Richard Duhautois

Cee

Profit-Sharing and Wages: An Empirical Analysis Using French Data Between 2000 and 2007 Noélie Delahaie (IRES)

Economic theory presents two main views on the effect of profit-sharing on wages. First, profitsharing may substitute for base wages and have a neutral effect on total compensation. Second, it may be interpreted as an "efficiency wage" that increases total compensation. Existing empirical literature does not allow a determination of which of these two arguments is valid. This paper attempts to tackle this issue in the case of France for the 2000-2007 period. Based on a differencein-differences selection model, our results suggest that profit-sharing has a neutral effect on total compensation. Several years after its implementation within firms, profit-sharing lowers base wages, which are offset by profit-sharing bonuses.

I. Introduction

In the literature, there are two different views of the effect of profit-sharing on wages, both of which claim that profit-sharing systems enhance firm performance. The first view argues that profit-sharing bonuses substitute for base wages (i.e., the fixed part of total compensation) and consequently have a neutral effect on total compensation [START_REF] Weitzman | The Share Economy. Conquering the Stagflation[END_REF][START_REF] Weitzman | The simple macroeconomics of Profit Sharing[END_REF]. The second view argues that profit-sharing increases labour productivity by enhancing workers' effort and cooperation [START_REF] Kruse | Profit-sharing: Does it make a Difference? The Productivity and Stability Effects of Employee Profit-sharing Plans[END_REF][START_REF] Kruse | Do workers Gain by Sharing? Employee Outcomes under Employee Ownership, Profit-sharing and Broad-based Stock Options[END_REF] or by retaining the most qualified and productive employees [START_REF] Long | Do Employees Profit from Profit Sharing? Evidence from Canadian Panel Date[END_REF]. A profit-sharing bonus is thus interpreted as an "efficiency wage" that adds to the base wage. Numerous empirical studies show that profit-sharing induces higher labour productivity and improves firm performance. However, the empirical literature on the effect of profit-sharing on wages is limited, and neither the Weitzman theory nor the efficiency wage hypothesis is borne out by existing results. This paper intends to tackle this issue in the case of France.

From an historical point of view, profit-sharing was implemented in France in the early 1960s to promote employee participation in management and to diminish conflicts between employees and employers. French labour law currently defines two profit-sharing mechanisms. The first mechanism, called "intéressement" and denoted "free" profit-sharing (FPS) in this paper, was introduced in 1959. Its implementation within a firm is voluntary, and the bonus depends on the firm's performance (e.g., financial results, labour productivity, absenteeism decrease, etc.). The second mechanism, called "participation aux bénéfices" and denoted "legal" profit-sharing (LPS), was implemented in 1967. It differs from FPS in three main respects: First, the system is compulsory for all firms with at least 50 employees 1 . Second, the law defines the computation formula of the LPS bonus. Finally, until 2009, LPS was designed as a deferred profit-sharing, so bonuses were not paid directly to employees. LPS bonuses were systematically saved though employee savings plans or others savings accounts that were designed to enhance the productive investments of firms. As in Great Britain, the introduction of tax and social benefits may have played a crucial role in the implementation of profit-sharing in France [START_REF] Marsden | Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain[END_REF]. Indeed, profit-sharing systems, especially FPS, became widespread and popular at the beginning of the 1980s when the French State implemented an attractive tax and social system for both employers and employees. By the early 2000s, FPS underwent a renewal because of new tax and social benefits for small firms and numerous legal regulations to promote collective bargaining on profit-sharing. Such advantages are designed to encourage employers to foster financial participation (e.g., profit-sharing, company savings plans, and employee stock ownership plans). On the employee side, tax and social benefits aim to encourage employees to invest a part of their compensation in employee savings plans. In French law, the goal of tax and social incentives is also to compensate for employees' exposure to risk owing to the uncertainty and variability of profit-sharing bonuses 2 . The introduction of a profit-sharing system raises the question of whether profit-sharing, which induces variability in employees' total compensation, affects employees' earnings.

In this paper, we focus on FPS because of its non-compulsory character. To assess the effect of FPS, we work with an original database that covers more than 22,000 French firms over the 2000-2007 period. Our research contributes to knowledge by assessing the effect of profit-sharing on both base wages and total compensation. Moreover, it sheds new light on the relationships between profit-sharing and wages by examining, on one hand, the influence of FPS during the first year after its implementation in firms and, on the other hand, the effect of FPS over seven years. The focus on the first year after the implementation of FPS is critical because French law prohibits the substitution of FPS bonuses for wages for at least one year after its introduction to prevent firms from using profit-sharing as a form of tax optimisation.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The second section presents a review of the theoretical and empirical literature addressing the link between profit-sharing and wages. The third section describes our data and the econometric strategy, and the fourth section presents our results. Finally, we conclude by discussing the potential role of the tax and social reliefs from FPS in France.

II. A brief survey of the literature addressing the link between profit-sharing and wages

Economic theory provides two main views on the effect of profit-sharing on wages. Under the first view, profit-sharing has a neutral effect on total compensation and a negative impact on base wages. Under the second view, profit-sharing has a positive effect on employees' involvement and the retention of the most qualified workers. In this second case, profit-sharing induces an increase in total compensation.

II.1 Theoretical background

According to [START_REF] Weitzman | The Share Economy. Conquering the Stagflation[END_REF][START_REF] Weitzman | The simple macroeconomics of Profit Sharing[END_REF], profit-sharing bonuses substitute for base wages. The Weitzman theory focuses on the macroeconomic impacts of profit-sharing on unemployment. In the "share economy", which opposes a wage-based economy, the widespread use of profit-sharing increases firms' demand for labour and then ultimately resolves the problem of unemployment without generating inflation. Firms obtain higher profits and employment levels out. Moreover, regardless of the context (share economy or wage-based economy), the level of wages is identical even if the compensation structure differs. The share economy differs from the wage-based economy, however, in that employees' total compensation comprises a base wage (i.e., the fixed part of compensation) and a profit-sharing bonus. From a microeconomic point of view, if profitsharing lowers base wages, the employment level will increase since firms will make employment decisions by taking into account the level of the base wage (and not total compensation). Profit-sharing systems thus allow for adjustments to labour costs in the context of an economic downturn. Weitzman argues that firms with a profit-sharing system succeed in maintaining a certain level of employment (and thus profits) by decreasing profit-sharing bonuses, whereas firms without such a system reduce their level of employment (because of wage rigidity).

The Weitzman theory is subject to numerous counterarguments 3 . The most popular objection is that employees, who are supposed to be risk adverse, might resist additional hiring to avoid a reduction to their own profit-sharing bonus. [START_REF] Weitzman | The simple macroeconomics of Profit Sharing[END_REF] circumvents this criticism by recommending the implementation of social and tax incentives to encourage firms to introduce profit-sharing. However, this idea is unconvincing to some scholars. For instance, in the case of France, [START_REF] Cahuc | Profit-sharing: Does it Increase Productivity and Employment? A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence of French Micro Data[END_REF] claim that the introduction of profit-sharing may induce a cost for firms, which is compensated for higher productivity. Numerous economists claim that the effects of profit-sharing on employment are related more to its impact on labour productivity than to its impact on wage flexibility. Several conditions are required to solve the free-riding problem that occurs in the presence of collective bonuses. In the vein of the "efficiency wage" hypothesis, Fitzroy andKraft (1987, 1992) argue that profit-sharing induces higher employee cooperation when employers cannot observe individual effort or when tasks are independent 4 . Work organisation is also an important determinant of the effect of profit-sharing on productivity, with greater employee autonomy leading to higher labour productivity [START_REF] Marsden | Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain[END_REF]. Numerous authors such as [START_REF] Cable | Productive Efficiency, Incentives and Employee Participation: Some Preliminary Results for West-Germany[END_REF] highlight that profit-sharing efficiency is related to the introduction of other human resource management systems that foster improved information sharing and employee participation in firm decision making. According to [START_REF] Prendergast | The provision of Incentives in Firms[END_REF], the increase in productivity may also result from profit-sharing firms' selection of more productive workers. In this vein, some economists argue that profit-sharing increases the level of labour productivity because it allows firms to retain and attract the most qualified workers [START_REF] Long | Do Employees Profit from Profit Sharing? Evidence from Canadian Panel Date[END_REF] or to increase investments in employee training [START_REF] Gielen | Profit Sharing for increased Training Investments[END_REF][START_REF] Green | Profit Sharing, Separation and Training[END_REF].

To sum up, economic theory predicts two opposite effects of profit-sharing on wages. On one hand, profit-sharing reduces base wages, which is compensated for bonuses (engendering a neutral effect on total compensation), and on the other hand, it adds to base wages.

II.2 Empirical evidence

From an empirical point of view, abundant literature exists on the links between firm performance and profit-sharing (for a survey, see [START_REF] Pérotin | Employee Participation in Profit and Ownership: A review of the issues and evidence[END_REF]. Numerous studies show the positive effects of profit-sharing on labour productivity and firm performance in the United States [START_REF] Kruse | Profit-sharing and Productivity: Microeconomic Evidence from the United States[END_REF][START_REF] Kruse | Profit-sharing: Does it make a Difference? The Productivity and Stability Effects of Employee Profit-sharing Plans[END_REF], Germany [START_REF] Cable | Productive Efficiency, Incentives and Employee Participation: Some Preliminary Results for West-Germany[END_REF][START_REF] Fitzroy | Cooperation, Productivity and Profit Sharing[END_REF][START_REF] Kraft | Profit Sharing and Financial Performance of Firms: Evidence from Germany[END_REF], France [START_REF] Cahuc | Profit-sharing: Does it Increase Productivity and Employment? A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence of French Micro Data[END_REF][START_REF] Fakhfakh | Sharing Schemes and Productivity: an Empirical Analysis Based on Large French Firms Using Production Function and Frontiers[END_REF][START_REF] Fakhfakh | The effects of Profit-sharing on Firm Performance in France[END_REF], and Great Britain [START_REF] Bryson | How does Shared Capitalism Affect Economic Performance in the United Kingdom?[END_REF][START_REF] Conyon | Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance U.K. Evidence[END_REF][START_REF] Robinson | Employee financial participation and Productivity: An Empirical Reappraisal[END_REF]. Some of these studies demonstrate that labour productivity gains are due to not only profit-sharing but also improved employee participation or information sharing [START_REF] Dube | Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decisionmaking systems: Evidence from the American Labor Market[END_REF][START_REF] Cable | Productive Efficiency, Incentives and Employee Participation: Some Preliminary Results for West-Germany[END_REF]. [START_REF] Fakhfakh | The effects of Profit-sharing on Firm Performance in France[END_REF] note that work organisation plays an important role in the effect of profit-sharing on productivity. In particular, profit-sharing has a positive impact on labour productivity when hierarchical monitoring is weak. Other empirical works focus on the impact of profit-sharing on worker behaviour and find a positive impact of profit-sharing on the decline of absenteeism in France (Brown et al. 2000) and Great Britain [START_REF] Wilson | The impact on Absenteeism and Quits of Profit-sharing and Other Forms of Employee Participation[END_REF]. In a more recent study, [START_REF] Blasi | Creating a Bigger Pie? The effects of Employee Ownership, Profit-sharing, and Stock Options on Workplace Performance[END_REF] find that profit-sharing is associated with lower employee turnover and greater loyalty in the United States. However, none of these studies question whether wages might be affected by profit-sharing, and yet, wage flexibility and firm performance improvement are not necessarily opposing objectives [START_REF] Weitzman | The Share Economy. Conquering the Stagflation[END_REF].

Empirical evidence on the effect of profit-sharing on wages remains scarce: few analyses use recent data, and the existing results are contradictory. In the case of France, [START_REF] Mabile | Intéressement et salaires : complémentarité ou substitution ?[END_REF] uses the 1992 French survey on the structure of earnings and administrative data from collective agreements on FPS for the period between 1986 and 1992. The results reveal that employees who were within an FPS system earned higher total compensation in 1992 that those who were not within such a system. The difference in total compensation is approximately 4.3% within firms that effectively distributed a FPS bonus (compared with 1.3% within firms that did not). However, a few years after the implementation of FPS, the increase in base wages is lower in firms with FPS than in other firms, and the impact of FPS even becomes negative five years after the implementation of profit-sharing, while total compensation remains higher in firms with FPS than in other firms. The main drawback of this study is the lack of information on the economic situation of the firms: for instance, the observed higher wages and total compensation may be related to the greater economic performance of firms with FPS. These findings confirm other analyses, particularly from the United States. For instance, [START_REF] Bell | Lump-Sum Payments and Profit-sharing Plans in the Union Sector of the United States Economy[END_REF] conclude that profit-sharing led to a 5% annual decline in labour costs between 1984 and 1987 in the unionised sector. Mitchel et al. (1990) similarly find a negative correlation between profit-sharing and wages over the 1981-1987 period. Likewise, comparing the wage level in the automobile industry in the United States and Canada over the 1982-1989 period, [START_REF] Katz | Profit Sharing and Auto Workers earning: the United States versus Canada[END_REF] conclude that profitsharing substitutes for wages in the United States, and they attribute the higher earnings perceived by Canadian workers to the avoidance of profit-sharing.

Other studies find a neutral effect of profit-sharing on wages. For instance, [START_REF] Forth | High-involvement Management and Pay in Britain[END_REF] use the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) to analyse the impact of high-involvement management practices on gross hourly earnings. They show that the individual influence of financial participation (i.e., profit-sharing and/or employee stock ownership) is not significant; however, the correlation becomes positive and significant when they take into account other high-involvement practices. Using the same data as Forth and Millward, McNabb and Withfield (2007) also find that profit-sharing alone has a neutral effect on wages but that pay is lower when profit-sharing is associated with other performance-related pay. However, these last two studies do not explain the impact of profit-sharing on the compensation structure.

Finally, some studies support the efficiency wage hypothesis. For instance, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey Youth, [START_REF] Afzar | Profit-sharing, employment stability and wage growth[END_REF] find a positive impact of profitsharing on wage growth in the United States for the period between 1988 and 1994. Further, [START_REF] Wadhwani | The effects of profit-sharing on employment, wages, stock returns and productivity: evidence from UK micro-data[END_REF] use data on 101 British manufacturing firms for the 1972-1982 period and find a positive impact of profit-sharing on both base wages and labour productivity. Likewise, [START_REF] Bhargava | Explicit versus Implicit Profit Sharing and the Determination of Wages: Microeconomic Evidence from the UK[END_REF] analyse data on 144 British firms over the 1979-1989 period and find that the introduction of profit-sharing increases base wages by 4% to 6%. For Germany, [START_REF] Hart | Are Profit Shares and Wages Substitute or Complementary Forms of Compensation?[END_REF] use individual data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984 and 1985, and they find that base wages are higher in firms with profit-sharing than for other firms. Moreover, using several waves of the IAB Establishment Panel (2000, 2001[START_REF] Caliendo | Some Practical Guidance for the Implementation of Propensity Score Matching[END_REF][START_REF] Mcnabb | The Impact of Varying Types of Performance Related Pay and Employee Participation on Earnings[END_REF]), [START_REF] Andrews | The Impact of Financial Participation on Worker's Compensation[END_REF] conclude that profit-sharing increases total compensation (including profitsharing bonuses) within German establishments. For Canada, [START_REF] Long | Do Employees Profit from Profit Sharing? Evidence from Canadian Panel Date[END_REF] show that firms that introduced profit-sharing between 2000 and 2001 paid higher total compensation than other firms. More precisely, the authors find that total compensation increased by 15% five years after the implementation of profit-sharing, whereas the increase in base wages remained small. The analysis by [START_REF] Baghdadi | Financial Participation: does the Risk Transfer Story Hold in France?[END_REF] based on the Annual Survey of the Cost of the Labour and the Wage Structure for 2006 (ECMOSS) on French firms corroborates the above results. Assessing the individual influence of FPS and the joint effect of employee stock ownership plans and FPS, these authors obtain findings consistent with the efficiency wage hypothesis: employee stock ownership plans and FPS have a positive joint effect on both total compensation and base wage for managerial and non-managerial workers, whereas FPS has a neutral individual impact on base wage and a positive individual impact on total compensation for 2006, wherein profit-sharing appears to be an "extra-payment".

In sum, existing empirical evidence on the relationship between wages and profit-sharing remains insufficient to conclude which theoretical argument (substitution versus complementarity) generally prevails. As [START_REF] Long | Do Employees Profit from Profit Sharing? Evidence from Canadian Panel Date[END_REF] note, some studies use cross-sectional data that do not allow one to control for causal inferences. Rather, panel data are required to determine whether profit-sharing and wages are substitutes or complementary components of employee compensation. As mentioned above, in the case of France, the use of panel data appears to be crucial because of the legal prohibition against the substitution of profit-sharing for base wages during the first twelve months after the introduction of profit-sharing. In addition, most studies do not explain how profit-sharing might affect both base wages and total compensation. Thus, the effect of profit-sharing must be reconsidered by taking into account the date of the introduction of profit-sharing within a firm and the compensation structure.

III. Data and key variables

To assess the effect of profit-sharing on wages, we construct an original panel dataset by merging three statistical sources. First, we use the firm-level survey called the PIPA survey ("Participation, Intéressement, Plan d'épargne entreprise et Actionnariat des salariés"). This survey is conducted on a yearly basis by the French Ministry of Labour. It covers a representative sample of firms (approximately 17,000 firms) with at least 10 employees in the private sector and provides detailed information on the use of profit-sharing and employee savings plans among French firms as well as the amount of bonuses distributed. Information on wage bills from the DADS file (see infra) is also available. In the PIPA survey, variables refer to firms' practices during the year preceding the time of data collection: for instance, the 2001 PIPA survey provides wage bills paid by firms in 2000 and profit-sharing bonuses distributed in 2000 and calculated on the 1999 accounting year basis. In this paper, we use data from the PIPA survey for the 2000-2008 period to obtain homogenous data on firms between 1999 and 2007 5 . Second, we use two administrative sources produced by the French Institute of Statistics (Insee): the FICUS and the DADS files for the 1999-2007 period. The FICUS files provide various economic and financial variables (e.g., value added, capital investment, firm profit), and the DADS files provide information about wage levels and workforce characteristics (e.g., qualification, gender). In the DADS files, the concept of wage is interpreted broadly; thus, it actually refers to annual total gross compensation, including profit-sharing bonuses and supplementary top-up payments. No information on the structure of total compensation (basic wage, premium, and bonuses) is available. To determine how FPS affects wages, we construct two dependent variables:

-Total compensation (Twage; in logarithm form) denotes the gross annual wage perceived by an employee. Information for this variable comes from the DADS files and includes all payments made by employers each year (including the FPS bonus).

-Base wage (Bwage; in logarithm form) is the total gross annual wage minus the FPS bonus. We construct this variable by using the DADS files to obtain total compensation and the PIPA surveys to obtain information on FPS bonuses (distribution and amounts).

As mentioned above, given the time lag of PIPA surveys, we analyse trends in total compensation and base wages between 2000 and 2007.

After merging the three statistical sources, we obtain an original unbalanced panel database of a large sample of firms over the 2000-2007 period. To differentiate the effects of FPS by the year of implementation, we construct four groups of firms by taking into account their practices at the first and the last observation: the first group, called "implementation of FPS" (Group 1), includes firms that implemented FPS for the first time during the 2000-2007 period; the second group, called "abandonment of FPS", includes firms that practiced FPS in 2000 but not in 2007 (Group 2); the third group, "existence of profit-sharing", includes firms in which FPS was implemented continuously between 2000 and 2007 (Group 3); the last group, "absence of profit-sharing", includes firms that never implemented FPS during the studied period (Group 4). At this stage, the main drawback is the difficulty of differentiating between firms that never implemented FPS during the 2000-2007 period and firms that did not implement FPS at either the first or the last observation. As a profit-sharing agreement usually last for at least three years, we exclude firms for which any change in FPS practices occurred within a three-year period. Finally, we work with an unbalanced panel of 22,980 firms with at least 10 employees that contains more than 86,400 observations over the 2000-2007 period. Table 1 reports the distribution of firms according to their FPS practices between 2000 and 2007. The "absence of FPS" group constitutes the largest group (more than 66% of firms), while approximately 22% of the sample comprises firms that implemented FPS each year between 2000 and 2007. Further, less than 8% of the sample comprises firms that began implementing FPS between 2000 and 2007, and only 3.7% of firms abandon FPS during the period.

[Table 1]

Our database enables us to assess the effect of FPS on total compensation and base wages while taking into account observable firm characteristics (e.g., sector, size, workforce characteristics, economic and financial indicators) and unobservable characteristics since data are available for at least two dates (i.e., the first and the last observations) (see Appendix A for descriptive statistics on the main variables).

IV. Empirical strategy

Since firms that implement profit-sharing share few characteristics with firms that do not (i.e., Group 4), we use an empirical methodology that enables us to account for these differences. Specifically, we use a propensity score matching model that was initially developed by [START_REF] Rosenbaum | The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects[END_REF] to assess the effects of medical treatments. This method entails considering profit-sharing as a treatment and constructing for each firm that implemented FPS an identical counterfactual that did not implement FPS. Given our data, we have two types of firms: firms included in Group 1 or Group 3 that implemented FPS (FPS=1) and those included in Group 4 that did not implement FPS over the 2000-2007 period (FPS=0). The effect of FPS on wages is measured with the outcome variables. Thus, each firm is characterised by two potential outcomes: 0 y if FPS=0 and 1 y if FPS=1. However, the effect of FPS on wages ( 1 0 C y y = -) is unobservable and individual. Consequently, the distribution of this effect is not identifiable since 0 y and 1 y are never observed simultaneously. Only the achieved outcome can be observed.

Let Y i be the vector of outcome variables. For each firm, only the couple (Y, FPS) is observed. Nevertheless, if the latent outcome variables are independent of the assignment to the treatment

( ( ) FPS y y ⊥ 1 0 ,
) -in others words, if the treatment is randomly assigned-then the average effect on the treated firms (i.e., firms with FPS) can be identified:

( ) [ ] 1 / , 1 0 = = FPS y y E C treated
. However, this property of independence is seldom confirmed. A solution would also entail constructing a control group, so that the distribution of a set of observable characteristics (i.e., a set of control variables, noted X) is identical to the characteristic set of firms implementing FPS. In this way, we are able to reduce the selection bias. The identification condition also becomes less restrictive, and the independence property has to be checked ( ( )

X EP y y / , 1 0 ⊥
). If numerous control variables are taken into account, finding a counterfactual for each treated firm becomes problematic. According to [START_REF] Rosenbaum | The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects[END_REF], the conditional independence with respect to the set of control variables is equal to the independence relative to the propensity score ( ) P X , which is a one-dimensional summary of matching variables that estimates the probability of being assigned to the treatment, conditional these variables: ( )

X EP y y / , 1 0 ⊥
. The literature defines numerous propensity score matching methodologies. For instance, [START_REF] Caliendo | Some Practical Guidance for the Implementation of Propensity Score Matching[END_REF] recommend the use of several estimators. If we obtain similar results, the chosen approach does not matter. Therefore, we implement two matching strategies: nearestneighbour matching with and without replacement and radius matching. In this paper, we report only the results obtained by using radius matching (with a radius equal to 0.001) since we obtain very similar findings by using nearest-neighbour matching.

The panel allows us to control for an individual and unobservable fixed effect that simultaneously affects the treatment and outcome variables. We are able to match differences between firms by using a difference-in-differences selection model and observing firms over time [START_REF] Heckman | Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator[END_REF][START_REF] Heckman | Characterizing Selection Bias Using Experimental Data[END_REF]. This methodology allows us to take into account both observable and unobservable characteristics of firms that implemented FPS when we evaluate the causal effect of FPS on wages. This approach entails observing the variation of the outcome variable between two dates (first difference) and comparing this variation between the treated and the untreated firms (second difference). The formula of the treatment effect on the treated firms is as follows:

Where N 1 is the number of firms that implemented FPS. I 1 represents the whole sample of firms that are involved in this profit-sharing mechanism, and 0 I represents the sample of firms that are not. P(X) is the estimated propensity score, and Y, the wage level. M i [] represents the average value of the outcome variable among the population of firms j that belong to the control group and that are selected among firms i. t and t' represent the two periods, before and after the treatment assignment. This estimator is supposed to satisfy the common trend assumption that we will simultaneously find treated and untreated firms for each value of the matching variable.

Our empirical strategy involves two steps. In the first step, we run a probit model to estimate the propensity score. We thus estimate two models because our goal is to assess the effects of FPS on

∆ = 1 N 1 Y t,i -Y t',i ( ) -M i P X j ( ) -P X i ( ) ( )       P X j ( ) -P X i ( ) ( )       i∈I 0 ∑             j∈I 0 ∑ Y t, j -Y t', j ( )               i∈I 1 ∑
wages within two groups of firms: Group 1 ("implementation of FPS") and Group 3 ("existence of FPS"). The first model (Model 1) estimates the probability that a firm will begin implementing FPS between 2000 and 2007, and the second model (Model 2) computes the probability that a firm will implement FPS each year (without discontinuity). From the literature on the determinants of FPS, we retain three categories of control variables (regardless of the model): firm characteristics (firm size, sector, business group affiliation), economic performance indicators (economic rate of return, labour productivity) and workforce characteristics (proportion of managerial employees, proportion of women). Since we do not necessarily compute wage differences during the same period, we also introduce a variable that takes into account the number of years between the first and the last observation for each firm ("time window"). Moreover, we consider the potential simultaneous implementation of compulsory profit-sharing (LPS) (and bonus distribution) because of the potential correlation between LPS and FPS. Finally, we introduce years as dummy variables to take into account economic circumstances. All variables are lagged by the first observation. In addition, we consider the distribution of quantitative variables (by quartile) as dummy variables.

To check whether the probit models provide a sufficient specification to evaluate FPS practices, we implement a balancing test that analyses standardised differences. For this test, we compute the mean of each control variable for the treated and untreated firms and thus estimate the reduction in selection bias associated with the difference in average differences before and after matching. In the second step, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) to show the difference in wage variation between the treated and the untreated groups by using the radius matching estimator. During this step, we compute standard deviations with and without bootstraps, which appear to be nearly identical.

V. Results

We first present the estimated effect of FPS implementation and then discuss the effect of the existence of FPS on wages. Subsequently, we check the robustness of our results.

V.1 Estimated effect of the implementation of FPS

To assess the effect of the implementation of FPS, we compare both total compensation and base wages between firms that implemented FPS for the first time between 2000 and 2007 (Group 1) and firms that did not implement FPS (Group 4). As explained above, we first run a probit model to compute the propensity score, which refers to the probability that a firm introduces FPS during the 2000-2007 period. The first stage enables us to discuss the determinants of FPS implementation within firms. The results are listed in Appendix B. As shown, the coefficient for the variable "time window" is positive and significant, indicating that firms with FPS survive longer than firms without FPS. Moreover, we find that the implementation of FPS is significantly associated with several firm characteristics. Regarding firm size, the probability of implementing FPS increases with firm size, especially up to the 500-employee threshold. Sector and business group affiliation are also important factors. Relative to the reference sector (energy), most of sectors are negatively associated with the probability of implementing FPS. The independent firms are less likely to implement profit-sharing. The relationships between firm performance and FPS implementation are rather surprising. The probability of introducing FPS decreases with profitability. We speculate that less profitable firms may introduce FPS to boost their economic performance. In line with the efficiency wage hypothesis, we find a positive correlation between labour productivity and FPS implementation. Workforce composition likely plays an important role in FPS implementation. Similar to Fakhfkah and Perotin (2000), we find that the introduction of FPS is associated with a higher proportion of managers. This result may indicate that firms with FPS may attract the most qualified workers [START_REF] Long | Do Employees Profit from Profit Sharing? Evidence from Canadian Panel Date[END_REF]. In addition, the estimated probability of introducing FPS decreases with the proportion of women. Finally, LPS and FPS seem to be complementary mechanisms since the implementation of FPS is positively correlated with the existence of LPS. However, the distribution of LPS and the probability of introducing FPS are negatively correlated. With respect to this result, we speculate that firms that already distribute LPS cannot pay additional bonuses (i.e., FPS).

As detailed in the previous section, we check whether two conditions that are necessary for the propensity score estimation are satisfied. The first condition is that the common support of treated and untreated firms is sufficiently large (see Appendix C). The balancing test that analyses standardised differences reveals that the bias is strongly reduced after the matching procedure. For almost all the variables, the bias reduction is approximately 90% (see Appendix D).

In the second step, we estimate the causal effect of FPS implementation by controlling for observable and unobservable characteristics. In this way, we use the estimated probabilities on the treated and the untreated firms to compute the effect of FPS implementation on differences in both total compensation and base wages. The matching results are reported in Table 2. Two outcomes variables are defined as the variation in total compensation and the variation in base wages between 2000 and 2007. For each of these outcomes variables, Table 2 presents the difference in variation between firms that implemented FPS (Group 1) and firms that did not (Group 4) before and after matching.

[Table 2]

The results reveal that the difference in total compensation (with FPS bonuses included) between firms that implemented FPS and firms that did not is positive and significant before matching (by 6.9 points). On average, total compensation increased at a faster rate in firms that implemented FPS between 2000 and 2007 than in firms that did not. Once we control for observable and unobservable characteristic, the difference is still positive, but it becomes non-significant. As expected, the results show that the difference in base wages is not significant before and after matching, suggesting that firms respect the legal prohibition of the substitution of FPS for wages during the first year after the introduction of FPS. Finally, the ATT based on the difference-indifferences model also suggests that the effect of FPS implementation is neutral regardless of the outcome variable. Based on these results, we conjecture that during the year after FPS implementation, FPS bonuses may be too low to substitute for or complement base wages. Finally, these findings do not enable us to validate the Weitzman theory or the efficiency wage hypothesis.

V.2 Estimated effect of the existence of FPS

Furthermore, we assess the effect of FPS implementation over several years, particularly since 2000. The results of the probit model (Model 2) estimating the probability of the existence of FPS since 2000 are reported in Appendix E. The results are similar to the findings reported in the previous section. Once again, the results show that the existence of FPS is strongly correlated with firm characteristics. The estimated probability increases with firm size. As mentioned above, substantial differences across sectors are observed, with almost all sectors (except for the financial and real estate sectors) relative to the energy sector showing negatively correlations with the existence of profit-sharing. Moreover, the probability of the existence of FPS increases with the proportion of managers. Further, the most profitable firms are less likely to have practiced FPS over the studied period, whereas the most productive firms (in terms of labour productivity) often more likely to have practiced FPS since 2000. Finally, FPS and LPS are positively correlated. As in the previous section, the two conditions that are necessary for a good specification are satisfied. The common support (see Appendix F) is sufficiently large such that the propensity scores of treated and untreated firms are satisfactorily superposed. Moreover, for almost all variables, the bias reduction is approximately 90% after matching (see Appendix D). Table 3 reports the results regarding the effects of the existence of FPS.

[Table 3]

Before we take into account observable and unobservable firm characteristics (i.e., before matching), firms with profit-sharing pay higher total compensation and base wages than firms without profit-sharing. The difference of trends in total compensation is indeed positive and significant (approximately 4 points), and after matching, this difference remains positive but becomes non-significant. Meanwhile, before matching, the results do not show a difference of trends in base wages between firms with profit-sharing and other firms. However, after matching, this difference becomes negative and significant. In other words, profit-sharing has a neutral effect on total compensation and a negative impact on base wages. These results are consistent with the Weitzman hypothesis. The effect of profit-sharing is neutral because employees receive total compensation that is equivalent to the base wage paid by non-profit-sharing firms. Profit-sharing should thus be interpreted as a device whereby the profit-sharing bonus compensates for the wage moderation. Our conclusions also confirm the findings of [START_REF] Mabile | Intéressement et salaires : complémentarité ou substitution ?[END_REF] that highlight the role played by the date of FPS introduction.

V.3 Robustness check

To test the robustness of our results, we implement an alternative econometric strategy: an instrumental variable method with panel data. With this strategy, we can control for unobservable heterogeneity by using the "within" estimator instead of a double-difference matching estimator. We also assume that the amount of the FPS bonus (and implicitly its distribution) is endogenous: it depends on the choice of the firm to implement FPS.

We use a fixed-effect, two-stage least squares estimator (FE-2SLS). The main drawback of our data is the difficulty of finding a valid instrumental variable. We choose to consider the lagged distributed bonuses as an instrumental variable. In most cases, this variable would not be appropriate; however, it is the only variable available in our data. We take into account differences in observation duration between firms because our panel data are unbalanced. For each firm, all variables are also centred by weighting them by the observation duration.

The results confirm our previous findings: FPS substitutes for base wages in firms with FPS. Moreover, total compensation is not affected, as the trends in total compensation are similar between firms with FPS and firms without FPS.

VI. Conclusion

This paper investigates the effect of "free" profit-sharing (FPS) on employee earnings for the period between 2000 and 2007 in France. For this purpose, we distinguish between trends in base wages and trends in total compensation. We also differentiate the effects between the years of FPS implementation since the French Law prohibits the substitution of profit-sharing for wages during the first twelve months after the introduction of FPS. For this analysis, we construct an original unbalanced database that reflects FPS practices within more than 22,000 firms over the 2000-2007 period. To account for the observable and unobservable characteristics of firms according to their FPS practices, we use a difference-in-differences selection model.

First, we show that the introduction of FPS does not affect base wages or total compensation. Taking into account observable and unobservable firm characteristics, we show that the trends in base wages and total compensation within firms with FPS are similar to those in firms without FPS. This neutral influence suggests that profit-sharing bonuses are too weak to substitute for or complement wages during the first year after the implementation of FPS in a firm. Second, the comparison between firms that have practiced FPS for a long time and firms that never implemented FPS between 2000 and 2007 reveals that FPS bonuses substitute for base wages. While the effect of FPS on total compensation remains neutral, it becomes negative on base wage. This result is consistent with the mechanism described by [START_REF] Weitzman | The Share Economy. Conquering the Stagflation[END_REF][START_REF] Weitzman | The simple macroeconomics of Profit Sharing[END_REF]: FPS bonuses offset the wage moderation such that total compensation is similar between firms with profitsharing and firms without profit-sharing, even if the compensation structure is different. This paper suggests that FPS generally did not provide employees with additional compensation beyond their base wages between 2000 and 2007. This finding raises the question whether existing tax and social relief might lead employers and employees who are involved in profit-sharing to share a "tax rent". [START_REF] Estrin | Profit-Sharing and Employee Ownership[END_REF] and Wadwhani (1988) note the potential inefficiency of tax relief in Great Britain since it may lead to "cosmetic profit-sharing". Shedding new light on the debate regarding profit-sharing, our results suggest that the gains for employees from FPS might be related more to social and tax advantages than to the FPS bonus. Indeed, employees who save their FPS bonus though employee savings plans receive tax exemptions. From the employer point of view, FPS might represent not only a flexibility wage tool but also a tax optimisation device since it lowers base wages that are currently subject to social contributions. (2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008); DADS andFICUS files (1999-2007). Field: Firms with at least 10 employees in the private sector. Source: Unbalanced panel of firms. PIPA Survey (2000Survey ( -2008)); DADS andFICUS files (1999-2007). Field: Firms with at least 10 employees in the private sector. Note: Significance level: *** (1%). Source: Unbalanced panel of firms. PIPA Survey (2000Survey ( -2008)); DADS andFICUS files (1999-2007). Field: Firms with at least 10 employees in the private sector. Note: Significance level: *** (1%).

Appendix A: Main variables (descriptive statistics)

Table 1 -Distribution of firms according to their FPS practices

 1

		Nb of firms % of firms Nb of observations
	Group 1: Implementation of FPS	1,713	7.5	8,434
	Group 2: Abandonment of FPS	860	3.7	3,782
	Group 3: Existence of FPS	5,055	22.0	22,314
	Group 4: Absence of FPS	15,352	66.8	51,961
	Total	22,98	100	86,491

Source: Unbalanced panel of firms. PIPA Survey

Table 2 -Estimated effects of FPS implementation (average treatment effect on the treated -ATT)

 2

	Outcome variables

Table 3 -Estimated effect of the existence of FPS (average treatment effect on the treated -ATT)

 3

	Outcome variables

This legal requirement does not apply to some firms. In particular, public firms, administrations, mutual societies, holding companies, and firms that do not generate profit are not concerned.

Social contributions do not apply to profit-sharing bonuses. To benefit from social and tax reliefs, firms have to define an FPS agreement, which can be reached with personal representatives or employees. In addition, FPS bonuses must be variable and random. In if profit-sharing bonuses substitute for wages, the French administration cannot claim damage if a twelve-month delay has occurred between the implementation of profit-sharing and the wage cut. On the employee side, tax exemptions are granted if employees agree to save FPS bonuses through company savings plans. To prevent firms from engaging in tax optimisation, in 2009, the French legislator introduced a new contribution ("social forfait"), which is equal to 2% of profit-sharing bonuses. In 2014, this contribution, which is paid by employers, is about 20%.

For a discussion of objections to the Weitzman theory, see, for instance,[START_REF] Blanchflower | Profit Sharing-Can it Work?[END_REF],[START_REF] Nuti | Profit-sharing and Employment: Claims and Overclaims[END_REF][START_REF] Wadhwani | Profit-Sharing as a Cure for Unemployment[END_REF].

Cooperation between employees occurs under a "peer-pressure" context, where workers are supposed to place pressure on others colleagues to monitor shirking behaviour[START_REF] Kandel | Peer Pressure and Partnership[END_REF][START_REF] Lazear | Personnel Economics[END_REF].

This survey has been conducted since 1989, but it was amended in 2000 and 2006. Since 2000, data are not restricted to only firms for which profit-sharing agreements are registered by the French Ministry of Labour. After 2006, firms with less than 10 employees are excluded.

Source: Unbalanced panel of firms. PIPA Survey (2000Survey ( -2008)); DADS andFICUS files (1999-2007). Field: Firms with at least 10 employees in the private sector.

Reading note: In all, 7.5% of firms implemented profit-sharing between 2000 and 2007. 14.1% of these firms employ between 10 and 49 employees. [1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007]. Field: Firms with at least 10 employees in the private sector. Reading: "ns" means that differences between treated and untreated firms were not significant before matching.

Appendix B: Estimation results of the probability for introducing FPS between 2000 and 2007 (Model 1)

Regarding the Model 1, the introduction of the variable "business group affiliation" as an independent variable enables us to reduce differences between treated and untreated firms after matching on average by 99.3%. (2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008); DADS andFICUS files (1999-2007). Field: Firms with at least 10 employees in the private sector. Notes: Significance levels: *** (1%); ** (5 %); * (10 %).

Appendix E: Estimation results of the probability of the existence of FPS between 2000 and 2007 (Model 2)


Narratology in the Press SYLVIE PATRON University of Paris Diderot

This paper deals with the results of an investigation into the use of the terms narrateur, narratrice ("narrator", male and female) and their derivatives, in the book reviews published in "Le Monde des livres", the literary supplement of the French newspaper Le Monde, between Friday, September 6, 2013, and Friday, August 29, 2014.

The paper is made up of three parts. The first part presents the quantitative and qualitative results of the investigation. The second contextualises these results, connecting them to the problem of the narrator in narrative theory (the debate between pan--narrator theories and optional--narrator theories). It establishes a standard model for the use of the terms narrateur and narratrice, and analyses some problematic occurrences. The third part interprets these results, in other words, makes connections between the analysis of the results, the contextualising problem and the field in which the research was carried out.

The aim of the paper is to raise considerations about the contradictions attached to the use of the term and concept of the narrator in journalistic criticism and as a result the contradictions of the prevailing theory (pan--narrator theory) which inspired it. 1. Quantitative and qualitative results 1.1. The corpus is made up of 47 "Le Monde des livres" supplements, appearing in the Friday edition of the newspaper (except during July and August). Each supplement is four to twelve pages long. In addition to these supplements are the two pages called "Les Livres de l'été" ("Summer books"), which replace the supplement in the Friday, July 31, and Friday August 8, 2014 editions.

There are 200 occurrences in this corpus of the term narrateur and 45 occurrences of the term narratrice. There are no occurrences of the terms narrataire (narratee) or narratorial (narrational).

Note: The count had to be done manually by going through the supplements and pages under consideration. According to the head of electronic documentation at Paris Diderot University: "the PDF format is only available for the last 30 issues". "Previous issues can be consulted in HTML format, but it is not possible to download and store them". Finally, "the newspaper's search engine is not very effective and does not allow, for example, searches by date" (Natacha Leclercq--Varlan to Sylvie Patron, October 15, 2014). 1.2. The 245 occurrences under consideration (200 occurrences of the term narrateur, 45 occurrences of the term narratrice) all appear in the "Literature" pages of "Le Monde des livres". There was no occurrence of these terms found on the pages dedicated to essays.

The occurrences of the words narrateur and narratrice are distributed in the following way: -4 occurrences in the editorials by Jean Birnbaum, editor of "Le Monde des livres"; - 6 occurrences in the personal portraits in the "Rencontre" ("Encounter") section, featured on the last page;

-19 occurrences in the regular columns; -48 occurrences in the dossiers (double--page spreads on a particular theme); - 57 occurrences in what I call "notes", short articles appearing in the sections "Sans oublier" ("Not forgetting"), "Sélection" ("Selection"), "Les choix du 'Monde des livres'" ('The choices of 'Le Monde des livres'"), etc., or attached to the "Traversée" ("Cross--section") and "Rencontre" pages; -112 occurrences in the articles devoted to novels or short story collections. -"Traversée" or "Grande traversée" ("Major Cross--section") section -"Dossier" section 48 26 22 Notes: in the "Sans oublier", "Sélection", "Les choix du 'Monde des livres'", "Dans les poches" ("Paperbacks"), "Mon poche de chevet" ("Bedside paperback"), "C'est d'actualité" ("Happening now") sections, and on the "Traversée", "Grande traversée" and "Rencontre" pages 57 Articles dedicated to novels or short story collections on front page articles included in the above 111 9 Special instances: 13 occurrences of narrateur, with or without capitalisation, to refer to the Proustian narrator. 1.3. The words narrateur and narratrice are sometimes replaced by synonyms or circumlocutions.

[…] Rebecca raconte à la première personne une vie de souffrance et d'exclusion […].

[…] Rebecca narrates a life of suffering and exclusion in the first--person […].

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21347, Friday, September 6, 2013, p. 5) Et une fois le livre terminé, la voix rêche et révoltée de Béatrice résonne longtemps dans la mémoire du lecteur. And once the book is finished, the harsh and rebellious voice of Béatrice resonates for a long time in the reader's memory.

(Ibid.) La narration est confiée alternativement à celle--ci et à celui--là. The narration is alternately assigned to one and the other.

( Pan--narrator theories: For these theories, the presence of a fictional narrator, whether overt or covert, is constitutive of the definition of fictional narrative. "There is always a fictional narrator in all fictional narratives." "There is no narrative without a narrator." "The narrator is either homodiegetic or heterodiegetic" (present or absent as a character in the story he/she tells).

Optional narrator theories: They challenge pan--narrator theories and favour optionalism, i.e. the argument for the optional nature of the narrator in the theory and analysis of fictional narrative. "There is a fictional narrator in some fictional narratives." "There are narratives without a narrator."

Note: the optional--narrator theorists are not clear as to the status and place of the traditional concept of the narrator (i.e. the narrator of the first--person narrative) in their model. [...] only in cases where the narrative poet actually does 'create' a narrator, namely the first--person narrator of the first--person narrative, can one speak of the latter as a (fictive) narrator. (Hamburger 1973(Hamburger , 1973(Hamburger [1968]]: 140; see also Banfield 1978: 297 and1982: 185) In this quotation, "narrator" designates the narrator of the first--person narrative.

[…] there is a narrator if we have good reasons to postulate a narrator.

[…] we have good reasons to do this if a text explicitly or implicitly authorizes us to imagine that the story is told by a narrator. (Köppe and Stühring 2011: 73) In this quotation, "narrator" does not only designate the narrator of the first--person narrative.

In the traditional conception, the "first--person novel" precisely corresponds to the "homodiegetic novel", which is to say a novel in which a character tells his or her own story (or a story in which he or she has participated in as a witness). 2.2. In the corpus under consideration, 239 out of the 245 occurrences refer to novels or collections of short stories told in the first person.

We can establish a standard model for the use of the terms narrateur and narratrice:

1) The male or female narrator is always or almost always named. ("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21586, Friday, June 13, 2014, p. 4) Special instances: anonymous narrators (narrators whose name is not revealed to the reader).

[…] ce narrateur -un homme d'environ 35 ans dont on ne saura jamais le nom […].

[…] this narrator -a man about 35 years old whose name we never find out […].

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21383, Friday, October 18, 2013, p. 4) A counter--example:

On ne sait rien du narrateur sinon qu'il est chez lui lorsqu'il entend des pas sur le gravier.

We know nothing about the narrator except that he is at home when he hears footsteps on the gravel.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21586, Friday, June 13, 2014, p. 3) 3) The narrator belongs to the same fictional world as the other characters, which is signalled by generational considerations, for example.

Une narratrice, à qui sa famille reproche "de vivre dans le passé", se souvient des trois amies, fréquentées séparément à l'orée de l'âge adulte, qui ont fait d'elle ce qu'elle est. […] Leurs histoires individuelles, puis leurs rencontres avec la narratrice, vont permettre à celle--ci de se former et de se définir, et au livre d'accéder à sa dimension générationnelle.

A narrator, reproached by her family for "living in the past", remembers three friends who she knew separately on the cusp of adulthood and who made her who she is. [...] Their individual stories and then their encounters with the narrator allow her to shape and define herself, and the book to take on a generational dimension.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21359, Friday, September 20, 2013, p. 3) Ils appartiennent, comme Eddy le narrateur, "au monde de ces enfants qui regardent la télévision le matin au réveil", s'ennuient à l'école, jouent au football et "passent des heures dans les rues, le soir et la nuit, à zoner". They belong, like Eddy the narrator, "to the world of those children who watch television in the morning on waking", are bored at school, play football and "spend hours in the streets in the evening and at night, just hanging around".

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21461, Friday, January 17, 2014, p. 7) Special instance: in Kamel Daoud's novel Meursault, contre--enquête, the narrator is the brother of a character in another, very famous, novel, Camus' L'Étranger.

Que faisait--il [l'Arabe] ce jour--là, allongé sur le sable, lorsque Meursault a croisé son chemin ? Son frère cadet, le narrateur de Meursault, contre--enquête, l'ignore, malgré ses tentatives de reconstitution.

What was he [the Arab] doing that day, lying on the sand, when Meursault crossed his path? His younger brother, the narrator of Meursault, contre--enquête, doesn't know, despite his attempts to put the pieces together.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21598, Friday, June 27, 2014, p. 1) 4) Sometimes there are comments on the difference between the "experiencing I" and the "narrating I".

Entrecroisant la parole crue, sans concession, brutale de l'adolescente et le regard rétrospectif, plus distancié, d'une narratrice adulte, Emmanuelle Richard saisit avec une étonnante justesse la sauvagerie de cet âge à vif.

Intertwining the rough, uncompromising, brutal voice of the adolescent girl and the more distanced, retrospective view of an adult narrator, Emmanuelle Richard captures the anti--social nature of this raw age with an amazing accuracy.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21509, Friday, March 14, 2014, p. 2) Dans l'Argentine des années 1970 commence l'histoire que le narrateur se force à retrouver […]. The story that the narrator forces himself to unearth begins in the Argentina of the 1970s […].

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21521, Friday, March 28, 2014, p. 5) 5) There are often comments on the relationship between the male or female narrator and the male or female author of the novel.

The male or female narrator and author are generally differentiated by their names. David di Nota, naguère danseur à l'Opéra, épouse ici les pas d'un imbécile standard. David di Nota, who used to be a dancer at the Opéra, here follows the steps of a common idiot.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21347, Friday, September 6, 2013, p. 1) Jeune romancière née en 1989, Antonia Kerr choisit pour la deuxième fois un narrateur assez inattendu: un homme vieillissant.

A young novelist born in 1989, Antonia Kerr chooses for the second time a rather unexpected narrator: an aging man.

(Ibid., p. 4) Le jeune "payo" (non--gitan) est un narrateur idéal, suffisamment à distance pour permettre au romancier d'échapper au sentiment d'imposture qui le guette. The young "payo" (non--gypsy) is an ideal narrator, sufficiently removed for the novelist to escape the nagging feeling he has of being an impostor.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21371, Friday, October 4, 2013, p. 6) One of Éric Chevillard's columns, "Le roman de la mascotte", on Poupée by Alain Sevestre, is totally devoted to this theme.

Often the novelist complains of being confused with his narrator on the pretext that the narrator expresses himself in the first person, using his own fountain pen, what's more. "But I have nothing to do with this pretentious loser!", he boasts, flicking his glasses back on his nose with his index finger, just as his character also does when annoyed. In other words, the reader can be excused. As can the novelist, who isn't always aware of the resemblance or thinks he has good reasons to deny it, like the father of three girls with moustaches who questions his paternity when he shaves his own off. What can be done to dispel this illusion that is the source of so many misunderstandings? The writer sometimes thinks the solution is to boldly assign the narration of the story to a character of the opposite sex. A crude trick that fools no one, transvestism being one of the most common textual practices in literature. And there is always a moment when the frail Isolde betrays herself by running 100 metres in less than ten seconds and the imposture is exposed for all to see. It's clear something else has to be devised. "She speaks to me. She makes me speak. What can I answer? When they'll know who I am!" exclaims, 60 pages in, Scott, the narrator of Alain Sevestre's new novel, Poupée. Since the revelation comes without delay, I can spill the beans: Scott is not a dog. And the puzzle of this identity, posed from the outset, represents a disturbance at the heart of the narrative, which grows with the suspense introduced from the second chapter [...].

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21491, Friday, 21 February 2014) (We learn later that Scott, the narrator of Poupée, is a lion, and later still, a stuffed toy lion.)

We can also note that much of the effort of the journalist critics consists in identifying resemblances between the narrator and the male or female author of the novel.

Le passé nous est généralement mieux connu que l'avenir […]. Or […] ce principe ne se vérifie pas toujours. Ainsi, en dépit de nombreuses hypothèses vraisemblables, nous ignorons encore aujourd'hui ce qui a entraîné la disparition des dinosaures alors que nous savons qu'une catastrophe nucléaire sera la cause de la nôtre. L'absence de suspense apparaîtrait même comme rédhibitoire si l'aventure humaine était l'oeuvre d'un narrateur qui nous la livrerait par épisodes et je vous prie de croire que je serais sans pitié pour lui dans ma chronique. We generally know more about the past than the future [...]. But [...] this principle doesn't always apply. Thus, despite numerous plausible hypotheses, we still don't know today what led to the disappearance of the dinosaurs, whereas we know that a nuclear catastrophe will be the cause of our own. This lack of suspense would be ruinous in fact if the story of the human race were the work of a narrator who gave it to us in serial instalments and I can assure you that I would be merciless to him in my column.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21353, Friday, September 13, 2013, p. 12)

The use of the term narrator here is explained by its use immediately afterwards to refer to the narrator of Javier Sebastián's Cycliste de Tchernobyl, which follows the standard model: A quest for identity that is not only that of the narrator, but of Europe as a whole.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21467, Friday, January 24, 2014, p. 4) The use of the term narrator here is explained by the fact that the narratives in question, Intérieurs by Thomas Clerc and Double exil by Yannis Kiourtsakis, lie on the border between autobiography and novel.

The four other problematic occurrences involve novels or collections of short stories which are not narrated in the first person.

"David ne se souvenait pas d'avoir jamais eu honte d'elle", précise le narrateur. "David didn't remember ever being ashamed of her", the narrator adds.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21395, Friday, November 1, 2013, p. 7 -about Les Complémentaires by Jens Christian Grøndahl) Dans ces nouvelles, tout passe par le regard (des personnages), comme si l'oeil s'exposait à la maladie du quotidien et de l'égarement. Parfois ce regard (celui du narrateur aussi) est appuyé, parfois non, comme pour les quatre couples d'"Une heure dans l'histoire de l'amour" à différents âges de leur attachement. In these short stories, everything happens via the gaze (of the characters), as though the eye were exposed to the disease of distraction and the everyday. Sometimes this gaze (that of the narrator as well) is focused, sometimes not, as for the four couples of "Une heure dans l'histoire de l'amour" at different stages of their relationship.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21401, Friday, November 8, 2013, p. 5 -about Quelque chose est là dehors et autres nouvelles by Richard Bausch) Je voulais un roman collectif, une petite Comédie humaine: réunir un groupe et étudier ses comportements. Pour cela, j'avais besoin d'un narrateur omniscient, et je n'ai pas pu faire autrement que de m'éloigner du point de vue et des sentiments des personnages. I wanted a collective novel, a little Comédie humaine: to bring together a group and study its behaviour. For that, I needed an omniscient narrator and my only option was to distance myself from the point of view and feelings of the characters.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21467, Friday, January 24, 2014, p. 10 -about Le Village évanoui by Bernard Quiriny [quote from the author]).

auteur a choisi un double fictif, Franck, et un trajet criminel qui n'est pas le sien, afin d'élever ce récit au rang des meilleurs romans noirs. […] the author has chosen a fictional double, Franck, and a criminal path that is not his own, in order to elevate this narrative to the rank of the best noir novels

  Madeleine Miller: elle racontera l'histoire d'amour entre Patrocle et Achille par la voix du premier. It was obvious to Madeleine Miller from the start: she would recount the love story between Patroclus and Achilles using the voice of the former.

	"Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21521,
	Friday, March 28, 2014, p. 8)
	[…] l'.
	("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21562,
	Friday, May 16, 2014, p. 11)
	Claude Pujade--Renaud prend la voix de Louise Victoire Jenamy, cette jeune musicienne aveugle [...].
	Claude Pujade--Renaud takes the voice of Louise Victoire Jenamy, this young blind musician [...]
	("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21574,
	Friday, May 30, 2014)
	Dès le départ, l'évidence s'impose à

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no.

21598, Friday, June 27, 2014, p. 6)

  La narratrice d'Après l'amour - appelons--la 'Divine', pseudo qu'elle s'est choisi sur le site de rencontres lesbiennes qu'elle hante, et nom de guerre qui rappelle Notre--Dame--des--Fleurs […]. The narrator of Après l'amour -let's call her 'Divine', the pseudonym she gives herself on the lesbian dating site she haunts, and a nom de guerre reminiscent of Notre--Dame--des--Fleurs […].

	("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21365,
	Friday, September 27, 2013, p. 8)
	Le narrateur, un gamin prénommé Nicolas […].
	The narrator, a kid called Nicolas […].

[…] Laura Kern, héroïne et narratrice de l'envoûtant Lady Hunt

[…]

.

[…] Laura Kern, heroine and narrator of the captivating Lady Hunt

[…]

.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21359, Friday, September 20, 2013, p. 5) Jean Deichel, le narrateur de ce roman

[…]

. Jean Deichel, the narrator of this novel

[…]

.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no.

21365, Friday, September 27, 2013, p. 10)

  Pourquoi le narrateur d'Un autre (titre tourné déjà comme un aveu), qui répond au même nom que l'auteur, préfère--t--il se faire appeler Alain Fayer ? Why does the narrator of Un autre (a title that already has the air of an admission), who answers to the same name as the author, prefer to be called Alain Fayer?("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21503,

	Friday, March 7, 2014, p. 8)
	Le narrateur, Eduardo Halfon, a beau avoir le patronyme de l'auteur, il ne s'agit pas d'autofiction […].
	Though the narrator, Eduardo Halfon, may well share a surname with the author, this is not an autobiographical
	novel […].
	("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21491,
	Friday, February 21, 2014, p. 5)
	En effet, le narrateur porte son nom […].
	Indeed, the narrator bears his name […].
	("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21539,
	Friday, April 18, 2014, p. 4)
	They are distinguished by other features, sometimes unexpected ones.

Enzo, le narrateur de Borgestein, l'un des deux romans de Sergio Bizzio qui viennent de paraître en français

[…]

. Enzo, the narrator of Borgestein, one of the two novels by Sergio Bizzio that have just been published in French

[…]

.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no.

21515, Friday, March 21, 2014, p. 4)

Counter--examples:

  Mais Javier Sebastián n'ouvre pas son roman sur le récit de la catastrophe. Tout commence vingt--cinq ans plus tard dans un self--service des Champs--Élysées où se trouve présent le narrateur, un fonctionnaire espagnol venu participer à la Conférence internationale des poids et mesures en tant que membre de la commission kilo. But Javier Sebastián doesn't open his novel with the story of the catastrophe. Everything begins twenty--five years later in a self--service restaurant on the Champs--Élysées, where the narrator, a Spanish public servant who has come to attend the International Conference of Weights and Measures as a member of the kilo committee, Une quête d'identité qui n'est pas seulement celle du narrateur, mais celle de l'Europe tout entière.

	finds himself.
	(Ibid.)
	Other examples:

C'est pour varier les points de vue que la description passe de temps en temps du 'je' au 'il' et que parfois, même, le narrateur se féminise.

To vary the point of view, the description moves from 'I' to 'he' from time to time, and sometimes the narrator even becomes female.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21359, Friday, September 20, 2013, p. 12)

Contextualisation (the debate between pan--narrator theories and optional--narrator theories)2.1. Review of the debate

La narratrice, double maladroit de la romancière et amie d'une certaine "Gaëlle" -trois poupées gigognes […]. The narrator, a clumsy double of the novelist and friend of a certain "Gaëlle" -three Russian dolls [...].

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21401, Friday, November 8, 2013, p. 9) Il y a toujours un vélo, chez Lionel Duroy. Un vélo sur lequel son narrateur, qui lui ressemble comme un frère, quel que soit le masque qu'il emprunte, pédale en rond […]. There is always a bike in Lionel Duroy's novels. A bike on which the narrator, who resembles him like a brother, whatever mask he uses, rides round in circles [...]. ("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21437, Friday, December 20, 2013, p. 2) Une fresque lucide et drôle des Années folles, qui balade le narrateur, alter ego à peine caché de l'auteur dans une succession d'aventures mondaines et littéraires entre Paris et Nice. A lucid and funny panorama of the Roaring Twenties, which carries the narrator, the barely disguised alter ego of the author, into a series of high society and literary adventures between Paris and Nice. ("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21443, Friday, December 27, 2013, p. 4) Brizuela, qui avait 13 ans en 1976, a sans doute mis beaucoup de lui dans la figure de Bazán […]. Brizuela, who was 13 in 1976, has no doubt put a lot of himself into the figure of Bazán […]. ("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21449, Friday, January 3, 2014, p. 5) Difficile de ne pas voir dans Hobbie une image de Donna Tartt elle--même […]. It's difficult not to see an image of Donna Tartt herself in Hobbie […].

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21455, Friday, January 10, 2014, p. 1) En quoi le héros et narrateur de La Fille de mon meilleur ami évoque un peu son auteur, Yves Ravey, roi du bonneteau littéraire, qui excelle à attirer le lecteur vers de fausses pistes. In this respect the hero and narrator of La Fille de mon meilleur ami is somewhat reminiscent of its author, Yves Ravey, a master of the literary shell game who excels at leading the reader down the wrong path.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21503, Friday, March 7, 2014, p. 4) Double romanesque de l'écrivain, Colson Whitehead, Ben regarde avec autant de crainte que d'impatience s'éloigner les rivages de l'enfance. A literary double of the writer, Colson Whitehead, Ben watches the shores of childhood recede into the distance with as much fear as impatience.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21509, Friday, March 14, 2014, p. 2) Ces deux narrateurs pris dans les embarras de la fiction sont bien évidemment des figures de l'auteur lui--même, Sergi Pàmies au travail […]. These two narrators caught up in the predicaments of the story are obviously versions of the author himself, Sergi Pàmies, at work […].

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21533, Friday, April 11, 2014, p. 8) À la fin de ses études, le narrateur, qui ressemble fort à l'auteur, Écossais émigré aux États--Unis, se trouva fort dépourvu. At the end of his studies, the narrator, who bears a strong resemblance to the author, a Scot who emigrated to the United States, found himself sorely deprived.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21550, Friday, May 2, 2014, p. 9) This standard model is found in all the different types of articles in the corpus: editorials, columns, notes, and so on. It is also reinforced by the examples where the words narrateur and narratrice are replaced by synonyms or circumlocutions.

On the edges of this model, we can identify seven problematic occurrences. The first three involve narratives that can't immediately be described as novels. First example:

 […]le narrateur est lui aussi un homme de l'ombre: on ne connaît d'ailleurs même pas son nom.

[…] the narrator is also a shadowy figure: we don't even know his name in fact.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21443, Friday, December 27, 2013, p. 4) À l'image de la Laurel de Ron Rash, le narrateur, qui n'est jamais nommé […]. Like Ron Rash's Laurel, the narrator, who is never named […].

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21503, Friday, March 7, 2014, p. 3) Le point commun entre Snobs et Passé imparfait ? Un narrateur artiste dont on ignore le nom […]. What do Snobs and Passé imparfait have in common? An artist narrator whose name we don't know […].

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21592, Friday, June 20, 2014, p. 10) 2) The narrator is characterised according to profession, age, personal history, and so on (gender being specified by the terms narrateur and narratrice or by proper names).

Son narrateur, journaliste employé par un quotidien de droite ("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21425, Friday, December 6, 2013, p. 5) Son narrateur, Richard, aura bientôt 18 ans, mais sait qu'il n'atteindra jamais les 19: il est en soins palliatifs. Its narrator, Richard, will soon be 18, but knows that he will never reach 19: he is in palliative care.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21509, Friday, March 14, 2014, p. 3) […] Rukshana, la narratrice, une jeune journaliste qui fait partie de l'équipe féminine de son université, en Inde.

[…] Rukshana, the narrator, a young journalist who is part of the female team of her university, in India.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21592, Friday, June 20, 2014, p. 5) Le narrateur est un illustrateur, installé dans l'est des Pays--Bas, hanté par des images vieilles de trente ans. The narrator is an illustrator, living in the eastern part of the Netherlands, haunted by images that are thirty years old."

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21604, Friday, July 4, 2014, p. 4) La voix taquine de son narrateur omniscient explorant avec finesse l'intimité des personnages s'entremêle aux fragilités grinçantes de Gary, enfin prêt à retourner sur les traces de son passé. The teasing voice of its omniscient narrator, skilfully exploring the inner lives of the characters, becomes entwined with the darkly humorous frailties of Gary, finally ready to go back over the traces of his past.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21545, Friday, April 25, 2014, p. 4 -about Gary tout seul by Sophie Simon)

Interpretation

We have seen that 239 out of the 245 occurrences refer to novels or collections of short stories told in the first person, which is to say 97.5 %. This figure is not at all reflective of the percentage of novels told in the first person in relation to novels told in the third person, which is approximately 28%.

In other words:

-in the case of novels told in the first person, we find the terms narrateur or narratrice, or their synonyms, almost automatically;

- in the case of the novels told in the third person, we only find the term narrateur in exceptional cases (and never the term narratrice).

This observation runs counter to the claims of pan--narrator theory -"There is always a fictional narrator in all fictional narratives", "The narrator is either homodiegetic or heterodiegetic", etc. -and supports rather the theory of the optional narrator.

We can add that the only article that reflects on the question of the narrator in any way, "Le roman de la mascotte" by Éric Chevillard, on Poupée by Alain Sevestre, concerns a novel told in the first person.

In the four instances where the term narrator is used to refer to novels or collections of short stories told in the third person:

1) the narrator is not named;

2) the narrator is not characterised in any way;

3) there is nothing that allows us to say that the narrator belongs to the same fictional world as the characters; on the contrary (the case of the narrator described as "omniscient"):

I wanted a collective novel, a little Comédie humaine: to bring together a group and study its behaviour. For that, I needed an omniscient narrator and my only option was to distance myself from the point of view and feelings of the characters. The teasing voice of its omniscient narrator, skilfully exploring the inner lives of the characters, becomes entwined with the darkly humorous frailties of Gary, finally ready to go back over the traces of his past. These examples reflect the contradictions of the pan--narrator theory, which simultaneously asserts the presence of a fictional narrator in all fictional narratives and doesn't allow this narrator to be part of the same fictional world as the characters in the case of "omniscient" narration, in other words the narration that offers direct access to the thoughts and feelings of the characters.

4) there are also never any comments concerning the opposition between the "experiencing I" and the "narrating I"; 5) nor any comments concerning the relationship between the male or female narrator and author of the novel -except perhaps, very discreetly, in the quote from Bernard Quiriny:

Pour cela, j'avais besoin d'un narrateur omniscient […].

For that, I needed an omniscient narrator [...]. Which is to say: the narrator is not me.

What we can conclude from this review is that when it comes to this narrator (the narrator of certain novels or collections of short stories told in the third person), there is nothing to say. In two out of the four cases considered, the term narrator could moreover be replaced by the terms narrative or narration.

"David ne se souvenait pas d'avoir jamais eu honte d'elle", précise le récit. "David didn't remember ever being ashamed of her", the narrative adds.

Je voulais un roman collectif, une petite Comédie humaine: réunir un groupe et étudier ses comportements. Pour cela, j'avais besoin d'une narration omnisciente, et je n'ai pas pu faire autrement que de m'éloigner du point de vue et des sentiments des personnages.

I wanted a collective novel, a little Comédie humaine: to bring together a group and study its behaviour. For that, I needed an omiscient narration and my only option was to distance myself from the point of view and feelings of the characters. There remains the two following examples:

In these short stories, everything happens via the gaze (of the characters), as if the eye were exposed to the disease of distraction and the everyday. Sometimes this gaze (that of the narrator as well) is focused, sometimes not, as for the four couples of 'Une heure dans l'histoire de l'amour' at different stages of their relationship. The teasing voice of its omniscient narrator, skilfully exploring the inner lives of the characters, becomes entwined with the darkly humorous frailties of Gary, finally ready to go back over the traces of his past.

In these two examples, the narration is attributed to an anthropomorphic narrator, which rules out the possibility of replacing the term narrator with narrative or narration. We can nevertheless wonder whether the metaphor of the gaze of the narrator is appropriate to account for the narrative technique or more probably the descriptive technique used (the more or less focused "gaze" of the narrator probably referring to the more or less detailed nature of the narrative).

One final remark: the two examples, "'David didn't remember ever being ashamed of her', the narrator adds" and "Sometimes this gaze (that of the narrator as well) is focused, sometimes not", and so on, are taken from articles by the same journalist, Nils C. Ahl. Ahl is also a writer and a translator. His educational background is the preparatory class at Lycée Honoré de Balzac, in Paris, and the University of Paris X--Nanterre. It is thus not surprising that he spontaneously resorts to the pan--narrator theory of fictional narrative, which is the dominant theory in these courses of instruction. The example "The teasing voice of its omniscient narrator", and so on, is taken from an article by Esther Attias, whose educational background is identical to Nils C. Ahl's (preparatory class at Lycée Fénelon in Paris, École Normale Supérieure at Cachan and University Paris Diderot in English).

I will finish with a final quote, taken from the editorial of "Le Monde des livres" dated October 25, 2013:

"C'est fou comme on se fait vite des relations quand on n'est là pour personne", écrit--[Jean--Yves Lacroix]. Ouvrez Haute époque, pourtant, et vous comprendrez d'emblée qu'il y a quelqu'un. La voix d'un "libraire en chambre" qui connaît son métier. "It's mad how quickly you develop relationships when you're not there for anyone", writes [Jean--Yves Lacroix]. Open up Haute époque, however and you immediately know someone is there. The voice of a "home--based bookseller" who knows his trade.

("Le Monde des livres", Le Monde supplement no. 21389, Friday, October 25, 2013, p. 1) "Someone is there" (and therefore there is something to say about him or her) or "No one is there" (and therefore there is no reason to talk about him or her): this could sum up this investigation into the use of the terms narrateur and narratrice in "Le Monde des livres", between Friday, September 6, 2013, and Friday, August 29, 2014. It shows the influence of the pan--narrator theory in the background of certain journalist critics, but also and above all what little critical utility this theory has, which ultimately justifies the claims of the optional--narrator theory. Banfield, Ann (1978). "The Formal Coherence of Represented Speech and Thought". PTL 3: 289-314. -(1982). Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction. London: Routledge. Hamburger, Käte (1973Käte ( [1968]]). The Logic of Literature. Translated by Marilynn J. Rose. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Köppe, Tilmann, and Jan Stühring (2011). "Against Pan--Narrator Theories". Journal of Literary Semantics 40: 59-80.

Translated by Melissa McMahon