author: CHRISTENSEN, Senior District Judge.

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Walter HAWKE, Sr., Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 74-1136.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    Nov. 11, 1974.
    Certiorari Denied March 17, 1975.
    See 95 S.Ct. 1404.

      Daniel J. High, Asst. Public Defender, Wichita, Kan. (Leonard D. Munker, Federal Public Defender, Wichita, Kan., with him on the brief), for defendant-appellant.
    Stephen K. Lester, Asst. U. S. Atty., Wichita, Kan. (Robert J. Roth, U. S. Atty., with him on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
    Before HOLLOWAY and McWIL-LIAMS, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN, Senior District Judge.

       Of the District of Utah, sitting by designation.

   CHRISTENSEN, Senior District Judge.

Convicted and sentenced upon jury trial of unlawfully transporting in interstate commerce a firearm having a barrel less than eighteen inches in length which was not registered, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (j), unlawfully possessing such firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and unlawfully transferring it without having first filed a written application with the Secretary of the Treasury as required by 26 U.S.C. § 5812 in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(e), appellant James Walker Hawke, Sr. contends in support of this appeal that (1) the trial court committed plain error in submitting the issue of entrapment to the jury as well as giving the usual instructions under a plea of not guilty, since the defendant did not “admit” the acts charged in the indictment; (2) similarly erred in receiving evidence of criminal activity by the defendant not related to the crimes charged; (S) erred in receiving in evidence transcripts of recorded telephone conversations between the defendant and a government informer, and (4) erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case in chief for failure of possession and interstate transportation proof.

No extended review of facts or law is essential to lead into a discussion and resolution of these questions. The development and present status of the defense of entrapment have been adequately reviewed for present purposes in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973), with which the numerous decisions of this court on the subject are essentially consistent. Those in which appellant finds some comfort will be noted later with reference to particular points. Factually we may start out with recognition that the record tends to show that the appellant caused to be delivered the sawed-off shotgun described in the indictment under circumstances establishing a colorable case of entrapment by an informer acting in consort with state and federal agents, but falling far short of entrapment as a matter of law.

Appellant argues here that the giving of an entrapment instruction, although no exception was taken to submission of the issue to the jury, was improper or confusing and constituted plain error. Relying upon language in Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1967), and Ortiz v. United States, 358 F.2d 107 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 861, 87 S.Ct. 114, 17 L.Ed.2d 88 (1966), that to utilize that defense the commission of the crime must be “admitted”, appellant says that he made no such admission and on the contrary, although he did not take the stand, contested all elements of the claimed offenses. It is true that the trial court did place upon the government the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offenses charged, together with the absence of entrapment.

Martinez and Ortiz supply no definitive answers as to the form the “admission” must take and whether a court may commit prejudicial error against an accused who declines to testify in support of the defense of entrapment by failure to submit, or by submitting without specific or implied request, that evidentially supported issue to the jury or by the submission also over objection or on a silent record in this respect of issues relating to the elements of the offense under the plea of not guilty. Whether the court should comment to the jury concerning any implication of guilt the defense of entrapment carries beyond the confines of that defense is a related problem that seems not to have been suggested heretofore. We need not now pursue puzzling aspects of these other problems, beyond noting cases from this and other circuits which squint at them while lighting up the narrower conclusion we reach here.

Consistent with Martínez and other decisions in this circuit it is clear that appellant is in no position to complain of the submission of the issue of entrapment to the jury or of the resolution by it of that and the other submitted issues against him.

The record demonstrates that appellant relied upon entrapment as an important defense in this case and sought before the jury an acquittal on the basis of it. Appellant's counsel took no exception to the submission of the entrapment issue to the jury, ex-pressly stated that the first two paragraphs of the instruction on the subject were correct and expected to the remainder only because “I don’t feel it states the law . . . [and] asks the jury to speculate . . . [d]oesn’t have any definition of where this act must originate, in whose mind it must originate.” These limited exceptions were meritless. Any incongruity in the submission of the entrapment defense along with other defenses was invited by appellant, was sought to be capitalized upon by him, afforded him, if irregular, more rather than less by way of defenses than he may have been entitled to, and did not constitute prejudicial, much less fundamental, error. Jordan v. United States, 348 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1965).

Appellant next contends that the admission of evidence of appellant’s other criminal activity “unrelated to the crime charged in the indictment” constituted plain error that should be noticed here despite the absence of objection.

The record discloses that a Kansas Bureau of Investigation agent and federal Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agent, working undercover, had purchased the sawed-off shotgun as a result of the representation of an informer, Green, that they were looking over a job in Missouri and needed shotguns that could be “hidden under a coat”. During personal and telephone conversations, some of which were recorded by the informer, the appellant had discussed various other criminal activities of his own and had sought to hire one of the agents to murder the current husband of appellant’s ex-wife. Appellant agreed to pay $200 as a down payment for the murder. He withheld from this sum $60 as payment for the shotgun and handed over the $140 balance to the agents at the time they received the shotgun.

The requested killing and other criminal activities and plans of the appellant were not mentioned in the prosecution’s opening statement; they did not come to the attention of the jury until counsel for the son of appellant, jointly charged but later acquitted, brought them out during cross-examination of the informer. Appellant made no objection to this testimony at the time and only when it was amplified on redirect-examination by the government was any opposition noted.

Irrespective of whether, as suggested by the government, the evidence of other criminal activity came into the record as a result of some common tactical plan of the defendants, we are of the opinion that its admission was not prejudicially erroneous. If the evidence concerning other criminal activities and plans were not so intimately connected with negotiations for the gun as to be admissible in any event as a part of the res gestae, so to speak, cf. United States v. Gilbert, 447 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1971), it was under the circumstances and in the context in which it arose admissible as evidence of the predisposition of the appellant to commit the crime charged.

It is now so well established as to require the citation of no further authority that where the issue of entrapment is properly before the jury without valid objection on the part of an accused, proof of his predisposition by evidence of similar offenses, general reputation, or other reasonable indicia of intent or desire to commit the crime in question, is admissible. A defendant under such circumstances “cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue”. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932), supra, note 2, at 819-820.

Appellant makes the point that the evidence did not go directly to a propensity to commit the particular offenses charged, as distinguished from a general propensity to violate the law. Some of it in fact did, but some of it did not bear expressly upon the types of crimes charged. We agree that the vital issue in relation to entrapment is whether the accused had a propensity to commit the particular crimes charged. The Supreme Court in Sorrells, Sherman, and Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 87 S.Ct. 429, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966), so indicated, and this court said as much in United States v. Gant, 487 F.2d 30, 33 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941, 94 S.Ct. 1946, 40 L.Ed.2d 293 (1974), its latest expression specifically on the point. And in the later case of United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1974) while an instruction to this effect was not reviewed for lack of objection, the court held that since there was sufficient evi-fence to show the defendant to be ready and willing “to sell heroin ... we cannot say he was entrapped [into selling heroin] as a matter of law.”

Of course the commission of certain types of crimes may be clearly irrelevant; for example, negligent homicide by automobile could have no bearing on the issue of proclivity or predisposition to violate firearm or drug acts. Other offenses or conduct involving specific intent to violate the law may or may not be relevant dependant upon logical bearing in context. Departures from proof of the same types of crimes are accompanied by the potential for collateral involvements both unwarranted and prejudicial. Courts must remain on guard against these. Cf. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959). But where, as here, there is evidence tending to show that an accused in connection with negotiations for the sale of illegal firearms was willing and anxious to take part in almost any sort of criminal activity, there can be little question of the relevancy of that evidence to his propensity to commit the charged offenses. Requisite propensity can be shown by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. Trial courts have broad discretion in the acceptance of evidence and this is especially true where timely objection is not interposed. Under the circumstances there was no abuse of that discretion in the admission of the evidence concerning negotiations with the informer and the undercover agents for the sale of the firearm in question and bearing upon the defense of entrapment.

The contention that the trial court erred in the admission of transcripts of recorded telephone conversations between appellant and the informer because they were irrelevant and “in violation of the best evidence rule” is without merit. The conversations, where they did not relate intimately to arrangements for procuring and delivering the gun, were relevant to appellant’s predisposition in the sense already discussed. The court in camera compared the transcripts with the original recordings and determined that, except for the deletion of conversations of the informer with persons not connected with the Hawke investigation and containing nothing that would be helpful to him, they accurately reflected the contents of the tapes.

Appellant claims that his motion for acquittal should have been granted because the government failed to prove his possession of the firearm, that he knew that the barrel had been cut at the time of its delivery and that it was transported from Oklahoma into Kansas. Assuming that these elements had to be proved despite appellant’s reliance upon the defense of entrapment, we think they were.

There was substantial evidence that appellant agreed to produce the shotgun at a certain time and place; that he and his son met with the informer and the agents at the time and place designated and the gun pursuant to appellant’s specific directions was taken by the son from the trunk of the car in which the appellant had arrived and handed to one of the agents, and that appellant retained $60 from the $200 down-payment on the “murder” in consideration of delivery of the gun. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish appellant’s actual possession, United States v. Henry, 468 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1972), although the constructive possession abundantly evident would have been enough. Where one is more than a mere participant in a transaction but has control over and is able to assure delivery, the doctrine of constructive possession prevents him from escaping “the consequences of his conduct by avoiding actual contact with the contraband”. Lucero v. United States, 311 F.2d 457, 459 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 936, 83 S.Ct. 883, 9 L.Ed.2d 767 (1963). See also United States v. Virciglio, 441 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Cepelis, 426 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846, 92 S.Ct. 149, 30 L.Ed.2d 83 (1971).

Proof that appellant himself cut off the barrel of the shotgun or had knowledge of its lack of subsequent registration was not required. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971). The evidence showed that before its delivery within the State of Kansas the gun was located in Enid, Oklahoma, appellant’s place of residence. Four days before the transfer appellant had agreed to produce a shotgun that could be hidden under a coat and a day later he told the informer that he would bring such a gun along with him when he traveled to an agreed point within the State of Kansas. As a part of the government’s case there was abundant circumstantial evidence of the interstate transportation of the gun after it had been cut. Moreover, prior to the appellant’s resting, there was testimony from the co-defendant to the effect that irrespective of the gun’s condition— and the son denied he knew — as delivered to the agents it had been transported from Oklahoma in the trunk of the car in which he and appellant had arrived. See Maupin v. United States, 225 F.2d 680, 682 (10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 903 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Lucas v. United States, 355 F.2d 245 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 977, 86 S.Ct. 1873, 16 L.Ed.2d 687 (1966).

Affirmed.

      . “[The] word of art — ‘entrapment’—embodies one of the most confusing concepts in the law.” Robison v. United States, 379 F.2d 338, 346 (9th Cir. 1967). The vacating of this decision by the Supreme Court, 390 U.S. 198 (1968), had no similar effect upon any such confusion that may have existed. (See United States v. Robison, 307 F.Supp. 403 (N.D.Cal.1968).)

      . In Martinez the submission of an entrapment defense to the jury was held to be proper and the manner of its submission, although irregular in form, free from prejudicial error. In the course of the opinion the court observed that this defense “cannot be applicable to the facts of a particular case unless the commission of the crime charged is admitted by the accused raising the defense,” citing Ortiz, supra; United States v. Georgiou, 333 F.2d 440 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901, 85 S.Ct. 191, 13 L.Ed.2d 176 (1964); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958), and Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932). The Supreme Court in the last two cases, except to the extent implicit in the very nature of the defense of entrapment, does not throw much light on the points. Ortiz, supra, says that “where a defendant denies the commission of a crime, he is not entitled to the defense of entrapment.” There the defendant had testified and denied the commission of the crimes charged. The court of appeals accordingly held that refusal to submit the issue of entrapment to the jury was not error. Dunbar v. United States, 342 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1965), and Eastman v. United States, 212 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1954), both cited in Ortiz, are to the same effect. The oi>inion in Georgiou does not reveal whether the defendant took the stand, but without citation of authority states broadly that “[b]y invoking the defense of entrapment, defendant admits commission of the offense charged in the indictment.” A variation is presented in Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961), where it was held that the defendant could not urge for the first time on appeal entrapment as a matter of law, because throughout the trial he had “maintained that he did not commit ,the crimes charged,” (although apparently he did not personally testify). In Garcia v. United States, 373 F.2d 806 (10th Cir. 1967), the record was held to be free of prejudicial error although the trial court at the request of the convicted defendant and over the objection of the government had submitted both entrapment and the general issues to the jury.
      In Rowlette v. United States, 392 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1968), however, in reliance upon language in Martinez, the court rules that in view of the defendant’s having interposed the defense of entrapment and because this was not applicable “unless the commission of the crime charged is admitted by the accused raising the defense” the alternative claim on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the finding of guilt would not be considered.
      See also Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965), by which it was decided that the trial court had committed prejudicial error by failing to submit to the jury the issue of entrapment where the government’s own case in chief injected substantial evidence of entrapment and the defendant, although not introducing evidence in support of it and asserting his innocence, did not take an inconsistent position. In Rodriguez v. United States, 227 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1955), it was acknowledged that the entrapment defense may be raised even though the defendant pleads not guilty, but it is pointed out that where a defendant insists, as was the case there, that the acts charged were not committed, “one of the bases of the defense is absent” and the trial court therefore was not in error in refusing tó submit it. The defendant in Ware v. United States, 259 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1958), had taken the stand in his own defense and denied making the sales in question: “He is in no position now to claim that he was entrapped into making the sales which he denies making.”
      Finally, it is to be noted that in United States v. Test, 486 F.2d 922 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 967, 94 S.Ct. 3170, 41 L.Ed.2d 1138 (1974), both the issue of intent and the defense of entrapment were submitted to the jury. The government had contended, citing Martinez, that Test was not entitled to have the entrapment issue submitted because he pled not guilty to the offense charged. This court said: “Whether or not this be so as a general rule, [noting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 439, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413] a matter we do not reach, it is clear that the Government’s case here was in no wise prejudice in the submission because the jury found with the Government.”

      . At an omnibus hearing before a magistrate, following his indictment, appellant gave notice that he would rely on the defenses of “lack of knowledge of contraband; lack of specific intent; entrapment; general denial”. During the course of the trial the court made clear on the record its understanding that the defense of entrapment along with other defenses was being relied upon. Prior to instructing the jury appellant’s counsel was informed by the trial court that it would instruct the jury on the issue of entrapment. At no time during the course of the trial did appellant’s counsel indicate in any way that the defense of entrapment was not relied upon. Appellant’s counsel in final argument outlined to the jury the substance of the court’s instruction on entrapment and contended that within that instruction the officers placed in the mind of a person, otherwise innocent, the idea to violate the law and added: “I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury that is precisely what bap-pended in this case. Even if you can get to the point of deciding if the law was ever violated and that Mr. Hawke, Sr. had any knowledge of it. I say to you that entrapment is a complete defense in this case.” Counsel further argued that the lawmen had “baited Mr. Hawke into whatever may have been done”; that the appellant “was lured . . into obtaining the shotgun”, and that “I believe he was entrapped and I think you do, too, by Mr. Green and by the agents.”

      . “We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them.” 287 U.S. at 448, 53 S.Ct. at 215.

      . “In 1942 petitioner was convicted of illegally selling narcotics ; in 1946 he was convicted of illegally possessing them. However, a nine-year-old sales conviction and a five-year-old possession conviction are insufficient to prove petitioner had a readiness to sell narcotics at the time Kalchinian approached him . . . The case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of entrapment is designed to overcome . . . the government plays on the weakness of an innocent party and beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted.” 356 U.S. at 375-376, 78 S.Ct. at 822.

      . “Moreover, it is settled that when the defense of entrapment is raised, evidence of prior conduct tending to show the defendant’s predisposition to commit the offense charged is admissible.” 385 U.S. at 332, n. 11, 87 S.Ct. at 434.

      . “Moreover, predisposition to commit the crime charged in the information is relevant evidence when the accused has raised the defense of entrapment. See United States v. Abbadessa, 470 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1972).”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JOHN W. PECK, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Charlie Edward SMITH, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee. William Melvin CHRISTMAN, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee. Charles Edward SMITH and George David Duncan, Defendants-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Nos. 73-2062, 73-2141, 73-2142.
    United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
    Nov. 13, 1974.

      Gilbert H. Deitch, Atlanta, Ga., Joseph J. Levitt, Jr., Knoxville, Tenn., Robert Eugene Smith, Baltimore, Md., George E. Paire, Knoxville, Tenn., Howard J. Greenwald, Charlotte, N. C., for defendants-appellants.
    John L. Bowers, U. S. Atty., Edward E. Wilson, Charles N. Stedman, Carl P. McDonald, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and WEICK and PECK, Circuit Judges.
   JOHN W. PECK, Circuit Judge.

Involved here are appeals by three defendants-appellants convicted for interstate transportation of obscene films in a common jury trial (Nos. 73-2141 and 73-2142); also involved is an appeal from an order dismissing appellant Smith’s civil action for the return of seized property (No. 73-2062). Appellants Duncan and Smith, joined in the brief filed in appeals Nos. 73-2062 and 73-2142, and appellant Christman filed separate briefs in No. 73-2141. Each appellant has adopted by reference the arguments advanced by his co-appellants pursuant to Rule 28(i), Fed.R.App.P.

The facts are not in dispute. Richard Nunnally, a resident of Knox County, Tennessee, testified that he received a telephone call at his residence on November 7, 1972. The caller stated that a mutual friend, one George Duncan, had given him Nunnally’s name. The caller asked Nunnally whether he would be interested in some stag movies. Nunnally was noncommittal. A few days later, Nunnally received a phone call from the same individual who this time identified himself as Charlie Smith. Smith told Nunnally that he had made arrangements to obtain 2,400 reels of film and that he would like to meet to talk business. Nunnally received a third call from a person identifying himself as Charlie Smith on November 13, 1972, and subsequent to this phone call Nun-nally contacted the Knox County State Attorney General’s Office, the Knoxville Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The following day, November 14, 1972, Nunnally, agent Shanahan of the FBI and Captain Odom of the Knoxville Police Department, met Smith at a motel in Knoxville where Smith displayed three reels of sexually explicit film to them. Arrangements were made at this meeting for the purchase of additional stag films at a later date. A further contact firmed the contemplated transaction for the sale of some 2,000 stag films (at $6.75 per reel) on Friday, November 17, 1972, at the Holiday Inn West in Knoxville.

Nunnally and a number of federal agents went to Smith’s room at the Holiday Inn as planned, but Smith did not have the films with him in the room. Smith made a telephone call and appellants George Duncan and Melvin Christ-man appeared shortly thereafter. A quantity of films was unloaded from a Buick automobile parked outside the room and a random sampling of the films was made by agent Shanahan. Each of the appellants, as well as the agents present, assisted in unloading the automobile. After unloading, appellants Duncan and Christman left the motel room, got back into the Buick and drove away. They returned within a short time with another load of films and the second load was moved into the motel room.

Appellant Smith made it clear that he wanted to be paid before he turned the films over to Nunnally and his associates. In the presence of all the appellants agent Shanahan pulled a roll of money from his pocket and handed it to Smith. As Smith took the money in hand, Shanahan drew his revolver, announced that he was with the FBI, and placed appellants under arrest. FBI agents took 2,109 reels of film and 280 tapes into custody.

Each of the appellants was interrogated while in custody. After being advised of his constitutional rights, and in spite of the fact that he said he did not wish to make any statements concerning the allegedly obscene materials, appellant Smith told an FBI agent that this was the first time anything like this had happened to him and that he knew he should not have done it. Similarly, appellant Christman refused to waive his rights but nonetheless volunteered that he had driven a 1973 Thunderbird from North Carolina with some of the materials seized at the time of the arrest. He also stated that the seized materials belonged to him.

Appellant Duncan executed a waiver of rights form and told his questioner that he had been in Charlotte, North Carolina, on the morning of November 17, 1972, and that another individual had come to his residence. He, together with this other individual, left Charlotte some time between 8:00 and 9:00 a. m. that morning and arrived in his Buick automobile in Knoxville, Tennessee, between 1:00 and 1:30 that afternoon. He further stated that there was another automobile with two individuals traveling with them in convoy and that they had loaded the car before they left Charlotte. After having made the first statement that they had loaded the car in Charlotte before they left, he changed the statement to say that the material in his car had been loaded from another car in Knoxville.

On April 30, 1973, appellant Smith filed a Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, Declaratory Judgment and/or in the alternative, Motion for Return of Evidence under Rule 41(e), Fed.R.Crim.P. On that same date the district court denied the Rule 41(e) motion on the grounds that there was not at that time a criminal action pending against Smith. The United States filed its answer to the complaint on July 2, 1973, and on July 6, 1973, the district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the issues raised were moot because in the interim Smith had been tried before a jury and found guilty.

A single count indictment was returned on May 9, 1973, and appellants responded by filing a number of pretrial motions including motions for suppression of evidence, return of evidence, separate trial and dismissal of charges. All pretrial motions were summarily denied with the exception of appellant Christ-man’s motion for suppression of evidence, which was denied after an eviden-tiary hearing. During the course of the trial each of the appellants moved for acquittal on the grounds that the government had failed to introduce sufficient evidence. These motions were also overruled. Following the guilty verdict rendered by the jury the court sentenced each appellant to 30 months in prison.

Appellants attack the statute under which they were prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. § 1465, as unconstitutional under the standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). As a corollary, they contend that the indictment thereunder was fatally defective in that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United States.

The statute involved prohibits the knowing transportation “in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution of any obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy . . . film . .” Appellants argue (1) that § 1465 is not properly limited to any specifically defined sexual conduct; (2) that the statute requires that materials be judged by a national standard not subject to rational definition; and (3) that the statute has read into it the “utterly lacking in redeeming social value or importance” standard rejected by the Supreme Court as vague and ambiguous. These arguments, based on Miller v. California, supra, were submitted before the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), was handed down. As will hereinafter become apparent, Hamling provides the answer to each of the above contentions.

In Hamling the Supreme Court rejected an argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1461, which makes criminal the use of the mails to distribute prohibited materials in terms nearly identical to those used in § 1465, was unconstitutionally vague because it did not specifically define the types of sexual conduct that are “obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy.” Finding that “the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 had been, prior to . Miller, authoritatively construed in a manner consistent with Miller,” the Court unequivocally stated that “[a]t no point does Miller . . . intimate that the constitutionality of pre-Miller convictions under statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 1461 was to be east in doubt.” 418 U.S. at 112, 94 S.Ct. at 2905. In addition, after noting that it had construed a similar statute to be limited to the type of offensive representations of conduct contemplated by Miller, the Court held that § 1461 passed constitutional muster whether judged by pre- or post-Miller standards. 418 U.S. at 115-116, 94 S.Ct. 2887. In light of the above, it is clear that § 1465 gives fair notice of the type of conduct that constitutes a criminal offense.

Likewise, in Hamling the Court found meritless the argument that § 1461 required the application of a nonexistent national standard. The trial court in Hamling had referred to a national standard in its jury instructions, but the Court nonetheless concluded that reversal was required “only where there [was] a probability that the excision of the references to the ‘country as a whole’ in the instructions dealing with community standards would have materially affected the deliberations of the jury.” 418 U.S. 108, 94 S.Ct. at 2903. The jury in the case at bar received the following instruction on community standards:

“Contemporary community standards are set by what is in fact accepted in the community as a whole; that is to say, by society at large or people in general in the entire nation, and not by what some persons or groups may believe the community as a whole ought to accept or refuse to accept. It is a matter of common knowledge, of which this Court takes judicial notice, that customs change, and that the community as a whole may from time to time find acceptable that which was formerly unacceptable.”

Examination of the record in this case, and particularly of the charge read in its entirety, leads us to conclude that appellants were not materially prejudiced by the reference to the “entire nation” in the above instruction.

Appellants also complain that § 1465 has read into it the ambiguous “utterly lacking in redeeming social value” test rejected in Miller. The favorable outcome of an argument along these lines depends, however, upon the premise that appellants could derive some benefit from the rejection of this social value test, a premise refuted by Hamling. As Mr. Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Hamling, Miller signaled a return to the definition of obscenity in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), and constituted a lessening of the prosecutorial burden. “Since Miller permits the imposition of a lesser burden on the prosecutor . than did Memoirs [Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975, 16 L.Ed.2d 1 (1966)], and since the jury convicted these petitioners on the basis of an instruction concededly based on the Memoirs test, petitioners derive no benefit from the revision of that test in Miller.” 418 U.S. at 116-117, 94 S.Ct. at 2907.

The challenged indictment charged an offense in the language of § 1465, set out the required particulars of time and place, and listed in detail the materials considered obscene. It is well settled that an indictment may be properly drawn using the language of the statute in the general description of the offense. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887. Furthermore, as our opinion hereinabove indicates, § 1465 is not unconstitutionally vague. Appellants’ challenge is, therefore, without merit.

Appellants assert that the district court erred in denying motions to suppress the films seized by the agents at the time of the arrests. Appellant Smith additionally argues that he was erroneously denied an independent hearing on his preindictment motion to suppress. In view of our finding that the seizure was legal, however, we need not consider Smith’s contention.

FBI agents took possession of the films immediately following the arrests. The crime for which appellants were arrested was committed in the presence of the agents; the sale of obscene materials that had been transported in interstate commerce. The agents could not have secured a search warrant prior to the arrests because until the films were moved into the motel room there was no way of determining where the films were or where they would be transferred. It is a classic case “[w]here there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime . . . .” Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505, 93 S.Ct. 2796, 2802, 37 L.Ed.2d 757 (1973); see United States v. Apple, 305 F.Supp. 330 (D.Md.1968).

This court is fully aware of the Fourth Amendment limitations on the seizure of allegedly obscene materials being exhibited or distributed to the public. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 37 L.Ed.2d 745 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, supra. But,

“The defendants here were not operating either a bookstore or a motion picture theatre with the public invited to purchase material or to view screenings. This was strictly an underground operation in hard core pornography .... The ‘setting’ then is hardly such as to presumptively invoke First Amendment protection. . The defendants were dealing commercially in large scale fungible smut.” United States v. Cangiano, 491 F.2d 906, 913 (2d Cir. 1974).

This language is precisely applicable to the situation before us, and we hold that no error resulted from the denial of the motion to suppress. We further note, in this regard, that the district court afforded appellant Christman an independent hearing on his motion to suppress prior to the trial. Present at that hearing were all the appellants and their attorneys.

Appellants object to the trial court’s refusal to strike certain testimony relating to the admissions made by appellant Christman to an FBI agent while he was in custody following his arrest. They argue that no statement made by Christman after he had refused to waive his rights should have been admitted, and that there was insufficient corroborative evidence of his guilt to support the alleged admissions. The record shows that Christman refused to waive his rights but did consent to furnish “background” information to the interrogating agent. It was while he was providing the so-called “background” information that Christman made the challenged admissions. It appears that the detrimental admissions were made voluntarily and without hint of coercion.

The general rule is that all interrogation must cease if a suspect indicates that he wishes to remain silent. However, there is authority for the proposition that police may continue the interrogation in any subject-area that the suspect is willing to talk about. Hill v. Whealon, 490 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Vasquez, 476 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit noted that in applying the above exception courts must carefully scrutinize the circumstances to determine that the police did not use subterfuge to extract information about matters relating to subjects that the suspect did not want to discuss. No such subterfuge was involved herein. We are satisfied that neither appellant’s privilege against self-incrimination nor his right to counsel was offended during the custodial questioning, see United States v. La-Monica, 472 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1972), and that there was ample evidence of record to corroborate the admissions.

Appellants made a number of other assignments of error, which after close examination, we have found to be without merit.

The judgments are affirmed.

      . 18 U.S.C. § 1465 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
      “Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette,
      drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription or other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”

      . 18 U.S.C. § 1461 reads :
      “Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance; and—
      “Every article or thing designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception or producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral use; and
      “Every article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing which is advertised or described in a manner calculated to lead another to use or apply it for preventing conception or producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral purpose ; and
      “Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mention'd matters, articles, or things may be obtained or made, or where or by whom any act or operation of any kind for the procuring or producing of abortion will be done or performed, or how or by what means conception may be prevented or abortion produced, whether sealed or unsealed; and
      “Every paper, writing, advertisement, or representation that any article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing may, or can, be used or applied for preventing conception or producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral purpose ; and
      “Every description calculated to induce or incite a person to so use or apply any such article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing—
      “Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
      “Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of anything declared by this section to be non-mailable, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, or knowingly takes any such thing from the mails for the jrarpose of circulating or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first such offense, and shall be fined not more than $10,-000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, for each such offense thereafter.
      “The term ‘indecent’, as used in this section includes matter of a character tending to incite arson, murder, or assassination. June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 768; June 28, 1955, c. 190, §§ 1, 2, 69 Stat. 183; Aug. 28, 1958, Pub.L. 85-796, § 1, 72 Stat. 962.”

      . Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 479, 82 S.Ct. 1432, 8 L.Ed.2d 639 (1962). Section 1465 has also been found constitutional. United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947, 92 S.Ct. 281, 30 L.Ed.2d 264 (1971).

      . Tlie Supreme Court found 18 U.S.C. § 1462 constitutional. United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973).


author: DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:

text:
    Grace B. BLUE et al., Appellants, v. Clifton M. CRAIG, Commissioner of the North Carolina Department of Social Services, et al., Appellees.
    No. 73-2183.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued June 7, 1974.
    Decided Oct. 18, 1974.

      Denison Ray, Durham, N.C., The Legal Aid Society of Durham County, North Carolina, for appellants.
    William F. O’Connel, Asst. Atty. Gen. of North Carolina (Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen. of North Carolina, on brief), for appellees Clifton M. Craig and North Carolina Board of Social Services.
    Lester W. Owen, Durham, N.C., on brief for appellee Thomas Hogan.
    Before WINTER, RUSSELL and FIELD, Circuit Judges.
   DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:

This is a class suit for a declaratory judgment that the North Carolina State Plan for Medical Assistance, fails to provide and thus deprives North Carolina recipients of medical assistance secured to them by Section 1396a, et seq., 42 U.S.C., Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The actual deprivation complained of is the failure to provide such recipients with “the necessary transportation to and from the providers of medical services or in the alternative, adequate reimbursement for transportation costs” as allegedly required under the Social Security Act and regulations promulgated thereunder but denied under the North Carolina regulations. In-junctive relief assuring future rights to transportation reimbursement and for reimbursement on account of past expenses of transportation are, also, sought.

The plaintiffs are all residents of Durham, North Carolina, and certified as eligible for medical assistance under the North Carolina Medical Assistance Program, as established by the State of North Carolina in cooperation with the federal government under the terms of the Social Security Act. They sue not only individually but also on behalf of the entire class of recipients similar in interest to them.

The defendants are the chief administrative officer of the North Carolina Department of Social Services, the members of the State Board of Social Services, and the Director of the Durham County Department of Social Services.

Federal jurisdiction of the action was asserted under Section 1983, 42 U.S.C., and Sections 1331, 1343(3) and 1343(4), 28 U.S.C. and Sections 2201, 2202, 28 U. S.C. Of its own motion, the District Court suggested dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim cognizable under Section 1983. After a hearing on that motion, the District Court dismissed the action, “insofar as § 1983 is relied upon to maintain this suit.” It likewise found want of jurisdiction on the alternative ground under Section 1331 by reason of the absence of the jurisdictional amount. The plaintiffs have appealed from this dismissal. We reverse.

The primary theory on which the plaintiffs predicated their federal right of action and which the District Court disallowed was that their action itself was authorized by Section 1983, 42 U.S. C. and that jurisdiction of that action in turn was conferred by Sections 1343(3) and (4), 28 U.S.C., for which there is no jurisdictional amount requirement. Numerous authorities may be cited in support of the availability of § 1983 as a vehicle for redress of violations of rights guaranteed by the Social Security Act. Edelman v. Jordan (1974), 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662; Hagans v. Lavine (1974), 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577; California Human Resources Dept. v. Java (1971), 402 U.S. 121, 91 S.Ct. 1347, 28 L.Ed.2d 666; Rosado v. Wyman (1970), 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442; Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287; Dandridge v. Williams (1970), 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491; King v. Smith (1968), 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118; Damico v. California (1967), 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647; Anderson v. Graham (8th Cir. 1973), 492 F.2d 986; Gilliard v. Craig (D.C.N.C.1971), 331 F.Supp. 587, aff’d 409 U.S. 807, 93 S.Ct. 39, 34 L.Ed.2d 66; Roselli v. Affleck (D.C.R.I.1974), 373 F.Supp. 36; Bass v. Rockefeller (D.C.N.Y.1971), 331 F.Supp. 945, vacated on other grounds (2 Cir.), 464 F.2d 1300; Ojeda v. Hackney (D.C.Tex.1970), 319 F.Supp. 149, vacated on other grounds (5th Cir.), 452 F.2d 947. Such cases have, however, generally involved claims of constitutional deprivations, and the District Court held in this case that the availability of § 1983 as a basis for an action such as this extends only to situations where the claim is constitutionally, based. Specifically, it held § 1983 does not afford a right of action on account of a deprivation under “color” of a state statute or regulation of a right based merely on a federal statute. Since, under its construction of the complaint, the plaintiffs stated no constitutional deprivation as a basis for their cause of action but had rested their action entirely on the claim that the state regulation in question was simply inconsistent with the federal statute, it concluded that the plaintiffs were without any rights under Section 1983. For the reasons hereafter given, we are not certain the complaint should be so narrowly construed as premising plaintiffs’ cause of action wholly on inconsistency of state regulation and federal law and as not presenting constitutional issues. Accepting, however, for the moment the premise that plaintiffs’ action poses only a claim of an infringement by a state regulation on a right conferred merely by federal “law,” we disagree with the conclusion reached by the District Court.

By its express terms § 1983, which, as one commentator has remarked, “is notable for the absence of qualification or limitation,” creates a cause of action for a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’’ of the United States. (Italics added) Despite this seemingly unambiguous language authorizing both statutorily-based and constitutionally-based actions, the District Court, relying on Wynn v. Indiana State Department of Public Welfare (D.C.Ind.1970), 316 F.Supp. 324, dismissed on appeal by agreement of parties under Rule 42(b), Rules of Appellate Procedure (May 26, 1971), would disregard completely the words “and laws” as a basis for a cause of action under § 1983 and would thereby deny jurisdiction under the section over statutorily-based actions. It arrived at this conclusion by adopting the reasoning of Wynn that the words “and laws” were not in the original Civil Rights statute as adopted by Congress in 1871 but represented a gratuitous interpolation by the draftsman of the 1875 Revised Statutes, an interpolation which, even though approved in the adoption of the Revised Statutes, could not enlarge the scope of- the original statute. The rationale behind this conclusion was stated in Wynn in these words:

“ * * * No alterations in statutory coverage may be based upon * * * changes by the reviser * * *. The intention of Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871 must be determined from the language of the original statute, its legislative history and subsequent judicial interpretations.” (Emphasis in text) (At 328).

Such pruning of the statute by the elimination therefrom of a phrase that has appeared in the Statute, as the Revised Statutes have been phrased, for almost a century without any question being raised of its legitimacy certainly has never received the sanction of the Supreme Court, either before or after the decision in Wynn. In Greenwood v. Peacock (1966), 384 U.S. 808, 829-830, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 1813, 16 L.Ed.2d 944, which preceded Wynn, the Court said:

“ * * * Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964 ed.) the officers may be made to respond in damages not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well.” (Italics added).

Again, in Dandridge v. Williams, supra (397 U.S. at 475, 90 S.Ct. at 1156), the Court, in reviewing a § 1983 District Court decision invalidating a Maryland regulation under its AFDC program for inconsistency with the federal Act, declared that the decision below must “be affirmed if the Maryland regulation is in conflict with either the federal statute or the Constitution” (Italics added), thus equating for § 1983 considerations statutorily-based and constitutionally-based claims. And recently and subsequent to Wynn, the Court in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. (1972), 405 U.S. 538, 543, n. 7, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 1117, 31 L.Ed.2d 424, reh. denied, 406 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 1611, 31 L.Ed.2d 822, after summarizing much of the legislative history discussed at length in Wynn, con-eluded with this definitive explication of the scope of 1983:

“ * * * Although the oi’iginal substantive provision had protected rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution, the provision in the Revised Statutes was enlarged to provide protection for rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law as well.”

It seems plain from these excerpts — dicta though they may be, as Wynn would suggest- — that the Supreme Court reads § 1983 as it is plainly phrased in the Revised Statutes and, unlike the decision below and that in Wynn, would give effect to the words “and laws.” In so doing, the Court is simply recognizing “that the Revised Statutes are positive law that repeal and supersede all previous Statutes at Large.” Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 Col.L.Rev. 1404, 1418 (1972).

This conclusion that § 1983 authorizes actions brought “to provide protection of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law” has been recognized and applied in a number of well-reasoned federal decisions. The first decision to give it such application was Bomar v. Keyes (2d Cir. 1947), 162 F.2d 136, 138-139, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825, 68 S.Ct. 166, 92 L.Ed. 400, reh. denied, 332 U.S. 845, 68 S.Ct. 266, 92 L.Ed. 416, in which Judge Learned Hand put the matter tersely:

“ * * * Although the books are full of cases under that statute concerning deprivation of rights and privileges, secured by the Constitution, we have been unable to find any in which the right or privilege at stake was secured by a ‘law’ of the United States. Nevertheless the language is so plain that the only question is whether this particular ‘law’ secured to the plaintiff a ‘privilege.’ ”

The same conclusion was reached in Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service (5th Cir. 1969), 417 F.2d 569, a case strongly disapproved in Wynn. There, the Court declared that, “ [I]t is true that § 1983 has quite often been used as a means of protecting Constitutionally guaranteed rights, particularly in the area of equal protection of the Negro. But the language of this civil rights statute is broad: it is a violation of the statute to transgress ‘any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States. (Court’s italics) * * * Moreover, the Supreme Court in Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 1964, 384 U.S. 808, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 16 L.Ed.2d 944, clearly indicated that § 1983 was applicable when statutory, as well as, constitutional ‘rights, privileges and immunities’ were involved.” (at 579) And Anderson v. Graham, supra (492 F.2d 986), though it does not discuss the point, represents a judicial recognition of the same construction of § 1983, since the basis of the right of action, upheld in that case, was the same as that here, i. e., a claim that a state AFDC regulation violated the federal law. See, to the same effect: Giguere v. Affleck (D.C.R.I.1974), 370 F.Supp. 154, 157-158, Roselli v. Af-fleck, supra (373 F.Supp. at 39-40), and Bass v. Rockefeller, supra (331 F.Supp. at 949, n. 5). We accordingly have no difficulty in resolving that this action, which seeks to invalidate a state-wide regulation alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of civil rights given them by the Social Security Act, even if regarded as being wholly statutorily-based, qualifies under § 1983.

But § 1983, while providing a substantive right of action, is not a jurisdictional statute. The “jurisdictional counterpart” for § 1983 was traditionally § 1343(3), 28 U.S.C., though jurisdiction has recently been enlarged by § 1343(4). To establish jurisdiction in this case, without satisfying the requirement for jurisdictional amount, the plaintiffs must meet the standards for qualification under § 1983 and either § 1343(3) or § 1343(4) — or both. Since § 1343(4) was only enacted in 1957, we shall first deal with jurisdiction in terms of § 1343(3), since for almost eighty years, § 1343(3), in one form or another, was regarded as the proper jurisdictional counterpart for § 1983. The two initial provisions — the substantive and the jurisdictional provisions — were initially parts of a single act, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, a single act which gave both a right of action and a grant of federal jurisdiction over that action. 17 Stat. 13. As one commentator has remarked, “ * * * the parent statute of sections 1983 and 1343(3) did not create new substantive rights; rather, by providing a private cause of action at law or in equity in the federal courts, the 1871 Act created an enforcement mechanism to secure the equal rights and equal protection of the laws granted by the fourteenth amendment.” Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 Harv.Civ. Rights — Civ.Liberties L.Rev. 1, 5 (1970). And the grant of jurisdiction provided by this original Act was as broad and extensive as the cause of action granted thereby. Thus, to such extent as the statute gave a right of action it conferred full federal jurisdiction for the vindication of that right of action.

In the 1875 revision, however, the 1871 Act was separated into substantive and jurisdictional provisions. The substantive part of the statute is now codified as § 1983, 42 U.S.C. and the jurisdictional part as § 1343(3), 28 U.S.C. But such separation into distinct sections was not intended to alter in anyway the inter-relation of the two sections, as they had previously existed in the original Act; the substantive and jurisdictional sections were still intended to be co-extensive, just as they had been initially. No other construction can be placed on the explanatory language as used by the Reviser in discussing the rearrangement of the two sections. And this was indisputably the ease in connection with jurisdiction conferred on the district courts in this 1875 revision. The jurisdictional statute as it related to actions under the substantive act in district courts, under this 1875 revision, “was identical in scope with the expanded substantive provision” itself (i. e., § 1983). Such misunderstanding as there is in the construction of § 1343(3) had its genesis, however, in the provision for concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit courts over an .action under the substantive provision, as provided in this 1875 revision. In this jurisdictional section covering circuit courts, the violations which would support jurisdiction were defined as those deprivations which were violative of the Constitution or laws “providing for equal rights.” Even though there was this difference in the language of the two jurisdictional sections, with the district court section being “identical” with the substantive provision and with the circuit court section including the additional phrase “providing for equal rights”, there is no indication that, by such difference, with one jurisdictional statute referring to “civil rights” and the other to “equal rights”, the Congress intended to make the jurisdiction in either the district or the circuit court over an action under § 1983 any less than the full scope of the substantive provision itself and it perceived, it would seem, no difference in the actual application of the two jurisdictional sections, so far as § 1983 was concerned.

This conclusion is confirmed by the manner in which the Reviser arranged and cross-referenced the several substantive and jurisdictional provisions in this 1875 revision. Both the circuit court and district court jurisdictional statutes were cross-referenced as supporting ju-risdictionally any case maintainable under what was then Revised Statute 1979, now § 1983. This would plainly indicate that the Revisers thought the two jurisdictional statutes were identical in scope. Moreover, while it may be true that all the post-war Civil Rights statutes “were obscurely and sloppily drafted, and obscurely and sloppily codified”, as one commentator has remarked, it would seem inconceivable that Congress, by its variance in the language of these two jurisdictional statutes in the 1875 revision, intended any variance in the jurisdiction of the two courts — the district and circuit courts. Any other construction of the two statutes would operate to nullify the statutory provision that there was concurrent (i. e., like) jurisdiction in both courts over any actions maintainable under original § 1983, and would create a dichotomy in the application of the two jurisdictional provisions never intended or contemplated by Congress.

Nor does it seem that too much significance should be accorded the use of the phrase “equal rights” in the circuit court jurisdictional statute. The term “ ‘equal protection’ * * * had no significant history prior to incorporation in the fourteenth amendment”, and, in its incorporation in that Amendment, it “was given ‘only general attention’ by the Congress.” Note, Development in the Law — -Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1068 (1969). It was, in fact, a general term used to characterize all the post-war Civil Rights Statutes, including what is now § 1983, and it was in this sense it was used — as a reference broadly by way of identification to all the enforcing legislation - enacted to give effect to what was often spoken of as the “Equal Rights Amendment.” This point was persuasively put in Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 Harv.Civil Rights — Civil Liberties L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1970):

“ * * * in the process of codification and reorganization of sections 1983 and 1343(3), no clear congressional intent that the scope of 1343(3) should be narrower than the reach of section 1983 ever appeared. The crucial ‘equal rights’ language did not appear until the general revision of 1875, which made no substantive changes in the Act of 1871 but merely separated its substantive and jurisdictional provisions. Since the phrase was placed in a jurisdictional subsection, the equal rights language appears to have been employed solely to refer to the estranged substantive sections of the Ku Klux Klan Act rather than to limit the scope of the substantive provisions. Because the fourteenth amendment was originally intended to secure ‘equal rights’ to emancipated blacks, it is understandable that the revisors would use this wording to refer to the displaced substantive provisions which had been enacted to enforce the amendment. It seems illogical to infer from this history that Congress intended to limit substantially the scope of section 1983 by restricting its jurisdictional counterpart, section 1343(3), or to create causes of action under section 1983 for which it excluded jurisdiction under section 1343(3). Instead of constricting the operation of section 1343(3), the equal rights phrase should be interpreted to refer this jurisdictional section back to its substantive and coextensive partner. Since section 1983 has been expanded well beyond equal rights cases, the scope of section 1343(3) should be similarly extended.”

And this, in our opinion, is the proper method of construing the term “equal rights” in this 1875 statement of the jurisdiction of the circuit courts — not so much as a term limiting the scope of the statute but rather as a term intended to spread the jurisdictional umbrella of the federal courts over any actions authorized under statutes enacted to give effect to the Fourteenth Amendment, including specifically § 1983.

Although circuit courts as a part of the federal judicial system were abolished in connection with the 1911 revision of the Judicial Code, this discussion of the construction to be given the statute fixing the jurisdiction of circuit courts under the 1875 revision over actions authorized under § 1983 has importance because of its relation to the present phraseology of § 1343(3). In that 1911 revision the jurisdiction previously exercised by circuit courts was devolved upon the district courts and in this process, the two jurisdictional provisions supporting actions under § 1983 in the circuit and district courts were consolidated with the adoption of the jurisdictional language in the circuit court statute. As so adopted, it included the phrase, “providing for equal rights” and it is this inclusion which it is argued operated to reduce the district court’s unquestioned previous jurisdiction over § 1983 actions. For the reasons already given, we do not regard the phrase “providing for equal rights” as creating any conflict with the original jurisdictional grant given the district courts. It seems clear that, in adopting the language it did in the consolidation, Congress did not intend to change the district court’s jurisdiction. In fact, it disclaimed expressly any such intention. It apparently was using the term “equal rights” in the same sense as it had been used in the 1875 statement of the circuit court jurisdiction as a “short-hand” reference back to all rights of actions qualifying for enforcement under the various remedial statutes enacted to give effect to the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment. And that we believe is the proper construction of 1343(3). In short, adopted as the jurisdictional counterpart of § 1983, it is to be given as broad and extensive an application as § 1983 itself.

In reaching our conclusion, we recognize that the Supreme Court has on three occasions specifically reserved decision on the applicability of 1343(3) to welfare cases in which the only issue is the inconsistency of state law with federal law, and that the Second Circuit has held categorically that welfare cases such as this are not “equal rights” cases and do not qualify under 1343(3). Finding that claims arising out of a violation by a state of rights given by the Social Security Act did not “involve[s] the redress of either ‘equal rights’ or a ‘civil right’ as those terms are used in § 1343,” and concluding “that the federal courts are [not] the appropriate forum” for the resolution of such claims of deprivation, the Second Circuit denied jurisdiction in Rosado v. Wyman (414 F.2d 170, 181, rev., 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442). Though expressing amazement and bafflement at “the puzzle arising from the [Supreme] Court’s unquestioning assumption of § 1343(3) jurisdiction in all welfare cases that have come before it,” and despite the reversal in Rosado, that Court restated this conclusion in McCall v. Shapiro (2d Cir. 1969), 416 F.2d 246, 250 and Aguayo v. Richardson (2d Cir. 1973), 473 F.2d 1090, 1101, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 921, 93 S.Ct. 1350, 35 L.Ed.2d 583 To such extent as this conclusion rests on the theory that, to sustain jurisdiction under § 1343(3) over such claims would overwhelm federal courts the objection was apparently answered by the Supreme Court in its reversal of Wyman, in which it stated by way of justification of federal jurisdiction in the welfare area (397 U.S. at 422, 90 S.Ct. at 1222):

“ * * * While we view with concern the escalating involvement of federal courts in this highly complicated area of welfare benefits, one that should be formally placed under the supervision of HEW, at least in the first instance, we find not the slightest indication that Congress meant to deprive federal courts of their transitional jurisdiction to hear and decide federal questions in this field.”

Another ground expressed in the decisions of the Second Circuit for denial of jurisdiction is that:

“ * * * Section 1983 grants jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy when there is an unconstitutional infringement on individual rights (e. g., speech, liberty, vote, press, religion) incapable of monetary valuation. * * * It would appear that the limited exception to the amount in controversy requirement remaining in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which consists of suits under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 does not extend to suits involving solely money claims not related to violation of civil rights.” McCall v. Shapiro, supra (416 F.2d at 250).

Since under this view, a welfare claim was “monetary” or “proprietary”, it was held by the Second Circuit not to be within § 1983 jurisdiction. But this distinction between “proprietary” and personal liberty, was attenuated by the Second Circuit itself in Johnson v. Harder (2d Cir. 1971), 438 F.2d 7, and was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in Lynch. In that latter case, the Court said (405 U.S. at 551, n. 19, 92 S.Ct. at 1121):

“As noted above, we have never adopted the property rights — personal liberties test for § 1343(3) jurisdiction. In Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said that application of the test would bar many welfare claims. * * * We have, however, continually found § 1343(3) jurisdiction in such cases. See, e. g., California Department of Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, [91 S.Ct. 1347, 28 L.Ed.2d 666]; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, [90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442]; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, [88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118]; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, [90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287]; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, [90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491] ; Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, [88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647].”

This argument, as advanced in McCall and the subsequent cases adopting its view, assumes that there is a lacuna or gap created by the inclusion of the phrase “equal rights” in § 1343(3), so far as the enforcement of a right of action under § 1983 may be had in federal court. Under this argument a case which falls clearly under § 1983 may only be prosecuted in the federal court if that claim may be regarded as one involving strictly “equal rights” as that term is construed today rather than as it was used and considered in the 1871 and 1875 Acts. What this argument really means is that while the plaintiffs may be given a right of action under § 1983 to void a denial of a federal right by a state statute or regulation, that action is not within the jurisdictional counterpart of § 1983, to-wit, § 1343(3) and their federal right may be said, as a practical matter, to be unenforceable in federal courts. But, as Professor Cover has observed “there is no indication that Congress intended that there be 1983 causes of action which could not be reached jurisdictionally by the federal court. Indeed, the whole point of the statute [i. e., § 1343] is to provide a comprehensive federal remedy.” Cover, supra, p. 24. And so, far from resorting to some technical language in § 1343(3) to thwart a federal remedy, the Courts should give to the two statutes, the substantive and jurisdictional, (which were clearly intended to complement one another), a construction that is co-extensive so that the federal court may afford the aggrieved the “comprehensive federal remedy” contemplated by Congress. As Professor Cover has again stated, “[It] is of the utmost importance that some reconciliation of the statutes take place. It would be idiotic to permit subtle distinctions in language where there is no evidence of any intent to make distinctions in meaning accomplish a result which would be deplorable in any event. Only when there is no uncertainty should the courts conclude that Congress has set up a remedial system which overlooks nothing but the minor technicality of giving jurisdiction to some court. The courts should be especially reluctant to reach such a result when there is every evidence that a federal forum was a focal point of the legislation.” For the reasons already given, we are convinced that the jurisdiction of a federal court over an action brought under § 1983 is properly within the scope of § 1343(3). Any right of action that finds its roots in any of the civil rights legislation enacted between 1866 and 1871, as does this action, qualifies under the language of § 1343(3) as one “promoting equal rights”, as such rights were envisioned in the enactment of the original Act and as used in the 1875 revision, which construction was taken over in the 1911 recodification.

Even if jurisdiction over this action did not exist under § 1343(3), however, it is plain, as the Court held in Gomez, jurisdiction is conferred by § 1343(4). This section provides for jurisdiction over an action “under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights * * “Certainly § 1983 is an ‘Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.’ ” Hall v. Garson (5th Cir. 1970), 430 F.2d 430, 438. McCall v. Shapiro, supra (416 F.2d 246), is, however, to the contrary. The Court in that case bluntly declared that, “[T]he Social Security Act is not one ‘providing for the protection of civil rights.’ ” (p. 249) We are not persuaded to adopt that conclusion, for which the Second Circuit offers no reason beyond the bare statement itself. The difficulty with the conclusion is that it overlooks the fact that, while the alleged illegality of the deprivation complained of finds its warrant in the Social Security Act, the actual cause of action is granted not by the Social Security Act but by § 1983, which is historically and textually a “civil rights” Act.

The editor of the Note in 72 Col.L. Rev. 1427-28, already noted, gives some support, though, to the argument that § 1343(4) will not cover a case such as this. The note points out that the legislative history of this section, which was adopted as a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, demonstrates that its purpose was “to ensure jurisdiction over claims based on the new statute,” and suggests that the application of the provision should be restricted to that legislative purpose. But, as the Note states, the Supreme Court does not appear to have taken so restricted a view of the application of the provision. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (1968), 392 U.S. 409, 412, n. 1, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189, the Court approved § 1343(4) jurisdiction over a claim based on the 1866 Civil Rights Act. The Second Circuit itself took note of this action in Jones and conceded that “by its letter” the section plainly embraced cases such as these welfare cases and recognized that by its decision in Jones the Supreme Court had indicated that it intended to give the language of the section its natural import and normal construction. Eisen v. Eastman (2d Cir. 1969), 421 F.2d 560, 562, n. 2. We are persuaded by the action of the Supreme Court in Jones to conclude as did the Fifth Circuit in the Gomez case that § 1343(4) is to be given the construction that its plain language justifies. So construed, it supports federal jurisdiction, despite the absence of the jurisdictional amount over this cause.

It has been assumed up to .this point that the claim of the plaintiffs rested entirely on an inconsistency between the state regulation and the controlling federal law and that it presented no constitutional “overtones.” Of course, if such a claim does present a constitutional issue, all the authorities agree that jurisdiction may be predicated on § 1343(3). See, New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino (1973), 413 U.S. 405, 412, n. 11, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 37 L.Ed.2d 688; Aguayo v. Richardson, supra (473 F.2d at 1102). In Townsend v. Swank (1971), 404 U.S. 282, 286, 92 S.Ct. 502, 505, 30 L.Ed.2d 448, the Court, construing the earlier decision of . King v. Smith, supra (392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118) said that “a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance, under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” This language of Townsend was quoted approvingly in Carleson v. Remillard (1972), 406 U.S. 598, 600, 92 S.Ct. 1932, 32 L.Ed.2d 352, in which the Court also cited with approval Stoddard v. Fisher (3-judge ct. D.C.Me.1971), 330 F.Supp. 566, 571-572, which found in a welfare case a constitutional violation “under the Supremacy Clause.” (p. 603) In Dublino v. New York State Department of Social Serv. (3-judge ct. D.C.N.Y. 1972), 348 F.Supp. 290, 295, rev., 413 U.S. 405, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 37 L.Ed.2d 688, the Court, in sustaining jurisdiction under § 1343(3) over a claim of conflict between federal and state welfare laws, as one arising under the Constitution, said:

“In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448 (1971) and Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 92 S.Ct. 1932, 32 L.Ed.2d 352 (1972), the Court held that ‘a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid’ under the Supremacy Clause.’ ”

And in the recent case of Hagans v. Lavine, supra, 415 U.S. 533, n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 1379 the Court recognizes the argument that a conflict between federal and state law in the administration of the welfare provisions of the Social Security Act may be “itself a constitutional matter within the meaning of § 1343(3)”, though it left the resolution of the argument “for another day”. It observed, however, that “when we have previously determined that state AFDC laws do not conform with the Social Security Act of HEW regulations, they have been invalidated under the Supremacy Clause. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286, [92 S.Ct. 502, 505, 30 L.Ed.2d 448] (1971).” It, also, noted that Swift & Co. v. Wickham (1965), 382 U.S. 111, 125, 86 S.Ct. 258, 15 L.Ed.2d 194, had assumed “that a suit to have a state statute declared void and to secure the benefits of the federal statute with which the state law is allegedly in conflict cannot succeed without ultimate resort to the Federal Constitution — ‘to be sure, any determination that a state statute is void for obstructing a federal statute does rest in the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution.’ ” Despite its reservation of decision, the Court by this language in its opinion, it would seem, has pointed inescapably to the conclusion “that the ‘secured by the Constitution’ language of § 1343(3) should not be construed to exclude Supremacy Clause issues” and that a claim that a state statute or regulation 'is inconsistent with federal law poses a constitutional issue under the Supremacy Clause, jurisdictionally cognizable under § 1343(3). This is such a case. It is true, the plaintiffs have not invoked in haec verba the Supremacy Clause in aid of jurisdiction but they have plead the facts that make out a violation of that constitutional provison. By alleging that the state regulation is inconsistent with the controlling federal statute, they have plead all that is required under our liberal form of pleading to make the constitutionality of the regulation an issue. As the Court in Williams v. United States (9th Cir. 1969), 405 F.2d 951, 954, citing in support Schwarz v. United States (4th Cir. 1951), 191 F.2d 618, 620, put it, “ [I] f facts giving the court jurisdiction are set forth in the complaint, the provision conferring jurisdiction need not be specifically pleaded.” After all, “[I]t is well settled that the recitation of a statute can neither deprive a court of jurisdiction nor confer jurisdiction upon it.” Beeler v. United States (3d Cir. 1964), 338 F.2d 687, 689. Even where a complainant has incorrectly planted his case on one federal right, he is still entitled to maintain his action if jurisdiction can be sustained on any other ground appearing in the record. Blanchard v. Terry & Wright, Inc. (6th Cir. 1964), 331 F.2d 467, 468-469, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 831, 85 S.Ct. 62, 13 L.Ed.2d 40. And even were this not so, it would be inequitable and unjust to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds this action without giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint to set forth in formal terms the constitutional issue. That right is given them by Section 1653, 28 U.S.C.

Nor, for that matter, is it clear that this case does not present an “equal rights” case, as that term has come to be interpreted. In Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1486, 1496 (1969), the author states:

“If by state action a class has been deprived of federal rights, or an individual so deprived on account of his membership in a class, there will probably have been a denial of equal protection of the laws.”

Indisputably, the plaintiffs are representative of a class that claims a deprivation of federal rights. Such a claim sets forth under the above test at least a colorable claim of denial of equal protection and that is all that is required for jurisdiction under § 1343(3). Of course, on the merits, the classification may be found legitimate, as was the case in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, (397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491) but that determination on the merits is quite different from the determination of a colorable claim, sufficient for jurisdictional purposes. In Dandridge, the illegitimacy of the classification was sufficient for jurisdictional purposes but it was not sufficient to support a decision in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits.

It is argued, too, that jurisdiction exists under § 1331, 28 U.S.C. Since we have found jurisdiction clearly to exist under both § 1343(3) and § 1343(4), 28 U.S.C., it is unnecessary to consider this additional jurisdictional ground. We, of course, intimate no views on the merits of plaintiffs’ claim but remand the cause to the District Court for the resolution of that issue.

Reversed and remanded.

      . North Carolina General Statutes § 108-59 through § 108-61.1, and regulations and executive orders issued thereunder.

      . 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a) (4).

      . See, for instance, Hagans v. Lavine, supra; Rosado v. Wyman, supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra.

      Not infrequently, the constitutional claim is at best colorable and the decision of the Court passes over the constitutional claim and reaches its conclusion entirely on the inconsistency of the State regulation or statute with federal law. This occasioned Judge Kaufman’s comment in his concurring opinion in McCall v. Shapiro (2d Cir. 1969), 416 F.2d 246, 251:
      “Thus I find King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), particularly troublesome. The Court there invalidated a State ‘man in the house’ rule on the basis of inconsistency with the federal statute under which the AFDC program was administered. The Court found jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. § 1343(3) (‘deprivation * * * of any right * * * secured by the Constitution * * * or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights’) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (‘to secure * * * relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote’). Although basing its exception to the jurisdictional amount on constitutional claims the Court decided the case on the sole ground of supremacy of the federal statute. I note therefore, that while it took jurisdiction on a constitutional ground, the Court’s ultimate decision was based solely on statutory construction. If this be a basis for jurisdiction, without regard to amount in controversy, then appellant’s due process ‘whipsaw’ claim arguably suffices in this action. I would prefer, however, to await a clear declaration by the Supreme Court before holding in effect that any welfare recipient may obtain federal court review by urging what may be no more than a color-able constitutional claim, joined to a substantial statutory issue.”

        See, also, Johnson v. Harder (2d Cir. 1971), 438 F.2d 7, 12, where the Court, in a welfare case, said:
      “ * * * For the reasons outlined above, we have found that so long as a colorable constitutional claim has been raised, jurisdiction [under § 1343(3)] will properly lie.”
      In Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 Harv.L.Rev. at 1486, 1496 (1969), the editor states:
      “ * * * federal jurisdiction (under § 1983) should attach if plaintiff colorably alleges a state deprivation of fourteenth amendment equal protection of the laws.”

      . Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, supra, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1486.

      . See, also, the concurring opinion of Judge Lumbard in Rosado v. Wyman (2d Cir. 1969), 414 F.2d 170, 181:
      “ * * * I do not believe that the claim, though one founded on a federal right, falls within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1983, for it lacks the constitutional overtones that have been present in all the welfare cases cited by the plaintiffs which have been sustained under that section.” (Italics added)

      . See, also, Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Marshall and Blackmun, Justices, dissenting, 415 U.S. p. 690, 94 S.Ct. p. 1369, 39 L.Ed.2d 662):
      “But a cause of action is clearly provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which in terms authorizes suits to redress deprivations of rights secured by the ‘laws’ of the United States.”
      Scholarly opinion is in accord with this view. Thus, in Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction : A Reply, 83 ITarv.L.Rev. 1352, 1356 (1970), the author phrases the application of the statute succinctly in these words:
      “The scope of the present jurisdiction [under § 19831 may be stated in a nut-sh'dl: A person may resort to the federal courts to remedy an abuse by a state official in a matter of personal rights protected by tlie Federal Constitution or laws” (Italics added).

      . It is of interest in this connection that the decisions from the Second Circuit, which have denied jurisdiction in welfare deprivation suits, and which are subsequently discussed, have done so not because, in their opinion, tiie scope of § 1983 should be limited strictly to constitutionally-based claims. Indeed, the opinions of that Circuit seem to assume that § 1983 is sufficiently plain as to embrace statutorily-based claims. Those decisions predicate their finding of non-jurisdiction on the peculiar phraseology of § 1343(3) as it relates to statutorily-based claims. Under their construction of § 1343(3) statutorily-based claims, arising out of § 1983, are federally cognizable under § 1343(3) but only if such statutorily-based claims may be considered as presenting an equal protection issue. See Rosado v. Wyman, supra (414 F.2d at 181); McCall v. Shapiro, supra (416 F.2d at 250). We discuss this construction of § 1343(3), as advanced by the Second Circuit, infra.

      . For reasons hereafter given, we are of opinion that this action may properly be deemed to be constitutionally-based.

      . See, Hagans v. Lavine, supra (415 U.S. at 535, 94 S.Ct. at 1378):
      “By its terms, § 1983 embraces petitioners’ claims that the challenged regulation enforced by respondent state and county welfare officials deprives them of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws,’ viz., the equal protection of the laws. But the federal cause of action created by the section does not by itself confer jurisdiction upon the Federal District Courts to adjudicate these claims.”
      Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Challenges to State Welfare Programs, supra, 72 Col.L.Rev. at 1407:
      “ * * * It is important to recognize' that section 1983 does not in itself confer federal jurisdiction; rather, it merely creates a cause of action. Section 1983 is a functional prerequisite to establishing jurisdiction under section 1343(3) and, for analytical purposes, is treated independently.”

      . For a history of the Act of 1871 and its descendants, § 1983 and § 1343(3), see Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. (1972) 405 U.S. 538, 543-544, n. 7, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424.

      . Of., Cover, Establishing Federal Jurisdiction In Actions Brought to Vindicate Statutory (Federal) Rights When No Violations of Constitutional Rights are Alleged, Clearinghouse Rev., Feb.-Mar., 1969, at p. 5, 6, where, speaking to the original Act, the author said:
      “ * * * There was a rather clear intent to establish a right to bring any authorized Civil Rights action in the federal courts. This is the interpretation given the statute in Hart & Wechsler, Federal Courts & the Federal System, at p. 729.”

      . See, Cover, Establishing Federal Jurisdiction In Actions Brought to Vindicate Statutory (Federal) Rights When No Violations of Constitutional Rights are Alleged, supra.

      . Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., supra (405 U.S. at p. 544, n. 7, 92 S.Ct. at p. 1117.

      . See, Cover, supra, where this point is carefully outlined.

      . Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federal Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Trials, 113 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 793, 871, n. 311 (1965).

      . Cf., People of State of New York v. Galamison (2d Cir. 1965), 342 F.2d 255, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 977, 85 S.Ct. 1342, 14 L.Ed.2d 272:
      “It should be noted that the Civil Rights Act of 1870 was considered the first enforcement act (entitled ‘An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the Several States of the Union and for other Purposes’) and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 considered the second enforcement act; this would support the tendency to view them together, as the members of the same class — ‘any law providing for equal rights.’ ” (P. 282, n. 8 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).

      . See Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 Col.L.Rev. 84, 113 (1967) :
      “ * * * Certainly there is no evidence that Congress intended to diminish the prior jurisdiction of the district court. Indeed, some of the brief legislative history suggests precisely the contrary — that the sole purpose was to remove any original civil rights jurisdiction from the circuit courts and to vest in the district courts whatever jurisdiction had previously existed in the two courts.”

        See, also, S.Rep. No. 3888, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2 at 50-1 (1910) :
      “The changes proposed by the bill are generally of form rather than substance. Where the substance of the laws would appear to be changed, it is generally because of the reorganization and consolidation of the laws.”

      . The latest expression of the Supreme Court on this issue appears in Hagans v. Lavine (1974), 415 U.S. 534, n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 1377, 39 L.Ed.2d 577:
      “Petitioners contend that § 1983 authorizes suits to vindicate rights under the ‘laws’ of the United States as well as under the Constitution and that a suit brought under § 1983 to vindicate a statutory right under the Social Security Act, is a suit under an Act of Congress ‘providing for the protection of civil rights, including that right to vote’ within the meaning of § 1343(4). They further argue that in any event, §,1343(3) in particular, and § 1343 in general, should be construed to invest the district courts with jurisdiction to hear any suit authorized by § 1983. These issues we also do not reach.”
      King v. Smith (1968), 392 U. S. 309, 312, n. 3, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2131, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118:
      “We intimate no views as to whether and under what circumstances suits challenging state AFDC provisions only on the ground that they are inconsistent with the federal Statute may be brought in federal courts,” The same reservation of opinion appears in
      Rosado v. Wyman (1970), 397 U. S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442.

      . Almenares v. Wyman (2d Cir. 1971), 453 F.2d 1075 at 1082, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944, 92 S.Ct. 962, 30 L.Ed.2d 815.
      Moreover, in Lynch, supra, at p. 551, n. 20 of 405 U.S., at p. 1120 of 92 S.Ct., the Court said:
      “The federal courts have produced inconsistent results regarding § 1343(3) jurisdiction of welfare claims. Compare Roberts v. Harder, 2 Cir., 440 F.2d 1229, with Alvarado v. Schmidt, D.C., 317 F.Supp. 1027. See also n. 19, supra. Tet, without always explaining why such interests are ‘personal’ rather than ‘proprietary,’ courts have consistently found civil rights jurisr diction over suits alleging discrimination in the issuance of business licenses. * :|i * »

        See, also, Hagans v. Lavine (1974), 415 U. S. 533, n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 1377.
      “Several past decisions of this Court concerning challenges by federal categorical assistance recipients to state welfare regulations have either assumed that jurisdiction existed under § 1343 or so stated without analysis.”

      . This same Circuit in Bomar v. Keyes, supra (162 F.2d 136) had no difficulty in reaching what amounted to a contrary conclusion, though Judge Learned Hand, in Bomar, apparently thought so little of the jurisdictional objection based on § 1343(3) that he did not even advert to it in his opinion but assumed that the jurisdictional provision under § 1343(3) was “identical” with the reach of § 1983 itself.

        See, however, McGuire v. Amrein (D.C.Md.1951), 101 F.Supp. 414, 420, which also would take the strict lexicographer’s view of the term “equal rights” in § 1343(3) rather than recognizing that the phrase “is always a notion of many shades and connotations,” to be' defined in its historical setting, as a general reference to all the enforcing statutes adopted under the Fourteenth Amendment. Note, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1160 (1969).

      . See, McCall v. Shapiro, supra (416 F.2d at 250).

      . Cf. Zwickler v. Koota (1967), 389 U.S. 241, 248, 88 S.Ct. 391, 395, 19 L.Ed.2d 444, where discussing the expansion of federal jurisdiction under § Í983, the Court said:
      “In thus expanding federal judicial power, Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor’s choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims. Plainly, escape from that duty is not permissible merely because state courts also have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal courts, ‘ * * * to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States jjc % * JJ

      . See, also, Roberts v. Harder, supra (440 F.2d 1229), vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Lynch (405 U.S. 1037, 92 S.Ct. 1319, 31 L.Ed.2d 577).

      . Of., McGaw v. Farrow (4th Cir. 1973), 472 F.2d 952, where, unlike the situation here, there is no indication in the legislative history to suggest that the gap in federal jurisdiction was not intended or contemplated.

      . Cover, supra, p. 25.

      . Gomez, supra (417 F.2d at pp. 578-579). To the same effect: Anderson v. Graham, supra (492 F.2d 986); Giguere v. Affleck, supra (370 F.Supp. at 157-158); Roselli v. Affleck, supra (373 F.Supp. at 39—40), and Bass v. Rockefeller, supra (331 F.Supp. at 949, n. 5).

      . This conclusion has been recently reiterated by way of a dictum in Aguayo v. Richardson (2d Cir. 1973), 473 F.2d 1090, 1101, cert. denied, 410 U. S. 921, 93 S.Ct. 1350, 35 L.Ed.2d 583.

      . There is, to say the least, obvious inconsistency in adopting an argument that denies any relevance to legislative intent in construing “equal rights” in § 1343(3) but nullifies, on the authority of so-called legislative intent, the plain language of. § 1343(4).

      . In Eisen v. Eastman (2d Cir. 1969), 421 F.2d 560, 565, n. 8, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841, 91 S.Ct.2d 82, 27 L.Ed.2d 75:
      “We note that in many of the cases just cited, and in some of those cited in the next paragraph in the text, attention is devoted only to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or, if 28 •U.S.C. § 1343(3) is refe'rred to at all, the reference is merely in the proposition that if there is a cause of' action under § 1983, there is jurisdiction under § 1343(3). Hornsby v. Allen, supra, [5 Cir.,] 326 F.2d 605, is a prime example. While this treatment accords with our view that in cases alleging constitutional deprivations both sections are subject to the same interpretation, see note 5, supra, one cannot help forming the impression that'The focus on § 1983 — and the neglect of § 1343(3) — has contributed to the failure to deal with Hague’s [Hague v. O.I.O. 307 U. S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423] interpretation of the latter section and, in some cases, the failure even to mention that decision at all.” (Italics added)
      In Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Challenges to State Welfare Programs, supra, (72 'Col.L.Rev. at 1412) the commentator, commenting on Ijynch said :
      “The Supreme Court thus unequivocally declared that the ‘rights, privileges and immunities’ that give rise to jurisdiction under section 1343(3) include all constitutional rights, not just those that can be classifkd as ‘personal’ under Justice Stone’s test. There is therefore no doubt that section 1343(3) grants federal jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to state welfare programs.” (Emphasis in text)

      . While the Supreme Court reversed this case on the merits, it affirmed the jurisdictional ruling. 413 U. S. 405, 412, n. 11, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 37 L.Ed.2d 688.

      . See, also, 5 Wriglit & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1209, p. 92 :
      “ * * * Despite occasional language or judicial intimations to the contrary, a failure to name the particular statute, treaty, or section of the Constitution under which the action arises is not fatal if the remainder of the complaint shows that a federal question actually is involved or relied upon by the pleader.”

      . See, also, Note, Developments in the Law— Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1159 (1969) :
      “Professor Paul Freund lias described tlie equal protection guarantee as a moral standard wrapped in a legal command which allows the Court in establishing constitutional doctrines to help shape the nation’s thinking about social justice and ethical conduct. Like ‘due process,’ the substantive reach of ‘equal protection’ can hardly be determined by reference to the words of the legal wrapping alone. Of necessity, in relying upon the guarantee for decision, the Court assumes the role of constitutional sculptor as well as its narrower role of word analyst and legal logician.”