author: WATSON, Judge:

text:
    ZENITH RADIO CORPORATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.
    Court No. 81-06-00734.
    United States Court of International Trade.
    March 13, 1985.

      Frederick L. Ikenson, P.C., Washington, D.C. (Frederick L. Ikenson and J. Eric Nissley, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for plaintiff Zenith Radio Corporation.
    Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott, Washington, D.C. (Paul D. Cullen and Paul C. Rosenthal, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for plaintiffs International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, et al.
    Richard K. Willard, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., David M. Cohen, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch (Sheila N. Ziff, Washington, D.C., attorney), for defendants.
    Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York City, (A. Paul Victor, Stuart M. Rosen, Charles H. Bayar, and Bret E. Suval, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-intervenors, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., et al.
    Tanaka Walders & Ritger, Washington, D.C. (H. William Tanaka, Lawrence R. Walders, Patrick O’Leary, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for defendant-intervenors, Hitachi Ltd., et al.
    Sharretts, Paley, Carter & Blauvelt, P.C., New York City (Gail T. Cumins and Ned H. Marshak, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-intervenor Sanyo Electric, Inc.

      Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C. (Robert H. Huey and Rodney F. Page, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for defendant-intervenors, Toshiba Corporation, et al.
    Wender, Murase & White, New York City (Peter J. Gartland and Robert D. Piliero, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-intervenor Sharp Electronics Corporation.
    Baker & McKenzie, Washington, D.C. (Thomas P. Ondeck, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for defendant-intervenors Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, et al.
    Siegel, Mandell & Davidson, P.C., New York City (Brian S. Goldstein and Edward Ackerman, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-intervenor The General Corporation of Japan.
   Memorandum Opinion and Order

WATSON, Judge:

This consolidated action is a judicial review of a determination by the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA). It is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment.

The determination in dispute fixed the antidumping duties due on television sets from Japan that were entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption between April 1, 1979 and March 31, 1980.

Under the law, if the United States Price is less than the Foreign Market Value the difference between the two is a margin of dumping in the United States and anti-dumping duties must be paid to eliminate it. 19 U.S.C. § 1673.

The determination of Foreign Market Value starts with the price in the producer’s home market. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(A) Certain costs (such as containers and coverings) are then added to the price. Finally, “adjustments” may be made to the price for those elements in the price which are “differences in circumstances of sale.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4).

If the price method cannot be applied with information from home market sources, the Foreign Market Value can be determined from a price method using sales to third countries other than the United States (19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(B)) or from a non-price method known as Constructed Value, in which the value is built up from the elements of costs of materials, cost of production and general expenses and profit. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2) and 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e).

The plaintiffs claim that the ITA committed errors of law in its determination of the Foreign Market Value of the television sets under investigation.

I

Plaintiffs first argue that the ITA erred when it used constructed value to find the Foreign Market Value of television sets produced by Sharp Corporation (Sharp). They contend that, after the ITA declined to use the prices submitted by Sharp, it should have used the evidence of the declared amounts on which Sharp paid the Japanese Commodity Tax on the television sets it sold in Japan.

The Court is of the opinion that, although the use of the commodity tax information would have been lawful and had much to recommend it, the ITA was under no statutory obligation to use it.

The ITA apparently thought that if it had no direct evidence of prices in transactions for sale in the Japanese market, the statute would obligate it to turn immediately to sales to third countries or to constructed value. This belief was expressed at 42 Fed.Reg. 30164 ¶ 4. Although this understanding was wrong, it did not amount to harmful error in the administration of the law.

In reality, the ITA has the authority to go beyond direct evidence of relevant matters in appropriate situations. This is part of its inherent power to make these determinations so long as they are lawful and based on substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not have to be perfect evidence. The ITA is even empowered to utilize information which might be less than satisfactory in normal situations. Thus, in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) the agencies are allowed to base their determinations on “the best information otherwise available” when a party refuses or is unable to produce information. By a fortiori reasoning they are certainly authorized to use secondary evidence of price (such as the commodity tax information) when direct evidence is not sufficient or usable.

Consequently, it is puzzling that the ITA did not utilize its authority to rely on good secondary evidence of price. It is even more bewildering to note that by turning to the complicated use of constructed value the ITA lost an opportunity to promote its administrative efficiency, a point which has recently been stressed as an important factor in the administration of this law. Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed America, Inc., 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed.Cir.1985). The use of the commodity tax information would have been markedly simpler than the use of constructed value.

Nevertheless, the failure to use a discretionary alternative form of proof for one type of valuation does not amount to error when the agency uses a lawful second means of valuation.

In short, if the ITA had seen fit to use the commodity tax information in the case of Sharp, its action would have been unassailable. Even though it displayed a curious restraint in the use of its discretion, it did not violate a requirement of the law by failing to use secondary evidence of price.

In sum, it can be said that the authority to use secondary sources of information is part of the power of the agency to use all reasonable ways and means to accomplish its task. 19 U.S.C. § 1673h This authority does not create an obligation to turn to secondary sources before using an alternative statutory method of valuation.

For the producers other than Sharp, alternative information would not come into play if their actual prices were being properly used. For those producers the dispute centers on the use of their prices in sales to related parties in Japan and the general question of whether the relationship between parties was adequately investigated.

II

Plaintiffs next turn to the foreign market value determinations made for the remaining Japanese producers of television sets. For those producers, direct proof of prices in the home market was found to be satisfactory.

Plaintiffs claim that the ITA did not eliminate the taint of relationship from the information used to determine Foreign Market Value. Plaintiffs argue that limiting the investigation of relationships to financial connections was improper. Zenith presented a scholarly argument that Japanese business relationships are governed by a tradition of conduct known as keiretsu, which produces coordinated action and the practical effects of relationship without the presence of equity connections.

The Court is of the opinion that the requirements of our law are satisfied when the ITA investigates whether there is any financial relationship between the producer and the purchaser in the home market. This goes to the essence of those relationships which the law details in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(13) and which would obviously tend to undermine the acceptability of a sale price. The question posed by the ITA was adequate to explore the full range of possible financial relationships involved in the enforcement of the law.

The discernment of relationships which do not find expression in concrete financial terms is not something which can be posited as a mandatory duty, and is not required of the ITA by law. In this case the ITA’s determinations on the question of relationship were supported by substantial evidence and were in accordance with the law.

The plaintiffs have also challenged the validation of prices between related parties by means of prices to unrelated parties, claiming that the ITA did not determine that the volume of sales to unrelated parties was sufficient to serve as validation. However, this process of validation is not dependent on any fixed relative volume of sales. In the absence of any indication that the unrelated sales are arranged solely to validate the price to related parties, the ITA is within its authority to use such sales as are commercially significant.

The record shows that for Hitachi, Matsushita, and Mitsubishi, sales to unrelated parties were at prices identical to the prices to related purchasers. In the case of Sanyo, whose prices to unrelated purchasers were higher, the ITA used the higher prices and did not use the prices to related purchasers. For Toshiba, which sold only to related purchasers in Japan, the ITA compared its prices to those of manufacturers selling comparable television sets in arms-length transactions. This manner of proceeding accords with the law and its results are supported by substantial evidence.

As a final point on the subject of related parties, the plaintiffs claim that special verification should have been undertaken by the ITA after the matter became an issue in the proceeding. The Court does not believe that in the circumstances of this proceeding a duty arose to conduct a specific, additional verification of the relationship issue. In the opinion of the Court, the record before the ITA was sufficient to permit it to draw sound conclusions on the issue of relationships. This was not a case in which the verification duty was abdicated or violated to the point of eroding the legitimacy of the proceeding. See, Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 6 CIT — (Slip Op. 83-119), 575 F.Supp. 1277, affirmed, 745 F.2d 632 (Fed.Cir.1984).

Ill

Plaintiffs’ third area of disagreement with the determination involves the ITA’s use of discounts and rebates to lower the foreign market value of television sets sold in Japan.

According to plaintiffs, if discounts and rebates are to enter into the calculation of foreign market value at all, it must be by means of deductions from price for those discounts and rebates that are available to all purchasers.

In the opinion of the Court this seemingly plausible claim has been precluded by the decision of our appellate court in Smith-Corona Group Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp., v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568 (C.A.F.C.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1274, 79 L.Ed.2d 679 (1984). In that opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) characterized the offer of a rebate in Japan as a difference in the circumstance of sale in Japan as opposed to the sale in the United States. The CAFC further discussed rebates as increasing the effective cost to the manufacturer of the transactions under scrutiny. 713 F.2d at 1850. This means that to the extent that rebates and discounts are considered differences in circumstances of sale they are adjustments made for the exigencies of particular transactions under the authority of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4). As such, they do not have to meet the same requirements as would a “price,” that is to say, they do not have to be given to “all purchasers.” As items unrelated to price, rebates and discounts are not subject to the limitations on price of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(A) or 19 U.S.C. § 1677(14).

Before the decision in Smith Corona, supra, the plain meaning of the law, the force of logic, and the teaching of analogous case law would have compelled the Court to reason as follows: Discounts and rebates are practices which relate directly to price. The law depends on the determination of a single price which must be the price available to all purchasers. If discounts and rebates are given to some purchasers and not to others they ought not to figure in the price. “All purchasers” cannot necessarily obtain the discounted price or the rebates, nor can “all purchasers” obtain any “average” price into which the discounts or rebates are averaged.

A. correlary of this point would be that the authority of the agency to utilize techñiques of averaging or sampling under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f) could not justify the use of prices which are not available to. all purchasers. This standard also has the advantage of immensely simplifying the administration of the law — a point which has come to figure prominently in analysis of administrative action in this area. Consumer Products Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed America, Inc., 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir.1985).

At this time however, the holding of our appellate court has eliminated this line of reasoning. The claim by plaintiffs that discounts and rebates were improperly used in the calculation of foreign market value is rejected.

IV

As a fourth issue Zenith has maintained its claim that the so-called exporter’s sales price offset (the ESP offset) is erroneous as a matter of law. Zenith acknowledges that this issue was decided in Smith Corona Group Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568, cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 1274, 79 L.Ed.2d 679 (1984). In that opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated that:

Were it not for the exporter’s sale price offset, comparisons based on purchase price would be fair, yet comparisons based on exporter’s sales price would be skewed in favor of a higher dumping margin.

718 F.2d at 1578

The Appellate Court further stated that:

In view of the discretion accorded the Secretary under the statute to make adjustments to foreign market value, we conclude that the exporter’s sale price offset, 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) is a proper and reasonable exercise of the Secretary’s authority to administer the statute fairly.
713 F.2d at 1579

It must be observed ■ however that the result to which this Court is directed appears to nullify a fundamental statutory provision for determining United States price when the producer and the importer are related. In good conscience and with all due respect the Court must state that it does not see the unfairness which supposedly justifies the offset. This Court sees only a cancellation of an important part of the operation of the exporter’s sales price method of finding a U.S. price. This amounts to a thwarting of Congressional intention.

The ITA evidently thinks that because selling expenses were extracted from the price of the first transaction inside the United States (as part of the technique of going back to what would be the true price in a transaction between the exporter and importer) there is something unfair in leaving selling expenses “inside” the price at which the exporter-producer sells to its customers in Japan. It therefore allows an equal amount to be deducted from that foreign market value in 19 C.F.R. § 353.-15(c).

But this is nothing less than the nullification of the step specifically provided by law to help arrive at a fair price in related party transactions.

As noted earlier, the dumping margin in the United States is the amount by which the United States price is lower than the Foreign Market Value. When the United States price can’t be obtained from the purchase price (the sale between the importer and exporter) because the parties are related, it has to be extracted from a later price (the sale from the related importer to an unrelated U.S. purchaser, i.e., the sale after importation). That price must be cleansed of the selling expenses of the importer in order to help arrive at what would be the real price between an exporter and an importer. This is essential to arriving at a fair U.S. Price, unaffected by special relationships. That is where the adjustment for selling expenses ought to stop. At that point the law has operated to bring the price found in the first U.S. transaction back to what it would be in an importation transaction. Then, both the purchase price (in the sale between unrelated importer and exporter) and the exporter’s sales price (arrived at by the “extraction” method) are subject to adjustments which bring them further back to the equivalent of an ex-factory price in the home market for sales in exportation to the United States. At that point the operation of the alternative methods of finding a U.S. Price is complete and harmonious. Those prices may then be compared with the producers foreign market value in each instance to see whether the U.S. price is lower.

The ITA’s creation of an “offset,” does violence to this carefully worked-out statutory method. It disrupts the balanced statutory scheme and allows foreign market value to be unjustifiably reduced by selling expenses in the home market when the foreign market value is being used in a related party situation.

The Court is unable to see any unfairness resulting from the statutory method or any “skewing” in favor of higher dumping margins when it is used. In the related party situation the related exporter has no usable price to the U.S. until the exporter’s sales price method is applied. To say that a crucial element of its application is a "skewing” is nothing less than a straightforward disagreement with the plain meaning of the law, a judgment that exporter’s sales price should not work the way it was intended to.

The removal of selling expenses from the U.S. side of the equation is essential to finding a fair U.S. price. The related exporter is told that its price is actually the next transaction price of its related importer, but only after those elements are removed which would not be in the exporter’s price in a transaction with the importer. If that exporter is then allowed to deduct from his home market price an equivalent element of selling expenses the entire special statutory method is being negated. In short, the “offset” restores an element of one of the very items that Congress wanted to remove from U.S. Price in related party transactions.

To allow the ITA the discretion to promulgate rules which alter this method of statutory valuation, and to do so based on a misconception of what is fair, amounts to a grant of authority to freely amend the law. This result creates two foreign market values where one was intended, destroys the operation of exporter’s sales price and represents the ultimate extension of discretion to the ITA.

In the shadow of these developments it becomes difficult to imagine what judicial control remains on the administration and interpretation of this law. It must be remembered that this entire administrative novelty has emerged from a regulation assertedly based on the authority to make adjustments due to “circumstances of sale.” From this limited category of authority, intended only for proper adjustments to foreign market value, major surgery has been accomplished on the important statutory section dealing with the exporter’s sales price method for determining a U.S. price.

With these comments in mind, the Court conforms to the ruling of the appellate court and rejects plaintiff’s claim that the ESP offset is invalid.

V

The plaintiff unions have claimed that the ITA used a weighted average technique to determine U.S. price when it used the exporter’s sale price method for Sharp. Obviously, a weighted average can eliminate dumping margins at one point in time by averaging in higher prices from a later time. That would clearly be unacceptable.

The government points out however, that the technique used weight averaging only within each entry, in a manner that did not alter the amount of the margin. The method is found acceptable by the Court insofar as its results do not differ from what would result from the sum of exporter’s sales price for each selling price in each entry. In short, the Court is satisfied that the method did not conceal dumping margins and is in accordance with the law.

For the reasons expressed in this opinion the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment must be, and hereby are, Denied. On the grounds expressed, the cross-motions for summary judgment are hereby Granted.

      . The determination was published at 46 Fed. Reg. 30163 (June 5, 1981).

      . 19 U.S.C. § 1673
      1673. Imposition of antidumping duties imposed If—
      (1) the administering authority determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value, and
      (2) the Commission determines that—
      (A) an industry in the United States—
      (i) is materially injured, or
      (ii) is threatened with material injury, or
      (B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
      by reason of imports of that merchandise, then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, in an amount equal to the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United States price for the merchandise.

      . 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(A)
      § 1677b. Foreign market value
      (a) Determination; fictitious market; sales agencies. For purposes of this title—
      (1) In general. The foreign market value of imported merchandise shall be the price, at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States— (A) at which such or similar merchandise is sold or, in the absence of sales, offered for sale in the principal markets of the country from which exported, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for home consumption____

      . 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)
      (4) Other adjustments. In determining foreign market value, if it is established to the satisfaction of the administering authority that the amount of any difference between the United States price and the foreign market value (or that the fact that the United States price is the same as the foreign market value) is wholly or partly due to—
      (A) the fact that the wholesale quantities, in which such or similar merchandise is sold or, in the absence of sales, offered for sale, for exportation to, or in the principal market of, the United States, as appropriate, in the ordinary course of trade, are less or are greater than the wholesale quantities in which such or similar merchandise is sold or, in the absence of sales, offered for sale, in the principal markets of the country of exportation in the ordinary course of trade for home consumption (or, if not so sold for home consumption, then for exportation to countries other than the United States);
      (B) other differences in circumstances of sale; or

        (C) the fact that merchandise described in paragraph (B) or (C) of section 771(16) [19 USC § 1677(16)(B) or (C) ] is used in determining foreign market value,
      then due allowance shall be made therefor.

      . 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2)
      (2) Use of constructed value. If the administering authority determines that the foreign market value of imported merchandise cannot be determined under paragraph (1)(A), then, notwithstanding paragraph (1)(B), the foreign market value of the merchandise may be the constructed value of that merchandise, as determined under subsection (e).

      . 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)
      (e) Constructed value. (1) Determination. For the purposes of this title, the constructed value of imported merchandise shall be the sum of—
      (A) the cost of materials (exclusive of any internal tax applicable in the country of exportation directly to such materials or their disposition, but remitted or refunded upon the exportation of the article in the production of which such materials are used) and of fabrication or other processing of any kind employed in producing such or similar merchandise, at a time preceding the date of exportation of the merchandise under consideration which would ordinarily permit the production of that particular merchandise in the ordinary course of business;
      (B) an amount for general expenses and profit equal to that usually reflected in sales of merchandise of the same general class or kind as the merchandise under consideration which are made by producers in the country of exportation, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade, except that—
      (i) the amount for general expenses shall not be less than 10 percent of the cost as defined in subparagraph (A), and
      (ii) the amount for profit shall not be less than 8 percent of the sum of such general expenses and cost; and
      (C) the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature, and all other expenses incidental to placing the merchandise under consideration in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States.

      . The Japanese Commodity Tax Law defines the taxable basis of the television sets in terms which are virtually identical to the terms of foreign market value.

      . 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)
      (b) Determinations to be made on best information available. In making their determinations under this title, the administering authority and the Commission shall, whenever a party or any other person refuses or is unable to produce information requested in a timely manner and in the form required, or otherwise significantly impedes an investigation, use the best information otherwise available.

      . 19 U.S.C. § 1673h. Duties of customs officers
      In the case of all imported merchandise of a class or kind as to which the administering authority has published an antidumping duty order under section 736 [19 U.S.C. § 1673e] under which entries have not been liquidated, the appropriate customs officer shall, by all reasonable ways and means and consistently with the provisions of this title [19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 et seq.], ascertain and determine, or estimate, the foreign market value,, the United States price, and any other information which the administering authority deems necessary for the purposes of administering this title [19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 et seq.].

      . 19 U.S.C. § 1677(13)
      (13) Exporter. For the purpose of determining United States price, the term "exporter” includes the person by whom or for whose account the merchandise is imported into the United States if—
      (A) such person is the agent or principal of the exporter, manufacturer, or producer;
      (B) such person owns or controls, directly or indirectly, through stock ownership or control or otherwise, any interest in the business of the exporter, manufacturer, or producer;
      (C) the exporter, manufacturer, or producer owns or controls, directly or indirectly, through stock ownership or control or otherwise, any interest in any business conducted by such person; or
      (D) any person or persons, jointly or severally, directly or indirectly, through stock ownership or control or otherwise, own or control in the aggregate 20 percent or more of the voting power or control in the business carried on by the person by whom or for whose account the merchandise is imported into the United States, and also 20 percent or more of such power or control in the business of the exporter, manufacturer, or producer.

      . See Footnote 4, supra.

      . See Footnote 3, supra.

      . 19 U.S.C. § 1677(14)
      Sold or, in the absence of sales, offered for sale. The term "sold or, in the absence of sales, offered for sale” means sold or, in the absence of sales, offered—
      (A) to all purchasers at wholesale, or
      (B) in the ordinary course of trade to one or more selected purchasers at wholesale at a price which fairly reflects the market value of the merchandise,
      without regard to restrictions as to the disposition or use of the merchandise by the purchaser except that, where such restrictions are found to affect the market value of the merchandise, adjustment shall be made therefor in calculating the price at which the merchandise is sold or offered for sale.

      . 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)
      (f) Authority to use sampling techniques and to disregard insignificant adjustments.
      For the purpose of determining foreign market value under this section, the administering authority may—
      (1) use averaging or generally recognized sampling techniques whenever a significant volume of sales is involved or a significant number of adjustments to prices is required, and
      (2) decline to take into account adjustments which are insignificant in relation to the price or value of the merchandise.

      . 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1980) provides:
      (c) Special rule. Notwithstanding the criteria for adjustments for differences in circumstances of sale set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section,
      [i]n making comparisons using exporter's sales price reasonable allowance will be made for all actual selling expenses incurred in the home market up to the amount of the selling expenses incurred in the United States market. [Emphasis supplied.]


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: RE, Chief Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    The UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. Saul MIZRAHIE and Safeco Insurance Company of America, Defendants, SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Rebecca MIZRAHIE, Third-Party Defendant.
    Court No. 83-8-01189.
    United States Court of International Trade.
    March 19, 1985.

      Richard K. Willard, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., Joseph I. Liebman, Attorney-in-Charge, International Trade 'Field Office, Commercial Litigation Branch (Jerry P. Wiskin, New York City), for plaintiff.
    Marks & Brooklier, Beverly Hills, Cal. (Anthony P. Brooklier, Beverly Hills, Cal.), for defendant, and third-party defendant.
    Hart & Hume, New York City (Mark S. Gamell, New York City), for defendant-third-party plaintiff.
   MEMORANDUM OPINION

RE, Chief Judge:

The question presented in this case is whether a surety seeking indemnification on an import bond, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1583 (1982), may obtain a writ of attachment against an indemnitor’s real property located in California. This Court holds that it is empowered to issue a writ of attachment affecting property located in California, and that the requirements of California law, for the issuance of the writ, have been met.

On March 6, 1985, defendant-third-party plaintiff, Safeco Insurance Company of America (Safeco), sought an ex parte right to attach order, and the issuance of a writ of attachment affecting real property, located in the State of California, owned by third-party defendant, Rebecca Mizrahie. Upon due consideration and examination of Safeco’s application and supporting affidavits, on March 8, 1985, this Court ordered that the Clerk of the Court issue a writ of attachment.

This is the first case before this Court in which a private party has requested, and has been granted a writ of attachment pri- or to judgment.

FACTS

On August 18, 1983, September 29, 1983, and July 17, 1984, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1582(2) (1982), plaintiff, the United States, instituted three separate actions in this Court, U.S.C.I.T. Nos. 83-8-1189, 83-9-1385, and 84-7-990, against Saul Mizrahie and Safeco. On February 19, 1985, the Court issued an order consolidating all three actions into one action bearing consolidated court number 83-8-1189. In each of these actions, the United States seeks to recover liquidated damage penalties against Saul Mizrahie for his alleged violations of 19 C.F.R. § 12.80, which governs the importation of vehicles that do not conform to federal motor vehicle safety standards, and against Saul Mizrahie and Safe-co for breach of three Immediate Delivery and Consumption Bonds (bonds or consumption bonds). The relief sought by the United States is the recovery of $43,811 in liquidated damage penalties, plus pre-judgment interest from the date of each liquidated damage assessment made by the Customs Service.

The imported merchandise consisted of various models of Mercedez Benz automobiles (vehicles) which were entered, on separate occasions, at the port of Long Beach, California. On each occasion, the vehicles, which did not conform to federal motor vehicle safety standards, were conditionally released to Saul Mizrahie. As a condition of each vehicle’s release, Mizrahie was obligated, within ninety days, either to provide a satisfactory statement that the vehicles had been altered to conform to federal safety standards, or to redeliver the nonconforming vehicles. As security for any liquidated damage penalties that might be incurred for failure to perform his obligations, Mizrahie executed, jointly with Safe-co as surety, the three consumption bonds that form the basis of Safeco’s cross and third-party claims.

Alleging that Saul Mizrahie neither provided satisfactory statements of conformity, nor redelivered the vehicles within ninety days after their respective releases, the Customs Service, on June 2, 1978 and March 30, 1979, assessed liquidated damages against him. Saul Mizrahie then petitioned for, and was denied, mitigation of the assessment of liquidated damage penalties. Plaintiff, the United States, subsequently brought the three actions against Saul Mizrahie and Safeco.

In each of the three actions Safeco interposed an answer, and cross-claimed for judgment against Saul Mizrahie based upon the common law right of a surety to indemnification from its principal, and upon a written General Agreement of Indemnity, dated June 26, 1977 (Indemnity Agreement). The Indemnity Agreement was executed by Saul and Rebecca Mizrahie, in favor of Safeco.

Pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Rules of this Court, Rebecca Mizrahie was personally served with a third-party summons and complaint on December 13, 1983 and November 9, 1984. To date, Saul Mizrahie, who has appeared and answered in these actions, has not served an answer to the cross-claims of Safeco as required by Rule 7(a) of the Rules of this Court. Rebecca Mizrahie has neither appeared, nor served an answer to Safeco’s third-party complaint. •

On January 31, 1985, the United States moved for summary judgment against Saul Mizrahie and Safeco. On March 6, 1985, Safeco moved ex parte, pursuant to Rule 64, for a “right to attach order” and for the issuance of a writ of attachment, contending that, since Saul and Rebecca Mizrahie are in default as to Safeco’s claims against them, they are liable to Safeco for any judgment which may be obtained by the United States against Safeco.

The following questions were presented by Safeco’s application for the issuance of a writ of attachment:

1. Whether this Court is empowered to order the issuance of an ex parte writ of attachment affecting property located in the State of California; and
2. Whether Safeco has satisfied the requirements, under California law, for the issuance of an ex parte writ of attachment.

For the reasons that follow, the court has granted Safeco’s ex parte application for a right to attach order and a writ of attachment.

Jurisdiction

With the enactment of the Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980), Congress expanded and clarified the jurisdiction of this Court to create “a comprehensive system for judicial review of civil actions arising out of import transactions and federal statutes affecting international trade.” Statement of President Carter, 16 Weekly Comp, of Pres. Doc. 2183 (Oct. 11, 1980). See H.R.Rep. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1980), U.S’Code Cong. & Admin.News 1980, p. 3729.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1582, this Court was granted exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over civil penalty actions under sections 592, 704(i)(2), and 734(i)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, and over actions “to recover upon a bond relating to the importation of merchandise” required by federal law or Treasury regulations. 28 U.S.C. § 1582. In addition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1583, the Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party action of any party to recover on a bond related to the importation of merchandise that is the subject of the civil action. Id. § 1583.

An examination of the legislative history of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 sheds considerable light on these sections. As originally introduced, the predecessor bill to the 1980 Act, H.R. 6394, did not provide for cross-claims and third-party actions arising out of suits by the United States to recover on a bond. See H.R. 6394, 96 Cong., 2d Sess., 126 Cong.Rec. 1530 (1980). Under that proposal, an aggrieved surety who wished to recover for breach of contract against the principal would have been required to bring a separate action in a federal district court or in a state court. After hearings on the bill, it became clear that it would be preferable to allow all claims arising out of an underlying import transaction to be adjudicated in one action before the Court of International Trade. See H.R.Rep. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1980). Accordingly, the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, amended the proposed section 1583 to authorize the assertion of any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party action of any party in an action to recover on the bond. Id. at 38. Section 1583, therefore, as enacted, manifests clearly the intent of the Congress to have the rights of all of the parties adjudicated fully and completely in one action before the Court of International Trade. See id. at 50-51.

Since Safeco’s cross-claim and third-party action seek indemnification on a bond required by Treasury regulations, this action falls squarely within section 1583. The defendant, Saul Mizrahie, and third-party defendant, Rebecca Mizrahie, were both duly served with process in this action. Thus, it is clear that this Court possesses subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over the parties.

The Court’s Equitable Powers

Of equal significance to the Court’s expanded jurisdiction in the 1980 Act was Congress’ explicit conferral upon the Court of International Trade of “all the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1982). Thus, the Act granted this Court “remedial powers co-extensive with those of a federal district court.” H.R.Rep. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 61 (1980), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1980, p. 3773. See also Budd Co. Ry. Div. v. United States, 1 CIT 175, 176-78 (1981). With certain limited exceptions, not relevant here, Congress authorized the Court “to order any form of relief that is appropriate in a civil action, including, but not limited to, declaratory judgments, orders of remand, injunctions, and writs of mandamus and prohibition.” 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c) (emphasis added). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982); Alberta Gas Chem., Inc. v. United States, 85 CustCt. 122, 125, C.R.D. 80-13, 496 F.Supp. 1332, 1334-36 (1980). The legislative history of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 leaves no doubt that 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(1) “is a general grant of authority for the Court of International Trade to order any form of relief that it deems appropriate under the circumstances.” H.R. Rep. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 61 (1980), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1980, p. 3772.

Decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit teach that, in cases in which jurisdiction has been established, this Court has the power to grant preliminary injunctive relief in order to preserve the status quo until a final judgment is rendered. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806, 809-10 (1983); S.J. Stile Assoc. Ltd. v. Snyder, 68 C.C.P.A. 27, 29-30, C.A.D. 1261, 646 F.2d 522, 525 (1981); Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A., v. United States, 7 CIT -, 590 F.Supp. 1260, 1263 (1984); Amer ican Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 1 CIT 293, 298-300, 515 F.Supp. 47, 52-53 (1981); Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. United States, 1 CIT 306, 309, 515 F.Supp. 775, 778 (1981).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64, which governs the district courts, provides that provisional remedies, including attachment, “for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in the action are available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of the state in which the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy was sought____” Fed.R.Civ.P. 64.

The language of Rule 64 of the Rules of this Court, which implements this Court’s statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1585 and § 2643(c)(1), is substantially similar to Fed.R.Civ.P. 64. Rule 64 of this Court provides that provisional remedies, such as attachment, are available in accordance with “appropriate state law existing at the time the remedy is sought.” Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly apply only to the federal district courts, it has been held that, where substantially similar, they provide guidance in the interpretation of the rules of this Court. See United States v. Porter, 68 C.C.P.A. 15, 20, C.A.D. 1259, 645 F.2d 52, 57 (1981). Thus, in support of this Court’s jurisdiction and to effectuate its judgment, the Rules of this Court permit the attachment of property, prior to judgment, in accordance with, and to the extent permitted by state law. In considering the application for attachment, since the property sought to be attached is real property located in the State of California, the applicable law is the law of California.

It should be emphasized that the issuance of a writ of attachment in this case in no way threatens the jurisdiction of any state. The territorial jurisdiction of this Court is national in scope. Furthermore, the equitable power of the court to attach property for the purpose of securing a judgment is coextensive with the equitable power of a district court. See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 61 (1980); U.S.C.I.T. Rule 64; Fed.R.Civ.P. 64. Moreover, a writ of attachment will issue only in conformance with state law. U.S.C. I.T. Rule 64; Fed.R.Civ.P. 64.

It is well to note that, although the “offices” of this Court are located in the State of New York, trials and other proceedings may be held at “any place within the jurisdiction of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 256 (1982). See U.S.C.I.T. Rule 77(c)(2). See generally Re, Litigation Before the Court of International Trade, 19 U.S.C.A. vii, x (Supp.1984). It is also noteworthy that the effective reach of the court’s process extends throughout the entire United States. See U.S.C.I.T. Rule 4. Consequently, if deemed necessary and appropriate, the proceedings in this action could be conducted or transferred to a United States courthouse located in California. Indeed, if the defendants, upon being served with the writ in this case, were to move to vacate the attachment, if it were deemed necessary, the chief judge of the Court could order that these proceedings be held in California. See Shannon Luminous Materials Co. v. United States, 69 Cust.Ct. 317, 318-20, C.R.D. 72-21 (1972).

The comprehensive statutory scheme which established this Court and its jurisdiction, clearly requires that the Court of International Trade resolve disputes within its subject matter jurisdiction regardless of the state in which the dispute arose. Since the Court, like its predecessor, the United States Customs Court, is a court of national jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that it may exercise its jurisdiction in cases properly before it in any of the fifty states. See 28 U.S.C. § 256 (1982); S.Rep. No. 96-466, 96 Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 15 (1979); Customs Court: Hearings on S.2624 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969) (statement of Senator Hruska).

In order to effectuate the statutory responsibilities of the Court’s nationwide subject-matter jurisdiction, Congress enacted sections 569(a), 751(f), and 1963A of Title 28 to enable this Court to be physically present “at any place within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Section 569(a) provides that the United States marshal for each district, except for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, is the mar-shall of the Court of International Trade when the Court is holding sessions in that district. 28 U.S.C. § 569(a) (Supp.1984). Section 751(f) provides that the clerk of any district in which the Court of International Trade is sitting, except the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, shall upon the request of the chief judge of this Court, and with the approval of the district court, act as the clerk of this Court “for all purposes relating to the civil action then pending before such court.” 28 U.S.C. § 751(f) (1982). Pursuant to section 1963A, a final judgment entered by the Court of International Trade may be registered in any judicial district, and shall have the same effect and be enforced in the same manner as a judgment of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1963A (1982).

Since this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1583 is exclusive, a surety seeking indemnification from the principal for breach of the terms of a consumption bond must seek redress before the Court of International Trade. If the preliminary relief sought by Safeco were not available in this Court, it is likely that it would not be available in any other, since all other courts are barred from entertaining Safeco’s claims. Id. In providing for exclusive jurisdiction over cross-claims and third-party actions on import bonds, the Congress intended to foster judicial economy, and afford the parties an effective and complete remedy. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1980). Therefore, it is clear that, with the passage of the 1980 Act, Congress provided this Court with the full legal and equitable power to grant complete relief to all parties to an action properly before it, regardless of where the action arose.

Consequently, this Court has both the exclusive jurisdiction and the necessary equitable power to issue a writ of attachment, prior to judgment, in an action to recover on a consumption bond. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1583; 1585. This equitable power is implemented by U.S.C.I.T. Rule 64, which authorizes the issuance of a writ of attachment in accordance with state law. The inability or refusal to issue a writ could render any judgment obtained by Safeco in this Court ineffective and a nullity. Such an anomalous result would frustrate Congress’ firmly expressed intent to afford all parties to an import transaction access to a tribunal that could grant an appropriate remedy and do complete justice.

The case of United States v. Gold Mountain Coffee, Ltd., 8 CIT-, 597 F.Supp. 510 (1984) is not authority contrary to the court’s holding in this case. In that case, the plaintiff, the United States, had seized certain coffee beans imported and stored in California, pursuant to a warrant of arrest under 28 U.S.C. § 2461(b) (1982), purportedly in furtherance of 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1982) and 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1982). On the defendant’s motion, the court quashed the warrant, and held that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 545, and that the judicially ordered forfeiture of the merchandise was not warranted under 19 U.S.C. § 1592. Gold Mountain Coffee, Ltd., supra, -, 597 F.Supp. at 515, 516. Section 1592(c)(5), the court concluded, contains specific statutory standards for the forfeiture of property by the government under section 1592, which were not satisfied in that case. Nevertheless, the court specifically noted the availability of other pre-judgment remedies under Rule 64. Id. at-n. 11, 597 F.Supp. at 516. In contrast, Safeco’s claims, in this application, pursuant to section 1583, are based upon contract, for which traditional legal and equitable remedies are available.

The Issuance of a Writ of Attachment Under California Law

As discussed previously, since the property sought to be attached in this action is real property located in the State of California, California law governs Safeco’s right to an attachment. U.S.C.I.T. Rule 64.

Under California law, the provisional remedy of prejudgment attachment is statutory, and is designed to ensure the collect-ability of a judgment by limiting the defendant’s control of his assets until plaintiff obtains judgment. Pursuant to Section 483.010 of the California Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.), a writ of attachment may be issued:

[0]nly in an action on a claim ór claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500) exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.

C.C.P. § 483.010(a). Under the prior version of C.C.P. § 483.010, it has been held that an attachment could properly issue in an action brought by a surety against its indemnitors. See General Insurance, Co. of America v. Howard Hampton, Inc., 185 Cal.App.2d 426, 8 Cal.Rptr. 353 (1960).

Clearly, since Safeco’s claim against the Mizrahies is based upon a contract of indemnity, seeks money only, and is in an amount that exceeds five hundred dollars, Safeco’s application meets the requirements of C.C.P. § 483.010(a).

Under the present California statute, no right to attach order or writ of attachment may be obtained ex parte “unless it appears from the facts shown by affidavit that great or irreparable injury would result ... if issuance of the order were delayed until the matter could be heard on notice.” C.C.P. § 485.010(a). This statutory language was the result of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Randone v. Appellate Dept, of Sup. Ct. of Sacramento County, 5 Cal.3d 536, 96 Cal.Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924, 92 S.Ct. 2452, 32 L.Ed.2d 811 (1972), in which California’s prior attachment statute was declared unconstitutional.

In Randone, a collection agency, without notice, attached the checking account of the petitioners. The collection agency was the assignee of a law firm, to which the petitioners owed $490 for services rendered, plus $130 in accumulated interest. The California Supreme Court found that the statute, permitting attachment of any property of a debtor, including necessities of life, without prior hearing or notice, violated the constitutional guarantee of due process. The court held that notice could be dispensed with only in “extraordinary circumstances,” otherwise the statute would be unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 563, 96 Cal.Rptr. at 728, 488 P.2d at 32.

The Randone court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969), which voided a Wisconsin prejudgment wage garnishment statute, and held that the statute, since it sanctioned the taking of property without prior notice, violated procedural due process. The California Supreme Court found that Sniadach “returned the entire domain of prejudgement remedies to the long standing procedural due process principle which dictates that, except in extraordinary circumstances, an individual may not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without notice and hearing.” 5 Cal.3d at 547, 96 Cal.Rptr. at 715, 488 P.2d at 19 (emphasis added). Thus, since the California statute in Ran-done was not sufficiently limited, it was held to be invalid.

The Randone court also noted that Sniadach referred to only three circumstances that would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of “extraordinary circumstances.” These circumstances were stated to be (1) summary procedures permitting specialized governmental officers to react to financial difficulties at a particular bank by seizing operational control of its assets; (2) summary seizure of misbranded drugs; and (3) prejudgment attachment of property of a non-resident by a resident creditor. 5 Cal.3d at 553-54, 96 Cal.Rptr. 720-21, 488 P.2d at 24-25; see Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870, 94 L.Ed. 1088 (1950); Fahey v. Malonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed. 2030 (1947); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 48 S.Ct. 422, 72 L.Ed. 768 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921). The Randone court further stated that a constitutionally valid statute could be drafted “to permit attachment before notice in exceptional cases where, for example, the creditor can additionally demonstrate ... that an actual risk has arisen that assets will be concealed or that the debtor will abscond.” Id., 5 Cal.3d at 563, 96 Cal.Rptr. at 727, 488 P.2d at 31 (citations omitted); see also People v. Allstate Leasing Corp., 24 Cal.App.3d 973, 101 Cal.Rptr. 470 (1972).

As a result, and in response to the Ran-done decision, section 485.010(b) now provides that the requirement of showing great or irreparable injury is satisfied only if it is established that:

(1) Under the circumstances of the case, it may be inferred that there is a danger that the property sought to be attached would be concealed, substantially impaired in value, or otherwise made unavailable to levy if issuance of the order were delayed until the matter could be heard on notice.

C.C.P. § 485.010(b)(1).

In Johnson v. Alexander, 63 Cal.App.3d 806, 134 Cal.Rptr. 101 (1976), the Second District Court of Appeal reviewed C.C.P. § 585.5, the predecessor of section 485.010, and found that the grounds on which an original pre-notice attachment had been based remained valid, and affirmed a lower court decision denying dissolution of the attachment. The court also noted that there remained “a substantial danger that the defendants would transfer, other than in the ordinary course of business, remove or conceal the property sought to be attached.” Id. at 814, 134 Cal.Rep. at 106.

Hence, a court must examine the application for a right to attach order and supporting affidavit to determine whether it complies with the following requirements of section 485.220(a):

[A] right to attach order, which shall state the amount to be secured by the attachment, and order a writ of attachment to be issued upon the filing of an undertaking ..., if it finds all of the following:
(1) The claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued.
(2) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based.
(3) The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery upon the claim upon which the attachment is based.
(4) The affidavit accompanying the application shows that the property sought to be attached, or the portion thereof to be specified in the writ, is not exempt from attachment.
(5) The plaintiff will suffer great or irreparable injury (within the meaning of Section 485.010) if issuance of the order is delayed until the matter can be heard on notice.

Id.

In this case, Safeco moved ex parte for a right to attach order, and alleged in its application and supporting papers that there was a danger that the property sought to be attached “would be concealed, impaired in value or made unavailable to levy if issuance of the order were delayed until the matter could be heard on notice.”

In support of Safeco’s allegation of irreparable injury, the court was furnished with several documents which indicated a potential for “great or irreparable injury” to Safeco. The first document was Saul and Rebecca Mizrahies’ statement of financial condition as of July 11, 1977, given to Safe-co by the Mizrahies in connection with the issuance of the bonds and indemnity contract at issue. This statement reflects a net worth exceeding three million dollars ($3,000,000), and includes a list of real and other property held by the Mizrahies at that time. Since the dates of the assessments for which the United States brought suit, the Mizrahies have transferred or liquidated their interest in all the property listed in their statement except for the real property located at 6130 Warner Drive, Los Angeles, California. A copy of an Individual Quitclaim Deed from the Los Angeles County Recorder's office reveals that on January 13,1981, subsequent to the assessment of the liquidated damage penalties underlying this action, Saul Mizrahie transferred record ownership of that property to his wife, Rebecca. It is alleged by Safeco that Rebecca Mizrahie is still record owner of that property, and that it is apparently the Mizrahies’ present residence.

The court was also furnished with a copy of an indictment dated January 23, 1985 in “U.S. v. Saul Mizrahie,” Criminal Case No. 8500586, currently pending in the United States District Court, Southern District of California. The indictment charges Saul Mizrahie with three counts of concealing merchandise imported contrary to law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1982). The merchandise, which is the basis of the indictment, is unrelated to the subject matter of this action. Safeco also states that Saul Mizrahie has petitioned the district court for permission to proceed in forma pauperis in that criminal action, and that he claims to have no assets.

In light of these overwhelming indications of the Mizrahies’ severe financial and legal distress, and their failure to answer Safeco’s cross and third-party claims, there is a substantial likelihood that Rebecca Mizrahie would transfer their last significant remaining asset, the Los Angeles house. A grand jury has found sufficient evidence to indict Saul Mizrahie for knowingly and willfully concealing merchandise that he knew was imported contrary to law. All other assets of the Mizrahies have disappeared. If title to the Los Angeles house is transferred, Safeco will suffer “irreparable injury” in that it will be unable to collect a judgment against the Mizrahies. In view of the foregoing, it is the determination of the Court that the statutory requirements of section 485.010, as well as the constitutional requirement of “extraordinary circumstances” for issuance of the writ, have been met. See Johnson v. Alexander, 63 Cal.App.3d 806, 814, 134 Cal. Rptr. 101, 106 (1976); Randone v. Appellate Dept. of Sup. Ct. of Sacramento, 5 Cal.3d 536, 96 Cal.Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924, 92 S.Ct. 2452, 32 L.Ed.2d 811 (1972).

As for the validity of Safeco’s claim, the Mizrahies have defaulted on Safeco’s cross and third-party claims. Assuming, therefore, that the government succeeds on the merits, it appears likely that Safeco will be found liable to the government on the consumption bonds. Under California law a written agreement of indemnity is fully enforceable, and may entitle the indemnitor to costs and attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting the indemnification claim. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 719 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.1983); Schackman v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 Cal.App.2d 857, 863, 63 Cal.Rptr. 607 (1967). Since the indemnity agreement in this case was executed in California, and is governed by California law, the Court in issuing the writ determined that Safeco’s probability of success on the merits was considerable.

It should be noted that the effect of the writ issued against the Mizrahies’ Los Angeles property is only to prevent its transfer prior to judgment, and does not affect their right to possession. In addition, in accordance with the provisions of C.C.P. §§ 489.210 and 489.230, Safeco posted an undertaking in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) to secure payment of any judgment the Mizrahies might recover for the wrongful attachment of their property by Safeco.

Thus, the Court determined that the requirements mandated by California law for the issuance of an ex parte writ of attachment were met by Safeco’s application in that:

1. Safeco’s claim upon which the attachment is based is for money only and more than five hundred dollars;
2. Safeco established the probable validity of its claim;
3. Safeco’s attachment was not sought for a purpose other than securing Safeco’s recovery on its claims;
4. Safeco’s affidavit showed that the property sought to be attached was not exempt from attachment under C.C.P. § 487.020, and is subject to attachment under C.C.P. § 487.010; and
5. Safeco showed that it would have suffered great or irreparable injury, within the meaning of C.C.P. § 485.010, if issuance of the order was delayed until the matter could have been heard on notice.

In view of the foregoing, the Court on March 8, 1985, granted Safeco’s application for an ex parte right to attach order, and directed the Clerk of this Court to issue a writ of attachment affecting the property located at 6130 Warner Drive, Los Angeles, California.

      . Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 12.80(e), vehicles that do not conform to federal motor vehicle safety standards may not be released unless a surety bond, equal to the value of the vehicle plus estimated duties and taxes, is posted with the Customs Service. The release of the bond is conditioned upon obtaining a statement from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, stating that the vehicle has been brought into conformity with all applicable safety standards. Id. If the statement is not obtained and the vehicle not redelivered, liquidated damages in the amount of the bond shall be assessed. Id. See also 19 C.F.R. § 113.14.

      . Since defendants Saul Mizrahie and Safeco requested and were granted an extension of time until March 21, 1985, to respond to the United States’ motions for summary judgment, the motions for summary judgment are still pending.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re ASBESTOS SCHOOL PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.
    No. 624.
    Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
    April 10, 1985.
    Before ANDREW A. CAFFREY, Chairman, ROBERT H. SCHNACKE, FRED DAUGHERTY, SAM C. POINTER, Jr.,* S. HUGH DILLIN, MILTON POLLACK, and LOUIS H. POLLAK, Judges of the Panel.

       Judge Milton Pollack recused himself and took no part in the decision of this matter. In addition, Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr. took no part in the decision of this matter.

   ORDER DENYING TRANSFER

PER CURIAM.

Presently before the Panel is a motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, filed by three defendants in actions in this docket, to centralize in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings the twenty actions listed on the following Schedule A.

On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing held, we find that Section 1407 transfer would neither serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses nor further the just and efficient conduct of the litigation. Although we recognize that the actions in this litigation involve some common questions of fact, we are not persuaded that these common questions of fact will predominate over individual questions of fact present in each action. Moreover, we note that the common questions of fact involved in these actions have been extensively litigated for the past ten years in connection with thousands of personal injury actions arising from alleged asbestos exposure. We further note that 1) one action included in the Section 1407 motion has already been tried, and several other actions have been scheduled for trial within the next six months; and 2) the great majority of parties responding to the Section 1407 motion opposes centralization. The Panel concludes that centralization of these actions is inappropriate for many of the reasons expressed by the Panel in its previous rulings denying transfer of asbestos-related actions. See In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material Products Liability Litigation, 431 F.Supp. 906 (J.P.M. L.1977); In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. II), MDL-416 (J.P.M.L., March 13, 1980) (unpublished order).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion for transfer, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

SCHEDULE A

Northern District of Alabama

Franklin County School Board, et al. v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., et al., C.A. No. CV84-HM-5435NW

District of Colorado

Adams-Arapahoe School District 28-J v. Celotex Corp., et al., C.A. No. 84-1974

Southern District of Florida

Greater Miami Hebrew Academy v. United States Gypsum Co., C.A. No. 84-0202-CIV-EPS

Western District of Kentucky

McCracken County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co., C.A. No. C83-0317P(J)

Southern District of Mississippi

Board of Trustees, Gulfport Municipal Separate School District v. National Gypsum Co., C.A. No. S-83-0943

District of New Hampshire

City of Manchester v. National Gypsum Co., et al, C.A. No. 83-143-L

Town of Hooksett School District v. W.R. Grace and Co., C.A. No. C-83-761-L

District of South Carolina

Spartanburg County School District Seven v. National Gypsum Co., et al., C.A. No. 83-1744-14

Eastern District of Tennessee

The City of Greenville, Tennessee v. National Gypsum Co., et al, C.A. No. 2-83-294

Sherry Wolfe, et al. v. United States Gypsum Co., et al, C.A. No. 2-83-329

County of Johnson, Tennessee, etc. v. United States Gypsum Co., et al., C.A. No. 2-83-262

Middle District of Tennessee

Clarksville-Montgomery County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co., et al, C.A. No. 3-84-0315

Rutherford County Board of Education v. W.R. Grace and Co., C.A. No. 3-83-0582

Western District of Tennessee

Shelby County, Tennessee, et al. v. W.R. Grace and Co., et al., C.A. No. 84-2093 G.B.

Eastern District of Texas

Dayton Independent School District v. United States Gypsum Co., et al., C.A. No. B-81-277

Evadale Independent School District v. United States Gypsum Co., et al., C.A. No. B-81-293

Western District of Virginia

County School Board of Amelia County Virginia, et al. v. United States Gypsum Co., et al., C.A. No. 84-0022C

Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Barnwell School District No. 45 v. United States Gypsum Co., et al., C.A. No. 83-1395

Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, et al. v. United States Gypsum Co., et al., C.A. No. 84-2312

School District of Lancaster, et al. v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., et al., C.A. No. 83-0268

      . The Section 1407 motion included one additional action — County of Anderson, etc. v. United States Gypsum Co., et al., E.D.Tennessee, C.A. No. CIV-3-83-511 — that was tried in March, 1985, resulting in a jury verdict for defendants and a subsequent order dismissing the action. Accordingly, the question of transfer of this action under Section 1407 is moot.


text:
    In re RICHARDSON-MERRELL, INC. “BENDECTIN” PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION (NO. II).
    No. 486.
    Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
    April 11, 1985.
    See also, D.C., 588 P.Supp. 1448, 6th Cir., 727 F.2d 608.

      Before ANDREW A. CAFFREY, Chairman, and ROBERT H. SCHNACKE, FRED DAUGHERTY, SAM C. POINTER, Jr.,* S. HUGH DILLIN, MILTON POLLACK,* and LOUIS H. POLLAK, Judges of the Panel.

       Judges Andrew A. Caffrey and Milton Pollack recused themselves and took no part in the decision of this matter. In addition, Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr. took no part in the decision of this matter.

   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Presently before the Panel are motions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) and Rule ll(c)(i), R.P.J.P.M.L., 89 F.R.D. 273, 280 (1981), by plaintiffs in the 83 actions listed on the following Schedule A and in the six actions listed on the following Schedule B, to remand those actions from the Southern District of Ohio to their respective transfer- or courts. Defendant Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Merrell) initially opposed the motions, but counsel for Merrell stated at oral argument in this matter that Merrell no longer opposes remand, although Merrell takes the position that Judge Carl B. Rubin, the transferee judge in this litigation, should make certain rulings prior to remand.

On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing held, the Panel finds that remand of the 83 actions on Schedule A is appropriate at this time. Plaintiffs in these 83 actions did not elect to opt into the consolidated causation trial conducted in the Southern District of Ohio by Judge Rubin. On March 12, 1985, the jury in the consolidated causation trial returned a verdict in favor of Merrell. In the wake of the verdict, Judge Rubin has now advised the Panel that he believes that he has completed his task under Section 1407 as transferee judge in this litigation. He has therefore suggested that remand is now appropriate for all actions transferred under Section 1407 in which plaintiffs did not elect to opt into the consolidated causation trial. In conjunction with Judge Rubin’s suggestion, the transferee court has provided the Panel with a list of 305 actions (including the 83 actions on Schedule A) that meet the above-stated criteria for remand. In considering remand of actions, the Panel is greatly influenced by the transferee judge’s suggestion that remand is appropriate. In re Evergreen Valley Project Litigation, 435 F.Supp. 923, 924 (J.P.M.L.1977). We adopt Judge Rubin’s suggestion and order remand of these 83 actions.

The six actions on Schedule B do not appear on the transferee court’s list of actions that meet the criteria for remand. Accordingly, in the absence of a suggestion of remand directed to any of these six actions, remand of those actions is not appropriate at this time.

Also before the Panel are motions, pursuant to Rule 9, supra, 89 F.R.D. at 278-79, brought by plaintiffs in the six actions listed on the following Schedule C, to vacate the conditional transfer orders entered by the Panel in those six actions.

On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing held, the Panel finds that transfer of these actions at this time would not serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses or promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation. Although we recognize that these actions share questions of fact with actions previously transferred in this litigation, we are not persuaded that transfer under Section 1407 remains appropriate for newly filed actions in this docket, in light of Judge Rubin’s view that he has completed his task as transferee judge and that all pending Bendectin actions not included in the consolidated causation trial should now proceed in their courts of origin rather than in the transferee court.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the 83 actions listed on the following Schedule A be, and the same hereby are, REMANDED from the Southern District of Ohio to their respective transferor courts.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that remand of the six actions listed on the following Schedule B be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Panel’s orders conditionally transferring the six actions listed on the following Schedule C be, and the same hereby are, VACATED.

SCHEDULE A

Southern District of Ohio

Daniel D. Doe, et al. v. Merrell-National Laboratories, C.A. No. 82-234 (E.D.Mich., 80-72902)

LaVerne M. Burzynski, et al. v. Merrell-National Laboratories, C.A. No. 82-237 (E.D.Mich., 81-10021)

Brian Wolfe v. Merrell-National Laboratories, C.A. No. 82-238 (E.D.Mich., 81-70192)

Richard O. Schaum, et al. v. Merrell-National Laboratories, C.A. No. 82-493 (E.D.Mich., 82-70354)

Christie Lee Tattersall, et al. v. Merrell-National Laboratories, C.A. No. 82-530 (E.D.Mich., 83-71125)

Jeffrey Oatten, et al. v. Merrell-National Laboratories, C.A. No. 82-632 (E.D.Mich., 82-10142)

Roger Slone, etc. v. Merrell-National Laboratories, C.A. No. 82-695 (E.D.Mich., 82-71840)

Alan W. Tackaberry, et al. v. Merrell-National Laboratories, C.A. No. 82-863 (E.D.Mich., 82-30058)

John Aulgur, et al. v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 82-1315 (E.D.Mich., 82-73583)

Riola J. Billops, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 83-208 (E.D.Mich., 82-74570)

Lynn Marie Trombley, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 83-615 (E.D.Mich., 83-0652)

Cathy Jean Snyder, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 83-1088 (E.D.Mich., 83-CV-7140)

Belinda Janes, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 83-1329 (E.D.Mich., 83-CV-2376DT)

Dawn M. Schultz, etc. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 83-1909 (W.D.Mich., G83-1075CA6)

Pamela Timlick v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0146 (E.D.Mich., 83-CV-5109DT)

Penny Breed, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0152 (E.D.Mich., 83-CV-8673FL)

Deborah McFarlin, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0155 (E.D.Mich., 83-CV-5405DT)

Bessie James, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0156 (E.D.Mich., 83-CV-5503DT)

Marion Meade, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0157 (E.D.Mich., 83-CV-7424BC)

Cheryl Siman, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0158 (E.D.Mich., 83-CV-5406DT)

Barberine Ruth, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0223 (E.D.Mich., 83-CV-6502AA)

Gary B. Perkins, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0377 (E.D.Mich., 84-CV-0301DT)

Paul Karr, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-583 (E.D.Mich., 84-CV-0676DT)

Debra Ann Karbousky, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1243 (E.D.Mich., 84-CV-1183DT)

Shirley Barker, etc. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1254 (C.D.Ill., 84-3163)

Lori C. Malak, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1382 (E.D.Mich., 84-CV-2179DT)

Roland K. Johnson, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1659 (E.D.La., 84-2044-M(2))

Randy Accardo, et al. ¶. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1658 (E.D.La., 84-2045-K(2))

Kathy Bordick, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1657 (W.D.Pa., CA84-183-ERIE)

Mary L. Newton, Sr., et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1656 (W.D.Pa., CA84-1522)

Lawrence Longmore, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 84-1655 (D. Idaho, CIV-84-4071)

Veronica Taylor, etc. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1650 (D.D.C., 84-1168)

Edward C. Kelley, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1647 (D.Md., R84-1229)

David Will, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1648 (S.D.Ga., CV-484-118)

Ronnie Lee, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1649 (W.D.Tenn., 84-2228GB)

George R. Hoffman, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1646 (D.Md., R-84-1159)

Randal P. Guidry, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1645 (W.D.La., 84-1122 Sec. L)

Timothy J. Comeau, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1661 (D.Mass., 84-963-N)

Thomas S. Girardi, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1660 (D.Mass., 84-962-N)

Sekou Ealy, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1102 (D.D.C., 83- 3504)

Stephanie Ann Johnson, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1101 (D.Md., B83-3814)

Donald Raynor, Jr., et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1103 (D.D.C., 83-3506)

Jennifer Branda, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 82-251 (E.D. Pa., 81-2605)

Tatanisha Carolina, etc. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 82-707 (D.N.J., 82-105)

Dennis J. Cogan, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 82-255 (E.D.Pa., 81-2538)

Nikki Lyn Curcio, etc. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 85-0355 (E.D.Pa., 84-1414)

Ryan Hayes, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 82-254 (E.D.Pa., 81- 3772)

Mitchell Heskel v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1105 (E.D.Pa., 83-5366)

Joseph Keller, etc. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1652 (E.D.Pa., 84- 1662)

Anthony Lanzilotti, et al. v. Merrell-National Laboratories, Inc., C.A. No. 82- 460 (E.D.Pa., 82-0183)

Genevieve Lodise v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 82-633 (E.D.Pa., 82-1730)

Carita Richardson, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1104 (D.D.C., 83-3505)

Donald R. Hagen, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1380 (N.D.Ill., 84-C-2628)

Gary Turpin, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1249 (E.D.Kentucky, 84-105)

John Guiso, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-525 (D.Minn., 3-84-127)

Lori Mangels, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 83-1939 (D.Md., R-83-3272)

Linda W. Porter, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0442 (E.D.La., 84-638)

Debra A. Arbrough v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0365 (E.D.La., 84-146)

Janice Swearingen v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0444 (S.D.Miss., G84-0051W)

Jonathan Minima v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1654 (E.D.Pa., 84-2103)

David M. Orcutt v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1651 (E.D.Pa., 84-1022)

Jeremy Joseph Ortolona v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 85-0354 (E.D.Pa., 84-2730)

Teresa Peterson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 82-378 (E.D.Pa., 81-4063)

Leonard Pospiech v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 82-1051 (E.D.Pa., 82-3626)

Michael Rantz v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 85-0356 (E.D.Pa., 84-2897)

Ryan Michael Rosen v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., C.A. No. 82-458 (E.D.Pa., 82-0513)

Cristopher J. Yarger v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1653 (E.D.Pa., 84-1289)

Megan Mahan v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 82-252 (E.D.Pa., 81-0885)

Luigi Amedeo Bommino, Jr., et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al, C.A. No. 83-1900 (C.D.Cal., 83-6216 CBM (JRx)

John Davis, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al, C.A. No. 83-1663 (C.D.Cal., 83-5139 MRP(Kx)

Linda Agner, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0140 (D.Hawaii, CA 83-0623)

Edward Bruffey, et al. v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0141 (D.Hawaii, CA 83-1083)

Linda Kim, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0143 (D.Hawaii, CA 83-1085)

Gail Levy, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0144 (D.Hawaii, 83-1086)

Stanley Sakuma, et al. v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-0142 (D.Hawaii, 83-1084)

Lynn Annette Hill, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, C.A. No. 83-493 (W.D.Wash., C83-74T)

Tawana Herring v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, C.A. No. 83-494 (D.D.C., C83-399)

Tommy Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 85-0357 (E.D.Cal., CIVS-84-1110MLS)

Cynthia Diane Pringle v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 85-0358 (E.D.Cal., CIVS-84-1223LKK)

Terrance Wood, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 82-750 (W.D.Wash., C82-665C)

Paul Ingle, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1474 (N.D.Tex., CA-4-84-361 K)

Elizabeth Ann Davis, et al. v. Merrell-National Laboratories, et al., C.A. No. 82-859 (D.Ariz., CIV82-1062-PHX-EHC)

Michelle Rose Mullett, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84-1566 (C.D.Ill., 84-3347)

SCHEDULE B

Southern District of Ohio

Brenda B. Babin, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 82-456 (E.D.La., 81-5039)

Carmen Gonzales Gomez, et al. v. Merrell National Laboratories, et al., C.A. No. 82-242 (E.D.La., 81-2022)

Jesse Nariskus v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 82-253 (E.D.Pa., 81-3575)

Duane Lamont Martineau, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 83-1522 (D.Ariz., CIV83-844-PHX-CAM

Lane D. Hallows, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 83-205 (D.Ariz., CIV82-1091-PHX-EHC)

Howard Alexander, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 83-1521 (D.Ariz., CIV831371-PHX-EHC)

SCHEDULE C

District of Colorado

Cara Marie Pleau, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 84Z2425

Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Michael O’Brien, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 84-3630 (LB)

Ronald Snowden, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-4269

Northern District of Illinois

Michelle Le Parte, et al. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 84-C-9944

Southern District of Florida

Kai C. Winding, etc. v. Merrell Dow Laboratory, C.A. No. 84-2776-Civ

Northern District of Texas

Wilfred Bourg, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., C.A. No. CA4-84-469-E

      . The remaining actions included on the transferee court's list will be processed by the Panel by means of conditional remand orders, pursuant to Rule 11(f), supra, 89 F.R.D. at 281-82.

      . In the event that the transferee court amends its list to include any of these six actions or any other actions not presently on the list, the Panel will process these actions in the manner described in note 1, id.