Laxmi Gunupudi
email: gunupudi.laxmi10@iimb.ernet.in

Rahul De'

Market Separations Perspective of Agricultural Markets and Successful AMIS: Beyond Technical Rationality

Keywords: Market Separations, AMIS, ICT

Agriculture is an important economic activity and is a primary driver of economic growth of many developing countries. Improving the performance and profitability of agricultural markets will lead to the growth of the agricultural sector. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) based Agricultural Market Information Systems (AMIS) is a development initiative which promises to empower the stakeholders of the agricultural supply chain with information and aid the development of the agricultural sector. Many attempts have been made by governments in a number of developing countries to provide AMIS, with a poor success rate. It is important to understand the factors that determine the success or failure of these systems. In this paper we take the theoretical lens provided by Bartels' theory of market separations in order to define the success of AMIS. Using a technical/rational view, we conduct a two level analysis of market separationsthose in agricultural markets and those in AMIS services markets. We find that information separation is a strong feature that exists in agricultural markets and AMIS provide good means of reducing this separation. Success of AMIS is defined by the reduction of market separations at both these levels. Later we go beyond technical rationality and note that socio-political issues limit the utilization of market information provided by AMIS. Thus we state that socio-political separation of agricultural markets must also be tackled in order to successfully implement AMIS. A comprehensive policy environment in a region can help reduce these separations.

Introduction

Socio-economic and industrial development of any nation depends upon the growth in its agricultural sector. It is particularly true in the case of developing countries, where a large percentage of the population lives in rural areas and agriculture is their primary occupation [START_REF] Ogen | The Agricultural Sector and Nigeria's Development: Comparitive Perspective from the Brazilian Agro-Industrial Economy[END_REF]. This sector drives the growth of the economy by meeting food requirements and providing raw materials to industries and by generating employment and earning foreign exchange.

Agricultural produce is traded in agricultural markets. Agricultural marketing spans across numerous activities covering all the services involved in moving an agricultural produce from the farm to the consumer such as planning production, growing and harvesting, grading, packing, transport, storage, agro-and food processing, distribution, advertising and sale. In developing countries, traditional agricultural markets function poorly. Market information systems can provide a means to reduce the inefficiencies and power inequalities that exist in these markets [START_REF] Shepherd | Market information Services : Theory and Practice[END_REF][START_REF] Gunupudi | Role of AMIS in Resolving Information Asymmetries in Agricultural Markets: Guidelines for AMIS Design[END_REF]. Proliferations of ICT-based AMIS can help in achieving economic efficiency, performance and equity in these markets. They empower various stakeholders in the agricultural supply chain with information about different markets. This can help in correcting large scale imperfections that exist in rural and unorganized markets, thereby making them more efficient and productive [START_REF] Abraham | Mobile Phones and Economic Development:Evidence from the fishing industry in India[END_REF]. Information from these systems has been posited to benefit all the stakeholders of the sector. Farmers take better decisions with regards to choice of markets, arbitrage, and production planning. Traders benefit from lower costs of gathering information. Government and policy makers take informed decisions about food security planning and policy [START_REF] Islam | Agriculture Market Information Services (AMIS) in Least Developed Countries (LDCs): Nature, Scopes and Challenges[END_REF].

Though many attempts have been made by a number of governments to provide Agricultural Market Information Services (AMIS), the success rate is poor. In this paper, we take both development and Information Systems (IS) perspectives to understand the factors that determine the success of AMIS. The focus of the development perspective is on improving the efficiency and performance of agricultural markets. The IS perspective deals with implementing an efficient and usable system that provides useful and reliable information to the stakeholders. Diversity has been an implicit and dominant theme in IS research and theories from several reference disciplines have contributed to theoretical foundations of IS discipline [START_REF] Benbasat | Research Commentary: Rethinking "Diversity" in Information Systems Research[END_REF]. Given the context of markets, we borrow the theory of market separations from the marketing discipline to understand the functioning of agricultural markets. We take the developmental perspective to understand the separations in agricultural markets and the IS perspective to understand the separations in AMIS services markets. In the following section we take a look at the functioning of agricultural markets in developing countries.

Agricultural Markets in developing countries

Markets represent the meeting space for demand and supply of commodities. In economic terms it is any structure meant for exchange of goods, services and information between buyers and sellers. Market prices are a reflection of demand-supply equations, production costs and marketing costs.

Economies of many developing countries are heavily dependent on agricultural sector and allied activities [START_REF] Ogen | The Agricultural Sector and Nigeria's Development: Comparitive Perspective from the Brazilian Agro-Industrial Economy[END_REF] (in India, for instance, agriculture and allied activities contribute about 30% of Gross Domestic Product). Agricultural produce is traded in agricultural markets. In developing countries, traditional agricultural markets function poorly and homogeneous goods sold at different locations do not have the same prices (net of transportation costs) [START_REF] Shepherd | Market information Services : Theory and Practice[END_REF]. In 2007, World Bank has given top priority for improving market efficiency as a part of the agriculture-for-development agenda. They believe that the context of failed markets determines the livelihood of people in rural areas in developing countries and that secured and sustained agricultural growth is only possible when markets function properly [START_REF] Worldbank | Retrieved from The International Bank for Reconstruction and Developmet/ The World Bank[END_REF]. To understand the functioning of agricultural markets in developing countries, we look at the situation in India in the next section.

Functioning of Agricultural Markets in India

Agricultural marketing is primarily concerned with buying and selling of agricultural products. Let us consider the case of Indian agricultural markets. In the earlier days when the village economy was more or less self-sufficient, each neighbourhood had its own designated location where buyers and sellers engaged in trade, without the presence of a strong institution and the farmer sold his produce to the consumer on a cash or barter basis. Today's agricultural marketing has to undergo several exchanges before it reaches the consumer in the form of assembling, preparation for consumption and distribution. Sale of agricultural produce depends upon the demand for the product at that time, availability of storage etc. The products may be sold directly in the market or it may be stored locally for the time being. Moreover, it may be sold as it is gathered from the field or it may be cleaned, graded and processed by the farmer or the merchant of the village. Distribution system must ensure the balance between the supply with the existing demand by wholesaling and retailing in various points of different markets like primary, secondary or terminal [START_REF] Biswas | Agricultural Marketing in India[END_REF].

Farmers, small and large traders, Government and policy makers are the major stakeholders of these agricultural markets. Farmers sell their produce to traders in the markets. Small traders trade in few mandis and they buy products from farmers and sell them to the wholesaler. Large traders trade at a number of markets. They have their own information networks. These traders invest in storage and transportation facilities and take advantage of both spatial and temporal arbitrage. This prevents the entry of small traders to the markets. Government has an important role to monitor differences in prices at which famers and retailers sell their products in various markets to check for inefficiencies. Policy makers are responsible for making policies with regard to food security. They have to identify early warnings of food shortages and manage food security reserves [START_REF] Helder | Market Information for Early Warning[END_REF]. They also have to be alert to the traders' association's lobbying activities.

Indian Government has framed some salient policies for efficient functioning of agricultural markets [START_REF] Thomas | Agricultural commodity markets in India: Policy Issues for Growth[END_REF]. "Primary commodities" were defined, for which the government sets a minimum support price (MSP). A farmer can sell his produce to the government if the market price falls much below the MSP. Formal agricultural commodities markets are restricted to localized wholesale markets called mandis where the price of these commodities is determined. In mandis traders purchase commodities from farmers and then auction and sell these commodities to wholesalers. If the prices of these commodities go below MSP, traders have to purchase the commodities at MSP and they are later compensated by the mandis for the price differential. Only those traders with a license from the mandi can buy and sell commodities at the mandi. Mandis collect a market fee from the traders. Commodity prices are determined by a process of auction which happens at a fixed time at each mandi. As each lot is auctioned, a new price is set.

Agricultural Market Information Systems (AMIS)

Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) is defined as "A service, usually operated by the public sector, which involves the collection on a regular basis of information on prices and in some cases, quantities of widely traded agricultural products from rural assembly markets, wholesale and retail markets, as appropriate, and dissemination of this information on a timely and regular basis through various media to farmers, traders, government officials, policy makers and others including customers." [START_REF] Shepherd | Market information Services : Theory and Practice[END_REF] It is a system that links information from various agricultural markets across the country and provides the same to the various stakeholders. It involves the usage of ICT, such as the internet and mobile phones, in coordination with mass media like radio, newspaper and television along with blackboard displays and public addressing systems at the market place. The idea is to provide a reliable information network for data collection and information dissemination. Prior research has investigated the spread and use of AMIS in least developed countries in terms of users, management, funding, infrastructure and data [START_REF] Islam | Agriculture Market Information Services (AMIS) in Least Developed Countries (LDCs): Nature, Scopes and Challenges[END_REF]. Their findings show that data collection and information dissemination are two major activities involved in providing AMIS.

The systems provide current and up-to-date information on prices and market conditions such as transportation details and weather conditions based on raw data collected. They also gathers data over time and provide useful analysis regarding seasonal price trends, market trends, forecasts and comparative analysis of prices across markets.

These systems can be classified based on the ownership, technology used and coverage. Ownership of these systems varies from state-run market information systems to privately managed ones and also public-private ownership arrangements where the initiative is taken up by semi-government organizations or by partnership between government and private agencies. Technology used can be traditional like the newspapers, bulletin boards or price boards at the markets; semi-modern like television and radio; modern like internet and mobile phones. Coverage varies from being local which is restricted to a particular region or state to national where the information dissemination happens across the country.

AMIS provides numerous benefits to its stakeholders. Spatial arbitrage is the process of exchange of commodities taking advantage of price differences across markets which exceed the transaction costs (of operating in those markets) and temporal arbitrage is the process of exchange of commodities taking advantage of price differences over time. Current information is generally useful for spatial arbitrage and historic information is useful for temporal arbitrage. With the availability of information, farmers can take advantage of both spatial and temporal arbitrage. Analysis of this current and historic data helps in identifying trends which can further help farmers in taking decisions on production planning [START_REF] Shepherd | Market information Services : Theory and Practice[END_REF]. Knowledge of prevailing market prices can help farmers negotiate with the traders from a position of relative strength. Depending on customer preferences and demand (reflected in price information), they may even improve the quality and presentation of their product. Analysis of market and price trends from AMIS can help them make informed decisions on the quality and quantity of their produce. They may change their marketing plans and may even take advantage of group marketing [START_REF] Holtzman | Market Information Systems and Services: Lessons from the AMIS Project Experience[END_REF]. Large traders can reduce their investment on private information networks and make use of their storage capacities to benefit from temporal arbitrage. Many new small traders may enter the markets with the availability of market information [START_REF] Shepherd | Market information Services : Theory and Practice[END_REF]. Government can make use of reliable market information to evaluate market performance and to identify macro economic constraints [START_REF] Evans | Strategic Grain Reserves -Guidelines for their establishment Management and Operation[END_REF]. Policy makers can get early warnings of food shortages and use forecast data for production planning and for managing food security reserves [START_REF] Evans | Strategic Grain Reserves -Guidelines for their establishment Management and Operation[END_REF]. Customers can also negotiate with traders better with the available information.

Theory of Market Separations

Bartels' theory of market separations [START_REF] Bartels | The General Theory of Marketing[END_REF] describes four kinds of separations between the consumers and producers that impact exchange and consumption of agricultural products. Markets can function efficiently when these separations are reduced. The four kinds of separations are described as follows:

 Spatial -Consumers and producers are separated by physical distances.  Temporal -Consumers and producers are separated by time difference between the production and consumption of goods.  Informational -Consumers and producers are separated by knowledge of products and market conditions.  Financial -Consumers and producers are separated by lack of purchasing power at the time of need. These separations (as illustrated in Figure 1) prevent successful market transactions between the producers and consumers. The strength and impact of each of these separations depends upon the social context of the markets [START_REF] Bartels | The General Theory of Marketing[END_REF]. This theory has been used in IS research earlier to analyze the role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in development at the Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) [START_REF] Tarafdar | A Market Separations Perspective to Analyze the Role of ICT in Development at the Bottom of the Pyramid[END_REF]. In the next section we will briefly explain the research objective and methodology.

Research Question and Methodology

In this paper, we would like to take the market separations perspective to understand the functioning of agricultural markets in developing countries and the role of ICTs in bridging these separations. Given the context, this theory is appropriate in understanding the inefficiencies of agricultural markets. We would like to address the research question: How can AMIS systems be designed to close the separations in markets for agricultural commodities in developing countries?

We primarily rely on published literature on agricultural markets and design of AMIS. This is a conceptual paper based on prior research, where we provide a new theoretical lens for evaluating market information systems from both a developmental and IS perspective. We also look at some field studies to support our argument.

In the following sections we take up a detailed analysis of these markets and associated IS using the theoretical lens of market separations theory.

Technical/Rational Analysis of Agricultural Markets and AMIS

The body of knowledge based on technical rationality is rooted in the normative research paradigm concerned with systematic reasoning, decision making, and governing of practice through methods, techniques and technologies [START_REF] Avgerou | Power, rationality, and the art of living through socio-technical change[END_REF]. Using technical rationality as our driver, in this section, we will take up the analysis of agricultural markets and AMIS at two levels. At the higher level we map the inefficiencies of agricultural markets in developing countries to the market separations that exist between producers and consumers based on Bartels' theory. Here the goods of exchange are the agricultural products.

We will analyze the role of AMIS in reducing these separations.

At the second level we consider the services provided by AMIS as the goods of exchange and map the market separations that exist between the providers of these services and the consumers. We will look at the AMIS design process which can reduce these separations.

AMIS as a solution to the Market Separations in Agricultural Markets

In this section we will identify and map the four separations in agricultural markets as identified by Bartels' theory. According to his theory, depending on the context of application, the strength and impact of each of these separations vary.

In the context of agricultural markets, the producers are farmers who want to sell their agricultural products in the markets. They represent the supply side in the equation. Consumers are those people who are in need of and are willing to purchase the agricultural produce for consumption. They represent the demand side. Market prices of the products are reflective of the demand and supply.

The following is the analysis of agricultural markets on the basis of FAO's bulletin (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations [START_REF] Shepherd | Market information Services : Theory and Practice[END_REF]) along the lines of market separations theory:

 Spatial: This separation occurs when producers are unaware of the demand for their produce in markets other than their regular trading market and consumers are unaware of the availability of the product of their choice in other markets. Market prices are indicative of demand and supply. Market price information from various markets and availability of transportation facilities can help reduce this separation. Farmers can transport their produce to the markets where there is demand and take advantage of spatial arbitrage.  Temporal: This separation occurs when the producers are unaware of the demand and price trends for their produce. This happens under certain conditions when demand and supply are out of phase and demand lags supply. Availability of information on historical price and demand trends and their analysis to forecast demand can help farmers take decisions about storage of their produce to take advantage of temporal arbitrage and thereby reduce temporal market separation.  Financial: This separation occurs when buyers do not have purchasing power at the time when they have willingness or need to buy. This happens when producers do not have the information on demand for their produce at the time of sale. Again, information on demand cycles for their produce and forecasts about the same can help farmers plan their production and reduce financial market separation.  Informational: This separation occurs as a result of differential information held by producers and consumers on product prices and market conditions. This can be considered as an outcome of information asymmetries that exist in agricultural markets. Information asymmetry is defined "as a situation where some party in a transaction benefits from having preferential access to information" [START_REF] Stiglitz | Information and the change in the Paradigm in Economics[END_REF]. George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph E. Stiglitz were awarded the Nobel Prize in the year 2001 in Economics for their study of markets with information asymmetry. Traders have preferential access to information in this context and they benefit from this advantage. They manipulate the information that both producers and consumers have in order to gain this advantage. The following table summarizes the four market separations in agricultural markets and their possible solutions.

Market Separations in Agricultural Markets

From the analysis of the above separations, we can easily conclude that solving the problem of informational separation will also reduce the other separations in the context of agricultural markets. Availability of information on market conditions and prices across the region or state will help producers plan their production and take advantage of spatial and temporal arbitrage.

This can be illustrated as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 : Market Separations that exist in Agricultural Markets

AMIS provides both current information and analysis of historic data. Current information will help producers and consumers in reducing the spatial and informational separations. Demand and price trends and forecasts from the analysis of historic data will help producers plan their production or store their produce thereby reducing temporal and financial separations.

Market Separations Perspective of AMIS Services and AMIS Design

Considering the services provided by AMIS as the goods of exchange, in this section we map the market separations that exist between the providers of these services and the consumers.

In this case, providers of these services who are responsible for collection of raw data from markets and dissemination of information are the producers. They represent the supply side. Stakeholders of agricultural markets who are interested in the information being provided by these services are the consumers and they represent the demand side.

Prior work on AMIS [START_REF] Gunupudi | Role of AMIS in Resolving Information Asymmetries in Agricultural Markets: Guidelines for AMIS Design[END_REF]) has come up with some guidelines for designing AMIS for economic sustainability and effectiveness. Their guidelines define the processes for data collection and information dissemination. Following is the analysis of AMIS service market separations and possible design solutions for reducing these separations based on the above guidelines.

 Spatial -This market separation occurs when consumers are not able to access information from AMIS. In order to reduce this separation, AMIS must aim to reach target audience through locally available and accessible modes of information dissemination. Full-time, trained, data collectors must ensure that up-to-date and reliable data is collected. The focus must not be on technological sophistication of medium of information dissemination, but on provision of accurate and consistent information to a wide target audience [START_REF] Shepherd | Market information Services : Theory and Practice[END_REF].  Temporal -This market separation occurs when consumers do not have information on historical prices or demand trends and are unable to forecast prices and demand. This separation can be reduced by providing extension services where one can obtain information on demand and price trends, price forecasts, crop patterns and other related aspects. Information from these services must help target audience take important decisions. Mobile phone services have been identified in prior research as a good means of providing these extension services [START_REF] Davis | Extension in Sub-Saharan Africa : Overview and Assessment of Past and Current Models, and Future Prospects[END_REF].  Financial -This market separation occurs when consumers are not in a position to afford the services provided by AMIS. To reduce this separation, during the design phase, broadcasting charges and sponsors should be identified and economically sustainable modes of dissemination must be chosen. Basic information such as market prices and market conditions which constitute current information must be provided free to all the target audience and extension services which provide information on price trends and forecasts must be provided on a pay-per-use basis. This will ensure that the services provided are equitable and at the same time ensure the economic sustainability of the system, thus reducing financial market separations in this context [START_REF] Dinar | Extension Commercialization : How much to charge for extension services[END_REF].  Informational -This market separation is a result of consumers' ignorance of available AMIS services and their access procedures. AMIS design must ensure that consumers are aware of all the available services on AMIS. Design must aim to increase the perceived value of these services.

Offering training courses to farmers on the usage of these services [START_REF] Singh | Selected Success Stories on Agricultural Information Systems[END_REF]) is a good way of reducing this markets separation. Field workers can also help people interpret the information received from these services. These separations in AMIS services markets are summarized in the following table (Table 2).

Table 2: Market Separations in AMIS Markets

Market Separation Underlying Cause Possible AMIS Design Solution

Spatial Consumers unable to access information from AMIS Locally available and accessible medium of information dissemination must be chosen. Trained and full-time data collectors must ensure up-to-date reliable information.

Temporal

Consumers do not have information on price and demand trends and forecasts

Extension services of the system can provide specific information on price and demand trends in markets. This information can be disseminated through mobile phones.

Financial Consumers cannot afford AMIS services

Revenue model must be designed to ensure both financially sustainability and equitability of the system.

Informational

Consumers are not aware of AMIS services and their access procedures

Marketing of these services must also train the users on the usage of the services and interpretation of information received

Market Separations in AMIS Markets

From the analysis of above separations, we understand that following design guidelines for effective and reliable AMIS, providers can ensure that market separations are reduced and services are utilized by the stakeholders of agricultural markets. Choice of an appropriate information dissemination medium reduces spatial separations and provision of extension services reduces temporal separations. Suitable revenue model ensures that financial separation is reduced and marketing of services and training on usage of these services and interpretation of information received reduces informational separation.

In the following section we integrate the two levels of analysis to define successful implementation of AMIS in developing countries.

Beyond Technical Rationality: Fifth Dimension of Market Separations in Agricultural Markets (Socio-Political Separations)

AMIS is one of the initiatives that stems from active innovation perspective of technology and development. According to this perspective, markets will not deliver to the poor and interventions in the form of innovations are imperative to meet development goals [START_REF] Heeks | ICT4D 2.0: The next phase of applying ICT for international development[END_REF].

As stated by Heek's (2008) it is important to evaluate the ICT for Development initiatives for success. In order to define success for an AMIS implementation, we need to take two perspectives. One is the developmental perspective and the other is the IS perspective.

The primary developmental objective behind providing AMIS is to make the agricultural markets in developing countries more efficient and profitable. This will lead to the growth of the agricultural sector, which is a primary driver of GDP for these countries, there by contributing to the development of the country as a whole. Simon defined human development "as the process of enhancing individual and collective quality of life in a manner that satisfies basic needs (as a minimum), is environmentally, socially and economically sustainable and is empowering in the sense that people concerned have a substantial degree of control over the process through access to the means of accumulating social power" [START_REF] Simon | Development Reconsidered: New Directions in Development Thinking[END_REF]. Therefore AMIS supported by ICTs can be defined as a development initiative that empowers the stakeholders in the agricultural value chain with information.

From an IS perspective, AMIS has to be a usable system providing reliable information which is useful to the stakeholders. Scalability and sustainability are some of the measures of success of ICT for Development initiatives [START_REF] Heeks | ICT4D 2.0: The next phase of applying ICT for international development[END_REF].

In this paper, taking the theoretical lens of Bartels' market separations, we have analyzed market separations of AMIS at two levels. The first level deals with the market separations in agricultural markets corresponding to the developmental perspective. We identified informational separation as a strong separation in agricultural markets which can be reduced by the provision of AMIS. In the second level, we analyzed the market separations of the AMIS services markets, which correspond to the IS perspective. From the above analysis we can successfully conclude that success of any AMIS can be determined by its ability to reduce market separations at both these levels.

The above analysis involves a technical/rational view of agricultural markets. Primary assumption underlying this analysis is that, information provided by AMIS services will definitely be utilized in reducing these market separations. In the case of developmental initiatives like this, it is important to understand the socio-political context of implementations [START_REF] Avgerou | Power, rationality, and the art of living through socio-technical change[END_REF].

When we look at the socio-political context of AMIS implementation, we come upon many situations that limit the effective utilization of information provided by AMIS services. In the case of rural India, many farmers have limited outlets for their produce. They are constrained by traditional trading relationships with middlemen. These relationships can be attributed to many reasons. An obvious rational explanation is their dependence on these middlemen for credit which binds them in these relationships. Other socio-political barriers to utilization of information by farmers and other stakeholders are local power politics. Prior research has identified the following factors that cause socio-political separations:

 Caste -Caste shapes the outcomes of ICT implementations because of its influence on both the social and political contours of village life [START_REF] Nicholas | Structures of politics in the villages of Southern Asia[END_REF]). Prior research findings on the outcomes of implementation of kiosks in India state that caste manifests itself "in everyday practices of access to, mobility around, sharing of knowledge about, and use of the kiosks" [START_REF] De | Caste Structures and E-Governance in a Developing Country[END_REF]) (in the case of Bhoomi Kiosks for land records). Caste can act as a barrier in this context of AMIS with regards to access to both technology and agricultural markets.  Community Membership -Similar to caste, membership to various communities creates barriers to utilization of information from AMIS. Prior research suggests that members of certain communities do not usually cross the boundaries that are created as a result of social structures that have been dominant over years. These boundaries prevent the movement of agricultural produce to markets that are in other regions or domains. This phenomenon has been observed in a study in Kuppam town (in the state of Andhra Pradesh in India), where the access to dealers in a market was driven by community membership. Members of certain communities did not access these dealers as they were from groups outside the 'boundary' of their community.  Community Leader -In many areas, community leaders take a decision on the agricultural markets to trade for the entire community. Members of the community have to abide by the decision taken by the leader. This prevents the members of the community from trading in other markets.  Gender -Prior studies by FAO in 2011 have noted that women in agricultural sector in developing countries have lower education and are lesser likely to have access to technology extension services compared to men. Gender roles within a specific geographic and cultural context determine the access to these services (FAO, 2010(FAO, -2011)). Also in some regions, access to agricultural markets is based on gender. Hence we consider gender as one of the barriers that contributes to socio-political separations in agricultural markets. The following table (Table 3) highlights the underlying causes that contribute to socio-political separations.

Causes

Underlying Reasons

Caste

Caste influences the access to agricultural markets.

Community Membership

Membership to a community plays a crucial in deciding the target agricultural markets for sale.

Community Leader

Community leaders determine and decide the target markets for agricultural produce.

Gender

Women have lesser access to technology compared to men. Women's access to agricultural markets is restricted in some areas.

Socio-Political Separations

Taking this view, we find that, socio-political separations have a very strong impact in agricultural markets. In our view, this market separation is most difficult to tackle. Effective and efficient design of AMIS might reduce the market separations defined by Bartels' in this theory. But success of AMIS depends on reducing the socio-political separation that exists. It is important for policy makers to make appropriate policy changes to remove these socio-political barriers along with implementation of a system like AMIS. Thus wider policy environment in the country determines the success of AMIS to a large extent.

Conclusion

In this paper we make use of Bartels' theory of market separations to define success for the implementation of AMIS. The objective of the paper is to understand how AMIS systems can be designed to close the separations in markets for agricultural commodities in developing countries. From technical/rational analysis of separations in agricultural markets and markets for AMIS services, we find that informational separation is a strong factor in agricultural markets. Reduction in informational separation will eventually reduce other separations. AMIS empowers players in agricultural markets with the requisite information, thereby reducing the market separations. Effective design of AMIS can ensure reduction of separations in AMIS services markets. From a developmental perspective it is important to reduce separations in agricultural markets and from an IS perspective we need to reduce separations in AMIS service markets. Thus we define success of AMIS by the reduction of market separations at both these levels.

Going beyond the technical rationality, we find that market separations in the context agricultural markets are not limited to the four separations as defined by Bartels'. Socio-political context creates a number of barriers for the effective utilization of information provided and the impact of AMIS in reducing these separations is limited. Thus we identify the fifth dimensionsocio-political separation in the context of these markets. Caste, community membership, community leaders and gender are some of the barriers that lead to this separation. Thus, it is extremely important to recognize diversity in contexts in order to achieve development outcomes from initiatives such as AMIS.

Implementation of AMIS must be accompanied by changes in wider policy environment to support the stakeholders in utilizing the information effectively. Policies related to credit, public-distribution, financial inclusion etc. will have an impact on the success of AMIS.

We believe that it is important to identify an appropriate theoretical lens to evaluate the success of IS in developmental contexts. Imperfections and separations in agricultural markets have been implicitly studied in prior research. This is a conceptual paper based on prior research on agricultural markets and AMIS, where we provide a new theoretical lens for evaluating market information systems from both a developmental and IS perspective. We also extend this theory to make sense of the socio-political factors that greatly impact such implementations. It demonstrates the suitability of this theory in determining the success of ICTs used in developmental contexts. We intend to empirically validate the concept put forward in this paper.

Figure 1 :

 1 Figure 1 : Market Separations from Bartels' Theory

Figure 3 :

 3 Figure 3 : Market Separations in Agricultural Markets -Beyond Technical Rationality

Table 1 : Market Separations in Agricultural Markets Market Separation Underlying Cause Possible Solution

 1

		Producers unaware of demand	Provision of Market price
	Spatial	and consumers unaware of supply	information and transportation
		in different markets	facilities.
	Temporal	Demand and suppply out of phase and demand lags supply	Provision of information on price trends and access to storage facilities.
		Demand supply mismacth	Provision of information on
	Financial	resulting from improper	demand and price trends for
		production planning	production planning
	Informational	Lack of information on market prices and market conditions	Provision of information on market prices and market conditions

Table 3 : Socio-Political Separations

 3


Deborah Bunker
email: deborah.bunker@sydney.edu.au

Linda Levine

Carol Woody
email: cwoody@cert.org

Repertoires of Collaboration for Disaster Management: Negotiating Emergent and Dynamic Systems Success

Keywords: common operating pictures, dynamic operating pictures, disaster management, information systems management, collaboration, crisis response

 Negotiated Arrangements Theory (NAT) to highlight issues and problems with traditional command and control approaches and CoP, during three disaster scenarios. As a result of lessons learned from this analysis we suggest that developing a supplementary "repertoires of collaboration" approach to the negotiation of DoP for disaster management, would have a positive impact on disaster management outcomes.

Introduction

Figure 1: Mapping of PPRR Approach to CWS Note -changing requirement of CWS throughout an Incident Diagram reproduced from [START_REF] Bunker | Disaster Management and Community Warning (CW) Systems: Inter-Organisational Collaboration and ICT Innovation[END_REF] What we do know is that during crises and disasters, traditional first responder command and control approaches to development of a common operating picture (CoP) for disaster management, are utilized with varying degrees of success and effectiveness (Bunker & Smith, 1999[START_REF] Betts | The missing links in community warning systems: findings from two Victorian community warning information systems projects[END_REF][START_REF] Levine | System of Systems Analysis of Catastrophic Events: A Preliminary Investigation of Unprecedented Scenarios[END_REF]. Many governments and their emergency services agencies have adopted a Prevent, Prepare, Respond and Recover (PPRR) protocol (see Figure 1) which provides a common strategy for the development of this CoP but most emergency agencies use their own currently proven technologies and information systems that can be enhanced and scaled to optimize outcomes and value for money to deliver the CoP.

The term "common operating picture" (CoP) is used by emergency services agencies and the military to describe "situational awareness, by enabling multiple organisations to view and share information in a timely manner across a single picture" (DIGO website <www.defence.gov.au/digo/geoint-palanterra.htm>). We would argue, however, that in the case of disasters or crises, agencies are presented with the need for a dynamic operating picture (DoP) where there is a requirement to view multiple representations of the same phenomenon and perhaps, other representations of related phenomena by many different stakeholders with many different objectives. In order to enable a DoP, technology/information/human resources must be supplied and managed by multiple stakeholders with different objectives, and this presents a different type of complexity to CoP that is problematic to deal with when negotiating systems outcomes.

A common operating picture view of a disaster, therefore, does not present the full range of representations of the disaster scenario nor deal fully with the emergent and dynamic nature of a disaster. It also does not take into account the need for multiple stakeholders to be able to collaborate in order to negotiate a relevant and applicable information systems outcome for their particular disaster management requirements.

From CoP to DoP Through Repertoires of Collaboration

In reality, all operating picture information must be gathered, processed and delivered via a multitude of technology channels including telephone, mobile phone, SMS, facsimile, email and web pages to ensure that the disaster can eventually be effectively managed [START_REF] Smith | Community Warning Systems: An Information Process and ICT Architecture Approach for Emergency Incident Response" -Issues Paper prepared for the NSW Department of Commerce[END_REF][START_REF] Bunker | Disaster Management and Community Warning (CW) Systems: Inter-Organisational Collaboration and ICT Innovation[END_REF]. This information comes from many different sources such as sensor data, satellites, geospatial systems, operational systems, business systems, emergency responders and the general public. Evaluating and authenticating this information during a disaster is problematic in its own right, but disaster scenarios are also emergent and dynamic in nature, and so they often push existing information systems and channels to failure that cannot match these requirements. This means that IS requirements for disaster management systems are also emergent and dynamic, and so need to produce systems that are resilient, flexible and fault tolerant [START_REF] Pauchant | The Dial Tone Does Not Come from God ! How a Crisis Can Challenge Dangerous Strategic Assumptions Made About High Technologies: The Case of the Hinsdale Telecommunication Outage[END_REF][START_REF] Pearson | Reframing Crisis Management[END_REF]. Our traditional approaches to building CoP should be re-conceptualized with emphasis on dealing with these systems characteristics which by their very nature must be derived through collaboration and negotiation between stakeholders.

This paper firstly defines collaboration using [START_REF] Mccann | Design guidelines for social problem-solving interventions[END_REF] Negotiated Order Theory as a basis to develop successful DoP in disaster management. It then examines data collected by the commissions of enquiry into the Victorian Bushfires of 2009 (Parliament of Victoria 2010), 911Terrorist Attacks in 2001 [START_REF] Kean | The Complete Investigation: 9/11 Report with Commentary by The New York Times. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States[END_REF]) and Hurricane Katrina during 2005 [START_REF] Davis | A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation For and Response to Hurricane Katrina[END_REF]) utilizing [START_REF] Mccann | Design guidelines for social problem-solving interventions[END_REF] collaborative Negotiated Arrangements Theory as a method of analysis. IS issues and problems are then highlighted in each of these cases that impacted the ability to collaborate and negotiate a DoP. A "repertoires of collaboration" approach is then discussed with a view to the more effective provision of a DoP for any given disaster scenario, whilst reusing technology, information, human resources and "know how" in a flexible, sustainable and efficient manner.

Collaboration and Negotiation for the Development of DoP for Disaster Management

Negotiation plays an important role in organizational collaboration "so when organizations agree on an issue, negotiation is used to find the best way or the best solution to address a task. If organizations 'agree to disagree' on an issue, however, negotiation then reflects an organization's willingness to compromise in order to find common ground" (Bunker & Smith 2009p 3). If an organization collaborates for a common strategy, well thought out business processes and ICT architecture can make a huge difference to this collaboration [START_REF] Pang | Development of a Framework to Examine the Collaborative Process in Inter-Organisational System Adoption[END_REF]). Arrangements Theory to show that disaster management DoPs: 1) have different (but aligned) ESA stakeholder objectives which also add a layer of complexity to their specification; 2) encompass different types of emergency incidents of varying complexity and so must reflect and cope with incident complexity; 3) must not rely solely on any one information and communications technology (ICT) platform or delivery system for their economies of scale; 4) need to integrate ESA operational, community, communication and ICT requirements to legitimize and give them a sense of direction; 5) collaborative processes require further and more detailed studies into the psychology, content and action resulting from messaging and 6) need to be developed and deployed with a view to adaptation and change.

As part of a larger disaster management project based at the University of Sydney, and commissioned by the NSW Government, Emergency Information & Coordination Unit (EICU) a geospatial data reference architecture was produced [START_REF] Gill | NSW Land and Property Information EICU Reference Architecture 1.0presented as part of a larger Disaster Management Project[END_REF].

This architecture outlines the collection, storage, processing and distribution of geospatial information to emergency services agencies that then use it to manage dynamic and emergent situations such as crowd control, crises and disasters. In the analysis of this architecture it was found that DoP are heavily reliant on:

• Technological Flexibility and Connectivityas multiple systems produce a DoP the technological flexibility to build up information layers and differing and related perspectives is essential. As there is a requirement for different agencies and organizations to manipulate this information from different locations and in different forms, then technological connectivity through different channels e.g. online, offline and mobile is also an essential requirement;

• Information Governance Mechanisms -whatever the source, information authenticity; accuracy; reliability; and legality must be guaranteed in order to make effective decisions; and

• Long Term Systems Sustainability and Resource Efficiency -DoP require constantly updated information, flexible systems tools and skilled personnel to be available each time they are generated, to effectively view and interpret the picture and make appropriate decisions. As this is a resource intensive activity, and in light of government budget constraints, there is also a requirement for a better understanding of how to construct a DoP as efficiently as possible in order to ensure long term systems sustainability.

McCann (1983) maintains that negotiated arrangements (processes) are also needed by organizations in a shared problem domain to ensure a workable collaborative outcome. "The inability of stakeholders to negotiate needed roles and responsibilities and perform regulative functions will ultimately limit the viability of their problem domain" (McCann 1983p 181) Stakeholder collaboration and negotiating is the key, therefore, to the successful development of DoP and within this study [START_REF] Mccann | Design guidelines for social problem-solving interventions[END_REF] five negotiated arrangements as they apply to DoP are as follows:

(a) Diverse stakeholder involvement -assure that benefits accruing to stakeholders as a result of their involvement are favorably balanced against their contributions over the long run;

(b) Dealing with uncertainty and complexity -manage uncertainty and complexity within the domain by developing coordination and control mechanisms for implementing policies and programs;

(c) Development of economies of scale -generate economies of scale or otherwise facilitate the efficient procurement and allocation of resources among stakeholders;

(d) Development of a sense of shared direction -help maintain the sense of shared direction and legitimacy of that direction by creating and building a visible identity for those involvede.g., a legally formed association or cooperation; and

(e) Development of an orderly process for adapting to change (more suitable ICT architectures) -provide an orderly process for adapting to change by building the learning capacities and skills of stakeholders.

The Victorian "Black Saturday" bushfires (2009), Hurricane Katrina (2005) and 9/11 Terrorist Attacks (2001) are all typical of an emergent disaster scenario where traditional command and control CoP approaches to IS and supporting processes proved to be problematic due to lack of effective negotiated arrangements.

As negotiated arrangements are critical to dealing with dynamic and emergent incidents the following section of this paper analyzes each of these disasters in turn, using McCann's 5 negotiated arrangements as a lens of analysis to determine evidence of negotiated arrangements or the impact of their absence.

Research Methods, Data Sources and Analysis

Negotiated Arrangements Theory had been used in a prior study of a major flood debrief [START_REF] Bunker | Disaster Management and Community Warning (CW) Systems: Inter-Organisational Collaboration and ICT Innovation[END_REF] to show how various NSW Government emergency agencies collaborated to negotiate disaster management outcomes during a flood event. It was felt that this same approach would be a useful way to analyze and categorize data from a number of diverse disaster cases (bushfire, hurricane, terrorism) to understand how emergency organizations involved in these events collaborated (or not) and the resulting consequences.

Victorian "Black Saturday" Bushfires (2009)

Scenario

Australia is a dry and arid continent with only 5% of the land area suitable for habitation and cultivation. Bushfires occur regularly in the southern states of Australia from October to March when temperatures rise and humidity falls giving rise to perfect fire conditions. This combined with the Australian natural vegetation of Eucalyptus trees facilitates and accelerates fire events. The Victorian fires which started in January 2009, spread rapidly on 7th February 2009. At the time there were unprecedented and "extreme" fire conditions (high temperatures, low humidity, high volumes of forest "fuel") which were identified ahead of time by the Victorian Government and the relevant fire agencies, however, many long standing fire officers had no experience of such conditions (Parliament of Victoria 2010).

Victorians were warned prior to these "extreme" conditions of the likelihood of fire outbreaks. Once the fires started the rate of their spread was uncontrollable and fire behavior was unique (never before experienced). As a result, of these fires 173 people died and many homes and businesses were lost at great personal and societal cost and impact.

Data Sources

Royal Commissions are major governmental enquiries into matters of public importance. They have quasi-judicial powers and the ability to compel witnesses to testify. Because of the circumstances and outcomes of these fires, including the tragic loss of so many lives, the Victorian government chose to hold a Royal Commission into these events. This commission ran from February 2009 and concluded its final report in June 2010 (Parliament of Victoria 2010) which is the primary input for the analysis in this paper.

Over 1200 public submissions were received and used to frame the investigation of the Commission. Those submissions that were ranked highest and that impacted the use of IS and supporting processes to form a common operating picture were; disaster warnings (430 submissions ranked 3 rd highest) and emergency communications (140 submissions). It is these areas of the report which are the subject of our analysis.

The report classified its investigation and recommendations into: warnings (types and processes); information (how it is used); relocation; "Stay or go" policy; risk and refuge; incident management; emergency management; commonwealth response; and emergency calls and so the interpretation of the evidence also lends weight to the importance of IS and process issues in disaster management.

Data Analysis -Negotiated Order Theory

(a)

Diverse stakeholder involvement

Incident control centers (a shared resource) were not properly staffed and equipped to enable immediate operation in the case of these fires. State Emergency Response Plans (shared plans with input of resources from control agencies responsible for warnings) needed to be amended to focus on: "managing the message" i.e. "stay or go" policy. There was also no effective higher level emergency management and co-ordination arrangements during the bushfire season for example for police co-ordination of roadblocks with warnings "Evidence revealed a number of systemic problems with the way the roadblocks operated, among them inflexibility, poor communication and denying access to firefighters" (p 9 -Summary)

Commonwealth resources also needed to be deployed more rapidly to assist State officers to detect, track and suppress bushfires; and provision of Emergency Management Australia briefings to states were also lacking.

(b) Dealing with uncertainty and complexity

There was an absence of simpler and clearer language for impending disaster warning so that communication of warnings was unclear. "It became apparent during the Commission's hearings that a number of bushfire-related terms are cumbersome, have obscure meanings or are potentially confusing to the general public" (p 20 -Summary).

There was also a lack of an orderly process for adapting to change as there was no mechanism to build on learning capacities and skills of all stakeholders from past incidents. When the situation became more complex and uncertain there was a difficulty in:

 posting of information by Incident Control Centers directly to ESA information portals;

 agreement of procedures by the Country Fire Authority (CFA) and Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) to create flexibility for officers of different designations to "give warnings" in the field (system of effective delegation and interagency warnings);  placement of authority with Chief Officer to issue warnings and manage risk information, co-ordination and centralization; close coordination among multiple organizations and roles for disaster response; and  co-ordination and distribution of decision making so that information and communications dependencies were understood and managed e.g. the different organizations CFA and DSE were responsible for issuing various warnings but no entity (or shared standard) watched over the integrity of the whole system.

"The experience of 7 February also highlighted several areas in which high-level state arrangements need reform. On Black Saturday the roles of the most senior personnel were not clear, and there was no single agency or individual in charge of the emergency…….It recommends that the roles be clarified, including through organizational change" (p 8 -Summary).

(c) Development of economies of scale

The Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority and Telstra Triple Zero had little warning of high risk days (Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner responsibility) so that they could allocate resources and better prepare; and incident control centers (ICCs -a shared resource) had limited scope to prepare for and respond to the emergent disaster scenario. The report highlights that "..the state of readiness of ICCs and level 3 incident management teams that staffed them varied" (p 8 Summary)see point (a) previous.

(d) Development of a sense of shared direction

There appeared to be no utilization and learning from the wealth of reviews and reports to government on the topics of disaster management. "The Commission notes that the recommendations of previous enquiries have not always been implemented (p 21 Summary)" and as a result there was no consensus approach to handling warnings (see point (b) previous) nor the development of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for commercial operators on dissemination of warnings.

(e) Development of an orderly process for adapting to change (more suitable ICT architectures)

Whilst government was working towards a common approach to warnings through development of Common Applications Protocol (CAP) and SEWS as PPRR approaches this was not in an advanced enough state to be useful in this case. As the report states "…various problems became evident with information technology at incident control centres, including because the CFA and DSE used different systems and incident management team staff sometimes had difficulty gaining access to both systems. This inhibited the use and transfer of information such as warnings, maps and situation reports" (p 10 -Summary). There was also a shortfall in the resourcing and development of a multi ESA information warning portal and limited capacity to handle a greater information "surge" capacity for extreme events i.e. need to improve efficiency of internal information function (including additional work stations). There was also a need for Commonwealth (COAG) to promote more effective emergency call service arrangements in all States. Katrina formed over the Bahamas and crossed south Florida as a moderate hurricane, before strengthening to a Category 5 hurricane over the Gulf. Then Katrina made her second landfall as a Category 3 hurricane on August 29 in southeast Louisiana. Much of the devastation was due to the storm surge; and the largest number of fatalities occurred in New Orleans, Louisiana, which flooded when the levee system catastrophically failed. Eventually 80% of the city and large parts of neighboring parishes became flooded. The floodwaters lingered for weeks. The worst property damage occurred in coastal areas and towns, which were flooded over 90% within hours, with waters reaching 6-12 miles from the beach.

Hurricane

The failure of the levee system in New Orleans is considered the worst civil engineering disaster in U.S. history. A lawsuit was brought against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the designers and builders of the levee system as mandated by the Flood Control Act of 1965. Responsibility for the failures and flooding was laid directly on the Army Corps in January 2008. An investigation of the responses from federal, state and local governments also resulted in the resignation of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) director and New Orleans Police Department Superintendent.

The Coast Guard, National Hurricane Center, and National Weather Service were praised for their actions. They provided exact tracking forecasts with adequate lead time. Unfortunately, repeated and urgent appeals from national, state and local officials to residents to evacuate before the storm did not warn that the levees could break and fail.

Data Sources

The primary source for our analysis of Hurricane Katrina is the comprehensive special report, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation For and Response to Hurricane Katrina [START_REF] Davis | A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation For and Response to Hurricane Katrina[END_REF]. There is no shortage of examples of the failure of negotiated order and so we have selected a subset, covering topics including: Hurricane Pam exercise, levees, evacuation, and finally the National Framework, also specifically known as the National Response Plan (NRP) Catastrophe Incident Annex (CIA).

Data Analysis -Negotiated Order Theory

This analysis presents us with a number of negotiated arrangements that overlap.

(a) Diverse stakeholder involvement AND (c) Development of economies of scale

The Hurricane Pam exercise of 2004 is a prime illustration of misunderstanding and a failure in these areas. This simulation, designed and run by private Baton Rouge based contractor, Innovative Emergency Management, Ltd., was sufficiently distorted so that it was unable to achieve its real objectives. The delivery of the results from the exercise was expedited so that these could be translated into operational plans. However, according to IEM President Beriwal, "the plan was not meant to provide operational detail but rather was designed to provide general guidance, a sort of "to do list" for state and localities. Beriwal characterized the exercise as a "work in progress," describing IEM's role as "facilitator and assessors of consequences" (p. 82).

The results from Pam were clearly misused and misaligned. "Some state and parish officials said they saw Pam as a "contract" of what the various parties were going to do, and the federal government did not do the things it had committed to doing. … Beriwal said, however, the plan derived from the Pam exercise was intended as a "bridging document" designed to serve as a guide and roadmap to be used by emergency operational officials to take the Plan and turn it into more detailed individual operational plans" (p.83). The officials' viewed Pam as a contract. IEM's stance reflects a view where the results of the exercise were intended to serve more loosely as guidance or a road map that would need to be operationalized and scaled up. These conflicting views are virtually a guarantee for difficulty and dissatisfaction on both sides.

(b) Dealing with uncertainty and complexity

The response to Katrina was described by government officials and citizens alike as demonstrating poor leadership and poor coordination. The Katrina evacuation conveyed confusion and a lack of clarity. For example, the different parishes used a wide variety of terms to describe the level of evacuation imposed before declaring a mandatory evacuation. Jefferson Parish-the other major component of metropolitan New Orleans-never did declare a mandatory evacuation, except for the lower parts of the parish on the Gulf Coast. In a conference call among parish officials, Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard said he did not have the "resources to enforce" a mandatory evacuation (p. 110).

The wide variety of terms might suggest desired precision and accompanying rules to govern different conditions, but in this instance the effect was opposite, resulting in confusion and large parts of the population remaining in their home at great peril and not evacuating. "Why would you get in the public media and ask a city, where 80 percent of its citizens ride public transit, to evacuate? What [were] they supposed to do? Fly? (p. 111).

The situation with the levees-flood walls which broke and flooded major portions of New Orleans-can be described as a "catch 22" around requirements and dealing with uncertainty and complexity. While federal regulations require monitoring levees during periods of potential flooding, the requirement is impractical to implement during a hurricane" (p. 87). In this circumstance, at once, there are requirements with no act of responsibility assigned at the same time as there are impractical requirements. The "standard project hurricane" was used nationwide for all hurricane protection projects where the loss of human life is possible.

According to the US Army Corps of Engineers, the "standard project hurricane" was used to design the New Orleans levees and is roughly equivalent to a fast moving, or "moderate" category 3 hurricane. However, there is no direct comparison of the standard project hurricane" to a specific category on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale-which did not exist when the levees were designed. …In addition, there is no "standard" hurricane-the actual forces that levees need to withstand are a function of several factors (p. 89).

This example is interesting in a number of ways. First, a "standard" by definition assumes structure, predictability and regularity. In Katrina, the hurricane was simultaneously treated as a standard and non standard event, and this incompatibility is an invitation for ambiguity and confusion at minimum and more likely chaos.

(d) Development of a sense of shared direction

In addition to the ambiguity and confusion that we see around a "standard hurricane," the response to Katrina revealed that local solutions were incompatible. A global perspective was missing and shared direction had not been negotiated. "The different local organizations involved had the effect of diffusing responsibility and creating potential weaknesses. For example levee breaches and distress were repeatedly noted at transition sections, where different organizations [primarily New Orleans parishes] were responsible for different pieces and thus two different levee or wall systems joined together" (pp. 91-92). One can envision a scenario where each local organization's use of rules and procedures might satisfy local needs; however, in conjunction their approaches are not interoperable. In disaster response, where the coordinated effort of many agents and agencies is vital, such errors have a critical impact.

(e) Development of an orderly process for adapting to change (more suitable ICT architectures)

The failure of achieving of interoperability is succinctly expressed here: "The local sponsors-a patchwork quilt of levee and water and sewer boards-were responsible only for their own piece of levee. It seems no federal, state, or local entity watched over the integrity of the whole system, which might have mitigated to some degree the effects of the hurricane" (p. 97).

9/11 Terrorist Attacks (2001)

Scenario 9/11 was the first multiple hijacking in the United States, and the first in the world in more than thirty years. On September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists boarded four commercial jetliners, all transcontinental flights, carrying a maximum load of 11,400 gallons of jet fuel. Their objective was to take control of the planes once they were airborne and turn them into flying weapons of destruction. This was a typical summer day in New York City and Washington, D.C. Before ordinary passenger jets became fiery menaces, people in the World Trade Center and Pentagon were working at computers, reading e-mail, speaking on the phone or processing paperwork. None of the civilians seemed to know what was to happen.

Four targets had been chosen, all iconic American buildings that would send a clear message of the depth of the terrorists' hatred for the United States. All four planes crashed, killing all on board-terrorists, crew members, and passengers, along with hundreds who were killed inside the structures, on the ground, and the men and women who ran into collapsing buildings in an effort to try and save others. Only one of the four planes did not find its target. Thanks to cellular phones, passengers heard of the other crashes and chose to sacrifice themselves rather than let another plane devastate a fourth target, killing even more innocent people.

Data Sources

The Complete Investigation: 9/11 Report with Commentary by The New York Times. [START_REF] Kean | The Complete Investigation: 9/11 Report with Commentary by The New York Times. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States[END_REF] was used as the primary source of information about the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. This document provided a detailed description of the steps leading up to the attack, the actions taken by responders, victims, and government bodies tied to the scenes of the attacks, and an analysis of actions taken after the attack to address problems. The commission interviewed over 1,200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over two and a half million pages of documents, including some closely guarded classified national security documents. Before it was released by the commission, the final public report was screened for any potentially classified information and edited as necessary.

There is a wealth of relevant material to use for this analysis. We have selected examples pertaining to recognizing the threat, preparation for a possible attack, and managing first responders.

Data Analysis -Negotiated Order Theory

(a)

Diverse stakeholder involvement AND (b) Dealing with uncertainty and complexity

Recognizing the Threat Information sharing among stakeholder groups was identified as a critical gap in the identification and possible deterrence of terrorists in advance of the attack. Many lost opportunities for stopping the attack were identified in hindsight (p. 549). It was found that 15 of the 19 hijackers were potentially vulnerable to interception by border authorities. Analyzing their characteristic travel documents and travel patterns could have allowed authorities to intercept 4 to 15 and more effective use of information available in the US government databases could have identified up to 3 hijackers.

However, recognizing and acting on these pieces of critical information was extremely difficult to do in advance, and technology sources were not directly linked to the screening roles where interception could have occurred.

With respect to handling complexity, frequently a significant element of information was not recognized and shared because it comes bundled with thousands of other pieces of information and is lost in the volume. Also, identification of issues within the noise of constant day to day chatter requires someone to be listening for the message. There was a continual focus on rules of engagement without consideration of the desired results of the interactions.

Information may not be shared because those needing the information view it differently. The FBI focuses only on investigations and not on intelligence. Information not tied to a criminal investigation is not viewed as important. Hence content related to terrorist monitoring by the CIA was not readily useful to the FBI and not valued. Current rules governing information sharing require a clearly demonstrated "need to know" before sharing occurs. This approach assumes it is possible to know in advance what information is needed and why and assumes risk of exposure inappropriately outweighs the value of wider sharing.

(c) Development of economies of scale AND (d) Development of a sense of shared direction

A heightened terrorist threat resulted in tightened security in U.S. foreign facilities such as embassies and consulates, but precipitated no domestic response to negotiating economies of scale and efficient procurement and allocation of resources. U.S. foreign facilities have clear actions to be taken in case of threats (playbooks). No sense of shared direction was developed and domestic agencies had no game plan. Moreover, none of the organizations issuing the warnings instructed domestic agencies to develop a playbook. Even when specific threat concerns related to airlines were identified and communicated to the FAA, the responses mirrored actions taken to address hijacking and did not include consideration of a new type of terrorist (p. 379).

(e) Development of an orderly process for adapting to change (more suitable ICT architectures)

Responders at the WTC included members of the Port Authority, the fire department (FDNY) and the police (NYPD). Each of these groups had their own chain of command, their own communication protocols, and their own procedures and practices. Consequently, the groups did not have shared and orderly meta-processes for coordinated response. FDNY took over control of the towers to address the fire and the police worked in the surrounding areas to cover traffic flow and cordon off the area. Helicopter surveillance was provided by NYPD (p. 405). In a 17-minute period NYC and Port Authority of NY and NJ had mobilized the largest rescue operation in the city's history (over 1000 first responders), evacuation of the first tower had begun, and a decision was made that the fire in the first tower could not be fought. Then the second plane hit the World Trade Center. As the crises unfolded, the inability of various responder groups to share situational awareness information began to impact operational effectiveness (p. 422).

Victims trapped in the building were calling the 911 emergency response resources asking what to do. Although the offices in the WTC had gone through practice drills, when these were carried out the occupants were left gathering on the floor and awaiting instructions. When no instructions came due to communication failures, the occupants did not know what to do (p. 420). People from upper floors of the WTC went to the roof; helicopter evacuations were used successfully in the previous bombing. The helicopters were operated by NYPD and no FDNY personnel were placed in them during monitoring and decision making to determine if such a rescue option was feasible this time. The 911 operators did not receive any communication from site sources and did not know the location of the fire (floors) and could not tell people if it was possible for them to descend. They told victims to remain in place (standard response protocol) leaving the individuals trapped when many could have left safely.

The established procedures worked well as far as they went: police cleared the area and blocked further entrée; fire personnel identified what could be done to address fire and organized an orderly evacuation; port authority rescued people from PATH trains and metro below WTC; and an evacuation path was developed by fire personnel from the site directing people away from falling debris (p. 427). Each of these effective responses was handled by a single responder organization under a single command.

The limitations of the communication capabilities of FDNY with police and port authority personnel resulted in limited situational awareness being shared within the buildings. The occupants in building 2 did not know when building 1 had collapsed and did not recognize the significance of this event to their survival (many ignored the notification to evacuate when it came from another command).

In contrast, the Pentagon had rehearsed joint exercises among a range of first responders and had a clear command structure for blended responseall commands had a clear view of the site and could monitor the situation and communicate with their units. This allowed them to respond jointly to the changing situation. The circumstances of the attacked zone at the Pentagon were very different from NYC. The site was isolated physically from normal pedestrian and vehicle travel routes and under the control of a military organization with a structured military chain of command. The victims were not totally reliant on general first responder support (p. 451).

Discussion

The review of issues in collaboration and negotiation of outcomes across all three disasters show that there are many interdependent information, warning and communications connections that are critical, for effective disaster management. When these connections fail, generally as a result of staying with traditional command and control CoP approaches, there appears to be no acceptable alternative, i.e. there was no ability to negotiate a substitute disaster management picture. For example, in all three disasters there was a lack of a holistic view of the incident, i.e. lack of shared protocols (communications and procedures) and lack of ability to cope with the resulting information surge, which resulted in poor shared situational awareness of what was unfolding and the most appropriate response to it.

In the case of each disaster we see: 2). In asking these questions of all stakeholders in each instance of a disaster, a new DoP is generated to suit the emergent and dynamic characteristics of that scenario while reusing technological/informational/human resources and process knowledge that is available to hand and which suits the new circumstances. This is a departure from the current "command and control" approach to disaster management where agencies establish a command centre to assemble a common operating picture. Our approach facilitates collaboration of decentralized stakeholders and resources for the management of dynamic and emerging scenarios.

Table 2. Negotiated Arrangements for a Dynamic Operating Picture

DoP REQUIREMENTS Technological flexibility and connectivity

management and allocation as well as cultural conflicts between domestic and foreign personnel. Inter-regional disaster management and response is also more complex for similar reasons. Disaster management systems, information and processes could be managed to reduce complexity and conflict if we develop sufficient knowledge about these scenarios and what are appropriate responses to them.

Conclusion

Disasters are emergent and dynamic scenarios involving diverse stakeholders. To improve disaster response, we suggest that emergency service agencies should consider supplementing their "command and control" approaches and common operating pictures (CoP), to better account for these conditions.

This paper focuses on collaboration as a means to supplement current practice, and uses [START_REF] Mccann | Design guidelines for social problem-solving interventions[END_REF] Negotiated Order Theory as an analytical lens and as a basis to develop successful DoP in disaster management. We then examined data collected by the commissions of enquiry into the Victorian Bushfires of 2009 (Parliament of Victoria 2010), Hurricane Katrina during 2005 [START_REF] Davis | A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation For and Response to Hurricane Katrina[END_REF]) and 911 Terrorist Attacks in 2001 [START_REF] Kean | The Complete Investigation: 9/11 Report with Commentary by The New York Times. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States[END_REF]).

Our analysis demonstrates that these three quite different disasters share common command and control CoP systems failings. This suggests that development of a negotiated DoP, rather than the usual CoP "command centre" approaches to domain specific disasters such as bushfires, hurricanes or terrorist acts, may be more appropriate for disaster management in general. The analysis provided in this paper could equally be applied to other disaster scenarios, such as the Fukoshima Tsunami (2011), Haiti Earthquake (2010), Gulf Oil Spill (2010) or Queensland Floods (2010/11) to highlight similarities and differences between them and then derive where CoP approaches can be best supplemented with collaboration and negotiated DoP.

Our analysis of these cases also highlights the unique socio-organizational aspects of federal, state and local governments and community groups and the resulting structural, policy and cultural roadblocks to effective disaster management. Socioorganizational factors and their impact on collaborative negotiated outcomes often literally mean the difference between life and death in a disaster scenario.

Building on the creation of a disaster scenario "bank" as well as repertoires of collaboration for the negotiation of DoP, the longer term objective of this project is the development and introduction of unique, easily understood, collaborative disaster management information and process modeling methods, organizational structures and metrics to complement the "repertoires" approach to enabling DoP. These would be useful to accelerate the maturity of government inter-agency information and process improvement approaches, as well as translating successful process improvements to other agencies, by enabling collaborative communication and adaptation of information, process and organizational change. By incorporating tools and metrics to model, compare and evaluate disaster management information and process approaches, their organization and management, government, community groups and ICT providers will be able to utilize this knowledge to facilitate optimal outcomes in disaster management regardless of scenario.

  the most destructive Atlantic hurricane of 2005 and one of the five deadliest in U.S. history. More than 1,833 people perished during Katrina and the ensuing floods, making it the deadliest hurricane since the Okeechobee hurricane in 1928. Property damage for Katrina was estimated at $81 billion (in 2005 USD).

  The necessity is growing for the development approaches to collaboration for, and negotiation of, dynamic operating pictures for disaster management. As we know, DoP rely heavily on: technological flexibility and connectivity; information governance mechanisms; long term systems sustainability and resource efficiency (Qumer-Gill 2012), while disaster management stakeholders are required to negotiate roles and responsibilities to perform regulative functions, otherwise the viability of satisfactory disaster management outcomes are at stake[START_REF] Mccann | Design guidelines for social problem-solving interventions[END_REF].[START_REF] Mccann | Design guidelines for social problem-solving interventions[END_REF] gives us a useful starting point by which to formulate approaches for DoP development as negotiated arrangements theory attempts to address differences in socio-organisational factors by focusing on: (a) diverse stakeholder involvement; (b) dealing with uncertainty and complexity; (c) development of economies of scale; (d) development of a sense of shared direction and (e) development of an orderly process for adapting to change (more suitable ICT architectures) in order to facilitate collaboration between organizations. By combining negotiated arrangements characteristics with DoP requirements we are able to generate a collaborative focus for disaster management, what we call "repertoires of collaboration" for governments, agencies, businesses and the community when negotiating a DoP for any given disaster scenario (see Table

		Incompatibility of local responses and a lack of global management of the emerging disaster;
		Imprecise and ambiguous warnings and a lack of urgency to react/evacuate being communicated;
		A lack of oversight and sense of common purpose resulting in poor information/technical/human resource management;
		"Paralysis" of government agencies as they did not want to be seen to be complicating disaster response by over-reacting or
		wasting resources;



Poor recognition of threats (in all 3 incidents) due to lack of sharing and ownership of different views of information, which was a critical gap in recognizing the threats posed by these incidents in the first place; and  Little coordinated oversight of the "command and control" structures between emergency agencies and their inability to flexibly and effectively share changing situational awareness.

Information governance mechanisms

Long term systems sustainability and resource efficiency Negotiated Arrangements CHARACTERISTICS

Diverse stakeholder involvement

What technology can we supply to design and deliver (enable) the DoP ?

How can we supply authentic, accurate, reliable and legal information (quality) to the DoP ? How do we sustain a DoP architectural focus over the long term while minimizing organizational (process) requirements?

Dealing with uncertainty and complexity

How do we identify the most successful and simplest way to technically enable the DoP ? How can we reduce information complexity while increasing its quality in the DoP? How to we sustain a DoP while minimizing process complexity?

Development of economies of scale

How do we collaborate with other stakeholders to procure, allocate and manage technologies for the DoP?

How do we collaborate with other stakeholders to procure, allocate and manage information in the DoP?

How do we collaborate with other stakeholders to ensure long term systems sustainability and resource efficiency of the DoP?

Development of a sense of shared direction

How do we organize stakeholders to identify with and enable the DoP architecture? How do we organize to ensure that all stakeholders are managing information in a way that enables the DoP? How do we organize to combine architectural and informational components supplied by stakeholders in a sustainable and efficient manner (multistakeholder processes)

Development of an orderly process for adapting to change

How do we retain the knowledge and experience of DoP design and delivery for the next disaster scenario?

How do we retain the knowledge and experience of DoP information sourcing and supply for the next disaster scenario? How do we retain the knowledge and experience of DoP multi stakeholder processes for the next disaster scenario?

The initially developed questions could be used to make improvements to scenario dependent technology, information and process management. In time, appropriate metrics might also be developed and trialed in order to measure costs and benefits of improvements to the use of these resources.

Further incorporation of "lessons learned" from the analysis of other disaster scenarios would give the global research community a more holistic view of the types of disaster that may occur, the various environments in which governments, agencies, business and communities operate, as well as a direction to more effectively harness and manage technical/information/human resources. This is particularly important for areas of the world where resources are scare and where a response may rely on foreign aid and personnel. Disaster scenarios in these situations, are often more complex to manage due to perceived lack of control over resource