Martine Mazaudon Lacito
email: mazaudon@vjf.cnrs.fr

On tone in Tamang and neighbouring languages: synchrony and diachrony

The tonal situation of languages of the Tamangish (TGTM) and Bodish (Tibetan) groups Following Shafer's classification, the languages discussed here all belong to one division among six in Sino-Tibetan, 1 the Bodic division, a name formed on bod, the name of Tibet in Tibetan. The Bodic division contains four sections, one of which, the Bodish section, contains two main branches, the Bodish branch, cons isting of all the Tibetan dialects, and the Gurung branch, which I have renamed "Tamang or Tamangish branch" to follow the speakers' autonym, or TGTM after the initials of its main languages, Tamang, Gurung, Thakali, and Manangke (Shafer R., 1955). No claim is made here concerning the higher level classification of the family, but Tibetan (in its many dialects) and Tamangish are definitely closely related.

Geographically, these two branches of the Tibeto-Burman (TB) family are located contiguously at the south-western edge of the Sino-Tibetan area, in contact with the non-tonal Indo-Aryan languages. If tonogenesis has spread from the east, it might be expected that this western edge would have been reached most recently, and that tone formation processes could still be observed, yielding typologically "less tonal" languages.

Languages of the Tamang branch are all tonal, and have very similar four-tone systems, in regular etymological correspondence. The bipartition of an earlier two-tone system is reconstructible, but the origin of these earlier two tones is obscure. I have shown that Benedict's attempt to correlate the two old Tamang tones to the two tones reconstructed for Lolo-Burmese and Sino-Tibetan is not conclusive. (

It would be easy to believe that "tone languages" cons titute by now a well defined typological category. Numerous books and articles have endeavoured to provide us with a reliable definition, with a list of characteristics. But there are at least two classes of powerful contenders for the title of prototypical tone language. These classes can be exemplified by (1) a Nilo-Saharan African language like Kunama, with its three level tones, assignable to each mora, and four contour tones analysable as 'tone-clusters' of level tones (Yip M., 2002:141-2) on the one hand, or (2) an Asian language like Vietnamese, with six melodic tones, assignable to each syllable.

Languages with a lower concentration of lexically distinctive pitches in the spoken chain were not traditionally assigned to the "tone language" category (Pike K. L., 1948), unless the interplay of a tone system with an accent system could be invoked to explain away the absence of pitch contrasts on uns tressed syllables by neutralization (Martinet A., 1967:90-91). Some of these less than fully tonal languages were categorized as "pitch-accent" systems, with either Swedish, Norwegian or Serbo-Croatian acting as the prototype (Lehiste I., 1970:85).

Beside the tone-bearing unit, and the possibility of analysing contours as "toneclusters" (as in Kunuma) or not (as in Vietnamese), a third aspect of tone systems which can be debated is "the interaction between tone and non-tonal (typically laryngeal) features", which can sometimes be interpreted as "a pho nological condition on tone" or "even be a part of the definition of a tone, e.g. the low creaky tone of Vietnamese" (Hyma n L., 2001(Hyma n L., :1371)).

For the Tamangish (or TGTM) branch of Tibeto-Burman, and for the tonal dialects of Tibetan, in the neighboring Bodish branch, we make two claims :

(1) The tone bearing unit is the morpheme, or the word.

(2) Cooccurring laryngeal features are best analyzed as features of the tones.

The historical origin of these tones in segmental material at the beginning and the end of words is consistent with these synchronic claims. Tibetan dialects on the other hand go from toneless, as in Ngaba Amdo, to marginally tonal with almost no functional load, as in Balti (Pakistan), to fully tonal as in Lhasa, Shigatse, or Dzongkha (Bhutan), although some redundancy with associated segmental features remains (Huang B., 1995 ;Sun J. T.-S., 1997Sun J. T.-S., , 2003)). For Tibetan we are lucky to have a written form dating from the 7th century, predating tonogenesis. Tibetan tones are more recent than the two proto-Tamang tones. They can easily be traced to segmental material at the beginning and the end of words as reflected in the conservative Tibetan orthography. Tamangish is close to Tibetan, but their separation dates from before the period of Written Tibetan (WT). The reconstruction of the older Tamangish two-tone system has to be done by internal and comparative reconstruction inside the group of Tamangish dialects. (Mazaudon M., 1978). This system is not shared by Old Tibetan which appears to have been toneless.

The domain of tone

In a recent encyclopedia article Hyman proposes the following definition: "A language with tone is one in which an indication of pitch enters into the lexical realization of at least some morphemes" (Hyman L., 2001(Hyman L., :1368)). But Hyman specifically avoids saying that all languages that have tone [in the sense of his definition] are "tone languages" (ibid. 1376). The problem with Hyman's definition, for the languages we are concerned with, is that it contains an unspoken part, which is listed the Kuki-Naga languages in India, 3. Baric, i.e. the group around the Bodo-Garo languages of Assam, 4. Karenic, the Karen languages in Burma and Thailand, 5. Sinitic, the Chinese so-called 'dialects', and 6. Daic, i.e. Thai Kadai and their group. The Daic division is not now generally considered to be a member of Sino-Tibetan. Tibeto-Burman is here used to designate divisions 1 to 4.

On tone in Tamang and neighbouring languages 3 as a "property" of tone. The "tone bearing unit (TBU)" is said to be the mora, the vowel, or at most the syllable (ibid. 1368). Any assignment of a pitch pattern to a larger domain has to be worked out as an interplay of stress and tone. So Swedish type "pitchaccent" systems are considered as "hybrids" which mix properties of stress-systems and of tone-systems, while a system like Tokyo Japanese is considered as a "restricted tonesystem" (ibid. 1376). Himalayan tones are not considered.

I started working on Nepalese Tibeto-Burman languages in 1969, at about the same time as Kenneth Pike and some members of his team. Pike was the author of the famous early definition of a tone language as "a language having lexically significant, contrastive but relative pitch on each syllable" (Pike K. L., 1948:3). After a few months of working with Tamang, Gurung and Thakali, Pike was led to admit that the "foot" or "phonological word" was the domain in which pitch and voice quality (breathiness) contrasts had to be stated (Pike K. L., 1970). At this point the analysis was still in progress, and Pike's statement was made in terms of "restrictions". By mid 1970, however, he co-signed with Maria Hari and Doreen Taylor a paper on Western Tamang which plainly states that "the domain for each of these contrasts [of breathiness and pitch contour] is the morpheme or the morpheme followed by non-tonal suffixes" (Hari M., D. Taylor & K. L. Pike, 1970:82).

At the same time, I worked out the tonal system of a dialect of Eastern Tamang, which, unsurprisingly, had similar characteristics. The demonstration was done in my dissertation in 1971 and was published in 1973. (Mazaudon M., 1973b:61-92). I must say that, without the moral support of Pike, the official proponent of the one-tone-persyllable theory, I would never, as a PhD student at the time, have dared to believe that my inability to break down the tonal patterns into successions of syllabic tones with sandhi or accentual restrictions was not simply due to my own incompetence. Of course a "solution" is always possible inside a theory, provided enough fudging is allowed. I believe the theory should rather be revised to allow for some languages with a TBU larger than the syllable. I will briefly summarize the evidence for TGTM languages, then compare the structure of their tonal domain to that of some Tibetan dialects.

Word-tone in the languages of the Tamang group (TGTM)

In TGTM languages the tone bearing unit in the lexicon is the morpheme; in the sentence, it is the word, formed of a tonal lexical item plus its atonal grammatical affixes. The tonal melody which characterizes the tone of the lexical item fully determines the pitch of the suffix or string of suffixes. In many cases, the melody simply extends, or rather deploys itself over the number of syllables available.

All languages of the Tamang branch described until now2 exhibit a four-tone system (Mazaudon M., 1978). Pitch values on monosyllabic words for eight of these dialects are represented in figure 1 3 , using Chao Yuen-ren's notation (Chao Y.-r., 1933).

Excursus on tonogenesis in TGTM: a case of tonal bipartition

Five of the eight dialects listed have a main split in their system between two high tones and two low tones. These are Risiangku and Sahugaon Tamang, Tukche and Syang Thakali, and Ghachok Gurung. Correlatively, the low tones are accompanied by a particular phonation type, which has been described as breathiness (shown by a grey background in the chart), while the two high tones are pronounced with modal voice.

Two more features are associated with low tone words in these five dialects, one phonological, one phonetic. First, and this is valid for all eight dialects, the obstruent initials, on which a contrast of aspiration exists under tone-1 and tone-2, do not contrast for aspiration under tone-3 and tone-4. In words of tones 3 and 4, only one laryngeal mode is found on word-initial consonants. In the five dialects with a main High/Low division, the resulting archiphoneme is unaspirated.

Secondly, phonetically, obstruent initials under the low tones in these five dialects can be optionally slightly voiced. Nowhere in the phonemic systems of the eight dialects is a voicing contrast pertinent 4 : initials on the high tones are either voiceless aspirated or voiceless unaspirated, phonetically and phonemically. In intervocalic position, unaspirated obstruents are voiced, and often spirantized. In dialects where the intervocalic aspiration contrast exists (Risiangku among them) the aspirated obstruents remain uncha nged (no deaspiration, no voicing, no spirantization). reported to have reduced its tone system to a simple high-low opposition (Hildebrandt K., 2003). 3 Language cum ethnic names are on the first line, village names on the second line. Ris. is Risiangku, Sahu is Sahugaon. 4 Nepali loans in Gurung are an exception.

Tone

Voice The relationship between pitch and laryngeal features on the vowel and the initial is a giveaway for the origin of the tones. We can readily reconstruct the redundant occasional feature of voice as belonging to the ancestral stage, while a tonal opposition developed later from what used to be redundant pitch lowering after proto-voiced initials. As devoicing of the obstruent initials progressed, the voicing contrast on continuants and sibilants disappeared, and tones were phonemicized. We can thus reconstruct an old system for Proto-TGTM with two tones, a three-way contrast (aspirated, voiceless, voiced) on obstruent initials, and a two-way contrast (voiced and voiceless) on continuant initials. For a step by step demonstration see (Mazaudon M., 1973a(Mazaudon M., , 1978)). This is the absolutely standard scenario of tonal bipartition which took place repeatedly all over Asia, as demonstrated by Haudricourt for Vietnamese and Chinese in his 1954 articles (Haudricourt A.-G., 1954b(Haudricourt A.-G., , 1954a)), and which we can represent in the format he used in his detailed survey Bipartition et tripartition des systèmes de tons dans quelques langues d'Extrême-Orient (Haudricourt A.-G., 1961).

Initials ?

Tones ? *A *B k,ts,t,p..., kh,tsh,th,ph..., s, *hm>m, *hn>n ..., *hl>l, *hr>r ... 1 2 *g>k, *dz>ts, *d>t, *b>p ..., *z>s..., m, n, ..., l, r, w... 3 4

Fig. 3. Bipartition of tones in proto-TGTM

We will return to the other three dialects in section 4.1, after considering the domain of the tones.

The domain of tone in TGTM

In all the languages of the group, grammatical suffixes are reported to be devoid of distinctive tones, and to carry pitch patterns entirely conditioned by the tone of the root.

As an example, figure 4 presents the four tonal contours of Risiangku Tamang as pronounced by a male speaker on a verb root followed by the suffix /-ma/. The contours are averaged over 38 different verbs, in a carrier sentence. The carrier sentence -/Xma X-ma 3 la:nan X-ci/ 'He X-ed a lot' (X-ing X-ing much X-ed) -provides three occurrences of the verb+suffix combination in three positions in the intonation curve. The second occurrence of /X-ma/ was chosen for the present calculation5 .

Fig. 4. The four tones of Risiangku on disyllabic bimorphemic verbal words

The same patterns occur on disyllabic monomorphemic nouns.

Except for some realignment in timing, and occasional loss of the extremities of the curve on short items, the se patterns are the same four patterns that are realized on monosyllabic monomorphemic words. Thus in a language like Risiangku Tamang, which has an independent opposition between long and short vowels, we observe the same four tones on a short CV word, a long CVV word, a monomorphemic CVCV disyllable, bimorphemic CV-CV or CVCV-CV words, ..., and so on up to trisyllabic morphemes, which are rare, or roots with strings of suffixes, which are frequent.

As an example, we can compare, in figure 5, the fall-rise on the word 'horse' (resulting in the acoustic impression of a level tone), to the tone-2 pattern on verbal words in figure 4, which falls on the first syllable and rises on the second syllable (before a phrase-final fall which is found with all tones). The sentence is : /²ta ³pi-pa/ 'he says horse'. Similarly on a tone-2 trisyllabic word, the first syllable falls gently, the second is higher, and the third slightly lower than the second. (fig. 6).

for individual syllables were interpolated linearly at 100 time points equally spaced between the beginning and end of the vowel, so that the results could be averaged over syllables. More technical detail on the method can be found in A. Michaud's article, Final consonants and glottalization: new perspectives from Hanoi Vietnamese, Phonetica 61: 119-146 (2004). Tone-1, a high-falling tone in Risiangku, falls sharply, after an optional rise, on phrase-final monosyllables. In the tone-1 disyllabic words of figure 4 this is realized by the sharp increase in the slope of the Fall on the suffix. Note also that brevity was described as a correlative character of tone-1 on monosyllables (Mazaudon M., 1973b:63). In figure 4 we observe that the verb root is not significantly shorter for tone-1 than for the other tones, but the suffix is extremely short.

The same expansion-compression of the tonal melody can be observed in the other TGTM languages.

We will now take an example in Tukche Thakali, from a recording by Maria Hari (Hari M., 1971). Figure 7 compares two tone-4 monomorphemic words, / 4 me/ (spelled 'meh) 'cow' and / 4 came/ ('cahme) 'daughter' in the carrier sentence /cu nga-e --ihmu/ 'this is my --' .

It appears that the full pattern Fall-Rise-Leveling-and-Fall that is realized on the disyllable / 4 came/ is simplified to almost only the Rise on the short vowel of the monosyllable / 4 me/. If we were to consider the first syllable as the sole carrier of the tone, / 4 me/ would be a rising tone, and / 4 came/ would be a falling tone. When a final nasal lengthens the rime, as in / 4 tim/ ('tihm) 6 the overall melody on the rime resembles closely that on the disyllable / 4 came/ (fig 7c).

disyllable c. CN rime

In Manangke, a recent paper by Kristine Hildebrandt presents tracings of tone contrasts on quasi-minimal sets, showing the spreading of tone patterns on monosyllables, disyllabic roots, and disyllabic words formed of verb stems + nominalizer suffix (Hildebrandt K., 2005:26-31). This could be shown for all languages of the group.

I have dwelt at length on the issue of the tone-bearing unit and presented some phonetic illustrations because this type of system is uncommon. It is likely connected to emergent tone systems (provided that emergence is understood as a process which can last a few centuries), rather than to long established systems. Nonethe less it should be emphasized that it can be ascribed to the same consonant-based laryngeal origin which is at the source of so many Asian tones and not to "prosodic features such as length, stress, and intonational tones", as is postulated for pitch-accent languages (Ove L., 2004).

As a final rema rk, note that, in Risiangku Tamang, breathiness, which we will cons ider in section 3, also extends over the whole morpheme7 (maybe the word), unless it is stopped by a phonetically voiceless segment, that is, an aspirated stop or /s/.

The domain of tone in Tibetan languages

The tonal dialects of Tibetan also have word-tone systems. They differ from the TGTM type in that part of the word may fall out of the domain of the tone. These extrametrical syllables, short and unstressed, disappear in Dzongkha, leaving a compensatory fall in pitch.

Lhasa

In Lhasa Tibetan as described by Sprigg (Sprigg R. K., 1954(Sprigg R. K., , 1955)), Chang and Shefts (Shefts B. C., 1968b(Shefts B. C., , 1968a) ) , Hu (Hu [START_REF] Tan | Recherches sur les tons du tibétain (dialecte de Lhasa)[END_REF], and many others, we can distinguish four prosodic entities on monosyllables: high, high falling-glottalized, low, low-rising-falling-glottalized. A length distinction exists additionally on non-glottalized syllables. Depending on the features that each analyst chooses to include as "tonal", this makes from 2 (only HIGH and LOW) to 6 "tones" (if length is considered an attribute of tone)8 . Length can occur on initial or non-initial syllables, and I believe it best treated as separate from the tone pattern. On longer items, whether etymologically compounds or formed of a root plus a derivational suffix, the same four patterns are encountered: the beginning of the word is high or low, the end is falling-glottalized or level-smooth. The intervening syllables are high.

The segmental origin of these pitch patterns has been understood for over a century because the older form of a non-tonal Tibetan is faithfully reflected in the orthography. As in TGTM, and possibly at roughly the same time, the loss of the voicing contrast on the initials (complicated by the simplification of initial clusters) gave rise to the high/low register contrast which all authors recognize. Note that this emergence of a tonal contrast occurred in a toneless language, whereas the TGTM languages were already tonal. The two "falling-glottalized tones" are reported to have alternative pronunciations, without a noticeable fall when a final oral or glottal stop is actually pronounced (Sprigg R. K., 1955). Some other authors consider such pronunciations as bookish. Whatever the case may be, the transphonologization of the closure due to the presence of an obstruent final into a falling pitch pattern is a later development, still in progress.

From the point of view of the domain of tone, it should be noted that wordinternally, whether syllable final consonants are present or not, there is no falling pitch, and whether syllable initials are spelled with voiced initials or not, there is no low tone9 . It all works as if only the word-initial and word-final consonants had seen their features transferred to a tonal contrast. And I would like to suggest that this may indeed have been the case.

There is a typological difference, however, between Lhasa Tibetan and languages of the Tamang group. Tamang syllables appear to be all about equally stressed. In Lhasa Tibetan, inflectional (as opposed to derivational) suffixes, like case-markers and verbal suffixes, are de-stressed. Correlatively, they are "extrametrical" from the tonal point of view, "in that the host syllable they are attached to is characterized by domainfinal contours, as if the enclitics do not count as part of the tonal domain" to quote J. Sun's formulation (Sun J. T.-S., 1997:503) (see also Mazaudon, 1977:82-83). These suffixes are written without tone marks in Chang and Shefts' transcription and marked low by Sprigg. They do not carry the distinctive features of the root tone, and play no role in its identification.

Dzongkha

A last type of tonal development I would like to touch upon occurred in Dzongkha, the national language of Bhutan. The languages of the Bodish section, and to a large extent TB languages in general, are poor in accentual contrasts. They do not generally give prominence, either by way of F0 or intensity, to one syllable per unit. Either all syllables have roughly equal prominence, as in the TGTM group, or one syllable per unit is weak. This last is the case of Burmese schwa syllables at the beginning of the word, a structure which Matisoff has named "sesquisyllable" (Matisoff J. A., 1999:11).

What we just mentioned about extrametrical suffixes in Lhasa points to the opposite pattern: a weak syllable at the end of the word. Dzongkha has pus hed this characteristic one step further, and reduced disyllables to monosyllables. (Mazaudon M. & B. Michailovsky, 1988). In so doing it gave rise to a bipartition of its High/Low basic system (of the same origin as in Tibetan or TGTM) into a four-tone system. Monosyllables derived from old disyllables have falling pitch, while historical monosyllables have level pitch, except for old vowel + r and l rimes which also have falling pitch. Ex. WT thag-pa > thap [42] 'rope' , WT thap > thap [44] 'stove'. The synchronic result is a four-tone system on all syllable types, except short open CV syllables.

The origin of word-tone in Bodish

The basic question in this domain is whether richer systems of syllabic tones existed before and were reduced through sandhi phenomena in polysyllabic words, or whether word-tone systems emerged as such. In recent compounds, across Bodish languages, both in the TGTM and in the Tibetan group, we find that two behaviours are possible depending on the degree of integration of the compound. Some compounds retain the tones of each component. This is often accompanied by other signs of the independance of the components, for instance, in Risiangku Tamang, retaining a long vowel in the second component, and failing to voice the initial of the second component. Composition in this case is only syntactic (no possible separation of the components without a change in meaning). Other compounds acquire a single tone. Some can oscillate between the two structures.

For those words which always have a single tone, the date of compounding cannot be ascertained for unwritten languages, but certainly a number at least of modern Tibetan compounds and words derived through suffixation are attested as such from the beginning of Written Tibetan. In such old polysyllabic items, I have heard from classical Tibetan scholars that many "spelling mistakes" occur in old texts between all three series of initials: voiced, voiceless and aspirated. This indicates that the three-way manner contrast which gave rise to tone in word-initial position was not present in intervocalic position at the time when tone started to develop, and explains why tone did not develop in non-initial syllables.

The other source of initial-based tonal contrasts in Tibetan was the reduction of initial clusters: this did not occur in word internal position, where the clusters are still found10 . Thus a second potential source of tonal opposition was unavailable in internal position.

The non-F0 cues of tone, concomitant, successive, or alternative

Breathiness and Tamang tones

Phonation and melody: concomitant or successive

As we have already mentioned, breathiness on the initial consonant and the rime coocurs with low tone in most Tibetan dialects and in all TGTM dialects. This is not to say that the degree of breathiness or the implementation of breathiness is the same everywhere. According to Silverman, Tamang is an exception to a general rule he was able to establish according to which, in languages where a tonal system and a phonation contrast coexist, the implementation of features of tone and features of phonation (creak or breathiness) are sequential, not simultaneous. Typically, in a system which has tone, breathy phonation would occur at the beginning of the vowel, or on the end of an initial sonorant and the beginning of the vowel, leaving the end of the vowel free for tonal contrasts, as in Mazatec, an Otomanguean language of Mexico (Silverman D., 1997:152-4), or alternatively it could occur later, after tonal contrasts, and be heard as post-vocalic aspiration, as in Jeh, a Mon-Khmer language of . Breathiness blurs tonal information, and thus the simultaneity of tone information and phonation information is less than optimal from an efficiency point of view.

Sequencing or "phasing", to use Silverman's term, is not the way TGTM languages treat this potential conflict. All sources report the presence of breathiness all through the vowel, often starting during a sonorant initial, and the occasional perception of a post-vocalic h-like sound. In Risiangku Tamang I have even observed that breathiness may extend to the following syllable if not arrested by an intervening phonetically voiceless consonant (an aspirate or /s/). Silverman surmises (ibid. 194) that since Tamang uses tone and breathiness in a non-sequential manner, Tamang breathiness must be weak. This is indeed the case. There is much less noise in a Tamang breathy word than in a Nepali word starting with a so-called voiced aspirate.

But there is another consideration which will resolve Tamang's exceptionality. Maddieson (Maddieson I., 1984:132) reinterprets the Tamang four-tone system as the combination of two tones and two phonation types. This can be done mechanically from the charts in figures 1 and 2, by analysing tone-3 as "tone-1 + breathy", and tone-4 as "tone-2 + breathy" (tone-1 being "tone-1 + clear", and tone-2 now being "tone-2 + clear"). However Mazaudon (1973: 79-84) had demonstrated at some length that any analysis of the four tones as combinations of binary features resulted in arbitrary choices, and concluded that the best interpretation was a scalar system of four tones from highest to lowest, each tone having idiosyncratic secondary cues. Breathiness is one of those secondary cues. In this interpretation Tamang is no longer an example of a "laryngeally complex language", defined as a language making independent phonological use of F0 and voice quality. Pitch and phonation cues to tonal oppositions in Tamang can be realized concomitantly because they are cues to a single tone rather than distinct entities.

Silverman observes that laryngeal features usually are formed with a "primary gesture", e.g. "lower vocal fold tension" for low tone and "higher glottal aperture" for breathiness. Each feature also has concomitant "enhancing gestures", which contribute to its audibility (ibid.:141-3). As it happens, breathy voice and low tone share some "enhancing gestures", like "lower larynx". The primary gesture for each of them also happens to be a member of the set of enhancing gestures of the other. So, if low tone and breathiness cooccur they reinforce each other. This actually is rather consistent with the details of Tamang phonetics. In Risiangku, tone-4, the lowest tone, is also the more breathy of the two low tones. Tone-3, which is less low and less breathy than tone-4, conversely retains more often and to a greater degree the etymological voiced (or lenis) character of the initial stop.

So if Silverman would revert to my analysis of Tamang tones, tones 3 and 4 would be, like Mandarin third tone, cases of tonal melody with secondary phonation cues, and he would be left with only one exception to his generalization, the Mpi language of Thailand, whose use of creakiness is unresolved.

The alternative use of tonal cues

The alternative use of cues to a given phonemic entity constitutes the synchronic variation which allows historical change. During the evolution of TGTM languages, after a period when low pitch and breathy phonation increased together while the initial was becoming more and more voiceless, these two features started going their separate ways in some dialects, as we will see in section 4. Thus when tone-4 in Taglung Tamang had become high falling (instead of very low 11 ) the breathy phonation stopped being an "enhancer" and was dropped.

Synchronically, I noted in Risiangku that among variant realizations of tone-4, when the pitch fell to the bottom of the range, the initial was totally voiceless, and breathiness too was absent. When the tone is low enough, the additional clue of breathiness can be dispensed with.

Allophony, or allotony between pitch and non-pitch features is found in languages other than Tamang. In Latvian, for example, Lehiste says, "laryngealization is the one consistant phonetic feature associated with the so-called third tone" (Lehiste I., 1970:90) and again "laryngealization [...] may also function [...] as an allotone of low pitch." In a similar manner, allophony between a final consonant and a melodic pattern is often claimed for Tibetan.

Breathiness and Tibetan tones

The high pitch of non-initial syllables

Yip (Yip M., 2002:196-9), following Duanmu (Duanmu S., 1992), proposes a synchronic analysis of Lhasa Tibetan which explains the High pitch on internal syllables as the spreading of a postulated High component which is postulated to be present in all initial tones. Thus high initial would be H, and a low initial would be LH. This is postulated to explain the high pitch of word internal syllables in Lhasa.

Sun convincingly refutates this argument by demonstrating that High in Lhasa (and in all other Tibetan dialects) is the neutral tone, and need not be posited underlyingly (Sun J. T.-S., 1997). He points out that his analysis is also consistent with history. The default tone is High synchronically because it was always high; it is unchanged from the non-tonal stage of old Tibetan. I would like to phrase this a little differently, following the same line of argument. Instead of saying that in old Tibetan "all syllables were normally produced in the high register" (Sun, 1997:508), I would prefer to say they were all produced with a modal voice (and no pitch register). The important point is that, as Sun rightly empha sizes, when pitch differences started to be phonologized, some syllables migrated to Low, and not the reverse. Thus the internal syllables, with their high pitch, represent the unchanged state historically, which is also the synchronic default tone (in a syllabic analysis) in modern Tibetan 11 This kind of evolution with melodic tones is nothing miraculous. It is definitely not a one step process, as shown by dialect comparison (Mazaudon, 1978). When a Low cannot become any lower, it turns rising or falling (in a very similar way to *i > ai in the Great English vowel shift), after which any portion of the curve can become the prominent cue.

Sun draws an argument for his analysis of "High" as the default across all Tibetan dialects from two Khams dialects, Derge and Batang, where a proto-voiced initial, when unprefixed, yielded a voiceless initial with low tone (WT go > Derge ko (L) 'hear'), but where those proto-voiced initials which were originally prefixed remained voiced, and are on the High tone (WT dgu > gu (H) 'nine'). So, says Sun, since voice phonetically lowers the pitch, if a High occurs after a voiced initial it has to be original. This case constitutes a good example, in my view, of how alternative cues which are used in a period of change get settled or not: in forms where voicing was retained, low pitch, even if it developed phonetically at a time, did not become established as a main cue, and it was eventually dropped in later evolution.

"Furthermore, Sun remarks, register on syllables with synchronically [Sun's emphasis] voiced obstruent initials show variation in register which is apparently random in some dialects, e.g. Derge (Huang B., 1995), Chamdo (Liu F.-H., 1984)". This Khams data is a textbook case for a structuralist analysis: if there is no difference, there is no object. If Low does not exist after modern voiced initials, then High does not "exist" either. The observed random variation reflects the absence of a phonological contrast, in my terms an archiphoneme, in Sun's terms a neutral tone.

The role of breathiness

Historically I would recast the story, introducing breathy voice as a main actor, in the following terms. Unprefixed voiced initials started devoicing and became breathy, along with the following rime, at the same time as the pitch of the syllable became lower. We have already seen that breathiness and Low pitch are mutually reinforcing. Prefixed voiced initials had their voicing protected by the prevoicing due to the prefix. They may have had a slight depressing effect on pitch, as is reported universally for voiced initials, but that depression was not developed nor phonologized. So, eventually, depending on the dialect, when tone was phonemicized on breathy syllables12 , voiced initial syllables, which were phonologically toneless13 , either retained that 'neutral' status, whence the random variation in Derge and Chamdo, or lined up as a group with one of the two newly created tones. Or again, as in the example of Batang, quoted by Sun from Gesang (Gesang J., 1985), they split between High and Low according to some other small phonetic difference created by the point of articulation of their initial, as in Batang ndzee (H) 'rice' < WT 'bras vs ndzee (L) 'to resent' < WT 'gras.

The intermediate presence of breathiness seems certain. It exists synchronically in many if not most Tibetan dialects, probably in more dialects than has been reported. Mainland Chinese scholars, who are doing a thorough job of describing these dialects, are not in the habit of transcribing phonation differences which are analyzed as a redundant feature. Tone-as-pitch is considered the element to be noted. But for history you need those redundant features: they are the stuff that past and future are made of. Tibetan and TGTM display in their synchronic state, with their multi-clue tonal systems, an embodiment of the diachronic process. They demonstrate something which is not new but is sometimes forgotten, that phonetically "Voice" may give rise to low(ering) but phonemically it is "Voice merges with Voiceless" which gives rise to Low.

The evolution of tones in TGTM after the bipartition

As Haudricourt pointed out, "once it is constituted, the tonal system evolves without remembering its origins" 14 . Thus, for example, the old *B-LOW and *B-HIGH tones, in the Popei dialect of Chinese, acquired a high and a low value, respectively, in the modern language.

4.1. The evolution after the bipartition of the three TGTM dialects which we have not yet examined in detail demonstrates this point. In figure 1 we can see that tone-4 in Taglung and Marpha has evolved from being a very low tone to being the highest tone in the system and sharply falling [51]. It has lost its breathy component at the same time. As an heir to the LOW tonal series, it has kept the neutralisation 15 of aspiration on initial stops, and only voiceless unaspirate stops occur.

In Manang, tone-4 has remained rather low [31], but tone-3 has soared to the top of the scale [54]. Both lost their breathy component, but both keep the trace of their LOW origin in the neutralization of aspiration on their initial stops. Interestingly, the archiphoneme is realized voiceless unaspirated under tone-3, as in Taglung and Marpha, but voiceless aspirated under tone-4. I believe this reflects the difference in the degree of breathiness that we noted in Risiangku Tamang. In Manangke, when devoicing of the initial was complete, the heavy breathiness of tone-4 was reinterpreted as aspiration on segments which allowed it (occlusive stops), and was lost on segments which did not allow aspiration (sonorants and /s/). The breathiness on tone-3, being lighter, was dropped whatever the initial. I noted an occasional extreme tenseness verging on a creak on very high realizations of tone-3. This is a phonetic reinforcement of the tense character of high tones (see Silverman) and not etymological 16 . 4.2. The latest evolution of the Manangke tonal system in the speech of young urban bilinguals also displays an individual evolution of each tone : tones merge according to their phonetic proximity, not their etymological closeness. Hildebrandt shows that, across speakers, tone-1 (old *A-High series but modern low level) and tone-4 ( old *B-Low series, modern low falling) get closer and closer, and eventually merge for the most advanced speakers. (Hildebrandt K., 2003:177-182). Actually a very slight difference on the coda is still noted on monosyllabic nouns, and Hildebrandt 14 "Une fois constitué, le système tonal évolue sans souci de sa valeur ancienne étymologique" (Haudricourt A.-G., 1961(Haudricourt A.-G., ) (p.286 in the 1972 reprinting) reprinting) 15 Remember that a "neutralization" is not a "merger". "Neutralisation" in its original meaning in the Prague school, is a synchronic relation, not a diachronic process. Diachronically, neutralisation can result from the loss of an opposition, but just as frequently, from the failure to create an opposition. 16 This might have been a "teaching" pronunciation used by my informants in the context of elicitation. Hildebrandt did not note it. remarks that verb roots followed by a suffix merge totally, but the suffixes following a tone-1 root and following a tone-4 root remain different. Thus the distinction seems to me to be temporarily maintained, although threatened, the timing of the modulation becoming more and more delayed, and being now totally realized on the suffix.

Conclusion

The Bodish languages are at the south-western edge of the vast tone-prone area of East and South-East Asia. Their neighbours to the west and south are non-tonal Indo-Aryan languages. It may thus be believed that they constitute the western frontier of the expansion of tone which started somewhere farther east. As such they are newly tonal languages, and they evidence features that may be attributed to that status. As a testimony of the areal spreading of tonality we should remember the presence of wordtone on Punjabi (Bahl K. C., 1956(Bahl K. C., , 1957)), a neighbouring Indo-Aryan language.

Fig. 5 .

 5 Fig.5. An example of tone-2 on a short CV word /²ta/ 'horse' in Risiangku

Fig

  Fig.7. Tone-4 in Tukche Thakali on: a. short monosyllable b. disyllable c. CN rime

Shafer's six divisions of Sino-Tibetan, all bearing names in -ic, are 1.Bodic,

2.Burmic, a very large group containing, among others, Burmese, the Yi languages in China, and

There are two exceptions: Chantyal, which has borrowed 80% of its vocabulary from Indo-Aryan Nepali, and is reported to have lost its tone system(Noonan M., 2003) and an urban variety of Manangke spoken by young bilinguals in Kathmandu, which is

Thanks to Alexis Michaud for realizing this figure. The measures were done on open syllable verb roots with a long vowel exemplifying the different vocalic qualities. Data

the transcription ih + i, in figure

7c, is only meant to point out the breathy part of the vowel. There is no rearticulation, the vowel is short.

In Tukche Thakali and Gurung it is reported to be limited to the first syllable.

CV [54] and [12], CVV or CVN[55] and [113], CVc or CVNc or CVC[52] and [132] after(Hu Tan, 1982:18-20).

The reported "spreading", in the Lhasa dialect, of an initial low tone into a second syllable if it is long (whence a phonetic rise) does not constitute counter evidence, since the low pitch realized in that context is non distinctive(Sun J. T.-S., 1997:501sqq ; 2003:40). This non coincidence of pitch patterns with syllabic boundaries actually makes Lhasa more similar to Tamang.

A more detailed argument is given in(Mazaudon M., 1974:36-38, and 1977:87-90).

that is, cognitively when tone became the preeminent clue, and phonologically when at least one initial merged totally with another. The first candidate to look for in Bodish is always *z > s, and next the sonorants.

As an unrepentent Prague school structuralist, I would say a neutralization context was created there.


Mathias Girel
email: mathias.girel@ens.fr

How Pragmatic are the Examples in Peirce's Illustrations?

Keywords: Dispositions, Inquiry, Belief, Reality, Pragmatism (Proof of), Peirce, Helmholtz, Clifford

come

Introduction

One of the well-known puzzles in the Peirce scholarship pertains to the relationship between the sundry papers retrieved in the Illustrations of the Logic of Science, and in particular to the articulation between Peirce's Fixation of Belief and How to Make our Ideas Clear, that is to say between the theory of inquiry and the pragmatism maxim. The fact that it was a problem also to Peirce's eyes is evidenced by his numerous late attempts to provide a 'proof' of pragmatism 3 and to unite the two first Illustrations in a single paper.

The 'proof' of pragmatism, and in general the idea that the relevance of the pragmatist maxim had to be 'proved', is a vexed question, and one should be cautious, here, before embarking into its treatment: Christopher Hookway has devoted a long series of papers to this very question and they often involve the consideration of minute details in Peirce's late writings 4 . I will content myself here with a puzzle that comes before, if I'm right: scholars have long taken for granted that Peirce had applied, within a new logical and metaphysical context, Bain's doctrine that a belief was a preparedness to act and that this application provided the core of Peirce's first pragmatism 5 . I think that even in the first texts, that is not exactly true and that, contrariwise to what is often held, dispositions to act do not play such an obvious role in the Illustrations of the Logic of Science. To put it in a nutshell, It is not clear whether Peirce's examples are actually,at that time, pragmatic examples.

The first section provides a tentative roadmap to assess the sundry dimensions of Peirce's Pragmatism in the 1870s, the second deals with the alleged role of dispositionalism in How to Make our Ideas Clear (Hereafter HMIC), the third one provides some contextual elements that might account for the 'outburst' of dispositionalism in 1878.

Three claims

It is not the least of paradoxes that the idea of pragmatism itself proved to be so confusing, and for so long; seventy years after Lovejoy 6 , it took nearly fifteen years, according to Joseph Margolis's narrative, to Rorty and Putnam to tell what their main differences over pragmatism actually consisted in 7 . Some scholars provide a list of tenets (Wiener 8 , Thayer 9 , Shusterman 10 ), some others might try a definition, I will content myself here with delineating three distinctively pragmatist claims, which can be cumulative or independent, and that eventuate in very different kinds of pragmatism indeed. This will help me tracking one of these claims in Peirce's Illustrations, but I submit this might also be helpful when we deal with other pragmatists.

What kind of Pragmatism?

Some confusions arise from the fact that 'pragmatism' is often used to refer to at least three strands that one can actually find in Peirce's early writings (as well as in James or, later, in Dewey), so that it is often quite difficult to find out what exactly Peirce is trying to prove: 1. Inquiry. First, one would have the idea that there are several modes of fixation of beliefs, but that they have a minimal homogeneity;or, for later pragmatists, that inquiry is a general pattern of existence, rooted in the way we face the sting of concrete doubt or again, in Deweyan terms, a discrepancy in the situation. One needs to endorse something like that in order to qualify as a 'pragmatist' about the sciences or about inquiry in general. That is what most people have in mind when they use the term. To use Peircian terms, if there was a radical difference, regarding their objects, between the the 'fourth mode' of fixation and the three others -and there might be-there would be no pragmatism at all in the first sense. Actually, the Fixation of Belief (hereafter: FB) deals with four methods of settling beliefs, not three methods for fixing practical beliefs and one last method specific to science and, say, theoretical beliefs. A good point can be made, with the help of the 1898 lectures 11 , that Peirce conceived growing doubts about that first claim12 , but the standard view of pragmatism is that this view has exploded abstract approaches to aspect of beliefs than the first one;

(3) the last four Illustrations, where other important patterns are tackled. I'll deal here only with the two first groups.

5 FISCH (1954), in the classical paper on this point, already made the point that Saint John Green already 'applied' Bain, so that he might have a claim on the title of 'grandfather' of Pragmatism.

6 'The Thirteen Pragmatisms' (1908), retrieved in LOVEJOY (1963).

7 MARGOLIS (2002).

8 WIENER (1973).

9 THAYER (1968).

10 SHUSTERMAN (2010).

11 On the standard view also, James is the main target for these lectures. I have claimed that Royce is another, see GIREL (2011).

theories and replaced them with the dynamics of belief-fixation 13 . So, we might say that this first claim is an epistemological claim. 2. Dispositions. Secondly, one has the idea that beliefs, and maybe other products of the mind as well, can be construed as dispositions to act 14 ; that would be the Bainian thrust 15 . If you are not a dispositionalist, chances are that you still consider beliefs as purely intellectual episodes in the life of the mind. A good question to ask to the would-be dispositionalist is whether he or she admits of a sharp distinction between practical and theoretical beliefs. And, in case there are such purely theoretical beliefs, whether they involve a distinct kind of practice or not: are there dispositional beliefs in the fields of mathematics for example? Are there special layers of conduct, when we draw a graph? Are there 'gestures' 16 even in the remotest parts of the gamma-graphs? This second claim involves a philosophy of mind and also a philosophy of action. 3. Meanings. Thirdly, we have the idea that the reference to 'practical bearings' can be helpful when we have to elucidate the meanings of the objects of our thoughts, whether we have to dismiss sheer nonsense, spurious homonymies or, on the contrary, to ascertain non-obvious synonymies. That insight is encapsulated in the Pragmatist Maxim:

It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object 17 .

We have here two interesting questions I have tried to address elsewhere: one can ask whether the pragmatism maxim applies to each and every kind of object (I have proposed to call that the 'range' of the maxim 18 ), one can ask whether it elucidates everything important there is in the object (I have proposed to call that the 'comprehensiveness' of the maxim 19 ). This would be a semantical, or, at the very least, a methodological claim.

Weak and strong versions

This first division, of course, does not tell the whole story, because one can endorse a strong or a weak version of each and every of these claims.

1. One can maintain either that there is no substantial difference between science and other matters, or one can argue, without going so far, that there is no sharp dichotomy between facts and values, that there are norms in science as well as in other practical matters, and certainly transversal norms (think of Putnam's examples: simplicity, elegance, Putnam (2002)).

2. Secondly, one can endorse a strong dispositionalist account of mind, by assuming that beliefs are only the psychologically available aspect of deeper dispositions, verbal or not, or one can endorse contra HOOKWAY (2000). 13 In addition, it is often overlooked that Peirce's fourth method is the 'scientific method', not the 'method of the sciences' only: Peirce sees very well that you can be a scientist but fix at least some of your beliefs with the method of tenacity or authority (just think of his enemy Newcomb), or that you can be a detective or an historian and fix your beliefs with the scientific method (that is, if you work under the presupposition of reality and that, if your question is correctly framed, you can reasonably expect a convergence among competent inquirers).

14 There might be some interesting differences between 'dispositions' and 'capacities', CHAUVIRÉ (2002).

15 FISCH (1954).

16 MADDALENA (2015). 17 W3, 266. 18 Peirce sometimes mentions uses of the maxim concerning natural kinds ('precepts', CP 2.330), and sometimes restricts it to 'intellectual concepts' (CP 5.467: 'I understand pragmatism to be a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but only of what I call 'intellectual concepts', that is to say, of those upon the structure of which, arguments concerning objective fact may hinge.').

19 GIREL (2004).

the view that some of our staunchest beliefs, in conjunction with desires, usually and functionally eventuate in lines of conduct 20 ; we know that Bain himself wavered between such a strong and a weak versions of his thesis, and some of his readers think that he has 'recanted' from his earlier, too naturalist and too physiological, views 21 .

3. Thirdly, one can understand 'practical' as involving practice, i.e. as involving conduct, i.e. what we do, or one can understand 'practical', as James sometimes did, as involving only a reference to particulars, whether they are acts (that we are to prepare) or are of a sensational character (sensations we are to expect) 22 .

From there, one can build a matrix 23 that is useful to disambiguate some of the most frequent forms of pragmatism but that will not be my main concern here, even if I think that it is important, before we come to characterize a 'flavor' of pragmatism, to say where we are with respect to these three claims. For example, some readers refer to James's 'pragmatism' when they in point of fact have the Will to believe in mind (and thus something like the first family of claims), sometimes they refer to his way of elucidating meanings, whether this imply a substantive account of action or not24 .

Presuppositions

As we can expect, there can be a more or less compact entanglement between these claims. I am interested here in the 'non-entanglement' dimension, since I wish to assess whether the idea that beliefs are dispositions to act is a thesis that can be defended without involving the two others, and conversely whether one can be a pragmatist without endorsing it.

1 does not presuppose 2. You can be a pragmatist in the first sense without being pragmatist in the second sense: you can subscribe to the view that the goal of inquiry is to lead to the settlement of doxastic states -to acquire stable beliefs-without endorsing the view that these states are also sequences or action (Hookway 2000, 23). Thinking that the goal of inquiry is to reach settled doxastic states simply does not imply that these states are also, functionally, phases of conduct, or, for that matter, habits. This is so true that, in Peirce's first drafts about the theory of inquiry, the view that beliefs can also be seen as habits does not play a major role and deserves only passing mention25 .

2 presupposes neither 1 nor 3.

The theory we are to adopt about mind is indeed compatible with several theories about knowledge, even though a strong dispositionalist approach can lead us to favor an epistemology where stable states, which have some of the characteristics of habit, play an important role; and of 20 This line of thought is present in James early rephrasing of Peirce's ideas, and is prominent in the Talks to Teachers; I have argued elsewhere that the Talks to Students endorsed a more comprehensive account of action. See GIREL (2007b). 21 See WERNHAM (1986b) and WERNHAM (1986a).

22 See William James's definition of Pragmatism, in Baldwin's Dictionary (1901-02), as retrieved in CP 5.2: 'The doctrine that the whole "meaning" of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true.' course one is free to have different theories about semantics or, in a more modest register, about the methodological rules for elucidating concepts, even though, here again, some theories about meaning will be hard to reconcile with 2 26 .

3 does not presuppose 2.

It might be the case that in some writings, Peircs had assumed the dispositionalist account as the background of the pragmatist maxim. Forster, already in the papers preparing his book 27 , strongly made the case that it was not a necessary step and that, if there was a foundation for the pragmatic maxim (that is, for 3), it was to be found in the general theory of symbols, and in a special application of this theory to the consequences we can draw from 'A believes X'. Peirce at the end of his life assumed that the ultimate logical interpretant could be phrased in terms of habits, but those who are familiar with the details of MS317-18 know that the 'deduction' of habits, there, is a tricky matter indeed. If one his a Sellarsian or a Brandomian, the inferential account of meaning is related to the practice of assertion and to the 'game of giving and asking for reasons', but Brandom is very explicit on the fact that he is in no way committed to the naturalist account of belief that was so important to some pragmatists 28 .

3 does not presuppose 1 (insofar as 2 does not presuppose 1)

We might want to elucidate beliefs (or, for that matter arguments, propositions, rhemes, etc.) before they are fixed, or sometimes beliefs that never had to be fixed in the first place. Peirce later made a distinction between beliefs that have to be fixed and those that have to be elucidated 29 . It also makes sense to make notions clear even though they are part of a theory that proved to be unsatisfactory (and which does not lead to a stable belief anymore).

1 presupposes 3 in a weak sense That's in fact the transition between the two papers: pragmatic clarifications might be useful, in addition to the two first grades of clearness to settle unending metaphysical disputes 30 .

To put it shortly, there are two kinds of 'proof' of pragmatism: one broad kind of proof would consist in articulating these three claims, and articulating them is no trivial task indeed since their mutual implication is rather weak. A lot could be said here, but it is clear at least that if you have a strong version of 2, you can build it in such a way that it will fit nicely with 1 (courtesy of the 'stability' part), and 3 (courtesy of the intended consequences), which is the decisive step.

Another kind of proof is internal to one of the three claims: you might want to prove that the scientific method does not postpone indefinitely the fixation of belief 31 ; or, you might want to prove that beliefs really need to be understood as preparednesses to act 32 ; or, you might want to prove that there is an ultimate logical interpretant and that this interpretant is of the nature of habits or of conditional practical expectations 33 . 26 As we can see in the exchange between Sellars and Chisholm, where Sellars defends his account of intentionality based on his views on verbal behavior and thinking-out-loud, CHISHOLM (1958).

27 See FORSTER ( 2003) and of course FORSTER (2011), especially Chapters 5 and 6.

28 See for example, BRANDOM (2000), Preface.

29 See MS596, RR22 59600050.

30 MS323, 4-5.

31 SHORT (2000).

32

TURRISI and Charles Sanders PEIRCE (1997), Lect 1.

MS318.

Let's stick here with the first (broad) kind of proof and let's see whether the second claim, about beliefs and dispositions, is instrumental or not in 1878.

How Pragmatic are the Pragmatic Examples?

In which ways exactly are pragmatic clarifications pragmatic? In later texts, Peirce sometimes refered to pragmatism as the idea that a thought is nothing but a habit connected with a sign 34 . We would then have a neat articulation of the three claims. Things would be pretty clear: we would have a full-blown dispositionalism, easily integrated into Peirce's own mature tri-categorial realism and semiotics, and it is certainly no accident that the most suggestive accounts of conduct in Peirce deal with these later writings.

It is often assumed that Peirce was more of a naturalist in 1878 and already a dispositionalist.

What about Peirce's examples in the Illustrations then? In which way do they involve a version of claim 2 and of claim 3? Or again:

-Is the dispositional account even important in their clarifications?

-Does the elucidated meanings clearly incorporate reference to practical bearings?

In the same way as it is natural to confront the Pragmatists' sundry agendas and their respective achievements, it is natural to look not only at what Peirce claims about belief but at what he makes out of it.

There are six examples in How to make our ideas clear (HMIC), and the three first ones are easily overlooked in the extant scholarship: the musical melody, the 'dots', transubstantiation, hardness, force, and, of course, reality. The pragmatist maxim is given as a kind of conclusion of the third exemple and the end of the paper consists in 'illustrations' of it.

Specious pragmatism?

As we know with the help of the manuscripts, some of Peirce's last examples, in the list I just mentioned, are by no means new in 1878. Some of them were used as early as 1872 in the context of the realist -Peirce sometimes says 'idealist' 35 -argument he was then construing. Peirce had to prove, against the nominalists, that reality could somehow be connected to our chains of reasonings, not at the beginning, in 'observations' for example, as classical empiricists or psychological nominalists would have it, but at the other 'end', on the side of our conclusions, of the consequences we expect.

Reality is independent not of thought in general but of my thought(s) or your thought(s). But thoughts as psychical events, as observations for example, are singular in character; so reality is independent of our starting-points in their singularity (that's the gist of the story with the deafmute and the blind witnessing the same murder in the 1871 Fraser Review). Of course, this account of reality certainly sounded paradoxical enough to Peirce's non-Kantian listeners or readers and he felt he had to give it some flesh: he had to explain how it is that 'the object of the final belief, which exists only in consequence of the belief, should itself produce the belief 36 .' Or, in other words: how the reality of the object of the occurrent belief is contingent upon something that 'will' happen, that is to say one having the 'final' opinion37 . Peirce tries hard to make this 34 NEM, 3, 191 (1911).

35 'Thus we find the physicists, the exactest of thinkers, holding on regard to those things which they have studied most exactly, that their existence depends on their manifestations or rather on their manifestability. We have only to extend this conception to all real existence and to hold these two facts to be identical, namely that they exist and that sufficient investigation would lead to a settled belief in them, to have our Idealist theory of metaphysics.' (W3, 59). For a good analysis of the apparent naturalism of the 1872-73 texts, Murphey is still very accurate (MURPHEY (1961), 166-67).

36 W3, 30. view less paradoxical, to show that it is 'already' presupposed in the ordinary ways we talk about reality 38 , and he sees that the same kind of relation is evidenced in all the common elucidations we give of properties, whether physical or mental 39 . After all, their reality is also dependent on something that will happen (later, he will say, that would happen). So, the logic of his examples, in the 1872 drafts, is to make his reality argument 'less paradoxical', less 'extraordinary'. For example:

There is nothing extraordinary therefore in saying that the existence of external realities depends upon the fact, that opinion will finally settle in the opinion in them. And yet that these realities existed before the belief took rise, and were even the cause of that belief, just as the force of gravity is the cause of the falling of the inkstand -although the force of gravity consists merely in the fact that the inkstand and other objects will fall 40 .

Or, again:

Thus the existence of something in the present depends on the future occurrence of a certain event. This may sound strange but the strangeness will disappear Here is the first role of the examples in 1872: even if we can point to the fact that they rely more on philonian conditionals than on Peirce's more mature view of counterfactuals, they are here to prove one thing, that the reality of hardness, of weight, of force, even of our linguistic capacities, is not confined to actual manifestations or observations, as is clear in the example the example of force:

Every force resident in a body consists only in the fact that certain phenomena will occur under certain conditions 42 .

So much for the clarification of the physical concept of force itself. The examples are instrumental inside an argument about reality 43 , they are here to elucidate the notion of reality itself. What is important then is not our actions but the future events involved but the fact that any property encapsulates a host of upcoming happenings. The reasoning would be the same if the scratch on this stone was made by some brute dyadic encounter with other stones rather than by manipulation, and that is exactly the way Peirce elucidates hardness ('a rock crystal will not press.

38 I cannot get into further details here, but it is integral part of Peirce's method and this is what leads him to give a prominent role to belief and doubt in his early epistemology. See W2, 357: 'We wish to ascertain the truth, but what is truth? This is an indispensible inquiry if we so define the function of reason, yet it would plunge us at once into a sea of metaphysics from which we could not hope soon to emerge. Opinions upon this subject are various; and it is therefore uncertain what truth is. It is not likely we could reconcile those opinions when so many greater men have failed, and therefore we could not obtain any certain answer to this question. By such a method, therefore, we could gain no clear and trustworthy conception of the end of reasoning. Let us then avoid this idea of truth as long as we can and keep in the realm of those everyday and concrete notions about which there can be no mystery nor vagueness' (emph. mine). See also CP8.112: 'We must set out from ideas familiar and complex, as Hegel began his greater masterpiece by considering a man sitting under a tree in a garden in the afternoon. We must not begin by talking of pure ideas, -vagabond thoughts that tramp the public roads without any human habitation,but must begin with men and their conversation.'

39 On properties and powers, the review of Fraser's Berkeley is also a good starting-point, see W2, 469 (1871).

40 W3, 31, emph. mine.

41 W3, 80, emph. mine.

42 W3, 81. See also: 'The existence of any physical force is nothing but the truth of the fact that if certain conditions shall be complied with, certain accelerations will take place' (W3, 59). 43 This would be an important point in order to qualify Hookway's 1985 views that naturalism was a permanent pattern in Peirce's philosophy in the 1870s (HOOKWAY (1985), 52-53).

scratch it'), unless we advance the bolder argument that everything that is expectacious is somehow connected to human action, but that would be another, well, bold move. Just to be clear: the 'hardness' example in 1878, as in 1872, does not refer explicitly to the action of the mineralogist (as later texts will do), the 'force' example does not refer explicitly to the work of the physicist, but to the fact that forces are only compound partial accelerations.

Space being short, I will thus content myself with saying that I only see minor changes between 1872 and 1878 for those examples44 , which is not to say that they function exactly the same way.

The only major difference is that they are now introduced by an account of thought and human action, exactly the one that drew the attention of James first and then of scholars who were looking for the roots of Peirce's dispositionalism. But what do we mean by saying that 'practice' or 'dispositions' do not play a key role in those elucidations? Is it to be found elsewhere in HMIC?

"Harder" pragmatism

Let's come back to 1878 and to HMIC. I claim that this pragmatism is 'harder' because it articulates clearly the idea of that the end of thought is the settlement of belief (claim 1) with the idea that thought eventuates in rules of action (claim 2), which paves the way for interpreting the content of our thoughts in terms of the intended effects of our actions (claim 3), and claim 2 is certainly pivotal in the argument.

The paper is divided into four sections: Section I deals mainly with the two first grades of clearness, Section II introduces the 'bold' definition of belief as habit and the pragmatist maxim.

It appears at the end of the example of transubstantiation. Section III applies this conception to the notions of hardness, weight and force, Section IV to the notion of Reality, with the same arguments we have just underlined. We have already dealt with the last four exemples.

Commentaries often overlook what happens in section II and the two first examples. Are they more 'pragmatic'?

Peirce introduces the topic of thought in section II, and, as Frege but following different lines, he wants to make a distinction between 'thinking' and the 'thought'. Maybe in recollection of his European trip where he attended several operas, he compares thought to music; there can be many instruments, many ornaments, and a single melody:

We may add that just as a piece of music may be written in parts, each part having its own air, so various systems of relationship of succession subsist together between the same sensations. These different systems are distinguished by having different motives, ideas, or functions. Thought is only one such system, for its sole motive, idea, and function is to produce belief, and whatever does not concern that purpose belongs to some other system of relations 45 .

Not everything that involves the mind (or that involves the infinite transformations of signs) counts as thought. Only what is congruent with the 'end' of thought, that is to say reaching stable beliefs, will qualify. All this sounds both like a recapitulation of Fixation but what is totally new, compared to the former manuscripts, lies in the analysis of belief and in the idea that the line of action 'flowing' out of a belief is actually what individuates that belief. The function of thought is to reach stable beliefs, and now these stable beliefs are also described as distinct modes of action:

The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes 46 .

We don't find such claims in the preparatory manuscripts. Peirce's argument is not trivial: he has to account for the identity of habits, and it's at this very point that he makes a weighty choice.

There is a well-known side, and a lesser-known side to it.

1) The well-known first: Peirce endorses a definition of habit, that many commentators, starting with Alston back in the 1950s (Alston (1955) have found to involve a very narrow theory of motivation, and sometimes to beg the question 47 . Now, the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, not merely under such circumstances as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly occur, no matter how improbable they may be. What the habit is depends on when and how it causes us to act. As for the when, every stimulus to action is derived from perception; as for the how, every purpose of action is to produce some sensible result. Thus, we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtile it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice 48 .

What is perplexing is that, even with the proviso that 'conceivable' consequences play a part, it totally reduces, or eliminates, action as involving continua, norms, ends. Habit, here, is determined with respect to perception ('every stimulus to action is derived from perception') and leads to percepts (it has to 'produce some sensible result'). As a result, the practical, oddly enough, is nearly equivalent to sensations, or, better, to expected sensations (the 'difference in practice', at the end, is a difference in the 'tangible'). We can see that this first articulation between the three -epistemological, mental, semantical -claims is made at the cost of the richness of practice itself: it is so to say a pragmatism without practice.

Some readers saw very clearly that this last move was weak: every statement about experience can be converted in a statement about practice, provided we describe the experimentation itself as a conduct. If you do Y, you will experience X (Or, if you only did so and so, you would experience X). That is an eternal bone of contention between instrumentalist and realist interpretations of quantum mechanics: the latter interpreters claim that the first ones content themselves with rephrasing actual observations as indications stipulating how you should organize such experiments. You don't become a pragmatist just by changing a bit the terminology. The nontrivial claim is to assess whether it is true that each and every experimental statement, without exception, is a disguised form of practical statement 49 ? That would of course be a strong 'proof' of pragmatism. Peirce gives in 1878 something that is close to this proof: beliefs are habits, they have a stimulus and lead to new sensations, but practice nearly evaporates in that account.

Fortunately, we have richer accounts of habit, in Peirce and, as regards the scholarship, in Vincent Colapietro's paper on clarification, competence and purpose (Colapietro (2009) 50 ), andI can confine myself, here, to what Peirce actually does with the approach I have just sketched in 1878.

This would be the lesser-known part.

46 W3, 263, emph mine. 47 Peirce himself raised the point, in the Harvard Lectures and in other MSS. '[It] could hardly fail to be based on a begging of the question as it plainly is in that it is entirely built upon the principle that that which a man believes is the proposition upon which he will be satisfied to act.' (MS296, 39 (1907-08 according to Robin), as quoted by FISCH (1986), 367).

48 W3, 265.

49 'Since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it.' 5.412.

50 I subscribe to most of the points of this excellent paper; still, it is telling that most of the quotes are borrowed from EP2, that from a period when Peirce had overcome some of the limitations of HMIC.

2) The first real example is that of the two graphs, which are a bit different in the English and in the French version 51 (certainly because of different national habits! ).

Of course, they are identical in some determinate respects: believing that objects are arranged as in figure 1 is also believing that they are arranged as in Fig 2, but in which ways exactly does this identity involve habits? That is not clear in Peirce's text. Of course, you can imagine that the second grid is the first one modulo a bit of rotation or another symmetry; but is habit so important and even interesting there? That is not obvious. Is it even true that they would involve the same substantial habits? Let me offer just one example: two traffic signs can be identical as regards the mutual relationships of their points but not at all with respect to a real vector space and to the habits of conduct, of driving actually, that they govern. The first sign obtains quite frequently in my neighborhood, the second one, obtained though axial symmetry, nowhere in France (since it implies that one drives on the left side of the road), the third one is not to be confused with the first one of course.

How are we to decide which practical 'details' are unimportant here? In addition, saying that his example is already 'pragmatic' begs the question if all one has to say is that one can transform the first graph into the second. That would be a very implicit pragmatism, compared to the 'loud' dispositionalism that introduced this example.

The second example, the one that helps introducing the pragmatist maxim is of course transubstantiation. Peirce's point is to show that if we have any idea about 'wine', this involves definite sensational consequences, and Catholics and Protestants are supposed to agree on the 'accidents', whether they interpret the substance-change the same way or not. But do Catholics and Protestants have the same habits? That is a bit tricky: of course, they expect the same accidents when they deal with diluted wine and wafers, but will they act the same way? Nothing is less sure. See anyway how action disappears from the consequences Peirce draws:

Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself. It is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function. It is foolish for Catholics and Protestants to fancy themselves in disagreement about the elements of the sacrament, if they agree in regard to all their sensible effects, here and hereafter 52 .

51 An interesting thing is that in the original version, the two figures, 1 & 2, are actually different, as well as in my copy of W3 (1986 edition), but only a few readers noticed. The version given in EP1 is corrected.

52 CP5.401.

I do not need to repeat that the pragmatist maxim is offered as a sequel to those very lines, so much so that the 'practical', in the 'practical bearings' mentioned in the maxim is certainly to be read along just these lines, that is to say as involving sensational particulars. Which, again, is not to say that Peirce did not reconstruct hereafter the same maxim around a much broader account of conduct, but this account is simply not at work in any of Peirce's examples in 1878.

3 The emergence of dispositionalism?

So we have what seems to be a full-blown dispositionalist account of belief in How to make our ideas clear, but this seems to be confined to section II and does not play a major role in the elucidations. We have also said that what makes the pragmatist maxim pragmatist cannot be clearly located in the extant 1872 manuscripts. If the points I've raised in the previous section are right, then we would have an 'outburst' of dispositionalism that is of no real import at the time, which does not mean that it did not prove to be a major ferment for Peirce's later thought (I think that is the case). One tempting idea is to think that it was introduced into the Illustrations ahead of a fuller treatment because Peirce felt it was something promising in contemporary accounts of science, something that he came to see more clearly when he wrote the new parts of the papers around 1877.

"Amplifications" and "padding"?

The points I have just made, about the composition of the Illustrations and the role of the This seems to imply that both papers articulate a clear and consistent account that would already have been crystallized as soon as 1872 (around the realist argument I've been sketching). Still, in what follows immediately, Peirce points to some 'additions' -in his own words 'amplifications and padding' -to the original text. This is important since we can reconstruct nearly all of Fixation with the earlier manuscript, but we know that Peirce produced some fresh work when he wrote HMIC. These additions should thus be closer to the line of thought he was then following and they look by no means trivial:

One set of amplifications, in the second article, occupied considerable space and were highly important.

[…] My second magazine article, now at last, is explicitly presented, as it was always intended, as the second chapter of an essay, amplifying the paper read to the Club with illustrations of the maxim of clearness that had not been needed at first, on account of my having put forth such interpretations at previous meetings, before I had undertaken to formulate their common motive.

[...]. Another amplification of the original paper, first introduced in the Magazine article lies in its [second] section, where the pragmatic interpretation is treated as the highest of three grades of clearness of apprehension 55 .

We have several claims here:

- 53 Max Fisch published this MS 620 as an appendix to his essay "Was There a Metaphysical Club in Cambridge? " published in MOORE AND ROBIN (1964), pp. 1-32. The appendix is pp. 24-29. This was not included in the 1986 collection. I have worked on the microfilm version. 54 Peirce, MS 620, 1909, 16 55 Ibid.

-The second kind of addition lies with the 'pragmatic interpretation' as 'the highest of three grades of clearness of apprehension', that is, with the pragmatist maxim itself.

The substantial additions to 1872 are thus, as Fisch suggested, tnothing less than he pragmatist maxim, the examples, and accordingly the claims on the 'end' of belief which introduce the latter. The context is important: around 1875, Peirce is often in Europe and has many encounters with his fellow-scientists. It might be the case that the 'additions' convey something of the scientific Zeitgeist of the time.

Berkeley, Helmholtz?

I have long thought that some of nominalist and naturalist strands in the 70s came from both his reading of Berkeley and Helmholtz, who is present as a reference in the Fraser review and, certainly implicitly, in the Illustrations as well. Peirce comes very close to his 1878 pragmatism in the Fraser review, when he says that when 'things fulfill the same function practically', they should be 'signified by the same word' 56 , but without referring to beliefs as dispositions (he would thus be defending claim 3 without claim 2). Helmholtz, in his Physiological Optics and in the same spirit, claims that our ideas are 'symbols', insofar as they are 'natural signs for things which we learn how to use in order to regulate our movements and actions':

In my opinion, therefore, there can be no possible sense in speaking of any other truth of our ideas except of a practical truth. Our ideas of things cannot be anything but symbols, natural signs for things which we learn how to use in order to regulate our movements and actions. Having learned correctly how to read those symbols, we are enabled by their help to adjust our actions so as to bring about the desired result; that is, so that the expected new sensations will arise 57 .

You can make a practical use of ideas, you can use your visual 'ideas' as signs for tactile 'ideas', as Berkeley argued in his New Theory of vision, but action, here, is subjected to the same kind of reduction to sensations, antecedent of expected, we have witnessed in the Illustrations. Is it the case that thinkers, close to Peirce, used more explicity Bain's ideas, or an equivalent, to make sense of science, without subscribing to a narrow view of conduct?

A Cliffordian Strain?

Let's get a bit hypothetical here, and let's ground this hypothesis on something that is not too speculative. At the end of Fixation, Peirce has an interesting claim about belief-change (by the way, in a paragraph that was not in the manuscripts), where the point is that we should not elude our responsibility regarding our own beliefs. This would be the responsibilist account that is of so much interest in Christopher Hookway's reading. Peirce's version could be summed up as:

It is wrong, always and everywhere, not to inspect the integrity of one's beliefs, or, in more words:

But, above all, let it be considered that what is more wholesome than any particular belief is integrity of belief, and that to avoid looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous. The person who confesses that there is such a thing as truth, which is distinguished from falsehood simply by this, that if acted on it should, on full consideration, carry us to the point we aim at and not astray, and then, though convinced of this, dares not know the truth and seeks to avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind indeed 58 .

56 'A better rule for avoiding the deceits of language is this: Do things fulfill the same function practically? Then let them be signified by the same word. Do they not? Then let them be distinguished. If I have learned a formula in gibberish which in any way jogs my memory so as to enable me in each single case to act as though I had a general idea, what possible utility is there in distinguishing between such a gibberish and formula and an idea? Why use the term a general idea in such a sense as to separate things which, for all experiential purposes, are the same? ' (Fraser's Berkeley Review, EP1, 102, 1871). 57 Helmholtz, Physiological Optics, [1867-71, tr. HELMHOLTZ AND SOUTHALL (1925), vol 3, 19-20. 58 W3, 257.

That is vey Cliffordian in tone and the point has sometimes been made 59 . But is it explicitly so? I would be tempted to argue that it is the case. Clifford is Bainian in quite a radical way: there is an ethics of belief because beliefs have consequences. In a paper Clifford read at the Metaphysical Society, exactly at the time he met with Peirce in London in 1875, Clifford has a definition of science that is the closest I know to the Pragmatist maxim. It starts with the idea that science is a kind of refined craft, and offers a general definition.

The important point is that science, though apparently transformed into pure knowledge, has yet never lost its character of being a craft; and that it is not the knowledge itself which can rightly be called science, but a special way of getting and of using knowledge. Namely, science is the getting of knowledge from experience on the assumption of uniformity in nature, and the use of such knowledge to guide the actions of men. And the most abstract statements or propositions in science are to be regarded as bundles of hypothetical maxims packed into a portable shape and size. Every scientific fact is a shorthand expression for a vast number of practical directions: if you want so-and-so, do soand-so 60 .

We have, here, something that will be typical of pragmatism: a dispositional account of belief, an interpretation of sentences in the indicative mood as confused forms of imperatives, an articulation between the psychological and the physiological, the claim that the nature of 'science' is not conveyed in the conclusions or in mere formal relations but in methods. It is striking that exactly this idea surfaces in the 'amplifications' and 'padding' Peirce added just before publishing HMIC, and it also striking that Clifford offered his own 'pragmatist maxim' with presupposing the narrow view of action that was so 'unpragmatic' in HMIC.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have claimed that, oddly enough, Peirce's early papers do not obviously contain pragmatic clarifications, in two senses. They do not necessarily use, in their clarifications, the dispositional account of belief that is forcefully articulated in the second section of How to make our Ideas Clear. They do not necessarily interpret 'practical' in the 'practical bearings' of the objects of our thought, as referring to what we call practice, as referring to 'conduct'. I submit that one should assess pragmatic clarifications by what they actually do, and I also think we have still some ground to cover, as regards the intellectual context of the Illustrations. There is already some stimulating work concerning Peirce's European contacts, and there might be some unexpected fellow-pragmatists.

We tend to read the 1878 texts through the later texts (and in particular the Pragmatism Monist series), where the stress on conduct is more prominent, and we might thus be led to overlook a major conceptual move on the notion of the 'practical', in the Pragmatism maxim, in the interval between 1878 and 1905. More and more, Peirce came to consider 'practical' as equivalent to 'subject to self-controlled conduct', and this certainly has consequences on the reconstruction of the pragmatist framework he provides.

A last word: Peirce certainly could not be a crude dispositionalist in a reductionist way in the 1870s since the antidote was already in his drafts. Actions flowing out of our beliefs are not mere deeds, they are also signs, and this was something that was already pretty clear to Peirce's eyes, already in 1872, in lines that unfortunately did not make their way to the Illustrations: 'Even if a belief is a direct motive to action it still is a belief only because that action is interpretable again. And thus the intellectual character of beliefs at least are dependent upon the capability of the endless translation of sign into sign' 61 . It is tempting to think that Peirce glanced at these drafts, 59 See for example ANDERSON and Peirce (1995), 94, and ANDERSON (1997), 226; see also POTTER AND COLAPIETRO (1996), 20. Surprisingly, MITOVA (2008) does not mention Peirce. at some time during the 1880s, just before his 1885 review of Royce, where the semiotic integration of beliefs is given a fresh start, and this is also tempting to think this would be the real first sequel to the Illustrations, but this would be the matter for another paper 62 .

62 See nevertheless some elements in GIREL (2011).

23

  As in the 1903 Harvard Lectures with the systems of metaphysics, one would have seven kinds of pragmatism, I, II, III, I-II, I-III, I-II-III, II-III (only seven because someone who would not endorse any of the three claims would of course not count as a pragmatist). If we take into account the weak and strong version for each claim, there are of course more positions.

  One first kind of additions lies with the 'illustrations of the maxim of clearness'. It is difficult to see if the illustrations he added are just the 'dots' and the example of transubstantiation or all the examples but what has been said before clearly show that the real additions are the first examples.

  60 W. K. CLIFFORD, 'Scientific basis of Morals', 1875,Lectures and Essays, London, 1879, 2, p. 109. 61 CP 7.357.

  upon considering the numerous familiar instances of the same sort. A diamond is really hard. Its hardness consists in a quality he possesses all the time. And now what does this hardness consist in? It consists in nothing else but this, that rock crystal will not scratch it 41 .

  dispositionalist theme do not rely on Peirce's later recollections: one just has to read the texts and to compare. The fact is nevertheless that this analysis can be backed by one late account of the Metaphysical club period in MS 620 (1909) 53 :My Metaphysical Club paper on Pragmatism, almost without alteration other than amplifications and padding, served for my first two articles 54 .

For an interesting reading that argues that there is no 'tension' between 1878 and 1898, see[START_REF] Migotti | The Key to Peirce's View of the Role of Belief in Scientific Inquiry[END_REF]

For reasons that would be too long to explain to explain here, this is what happened to James when he was introduced in France. I have documented some aspects of this distortion/reception inGirel (2007a), and in another paper still in press: 'What Went Wrong? A Confused Reception for James and a Faint One for Royce', James and Royce: Pragmatism and Idealism in Dialogue, D. Lamberth ed, HUP; available from my page on Academia.edu.

I would make an exception for W3, 76-77.

Peirce says in 1870 'will' (future tense); for an analysis of the move from philonian conditionals to counterfactual ones, C. Tiercelin, Why Pragmatism implies realism,Pragmatism and Quantum Mechanics, M. Bächthold Ed., under

One often has the feeling that the hardness example is more 'pragmatic', because it involves the action of the knife of the mineralogist, but this character appears only in later re-phrasings, see CP 5.467.

W3, 263.