Maria De Filippo

Omar Ali

Al L Ali

Jean Luc Bourrain

Pascal Demoly

Anca Mirela Chiriac
email: chiriac@chu-montpellier.fr

D E Filippo

M.D, BOURRAIN Jean Luc

Demoly Pascal

Dr Anca Mirela

Immediate flare-up-like reaction of skin tests to betalactams with lymphangitis during drug provocation test

de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Beta-lactam (BL) antibiotics are the most common cause of drug-induced hypersensitivity reactions (DHR).

Clinical Implications:

We present two clinical cases of patients with suspected immediate BL DHR who underwent drug allergy work-up according to standardized diagnostic procedures, including skin tests (ST: prick, SPT and intradermal tests, IDT) and drug provocation tests (DPT) 1 . ST became positive after the first DPT dose. The patients gave their consent to the diagnostic allergy work-up and use of their de-identified data for research purposes.

A 68-year-old man placed on the liver transplantation waitlist for cirrhosis due to hepatitis C viral infection in August 2017 was admitted to the hospital for cholangitis. The patient was empirically treated with piperacilline/tazobactam (piperacillin 4g/t.i.d) intravenously. He had previously tolerated this drug. About 45 minutes after the first dose, he developed pruritus and urticaria on the neck and trunk without other associated symptoms. He rapidly recovered with cetirizine (10 mg) by oral route. In December 2018 the patient reported a similar episode, treated with intravenous dexchlorpheniramine. In June 2019, the patient underwent ST with several penicillin and cephalosporin reagents. Histamine was used as a positive control. As SPT and IDT at the highest recommended concentrations were negative when read after 15 minutes and 20 minutes respectively (according to current recommendations), we proceeded to DPT (the first dose was given 60 minutes after the IDT reading). Single-blind challenge with intravenous piperacilline/tazobactam was performed, with 30 minutes increments, starting with 5% 2 (200 mg) of the therapeutic dose (4000 mg) that elicited his initial reaction. A few minutes before the administration of the second dose the patient reported itching on the arms and scalp, in the absence of objective clinical signs. Therefore, we decided to interrupt the test and monitor the patient for 15 minutes. A few minutes later the patient presented a localized itchy erythema at the site of the ST corresponding to pure IDT to piperacillin/ tazobactam and piperacillin, with ascending lymphangitic infiltration (Figure 1). No wheal was observed. The ST was nonetheless considered positive, the DPT was interrupted and cetirizine (10 mg) was administered.

Two hours after the administration of the first dose of the drug, the patient presented localized urticaria on the arms and the abdomen, with resolution in 90 minutes (see Figure E1 in the Online Repository).

A 62-year-old male patient, mentioned an episode of potential DHR in October 2012, with generalized urticaria, preceded by pruritus of palms and soles. This reaction started five minutes after the ingestion of 1000 mg amoxicillin for sinusitis, and during a meal containing shrimps. The allergy work-up was performed six weeks after the initial reaction. Skin tests (read at 20 min for IDT) were negative at the maximum recommended concentrations. As the patient had a history of immediate reaction, DPT with amoxicillin was started immediately after reading the skin tests. The began with 1 mg of amoxicillin (this was the first dose of the empirical DPT protocols that have been used in our unit till 2016). Thirty minutes after the first dose of amoxicillin, the patient presented a positive ST (> 3mm increase in the diameter compared to the injected wheal, surrounded by erythema) in IDT only at the site of amoxicillin injection, with a linear shape form and ascending lymphangitis 7.5 cm upward from the injection site (Figure 2). All the other ST were negative. The DPT was stopped immediately, he was treated with cetirizine (10 mg) and monitored for 90 minutes. No other symptoms appeared.

When negative immediate-reading ST occur in patients with a clinical history compatible with an immediate reaction (i.e., potentially IgE-mediated), a DPT is usually performed, in absence of contra-indications 1 . In the two cases we present, the first dose of the oral DPT was followed by ST positivity, associated in Case 1 with a systemic reaction (dose administered, 5% of initial eliciting dose). The peculiarity of the second case is that the patient developed a positive ST at 60 minutes, as opposed to 20 minutes following their performance and 30 minutes after the start of DPT without systemic symptoms (dose administered 0.1% of the initial eliciting dose). The absence of any systemic reaction in Case 2 may be due to the low initial dose.

ST reversal in these patients is likely due to a flare-up phenomenon. Flare-up reactions refer to the reactivation of previous positive ST or the switch from negative to positive ST, usually after a systemic challenge. This phenomenon is classically described in delayed-type allergy 3 . To the best of our knowledge, such rapid flare-up reactions have not been described for BL (published cases include delayed reactions) 3,4 , but case reports suggestive of a flare-up-like reactivity suggesting IgE-mediated allergy have been described for other drugs (e.g., ibuprofen 5 , paracetamol 6 ).

In the two cases we present we observed localized superficial inflammation processes that induced linear in superficial lymphangitis from the site of the IDT of piperacillin and piperacillin/tazobactam (Case 1) and amoxicillin (Case 2), extending toward the arm. Lymphangitis is an inflammation of one or more lymphatic channels mostly induced by infections (mostly bacterial infections) occurring at the distal site of vessels. Many other causes could induce linear supralymphatic eruptions with superficial lymphangitis and some of these are viral and fungal infections, insect or spider bites, and iatrogenic etiologies like vaccinations, purified protein derivative placement7. In a case series reported by Kano et al, three different cases which focus on the theme of superficial lymphangitis were discussed and the idea of the effect of contact allergens as a co-factor in this pathology was put forward. In their report, ST were negative for the alleged contact allergens and this is why they were merely considered as co-factors8. In our cases, the drugs are not contact allergens in the clinical history but injecting them by IDT may render them similar to a contact allergen. Most described cases of allergic lymphangitis concern delayed hypersensitivity reactions. Because dendritic cells are known to migrate from the sites of allergen exposure to draining lymph nodes during the inflammatory response, this hypothesis could explain why the linear lesions begin within the sites of IDTs and extend proximally to the draining lymph nodes, in delayed DHR. The two cases we presented revealed acute superficial lymphangitis, which raises the hypothesis of a local immunologic reaction to an allergen along lymphatic vessels, establishing a linear lesion overlying the skin. The promptness in onset and resolution of the lesions supports the assumption of this local reaction being elicited by mast cell mediator release, as connective tissue mast cells are located by nerve endings and alongside the blood and lymphatic vasculature 9 . Late-phase IgE-associated inflammatory responses to allergens cannot be excluded, considering that the reaction occurred later than classically observed in ST for immediate type reactions.

Although in Case 1, the reactive IDTs did not match the recommended positivity criteria (no wheal was detected, only surrounding erythema), in Case 2, the IDT became positive according to recommended reading criteria. In our experience, in more than 4000 patients tested for a suspicion of DHR to BL, these are the only two cases of their kind.

As clinicians working in the drug allergy field and operating with iatrogenic procedures (especially with BL antibiotics), we should be aware of rare cases. In these examples, monitoring the site of a negative ST (despite clinical histories of immediate reactions) even after reading the ST result within recommended lapses of time and when starting DPT prevented us from exposing our patients to higher doses of allergens and potentially a more severe reaction.

Funding The following reagents were tested at the maximal non-irritant concentrations ("pure"): penicillin G (10 000 UI/ml, PG), amoxicillin/clavulanic acid (20 mg/ml for amoxicillin, Ag), ampicillin (20 mg/ml, Ap), piperacillin (20 mg/ml), piperacillin/tazobactam (20 mg/ml for piperacillin), cefuroxime (20 mg/ml, Z), ceftriaxone (20 mg/ml, C4).

FIGURE 2:

Positive skin test to amoxicillin (20 mg/ml); the injected wheal is circled at the time of the performance of IDT; the increased wheal, erythema and lymphangitis occurred after 1 mg amoxicillin by oral route.

FIGURE

  FIGURE 1:The following reagents were tested at the maximal non-irritant concentrations ("pure"): penicillin G (10 000 UI/ml, PG), amoxicillin/clavulanic acid (20 mg/ml for amoxicillin, Ag), ampicillin (20 mg/ml, Ap), piperacillin (20 mg/ml), piperacillin/tazobactam (20 mg/ml for piperacillin), cefuroxime (20 mg/ml, Z), ceftriaxone (20 mg/ml, C4).

  FIGURE 1

  : none BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Romano A, Atanaskovic-Markovic M, Barbaud A, Bircher AJ, Brockow K, Caubet JC et al. Towards a more precise diagnosis of hypersensitivity to beta-lactams -an EAACI position paper [published online ahead of print, 2019 Nov 21]. Allergy. 2019;10.1111/all.14122. González de Olano D, González Mancebo E, Gandolfo Cano M, Menéndez Baltanás A, Trujillo Trujillo MJ. Flare-up-Like phenomenon in a skin prick test after oral challenge with ibuprofen. J Investig Allergol Clin Immunol. 2007;17(6):414-415. 6. Rodríguez-Fernández A, Sánchez-Domínguez M, Noguerado-Mellado B, Rojas-Pérez-Ezquerra P. Flare-Up Phenomenon of Intradermal Test with Anaphylactic Reaction to Paracetamol (Acetaminophen). Recent Pat Inflamm Allergy Drug Discov. 2019;13(1):69-72. 7. Cohen BE, Nagler AR, Pomeranz MK. Nonbacterial Causes of Lymphangitis with Streaking. J Am Board Fam Med. 2016;29(6):808-812. 8. Kano Y, Inaoka M, Shiohara T. Superficial lymphangitis with interface dermatitis occurring shortly after a minor injury: possible involvement of a bacterial infection and contact allergens. Dermatology. 2001;203(3):217-20. 9. Pal S, Nath S, Meininger CJ, Gashev AA. Emerging Roles of Mast Cells in the Regulation of Lymphatic Immuno-Physiology. Front Immunol. 2020;11:1234.

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Bastien Trémolière
email: bastien.tremoliere@gmail.com

Univ Nimes

Hakim Djeriouat

Exploring the roles of analytic cognitive style, climate science literacy, illusion of knowledge, and political orientation in climate change skepticism

Keywords: Climate change skepticism, Analytic cognitive style, Illusion of knowledge, Belief in Science, Numeracy, Science literacy, Political orientation

The issue of climate change has become central in recent years as alarming data accumulate. It nevertheless has its critics, consisting of people denying climate change or minimizing the responsibility of human beings in the process. This skepticism partly derives from the complexity of the topic, encouraging people to rely on cognitive shortcuts to grasp the phenomenon. We question the role of analytic cognitive style, general and climate change-related knowledge, overconfidence, and political partisanship (plus additional expected confounding variables) in this process through a package of three studies (total N = 1031). In a first study, we showed that an intuitive mindset predicted greater skepticism relative to an analytical mindset while controlling for cognitive ability and the degree to which individuals value science, suggesting that reasoning cognitive style and trust are key parameters of climate change skepticism. A second study highlighted that climate science knowledge stands as strong and independent predictors of skepticism relative to analytic cognitive style. A final study revealed that analytic cognitive style and climate change knowledge generated less influence on climate change skepticism among conservatives than among liberals and moderates, suggesting that reliance on deliberative thinking and knowledgeability on climate science are not sufficient to mitigate climate change skepticism among conservatives. We discuss the critical interplay between cognitive processes and political partisanship in this ongoing debate.

Introduction

The issue of whether climate change has anthropogenic roots spawns heated controversies in the public opinion all over the world. A poll addressing public opinion on climate change in the USA (University of Michigan's Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy: 2012) showed that 60 % of people acknowledged a human influence on climate change, leaving a non-negligible segment of climate change skeptics. Skepticism is present despite the large scientific evidence about climate change and the role of mankind in the process: a comprehensive content analysis of climate science publications revealed that 97% of active climate scholars comply with the conclusions supported by the Intergovernmental Panel Climate Change regarding the anthropogenic influence on climate change [START_REF] Anderegg | Moving beyond scientific agreement[END_REF]; see also [START_REF] Bedford | Agnotology, scientific consensus, and the teaching and learning of climate change: A response to Legates, Soon and Briggs[END_REF][START_REF] Oreskes | The scientific consensus on climate change[END_REF]. Thus, it is questionable whether this form of pseudoskepticism (Torcello, 2016) does rest or not on informed, well-reasoned critical thinking, or else on climate science denialism. Considering the possibly irreversible environmental damage caused by human activity and the necessity to hearten efficient proenvironmental policies and behaviors, climate change skepticism represents a major challenge.

The reasons for the opinion gap between climate experts and lay climate change skeptics are multifaceted [START_REF] Milfont | Socio-structural and psychological foundations of climate change beliefs[END_REF]. Among the multiple causations, political ideology is an important factor [START_REF] Jacques | The organisation of denial: Conservative think tanks and environmental scepticism[END_REF], with conservatives expressing fewer concerns about climate change than democrats [START_REF] Mccright | Cool dudes: The denial of climate change among conservative white males in the United States[END_REF][START_REF] Gromet | Political ideology affects energyefficiency attitudes and choices[END_REF]. Climate change denial has also to do with the endorsement of conspiracy narratives questioning the actual intention of scientific elites (e.g., return on renewable-energy investment, promotion of nuclear power, etc.), leading some people to question the value of scientific speech (Douglas & Sutton, 2015).

Of importance is how lay people process information, since cognitive functioning stands as a decisive component of risk perception and skepticism [START_REF] Van Der Linden | The social-psychological determinants of climate change risk perceptions: Towards a comprehensive model[END_REF]. The topic of climate change is filled with explanatory models and concepts which are often difficult to comprehend, generating misconceptions (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012;[START_REF] Weber | Public understanding of climate change in the United States[END_REF]. Inaccuracies start from conceptual confusions (e.g., people conflate weather with climate, climate change with ozone depletion; [START_REF] Reynolds | Now what do people know about global climate change? Survey studies of educated laypeople[END_REF] to a weak understanding of dynamic models (e.g., people mistakenly believe that drop in CO2 emissions would cause a drop in CO2 concentrations and global temperature; [START_REF] Sterman | Understanding public complacency about climate change: Adults' mental models of climate change violate conservation of matter[END_REF]. Climate change education in the classroom remains underinvested and recent evidence suggests that most teachers deliver mixed messages about the anthropogenic nature of climate change, underestimate levels of consensus among experts and report poor knowledgeability about climate functioning [START_REF] Plutzer | Climate confusion among US teachers[END_REF]. In addition, the use of different framings to characterize the very same phenomenon (conservatives favoring the label "global warming" when liberals favoring "climate change") impairs the transmission of relevant climate information, making a large-scale educational policy more complicated [START_REF] Schuldt | Global warming" or "climate change"? Whether the planet is warming depends on question wording[END_REF].

Thus, the existence of conflicting and misleading sources of information shapes lay people's understanding of climate change, leading to decreased perceived risks compared to experts [START_REF] Whitmarsh | Scepticism and uncertainty about climate change: Dimensions, determinants and change over time[END_REF]. The possibility that skepticism is informed by individual differences in information processing is warranted, especially in the perspective that climate change understanding requires sound deliberative thinking. Moreover, there is a critical interest to examine the cognitive dimension in conjunction with ideological preferences in order to draw a comprehensive picture of climate change skepticism.

The main purpose of this research is to examine the relative importance of thinking processes, knowledge, self-assessment of knowledge, and political orientation in the development of climate change skepticism. The final purpose is to provide a general picture of the way information processing and knowledge levels shape climate change skepticism in the light of political orientation. Study 1 tests the predictive value of analytic cognitive style in the context of climate change skepticism above and beyond that of numeracy and science literacy. Study 2 tests the importance of general and climate change-related knowledge and targets the role of overconfidence in one's knowledge, at both domain-general and domainspecific levels. Finally, Study 3 explores the impact of political orientation, for which data accumulate which suggest an important implication of this factor in the context of climate change.

Data analyses

All measures and conditions are reported and all analyses, inclusions/exclusions were determined a priori, with any deviation disclosed. Data were analyzed using R software. Each multiple regression model was computed while adjusting for potential confounding demographic factors (age, gender, and education). All data, materials, and scripts are available from the Open Science Framework platform (https://osf.io/uzyax/).

Study 1: Climate change skepticism from a dual-processing perspective

The complexity of the climate change topic inevitably makes lay people rely on cognitive shortcomings. For instance, an averaging bias makes people mistakenly believe that environmentally-harmful actions (e.g., taking one's car to work) can be counterbalanced by environmental-friendly ones (e.g., sorting waste) (Holmgren et al., 2018). There is also evidence of attribute substitution, whereby people use less relevant but accessible information (e.g., current temperature) in place of more relevant but less accessible information (e.g., global climate change patterns) to draw inferences about climate change [START_REF] Zaval | How warm days increase belief in global warming[END_REF].

Else, high levels of psychological distance to damaging climate change consequences lead to abstract representation of the issue, which mitigates motivation for environmentally-friendly initiatives [START_REF] Ejelöv | Regulating emotional responses to climate change-a construal level perspective[END_REF]. If part of the population relies on easy-going informationsearch strategy, the relevance of pointing reasoning as a determinant of skepticism is worth investigating.

That lay people rely on inaccurate mental models or heuristics to apprehend climate change can be investigated under the framework of dual-process theories of thinking. The generic version of the dual-process theory [START_REF] Epstein | Integration of the cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious[END_REF][START_REF] Evans | Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate[END_REF][START_REF] Kahneman | Thinking, fast and slow[END_REF] postulates that people have two different thinking processes. Type 1 processes are fast, do not require much cognitive resources, and are based on an intuitive mode of understanding the world. As such, intuition can be viewed as an easy route by which to understand how the world works even though diagnostic information is lacking and/or of challenging complexity. By contrast, Type 2 processes are assumed to be slow, deliberative, greedy in limited cognitive resources, and are based on a mode of thinking favoring evidencebased information. People's motivation and ability to engage in analytic thinking in the presence of conflicting responses is conceptualized as cognitive reflection (or analytic cognitive style), which is largely dependent on the ability to detect and override cognitive conflict (for a review on conflict detection in reasoning, see De Neys, 2014; see also Pennycook et al., 2015b for temporal specifications). Recent data showed that analytic thinking promotes sound reasoning in many areas, with people more analytic showing decreased endorsement of fake news (e.g., [START_REF] Pennycook | Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning[END_REF], conspiracy theories (e.g., Swami et al., 2014), and many other epistemically suspect beliefs (e.g., Pennycook et al., 2015a;Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013;[START_REF] Trémolière | Love is not exactly blind, at least for some people: Analytic cognitive style predicts romantic beliefs[END_REF]; and it does so independently of cognitive ability (i.e., people's ease to correctly rely on the analytic system in the absence of a conflicting intuitive response). There is support for the classic view of analytic thinking regarding climate change skepticism. Lay people use an intuitive mode of thinking in the case of climatic change perception, relying mainly on simple mental models and experiential cues [START_REF] Weber | Public understanding of climate change in the United States[END_REF]. For instance, vivid experiences of climate change increase global climate change risk perception [START_REF] Akerlof | Do people "personally experience" global warming, and if so how, and does it matter?[END_REF][START_REF] Brody | Examining the relationship between physical vulnerability and public perceptions of global climate change in the United States[END_REF], while the lack of personal experience of climate change leads to call into question the perceived seriousness and the anthropogenic roots of the phenomenon (see [START_REF] Spence | Perceptions of climate change and willingness to save energy related to flood experience[END_REF].

Moreover, climate change skepticism may arise when short-term personal experience is misdiagnosed as incompatible with long-term global warming trends. Short-term ambient temperature can be used as a proxy to such a point that unusually cold weather could help extenuate the plausibility that climate change operates globally (Egan and Mullin 2012). The recent accumulation of data has evidenced that cognitive reflection, compared to cognitive ability, was a better predictor of sensitivity to cognitive biases and endorsement of intuitive beliefs. Of critical value in this comprehension is the degree of trust placed in the scientific community and the extent to which people approve of scientific claims. Climate change skepticism might appear when intuitively appealing material about climate outweighs consensual scientific claims due to a lesser belief in the value of science. This rationale mirrors the observation that lay people are unwilling to trust scientific evidence that is counterintuitive in character [START_REF] Miton | Cognitive obstacles to pro-vaccination beliefs[END_REF].

Study 1 aims to evaluate the predictive influence of analytic cognitive style on climate change skepticism while controlling for general science literacy and cognitive ability, two measures which were confounded in [START_REF] Kahan | The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks[END_REF]. In the present study, rather, we distinguish analytic cognitive style (the willingness and ability to overcome Type 1 responses) from cognitive ability (the ability to conduct Type 2 operations) to directly test the validity of the classic view of analytic thinking in the framework of climate change skepticism. In addition, we will also examine belief in science to control for the possibility that climate change skepticism partly stems from a disregard for the values of science and the scientific community (see [START_REF] Hamilton | Trust in scientists on climate change and vaccines[END_REF]. Should the motivation and ability to correctly handle cognitive conflict be central components predicting epistemically suspect beliefs, we predict that people more intuitive will hold stronger levels of climate change skepticism above and beyond these variables.

Method

Sample size determination. An a priori power analysis was conducted using Gpower [START_REF] Erdfelder | Gpower: A general power analysis program[END_REF]. The analysis indicated that a sample size of 360 would be sufficient to detect a significant effect of our predictors with a power of 0.95 and an alpha of 0.05, based on an effect size (F 2 ) of 0.05. Anticipating drop out and exclusion issues, we requested about 480 participants.

Participants and design: A total of 479 American participants were recruited on the Amazon Mechanical Turk online data collection platform. Among the initial sample, 106 participants did not complete the questionnaire (N = 37) and/or failed (N = 69) to correctly answer the attention check. They were then removed from any further analysis, leaving a final sample of 373 participants (226 females, 1 "other"; Meanage = 37.6, SDage = 13.2) (see supplementary material S1 for detailed demographic information).

Material:

Analytic cognitive style

Cognitive Reflection Test. To assess reasoning cognitive style, we used a 7-item version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; 3-item original version by [START_REF] Frederick | Cognitive reflection and decision-making[END_REF]; additional items by [START_REF] Thomson | Investigating an alternate form of the cognitive reflection test[END_REF]. CRT captures people's ability to override an appealing but incorrect intuitive response. An example of item reads as follow:

In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? When addressing this problem, one would be easily tempted to answer 24 days (as 24 is half of 48). However, this intuitive response is incorrect, and one has to inhibit it to give the correct response (47 days). Participants scored 1 point per correct response, and a composite score was computed (out of 7). Higher scores indicate greater cognitive reflection.

Thinking disposition. To assess thinking dispositions, we used the Actively Open-minded Thinking scale (AOT; [START_REF] Baron | Why does the cognitive reflection test (sometimes) predict utilitarian moral judgment (and other things)?[END_REF][START_REF] Stanovich | Reasoning independently of prior belief and individual differences in actively open-minded thinking[END_REF]. We used a 8-item version of the scale, which assesses people's willingness to reconsider one's beliefs (e.g., 'People should revise their beliefs in response to new information or evidence') and targets attitude toward evidence (see Pennycook et al., 2020 ). Participants answered using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). A composite score was then computed (out of 8), with higher scores reflecting greater open-minded thinking. The scale showed good reliability (Cronbach's α = .76).

Exploring the extent to which analytic cognitive style predicts climate change skepticism, and to avoid collinearity issues (see [START_REF] Berry | Multiple regression in practice[END_REF], we transformed CRT and AOT into ratio scores, and we combined the two measures into a composite analytic cognitive style score (Cronbach's α = .78).

Cognitive Ability. We used the 3-item version of the numeracy scale [START_REF] Schwartz | The role of numeracy in understanding the benefit of screening mammography[END_REF], a task which has been regularly used to assess cognitive ability (e.g., [START_REF] Liberali | Individual differences in numeracy and cognitive reflection, with implications for biases and fallacies in probability judgment[END_REF][START_REF] Pennycook | The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values[END_REF]. Each item consists in a short mathematical problem that participants have to solve, capturing people's ability in performing simple mathematical operations. An example of problem reads as follow:

Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?

A composite score of numeracy was then computed out of three, with higher scores indicating greater numeracy.

Belief in Science. We used the 10-item belief in science scale [START_REF] Farias | Scientific faith: Belief in science increases in the face of stress and existential anxiety[END_REF].

The scale assesses the extent to which people believe in and value science (e.g., "Science is the most efficient means of attaining truth"). Participants answered using a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree). A composite score was then computed, with higher scores indicating stronger belief in science. The scale showed excellent reliability (Cronbach's α = .94).

Science Literacy. To assess science literacy, we used the 8 questions used by [START_REF] Kahan | The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks[END_REF], which were originally drawn from the National Science Foundation's "Science and Engineering Indicators", and are largely used as an index of public understanding of basic science (see [START_REF] Allum | Science knowledge and attitudes across cultures: A meta-analysis[END_REF]. An example of question reads as follows: "Electrons are smaller than atoms" [true/false]. Participants scored 1 point per correct answer and a composite score was computed (out of 8).

Climate Change Skepticism.

To examine skepticism about climate change, we used the 12 items targeting skepticism in the measure originally proposed by [START_REF] Whitmarsh | Scepticism and uncertainty about climate change: Dimensions, determinants and change over time[END_REF] 1 .

The items capture various issues about climate change, such as the causes for climate change (e.g., 'Claims that human activities are changing the climate are exaggerated') or else evidence of climate change itself (e.g., "The evidence for climate change is unreliable").

Participants answered each item using a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). The scale showed excellent reliability (Cronbach's α = .96).

Attention Check. In order to ensure that participants gave sufficient attention to the survey, and to collect good quality data, we included in each study an attention check within the climate change skepticism scale. This item read as follows: "This is a control question, please respond Somewhat Agree". Participants who gave another response were excluded from the analyses.

Results and Discussion

Table 1 displays semi-partial correlations as well as a multiple linear regression model including our variables of interest. Analytic cognitive style (β = -0.24) and belief in science (β = -0.18) independently predicted climate change skepticism, with analytic cognitive style found to be the strongest predictor (full details in Table 1). Science literacy and numeracy were overshadowed by the inclusion of the other variables.

These results give substance to the notion that analytic cognitive style is a decisive component of public opinion on climate change. People more intuitive seem more likely to endorse skepticism despite scientific evidence and consensus as compared to people more analytic. These data align with research showing that unscientific, epistemically suspect beliefs partly derive from reasoning cognitive style (see Pennycook et al., 2012).

Interestingly, belief in science emerged as an independent predictor of climate skepticism, suggesting that lack of recognition of science as a valuable, reliable method of inquiry belonging to a trustworthy institution also paves the way for climate change skepticism.

Hence, for some people, rejection of scientific consensus and climate change scientific claims might stem from an alternative epistemology, leading them to validate or disapprove statements on grounds other than that of science. This tendency reflects environmental antiscience (see Ehrilich, 1996) and is consistent with prior results related to scientific mistrust toward climate models and data (see [START_REF] Malka | The association of knowledge with concern about global warming: Trusted information sources shape public thinking[END_REF].

Study 2: Knowledge and illusion of knowledge

Analytic cognitive style left aside, a knowledge-deficit account is often raised for diagnosing lack of adherence to climate change (see [START_REF] Milfont | The interplay between knowledge, perceived efficacy, and concern about global warming and climate change: a one-year longitudinal study[END_REF]. The general rationale is that a low reception of appropriate scientific information decreases the potentiality of climate concerns. There is evidence that a lack of scientific information is conducive to negative attitudes toward science [START_REF] Rutjens | Attitudes towards science[END_REF]. More specifically, lacking scientific knowledge about specific scientific issues (e.g., innocuousness of GMO foods) increases the level of suspicious, mistrustful attitudes toward these issues [START_REF] Mcphetres | Modifying attitudes about modified foods: increased knowledge leads to more positive attitudes[END_REF]). Yet, increasing education in these domains helps reverse aversive attitudes [START_REF] Mcphetres | Modifying attitudes about modified foods: increased knowledge leads to more positive attitudes[END_REF].

Not only may climate change skepticism be a matter of knowledge, but it may also be a matter of one's own subjective evaluation of climate change knowledgeability. Aside from considering the extent of knowledge people have about a topic, it would be fruitful to evaluate whether self-assessment of domain-specific knowledge (i.e., the illusion of knowledge; [START_REF] Kruger | Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments[END_REF]) is also at stake when it comes to subscribing to climate change skepticism. Indeed, some findings illustrate that people display poor climatology literacy and have a very limited understanding of how the mechanism of climate change works [START_REF] Weber | Public understanding of climate change in the United States[END_REF]). Yet, some people hold strict conviction about the non-anthropogenic nature of climate change, even though they are in opposition to the scientific doxa. It follows that some climate skeptics might believe that they detain sufficient information on the issue to challenge evidence-based claims (see Torcello, 2016). As such, the exploration of overconfidence is an important novelty in the context of climate change skepticism, since overconfidence in one's own knowledge has direct consequences on the motivation to confirm one's prior beliefs (i.e., exhibiting confirmation bias), rather than to seek reliable information (see [START_REF] Hart | Feeling validated versus being correct: a meta-analysis of selective exposure to information[END_REF]. By contrast, awareness of domain-specific incompetence, or intellectual humility, is more likely to make people rely on evidence, thereby enhancing recognition of scientific authority.

Study 2 tests the level of knowledge and the illusion of knowledge (or confidence bias) as possible mechanisms explaining climate change skepticism. We investigate knowledge and overconfidence both at the dispositional level (general knowledge) and the specific level (knowledge about climate change topic). The choice to use both a general and specific knowledge measure is motivated by differences in results obtained between the two types of measures ; although general knowledge has been shown to support political identity in the framework of climate change, specific climate change knowledge positively correlates with the acceptance that climate change is occurring [START_REF] Guy | Investigating the effects of knowledge and ideology on climate change beliefs[END_REF]. In addition, Study 2 will also provide the testing of competing accounts to explain climate change skepticism, the classic view of analytic thinking, as it was explored in Study 1, and the knowledge deficit account (see also McPhetres, & Pennycook, preprint).

We hypothesize that general and climate change knowledge would stand as independent negative predictors of climate change skepticism while overconfidence in this knowledge would be a positive condition for holding climate change skepticism. We also maintain our initial hypothesis regarding the role of analytic cognitive style. The relative importance of knowledge and illusion of knowledge will be appraised relative to analytic cognitive style by including them in the same linear regression equation.

Method

Sampling rationale: An a priori power analysis was conducted using Gpower [START_REF] Erdfelder | Gpower: A general power analysis program[END_REF]. The analysis indicated that a sample size of 460 would be required to observe a significant effect of our predictors with a power of 0.95 and an alpha of 0.05, based on an effect size (F 2 ) of 0.05.

Participants and design: A total of 496 American participants were recruited on the Amazon Mechanical Turk online data collection platform. Among the initial sample, 110 participants did not complete the questionnaire (N = 82) and/or failed to respond to the attention check question (N = 67). They were then removed from any further analysis, leaving a final sample of 386 participants (246 females, 1 "other"; Meanage = 40.2, SDage = 13.2) (see supplementary material S2 for detailed demographic information).

Material:

The climate change skepticism scale (Cronbach's α = .96), the cognitive reflection measure (CRT) and the cognitive ability measure (Numeracy) were the same as the measures used in Study 1. We detail the new measures.

Rational Experiential Inventory:

We used the 10-item version of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI- 10 Epstein et al., 1996), which includes two independent constructs operating in parallel. Five items assess people's Need For Cognition (NFC), that is, the extent to which people are inclined towards cognitive effort (e.g., 'I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than something that requires little thought'; [START_REF] Cacioppo | The need for cognition[END_REF].

Five items assess people's Faith in Intuition (FI), that is, the extent to which people rely on intuition and experience to make decisions (e.g., 'I believe in trusting my hunches'; [START_REF] Epstein | Irrational reactions to negative outcomes: Evidence for two conceptual systems[END_REF]. Participants answered NFC (Cronbach's α = .77) and FI (Cronbach's α = .90) using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Completely False) to 5 (Completely True). A composite score for each of the dimensions was then calculated. A high score on the NFC scale indicates stronger engagement and enjoyment of cognitive activities and analytical thinking. A high score on the FI scale indicates stronger engagement and enjoyment of intuitive thinking.

Following the same rationale as in Study 1, to avoid collinearity, we transformed CRT, NFC, and FI (reversed) into a ratio score, and we combined the three measures into an analytic cognitive style score (Cronbach's α = .75).

Climate Change Knowledge and Confidence:

To assess people's climate change literacy, we relied on the questionnaire proposed by [START_REF] Tobler | Consumers' knowledge about climate change[END_REF]. The original version captures five dimensions. With regard to our purpose, we included 19 items from only three dimensions: 7 items for General and Causal knowledge dimension (e.g., "The global CO2 concentration in the atmosphere has increased during the past 250 years" [True/False]), 6 items for Physical knowledge (e.g., "At the same quantity, CO2 is more harmful to the climate than methane" [True/False]), and 6 items for Consequence knowledge (e.g., "For the next few decades, the majority of climate scientists expect a warmer climate to increase the melting of polar ice, which will lead to an overall rise of the sea level" [True/False]).

Participants scored 1 point per correct answer and a composite performance score was calculated (out of 19).

After answering each question, participants were instructed to indicate the extent to which they were confident that the response they just provided was the correct one, using a scale ranging from 0 (Not at all confident) to 100 (Totally confident) 2 . Overconfidence levels were calculated as the difference between the average confidence level and the proportion of correct answers for each participant. An average confidence level higher than the proportion of correct answers indicates overconfidence, while an average confidence level lower than the proportion of correct answers indicates underconfidence (a difference of 0 indicates no confidence bias).

General Knowledge and Confidence:

To assess participants' general knowledge, we used the measure proposed by [START_REF] Ilieva | Yes, we know!" (Over) confidence in general knowledge among Austrian entrepreneurs[END_REF]. The measure consists of 18 questions about general knowledge and participants have to decide between three options which is the correct one (e.g., "What artistic movement does Anacreontics belong to? » [Response options: Rococo; Romanticism; Realism]). Similar to the climate change literacy task, after answering each 2 Some scholars use a confidence scale ranging from 33% (guess) to 100% (totally sure) when participants have to find the correct answer among 3 proposed options. However, because lay people are not necessarily comfortable with probabilities, and because we are interested in their subjective perception, we decided to range our confidence scale between 0 and 100. For the sake of completeness, we nevertheless reanalyzed our data excluding confidence ratings below 33%. The results were straightforwardly the same as when all the confidence ratings were included in the analyses. question, participants were instructed to indicate the extent to which they were confident in their answer, using a scale ranging from 0 (Not at all confident) to 100 (Totally confident).

Results

We computed Pearson's r correlations and multiple linear regressions models. Including knowledge levels and overconfidence together made us suspect suppressor effects on the general knowledge variable (for which r is nonsignificant and negative, but with a beta following multiple linear regressions significant and positive) and the climate change overconfidence (for which r is significant and positive, but with a beta following multiple linear regressions significant and negative). Because suppressor effects are hardly interpretable, we present two models enabling clearer interpretations, one which includes the knowledge variables (see Table 2a), one which includes the overconfidence variables (see Table 2b).

Analytic cognitive style was found to be an independent predictor of climate change skepticism (β = -0.13). Importantly, in regard to our current purpose, climate change knowledge was the stronger, negative predictor of climate change skepticism (β = -0.41): people with greater knowledge about climate change were less skeptical about climate change (note that this predictor was also significant, of the same sign, and was found to be the strongest predictor when explored using all the variables in a single model). Overconfidence, both at the general and specific level, although significantly associated with climate change skepticism in the bivariate correlations, did not survive the inclusion of the other variables, just as was the case for numeracy. , 2011a[START_REF] Mccright | The politicization of climate change and polarization in the American public's views of global warming, 2001-2010[END_REF][START_REF] Gromet | Political ideology affects energyefficiency attitudes and choices[END_REF]. Literature on politically motivated reasoning stresses that moral and political attitudes configure information processing and information selection strategy: when evaluating political arguments, people seem unable to escape the pull of (political) ideology [START_REF] Bolsen | Citizens', scientists', and policy advisors' beliefs about global warming[END_REF][START_REF] Jost | Hot" political cognition: Its self-, group-, and system-serving purposes[END_REF][START_REF] Kahan | Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government[END_REF][START_REF] Taber | Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs[END_REF]. This Identity Protective Cognition (IPC; [START_REF] Kahan | The politically motivated reasoning paradigm, part 1: What politically motivated reasoning is and how to measure it[END_REF][START_REF] Kahan | Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government[END_REF]) reflects people's tendency to selectively favor or dismiss evidence or information in a fashion that is consistent with the beliefs and values which prevail in their own group. Strikingly, critical reasoning aptitudes do not steer ideologicallymotivated individuals toward the best possible evidence, unless the latter dovetails with ideological preferences (see [START_REF] Kahan | The politically motivated reasoning paradigm, part 1: What politically motivated reasoning is and how to measure it[END_REF] ; and this phenomenon is observed on a wide variety of topics (for instance, see [START_REF] Drummond | Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics[END_REF][START_REF] Khanna | Motivated responding in studies of factual learning[END_REF][START_REF] Washburn | Science denial across the political divide: Liberals and conserva-tives are similarly motivated to deny attitude-inconsistent science[END_REF]. Specifically, it was observed that cognitive sophistication articulates with identity protective cognition in such a manner that the effects of ideology are greater the more cognitively sophisticated participants are (i.e. a polarization effect; see [START_REF] Kahan | The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks[END_REF]. The willingness to engage Type 2 processes would make individuals able to deal with complex evidence and supply them with opportunities to form strong (counter)

arguments that fit their ideological interests (Kahan, 2013).

Applied to the topic of climate change, IPC would predict a greater acceptance of the existence of climate change among liberals with high cognitive sophistication and, by contrast, greater skepticism among conservatives with high cognitive sophistication. There is evidence that, when it comes to gauging perceived risks associated with climate change, individualistic interests and partisan tribalism prevail, while climate science comprehension and technical reasoning are instrumented to rationalize one's political preconception [START_REF] Kahan | The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks[END_REF][START_REF] Van Der Linden | Scientific agreement can neutralize politicization of facts[END_REF]. For instance, people high in critical reasoning and science comprehension were shown to have higher propensity to align their stance with that of their political group regarding the anthropogenic dimension of climate change [START_REF] Kahan | The politically motivated reasoning paradigm, part 1: What politically motivated reasoning is and how to measure it[END_REF].

To date, most of the investigations have been devoted to deciphering the reasons for identity-consistent positioning among conservatives. Some findings suggest that, beyond ideologically-driven disparity in exposure to climate science information [START_REF] Campbell | Solution aversion: On the relation between ideology and motivated disbelief[END_REF] or gap in attitude toward science [START_REF] Gauchat | Politicization of science in the public sphere: A study of public trust in the United States, 1974 to 2010[END_REF], higher prevalence of climate change denialism among conservatives has to do with the fear that potential policy solutions -e.g., restriction on free-market, carbon taxes -conflict with their political values [START_REF] Campbell | Solution aversion: On the relation between ideology and motivated disbelief[END_REF].

Although there is evidence supporting IPC, some data, however, challenge this account, with some studies failing to confirm the predicted interaction effect. For instance, In this study, we appraise dispositional cognitive factors, knowledge 3 , and overconfidence in knowledge, together with political orientation. Two main competing predictions can be made regarding the influence of these variables as a function of political orientation. One the one hand, IPC would allow to conjecture a polarization effect in which high reasoning proficiency, higher level of knowledge, and lower level of knowledge overconfidence would be associated with lower levels of climate change skepticism among liberals but higher levels of skepticism among conservatives. On the other hand, the classic view of analytical thinking would predict that these elements would contribute to abate climate change skepticism irrespective of political partisanship [START_REF] Pennycook | Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning[END_REF] see also McPhetres, & Pennycook, preprint). Overall, the planned exploration will provide 3 We still rely on both the knowledge measures (specific and general) used in Study 2, to provide a further exploration of the effect found by [START_REF] Guy | Investigating the effects of knowledge and ideology on climate change beliefs[END_REF] -i.e., that general knowledge supports political identity in the framework of climate change, whereas specific climate change knowledge is positively associated with the acceptance that climate change is occurring regardless of political orientation.

additional insights in the attempt to disentangle the influence of both cognitive and cultural dimensions.

Method

Sampling rationale: An a priori power analysis was conducted using Gpower [START_REF] Erdfelder | Gpower: A general power analysis program[END_REF]. The analysis indicated that a sample size of 251 would be required to reach a significant effect of our predictors with a power of 95 % and an alpha of 0.05, based on medium effect size (F 2 ) of 0.10. Based on prior studies, we expected that between hundred and hundred and fifty participants would be discarded from the sample due to attention check failure.

Participants and design: A total of 397 American participants were recruited on the Amazon Mechanical Turk online data collection platform. Among the initial sample, 125 participants did not complete the questionnaire (N = 82) and/or failed to correctly answer the attention check question (N = 84). They were then removed from any further analysis, leaving a final sample of 272 participants (97 females; Meanage = 37.6, SDage = 12.1) (see supplementary material S1c for detailed demographic information).

Material:

The climate change skepticism scale (Cronbach's α= .94), the cognitive reflection measure (CRT), the cognitive ability measure (Numeracy), the general knowledge (and confidence)

and the climate change knowledge (and confidence) measures were the same as the ones used in Study 2. The novelty is the assessment of political orientation. We used the scale used by Pennycook et al. (2020) which consists in the two following statements "on social issues, I am" and "on economic issues, I am" to which participants are instructed to answer using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly liberal) to 5 (Strongly conservative). The questions showed very good reliability (α = .85), and a composite mean score was computed.

Results

Before conducting our main analyses, we started by addressing a current worry about the political representativeness of participants recruited on MTurk (e.g., Kahan, 2013; but see [START_REF] Clifford | Are samples drawn from Mechanical Turk valid for research on political ideology[END_REF], for a direct assessment; see also [START_REF] Berinsky | Evaluating online labor markets for experimental research: Amazon. com's Mechanical Turk[END_REF][START_REF] Mullinix | The generalizability of survey experiments[END_REF], for instance, who show that Mturkers are at least -if no more-as representative of the U.S. population as in-person convenience samples). As it is displayed in Figure 1, we observe a widespread distribution, with data not normally distributed (p < .001) and negatively skewed (skewness = -0.61), suggesting that conservatives are sufficiently represented to carry out analyses. Similar to Study 2, an initial investigation of the regressed variable including all our variables of interest led us to suspect a suppression effect for the general knowledge variable (which has a significant and negative correlation coefficient, but a significant and positive beta following multiple linear regressions). Following the same rationale as in Study 2, we present two models, one which includes the knowledge variables (see Table 3a), and one which includes the overconfidence variables (see Table 3b).

CRT (β = -0.17) and climate change knowledge (β = -0.33) remained significant negative predictors of climate change skepticism. Overconfidence, both at the general and specific levels, remained significant when including the other variables (βgeneral = 0.13; βspecific = 0.27). Of importance, with regard to our current purpose, is the politics variable, which was found the greater predictor of climate change skepticism (β = 0.36) with participants more conservative showing the highest levels of climate change skepticism; and it was observed in the two models. We further tested whether the relationship between our cognitive variables and climate change skepticism varied as a function of political orientation. To this end, we classified participants who scored 1 or 2 on the political orientation scale as Liberals, participants who scored 3 as Moderates, and participants who scored 4 or 5 as Conservatives (see Pennycook et al. (2020). Interaction analyses were performed between the cognitive variables and the political orientation variable (dummy coded). All the interactions, but for the Numeracy × Political orientation, were significant (Table 4; see also Figure 2). and liberals (estimate = -2.56, SE =0.84, t(266) = -3.04, p = 0.007), with flatter slopes for the conservative group, while no difference was observed between liberals and moderates (estimate = 0.17, SE = 1.08, t(266) = 0.16, p = 0.99. Climate change overconfidence followed the same direction, although the differences did not reach significance (all ps > .08). Taken together, these results suggest that the cognitive variables predict significantly less climate change skepticism in conservatives. Interestingly, we also observed, in Study 3, that overconfidence in domain-specific knowledge independently predicts climate change skepticism (although that variable did not survive the inclusion of the other predictors in Study 2). Overall, participants who showed higher levels of epistemic circumspection exhibited lower levels of climate change skepticism. In line with our expectation, aside from cognitive structure and knowledge levels, the metacognitive dimension may be of great importance in the process. Hence, intellectual humility and circumspection could help facilitate the recognition of the complexity of climate science or refrain one from jumping to hasty conclusions.

The present results only partially support IPC and the proposed dynamic between ideological orientation and cognitive factors in the domain of climate change evaluation (see [START_REF] Kahan | The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks[END_REF][START_REF] Kahan | The politically motivated reasoning paradigm, part 1: What politically motivated reasoning is and how to measure it[END_REF]. Our results showed that both cognitive reflection and the amount of knowledge on the topic negatively predict climate change anti-skepticism in liberals. The predictive value of these variables was significantly weaker in conservatives but remained in the same direction: cognitive reflection and knowledge negatively predict climate change skepticism in conservatives, contrary to what IPC would have suggested [START_REF] Kahan | Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government[END_REF]. The results reported herein would align with the classical reasoning account, although they do not provide full support for a pure version of this account, at least in this specific context: analytic thinking style prevents both liberals and conservatives from exhibiting climate change skepticism, but this effect is significantly reduced in conservatives, as supported by the interaction effects and the subsequent simple slope analyses.

Reflecting upon the latter results, another perspective may be advocated Everything happens as if conservatives who are cognitively equipped to grasp the stake of climate change show attenuated skepticism without completely giving it up. According to this asymmetrical conflict account, the opposite trend may be expected if a scientific consensus was supportive of the conservative worldview. However, things are not as simple as it may appear since conservatives have been shown in the literature to be more concerned by the concept of authority/respect than liberals [START_REF] Graham | Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations[END_REF]. Perhaps, analytical liberals would go through a less demanding conflicting experience. Future research is needed to examine whether such a conflict exists more in conservatives. In addition, it would be interesting to study the narrative and the reasoning of individuals who portray themselves as conservatives but hold a counter-normative stance about the question of climate change. It is reasonable enough to state that among conservatives, some people, with a science background or not, rely on scientific consensus and are convinced that climate change occurs.

Although speculative we acknowledge, another explanation would rely on possible differences in terms of information exposure. Second, the distribution of ideology (which is negatively skewed, with a greater number of conservatives than liberals) is somewhat unusual according to the studies conducted on Mechanical Turk. For instance, a study targeting the political composition of Mturk samples [START_REF] Levay | The demographic and political composition of Mechanical Turk samples[END_REF] showed that only about 22% of the participants qualified as (slight to extreme) conservatives while liberals accounted for about 58% of the Mturk sample. We acknowledge that we have no compelling cues explaining this unusual, furthermore considering that some data support demographic stability on Mechanical Turk in the COVID-19 period (see [START_REF] Moss | Demographic Stability on Mechanical Turk Despite COVID-19[END_REF], for instance, although they are silent regarding the political composition of their sample).

An additional limitation refers to the sample size of Study 3 regarding the interaction effects. A sensitivity analysis conducted with a power of .95, an alpha of 0.05, and a sample size of 272 participants for linear multiple regression analyses including the interaction terms indicated that a minimal effect size (f²) of 0.057 was required. In our study, the obtained effect sizes (f²) for the interaction terms range from 0.03 to 0.04, suggesting that Study 3 may appear slightly underpowered to confidently claim that the obtained significant interaction terms are probable true positives. On a side note, it is worth noting that a less conservative sensitivity analysis with a standard power of 80 % showed a required minimal effect size of 0.035, suggesting adequate power in this case.

How can one succeed at debiasing climate change skeptics? There is no obvious answer and several propositions and attempts have been made, most that target the intuitive component. In response to the observation that lay people are ready to conform their beliefs to that of their group, a call has recently been made for climate communicators to create a sound climate change message in which scientific information does not threaten groups' values [START_REF] Kahan | The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks[END_REF], as well as for communicators to make people they want to convince like them [START_REF] Haidt | The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion[END_REF]. Taking people's difficulty to apprehend climate change into account, other levers have been proposed that rely on climate change nudges (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). As promising they are, they only show mixed effects to date, the reliance on nudges undermining support for more costly greater impact policies [START_REF] Hagmann | Nudging out support for a carbon tax[END_REF].

We contend that targeting the individuals' intuitive thinking component is not sufficient on its own in the long run, as people's deliberative engagement, in conjunction with the exposure of factual scientific information, seems to us a sine qua non condition to foster the conditions for a march towards informed and sustainable environmental improvement.

This suggests that specific levers must actually be targeted. We believe that parallel efforts must be made to promote critical thinking in education and foster intellectual humility (see [START_REF] Pithers | Critical thinking in education: A review[END_REF]. Inoculation framework has proven useful to promote critical thinking in the case of climate change, by providing people with a set of propositions that counter misinformation, and by training them to spot fallacious reasoning [START_REF] Cook | Neutralizing misinformation through inoculation: Exposing misleading argumentation techniques reduces their influence[END_REF].

Intellectual humility, on his side, has been shown to be connected to critical thinking and learning. It qualifies as a worthy and meaningful educational purpose [START_REF] Baehr | Is intellectual character growth a realistic educational aim[END_REF] since people might lack self-insight about the foundation of their opinion and beliefs [START_REF] Fernbach | Political extremism is supported by an illusion of understanding[END_REF]. In this respect, education can take place everywhere. Encouraging results have been observed through recent popular initiatives in which simple informal dialogues were designed to make people dialectically tackle their questionable beliefs. Inspired by Socrates' maieutic philosophy in which people come to probe the foundation of their opinion, street epistemology [START_REF] Boghossian | A manual for creating atheists[END_REF]) is a step by step discussion that has proven useful (see also [START_REF] Ranney | Climate change conceptual change: Scientific information can transform attitudes[END_REF], on the role of learning and instructions on understanding of climate change). Such educational initiatives must target lay people as well as leaders who exert important vertical influence [START_REF] Druckman | The evidence for motivated reasoning in climate change preference formation[END_REF]. A partisan shift or moderation regarding climate change issues could help reduce potential culture-versus-cognition conflicts among analytical conservatives.

The road to the global acceptance of climate change and human responsibility in the process is full of pitfalls. Maintaining higher educational standards is not a sufficient condition to address the biggest problem humanity has to solve. It is not only the quantity and quality of information that is at stake, but how people process information and practice intellectual self-defense or epistemic vigilance [START_REF] Sperber | Epistemic vigilance[END_REF] in a world overwhelmingly filled with fake news and ideological discourses.

  Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights. β indicates the standardized regression weights. sr 2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents the zeroorder correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01.

  first, it aims to replicate the present results; second, and of importance, it examines the articulation between knowledge/reasoning and political orientation, which has been shown to play an important part in the development of climate change skepticism. Study 3 Political orientation and climate change skepticism So far, our studies shed the light on the importance of cognitive reflection and climate change knowledge as leading factors of climate change skepticism. Beyond the implication of the cognitive dimension, there is also evidence that stances on climate change are shaped by political culture (e.g., McCright & Dunlap

  [START_REF] Connor | Motivated numeracy and active reasoning in a Western European sample[END_REF] failed to replicate the[START_REF] Kahan | Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government[END_REF]'s polarization effect using a Western European sample. Experimental manipulations also showed results hardly reconcilable with IPC. For instance, van der Linden et al.(2018) showed that exposing participants to a simple fact about climate change made both liberals and conservatives update their beliefs on the issue in line with the scientific norm.,

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. Frequency and density of the sample on the political orientation variable, ranging

  Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr 2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents the zeroorder correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.

Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. Interaction patterns between Political orientation (Liberals, Moderates, Conservatives) and each of

  . The pattern of relationships between the cognitive variables (especially cognitive reflection and domainspecific knowledge about climate) and climate change skepticism in the liberal subsample mirrors that of the conservative subsample, but with a different magnitude. An asymmetrical conflict account may help reconcile both the classical reasoning and the IPC perspectives about the effect of analytical thinking on the topic of climate change. According to this perspective, when it comes to reflect about the existence of climate change or its anthropogenic nature, analytical conservatives could undergo a taxing transaction between their motivation and ability for analytic thinking and their identity-protective mindset. This conflict would not be experienced by analytical liberals because the rational and evidencebased conclusions dovetail with partisan narratives about the issue. If analytical conservatives were to deliberately dismiss the best available scientific evidence in favor of partisan tribalism, we would observe, if not a positive correlation between cognitive reflection/climate knowledge and climate change skepticism (according to an IPC conjecture), at least an absence of correlation. In the same manner, if climate change beliefs were only influenced by analytical reasoning, we would not observe the moderating impact of political orientation.

Table 1 .

 1 Semi-partial correlations and multiple regression results using climate change skepticism as the criterion (Study 1).

			b		β		sr 2
	Predictor	b	95% CI	β	95% CI	sr 2	95% CI	r	Fit
			[LL, UL]		[LL, UL]		[LL, UL]
	(Intercept)	57.57**	[47.36, 67.78]
	Age	0.01	[-0.09, 0.11]	0.01 [-0.08, 0.11] < .001 [-.00, .00]	.03
	Gender	-5.68**	[-8.33, -3.04]	-0.20 [-0.30, -0.11]	.04	[.00, .08] -.18**
	Education	0.54	[-0.20, 1.29]	0.07 [-0.03, 0.16]	.00	[-.01, .02]	.03
	Belief in Science	-0.20**	[-0.31, -0.09]	-0.18 [-0.27, -0.08]	.03	[-.00, .06] -.21**
	Science literacy	-0.49	[-1.50, 0.52]	-0.05 [-0.16, 0.05]	.00	[-.01, .01] -.18**
	Numeracy	-1.52	[-3.16, 0.12]	-0.10 [-0.21, 0.01]	.01	[-.01, .02] -.23**
	Analytic Cognitive Style	-18.58

**

[-26.95, -10

.21] -0.24

[-0.35, -0.13]

.04

[.01, .08] -.33** R 2 = .186** 95% CI

[.11, .24]

Table 2a .

 2a Semi-partial correlations and multiple regression results using climate change skepticism as the criterion (including general and climate change knowledge; Study 2). Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr 2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents the zeroorder correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.

				b				beta		sr 2
	Predictor	b	95% CI			beta	95% CI	sr 2	95% CI	r	Fit
				[LL, UL]				[LL, UL]		[LL, UL]
	(Intercept) 5.47**	[4.55, 6.39]
	Age 0.01**	[0.01, 0.02]			0.16	[0.08, 0.25]	.03	[-.00, .05]	.10
	Gender -0.53**	[-0.74, -0.31]	-0.22 [-0.31, -0.13] .04	[.01, .08]	-.17**
	Education 0.03	[-0.03, 0.09]		0.05	[-0.04, 0.14]	.00	[-.01, .01]	.01
	Numeracy -0.09 The present results suggest that analytic cognitive style and climate change knowledge [-0.39, 0.21] -0.03 [-0.14, 0.07] .00 [-.00, .01] -.19**
	Analytic cognitive style are two independent negative predictors of climate change. So far, our results confirm one -1.11* [-2.01, -0.20] -0.13 [-0.24, -0.02] .01 [-.01, .03] -.24**
	General Knowledge more time that cognitive reflection was a stronger predictor than cognitive ability (measured 0.02 [-0.02, 0.07] 0.05 [-0.04, 0.14] .00 [-.01, .01] -.03
	Climate Change Knowledge via numeracy). Of importance is that climate change knowledge was the stronger predictor of -0.20** [-0.24, -0.15] -0.41 [-0.51, -0.31] .13 [.07, .19] -.43**
										R 2 = .266**
										95% CI[.18,.32]
				b				beta		sr 2
	Predictor	b		95% CI	beta			95% CI	sr 2	95% CI	r	Fit
				[LL, UL]				[LL, UL]		[LL, UL]
	(Intercept) 3.96**	[3.13, 4.78]
	Age 0.01**	[0.00, 0.02]	0.14			[0.05, 0.24]	.02 [-.01, .05]	.10
	Gender -0.56** [-0.80, -0.32] -0.23	[-0.33, -0.13]	.05	[.01, .09] -.17**
	Education	0.01		[-0.05, 0.08]	0.02		[-0.08, 0.12]	.00 [-.00, .00]	.01
	Numeracy -0.27	[-0.59, 0.05] -0.09	[-0.21, 0.02]	.01 [-.01, .02] -.19**
	Analytic cognitive style	-2.10** [-3.05, -1.14] -0.25	[-0.36, -0.14]	.04	[.01, .08] -.24**
	General overconfidence	0.00		[-0.00, 0.01]	0.05		[-0.06, 0.15]	.00 [-.01, .01] .14**
	Climate change overconfidence	0.00		[-0.01, 0.01]	0.00		[-0.10, 0.11]	.00 [-.00, .00]	.12*
										R 2 = .138**
										95% CI[.07,.19]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr 2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents the zeroorder correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. Table 2b. Semi-partial correlations and multiple regression results using climate change skepticism as the criterion (including general and climate change overconfidence; Study 2).

climate change skepticism. That is, analytic cognitive style seems not the unique central element predicting skepticism. Interestingly, these results highlight that both the structure and the content of the cognition are required to depict an acute understanding of the issue. These results go beyond the simple knowledge-deficit account (see

[START_REF] Weber | Public understanding of climate change in the United States[END_REF]

or reasoning-deficit account, but stress that the both are critical aspects of climate understanding.

Before drawing any further conclusion, we present a third study, whom purpose is twofold:

Table 3a .

 3a Semi-partial correlations and multiple regression results using climate change skepticism as the criterion (including general and climate change knowledge; Study 3). indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.

			b		beta		sr 2
	Predictor	b	95% CI	beta	95% CI	sr 2	95% CI	r	Fit
			[LL, UL]		[LL, UL]		[LL, UL]
	(Intercept) 4.19**	[3.35, 5.04]
	Age -0.00	[-0.01, 0.01]	-0.00 [-0.09, 0.09]	.00	[-.00, .00]	-.11
	Gender -0.26**	[-0.43, -0.10]	-0.13 [-0.22, -0.05] .02	[-.00, .04] -.16**
	Education	0.06	[-0.01, 0.13]	0.07	[-0.01, 0.16]	.00	[-.01, .02]	.11
	Numeracy -0.34*	[-0.64, -0.03]	-0.12 [-0.22, -0.01] .01	[-.01, .02] -.42**
	CRT -0.60**	[-0.96, -0.23]	-0.17 [-0.27, -0.07] .02	[-.00, .04] -.45**
	General knowledge	-0.02	[-0.49, 0.45]	-0.00 [-0.09, 0.09]	.00	[-.00, .00]	-.14*
	Climate change knowledge	-2.65**	[-3.43, -1.87]	-0.33 [-0.42, -0.23] .08	[.03, .13]	-.54**
	Politics 0.31**	[0.24, 0.39]	0.36	[0.27, 0.45]	.11	[.06, .17]	.54**
									R 2 = .528**
									95% CI[.43,.58]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr 2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents the zeroorder correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. *

Table 3b .

 3b Semi-partial correlations and multiple regression results using climate change skepticism as the criterion (including general and climate change overconfidence; Study 3).

			b		beta		sr 2
	Predictor	b	95% CI	beta	95% CI	sr 2	95% CI	r	Fit
			[LL, UL]		[LL, UL]		[LL, UL]
	(Intercept) 2.45** [1.70, 3.19]
	Age -0.00	[-0.01, 0.00]	-0.03 [-0.12, 0.06] .00	[-.00, .01] -.11
	Gender -0.21*	[-0.38, -0.04]	-0.10 [-0.19, -0.02] .01	[-.01, .03] -.16**
	Education 0.05	[-0.02, 0.12]	0.06 [-0.02, 0.15] .00	[-.01, .01] .11
	Numeracy -0.28	[-0.57, 0.02]	-0.10 [-0.20, 0.01] .01	[-.01, .02] -.42**
	CRT -0.68** [-1.03, -0.33]	-0.19 [-0.29, -0.09] .03	[-.00, .05] -.45**
	General overconfidence	0.01*	[0.00, 0.01]	0.13 [0.02, 0.23]	.01	[-.01, .03] .45**
	Climate change overconfidence	0.01** [0.01, 0.02]	0.27 [0.17, 0.37]	.05	[.01, .08]	.56**
	Politics 0.28** [0.20, 0.36]	0.32 [0.23, 0.41]	.08	[.04, .13]	.54**
									R 2 = .538**
									95% CI[.45,.59]

Table 4 .

 4 Results from the interaction analyses. Political orientation was dummy coded. All the combinations were tested before concluding on non-significant interactions.

	Estimate	SE	t	p	Intera ction	Cohens's f²	(CI 90 %)

  On the very topic of climate change, liberals' views fit with the conclusion drawn from climate scientists. As a result, liberal elites do not need to form strong competing arguments against anthropogenic climate change, contrary to conservative elites. Analytic conservatives, by contrast, may be compelled to consider valid scientific arguments possibly diluted in a whole constellation of (scientific or non scientific) counter-arguments consistent with the conservative view ; what may attenuate conservatives' reliance on the best scientific evidence to such a point that climate skepticism is not totally casted aside. Perhaps, increasing a preferential focus on factual-based information may alleviate skepticism, a view consistent with interventionist studies reversing skeptic attitudes on various scientific issues[START_REF] Mcphetres | Modifying attitudes about modified foods: increased knowledge leads to more positive attitudes[END_REF][START_REF] Van Der Linden | Scientific agreement can neutralize politicization of facts[END_REF].A limitation in our studies, we advocate, is the correlational nature of our designs, which makes it impossible to test for the directionality of the effects observed. The issue with correlational studies is that it only provides punctual measurements of attitude, beliefs, and cognitive processing. In addition, the specific contents of thoughts that are conducive to skepticism or anti-skepticism, how arguments and counterarguments regarding climate change are dealt with with respect to prior beliefs, or else the content of beliefs that revolve around climate skepticism are not much considered (seeBago, Pennycook, and Rand, preprint). Experimental longitudinal investigations can yield conclusive evidence about the nature of information (corpus of scientific facts) that can cause shifts in beliefs whatever partisanships (see[START_REF] Mcphetres | Modifying attitudes about modified foods: increased knowledge leads to more positive attitudes[END_REF][START_REF] Van Der Linden | Scientific agreement can neutralize politicization of facts[END_REF]; and there is evidence for it: while correlational studies tend to support identity protective cognition (note that our present results moderate this point), empirical interventions targeting a given topic mitigate prior beliefs in spite of partisan tribalism.

The original measure taps four dimensions, but only the first one, which targets the belief component of skepticism, was administered to the participants.

Acknowledgment

This study received support from the LABEX CORTEX (ANR-11-LABX-0042) of Université de Lyon, within the program "Investissements d'Avenir" (ANR-11-IDEX-0007) operated by the French National Research Agency (ANR).

Author contributions

The authors contributed equally at all stages of the present research.

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.