author: GIERBOLINI, District Judge.

text:
    CONFEDERACION LABORISTA DE PUERTO RICO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CERVECERIA INDIA, INC., Defendant.
    Civ. No. 84-1394 GG.
    United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.
    April 17, 1985.

      Jesús Hernández Sánchez, Santurce, P.R., for plaintiffs.
    Tristan Reyes Gilestra, Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, P.R., for defendant.
   OPINION AND ORDER

GIERBOLINI, District Judge.

This is an action brought by plaintiffs, Confederación Laborista de Puerto Rico and Unión de Empleados Vendedores de la Cervecería India, Inc. (the Union), together with certain former employees of the employer, Cervecería India (the Employer), seeking damages for an alleged unlawful dismissal made in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, et seq.

Succinctly stated, the Union seeks compensatory and punitive damages on its behalf and that of the dismissed employees as a result of the discharge. The Union argues that the Employer has refused to arbitrate the dismissal of the employees even though it was requested to do so, and has kept the employees out of their jobs.

The individual plaintiffs assert that this court has pendent jurisdiction to entertain certain state law claims pursuant to 31 L.P.R.A. § 2991 et seq., which governs the enforcement of private obligations and contracts. These claims are grounded on the Employer’s unilateral rescission of the contract.

On the other hand, defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that we do not have jurisdiction to entertain the claims presented, since they are the subject of binding arbitration between the parties pursuant to the contractual remedies of the collective bargaining agreement which must be exhausted prior to filing suit under Section 301. Defendant also argues that this court cannot exercise pendent jurisdiction over certain state law claims due to the insubstantiality of the federal claims advanced.

A brief summary of the facts is necessary. On June 13, 1981, the Union and the Employer executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement which expired on May 25, 1984. This agreement covered plaintiffs who were employed as salesmen for the Employer. Some of the relevant provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement are included in an Annex to this opinion.

On January 11, 1984, the Employer discharged all of its salesmen employees due to an economic crisis. This action was notified to Mr. Román Vélez Mangual, president of the Confederación Laborista de Puerto Rico, by letter dated January 10, 1984.

Thereafter, on January 13, 1984, Mr. Vélez Mangual submitted a grievance for unjustified discharge before the Grievance Committee.

By letter dated January 20, 1984, Mr. Pérez Sosa scheduled a meeting for January 24, 1984, in accordance with the procedure established in Article XXIV, Section 4, which provides that all grievances arising during the term of the agreement shall be initially treated in an administrative manner between the parties. Subsequently, the meeting was rescheduled and held on February 1, 1984, at the Bureau of Conciliation and Arbitration (the Bureau) of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor. Another meeting was also held by the parties at the Bureau on February 9, 1984.

On February 14, 1984, the parties submitted the grievance to the Bureau as provided in the agreement. Coetaneously, Mr. Vélez Mangual submitted an application for designation of an arbitrator to mediate the grievance concerning the alleged unjustified discharges. This document was accompanied by a letter of even date from Mr. Vélez Mangual to the Director of the Bureau.

Thereafter, upon request of the parties, the grievance was designated a number and the case was scheduled for hearing on August 30, 1984 by the arbitrator, Mr. Angel R. Marin. The hearing was rescheduled for November 30, 1984.

On June 27, 1984, Mr. Vélez Mangual notified the Director of the Bureau that he was withdrawing the grievance before the Bureau because suit had been filed in federal court. Notwithstanding the petition made by Mr. Vélez Mangual, the arbitrator refused to terminate the administrative proceedings, since he found that the Union’s petition lacked legal grounds.

Additionally, the Union also filed an unfair labor practice charge against the employer before the National Labor Relations Board alleging several violations of the National Labor Relations Act. After consideration, the charge was administratively deferred by the National Labor Relations Board upon a finding that the dispute was arguably cognizable under the agreement which contained a binding arbitration clause and that the Employer was willing to arbitrate the dispute.

Notwithstanding the above-cited facts, the Union argues that since it withdrew the unfair labor practice charge before the National Labor Relations Board and the arbitrator, this court is not preempted. Furthermore, the Union argues that it notified the arbitrator that redress would be sought in court in accordance with Article XXV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement which provides:

No Strikes or Lock-Outs
Séction 1: Nor (sic) the Union, nor any of its officers, or members, or groups, or employees of the COMPANY, shall declare a strike or work stoppage in the factory, warehouses, offices or in any other dependency of the COMPANY, nor urge such declaration, directly or indirectly, nor foment a stoppage nor abandon work, nor carry out measures which prejudice industrial peace or production and the normal work of the COMPANY.
Section 2: The COMPANY commits itself not to declare a lock-out.
Section 3: Regardless of the magnitude of the dispute which arises in the factory, warehouses/or offices, it shall be the obligation of the contractual parties to appeal to the Grievance and Complaint Committee in order to find an adequate and appropriate remedy; provided that in the event of a violation of one of the parts of the provisions of this article, the aggrieved party may appeal to the courts in order to protect its rights, without the necessity of first exhausting contractual remedies. (Emphasis supplied).

The aforecited article expressly permits direct resort to the courts only when either party breaches its terms. It refers to the specific terms of that article and not the terms of any other article contained in the agreement. Moreover, Article XXV refers exclusively to two specific instances of breach: a strike by the Union and a lockout by the Employer. Clearly, the parties intended that resort to the grievance and arbitration procedure be non-exclusive only in those two particular circumstances. In the absence of those circumstances, the language is clear that resort to the grievance procedure shall be exclusive.

The record reveals that the Employer “has seen the need to end and terminate the operation of sales and distribution of our Division of Beer and Malt Liquor in all districts” due to an economic crisis. Clearly, this is a termination of operations and not a “lockout”. A “lockout” is “the withholding of employment by an employer from his employees for the purpose of resisting their demands or gaining a concession from them.” Charles J. Morris, The Developing Labor Law, Vol. II, p. 1034 (2d Ed.1983). Since there was no strike and the Employer had not decreed a “lockout”, the court remedy provided in Article XXV was not triggered, and consequently, plaintiff must exhaust the grievance remedies provided in Article XXIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to filing suit under Section 301.

It is axiomatic that if the collective bargaining agreement establishes a mechanism to solve disputes and grievances, the parties should ordinarily adhere to that mechanism and will not be permitted to unilaterally dodge or disregard the same. Differently stated, “[t]he collective bargaining agreement cannot so cavalierly be pushed aside.” Condon v. Local 2944, etc., 683 F.2d 590 (1st Cir.1982). It is to “such voluntarily selected machinery that [the parties] must normally look for resolution of disputes.” Early v. Eastern Transfer, et al, 699 F.2d 552 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 93, 78 L.Ed.2d 100.

Although in a disparate context, the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) stated that:

... the courts of appeals have since consistently concluded that questions of ar-bitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration. We agree. The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.

See also cases cited in note 3 and the case of Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965).

It is obvious that if an employee is allowed to disregard the grievance procedures incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement by the easily formulated allegation that the employer repudiated the grievance procedure or that the union breached its duty of fair representation, we would be effectively destroying the machinery established by the parties for the speedy resolution of their labor disputes. To permit an employee to completely sidestep the available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit “would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements.” Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103, 82 S.Ct. 571, 577, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962). Such a result would be against the clear intention of the parties and against the purposes expressed by Congress in 29 U.S.C. 1739(d). See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976).

Since the employees’ claims are based upon breach of the collective bargaining agreement, they are bound by the terms of that agreement which provides for a grievance and arbitration procedure, as in the ease here. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967).

In Vaca v. Sipes, supra, the Supreme Court recognized certain circumstances under which an employee could obtain judicial review of his breach-of-contract claim despite his failure to resort to his contractual remedies. 386 U.S. at 185. The first was when the conduct of the employer amounted to repudiation of the contractual procedures and second, was when the employee had been prevented from exhausting his contractual remedies by the union’s wrongful refusal to process the grievance.

The record as it stands now fails to show that the employer repudiated or in any way frustrated the grievance process. Quite to the contrary, the facts reveal that the employer was actively participating in the grievance procedures until plaintiffs unilaterally elected to withdraw from arbitration in favor of filing suit in this court. Nor does the record show that the union has breached its duty of fair representation nor have they so alleged.

Finally, we address plaintiffs’ pendent state law claims for breach of contract based on the Employer’s unilateral rescission of the contract (the collective bargaining agreement).

Pendent jurisdiction exists whenever there is a claim arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made under their Authority and the relationship between that claim and the state claim can be found to constitute, but one constitutional case. The state claims must be linked to the federal claim by a “common nucleus of operative facts”, and must be sufficiently substantial to confer federal court jurisdiction. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Clearly, the pendent state law claim must be dismissed under the authority of Gibbs, supra, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. If the federal claim is dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense the state claim should be dismissed as well. Cf. Rice v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 339 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928, 102 S.Ct. 1976, 72 L.Ed.2d 444.

Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The present complaint is dismissed without prejudice that plaintiffs, if they so desire, continue to prosecute their grievances in accordance with the procedures established in the collective bargaining agreement, since that was precisely what the parties bargained for.

The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

ANNEX

ARTICLE XXIV

COMPLAINTS AND GRIEVANCES COMMITTE

Section 1. There shall be a Complaints and Grievances Committee to resolve the controversies brought to its consideration.

Section 3. Any of the signatory parties could file complaints through its official representatives, before the Complaints and Grievances Committee for its consideration and resolution.

Section 4. It is provided that every complaint that arises during the period this Collective Bargaining Agreement is in force, shall be initially treated in an administrative manner between the parties.

Section 5. The term “grievance” is hereby defined as a controversy between the COMPANY, as one party, and one or several employees members of the UNION, as the other party. These controversies shall be limited to any of the following:

A) Any controversy referring to the working conditions covered by this contract or any other working condition that might affect the employees, as long as the same is not an amendment to this contract.
B) Any controversy referring to the interpretation of any of the provisions of this contract.
C) Any controversy that involves the violation of any of the clauses of this contract.

Section 6. The procedure for the solution of the Complaints and Grievances shall adjust to the following rules:

A) The UNION’S Delegate and the Sales Managers in each district shall originally hear every complaint and shall have the power to investigate the facts that motivate it. -To these ends, the proper arrangements shall be made. The complaints shall be heard Fridays unless the same involves the suspension of employment or termination, in which case both parties shall come to an agreement so as to see the case not later than seventy two (72) hours after the action taken. The agreement arrived by those officers shall be included, signed by both parties, in the employee’s records.
******
D)The Complaints and Grievances Committee shall resolve any complaint under its consideration within the term of seven (7) days following the celebration of the hearings that might be necessary.
* * * * . * *
I) Within three (3) days after the final hearing, the Committee shall prepare a record of the agreements reached or in its default, a record of the facts occurred and actions taken in the matter. Said record shall be signed by the members of the Committee.
******
L) The resolution of the Complaints and Grievances Committee shall be final and binding for both parties.
M) It is agreed that by mutual consent of the parties, the first two steps established in Section 6(A) and 6(C) of Article XXIV can be deleted, in order to submit the arising complaint directly to an arbiter, that shall be selected by mutual consent.

Section 7. In the case where the majority of the members of the Committee cannot reach an agreement in the solution of a complaint, an arbiter will then be selected. The arbiter shall be selected by common agreement between the members of the Committee from among the arbiters of the Puerto Rico Labor Department. If the parties could not reach an agreement as to the designation of this arbiter, the designation made by the Secretary of Labor of Puerto Rico to that effect shall prevail.

Section 8. Once the arbiter is selected and appointed, the Complaints and' Grievances Committee shall submit to said arbiter the complaint for its final solution. Said arbiter shall give the complainant and the defendant the opportunity to state their allegations and to prove their points and shall have the power invested in him to summon witnesses and obtain evidence that is pertinent for the best solution of the controversy at hand.

Section 9. The arbiter shall call for a meeting, hold a hearing or as many as necessary and shall decide the complaint within the maximum term of fifteen (15) days after the submission of the case to him.

Section 10. The arbiter’s resolution shall be final, and when the same is in accordance with the law, the parties shall be bound to execute it.

Section 12. In case the Complaints and Grievances Committee or the arbiter decides that the aggrieved employee has been suspended or terminated by the COMPANY without justifiable cause, it shall have the power to order the reinstatement of the employee with retroactive payment as of the date in which he was deprived of his employment and salary. It can also order the retroactive or prospective payment of any salary differential or to provide other benefits that the aggrieved employee has a right to according to the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Likewise, the arbiter could modify the penalty or disciplinary measures imposed by the COMPANY, pursuant to the facts of the case.

      . 29 U.S.C. § 185 provides in part:
      Suits for violation of contract between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect of the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

      . After the drafting of this opinion, the parties filed several motions which indicate, inter alia, that there is still pending before the arbitrator a motion for reconsideration filed by the Union. We have considered these motions and, notwithstanding their contents, our decision today remains unaltered.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ROY, District Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Vernon Dale TRAVIS, Plaintiff, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director Arkansas Department of Correction, Defendant. James Gary WHITTINGTON, Plaintiff, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director Arkansas Department of Correction, Defendant.
    Nos. PB-C-84-309, PB-C-84-311.
    United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Pine Bluff Division.
    April 18, 1985.

      Vernon Dale Travis and James Gary Whittington, plaintiffs, pro se.

    the State was represented by the Attorney General’s office.
   MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROY, District Judge.

The Court has received separate complaints from the above-named plaintiffs, who are currently confined at the Tucker Maximum Security Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction. Plaintiffs allege that their First Amendment rights are being violated by the Department’s policy of scanning both incoming and outgoing mail directed to and received from media representatives. Plaintiffs assert that the Department’s policy of reading media mail has resulted in suppression of criticism of the correctional institution and institution officials. The defendant denies that- the Department has a policy of reading either incoming or outgoing mail, but affirmatively states that all non-privileged mail is subject to being checked for contraband materials and is occasionally scanned for reasons of institutional security.

Upon a review of the plaintiffs’ complaints, it was determined that because of the commonality of the issues involved, and in the interest of judicial economy, the most appropriate method of considering the allegations raised by plaintiffs would bé to conduct a joint hearing. An evidentiary hearing was conducted by United States Magistrate Robert W. Faulkner on January 29, 1985, in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Plaintiffs appeared pro se, while the defendant was represented by Deputy Attorney. General A. Carter Hardage.

At the hearing, inmate Travis testified that he believed that he has a right to uncensored correspondence with members of the media. Currently, the Department’s policy regarding general correspondence provides that inmates place their unsealed letters in the mailbox for inspection of contraband. Incoming general correspondence is opened by prison officials and also checked for contraband materials prior to the inmate’s receipt of his mail. Inmate Travis stated that he has sent several letters to the Arkansas Democrat for publication in the “Voices” column. Inmate Travis also stated that only the letters that he sent through third parties, including an attorney and legal organizations, have been printed. He suggested that officials may have tampered with some of his letters because the letters were critical of the correctional institution, its policies, and its officials. On cross-examination, inmate Travis testified that he did not-have any copies of the letters which he intimated were withheld from the mail by prison officials, and acknowledged that not all letters sent to the “Voices” column were ultimately printed. The defendant offered into evidence copies of several of inmate Travis’ letters (Defendant’s Exhibits 1-5) which were published in the Arkansas Democrat newspaper.

Inmate James Gary Whittington testified that he had corresponded with reporter Ted Gup of the Washington Post in September and October of 1984 and had mailed several letters to him through third parties. He also testified that he had sent several letters to the Arkansas Democrat through third parties. Defendant’s Exhibits 6-9 are copies of inmate Whittington’s letters which have been published in the “Voices” column of the Arkansas Democrat. Inmate Whittington stated that he attempted to send a sealed letter to a media representative and that it was returned to him. He also stated that having to send mail through a third party because of his concern for censorship caused a delay in the receipt of his mail and that he believed that correspondence with media sources should fall in the privileged mail category.

Larry Norris, Warden of the Tucker Maximum Security Unit, testified regarding the Department’s mail policy. (See Defendant’s Exhibit 10 for the Department’s administrative regulations.) He testified that neither Travis nor Whittington had ever complained to him about problems regarding any correspondence to media sources. He also testified that neither Mr. Gup nor any other member of the press had requested permission to interview inmate Travis or Whittington, nor had they filed an application with the Arkansas Department of Correction to do so. Warden Norris stated that mail sent to and received from members of the press is not censored and that the reason that such mail is required to be unsealed is for purposes of inspection for contraband. He stated that the Department’s policy regarding all general mail, which includes media mail, is to have the mail opened and inspected by the prison’s mail officer and then distributed to the inmates.

Director Lockhart testified that legal mail is entitled to a higher degree of privacy and security than mail sent to media representatives. He further testified that the prison’s mail officer can refer to a list of attorneys and courts to ensure that mail marked as legal mail is in fact legal mail, while no such list is available for reference in determining media sources. He opined that there was no less restrictive means of dealing with media mail than the present method and that it would be more burdensome on the institution and its personnel to handle media mail like legal mail. Mr. Lockhart further opined that changing the policy regarding the handling of media mail would not aid in rehabilitation or increase safety measures for inmates. On cross-examination, he testified that the mail has been used to introduce contraband materials, including drugs, money, and weapons, into the prison. Director Lockhart stated that the Department’s policy regarding interviews with inmates is to check the status of the inmate in regards to potential security problems, then check with the inmate and his attorney to see if they would consent to be interviewed.

The case law regarding privileged mail is clear that privileged prisoner mail may not be opened for inspection of contraband except in the presence of the inmate. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Privileged mail has been defined in this circuit as mail to or from an inmate’s attorney which is identified as such. The definition of legal mail also includes mail to or from the courts. Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir.1981). Other circuits have included mail sent to and received from medial sources in the privileged mail category. Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local #82, of American Newspaper Guild, et al. v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062. (9th Cir.1973); Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.1978). In Guajardo, supra, the Court found that prison officials were properly required to allow inmates to send media mail unopened and to receive media mail that would be opened only for inspection of contraband in the inmate’s presence, provided that prison authorities had reasonable time, when necessary, to verify that an addressee was actually a member of a media organization.

A recent case also held that a prison regulation which permitted personnel from the Department of Correction to inspect mail from residents in administrative segregation sent to media representatives infringed on First Amendment rights of both residents and the press by raising the possibility of censorship, and that inspection was not justified to check for contraband leaving the correction facility. Burton v. Foltz, 599 F.Supp. 114 (E.D.Mich.1984). In Foltz, the District Court noted that residents in the general population are specifically allowed to send uncensored correspondence to media representatives, citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), and Guajardo, supra, for the contention that persons in custody have a constitutional right to have mail sent to members of the media unopened, 599 F.Supp. at 116-117.

The testimony elicited from the defendant and Warden Norris noted that it would be possible to send media mail in the same manner as legal mail by having inmates show the mail officer their opened envelope and correspondence and then seal it. The Court notes that unhindered communication between prison inmates and the media protects important interests of- the inmates, the press, and the general public. The Supreme Court has held that the media has “a First Amendment right to receive letters from inmates criticizing jail officials and reporting on conditions.” Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 2597, 57 L.Ed.2d 553 (1978). “Allowing inspection of media mail will chill open communication by these residents with the media since it allows critics to be identified, creating fear of reprisals.” Procunier, supra, 416 U.S. at 424, 94 S.Ct. at 1816 (Justice Marshall, concurring). The Court finds that handling media correspondence like legal mail would not place an impermissible burden on prison personnel. Further, after balancing the considerations of an increased workload on mailroom personnel against the First Amendment rights of prison residents, the Court is convinced that the interest in protecting unrestricted media correspondence outweighs any possibility of additional duties being placed on prison personnel.

The Court finds that although the plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient proof to support their claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief is appropriate, and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Arkansas Department of Correction adopt policies or regulations in conformity with this Memorandum and Order concerning mail sent to and received from media representatives.


author: BUA, District Judge.

text:
    Michael L. SHAKMAN and Paul M. Lurie, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF COOK COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
    No. 69 C 2145.
    United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.
    April 18, 1985.
    See also, D.C., 508 F.Supp. 1059, D.C., 508 F.Supp. 1063.
    C. Richard Johnson, Isham, Lincoln & Beale, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

      Richard M. Daley, State’s Atty. of Cook County by Randolph T. Kemmer, Asst. State’s Atty., Chicago, Ill., for defendants Elrod, Rosewell, Kusper, Hynes, Dunne, and Daley.
    Jerome H. Torshen, James T. Ryan, Greenberger, Krauss & Jacobs, Chtd., Chicago, Ill., for defendant Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County.
    Jerome H. Torshen, Peter Fitzpatrick, Chicago, Ill., for The Democratic Party County Central Committee for Cook County and Edward R. Yrdolyak.
   ORDER

BUA, District Judge.

The following defendants have filed motions to alter or amend the Court’s April 4, 1983 judgment in this cause: Democratic Party County Central Committee for Cook County and its members; Edward R. Yrdol-yak; Forest Preserve District of Cook County; Richard J. Elrod; Edward J. Rose-well; Stanley T. Kusper, Jr.; Thomas C. Hynes and George W. Dunne. 569 F.Supp. 177. For the reasons stated below, defendants’ motions are granted in part and denied in part.

Defendants’ misinterpretation of the Decree does not warrant reconsideration or amendment of the April 4 Judgment Order. First, the injunctive provisions of the Court’s judgment are neither vague nor overbroad. The Decree does not inhibit anyone’s voluntary political activities, but rather the judgment simply provides that, for non-exempt jobs, a person’s lawful political activity, or lack of such activity, is to have nothing to do with getting or keeping a job. Neither does the Decree impose a civil service system as defendants contend. See Judgment Order dated April 4, 1983, at 2 (“The Judgment goes no further than to attempt to eliminate political considerations in the hiring of government employees. It does not impose a civil service system nor does it necessitate that a merit system be utilized.”) Second, defendants’ argument that the Decree improperly excludes party leaders from any role in the hiring process is without merit. Although the Decree does prohibit the existing system by which hiring decisions are delegated to ward and township committeemen, the Decree does not prohibit party leaders from disseminating public information concerning job openings, referring people to employment offices of the defendants, or even from recommending persons about whom they have specific job related information. The Decree simply prohibits hiring which gives political recommendations more weight than other relevant recommendations (including recommendations of rival political groups). Third, defendants argue that the Decree is overbroad because it applies to “all others in active concert or participation with defendants_” Defendants’ argument however, is without merit since the language of the Decree is taken verbatim from Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendants’ objections to the reporting requirements of the Decree are similarly without merit. Given the long history of the patronage hiring practices in issue here, the requirement that there be, for a limited period, a report on all politically recommended hiring is an entirely reasonable monitoring device. The Decree does not prohibit any hiring of such persons. The Decree does, however, enable the parties to determine if politically recommended hiring occurs to such an extent as to question the general compliance with the provisions of the decree. This reporting provision of the Judgment is vital for there to be adequate monitoring of compliance with the Decree, without detailed judicial supervision of hiring systems. The provisions are modest and reasonable requirements.

Notwithstanding defendants’ argument to the contrary, the enforcement provisions of the judgment are not overly broad. Defendants argue that registered voters should not be allowed to enforce the Decree. This provision of the decree, however, serves to enable the protected classes of persons to enforce the decree. By allowing enforcement actions to be brought by registered voters, the Decree provides a. means for the protected classes to enforce the Decree while maintaining privacy as to how one casts one’s ballot.

Neither are the provisions of the Decree for interim exemptions inappropriate. The Judgment provides that the Court’s jurisdiction is retained to determine which positions should be exempt from the Decree. Exemptions are necessary in order to ensure that prevailing candidates are able lawfully to direct the policies of the governmental office to which they are elected. The Decree provides for interim exemptions from its provisions, until defendants establish which positions need permanently to be exempted. For the County officers, the Decree provides exemptions for private secretaries, executive heads of departments and, in total, up to 125 additional positions. The additional positions are to be designated by the governing board of the County, its Board of Commissioners. This technique of dealing with exemptions for County officers was necessitated precisely because those officers defaulted in requesting exemptions from the decree. No County officer has ever filed a petition for a single position to be exempt. In light of the County officers’ failure to seek exemptions, the provisions of interim exemptions are eminently reasonable. Likewise, the Central Committee’s argument that the number of interim exemptions is too small is without merit in light of defendants’ failure to petition the Court for additional interim exemptions.

Defendant Forest Preserve District’s contention that it has been denied an opportunity to defend itself is frivolous. Defendants’ argument that the Court erred in granting plaintiffs summary judgment on liability is equally without merit.

Finally, three minor aspects of the Court’s April 4, 1983 Judgment are amended as follows:

In Paragraph C of the April 4, 1983 Judgment Order, the following defendants are deleted: City of Chicago; Jane M. Byrne, individually and as Mayor of the City of Chicago; Chicago Park District; Richard J. Elrod, individually and as Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois; Morgan M. Finley, individually and as Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; Edward J. Rosewell, individually and as Treasurer of Cook County, Illinois. These defendants have entered into separate consent judgments.

(1) In Paragraph L, line 13, of the April 4, 1983 Judgment Order, the word “member” is deleted. Since any person who votes in an Illinois primary is technically a “member” of a political party, it will be sufficient to require defendants to submit affidavits of compliance which report all direct or indirect recommendations or sponsorships from “a political party official, employee or agent.”

(2) In Paragraph M of the April 4, 1983 Judgment Order, the phrase “years 1983 through 1992” is amended to read “years 1984 through 1992.” -

For all of the above reasons, defendants’ motions to alter or amend judgment are granted in part and denied in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.