author: WIDENER, Circuit Judge:

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Larry James PHIFER, Appellant.
    No. 74-1078.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued Sept. 30, 1974.
    Decided Feb. 7, 1975.

      F. Byron Parker, Jr., Richmond, Va. [Court appointed counsel] (Elmore & Parker, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellant.
    Michael S. Scofield, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Keith S. Snyder, U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.
    Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WIDENER, Circuit Judge.
   WIDENER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal involves the defendant’s right to counsel in a criminal prosecution when his court appointed attorney refused to proceed with the case.

The defendant was arrested on April 20, 1973 and charged with aiding and abetting Thomas Walter Reid in the interstate transportation of money orders knowing them to be falsely made, forged and stolen, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2314 and 2. Brought before a United States Magistrate, he waived his right to counsel at the preliminary hearing but indicated that he would retain private counsel for all subsequent proceedings.

On July 3, 1973, the defendant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. At this time he was represented by Arthur Goodman, who had represented him in the past and agreed to represent him at the arraignment. Further representation by Goodman was, with the consent of the court, made contingent on the defendant retaining him. The court advised the defendant of his right to appointed counsel if he could not afford one. The defendant told the court that he was financially able to employ counsel and that he would employ Mr. Goodman. The court advised the defendant to get busy and make his arrangements with a lawyer.

The trial was scheduled for October 4, 1973. This was advanced to October 1, 1973, at which time Goodman appeared without the defendant. (Apparently due to the advanced trial date the defendant had not received notice). Goodman informed the court that the defendant had not made any arrangements to employ him, had not kept an appointment with him, and asked to be removed as attorney of record. Later that same afternoon, the defendant appeared before the court alone. He told the court he had employed Goodman as his attorney who would represent him at his trial scheduled for October 4.

On October 4, 1973, the case was called for trial and the defendant appeared without counsel. He related his fee discussions with Mr. Goodman, and that he was under the impression that Goodman would represent him. The court ordered a continuance and for Mr. Goodman to be advised that he was going to be required to represent the defendant.

On November 1, 1973 the case was again called for trial and again the defendant appeared without counsel. At this time he informed the court that he could not afford a lawyer. The court ordered counsel to be appointed.

On November 9, 1973, Michael Sheely was appointed to represent the defendant in this matter. Trial was scheduled for November 29, 1973. Sheely by letter dated November 20, 1973 informed the clerk that the defendant had failed to keep three appointments and asked for a continuance.

The case was heard on November 29, 1973. At this late time Sheely formally moved for a continuance to allow him time to prepare for trial and to receive the results of private handwriting experts’ examination of the evidence. The court denied the motion on the basis that the defendant had obtained several continuances due to his failure to employ a lawyer and had had sufficient time to prepare if he had acted with due diligence. Sheely then attempted to withdraw from the case. The court informed Sheely that he would be required to represent the defendant and that any flaws in that defense due to lack of trial preparation were the defendant’s fault, not Sheely’s. Sheely still refused to continue. The court then allowed Sheely to leave the courtroom and proceeded to trial without any defense counsel, holding that defendant had waived his right to counsel.

The defendant was convicted and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. From this conviction he appeals, urging that requiring him to proceed with the trial without an attorney was a denial of his right to counsel. We reverse.

The conduct of a defendant in failing either to retain counsel or to avail himself of his right to court appointed counsel, if he were indigent, may make him solely responsible for any lack of trial preparation on the part of his counsel. See United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182, 210 (4th Cir. 1968). While the issue is not squarely before us, it is obvious that the defendant had ample time and opportunity to make arrangements for counsel and any expert testimony that was required. By choosing such a course, he lost any claim of abuse of discretion in the court’s denying the continuance.

But the failure to continue the case is not the issue here. The matter before us is whether or not the trial judge should have permitted Sheely to withdraw from the case and the courtroom and proceed with the trial in his absence.

Of course it was the right and the duty of the defendant’s attorney to inform the court if he were not prepared and to ask for a continuance. However, zealous advocacy does not require, nor does the Code of Professional Responsibility permit an attorney to abandon his client and refuse to continue when the court has ruled adversely to his motion. Sheely should not have withdrawn from the case and left the courtroom. Nor should he have been permitted so to do. His conduct was quite inexcusable and thoroughly unprofessional.

Attempts by defendants to delay trial or otherwise frustrate the judicial system by endless delays to seek new counsel or last minute discharge of counsel have not been approved by this court and nothing in this opinion should be so construed. This does not mean that a defendant, however recalcitrant and uncooperative, must be bound by the misconduct of his attorney in abandoning his case. The faulty conduct of Sheely lends no support to requiring the defendant to bear the burden of trial without counsel. The defendant did not discharge Sheely, and there is no indication either on or off the record that he approved of Sheely’s departure. We are unable to say he waived his right to counsel. To proceed with the trial in the absence of the defendant’s attorney was error. FRCrP 44(a).

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

      . “A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.” American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7.

      . “(1) If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a proceeding before that tribunal without its permission. (2) In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules.” American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-110.

      . United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Lisk, 454 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Pigford, 461 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1973).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    PEOPLE OF the STATE OF CALIFORNIA ex rel. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, Petitioner, v. The ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, and Russell E. Train, as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Respondents. STATE OF WASHINGTON and its Department of Ecology, Petitioners, v. The ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY and Russell E. Train, as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, United States of America, Respondents.
    Nos. 73-2466, 73-2486 and 74-1189.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Feb. 13, 1975.
    Certiorari Granted June 23, 1975.
    See 95 S.Ct. 2655.

      Roderick Walston, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued) San Francisco, Cal., Charles B. Roe, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Olympia, Wash., for petitioners.
    Raymond W. Mushal (argued), Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for respondents.

       Of the District of Oregon.

   OPINION

Before WRIGHT and CHOY, Circuit Judges and BURNS, District Judge.'

EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

Are federal agencies and enclaves within California and Washington required to comply with state procedural requirements with respect to control of water pollution? We hold that they are and we direct the respondent administrator to proceed accordingly and to reconsider the application of the state agencies of Washington and California.

Section 313 of the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [hereinafter “the Act,” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. II, 1972)] directs that federal agencies “shall comply with State . . . requirements respecting control and abatement of pollution.” But the issue before us is whether federal agencies should submit to the procedural requirements for securing discharge permits which state regulatory bodies may impose on local dis-chargers under section 402 of the statute, which is also sometimes referred to as the Clean Water Act.

Section 402 of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1342] established the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System [hereinafter NPDES]. Thereunder, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter “the Administrator”] is delegated the initial responsibility for issuing permits for discharges of pollutants into the navigable waters of the United States.

The Act contemplates, however, that the states will assume primary responsibility for operation of the NPDES permit system. Section 402(b) of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)] provides for approval by the Administrator of state-submitted permit programs which are adequate to ensure compliance with the federal standards set out in the Act. After approving a state program, the Administrator is required to suspend his issuance of discharge permits “as to those navigable waters subject to [that state’s] program.” Section 402(c)(1) of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1)],

Petitioners (California and Washington) challenged the Administrator’s limited approval of their proposed permit programs in original actions authorized by Section 509(b)(1)(D) of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(D)], Both states claim error because the Administrator’s approval exempted federal agencies and instrumentalities from compliance with their proposed permit programs. We ordered the cases consolidated for purposes of the government’s briefing and' oral argument.

We have determined that the interpretation advanced by petitioners, that the Act provides for state regulation of federal as well as state dischargers, is correct. Hence we declare invalid those portions of 40 C.F.R. 125.2(b) that exclude federal facilities discharging pollutants into navigable waters from compliance with any state permit program operating under NPDES. We direct the Environmental Protection Agency and its Administrator to include henceforth in any otherwise approvable permit program submitted to it by the governors of the States of Washington or California, the authority to issue permits for all discharges by federal facilities within their respective jurisdictions.

A. THE STATUTE.

Modern federal legislation in the area of water pollution control began in 1948 with the enactment of the initial version of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155. The Act was amended in 1956, 1965, 1966, and 1970 as well as in 1972, each set of amendments seeking to establish a more comprehensive and effective national system for encouraging and coordinating regulation of waste discharges into the nation’s waters.

At the same time, all successive versions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act have reflected a consistent federal policy that the primary responsibility and right to control water pollution lies with the states. See generally S.Rep.No.92-414, 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 3668, 3669-3670. As a corollary, the federal role has primarily been viewed as one of supporting and assisting state efforts in this area. See id. Section 21(a) of the 1970 amendments to the Act (collectively dubbed the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub.L. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91) applied this policy of primary state responsibility for water pollution control to federal agency dischargers. It required federal agencies having jurisdiction over properties, or engaged in public works activities, to comply with “applicable water quality standards” as well as with the more general pollution abating purposes behind the legislation.

In reporting favorably what became the House version of the 1970 amendments, the House Committee on Public Works noted that Section 21(a) would require federal agencies to take “immediate and appropriate steps to insure compliance with applicable Federal, State and local water quality standards subject to the availability of appropriations and the needs of the United States.” H.R.Rep.No.91-127, 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 2691, 2736-2737.

The final bill which emerged from conference removed any discretion based on availability of appropriations, and thus required compliance by federal agencies subject only to “the paramount interest of the United States as determined by the President.” Id. at 2740. The interpretation of Section 21(a) suggested by this legislative history (that federal agencies must comply with local pollution abatement standards and guidelines “unless and until the President may determine otherwise”) was judicially approved in California v. Davidson, 3 E.R.C. 1157, 1158 (N.D.Cal.1971) (refusing to dismiss an action by the State of California against the Army’s commanding general at Fort Ord, seeking injunctive relief and damages for the installation’s violation of the state’s waste discharge limitations).

Section 21(a) was replaced in 1972 by Section 313 of the 1972 Amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 1323, which set out the compliance requirement for federal agencies in the following language:

Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge or runoff of pollutants shall comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements respecting control and abatement of pollution to the same extent that any person is subject to such requirements, including the payment of reasonable service charges. The President may exempt any effluent source of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance with any such a requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of the United States to do so; except that no exemption may be granted from the requirements of section 1316 or 1317 of this title. No such exemptions shall be granted due to lack of appropriation unless the President shall have specifically requested such appropriation as a part of the budgetary process and the Congress shall have failed to make available such requested appropriation.

The legislative history behind Section 313 shows that Congress considered that section “similar to one in existing law.” S.Rep.No.92-414, 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 3733. Several supplementary affidavits submitted by petitioner State of California indicate that some federal installations may in fact be refusing in certain instances to comply with water quality standards established by state administrative boards. However, respondents are willing to concede, at least in principle, that Section 313 does command deference to the substantive effluent limitations and standards promulgated by states pursuant to the Act.

In determining whether Section 313 commands a like federal deference to procedures for obtaining state NPDES permits, California v. Davidson, supra, may again be of some guidance. In that case District Judge Weigel held that California’s assertion that the Army had refused to bring one of its facilities into compliance with “requirements” promulgated by a California regional water quality control board stated a good cause of action for injunctive relief under Section 21(a) of the 1970 amendments to the Act [the former 33 U.S.C. § 1171(a) (1970)]. Since the regional boards determine “substantive” requirements applicable to specific waste discharges via administrative hearings which are ordinarily participated in by the discharger, the inference might be drawn that Section 21(a) required compliance with state administrative procedures as well.

Any such inference that federal agencies must comply with “procedural” as well as substantive state discharge permit requirements could only be strengthened by the language of the section of the 1972 amendments which replaced Section 21(a), considered in Davidson. Section 21(a) had required only that federal agencies comply with “applicable water quality standards,” without specifying whether compliance was limited to the substantive content of the “standards” referred to, and without specifying whether those standards included state standards. Section 313 changed the word “standards” to “requirements,” and expressly made reference to “State” and “local” requirements.

B. CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR A STATUTORY WAIVER OF EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION.

Standing by itself, however, this reasoning would be insufficient to allow us to conclude that the Act requires federal agencies to comply with procedures for obtaining permits under state programs satisfying the criteria of Section 402(b). Our ability to reach such a determination is limited by the plenary powers clause (U.S.Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17), which gives Congress exclusive legislative authority over federal enclaves. It is further limited by the supremacy clause (U.S.Const. Art. VI, cl. 2), according to which federal law cannot be subordinated to state regulation within the areas of Congress’ exclusive legislative powers.

It is, of course, well established that Congress may waive exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the activities of federal enclaves in deference to state regulation of those activities, at least so long as in doing so it does not undermine its ultimate legislative control over these areas. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263, 83 S.Ct. 426, 9 L.Ed.2d 292 (1963); United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 78 S.Ct. 291, 2 L.Ed.2d 282 (1958). See also Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 63 S.Ct. 1137, 87 L.Ed. 1504 (1943); Maun v. United States, 347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1965).

But waivers of exclusive federal jurisdiction, like waivers of sovereign immunity, are to be strictly construed. Cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949). In order for us to hold in favor of petitioners, therefore, we must find that the claimed waiver of exclusive federal jurisdiction is clear and unambiguous, and also that it is not unduly broad or irrevocable.

C. THE SCOPE OF THE CLAIMED WAIVER.

Respondents point to the language of the plenary powers clause itself in arguing that Congress cannot delegate to states the authority to regulate federal facilities. On this point, however, we find persuasive the language in a recent case, Illinois v. Department of Defense, Civil No. 73 C 2081 (N.D.Ill, July 18, 1974) (unpublished memorandum filed with court by respondents):

The Plenary Powers Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockyards and other needful Buildings.” The defendants argue that the term “exclusive” means literally that the States cannot be permitted to exercise any power in regard to these enclaves. In support thereof they cite three dictionary definitions of the meaning of the word, “exclusive,” which is inappropriate. This reliance is ill founded, for while literal meanings may be helpful, they hardly measure the breadth or historical significance of the clauses of the Constitution.

Id., at 5.

A delegation to the states of permit-issuing authority over federal agencies would, to be sure, involve the states to a far greater extent in the regulatory process than would an incorporation of their evolving substantive standards into federal law (the type of legislation upheld in United States v. Sharpnack, supra). However, Paul, supra, 371 U.S. at 263, 83 S.Ct. 426, clearly indicates that states may engage in actual regulatory activities if allowed by specific Congressional action. This would seem a natural extension of the power of Congress to delegate substantive lawmaking authority as in Sharpnack. As the Supreme Court noted in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542, 72 S.Ct. 525, 535, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952), “Congress can only legislate so far as is reasonable and practicable, and must leave to executive officers the authority to accomplish its purpose.”

The Congressional purpose behind the Water Pollution Control Act is clear: “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” [33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).] The strong state interest in controlling pollution has been recognized by the Supreme Court, see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104, 107, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972), as well as in the Act itself, see Section 101(b) of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)].

Thus any delegation of permit-issuing responsibilities under the Act would merely involve “the selection of an alternative means for achieving the purposes of the Act.” Illinois v. Department of Defense, supra, at 7. Since Congress has the power to subject federal agencies to substantive state standards, see United States v. Sharpnack, supra, we can see no reason why Congress cannot utilize state regulatory bodies to certify whether the affected agencies are in compliance with those standards.

Several limitations embodied in the Act itself demonstrate Congress’ efforts to ensure that the Act’s grant of permit-issuing authority to the states, under Section 402(b), could in no way undermine the federal government’s ultimate power over its own instrumentalities and over interstate commerce by the constitutional grant of authority over these areas to Congress. First, the Act in no way seeks to limit Congress’ ability to reassert exclusive control over the affected federal areas. Nor does it seem that in practice Congress would be politically compelled to retain the Act in its present form, if states attempted significant incursions into the federal prerogative.

Secondly, Section 402(b) allows the Administrator to withhold or withdraw approval of state programs which do not meet clearly defined guidelines set out in Section 402(a) of the Act. Finally, as noted previously, Section 313 allows the President to exempt any effluent source from the provisions of the Act, where for any reason (other than a lack of appropriated funds) he deems it in the paramount national interest that a source not be covered. Section 313 of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1323],

D. THE CLARITY OF THE WAIVER.

Having determined that Congress had the power to compel agencies within its “exclusive” legislative jurisdiction to seek state discharge permits, we now consider whether it acted in a sufficiently unequivocal manner for us to conclude that it clearly intended to do so. See, e. g., United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969). We find the language of waiver sufficiently clear and free from ambiguity.

Both sides point to the Act’s legislative history as supportive of their respective positions. However, it is admitted that that part of the record pertaining to Section 313 is silent as to the meaning of that section’s “shall comply with State . . . requirements” admonition.

Nor do we find any other legislative history surrounding the Act which conclusively establishes whether Congress did or did not intend to distinguish between substantive and procedural requirements in defining the federal agency compliance duty with state permit programs. “Confronted with this ambiguity, we rely on the words of [Section 313], the scheme of the Act as a whole, and what we discern to be the Congressional purpose, as the best guides to interpreting the section.” Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussed infra).

If taken in isolation, certain parts of the legislative history would seem to indicate that the “requirements” language of Section 313 refers simply and solely to substantive water quality standards. For example, the committee report accompanying the House version of the Act stated:

This section [Section 313] requires that Federal facilities meet the same effluent limitations, other limitations, performance standards, toxic effluent standards and thermal discharge regulations as private sources of pollution, unless the Federal facility is specifically exempted by the President.

However, the last clause in the sentence containing the disputed “requirements” language would seem to indicate that the above legislative history of Section 313 should be viewed as a mere summary of the Act’s major provisions, and not taken as dispositive of Congressional intent. That clause requires federal agencies to comply with state requirements respecting pollution control and abatement just as any other discharger, “including the payment of reasonable service charges.”

Respondents contend that these “reasonable service charges” refer to those for state and local sewage treatment hookups. We disagree. Although the legislative history of Section 313 is silent regarding the meaning of the “reasonable service charges” language, it seems the better interpretation is to read it as referring to charges incident to state permit programs. Even if we were to read the word “requirements” in Section 313 to mean “effluent standards and limitations,” as respondents contend we should, interpreting the “reasonable service charge” language to refer to municipal waste disposal charges would create a non sequitur.

Moreover, interpreting “reasonable service charges” to refer to charges associated with state permit programs would be in accord with the canon of statutory construction that, where language in a statute can be given two possible interpretations, that interpretation should be chosen which does not render the language meaningless. Although a state’s taxing power cannot operate within the confines of a federal enclave without the consent of the United States, Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Cocreham, 390 F.2d 34, 35 (5th Cir. 1968), no serious contention has ever been made that subordinate governmental bodies must supply public utility services to federal agencies free of normal user charges. Hence, there would be no need for Congress to explicitly direct federal agencies to pay their full share of municipal sewer system costs. On the other hand, any permit program charges might be sufficiently in the nature of a tax that specific federal consent would be required before they could be certified as “properly payable” federal obligations.

Reading “reasonable service charges” to mean charges for administering state permit programs finds some support in past state administrative practices as well. Among the federal applicants for waste discharge “requirements” from California’s regional water quality control boards, several have paid the filing fees required by state law. (The State of Washington assesses no fee for processing discharge permit applications under the Act.) Congress may have been aware of this sporadic record of compliance, and have sought to ensure that in the future federal agencies would uniformly contribute their full share to the cost of processing their applications under state permit programs.

Section 313 also requires federal agencies to comply with state pollution control requirements “to the same extent that any person is subject to such requirements.” Hence, the extent of the federal agency compliance duty can only be gauged from the type of program that section 402 of the Act demands that states institute for private dischargers.

Sections 402(a)(1) and 402(a)(2) of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) and (2)] sketch the type of state permit scheme contemplated by Congress. They provide for the imposition of “conditions” on permits. Such conditions can realistically be expected to be developed only in the type of administrative proceeding in which the permit requirements can be tailored to the specific discharger. Since this type of administrative proceeding requires cooperation by the dis-charger in order to be effective, an interpretation of Section 313, which did not compel federal agencies to comply with the procedural requirements of state permit programs would also jeopardize their conceded duty to comply with the substance of state water pollution control efforts.

In other words, without federal agency participation in the regular state administrative process, it would be difficult to determine what substantive standards were properly applicable. Consequently, unless they are forced to seek discharge permits like any other dischargers, federal agencies will not be complying with state requirements — substantive or procedural — “to the same extent that any person is subject to such requirements,” thus undermining the purpose of Section 313.

We have already noted, however, the Administrator’s apparent concession that federal agencies are bound by “substantive” state requirements. It is therefore possible that his position is not that federal agencies may bypass state administrative processes, but only that after all effluent standards and limitations have been determined for a federal discharger, it is up to the Administrator and-not the states to issue the permit incorporating these standards.

This interpretation of Section 313’s command should also be rejected. When we are faced with two alternative readings of an act, we should be reluctant to attribute to Congress a conscious choice in favor of the less efficient one, at least when there is no constitutional compulsion to do so. This is especially the case, when we consider the admonition of Section 101(f) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(f):

It is the national policy that to the maximum extent possible the procedures utilized for implementing this chapter shall encourage the drastic minimization of paperwork and interagency decision procedures, and the best use of available manpower and funds, so ^s to prevent needless duplication and unnecessary delays at all levels of government.

As with Section 402, Section 510 of the Water Pollution Control Act has no counterpart in the Clean Air language construed in Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus, 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974), and California v. Stastny, 4 E.R.C. 1447 (C.D.Cal. 1972), appeal pending, 9th Circuit No. 72-2905. Section 510 provides:

State authority
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that if an effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance is in effect under this chapter; such State or political subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance which is less stringent \han the effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance under this chapter; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States.

The above language undercuts respondents’ theory that “effluent limitations” and “requirements” were meant to be considered interchangeable terms within the framework of the Water Pollution Control Act. It specifically distinguishes between a “standard” or “limitation” respecting discharges of pollutants, in subdivision (1)(A), and a “requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution” in (1)(B).

Moreover, Section 510 implicitly grants to states the right to develop more stringent standards than the Administrator might apply to a federal agency discharger. Thus, even if Section 313 were held to require federal agencies to seek permits from the Administrator rather than from the states, Section 510 would compel compliance with those state standards which were stricter than the Administrator’s. But as noted above, Section 510 would in practice be rendered ineffectual by such an interpretation for state permit program compliance is essential both to establishment of discharge standards and to detection of discharge violations.

Considered in the light of Sections 402 and 510, other sections in the Act afford added support to petitioners’ interpretation of the term “requirements” in Section 313, though the significance of each would have been less certain apart from these two sections. For example, several provisions of the Act use the terms “effluent limitations” and “standards” in a very precise sense. Other sections expressly exempt federal agencies from their requirements. And one section, Section 404 of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1344], sets up a separate permit program, run by the Secretary of the Army rather than by the states, for discharges of dredged or fill material into navigable waters. Consequently, it would appear that the reference in Section 313 to federal agency compliance with state “requirements,” was purposeful and artistic, and was meant to refer to those requirements which state administrative agencies might adopt under their express Section 402 authorizations.

This view is supported by Section 505(f) of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)], which also shows that the Act’s drafters meant to draw a distinction between the two terms. Section 505(f) explicitly distinguishes between an “effluent standard or limitation” and other types of “limitation” or “standard,” on the one hand, and a “requirement applicable by reason of section 313” on the other.

It is true that other courts are in disagreement as to what effect should be given language in the Clean Air Act of 1970 [42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1970)], portions of which are substantially identical to the language of Section 313 and of several other sections of the 1972 Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Compare Alabama v. Seeber, supra, with Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus, 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974), and California v. Stastny, supra. At issue in those cases was whether Section 118 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. § 1857f], which lacks only the “reasonable service charges” language of Section 313, requires federal agencies to seek state permits for air pollutant emissions.

In Seeber, the majority relied on Section 118 to hold unjustified the refusal of TVA and Army officials to apply for such permits. This was contrary to the prior holdings in California v. Stastny and Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus. In the Kentucky case, a unanimous Sixth Circuit panel had refused to order various TVA and other federal officials to seek state permits before operating air polluting equipment. The Kentucky court found “no congressional intent to subject federal instrumentalities and agencies to state administrative regulations,” and concluded that:

In the absence of a clear congressional purpose to subject federal agencies to state regulation, the district court was prevented by the Supremacy Clause from granting the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff.

Id. at 1176. In Stastny, the district court arrived at the same conclusion in a short memorandum decision.

We do not feel compelled to anticipate this court’s ruling on the appeal in Stastny by adopting either the Fifth or the Sixth Circuit’s position. We recognize the strong structural and terminological similarities between the Clean Air Act and the 1972 Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Moreover, it seems likely that these similarities were intentional. Nevertheless, we feel that our conclusion — that Section 318 requires full federal agency compliance with state water pollutant discharge permit programs — would not be inconsistent with either an affirmance or a reversal of the district court’s decision in Stastny.

As we have noted, the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments do contain significant provisions indicating a waiver of exclusive federal jurisdiction for which no counterparts are to be found in the Clean Air Act. The “reasonable service charges” clause of Section 313, the permit program of Section 402, and Section 510, containing the Act’s “State Authority” provisions, are the most important examples of these.

Furthermore, although the language of Section 505(f), discussed supra, closely parallels that of Section 304(f) of the Clean Air Act, there is also here critical additional language which seems to overcome the EPA’s contention that Congress intended to incorporate a substantive-procedural distinction into the Section 313 compliance requirement. Section 505(f) [33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)] provides:

“(f) For purposes of this section, the term ‘effluent standard or limitation under this chapter’ means (1) effective July 1, 1973, an unlawful act under subsection (a) of section 1311 of this title; (2) an effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311 or 1312 of this title; (3) standard of performance under section 1316 of this title; (4) prohibition, effluent standard or pretreatment standards under section 1317 of this title; (5) certification under section 1341 of this title; or (6) a permit or condition thereof issued under section 1342 of this title, which is in effect under this chapter (including a requirement applicable by reason of section 1323 of this title).”

The linking of the Section 402 permit scheme with the Section 313 “requirements” language in Subsection 505(f)(6) clearly indicates that state permit programs give rise to a separate category of requirements, non-compliance with which will subject federal agencies (and others) to suit under Section 505(a), just as “substantive” noncompliance will. Consequently, the inclusion of Subsection 505(f)(6) in Section 505, the Act’s primary enforcement section, dispels any ambiguity as to Congress’ intention to require full compliance with the procedural requirements of state pollution control initiatives as well as with the substance of their programs.

This dual compliance requirement seems natural, when considered in light of Section 510, discussed supra, which sets out the broad powers allowed states under the Act to promulgate stricter regulations than those required by the federal government. Furthermore, as we have noted, the practical effect of reading Section 313 so as to compel only “substantive” federal agency compliance would be to render state permit programs ineffectual as to those dischargers, both substantively and proceduraliy-

Finally, we find no bar to this action under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Petitioner states proceeded in this action under Section 509(b)(1)(D). Since that section explicitly provides for challenges to the Administrator’s “determinations” regarding state programs, there can be no doubt as to Congress’ consent to suits of the type before us.

Respondents assert that petitioners’ remedy, if any, lay under the “citizen suit” provisions of Section 505. We find this argument unpersuasive both as a matter of statutory construction and as a question of efficient judicial administration.

In the first place, we note that implicit in respondents’ contention are the premises that petitioners are only concerned that federal agencies do in fact meet the substantive requirements of state permit programs, and that all the states are really seeking to accomplish in this case can be attained by case-by-case attacks on the occasional instances of substantive noncompliance. As we have already noted, however, the states have a significant interest in ensuring procedural as well as substantive compliance with their permit programs.

Moreover, assuming without deciding the additional premise of respondents that a state is technically a “person” entitled to sue under Section 505, a state might nevertheless prefer to seek an advance determination of the scope of federal agency compliance duties under Section 509. What is challenged here is not a failure to perform any single “act” or “duty”, as much as the Administrator’s general misinterpretation of the scope of state regulatory jurisdiction under the Act. An action to spell out the scope of state authority granted by the Act seems to be the exact type of challenge that Congress must have contemplated in enacting Section 509. An interpretation that Congress intended that such a challenge be deferred until the states had first attacked individual violations of their programs would waste judicial resources as well as conflict with the Act’s intent to let the states take the lead in attacking water pollution at the earliest possible time.

E. CONCLUSION.

In conclusion, the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act clearly mandate a federal agency duty of full compliance with all aspects of state permit programs. We are aware that the Act retains some phraseology which courts, in interpreting the Clean Air Act, have found too inconclusive to support the clear waiver of federal legislative jurisdiction which is necessary to overcome the presumption of exclusive federal jurisdiction under the plenary powers clause. But the 1972 version of the Water Pollution Control Act introduces several important terminological and structural changes from the Clean Air Act language. It also differs significantly from the Clean Air Act in the comprehensiveness of the administrative scheme it ordains. These distinctions help manifest the congressional purpose that states be in the vanguard of the national attack on water pollution, as California v. Davidson, supra, found to have been the recurrent theme of federal water pollution control efforts. They also suggest a clear congressional choice to rely on state regulatory and enforcement agencies to carry out this effort.

Where a construction finding a waiver of exclusive federal jurisdiction' would support the stated congressional purpose, then it seems to us that a purported waiver should be “construed, if not liberally, at least sensibly.” See H. Hart and H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1351 (2d ed. 1973). In this case, Congress left no question as to its intent that states should take the lead in water pollution control efforts, and that states should view the compliance schedules and standards in Section 402(a) as floors, not ceilings, for their own Section 402(b) programs. Thus we act in accordance with the clear intent of Congress as well as with the plain language of the statute in holding that federal dischargers within a state’s jurisdiction must comply fully with state permit programs satisfying the Section 402 conditions for approval by the Administrator.

We direct the Administrator to reconsider the applications of the States of Washington and California to the extent that he previously withheld approval from such proposed programs, and to act expeditiously on those previously disapproved portions of the applications in a manner not inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

      . Congress has used the phrase “navigable waters of the United States” in several different senses, ranging from the narrowest and most literal interpretation of that phrase (“navigable in fact”) to the most expansive one permitted by the constitutional grant, U.S.Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3. Compare, e. g. , The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 19 L.Ed.2d 999 (1870) with Kalur v. Resor, 335 F.Supp. 1, 11 (D.C.D.C.1971). Cf. also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Section 502(7) of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)] speaks of the term “navigable waters” as encompassing “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” S.Conf.Rep.No.92-1236, 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 3821. Thus Congress clearly meant to extend the Act’s jurisdiction to the constitutional limit, to include all tributaries of rivers which, “when combined with other waters or systems of transportation, the commerce on such waters would have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” Report of the Conference Committee on S. 2770, reported in A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 166, 178 (Comm, on Publ. Works Print, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History],
      The Act thus contemplates regulation of any activity within the class of streams noted above or the class of pollution discharges into such streams, without regard to whether either the particular discharge or the individual receiving waters discemibly affect interstate commerce. See United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co., 364 F.Supp. 349 (W.D. Ky.1973); United States v. Holland, 373 F.Supp. 665 (M.D.Fla.1974). The legislative history expressly discloses an intention to avoid the limitations on implementation of the 1965 Act which had been occasioned by a narrow interpretation of the phrase “navigable waters” as used in that Act. S.Rep.No. 92-414, 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 3742.

      . An affidavit of Bill Dendy, Executive Officer of the California State Water Resources Control Board, is attached to the reply brief of petitioner California. It details two recent occasions where the Administrator has issued permits for the discharge of pollutants by federal agencies (Norton Air Force Base and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation) without including conditions in the permit as requested by the interested state regulator agencies. Instead, the Administrator is continuing to screen such state-requested permit conditions, and apply his own notions of “best practicable” and “best available” technology and of what constitutes compliance “to the fullest extent possible” in issuing permits to federal agencies, rather than the standards suggested by the state. Cf. Section 301(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1) & (b)(2). See also note 12, infra; S.Rep.No.92-414, supra note 1, at 3733:
      “Evidence received in hearings disclosed many incidents of flagrant violations of air and water pollution requirements by Federal facilities and activities. Lack of Federal leadership has been detrimental to the water pollution control effort.”

      . The Porter-Cologne Act, Cal. Water Code § 13020 et seq., enacted by the California legislature in 1969, authorizes California’s regional water quality control boards to issue standards, or “requirements,” applicable to waste discharges which might affect the state’s waters. Id. § 13263. The regional boards conduct administrative proceedings, which are participated in by the applicant, and issue “requirements” applicable to the specific discharge. Both the regional boards and the State Water Resources Control Board, which must issue water appropriation permits, are required to comply with the provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Publ. Resources Code § 21000 et seq. The State Board is also statutorily required to consider “the public interest.” Cal. Water Code §§ 1253, 1255, 1257.

      . Cf. Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238, 1248 (5th Cir. 1974).

      . However, the Administrator’s role following approval of a state permit program is a very limited one. Sections 402(d)(2)(A) and (B) of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(A) and (B)] allow the Administrator to prevent issuance of a state permit only if the proposed discharge would adversely affect a downstream state, or if the permit is inconsistent with the Administrator’s guidelines under § 402(a).

      . H.Rep.No.92-911, Legislative History at 805. Similar language was found in the Senate committee reports accompanying S. 2770, eventually passed in lieu of the House bill, See S.Rep.No.92-414, supra note 1, at 3733-3734; S.Conf.Rep.No.92-1236, supra note 1, at 3812-3813.

      . Accord, Comment, Local Control of Pollution from Federal Facilities, 11 San Diego L.Rev. 972, 991 (1974).

      . See J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 (4th ed. C. Stands 1972).

      . See note 3, supra.

      . See affidavit of Bill Dendy, cited in note 2,

      . In programs modeled after the California NPDES program, the first to be approved by the Administrator following the Act’s passage, the process is initiated by the discharger submitting a report of an actual or contemplated discharge to an administrative board. Thereafter the board conducts a hearing concerning the discharge, and develops limitations, requirements, and conditions with which the discharger must comply as a condition of obtaining and retaining the permit. It is thus by the administrative process that discharges are brought to the state’s attention, and applicable quantitative and qualitative standards developed.

      . We disagree with the assumption in Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus, 497 F.2d 1172, 1177 (6th Cir. 1974), that a permit has nothing to do with air (or water) quality. See Comment, supra note 7, at 986.

      . This position would appear to be consistent with Executive Order No. 11752, 3 C.F.R. 380 (1974).
      Respondents’ reliance on it is misplaced. In the first place, even if we accept respondents’ contention that this executive order constitutes an administrative interpretation of Section 313, but see contra Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d at 1249, the normal rule attaching significance to the manner in which a statute is interpreted by the agency charged with its enforcement is inapplicable here. That rule is based on the assumption that Congress’ long-standing failure to overturn the agency’s interpretation indicates congressional acquiescence in that interpretation. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965). In this case, the executive order was issued too recently for Congress to have undertaken contrary amendatory action.
      Secondly, in finding support for its holding in Executive Order 11752, the court in Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus pointed out that the above-noted rule of statutory construction is of particular importance where supported by the legislative history of the act to which the order refers. 497 F.2d at 1176. Here, however, it is admitted that the legislative history is silent as to the question presented regarding the correct interpretation of Section 313.
      Finally, the fact that Executive Order No. 11752 was issued more than four months after petitioner California brought this suit suggests that the order was issued in response to it. For this reason also it is entitled to less weight.
      Nor can Executive Order No. 11752 be considered an exercise of the President’s authority under Clean Air Act § 118 and § 313 of the Water Pollution Control Act to exempt federal facilities from certain requirements. “Exercise of that authority contemplates a case by case determination that the exemption is ‘in the paramount interest of the United States.’ ” Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d at 1249.

      . Nowhere in the language of Section 402, establishing the NPDES, is there any suggestion that the Administrator may establish a dual permit system, administered in part by a state and in part by himself. The legislative history of Section 313 also is devoid of any indication that Congress intended to allow the Administrator to retain partial permit issuing authority.

      . E. g., see Sections 301, 302, 303, 306, 307 and 315 of the Act [33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, 1317, 1325].

      . See Sections 306(c), 308(c), 401(a)(6) of the Act [33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(c), 1318(c), 1341(a)(6)],

        . 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(f).

      . See Section 101(b) of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)]. Cf. Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d at 1244-45.


author: MOORE, Circuit Judge:

text:
    Joyce J. BEAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS, MATES, AND PILOTS et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 218, Docket 74-1725.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Argued Oct. 23, 1974.
    Decided Feb. 24, 1975.

      Raymond J. Conboy, Portland, Or. (Pozzi, Wilson & Atchison, Portland, Or., of counsel, and Julien, Blitz & Schlesinger,. P. C., New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
    Albert E. Rice, New York City, for defendants-appellees.
    Before MOORE, OAKES and GURFEIN, Circuit Judges.
   MOORE, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment based on a finding below that the Trustees of the Masters, Mates, and Pilots Welfare Plan, a jointly-administered labor-management trust, had not acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner in denying accidental death benefits to the widow of Russell Beam where the facts as to the circumstances surrounding his death are not in issue. Plaintiff-appellant is the widow and beneficiary of Mr. Beam. Defendants-appellees include the union, the International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots (IOMMP), and Trustees and Officers of the plan.

On February 12, 1971, Mr. Beam was severely burned in a fire' in his motel room. He was admitted to a hospital where he died 18 days later. The death certificate listed the cause of death as “acute pancreatitis” due to “acute and chronic alcoholism” and indicated that the third degree burns which covered 25% of Mr. Beam’s body were “a contributing factor.”

When the death certificate, appended to Mrs. Beam’s application for death benefits, was received by the trust fund on March 11, 1971, the claims officer requested the attending physician to elaborate on the role of the burns in the demise of Mr. Beam. The physician, writing on April 15, 1971, explained that Mr. Beam had suffered from chronic pancreatitis for at least 10 years, that the burns caused Mr. Beam’s alcoholic intake to terminate and also produced massive body stress, and that the simultaneous occurrence of these two circumstances brought on a massive attack of acute pancreatitis. In the doctor’s words:

This particular combination [body stress and termination of alcoholic intake] of circumstances is a well-known etiologic factor for development of an acute massive pancreatitis which occurred in this instance. The pancreatitis was the cause of death and not a complication of the burn surface itself. However, I think that one could well say that the occurrence of the accident led to a series of circumstances resulting in death.

With the death certificate and this explanation, the Trustees consulted a physician-consultant who advised that death was caused by “acute exacerbation of chronic pancreatitis”. The Trustees subsequently denied Mrs. Beam’s accidental death benefit claim. After the motion for summary judgment was filed, Mrs. Beam, through counsel, requested the physician who had attended her husband to write to the Trustees once more. This communication described the same circumstances mentioned above with the additional statement:

This patient died of acute and chronic pancreatitis for which he was predisposed by his acute and chronic alcoholism. But for the accident resulting in burns covering 25% of his total body surface, there is no indication that this patient would have developed a massive acute pancreatitis and died at that time.

The accidental death benefit was provided for in a section of the Rules and Regulations of the Masters, Mates and Pilots Welfare Plan:

If an Employee, . . . suffers any of the losses described in Section 7 [Schedule of Indemnities, including proviso for full amount payment for loss of life] of this Article, as a result of bodily injuries sustained solely through external, violent and accidental means, directly and independently of all other causes . . . the Trustee shall pay . . . the beneficiary . . . provided however, that no payment shall be made for any loss caused wholly or partly, directly or indictectly, by
(a) disease, or bodily or mental infirmity or medical or surgical treatment thereof . . (emphasis added).

Jurisdiction was asserted in the district court by plaintiff on two grounds: (1) plaintiff claims that federal jurisdiction exists pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. Section 185; and (2) plaintiff also asserts jurisdiction based on diversity since plaintiff is an Oregon resident and the situs of the trust is New York.

The district court expressed some doubts as to the jurisdictional claim based on Federal labor law but found that it was unnecessary to determine this issue since diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332 was beyond question. The lower court was of the opinion that if a federal standard by which to test the Trustees’ action existed it was substantively the same as that of the State of New York. Appellant brings the jurisdictional issue before this court in this appeal arguing that she has a claim pursuant to Section 301 or alternatively pursuant to Section 302 and 28 U.S.C. Section 1337 and, therefore, federal substantive law controls.

We agree with the district court that federal jurisdiction is to be exercised in this case on the basis of diversity. Appellant has failed to indicate how review would be changed if jurisdiction were to be based on federal labor laws, and we have found no case describing a federal substantive standard for review of fiduciaries’ determination of an individual claim brought pursuant to a jointly-administered welfare trust fund created pursuant to Section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act.

Appellant argues that Section 301 confers jurisdiction on the federal courts whenever a claim involving a labor management trust is involved. Smith v. Evening News Association, 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962) and subsequent lower court cases where jurisdiction was based on Section 301 all involve directly the collective bargaining agreement or machinery, and we must be hesitant about reading Smith as supportive of the proposition that Section 301 creates federal court jurisdiction each time a decision of Trustees involving the application of rules of a jointly-administered trust to an individual claim is challenged.

While appellant did not offer Section 302 as a jurisdictional basis below, on appeal she seeks support in Moglia v. Geoghegan, 403 F.2d 110 (2d Cir., 1968) where jurisdiction was predicated on the existence of a question arising under a statute of the United States, namely, Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 186, making the action one of which the district court had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1337. Moglia, unlike the case at bar, dealt with the failure of the employer and union to comply with the specific requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) in creating the jointly-administered trust. The court there properly asserted federal jurisdiction to determine a question unique in the realm of national labor policy. The court in Moglia in obiter dictum suggested that the plaintiff there could bring a subsequent action in state court based on state law claims regarding fiduciary duties.

Appellant contends that federal courts have no mandate to apply traditional trust law to Section 302 jointly administered trusts and brings up a variety of abuses argued to be unique and endemic in this labor relations field. Section 302 was originally passed as part of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 to curb abuses revealed during extensive Congressional investigation. See S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947). Congress sought to remedy the situation where employers contributed to funds which were administered by union officials who were unaccountable either to the contributors or the union membership by amendment in 1959. 1959 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 2326 — 2330.

The statute provides for the use of trust funds managed jointly by an equal number of union representatives and employer representatives. The legislation also provided for means of breaking deadlocks and required specific written agreements. Perhaps Congress should have gone further setting special standards of review for these trustees but this is not a determination to be made by this court today. Absent a legislative mandate to apply a special law on review of trustee actions in jointly administered trusts, we must apply what appellant has called the traditional trust law.

Whatever the jurisdictional route leading to review of the Trustees’ action, the issues presented are: (1) did the actions of the Trustees violate Section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act; (2) did the actions of the Trustees exceed their authority; and (3) were the actions of the Trustees arbitrary and capricious, motivated by bad faith, or unsupported by the evidence before them when they made the decision.

The Masters, Mates and Pilots Welfare Plan consists of two documents: (1) an “Agreement and Declaration of Trust” and (2) “Rules and Regulations” which were adopted by the Trustees. Thus the plan meets the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) that there be a written agreement detailing the basis for payments. The documents referred to above give the Trustees broad discretion in determining both the structure of the eligibility requirements for beneficiaries of the trust as well as the application and interpretation of the requirements in a given instance.

In reviewing the action of the Trustees using the fiduciary standard articulated in Lowenstern v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 479 F.2d 1211, 1213 (1973), Danti v. Lewis, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 105, 312 F.2d 345, 348 (1962) and Kosty v. Lewis, 115 U.S.App. D.C. 343, 319 F.2d 744, 746 (1963), or Gitelson v. DuPont, 17 N.Y.2d 46, 268 N.Y.S.2d 11, 215 N.E.2d 336 (1966), we only determine whether the Trustees’ decision was arbitrary or capricious, the product of bad faith, and whether or not such decision was based on substantial evidence. Mrs. Beam submitted the death certificate. The claims officer then requested additional information from the attending physician and subsequently obtained the opinion of a medical consultant who examined the death certificate and the supplementary statement of the attending physician. While another statement of the attending physician, submitted after the motion for summary judgment was made, places more emphasis on the role of the burns in the Beam death, we agree with the court below that the Trustees’ action was not arbitrary, capricious, or motivated by bad faith and that a determination that the death was not caused solely by accident was supported by the evidence before the Trustees.

Appellant argues that the court should review this decision in a manner similar to review of a denial of the claim of an insurance beneficiary by an insurance policy where the contract provides coverage for bodily injuries “caused directly and independently of all other causes by accidental means” excepting “accident, injury, disability, death or other loss caused wholly or partly by disease or bodily or mental infirmity or medical or surgical treatment therefor.” Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 (1930). The governing principle in cases determining insurance company liability is clear:

If there is no active disease, but merely a frail general condition, so that powers of resistance are easily overcome, or merely a tendency to disease which is started up and made operative, whereby death results, then there may be recovery even though the accident would not have caused that effect upon a healthy person in a normal state. Leland v. Order of U. C. Travelers, 233 Mass. 558, 564, 124 N.E. 517 520 (1919).

But review in this case is not the examination of a dispute between an insurance company with a boilerplate contract on one hand and a consumer on the other. Nor are we seeking the “proximate cause” of death. Review is limited in scope here to the review traditionally accorded fiduciaries. This has been the standard used consistently in the field of the labor-management trust funds. Accordingly where no factual dispute as to the circumstances of death existed and where the applicable law of review was clear, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots.

Judgment affirmed.

      . Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provides:
      (a) Suits for violation of contract between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

      . Section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides exceptions to restrictions on payments to labor organizations or employee representatives:
      The provisions of this section [restricting payments by employers to union representatives] shall not be applicable (5) with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents (or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents): Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of employees may agree upon and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in the event of their failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the district court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its principal office, and shall also contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available for inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such other places as may be designated in such written agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or annuities.

      . The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1948).

      . See e. g., Retail Clerks, Local Union 1222 v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 327 F.2d 442 (9 Cir., 1964); International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Textron, Inc., 312 F.2d 688 (6th Cir., 1963); and Hauser v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 299 F.Supp. 387 (D.Minn., 1969). See also, Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 80 S.Ct. 489, 4 L.Ed.2d 442 (1960).

      . The Supreme Court has considered the role of federal jurisdiction and the role of federal substantive law under this section in a case involving criminal liability of a trustee in a jointly administered trust. See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 79 S.Ct. 864, 3 L.Ed.2d 915 (1959). In that case the Court held trustee’s larceny by trick could not be prosecuted in federal court pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act and that federal substantive law was limited to specific infractions of Section 302. The Court suggested that the state courts retained jurisdiction over any misconduct which fell outside the specific misconduct prohibited by Section 302 and indicated that state substantive law was controlling.

      . The question in Moglia was whether appellant was entitled to benefit payments from a pension trust notwithstanding the fact that the “written agreement” detailing the basis upon which payments were to be made required by § 302 had never been executed. Despite the lack of written agreement, the employer has made contributions to the local union for trust fund purposes.

      . 403 F.2d at 116 n. 3.

      . Example, Article IV of the “Agreement and Declaration of Trust” provides:
      1. Benefits. The Trustees, by majority vote, shall have full authority to determine all questions of the nature, amount and duration of benefits to be paid under the Plan based on what it is estimated the Fund can provide without undue depletion or excessive accumulation.
      2. Coverage and Eligibility. The Trustees, by majority vote, shall have full authority to determine all questions of coverage and eligibility to participate in and receive the benefits of the Plan and shall have the power to construe the provisions of this Agreement and the terms used herein and any such questions so determined or any construction so adopted by the majority of the Trustees shall be so binding upon all parties and persons concerned.
      The “Rules and Regulations” contain the provision relating to accidental death and disability benefits quoted on p. 1880, supra, as well as the following provision:
      In order that the Trustees may carry out their obligation to maintain within the limits of the funds available to them a sound and economic program dedicated to providing the maximum benefits for employees as a whole, the Trustees expressly reserve the right in their sole discretion and without notice to employees, employers, the union or others affected thereby, but upon a nondiscriminatory basis
      (d) To interpret the provisions of these rules and regulations.


author: CHOY, Circuit Judge: CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge

text:
    AMERICAN TIMBER & TRADING COMPANY, an Oregon corporation on its own behalf and on behalf of all corporations and individuals who have been and are presently being charged interest rates in excess of the rates permitted by law, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OREGON, Defendant-Appellant, v. Lawrence BERNARD, Individually and Dr. Lawrence Bernard, Professional Corporation, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee.
    No. 72-1066.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Nov. 20, 1973.
    Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 2, 1974.
    Certiorari Denied April 14, 1975.
    See 95 S.Ct. 1588.

      Fredric A. Yerke (argued), Norman J. Wiener (argued), of Miller, Anderson, Nash, Yerke & Wiener, Portland, Or., for defendant-appellant.
    Gerson F. Goldsmith (argued), of Goldsmith, Siegel & Engel, Portland, Or., Henry A. Carey, Jr., Carey & Hanlon, Portland, Or., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Jesse Lee Griffin, Long Beach, Cal., and Matthew Hale (argued), Gen. Counsel, The American Bankers Assoc., Washington, D. C., amicus curiae.
    Before CHAMBERS and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and KELLEHER, District Judge.

       The Honorable Robert J. Kelleher, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

   CHOY, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs American Timber and Trading Co. (AT&T) and Lawrence Bernard and Dr. Lawrence Bernard, P.C. (Bernard) brought this class action claiming that the First National Bank of Oregon (the bank) charged usurious interest rates and thereby violated 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86.

The bank charged individual and corporate borrowers the Oregon statutory limits of interest at the rates of 10% and 12% per annum respectively for a 365 day year (ORS 82.010), but computed such interest on the basis of a 360 day year (365/360 method). By using this method, the aetal interest rates for a calendar year were 10.139% and 12.-167% respectively.

In the trial below, the district judge indicated that he wanted to segregate for advance determination the issue whether the 365/360 method was usurious under 12 U.S.C. § 86. Therefore, on stipulated facts the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court concluded that, because the 365/360 method produces in a single calendar year more interest than would be produced by applying the maximum legal rate to a calendar year of 365 days, it violates ORS 82.010. Moreover, the court ruled that the bank knowingly exacted the excess interest and thereby violated 12 U.S.C. § 86. 334 F.Supp. 888 (D.Ore.1971). The district court certified the issue to this' court as appropriate for interlocutory appeal. We affirm.

Sections 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86 prescribe the rates of interest that may be charged by national banking associations and declare that the receiving of a rate of interest greater than that allowed, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest due and in case the greater rate of interest has been paid, the borrower may recover twice the amount of the interest paid. Section 85 provides that a bank may charge interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state where the bank is located. The National Bank Act “adopts usury laws of the states only in so far as they severally fix the rate of interest.” Evans v. National Bank of Savannah, 251 U.S. 108, 111, 40 S.Ct. 58, 59, 64 L.Ed. 171 (1919).

Thus, we must first look to Oregon law to determine if the rate charged in the instant case was excessive. An Oregon lender may exact from individual and corporate borrowers 10% and 12% per annum respectively. ORS 82.010. Unfortunately there is neither legislative history, nor are there court decisions construing the words per annum in the 360 day context. The district court determined that the Latin words per annum mean “by the year” and that the ordinary person assumes that a year, except leap year, has 365 days; thus, because the bank’s method of computation produces in a single calendar year more interest than would be produced by applying the maximum legal rate to a calendar year of 365 days, the challenged method of computation violates ORS 82.010.

We attach great weight to the district court’s determination as to the law of the particular state in which it sits, especially where, as here, there has been no clear exposition of the controlling principle by the highest court of Oregon. Insurance Co. of North America v. Thompson, 381 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1967). The district court’s determination will be accepted on review unless shown to be clearly wrong. Owens v. White, 380 F.2d 310, 315 (9th Cir. 1967). The bank has not convinced us that the decision of the district court (Judge Goodwin, a former Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court) is a clearly incorrect statement of Oregon law.

The bank contends that even if the rate charged is excessive, the loans were not usurious because the loan contracts were at rates permitted by law. Thus, the money received in excess of the legal rate is not interest, but an. overcharge. We see no merit to this contention. Although the literal terms of the loan agreements provided for 10% and 12% interest, it was implicit in the agreement that the bank would calculate interest on its customary basis of a 360 day year. Moreover, Oregon law does not require that a usurious rate be specified in the loan agreement. The exacting of a greater rate of interest is sufficient to constitute usury. ORS 82.120(2), Balfour v. Davis, 14 Or. 47, 52, 12 P. 89, 92 (1886).

The bank further contends that it did not intend to violate the law, so it did not knowingly exact excess interest. We disagree. While the bank may not have realized that its method of computation was illegal, it was agreed that the bank knew that its computation of interest on the 360 day year would result in a borrower paying more in one year than at the maximum legal rate when computed on a calendar year. The act of charging the excessive interest was intentional. This is sufficient to constitute a knowing violation of the law. United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 91 S.Ct. 1697, 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971).

The bank also challenges the ruling of the district court on the ground that it was precluded from producing any evidence of banking custom. The bank contends that the use of a 365/365 method creates difficult computations and, therefore, for reasons of convenience the banking community considers it proper to use the simpler 365/360 method. The district court noted that the legislative intent in enacting usury laws is to protect borrowers from paying excessive interest. The court felt the act should be construed with regard to its net effect upon the borrower rather than upon the bookkeeping burden, custom, or convenience of the lender. The court noted that the bank used the 365/365 method to compute interest it paid to its depositors. Moreover, the court doubted whether the practice could obtain legitimacy by long usage because only in periods of high interest and heavy borrowing would the question ever arise. Therefore, it concluded that it could not be said that the Legislative Assembly has acquiesced in a practical construction of the law at odds with the plain meaning of its words. Again, we agree with the district court’s ruling.

In September, 1971, the Oregon legislature enacted a provision which limits the defense of usury to transactions involving less than $50,000. ORS 82.125. It is undisputed that the nominal plaintiffs in this case had loans in excess of $50,000, although these loans were contracted prior to September, 1971. The bank, however, contends that the new Oregon legislation removes not only the defense of usury, but also any claim to recover usurious interest. We disagree with the bank’s construction of this legislation. Plaintiffs’ law suit commenced almost a year before ORS 82.125 became effective. Absent a clear, express intention, legislation in Oregon is not normally applied retroactively. Seton v. Hoyt, 34 Or. 266, 55 P. 967 (1899); Smith v. Clackamas County, 252 Or. 230, 448 P.2d 512 (1968). Nothing in either the language of the statute or the legislative history indicated a desire to eliminate causes of action that had already accrued prior to the passage of the act. Again, we see no basis for a reversal.

Finally, the bank contends that we should give our ruling only prospective effect. We have given this issue serious consideration, and have decided that it would be inadvisable to give this decision only prospective effect. First, we cannot deny plaintiffs the fruits of successful litigation. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 396 U.S. 13, 90 S.Ct. 30, 24 L.Ed. 2d 13 (1969). Second, we do not think that the ruling in the instant case qualifies for prospective application under the three-prong test established by the Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Hudson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). Our decision is not overruling clear past judicial precedent on which the bank may have relied. Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496, 88 S.Ct. 2224, 20 L.Ed.2d 1231 (1968). The bank contends that it relied upon industry custom. As we said earlier, we doubt the existence of such custom, but even if it were industry practice, it is highly unlikely that this would be sufficient to justify nonretroactive application. Any claim by the banking industry that ease of calculation is justification for exacting higher interest is of dubious validity in this age of computer technology. We think non-retroactive application would retard the operation of the rule announced today. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). We also doubt that this decision will create great hardships as the bank suggests. Our decision is limited to a construction of Oregon law. Oregon limits the usury defense to loans of less than $50,000 (if made after September, 1971). The National Bank Act contains a short two-year statute of limitations. Undoubtedly a significant number of borrowers will take advantage of this decision, but the disastrous consequences suggested by the amicus curiae, American Bankers Association, are greatly exaggerated. Therefore, the decision in this case does not justify any special treatment such as prospective application.

Affirmed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge

(concurring) :

I concur in the foregoing opinion on the basis of precedent. Certainly what the bank was doing was not venal. This is not a case of loan sharking. I think the situation cries out for an amendment to the federal statutes to permit what was done here, i. e., 365/360.

Also, I think this is a case where our class action rules present a monstrosity. I was a lawyer once, and I am sure that most of the members of the class have never met the attorneys for plaintiffs. If outset solicitation of the business were proper, I am sure most of the “class” would have said, “No thank you.”

As I understand it, the district court has not yet fully defined the class and has not specifically ruled on the “small loans” question.

      . There are three different methods used in calculating interest. They are as follows: 365/365: Under this method the rate of interest is divided by 365 and this produces a daily interest factor. The number of days that the loan is outstanding is then multiplied by this daily interest factor. Under this method a different amount of interest is charged for months of different lengths.
      360/360: Under this method each month is treated as having the same number of days (30). Thus, interest for each month is the same. However, for a calendar year the interest is exactly the same as that calculated by using the 365/365 method.
      365/360: The third method (the one used in this case) is a combination of the first two methods. The interest rate is divided by 360 days (30 days for each month) to create a daily factor. The number of days that a loan is outstanding is then multiplied by this daily factor. Thus interest charged for months of different lengths is different and interest charged for a calendar year is greater than interest charged under either the 365/365 or 360/360 methods.

      . Although the district court ruled that the case should proceed as a class action, the court held this aspect of the case in abeyance pending the resolution of the substantive issues. On appeal both parties raise questions relating to the class action aspects of the case. This issue was not certified and therefore we do not consider it.

      . Nationwide surveys indicate that although the 365/360 method is used there is no definite, uniform, long-established custom. The results of a Federal Reserve Board survey were summarized by Congressman Patman as follows:
      This practice [use of the 365/360 method] is not standard or uniform in any way. It varies among banks with respect to the types of loans or maturities of loans subjected to the practice. It varies even in many instances within the same bank with respect to the type of loans and maturity of loans to which the practice is applied, and it varies significantly from one part of the country to another. 117 Cong.Rec. 18539 (1971) (Remarks of Congressman Patman).