Anthony C Davies
email: tonydavies@ieee.org

The Impact of the Microprocessor

Keywords: Microprocessor, electrical engineering students, curriculum

de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

The Higher-Education Background in UK

In the 1960s and early 1970s teachers in UK universities had considerable freedom to interpret the syllabuses of courses which they taught. Around 1965, I was teaching a final year undergraduate course for electrical engineers which contained no material on digital electronics. However the syllabus contained the phrase "and/or gates", no doubt intended to occupy only a few minutes of one lecture. I decided to interpret that as an excuse to include a substantial amount of material on digital logic including Boolean algebra, combination logic design, synchronous logic design, which developed into around half of the course content. By the mid-1970s, I was involved in teaching essentially the same material to the first year undergraduates, where it had been transferred against the opposition of the older academic traditionalists. Much the same happened at about the same time in many other UK universities.

Boolean algebra had been included earlier but typically taught by mathematicians who may have known about the original application to logic of a different kind but usually had no idea of the application to switching circuits and electronics. Such teaching did not have a favourable impact on most engineering undergraduates.

In parallel with this it had become common for engineering undergraduates to learn programming in languages such as FORTRAN, used to solve engineering problems, submitting their work by punched-cards or paper tape and receiving the results hours (or sometimes, days, later). By about 1970, they were typically also using electromechanical teletypes for multi-user access to a central computer providing fast return of results. Later, a few had access to and use of a mini-computer such as the PDP-8 for measurement, instrumentation or control applications and this could be in a real-time context.

Errors in programming resulted in wrong answers or crashed programs leading simply to modifications and re-submissions. No concepts such as software engineering or software design were involved. It was considered a sufficient education to have a FORTRAN language handbook and see a few examples [START_REF] Mccracken | Guide to Fortran Programming[END_REF].

Electronic engineering undergraduates were unlikely to be taught about computer architectures or assembly language programming except in a very superficial way.

It was against this background that the microprocessor as an electronic component appeared in the form of the 4-bit Intel 4004, announced in 1971 and the 8-bit Intel 8008 the following year. General availability had arisen by 1973, and the impact was really being felt in industry by 1975, with the availability of 8-bit microprocessors such as the Intel 8080 and Motorola 6800.

The Initial Context and Impact of the First Microprocessors

The microprocessor created a shock amongst local electronic component distributors. They found out they had to sell a new kind of component which needed not just the support of a single page datasheet but, rather, huge manuals fall of unfamiliar material plus additional supporting supplies such as a deck of punched cards comprising a cross assembler to run on a mini-computer or mainframe computer, truly a "New World" for which their sales force was totally unprepared and untrained.

A further complexity for both the distributors and potential users of these components in new engineering designs was that each major semiconductor device manufacturer wanted to produce its own unique microprocessor range (see Appendix and Table I). Each microprocessor had a different architecture, a different assembly language and different package pin-outs and needed different 'support-chips' to make a working system. Deciding which microprocessor was the best to choose was a major hurdle for practising engineers as was deciding what was the fundamental expertise needed to use these devices and what was salesman's hype.

At the time there were many companies making integrated circuits, but most were not computer manufacturers. Microprocessors involved making a quite new class of product and so moving into uncharted territory for them. There was no move towards standardisation, each manufacturer hoping to become a market leader. Some 'secondsourcing' agreements were made (for example between Fairchild and Mostek for the F8 and later Zilog and Mostek for the Z80), since this was seen as a sales-advantage with some classes of customer.

The Education and Training Responses

All this created a market for short courses of a few days duration run by entrepreneurial engineers who could hire some small rooms in a hotel to present introductory courses focusing on a particular microprocessor type and including hands-on work with inexpensive kits. Typically such courses included simple machine-code and assembly language programming tasks which could be immediately executed on the kits and the participants carried out such assignments as controlling a seven-segment numeric display, responding to the pressing of a pushbutton, generating simple sequences and waveforms and perhaps even starting and stopping a simple miniature electrical motor.

My assessment of such courses at the time was that they were rather too expensive for many electronics engineers in industry and too detailed in content for the senior managers who could afford the fees but perhaps would have felt that assembly language programming of the kits was beneath their dignity. I therefore had an idea to start running very low cost but useful courses for practising electronics engineers, and accordingly, with the support of my university and IEEE and the aid of two engineers from a nearby industrial research laboratory 1 who had been working intensively with microprocessors, our first short course of weekly evening lectures was run for a fee of only £10 in October 1975 (Figure 2a).

By any standards that was extremely cheap and affordable, our aim was not to make money but to do something useful without the risk of actually losing money. This aim was comfortably achieved and led me to promoting and teaching a sequence of frequent short courses on various aspects of microprocessors over the following years (such as the one illustrated by Figure 2b). Other universities and polytechnics in the UK also began running such courses. It was clear by this time that a new electronic design paradigm had arisen. There was the prospect of using programmable electronics rather than hardwired logic (which came to be called random logic) in many kinds of electronic products. An obvious consequence was a need for major retraining of engineers in industry, a new responsibility for Learned Societies in the engineering domain, and a need to do something about modernisation of the typical electronic engineering curricula of universities and polytechnics. However understanding what to do and how it should be done represented a challenge, with indecision and many obstacles for senior people in academia and industry and the Professional Institutions. At the management level (staff and volunteers) of the IEE (Institution of Electrical Engineers) the realisation that something had to be done was accompanied by a general belief that the scope of the Institution did not permit inclusion of either computer architecture or computer programming and a realisation that many of the people knowledgeable about microprocessors were not members of the Institution and maybe not even qualified to become members. From the perspective of the traditionalists in IEE, the British Computer Society was made up of what they felt were mainly hobbyists and amateurs whom they considered to be irreconcilably distinct from the professional engineers of the IEE.

Nevertheless, seeing an urgent need to become involved with microprocessors, they set up a somewhat independent Microprocessor Application Group, with funding and publicity which enabled IEE to have committees, arrange meetings, and generally support this topic, without really either understanding it or admitting it into the scope of IEE. Growth in this subject area enabled them after a few years to incorporate it within the scope of IEE, although arguments continued about whether computer architecture and software engineering belonged in the Institution. For a while there was an uninformed view among some senior members that software engineering meant using computers to solve engineering design problems and they could not or would not recognise that it meant designing software in an engineering manner for any kinds of applications, including embedded software in real time systems incorporating microprocessors.

I recall being at an IEE Council Meeting at which one of the older members suggested that IEE should have nothing to do with Computer Architecture because that would lead to jealousy from the Institution of Civil Engineers.

At about this time, The City University in London started a bachelors degree course called 'Computer Engineering' [3]. Figure 4 shows the cover of a brochure for this course. The intention was that this would be for the 'modern' type of future electronic engineer, in recognition of the importance of computers in all domains, including the use of microprocessors in electronic projects. Getting academic approval and professional institution accreditation proved difficult, and instead of bringing in hoped-for collaboration between the electrical engineering and computer science departments it led to incomprehension and something more akin to warfare.

Nevertheless it provided a route by which much more digital electronics and microprocessor work was incorporated into the undergraduate engineering program.

The typical student experience included similar laboratory experiments to those used in the commercial short courses, e.g. designing and executing simple small assembly language programs on various microprocessor kits, to carry out simple realtime tasks. For the first time electronic engineering undergraduates were introduced to the mechanisms of subroutines and interrupts rather than just using high-level languages to solve problems by sending programs to a computer centre and waiting for the results. It became feasible to 'slide' this laboratory work gradually into that for those on the traditional electronic and electrical engineering degree courses without the opposition of the traditionalists.

The first microprocessor-evaluation kits often had only about one-millionth of the amount of random access memory (RAM) to store programs and data that is today provided in a typical basic laptop computer for home-uses running the Windows operating system.

Initially we made much use of a simple 'kit' for the F8, shown in Figure 3(a), which had a small operating system with a few subroutines for input and output, a teletype interface, a loader for machine code programmes and (almost) 1024 8-bit words of user programmable memory. Programs written in assembly language were translated to machine code by a cross-assembler (written in FORTRAN!) running on a main-frame computer (ICL 1905), with output on a paper-tape which was loaded into the 'kit' using a teletype. Soon after, with the availability of microcomputer systems with more capable operating systems and having storage on 7 inch floppy discs, it became possible to assemble and test the programming tasks in a selfcontained portable unit, no longer requiring access to a main-frame computer. Fluency with hexadecimal arithmetic was one of the skills students had to acquire.

It should not be assumed that we 'educationalists' involved in these changes were wise and far-sighted prophets, we were just somewhat less hidebound by tradition than some senior academics and professional engineers. We were aware of Moore's Law [START_REF] Moore | Cramming more components onto integrated circuits[END_REF], and observed the exponential rise in the complexity of digital integrated circuit chips, but (at least in my case) concluded that this could not go on for long, because the Law indicated that soon there would be a million transistors per chip, from which I concluded (and told others) that designing a microprocessor with so many transistors would be beyond human capability. Of course, that proved completely incorrect, and now single-chip processors with transistor counts of one billion are commonplace (and the fabrication cost per transistor is apparently less than the cost of growing one grain of rice). The first microprocessor chips comprised a few thousand transistors I also recall a public meeting at which an experienced engineer insisted that there would never be 16-bit microprocessors using silicon technology, because it could be proved from fundamental physics and the laws of thermodynamics that too much heat would be generated. At the time the first rudimentary 16-bit microprocessors were already being developed, and now silicon 32-bit and even 64-bit processors are perfectly feasible and in use.

The UK Government Response to Microprocessors

While all this was going on there were members of the UK government who recognised that the introduction of the microprocessor represented a fundamental change for the engineering industry and their products. They perceived that if the UK did not take the correct steps to participate successfully in this change the future prosperity of the UK might be severely damaged.

In addition to commercial applications related to national prosperity this was also the time of the Cold War and so the relationship to military systems and defence could not be forgotten.

It was within this context that in 1979, funding of £15 million was provided to the National Computer Centre for a microprocessor application project (MAP), which invited bids for government financial support for training courses and schemes aimed at updating British industry in the use of microprocessors in manufacturing and in end-products. This source of funding attracted the attention of the universities and polytechnics. In the universities it was often seen as a way of creating additional income by running short courses for industry for high fees and so generating comfortable surpluses. In the polytechnics their funding schemes often meant that any surpluses created by their activities, including short courses, reverted to the local authorities that controlled them and brought no benefit to the polytechnics. This meant the polytechnics often ran short courses charging fees which just covered the direct costs and so spoiled a lucrative market for the universities and also for the small entrepreneurs previously mentioned who were running courses in hotels and making a comfortable income for themselves. One of the outcomes was that many expensively produced university microprocessor courses attracted few customers and did not create the hoped-for financial surpluses. It could be said that the market was flooded with far more courses than was needed. Nevertheless some did continue successfully and I had personal experience of teaching such short courses in Washington DC and in Berlin as well as in or alongside various industrial companies and government establishments around the UK.

Soon afterwards notice was being taken of what was called the Fifth Generation Computer Project underway in Japan, the purpose of which included research and development to solve some of the difficult problems for which computers had so far been unsuccessful (for example speech recognition, speech understanding, speech synthesis, image processing and recognition and various forms of so-called artificial intelligence). The microprocessor was denoted the 'fourth generation' in computer hardware, and so the Japanese programme was intended to be the next major step.

Shortly after this, the UK Government launched the Alvey Programme (1983-1987), a very well-funded scheme with the aim of moving forward UK research in the computer and information engineering areas with the specific idea of enhancing the position of the UK in associated scientific development and economic prosperity. It was to a large extent based on the assumption that competing with the Japanese Fifth Generation Computer project was necessary. The programme provided a convenient and welcome boost to the funding of related research in UK universities, of particular help to Computer Science, although in retrospect, not much seems to be recalled about the positive outcomes.

There was a sensible realisation that teenage children needed to get some experience of microprocessors, and the many simple and fairly expensive microcomputers becoming available was leading to amateur and hobby groups being formed. One significant consequence was the BBC Micro, based on a design from the Acorn Company (the Acorn Atom) which was chosen from several competing alternatives, and this became widely used to teach programming in schools, clubs and in many university electrical engineering departments. It used a non-standard but somewhat superior form of the BASIC language, with the inclusion of capabilities to support graphics programming and real-time interfacing. The cost was low enough for widespread adoption, and the BBC Micro was powerful and versatile enough to provide an educational foundation for beginners and to be used in simple real-time control engineering applications and experimental work.

Whereas in the early days of semiconductor technology and the move towards integrated circuits, very many of the major electrical engineering companies became involved in fabrication, making their own products, as the complexity of digital integrated circuits increased and the feature sizes of the transistors decreased dramatically (as predicted by Moore [START_REF] Moore | Cramming more components onto integrated circuits[END_REF]), the cost of an up-to-date semiconductor plant became unaffordable for more and more companies. This is now well-known.

In the hope that the UK could remain active and competitive in this field, the INMOS company was formed with government financial support, against a background that most of the British companies which had semiconductor manufacturing capabilities were closing them down or not keeping up with the general advances and instead limiting themselves to specialized niche markets. Ultimately, INMOS had its government support withdrawn and its activities effectively terminated. However, it was responsible for one very significant product, the INMOS transputer, a microprocessor with a very different architecture specifically intended to support a multi-processor design paradigm. This approach was supported enthusiastically by many UK Computer Science Departments as a basis for both their teaching and research, and brought them more into contact with industry and contractsupported research. However, the final demise of INMOS and the transputer limited the long-term impact of this, and it seems to have done little in most universities to bridge the gap between Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Departments.

Some more Technical Details about Microprocessors

Initially, a minimum working system needed several integrated circuits but soon single-chip microcomputers (microcontrollers) appeared, with everything needed in a single 28 or 40 pin dual-in-line package, either mask-programmable for quantityproduction (as in the Intel 8048) or with user-programmable memory which could be erased with ultra-violet light and re-programmed for design and experiment and for small-number production runs (as in the Intel 8748).

A significant constraint was the number of pins available when using the industry standard dual in-line packages. The Intel 8008 was in a 18 pin package (Figure 5a) and subsequently packages with 40 pins were generally used for the early microprocessors (Figure 5b). Such large packages were already at the limit of conventional manufacturing and assembly processes for electronic circuit boards. Texas Instruments developed the 9900, a 16-bit processor in a 64-pin dual in-line package, based on their 990 minicomputer. The package was difficult to handle and represented an upper limit for the dual in-line format. Later, totally new kinds of package had to be developed with far more pins (such as the Pin Grid Array) and some with special cooling arrangements. The Intel 80386 was in a 132 pin PGA. Figure 5c shows the Intel 80486 in a 168-pin package with the corresponding socket shown in Figure 5d. Many other types of package were developed to cater for increased miniaturisation and more pin numbers.

The first microprocessors used PMOS technology but this was soon replaced by the faster NMOS and later by CMOS which allowed much lower power consumption. Bipolar technology offered greater speed but could only achieve much lower circuit complexity per integrated circuit and it was used mainly for military applications until CMOS technology "caught up". These small computers provided the means of supporting the programming of microprocessor-based systems. Initially that involved assembly language programming but as the computers became more powerful the use of high-level languages with microprocessors began. This was also a necessary development to enable these small computers to be used by various kinds of beginners (hobbyists, teenagers in schools, and those with no electronics or computer background who were finding interests and applications in such things). Nevertheless, it was still possible to hear 'experts' claiming that high-level languages were inappropriate for use with microprocessors!

In the University teaching environment, there was typically a split between those who preferred the BASIC language and those who preferred languages in the Pascal and Modula-2 style. Most often it was the engineering departments using assembly language and BASIC, while computer science departments understood the conceptual advantages of Pascal and were sometimes rather uninterested in or ignorant about hardware and real-time applications of interest in engineering. The typically limited comprehension of software engineering principles and good software design was an often unrecognised handicap in the engineering departments. Indeed it was often a handicap among practising engineers in industry.

Desk-top Computing

The microprocessor made possible the development of the home computer and the office desk-top microcomputer. Initially with very limited capabilities, they soon improved to make their use normal for document preparation and financial management¸ as well as providing a basis for the support of teaching of all subjects The IBM PC design ensured dominance of the Intel microprocessor range and laid the foundations for the success of Microsoft, while Apple provided an alternative built around Motorola products and supporting somewhat a different conceptual basis, with more emphasis on graphics and the human interface in a closed system which discouraged a market in competing but compatible products. The Apple design may have laid the foundation for their ipad and iphone, and similar products from other manufacturers.

Conclusions

The 'birth' of the microprocessor heralded a fundamental change in the educational framework, the practice of engineering design and the products of the manufacturing industries. It is now inconceivable that widely-used products from automobiles to telephones to military weapons systems (including aircraft) would be designed without incorporating microprocessors and microcontrollers.

This has fundamentally altered the education for and practice of the engineering profession.

One could say that it was a 'difficult' birth, but one whose consequences changed lives throughout the world, and laid the foundation for the internet and mobile phones and much that is now taken for granted as essential aspects of modern life. some ultimately-unsuccessful designs (e.g. the MOS Technology 6502), the ARM computer design developed, and became the central processor used in almost all mobile phones. It is the architecture which supports Blackberry ® and the Android operating systems and is used in Kindle e-books.

Figure 1 :

 1 Figure 1: 126 page User manual forIntel 8008[START_REF]MCS-8 Micro Computer Set, Users Manual[END_REF]

Figure 2 1Figure 2a :Figure 2b :

 22a2b Figure 2

Figure 3b :

 3b Figure 3b: Single-chip microcomputer: a new kind of component for the electronic-system designer

Figure 4 :

 4 Figure 4: Computer Engineering Course brochure (shows metallization pattern of Am2909 Microprogram Sequencer)

Figure 5a :

 5a Figure 5a: Intel 8008 in 18-pin dual-in-line package

Figure 5b :

 5b Figure 5b: 40-pin ceramic dual-in-line package

Figure 5c :

 5c Figure 5c: Intel 80486 in 168-pin PGA (underside) Figure 5d: Socket for PGA

Table 1 :

 1 Diversity in early microprocessor designs

	Manufacturer	Name	Others (if	Comments
			applicable)
	Intel	4004	80088080808	Developed into the 80286, 80386,
			58086	80486 range leading to current designs
	Motorola	6800	600068000 and	Developed to 68020 and current
			6809	designs. 6809 came too late for success
	Fairchild	F8		May have been based on LP8000.
				F8 was second-sourced by Mostek.
	Zilog	Z80	Z8, Z8000	Z80 second sourced by Mostek,
				development via Intel 8080.
				Z8 is a single-chip microcomputer.
	General	LP8000	CP1600	CP1600 was an early 16-bit
	Instruments (GI)			microprocessor.
	Rockwell	PPS-4	Later, R6500 was	R6500 was developed from MOS
			produced	Technology's 6502.
	Signetics	2650		Popular for a while with hobbyists.
	Texas	TMS1000	9900 16-bit	TMS1000 4-bit microcomputer used in
	Instruments (TI)		microprocessor	many low-cost embedded-computer
			produced later, but	applications. Later TI prominence was
			failed to find a	with signal processing products such as
			significant market.	TMS 320 series.
	MOS Technology	6501	 6502	Used in BBC Micro.
	National	SC/MP	Later, 16032 	Pronounced "scamp". Independently
	Semiconductor		32016  30032.	and later, 32000 series was a very early
			NSC800 (a CMOS	32-bit processor.
			version of Z80)
	RCA	1802 (COSMAC)		COSMAC was an early CMOS design,
		and 6511		offering very low power consumption.
	Intersil	IM6100		12-bit CMOS design, with architecture
				similar to PDP-8 minicomputer.
	Ferranti	F100-L		16-bit microprocessor, military sponsor
				based on FM1600 B minicomputer.
				Promoted as first European
				microprocessor, but not commercially
				successful.
	Intel	8048	80488051	Single-chip microcomputer
	Mostek	MK3870		Single-chip microcomputer, based on
				F8.

A table in Personal Computer World magazine in 1980[START_REF]In Store[END_REF] lists 83 microcomputer systems on sale in UK, of which only a few are generally remembered today (for example, Acorn Atom, Cromemco, HP85, North Star Horizon, Commodore PET, Sinclair ZX80, Tandy TRS 80)

Appendix

Table 1 gives an indication of the somewhat bewildering assortment of microprocessor designs which arose in the early years, with no claim that it is complete. It illustrates the situation that confronted electronics engineers, most of whom had little or no computer experience but who had to choose and learn to understand and use such novel components in products which they had to design. Only with hindsight can it be seen that just a few semiconductor manufacturers (e.g. Intel, AMD, Motorola and Texas Instruments) would survive in this market as the complexity and cost of making state-of-the-art integrated circuits increased. From A more detailed comparison of the wide range of microprocessors and microcomputers was made by Depledge [START_REF] Depledge | A review of available microprocessors[END_REF].


Christopher Leslie
email: cleslie@poly.edu

Keywords: History of the Internet, packet switching, technology policy, innovation

One way to make the history of computing relevant is to explain how different histories are in competition with each other and how they support quite different technology policy. The prevalent history that the US military created the Internet hides the international spirit of goodwill and cooperation that made a particular implementation of Internet happen. This is not just an academic issue. The success of the Internet encourages us to ask how we can continue to innovate the technologies of the Internet or new technologies of a similar power. The myth that the military created the Internet also supports the idea that it was designed on purpose according to a plan. This could not be further from the truth. In fact, the most interesting thing about the Internet is that, in its history, it had a tendency to violate the plans set forth. The international community invigorated the kind of inquiry that would lead to the Internet, not the United States in isolation. In order to create something like the Internet, then, we need to provide an environment for international exchange and cooperation, not maintain proprietary secrets and work in a disciplined environment of practical research.

Introduction

The facts seem simple: The United States military funded a project to build, test, and improve a packet-switched network in the 1970s that provided the groundwork upon which the modern Internet was built. This story has been told many times, but the facts are not the most interesting thing in the discipline of history; to the historian, the implication of these facts is more important. Is this a story of military contracts providing technology to civilians? Is this a story of American ingenuity and technological superiority? Or is it a story of how academic researchers and commercial enterprises made a technology by innovating science developed for the military? One way to make the history of computing relevant is to explain how different histories are in competition with each other and how they support quite different technology policies. Because the Internet has been so successful, it is important to tell the right history of its development so that future innovation can be supported. Unfortunately, the story of the Internet is frequently told in such a way that hides the vital role of the international scientific community. Historians of technology frequently rail against "whiggish" histories, or histories that interpret the past by explaining how we arrived at the present, as if there were a clear, linear path from an identifiable origin to the modern day. The history of the Internet is sometimes referred to in such a manner. Where Wizards Stay Up Late [START_REF] Hafner | Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the Internet[END_REF] is a perfect example. This book combines interviews with many people who helped manage projects that built up to the Internet, and the authors provide an indispensable resource for someone who wants to know about the Internet's history. Nerds: 2.0.1: A Brief History of the Internet similarly relates a tale for dramatic effect of the slow building of technology until the present day [START_REF] Segaller | Nerds 2.0.1: A Brief History of the Internet[END_REF]. Both of these texts are useful, but an unintended consequence of their approach is that it seems as if technological devices grow with their own inertia, one development adding itself to the next until the perfected whole is achieved. Shorthanded accounts of the history of the Internet proliferate in newspapers and college history and media studies courses, promoting the idea that the Internet grew linearly and inevitably from a simple idea into a complex version in the present. An historian of technology would protest that these versions of the story make the development seem inevitable and free from connection to the economic, legal, political, social, ideological circumstances, let alone from dependence on existing technology. This might suggest that there is only one best way to make a worldwide computer network or, by extension, any other technological innovation. Although this approach is good for television series and mass-market books, it is not suitable for those interested in technological innovation. Given the success of the Internet, engineers and computer scientists interested in inventing in a similar environment need a more nuanced history.

Teleological approaches have been shunned for twenty years, and historians have begun offered alternatives to this approach. Janet Abbate's Inventing the Internet [START_REF] Abbate | Inventing the Internet[END_REF] was one of the first, telling as it did the ways in which Internet history was woven together with a larger institutional framework and existing technological achievements. Milton Mueller's Ruling the Root [START_REF] Mueller | Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace[END_REF] adds counterfactual histories, hypothesizing for readers how things could have worked differently, to his discussion of how a new form of internet governance emerged at the end of the 1990s. Martin Campbell-Kelly and Daniel D. Garcia's recent article "The History of the Internet: The Missing Narratives" similarly makes hypothetical forays into what could have brought together widespread computer networks besides TCP/IP and examines the consequences and opportunities of each; it is not as if the Internet grew from the ARPANet "as a tree from a tiny acorn" [START_REF] Campbell-Kelly | The History of the Internet: The Missing Narratives[END_REF]. As well, Byung-Keun Kim [START_REF] Kim | Internationalizing the Internet: the Co-evolution of Influence and Technology[END_REF] makes an effort to describe the multiple histories of networks that led to the Internet, and Luis Arroyo has documented a 1972 commercial packet-switched network designed independently in Spain [START_REF] Arroyo | The First Worldwide Public Packet Switching Network[END_REF]. At this conference, we have heard more about local histories of computers that are evidence of large community of professionals engaged in innovating computers and networks. The history of this community, with its multiple efforts to advance computing technology, needs to be elaborated because it helps to explain why the growth of the Internet was not inevitable, but one that relied on a particular ethic of cosmopolitan cooperation. This version of the history of the Internet is more appropriate for engineers and computer scientists who hope to innovate new technology because it helps them to draw connections between the technological, political, and economic framework that enabled certain aspects of Internet innovation while at the same time forestalling other possibilities.

In this paper, I would like to build on these studies by employing a notion of the user from Science and Technology Studies. As pointed out by the contributors to the volume How Users Matter [START_REF]How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users and Technology[END_REF], it is difficult and even inappropriate to separate a technical, design stage of a technology from its social, consumer diffusion to users. In fact, the idea that a technology is developed without an end user in mind runs counter to both intuitive notions of how design is accomplished and also anecdotal studies of innovation, which both suggest that the concept of the end user is always on the mind of designers. This concept harkens back to Bruno Latour's 1987 critique of the diffusion model [START_REF] Latour | Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society[END_REF], wherein Latour points out that if so many people unthinkingly accept a technology (as it is proposed in the diffusion model), it would seem as if objects themselves compelled users to work with thembut what, he asked, is this "inertia that does not depend on the action of people" that propels them? Latour states that the simple belief in diffusion does not account for the "long translations" that were necessary to bring different actors into an alliance that would, for instance, produce vaccinations or the Diesel engine. Latour's diffusion model points to the active role that users take in the development of technology as well as lends credence to the idea that creating juxtapositions of hypothetical users with technological systems is an important aspect of innovation.

I would like to extend this analysis of "translations" with the study of the history of the Internet. Recounting the story of the complex interactions between users behind the innovations that led to the Internet is similar to Latour's effort to counter the mythic, passive society that is constructed in order to support the theory of diffusion to simple users. The story of the Internet's adds to Latour's translation model the necessary substrate of the international scientific community. The TCP/IP Internet did not succeed because it was a good technological innovation that either was inevitably accepted by large groups of users based on its merits nor, as is sometimes asserted by my students, because it was enforced through the military and cultural might of the United States over other alternatives like the proposed OSI model. Basing the Internet's eventual success on the diffusion model hides the work of the many actors that added their insights to create a flexible protocol that would work in unexpected circumstances. It was the efforts of these individualsand their ideal of communication that would function through networks that were locally administered, as would be the case in international contexts where national governments have control over communication or in business communities where networks are designed to aid the enterprisethat accounts for the Internet's success. The translational activities of these user groups, however, is not often told when one considers the history of the Internet.

Before the conference, a group of us was fortunate enough to visit The National Museum of Computing at Bletchley Park on Sunday. One of the clearest indications that the international community is essential to the history of the Internet is the museum's exhibit on Donald Davies. Donald Davies, at the National Physical Laboratory in the England, made a proposal for a "national message switching network" for commercial applications. A paper written by Davies his colleagues uses the word "packet" for the first time and describes a common-carrier network. The IFIP conference as well has allowed us to think about why this story matters. At the conference, Gauthier van den Hove's insight that one way to make the history of computing relevant is to utilize it as inspiration for the present. Several presenters have done the same, and it is something that I know is successful based on my own teaching of courses like Hypertext in Context at the Polytechnic Institute of NYU. I think one reason why people do not think it is useful to study the history of technology is because they think technology proceeds on its own logic, the determinist version of history that Tilly Blyth in her paper said that she wants to combat.

Learning how to tell the history of a technological advance like the Internet is essential. As a field of the humanities, history is more complicated than ascertaining the facts. Historians try to understand not only the story of what happened and determine why it happened that way, but also to understand what is at stake with the common histories that are told. As pointed out by computer historian Mike Mahoney [START_REF] Mahoney | Histories of Computing[END_REF], histories of computing are rhetorical devices used by developers and funders of technology to make what they are doing seem natural. It is the job of the historian, then, to make sure that the right histories are being told of the right developments. If the U.S.-centric story is the history of the Internet, a certain kind of innovation policy is implied: one must enhance the ability of national projects in partnership with the military. But what about the other history of the Internet, the one that focuses on the international community? If this story is plausible, then it implies a different kind of technology policy, one that enhances international cooperation.

The Military Origin Myth

One of the most common myths about the Internet is that it was started as a military communication project to withstand a nuclear attack. Like many myths, this reflects reality to a certain extent, even though the founders of the Internet have gone to great lengths to revise the record to state that this idea is distorted (Larry Roberts, for instance, is quoted by Andreu Veà [START_REF] Veà | The Unknown History of the Internet: Engineering the Worldwide WiWiW Project[END_REF] as saying that ARPANet had "nothing to do with nuclear war or survivability"). One of the technical achievements of Internet technology is the use of packets, which means that a long message is split into short units of a predetermined length. As documented by Les Earnest [START_REF] Earnest | Internet Creation Myths[END_REF], the first time that packetized data was used in communications was for the SAGE missile defense system. SAGE was a network of computers designed to integrate twenty-two radar stations around the perimeter of the United States and it was designed to detect an aircraft carrying a heavy payloadin other words, to prevent the Soviet Union doing to the United States what the United States had done to Japan in 1945: detonating a nuclear device over its cities. SAGE was not exactly a success; it became operational in 1954 and it could track aircraft and send out intercepting fighter jets. However, with the use of ballistic missile that could carry nuclear weapons, the SAGE system was obsolete almost before it began.

Nevertheless, as documented by Paul N. Edwards [START_REF] Edwards | The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America[END_REF] and others, SAGE was successful in unexpected ways. It pioneered important technologies, such as computer screens, modems, and computer memory, not to mention transmission of information in packets. This system would not have survived a nuclear attack, however, for two reasons. One was because it had a centralized command center, so disabling the command center would have ended the system's capabilities. The other was that the system used ordinary telephone lines for transmissions; certainly, the copper wires used for the telephone network in the 1950s could not have withstood a nuclear attack.

SAGE is visible not only in the histories of the Internet but also in mass media. Feature films such as Fail Safe (1964), Dr. Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964), and WarGames (1983) all depict computer systems that resemble SAGE. This visibility, however, hides a robust international community that existed at the time SAGE was developed. As documented by William Aspray [START_REF] Aspray | International Diffusion of Computer Technology, 1945-1955[END_REF], computing had already spread to fifteen countries by 1955, and surprisingly, government did not play a large role in countries outside the United States and Britain. Even in the U.S. and Britain, where government played a larger role, an equal number of computers were built by universities as were built by government. This transfer of technology would later be accomplished by commercial means, but as Aspray points out, it was initially accomplished by the mechanisms of "international science": "reports, professional journals and monographs, visits, secondment, and professional conferences" (356). This is not surprising, given the robust international scientific and technical community that had developed over centuries, and yet it is often omitted from the histories of the Internet.

The use of data packets for SAGE was not the only thing that was used in the creation of the Internet; the Internet is an example of packet-switched technology. The first large-scale test of packet switching began in 1969, when the Advanced Research Projects Agency, an agency of the Department of Defense, established a computer network for research purposes. However, there are ten years between the use of packets in SAGE and the packet-switched network known as ARPANet. How did this idea find enough advocates in these ten years so that the idea would seem obvious to the ARPA leaders that the time had come for packet-switching? The innovation of implementing a switched network was thought about in three different places in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Leonard Kleinrock's 1961 doctoral dissertation at MIT provided mathematical models to support the idea of packet switching, proving that it would work. Paul Baran, working on a military communication project for the Air Force, reported in 1964 that a switched network was the most reliable way to set up a survivable emergency communication network. Finally, Donald Davies at the National Physical Laboratory in the United Kingdom made a proposal for a "national message switching network" (225-6) for commercial applications; it was not until the next year that it was brought to Davies's attention that Baran had made a similar proposal [START_REF] Campbell-Kelly | Data Communications at the National Physical Laboratory[END_REF]. Although some have suggested that packet-switching was developed independently by two or three different researchers, it would be more accurate to state that the research was conducted collaboratively.

The thesis that direct international cooperation was essential for the development of the Internet is supported in this period. Davies and three colleagues used the word "packet" in a paper presented by R. A. Scantlebury at the same ACM symposium in 1967 where Larry Roberts made the first public presentation of the funding priorities for the ARPA network [START_REF] Davies | A Digital Communication Network for Computers Giving Rapid Response at Remote Terminals[END_REF]. These three individuals who made well-known testimonials for packet switching discussed the idea with the head of ARPA and convinced him to use packet-switching for his network. In preparation for developing the British network, Scantlebury (along with K. A. Bartlett and P. T. Wilkinson) developed a single-bit handshaking procedure for transmitting data over a serial link reliably, a protocol that was eventually adopted for the ARPANet in a modification to the IMP software in 1972. The adaptation of the "odd/even" packet acknowledgement improved network efficiency by 10 to 20 percent [START_REF] Mcquillan | Improvements in the Design and Performance of the ARPA Network[END_REF]. The international academic transfer of technology as described by [START_REF] Aspray | International Diffusion of Computer Technology, 1945-1955[END_REF] clearly extended to the age of the ARPANet; additionally, it is important to note that Davies and his team sought commercial applications for their network and were not interested in military research or survivability in the event of nuclear attack.

Of the three people -Kleinrock, Baran, and Daviesone of them did in fact design a network to withstand a nuclear strike. Baran's network [START_REF] Baran | On Distributed Communications, 1: Introduction to Distributed Communications Networks[END_REF] was innovative in the way that it created redundant pathways between important locations in the network. Baran imagined that telephone lines were part of the network, but also there would be microwave transmitters, FM radio transmitters, buried cables, satellite links, and other paths that the messages could take. This robust and redundant network would have survived a nuclear attack; it also would have been inordinately expensive for widespread use. The Air Force declined to pursue his plan for a defense communication network, and so the project was ended. The main legacy of this network (with regard to the Internet, anyway) is that Baran's paper inspired Donald Davies and influenced the decision of ARPA to start the widespread use of a switched network. (Interestingly, Arroyo [START_REF] Arroyo | The First Worldwide Public Packet Switching Network[END_REF] suggests that this work was not discussed with the researchers working on the Spanish network.)

The ARPAnet was the one project that was built and expanded, while Baran's project was never tested and Davies' did not get far. Although ARPANet was a defense department project, there is one definite way in which it was not a network to survive a nuclear attack: that is because it, like SAGE, used telephone lines for its connections. In this way, it is quite different from the network that was imagined by Paul Baran but never built. Nevertheless, the myth that the Internet was designed by military generals as a communication network to withstand a nuclear attack is quite pervasive, even though the Internet pioneers (including Baran) have tried hard to discredit it. This myth supports other widespread myths about the Internet. If we believe the myth that the Internet was invented to survive a nuclear attack, it is much easier to believe the myth that the Internet was started and perfected by the United States before it was sent out to other countries. This myth is very satisfying to Americans, but it is not very ethical.

The development of the Internet depended on the international community of researchers from the start. One of the three early proponents of switched networks was Donald Davies from Great Britain. The fact that he heard of the idea from the U.S., tested it out in the UK, and then came to a computer conference in the United States and talked to the leader of the ARPANet project demonstrates how these ideas were fully discussed and shared in an international atmosphere. In fact, the word we use to describe this technologypacket -makes more sense in the context of British English. Baran had called the technology message-switching, but the British influence is shown in the original ARPAnet documentation, which called the technology "packet-switching." A "packet," in British English, is a small, flat package, and this connection does more than provide evidence of the British influence on Internet technology. The idea of the helpful post office that knows how to deliver packages was described in Klienrock's paper. Furthermore, as pointed out by the Oxford English Dictionary [START_REF]Packet[END_REF], the packets that one receives in the mail are related to the packet boats that carried them; the first packets were standard shipping of letters between two points, such as England and Ireland. Thus, by appreciating the international community behind the early Internet technology, one can see how it was built by translating ideas from successful networks already in operation to electronic networks. This shows how users translate new ideas from concepts in other domains in order to actively support innovation.

From ARPANet to Internet

The ARPANet was publically demonstrated at the 1972 International Conference on Computer Communications, and as noted by Abbate and others, it was at this conference that the International Networking Working Group (INWG) was formed, with Vinton Cerf in charge of the group (this group would become IFIP Working Group 6.1 [START_REF] Mckenzie | INWG and the Conception of the Internet: An Eyewitness Account[END_REF]). With the success of a national project for networking, the idea of the group was to "take the lead in creating an international network of networks" (quoted by [START_REF] Hafner | Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the Internet[END_REF]). The group quickly allied itself with the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP), giving it "visibility and legitimacy within the international computer science community" [START_REF] Abbate | Inventing the Internet[END_REF]. It is, perhaps, not surprising that the international conversation around the innovation of packet switching before ARPA financed its networking project was embodied in the conception of the user as an international scientist after ARPAnet was established.

In the wake of the INWG's second meeting in 1973, Cerf edited and distributed a draft of was then called the "International Transmission Protocol" created with an international group of researchers who had experience in packet switching [START_REF] Mckenzie | INWG and the Conception of the Internet: An Eyewitness Account[END_REF]. By 1973, Davies had an operating packet-switched network in his laboratory, and that same year, the first connections were made for the CYCLADES network in France, which "links several major computing centers" [START_REF] Roberts | The Evolution of Packet Switching[END_REF]. Although today one might be tempted to see these as distinct projects, it is clear that there was an active exchange of ideas among the researchers involved; furthermore, what one might see as different networks today may not have been so distinct at the time: as noted by [START_REF] Kim | Internationalizing the Internet: the Co-evolution of Influence and Technology[END_REF], "ARPANet was not notably different to several other embryonic internetworking research projects": the UK's EPSS, CYCLADES, and the European Informatics Network [START_REF] Russell | The Internet that Wasn't[END_REF]. It is clear that the ARPANet, at this point in the story, was not the only packetswitched network in the world.

What is more, the ARPANet was not the Internet: The ARPANet would have to adapt its implementation of packet-switching in order to connect heterogeneous networks, and this shows evidence of additional international collaboration. Cerf and Robert Kahn started working on what they called the "Internetworking" project at this time: how could someone send a message between different networks? They presented their ideas to a 1973 meeting of the INWG at the University of Sussex [START_REF] Hafner | Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the Internet[END_REF]. In one of their first published papers on this topic, they note that the design goal is to establish protocols that eliminate the problems when "dissimilar networks are interconnected." This 1974 paper [START_REF] Cerf | A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication[END_REF] acknowledges that the "early discussions of international network protocols" were helpful, and mentions Scantlebury and Davies by name. In addition, they thank and cite the work of Louis Pouzin, the French researcher behind CYCLADES. In creating a protocol that could easily work between networks, it was clear that the restrictions and capabilities for each network were different because they had different physical properties. To accommodate this, one of the key ideas in TCP/IP is that each packet needs a wrapper. Packets that originate on different networks might be set up differently, and this wrapper would help the networks carrying the message work with it, even though they could not know what the contents were. Cerf and Kahn acknowledge that they borrowed the solution from the French computer science community. CYCLADES had a slightly different implementation, and this difference resulted in an innovation that was applied directly to the TCP/IP protocol. The name CYCLADES comes from a group of Greek islands, and this name was used for the network because the researchers wanted to inspire islands of computing. In other words, they thought about creating a mixed networking environment much like Cerf and Kahn were trying to make. Thus they borrowed the idea of the datagram created in this heterogeneous environment and imported it into their design.

With the switchover to TCP/IP in 1983, once can say that the Internet had truly arrived: after all, the "i" in IP stands for internetworking. The power of TCP/IP was demonstrated many times in the expansion of the Internet. This is especially shown in the international community, where different kinds of computers and different kinds of national networks would have prevented a less flexible network from working. An excellent example of this was China's first connection to the TCP/IP network. There was no way that China could be directly connected to the U.S. Internet during the Cold War; the United States had strict laws about exporting technology to communist countries at this time. However, the U.S. was friendly to its partners. As part of the networking project known as CSNET, the U.S. made several international connections, including one to West Germany.

CSNET was established from 1979-1982 at the University of Wisconsin by Lawrence Landweber, who noted that there were 120 computer science departments at the time, even though only 25% (15 of 61) ARPANet sites were at universities [START_REF] Comer | The Computer Science Research Network CSNET: A History and Status Report[END_REF]. The network that emerged from funding by the National Science Foundation had three tiers: a top tier of full ARPANet connections, a second tier that send TCP/IP packets over commercial X.25 lines so that researchers could use services like mail, telnet and FTP, and an e-mail only service. Along with setting up the service, Landweber held a series of meetings that came to be known as Larry's Networkshops, which "formed an important way, along with BITNET, to spread the Internet overseas" [START_REF] Malamud | Exploring the Internet: A Technical Travelogue[END_REF]. The first meeting in 1982 was held in London, where German researchers described plans for Deutsche Forschungsnetz (DFN), active projects in Norway and Sweden were described, the U.K. described the Coloured Book, and CERN described an early version of HEPnet. At the 1983 networkshop, Landweber announced that CSNET would go international, and the next year, Israel became the first connection outside the U.S. Connections to Korea, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and Japan followed.

Landweber's effort to support the story of international connections shows how today's ubiquity of TCP/IP was not inevitable. As told by Andrew L. Russell [START_REF] Russell | The Internet that Wasn't[END_REF], at the time TCP/IP was thought of as a temporary solution to international networking that would later be supplanted by protocols under development by the International Organization for Standardization known as Open Systems Interconnection (OSI).

Remarkably, Vinton Cerf had resigned as chair of INWG after becoming "discouraged by his international adventures in standards making" (40). By 1985, the U.S. Department of Defense recommended a transition away from TCP/IP and in 1988, Russell writes, the U.S. Department of Commerce mandated that all government computers use OSI by 1990. Russell [START_REF] Russell | Rough Consensus and Running Code" and the Internet-OSI Standards War[END_REF] has characterized this conflict as a "protracted international struggle" (56), even though today the discussion is largely forgotten. It is clear, however, that the international community involved in networking research resented a top-down approach to generating standards, an attitude that is nicely summarized in David Clark's 1992 dictum "We reject: kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running code" [START_REF] Clark | A Cloudy Crystal Ball: Visions of the Future[END_REF]. By 1992, Clark was able to refer to the defeat of OSI as an example of how the grassroots commitment to Internet development had provided the world with a working network, but the ability of the international community to successfully resist top-down demands for standards was far from certain.

An example of how "running code" became the default standard for the Internet is seen in the story of how China was connected to the international Internet. West Germany had a robust computer industry, and through a contract with the World Bank, Siemens Corporation had supplied computers to China and helped connect computer science researchers in both companies. Werner Zorn, who was responsible for organizing German visitors to China, was dismayed that he could not send e-mail to his Chinese colleagues: "A turnaround time of 14 days is even considered fast if one does not want to resort to the extortionately expensive telephone or telex, which are not available everywhere" [START_REF] Zorn | How China was Connected to the International Computer Networks[END_REF]. He then tried to set up a modem connection between the two countries, but the phone lines in China were not reliable enough to sponsor communication. He ended up using the CSNET softwaremodified to the Chinese setup of Siemens computers, of courseto send TCP/IP packets through a satellite connection that China had with Italy, and then through the European networks to Zorn's university computer [START_REF] Zorn | China's CSNET Connection 1987origin of the China Academic Network CANET[END_REF]. Finally, his colleagues could exchange email messages with the rest of the world. The development of TCP/IP utilized a conception of a user who was an international scientist managing a local network, and this definition of a user enabled Zorn to connect his Chinese counterparts to the Internet in spite of Cold War prohibitions about the export of technology.

In stories like this, one sees how it was not the inevitable progress of a military objective that led to the widespread adoption of the Internet, but instead the value of translational work of individuals who sought to enhance their access to the value of the versatile networking protocols that were developed with the help of the international community, and how the desire to connect different networks in different countries helped TCP/IP to become the dominant networking standard. If we want to be unfriendly to the United States, we could say that the U.S. researchers stole these ideas from their foreign colleagues and used them for their own work. But the reality is that this sharing has a long tradition in the history of science, and the Internet is no different than any other scientific endeavor. The idea of sharing ideas in an international forum and then making the ideas work in one's home environment is one of the established principles of the scientific community. The myth that the Internet is a U.S. invention, then, hides how it was developed and tested with the conception of an ideal user who was a member of an international group of scholars.

Conclusion

Dispelling the myth that the United States created the Internet in isolation is crucial if one wants to recreate the environment that brought about the Internet in the first place. If the military made the Internet, then it would seem that one needs to give more money to the military to continue this kind of innovation. If the United States developed the Internet on its own, then there is no need to foster international cooperation. If the Internet was made according to a plan, then one needs to keep research tied to a clearly specified timeline with clear goals and deadlines. However, the way to invent the Internet (or the next generation of Internet technologies) is quite opposite to what these myths would lead us to believe. The technologies behind the Internet were invigorated by the international community, not by the United States in isolation. In order to create something like the Internet, then, it is necessary to foster an environment for international exchange and cooperation, not maintain proprietary secrets. The historian has an important role to play in making sure this environment is available. If we allow the myths of the Internet to perpetuate, we give support to misguided projects that will not be able to create the innovations of tomorrow.

Clearly, the popular history of the Internet needs to be revised. Sponsoring insular, high-tech research projects is not the way to create the next generation of Internet technologies. The story of the academic, international Internet is one that encourages us to foster heterogeneous connections. It is the role of the historian to remind policy makers, educators, and the users of the Internet that it was not planned from the start. It was hacked together by users of different projects to help them do the kind of work they found most valuable. In order to make the history of computing relevant, it is the task of the historian to show how the cosmopolitan tradition of science is responsible for the Internet we know today, and in order to foster this kind of innovation in the future, this community must be supported.