author: TAMM, Circuit Judge:

text:
    LAKEWOOD BROADCASTING SERVICE, INC., Appellant, v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, KBTR, Inc., Mission Denver Company, Intervenors. COLORADO CITIZENS FOR BROADCASTING et al., Appellants, v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, KBTR, Inc., Mission Denver Company, Intervenors.
    Nos. 72-1757, 72-1758.
    Rehearings Denied in No. 72-1757 May 24, 1973 and in No. 72-1758 May 29, 1973.
    United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
    Argued Dec. 14, 1972.
    Decided May 4, 1973.

      Aloysius B. McCabe, Washington, D. C., with whom John C. Quale, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellant in No. 72-1757.
    Thomas R. Asher, Washington, D. C., for appellant in No. 72-1758.
    R. Michael Senkowski, Counsel, F. C. C., with whom John W. Pettit, Gen. Counsel, and Joseph A. Marino, Associate Gen. Counsel, F. C. C., were on the brief for appellee.
    Harry M. Plotkin, Washington, D. C., with whom Gene A. Bechtel, Eric L. Bernthal and Charles J. McKerns, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for in-tervenors. Ralph W. Hardy, Jr., Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for intervenor KBTR, Inc.
    Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, TAMM, Circuit Judge and HARRISON WINTER, Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit.

       Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1970).

   TAMM, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated appeals are taken from a Memorandum Opinion and Order of the Federal Communications Commission [hereinafter “Commission”] granting an application for assignment of the license of radio station KBTR (AM), Denver, Colorado, and the contemporaneous denial of the appellants’ Petitions to Deny the assignment. The Commission opinion is reported as Charles A. Haskell, 36 F.C.C.2d 78 (1972). The sole issue propounded in both appeals is identical to that which was before the court in Hartford Communications Committee v. FCC, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 467 F.2d 408, 410 (1972): “[W]hether the Commission could reasonably conclude that appellants had not raised substantial and material questions of fact which would make a prima facie showing that Commission approval of the license assignment would not be in the public interest. Put more succinctly the issue is whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary.” See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1970). We find that no hearing was required.

I.

KBTR (AM), wholly owned by the late John C. Mullins since 1961, is a five kilowatt station providing twenty-four hour radio service to the Denver metropolitan area. Following several unsuccessful attempts at alternative formats the station in 1967 adopted an “all news” format, becoming the sole station in the Denver area to do so. *The “all news” format received heavy television promotion over a Mullins owned television station, KBTV, and considerable print media promotion through utilization of a Mullins owned billboard company. KBTR (AM) nonetheless suffered considerable financial losses totaling nearly a half-million dollars, and not long after Mr. Mullins’ demise the executors of his estate entered into a contract to sell the station to Mission Denver Company.

. Mission Denver’s proposal in its assignment application before the Commission to alter KBTR (AM)’s format to “country and western” music engendered Petitions to Deny from Lakewood Broadcasting Service, Inc., the would-be primary competitor of KBTR (AM) in the Denver “country and western” market, and Colorado Citizens for Broadcasting, a citizens association whose activities are “directed to scrutinizing the performance of the broadcast media in Colorado to assure maximum public service and accountability.” The petitioners jointly sought a hearing on the public interest ramifications of abandoning the unique “all news” format, citing Citizens Committee v. FCC, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 436 F.2d 263 (1970), and Lakewood additionally challenged the financial qualifications of Mission Denver. The Commission, in a painstakingly thorough decision, rejected the contention that a hearing was required and adjudged that the public interest would best be served by granting the assignment application.

II.

1. Format Change

In Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 156 U.S.App.D.C.—, 478 F.2d 926 (1973), also issued today, we have analyzed at some length the ramifications of the Citizens Committee decision. Where a “significant minority” of those whom a station is obligated to serve voice discontent over a proposed entertainment format change, the format change becomes an issue to be dealt with by the Commission in its 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970) determination that the assignment comports with public interest, convenience, and necessity. Consequently, factual disputes surrounding the format change are material, and if substantial become subject to the 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970) hearing requirement. In Progressive Rock we also noted, however, the limited scope of review we exercise over the Commission’s hearing determination, quoting from West Michigan Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 396 F.2d 688, 691 (1968):

Admittedly, the scope of our review is quite narrow; we defer to the expertise and experience of the Commission within its field of specialty and' would reverse only where the Commission’s position is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. And it is clear that the decision of when hearings are necessary or desirable to clarify issues is one which lies in the first instance with the Commission. (Citations omitted.)

Progressive Rock, supra, 156 U.S.App.D.C. at—n. 25, 478 F.2d at 926.

All of our “format” decisions to date have involved entertainment formats. In light of the special public interest in news sources, see City of Camden, 18 F.C.C.2d 412, 423 (1969), and the analogy to the entertainment decisions in this unusual situation where news is the “entertainment” substance of the format, we feel that the logic of Citizens Committee and Progressive Rock most certainly applies to the case at hand. A close analysis of the record reveals, however, that no substantial and material facts are at issue, and therefore that the Commission could rightly make its public interest determination as to the format change without an evidentiary hearing.

Appellants claim that interview summaries submitted to the Commission — in compliance with the requirement that the applicant consult with community leaders, evaluate community problems based on those consultations, and program accordingly — were defective in that they failed to recite that many of the civic leaders interviewed favored retention of the “all news” format. Appellants additionally allege that in some instances the interviewees were not informed of the proposed format change. These actions, appellants claim, raise factual questions concerning the adequacy and accuracy of the community survey which can only be resolved in an evidentiary hearing.

The Commission found appellant’s assertion to be based on a persistent “misreading of the purpose of ascertainment procedures,” and stated that “the purpose of interviewing community leaders is to discover community problems, not to elicit program preferences.” 36 F.C.C.2d at 84-85. We must agree. Clearly the Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 682 (1971), elucidates that the ascertainment procedures are meant to determine the problems of the community, e. g., drug abuse, pollution, race relations, crime, as opposed to the programming preferences of the interviewees.

In Citizens Committee we remanded for a hearing to resolve alleged discrepancies in the summaries of interviews with thirteen community leaders, and thus to determine if misrepresentation was more than just an allegation. The summaries at issue were submitted by the applicant-assignee to reflect fa-' vorable views toward the proposed new entertainment format, in an effort to offset mounting pressure being applied by citizens seeking to retain the old. To the extent that the summaries did not truly reflect the affiants’ views regarding programming preferences — precisely the issue they were represented to influence — misrepresentation and appendant denial of the application were in issue. In the situation sub judice, however, statements of preference simply are not relevant to the ascertainment survey as presently constituted, and so the Commission’s conclusion that the alleged misrepresentations regarding format preferences do not raise material issues of fact cannot be faulted. We adopt the Commission logic, 36 F.C.C.2d at 86:

[S]ince the Primer is not concerned with community leaders’ views or program preferences, there is no basis for concluding Mission tried to mislead the Commission by not including interviewee comments on format choices in the consultation reports filed with the application. Given the Primer requirements, any factual questions raised by Mission’s alleged failure to inform interviewees of the format change or to include their comments on such proposal are not substantial questions, and certainly not the material questions which are required before a hearing is needed.

Appellants additionally complain that there exist material and substantial questions of fact concerning alternative sources of the “all news” format and the financial viability of the “all news” format. It is enough to respond (without entering into a lengthy enumeration of facts and figures) that our study of the record shows that what really is being challenged is not the authenticity or accuracy of the surveys, composites, or economic reports, but rather the inferences which the Commission may draw therefrom. Certainly the' “inferences to be drawn from facts already known and the legal conclusions to be derived from those facts” may be made by the Commission without an evidentiary hearing. Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. FCC, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 146, 403 F.2d 169, 171 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930, 89 S.Ct. 1190, 22 L.Ed.2d 459 (1969).

2. The Financial Qualifications of Mission Denver

Appellant Lakewood challenges the financial qualifications of Mission Denver, citing the “staleness” and “speculative nature” of its financial submission. The applicable standard established by the Commission in Ultravision Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 544, 546-47 (1965), places the burden on the applicant to show that it has the financial strength to withstand the costs of purchase and the first year of operation. The Commission estimated that some $2,079,900 would thus be needed, an estimate that is unchallenged. The Commission additionally estimated that $2,224,705 (some $180,000 less than applicant-assignee’s estimate) would be available from the following sources: (1) a $2,000,000 loan, the existence of which is also unchallenged; (2) $192,087 in excess of current assets over current liabilities as shown on the consolidated balance sheet of Mission Broadcasting Company, Mission Denver’s parent corporation; and (3) $46,435 in estimated profit from the first year of operation of KBTR (AM). 36 F.C.C.2d at 87-88. We find, notwithstanding the fact that the figures relied upo.n by the Commission in its extrapolations were several months old at the time of the decision, that the Commission’s determinations were sound and reasonable, especially in light of the fact that only $79,000 was really in issue. Finding such, we are bound to affirm. See Hartford, supra, 467 F.2d at 414.

The determination of the Commission that no material and substantial questions of fact, existed, and so no evidentiary hearing was required, along with its conclusion that the public interest would be served by granting the application, is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is neither arbitrary, unreasonable, nor capricious. Accordingly, the order of the Commission granting the application for assignment of KBTR (AM) and denying appellants’ Petitions to Deny is

Affirmed.

      . The other stations in the Denver area provide, inter alia, “top forty,” “middle of the road,” “classical,” “easy listening,” “rhythm and blues,” “religious,” and “country and western” formats. See Joint Brief of Intervenors at 22-23.

      . The cash flow figures relied upon by the Commission, 36 F.C.C.2d at 79-80, and supported by an affidavit of the vice-president of Mullins Broadcasting Co., Jt. App. at 204-07, reflect net operating losses of $338,986 for 1967, $136,063 for 1968, $120,972 for 1969, and net operating profits of $46,435 for 1970, and $20,997 for the first nine months of 1971. This results in a cumulative net operating loss of $528,589 while operating under the “all news” format.

      . A desire to liquidate the estate’s assets, a need for cash to pay taxes and debts, and the co-executors’ alleged realization that “their duties and fiscal responsibilities in their fiduciary capacity required them to manage the business in an extremely conservative fashion, sometimes in a manner almost contrary to their inclinations as businessmen,” brought about the contract for sale. Jt.App. at 2-3.
      Mission Denver Co. is a newly formed corporation. Its parent corporation, Mission Broadcasting Co., has a forty-five year record in the broadcasting business. Jt.App. at 164.

      . Colorado Citizens for Broadcasting was joined in its petition by several individuals, and by organizations such as the Denver Area Association of the Blind, Colorado Springs Council of the Blind, Colorado Media Project, Inc., and the National Organization for Women.

      . Jt.App. at 38.

      . See Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 156 U.S.App.D.C.—, 478 F.2d 926 (1973) (progressive rock) ; Citizens Committee to Preserve the Present Programming of WONO (FM) v. FCC, No. 71-1386 (D.C.Cir. May 13, 1971) (classical music) ; Citizens Committee v. FCC, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 436 F.2d 263 (1970) (classical music).

      . See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 683-87 questions #11 through 36 (1971).

      . Appellants allege that out of the sixty community leaders resurveyed, twenty-nine stated they had not been told by Mission of the intended format change, and only fifteen were certain they had been told. Twenty-four of the sixty allegedly “expressed views about the need to continue KBTR’s format.” Jt.App. at 52-53. Appellees challenge not only the relevancy of such a finding but also the methodology of the resurvey. Joint Brief of Intervenors at 36 n. 49.

      . In the Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 679-80 (1971), the Commission points out that it was specifically “excluding] a question recommended . . . relating to the showing that must be made in cases where a station proposes to change its format.” It did recognize, however, that Citizens Committee v. FCC, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 436 F.2d 263 (1970), necessitated “that any application involving a substantial change in program format ... be scrutinized” and that “applicants should be prepared to support their proposals to change formats in light of the needs and tastes of the community and the types of programming available from other stations.” See Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 156 U.S.App.D.C. at—, 478 F.2d at 926 (1973).
      The ascertainment survey is concerned with problems, not preferences and need not be the vehicle for supporting evidence regarding a program format alteration. This is especially true in light of the fact that unless a significant minority voices opposition to the format change “the Commission assumes — and properly so — that the new format is acceptable.” Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., 35 F.C.C.2d 969, 974 (1972) (Commissioner Johnson, dissenting). See Progressive Rock, supra, 156 U.S.App.D.C. at — n. 23, 478 F.2d at 926. Thus the absence of any references to preference in the ascertainment survey cannot be considered a misrepresentation. If the format change does become a public interest issue, however, and surveys et al. are submitted by the applicant “to support [its] proposals to change formats,” misrepresentations contained therein certainly become material. See Gitiaens Committee, supra. Also, should an applicant anticipate opposition and include references to program preferences in its ascertainment survey in an effort to supply videntiary support for its proposed change, hen if format change becomes a public interest issue any misrepresentations will become material. We are presented with neither of those situations.

      . The Commission found, 36 F.C.C.2d at 86, that the twenty other Denver area radio stations would provide a total of 291 hours and 39 minutes of radio news per week. See Jt.App. at 209-10. Two Denver area stations altered their formats to provide “all news” in prime listening hours and have increased their news staffs and news gathering facilities. The Commission concluded, 36 F.C.C.2d at 87:
      [T]he plethora of news services available in Denver, the prime time “all news” services recently made available by Stations KGMC and KOA-AM, and the alternative balanced program format .proposed by Mission all justify the format change at KBTR. In making this judgment, we do not pretend that every demonstrated listener need or interest in Denver will be perfectly met. But as suggested before, we cannot guarantee that every broadcast need will be instantly ratified on a fixed frequency twenty-four hours per day. It is unreasonable to expect this, and the Communications Act neither requires nor authorizes such a result.

      . In addition to the financial losses experienced over the past five years, see note 2 supra, increased operating expenses as a result of the disaffiliation with KBTV (sold to another buyer in compliance with the Commission’s “one-to-the-market” policy), were a distinct possibility. See Jt.App. at 203.

      . There have been advanced glimmerings of an argument that no Commission determination of the public interest can be made absent a survey of community preferences on the issue, similar to that conducted in Citizens Committee. Certainly the extent of community support is an element to be considered by the Commission, but the exact proportions or degree of such support need not always be known prior to a reasoned determination. Here the case for allowing the format change, in view of financial considerations, alternative sources, and the broadcasting record of the assignee, was strong. Tlie Commission had to consider the public interest, but that does not in all situations require a survey to determine the exact degree of support for the old format.

      . The statement of consolidated and retained earnings of Mission Broadcasting Co. covered a period through July 31, 1971, Jt.App. at 11, while the “Statements of Income and Expense’ of KBTR. (AM) were through September 30, 1971. Jt.App. at 206. The assignment application was filed on August 27, 1971. FCC Form 314, section III, item 2(a) requires that a “detailed balance sheet of' as-signee as of the close of a month within 90 days of the date of the application showing applicant’s financial position” be filed with the assignment application. 47 C.F.R. § 1.65 requires that an amendment to the application be filed by the applicant whenever “the pending application is no longer substantially accurate and complete in all significant respects

      . One further note of explanation regarding our decisions in the area of the law explored today in Progressive Rode and Lakewood Broadcasting is in order. While we have recognized that format changes may impair the public’s paramount interest in diversified programming, we have never attempted to set out specific guidelines for achieving the marketplace ideal. The first, tentative steps into this complex area of regulation must be taken by the Commission. The Commission, and perhaps rightly so, appears loathe to lightly undertake a task which smacks of establishing it as the “national arbiter of taste.” The law in this area, following the lead of Citizens Committee, is in a state of transition. Whatever standards are set must remain flexible and open to new information and new understanding.
      So far we have only pointed out on a case by case basis those circumstances in which the Commission must take a closer look at the result achieved by the give and take of the market environment and the business judgment of the licensee— and must test this result against the public interest in accommodating “all major aspects of contemporary culture.” We do not here intimate any views on how the balance of competing public, and public and private, interests should be struck.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    The CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO KEEP PROGRESSIVE ROCK, Appellant, v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, Midwestern Broadcasting Company, Intervenor.
    No. 72-1675.
    United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
    Argued March 5, 1973.
    Decided May 4, 1973.
    As Amended May 11, 1973.

      Tracy A. Westen, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
    R. Michael Senkowski, Counsel, F. C. C. with whom John W. Pettit, Gen. Counsel, and Joseph A. Marino, Associate Gen. Counsel, F. C. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
    Stanley B. Cohen, Washington, D. C., with whom Ian D. Volner, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for intervenor.
    Before McGOWAN and TAMM, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAM J. JAME-SON, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Montana.

       Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.O. § 294(d) (1970).

   TAMM, Circuit Judge:

Appellant, a citizens committee organized to contest the assignment of radio station WGLN (FM), Sylvania, Ohio, from Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., to Midwestern Broadcasting Corp., brings this appeal from an order of the Federal Communications Commission [hereinafter “Commission”] affirming a prior grant of the assignment application. The primary issue raised by appellant concerns the statutory requirement for a hearing whenever “substantial and material question [s] of fact” are raised regarding the application. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970). Contrary to the Commission’s determination we find that there are substantial and material factual questions at issue rendering a hearing necessary prior to resolution of the application. We reverse the order of the Commission and remand for such a hearing.

I.

WGLN (FM) began operation on November 29, 1968, as a “country and western” music station licensed to Twin States Broadcasting, Inc. Twin States’ application for construction and license stated that “although the applicant proposes to principally serve Sylvania [a small Ohio “bedroom” suburban community on the outskirts of Toledo], which has no other broadcast station licensed to serve it at the present time, the applicant believes that it also has the responsibility to serve the program needs of the remainder of its service area.” Thus, although its primary service obligation was to its principal city of license, Sylvania, Twin States recognized a secondary responsibility to service the effective area of its signal, including other suburban communities and at minimum a significant portion of Toledo proper.

Following renewal of its license in 1970, in March of 1971 WGLN (FM) altered its programming to a commercialized format of “golden oldies.” Finding neither format economically successful and suffering significant losses in its investment, on August 12, 1971, Twin States sought Commission consent to assignment of the license to Midwestern Broadcasting Corp. The proposed assignee, which also owned a highly successful “top forty” music station licensed to Toledo, WOHO (AM), stated in the assignment application that it proposed to program “generally middle of the road music which may include some contemporary, folk and jazz, similar to what [the] station is currently programming.” The assignee proposed to serve the city of license and other suburban communities in the greater Toledo metropolitan area.

On August 31, 1971, while the application for assignment was still pending before the Commission, WGLN (FM) began experimentation with a “progressive rock” music program for several hours late each evening. The unprecedented success of the program led to the eventual complete change of the format to “progressive rock” on October 15, 1971.

On February 23, 1972, the Commission without the benefit of a hearing found that the “grant of [the WGLN (FM) assignment] application will serve the public interest, convenience and necessity,” and released an order granting the application. Shortly thereafter it became evident to the individuals who now make up the Citizens Committee that the “progressive rock” format which they so dearly cherished was to be abandoned. The Committee was formed, petitions calling for the retention of the “progressive rock” format circulated, and on March 27, 1971, a Petition for Stay, Reconsideration and Permanent Denial of Assignment Application was filed with the Commission. The Committee’s main contention was that since the “progressive rock” format of WGLN (FM) was unique to the Toledo area, and since a significant portion of the “residents of the metropolitan Toledo area” (as evidenced by more than 11,000 petition signatures ultimately garnered and submitted) desired retention of the format, this court’s decision in Citizens Committee v. FCC, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 436 F.2d 263 (1970), mandated a hearing to examine the public interest implications of the proposal to convert the communities’ only “progressive rock” music station into one of several “middle of the road” stations. The Commission, for reasons we now deem unpersuasive, denied the Petition and affirmed its original order. Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., 35 F.C.C.2d 969 (1972).

WGLN (FM) has since changed its call letters to WXEZ (FM), moved its studios to those of WOHO (AM) in Oregon, Ohio, and provides the same “middle of the road” format that is now offered to the Toledo environs by at least six other licensees.

II.

In Citizens Committee we held that the public has an interest in diversity of entertainment formats and therefore that format changes can be detrimental to the public interest. Consequently, in compliance with its statutory mandate to approve only those assignment applications which it finds to serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970), the Commission must consider format changes and their effect upon the desired diversity.

The majority of format changes do not diminish the diversity available, and are thus left to the give and take of each market environment and the business judgment of the licensee. See WCAB, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 743, 746 (1971), and Hartford Communications Committee v. FCC, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 467 F.2d 408 (1972). Citizens Committee dealt with the specialized situation where the format to be discontinued, “classical music,” was apparently unique to the area while the proposed format, “middle of the road,” was not. A “not insignificant portion” (sixteen per cent) of the area’s residents desired retention of the unique format, and we stated, 436 F.2d at 269:

[I]t is surely in the public interest, as that was conceived of by a Congress representative of all the people, for all major aspects of contemporary culture to be accommodated by the commonly-owned public resources whenever that is technically and economically feasible.

In essence, one man’s Bread is the next man’s Bach, Bacharach, or Buck Owens and the Buckeroos, and where “technically and economically feasible,” it is in the public’s best interest to have all segments represented.

Having thus raised format change to a public interest level, in Citizens Committee we went on to find factual disputes concerning (a) the financial necessity for the format change, (b) the accuracy of interviews with prominent citizens pertaining to the retention of the classical music format, and (c) the extent to which daytime listeners in Atlanta (the city of license) were provided with classical music from a non-Atlanta source. Since the format change was an issue to be considered in determining whether the assignment application was in the public interest, these factual disputes became “substantial and material” and 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970) required a hearing.

Not too surprisingly, Citizens Committee has become the object of dichotomous interpretation. The Commission, on the one hand, recognized Citizens Committee (and subsequently a summary reversal based thereon in Citizens Committee to Preserve the Present Programming of WONO (FM) v. FCC, No. 71-1336 (D.C.Cir. May 13, 1971)) to such an extent that in its Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 680 (1971), it stated:

[A]ny application involving a substantial change in program format— including assignment and transfer applications (where this type of question has usually arisen) and also applications for renewal or major changes in facilities if they involve a basic programming change — will be scrutinized in light of [the Citizens Committee] decision; and applicants should be prepared to support their proposals to change formats in light of the needs and tastes of the community and the types of programming available from other stations. A careful reading of this decision is recommended. (Footnote omitted.)

It is our distinct impression, however, based on the briefs and oral arguments in the case sub judice and Lakewood Broadcasting Service, Inc., et al., v. FCC, 156 U.S.App.D.C. —, 478 F.2d 926 (1973), also issued today, that the Commission desires as limiting an interpretation as is possible. We suspect, not altogether facetiously, that the Commission would be more than willing to limit the precedential effect of Citizens Committee to cases involving Atlanta classical music stations. On the other hand, voices have been heard, see dissenting opinion of Commissioner Johnson in this case, 35 F.C.C.2d at 973, espousing a more liberal interpretation — one holding that any format change diminishing the diversity available automatically gives rise to a hearing.

We treat format changes no differently from any other element affecting public interest. If there are factual disputes, as there were in Citizens Committee, then a hearing must be held. If there are none — for instance the financial viability of the existing format and the alternative sources of that format may be undisputed, so that the Commission is faced only with balancing the competing interests with known and unchallenged factors, and thus determines where the public interest lies— then no hearing is required.

In Hartford Communications Committee v. FCC, supra, we were presented with allegations running to (1) the financial qualifications of a proposed assignee, and (2) diminution of service, issues long considered in the public’s interest, yet we did not grant appellant’s request for a Commission hearing because we found no substantial factual dispute as to those material issues. The dispute concerned the interpretation from a public interest posture to be given the indisputable facts. That determination was for the Commission to make and did not require a hearing. See Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. FCC, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 146, 403 F.2d 169, 171 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930, 89 S.Ct. 1190, 22 L.Ed.2d 459 (1969). An identical procedure is applicable for format change considerations. When we say that a format change is of public interest proportions we mean that it must be considered by the Commission in its ultimate determination of public interest, and thus will be an element scrutinized by this court when called upon to exercise its review. If none of the issues pertaining to the format change are substantially in dispute, however, no hearing need be held.

Thus, the proposed format change before us should have been surveyed by the Commission, and we must look to the record to determine if any substantial and material issues of fact are present,

III.

The Commission’s decision views “the facts here as very much analogous to those which were before the Commission in WCAB, Inc., 21 RR2d 146, 27 FCC2d 743 (1971).” 35 F.C.C.2d at 970. In WCAB, however, there was no dispute that under a “progressive rock” format the licensee had suffered and continued to suffer serious financial losses. In addition, there was no dispute that an alternative source of the format, WZMF (FM) licensed to Menomonie Falls, Wisconsin, was available to Milwaukee area residents. Those issues are disputed here.

While it is true that financial difficulties were experienced under the “country and western” and “golden oldies” format, appellant has produced numerous affidavits of station employees and sales personnel to the effect that the “progressive rock” format was rapidly achieving financial viability. Hooper surveys for November-December, 1971, and January-February, 1972, showed substantial audience gains during all programming segments, and the station had risen to middle ranking in the twelve station market between 3:00 p. m. and 12:00 p. m. More importantly, the rate card was adjusted upward from $2.80 per sixty second announcement to $14.00, and a “no cut” policy was adopted and faithfully observed. The financial losses of the licensee under the prior formats are relevant, inter alia, to suspension of the “three year rule,” but not directly to the format change aspect of the public interest determination. The question is not whether the licensee is in such dire financial straits that an assignment should be granted, but whether the format is so economically unfeasible that an assignment encompassing a format change should be granted. WCAB represented a case of known economic un-feasibility. Contrariwise, here there exists a legitimate dispute concerning the viability of a “progressive rock” format, and the past difficulties under other formats are only minimally relevant. As appellant aptly points out in its brief, “[t]he question before the Commission is not whether WGLN (FM)’s prior format was profitable in the past, but whether progressive rock as a format has been, and is now, ‘economically feasible.’ ”

The supposed WCAB analogy is equally inapplicable from an alternative source viewpoint. While two “top forty” formats now service the Toledo area there has been no showing, at least on the record, that an alternative source of “progressive rock” is available. The implied Commission assertion that one is available — through reference to WCAB, and by the nunc pro tunc assertion in the Memorandum Opinion and Order denying appellant’s motion for stay, August 8, 1972, that “Toledo presently has two stations utilizing a ‘Top Forty’ entertainment format which, though not devoted exclusively to petitioners’ tastes, include some ‘progressive rock’ music” —is in the face of contrary allegations by the appellant that raise material issues of fact which must be explored in a hearing. We deal here with format, not occasional duplication of selections.

Finally, the Commission attempts to support its conclusion by reference to the fact that WGLN (FM) is the only station licensed to Sylvania, that we stated in Citizens Committee that “if there were only one radio channel available to Atlanta” the result therein might have been different, 436 F.2d at 269, and that the vast majority of petition signatures were those of Toledo rather than Sylvania residents.

WGLN (FM)’s city of license is its primary obligation. In considering the needs of the community it must stress those of Sylvania and program accordingly. A licensee’s obligations do not end there, however, and a secondary obligation exists .to satisfy the demands of the surrounding environs. Recognition of this requirement can be seen in Twin States’ application for construction and license, discussed earlier, and in the survey of community leaders. The survey contained in the assignee’s application, for example, compiled the results of interviews with eleven Toledo and five Oregon residents, six residents of other suburban communities, and thirty-five Sylvania residents. To the extent that WGLN (FM) secondarily serves Sylvania’s neighbors, it is secondarily responsible to them.

More importantly, however, is the degree to which Sylvania is served by the area’s other radio stations. WGLN (FM) may be the only channel licensed to Sylvania, but the availability of the multitude of other stations has a distinct bearing upon the format change determination before the Commission. Thus, in WCAB an alternative source available in Menomonie Falls eased the way for the format change of a Wauwa-tosa station serving the entire Milwaukee metropolitan area. Likewise, in Citizens Committee we remanded for a hearing to determine the extent to which a non-Atlanta station provided an alternative source of a “classical music” format for Atlanta residents. We realize that the fewer the radio sources the more the tastes of the majority must be recognized, and that some easy listening format could represent the greatest good for the greatest number. Nonetheless, when considering the “greatest good” in this case we cannot ignore the multitude of non-Sylvania stations serving the Syl-vania residents.

The Commission’s reasoning contains an interesting, if unacceptable, inconsistency. The Commission marks Sylvania as the sole city of license in an effort to support its failure to consider the petition signatures of non-Sylvania residents, and to support its disapproval of a specialized format; yet when the issue of alternative listening sources is raised it quickly points to two “top forty” formats offered by stations not licensed to Sylvania. Equally important, of course, is the fact that significant numbers of Sylvania residents did petition for retention of the “progressive rock” format. All things considered, a significant minority of those whom WGLN (FM) was obligated to serve desired retention of the apparently unique format. Change of the format became an issue for the Commission and a hearing was required regarding the disputed facts: alternative sources and economic feasibility. The Commission’s failure to recognize its obligation mandates this remand.

If no objection is raised to a format change the Commission may properly assume that the format is acceptable and, so long as all else is in order, it may grant the application. When the public grumbling reaches significant proportions, as here and in Citizens Committee, the format change becomes an issue for resolution and hearing procedures are applicable if issues of fact are in dispute. Questions regarding the extent of support for the format themselves may be material, and if substantial then the proper procedure is either a survey of the area residents or a hearing on the issue. Once the factual disputes are exposed and a hearing held the Commission’s decision regarding the public interest must be reasoned and based upon substantial evidence. Failure to hold a required hearing or failure to render a reasoned decision will be, as always, reversible error. No more is required, no less is accepted.

We recognize that in reviewing the Commission’s determinations, even as to whether a hearing should be held, our scope of review is limited. See West Michigan Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 396 F.2d 688 (1968), and Southwestern Operating Co. v. FCC, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 137, 351 F.2d 834 (1965). The failure to hold eviden-tiary hearings herein simply cannot pass muster even under the limited test we impose, and so the Commission’s order granting the assignment application of WGLN (FM) and denying appellant’s Petition for Reconsideration is

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      . We reject appellant’s argument that the Commission erred in refusing to order a hearing to determine whether the assignee of WGLN (FM) misrepresented its programming plans to its employees and the community of license in order to forestall protests.

      . The channel applied for, 288A, was assigned to the city of Toledo. 47 C.F.R. § 73.202(b). It was available for use at Sylvania, however, pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 73.203(b), the “25 mile rule.” The “rule” was amended effective June 4, 1968. See 33 Fed.Reg. 6663 (May 1, 1968).

      . The application for license renewal was filed on July 6, 1970, and stated at Exhibit 2A, in response to Part 1, Section IV(A), sentence (1) (A) (2) of the application : “The principal community served by the station is the community of Sylvania, Ohio (population 5,137), and the surrounding county of Lucas, Ohio (population 456,931), including the city of Toledo, Ohio (population 365,000).” Renewal was granted effective October 29, 1970 through October 1, 1973.

      . The licensee experienced an operating cash profit of $2,036.00 in 1969, a loss of $27,072.00 in 1970, and a loss of $21,901.00 during the first six months of 1971. Jt.App. at 84.

      . Jt.App. at 24. We agree with the (2om-mission that the similarity between a “golden oldies” and “middle of the road” format voids appellant’s argument that this is a misrepresentation. See Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., 35 F.C.C.2d 969, 972 (1972).

      . It makes no practical difference whether an adequate listening alternative is considered one of many elements (although undoubtedly the most important, and normally the conclusive element) to be considered by the Commission, or as a factor that renders inapplicable the entire Citizens Committee rationale. In either instance, the presence and adequacy of the alternative source is a material issue. See Keyes Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 32, 38 (1971) :
      It has been fully demonstrated that other stations serving the community of Canton carry substantially the same entertainment format as that presently carried by WNYN-FM and that, in consequence, its proposed change of format will not result in the elimination of the only station providing “quiet pool” entertainment fare. The assignee proposes contemporary popular music and standard popular music from the past. Thus, there is considerable doubt whether the doctrine of the Citizens’ Committee Case even comes into play. However, even if the doctrine of that case were to be applied. here, the application establishes beyond a doubt that the assignee’s proposals, as described above, are designed to serve the needs and interests of Canton and that the tastes of Canton for entertainment programming will continue to be met. (Footnote omitted.)

        See also Biola Schools and Colleges, Inc., 29 F.C.C.2d 787 (1971).

      . This assumes, of course, that a “significant minority” voices support for the format to be discontinued. De minimis non cwrant arbitri, but neither may the Commission ignore a minority’s petitions nor should it establish a quantitative minimum. Each situation is different and should be treated as such. Certainly the degree of support for retention of a unique format can be of critical importance in what otherwise are “close cases.”

      . We assume that all other issues relevant to the format change determination are likewise undisputed.

      . “Unchallenged” is tempered with ac-knowledgement that “ [c] ontradictory allegations and affidavits which create some possibly unresolved factual issue do not invariably necessitate an evidentiary hearing before the Commission can judge whether an assignment would be in the public interest.” Broadcast Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 390 F.2d 483, 485 (1968).

      . See Lakewood Broadcasting Service, Inc. et al., 156 U.S.App.D.C.—, 478 F.2d 919 (1973).

      . See affidavit of Dorian Paster, Jt.App. at 150, 155, 157, which was included with appellant’s Petition for Reconsideration.

      . See affidavit of Charles Schmitt, former sales manager for WGLN (FM), Jt.App. at 164, 166, which was included with appellant’s Petition for Reconsideration. See also affidavit of Richard Bird, Jr., former public affairs director for WGLN (FM), Jt.App. at 176. The affidavits submitted with appellant’s Petition for Reconsideration generally speak of the improved status of WGLN (FM) since the adoption of the “progressive rock” format, but also contain statements indicating that the station was not as financially sound as it should be, or would be in the future.

      . 47 C.F.R. § 1.597 (a) provides that unless the “assignor . . . has made an affirmative factual showing, supported by affidavits of a person or persons with personal knowledge thereof, which establishes that (due to unavailability of capital . . .) Commission consent to the proposed assignment or transfer of control will serve the public interest, convenience and necessity,” then if the station involved in a proposed assignment “has been operated by the proposed assignor . . . for less than three successive years, the application will be designated for hearing” pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970). The test is generally whether the assignor has made a sufficient showing that he is not “trafficking in broadcast licenses.” 35 F.C.C.2d at 972.

      . It is possible, although not probable, that a licensee could suffer such financial losses under prior formats that a newly found profitable format will be too little too late. In the event that no purchaser can be found willing to program the new economically feasible format (equally unlikely), and the public is thus faced with abandonment of the- channel altogether, the financial losses of the licensee under prior formats would have to be considered relevant to the format change determination.

      . Brief for Appellant at 32.

      . At oral argument reference was made by counsel for the Commission and Inter-venor to a new “progressive rock” station servicing the Toledo metropolitan area. This is a matter for the Commission’s consideration cn remand.

      . The Commission’s original decision was released on June 30, 1972, and is reported at 35 F.C.C.2d 969. Later, on August 8, 1972, Commissioners Robert E. Lee and H. Rex Lee, “acting as a Board,” adopted an opinion and order denying appellant’s motion for stay of the effective date of the Commission’s earlier order. Jt.App. at 288. In this second opinion the Commission for the first time distinguished the Citizens Committee case on the grounds that WGLN (FM) was Syl-vania’s only station, and that alternative sources of “progressive rock” were available. Appellant contends that this second opinion and order cannot be considered when reviewing the Commission decision to grant the application. We find the Commission decision defective even if we consider the reasons set out in the second opinion, and so we need not decide the issue.

      . Appellant circulated petitions with the following heading:
      We the people of the community know [sic] as Toledo, Ohio:
      Protest the elimination of programming dedicated to progressive rock and public affairs serving our community as formerly presented by station WGLN-FM. We the citizens oppose the approval of transfer of frequency 105.5 FM to Lewis Dickey, president of Midwestern Broadcasting and owner of WOHO-AM.
      We feel the interest of the public will best be served by an independent broadcaster using the same broadcasting principles established by WGLN prior to the takeover and elimination by Midwestern Broadcasting.
      Petition sponsored by Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock!
      Jt.App. at 187. Appellant asserts that 11,122 signatures “from the greater Toledo, Ohio, area” have been submitted to the Commission. Despite the language of the heading it is clear from the record that the petitions did include signatures of non-Toledo residents, although the exact number is questioned. Appellant stated in its Reply Brief in the Commission proceedings, Jt.App. at 237, that “a substantial percentage of the signers are residents of Sylvania,” and submitted with its Reply Brief the signatures of 188 additional Sylvania residents.

      . See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 682, question #6 (1971) :
      Question: Is an applicant expected to ascertain community problems outside the community of license?
      Answer: Yes. Of course, an applicant’s principal obligation is to ascertain the problems of his community of license. But he should also ascertain the problems of the other communities that he undertakes to serve, as set forth in his response to Question 1(a) (2) of Section IV-A or IV-B .... If an applicant chooses not to serve a major community that falls within his service contours a showing must be submitted explaining why. However, no major city more than 75 miles from the transmitter site need be included in the applicant’s ascertainment, even if the station’s contours exceed that distance.

      . See text at note 2 supra, and text of note 3 supra.

      . See note 18 supra.

      . Tlie Commission stated, 35 F.C.C.2d at 971 n. 3:
      It should be noted that WGLN did not have a “Progressive Bock” format when assignee contracted to buy it or when the assignment application was filed. Certainly assignee should not be held responsible for the continuation of a format which was not in existence when it filed its application. This factor clearly distinguishes this case from the decision in Citizens Committee (WGKA) v. FCC, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 436 F.2d 263 (1970) and where the Court found that there was a substantial question as to whether the stations were operating at a loss.
      We find, as did Commissioner Johnson in his dissent, that the time of adoption of the “progressive rock” format is “a distinction without a difference,” 35 F.C.C.2d at 974 n. 2:
      The majority attempts to distinguish this case from Citizens by pointing out that the current format was not adopted until after Midwestern contracted to buy the station, or even until after the application for approval of the purchase was filed. While this may be a distinction between this case and Citizens, it is a distinction without a difference. The relevant question is still whether, given what we know about the current operation of the station and the proposed future operation, the assignment is in the public interest.
      Naturally the length of time that a specific format has been on the air is a factor to be considered in the ultimate public interest determination, for it can have a direct bearing on the degree of attachment which the public has to the unique format. It is also relevant to determinations of economic feasibility. See WCAB, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 743, 746 n. 7 (1971), and Note, The Public Interest in Balanced Programming Content: The Case for FCC Regulation of Broadcasters’ Format Changes, 40 Geo.Wash. L.Rev. 933 (1972).

      . Again, Commissioner Johnson dissenting, 35 F.C.C.2d at 974: “Normally, when a station proposes to change a format, it is a matter between it and its community. If no one objects, the Commission assumes — and properly so — that the new format is acceptable.”

      . We see no greater difficulty in characterizing “progressive rock” as a format than that present in the characterization of “classical music” as such. See Citizens Committee v. FCC, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 436 F.2d 263, 265 n. 1 (1970).

      . As we stated in West Michigan Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 396 F.2d 688, 691 (1968) :
      Admittedly, the scope of our review is quite narrow; we defer to the expertise and experience of the Commission within its field of specialty and would reverse only where the Commission’s position is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. And it is clear that the decision of when hearings are necessary or desirable to clarify issues is one which lies in the first instance with the Commission. (Citations omitted.)

        See also Hartford Communications Committee v. FCC, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 467 F.2d 408, 411-412 (1972), and the cases cited therein.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    Ethel J. PULLIAM and Amy C. Petty v. Lucious PULLIAM, Appellant.
    No. 71-1604.
    United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
    Argued Nov. 3, 1972.
    Decided May 7, 1973.
    As Amended May 9, 1973.
    Dorsey Evans, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
    A. J. Spero, Washington, D. C., submitted on the brief for appellees.
    Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge, and WYZANSKI, Senior United States District Judge for District of Massachusetts.

       Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 294(d).

   PER CURIAM:

This case involves the court in a procedural debacle of such Byzantine complexity that even Dickens’ Mr. Bumble might find it remarkable. A brief retracing of the labyrinthine progress of this action in the District Court must begin on June 5, 1968, when the plaintiffs filed their complaint for the partition of certain real property. On Sept. 12, 1968, the defendant filed his answer. On Oct. 31, 1969, a default, the first step in a default judgment procedure, was entered against the defendant because neither he nor his attorney appeared at a pre-trial conference. It appears that defendant’s counsel did not receive notice of the hearing until it had been held, because he had moved to a new address, advised plaintiffs’ attorney of the move, and left a forwarding address, but failed to properly apprise the court.

Subsequent to the entry of the default but prior to the entry of the default judgment, the default may be set aside for good cause. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c). Defendant’s counsel filed what he styled a Motion to Reinstate Cause. The document did not refer to rule 55 or any other basis for setting aside the default; it merely recited the reasons for counsel’s failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. The District Court, nonetheless, treated the motion as one to set aside the default and denied it on Feb. 11, 1970.

Generally, the party in whose favor a default has been entered must apply for and the court grant a default judgment.1 The court, in its discretion, may enter the default judgment or allow the case to proceed to a determination on the merits. The plaintiffs did apply for a default judgment on May 22, 1970. In response, defendant, on June 1, filed a Motion to Reconsider Motion to Reinstate the Cause Herein and Motion to Strike Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. This document is rather problematic. There had been no findings of fact or conclusions of law. The motion adopted defendant’s earlier motion, but neither was accompanied by affidavits as to the facts alleged. Nor was the nature of the document readily apparent; again there was no mention of any federal rule as a predicate for the requested relief. We can only assume that the court treated the document as defendant’s opposition to the pending application for a default judgment or as a second set aside motion.

On June 2, the court granted the default judgment, appointed a trustee and ordered the property sold. Some judges may be more hesitant than others to enter a default judgment and thus, perhaps, penalize a client severely for the apparent neglect of his attorney. But the question whether the default judgment was properly entered in this case is not before us, since the defendant did not file a timely appeal from that judgment.

The party suffering a default judgment also has the remedy provided by rules 55(e) and 60. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c) provides that once a default judgment has been entered, the court may “set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b),” which is produced in relevant part below:

(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; [reasons 2-5 are inapplicable] (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

Since a resolution on the merits is preferable to a judgment by default, a court should liberally allow relief under this provision. Rule 60 is meant as a “corrective remedy, mitigating the harsh impact of calendar rules when a litigant’s action is dismissed as a result of counsel’s neglect.” Radack v. Norwegian America Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1963).

On August 6, 1970, defendant, represented by new counsel, filed a document entitled a Motion to Reconsider Motion to Reinstate Cause Herein, Interpreted as Motion to Set Asfde Default. Defendant resolved any doubts as to his intentions when, four days later, he filed a statement of points and authorities indicating that his document should be taken as a motion to set aside the default judgment. Again, however, no supporting affidavits were filed. The motion was denied on Aug. 14, 1970. We need not now become involved in the issue whether the defendant’s default was premised on the excusable neglect of his counsel or whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s rule 60 motion to set aside the default judgment. Defendant had 30 days in which to appeal to this court from that decision. He did not do so. The issue of the default judgment must therefore be taken as settled in this case.

On Jan. 20, 1971, the property still being unsold, plaintiffs moved to stay the trustee proceedings and to enter what they termed another default judgment. Plaintiffs seem to have misconstrued the technical nature of their motion, but its intent was clear — to relieve them from the operation of so much of the court’s June 2 judgment as ordered the property sold. This proceeding could thus properly be viewed as an action for relief from judgment or order, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60.

On Feb. 23, 1971, the court denied plaintiffs’ request to grant relief on an ex parte basis. Plaintiffs’ brief alleges that defendant’s counsel was notified of a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion but nonetheless failed to appear. According to plaintiffs, defendant’s counsel then attempted an “ex parte meeting with [the] judge ... to present proof in support of his claim. That meeting was refused. . . . ”

On May 24, the District Court set aside the June 2 judgment ordering the trustee to sell the property, and, as requested, ordered the defendant to transfer the property to the plaintiffs. The only proceeding properly before this court is the one culminating in this May 24 order. This was also a rule 60 motion, but it was made by the plaintiffs. There is no indication in the record that defendant used this occasion to again invoke the trial judge’s discretion to relieve him from the operation of the default judgment because it was premised on the excusable neglect of his attorney. Rather, the parties seemed to have been concerned with the merits of the suit; but a rule 60 motion does not, of course, bring up the underlying case for review.

Thus, this court is not in a position to review either the merits of the suit, the entry of the default, the entry of the default judgment, or the refusal to set aside the default or the default judgment. The only issue before us is whether the trial judge, on May 24, abused his discretion in ordering the property be transferred rather than sold. Neither party addressed this issue, and this court, on its own investigation, sees no reason for disturbing the decision below.

Affirmed.

      . D.D.C. Local R.Civ.P. 12(b) ; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 16; McGrady v. D’andrea Elec., Inc., 434 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1970).

      . Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b) (2).

      . Since a default is not favored in the law, all doubts should be resolved against entering a default judgment. Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1969). Where the default was a result of counsel’s error, his oversight should be forgiven even if it would not be “excusable neglect” for the purposes of rule 60(b). See, e. g., Bavouset v. Shaw’s of San Francisco, 43 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.Texas 1967).

      . H. F. Livermoore, Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 256, 432 F.2d 689 (1970) ; Thorpe v. Thorpe, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 299, 301, 364 F.2d 692, 694 (1966).

      . Accord, Barber v. Turberville, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 337, 218 F.2d 34, 36 (1954) ; see Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1969) ; Patapoff v. Vollstedt’s, Inc., 267 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1959) ; cf. Denman v. Shubow, 413 F.2d 258 (1st Cir. 1969). For a collection of cases in which a default was set aside on the grounds of excusable neglect of counsel see 6 Moore’s Federal Practice H 55.10(2) n. 11.

      . Fed.R.App.P. 4(a). The time for filing an appeal is not tolled by filing a set aside motion pursuant to rule 60.