author: WEICK, Circuit Judge. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,

text:
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. DAYTON MOTELS, INC., d/b/a Holiday Inn of Dayton, Respondent.
    No. 72-1078.
    United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
    Argued Oct. 11, 1972.
    Decided Feb. 14, 1973.

      Edwards, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

      John C. Getreu, Director, Region 9, N. L.R.B., Cincinnati, Ohio, Jay E. Shank-lin, N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner ; Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Robert A. Giannasi, N.L. R.B., Washington, D. C., on brief.
    Charles A. Lawrence, Jr., Memphis, Tenn., for respondent; Elbert H. Coles, McKnight, Hudson & Coles, Memphis, Tenn., on brief.
    Before WEICK, EDWARDS and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
   WEICK, Circuit Judge.

This case is before the Court on thé Board’s application for enforcement of its order reported at 192 NLRB No. 112, against Dayton Motels, Inc., doing business as Holiday Inn of Dayton (Company), which application was filed pursuant to Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) as amended. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). The Company has cross-petitioned for non-enforcement.

The Board found that the Company, shortly prior to the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement with the Union, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating and threatening employees, by soliciting employees to repudiate the Union, by soliciting an employee not to attend a Union meeting, and by promising benefits to employees who did not engage in the strike called by the Union. The Board also found that the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by withdrawing recognition from the Union and by thereafter refusing to bargain with the Union as the representative of its employees.

The Board ordered the Company to cease and desist from its unfair labor practices, to reinstate discharged striking employees, to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees, and to post appropriate notices.

We uphold the Board’s order only with respect to the Section 8(a)(1) unfair labor practices. We decline to enforce the order of the Board with respect to the Section 8(a)(5) alleged violation, and remand for further proceedings.

SECTION 8(a)(1) VIOLATIONS

We are of the opinion that, on the record before us, the findings of the Board with respect to Section 8(a)(1), violations are supported by substantial evidence. NLRB v. Howell Automatic Mach. Co., 454 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir. 1972).

The only colorably valid attack that the Company makes against the finding of Section 8(a)(1) violations is that the predominance of activities was attributable to Collins and Branham, neither one of whom was a supervisor. Simply stated, the Company’s position is that these activities took place near the end of the term of the agreement, and regardless of the anti-union nature of these employees’ activities, their acts cannot be imputed to the Company since they were not supervisory employees of the Company.

The argument falls short of a successful attack on the Section 8(a)(1) violations found by the Board, for two reasons. First, the activities of the Executive Housekeeper, who was a supervisor, alone would be sufficient to support a finding that Section 8(a) (1) was violated by the Company. Second, strict principles of agency are not applicable where management uses an employee who is a union member, for effectuating its own interests. If there is a connection between management and the employee’s actions, either by way of instigation, direction, approval, or at the very least acquiescence, then the acts of the employee will be imputed to the Company. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1968).

The Board found that employees Collins and Branham had close ties with management; in fact, they customarily delivered to other employees work instructions from management. Furthermore, while the Company perhaps did not actually direct the activities of Collins and Branham, at least it acquiesced in the anti-union efforts Thus, under the expanded agency principles applicable to Section 8(a)(1) the acts of these union-members employees are imputed to the Company and support the Board’s order directed to these activities.

SECTION 8(a)(5) VIOLATIONS

In June, 1970, three months prior to expiration of the collective bargaining agreement with the Union, the Company received a request from the Union to negotiate for a new collective bargaining agreement. The Company did not respond to this request and thereafter refused to meet with the Union for purposes of bargaining. However, on September 16, 1970, the expiration date of the agreement, a Union representative came to the Inn and met with the Company’s attorney. In the course of this meeting the Company’s attorney advised the Union representative of the Company’s position, that the Union did not represent a majority of its employees.

It was then suggested by the Company’s attorney that an election be conducted in order to give its employees an opportunity to express their desires concerning representation by the Union. This proposal was rejected by the Union representative. On the day following, the Unioii called a strike against the Company.

The Board found that the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union in June, 1970. The validity of this finding of the Board (and the resultant order of the Board that the Company bargain with the Union) depends on (1) whether the Union actually represented a majority of the employees, or (2) whether the Company had a good-faith doubt of the Union’s majority status when it refused to bargain.

In order to establish that an employer’s withdrawal of recognition and refusal to bargain with an incumbent union transgresses Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, the burden of proof is upon the Board to show that the union actually represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. Machinists Lodges 1746 & 743 v. NLRB, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 53, 416 F.2d 809 (1969).

Failure to prove a majority-status of the Union relieves an employer of any duty to bargain. Maphis Chapman Corp. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 298, 303 (4th Cir. 1966).

Furthermore, even if the Union is proved to be actually representative of a majority, the employer is not guilty of a Section 8(a)(5) violation if the employer had a reasonably-grounded belief that the Union did not represent an un-coerced majority of its employees. Pulley v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 302 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1962). A good-faith doubt exculpates the employer even if the Union in fact represented a majority of the employees. NLRB v. Ben Duth-ler, Inc., 395 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1968).

The 1967 agreement between the Company and the Union is relevant to the two aspects of Section 8(a)(5) above stated. First, the Board did not order that an employee vote should be taken in order to determine whether the Union actually represented a majority of the employees; rather, the Board relied on the doctrine that an existing agreement creates a presumption of majority status of the Union. Second, the Board excluded evidence offered by the Company tending to prove that the collective bargaining agreement was procured by means of coercive tactics of a company supervisor who was collaborating with the Union, and evidence tending to prove the fraudulent concealment of this fact from the Company by the Union when the Union presented the authorization cards to the Company to persuade the Company to recognize the Union. The reason given by the Board for exclusion of the evidence was that it also proved an unfair labor practice of the Union, proof of which was barred by the six-months’ time limitation in Section 10(b) of the Act.

This same statute precluded the Company from taking any action after it discovered the complicity of its supervisor and the fraud of the Union, when such discovery was made more than one year after the agreement was signed.

There seems to be no question but that the expiring agreement does give rise to a rebuttable presumption of majority status of the Union. Terrell Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970).

However, giving full recognition to the weight of the presumption, this does not help the Board because even if in fact the Union actually represented a majority of employees in the bargaining unit, the Company would still have a complete defense if it had a good-faith doubt about such representation. NLRB v. Ben Duthler, Inc., 395 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1968).

Section 10(b) of the Act provides in part as follows:

“ . . . Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board . . . ”

Literally, this section applies only to the filing of complaints with the Board. On its face it appears to be a statute of limitations on the institution of proceedings directed at unfair labor practices, and not to have any application to the defense of an unfair labor practice charge. However, it was recognized that the policy of the preventing stale unfair labor practice charges under Section 10(b) of the Act could easily be circumvented if the limitations provision was read narrowly.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court expanded considerably the effect of Section 10(b) of the Act, in Local Lodge No. 1424 (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 80 S.Ct. 822, 4 L.Ed.2d 832 (1960). In that ease the company had committed a putative unfair labor practice by signing a collective bargaining agreement with a union which did not in fact represent a majority of the employees at that time. More than six months subsequent thereto, an unfair labor practice charge was filed with the Board. The complaint alleged that an independent unfair labor practice had been committed within the six-month-limitation period by the company’s continued operation under the invalid agreement. The Court recognized that while the enforcement of the supposedly-invalid agreement was in a sense an independent unfair labor practice, it was entirely dependent on the initial time-barred unfair labor practice, and thus it was, in effect, a resurrection of a stale claim. The Court held that evidence of the time-barred unfair labor practice was inadmissible, and that the complaint based on the enforcement of the agreement must therefore fail.

In our case, however, the Company’s defense is not dependent on the time-barred unfair labor practice. The evidence was offered, to be considered along with other evidence, of its good-faith doubt about the majority status of the Union.

Bryan, supra, cannot be read as preventing the use of all evidence relating to events transpiring more than six months prior to the filing of an unfair labor practice charge. Justice Harlan so stated in the opinion which he wrote for the Court:

“It is doubtless true that § 10(b) does not prevent all use of evidence relating to events transpiring more than six months before the filing and service of an unfair labor practice charge. However, in applying rules of evidence as to the admissibility of past events, due regard for the purposes of § 10(b) requires that two different kinds of situations be distinguished. The first is one where occurrences within the six-month limitations period in and of themselves may constitute, as a substantive matter, unfair labor practices. There, earlier events may be utilized to shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period; and for that purpose § 10(b) ordinarily does not bar such evidentiary use of anterior events.” (362 U.S. at 416, 80 S.Ct. at 826)

Thus, these earlier events may be utilized to shed light on what occurred within the limitation period. In the present case these events were admissible as background evidence reflecting on the mental attitude or good-faith doubt of the Company officials that the Union ever represented a majority of its employees. In no way does this constitute an attack on the validity of the expiring agreement or on the presumption created thereby, which attack was barred by Section 10(b) of the Act. All that is shown is that the circumstances surrounding the agreement gave the Company good reason to believe that the Union never did represent the uncoerced choice of a majority of its employees. The fact that this evidence could have been the basis of an unfair labor practice charge in 1967 is coincidental and ought not to render the evidence inadmissible for another purpose.

If the Board’s argument in the present case were adopted, employers, in reaching a rational decision as to whether the Union continued to represent a majority of its employees, could not consider any events which occurred more than six months previously, if those events might possibly have constituted an unfair labor practice.

Hence, as the Board would have it, an employer who had to decide, at the expiration of an initial contract, whether to continue recognition of an incumbent Union, would have to approach the problem in the following manner: The employer would first look at the events surrounding the initial recognition of the Union to see if those events could cast doubt on the representative status of the Union. He would then have to decide whether those facts also would have supported an unfair labor practice charge. If they did not reach the level of proscription under the Act, he could take them into account. If they constituted an unfair labor practice, he could not use them in making his decision.

Such an artificial standard is obviously impractical and one which is well nigh impossible to be complied with. It would substantially impair, if not obliterate, the efficacy of the defense of good-faith doubt. Bryan did not involve the exclusion of evidence of good-faith doubt. There the attack was made on the validity of the agreement.

Reliance on NLRB v. United Mine Workers of America, 422 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1969), is misplaced. In that ease it was sought in a Section 7 charge to invalidate the agreement because such agreement had been procured by an unfair labor practice. This was a direct attack on the agreement, which attack was not made within the time specified in Section 10(b) and was therefore barred.

As pointed out above, we may assume that the expiring agreement in the present case was perfectly valid. It did not deprive the Company of its right, when asked to negotiate a new agreement upon expiration of the old one, to show that it had a good-faith doubt about the Union ever representing a majority of its employees.

NLRB v. Tragniew, Inc., 470 F.2d 669 (9th Cir., decided Sept. 8, 1972) does not help the Board, but on the contrary it supports the Company’s position. There the Court said:

“As contended by Tragniew, Section 10(b) does not bar all evidence of events outside the statutory six-month period, which bears upon lack of majority representation within that period. It was permissible for the Trial Examiner to admit evidence as to the manner in which Local 399 obtained and operated under its collective bargaining agreements.” (Emphasis added).

This is exactly what the Company, by the excluded evidence, attempted to prove. Footnote 4 in Tragniew cites the language of Bryan which we previously quoted.

The Board relies on NLRB v. Den-ham, 469 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1972), decided by the Ninth Circuit about two months after Tragniew. Denham goes further than any previous decision which has come to our attention. It holds that events within the Section 10(b) limitation period are inadmissible for any purpose, including consideration on the issue of good-faith doubt. We do not believe that Bryan supports that conclusion.

In any event, irrespective of Tragniew and Denham, it was competent for the Company to show that it discovered, more than one year after the collective bargaining agreement was signed, the complicity of its supervisor and the concealment by the Union of its misconduct.

In NLRB v. Patterson Menhaden Corp., d/b/a Gallant Man, 389 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1968), the Court held that statements by a boat captain that he would not hire crew members for the next season if they voted for the union, which statements were barred by Section 10(b) to establish an unfair labor practice, were nevertheless admissible as background evidence to corroborate other evidence offered by the Board. While this ease permitted the Board to make use of events barred by Section 10(b), there is no good reason why the same rule should not extend to the employer.

The Court stated:

“The Board held that these pre-election statements could not constitute an 8(a)(1) violation since they occurred more than six months before the charge was filed. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(b). They were properly used, however, as background evidence to corroborate other evidence adduced with respect to the pending and viable charges which pending charges might in and of themselves constitute an unfair labor practice depending on employer motive.” (389 F.2d at 702-703) (Emphasis added).

In other words, the evidence was used only to “shed light” on a present unfair labor practice charge.

Similarly, the Company in the present case seeks only to shed light on its good-faith doubt defense to the unfair labor practice charge. The Board erred in excluding such evidence. Accordingly, we remand this case to the Board with instructions to receive evidence on the circumstances surrounding the procurement of Union authorization cards in 1967, and to consider such evidence, along with other events subsequent thereto, on the issue of whether the Company did in fact have a good-faith doubt as to the majority status of the Union.

Enforcement granted only as to the Section 8(a)(1) violation; enforcement denied as to Section 8(a)(5), and remanded for further consideration.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In this case respondent company and the union entered into a labor agreement to run for three years, beginning September 16, 1967. Three months before the date for expiration of the agreement, the union requested negotiations for renewal, and the company informed it that it would no longer recognize the union as bargaining representative for its employees, since it felt the union did not represent a majority. Coincidentally there were numerous efforts by two supervisory employees to persuade the employees to sign statements indicating that they repudiated the union.

At the expiration of the agreement, the union called a strike and filed unfair labor practice charges, claiming 8(a)(1) (coercion) and 8(a>(5) (refusal to bargain) violations. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1970). The Hearing Examiner who heard the testimony found 8(a)(1) violations in the interference and coercion by the supervisory employees, and the Board seeks enforcement of same. The opinion of the court finds substantial evidence to support these findings and grants enforcement of the 8(a)(1) order, and I concur.

The real dispute in the case, however, concerns respondent’s contention that it was entitled to show at the hearing before the Hearing Examiner that the original agreement of September 16, 1967, was procured as a result of the influence of a supervisory employee who it is claimed organized the employees into the union concerned. The Hearing Examiner refused to admit this evidence on the basis of Section 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). This section provides that “no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board . . . .”

On its face this section simply bars complaints pertaining to unfair labor practices over six months old. But the United States Supreme Court has interpreted it also as a rule of evidence concerning the admissibility of past events which would constitute unfair labor practices.

In the Bryan Manufacturing Co. case Justice Harlan spelled out the applicable Supreme Court rule:

It is doubtless true that § 10(b) does not prevent all use of evidence relating to events transpiring more than six months before the filing and service of an unfair labor practice charge. However, in applying rules of evidence as to the admissibility of past events, due regard for the purposes of § 10(b) requires that two different kinds of situations be distinguished. The first is one where occurrences within the six-month limitations period in and of themselves may constitute, as a substantive matter, unfair labor practices. There, earlier events may be utilized to shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period; and for that purpose § 10(b) ordinarily does not bar such evidentiary use of anterior events. The second situation is that where conduct occurring within the limitations period can be charged to be an unfair labor practice only through reliance on an earlier unfair labor practice. There the use of the earlier unfair labor practice is not merely “evidentiary,” since it does not simply lay bare a putative current unfair labor practice. Rather, it serves to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful. And where a complaint based upon that earlier event is time-barred, to permit the event itself to be so used in effect results in reviving a legally defunct unfair labor practice. Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB (Bryan Mfg. Co.), 362 U.S. 411, 416-417, 80 S.Ct. 822, 826-827, 4 L.Ed.2d 832 (1960). (Footnote omitted.)

The rule of the Bryan Mfg. Co. case has been extended by this court and others to apply to bar evidence sought to be introduced to defend alleged unfair labor practices. NLRB v. District 30, UMW, 422 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959, 90 S.Ct. 2173, 26 L.Ed.2d 543 (1970); NLRB v. Tragniew, Inc., 470 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1972); Lane-Coos-Curry-Douglas Counties Bldg, v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 656, 659, n. 7 (9th Cir. 1969).

The crucial point in our present case is that the evidence as to which the court remands this case is clearly evidence of “a legally defunct unfair labor practice” and hence barred by the language employed above by Mr. Justice Harlan to describe “the second situation.”

A labor agreement, once negotiated, is entitled to a presumption of validity and there is a presumption that once a union majority has been recognized, it continues until there is proof that the majority has been dissipated or that the employer has “a reasonably grounded good faith doubt of [the union’s] majority support.” Terrell Machine Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929, 90 S.Ct. 1821, 26 L.Ed.2d 91 (1970); Bally Case & Cooler, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 910, 90 S.Ct. 2201, 26 L.Ed.2d 562 (1970). Without the admission of the evidence of the claimed invalidity of the original agreement, the Board’s finding of an unfair labor practice in respondent’s refusal to negotiate is clearly supported by substantial evidence — a conclusion which I do not believe my colleagues dispute.

I would grant enforcement of the 8(a)(5) order also.

      . Certainly the fact of supervisory coercion is very relevant to a decision as to whether the Union was the choice of a majority of employees. It has been consistently held that, absent a Sec. 10(b) problem, there can be no refusal to bargain in violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) if the purported representative of the employees was not freely designated as such by a majority of the employees. NLRB v. Heck’s, Inc., 386 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. H. Rohtstein & Co., 266 F.2d 407 (1st Cir. 1959).

      . The Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 3020, states: “It has not been unusual for the Board in the past to issue complaints years after an unfair labor practice was alleged to have occurred, and after records have been destroyed, witnesses have gone elsewhere and recollections of the events in question have become dim and confused.” Rep.No.245, 80th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 40.

      . The doctrine that evidence inadmissible for one purpose can be admitted for another purpose is firmly established in the law. Livergood v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 361 F.2d 269, 274 (3d Cir. 1966); 1 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 13 (3d ed. 1940).

      . This result was also reached in a number of other cases where a union sought to defend against a Sec. 8(b)(7) charge of unlawful recognitional picketing by attacking the underlying time-barred agreement between the company and the incumbent union. International Hod Carriers, etc. Loeal 1298 (Roman Stone Const. Co.), 153 NLRB 659 (1965) ; Lane-Coos-Curry-Douglas Counties Bldg. & C.T.C. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1969).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHRISTENSEN, Senior District Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Marie WILCOX et al., Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. COMMERCE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, a corporation, Appellee-Defendant.
    No. 72-1494.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Nov. 13, 1972.
    Decided Feb. 20, 1973.
    Rehearing Denied March 19,1973.

      Ronald L. Gold, Shawnee Mission, Kan., for appellants.
    Thomas J. Wheatley, Kansas City, Mo. (Maurice J. O’Sullivan, Jr., and Edward M. Boddington, Jr., Kansas City, Kan., on the brief), for appellee.
    Before LEWIS, Chief Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and CHRISTENSEN, Senior District Judge.

      . Of the District of Utah, sitting by designation.

   CHRISTENSEN, Senior District Judge.

Appellee is a large commercial bank which operates for its area a franchise credit card system known as BankAmericard. Appellants are holders of such credit cards of the bank. Their complaint in the district court was “on behalf of themselves and all other credit card holders” of appellee for alleged violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(1) and (4) and (b)(2), (5) and (6), and for the relief provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) and (2). The merits of the named plaintiffs’ claims were not reached as the district court denied their motion for determination that the case could be maintained as a class action. Appellants sought in this court and were granted an interlocutory appeal of such denial upon appropriate indication from the trial court that it was of the opinion that the order of denial involved a controlling question of law as to which there was substantial ground for differ-enees of opinions and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292. The sole question before us is whether the court below abused its discretion in refusing to permit the suit to be maintained as a' class action pursuant to Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.

Those similarly situated on whose behalf the action purportedly was brought number approximately 180,000 persons. There is no question but that appellee’s business involves an “open end consumer credit plan” covered by the Act and that plaintiffs and members of the proposed class are cardholders under said plan. Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, on the basis of which the class action aspect of the ease was proposed and terminated, clearly alleged violations of the Act as against plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class and on their behalf sought damages of at least $100.00 for each class member and as to each violation totaling “in excess of One Million Dollars per month” within the one-year period of limitations provided in the Act. It has been pointed out by appellee that since five separate violations as to each member of the class are alleged, each presumably occurring monthly, its penalty exposure might exceed one billion dollars.

The basic problem of the amenability of civil suits for violation of the Truth in Lending Act to class action treatment has been before numerous district courts with varying results. Insofar as we are aware no court of appeals has yet squarely decided the issue, although it is known that several appeals presenting it are now pending elsewhere.

The reasoning of the court below in denying class action status in this case is similar to that by which other district courts'have reached the same conclusion, Judge O’Connor points out in his memorandum decision that in order to maintain their suit as a class action plaintiffs must satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and any one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). The requirements of Rule 23(a) were found to have been met. The remaining question in the court’s view was whether subdivision (b)(3), “the only one of the three subdivisions which might apply to plaintiffs”, was satisfied as well. Attention was focused upon whether the class action was “superior to” other available methods “because that issue appears to be dispositive of the case”.

Impressed with Judge Frankel’s reasoning in the leading case of Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, 329 F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.1971), the trial court found that case, and Rogers v. Coburn Finance Corp. of Dekalb, 53 F.R.D. 182 (N.D.Ga.1971), to be more persuasive than Katz v. Carte Blanche Corporation, 52 F.R.D. 510, 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D.Pa.1971), another leading case sustaining the propriety of class action proceedings under similar circumstances. Factors the court reemphasized were the special and particular authorization of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), creating a species of “private attorney general” to participate prominently in enforcement; the minimum damages of $100 plus costs and attorney’s fees recoverable without proof of any actual damages; the huge potential liability for alleged violations of the Act should the class action be maintained to its conclusion; the lack of any need or justification for class action proceedings in the circumstances of a Truth in Lending case; and the “absurd and stultifying extreme” the case would assume as a class action in spite of the essentially inconsistent remedy prescribed by Congress as a means of private enforcement. Exercising that “considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature” required by the “broad and open ended terms” of Rule 23, Judge O’Connor determined that a class action in this case was not superior to the statutory method of individual recoveries. He, as did Judge Frankel in Ratner, considered the available statutory remedy vis-a-vis the “horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment, unrelated to any damage”, which would be a likely product of cases such as this if permitted to proceed as class actions. He also advanced further reasons to the same effect “inherent in the purposes of a class action” and exemplified by current criticisms of the operation of Rule 23, He indicated his view that the application of class action treatment to Truth in Lending cases would be an over-extension of the Rule.

This latter aspect of the opinion below doubtlessly inspired appellants’ basic thesis that the ruling was a policy decision which cavalierly denied class action status to such actions generally despite their being within, or even required by, the criteria laid down in Rule 23. In variation of this theme appellants say that the decision flies in the face of the established rule that “if there is to be any error made, let it be in favor and not against the maintenance of the class action”; that the trial court failed to consider criteria established by the Rule itself; that it improperly considered the merits of the case in arriving at its de-cisión, and that the Truth in Lending Act has not been exempted expressly or impliedly from the application of Rule 23.

Apart from any inherent incongruity between the remedies provided by the Truth in Lending Act and Rule 23, we agree that there is nothing in the Act itself, the Rule, or the notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to it which expressly or impliedly precludes class actions in this type of case. The legislative history of the Act throws scant light on the problem. To find any congressional intent to preclude at all events treatment of such cases under Rule 23 would be a work of clairvoyance and not of construction or interpretation.

On the other hand, notwithstanding the likelihood that most if not all of the requirements expressed in the Rule would be present, there is nothing to suggest a congressional intent that Truth in Lending cases should always, or generally, be handled as class actions. Any automatic application of the Rule irrespective of its realistic implications would be just as improbable as a matter of congressional intent as the total preclusion of its use in consumer suits of this nature. If we were to hazard a reconstruction of pertinent congressional intent from the enactment of the Truth in Lending Act, it would be that a mandate for general class action treatment of all of these cases, on the one hand, or for none of these cases as class action, on the other, was not intended in view of a congressional confidence in case by case determinations by qualified and informed trial judges with a wide general discretion and specific leeway under Rule 23 itself to avoid inferior, unfair or senseless applications of it.

We cannot agree that Esplin v. Hirschi, supra, dictates a position in this circuit inhospitable to such a discretion as to Truth in Lending cases. That case turned primarily upon whether common questions were predominant in a securities case where class action treatment was not unusual and in which it threatened no far-reaching consequences one way or another. This court was there persuaded that class action treatment, contrary to the views of the trial judge, was called for. Judge Hill’s opinion in Esplin has been widely cited in not only justification but encouragement of class action treatment in appropriate cases and continues to represent the considered views of this court. But its doctrine should not be extended to limit unreasonably the sound discretion of trial courts in eases such as this, where discretion may be the key to a realistic administration of Rule 23, particularly with respect to a determination of the most fair and efficient procedure. One of the reasons expressed in that case for a liberal application of the Rule was the retained power of the trial court later to establish sub-classes or even to abrogate the class status should developments indicate; here, developments were not likely to change the situation and the overriding considerations which would justify if not require a changed view had class action treatment been undertaken were before the trial court at the threshold.

Appellants also say that the trial court failed, contrary to the teachings of Esplin, to weigh the four non-exhaustive factors listed in subdivision (b)(3)(A), (B), (C), and (D), of Rule 23. The trial judge did in fact refer to these in his memorandum decision and there is nothing to indicate that he did not give proper appraisal to all of the pertinent factors enumerated by the Rule. He expressly approved the reasoning of Judge Frankel in Ratner which in turn had specifically quoted the subdivisions referred to as among the premises of his conclusions that the class action device was not shown as a superior one in that Truth in Lending case. The Rule requires the court as the basis for approving a class action to find that common questions of fact predominate and that a class action is superior, and the matters following this requirement are of course to be considered in the latter connection. But as Esplín points out, they are non-exhaustive. Nothing that we have said requires the inclusion by rote in findings or otherwise of the detailed subject matters of these non-exhaustive considerations in either granting or denying class action treatment so long as they do not on the record negate the basic finding of the trial court, which is not the case here.

There is less reason for appellants’ attack upon the sufficiency of the form of the trial court’s findings for not expressly covering the question of whether common questions of fact or law predominated. Appellants say that “the authorities on federal procedure” hold that the court must make two findings, the first of which is whether questions of law or fact are common and predominate over individual ones, and that “[a]s the district court must rule on both requirements of (b) (3) . the absence of a consideration whether questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over individual ones is clearly a further abuse of the trial court’s discretion.” We cannot agree. In denying class action status it was sufficient for the trial court to determine on an adequate record and for good reasons stated that the procedure was not superior to other procedures irrespective of whether the common issues of fact or law were predominant.

Katz v. Carte Blanche Corporation, 52 F.R.D. 510 (W.D.Pa.1971), supra, is relied upon by appellants as primary support for its position that in the circumstances of this ease the trial court was obliged to approve class action proceedings. We agree, as there held, that a plaintiff’s burden of satisfying the prerequisite of the rule for the maintenance of the class action does not involve convincing demonstration of the merits of his underlying cause of action. But we cannot agree that the trial court in ruling upon whether a class action should be maintained must close its eyes to possible consequences as they relate to the superiority or inferiority of such procedure in terms of fairness and efficiency. We are not called upon to say that Katz necessarily was in error in determining in the exercise of the trial court’s discretion at least for the time being that a class action was maintainable. But even in that case it is obvious that the court justifiably entertained substantial reservations. See 53 F.R.D. 539, 544 n. 11. It is to be hoped that the sequel of that decision will prove both fair and efficient. But at least until better established its pattern should not be indiscriminately thrust upon trial judges who entertain different views for sufficient reasons within their own discretion. Nor do we find convincing another case emphasized by appellants because the opinion was written by an assigned Circuit Judge, LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Company, 55 F.R.D. 22 (D.Ore.1972). Except for citation of Katz on another point the decision does not take notice of the special problems in Truth in Lending cases.

Appellants have cited Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972), in support of their contention that the court may not deny class status because there is no “need” for it if the prerequisites and conditions of the Federal Rules are met. The interpretation of that case, which involved subdivision (b) (2) of the Rule, is an oversimplification as applied to (b)(3) cases such as this. Within the criteria of the Rule, the “need” for class action treatment in a sense may be considered a vital, if not determinative, consideration as need inevitably relates to the problems of superiority, fairness and efficiency. These latter considerations may not be applied mechanically without a consideration of relative needs or necessities.

Reasons can be assigned but they often light up unexpressed counter reasons. To find the existence of reasons within the Rule is often indeterminate for still the Rule requires the weighing of one reason against another or against consideration of common sense and practicality. Many of the reasons assigned for the granting or denial of class action status are quite ambivalent and hardly sufficient one way or another in and of themselves: Appellants say that the enormity of the class dictates class action treatment; appellee responds that its very size militates against such a treatment. Appellee argues that because of the shocking exposure to annihilating liability the class action device here should not be utilized to seal such a doom; appellants that if there is such grave liability, congressional policy would be impermissibly frustrated if it were not enforced in the most effective and comprehensive fashion. Appellants assert that the lower court considered policy beyond the scope and authorization of the Rule; appellee that the Rule itself has explicit in it the policy of denying class action treatment when it would not be “superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”. And it could be added that while provision in the Act for the award of attorney’s fees as well as costs furnishes encouragement and practicality for individual actions, the cumulative consequence might be more horrendous to a defendant in view of this should all cardholders proceed and succeed individually than if they combined in a class action entailing a single fee.

These points and counterpoints serve only to emphasize the perplexity of our problem; they do not solve it. There may be no wholly satisfactory solution but we believe an acceptable one can be found in the present context by sustaining the authority of the trial court to employ realism and good sense in denying class action status.

We are of the opinion that it was within the sound discretion of the court below to avoid results thus appearing procedurally unnecessary and overwhelming. The exercise of such discretion related not only to the appellee but to the Rule itself, which bears the seeds of its own destruction through unrealistic applications within its theoretical span.

The fairness to be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision of course is procedural fairness. No one has suggested that with reference to the substantive rights of individual debtors there should not be full recognition. To approve a class action and then to cut down or dilute the right of recovery for the members of the class before the court to avoid their burdensome accumulation would involve substance. To leave debtors to their individual remedies rather than to invoke the class action procedure involves the question of procedural fairness which the Rule entrusts to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Within that discretion, we believe, is the attaching of determinative weight to the reality that if class action treatment were applied in this case where the complaint contains no indication of any actual damages in substantial or provable amount, this aggregated relief would be oppressive in consequence and difficult to justify. We do not consider it untenable to reject a single and unvarying answer to the problem in favor of this less rigid one. That the present emphasis upon discretion could lead to inconsistent results, and indeed has among the courts, is no insurmountable objection; the practicality of interpretation has furnished helpful testing ground through varying ideas of judges in many other contexts and this same type of testing can most profitably proceed in this area until, if ever, some more acceptable and general solution by amendments to the Rules or clarification by statute emerges. No such preferable solution within the power of a reviewing court occurs to us or has been called to our attention. Class action treatment in the context and under the circumstances now before us is not mandated. A decision one way or another "is not so decisive of the right of recovery as to make it incumbent upon this court to insist here that those who have not chosen to proceed individually must be given the opportunity to proceed as members of a class.

Yet we cannot agree that under all circumstances the class action device necessarily would be incompatible with Truth in Lending cases. Where overriding reasons for preclusion are not present, there see.ms no reason why the use of this procedural device may not be appropriate and desirable within the sound discretion of the trial courts. Creditors disregarding their responsibilities under the Act and causing damages to members of a class however limited or extensive should have no assurance that their accumulated responsibility cannot be enforced through this means. In such event a finding by the trial court to this effect may be entitled to the same respectful consideration we have found the decision of Judge O’Connor warrants. It is conceivable that there may be cases of this nature where thz class action procedure is so manifestly superior or inferior that an appellate court on review would be warranted in reversing the trial court’s determination to the contrary. We have no such problem before us. There may be some who understandably will feel uncomfortable with what might be regarded as excessive power on the part of trial courts to make such decisions with the persuasive effect here recognized. Indeed it might be comforting to all of us in a way if each decision on review could clatter out of a slot brightly and clearly minted whenever governing symbols seemed to match, without the necessity of pondering over more imponderable but significant indications. Yet our whole system of justice is importantly geared to the balancing of judgment across variant and numerous circumstances by judges who must be entrusted from the very difficulties of remote comparison and the superior perception of firsthand impression to a wide discretion. The discretion of the court below was not abused.

The results reached here are consistent both with the provisions of the Truth in Lending Act and Rule 23. Any other view might be inimical to both. Moreover, there seems no reasonable alternative. We cannot accept the alternative of mechanically or generally applying class treatment to these eases. If it were supposed that the only remedy would be submission of the matter to the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure in hope of clarification there appears little that could be done by it but to recommend the express exemption of Truth in Lending cases from class action treatment, or class action treatment in all such cases, or that trial courts be permitted in the exercise of sound discretion to determine within broad and open-ended guidelines whether that means is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy on a case by case basis. And the latter seemingly most sensible alternative would bring us full circle back to the present rule which, however it may be criticized otherwise, seems most practical in this respect.

Indeed the Rule generally may be at the crossroads, many knowledgeable lawyers and some judges maintaining that it should be completely scrapped; others that it should be substantially revised or reformed; and still others that it should be even more liberally administered to effectuate or promote societal objectives bearing little relationship to economics or practicality. We believe that the solution may well be to continue straight ahead for a time under the present Rule, but to smooth out to a degree the formal obstacles that may be unduly obstructing trial courts on the firing line in realistic and practical applications within their sound discretion and in view of superior opportunity to observe the battle conditions ease by case. It would be worse in the long run to maim or kill the Rule with universal but improvident kindness than to limit on a case by case basis within sound judicial discretion its application to situations offering sensible results.

Hence we conclude that the action of the trial court in denying the motion for maintenance of the suit as a class action was within its sound discretion and should not be disturbed.

Affirmed.

      . “§ 1637. Open end consumer credit plans — Required disclosures by creditor.
      “(a) Before opening any account under an open end consumer credit plan, the creditor shall disclose to the person to whom credit is to be extended each of the following items, to the extent applicable:
      “(1) The conditions under which a finance charge may be imposed, including the time period, if any, within which any credit extended may be repaid without incurring a finance charge.
      “(4) Where one or more periodic rates may be used to compute the finance charge, each such rate, the range of balances to which it is applicable, and the corresponding nominal annual percentage rate determined by multiplying the periodic rate by the number of periods in a year.
      “Statement required with each billing cycle
      “(b) The creditor of any account under an open end consumer credit plan shall transmit to the obligor, for each billing cycle at the end of which there is an outstanding balance in that account or with respect to which a finance charge is imposed, a statement setting forth each of the following items to the extent applicable :
      “ (2) The amount and date of each extension of credit during the period, and, if a purchase was involved, a brief identification (unless previously furnished) of the goods or services purchased.
      “(5) Where one or more periodic rates may be used to compute the finance charge, each such rate, the range of balances to which it is applicable, and, unless the annual percentage rate (determined under section 1606(a) (2) of this title) is required to be disclosed pursuant to paragraph (6), the corresponding nominal annual percentage rate determined by multiplying the periodic rate by the number of periods in a year.
      “(6) Where the total finance charge exceeds 50 cents for a monthly or longer billing cycle, or the pro rata part of 50 cents for a billing cycle shorter than monthly, the total finance charge expressed as an annual percentage rate (determined under section 1606(a) (2) of this title), except that if the finance charge is the sum of two or more products of a rate times a portion of the balance, the creditor may, in lieu of disclosing a single rate for the total charge, disclose each such rate expressed as an annual percentage rate, and the part of the balance to which it is applicable.”
      (See also the Regulations of the Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R. Part 226.)

      . “§ 1640. Civil liability — Failure to disclose.
      “(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails in connection with any consumer credit transaction to disclose to any person any information required under this part to be disclosed to that person is liable to that person in an amount equal to the sum of
      “(1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction, except that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000; and
      “(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.”

      . Ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability was deferred pending the determination of class action status. See generally, Annot., Civil Remedies of Consumer for Violation of Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1644, 1661-1665), 11 A.L.R.Fed. 815 (1972).

      . Based on Rule 23(c)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P.: “As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.”

      . See Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134 (D.Kan.1972).

      . Appellants’ brief enumerates also the questions of whether a denial properly could be based on grounds “outside the face of Rule 23” and whether the Truth in Lending Act “has been exempted by either Congress or the United States Supreme Court from Rule 23”. As hereafter explained, these queries are really encompassed by the main issue. But they need not be considered separately or in the abstract and, indeed, should not be, since they imply assumptions not involved necessarily in the action of the lower court, i. e., that it failed to consider criteria established by the Rule or that its decision could be justified only if such actions as this had been expressly or impliedly excluded from the application of Rule 23 under all circumstances.

      . 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) defines such a plan as one “prescribing the terms of credit transactions which may be made thereunder from time to time and under the terms of which a finance charge may be computed on the outstanding unpaid balance from time to time thereunder.”

      . “The term ‘cardholder’ means any person to whom a credit card is issued or any person who has agreed with the card issuer to pay obligations arising from the issuance of a credit card to another person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(in).

      . Specifically, appellants asserted that the appellee bank witii respect to the named plaintiffs and each member of the class deliberately and wilfully violated the Act and implementing regulations in that it failed to disclose the nominal annual percentage rates on cash advances as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(4), failed to disclose accurately the period in which a finance charge could be avoided as required by § 1637(a)(1), failed to disclose adequately transactions, during the cycle as mandated by § 1637 (b) (2), and prior to October, 1971, failed to disclose the nominal annual percentage rate in cases where a finance charge was not imposed for amounts over $900 corresponding to the periodic rates as required by § 1637 (b) (5) and (6). The Second Amended Complaint contains no allegations or other indication that any members of the proposed class suffered any actual damages by reason of any of these alleged violations, it being alleged with respect to damages only “[t]hat each plaintiff is entitled to a minimum of $100.00 up to $1,000.00 per month as provided for in Section 130 (15 U.S.C. § 1640) for each month that plaintiffs had an outstanding balance. . . . ”

      . See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) note 3, supra.

      . “15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). Jurisdiction of courts.
      “Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation.”

      . Class actions held proper:

      Berkman v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Civil No. 69C 2056 (N.D.Ill., filed June 25, 1970). 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide ¶ 99,268 (1972).
      Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Anchorage, 334 F.Supp. 1166 (D.Alas. 1971).
      Eleando v. McGinnis Used Cars, Civil No. 70-63 TUC (D.Ariz., filed Apr. 28,1971). Flickinger v. Horseshoe Development Company, Civil No. 11-334-C-1 (S.D.Iowa, filed March 10, 1972).
      Joseph v. Norman’s Health Club, Inc., 336 F.Supp. 307, (E.D.Mo., 1971) (four consolidated cases).
      Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510, 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D.Pa.1971).
      Lamar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22 (D.Or.1972).
      Martin v. Family Publications Service, Inc., Civil No. 5829 (D.Vt., filed June 30, 1970).
      Richardson v. Time Premium Co., Civil No. 70-1814-Civ-JLK (S.D.Fla., filed Feb. 5, 1971).
      Smith v. International Magazine Service of Mid Atlantic, Inc., Civil No. 71-16-F (N.D.W.Va., filed Oct. 29, 1971), 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide ¶ 99,249 (1972). Zachary v Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532 (S.D.N.Y.1971).

        Class Actions Held Improper:

      Allerton v. Century Credit Corp., Civil No. 70-1614-Civ-PF (S.D.Fla., filed Aug. 2, 1971), 4 CCH Consumer Guide ¶ 99,-271. Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D.Cal.1972) (two consolidated cases).
      Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., Civil No. 71-1271 (E.D.La., filed Aug. 8, 1972). Buford v. American Finance Co., 333 F.Supp. 1243 (N.D.Ga.1971), (nine consolidated cases).
      Castaneda v. Family Publications Service, Inc., Civil No. C-2317 (D.Colo., filed July 2, 1971).
      Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, 56 F.R.D. 548 (N.D.Ill.1972).
      Gerlach v. Allstate Insurance Co., 338 F.Supp. 642 (S.D.Fla.1972).
      Goldman v. The First National Bank of Chicago, (N.D.Ill.1972), 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D.Ill.1972).
      Grubb v. Dollar Loan Co., Civil Actions Nos. 15550, 15976 (N.D.Ga., filed May 26, 1972).
      Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., No. 70C 1827 (N.D.Ill., Sept. 20, 1972). Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F.Supp. 939 (N.D.Iowa 1972).
      Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., of Milwaukee, Wis., 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D.Wisc.1972).
      Moon v. Courtesy Finance Co., Civil No. 15087 (N.D.Ga.).
      Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide ¶ 99,632 (S.D.Fla.1971).
      Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.1971), 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y.1972). Rodriguez v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D.Cal.1972). Roesel v. The Fulton National Bank of Atlanta, Civil Action No. 15376 (N.D.Ga., filed May 25, 1972).
      Rogers v. Coburn Finance Corp. of De-Kalb, 53 F.R.D. 182 (1971), vacated, filed Dec. 1, 1971), order terminating class action [reinstating order in 53 F.R.D. 182], 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D.Ga.1972). Shields v. First Nat’l Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D.Ariz.1972).
      Smith v. Customers Loan Corp., Civil No. 15253 (N.D.Ga., filed Aug. 10, 1971). Syna v. Diners Club, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 119 (S.D.Fla.1970).

      . Informal inquiry of clerks’ offices reveals that of the decisions referred to in note 13 only Smith, Lamar and Syna have been appealed. Insofar as has been learned arguments in these appeals have not yet been heard.

      . 55 F.R.D. 134.

      . Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. Class Actions
      “(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued ns representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
      “(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition :
      “(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
      “(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
      “(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be disposi-tive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
      “(2) the party opposing the dass has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunc-tive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
      “(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) The interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.

      . Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.1972), supra. See also Marvin E. Frankel, “Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23”, 43, F.R.D. 39 (1967) : “The Rule — quite deliberately, I think — tends to ask more questions than it answers. It is neither a set of prescriptions nor a blue print. It is, rather, a broad outline of general policies and directions. As the commentators have said, it confides to the district judges a broad range of discretion.”

      . Citing the Report and Reeommendations of the Special Committee on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, American College of Trial Lawyers (March 15, 1972, pp. 5-6), Judge Edenfield’s comment on the use of the Rule in Buford v. American Finance Company, 333 F.Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D.Ga.1971), Judge Lumbard’s dissent in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968), and an observation by Professor Wright with reference to this court’s opinion in Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 9.9 (10th Cir. 1968), that if such “receptive spirit” encourages “courts to allow maintenance of class actions in controversies that are unmanageable by this device, the rule may come into disrepute even for the cases to which it is well suited.” C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 72, p. 307 (1970).

      . One of the decisions most recently published on the subject is Shields v. First National Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D. 442, (D.Ariz.1972). In that case Judge Cop-ple, in disapproving class action treatment of a comparable proceeding, referred extensively to Judge O’Connor’s opinion and held in line with it not that the Act should not be enforced but that its application under these circumstances is inappropriate. As did Judge O’Connor, 55 F.R.D. 134, 135, he found the special factors in such cases to go beyond and control the “four non-exliaustive considerations found in subdivision (b) (3) of the Rule itself.” Judge Copple noted that these subdivisions were “suggestive, not exhaustive.” 56 F.R.D. at 445.

      . Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968), supra.

      . Insofar as we have been able to determine there is in the legislative history of the Act no allusion to the possibility of class actions in Truth in Lending cases. Administrative enforcement is emphasized. House report No. 1040 of the Committee on Banking and Currency, to which was referred H.R. 11601 containing the disclosure provisions in question, emphasizes administrative enforcement stating: “Xour committee believes that administrative enforcement of the credit disclosure features of the bill is fundamental to its legislative purpose . . . For the relatively unsophisticated consumer, particularly those of modest means, administrative enforcement will provide their only protection against unscrupulous merchants or lenders. Such consumers neither will have the means for instituting their own civil suits, nor adequate knowledge or experience to enable them to file a complaint through proper channels to obtain redress through the Attorney General in a criminal action. Administrative enforcement can provide the broad and effective application of the principle of disclosure called for in the bill.” 2 U.S.Code Congressional and Administrative News, 90th Congress, Second Session 1968, p. 1975. The committee report later refers to the civil and criminal penalties to be provided by the bill without any notice being taken of the possibility of class actions and with renewed emphasis upon administrative enforcement: “While primary enforcement of the bill would be accomplished under the administrative enforcement section discussed above, further provision is made for the institution of civil action by an aggrieved debtor.” Ibid., p. 1976. Appel-lee’s brief, however, cites in support of its position that the Act does not contemplate class actions for its enforcement, a statement of Senator Frank E. Moss (D.-Utah), Chairman of the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee, made while conducting hearings on later legislation, the Consumer Protection Act of 1969. Senator Moss, who was actively involved in the Truth in Lending legislation, remarked to a witness, Assistant Attorney-General Richard McLaren;^"! do not believe class actions are permissible under Truth-in-Lending.” Mi'. McLaren responded by stating that the civil right of action provided for by the Act was subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore amenable to class action. Senator Moss replied, “My recollection did not bring that up. Perhaps you may want to annotate that for us, if you could, and send it for the record.” Mr. Mc-Laren’s letter of Feb. 26, 1970, printed in the record of the subcommittee hearings, reiterates the opinion he expressed to Senator Moss. Hearings Before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 2246, S. 3092 and S. 3201, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser. 91-43, pt. 1, at 27 (1970).

      . “In final analysis, resolution of the question now presented reverts to the ‘fair and efficient adjudication’ problem. The trial judge will have to face this problem in a realistic way. He should be afforded the greatest latitude in the exercise of his judgment after a careful factual exploration as to how this result can be attained.” City of New York v. International Pipe and Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 1969).

      . “In arriving at these determinations the court is directed to weigh four non-exhaustive factors: the interest of the class members in individually controlling separate suits, the extent and nature of litigation already pending, the desirability of concentrating litigation in a particular forum, and the difficulties likely to be encountered in managing a class action.” Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 98 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1968), supra. See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), cited in Esplin, wherein it is stated that “ . . . the dismissal in limine of a particular proceeding as not a proper class action is justified only by a clear showing to that effect and after a proper appraisal of all the factors enumerated on the face of the rule itself.”

      . Judge O’Connor noted that Rule 23(b) (3) requires findings both on the predominance of common questions of law or fact, and on the superiority of a class action as a method of adjudicating the controversy. However, he elected only to “consider whether a class action is ‘superior to’ other available methods, because that issue appears to be dispositive of the case.” Supporting this view that the required finding of superiority or inferiority is dispositive is the case of Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 488 (E.D.N.Y.1968), wherein Judge Weinstein declared: “Once the court has decided that a class action is superior to other available procedural devices, the crucial prerequisite for the maintenance of a class action under subdivision (b) (3) is the requirement that there be ‘questions of law or fact common to the members of the class’ and that such questions must ‘predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.’ ”

      . Of course more than a frivolous or insubstantial claim must be indicated and a motion for summary judgment or to dismiss on the pleadings is available to test the merits of the claim. See Duhart v. Carlson, 469 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1972).

      . In agreement with this view Wright reflects that “the rule does not indicate the weight to be given to each factor or require that the action be dismissed if particular conclusions are reached as to any or all of them. Clearly, no single element is determinative. The enumeration simply provides some guidelines to assist a judge in deciding whether a class action best serves the interests of the litigants and the court. When applying these factors, the judge should reflect on the wisdom of allowing the action to be maintained as a class suit.” Citing Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D.Pa. 1968), Prof. Wright includes in his treatise the suggestion that proposed class actions be evaluated in terms of the strain on courts required to process large numbers of claims, the importance of making known in advance those who will be bound by the judgment, avoiding solicitation of claims, avoiding modification of the applicable period of limitation, and advancing, or at least not prejudicing, recognized goals of public policy. 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1780, pp. 64-65.

      . “Students of the Rule have been led generally to recognize that its broad and open-ended terms call for 'the exercise of some considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature. Appealing to that kind of judgment, defendant points out that (1) the incentive of classaction benefits is unnecessary in view of the Act’s provisions for a $100 minimum recovery and payment of costs and a reasonable fee for counsel; and (2) the proposed recovery of $100 each for some 130,000 class members would be a horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any benefit to defendant, for what is at most a technical and debatable violation of the Truth in Lending Act. These points are cogent and persuasive.” Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.1972).

      . “Finally the amended rule is in jeopardy from those who embrace it too enthusiastically just as it is from those who approach it with distaste.” C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 72, p. 307.

      . The Advisory Committee in notes accompanying the Amended Rule states: “Subdivision (b) (3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.” 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-103

      . Cf. Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334 F.Supp. 774 (E.D.Mich.), aff’d 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978, 92 S.Ct. 1196, 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972), holding that a class action under Rule 23 cannot be brought for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act because 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) limits the binding effect of judgments to those who have filed written consent to become parties to the suit. See also Maguire v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y.1972).

      . See Statement of Black, J., dissenting from U.S. Supreme Court’s Order of Feb. 28, 1966, adopting the present version of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, 383 U.S. ' 1031, 1035-1037 (1966).

      . Thereby either absolutely precluding a type of enforcment which Congress did not see fit to preclude, or indiscriminately requiring it, when Congress in passing the Act had refrained from so doing.


author: THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:

text:
    Will WRIGHT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. S. Lamont SMITH, Warden, Georgia State Prison, Reidsville, Georgia, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 72-2249.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Feb. 14, 1973.
    Edward T. M. Garland, Eric Welch, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner-appellant.
    Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., W. Hen-sell Harris, Jr., Dorothy T. Beasley, Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent-appellee.

      Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and THORNBERRY and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.
   THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:

On August 8, 1967, a predominantly white grand jury in Fulton County, Georgia, indicted Will Wright, a Negro, for murder. On September 13, 1967, having been convicted by an all-white jury, Wright was sentenced to life imprisonment. On this appeal from the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Wright challenges the composition of his grand and petit juries, alleging that the method of juror selection systematically excluded Negroes and poor persons and was based on a numerically inadequate cross-section of the community. We affirm the judgment below.

Wright’s grand and petit juries were selected in the following manner. The Fulton County Jury Commissioners mailed a racially neutral questionnaire to each individual who filed a county property tax return for that year. When the questionnaires were returned, the Jury Commissioners excluded the names of those who, on the basis of the information supplied by the questionnaires, were exempt or disqualified from jury service. The remaining names were placed on a racially neutral master jury list. A judge drew jurors’ names from this list at random; each name was placed in the jury box on a slip of paper indistinguishable from the others.

In theory, this system was a good one. Every person who owned any real or personal property was required to file a county property tax return, regardless of whether, after subtracting exemptions, he would be subject to a net tax liability. Given Georgia’s comprehensive definition of personal property, few, if any, Georgia residents were not required to file a county tax return. Thus, the pool of prospective jurors (i. e., the tax returns) was — hypothetically—numerically comprehensive and was selected without regard to wealth. Furthermore, the system afforded no opportunity for racial discrimination, because questionnaires were sent to all persons filing tax returns without regard to race and because the questionnaires themselves disclosed nothing about a resident’s race.

In practice, however, this system produced less than ideal results, owing largely to the fact that only about one-half of the adult residents of Fulton County filed tax returns in 1965. larger percentage of the white population than of the black population filed returns, resulting in the overrepresentation of whites in the pool of prospective jurors. Thus, although whites outnumbered blacks in Fulton County by a ratio of two to one (68 percent white to 32 percent black), among those who filed returns and thereby entered the pool of prospective jurors, whites outnumbered blacks by more than five to one (84 percent white to 16 percent black). Wright’s grand jury and the petit jury panels actually drawn for his trial contained roughly the same percentage of blacks as did the tax returns. There were, according to the testimony of the jury clerk, “three or four” Negroes on Wright’s grand jury, meaning that the grand jury that indicted Wright was 13 or 17 percent black. And although the jury that convicted Wright was lily-white, there were “between seven and twenty-one” Negroes on the five petit jury panels from which Wright’s trial jury was chosen, the percentage of blacks on the jury panels thus ranging from roughly 12 percent to 35 percent. In short, there was no significant disparity between the percentage of blacks in the pool of prospective jurors A (16 percent) and the percentage of blacks on Wright’s grand jury and his petit jury panels. Bearing these facts in mind, we turn now to appellant’s contentions.

In order to have made a prima facie showing of systematic exclusion of blacks from his grand and petit juries, appellant had the burden of proving, first, that the opportunity for racial discrimination existed by reason of the use of a racially biased source of potential jurors, and, second, that the use of such an “infected source” produced a significant disparity between the percentages of blacks in the source and the percentage on the grand jury and petit jury panels. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967); Jones v. Smith, 5th Cir., 1969, 420 F.2d 774. In the instant case, appellant has shown neither. We have seen above that the percentages of blacks on the grand jury (13 or 17 percent) and on the petit jury panels (12 to 35 percent) were not significantly lower than the percentage of blacks in the pool of prospective jurors (16 percent); in fact, the percentage of blacks on the grand jury and the petit jury panels may have been higher than in the pool. Moreover, the system used in selecting grand and petit jurors in appellant’s prosecution afforded little, if any, opportunity for racial discrimination. Racially neutral questionnaires were sent to all persons filing tax returns; the Jury Commissioners excluded exempt or disqualified persons from the list without regard to race; the remaining names were placed in the jury box on indistinguishable slips of paper. This system contrasts starkly with the use of such an “infected source” as multi-colored tax returns bound into the tax digest by race, the method used in Georgia until shortly before the instant prosecution was brought, and a system which has been consistently condemned. It is true that there was a significant disparity between the percentage of blacks in Fulton County and the percentage of black grand and petit jurors; but this disparity was due not to the use of a racially biased source of potential jurors, but rather to the fact that a greater percentage of whites than of blacks fortuitously filed tax returns and thereby entered the pool of prospective jurors. Absent proof that selection procedures are biased, proof of disparity between racial percentages in the population and on the juries is not sufficient to shift the burden of explanation to the state. Alexander, supra, 405 U.S. at 630, 92 S.Ct. at 1225.

We also reject appellant’s contention that use of tax returns as the source of potential jurors resulted in systematic exclusion of poor persons from his grand and petit juries. Appellant argues that use of the tax returns automatically excluded persons owning less than a minimum amount of property. This is not true, because wealth did not determine whether a person was required to file a tax return. Every person who owned property (and it is difficult to imagine persons whose possessions would not be included in the all-embracing Georgia definition of property) was required to file a tax return, regardless of whether the value of his possessions exceeded the exemptions provided by Georgia law. Whatever else may have caused roughly half of the Fulton County population to refrain from filing returns and thus from entering the pool of prospective jurors, it was not poverty. Moreover, this court has on at least two occasions in the past upheld the nondiscriminatory use of tax returns as a source of potential jurors. Donlavey v. Smith, 5th Cir. 1970,. 426 F.2d 800; Roach v. Mauldin, 5th Cir. 1968, 391 F.2d 907, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1095, 89 S.Ct. 884, 21 L.Ed.2d 786 (1969).

There remains appellant’s contention that, apart from considerations of racial or economic discrimination, the tax returns afforded a numerically inadequate cross-section of the community, because tax returns represented only about half of the Fulton County residents eligible for jury service. In Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970), the Court suggested that a state has a duty to select prospective jurors from as comprehensive a list as possible; and a panel of this court, in Broadway v. Culpepper, 5th Cir. 1971, 439 F.2d 1253, hinted that the numerical inadequacy of the juror pool might be the basis for prospective remedial relief, plaintiffs having demonstrated a significant disparity between racial percentages in the population and in the prospective juror pool (in that case, the group of registered voters who had returned information questionnaires to the jury commissioners). While fully recognizing that the knowing use of a numerically inadequate source of potential jurors will often deny an accused his right to a jury selected from a fairly representative cross-section of the community, we hold that appellant in this case did not make a burden-shifting prima facie showing that his grand and petit jurors were selected from a numerically inadequate pool. First, we have no way of knowing exactly what percentage of the adult population of Fulton County actually entered the pool of prospective jurors. Although only 168,000 tax returns were filed out of a population of 339,-000, some of these returns must have been filed jointly by couples both of whom were twenty-one years of age or older. See footnote 5 supra. Depending on how many of these joint returns were filed, the pool of tax returns could represent vastly more than roughly one-half of the adult population. Secondly, even disregarding the joint return factor, a pool of one-half the adult population is nowhere near as suspect as was the pool in Broadway, supra, which reflected only about one-quarter of the adult population. Under these circumstances, and considering the absence from this case of racial or economic discrimination, we must reject appellant’s claim that his grand and petit juries were not chosen from a fairly representative cross-section of the community.

Affirmed.

      . Wright was paroled on March 26, 1972.

      . After Wright’s indictment and trial, Georgia law was changed to require the use of voter registration lists, rather than tax returns, as the basic source of of potential jurors, and to require that the voter registration list be supplemented if it does not reflect a fairly representative cross-section of a county’s population. Ga.Acts 1968, p. 533, codified in Ga.Code Ann. § 59-106 (Supp.1972).

      . At the times in question, Georgia law exempted up to $2,000 of the value of a home, Ga.Code Ann. § 92-219; $300 of the value of personal property such as clothing, furniture, domestic animals and tools, Ga.Code Ann. § 92-239; land held for charitable, religious, educational, or other eleemosynary purposes, Ga.Code Ann. § 92-130; and property owned by certain foreign corporations, Ga.Code Ann. § 92-201.

      . Ga.Code Ann. § 92-102 provides as follows :
      For the purposes of taxation, “personal property” shall be construed to include goods, chattels, moneys, credits and effects, whatsoever they may be; ships, boats, and vessels, whether at home or abroad, and capital invested therein; bonds and other securities of corporations of this or of other States; stock of corporations of other States; bonds, notes or other obligations of other States, and' of the counties, municipalities or other subdivisions thereof; money due on open account or evidenced by notes, contracts, bonds, or other obligations, secured or unsecured.

      . Of the 168,003 tax returns filed in 1965, an unknown number were filed jointly by husband and wife. If both husband and wife were twenty-one years of age or older, each joint return would represent two potential jurors, rather than one. Thus, much more than one-half of the Fulton County adult population may have been represented in the total returns filed.

      . Testimony in the district court revealed that there were no criminal sanctions for failure to file a county tax return, and that the supervising tax clerk of The Fulton County Tax Commissioner’s Office believed that his office was inadequately staffed to enforce the filing requirement by assessing penalties against those persons failing to file.

      . The foregoing statistics may be summarized as follows (percentages are approximate) :

        Group Normhite or Negro White Total

      Fulton County 108,013 231,045 339,058
      Adult Population (1960) (32%) (68%) (100%)
      1965 Tax Returns 26,518 (16%) 141,485 (84%) 168,003 (100%)
      Percentage of each race filing tax returns 24.5% 61%
      Appellant’s Grand Jury 3 or 4 (13% or 17%) 19 or 20 (83% or 87%) 23 (100%)
      Appellant’s Petit Jury Panels (5 panels of 12) 7 to 21 (12% to 35%) 39 to 53 (65% to 88%) 60 (100%)
      Appellant’s Petit Jury 0 (0%) 12 (100%) 12 (100%)

      . Indeed, some jurors for the period during which appellant was indicted and tried had been selected through reliance on the infamous multi-colored tax returns, but that system was abandoned and a complete group of jurors chosen by means of racially neutral questionnaires after the Jury Commissioners were informed that the old method was unconstitutional. For a discussion of this hasty change in the manner of selecting jurors, and approval of the method used in the instant case, see Lumpkin v. Smith, N.D.Ga.1970, 309 F.Supp. 1325, rev’d. on other grounds, 5th Cir. 1971, 439 F.2d 1084.

      . E. g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 043, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967); Colson v. Smith, 5th Cir. 1971, 438 F.2d 1075; Davis v. Smith, 5th Cir. 1970, 430 F.2d 1256; Jones v. Smith, 5th Cir. 1969, 420 F.2d 774; Peters v. Rutledge, 5th Cir. 1968, 397 F.2d 731; Vanleeward v. Rutledge, 5th Cir. 1966, 369 F.2d 584. Cf. Labat v. Bennett, 5th Cir. 1966, 365 F.2d 698, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991, 87 S.Ct. 1303, 18 L.Ed.2d 334 (1967) (indirect discrimination through exclusion of daily wage earners).

      . In Gibson v. Blair, 5th Cir. 1972, 467 F.2d 842, another panel of this court held that a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection was established by proof that “a significant disparity exists between the percentage of blacks chosen for jury duty and the percentage of blacks eligible for jury duty in the population from which jurors are drawn.” 467 F.2d at p. 844. We do not believe that this opinion, by suggesting that proof of a racially biased selection method is not part of a prima facie case, is in conflict with what we hold in the instant case. First, all of the cases cited in Blair as supporting that proposition involved not only a significant disparity in racial percentages, but also either a racially biased selection system (e. g., jurors selected through reliance on personal knowledge of jury commissioners who knew few, if any, Negroes ; automatic exclusion of predominantly Negro economic classes) or a history of decades during which no members of racial minorities had sat on juries. Secondly, the primary question before the court in Blair was not whether a prima facie case had been established, but rather whether the state trial court had erroneously excluded all evidence except that tending to show intentional discrimination by the jury commissioners. Significantly, the court in Blair pointed out that the record before it, containing proof of discrepancy between racial percentages without more, did not establish racial discrimination in the general venire of Washington Parish, 467 F.2d at 844.

      . Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953), upholding the use of a list of county property and poll taxpayers as the most comprehensive available source of potential jurors,