Honesty Pays

Keywords: multiparty bargaining, coalition formation, deception, social value orientation, perspective taking

People typically think of negotiations as competitive, which often leads them to engage in secrecy and even deception. In three experiments we show that this approach can backfire in coalition bargaining. Results show that, even though bargainers with an outcome advantage only obtain favorable outcomes when this information is public, they rarely choose to reveal this information. Fairness motivations fueled decisions to reveal this information and make attractive offers whereas self-interest fueled decisions not to reveal and make unattractive offers. Finally, perspective taking increased proselfs' inclinations to keep their advantage private whereas it increased prosocials' inclinations to reveal. These findings suggest that many people are not naturally inclined to reveal private information when they have an outcome advantage, but that fairness motives encourage revelation and, ironically, increase revealers' outcomes in coalition bargaining. Thus, in this context, honesty pays.

In many negotiations, bargainers have private information: what one party knows, the others don't, and the distribution of information can seriously affect both the bargaining process and its outcomes (De Dreu, [START_REF] De Dreu | The psychology of negotiation: Principles and basic processes[END_REF]. Information about who gets what when a specific deal is closed may be common knowledge, but often is only known to the specific individuals who benefit. Typical car buyers, for instance, are aware of their own outcomes and whether they have paid more or less than they wanted. Almost never, however, do they discover the sellers' or the car manufacturers' profits from their transaction. In the current research we investigate the effects of having and revealing private information about the payoffs in multiparty negotiations. We show that the popular belief that people should guard their private information and use it to maximize their own outcomes can backfire in this context. Thus, unlike the general stereotype that depicts negotiations as competitive, strategic, and stealthy, we identify competitive interactions in which honesty pays.

Information and Bargaining

Bargainers who have private information must decide how to use this information. In particular, they must choose whether they will share their private information truthfully.

Although revealing private information may help to create positive outcomes because it helps negotiators to discover creative outcomes that maximize their joint benefit, in more competitive interactions or purely distributive negotiations, revealing information risks nonreciprocity and exploitation. These dynamics are embodied in the "information dilemma" [START_REF] Murnighan | The information dilemma in negotiations: Effects of experience, incentives, and integrative potential[END_REF]: revealing information facilitates the

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Honesty Pays, 4 achievement of joint outcomes but simultaneously increases personal vulnerability.

Economic theories generally assume that bargainers aim to maximize their individual outcomes and that they will use their private information self-interestedly. [START_REF] Kagel | Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs[END_REF], for example, studied the impact of private information in a competitive negotiation in which the currency (chips) was worth more to one party than to the other.

Results showed that bargainers who had an exchange-rate advantage offered their counterparts more than half of the chips only when they knew that their counterparts were aware of the exchange rates. When they knew that their counterparts were uninformed, they tended to offer an equal split--which looked fair on the surface but which gave them much better outcomes than their counterparts because of their exchange-rate advantage.

Moreover, when bargainers have the option to reveal that their outcome advantage, the central notion of self interest, which is common to many bargaining models, suggest that they will keep this information to themselves (Gneezy, 1982;Thompson, 1991). The allure of higher outcomes can lead negotiators to not only protect but to actively misrepresent their payoffs (e.g. [START_REF] Lewicki | Lying and deception: A behavioral model[END_REF][START_REF] Roth | The role of information in bargaining: An experimental study[END_REF]Strudler, 1995;Tenbrunsel, 1998).

Research has shown that deception increases when: negotiators know that their counterparts lack information [START_REF] Croson | Cheap talk in bargaining A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT Honesty Pays, 33 experiments: Lying and threats in ultimatum games[END_REF], stakes are high (Tenbrunsel, 1998), they have task experience [START_REF] Murnighan | The information dilemma in negotiations: Effects of experience, incentives, and integrative potential[END_REF], they expect competition rather than cooperation [START_REF] Steinel | Social motives and strategic misrepresentation in[END_REF], they aim to maximize personal rather than joint gains [START_REF] O'connor | A nasty but effective negotiation strategy: Misrepresentation of a common-value issue[END_REF], or they face a stranger rather than a friend [START_REF] Schweitzer | Curtailing deception: The impact of direct questions on lies and omissions[END_REF] or an angry rather than a happy opponent (Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008).

In short, theories predict and empirical research indicates that bargainers typically use private information to maximize their own outcomes: they make self-serving offers when information is private and they often misrepresent the value of their payoffs when they can

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reveal their private information. Thus, bargainers are not only reluctant to reveal their outcome advantages--they often use this information to increase their own outcomes.

Private Information in Coalition Formation

These conclusions are all based on theories and observations of dyadic negotiations, settings where the strategic use of information can provide outcome benefits. 1 Indeed, when dyadic bargainers can exchange information, truth-tellers often do worse than liars (e.g., [START_REF] Boles | Deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining[END_REF]. In fact, bargainers who reveal that they have an outcome advantage, e.g., a superior exchange rate, give their disadvantaged counterparts an opportunity to argue for egalitarian outcomes [START_REF] Komorita | A bargaining theory of coalition formation[END_REF][START_REF] Roth | The role of information in bargaining: An experimental study[END_REF]. By restricting information exchange, advantaged players can obtain higher outcomes by making self-serving offers (e.g., [START_REF] Kagel | Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs[END_REF][START_REF] Pillutla | Being fair or appearing fair: Strategic behavior in ultimatum bargaining[END_REF]Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004;Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000).

In sharp contrast, however, we suggest that these effects need not generalize to distributive multiparty settings in which coalitions must form to secure favorable outcomes (for reviews of coalition formation, see e.g., [START_REF] Kahan | Theories of coalition formation[END_REF][START_REF] Komorita | Coalition bargaining[END_REF][START_REF] Komorita | Interpersonal relations: Mixed-motive interaction[END_REF][START_REF] Murnighan | Models of coalition behavior: Game theoretic, social psychological and political perspective[END_REF]Van Beest & Van Dijk, 2007).

Coalition formation has been defined as a process in which two or more parties negotiate about the decision to allocate payoffs to the parties who are included in the coalition [START_REF] Kahan | Theories of coalition formation[END_REF][START_REF] Polzer | Interest alignment and coalitions in multiparty negotiation[END_REF], leaving excluded parties with zero outcomes as well as emotional losses (e.g., Swaab, Kern, Medvec, & Diermeier, 2009;Van Beest & Williams, 2006;Williams, 2007). Examples of coalitions can be found at every level of human organization: romantic couples are social coalitions; trade unions are coalitions of workers who have joined forces to obtain better working conditions; mergers are coalitions of companies that hope to create economic synergies and increase their market share; and political parties are coalitions of individuals who hope to influence a

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Honesty Pays, 6 nation's politics. Some coalitions form with exclusion as their primary purpose, e.g., groups

based on class distinctions that alienate, restrict, and restrain the under-privileged; others push people into exclusion as a result of the negotiation outcome.

An important aspect of the coalition formation process is that individuals must not only consider the possible payoffs that they can obtain from different coalitions--they must also be concerned about being included in the winning coalition. In fact, this latter concern must be satisfied to succeed in the former. The need to be included requires a different set of strategies than the goal of maximizing one's outcomes. Individuals who come across as attractive increase their chances of being included in the final, winning coalition; individuals who come across as unattractive, e.g., by making strong demands or by appearing hard-toget, reduce their chances of inclusion and may even provide an impetus for others to coalesce against them. The harsh reality that accompanies coalition formation is that some people will be completely excluded, both from membership in the coalition and from the payoffs that comes with inclusion. Unlike dyadic negotiations in which both parties are either included or excluded from an agreement, the fact that coalition negotiations exclude some people means that bargainers must first attend to securing a position within the coalition before considering its payoffs (Van Beest & Van Dijk, 2007).

The need for inclusion means that appearing attractive to potential coalition partners can be critical. A particularly useful and obvious strategy to achieve this goal is to make attractive offers, i.e., offers that are larger than the offers that other players make. Some authors have argued that it is exactly this aspect of coalition strategizing that many bargainers fail to appreciate (e.g., [START_REF] Kelley | Coalitions in the triad: Critique and experiment[END_REF]Van Beest & Van Dijk, 2007;Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957), primarily because people have a natural tendency to approach multiparty interactions as they do dyadic interactions. Beest & Van Dijk, 2007). A classic example is the often observed "strength-is-weakness effect" (Caplow, 1959;[START_REF] Chertkoff | A revision of Caplow's coalition theory[END_REF][START_REF] Kelley | Coalitions in the triad: Critique and experiment[END_REF][START_REF] Murnighan | The dynamics of bargaining games[END_REF]Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957). Equity theory suggests that those who bring more resources should also get more outcomes (Walster, Walster & Berscheid, 1978), and many bargainers naturally expect that having more resources will help them obtain greater relative outcomes.

In multiparty interactions, however, 'strong' parties who have more resources are often excluded when parties with fewer resources still have enough resources, collectively, to form a winning coalition. In this instance, "strength" leads to exclusion ("weakness") when the lower-resource parties can obtain the coalition's benefits for less cost. Another example concerns anger expressions: in two-party bargaining, people who express anger often obtain superior outcomes (e.g., [START_REF] Sinaceur | Get mad and get more than even: When and why anger expression is effective in negotiations[END_REF]Van Kleef et al., 2004a,b).

Communicating anger in coalition bargaining, however, can backfire when anger alienates a person's potential coalition partners (Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008). Thus, although appearing strong and demanding can be beneficial in dyadic settings, it can be particularly detrimental when being included is of primary importance.

This suggests that coalition bargainers may underestimate the importance of inclusion, particularly when they have a payoff advantage. 2 In these situations, well-endowed bargainers can actually do well by revealing their outcome advantages. Why? Because their outcome advantage raises the joint outcome of any coalition that includes them, which allows them to make particularly attractive offers that potential rivals may not be able to

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Honesty Pays, 8 match. We predict, however, that well-endowed players will not make use their advantage effectively. Instead, we expect that they will keep their payoff information private and fail to make attractive offers, all in the false hope of maximizing outcomes that will never materialize.

Fairness

This discussion has been based on the implicit assumption that coalition bargainers are motivated to maximize their payoffs. An alternative motivation that drives many bargainers is the desire to be fair (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978;Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989;Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003;Van Beest & Van Dijk, 2007). People who are motivated by fairness are likely to have a natural inclination to disclose private information and to avoid taking advantage of unearned outcome advantages. Thus, we predict that fair-minded bargainers will reveal their private information and use their outcome advantages to increase their counterparts' outcomes (as well as their own) more than bargainers who are more motivated by self-interest. We also expect that this will result in their being included in more final coalitions and, ironically, obtaining better payoffs. In contrast, we expect that bargainers who are more motivated by self-interest will be less likely to reveal their private information and less likely to make attractive offers, hoping to maximize their individual outcomes, and that this will lead them to achieve the exact opposite of what they hope for.

Research Overview

We tested these predictions in three studies that incorporated information asymmetries within a classic coalition setting. In each study the participants negotiated a prize of 10 (Study 1) or 20 valuable chips (Studies 2 and 3) in a 4(3-2-2) simple weighted majority game. In this game, the number outside the parentheses, 4, denotes the minimum number of resources required to form a winning coalition and obtain 10 chips. The numbers inside the parentheses, 3-2-2, denote the number of resources each player possesses: player

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A controls 3 resources; players B and C each control 2. This particular distribution of resources has a long history in coalition research (Caplow, 1959;[START_REF] Chertkoff | A revision of Caplow's coalition theory[END_REF][START_REF] Kelley | Coalitions in the triad: Critique and experiment[END_REF][START_REF] Murnighan | The dynamics of bargaining games[END_REF]Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957). The most frequently formed coalition in the 4(3-2-2) game is the BC-coalition, with B and C sharing the payoff equally.

Thus, just on the basis of their resources, player As face a strength-is-weakness challenge:

their additional resource sets them up to be excluded from the winning coalition. To counteract this, we provided them with two strategic benefits: an additional outcome advantage and private information that they had this outcome advantage. These two benefits

give them an opportunity to overcome the disadvantage that their extra resource has created.

We predict, however, that they will not use this opportunity: they will not reveal their outcome advantage and this will result in frequent exclusions from the winning coalitions (and zero payoffs).

Thus, we investigated Player As who had a resource advantage, private information, and an outcome advantage (in the form of a favorable exchange rate; e.g., [START_REF] Kagel | Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs[END_REF]. This allowed them to make more attractive offers than player Bs and Cs could make to each other, even as they obtained outcomes that were larger than their coalition partner.

Here is how: because players B and C have equal resources, sharing the 10 chips equally (giving each of them 5 Euro) is an obvious outcome. Player As, in contrast, can offer either B or C 6 chips and demand only 4, increasing B or C's outcome and, as due to their exchange rate advantage each chip is worth 2 Euro to them, still yielding them 8 Euro. This strategy makes player As attractive in terms of the outcomes that they can provide to their partners.

(Offering 7 and retaining 3 makes player As even more attractive and still garners them 6

Euro--far better than the zero outcome that comes with exclusion.)

Although this logic seems obvious, we expected that player As would try to use their information advantage to maximize their own outcomes rather than to maximize their offer's

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Honesty Pays, 10 attractiveness. That is, we expected them to make offers that, if accepted, would increase their outcomes [e.g., offering 4 or 5 chips so that they could get 5 or 6 chips (to obtain 10 or 12 Euros)], even though these offers would not be more attractive than B's and C's offers to each other (i.e., 5 chips). Thus, we expected that player As would not do well when they alone had information about their exchange advantage. This outcome would replicate the classic strength-is-weakness effect in a markedly different context, one in which the strong player has both payoff and information advantages.

Ironically, we also expected that player As would do better when their strategic benefits were reduced, i.e., when their exchange rate advantage was common information.

Knowing that A had a better exchange rate signals that any coalition with A will yield more joint payoffs than any coalition without player A. This should result in players As getting more offers and increase the likelihood of their being included in the winning coalition (and thus earning better payoffs). We also expected that this might also lead them to make more attractive offers themselves, which would also increase their likelihood of inclusion.

The irony is that this condition imposes on player As exactly what they might not choose if they had the choice to reveal their private, exchange rate information. Thus, Studies 2 and 3 gave them this choice and assessed whether they revealed their exchange advantage; both studies also investigated a variety of mechanisms that might affect this choice, including fairness motivations, social value orientations, and perspective taking.

Study 2 tested our underlying prediction that fairness motivations will increase information disclosure as well as the likelihood of player As making more attractive offers. Study 3 draws attention to the fact that fairness concerns go hand in hand with a focus on other's outcomes that can provide strategic insights that are less available for people who are less concerned with others' payoff. Thus, Study 3 induced perspective taking to determine whether this would lead bargainers to make more attractive offers. Study 3 also measured

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Honesty Pays, 11 individuals' social value orientations to determine whether this augmenting effect generalized for self and other-oriented individuals or whether, in contrast, perspective taking might actually exacerbate individuals' original orientations.

Study 1

Study 1 tested our prediction that coalition bargainers who have private information about an exchange-rate advantage will not use their information effectively to increase their outcomes. Instead, we expected that most of them would fail to make attractive offers, which would lead them to be excluded from the winning coalition and yield them zero payoffs.

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 102 undergraduates at a Dutch university (74 females, 28 males; Mean age = 20.16, SD = 2.56); they were randomly assigned to one of the 3-2-2 positions and to either the informed or the uninformed condition, 4 resulting in 17 three-player groups in each condition. Participants were told that their monetary payoff would be based on their bargaining performance; after the experiment, however, everyone was paid 6 Euro (about 8 US$ at the time of the experiment).

Procedure. Participants were seated at computers in separate cubicles and informed that they were participating in a study of coalition formation. Their task was based on the landowner paradigm (for a more detailed description see e.g., Van Beest, Wilke, & Van Dijk, 2003). Participants played the role of landowners who could only obtain payoffs if they sold their parcel of land. After a (bogus) quiz to determine the relative size of each parcel, one participant (player A) 'earned' a parcel of 3 hectares and the other two participants (players B and C) each earned parcels of 2 hectares. They learned that a project developer wanted to buy at least 4 hectares of land for a fixed price of 10 valuable chips. It was explicitly stated that no single landowner had enough land to satisfy the developer's demands; they therefore needed to form a coalition with one other landowner. It was also

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Honesty Pays, 12 made clear that people could only sell their entire parcel and that money could only be earned if they managed to sell their parcel. Like previous coalition research (e.g., [START_REF] Kelley | Coalitions in the triad: Critique and experiment[END_REF][START_REF] Murnighan | The dynamics of bargaining games[END_REF], we did not allow participants to form a grand coalition that included everyone; in addition, they were not allowed to allocate payoffs to landowners who were excluded from the winning coalition.

The players then learned the value of each of their chips. This information included the manipulation of the independent variable, i.e., whether player Bs and Cs knew of player As' exchange advantage. Either all three participants or just player A learned that player As could exchange each of their chips for 2 Euro and that players B and C could exchange each of their chips for 1 Euro. In the informed condition all players were thus aware of player A's exchange-rate advantage; in the uninformed condition only player As were aware.

The instructions then described the logistics of their negotiation [START_REF] Komorita | Generality and validity of some theories of coalition formation[END_REF]Van Beest et al., 2004b). Negotiations took place in rounds and continued until a coalition was formed. In each round all three participants made one offer that identified the coalition's partners and how they wanted to allocate the chips if this coalition formed. No other communication was possible. All three received the others' offers and all three were instructed that they could only select one. A coalition formed when both members of a potential coalition selected the same offer. If a coalition did not form, e.g., if A selected B's offer, B selected C's, and C selected A's, they made a new set of offers. No other communications were allowed.

After the negotiations, participants completed a questionnaire that checked whether participants could identify their exchange rates and the coalitions that would include them.

Results

Manipulation checks. All of the participants accurately recalled their own exchange rates and, in the informed condition, player A's higher rate. All players B and C in the

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Honesty Pays, 13 uninformed conditions assumed that everyone had the same exchange rates, and everyone recalled their potential coalition memberships. Thus, the manipulations were successful.

Proposed coalitions. We hypothesized that players A would be included in more proposals in the informed condition than in the uninformed condition. Coalitions and final payoffs. The information conditions also influenced the composition of the winning coalitions (see Table 2) and the players' payoffs (see Table 3).

As predicted, player As were included in the winning coalition less often in the uninformed (18%) than in the informed condition (65%), χ 2 (1, N = 34) = 7.78, p < .005. This had a tremendous negative impact on their final payoffs: a 2 (condition) x 3 (players) repeated measures ANOVA with players as a within factor yielded main effects for information, F(1, 32) = 9.32, p < .005, players, F(1, 32) = 4.16, p < .03, and their interaction, F(2, 31) = 4.71, p < .02.

The information main effect shows that the players obtained higher overall payoffs in the informed (M = 12.88, SD = 2.28) compared to the uninformed conditions (M = 10.76, SD = 1.70). The players main effect shows that player Bs' payoffs (M = 4.79, SD = 1.59) were marginally higher than player As' (M = 3.64, SD = 4.52, t(33) = 1.33, p = .10) and significantly higher than player Cs' (M = 3.38, SD = 2.39; t(33) = 2.43, p = .01); player As' and Cs' did not differ significantly (t(33) = .23, ns).

The more important finding was the interaction, which showed that player As benefited from complete information, t(32) = -3.05, p = .001, and that player Cs benefited from incomplete information, t(32) = 1.85, p = .05. Player Bs outcomes were relatively unaffected by conditions, t(32) = 1.19, ns. As shown in Table 3, player As' average payoffs increased almost four-fold when everyone knew about their exchange rate advantage.

Opening offers and final payoffs. Player As made fewer attractive offers in the uninformed condition than the informed condition; they also did less well in the uninformed condition. A logistic regression analysis showed that lower opening offers to either player B shows that the detrimental effect of having private information about an exchange rate advantage is already apparent in opening offers.

Discussion

The results supported all of our predictions. Player As were included in fewer coalitions and received lower overall payoffs when they had important information that no one else had. Ironically, when the other players knew about As' exchange-rate advantage, player As did considerably better. This resulted from changes in player As' own behavior and the behavior of the other players, as player As made more attractive offers and the other players made player As more offers and chose player A more often. These findings clearly indicate that individuals who had an advantageous position were hurt rather than helped by having more information. Although we predicted this result, it also contradicts an old maxim that information is power. In this case, it was more like a curse.

Study 2

Study 1 showed that player As' outcome advantage helped them obtain superior coalition outcomes only when other negotiators were informed about their advantage. Study 2 assessed whether people voluntarily revealed their private information, truthfully deceptively, or not at all, and if they did, whether their offers were more attractive than player As' who did not reveal their information. [START_REF] Dana | What you don't know won't hurt me: costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games[END_REF] observed that, in a dictator game, in which one person could keep $10, share some of it with an anonymous other person, or 'opt out' for $9, one third of their participants took less money than they could have kept and opted out. By doing

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Honesty Pays, 16 so, they avoided the tough choice of whether and how much to share. We expected that our participants might have similar feelings: by choosing to send no information, they could avoid the risks of revealing (either truthfully or deceptively). Thus, we expected that many people would send no information. More importantly, we expected that non-revealers and liars would compound their already poor strategies by making less attractive offers than bargainers who would disclose their outcome advantage. They were told that whatever they obtained from the bargaining would be their experimental pay. After the negotiations ended, they learned that they had negotiated with a preprogrammed strategy; all were paid 3.50 Euro.

Procedure. Participants were seated at computers in individual cubicles. As in Study 1, participants first completed a (bogus) quiz to determine their resources in the game. After being designated player A, they learned everyone's exchange rate for the chips that they might obtain: 1.5 Euro for them but only 1 Euro for the other players. They were also told that the other players were not aware of this difference and that the other players typically assumed that everyone's exchange rates were identical (i.e., 1 Euro). The instructions then indicated that, prior to the start of negotiation, each participant could send a message about

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the payoff value of their chips to the other participants if they wished. They could either reveal their outcome advantage, indicate that their exchange rate was the same as the other players' (a lie), or send no information.

Participants were led to believe that the computer would randomly determine who would make the first offer; in fact, the participants always made the first offer. As before, their offers identified their desired partner and how they wanted to allocate the 20 chips;

offers to excluded players and the three-player grand coalition were not allowed. The participants' offers were always accepted; this ended the negotiation. We then assessed participants' understanding of the instructions by asking them to identify their exchange rates, the possible coalitions, and the value of the payoffs. As in Study 1, all of the participants provided correct answers to all of these questions.

Finally, we asked the participants whether they were motivated to maximize their own outcomes, maximize the difference in their outcomes, minimize the difference in their outcomes, maximize joint outcomes, and obtain equal outcomes. We recoded the first two questions and averaged their responses to form an index of their concern for others (α = .77).

Results

Manipulation check. All participants correctly indicated their exchange rate, size of their parcel, and number of coalition they could form. A loglinear analysis of the frequencies of attractive (more than 10 chips), unattractive

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(less than 10 chips), and equal offers (10 chips) yielded effects for revealers/liars/nonrevealers, χ 2 (2, N = 91) = 18.45, p = .001, for offer type, χ 2 (2, N = 91) = 36.08, p = .001, and for their interaction, χ 2 (4, N = 91) = 32.39, p = .001. Revealers made more attractive (8), fewer unattractive (7), and fewer equal offers (3) than liars (0 attractive vs. 11 unattractive vs. 12 equal offers) or non-revealers (0 attractive vs. 34 unattractive vs. 16 equal offers).

Thus, not sending information when the choice to do so was available was associated with the same detrimental strategy as deception (cf., [START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Accepted Manuscript Honesty | The effects of contracts on interpersonal trust[END_REF]. These effects support our predictions.

Motivation and mediation. 7,8 A regression analysis revealed a positive association between player As' concerns for others and the attractiveness of their offer, β = .87, SE = .13, p < .001. A logistic regression also revealed a positive association between player As' concerns for others and the likelihood that they would reveal their exchange rate truthfully, β = 5.47, SE = 1.26, p < .001. A third regression revealed a positive association between revelations and attractive offers, β = .79, SE = .14, p < .001. Controlling for revelations completely reduced the association between concerns for others and attractive offers to nonsignificance, β = .33, SE = .27, ns. Thus, these analyses indicate that truthfully revealing one's exchange advantage fully mediated the relationship between concern for others and the attractiveness of player As' offers. Further analyses showed that this was not the case for deception or not revealing one's exchange rate advantage, as concern for others was not significantly associated with either of these decisions, B = .44, SE = .79, ns. Sobel = 3.44, p

< .001

Discussion

Study 2 investigated the coalition strategies of negotiators, who had many resources, private information, and an exchange-rate advantage. Not only did a minority of them choose to reveal their exchange-rate advantage information, most participants chose not to

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send any information at all. In addition, non-revealers tended to send the same kinds of unattractive offers as negotiators who lied. Indeed, the only people who made frequent attractive offers were the negotiators who revealed their exchange-rate advantage. What do these findings mean for the behavior of Player As in Experiment 1? Remember that in Experiment 1, Player As could not communicate about their exchange rate advantage--this was private or public information by instructions. Player As benefitted from the experimental instructions that revealed their exchange rate advantage to their fellow players.

The findings of Study 2 thus suggest that many of the Study 1 player As in the informed condition may have benefitted inadvertently because, if given the choice to honestly reveal their exchange rate advantage, they would not have used this option effectively. In addition, many of Study 1's player As in the uninformed condition who did relatively poorly would probably not have benefitted from having the choice to reveal their private information, as so many did not use that option.

The combination of the findings from these two studies is ironic: rather than taking advantage of additional information, powerful negotiators in these situations misused it, repeatedly, by not revealing their information and by trying to take too much advantage of it.

Thus, these results suggest the old saying that "pigs get fed but hogs get slaughtered." They also indicate that, unlike the implications from dyadic bargaining, both honesty and fairness pay in coalition bargaining.

Because concerns for others were assessed at the end of the experiment rather than being independently manipulated, however, we can only make associative rather than causal conclusions about their impact. Thus, to provide further evidence for our reasoning and the underlying processes, Study 3 measured a stable disposition, social value orientations, before the coalition formation interaction, and it manipulated perspective taking. Moreover, instead of giving bargainers also the option to tell nothing we now only gave bargainers the option to

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Honesty Pays, 20 either tell the truth or to tell a lie about their outcome advantage. 9 These changes were instituted to increase our ability to draw causal conclusions.

Study 3

Social value orientations are stable dispositions that reflect the central assumption of interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978;Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003), i.e., that social interactions are not only shaped by concerns about one's own payoff but also by broader social or interpersonal concerns, such as concern with others' outcomes, with joint outcomes, and with equality (Messick & McClintock, 1968;Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). The literature on negotiations typically identifies two social value types:

proselfs, who are predisposed to enhance their own payoffs, either absolutely or relatively, and prosocials, who are predisposed toward equal payoffs and maximizing joint payoffs. We predicted that prosocials would be more likely to reveal their exchange-rate advantage and make more attractive offers than proselfs.

Study 3 also manipulated perspective taking, a cognitive capacity to consider the world from others' points of view (e.g., [START_REF] Batson | Perspective taking: Imagining how another feels versus imagining how you would feel[END_REF][START_REF] Davis | Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach[END_REF]Van Beest et al., 2005). According to [START_REF] Davis | Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach[END_REF], perspective taking allows people to anticipate the behavior and reactions of others. Recent research on dyadic negotiations found that negotiators who took the perspective of others created and claimed more payoffs (Galinsky, Maddux, Gillin, & White, 2008). In essence, while interacting positively and creatively with their counterparts, perspective takers also set the stage so that they would benefit most.

In the context of coalition formation, we expected that perspective taking might also have either of two inconsistent effects for prosocials and proselfs. On the one hand, encouraging participants to take their counterparts' perspectives might reduce the impact of social value orientations by encouraging everyone to disclose their exchange rates and decrease their demands. In so doing, it might induce proselfs to discover the strategic

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Honesty Pays, 21 benefits of being more attractive then potential rivals. On the other hand, however, perspective taking might amplify the effects of social value orientations by alerting people to how they might best negotiate if they were negotiating with themselves (i.e., the false consensus effect, [START_REF] Ross | The false consensus effect: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes[END_REF]. This would lead proselfs to negotiate as if they were negotiating with other proselfs and prosocials to negotiate as if they were negotiating with other prosocials. [START_REF] Steinel | Social motives and strategic misrepresentation in[END_REF], for instance, found that bargainers used deception more when they expected that their opponent had a proself rather than a prosocial orientation. Thus, proselfs might be even less likely to disclose information than prosocials when they take the perspective of their potential coalition partners.

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 108 students (90 females, 18 males) from a Dutch university (Mean age = 20.69, SD = 2.30); all were assigned the role of player A in the 4(3-2-2) landowner game. 7 They were told that their outcomes from the bargaining would be their experimental pay. After the negotiations, they learned that their counterpart was a preprogrammed strategy; all were paid 4.50 Euro. The design was a 2 (perspective taking vs. control) × 2 (social value orientation: prosocial, proself) between-participants factorial.

Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 2 with the exception that we now manipulated perspective taking and assessed social value orientations before participants made any decisions, and participants were required to either reveal their exchange rate advantage or, if they chose, lie about it. We used Van Lange and Kuhlman's (1994) standard,

nine-item measure to assess social value orientations. It has excellent psychometric qualities:

it is internally consistent (e.g. Parks, 1994), reliable over substantial time periods [START_REF] Eisenberger | Effects of social values, effort training, and goal structure on task persistence[END_REF]Van Beest, Andeweg, Van Lange & Koning, 2008), and is not related to measures of social desirability (e.g., [START_REF] Platow | An evaluation of the social desirability of prosocial self-other allocation choices[END_REF]. It classifies The experiment then proceeded as it had in Study 2. Following their messages and choice of coalition partners, and the automatic acceptance of their offers, participants completed a post-experiment questionnaire that asked them to recall the exchange rates, the number of chips that the winning coalition would receive, the size of their parcel, and the coalitions that they could form. We also asked participants to rate how much they had considered the viewpoint of the other players when they made their offers, on a 7-point scale. Finally, at the end of the questionnaire, we assessed whether their behavior was motivated by fairness and/or by self-interest.

Results

Manipulation checks. All of the participants gave correct answers to all of the questions on the experimental procedures. A series of 2×2 ANOVAs, on their perspective Revelations. A 2 (social value orientation) × 2 (perspective taking) × 2 (revelation) loglinear analysis assessed the effects of social value orientations and perspective taking on revelations (see Table 4). As predicted, prosocials revealed their exchange rate (60%) more than proselfs did (34%), χ 2 (1, N = 94) = 6.61, p = .010. In addition, a significant interaction, χ 2 (1, N = 94) = 4.01, p = .045, indicated that prosocials revealed their exchange rate more in the perspective taking (72%) than in the control condition (50%), χ 2 (1, N = 53) = 2.67, p = .05, but proselfs revealed less in the perspective taking (26%) than in the control condition (44%), χ 2 (1, N = 41) = 1.51, p = .10. Thus, perspective taking amplified rather than dampened the effects of social value orientations: it did not "help" proselfs discover the benefits of being more attractive then potential rivals.

Offers. As predicted, a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA showed that prosocials made more attractive offers than proselfs (M = 9.47, SD = 1.71 versus M = 8.41, SD = 2.08), F(1, 90) = 7.24, p < .009. Furthermore, it also led to a marginally significant effect for revelations: as in Study 2, truth-tellers made somewhat more attractive offers (M = 9.56, SD = 1.86) than deceivers did (M = 8.47, SD = 1.89), F(1, 90) = 3.11 p = .08.

A 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 (type of offer) loglinear analysis of the frequency of equal, attractive, and unattractive offers replicated the main effects of social value orientation and revelation, χ 2 (1, N = 94) = 4.90, p = .08 and χ 2 (1, N = 94) = 6.24, p = .04, respectively. In addition, perspective taking moderated the effect of social value orientations on types of offers, χ 2 (1, N = 94) = 7.28,

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Honesty Pays, 24 p = .02: taking others' perspectives led prosocials to send fewer unattractive offers but led proselfs to send more (see Table 5).

Mediation. Finally, we assessed whether the effect of social value orientations on offers was mediated by revelations. A series of regression showed that this was the case. The regression of social value orientations on offers was significant, β = -1.05, SE = .391, p < .001.

The logistic regression of social value orientations on revelations was also significant, β -1.49, SE = .65, p < .001. Finally, the regression of revelations on offers was significant, β = -.87, SE = .39, p < .05, when controlled for the effect of social value orientations, β = -.83, SE = .40, p < .05. Sobel = 1.60, p = .10.

Discussion

These results replicate and expand the findings of Study 2: not revealing an advantageous exchange rate again went hand-in-hand with making less attractive offers, and this choice mediated the effect of fairness (in this case, social value orientation) on the attractiveness of an offer. These results also extended Study 2's findings by adding the effects of perspective taking. Ironically, the push to consider one's counterparts' perspectives accentuated rather than alleviated a proself social value orientation: it led proselfs to act more self-interestedly, which, given Study 1's findings, suggests that perspective taking might further erode their prospects of being included in winning coalitions and their ultimate monetary payoffs.

General Discussion

Having a better exchange rate is a huge benefit for coalition bargainers: it allows them to obtain better payoffs and to make more attractive offers to their potential coalition partners. We assumed, however, that people would squander this opportunity by focusing more on the first benefit and less on the second benefit. Thus, we predicted that people who had an exchange advantage would not use it to signal how attractive they were as a coalition

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Honesty Pays, 25 partner, unless they were motivated by fairness. All three studies reported here supported this logic.

Study 1 showed that people who had private information about an exchange advantage did not use their strategic opportunities effectively. The structure of their situation, facing two counterparts whose resources were equal, made player As less preferred coalition partners and they did not overcome these adverse preferences by making more attractive offers. Although they could not reveal their exchange rate advantage, they could have used it to make more attractive offers. Instead, they did the exact opposite, making less attractive offers than they did when their exchange rate advantage was known. Thus, the bargainers who had the greatest strategic options did extremely poorly. In contrast, when their exchange rate advantage was common knowledge, they attracted more offers, made more attractive offers, were included more often, and received excellent overall outcomes.

Studies 2 and 3 focused on the underlying mechanisms of these effects, with particular attention to fairness motivations, social value orientations, and perspective taking. Both of these studies again focused on whether advantaged coalition bargainers would reveal how attractive they were. As predicted, coalition bargainers who were motivated by self-interest rather than by fairness tended to actively conceal their exchange advantage, made less attractive, more selfish offers, and did less well for themselves as a result. In contrast, coalition bargainers who had stronger fairness concerns tended to reveal their exchange advantage, made better offers, and would thus do better for themselves.

Study 3 also showed that perspective taking accentuated the effects of individuals' social value orientations: taking their counterparts' points of view led proselfs to act more rather than less self-interestedly, sending deceptive messages and making unattractive offers, but it led prosocials to act even more cooperatively. It appears that this manipulation led both prosocials and proselfs to literally "put themselves in the other person's shoes," with proselfs

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Honesty Pays, 26 focusing on "themselves" and prosocials focusing on "the other person's shoes." Applying these results to the information dilemma [START_REF] Murnighan | The information dilemma in negotiations: Effects of experience, incentives, and integrative potential[END_REF] suggests that proselfs attended more to the potential exploitation that can follow information sharing while prosocials attended more to the potential benefits.

Our logic is thus supported in three experiments, in which either no communication was possible (Study 1; revelation vs. private information rather was a feature of the experiment), or Player As had the choice between two options (Study 2; honestly revealing vs. actively misrepresenting their exchange advantage), or Player As had the choice between three options (Study 3; honestly revealing, being silent about or actively misrepresenting their exchange advantage). Honest revelation helped Player As in all experiments, and Study 2 further showed that lying by commission (i.e., active misrepresentation) was associated with the same coalition choices as lying by omission (i.e., being silent). Therefore, our main conclusion is not that deception hurts in coalition bargaining-even though this may probably be the case in real life coalition negotiations, when deception is revealed or detected. This, however, is an issue for future research. Instead, what our results consistently showed is that honesty pays.

Coalition Formation

The current research is the first to investigate the impact of private information on coalition behavior. While research on dyadic negotiations suggests that keeping information about asymmetric payoffs private can be strategically beneficial [START_REF] Kagel | Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs[END_REF][START_REF] Pillutla | Being fair or appearing fair: Strategic behavior in ultimatum bargaining[END_REF]Straub & Murnighan, 1995;Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000;Van Dijk et al., 2004), the current research shows that a similar strategy in coalition bargaining can be particularly detrimental.

We tested our reasoning in a historically rich context, the 4(3-2-2) game (e.g., Caplow, 1959;[START_REF] Chertkoff | A revision of Caplow's coalition theory[END_REF][START_REF] Kelley | Coalitions in the triad: Critique and experiment[END_REF][START_REF] Murnighan | The dynamics of bargaining games[END_REF] Vinacke & Arkoff,

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Honesty Pays, 27 1957), in which coalition bargainers have often overestimated the impact of resource differentials when such resources are not critical (i.e., situations where having more resources is not associated with having more possibilities to form a coalition). This misunderstanding has led previous player As to demand more than is effective, increasing their chances of exclusion and zero payoffs. We replicated this classic finding in a setting in which player As had additional payoff and information advantages. Only when player As' hands were tied, and everyone knew about their outcome advantages, were they included in as many winning coalitions as their seemingly weaker counterparts.

Player As' exchange rate advantage was a real advantage--it set them up to obtain better payoffs than their counterparts; their resource advantage, in contrast, was only apparent. Thus, these results suggest that coalition bargainers not only overvalued their noncritical resources but they also failed to fully appreciate their critical resources. In essence, they did not realize that what made them attractive, in this case, was their ability to create larger outcomes for their potential partners. By viewing the situation socially rather than self-interestedly, perspective taking added to prosocials' already effective orientation. In stark contrast, perspective taking led proselfs to compound their initial, mistaken approach.

Future research should test the boundary conditions of these effects. We used a single context, the 4(3-2-2) game, that created a base rate in which player As would be likely to be excluded more than players B and C. Different games with different base rates could test the generality of player As' strategic miscalculations. Consider, for instance, the 2(1-1-1)-game, in which every player has an equal a priori chance to be included and all of the players are likely to demand an equal share of the rewards in every coalition. In this game, not revealing an outcome advantage and not compensating for this difference in value, may actually be strategically effective. Even in this game, however, players are more likely to be included in

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Honesty Pays, 28 winning coalitions when they make more attractive offers than their rivals. Thus, asking for less may again generally garner a coalition bargainer more.

Another potential avenue of further research would be to increase the number of times players participate in the coalition game. In our Study 1, participants played only one game.

Relevant here is that early coalition research has demonstrated that coalition players adhere more to game theoretic predictions when they have played a coalition game several times [START_REF] Kelley | Coalitions in the triad: Critique and experiment[END_REF]. Possibly, self-interested players may discover the strategic benefits of making attractive offers when they have played the game several times. In similar vein, it should be noticed that we used students in our experiments. It may be argued that they are perhaps not as skilled in negotiations as people who have had more experience in negotiations. That is, more skilled bargainers who are self-interested may use their advantages more effectively than the relative naive bargainers that were used in the current set of studies.

Social Value Orientations

Our findings also provide further insight into the effects of social values on coalition bargaining. Previous research suggests that prosocials are especially reluctant to exclude individuals from winning coalitions, even when counterparts contribute little or nothing (Van Beest et al., 2003). Similar effects have surfaced in group-versus-group negotiations (Van Beest et al., 2008). The present findings extend this literature by showing that prosocials are also more reluctant to deceive their potential partners than proselfs are, especially when they have taken their potential coalition partners' perspectives.

Research on dyadic negotiations has also shown that proselfs are more likely to provide incorrect information than prosocials, and bargainers were more deceptive when they knew that their opponents had a proself rather than a prosocial orientation [START_REF] Steinel | Social motives and strategic misrepresentation in[END_REF]. Also unlike prosocials, proselfs have more often used an information advantage to maximize their own outcomes (Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004). The current findings show that prosocials and proselfs do not alter their strategies in a coalition negotiation: proselfs remained more deceptive and made less attractive offers than prosocials. This fits with the proposition that humans have evolved and learned specific strategies in dyadic interactions and may be generalizing these strategies (Tooby et al., 2006) -even when they are inappropriate and ineffective -to multiparty settings.

Perspective Taking

Previous research has also shown that perspective taking is more effective than empathy in dyadic negotiations [START_REF] Galinsky | Why it pays to get inside the head of your opponent: The differential effects of perspective taking and empathy in negotiations[END_REF]: negotiators who considered their counterpart's position created and claimed more than negotiators who did not consider their counterpart's feelings. By combining perspective taking and social value orientations, we observed beneficial effects for prosocials but increasing costs for proselfs. Galinsky and colleagues did not assess social value orientations but, based on the current results, we might expect that, after taking others' perspectives, prosocials would be more focused toward creating value and proselfs would be more focused toward claiming value. This is consistent with [START_REF] Epley | When perspective taking increases taking: Reactive egoism in social interaction[END_REF], who showed that perspective taking can increase selfish behavior in competitively framed interactions.

Our perspective taking instructions were similar to those of [START_REF] Galinsky | Why it pays to get inside the head of your opponent: The differential effects of perspective taking and empathy in negotiations[END_REF]:

participants were told to imagine how they would behave if they were in their counterpart's shoes. Research that focuses individuals' attention on empathy (e.g., [START_REF] Batson | Perspective taking: Imagining how another feels versus imagining how you would feel[END_REF][START_REF] Batson | … As you would have them do unto you": Does imagining yourself in the other's place stimulate moral action?[END_REF]

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Honesty Pays, 30 motivations [START_REF] Batson | Perspective taking: Imagining how another feels versus imagining how you would feel[END_REF]. The fact that we used a self-perspective instruction may thus be viewed as a conservative test of our reasoning. Indeed, a direct application of Batson's results to our paradigm might lead to a prediction of increased egoism, for both proselfs and prosocials. Yet, this is not what we observed. Instead, our perspective taking manipulation accentuated the initial inclinations of prosocials and proselfs. Further research might investigate the effects of asking people to consider their potential partners' feelings.

We argued that people who were motivated by fairness would be more likely to benefit than those who are motivated by self-interest. People who are motivated by fairness are more likely to disclose their outcome advantage and more likely to make attractive offers than people who are less motivated by fairness. We must stress here that we are not arguing that fair people have a better understanding of the situation and somehow see the strategic benefits of disclosing information. Instead, we are suggesting that they have a natural inclination to behave in a specific way and this specific inclination happens to be successful in this context. In fact, our findings even suggest that such inclinations are quite pervasive, given the fact that telling them to actively consider the position of their counterpart did not reduce their initial inclinations.

Conclusions

Economic theory and empirical research indicate that negotiators are particularly responsive to the down side of the information dilemma [START_REF] Murnighan | The information dilemma in negotiations: Effects of experience, incentives, and integrative potential[END_REF], leading them to keep their personal information private. Because so many of our experiences (and a considerable amount of research) involve dyadic negotiations, cautiousness may often be warranted. The results of the current experiments, however, show that generalizing these strategies to coalition bargaining can be particularly ineffective. In fact, the current research suggests that, contrary to the general wisdom of dyadic negotiations, honesty may actually be the best policy in coalition bargaining, both in the short and the long term. A concern for

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Honesty Pays, 31 others' outcomes -fairness --also appears to be self-beneficial, in terms of both inclusion and outcomes for individuals who have a potential outcome advantage. Thus, rather than interfering with the opportunity to strike a good deal, honesty can facilitate the formation of valuable coalitions and, in conjunction with fairness motivations, contribute to better individual outcomes as well. Thus, in this case, honesty wins all around.

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Honesty Pays, 32

  player As (M = 5.00, SD = 1.10) and to Bs (M = 4.72, SD = 0.64), t(15) = -0.6, ns, player Bs offered player As significantly less (M = 4.22, SD = 0.83) than they offered player Cs (M = 5.00, SD = 0.00), t(15) = 2.63, p < .05.

  2.45, SE = .84, p < .004) or player C (β = 2.47, SE = .84, p < .004) were associated with being included in fewer winning coalitions. A linear regression analysis showed that they were also associated with lower payoffs for player As, with either player Bs (β = 2.91, SE = .61, p < .001) or player Cs (β = 2.78, SE = .63, p < .001), F(2, 31) = 11.13, p < .001. This

Finally, we wanted

  to directly test our assumption that the reluctance to reveal one's advantage and associated unattractive offers are fueled by self-interest. Therefore, we assessed what motivated the decision to disclose information and whether this decision did indeed mediate the attractiveness of an offer. We assumed that more self-oriented motives would thus facilitate deception and withholding information whereas more other-oriented motives would facilitate honest revelations.MethodsParticipants. Participants were 91 students (74 females) from a Dutch university (Mean age = 19.73, SD = 2.39); all had the role of player A in a 4(3-2-2) landowner game.

  Information and offers. Over half of the participants (n = 50; 54.9%) chose to send no information about their exchange rate; a small minority revealed truthfully (n = 18; 19.8%); and a slightly larger minority lied (n = 23; 25.3%; χ 2 (1, N = 91) = 19.54, p = .001). In addition, revealers made significantly larger offers (M = 10.00, SD = 1.81) than liars (M = 8.86, SD = 1.51) or non-revealers (M = 8.20, SD = 1.59; F(1, 90) = 8.31, p < .001, η 2 = .24); the latter two means did not differ from each other.

  equality and maximum joint gain as prosocials and individuals who value their own maximum gain, absolutely or relatively, as proselfs. Fourteen unclassifiable participants were excluded from the analyses.The perspective taking manipulation was introduced after participants had read the instructions, but before they sent their message about their exchange rate. Participants in the perspective taking condition read this information (translated from Dutch): "Effective negotiators know how to take the perspective of other negotiators. They think about how others will behave and how they will react. With whom would you (and for what reason) form a coalition if you were either player B or player C?" Participants in the control condition did not receive this information.

  taking, their motivation to obtain fair outcomes and to maximize their own outcomes assessed and confirmed the effectiveness of the manipulations. Participants in the perspective taking condition (M = 5.65, SD = 1.04) indicated that they had taken others' perspectives more than participants in the control condition did (M = 4.46, SD = 1.68), F(1, 16.31, p < .001. Prosocials were more motivated to obtain fair outcomes (M = 5.00, SD = 1.61) than proselfs (M = 4.24, SD = 1.80), F(1, 90) = 4.62, p < .034, and proselfs (M = 5.71, SD = 1.17) were more motivated to maximize their own outcomes than prosocials (M = 4.53, SD = 1.62), F(1, 90) = 15.67, p < .001. No other effects in these analyses were significant.

  may have decidedly different effects. In fact, Batson and his colleagues have distinguished between imagining how another person feels (otherperspective) and imagining how you would feel (self-perspective) when perceiving the other's situation. Their results indicate that taking the other-perspective is associated more with altruistic motivations and taking the self-perspective is associated more with egoistic A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

  To test this prediction, we analyzed the coalition proposals made by players B and C. (Players As' proposals are less relevant here, as players A are necessarily included in all coalitions that they propose; see Table 1 for a complete overview of all frequencies and means). 5

	We conducted a 2 (condition: informed vs. uninformed) × 2 (player: B vs. C) x 2

(coalition type: including player A vs. excluding player A) loglinear analysis. Results revealed a main effect of coalition type, χ 2 (1, N = 68) = 20.06, p < .001, indicating that player As were frequently excluded from player Bs' and Cs' proposals. Furthermore, a condition by coalition type interaction, χ 2 (1, N = 68) = 18.62, p < .001 showed that player As received more offers when payoff information was public: Player As received only 1 of 34 offers in the uninformed condition but 15 of 34 offers in the informed condition.

Proposed payoff allocations. As expected, player As made more attractive offers to potential partners in the informed condition than in the uninformed condition (M = 5.47 chips, SD = 0.88 versus M = 4.82 chips, SD = 1.07) t(32) = 1.93, p < .05. Moreover, subsequent analysis that categorized offers as attractive (more than 5 chips), unattractive (less than 5 chips), or equal (5 chips) showed that this effect resulted primarily because they made 3 times as many attractive offers (12 of 17) in the informed than in the uninformed conditions (4 of 17), χ 2 (2, N = 34) = 8.90, p < .005.

Analyses of the value of Bs' and Cs' offers suggest that they tried to capitalize on player As' exchange rate in the informed condition. Player Bs used this strategy more than player Cs did: a 2(coalition type) x 2(player) analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded one significant effect, the interaction: F(1, 30) = 4.26, p < .05. Although player Cs made fairly

Analyses of participants' gender led to no significant effects. However, as before, the results should be interpreted cautiously, because so many participants were women.

. Information exchange in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 161-179. Tooby, J., Cosmides, L., & Price, M. E. (2006). Cognitive adaptations for n-person exchange: The evolutionary roots of organizational behavior. Managerial & Decision Economics, 27, 103-129. Van Beest, I., Andeweg, R., Koning, L., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2008). Do groups exclude others more readily than individuals in coalition formation? Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 11, 69-81. Van Beest, I., & Van Dijk, E. (2007). Self-interest and fairness in coalition formation: A social utility approach to understanding partner selection and payoff allocations in groups. European Review of Social Psychology, 18, 132-174. Van Beest, I., Van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (2004). Resources and alternatives in coalition formation: the effects on payoff, self-serving behavior, and bargaining length.

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M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT Honesty Pays, 38 European of Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 713-728. Van Beest, I., & Van Kleef, G., & Van Dijk, E. (2008). Get Angry, Get Out: The Interpersonal Effects of Anger Communication in Multiparty Negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(4), 993-1002. Van Beest, I., Wilke, H., & Van Dijk, E. (2003). The excluded player in coalition formation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 237-247. Van Beest, I., & Williams, K. D. (2006). When inclusion costs and ostracism pays, ostracism still hurts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91,918-928. Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., & Handgraaf, M. J. J. (2004). Social value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 697-707. Van Dijk, E., Van Kleef, G. A., Steinel, W., & Van Beest, I. (2008). A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Van Dijk, E., & Vermunt, R. (2000). Strategy and fairness in social decision making: Sometimes it pays to be powerless. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 1-25. Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2004a). The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 57-76. Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2004b). The interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations: A motivated information processing approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 510-528. Van Lange, P. A. M., & Kuhlman, D. M. (1994). Social value orientations and impressions of partner's honesty and intelligence: A test of the might versus morality effect.

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Honesty Pays, 37 social decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 419-434. Straub, P. G., & Murnighan, J. K. (1995). An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: Information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27, 345-364. Strudler, A. (1995). On the ethics of deception in negotiation. Business Ethics Quarterly, 5, 805-822.

Swaab, R.I., Kern, M.C., Medvec, V., & Diermeier, D. (2009). Who says what to whom?

The impact of communication setting and channel on exclusion from multiparty negotiation agreements. Social Cognition, 27, 385-401. Even then, however, bargainers are often reluctant to share information about their individual payoffs [START_REF] Steinel | Effects of experience and advice on process and performance in negotiations[END_REF]Thompson, 1991).

2 Having private information about a outcome advantage is only detrimental when the a priori odds of inclusion in the winning coalition are less than the a priori odds of one's rivals. For example, in veto games, veto players must be included in the final coalition; for them, having a outcome advantage and not revealing it can be profitable because inclusion is no longer their first strategic concern.

3 We used the 4(3-2-2) game because it has often been used in previous research and-more importantly--because player As have often been excluded from winning coalitions.

Thus, it provides a good baseline to test the added effect of having an information advantage.

4 Analyses of participants' gender led to no significant effects. The results should be interpreted cautiously, however, because so many participants in the sample were women.

5 A highloglinear analysis indicated that player As were more likely to propose an ABcoalition in the uninformed condition (15 AB-coalition proposals versus 2 AC-coalition proposals) than in the informed condition (10 AB-coalition proposals versus 7 AC-coalition proposals), χ 2 (1, N = 34) = 3.78, p = .05. This is somewhat surprising given that there are no a priori reasons to assume a preference for one partner over the other. We speculate that perhaps player As were more heuristic in the uninformed condition as they seemed to prefer forming a coalition with the letter that comes first in the alphabet.

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Honesty Pays, 41

7 MacKinnon (2008) and [START_REF] Mackinnon | Mediation analysis[END_REF] describe a number of methods to establish mediation. Most of these methods, with the bootstrap method of

Preacher and Hayes as one example, require that both the mediator and the dependent variable are continuous variables. These methods cannot be performed in our case, because the mediator is dichotomous, which require logistic or probit regressions. We used the 'joint test method' (MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz, 2007, p.601), which has high statistical power [START_REF] Mackinnon | Introduction to statistical mediation analysis[END_REF]98-100) and can deal with both logistic and normal regression analyses.

With this technique, mediation results when there is a statistically significant effect of the independent variable on the mediator and a statistically significant effect of the mediator on the dependent variable (controlling for the effect of the independent variable; MacKinnon, 2008; 394-395). 8 We also analyzed all 5 motivations separately. These separate analyses showed that each separate motivation had its expected effect on offer and whether or not they disclosed their exchange advantage. Hence, all motivations contributed to the reported mediation analysis. 9 We also conducted a similar experiment in which participants could either disclose their exchange rate or deceive their counterparts by misrepresenting it. Results showed that most participants provided false rather than true information (66% vs. 34%), χ 2 (1, N = 50) = 5.12, p = . .001, when controlled for fairness, β = .08, SE = .09, ns. Sobel = -2.11, p < .05. Thus, these findings replicated Study 2's effects and indicate that similar results emerge when the option to reveal the truth was one of only two choice options.

10 Analyses of participants' gender led to no significant effects. However, as before, the results should be interpreted cautiously, because so many participants were women.

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Erik Bijleveld
email: e.h.bijleveld@uu.nl.

Ruud Custers

Henk Aarts

Once the money is in sight: Distinctive effects of conscious and unconscious rewards on task performance

Keywords: rewards, unconscious motivation, priming, Attentional Blink, working memory performance

Monetary rewards facilitate performance on behavioral and cognitive tasks, even when these rewards are perceived without conscious awareness. Also, recent research suggests that consciously (vs. unconsciously) perceived rewards may prompt people to more strongly concentrate on task stimuli and details. Here we propose that the latter is sometimes dysfunctional, in that it prevents improvements in task performance. We used an Attentional Blink paradigm, in which such enhanced concentration on task stimuli is detrimental to performance. Participants were consciously (supraliminally) or unconsciously (subliminally) exposed to a high-value or low-value coin that they could earn by performing well on an Attentional Blink trial. As hypothesized, high-value rewards increased performance when they were presented subliminally, while this performance benefit vanished when high-value rewards were presented consciously. We discuss this finding in the context of recent research on unconscious goal pursuit.

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Once the Money is In Sight:

Distinctive effects of Conscious and Unconscious Rewards on Task Performance

In colloquial life, money is everywhere. Humans learn about its use and function starting at a young age [START_REF] Berti | The child's construction of economics[END_REF], and it is therefore not surprising that the psychological effects of money are widespread and profound [START_REF] Lea | Money as tool, money as drug: The biological psychology of a strong incentive[END_REF]. Money has been used as a powerful motivator for centuries, which makes sense: For money, humans are willing to work. Specifically, when monetary rewards are at stake, people perform better on tasks, generally increasing their chances at reward attainment. But is this always true?

Following current perspectives on conscious and unconscious processes in motivation and goal pursuit, we propose that monetary rewards can impact performance unconsciously [START_REF] Bargh | Motivation[END_REF]Custers & Aarts, 2010). Furthermore, we propose that conscious awareness of these rewards can additionally prompt people to more strongly concentrate on task stimuli and details, and we investigate a situation in which such increased concentration is counterproductive. In so doing, we test the intriguing possibility that monetary reward cues only increase performance when they are processed unconsciously.

Traditionally, research on reward effects has employed explicit reward cues (or instructions) that can readily be consciously perceived. In typical experiments, participants learn that they will receive money contingent on their performance and are told-or informed by means of a visual cue-how much can be earned in an upcoming task (e.g., [START_REF] Eisenberger | Incremental effects of reward on experienced performance pressure: positive outcomes for intrinsic interest and creativity[END_REF][START_REF] Glucksberg | The influence of strength of drive on functional fixedness and perceptual recognition[END_REF][START_REF] Richter | The heart contracts to reward: Monetary incentives and preejection period[END_REF]. Such studies suggest that monetary rewards that are at stake generally increase task concentration and engagement, but that this is not always functional as to improving performance (rewards may even be detrimental). Here, we dissociate between unconscious and conscious reward processing to enhance our understanding of when monetary reward cues leads to better performance-and when they do not.

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Remarkably, recent research shows that conscious awareness of rewards is not a necessary condition for them to increase task performance. Specifically, in an experiment [START_REF] Pessiglione | How the brain translates money into force: A neuroimaging study of subliminal motivation[END_REF], participants were shown a coin (of high or low value) that they could earn by forcefully squeezing a handgrip. Not surprisingly, people squeezed harder when a high-value coin was at stake. Strikingly, however, people also exerted more force for highvalue coins when these were presented subliminally (i.e., too briefly to be consciously perceived). Thus, bypassing conscious awareness of the reward at stake, just a slight amount of reward-cue input is sufficient to increase task performance.

This finding has been replicated for cognitive tasks. Subliminal rewards seem to increase cognitive performance to the same extent as do 'normal' (consciously perceived) rewards, as revealed by converging evidence from working memory tasks (Zedelius, Veling, & Aarts, in press; Capa, Bustin, Cleeremans, & Hansenne, in press), mathematical tasks [START_REF] Bijleveld | Unconscious reward cues increase invested effort, but do not change speed-accuracy tradeoffs[END_REF], and physiological measurements [START_REF] Bijleveld | The unconscious eye-opener: Pupil size reveals strategic recruitment of resources upon presentation of subliminal reward cues[END_REF]. These findings indicate that monetary rewards enhance performance on various cognitive tasks, including those reliant on working memory, without awareness.

Recent work in cognitive neuroscience offers an account for these findings.

Specifically, reward cues are processed in subcortical brain structures, such as the ventral striatum. While these lower-level structures presumably function independently of conscious awareness, they play a central role in assessing the rewarding value of outcomes. Importantly, these subcortical areas are known to directly connect to brain areas that are implicated in working memory and action control in goal pursuit, located in the frontal cortex (Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005). Whereas such higher-order processes are traditionally thought to require conscious intention and awareness to occur (Baars & Franklin, 2003;Baddeley, 1993), the interconnected nature of the subcortical reward center and frontal-cortical areas suggests the possibility that rewards can facilitate cognitive task performance directly and unconsciously.

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In line with this notion, and building on the conceptual distinction between consciousness and attention [START_REF] Dehaene | Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy[END_REF][START_REF] Koch | Attention and consciousness: Two distinct brain processes[END_REF][START_REF] Lamme | Why visual attention and awareness are different[END_REF], [START_REF] Dijksterhuis | Goals, attention, and (un)consciousness[END_REF] recently proposed that goals may recruit working memory and attentional control processes, but that these processes do not necessarily require conscious awareness of the goal to occur. Consistent with this suggestion, recent research shows that people can be unconsciously motivated to engage in working memory processes [START_REF] Aarts | Goal priming and the affective-motivational route to nonconscious goal pursuit[END_REF][START_REF] Hassin | Implicit working memory[END_REF].

Although the studies alluded to above seem to indicate that rewards evoke the same response irrespective of whether they are perceived consciously, this is not always the case.

Instead, several lines of research suggest that (or goals) may change the way people process incoming information and deal with task stimuli when these rewards permeate into consciousness [START_REF] Baars | The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence[END_REF][START_REF] Bijleveld | Unconscious reward cues increase invested effort, but do not change speed-accuracy tradeoffs[END_REF][START_REF] Dehaene | Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework[END_REF][START_REF] Dijksterhuis | Goals, attention, and (un)consciousness[END_REF]Zedelius et al., in press). That is, because consciously perceived rewards cause people to reflect on what is at stake, conscious awareness of rewards may prompt people to more strongly concentrate on task stimuli and details. Consistent with this idea, paying money according to performance induces people to focus more strongly on the task that is instrumental in attaining the money [START_REF] Baumeister | Choking under pressure: Self-consciousness and paradoxical effects of incentives on skillful performance[END_REF][START_REF] Hertwig | Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists[END_REF].

Paradoxically, however, this enhanced concentration on task information may sometimes interfere with effective performance, e.g., when enhanced concentration also entails better processing of irrelevant information. In other words, while people may hold the belief that increased concentration on the task helps them to perform better, this may in fact backfire in some tasks.

Inspired by this recent literature, we propose that valuable rewards may affect performance or not as a function of whether the reward is consciously perceived. While unconsciously perceived rewards facilitate cognitive (working memory) processes, this should

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Once the Money 6 in principle enhance task performance. Nevertheless, focusing too much on task details in response to a consciously perceived valuable reward may thwart this performance enhancement. To test this idea, we used an Attentional Blink paradigm-a paradigm examining the human ability to process serially presented information-in which consciously focusing on details of the task is a dysfunctional strategy.

Rewards and the Attentional Blink. The Attentional Blink (AB) is a phenomenon that occurs when two target stimuli appear in between distracters and in close temporal proximity.

While people can generally detect the first target with high accuracy (T1), they can only detect the second target (T2) fairly successfully if it follows the first either directly or after at least 500 ms [START_REF] Raymond | Temporary suppression of visual processing in an RSVP task: An Attentional Blink?[END_REF]. If the second target follows the first after 200-500 ms, the AB occurs: during this interval, detection accuracy is severely diminished.

The general explanation for this effect pertains to the occurrence of a two-stage process, in which an initial perceptual process is followed by a second stage in which stimuli are transferred into working memory. If both targets successfully pass through these two stages, they can be accurately reported, which is the (only) goal in the AB task. Several studies show that improved performance on the AB task is dependent on working memory functioning [START_REF] Arnell | Executive control processes of working memory predict attentional blink magnitude over and above storage capacity[END_REF]. Therefore, valuable monetary rewards should in principle induce people to perform better on the AB.

While motivational aspects of the AB increasingly enjoy empirical attention [START_REF] Raymond | Selective visual attention and motivation[END_REF], recent research suggests that consciously perceived monetary rewards do not enhance AB performance [START_REF] Olivers | The beneficial effect of concurrent taskirrelevant mental activity on temporal attention[END_REF], for a null finding).

An explanation for this comes from studies showing that focusing too much on AB stimuli is detrimental (instead of beneficial) for performance. Indeed, in the AB, concentrating on task stimuli does not selectively facilitate processing of targets but also of distracters, thereby increasing their potential for interference. For example, when participants are instructed to

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Once the Money 7 adopt a more absent-minded processing goal they paradoxically perform better-instead of worse [START_REF] Olivers | The beneficial effects of additional task load, positive affect, and instruction on the attentional blink[END_REF]. Taken together, concentrating too much on the task-a strategy that we hypothesized is adopted only after a valuable reward is consciously perceived-thwarts the otherwise favorable reward effect on AB performance (see also [START_REF] Arend | Task-irrelevant visual motion and flicker attenuate the attentional blink[END_REF][START_REF] Dale | Individual differences in dispositional focus of attention predict attentional blink magnitude[END_REF].

In sum, we propose that unconsciously perceived valuable rewards facilitate working memory processes [START_REF] Dijksterhuis | Goals, attention, and (un)consciousness[END_REF], and hence improve performance on the AB.

When consciously perceived, however, valuable rewards likely change people's task strategy to focus too much on subsequent task stimuli, including the distracters, which undermines the effects of rewards on AB performance. The present experiment tests this idea by examining effects of consciously (supraliminally) and unconsciously (subliminally) presented high-value vs. low-value monetary rewards on the AB.

Method

Participants and Design. Fifty-three students (15 males; mean age = 20) participated.

Participants learned that on each trial they would first see a coin. In line with typical AB tasks, the coin was followed by a stimulus-presentation stream. Participants could earn the coin by accurately reporting the two targets. The experiment started with 15 practice trials, followed by 128 experimental trials, 32 repetitions per lag (see below), which were crossed in a 2(reward: 1 cent versus 50 cents) × 2(presentation: subliminal versus supraliminal) design.

Experimental trials were presented in two blocks of equal length.

Procedure and Trials. Figure 1 illustrates the course of a trial. Each trial started with a fixation cross (500 ms), after which participants saw a coin. Participants learned that the coin was sometimes difficult to see. Accordingly, coins were presented either supraliminally (i.e., consciously visible; 300 ms) or subliminally (20 ms). The coin was either of high (50 cents)

or low (1 cent) value. It was preceded by a pre-mask and followed by a post-mask to ensure

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Once the Money 8 that participants would not be able to consciously see the coin when it was presented very briefly 1 . Irrespective of condition, the pre-mask, the coin, and the post-mask were always on screen for 1000 ms. After the post-mask, participants saw another fixation cross (1500 ms).

Next, participants saw a typical AB stream, containing 19 distractors (uppercase white letters) and two targets (white digits). Distractors and targets were randomly drawn from the alphabet or the digits 2-9, respectively. However, the letters I, O, Q, and S were left out because of their resemblance to digits; the digit 5 was left out because of its relation to the high-value coin. In rapid succession, items were presented for 50 ms each, followed by 50 ms blanks. The first digit (T1) appeared on the 10-13th temporal position. The position of T2 (i.e., the Lag factor) was 1, 2, 3, or 7 temporal positions after T1. After having seen the AB stream, participants reported the two targets in order. Next, participants received feedback:

when they had correctly identified T1 and T2, they saw a coin with a plus-sign (indicating reward attainment). When they were incorrect, they saw a coin blotted out by a red cross (indicating no reward). Finally, they saw their earnings, cumulative over trials.

Results

To assess performance on the AB task, average T1 and T2 identification accuracy were submitted to an ANOVA according to the design. Trials were scored as accurate when T1 and T2 were reported in order.

Figure 2 (top panels) shows the results for T1. There was only a main effect of Lag, F(3, 153) = 142.80, p < .001, η 2 p = .74, indicating that accuracy was higher at longer lags (other F's < 1). Figure 2 (bottom panels) shows the results for T2 when T1 was identified correctly, which is the standard measure for the AB effect. There was a main effect of Lag, F(3, 153) = 61.18, p < .001, η 2 p = .55, indicating a strong AB effect [START_REF] Raymond | Temporary suppression of visual processing in an RSVP task: An Attentional Blink?[END_REF].

Importantly, this effect was qualified by the Reward x Presentation x Lag interaction, F(3, 153) = 2.64, p = .05, η 2 p = .049. Inspection of the pattern of means suggests that the direction

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Figure 1. The course of a trial. First, participants saw a coin of high or low value that was masked such that it could be consciously perceivable or not. Then, 21 items were displayed in fast succession (50 ms each; each followed by a 50 ms blank). Among the distracter items (letters) were two targets (digits), that participants had to report on the end of each trial. The interval between the two targets (i.e., lag) varied (1, 2, 3, or 7). When participants correctly reported the two digits, they received the coin.

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Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. Performance (accuracy) as a function of reward presentation, lag, and reward value.

The work in this paper was supported by grants from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (VENI 451-06-014 and VICI 453-06-002).

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Once the Money 9 of this interaction is in line with the hypothesis that rewards mainly improve AB performance when they are presented subliminally (vs. supraliminally). To test this hypothesis, we conducted 2(Reward) x 4(Lag) analyses separately for the subliminal and supraliminal conditions.

In the subliminal condition, there was a main effect of Lag, F(3, 153) = 39.00, p < .001, η 2 p = .43. Moreover, there was a marginally significant effect of Reward, F(1, 51) = 2.82, p = .10, η 2 p = .05. Importantly, these effects were qualified by the predicted Reward × Lag interaction, F(3, 153) = 3.83, p = .01, η 2 p = .07. Consistent with our predictions, the pattern of means indicated that the drop in accuracy on lags 2 and 3-as compared to 1 and 7-was shallower when a high reward was at stake. To establish this pattern statistically, we tested whether the quadratic contrast of the Lag factor interacted with Reward, which turned out to be the case, F(1, 51) = 9.78, p = .004, η 2 p = .16. In other words, subliminal rewards improved AB performance.

In the supraliminal condition, there was a main effect of Lag, F(3, 153) = 50.24, p < .001, η 2 p = .50, indicating the presence of the AB effect. Importantly, there was no effect of Reward, F(1, 51) < 1, nor a Reward × Lag interaction, F(3, 153) < 1. Thus, in line with our predictions, supraliminal rewards did not improve AB performance.

To further substantiate the idea that subliminal but not supraliminal rewards significantly increase performance during the specific AB interval (i.e., lags 2 and 3),we conducted a separate 2(reward: 1 cent vs. 50 cents) × 2(presentation: subliminal vs.

supraliminal) × 2(lag: 2 vs. 3) ANOVA. This analysis revealed the predicted Reward x Presentation interaction, F(1, 51) = 5.38, p = .024, η 2 p =.10, confirming that rewards enhanced performance during the AB interval when they were subliminally presented, F(1, 51) = 7.23, p = .010, η 2 p = .12, but not when they were supraliminally presented, F(1, 51) < 1.

Discussion

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The present research showed that subliminal presentation of a valuable reward improves performance on the Attentional Blink task [START_REF] Raymond | Temporary suppression of visual processing in an RSVP task: An Attentional Blink?[END_REF], whereas supraliminal presentation of the same valuable reward does not. The former finding indicates that unconscious rewards can increase performance on a task that relies on working memory and attention processes, thus offering support for recent models that propose that people can engage in working memory processes in the absence of awareness of the goals they pursue [START_REF] Dijksterhuis | Goals, attention, and (un)consciousness[END_REF]. Importantly, however, our data also suggest that this facilitating response is thwarted when people consciously reflect on the reward, likely due to a dysfunctional task strategy of concentrating too much on the task at hand [START_REF] Olivers | The beneficial effects of additional task load, positive affect, and instruction on the attentional blink[END_REF].

In support of this suggestion, research shows that conscious, task-related strategies paradoxically impede performance in various other domains as well, such as category learning (DeCaro, Albert, Thomas, & Beilock, in press), decision making [START_REF] Dijksterhuis | A theory of unconscious thought[END_REF], and skilled motor performance [START_REF] Lewis | Thinking about choking? Attentional processes and paradoxical performance[END_REF]. Moreover, rewarding performance with money is thought to encourage exactly these strategies, as this induces people to become more concerned with doing well on the task and with complying with task instructions [START_REF] Hertwig | Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists[END_REF]. The current findings thus contribute to a growing body of literature that shows that increased task focus can hurt performance, and support the specific idea that such negative performance effects are rooted in consciousness [START_REF] Baumeister | Do conscious thoughts cause A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT Once the Money 13 behavior[END_REF][START_REF] Dijksterhuis | Goals, attention, and (un)consciousness[END_REF].

Previously, research on unconscious processes in the pursuit of rewards and goals has generally taken the approach of showing that unconsciously induced motivation (e.g., via priming) has the same qualities as consciously induced motivation [START_REF] Bargh | What have we been priming all these years? On the development, mechanisms, and ecology of nonconscious social behavior[END_REF][START_REF] Bargh | The automated will: Nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals[END_REF][START_REF] Bijleveld | The unconscious eye-opener: Pupil size reveals strategic recruitment of resources upon presentation of subliminal reward cues[END_REF][START_REF] Custers | Positive affect as implicit motivator: On the nonconscious operation of behavioral goals[END_REF][START_REF] Gollwitzer | Living on the edge: Shifting between nonconscious and conscious goal pursuit[END_REF]. This approach has certainly been

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informative, but has led some to suggest that the effects of unconscious manipulations (e.g., priming effects on behavior) are mediated by conscious processes, e.g., biasing of conscious perceptions (see Custers & Aarts, 2010, for a discussion). By revealing an effect that only holds for unconscious rewards, we provide compelling evidence in support of the idea that the unconscious component has a favorable effect by itself, free of any conscious intervention.

The present research suggests that consciously reflecting on a reward prompts people to use strategies that they think will increase the probability of reward attainment [START_REF] Bijleveld | Unconscious reward cues increase invested effort, but do not change speed-accuracy tradeoffs[END_REF]. While this may sometimes support performance, the present research shows that such a money-induced task focus is not always a good thing [START_REF] Beilock | On the fragility of skilled performance: What governs choking under pressure[END_REF][START_REF] Dijksterhuis | A theory of unconscious thought[END_REF][START_REF] Olivers | The beneficial effects of additional task load, positive affect, and instruction on the attentional blink[END_REF]. Furthermore, as money is generally assumed to be a powerful motivator for performance [START_REF] Lea | Money as tool, money as drug: The biological psychology of a strong incentive[END_REF], our findings offer intriguing and novel evidence indicating how money may not be desirable (cf.

Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). Accordingly, by demonstrating that the reward-effect that otherwise would occur may be thwarted when people are aware of what is at stake, the present work breaks new ground in examining the role of conscious awareness in the pursuit of rewards and goals.

Footnote

1 Subliminality of the stimuli was confirmed in a separate task. Twenty different participants were randomly presented with a set of 1 cent and 50 cents coins, masked in the same way as the 20-ms condition. Participants indicated the value of each presented coin (1c or 50c).

Performance at discriminating between the coins was no better than chance, M accuracy = .516 (SD = .113), t(19) = .61, p = .55. Deci, E., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychological bulletin, 125,