Political Cleavages

Amory Gethin

Jennifer Curtin

Gary Marks

Clara Martínez-Toledano

Thomas Piketty

Class Structures, and the Politics of Old and New Minorities

This paper studies the long-run transformation of the structure of political cleavages in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Regional, linguistic, and religious identities inherited from nation-building processes have differentially shaped the representation of social inequalities in the former dominions. I discuss how the politics of "old minorities" -Catholics of Irish descent in Australia, French speakers of Québec in Canada, and the Māori in New Zealandhave interacted with the politics of class and the formation of electoral divides. In all three countries, higher-educated voters have become increasingly supportive of labor, social democratic, liberal, and green parties, while high-income voters have remained more likely to vote for conservative forces, leading to the emergence of "multi-elite party systems" comparable to that found in other Western democracies. Nonetheless, nativist cleavages remain more limited in these democracies than in Western Europe, as illustrated by the only moderate support of immigrants and new minorities for left-wing and liberal parties.

Introduction

A recent literature has used post-electoral surveys to study how the changing structure of political cleavages relates to the evolution of income, wealth, and educational inequalities in Western democracies, and how these inequalities are represented by party systems in the long run (see for instance [START_REF] Piketty | Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality and the Changing Structure of Political Conflict[END_REF][START_REF] Gethin | Political Cleavages and Inequality: Evidence from Electoral Democracies, 1950-2018[END_REF][START_REF] Kosse | Electoral Cleavages and Socioeconomic Inequality in Germany 1949-2017[END_REF]. One of the objectives of these studies has been to construct unified series on the structure of the vote by income, wealth, education, and other sociodemographic characteristics of voters, to better contextualize recent political events and the rise of identity politics in light of broader long-run historical trajectories.

This paper contributes to this literature by combining existing post-electoral surveys conducted in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand since the 1960s to study the evolution of political cleavages in these three countries. The democratic politics of the old British dominions were shaped by differing patterns of religious, linguistic, and ethnic diversity inherited from the processes of settler colonialism that took place in the nineteenth century.

Historical specificities in the course of colonialist expansion contributed to differentially structure their party systems, the legacies of which can still be observed in contemporary politics, notably in the form of the linguistic cleavage in Canada, the religious cleavage in Australia, and the Māori-European cleavage in New Zealand.

Historical legacies have also been associated with significant differences in the old dominions' party systems. In Australia and New Zealand, the strength of class politics in the postwar era clearly structured political conflicts on a left-right (labor versus conservative) axis. This was never the case in Canada, where the Liberal Party succeeded in aggregating a diverse and changing coalition as early as the 1960s. Yet, education has had a growing impact on electoral behaviors in all three countries, as higher-educated voters have increasingly tilted towards labor, green, and liberal parties. In Australia and New Zealand, this transformation was largely driven by the rise of green parties; in Canada, it came more decisively from transformations within the existing Liberal Party and New Democratic Party.

The study of political cleavages in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand can also be useful to more generally understand the roots of political change in Western democracies. It has sometimes been argued, for instance, that the new educational divide in Western Europe could be accounted for by the growing importance of issues related to immigration, the integration of ethnoreligious minorities, or European integration. Understanding whether or not comparable changes are under way in the three countries studied in this paper, where immigration and the integration of old and new minorities have arguably taken different forms, can shed light on the contributions and limitations of such narratives.

Four main findings emerge from the analysis developed in this paper. First, in line with the existing literature, I document a long-run decline in class-based voting in Australia and New Zealand, but not in Canada, where it is well known that class cleavages never truly materialized and where class polarization may even have been growing since the 2000s.

Secondly, I document a clear shift of higher-educated voters towards labor, social democratic, green, and liberal parties in these three countries. This has led to the emergence of "multielite" party systems comparable to that observed in other Western democracies [START_REF] Gethin | Political Cleavages and Inequality: Evidence from Electoral Democracies, 1950-2018[END_REF], in which top-income voters continue to vote for conservative parties, while most educated voters now support labor, green, liberal, and affiliated parties.

Thirdly, I investigate how the political representation of religious and ethnic minorities has intersected with the politics of class. In New Zealand, the overrepresentation of the Māori in low-income groups has reinforced class cleavages, as Māori voters have been disproportionately more likely to vote for the Labour Party, the Greens, and other left-wing parties. This is not the case in Australia and Canada, where Catholic minorities were not significantly poorer than the rest of the population, leading the religious cleavage to represent an independent dimension of political conflicts. One interesting difference between Canada and Australia is that religious groups have remained more spatially and culturally differentiated in the former than in the latter, which may explain why Catholic-Protestant cleavages have persisted in Canada, while they have been gradually replaced by a secularreligious divide in Australia.

Finally, I exploit available data on respondents' country of birth to capture the strength of a new "nativist" dimension of political conflicts. The main result that emerges from this analysis is that this dimension is much less pronounced in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand than in other Western European countries (see e.g. Piketty 2018; [START_REF] Kosse | Electoral Cleavages and Socioeconomic Inequality in Germany 1949-2017[END_REF]). 1 In Australia and New Zealand, non-Western (mainly Asian) immigrants do not vote very differently from natives. One specificity of New Zealand, however, is the existence of the anti-immigration New Zealand First Party (NZF), which by receiving greater support from Māori voters has succeeded in "mobilizing" a minority against another. The NZF has joined coalitions with both the left and the right, which suggests that unlike what we observe in most European countries, immigration issues have not been absorbed into left-right divides in New Zealand. This is also true in Canada, where new Muslim and Sikh minorities have been more likely to vote for the Liberal Party than for the New Democratic Party.

Australia

The Transformation of the Australian Party System

Australia inherited its political system from the United Kingdom. A two-party system, opposing the Australian Labor Party (ALP) to the Liberal/National coalition (an alliance of the Liberal Party and the National Party, formerly Country Party), persisted throughout most of the twentieth century. While other small parties have generally managed to gather between 10 percent and 20 percent of popular votes, the ALP and the coalition have been the two main actors of Australian politics since the end of World War II (see Figure 1).

The long-run decline of the ALP, from 50 percent of votes in 1946 to 33 percent in 2019, has nonetheless coincided with the rise of new parties, such as the Democratic Labor Party that originated as a Catholic, anti-communist faction of the ALP, or the Australian Democrats , a centrist party breaking away from the Liberal Party, founded on principles related to direct democracy and environmental awareness. Since 1990, the Australian Greens have gained increasing support, adopting ideological stances further on the left of the political spectrum. These trends are comparable to the decline of social democratic parties and the concomitant rise of green parties in a number of other Western democracies.

The One Nation Party (ONP), created in 1997 by former liberal candidate Pauline Hanson, is usually located to the right of the Liberal/National coalition. It has found greater support among older men, working-class voters, and residents of Queensland [START_REF] Gibson | The Politics of Race and Immigration in Australia: One Nation Voting in the 1998 Election[END_REF], combining anti-immigration and anti-aboriginal positions with a platform of economic protectionism and support for farmers and small businesses (Grant et al. 2019). Finally, independent candidates have also grown in importance in recent years, and have proved critical to government formation and the balance of power [START_REF] Curtin | The Independents[END_REF], although the electoral system with single-member constituencies has mitigated the rise of small parties in the House of Representatives.

There have been significant changes in the policies proposed and implemented by the ALP in the past decades. Following the Chifley Labor government's attempt to nationalize the banks in the late 1940s and the party's failure to gain popular support in subsequent years, ALP leaders gradually reformed the party by limiting the influence of socialist and communist movements [START_REF] Scalmer | The Affluent Worker or the Divided Party? Explaining the Transformation of the ALP in the 1950s[END_REF]. Gough Whitlam, elected in 1972, conducted a series of social reforms, increasing the wages of public sector workers and introducing free university education and universal health care. However, Whitlam's mandate was also linked to a period of political polarization, and he was controversially dismissed during an institutional crisis in a context of inflation, rising unemployment, and government scandals.

This episode led to a further "moderation" of the ALP's policy proposals, which arose with the return of the party to power in 1983. The Labor governments of Bob Hawke (1983Hawke ( -1993) ) and Paul Keating (1993Keating ( -1996) ) embraced a more economically liberal agenda, including free trade and the privatization of state-owned enterprises [START_REF] Marks | Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Crossnational Perspective[END_REF]. The evolution of income inequality in Australia during the past decades, as in most English-speaking countries, correlates with these shifts in ideological positions, declining significantly until the 1970s, before rising steadily from the mid-1980s onwards [START_REF] Atkinson | The Distribution of Top Incomes in Australia[END_REF].

The Decline of Class Divides

I now turn to the study of electoral behaviors in Australia by drawing on comprehensive postelectoral surveys regularly conducted in Australia since 1987, the Australian Election Studies, as well as a number of other surveys, which allow me to cover the majority of elections held in the country between 1963 and 2019.2 Nearly all surveys have directly asked respondents about their perceived feeling of class affiliation, which provides a unique insight into the effect of subjective class identities on the vote and its long-run evolution. This is shown in Figure 2, which plots the difference between the share of individuals considering that they belong to the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of other voters voting for the ALP or the Greens. In the 1960s and 1970s, self-identified working-class voters were more likely to vote for the ALP by about 30 percentage points. This gap gradually decreased in the following decades, both before and after controls, until reaching 7 percentage points in the 2010s.

This strong decline of class voting in Australia is consistent with the findings of other studies using similar variables or occupational categories, and was found to have started even earlier than the 1960s [START_REF] Mcallister | The Australian Voter: 50 Years of Change[END_REF]Scott 1991;[START_REF] Aitkin | Stability and Change in Australian Politics[END_REF]. Hence, in spite of the fact that subjective class affiliations do continue to be strongly correlated to income and education3 , they have lost most of their relevance when it comes to explaining vote choices in federal elections. This is consistent with theories of political change emphasizing the supply side of electoral competition, that is the role played by political parties' strategies, partly independently from societal changes, in shaping political cleavages [START_REF] Marks | Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Crossnational Perspective[END_REF]. The rise of undecided voters and the declining effect of partisanship on the vote also arguably played an important role in explaining this dealignment process [START_REF] Marks | Partisanship and the Vote in Australia: Changes over Time 1967-1990[END_REF][START_REF] Cameron | Trends in Australian Political Opinion[END_REF].

The Transformation of the Religious Cleavage

Another historical division of Australian society opposed Catholics to the Protestant majority. This cleavage was imported by the first settlers of the early 19 th century, perpetuated with the immigration waves of Irish Catholics and English Anglicans associated with the gold rushes of the 1850s, and reinforced by the opposition between the nationalistic aspirations of the Irish in contrast to the loyalist positions of English and Scottish immigrants. These tensions then continued into the Australian party system, with Catholic organizations being closely tied to the ALP.

There has been a dramatic transformation of religious affiliations in Australia in the past decades, with the share of voters declaring no religion rising from less than 5 percent in the 1960s to nearly a third of the electorate in the 2010s. Almost all of this rise can be attributed to Protestants, whose share in the Australian population has declined from two thirds to one third of the voting age population, while the share of Catholics has remained stable at about 25 percent. 4 What have been the consequences of this transformation on the structure of Australian political cleavages? As shown in Figure 3, a growing cleavage between religious and nonreligious voters has emerged in parallel to the historical cleavage opposing Protestants and Catholics. The share of Catholics voting for the ALP (and later the Greens) has declined from 65 percent to 43 percent between the 1960s and the 2010s, while these two parties have become increasingly popular among voters declaring no religion. This rising divide between religious and non-religious voters is consistent with the growing political salience of new social issues, such as the right to abortion or same-sex marriage, which have created growing debates and tensions in recent years. In the 2019 federal election, for instance, the ALP's program included a requirement for public hospitals to offer abortion procedures, which led religious anti-abortion groups such as the Australian Christian Lobby to campaign against the party.

The Emergence of a Multi-Elite Party System

4 See appendix Figure A4.

The transformation of Australia's party system, as in many Western democracies [START_REF] Gethin | Political Cleavages and Inequality: Evidence from Electoral Democracies, 1950-2018[END_REF], has also been associated with the political divergence of highest-educated and top-income voters. As shown in Figure 4, the ALP received much greater support among low-income voters than among the top 10 percent in the 1960s and 1970s. This gap has declined since then, but it has remained negative and relatively stable since the 1980s. Meanwhile, highest-educated voters have gradually shifted to the left, and are now significantly more likely to vote for the Labor and the Greens than the lower educated.

The Contemporary Structure of Australian Political Cleavages

Table 1 provides a more granular perspective on the structure of the vote in the past decade by decomposing the share of votes received by the ALP, the Australian Greens, the National Party, and the Liberal Party by education, income, social class, and country of birth. A number of interesting results are visible. First, the Australian Greens' voting base is completely different from that of the ALP: tertiary-educated voters, middle-and high-income voters, and self-identified middle-class voters disproportionately support them. Secondly, while the Labor received higher support among working-class voters, education and income only had a weak effect on voting for the ALP. This suggests that "residual" class identities are today of greater importance than actual economic status in determining support for the Labor.

Thirdly, the structure of the vote for the Liberal Party and the National Party shows similar diverging patterns: the Liberal Party receives more votes from lower-educated, high-income voters, while the National Party performs better among working-class, lower-educated, lowincome voters. This fragmentation of the political space in Australia is similar to that found in the majority of Western European countries. In Western Europe, however, the shift of lower-educated voters towards the right was associated with the rise of both green and far-right parties; in Australia, it was more decisively driven by the Australian Greens. That being said, it is important to stress that this transformation is not only due to the rise of the Greens: there have also been major changes in the structure of the vote for the Labor Party, which has become relatively less concentrated among low-income, lower-educated, and self-identified working-class voters in past decades. 5 This change may have been the result of strategic shifts in the positions and issue emphases of the Labor to avoid electoral leakage towards the Greens, but the long-run analysis also suggests that it started well before the Greens even existed. The electoral weakness of the extreme right in Australia might also explain why foreign-born individuals have only been marginally more likely to support left-wing parties in Australia, as shown in Table 1. This lower salience of the nativist cleavage is, as we shall see, common to the three old dominions.

New Zealand

New Zealand's Party System

The beginning of New Zealand's modern democracy goes back to the introduction of universal suffrage in 1893, which led to a first two-party system opposing the Liberal Party and the conservative Reform Party in the first elections of the twentieth century. The quick rise of the Labour Party, culminating in its victory in the 1935 general election, led to the amalgamation of liberal and conservative movements into the National Party in 1936. 6 This second two-party system, opposing the Labour Party to the National Party, persisted in the decades following the end of World War II (see Figure 5). Until the 1980s, the main minor party was the Social Credit, which scored between 10 percent and 20 percent of votes by drawing support from both National and Labour constituencies [START_REF] Dickson | Social Credit and Class Voting[END_REF].

The 1990s announced the end of the postwar two-party system. Small parties had already started growing in the 1970s and 1980s, notably the Values Party (often considered to be the world's first environmentalist party of national significance), which polled 5 percent of the vote in 1975, as well as the libertarian New Zealand Party created by tycoon Bob Jones (12 percent of votes in 1984). However, it was the 1993 electoral reform that led to a decisive strengthening of new parties, with the adoption in 1996 of a mixed member proportional system in place of the first-past-the-post system operating since 1914.

In the proliferation of small parties that followed, only the Green Party and the New Zealand First (NZF) were able to emerge on a sustained basis. The Green Party traces its origin to the Values Party. After winning nearly 7 percent of votes in the 1990 elections, it co-founded the Alliance, a merger of other centrist and left-wing parties, which received 18 percent of votes in the 1993 elections. The Greens have run again independently since 1999, reaching 5 to 10 percent of votes in most elections (see Figure 5).

The NZF was founded in 1993 by former National Party politician Winston Peters, and was supported by 5 to 10 percent of voters in most elections since then. It has taken centrist positions on economic issues, and more conservative and nationalist positions on social issues. The policy proposals of the NZF have included, for instance, an annual cap on immigration, buying back state-owned enterprises, lowering taxes, and lengthening judicial sentences. The NZF has formed governments with both the National Party (1996 and 1998) and the Labour Party (2005 and 2017).

As in Australia, there have been significant ideological shifts in the policies implemented by ruling parties in New Zealand. 7 Founded in 1916, the Labour Party has its origins in the trade union movement but was always on the moderate side of socialist reform, banning members of the Communist Party from joining the organization. After securing a majority in 1938, it implemented a number of reforms in health, education, and social security, until it was defeated by the National Party in 1949. In the 1980s, the deregulation, privatization, and free trade programs implemented by Labour governments yet led to lasting internal dissent and eventually to a historical defeat in the 1990 general election, with only 35 percent of votes.

Similar reforms of state restructuring and labor market liberalization were then pursued by the National government. While the Labour Party succeeded in coming back to power in coalition with small parties in the following years, the 1990s and 2000s saw a further decline of its popularity overall, which culminated with its all-time low vote share of 25 percent in 2014.

The comeback of the Labour in 2017, followed by Jacinda Ardern's crushing victory in the 2020 elections in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, nonetheless seem to have announced a reversal of this medium-run trend.

The Decline of Class Divides

I now turn to documenting the evolution of political cleavages in New Zealand by drawing on a set of electoral surveys covering elections held between 1972 and 2017. 8 As in the case of Australia, I focus on three key transformations: the evolution of class voting, the vote of minorities, and the emergence of a multi-elite party system. I restrict the analysis to the determinants of the vote for the Labour Party, the Green Party, and a number of other minor center-left and left-wing parties.

7 See for instance Mulgan (2004), chapter 11. 8 See appendix Table B1.

Exactly as in Australia, there has been a sharp decline in class voting in New Zealand, both before and after controls: individuals identifying with the "working class" or the "lower class" were more likely to vote for the Labour by nearly 30 percentage points in the 1970s, compared to 10 percentage points in the past decade (Figure 6). This transformation stands in contrast with the socioeconomic structure of subjective class affiliations, which has not changed significantly in the past decades: identification with the working class continues to strongly correlate with lower income levels.9 This is consistent, as in the Australian case, with the idea that changes in class voting have been primarily due to a transformation in the political representation of class. As suggested by Figure 6, and as other studies have documented using measures based on occupational categories, the decline of class-based voting was most pronounced at the end of the 1980s, when the Labour government implemented pro-market economic reforms, alienating many of its traditional working-class supporters [START_REF] Haddon | Class Identification in New Zealand: An Analysis of the Relationship between Class Position and Subjective Social Location[END_REF]Mulgan 2004, chapter 12).

Ethnic Cleavages and the Vote of Māori, Pacific, and Asian Minorities in New Zealand

Unlike Australian aboriginals, indigenous people and immigrants have represented sizable minorities in New Zealand. In the 2018 census, 70 percent of the population identified as Pākehā (or European), 16.5 percent as Māori, 15 percent as Asian, and 9 percent as Pacific.

Asians are the population group whose size has grown most dramatically in recent years, from 6.6 percent in 2001 to 15 percent in 2018, as New Zealand experienced some of the highest per capita immigration flows among OECD countries. Among ethnic minorities, it is however the Māori who have most consistently cumulated social disadvantages in the past decades, including poorer health, lower life expectancy, and lower income levels, even if inequalities 14 between Asians or Pacific people and Europeans are also significant and have persisted until today (Stats NZ, 2020; Marriott & Sim 2014). 10 The indigenous status of the Māori in New Zealand has given them specific political rights, recognized by the three-article Treaty of Waitangi signed by representatives of the British Crown and Māori chiefs in 1840. The treaty both ceded complete government to the British Crown (article 1) and guaranteed that the Māori chiefs would retain their existing authority (article 2). Article 3 stated that the Māori people would be given full rights and protections as British subjects. Articles 2 and 3 were however soon forgotten, and colonial settlers deprived the Māori of a large share of their land in the second half of the nineteenth century through a combination of sales and confiscation. Furthermore, two versions of the treaty exist: one in Māori and one in English. The Māori version of article 1 did not cede sovereignty, but only governance, while the English version gave the queen the full right to power and sovereignty.

The Emergence of a Multi-Elite Party System

As Figure 8 shows, a multi-elite party system comparable to that visible in Australia seems to have gradually emerged in New Zealand, as highest-educated voters have become increasingly likely to vote for the Labour Party, the Greens, and affiliated parties since the 1970s. Meanwhile, there has been no secular trend in support for left-wing parties among topincome earners, whose tendency to vote conservative has stabilized at about 10 percentage points higher than that of low-income voters. As in Australia, the Green Party did play a significant role in this transformation by attracting a large share of higher-educated voters, but there have also been changes in the structure of the vote for the Labour Party, which used to receive greater support from lower-educated voters and has now been attracting a higher share of the tertiary educated.12 Therefore, while the fragmentation of New Zealand's party system may have accelerated this transition, it cannot be held sole responsible for these changes.

The Contemporary Structure of Political Cleavages in New Zealand

The previous analysis has revealed three clearly identifiable dimensions of political conflicts in New Zealand: a declining class dimension, an ethnic dimension, and, more recently, a growing educational cleavage. Table 2 reveals some particularly interesting intersections between them by showing the structure of the vote for New Zealand's four biggest parties in recent elections. The Labour Party appears to be a relatively hybrid entity today, still gaining votes from working-class and low-income votersthough less so than in previous decades -, but also attracting as many postgraduates as primary-educated voters. This is also the case of the Greens who, as in the case of Australia, are supported by middle-class, middle-income, and higher-educated citizens.

The vote for the New Zealand First, by contrast, is characterized by relatively unique patterns in comparative perspective. The NZF receives more votes from lower-educated, low-income, working-class voters. Given that the party has been fighting for both limitations to Asian immigration and lower taxes, it therefore closely resembles far-right Western European parties in that respect. However, in contrast to these parties, the NZF has not been primarily supported by the ethnic majority: 7 percent of Europeans voted for the NZF in the last three elections, compared to 12 percent of Māori voters. Even more surprising is the fact that Asians have been actually slightly more likely to vote for the National Party than for the Labour Party. This contrasts sharply with the dynamics visible in Western European countries, where immigrants and new minorities tend to be clearly supportive of social democratic and affiliated parties, in the context of conservative parties' increasing opposition to immigration.

These results are consistent with the idea that with the exception of the NZF, ruling parties in New Zealandas well as the majority of citizenshave been relatively favorable to Asian immigration, or at least have not been sharply opposed to it [START_REF] Vowles | A Populist Exception? The 2017 New Zealand General Election[END_REF]. In 2017, for instance, as much as 79 percent of New Zealanders answered "Strongly agree", "Agree", or "Neutral" when asked whether "Immigrants are generally good for New Zealand's economy". By contrast, the Māori were on average more opposed to immigration than Europeans: in 2017, 15 percent of Europeans strongly agreed to the above question, compared to 6 percent of self-identified Māori respondents. 13 The NZF therefore represents a unique case of a party successfully "mobilizing" an ethnic minority against another. 14 Unlike the majority of Western democracies, the politics of minorities in New Zealand have not been clearly integrated into the existing left-right axis, but seem to have represented a secondary, separated dimension of political conflict.

Canada

Canada's Two-and-a-half Party System

Canada gained autonomy from British rule in the second half the nineteenth century, when in 1867 the self-governing Dominion of Canada was formed, and the first federal election was 13 Author's computations using National Election Study data. See also [START_REF] Spoonley | Rising Asian Immigration Highlights New Zealand's Changing Demographics[END_REF]. 14 Notice that part of the NZF's success among Māoris may be due to a leader effect, as Winston Peters is partly Māori. In fact, the NZF does not have particularly strong stances pushing for greater representation of Māori people, and has shifted from holding all five Māori electorates in 1996 to officially rejecting the electorate system, campaigning in 2017 in favor of a referendum on abolishing Māori seats.

won by the Conservative Party against the Liberal Party. Unlike in Australia and New Zealand, however, where the rise of the labor movement pushed towards the fusion of liberal and conservative forces, socialist movements never gained sufficient traction in Canada to significantly alter the old party system. 15 The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, founded in 1932 by socialist and social democratic groups, did not exceed 16 percent of votes at its peak in 1994. It then merged with the Canadian Labour Congress to form the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1961. The NDP has not done much better since then, never exceeding 20 percent of votes, with the exception of the 2011 election (see Figure 9). The inability of left-wing movements to gain a majority of support at the national level resulted in large part, it has been argued, from the regionalization of Canadian politics, and more importantly from the inability of the NDP to connect with trade unions in Québec [START_REF] Johnston | The Class Basis of Canadian Elections[END_REF]. The two biggest parties in Canada have therefore remained the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party. Québécois has had a strong influence in Québec and has won the majority of seats in the province in most elections since 1993. It is both a social democratic and a separatist party, aiming to protect regional interests but also to defend social welfare programs. The Green Party of Canada, finally, founded in 1983, has grown from less than 1 percent of votes in 2000 to almost 7 percent in 2019, promoting environmentalism, social justice, and participatory democracy.

The evolution of parties' ideological positions in Canada show a number of similarities with Australia and New Zealand. After World War II, the Liberals moved towards the left of the political spectrum on economic issues, especially during the Pierre Trudeau period (1968-1979 and 1980-1984). After the economic and political crises of the 1990s, however, Liberal governments (1993-2003 and 2003-2006) then started to defend more liberal economic positions, emphasizing the need to keep taxes low and a sustainable government debt. The Conservative party has also undergone significant changes since the 1960s. Originally, the party was generally considered to mainly represent English Canadians' interests, bringing together a large share of the Protestant electorate. At the beginning of the 1980s, Progressive Conservatives shifted to promoting the values of free-market economics, especially under the Mulroney administration (1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993). Rising discontent with the conservatives under Mulroney's second termin particular the divisive Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, the 1980s recession and the implementation of the new Goods and Services Taxled to the collapse of the Conservatives in the 1993 federal election, who received a mere 16 percent of votes. Finally, the New Democratic Party originally promoted a transition towards the end of capitalism and the establishment of a socialist society. It gradually moved towards the center of the political spectrum to become a social democratic party, promoting social welfare programs and liberal values. These two dimensions were directly visible in the NDP's platform at the 2015 federal election, which included increasing corporate tax rates and reducing poverty, but also promoting gender equality and the welcoming of Syrian refugees [START_REF] Andersen | The Class-Party Relationship in Canada, 1965-2004[END_REF].

Religious, Linguistic, and Regional Identities in Canada

Region, language, and religion were found to be the strongest predictors of electoral behaviors in Canada throughout the country's democratic history (Andersen & Stephenson 2012;Carty et al. 2000, chapter 2). The exceptional divide between French and English speakers, as well as the spread of the population on a large territory, were generally cited as factors accounting for the development of varieties of political cultures, party affiliations, and policy positions, which have persisted until today [START_REF] Guth | Religion and Partisanship in Canada[END_REF][START_REF] Henderson | Political Cultures in Canada[END_REF]). These identities played a significant role in inhibiting the emergence of a stable class cleavage in the second half of the twentieth century. On the left of the political spectrum, the New Democratic Party was unable to unite union members of Québec and the Western provinces, thereby condemning the party to a role of secondary political actor [START_REF] Johnston | The Class Basis of Canadian Elections[END_REF]). In addition, the importance of religious, linguistic, and regional affiliations in determining support for Liberals, Conservatives, and the NDP left little space for other dimensions of political conflict to fully materialize [START_REF] Alford | Party and Society[END_REF]. While some authors have argued that class does matter in some regions, or that the lack of class cleavage is the result of parties' deliberate obliteration of class politics, there is a relative consensus that social class has remained a poor predictor of electoral behaviors overall [START_REF] Gidengil | Class and Region in Canadian Voting: A Dependency Interpretation[END_REF][START_REF] Ornstein | Region, Class and Political Culture in Canada[END_REF]).

The Canadian electorate can be divided into four broad regions: Québec (about 26 percent of the voting age population), Ontario (38 percent), the Western Provinces (29 percent), and the Eastern Atlantic Provinces (7 percent). English speakers make up two thirds of the adult population, French speakers about 25 percent. Language, religion, and region have been tightly associated in Canada, though never perfectly. The majority of French speakers live in Québec and are Catholics, but about a third of Catholics are English speakers, and about a tenth of Québec residents are English speakers. 16 Québec residents were historically significantly overrepresented in lower-income groups, even though regional inequalities 16 See appendix Table C2. 21 always remained limited in Canada in comparative perspective. These disparities have decreased significantly since then, but have not completely disappeared.17 The Politicization of Inequality in Canada: A Persistent Lack of Class Cleavage?

As explained above, the existing literature on political cleavages in Canada failed to identify the existence of a stable class cleavage, whether using occupational categories or subjective measures of class affiliations. Figure 11 reproduces this finding by focusing on income, showing the relative support of top 10 percent income earners towards the three main Canadian parties. With the exception of the 1960s, top-income earners have always been less to likely to vote for the NDP and more favorable to the Conservatives, with the Liberal Party standing in between. Interestingly, these results are similar to those found in other Western democracies, with comparable orders of magnitude (see [START_REF] Gethin | Political Cleavages and Inequality: Evidence from Electoral Democracies, 1950-2018[END_REF], suggesting that socioeconomic divides in Canada are not exceptionally weak on that dimension. Furthermore, the Liberal Party seems to have become gradually more oriented towards highincome voters since the 1970s, while support for the NDP has become increasingly concentrated among low-income constituencies in recent years. These results suggest that the politicization of inequality in Canada has changed significantly since the 1970s. On the one hand, the NDP followed a major transformation from a mainly urban, English-speaking party supported by union members and middle-income voters to a more broad-based party supported by the poor. 19 On the other hand, the Liberal Party has now become more popular among economic elites, making its voting base resemble more closely that of the Conservative Party in that respect. These results resonate well with the fact that both Liberals and Conservatives have been moving to the right of the political spectrum on economic matters in recent years, while the NDP has remained more left-wing [START_REF] Andersen | The Class-Party Relationship in Canada, 1965-2004[END_REF].

It is also worth noticing that this transition has coincided with a marked decline in electoral turnout since the 1990s, from 75 percent in 1988 to 66 percent in 2019, so that the Liberals' shift to the right may have been associated with a movement of low-income voters not only towards the NDP, but also towards abstention. Unfortunately, turnout cannot be studied consistently with the Canadian Election Studies without some substantive methodological corrections, as post-electoral surveys have been unable to correctly sample non-voters, especially in recent years [START_REF] Achen | Declining voter turnout in Taiwan: A generational effect?[END_REF]Gethin 2018, chapter 6). This is left for future research.

The Emergence of a Multi-Elite Party System in Canada

Figure 12 suggests that as in Australia and New Zealand, there has been a growing educational divide opposing the Liberals, the NDP, and the Greens to the Conservative Party. This is especially visible in the relative support of higher-educated voters towards the Conservative Party, which was only marginally negative until the 1980s and declined substantially in the most recent elections.

Interestingly, in contrast to the majority of Western countries, the figure also reveals that lower-educated voters never were more inclined to vote for the NDP or the Liberal Party than for the Conservative party. This may perhaps be linked to the fact that class cleavages were never strong in Canada, so that no coalition was ever able to bring together the majority of the low-income, lower-educated electorate. Strikingly, the structure of the vote for the NDP in the 1960s was very similar to that of the Japan Socialist Party at the same period [START_REF] Gethin | Political Cleavages and the Representation of Social Inequalities in Japan, 1953-2017[END_REF], being more concentrated among middle-income, urban, and higher-educated voters. 20

24

The Contemporary Structure of Political Cleavages in Canada Table 3 decomposes the structure of the vote for the main Canadian political parties in the last three elections. Four interesting results stand out. First, Canada's party system clearly appears to divide top-income and highest-educated voters in the same way as it does in other Western countries. Higher-educated voters are much less supportive of the conservatives than the lower educated, while top-income earners are more likely to vote for them. On the other side of the political spectrum, the NDP and the Greens receive greater support from both lowincome and higher-educated voters. The Liberal Party has somehow managed to bring together both types of elites, so that Canada's multi-elite party system closely resembles that visible in France in 2017, where higher education tilted voters towards the left, higher income tilted voters towards the right, and En Marche! united some voters from both groups at the center of the political spectrum [START_REF] Piketty | Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality and the Changing Structure of Political Conflict[END_REF]. In that sense, Canada's recent political transformations do not appear particularly unique. Regionalization and linguistic identities may explain in part why class politics in Canada differed significantly from most Western countries in the early postwar decades, but this is not the case today.

That being said, language and religion do continue to strongly influence electoral behaviors.

The NDP and the Greens attract a higher share of non-religious voters, while the Conservative Party gets the majority of protestant votes. The Liberal Party stands in between and finds strongest support among new Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh minorities. The Bloc Québécois has declined since the 1990s, but it still received about a quarter of French votes in the past decade, and almost no votes from other linguistic groups. In contrast to Spain, where independentism has been supported by the elites (Bauluz, Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Morgan 2021), the Bloc Québécois seems to be slightly more successful among low-income and primary-educated voters. 21Finally, as in Australia and New Zealand, Canadian politics do not seem to display a particularly pronounced nativist dimension. In countries like France, the United States or Germany, new ethnic minorities have disproportionately supported social democratic, democratic, and socialist parties [START_REF] Piketty | Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality and the Changing Structure of Political Conflict[END_REF][START_REF] Kosse | Electoral Cleavages and Socioeconomic Inequality in Germany 1949-2017[END_REF]. In Canada, it is the Liberal Party that has been most successful among new religious minorities and citizens born in non-Western countries. 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Difference between (% of top 10% educated) and (% of bottom 90% educated) voting Labor / Greens Difference between (% of top 10% earners) and (% of bottom 90% earners) voting Labor / Greens

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Source: author's computations using Australian electoral surveys. Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for the Labor Party and the Australian Greens. In the 1960s, top-income and highest-educated voters were less likely to vote Labor than low-income and lower-educated voters. The Labor / Green vote has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, employment status, marital status, subjective class, home ownership, and location. 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 After controlling for income, education, age, gender, occupation, home ownership, marital status, ethnic group, religion, church attendance, country of birth, location, union membership

Source: author's computations using New Zealand electoral surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters identifying with the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class" or "no class" voting for the Labour Party / the Greens / other left-wing parties, before and after controls. Class voting has significantly declined in New Zealand in the past decades. Source: author's computations using New Zealand electoral surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the New Zealand Labour Party, the Green Party, and other left-wing parties by ethnic group. Voters identifying as "European" or "Asian" have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than voters identifying as "Māori" or "Pacific". In the 1970s-1980s, top-income and highest-educated voters were less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income and lower-educated voters. The left-wing vote has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, occupation, home ownership, marital status, ethnic affiliation, religion, church attendance, country of birth, location, and union membership. Source: author's computations using Canadian electoral surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for the main Canadian political parties, after controlling for income, religion, age, gender, employment status, marital status, country of birth, and union membership. The Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party, and the Green Party have always received greater support from higher-educated voters, while the conservative vote has become increasingly concentrated among the lower educated since the 1990s. 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 After controlling or income, education, age, gender, religion, employment status, marital status, home ownership, location Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters perceiving themselves as "working class" and the share of other voters perceiving themselves as "middle class" of "no class" voting for Labor / Green parties, before and after controlling for other variables. 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies. Note: the figure shows the linguistic distribution of the Canadian adult population and its evolution over time since the 1960s. Language corresponds to the main language spoken at home , the language of the interview ( 2004) or the language first learnt during childhood (2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015)(2016)(2017)(2018)(2019) After controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment status, language, country of birth, marital status, region, religion, union membership Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for Liberal / NDP / Green parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure C38 -The gender cleavage in Canada

Difference between (% of women) and (% of men) voting Liberal / NDP / Green After controlling for income, education, age, employment status, language, country of birth, marital status, region, religion, union membership Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for Liberal / NDP / Green parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

  These diverging interpretations have been a significant point of contest throughout New Zealand's contemporary history. It was only by the 1930s that the first Labour government would make a decisive move towards honoring the treaty by ending ethnic discrimination in access to welfare benefits. 11 In the 1970s, the second Labour government also set the Waitangi Tribunal to address renewed conflicts over land alienation, which led to further concessions and redistribution. Politically, Māori specificity was recognized though the Māori electorates, which have attributed reserved seats to Māori representatives since 1867 (7 of the 120 seats in the 2017 elections). People of Māori descent can choose to be on the Māori roll or on the general roll through the "Māori option" implemented in 1975 by the Labour government (Vowles et al. 2017). The past decades have therefore witnessed persisting debates over the politics of Māori representation, the surge of a new Asian immigration, and the rise of new parties specifically representing Māori interests -such as the Mana Motuhake, the Māori Party, or the Mana Movement. As shown in figure 7, Māori and Pacific people have always been disproportionately more likely to vote for the Labour and other left-wing parties since the 1970s, while Asian voters have remained approximately as likely as Europeans to do so. The Māori-Pākehā cleavage in New Zealand is therefore very strong, comparable in size, for instance, to the bias of Muslims in France towards left-wing parties (Piketty 2018). By contrast, the emergence of a new Asian minority does not seem to have generated any form of new electoral divide.

  Several minor parties have nonetheless played a secondary role in Canadian politics since the end of World War II. The Social Credit Party, a social-conservative party promoting social credit theories of monetary reforms, obtained 5 to 10 percent of votes in the 1960s and 1970s. The Reform party was a conservative party originally founded to give a voice to Western Canadians' interests at the end of the 1980s, in a context of growing dissatisfaction towards the Conservative government elected in 1988. It dissolved in 2000 in favor of the Alliance, which itself joined the Conservative Party before the 2004 federal election. The Bloc

Figure 10

 10 Figure 10 reveals a remarkable persistence of religious cleavages in Canada by representing the relative support for the Conservatives, the NDP and the Greens, and the Liberal Party and the Bloc Québécois among specific religious affiliations. Putting the Liberal Party and the Bloc Québécois together for this particular analysis can be justified by the fact that the decline of the Liberal Party in Québec in the 1990s can be in large part attributable to the rise of the Bloc Québécois. Non-religious voters have always been supportive of the NDP, while the conservatives have always received much greater support from Protestants since the 1960s. The Liberal Party used to receive more votes from Catholicsmany of which shifted to supporting the Bloc Québécois in the 1990sand now attracts an important proportion of non-religious voters and new religious minorities (see below).

Figure 2 -

 2 Figure 1 -Election results in Australia, 1946-2019

Figure 6 -

 6 Figure 5 -Election results in New Zealand, 1946-2020

Figure 8 -

 8 Figure 8 -The emergence of a multi-elite party system in New Zealand, 1972-2017

FigureFigure 10 -Figure 11 -Figure 12 -

 101112 Figure 9 -Election results in Canada, 1945-2019

  Figure A1 -Election results in Australia, 1946-2019

Figure A28 -Figure A29 -Figure A30 -Figure A31 -Figure A32 -Figure A33 -Figure A34 -Figure A35 -Figure A36 -Figure A37 -Figure A38 -

 A28A29A30A31A32A33A34A35A36A37A38 Figure A28 -Vote for Labor / Green among university graduates

  Figure A39 -Vote for Labor / Green among young voters

FigureFigure B26 -Figure B27 -Figure B28 -Figure B29 -Figure B31 -

 B26B27B28B29B31 Figure B25 -Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by country of birth

Figure B40 -Figure B41 -Figure B42 -Figure B42b -

 B40B41B42B42b Figure B40 -Vote for Labour / Green / Other left among homeowners

  Figure C1 -Election results in Canada, 1945-2019

Figure C2 -

 C2 Figure C2 -Election results in Canada by groups, 1945-2019

Figure C37 -

 C37 Figure C37 -The rural-urban cleavage in Canada

Figure C39 -

 C39 Figure C39 -The age cleavage in Canada

Figure

  Figure C40 -Vote for Bloc Québécois by language in Québec

Figure

  Figure C41 -Vote for Bloc Québécois by age group

Figure C42 -

 C42 Figure C42 -Vote for Bloc Québécois by union membership

Figure

  Figure C43 -Vote for Bloc Québécois by religious affiliation

Figure C44 -

 C44 Figure C44 -Vote for Bloc Québécois by level of church attendance

Figure

  Figure C45 -Vote for Bloc Québécois by education level

Figure

  Figure C46 -Vote for Bloc Québécois by education group

FigureFigure C80 -

 C80 Figure C59 -Vote for the New Democratic Party by religious affiliation

Table 1 -The structure of political cleavages in Australia, 2010-2019 Share of votes received (%) Source

 1

		Labor	Greens	Liberal	National
	Education
	Primary	36%	7%	44%	5%
	Secondary	34%	7%	45%	4%
	Tertiary	36%	17%	39%	2%
	Postgraduate	36%	16%	38%	2%
	Income
	Bottom 50%	36%	9%	42%	5%
	Middle 40%	36%	13%	41%	3%
	Top 10%	30%	12%	53%	1%
	Social class
	Working / lower class	42%	7%	37%	5%
	Middle / no class	30%	13%	48%	3%
	Country of birth
	Australia	34%	11%	42%	4%
	Europe-US-Canada	35%	10%	44%	2%
	Non-Western countries	40%	8%	45%	1%

: author's computations using Australian electoral surveys. Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Australian political parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2010-2019 period. During the past decade, the Australian Greens have received greater support from higher-educated voters, high-income voters, voters identifying with the middle class or with no class, and voters born in Australia.

The ethnic cleavage in New Zealand, 1972-2017 Vote for Labour / Green / Other left by ethnic group

	90% 100%	Figure 7 -European	Maori	Pacific	Asian
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17

Table 2 -The structure of political cleavages in New Zealand, 2011-2017 Share of votes received (%) Source

 2

		60%
		50%
		40%
	(%)
	votes	30%
	of
	Share	20%
		10%
		0%

: author's computations using New Zealand electoral surveys. Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main New Zealand political parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2017 period. During the past decade, the NZF has received greater support from lower-educated voters, low-income voters, and voters identifying as Māori.

Table 3 -The structure of political cleavages in Canada, 2011-2019 Share of votes received (%) Source

 3

	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%

: author's computations using Canadian electoral surveys. Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Canadian political parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2019 period. The Liberal Party received greater support from high-income, higher-educated, and Muslim voters.

Election results in Australia by groups, 1946-2019

	90% 100%	Figure A2 -Centre-left / left-wing parties (Labor, Greens, Democratic Labor, Other left) Figure A3 -
			Centre-right / right-wing parties (Liberal, National, Country, Other right)
	80%		Other parties and independents
	70%
	30% popular 40% vote 50% (%) 60%
	of 20%
	Share 10%
	0%
		1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
							2015 2020
		Source: author's computations using official election results.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Australian political parties in
		federal elections between 1946 and 2019.

The evolution of education in Australia

	Figure A4 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Primary		Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of education levels of the Australian adult population and its evolution
	over time since the 1960s.

The evolution of religious affiliations in Australia

	Figure A5 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
		No religion	Protestant	Catholic	Other
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of the religion affiliations of the Australian adult population and its
	evolution over time since the 1960s.

The evolution of church attendance in Australia

	Figure A6 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Never	Less than monthly		Monthly or more
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of church attendance of the Australian adult population and its
	evolution over time since the 1960s.

The distribution of country of birth in Australia

	Figure A7 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Australia	Other Western country		Other non-Western
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of country of birth of the Australian adult population and its evolution
	over time since the 1960s. Western countries include Western European countries, the United States,
	Canada,and New Zealand.

The distribution of country of origin in Australia

  Note: the figure shows the distribution of country of origin of the Australian adult population and its evolution over time since the 1960s. Western countries include Western European countries, the United States, Canada,and New Zealand. The country of origin is non-Australian if at least one parent is born overseas.

	Figure A8 -
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Australia	Other Western country	Other non-Western
	0%
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys. 1963-66 1972-77 1983-87 1990-98	2001-07	2010-19

Vote for Labor / Greens by education level

		Figure A9 -
	70%
			Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Vote for Labor / Greens by education group

		Figure A10 -
	70%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education group.

Vote for Labor / Greens by income decile

		Figure A11 -
	80%
				D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5		D6	D7		D8	D9	D10
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.

Vote for Labor / Greens by income decile

		Figure A12 -
	70%
		1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98		2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.

Vote for Labor / Greens by income group

	Figure A13 -
	80%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.

Vote for Labor / Greens by religious affiliation

	Figure A13b -
	100%
	90%	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2001-07		2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religious affiliation.

Vote for Labor / Greens by detailed religious affiliation

	Figure A14 -
	70%
				None	Catholic	Other Christian
	60%			Jewish	Buddhist	Hindu
				Muslim
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by detailed religious affiliation.

Vote for Labor / Greens by church attendance

		Figure A15 -
	70%
			Never	Less than monthly	Monthly or more
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by frequency of church attendance.

Vote for Labor / Greens by occupation

		Figure A16 -
	70%
			Private sector	Public sector	Inactive	Unemployed
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by occupation.

Vote for Labor / Greens by location

		Figure A17 -
	90%
	80%		Urban	Rural
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by rural-urban location.

Vote for Labor / Greens by state

			Figure A18 -
	70%
		Australian Capital Territory	New South Wales	Western Australia
	60%	Tasmania Northern Territory	Victoria Queensland		South Australia
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
		Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by state of residence.

Vote for Labor / Greens by gender

	Figure A19 -
	70%
			Woman	Man
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by gender.

Vote for Labor / Greens by union membership

		Figure A20 -
	70%
	Not union member	Union member
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by union membership status.

Vote for Labor / Greens by marital status

	Figure A21 -
	70%
				Single	Married / Partner
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by marital status.

Vote for Labor / Greens by perceived social class

	Figure A22 -
	70%
	Working class	Middle class
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys. 1963-66 1972-77 1983-87 1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by self-perceived social class.

Working class includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class" and "upper class".

Vote for Labor / Greens by home status

		Figure A23 -
	70%
					Renting	Owning
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by home ownership status.

Vote for Labor / Greens by age group

	Figure A24 -
	90%
	80%	20-40	40-60	60+
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by age group.

Vote for Labor / Greens by country of birth

	Figure A25 -
	80%
	70%	Australia	Other Western countries	Non-Western countries
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1990-98		2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by country of birth. Other Western
	countries include Western European countries, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand. Non-
	Western countries include all remaining countries.

Vote for Labor / Greens by country of origin

		Figure A26 -
	40
		Australia	Other Western countries	Non-Western countries
	30
	20
	10
	0
	-10
	-20
	-30
	-40	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by country of origin. Other Western 1963-66 1972-77 1983-87 1990-98 2001-07 2010-19
		countries include Western European countries, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand. Non-
		Western countries include all remaining countries. A respondent has a foreign country of origin if at least
		one parent was born abroad.

Vote for Labor / Green among highest-educated and top- income voters

		Figure A27 -
	35
	30	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) educated voting Labor / Greens
	25
		Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting Labor / Greens
	20
	15
	10
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	-20
	-25
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the support for Labor / Greens among highest-educated and top-income voters.

Vote for Labor / Green among highest-educated and top- income voters, after controls

	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) educated voting Labor / Greens, after
	controls
	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting Labor / Greens, after
	controls
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the support for Labor / Greens among highest-educated and top-income voters,
	after controlling for other variables.

Vote for the Labor Party by education level

  Difference between (% of aged 20-39) and (% of other voters) voting Labor / Greens After controlling for income, education, gender, religion, employment status, marital status, perceived class, home ownership, location Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged 20-39 and the share of voters older than 40 voting for Labor / Green parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

	70% 70%	Figure A40 -Primary Figure A41 -	Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	60% 60%
	50% 50%
	40% 40%
	30% 30%
	20% 20%
	10% 10%
	0% 0%
	1963-66 1963-66	1972-77 1972-77	1983-87 1983-87	1990-98 1990-98	2001-07 2001-07	2010-19 2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labor Party by education level.

Vote for the Labor Party by education group

		Figure A42 -
	70%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labor Party by education group.

Vote for the Labor Party by income group

	Figure A43 -
	80%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labor Party by income group.

Vote for the Labor Party by religious affiliation

		Figure A44 -
	70%
				No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Labor Party by religious affiliation.

Vote for the Labor Party by gender

	Figure A45 -
	70%
			Woman	Man
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labor Party by gender.

Vote for the Labor Party by union membership

	Figure A46 -
	70%
	Not union member	Union member
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labor Party by union membership status.

Vote for the Labor Party by perceived social class

	Figure A47 -
	70%
	Working class	Middle class
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys. 1963-66 1972-77 1983-87 1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labor Party by self-perceived social class.

Working class includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class" and "upper class".

Vote for the Labor Party by home status

	Figure A48 -
	80%
		Renting	Owning
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labor Party by home ownership status.

Vote for the Labor Party by country of origin

  Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labor Party by country of origin. Other Western countries include Western European countries, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand. Non-Western countries include all remaining countries. A respondent has a foreign country of origin if at least one parent was born abroad.

	Figure A49 -
	30%
	Australia	Other Western countries	Non-Western countries
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19

Vote for The Australian Greens by education level

	Figure A50 -
	30%
		Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1990-98	2001-07			2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Greens by education level.

Vote for Greens by education group

	Figure A51 -
	20%
	18%	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	16%
	14%
	12%
	10%
	8%
	6%
	4%
	2%
	0%
	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Greens by education group.

Vote for The Australian Greens by income group

	Figure A52 -
	30%
		Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Greens by income group.

Vote for The Australian Greens by religious affiliation

	Figure A53 -
	20%
	18%	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	16%
	14%
	12%
	10%
	8%
	6%
	4%
	2%
	0%
	1990-98	2001-07		2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Greens by religious affiliation.

Vote for The Australian Greens by gender

	Figure A54 -
	20%
	18%		Woman	Man
	16%
	14%
	12%
	10%
	8%
	6%
	4%
	2%
	0%
	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Greens by gender.

Vote for The Australian Greens by union membership

		Figure A55 -
	20%
	18%	Not union member	Union member
	16%
	14%
	12%
	10%
	8%
	6%
	4%
	2%
	0%
		1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
		Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Greens by union membership status.

Vote for The Australian Greens by perceived social class

	Figure A56 -
	20%
	18%	Working class	Middle class
	16%
	14%
	12%
	10%
	8%
	6%
	4%
	2%
	0%
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys. 1990-98 2001-07	2010-19
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Greens by self-perceived social class. Working class
	includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class" and "upper class".

Vote for The Australian Greens by home status

	Figure A57 -
	20%
	18%	Renting	Owning
	16%
	14%
	12%
	10%
	8%
	6%
	4%
	2%
	0%
	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Greens by home ownership status.

Vote for The Australian Greens by country of origin

		Figure A58 -
	90%
	80%	Australia	Other Western countries	Non-Western countries
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Greens by country of origin. Other Western countries 1963-66 1972-77 1983-87 1990-98 2001-07 2010-19
		include Western European countries, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand. Non-Western
		countries include all remaining countries. A respondent has a foreign country of origin if at least one parent
		was born abroad.

Vote for Liberal / National by education level

	Figure A59 -
	70%
			Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal-National coalition by education level.

Vote for Liberal / National by education group

		Figure A60 -
	80%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal-National coalition by education group.

Vote for Liberal / National by income group

	Figure A61 -
	80%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal-National coalition by income group.

Vote for Liberal / National by religious affiliation

		Figure A62 -
	70%
				No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal-National coalition by religious affiliation.

Vote for Liberal / National by gender

	Figure A63 -
	70%
			Woman	Man
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal-National coalition by gender.

Vote for Liberal / National by union membership

	Figure A64 -
	70%
	Not union member	Union member
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-66	1972-77	1983-87	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal-National coalition by union membership.

Vote for Liberal / National by perceived social class

	Figure A65 -
	70%
	Working class	Middle class
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys. 1963-66 1972-77 1983-87 1990-98	2001-07	2010-19

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal-National coalition by self-perceived social class. Working class includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class" and "upper class".

Vote for Liberal / National by home status

	Figure A66 -
	80%
		Renting	Owning
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1990-98	2001-07	2010-19
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal-National coalition by home ownership.

Vote for Liberal / National by country of origin

  Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal-National coalition by country of origin. Other Western countries include Western European countries, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand. Non-Western countries include all remaining countries. A respondent has a foreign country of origin if at least one parent was born abroad.

	Figure A67 -
	100%
	90%	Australia	Other Western countries	Non-Western countries
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%		Middle 40%	Top 10%

Composition of income groups by perceived class, 1960s

	Figure A68 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	Working class	Middle / Upper / No class
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by perceived social class in

1963-1966.

Composition of income groups by perceived class, 2010s

	Figure A69 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	Working class	Middle class
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by perceived social class in 2010-2019.

Composition of income groups by religion, 1960s

	Figure A69 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%		Top 10%
	Religion: No religion	Religion: Catholic	Religion: Protestant	Religion: Other
	Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by religion in 1963-1966.

Composition of income groups by religion, 2010s

	Year	Survey	Source	Sample size
	1963	Social stratification in Australia	ISMP
	1966	Australian political attitudes	ISMP
	1972	Social mobility in Australia	ISMP
	1977	Australian political attitudes	ISMP
	1983	Australian national social science	ISMP
	1984	ISSP	ISMP
	1987	Australian Election Study	AES
	1990	Australian Election Study	AES
	1993	Australian Election Study	AES
	1996	Australian Election Study	AES
	1998	Australian Election Study	AES
	2001	Australian Election Study	AES
	2004	Australian Election Study	AES
	2007	Australian Election Study	AES
	2010	Australian Election Study	AES
	2013	Australian Election Study	AES
	2016	Australian Election Study	AES
	2019	Australian Election Study	AES
		Religion: No religion	Religion: Catholic	Religion: Protestant	Religion: Other
		Source: author's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by religion in 2010-2019.

Table A1 -Survey data sources Source

 A1

		1963-66 1972-77 1983-87 1990-98 2001-07 2010-19
	Age: 20-40	43%	39%	48%	36%	28%	25%
	Age: 40-60	45%	44%	33%	39%	44%	37%
	Age: 60+	13%	17%	19%	25%	28%	38%
	Subjective class: Not working class	53%	57%	50%	49%	54%	59%
	Education: Primary	64%	61%	57%	42%	34%	26%
	Education: Secondary	29%	31%	33%	42%	43%	40%
	Education: Tertiary	7%	8%	9%	10%	13%	19%
	Education: Postgraduate	0%	0%	1%	6%	10%	15%
	Employment status: Employed	92%	65%	59%	58%	60%	57%
	Employment status: Unemployed	0%	0%	1%	4%	3%	3%
	Employment status: Inactive	8%	35%	40%	38%	37%	39%
	Home ownership: Yes	59%	79%	81%	73%	74%	75%
	Marital status: Married or with partner	86%	76%	69%	70%	67%	65%
	Region: Australian Capital Territory			2%	2%	2%	2%
	Region: New South Wales			33%	30%	33%	32%
	Region: Northern Territory			0%	1%	0%	1%
	Region: Queensland			16%	16%	19%	19%
	Region: South Australia			11%	11%	8%	8%
	Region: Tasmania			3%	5%	3%	3%
	Region: Victoria			26%	23%	25%	25%
	Region: Western Australia			8%	12%	9%	10%
	Religion: No religion	2%	16%	11%	15%	21%	33%
	Religion: Catholic	25%	24%	26%	27%	27%	23%
	Religion: Protestant	67%	51%	59%	50%	48%	40%
	Religion: Other	6%	9%	4%	8%	4%	5%
	Church attendance: Never	12%	20%	29%	37%	41%	48%
	Church attendance: Less than monthly 51%	44%	45%	42%	40%	36%
	Church attendance: Monthly or more	37%	36%	26%	21%	19%	16%
	Rural-urban: Rural areas	26%	15%	29%	23%	23%	19%
	Sector		37%	34%	28%	26%	26%
	Gender: Man	58%	56%	49%	49%	48%	48%
	Union membership: Yes			41%	32%	25%	21%
	Country of birth: Australia			74%	78%	75%	76%
	Country of birth: Europe-US-Canada			16%	14%	13%	12%
	Country of birth: Other			10%	9%	12%	12%
	Country of origin: Australia			58%	60%	58%	58%
	Country of origin: Europe-US-Canada			27%	27%	24%	24%
	Country of origin: Other			16%	13%	18%	18%

: author's elaboration. ISSP: International Social Survey Programme, available from http://w.issp.org/. AES: Australian Election Studies, available from https://australianelectionstudy.org/voter-studies/. ISMP: International Social Mobility and Politics File, see P. Nieuwbeerta and H.B.G. Ganzeboom, "International Social Mobility and Politics File"

(Steinmetz Archive, 1996)

, available from https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/15265. Note: the table shows the surveys used, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

Table A2 -Complete descriptive statistics by decade Source: author

 A2 's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys. Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by decade for selected available variables.

		Labor	Greens	Liberal	National
	Education
	Primary	36%	7%	44%	5%
	Secondary	34%	7%	45%	4%
	Tertiary	36%	17%	39%	2%
	Postgraduate	36%	16%	38%	2%
	Income
	Bottom 50%	36%	9%	42%	5%
	Middle 40%	36%	13%	41%	3%
	Top 10%	30%	12%	53%	1%
	Social class
	Working class	42%	7%	37%	5%
	Middle class	30%	13%	48%	3%
	Country of birth
	Australia	34%	11%	42%	4%
	Europe-US-Canada	35%	10%	44%	2%
	Other	40%	8%	45%	1%
	Religion
	None	40%	20%	30%	2%
	Catholic	37%	7%	46%	4%
	Other Christian	29%	5%	51%	5%
	Jewish	15%	5%	77%	0%
	Buddhist	52%	10%	32%	0%
	Hindu	45%	5%	50%	0%
	Muslim	58%	14%	24%	0%
	Other	36%	22%	28%	3%

Table A3 -The structure of political cleavages in Australia, 2010-2019 Share of votes received (%) Source: author

 A3 's computations using Australian political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the Labor Party, the Australian Greens, the Liberal Party, and the National Party by selected individual characteristics over the 2010-2019 period.

	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%

Election results in New Zealand, 1946-2017

		100%	Figure B1 -Labour Party	National Party	Social Credit
		90%	Green / Values / Alliance	New Zealand First	Act
		80%	United
		70%
	(%)	60%
	vote	50%
	popular	40%
	of	30%
	Share	20%
		10%
		0%
					2010 2015 2020
		Source: author's computations using official election results.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of New Zealand political parties in
		general elections between 1946 and 2017.

Election results in New Zealand by groups, 1946-2017

	100%	Figure B2 -Centre-left / left-wing parties (Labour, Greens, Other left) Figure B3 -
	90%		Centre-right / right-wing parties (National, New Zealand First, Other right)
	80%		Other parties and independents
	70%
	(%) 60%
	vote 50%
	30% popular 40%
	of
	10% Share 20%
	0%
		1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
						2010 2015 2020
		Source: author's computations using official election results.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of New Zealand political parties in
		general elections between 1946 and 2017.

The evolution of education in New Zealand

	Figure B4 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of education levels of the New Zealand adult population.

The structure of employment in New Zealand

	Figure B5 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Employed private	Employed public / mixed	Unemployed	Inactive
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of employment of the New Zealand adult population.

The evolution of religious affiliations in New Zealand

	Figure B6 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	No religion	Catholic		Protestant	Other
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of the religion affiliations of the New Zealand adult population.

The evolution of church attendance in New Zealand

	Figure B7 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Never		Less than monthly	Monthly or more
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of church attendance of the New Zealand adult population.

The ethnic composition of the New Zealand population

	Figure B8 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	European	Maori	Other
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of ethnic groups in New Zealand and its evolution over time.

The evolution of country of birth in New Zealand

	Figure B9 -
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%	New Zealand	United Kingdom	Other
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of country of birth of the New Zealand adult population.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by education level

	Figure B10 -
	70%
			Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by education group

	Figure B11 -
	70%
			Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education group.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by income decile

		Figure B12 -
	80%
				D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5		D6	D7		D8	D9	D10
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by income decile

	Figure B13 -
	70%
		1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by income group

	Figure B14 -
	70%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by religious affiliation

	Figure B14 -
	100%
	90%	No religion	Catholic	Protestant
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religious affiliation.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by religious affiliation

	Figure B15 -
	70%
	None	Catholic	Other Christian	Jewish	Buddhist	Hindu	Muslim	Other
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78		1981-87	1990-99		2002-08		2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religious affiliation.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by church attendance

	Figure B16 -
	90%
		Never	Less than monthly	Monthly or more
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by frequency of church attendance.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by occupation

	Figure B17 -
	70%
		Employed private	Employed public
		Unemployed	Inactive
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by employment status.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by location

	Figure B18 -
	70%
				Urban	Rural
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by rural-urban location.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by gender

	Figure B19 -
	80%
	70%		Woman	Man
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by gender.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by union membership

	Figure B20 -
	70%
	Not union member	Union member
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by union membership status.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by marital status

	Figure B21 -
	90%
	80%			Single	Married / Partner
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by marital status.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by perceived class

	Figure B22 -
	70%
	Working class	Middle class / No class
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys. 1990-99 2002-08	2011-17
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by self-perceived social class.

Working class includes "lower class". Middle class includes "no class" and "upper class".

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by home status

	Figure B23 -
	70%
				Renting	Owning
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by home ownership status.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by age group

	Figure B24 -
	100%
	90%			20-40	40-60	60+
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08		2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by age group.

Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by ethnic group

	80%
			European	Maori	Pacific	Asian
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08		2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by ethnic group.

Vote for Labour / Green / Other left among voters with no religion

		Difference between (% of top 10% earners) and (% of other voters) voting Labour / Green / Other left After controlling for education Figure B32 -Difference between (% of no religion) and (% of other voters) voting Labour / Green / Other left Figure B33 -
		After controlling for education, age, gender, occupation, home ownership, marital status, ethnicity, After controlling for income, education, age, gender, occupation, home ownership, marital status,
		religion, church attendance, country of birth, location, union membership ethnicity, church attendance, country of birth, location, union membership
	8
	6 8 6
	4 4
	2 2
	-2 0 0
	-4 -2
	-6 -4
	1972-78 1972-78	1981-87 1981-87	1990-99 1990-99	2002-08 2002-08	2011-17 2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys. Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters declaring no religion and the share of
	voting for Labour / Green / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables. other voters voting for Labour / Green / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for Labour / Green / Other left among non-religious voters

	Figure B34 -
	Difference between (% of non-religious) and (% of other voters) voting Labour / Green / Other left
	After controlling for income, education, age, gender, occupation, home ownership, marital status,
	ethnicity, religion, country of birth, location, union membership
	-5
	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters never going to church and the share of
	other voters voting for Labour / Green / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for Labour / Green / Other left among public sector workers

	Figure B35 -
	Difference between (% of public sector) and (% of other voters) voting Labour / Green / Other left
	After controlling for income, education, age, gender, home ownership, marital status, ethnicity,
	religion, church attendance, country of birth, location, union membership
	-5
	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of public sector workers and the share of other
	voters voting for Labour / Green / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for Labour / Green / Other left among the unemployed

		Figure B36 -
	15
		Difference between (% of unemployed) and (% of other voters) voting Labour / Green / Other left
	10
		After controlling for income, education, age, gender, home ownership, marital status, ethnicity,
	5	religion, church attendance, country of birth, location, union membership
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	-20
	-25
	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of unemployed voters and the share of other
	voters voting for Labour / Green / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for Labour / Green / Other left among rural areas

		Figure B37 -
	18
	16	Difference between (% of rural areas) and (% of urban areas) voting Labour / Green / Other left
	14
	12	After controlling for income, education, age, gender, occupation, home ownership, marital status, ethnicity, religion, church attendance, country of birth, union membership
	10
	8
	6
	4
	2
	0
	-2
	-4
	-6
	-8
	-10
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting
	for Labour / Green / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for Labour / Green / Other left among women

	Figure B38 -
	Difference between (% of women) and (% of men) voting Labour / Green / Other left
	After controlling for income, education, age, gender, occupation, home ownership, marital status,
	ethnicity, religion, church attendance, country of birth, location, union membership
	-5
	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for Labour /
	Green / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for Labour / Green / Other left among union members

		Figure B39 -
		Difference between (% of union members) and (% of other voters) voting Labour / Green / Other left
		After controlling for income, education, age, gender, occupation, home ownership, ethnicity, religion,
		church attendance, country of birth, location, union membership
	-5
	1972-78	1981-87	1990-99	2002-08	2011-17
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of union members and the share of other voters
	voting for Labour / Green / Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Vote for Labour / Green / Other left among working class voters

	Difference between (% of 'working class') and (% of other voters) voting Labour / Green / Other left
	After controlling for income, education, age, gender, occupation, home ownership, marital status,
	ethnicity, religion, church attendance, country of birth, location, union membership
	Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters perceiving themselves as 'working class'
	and the share of other voters perceiving themselves as 'middle class' or 'no class' voting for Labour / Green

/ Other left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Ethnic inequality in New Zealand: Share of Maori in each income group, 1972-2017

  Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the share of Maori in each income group in New Zealand and its evolution.

	Bottom 50% 50% Bottom Figure B75 -0% Middle 40% Top 10% 40% 10% Middle Top 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% Figure B76 -	Bottom 50% 50% Bottom	Middle 40% 40% Middle	Top 10% 10% Top	Bottom 50% 50% Bottom	Middle 40% 40% Middle	Top 10% 10% Top	Bottom 50% 50% Bottom	Middle 40% 40% Middle	Top 10% 10% Top	Bottom 50% 50% Bottom	Middle 40% 40% Middle	10% 10% Top Top
	1972-78 1972-78	1981-87 1981-87		1990-99 1990-99		2002-08 2002-08		2011-17 2011-17

Ethnic inequality in New Zealand: Share of Asian / Pacific / Other in each income group, 1972-2017

	Year	Survey	Source	Sample size
		New Zealand Post-Election Survey, 1975	ADA	1604
		New Zealand Post-Election Survey, 1975	ADA
		New Zealand Voting Survey, post-election, 1981	ADA	1522
		New Zealand Voting Survey, post-election, 1981	ADA	1522
		New Zealand Election Survey, 1987	ADA	1013
		New Zealand Election Survey, 1987	ADA	1013
		New Zealand Election Study, 1990	NZES	2102
		New Zealand Election Study, 1993	NZES	2251
		New Zealand Election Study, 1996	NZES	4119
		New Zealand Election Study, 1999	NZES	5972
		New Zealand Election Study, 2002	NZES	2008
		New Zealand Election Study, 2005	NZES	3743
		New Zealand Election Study, 2008	NZES	3042
		New Zealand Election Study, 2011	NZES	3101
		New Zealand Election Study, 2014	NZES	2835
		New Zealand Election Study, 2017	NZES	3455
		Source: author's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of Asian, Pacific people, and other non-Maori ethnic minorities in each income group in New Zealand and its evolution.

Table B1 -Survey data sources Source

 B1 Note: the table shows the surveys used, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.In 1984In , 1981In , and 1972In , questions on previous voting behaviors from the 1987In , 1981In , and 1975 surveys were used respectively.

		1972-78 1981-87 1990-99 2002-08 2011-17
	Age: 20-40	53%	47%	40%	38%	33%
	Age: 40-60	30%	32%		41%	39%
	Age: 60+	16%	20%	23%	22%	28%
	Subjective class: Middle class	73%	74%	78%	81%	73%
	Country of birth: NZ	82%	81%	84%	82%	80%
	Country of birth: Other	5%	7%	5%	10%	13%
	Country of birth: UK	13%	12%	10%	8%	7%
	Education: Primary	23%	29%	37%	38%	29%
	Education: Secondary	62%	60%	51%	38%	49%
	Education: Tertiary	14%	12%	12%	17%	16%
	Education: Postgraduate	0%	0%	0%	7%	5%
	Employment status: Employed	57%	59%	61%	63%	60%
	Employment status: Unemployed	1%	2%	4%	2%	4%
	Employment status: Inactive	42%	39%	35%	35%	35%
	Home ownership: Yes			76%	70%	65%
	Marital status: Married or with partner	71%	62%	68%	66%	65%
	Ethnicity: Other	2%	3%	9%	12%	16%
	Ethnicity: European	94%	92%	85%	81%	76%
	Ethnicity: Maori	3%	5%	7%	8%	8%
	Religion: No religion	35%	31%	25%	30%	41%
	Religion: Catholic	13%	13%	14%	14%	13%
	Religion: Protestant	46%	55%	57%	50%	39%
	Religion: Other	6%	2%	4%	6%	6%
	Church attendance: Never	40%	41%	50%	57%	60%
	Church attendance: Less than monthly	34%	30%	31%	24%	24%
	Church attendance: Monthly or more	26%	29%	19%	20%	16%
	Rural-urban: Rural areas			23%	17%	16%
	Gender: Man	46%	48%	49%	47%	48%
	Union membership: Yes		30%	20%	14%	9%
	Occupation: Employed private		42%	46%	45%	45%
	Occupation: Employed public		19%	15%	17%	16%
	Occupation: Unemployed		2%	4%	2%	4%
	Occupation: Inactive		37%	35%	35%	35%

: author's elaboration. NZES: National Election Studies (https://www.nzes.org). ADA: Australian Data Archive (https://ada.edu.au/).

Table B2 -Complete descriptive statistics by decade Source: author

 B2 's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys. Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by decade for selected available variables.

		Labour	Greens	National	NZF
	Education
	Primary	35%	4%	43%	11%
	Secondary	27%	9%	49%	7%
	Tertiary	27%	17%	44%	3%
	Postgraduate	36%	15%	33%	5%
	Income
	Bottom 50%	34%	8%	37%	9%
	Middle 40%	25%	10%	51%	5%
	Top 10%	18%	9%	63%	4%
	Social class
	Working class	34%	7%	32%	14%
	Middle class	21%	11%	48%	6%
	Ethnicity
	European	27%	10%	48%	7%
	Maori	47%	8%	11%	12%
	Pacific	64%	0%	23%	11%
	Asian	29%	5%	57%	0%
	Religion
	None	30%	14%	40%	6%
	Catholic	31%	6%	47%	8%
	Other Christian	28%	5%	51%	8%
	Jewish	44%	14%	21%	0%
	Buddhist	27%	17%	46%	6%
	Hindu	59%	10%	31%	0%
	Muslim	76%	4%	18%	0%
	Other	33%	12%	38%	7%

Table B3 -The structure of political cleavages in New Zealand, 2011-2017 Source: author

 B3 's computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the Labour Party, the Green Party, the National Party, and the New Zealand First Party by selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2017 period.

	70%	Share of votes received (%)
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%

The evolution of education in Canada

	0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%	1963-68 1963-68 Figure C4 -1974-79 1974-79 Figure C3 -Primary	1980-88 Secondary 1980-88	1993-97 Tertiary 1993-97	2000-08 Postgraduate 2011-19 2000-08 2011-19
		Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
		Note: the figure shows the distribution of education levels of the Canadian adult population and its evolution
		over time since the 1960s.

The evolution of religious affiliations in Canada

	Figure C5 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
		No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the distribution of the religion affiliations of the Canadian adult population and its
	evolution over time since the 1960s.

The regional composition of the electorate in Canada

	Figure C6 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Eastern		Ontario	Québec	Western
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the geographical distribution of the Canadian adult population and its evolution over
	time since the 1960s.

The linguistic composition of the electorate in Canada

	English	French	Other

The composition of the electorate by country of birth

	0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%	1963-68 Figure C7 -Canada 1974-79 Figure C8 -	1980-88 Europe	1993-97 USA	2000-08	Other	2011-19
		Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies. 1963-68 1974-79 1980-88 1993-97	2000-08		2011-19
		Note: the figure shows the distribution of the country of birth of the Canadian electorate and its evolution
		over time since the 1960s.		.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by education level

  Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by education level.

	Figure C9 -
	90%
	80%		Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by education group

  Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by education group.

	Figure C10 -
	90%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by income decile

  Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by income decile.

		Figure C11 -
	80%
	75%			D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10
	70%
	65%
	60%
	55%
	50%
	45%
	40%
	35%
	30%
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5		D6	D7		D8	D9	D10
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by income decile

  Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by income decile.

	Figure C12 -
	90%
	80%	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by income group

  Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by income group.

	Figure C13 -
	90%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by religious affiliation

  Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by religious affiliation.

	Figure C13b -
	120%
	110%	No religion	Catholic	Protestant
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	2000-08		2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by religious affiliation

  Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by religious affiliation.

	Figure C14 -
	90%
		None	Catholic	Other Christian
	80%	Jewish	Buddhist	Hindu
		Muslim	Sikh	Other
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79		1980-88
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by level of church attendance

	Figure C15 -
	90%
			Never	Less than monthly	Monthly or more
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by frequency of
	church attendance.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by employment status

  Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by employment status.

		Figure C16 -
	80%
			Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by location

		Figure C17 -
	100%
	90%				Rural	Urban
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Liberal / NDP / Green parties by rural-urban location.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by region

  Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Liberal / NDP / Green parties by state of residence.

		Figure C18 -
	90%
		Eastern	Ontario	Quebec	Western
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by gender

	Figure C19 -
	80%
			Woman	Man
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Liberal / NDP / Green parties by gender.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by union membership

	Figure C20 -
	90%
	Not union member	Union member
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Liberal / NDP / Green parties by union membership.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by marital status

	Figure C21 -
	90%
	80%	Single	Married / Partner
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1980-88	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Liberal / NDP / Green parties by marital status.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by home status

		Figure C22 -
	90%
	80%	Renting	Owning
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
		1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
		Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
		Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Liberal / NDP / Green parties by home ownership.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by age group

		Figure C23 -
	90%
	80%				20-40	40-60	60+
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Liberal / NDP / Green parties by age group.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by language

	Figure C24 -
	90%
					English	French	Other
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Liberal / NDP / Green parties by language.

Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by country of birth

  Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Liberal / NDP / Green parties by country of birth.

		Figure C25 -
	20
	18			Canada	Europe / US	Other
	16
	14
	12
	10
	8
	6
	4
	2
	0
	-2
	-4
	-6
	-8
	-10
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

The education cleavage in Canada: Higher-educated

		Figure C26 -
	20
	18	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) educated voting Liberal / NDP / Green
	16	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) educated voting Liberal
	14	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) educated voting NDP
	12	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) educated voting Conservative
	10
	8
	6
	4
	2
	0
	-2
	-4
	-6
	-8
	-10
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of other
	voters voting for selected parties, after controlling for income, age, gender, employment, marital status,
	country of birth, union membership, religion, language, and region.

The education cleavage in Canada: Lower-educated

		Figure C27 -
	20
	18	Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) educated voting Liberal / NDP / Green
	16	Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) educated voting Liberal
	14	Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) educated voting NDP
	12	Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) educated voting Conservative
	10
	8
	6
	4
	2
	0
	-2
	-4
	-6
	-8
	-10
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% educated voters and the share of
	other voters voting for selected parties, after controlling for income, age, gender, employment, marital
	status, country of birth, union membership, religion, language, and region.

The income cleavage in Canada: High incomes

		Figure C28 -
	20
	18	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting Liberal / NDP / Green
	16	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting Liberal
	14	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting NDP
	12	Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) earners voting Conservative
	10
	8
	6
	4
	2
	0
	-2
	-4
	-6
	-8
	-10
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters
	voting for selected parties, after controlling for education, age, gender, employment, marital status, country
	of birth, union membership, religion, language, and region.

The income cleavage in Canada: Low incomes

		Figure C29 -
	35
		Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) earners voting Liberal / NDP / Green
	30	Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) earners voting Liberal
	25	Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) earners voting NDP
	20	Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) earners voting Conservative
	15
	10
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners and the share of other
	voters voting for selected parties, after controlling for education, age, gender, employment, marital status,
	country of birth, union membership, religion, language, and region.

The regional cleavage in Canada : Eastern region

		Figure C30 -
	35
		Difference between (% Eastern region) and (% other voters) voting Liberal / NDP / Green / BQ
	30	Difference between (% Eastern region residents) and (% other voters) voting Liberal
	25	Difference between (% Eastern region residents) and (% other voters) voting NDP
	20	Difference between (% Eastern region residents) and (% other voters) voting Conservative
	15
	10
	5
	0
	-5
	-10
	-15
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Eastern region residents and the share of other
	voters voting for selected parties, after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment, marital
	status, country of birth, union membership, religion, and language.

The regional cleavage in Canada : Ontario

		Figure C31 -
	50
		Difference between (% Ontario region) and (% other voters) voting Liberal / NDP / Green / BQ
	40	Difference between (% Ontario region residents) and (% other voters) voting Liberal
		Difference between (% Ontario region residents) and (% other voters) voting NDP
	30	Difference between (% Ontario region residents) and (% other voters) voting Conservative
	20
	10
	0
	-10
	-20
	-30
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Ontario residents and the share of other voters
	voting for selected parties, after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment, marital status,
	country of birth, union membership, religion, and language.

The regional cleavage in Canada : Québec

		Figure C32 -
	50
		Difference between (% Québec region) and (% other voters) voting Liberal / NDP / Green / BQ
	40	Difference between (% Québec region residents) and (% other voters) voting Liberal
		Difference between (% Québec region residents) and (% other voters) voting NDP
	30	Difference between (% Québec region residents) and (% other voters) voting Conservative
	20
	10
	0
	-10
	-20
	-30
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Québec residents and the share of other voters
	voting for selected parties, after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment, marital status,
	country of birth, union membership, religion, and language.

The regional cleavage in Canada : Western provinces

		Figure C33 -
	60
		Difference between (% Western region) and (% other voters) voting Liberal / NDP / Green / BQ
	50	Difference between (% Western region residents) and (% other voters) voting Liberal
	40	Difference between (% Western region residents) and (% other voters) voting NDP
		Difference between (% Western region residents) and (% other voters) voting Conservative
	30
	20
	10
	0
	-10
	-20
	-30
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Western provinces residents and the share of
	other voters voting for selected parties, after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment,
	marital status, country of birth, union membership, religion, and language.

The language cleavage in Canada: English speakers

		Figure C34 -
	60
		Difference between (% English speakers) and (% other voters) voting Liberal / NDP / Green / BQ
	50	Difference between (% English speakers) and (% other voters) voting Liberal
	40	Difference between (% English speakers) and (% other voters) voting NDP
		Difference between (% English speakers) and (% other voters) voting Conservative
	30
	20
	10
	0
	-10
	-20
	-30
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of English speakers and the share of other voters
	voting for selected parties, after controlling for education, age, gender, employment, marital status, country
	of birth, union membership, and religion.

The language cleavage in Canada: French speakers

		Figure C35 -
	60
		Difference between (% French speakers) and (% other voters) voting Liberal / NDP / Green / BQ
	50	Difference between (% French speakers)) and (% other voters) voting Liberal
	40	Difference between (% French speakers) and (% other voters) voting NDP
		Difference between (% French speakers) and (% other voters) voting Conservative
	30
	20
	10
	0
	-10
	-20
	-30
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of French speakers and the share of other voters
	voting for selected parties, after controlling for education, age, gender, employment, marital status, country
	of birth, union membership, and religion.

The language cleavage in Canada: Other languages

		Figure C36 -
	60
		Difference between (% Non-French/English) and (% other voters) voting Liberal / NDP / Green / BQ
	50	Difference between (% Non-French non-English) and (% other voters) voting Liberal
	40	Difference between (% Non-French non-English) and (% other voters) voting NDP
		Difference between (% Non-French non-English) and (% other voters) voting Conservative
	30
	20
	10
	0
	-10
	-20
	-30
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of non-English, non-French speakers and the
	share of other voters voting for selected parties, after controlling for education, age, gender, employment,
	marital status, country of birth, union membership, and religion.

The religious cleavage in Canada

	Difference between (% of Protestants) and (% of other voters) voting Conservative / Reform
	Difference between (% of Protestants) and (% of other voters) voting Liberal / Bloc Québécois
	Difference between (% of non-religious) and (% of other voters) voting NDP / Greens
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
	Note: the figure shows the bias of voters belonging to specific religious affiliations towards selected political
	parties in Canada, after controlling for the effects of income, education, age, gender, employment, marital
	status, country of birth, and union membership.

Figure C47 -Vote for Bloc Québécois by income group

		Figure C48 -
	80%
				Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received in Québec by the Bloc Québécois by income group.

Vote for the Liberal Party by education level

		Figure C49 -
	90%
	80%		Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Party by education level.

Vote for the Liberal Party by region

		Figure C50 -
	90%
	80%			Eastern	Ontario	Quebec	Western
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Party by region.

Vote for the Liberal Party by income quintile

	Figure C51 -
	90%
	80%			Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97		2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Party by income group.

Vote for the Liberal Party by religious affiliation

		Figure C52 -
	90%
				No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Party by religious affiliation.

Vote for the Liberal Party by gender

	Figure C53 -
	80%
					Woman	Man
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Party by gender.

Vote for the Liberal Party by union membership

		Figure C54 -
	90%
	Not union member	Union member
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Party by union membership.

Vote for the Liberal Party by language

		Figure C55 -
	90%
					English	French	Other
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08		2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Party by language.

Vote for the Liberal Party by country of birth

	Figure C56 -
	40%
				Other	Canada	Europe / US
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Party by country of birth.

Vote for the New Democratic Party by education level

		Figure C57 -
	40%
			Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Postgraduate
	35%
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the New Democratic Party by education level.

Vote for the New Democratic Party by region

	Figure C58 -
	40%
	35%			Eastern	Ontario	Quebec	Western
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97	2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the New Democratic Party by region.

Vote for the New Democratic Party by income group

	40%
	35%			Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
	30%
	25%
	20%
	15%
	10%
	5%
	0%
	1963-68	1974-79	1980-88	1993-97		2000-08	2011-19
	Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the New Democratic Party by income group.

Composition of income groups by religion, 2010s

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by religion in 1965-1968. Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by religion in 2011-2019.

	0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%	Religion: No religion Bottom 50% Bottom 50% Figure C81 -Religion: No religion Figure C82 -	Religion: Catholic Middle 40% Religion: Catholic Middle 40%	Religion: Protestant Religion: Protestant	Religion: Other Top 10% Religion: Other Top 10%

Composition of income groups by region, 1960s

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by region in1965-1968.

	Figure C83 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	Region: Eastern	Region: Ontario	Region: Quebec	Region: Western

Composition of income groups by region, 2010s

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by region in 2011-2019.

	Figure C84 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	Region: Eastern	Region: Ontario	Region: Quebec	Region: Western

Composition of income groups by language, 1960s

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by language in1965-1968.

	Figure C85 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	Language: English	Language: French	Language: Other

Composition of income groups by language, 2010s

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by language in 2011-2019.

	Figure C86 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	Language: English	Language: French	Language: Other

Composition of income groups by location, 1960s

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by rural-urban location in1965-1968.

	Figure C87 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
	Rural-urban: Urban	Rural-urban: Rural

Composition of income groups by location, 2010s

  authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by rural-urban location in 2011-2019.

		Figure C88 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	Source: 0%	Eastern	Urban Ontario	Rural Quebec	Western

Composition of regions by religion, 1960s

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of regions by religion in1965-1968.

	Figure C89 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Eastern	Ontario	Quebec	Western
	Religion: No religion	Religion: Catholic	Religion: Protestant	Religion: Other

Composition of regions by religion, 2010s

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of regions by religion in 2011-2019.

	Figure C90 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Eastern	Ontario	Quebec	Western
	Religion: No religion	Religion: Catholic	Religion: Protestant	Religion: Other

Composition of regions by language, 1960s

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of regions by language in1965-1968.

	Figure C91 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	Eastern	Ontario	Quebec	Western
	Language: English		Language: French	Language: Other

Composition of regions by language, 2010s

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of regions by language in 2011-2019.

	Figure C92 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	Language: English		Language: French	Language: Other

Composition of religion by language, 1960s

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of religion by language in1965-1968.

	Figure C93 -
	100%
	90%
	80%
	70%
	60%
	50%
	40%
	30%
	20%
	10%
	0%
	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Other
	Language: English		Language: French	Language: Other

Composition of religion by language, 2010

  Source: authors' computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Note: the figure shows the composition of religion by language in 2011-2019.

	Year	Survey	Source	Sample size
	1965	Canadian Election Study	CES
	1968	Canadian Election Study	CES
	1974	Canadian Election Study	CES
	1979	Canadian Election Study	CES
	1980	Canadian Election Study	CES
	1984	Canadian Election Study	CES
	1988	Canadian Election Study	CES
	1993	Canadian Election Study	CES
	1997	Canadian Election Study	CES
	2000	Canadian Election Study	CES
	2004	Canadian Election Study	CES
	2006	Canadian Election Study	CES
	2008	Canadian Election Study	CES
	2011	Canadian Election Study	CES
	2015	Canadian Election Study	CES
		Language: English	Language: French	Language: Other

Table C1 -Survey data sources Source: author

 C1 's elaboration. CES: Canadian Election Studies. Note: the table shows the surveys used, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

				Share of votes received (%)
		NDP	Greens	Liberal	Conservative	Bloc Québécois
	Education
	Primary	22%	3%	22%	43%	7%
	Secondary	23%	5%	27%	37%	7%
	Tertiary	25%	4%	34%	32%	5%
	Postgraduate	21%	6%	37%	29%	6%
	Income
	Bottom 50%	26%	5%	28%	32%	8%
	Middle 40%	23%	4%	30%	36%	6%
	Top 10%	15%	3%	34%	43%	4%
	Language
	English	22%	6%	30%	41%	0%
	French	27%	3%	25%	19%	24%
	Other	22%	2%	35%	39%	1%
	Country of birth
	Canada	24%	5%	28%	35%	7%
	Other	18%	3%	42%	36%	1%
	Europe / US	25%	4%	29%	39%	1%
	Religion
	None	27%	7%	32%	26%	6%
	Catholic	25%	3%	27%	31%	13%
	Other Christian	18%	4%	25%	51%	1%
	Jewish	6%	2%	41%	49%	0%
	Buddhist	31%	4%	41%	21%	2%
	Hindu	33%	2%	38%	27%	0%
	Muslim	27%	1%	63%	9%	1%
	Sikh	26%	1%	54%	19%	0%
	Other	18%	8%	31%	39%	1%

Table C3 -The structure of political cleavages in Canada, 2011-2019 Source: author

 C3 's computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the New Democratic Party, the Green Party, the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, and the Bloc Québécois by selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2019 period. author's computations using Canadian political attitudes surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by selected political parties in Québec across selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2019 period.

		NDP	Greens	Bloc Québécois	Liberal	Conservative
	Education
	Bottom 50%	27%	2%	24%	26%	20%
	Middle 40%	27%	3%	22%	28%	19%
	Top 10%	26%	5%	24%	30%	13%
	Income
	Bottom 50%	28%	3%	25%	25%	18%
	Middle 40%	26%	2%	23%	29%	19%
	Top 10%	23%	2%	23%	31%	20%
	Language
	French	28%	2%	27%	23%	18%
	English	17%	5%	2%	55%	21%
	Other	33%	1%	6%	36%	25%
	Age
	20-40	30%	4%	20%	25%	20%
	40-60	27%	3%	25%	26%	17%
	60+	24%	1%	24%	30%	20%
	Union membership
	Not union member	25%	2%	23%	30%	19%
	Union member	32%	3%	24%	21%	19%
	Source:

Table C4 -The structure of political cleavages in Québec, 2011-2019 Share of votes received (%)

 C4

The exception to this conclusion is the vote of the Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu religious minorities, which are, as in most Western European countries, substantially more likely to vote for left-wing and liberal parties: see appendix TablesA3, B3, and C3. These minorities are however extremely small in the old dominions (typically less than 1 % of the adult population).

See appendix TableA1.

See appendix Table A2 on the stability of working-class affiliations and appendix Figures A67 and A68 on the composition of income groups by social class.

See appendix FiguresA40 and A42.

The Liberal Party of the late nineteenth century did however make coalitions with parts of the labor movement, visible in "Liberal-Labour" candidates, members of the Liberal Party who received endorsement by the Labour movement or trade unions.

See appendix Figures B73 and B74.

The share of Māori in electoral surveys is much lower than in census data (see appendix TableB2), due to difficulties at sampling the Māori electorate.

Historical connections between the Labour Party and Māori voters go far back in time, and were formalized when the First Labour Government of 1935 allied with representatives of the Rātana movement. The Rātana Church has since then being instrumental in allowing the Labour to hold Māori electorates.

See appendix Figures B43 and B44.

See Carty et al. (2000), chapter 2.

See appendix Figures C80 to C87. Broad regional inequalities are low, but they are more significant when considering smaller geographical entities: see[START_REF] Breau | Rising Inequality in Canada: A Regional Perspective[END_REF].

See appendix Figures C29 to C35 for similar figures on region and language. See also[START_REF] Carty | Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics[END_REF], chapter 2.

On the full structure of the vote for the NDP, see appendix Figures C56 to C63.

See appendix Figures C56 to C63.

See appendix Figures C40 to C47.