membership. Third, we tested whether each factor was a unique antecedent of groupbased guilt. Specifi cally, we predicted that the more inequality and responsibility participants perceived and the less justifi ability they perceived, the more they would report group-based guilt. Fourth, although we expected to fi nd mainly additive effects, we also explored whether there were interactions between the antecedents and group-based guilt.

Method

Participants

We tested our hypotheses in three samples. Participants from all three samples were enrolled in undergraduate psychology classes at the Pennsylvania State University. Participants for the White sample included 38 males and 96 females, ranging in age from 18 to 46 (M = 18.9, SD = 3.0). All participants reported their race/ethnicity as White. Participants for the sample of men included 115 men, ranging in age from 18 to 23 (M = 19.4, SD = 1.4); 5% of the sample were Asian, 2.6% were Black, 2.6% were Hispanic, 88.7% were White and less than 1% chose the label of something else. Participants for the sample of women included 109 women, ranging in age from 18 to 37 (M = 19.7, SD = 3.8); 1% of the sample were American Indian, 7.3% were Asian, 10.9% were Black, 2.7% were Hispanic, 76.4% were White and 1.8% designated their background as something else. All participants completed materials for this study on the Internet.

Materials and procedure

Participants fi rst provided demographic information and then evaluated a series of group differences that pertained to their ingroup only. For example, Whites only read about group differences that favored Whites. Salient group membership is critical to producing feelings of group-based guilt [START_REF] Branscombe | Antecedents and consequences of collective guilt[END_REF]. We ensured that race was salient for the sample of Whites and gender was salient for the samples of women and men by having all participants indicate their race or gender at the beginning of the survey and by highlighting the social group of interest in each item. For example, White participants saw the phrase 'Whites, as a group' 114 times while completing the study measures.

Gender differences were selected from Branscombe's (1998) list of gender privileges and we generated some of our own examples to cover aspects of gender privilege that were not represented. We provided 20 group differences for women, and 21 group differences for men. Gender differences included the following categories:

• Gender roles (e.g. women are more likely than men to have people stop and offer assistance with car trouble/women are more likely than men to have to do housework). • Treatment by authorities (e.g. women are more likely than men to pay less for auto insurance/ men are more likely than women to get fair estimates for auto repairs). • Financial (women are less likely than men to pay for a date/men are more likely than women to be given fair career opportunities). • Freedom (e.g. women are less likely than men to appear weak when they cry/men are less likely than women to be afraid of being sexually harassed or raped). • Special social treatment (e.g. women are more likely than men to receive fl owers/men are more likely than women to receive special help from professors on diffi cult material). • Help from others (e.g. women are less likely than men to be asked to lift heavy objects/men are less likely than women to be expected to take time off of work to care for others such as children or elderly members of one's family).

Some examples of group differences for Whites (n = 19) were selected from McIntosh's (1998) list of White privileges. Again, we generated additional items to cover unrepresented areas. Racial differences included the following categories:

• Financial (e.g. Whites are more likely than Blacks to have an economic 'safety net' to fall back on in times of fi nancial trouble). • Historical distortion (Whites are more likely than Blacks to have historical struggles represented in history books). • Social treatment (Whites are more likely than

Blacks to be able to be able to complain about colleague or coworker behaviors without it being assumed that the matter is a racial issue). • Political (e.g. Blacks are more likely than Whites to have skin color taken into account when police decide whether to perform a routine traffi c stop).

After reading each group-specifi c example, participants fi rst evaluated inequality by indicating how important the difference was (e.g. it is an important group difference within society, regardless of whether it favors men or women) and how advantageous the difference was for their group (e.g. it is actually an advantage that men have relative to women). Participants then evaluated how justifi able the difference was (i.e. it is justifi able or fair). Next, participants evaluated the extent to which their ingroup was responsible for creating (e.g. Whites are the source of the advantage) and maintaining (e.g. Whites maintain the advantage) the group difference. Finally each group-specifi c difference was evaluated for how the difference made them feel (e.g. guilty that men have this advantage relative to women). All responses were made on a 1 not at all to 4 very much scale. We standardized all variables before conducting the analyses reported below.

Results

The data for the present research were nested within participants; therefore the ratings of each group difference were not independent. To account for the interdependence, we used Hierarchical Linear Modeling to conduct multilevel modeling [START_REF] Raudenbush | HLM 6: Hierarchical linear and nonlinear modeling[END_REF]) and test the extent to which our proposed antecedents predict group-based guilt. An additional advantage of multilevel modeling is that we can test for cross-level effects, or interactions, between groups and ratings of the group differences. In the present study, this means that we can test whether there are between-group differences in the extent to which the proposed antecedents predict group-based guilt. For instance, we can test whether the association between perceived responsibility and group-based guilt is equally strong for Whites, men and women. Additionally, crosslevel analyses control for main effects of group membership on the ratings. Because we standardized all items, the G coeffi cient in the analyses reported below can be interpreted similarly to a standardized beta weight in regression.

Preliminary analyses

Group differences in evaluations of the antecedents and reports of guilt We fi rst constructed three dummy-coded contrasts to test whether evaluations of the antecedents and reports of guilt differed by group. One contrast compared Whites (2) versus men (-1) and women (-1). The second compared men (2) versus Whites (-1) and women (-1). The third compared women (2) versus Whites (-1) and men (-1). We then tested whether each contrast predicted each antecedent by entering the contrast as a level 2 predictor of each antecedent's intercept. None of the contrasts signifi cantly predicted the intercept for inequality (G = -.002, SE = .02, p = ns, G = -.004, SE = .02, p = ns, G = -.001, SE = .02; Whites, men, women, respectively), responsibility (G = -.004, SE = .02, p = ns, G = -.007, SE = .03, p = ns, G = -.002, SE = .02, p = ns; Whites, men, women, respectively), or justifiability (G = -.001, SE = .02, p = ns, G = -.03, SE = .02, p = ns, G = .003, SE = .02, p = ns; Whites, men, women, respectively). Additionally, none of the contrasts signifi cantly predicted the intercept for guilt (G = -.009, SE = .03, p = ns, G = .02, SE = .03, p = ns, G = -.009, SE = .03, p = ns; Whites, men, women, respectively). Therefore, Whites, men and women all perceived inequality, responsibility and justifi ability, and reported group-based guilt, to the same extent. 1

Correlations between the antecedents We fi rst investigated the appropriateness of combining the advantageousness and importance items to create a measure of inequality. The two evaluations are correlated, yet distinct at G = .25, SE = .01, p < .001. When examined separately, we fi nd the same pattern of results reported below for advantageousness and importance as for the composite measure of inequality.

We then investigated the appropriateness of combining the evaluations of accountability for creating and maintaining a group difference to create a measure of responsibility. The association between ratings of accountability for creating and maintaining group differences was strong (G = .73, SE = .01, p < .001), suggesting that the distinction was not meaningful in the present study. Therefore we averaged the two measures together. When examined separately, we fi nd the same pattern of results reported below for both types of responsibility as for the composite measure.

We next assessed the correlations between the antecedents by entering one antecedent as the dependent variable and a second antecedent predicting that variable at level 1. In order to control for group membership, in separate analyses, we also entered each contrast as a level 2 predictor of the dependent variable. We found that the associations were identical when controlling for each contrast. Perceived inequality was correlated with perceived responsibility (G = .24, SE = .01, p < .001) and perceived justifi ability (G = .25, SE = .01, p < .001). Perceived justifi ability was correlated with perceived responsibility (G = .06, SE = .01, p < .001).

Main effects

We expected that each antecedent would be uniquely associated with group-based guilt, but that the strength of the associations might differ by group. We tested these two questions by entering inequality, responsibility and justifi ability as level 1 predictors of group-based guilt. In three separate analyses, we entered the contrasts from above as a level 2 predictor of group-based guilt and of the slope for each predictor. For instance, we included the contrast between Whites versus men and women as a predictor of group-based guilt and the same contrast as a predictor of the slope measuring the association between perceived inequality and group-based guilt. Consistent with the lack of group differences reported above for groupbased guilt, none of the contrasts predicted the intercept (G = -.008, SE = .02, p = ns, G = .02, SE = .02, p = ns, G = -.007, SE = .02, p = ns; Whites, men, women, respectively). However we did fi nd that the strength of associations between guilt and both inequality and responsibility differed on one or more contrasts. Specifi cally, the association between inequality and guilt differed for the contrast comparing women to Whites and men. Therefore we analyzed the association between inequality and guilt separately for each group and found that inequality was signifi cantly related to reports of group-based guilt for all three groups, but the association between inequality and guilt was stronger for Whites (G = .18, SE = .02, p < .001) and men (G = .18, SE = .02, p < .001), compared to women (G = .06, SE = .02, p < .01). The association between responsibility and guilt differed for all three contrasts (G = .05, SE = .01, p < .001, G = .03, SE = .01, p < .001, G = -.08, SE = .01, p < .00, Whites, men, women respectively). When we analyzed the association between responsibility and guilt separately for each group we found that, as with perceived inequality, the association between responsibility and guilt was signifi cant for all three groups, but the association was stronger for Whites (G = .33, SE = .02, p < .001) and men (G = .30, SE = .02, p < .001), compared to women (G = .09, SE = .02, p < .001). There were no cross level effects for the association between justifi ability and guilt, but justifiability was significantly associated with guilt and the association did not differ by contrast (G = -.12, SE = .01, p < .001).

Interactions

Finally, we tested for two-and three-way interactions between inequality, responsibility and justifi ability. At level 1, we entered inequality, responsibility and justifi ability, as well as the two-way interactions between inequality and responsibility, inequality and justifi ability, and responsibility and justifi ability, and the threeway interaction. In three separate analyses we entered each contrast as a level 2 predictor of group-based guilt and of the slope for the main effects, two-way and three-way interactions. The contrasts did not predict the slope for the three-way interaction. An analysis without the contrast predicting the slope showed that the three-way interaction was not signifi cant (G = .007, SE = .007, p = ns).

We then removed the three-way interaction from the equation and tested whether the contrasts predicted the two-way interactions. At level 1, we entered inequality, responsibility and justifi ability, the two-way interactions between inequality and responsibility, inequality and justifi ability, and responsibility and justifi ability. At level 2, in three separate analyses we entered each contrast as a predictor of groupbased guilt and of the slope for the main effects and the two-way interactions. None of the contrasts predicted the slopes of the two-way interactions between inequality and responsibility or between inequality and justifi ability. When the contrast was not included as a predictor of the interactions, the interactions remained nonsignifi cant, indicating that there was no two-way interaction for inequality, and this was true for all three groups.

The interaction between justifi ability and responsibility was signifi cant. Further, the contrast predicting the slope of the interaction was signifi cant for Whites versus men and women (G = -.02, SE = .01, p = .004) and men versus Whites and women (G = .02, SE = .01, p = .002), but not for women versus Whites and men (G = -.005, SE = .006, p = ns). Because two of the three contrasts were signifi cant, we analyzed the interaction separately for each group by including justifi ability, responsibility and their interaction as level 1 predictors of group-based guilt. The interaction was signifi cant for Whites (G = -.08, SE = .01, p < .001) 2 and women (G = -.05, SE = .02, p = .02), but not for men (G = .002, SE = .02, p = ns).

We expected that responsibility would be a stronger predictor of guilt when justifi ability was low and when inequality was high. The three-way interaction did not support this effect; however by extension we would predict the same pattern for a two-way interaction between justifi ability and responsibility. Consistent with this prediction, an examination of the means indicates that the most guilt was experienced when responsibility was high and justifi ability was low. Figures 1a and1b show the pattern of the interaction for Whites and women. We also examined the simple effects for responsibility predicting guilt at low, medium and high levels of justifi ability and for justifi ability predicting guilt at low, medium and high levels of responsibility. For Whites, responsibility predicted guilt at all levels of justifi ability, but was slightly stronger when justifiability was low (ω′ = .46 (.05), t = 20.42, p < .001) than when justifi ability was medium (ω′ = .38 (.02), t = 21.05, p < .001) or high (ω′ = .29 (.02), t = 13.66, p < .001). Further, justifi ability predicted group-based guilt when responsibility was medium (ω′ = .11 (.02), t = 7.52, p < .001) and high (ω′ = .19 (.02), Figure 1a. The two-way interaction between justifi ability and responsibility for reports of White guilt. t = 10.31, p < .001), but not when responsibility was low (ω′ = .03 (.02), t = 1.43, p = ns). For women, responsibility predicted guilt when justifi ability was low (ω′ = .17 (.04), t = 4.46, p < .001) and medium (ω′ = .08 (.02), t = 4.19, p < .001), but not when justifi ability was high (ω′ = -.01 (.04), t = -.17, p = ns). Replicating the results for Whites, justifi ability predicted group-based guilt when responsibility was medium (ω′ = -.12 (.06), t = -2.04, p = .04) and high (ω′ = -.22 (.07), t = -3.12, p = .002), but not when responsibility was low (ω′ = -.04 (.07), t = -.53, p = ns).

Discussion

The present research makes several important contributions to the literature on group-based guilt. First, we fi nd that Whites, men and women perceive the same extent of inequality, responsibility, justifi ability and group-based guilt. This is interesting given the fact that women are a low status, disadvantaged group, and might be expected to view their privileges as compensation for their low social status, thereby attenuating the infl uence of the antecedents on group-based guilt or reporting less guilt.

Second, we fi nd that inequality, responsibility and justifi ability are each unique and signifi cant predictors of group-based guilt for Whites, men and women. When considering differences that favor the ingroup, people need to go beyond merely recognizing that a difference exists; they need to acknowledge the added advantage and importance that the difference provides for the ingroup in order to feel group-based guilt. We also fi nd that for all three groups, perceptions of ingroup responsibility were positively related to reports of group-based guilt and that the justifi cations for group differences were negatively related to reports of group-based guilt. This is the fi rst research to establish the unique predictive ability of justifi ability in the context of inequality and responsibility. Thus consistently across groups, we fi nd reliable additive effects of perceived inequality, responsibility and justifi ability of group differences for reports of group-based guilt.

Third, we fi nd that although all three antecedents were significantly associated with reports of group-based guilt, the strength of some associations differed by group. Perceived inequality was a stronger predictor of groupbased guilt for Whites and men than for women. Although possibly due to the types of privileges that participants considered, the strength of the association between inequality and guilt might have been weaker for women because women perceived their privileges within the context of larger social inequality. Perceptions of ingroup responsibility were also a stronger predictor of guilt for Whites than for men and women. The association between responsibility and genderbased guilt, compared to race-based guilt, might have been weakened if gender differences were attributed to biology and complementarity more so than racial differences.

Fourth, we fi nd an interaction between justifiability and responsibility for women and Whites but not for men, indicating that for men, responsibility and justifi ability independently predict gender-based guilt. But when Whites considered race-based guilt and when women considered gender-based guilt, responsibility played a greater role when group differences were not very justifi able. Because the infl uence of responsibility on group-based guilt was tempered by justifi cations for ingroup privilege, a lack of justifi cations for privilege is also necessary for feelings of group-based guilt in Whites and women. Interestingly, the effect of perceived inequality was not moderated by perceived ingroup responsibility or justifi cations for ingroup privilege. Therefore, for at least some people, feelings of group-based guilt do not require perceived ingroup responsibility or a lack of justifi cations for ingroup privilege. This fi nding is in line with [START_REF] Hoffman | The contribution of empathy to justice and moral judgment[END_REF] work on feelings of guilt at the individual level-especially situations where people are innocent bystanders or a virtual transgressor. In both cases, the individual is not necessarily responsible for a transgression but feels guilt anyway.

It is diffi cult to know precisely why the interaction between justifi ability and responsibility only occurred for Whites and women. Perhaps men occupy a unique position as members of an advantaged gender group. Future research should sample a wider variety of groups to determine exactly when the antecedents are additive versus interactive as different types of advantaged groups, including heterosexuals or able-bodied individuals, may also differ in the experience of guilt. We anticipate that perceived inequality, responsibility and justifi ability will still predict group-based guilt, but that evaluations of the antecedents might vary. Finally, future research could continue to test our model by examining how other disadvantaged groups, including Blacks, non-heterosexuals and the disabled, assess their privileges. Other disadvantaged groups' privileges may be qualitatively different from those experienced by women, given that women's privileges are largely based upon gender role norms.

It would also be interesting to consider additional antecedents of guilt that operate at the interpersonal level. We chose to examine antecedents of guilt that operate regardless of the relationship between social groups, but Baumeister and colleagues (1994) describe antecedents of guilt that appear in close, communal relationships where two individuals are concerned about each other's welfare. It would be interesting to assess the degree of connection that an advantaged group feels to a disadvantaged group because greater feelings of connection with the outgroup might be associated with greater reports of group-based guilt. In the case of communal interpersonal relationships, the fear of rejection because of an interpersonal transgression leads to guilt. Therefore if an advantaged group feels connected to a disadvantaged group, then assessments of the anxiety or fear associated with rejection might also predict feelings of group-based guilt.

The present research represents an important advance in our understanding of the antecedents of group-based guilt. We chose to use specifi c examples of group differences that uniquely applied to each group so that we could test the effects of evaluations of our antecedents within individuals, using multilevel modeling. By using a variety of differences, we took advantage of naturalistic, existing group differences rather than holding group differences constant or experimentally manipulating the extent to which group differences were brought to mind. We covered a wide variety of categories including group differences that occur in fi nancial, historical, social and political realms, as well as in gender roles, treatment by authorities, freedom and help from others. 3 Yet despite the diversity of specifi c group differences that we addressed, we cannot know whether the groups would differentially perceive the antecedents or whether the antecedents would have different associations with guilt if they were described more generally (e.g. Whites have many privileges that Blacks do not) or if participants were allowed to generate their own list of group differences. Future research could examine this possibility, and also build from our existing work by manipulating levels of inequality, responsibility and justifi ability that appear in overall group differences to be either high or low. Doing so would further clarify whether there are mainly additive effects or whether being presented with high or low levels of the antecedents produces interactions.

In conclusion, feelings of group-based guilt can motivate prosocial behavior in many forms. As a result of feeling group-based guilt, Whites support affi rmative action for Blacks [START_REF] Swim | White guilt: Its antecedents and consequences for attitudes toward affi rmative action[END_REF], and both Whites and heterosexuals take collective action on behalf of Blacks and non-heterosexuals [START_REF] Mallett | Seeing through their eyes: When majority group members take collective action on behalf of an outgroup[END_REF]. Yet feelings of group-based guilt are relatively rare compared to other group-based emotions (Branscombe et al., 2004). Given the benefi cial consequences of group-based guilt for intergroup relations, it is important to understand what factors lead to feelings of group-based guilt. Our research reveals that perceived inequality, responsibility and justifi ability consistently predict feelings of group-based guilt for Whites, men and women. Understanding the antecedents of group-based guilt across a variety of social groups brings us one step closer to improving intergroup relations.

Notes

1. In addition to testing the three contrasts, we also tested whether each group differed from the other. That is, we compared Whites to men, Whites to women and men to women. Again, none of the contrasts signifi cantly predicted the intercept of any antecedent or of group-based guilt. 2. To test whether gender signifi cantly affected the interaction in the White data set, we added gender of participant as a level 2 predictor. It was not signifi cant (G = .03, SE = .11, p = ns). 3. To test whether our results varied by the type of group difference, we conducted separate analyses on each subgroup of differences. For example, for Whites, we compared fi nancial differences to historical, social and political differences. Our results replicated across all subgroups for Whites and women, and across three of the fi ve subgroups for men. This suggests that although we did not present Whites, women and men with identical group differences, the pattern of results that we present replicates across the same categories of group differences for many social groups.

Figure 1b .

 1b Figure 1b. The two-way interaction between justifi ability and responsibility for reports of women's genderbased guilt.

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Roger Giner-Sorolla and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on previous versions of this manuscript.