author: FLANNERY, District Judge.

text:
    SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 82, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT, et al., Defendants.
    Civ. A. No. 85-1031.
    United States District Court, District of Columbia.
    May 10, 1985.

      J. Lincoln Woodard, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
    Robert J. Harlan, Chief, Litigation Section, Community Development Div., Office of the Corporation Counsel, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
    Michael R. McAdoo, King and Nordlinger, Washington, D.C., amicus curiae, for Apartment and Office Building Ass’n.
   MEMORANDUM OPINION

FLANNERY, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs challenge to the constitutionality of certain regulations enacted by defendants to restrict the operations of street vendors in the District of Columbia. A motion for leave to file a brief amicus curiae in support of defendants has also been filed by four business groups. Plaintiff, a labor union which represents approximately 5,000 workers, including sidewalk vendors, in Washington, D.C., challenges the regulations on the grounds that they impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, and deprive members of their rights to equal protection and due process secured by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. The regulations are scheduled to go into effect on May 14, 1985.

I. Background

Plaintiff challenges ten regulations. They are: 24 D.C.M.R. § 502.11, which bars operation in a zone not designated on the vendor’s license; § 508.1, which mandates that records of sales and receipts of purchases and expenses be made available for inspection by “any authorized representative of the District of Columbia Government”; § 508.3, which penalizes failure to make such records available by allowing “immediate seizure, without notice, of the vendor’s license”; §§ 510.3 and 510.4, which restrict sidewalk vending to sidewalks which are at least eighteen feet wide and provide criteria for measuring sidewalks; § 511.1, which bars operation before 5 a.m. and after 10 p.m. Sunday through Thursday or after 1 a.m. on Saturday and Sunday mornings, and which also bans overnight storage of equipment or merchandise; § 512.2, which requires compliance with design standards for sidewalk carts; § 515.18(g), which restricts the types of merchandise which may be sold by street vendors; and §§ 524.1 and 524.2, which require payment of a bond in the amount of $500 for D.C. residents and $1,500 for nonresidents.

Plaintiff’s commerce clause challenge is directed to six of the regulations: §§ 502.-11, 511.1, 512.2, 515.18(g), 524.1, and 524.2. Sections 508.1, 510.3, and 510.4 are challenged as vague and ambiguous in violation of the due process clause. Plaintiff contends that §§ 502.11, 511.1, 512.2, 515.-18(g), 524.1, and 524.2 deprive its members of equal protection and due process of law. Finally, plaintiff argues that § 508.3 deprives its members of due process by allowing seizure of licenses without a pretermination hearing.

II. Discussion

A. Commerce Clause

1. Sections 502.11, 511.1, 512.2, and 515.18(g)

Plaintiff argues that the regulations barring operation outside the zone designated on the vendor’s license (§ 502.11), restricting hours of operation and overnight storage (§ 511.1), requiring compliance with design standards (§ 512.2), and limiting the types of merchandise street vendors may sell (§ 515.18(g)) violate the commerce clause because they inhibit the ability of street vendors to generate income, stifle competition between street vendors and “storefront vendors,” and discourage free trade among the states by reducing the amount of merchandise purchased by plaintiff’s members for resale in the District of Columbia. It appears, however, that plaintiff has misconstrued the role of the commerce clause in constitutional adjudication and ignored a number of long-standing precedents.

First, plaintiff has made no showing whatever of the burden, if any, imposed by these regulations on interstate commerce. Cases in which local regulations or state laws have been struck down as violative of the commerce clause typically involve protectionist measures designed to insulate local industries against competition from outside the state, or discriminate against out-of-state dealers by, for example, refusing to license them for in-state operations. See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, La., 341 U.S. 622, 636-37, 71 S.Ct. 920, 929-30, 95 L.Ed. 1233 (1951); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55, 71 S.Ct. 295, 297-98, 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951); Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-40, 69 S.Ct. 657, 664-66, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949); Electrolert Corp. v. Barry, 737 F.2d 110, 112-13 (D.C.Cir.1984). Here, in contrast, plaintiff has made no showing that these regulations will have any effect on out-of-state vendors different in any way from the effect on local vendors. “[Rjegulation that leaves out-of-state sellers on the same basis as local sellers cannot be invalid” so long as interstate commerce is neither prohibited nor discriminated against. See Breard, 341 U.S. at 638, 71 S.Ct. at 930; see also Electrolert Corp., 737 F.2d at 113 (ban on sale or possession of radar detectors held not to violate commerce clause because neither overtly protectionist nor favoring instate commerce); Commonwealth v. Gulden, 369 Mass. 965, 341 N.E.2d 262, 263 (1976) (city ordinance barring sales by “hawkers or peddlers” of any goods or merchandise within 500 feet of any city playground between 9 a.m. and 9 p.m. to protect children in or near city playgrounds did not violate commerce clause).

Even if plaintiff could show that nonresident vendors bore the brunt of the burden of these regulations, plaintiff’s challenge would have to be rejected. Breard is almost directly on point. There, the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance banning door-to-door solicitation against a challenge by a representative of an out-of-state corporation which was in the business of going from city to city soliciting magazine subscriptions. 341 U.S. at 624, 71 S.Ct. at 923. Despite the effect on interstate solicitors like plaintiff, the Court rejected the challenge, holding that “the usual methods of seeking business are left open by the ordinance. That such methods do not produce as much business as house-to-house canvassing is, constitutionally, immaterial and a matter for adjustment at the local level in the absence of federal legislation.” 341 U.S. at 638, 71 S.Ct. at 930.

With the exception of section 524, which sets the amount of bond, these regulations, on their face, are obviously not overtly protectionist of any in-state group vis a vis any out-of-state group. Plaintiff has made no showing whatever that these regulations will fall more heavily on nonresident street vendors than resident vendors, and has submitted no evidence that any discriminatory intent underlies the regulations in this regard. To the extent that they are protectionist of store front vendors vis a vis street vendors, however, the commerce clause is simply irrelevant to plaintiffs challenge. See Electrolert Corp., 737 F.2d at 113.

2. Sections 524-1 and 524-2

Plaintiff’s commerce clause challenge to the bonding requirements under sections 524.1 and 524.2 is, however, more substantial. Under section 524, nonresident vendors are required to post a bond $1,000 higher than the $500 bond required of resident vendors. Defendants contended in their briefs and at oral argument that the sole purpose of the bond requirement is to ensure the payment of sales taxes by street vendors. The distinction between the bond paid by resident and nonresident vendors, they contend, is justified by the District’s inability to distrain the goods of nonresident vendors in the event that they fail to pay or underpay the sales taxes on merchandise they sell in the District, and thus is justified solely as a means of ensuring collection and payment of the District’s sales taxes. Although amici point out that the distinction between resident and nonresident vendors disappears for any vendor who establishes a “track record” of dependability under §§ 524.6 and 524.8, counsel for defendant stated at oral argument that under section 524.8 it would take a minimum of five years to establish such a “track record.” In addition, the initial requirement of posting the extra $1,000 bond could well prevent many nonresident street vendors from ever obtaining a license in the first instance, precluding them from ever establishing such a “track record.”

Plaintiff has cited one case in which a bond required only of nonresident solicitors was struck down as violative of the commerce clause. In Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 154 A.2d 9 (N.J.1959), the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance which required a $1,000 bond “to be furnished only by non-residents of the borough or residents representing a firm whose principal place of business is located outside the State.” 154 A.2d at 14. Although the court conceded that the bond was “obviously designed to assure a source of financial redress to the purchaser in case of fraud” by a nonresident solicitor, it concluded that

the sum fixed bears no rational relation to the amount of business done, and is required of every single solicitor, even where, as here, several are employed by the same company____ [T]he bond requirement ... is unduly oppressive and so unreasonable as to the local police power____ Furthermore, the provision exempts borough residents unless they represent a firm whose principal place of business is outside the state. Extension of the requirement to residents soliciting for out-of-state businesses points to discrimination against those engaged in business across state lines.

154 A.2d at 20. The court further noted that the “cumulative effect” that such ordinances would have on nonresident solicitors in the event that they were enacted by many New Jersey communities provided an “added reason” to hold the provisions unconstitutional. 154 A.2d at 21.

There is the possibility, of course, that Moyant could be distinguished from the case at bar on several grounds. First, a bond of $1,500 may bear some relation to the amount of business done by a street vendor over a given period. Vendors who are District residents might be allowed to put up a smaller bond based on the city’s determination that the remedies available to it against residents for nonpayment of sales taxes render a bond of greater than $500 unnecessary. Additionally, because street vendors probably do not operate in more than one jurisdiction like magazine solicitors are likely to do, there is arguably little danger of any “cumulative effect” of such a bond requirement.

The District has not, however, either attempted to distinguish Moyant or, more importantly, offered any evidence that the treble bond for nonresidents is justified for purposes of sales tax collection. Although the city may need to establish only a “rational relation” between a higher bond and the District’s problems with enforcing the sales tax requirements against nonresident vendors to survive an equal protection challenge to section 524, it is equally well-established that an ordinance which discriminates on its face on the basis of residency must more nearly “fit” the purposes for which it was enacted when challenged as a violation of the commerce clause or the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, particularly when the challenged regulation interferes with the nonresident’s livelihood. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524, 98 S.Ct. 2482, 2487, 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 383, 387, 98 S.Ct. 1852, 1860, 1862, 56 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 1162, 92 L.Ed. 1460 (1948). When a local regulation overtly discriminates against an out-of-state business interest, the burden falls on the state to justify the discrimination “both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.” See Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 353, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2446, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); Dean Milk v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354, 71 S.Ct. 295, 297-98, 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951). Although neither the commerce clause nor the privileges and immunities clause precludes disparity of treatment when there are valid, independent reasons for it, see, e.g., Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396, 68 S.Ct. 1162, the Constitution mandates that the court examine closely statutes or regulations which practice overt discrimination against citizens of other states. The “fit” required of such provisions must be measured both in terms of their under- or over-inclusiveness and by the presence or absence of any nondiscriminatory alternatives open to the District. See Hunt, supra.

In this case, the court holds that defendants have failed to carry their burden of justifying section 524’s discrimination against nonresident vendors. This conclusion is unavoidable for several reasons. First, defendants have submitted no evidence whatsoever of the relation of the size of the bond to the amount at stake in the event that a nonresident vendor fails to pay the sales taxes due the District. At a sales tax rate of six percent, a vendor would have to sell $25,000 worth of goods before he would generate $1,500 in sales taxes. Assuming that, as plaintiff submits, sidewalk vendors are required to file a monthly sales tax return and to pay sales taxes on a monthly basis, it seems unlikely that very many vendors — if any — would generate sales sufficient to collect $1,500 in sales taxes without the District becoming aware of their noncompliance with the District’s tax laws.

But more importantly, it appears that the District’s interest in sales tax collection is already more than adequately protected by another provision of the new regulations. Under § 503.5, nonresident vendors may not obtain a certificate of registration, which is required before an applicant may obtain a vendor’s license under § 503.4, until they have filed a bond “in an amount not exceeding double the amount of the applicant’s estimated annual sales and use tax liability for a period not exceeding one (1) year.” Counsel for defendants conceded at oral argument that nonresident vendors would be subject to both the “double annual sales tax” bond required under § 503.5, and the treble bond required under § 524.2(b). Assuming that a typical vendor generates $1,500 in sales taxes per year (an amount which could arguably justify the $1,500 bond required of nonresidents under § 524), a nonresident vendor could be required to file a bond of up to $4,500 per year under sections 503.6 and 524, compared to a bond of no more than $600 required of District residents under those same regulations.

The inability of the District to relate the amount of the bond to the amount of sales tax “at risk,” as well as the disparity between resident and nonresident vendors, compels a holding that the challenged provision-section 524.2(b) — violates the commerce clause. While some distinction in the bonds required of resident and nonresident vendors might well be justified, a generalized interest in tax collection alone cannot justify so unreasonable a burden upon nonresidents, at least without evidence of record that the burden bears some proximate relation to the taxes at stake. As the Court held in Toomer,

[T]he importance of having commerce between the [fifty] States flow unimpeded by local barriers persuades us that State restrictions inimical to the commerce clause should not be approved simply because they facilitate in some measure enforcement of a valid tax.

334 U.S. at 406, 68 S.Ct. at 1167. As in Toomer, the court

would be closing [its] eyes to reality ... if [it] concluded that there was a reasonable relationship between the danger represented by non-citizens, as a class, and the severe discrimination practiced upon them.

334 U.S. at 399, 68 S.Ct. at 1163-64.

B. Equal Protection and Due Process

1. Sections 502.11, 511.1, and 512.2

As with most of plaintiffs challenges under the commerce clause, the bulk of its equal protection and due process challenges suffer from either a doctrinal misunderstanding of the nature of the constitutional claims or an overwhelming weight of contrary precedent. As a preliminary matter, it does not appear that street vendors and store front vendors are “similarly situated” for purposes of equal protection analysis. For example, plaintiff challenges § 502.11, which bars vendors from operating outside the zone designated on their licenses, as a violation of equal protection on the ground that it restricts street vendors but not store front vendors. As a practical matter, it is obvious that street vendors and shopkeepers cannot be deemed “similarly situated” for purposes of this regulation, since store front vendors lack the mobility enjoyed by street vendors, and thus could not move freely from zone to zone — or even from door-to-door — even if they considered such moves advantageous. But more importantly, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the regulations’ discrimination between street vendors and store front vendors involves either a suspect classification or a fundamental right. Absent invidious discrimination between groups based upon a suspect classification, such as race or religion, or involving a fundamental right, such as the right to vote or freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has made it clear that this court must uphold a statute challenged under equal protection or due process so long as the challenged classification bears some “rational relationship” to a legitimate state end. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 808-09, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1408, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464-65, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525, 54 S.Ct. 505, 510-11, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934); see also Stone v. District of Columbia, 572 F.Supp. 976, 981 (D.D.C.1983). The challenged regulations may thus be set aside as violative of plaintiff’s members’ rights to equal protection only if the separation of merchants into two classes— street vendors and store front vendors — is based on reasons totally unrelated to pursuit of the goals of the regulations. See McDonald, id.; Stone, id.

The court must give considerable deference to the legislature in determining the closeness of the “link” between the challenged regulations and their stated purposes. See Globe Fur Dyeing Corp., v. United States, 467 F.Supp 177 (D.D.C.1978), aff'd, 612 F.2d 586 (1980). As the Supreme Court stated in McDonald,

Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.

394 U.S. at 809, 89 S.Ct. at 1408; see also Globe Fur Dyeing Corp., supra. Therefore, even if the source materials supplied by defendants do not state the precise reasons for the challenged regulations, plaintiff’s equal protection challenge can be successful only if the court is unable to postulate any conceivable rationale for the regulations.

Defendants and amici have themselves proffered a variety of justifications for the regulations. Restrictions on areas of operation (§ 502.11), hours of operation and overnight storage (§ 511.1), and permissible designs (§ 512.2) are intended to guarantee public access to sidewalks by reducing congestion (Defendants’ Exhibit J at 1, 9), curb excess and late-night noise (Defendants’ Exhibits F, J at 18), enhance police enforcement efforts (Defendants’ Exhibit F), create an aesthetically pleasing and “visually interesting” environment that “attracts people and stimulates redevelopment and commerce” (Defendants’ Exhibit I, 31 D.C.R. 1114), and enhance street vendors’ ability to make a profitable living by reducing competition among them (Defendants’ Exhibit J at 10). The locational restrictions are also designed to guarantee better access to bus stops, loading and entrance zones, fire hydrants, parking meters, mail boxes, service and ventilation grates, and benches, as well as to reduce accumulation of litter that results from a high density of vendors on a given block. Defendants’ Exhibit J at 12-13, 18. The ban on overnight storage is designed to eliminate “unsightly and dangerous” street vending equipment from the city’s sidewalks. Defendants’ Exhibit J at 18. Design standards are imposed to meet the objective that carts be weather resistant, safe, structurally sound, and aesthetically pleasing. Brooks Affidavit at 2, Defendants’ Exhibit J at 20-22.

For the most part, the challenged regulations clearly bear a rational relation to the legitimate goals for which they were enacted. Locational restrictions will undoubtedly lead to less congestion on the city's sidewalks. Overnight storage poses a clear threat to pedestrian safety. Design restrictions, it may be believed, will lead to a more attractive “streetscape,” as defendants put it. Further, the city’s classification of merchants into shopkeepers and street vendors undoubtedly bears a close enough relation to the evils which the city purportedly seeks to avoid to withstand equal protection analysis. As the Supreme Court stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,

The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.

348 U.S. at 489, 75 S.Ct. at 465 (citations omitted). Although the regulations may “exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases, ... it is for the legislature, not the courts to balance the advantages and disadvantages.” Id. at 487, 75 S.Ct. at 464. “It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.” Id. at 487-88, 75 S.Ct. at 464.

There is also considerable precedential support for the validity of these regulations. In Dukes v. City of New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.1974), rev’d on other grounds, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), the court noted that “[T]he City Fathers might constitutionally enact any of a broad range of measures— for example, strict regulation of the location and appearance of pushcarts — in order to satisfy” the city’s concerns regarding congestion and aesthetics. 501 F.2d at 713 (emphasis added). Time and location restrictions withstood an equal protection challenge in Commonwealth v. Gulden, 369 Mass. 965, 341 N.E.2d 262, 263 (1976), and an outright ban on street vending in “congested areas” was upheld in this jurisdiction in 1926 in Carranzo v. District of Columbia, 10 F.2d 983, 983 (D.C.Cir.1926). See also John v. State, 577 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (city ordinance prohibiting sale of goods on city-owned property held to be a permissible way to regulate disruptions to pedestrian traffic flow); Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 155-56, 159-63 (1949) (ordinance barring sales of certain items upheld as not violative of equal protection).

Plaintiff declined to discuss any of these cases, either in its pleadings or at oral argument, on the ground that the cited cases originated from “other jurisdictions.” Plaintiff also contends that a case from this jurisdiction, Crane v. District of Columbia, 289 F. 557 (D.D.C.1923), compels the conclusion that these regulations are beyond the authority of the City Council. Aside from the obvious relevance of the cases cited by defendants and amici to the issues presently confronting the court, Crane is of doubtful relevance to the case at bar. First of all, Crane’s holding that the D.C. Commissioners lacked the authority to prohibit street sales by vendors was based entirely on a construction of the third paragraph of an Act of January 26, 1887, which has no bearing whatever on this case. Further, to the extent that Crane held that the police powers enjoyed by the Commissioners in 1923 were narrower than the police powers of a state legislature, plaintiff has cited no authority for the proposition that the District’s police power authority is still so limited since the advent of Home Rule. Finally, to the extent that Crane is relevant to the constitutional limitations on regulation of street vendors, the case actually contradicts plaintiff’s position that an absolute ban would violate the Constitution, since the court expressly held that Congress “could have authorized the commissioners to forbid all sales on the public streets ... or to limit such sales to licensed vendors.” 289 F. at 560-61.

The one case cited by plaintiff in which a regulation restricting hours of operation was struck down as violative of due process is easily distinguishable from this case. In Fasino v. Mayor and Members of the Borough Council of the Borough of Montvale, 122 N.J.Super. 304, 300 A.2d 195 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.), aff'd, 129 N.J.Super. 461, 324 A.2d 77 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1973), the court struck down a local ordinance which prohibited the operation of any retail business after 11 p.m. or before 6:30 a.m. Like defendants in the case at bar, the community defended the ordinance as a reasonable exercise of its police power to protect the “slumber of its residents by eliminating the noise, light and traffic that accompanies all-night retail operations,” and also contended that it was unable to provide adequate police protection to all-night establishments. 300 A.2d at 197. Although the court rejected that justification, it did so on the basis that the ordinance was overbroad, since it restricted “substantially every business without regard to its individual effect on the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” 300 A.2d at 201. In contrast, the court pointed out that such ordinances had been upheld when the “specific businesses that had been regulated presented a clear danger to the public health or safety or both.” 300 A.2d at 198. Among the examples of such “specific businesses” whose hours could legitimately be regulated under the police power, the court included drug stores, laundries in congested areas, and street vendors. 300 A.2d at 198-99. The challenged regulation in the case at bar not only lacks the general applicability that the Fasino court found fatal, but is directed toward an occupation that the Fasino court specifically recognized as properly subject to regulation.

2. Sections 515.18(g), 524.1, and 524-2

Plaintiff also challenges the limitations on the types of merchandise that may be sold (§ 515.18(g)) and the existence and amount of the bond (§§ 524.1 and 524.2) as violative of its members’ rights to due process and equal protection. The restrictions on merchandise are more troubling than any of the other regulations challenged on equal protection or due process grounds. Although consumer protection appears to be part of the rationale for restricting the types of goods that street vendors may sell, Defendants’ Exhibit J at 7, the primary purpose of barring sales of most types of manufactured items seems to be to protect shop owners from “unfair competition.” Defendants’ Exhibit J at 7. According to the Advisory Group on Street Vending, “Shop owners often view vendors as unfair competition because the vendor’s low overhead expenses allows him/her to sell similar goods at significantly lower prices.” Id. Rather than eliminate whole categories of goods, the Advisory Committee recommended that certain categories would be sold only in certain zones, in order to

ensur[e] that vending activity complements, rather than unfairly competes, with the goods offered by shop owners, while also allowing vendors to provide those same goods in areas where the public is not adequately served. In the Central Vending Zone, therefore, where stores and shops offer a wide array of general merchandise articles, this category of goods would be prohibited. However, in a neighborhood commercial area that does not offer a diversity of goods, sale of general merchandise should be allowed.

Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Defendants also note that “the City’s commercial streets are taking on the quality of a bazaar, which may be appropriate at certain locations, but should not be commonplace.” Id. at 7. While maintenance of a certain environmental quality or consumer protection are certainly permissible police power objectives, see, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304-05, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (per curiam); Breard, 341 U.S. at 640, 71 S.Ct. at 931, an avowed purpose of protecting one class of merchants — shop owners — at the expense of another class of merchants — street vendors — is a goal of highly doubtful legitimacy. As the New Jersey Supreme Court held in Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, albeit in the context of a commerce clause challenge,

There can be no doubt that the business of soliciting and canvassing is a proper subject for regulation under the police power, as is peddling, and has been so considered for generations. The ... business ... opens the way for fraud, deceit and dishonest dealing by the unscrupulous, even though by only a minority of those engaged in it, with redress difficult or practically impossible____ The power cannot, however, be exercised for ‘a purpose to shield the local shopkeepers from lawful competition, and thus to serve private interests in contravention of common rights.’

154 A.2d 9, 17-18 (N.J.1959) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Nevertheless, a number of courts have upheld restrictions on the types of goods, food, or merchandise that may be sold by street vendors against challenges brought under the due process or equal protection clauses. See Dukes v. City of New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706, 709 n. 1 (5th Cir.1974), rev’d on other grounds, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (upholding ordinance prohibiting pushcart sales of most items, such as soft drinks and novelties, but exempting certain others, such as hot dogs); Hixon v. State, 523 S.W.2d 711, 712-13 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (upholding ordinance banning sidewalk sales of anything except flowers and ice cream); City of Ravenna v. Ivec, 202 N.E.2d 706, 707 (Ohio Ct.App.1963) (upholding conviction under ordinance requiring license to solicit of all persons except those selling products they produced themselves); City of Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N.E.2d 905, 907-08 (1936) (upholding ordinance banning street sales of anything except newspapers); cf. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-05, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding city’s power to eliminate all vendors except those who had been in business eight or more years prior to passage of the ordinance).

The court agrees with the Moyant court’s conclusion that the police power cannot be legitimately exercised to “reorder the balance,” as counsel for defendants candidly put it, between street vendors and shopkeepers. The other interests advanced by the city for limiting the merchandise that may be sold by street vendors seem either overbroad or not closely related to the restrictions actually imposed. For example, while it may be in the interest of consumer protection to bar street sales of electronic devices or other items whose poor workmanship may be easily concealed, it seems doubtful that the District could justify the distinction between manufactured baskets, which are prohibited under section 515.18(g), and “hand-fashioned baskets and basketry” on that basis. Similarly, it is difficult to conceive of any aesthetic concern that would be furthered by barring sales of machine-made leather goods, pottery, or quilts, but not their handmade counterparts.

Yet as pointed out earlier, the court may strike the regulations challenged as violative of the equal protection guaranteed under the fifth amendment only if they can be justified under no conceivable rationale. Clearly, it would have been within the authority of the District to ban all street sales of merchandise in order to protect consumers from sales of shoddy merchandise by itinerant street vendors, to reduce congestion on the city’s sidewalks, or to prevent the city’s business district from taking on a “bazaar atmosphere” or for other aesthetic reasons. At the same time, the city could have taken account of the fact that street vendors who make their own goods for sale would be left with few or no retailers who would be willing to purchase handmade goods for resale, and exempted those vendors from the general ban on sales of merchandise that could have otherwise been imposed. The fact that the city could have furthered its underlying purpose — that of eliminating merchandise sales on the city’s streets — more completely does not warrant a conclusion that the method it chose is unconstitutional. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 390, 98 S.Ct. at 1864; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104-06, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). As the Court has repeatedly held over the past four decades, equal protection does not require that all evils of the same type be eradicated or none at all. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110, 69 S.Ct. 463, 466, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949). Therefore, plaintiffs fifth amendment challenge to the merchandise restrictions in section 515.18(g) must be denied.

Plaintiff apparently does not argue that the difference in the size of the bond between residents and nonresidents violates equal protection; rather, it contends that imposition of a bond on street vendors but not on store front vendors denies street vendors equal protection. The contention that any difference in the treatment of street vendors and shopkeepers violates vendors’ equal protection rights is wholly without merit. If any one principle can be gleaned from the past several decades of equal protection jurisprudence, it is that the Constitution permits considerable flexibility in distinguishing among groups so long as those distinctions implicate neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right.

Even if plaintiff’s challenge to the bond requirement is considered in terms of the resident/nonresident distinction, the court’s ruling that section 524.2(b) violates the commerce clause renders a further examination of this provision under the equal protection clause unnecessary.

3. Section 508.3

Finally, with regard to plaintiff’s due process challenge to section 508.3, the court is unable to render an opinion as to the constitutional validity of that provision at this time. Under section 508.3, a vendor’s license is subject to immediate seizure if he fails to make records of sales and receipts of purchases and expenses available for inspection. See §§ 508.1, 508.2, 508.3. Plaintiff contends that its members’ rights to due process entitle them to a pre-revocation hearing. Defendants and amici respond that a section 508.3 seizure is not a final deprivation; rather, section 508.4 provides that any license seized must be returned as soon as the vendor submits the records and receipts required to be kept under section 508.

Although it is a truism that “some form of hearing” is required before an owner is finally deprived of a significant property interest, both the timing and the nature of the required hearing depend on “ ‘appropriate accomodation of the competing interests involved.’ ” Those competing interests include the importance of the private interests involved, the length or finality of the deprivation, the likelihood of governmental error, and the magnitude of the governmental interests involved. Logan, 455 U.S. at 434, 102 S.Ct. at 1157. Although it may be conceded that the right to engage in their livelihood is of significant importance to street vendors, amici contend that the deprivation is brief, since the license must be returned upon submission of the required records and receipts; little discretion is involved so that the likelihood of government error is minimal; and the government’s interest in tax collection is substantial. See Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 595-97, 51 S.Ct. 608, 611, 75 L.Ed. 1289 (1931) (“[wjhere only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate”).

Since the procedures for return of a seized license are not specified by the regulations, it is impossible to determine the length of deprivation or the adequacy of the procedures for the ultimate determination by the Mayor under section 508.4 at this time. Similarly, although defendants argue that the likelihood of error is small since little discretion is involved, it is not clear that police officers will be able to make consistent determinations as to the “sufficiency” of the records of sales and receipts that must be made available under section 508.1. Indeed, the regulation itself does not specify for what purpose the records must “suffice.”

In sum, the issue of the constitutional adequacy of the post-seizure hearing that the District will provide is not yet ripe for judicial determination. Since a pre-seizure hearing is not necessarily required by due process, and since the court could only guess as to how section 508 will ultimately be enforced, a ruling at this time would merely constitute an advisory opinion regarding what the law would be on a hypothetical state of facts. Because this issue has not yet ripened into a justiciable controversy through actual enforcement, therefore, the court is unable to render an opinion on the constitutional validity of section 508.3.

C. Vagueness and ambiguity

Finally, plaintiff challenges three regulations on the ground that they are vague and ambiguous and thus violate its members’ due process rights. Plaintiff claims that § 508.1, which requires vendors to make records of sales and receipts available for inspection “to any authorized representative of the District of Columbia Government” is unconstitutionally vague because it “could be interpreted” to mean that any official, agent, or servant of the District has the authority to demand a vendor’s records and seize his license for non-production. Sections 510.3 and 510.4, which restrict street vendors to sidewalks which are at least eighteen feet wide and provide rules for measuring sidewalks to determine if they meet minimum width standards, are challenged as unconstitutionally vague on the ground that §§ 515.1 to 515.16, which specify the sections of the city where vending is permitted, do not list the sidewalks which are at least eighteen feet wide.

The Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff bringing a pre-enforcement facial challenge to an ordinance on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague bears a heavy burden. Assuming that the ordinance implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, such as freedom of speech, a court examining a facial vagueness challenge “should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 497, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 1193, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). In evaluating a business regulation for facial vagueness, the court held, “the principal inquiry is whether the law affords a fair warning of what is proscribed. Moreover, this emphasis is almost inescapable in reviewing a pre-enforcement challenge to a law.” Id. at 503, 102 S.Ct. at 1195-96.

In evaluating the challenged regulations under these standards, it seems clear that neither the regulation on enforcement nor the regulations on location are void for vagueness. As amici point out, any potential problem with §§ 510.3 and 510.4 is cured by reading those provisions together with §§ 515.1 to 515.16, which specify the areas within which vending is permitted and particular areas where vending is barred. All a vendor need do is first determine whether vending is permitted in the area within which he intends to sell his wares, and then make sure that the particular sidewalk on which he intends to place his cart meets the minimum width requirements of section 510.3, as measured pursuant to section 510.4. It would be impossible for this court to declare that the language of §§ 510.3 and 510.4 is so vague and amorphous as to render it unconstitutional. See Hoffman Estates, supra. Although the particular measurements required by section 510.4 may pose some threat of inconsistent or arbitrary enforcement, the court is not free to assume that the District will not take further steps to particularize or standardize the methods used to measure minimum sidewalk widths should such problems arise. The city may well “adopt administrative regulations that will sufficiently narrow potentially vague or arbitrary interpretations of the” regulation. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 504, 102 S.Ct. at 1196. “ ‘Although it is possible that specific future applications ... may engender concrete problems of constitutional dimension, it will be time enough to consider any such problems when they arise.’ ” Id. (quoting Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 52, 86 S.Ct. 1254, 1264, 16 L.Ed.2d 336 (1966)).

Plaintiff’s challenge to § 508.1 is only slightly more substantial. In evaluating a facial challenge to an ordinance, the court must consider any “limiting construction” that the city has offered. Id., 455 U.S. at 494 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. at 1191 n. 5. Here, defendants and amici point to section 501.12’s implicit limitation on section 508.1’s provision for inspection by “any authorized representative.” Under section 501.12, “[t]he Metropolitan Police Department shall have primary responsibility for the enforcement of vending regulations, pursuant to Mayor’s Order 82-186.” May- or’s Order 82-186 provides that the Chief of Police is delegated the authority vested in the Mayor for District-wide enforcement of the regulations governing street vending. Defendant’s Exhibit B. Therefore, defendants contend, the reference to “any authorized representative” in § 508.1 is vague neither on its face nor in any probable application. Because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any credible threat of enforcement of § 508.1 by council persons, school board members, garbage collectors, or any of its other “wild[] hypotheticals,” the facial vagueness challenge must fail. See Electrolert Corp. v. Barry, 737 F.2d 110, 114 (D.C.Cir.1984).

III. Conclusion

The court’s conclusion that most of the regulations at issue here withstand plaintiff’s challenges under the commerce clause and fifth amendment guarantees of equal protection and due process should not be construed as an indication that the court is without sympathy for the individuals whose livelihood may be threatened by the actions of the District of Columbia. But as the Supreme Court pointed out in Williamson v. Lee Optical, the day is long gone when courts may “strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.” 348 U.S. 483, 488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464 (1955). “ ‘For protection against abuses by legislatures,’ ” the Court emphasized, “ ‘the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.’ ” Id., 75 S.Ct. at 464-65 (quoting Munn v. State of Illinois, 4 Otto 113, 134, 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1876)).

Plaintiff’s complaints are essentially political ones. As plaintiff’s counsel himself has candidly admitted, the union’s members are “[dissatisfied with the results of the legislative process, [and] would now have the Court interject its judgment as to the propriety of the regulations.” Opposition to Amicus at 1. Yet literally scores of cases decided since the New Deal have made it clear beyond any doubt that the judiciary is without authority to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. Regardless of whether the court thinks the challenged regulations “unwise or improvident," all but section 524 are able to pass constitutional muster.

      . Business groups whose views are represented in the amicus brief are the Apartment and Office Building Association of Metropolitan Washington, Inc., the Connecticut Avenue Association, the Capitol Hill Association of Merchants' and Professionals, and the Business and Professional Association of Georgetown.

      . Plaintiff also raised challenges to the constitutionality of sections 503.5, 503.6, 515.18(c) through (f), 524.3, 524.6, and 524.7 for the first time in its opposition to the motion for leave to file brief amicus curiae. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae at 9 [hereinafter cited as Opposition to Amicus ]. None of those sections are mentioned in plaintiff's complaint or its motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff conceded at oral argument that the constitutionality of those regulations is not properly at issue in this case.

      . Plaintiff has also characterized the merchandise restrictions in section 515.18(g) as imposing a restriction on interstate commerce by limiting the “free flow of ... non-permitted goods in interstate commerce.” Opposition to Amicus at 2. This challenge must fail for two reasons. First, it appears that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge these regulations on behalf of manufacturers of non-permitted merchandise, since it is nowhere alleged that any of plaintiff’s members are manufacturers as well as vendors. But more importantly, it is obvious that the regulation provides no benefit to any in-state manufacturer. No street vendor may sell the non-permitted goods, irrespective of their source. Manufacturers of prohibited goods are still free to sell their goods to shopkeepers. The fact that overall sales of certain items in the District may be reduced by prohibiting their sale by street vendors is, as a matter of constitutional law, immaterial. See Breard, 341 U.S. at 638, 71 S.Ct. at 930.

      . Although plaintiff did not raise a privileges and immunities clause challenge to the regulations, the "mutually reinforcing relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2, and the Commerce Clause" renders a number of cases decided under the privileges and immunities clause relevant to plaintiff's commerce clause challenge. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-33, 98 S.Ct. 2482, 2490-91, 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978).

      . D.C. residents are subject to § 503.5, but, under § 503.6, may not be required to prepay more than $100.

      . As the estimated amount of annual sales tax rises, the disparity between nonresident and resident vendors increases dramatically. For example, a nonresident vendor who generates $5,000 per year in sales taxes could be required to post bonds of up to $11,500, ($10,000 under the "double annual sales tax” provision of § 503.5 and $1,500 under § 524.2(b)) compared to the bonds of no more than $600 required of a resident vendor (no more than $100 under §§ 503.5 and 503.6 and $500 under § 524.2(a)).

      . The initial problem with plaintiffs challenge is that the fourteenth amendment, under which plaintiff brings its equal protection claims, is not applicable to a suit against the District of Columbia. E.g., Bulluck v. Washington, 468 F.2d 1096, 1100 n. 9 (D.C.Cir.1972). Concepts of equal protection are, however, "inherent” in the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process of law, which is applicable to the District. Id.; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99, 74 S.Ct. 693, 694, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954). Although the phrases "equal protection" and “due process” are not always interchangeable, Bolling, supra, the court assumes for present purposes that to the extent that the challenged regulations would be barred by the equal protection clause if enacted by a state, they would also be violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment in the context of litigation against the District of Columbia. See Bulluck, supra.

      . Almost as an afterthought, plaintiff has made a bald assertion that "an overwhelming majority of sidewalk vendors are minorities and women." Opposition to Amicus at 8. Even assuming that this contention is true — and plaintiff has cited no evidence in support of its assertion — it is insufficient to justify the conclusion that the vending regulations are based on a suspect classification. First, the vending regulations apply to all street vendors, not just blacks or women. Second, the Supreme Court made it clear in Washington v. Davis that a racially disproportionate impact alone, without some other evidence of invidious discrimination, is insufficient to trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. 426 U.S. 229, 239, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 2049, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that the challenged regulations are racially motivated, nor does that appear to be its contention. Rather, plaintiff appears to contend that because blacks and females are disproportionately burdened by the new regulations, they violate vendors' rights to equal protection. Such a contention is precluded by Washington v. Davis, supra.

        . Clearly, the District has the authority to impose a complete ban on all vending on public property. Since street vendors enjoy no constitutional right to pursue their calling on the city’s streets and sidewalks, the court must reject any argument that the various restrictions imposed by the challenged regulations interfere with any substantive due process rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment. See Stone v. District of Columbia, 572 F.Supp. 976, 981 (D.D.C.1983). Whether the city’s authority to seize a vendor's license without a prior hearing under section 508.3 violates procedural due process rights is discussed infra.

      . Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422. 433. 102 S.Ct. 1148. 1156. 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982) (emphasis in original); see also Boddie v.

        Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971).

      . Logan, 455 U.S. at 434, 102 S.Ct. at 1157 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.Ct. 729, 738, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975)).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BARBOUR, District Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Henry J. KIRKSEY, Fred L. Banks, Jr., Credell Calhoun, Hillman Frazier, Henrene Matthews, Carsie A. Hall, Ms. Annie K. Ward, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Dale DANKS, Jr., Mayor and City Commissioner of the City of Jackson; George R. Porter, City Commissioner of the City of Jackson; Luther R. Roan, Jr., City Commissioner of the City of Jackson; City of Jackson, Mississippi, a municipal corporation; Jackson Municipal Democratic Executive Committee; V.H. McDaniel, Chairman of the Jackson Municipal Democratic Executive Committee; Jackson Municipal Republican Executive Committee; Jackson Municipal Election Commission; Jackie Povall, Bernice Denmar, and Minnie Gay Boyles, Members of the Jackson Municipal Election Commission, Defendants.
    Civ. A. No. J83-0077(B).
    United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.
    May 10, 1985.

      Nausead Stewart, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under-Law, Jackson, Miss., Frank R. Parker, William L. Robinson, Patricia M. Hanrahan, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.
    John Hedglin, City Attorney, City of Jackson, Jackson, Miss., for defendants.
    Jerris Leonard, Kathleen Heenan MeGuan, Jerris Leonard & Associates, Washington, D.C., for D. Danks, L.R. Roan, G.R. Porter & City of Jackson.
   MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BARBOUR, District Judge.

This case is presently pending before the Court on Motion of the Plaintiff for an award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Litigation by black voters of Jackson challenging at-large city council elections has gone on for seven and a half years.

Jackson, Mississippi adopted a commission form of government with at-large elections in 1912, and since then no black candidate has been elected to the three-member Jackson City Council, despite the fact that Jackson is now 47 percent black in population. In February, 1977, pursuant to the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 21-8-3 (Supp.1983), the City of Jackson had a referendum on changing the form of city government to a mayor-council form of government with nine council members elected by ward, and the referendum failed to pass, with 56 percent of the voters of Jackson voting against the change. Following the defeat of that referendum, 17 black voters of Jackson filed Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 461 F.Supp. 1282, 1285 (S.D.Mis.1978), vac’d and remanded on other grounds, 625 F.2d 21 (5th Cir.1980), on remand, 506 F.Supp. 491, 503 (S.D.Miss.1981), aff'd. 663 F.2d 659 (5th Cir.1981) (Kirksey I) alleging that at-large city council elections unlawfully diluted black voting strength in violation of their rights secured by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Federal voting rights statutes.

There were two separate trials in that case, and after each trial the District Court dismissed the case because plaintiffs had failed to prove that at-large elections were adopted or maintained with discriminatory intent, either under the discriminatory intent standard of Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir.1978), or City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980).

In June, 1982 Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to eliminate the requirement of proving discriminatory intent and to substitute a more liberal “results” test to prove a statutory violation. To take advantage of this change in the law and intervening Supreme court decisions on the intent standard, see Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 714 F.2d 42 (5th Cir.1983) (Kirksey I), Plaintiffs filed this case (Kirksey II) on February 7, 1983, as a new lawsuit. They alleged that at-large city council elections in Jackson have been imposed or applied in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote in violation of Section 2, as amended in 1982, and also that at-large voting has been maintained for a discriminatory purpose in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief against further at-large city council elections, and a change in the form of city government to a mayor-council form of government with council members elected from single-member districts or wards.

Extensive litigation followed. Defendants objected to the majority of Plaintiffs’ first set of interrogatories and strenuously resisted providing answers on the theory that any relitigation of the issues previously litigated in Kirksey I was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Magistrate sustained these objections and on appeal the Magistrate’s decision was overruled and Defendants were ordered by this court to answer. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Nov. 7, 1983.

Plaintiffs then moved to amend their complaint to allege that at-large voting had been maintained for a discriminatory purpose and sought to allege the results of the 1977 referendum in support of their contention. Again, Defendants objected to this amendment as an effort to relitigate issues decided in Kirksey I. The Magistrate allowed Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to allege discriminatory purpose, but refused to permit Plaintiffs to allege facts surrounding the 1977 referendum, and again on appeal this Court overruled the Magistrate’s decision and allowed Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint. Order of Jan. 12, 1984.

After a change in counsel for the Defendants, a new attorney for the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion for stay of discovery which, for the third time, alleged that Plaintiffs should not be permitted to litigate issues previously litigated in Kirksey /. Once again, this Court rejected this theory, denied both motions, and ordered the Defendants to pay a sanction of $250 to the Clerk and $1,089.96 in attorneys’ fees and expenses to the Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Order Denying Motions and Imposing Sanctions, June 26, 1984; Order of August 21, 1984.

Plaintiffs also undertook extensive discovery. Plaintiffs filed three sets of interrogatories, a request for admission of facts and documents, and a request for production of documents, and deposed the Defendant city council members and their expert witnesses. Defendants also served interrogatories and deposed Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses prior to trial.

In July, 1984, Plaintiffs and two of the three city council members, Commissioners George R. Porter and Luther L. Roan, Jr., agreed to a proposed settlement of this action under which the city council would be expanded to five members, with a May- or elected at-large and four commissioners elected from wards, two of which would be majority white and two majority black. Mayor Dale Danks, Jr., then filed an action in Hinds County Circuit Court and without notice or hearing obtained an ex parte order from that court enjoining the two commissioners from taking any action to settle this case. Dale Danks, Jr., Mayor, v. George R. Porter and Luther L. Roan, Jr., Commissioners, Docket No. 31,194 (Hinds County Cir.Ct.). That action subsequently was dismissed on July 19, when the two commissioners signed an agreement not to settle this case unless the settlement provided for a referendum on a form of municipal government "that is authorized or may become authorized by state law.” Because state law does not presently specifically provide for such form of government, no such referendum was held.

This resolution of Danks v. Porter effectively ended the proposed settlement between Plaintiffs and the two commissioners and forced the Plaintiffs to continue their preparation for trial.

The trial commenced on September 4, 1984, and Plaintiffs began their presentation of their case. On the same day, the City of .Jackson held another referendum as authorized by Miss. Code Ann. § 21-8-3 (1983 Supp.) on a change in the form of city government to a mayor-council form of government with seven council members elected from single-member districts or wards. This time the referendum passed, with 65 percent of those participating voting for the change. The passage of this referendum accomplished the two principle goals of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit: (1) it effectively brought an end to at-large voting for the members of the Jackson City Council, and (2) it provided for the election of council members from single-member districts or wards.

The entitlement of the Plaintiffs to a court award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses is determined by reference to both Section 14(e) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e), and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 1973l (e) provides:

In any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments, the Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.

Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in relevant part:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of public law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorneys’ fee as part of the costs.

In enacting both of these statutes, Congress directed the prevailing parties “should ordinarily recover an attorneys’ fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” S.Rep. No. 94-295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 774, 807 (Section 1973Z (e); S.Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 5908, 5912.

Plaintiffs are “prevailing parties” within the meaning of these statutes when they accomplish the goals of their litigation even though they obtain no judicial relief. The legislative history of both statutes make it clear that Congress intended that a litigant may prevail outside of the courts and still be eligible for a fee award:

For the purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.

S.Rep. No. 94-1011, supra, 5, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 5912 (§ 1988); S.Rep. No. 94-295, supra, 41, 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 808 (§ 1973l (e)). As the Supreme Court noted in Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2575, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980):

Nothing in the language of § 1988 conditions the district Court’s power to award fees on full litigation of the issues or on a judicial determination that the plaintiffs’ rights have been violated.

Thus, plaintiffs in voting rights eases are entitled to a fee award even “when subsequent remedial action by the defendant effectively moots the controversy after the lawsuit has been filed.” Connor v. Winter, 519 F.Supp. 1337, 1340 (S.D.Miss.1981) (three-judge court); see also, Ramos v. Koebig, 638 F.2d 838, 845-46 (5th Cir.1981). When plaintiffs’ cause of action is rendered moot by unilateral action of the defendant, plaintiffs may recover fees by showing

a causal connection between the filing of the suit and the defendant’s action and that the defendant’s conduct was required by law, i.e., not a wholly gratuitous response to an action that in itself was frivolous or groundless.

Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir.1982). Such a “causal connection” is present when plaintiffs show that the lawsuit was “a substantial factor or significant catalyst” in motivating the defendant to end the challenged conduct. Wooten v. Housing Authority of City of Dallas, 723 F.2d 390, 391 (5th Cir.1984); see also Robinson v. Kimbrough, 620 F.2d 468, 478 (5th Cir.1980) (plaintiffs may recover if “their lawsuit was a significant catalytic factor in achieving the primary relief sought through the litigation.”); Connor v. Winter, 519 F.Supp. at 1339-40. The inquiry is “an intensely factual, pragmatic one” involving an analysis of the “chronology of events” and all other factors bearing on the issue, recognizing that “defendants, on the whole, are usually rather reluctant to concede that the litigation prompted them to mend their ways.” Posada v. Lamb County, 716 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir.1983) (citations omitted).

The history of this litigation clearly shows that this lawsuit was a “substantial factor” and a “significant catalyst” in producing the September 4 referendum result. Prior to the filing of Kirksey I a referendum on a change in the form of city government was held and the referendum was defeated. The referendum did not pass until after this lawsuit was filed and Jackson was “under the gun.”

The newspaper articles submitted with the motion of the Plaintiffs show that the major actors responsible for the passage of the September 4 referendum were aware of this litigation and stated openly that if the change was not accomplished by the referendum, it would be done by the federal court in this litigation. On the day after this lawsuit was filed, the Jackson City Council announced that it proposed a citizens’ task force to gather the 12,000 signatures needed to call a referendum on changing the city’s form of government.

Mayor Dale Danks, Jr. said the citizens of Jackson and “not a federal court judge” should decide what form of government their city should have. Danks said the council doesn’t have the authority to call such an election on its own.
“I feel the people of this city should have the right to vote on their form of government,” Danks said. “I would encourage those who prefer the litigation route — I would suggest that those efforts would be better spent gathering signatures on a petition so we can all go the polls and vote.”

“City Council May Seek Referendum on Form of Government,” Jackson Clarion- Ledger, Feb. 9, 1983. The referendum effort was dormant until after the February, 1984 special election in which a black candidate who made the runoff election, Ms. Shirley Watson, was defeated by a white candidate, George Porter, in an election characterized by a high degree of racially polarized voting. Watson’s defeat was reported by the Jackson newspapers as adding additional support to Plaintiff Kirksey’s argument in this case that at-large elections prevent the election of black candidates to the city council. “Watson’s Defeat May Aid Push for New Form of City Government,” Clarion-Ledger-Jackson Daily News, Feb. 19, 1984; Jack Elliott column, “Black Candidates Lost the Battle, But Might Win the War,” Clarion-Ledger-Jackson Daily News, Feb. 19, 1984. Less than week after the special runoff election, Mayor Dale Danks appointed an 87-mem-ber advisory committee to study whether the city’s form of government should be changed. The newspaper article specifically mentioned this lawsuit and reiterated Mayor Danks’ view that the issue should be decided by a referendum rather than in this case:

The city’s current government, a three-member commission elected at large, is being challenged in federal court by a group of black residents, who contend it keeps blacks out of City Hall by diluting minority voting strength.
No blacks have been elected to the council since the commission form was adopted in 1912.
Opponents renewed their attacks on the form of government after last week’s election, saying the victory of George Porter over Shirley Watson proved that blacks will not be elected to the council until at-large elections are abandoned and council members are elected from wards.
‡ *
Danks said, “if the committee deems it’s in the best interest to hold a referendum, then so be it.”
“It has been my position that the people of this city have the right and the responsibility to choose what form their city government takes, and not have that decision removed from their control by the courts,” Danks said.

“Danks Names Panel to Study Change in Form of Government,” Clarion-Ledger, Feb.'21, 1984.

After public hearings and committee deliberations, this advisory committee recommended a change to mayor-council form of government with seven council members elected by ward. The articles reporting the advisory committee’s recommendations referred to this lawsuit. “City Panel Endorses Strong Mayor/Council,” Clarion Ledger, Mar. 23, 1984; “Vote May be Coming on Larger City Council,” Jackson Daily News, Mar. 30, 1984. The supporters of the change collected the required number of signatures on their petitions as required by Miss.Code Ann. § 21-8-3 (Supp.1983), and the referendum was set by the city council for September 4, the date previously set for the trial in this case.

The ads published in the Jackson newspapers by the group supporting the change, the Committee for the Mayor-Council Form of Government, which were run for at least a week prior to the referendum and on the day of the referendum, gave this lawsuit as the principal reason why the change was needed:

THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE CITY OF JACKSON IS YOUR DECISION ... BUT NOT FOR LONG
# sfc # * * 5k
On September 4th, the legal challenge against our present form of government will be heard in federal court. It is almost certain that our present form of government will be changed, because it has the effect of denying representation to a large segment of our community. A form of government which provides for electing a city council by wards or districts, rather than at large, will become necessary.
It’s clear that Jackson will have a new form of government. The only question is, will we change the form of government ourselves, by a vote, or will we take whatever form the courts decide for us?

Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 4, 1984.

Both Jackson newspapers published editorials supporting passage of the referendum. The Clarion-Ledger referred to “a federal gun pointed at Jackson’s head,” editorial, “Jackson’s Future,” Aug. 30, 1984, and the Jackson Daily News stated: “A court-imposed change of government appears inevitable if Jackson fails to change its form of government to one of its own choice. Court orders have denied voters in other cities — most recently Greenwood — the right to make that choice,” editorial, Politics Aside, Aug. 30, 1984.

On the Sunday before the referendum vote, the Jackson newspapers published the views of the three city council members and other leading citizens. In this forum piece, Mayor Danks cited this litigation as a major reason why the referendum should be adopted:

Third, I am for the people of Jackson having the right to select the mayor-council form of government. You can be sure that a federal court will do it for us, and we may not like what we get.

“Should Jackson Change Its Form of Government?, ’ ’ Clarion-Ledger-Jackson Daily News, Sept. 2, 1984.

This chronology, and these comments by Mayor Danks throughout the referendum effort, show the required “causal connection” between this lawsuit and the change, and that the plaintiffs, as prevailing parties, are entitled to their attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses.

Having reached the initial determination that the Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees, this Court must determine the fee which is “reasonable.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Following the outline contained in the opinion of the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, the starting point for this Court’s inquiry will be the number of hours reasonably expended on this litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. The two attorneys responsible for the representation of Plaintiffs in this action are Frank R. Parker and Patricia N. Hanrahan. Mr. Parker requests 315.69 hours at the hourly rate of $135.00 per hour. Ms. Hanrahan requests 175.7 hours at an hourly rate of $100.00 per hour. Both attorneys have travel time which they request at a reduced rate. Mr. Parker requests 56 hours of travel time at $67.50 per hour and Ms. Hanrahan requests 21.5 hours of travel time at $50.00 per hour. In addition to the attorney’s fees, the Plaintiffs request an award for paralegal work totalling $6,207.00. Total litigation expenses for which the Plaintiffs request reimbursement are $35,298.52. The total of -the request, including attorney’s fees, paralegal work and litigation expenses is $106,548.67. The only objections interposed by the Defendants is that the hourly rates claimed are unreasonable and that some litigation expenses and costs are inadequately documented or were not in fact incurred in preparation for trial. No hearing has been requested on these controverted matters and accordingly this Court will proceed to decide them on the basis of the material presented by both parties in support of and in opposition to the Motion for Attorney’s fees.

The number of hours which has been requested by the attorneys is certainly not unreasonable for a case as complex involving as many variables as this litigation. The Defendants have made no objection to the number of hours requested. The attorneys have provided this Court with fully detailed and documented affidavits requesting a total of 568.89 hours of legal work including the 77.5 hours of travel time. This represents the work of two attorneys over a period of 18 months of litigation. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ request is reasonable in light of the total number of hours required to prepare for this litigation. The affidavits of the attorneys for the Plaintiff show no indication that the hours claimed were not reasonably expended in the pursuit of the objectives sought by the Plaintiffs. Likewise, there appears to be no duplication of hours and the Plaintiffs have specifically deleted any hours for which compensation has already been granted pursuant to the order of this Court imposing sanctions and attorney’s fees on the Defendant for requiring the Plaintiff to repeatedly respond to an issue on which this Court had ruled.

The next step in the analysis of this Court is the determination of the appropriate hourly rate to which the Plaintiffs are entitled. The attorneys for the Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to the prevailing rate for the District of Columbia instead of those which are customary in the Jackson area. The reason advanced for this position is that the Plaintiffs were required to go outside of the Jackson area in order to obtain the expertise necessary to the success of this litigation. Additionally, the Plaintiffs argue that the City of Jackson itself went to attorneys in the District of Columbia paying lead counsel rates of $125.00 an hour and an associate only three years out of law school $100.00 an hour. They advance this argument as an additional reason for granting them the increased hourly rate.

While this Court does not comment on the wisdom of the officials of the City of Jackson in paying attorneys from the District of Columbia at the above quoted hourly rates, especially considering the limited experience of an attorney who has been out of law school only three years, this does not justify burdening the taxpayers with yet another set of attorneys fees at the hourly rate which prevails in the District of Columbia. This Court is convinced of Mr. Parker’s expertise and in no way denigrates his abilities. However, the prevailing rate in the City of Jackson for one of Mr. Parker’s abilities is $100.00 per hour and for those of Ms. Hanrahan are $60.00 per hour. It has been the experience of this Court that there are attorneys in the Jackson area who could handle this litigation for the Plaintiffs. This Court does not find that it was necessary for the Plaintiffs to go outside the Jackson area in order to retain counsel to prosecute this litigation. Accordingly, it is the determination of this Court that Mr. Parker should be compensated at the hourly rate that prevails for one of his expertise in this area, being $100.00 per hour and Ms. Hanrahan likewise at the rate of $60.00 per hour. These rates are consistent with the prevailing rates in this district. See Morrow v. Finch, 642 F.2d 823 (5th Cir.1981) (awarding Mr. Parker $100.00 per hour); Pendleton v. Hood, No. J83-0519(B) (S.D.Miss. July 19, 1984) (awarding Ms. Hanrahan $60.00 per hour). This Court has taken into consideration other awards and has also considered the 12 Johnson factors which will be set forth in detail infra.

This Court further finds that an hourly rate at one-half of the normal rate is appropriate for travel time for both attorneys Parker and Hanrahan. This is consistent with the normal fees charged by attorneys in this district. The result of computations on the basis of the hourly rates set forth above is an attorney’s fees award of $45,556.00 calculated as follows:

Attorney Hours/rate Total

Frank R. Parker 315.69 @ $100 $31,569.00

(Travel Time) 56 @ $50 2,800.00

Patricia M. Hanrahan 175.7 @ $60 10,542.00

(Travel Time) 21.5 @ $30 645.00

TOTAL ATTORNEY’S FEES ALLOWED $45,556.00

This, of course, is the lodestar figure. The next step in this Court’s analysis will be an in-depth examination of the Johnson factors. Many of these twelve factors have been tacitly considered by this Court in arriving at the initial “lodestar” figure determining the number of hours reasonably expended and the reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1949 n. 9.

The first of the factors is the time and labor required. Of course, this is the factor which the Court has considered above in arriving at the lodestar figure. Mr. Parker and Ms. Hanrahan maintained detailed records setting forth the date, the work performed and the hours entailed in accomplishing that work. This Court is satisfied that such hours were reasonable and should be included in the total number of hours allowed in the calculation of the lodestar figure.

The second Johnson factor is the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented by this lawsuit. There is no doubt but that this lawsuit was more than simply routine litigation. There were difficult challenges by the Defendants on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles arising out of the previous litigation in Kirksey I. The Plaintiffs were forced to make two applications for review of Magistrate’s Orders and additionally defend against the same issue on a motion for summary judgment made by the Defendants. The Plaintiffs were successful in all respects on these legal issues. Additionally, the Plaintiffs’ attorneys were familiar with this litigation by virtue of their involvement with the previous lawsuit attacking the at-large election system of the City of Jackson (Kirksey I).

This was one of the early lawsuits filed pursuant to the 1982 amendments to Sections 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. There were novel questions of the burden of proof and the factors needed for presentation of a prima facie case. All indications are that the Plaintiffs were prepared to proceed through a full blown trial of these issues. The fact that a referendum was scheduled for the same day as the trial should not preclude the Plaintiffs from recovering for all time appropriately spent preparing to present this case to the Court should that have become necessary.

The third Johnson factor is the skill required to perform the legal services properly. It is a widespread opinion of the federal courts both in this district, the Northern District of Mississippi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the federal courts in the District of Columbia that Mr. Parker is one of the preeminent attorneys in the field of voting rights. He has had extensive academic and practical experience in this field. The clarity with which issues were presented and focused for decision by this Court is testimony to the expertise of Mr. Parker and his associate Ms. Hanrahan.

The fourth factor for this Court to consider is the preclusion of other employment. The attorneys for the Plaintiff gave this case a high priority effectively preventing them from accepting additional eases from June of 1984 to September of 1984. While not precluding entirely other employment during the period of the pend-ency of this lawsuit, it is clear that acceptance of the responsibility for this litigation limited other employment to some degree even prior to the critical period during the summer and fall of 1984.

The fifth factor for this Court to consider is the customary fee. The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law accepts voting rights cases on a non-fee basis. The organization is largely dependent on court awards of attorney’s fees. As previously set forth, this Court has taken this factor into consideration in determining the lodestar figure. Mr. Parker has been awarded fees on a non-contingent hourly rate of $100.00 per hour in many cases in this district. While he has received awards as high as $135.00 per hour in cases in the District of Columbia, this Court has determined that the appropriate hourly rate for this ease should be that which prevails in this district and not in the District of Columbia.

The sixth factor is whether the fee was fixed or contingent. Because the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law is a private, charitable, civil rights, legal organization accepting cases involving constitutional civil rights of minority and poor persons on a non-fee generating basis, no fee arrangement is made with the clients of that organization. In that respect this case was a contingent fee case because the award of attorney’s fees is contingent upon the success of the plaintiffs. However, the experience of the attorney for the Plaintiffs in the previous Jackson form of government lawsuit (Kirksey I) provided Mr. Parker with the insight and knowledge that success in this litigation was much more likely than not.

The seventh factor for consideration by this Court is time limitation imposed by the client or the circumstances. Because this lawsuit involved voting rights seeking changes in the form of government, certain time limitations were inevitable. Additionally, because of the length of time that this litigation had been pending either in the form of this lawsuit or the previous one, a speedy resolution was important. The Plaintiffs’ attorneys state that this case has been handled on a priority basis. It is evident to this Court that such was the case in that the Plaintiffs prosecuted this lawsuit diligently and responsibly against the dilatory tactics of the Defendant.

The eighth factor entails an evaluation of the results obtained. As set forth above this Court finds that this lawsuit was the one major factor causing the petition drive and referendum election ultimately changing the form of government for the City of Jackson.

The ninth factor is the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys. As with many of the factors this also has been considered by the Court in determining the reasonable hourly rate to be allowed by this Court. It is clear that Mr. Parker has a long history of experience in the field of voting rights and is entitled to receive an hourly fee commensurate with that of a senior partner in a law firm. Mr. Parker has had not only an outstanding academic career but has also had experience in civil rights and voting rights cases. He is extensively published and has participated in many important cases affecting this field. His abilities have been recognized by many courts in passing on the appropriate attorney’s fee award.

The tenth factor is the undesirability of this case. Because Mr. Parker is a specialist in this area of litigation this case was not undesirable; however, it is likely that many attorneys in this area would have found it to be so.

The eleventh factor for this Court’s consideration is the nature and length of the professional relationship of the attorneys with their clients. The attorneys have represented the named Plaintiff, State Senator Henry J. Kirksey, in previous cases. All of these lawsuits have involved civil rights litigation, mostly legislative reapportionment and county redistricting lawsuits as well as the previous lawsuit attacking the at-large election of the mayor and councilmen for the City of Jackson. All of these cases have been dependent upon awards of attorney’s fees as is this case. Accordingly, the professional relationship has not involved work billed to the client and is not of the nature that provides continuing income. This is not the attorney-client relationship that may result in a reduced fee charged by the attorney.

The last factor is an examination of awards in similar cases. A fee award of $100.00 per hour is close to that which experienced lead counsel has been awarded in similar cases in this district. This is not substantially lower than similar cases outside of this district. See Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220 (5th Cir.1983). Likewise, a fee award for associate counsel based on an hourly rate of $60.00 is consistent with the award this Court has given this particular associate on a previous occasion.

It is the considered opinion of this Court that the results which the Plaintiffs obtained and the expertise which was brought to bear on this case deserves more than the straight award of the hours reasonably expended times a reasonable hourly rate. Accordingly, this Court has considered a multiplier in that this case was essentially on a contingent fee basis and was handled in an expert fashion by experienced counsel with a background in this particular litigation. There were some novel and difficult questions concerning the effect of res judicata and collateral estoppel present in this litigation. The number of hours is less than might ordinarily be expected in a lawsuit of this nature no doubt largely due to the attorney’s familiarity with the facts and circumstances of this case as a result of his exposure in the previous litigation attacking the form of government of the City of Jackson. Additionally, every point and issue has been litigated with vigor by the Defendants. Indeed, the litigiousness of the Defendants has been evidenced by this Court’s previous decision imposing sanctions for filing a frivolous motion for summary judgment.

In all, it is the determination of this Court that the attorneys for the Plaintiff are entitled to a multiplier for the excellent results achieved, the skill brought to bear on this litigation and the obstacles overcome in litigating this lawsuit. The attorney’s fees will be increased by 25% in accordance with this finding. The calculation of this adds $11,389.00 to the total award of attorney’s fees. This makes a total award of $56,945.00.

The Plaintiffs have also requested an award for legal work done by law students in a paralegal capacity. Deborah James spent 29.4 hours and Mark Haddad spent 177.5 hours working in a paralegal capacity. The Plaintiffs have requested compensation at an hourly rate of $30.00 per hour. This rate is entirely consistent with awards for paralegal work, especially where this reduces the amount of time the attorneys are required to spend researching and doing other work normally required of an attorney. Accordingly, this Court will allow the paralegal work at the rate requested. This award is as follows:

Attorney Hours Legal/rate Total

Deborah James 29.4 @ $30.00 $ 882.00

Mark Haddad 107.5 @ $30.00 5,325.00

TOTAL PARALEGAL FEES $6,207.00

The Defendants have objected to some of the litigation expenses and costs on the basis that they are inadequately documented or were not in fact incurred in preparation for this trial. The first item objected to is the fee for an expert witness, John Grimm, of $5,319.77. Mr. Grimm was retained by the Plaintiffs to do a survey of voter motivation in the 1977 referendum for presentation at the re-hearing of Kirksey I. The testimony of Mr. Grimm was excluded for failure of the Plaintiffs to follow the appropriate procedure in presenting it. The Plaintiffs argue that this testimony and the results of the survey were probative in the context of the present litigation to show racial motivation of white voters who voted against the referendum in 1977 seeking to change the form of government of the City of Jackson. It is clear that the work done by Mr. Grimm was completely transferable and it is inefficient to require the Plaintiffs to gather the same information again and incur the expense a second time where nothing would be gained by doing so. Accordingly, it is the determination of this Court that this expense should be allowed in its entirety. The decision of this Court to allow this expense is based in large part on the care with which this Petition for Attorney’s Fees has been presented. The Plaintiffs have not requested any compensation in any form for fees and expenses incurred in the previous lawsuit which resulted in an adverse decision. This appears to be the only exception of an expense incurred in the previous lawsuit which was to be utilized in the present litigation. As such, this Court is not in a position to disallow this expense solely for the reason that it was developed for purposes of the prior litigation where it appears to the satisfaction of this Court that it would have been used as probative evidence in the trial of this case should it have been necessary to complete the trial.

The Defendants have objected to long distance telephone charges on the basis of lack of documentation. The total amount for long distance telephone calls requested by the Plaintiffs to which to the Defendant have objected is $357.68. The Plaintiffs have provided this Court with detailed documentation of almost every expense which has been requested. The Plaintiffs have attached business records reflecting documentation for the $357.68. This Court is satisfied that these records substantiate the request and will not require any further documentation. The $357.68 will be allowed. The Defendants have also objected to $297.68 of telephone charges included in hotel bills. The Plaintiffs have decided to forego any request for reimbursement of these expenses and accordingly this Court will not decide the issue.

The Defendants also object to $1,913.14 for car rental. The cars were used by the Plaintiffs’ attorneys on trips to Jackson both preliminarily to trial and during the trial period. While it is certainly true that the Plaintiffs’ attorneys could have been lodged within walking distance of the courthouse, it is often necessary for an out-of-town attorney to have access to transportation and it is reasonable to rent a vehicle for those purposes, particularly in a city such as Jackson which does not have an extensive public transportation system. This Court will not disallow the expense of car rental on the basis argued by the Defendants.

In summary, the Plaintiffs request total expenses of $35,298.52. All of these expenses will be allowed except for $297.68 in long distance telephone calls which were charged to hotel bills. The disallowance of this amount results from a concession by the Plaintiff and the award of litigation expenses will be reduced accordingly. The resulting amount which will be allowed is $35,000.84.

In accordance with the above this Court will allow the following:

Attorneys Fees $56,945.00
Paralegal fees 6,207.00
Expenses 35,000.84
TOTAL $98,152.84

A judgment for this amount will be entered consistent with the above findings of this Court together with interest from this date until paid in full.

The final remaining issue before this Court is whether or not this case should be finally dismissed as moot. It is clear that the Plaintiffs do not contest such a dismissal as the only remaining question of attorney’s fees has been answered above. Accordingly, this Court shall enter final judgment dismissing this lawsuit as moot and awarding attorney’s fees, paralegal fees and litigation expenses of $98,152.84 by separate document consistent with Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

      . Because these two statutes employ almost identical language and are very similar in their purposes, they would be construed in similar fashion. Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir.1980). Also, the legislative history of the 1982 amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act makes clear that minority voters are entitled to court awards of attorneys' fees under these statutes for enforcing their Section 2 rights. H.R.Rep. No. 97-227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1981).