author: BUA, District Judge.

text:
    Erlinda REGNER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant.
    No. 83 C 6957.
    United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.
    Jan. 29, 1985.

      Paddy Harris McNamara, Paddy Harris McNamara, Ltd., Chicago, 111., for plaintiff.
    Darka Papushkewych, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, 111., for defendant.
   ORDER

BUA, District Judge.

Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment in a promotion discrimination case under Title VII. Plaintiff Erlinda Regner, a Filipino, is employed as a Librarian I by the defendant Chicago Public Library (CPL). For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. FACTS

On four occasions, plaintiff Erlinda Regner applied for a promotion at the Chicago Main Library. The requirements for promotion to Librarian II are a master’s degree in Library Science and one year of experience as a professional librarian. Regner has fulfilled both requirements. In addition, she has been employed as a professional librarian in the Chicago Public Library System since 1977. She has been in the Business/Scienee/Technology division in the Central Library since December, 1979.

All four promotions for which the plaintiff applied were in the Business/Science/Technology division. Pursuant to the selection procedure of the CPL, the candidates were interviewed and rated on their responses as well as the knowledge, skills and abilities identified as relevant to each such position. Regner was not selected for any of those positions. She filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)), alleging that she was not chosen because of her national origin (Filipino).

Plaintiff bases her claim of discrimination on the adverse impact which the selection procedure had on minorities. In addition, she asserts that the selection procedure was not validated as racially neutral and job-related. Her disparate impact theory rests on statistical evidence regarding the number of minority librarians promoted to Librarian II over a two and one-half year period and the number of years which minority librarians spend at the CPL before being promoted.

The statistical evidence on the number of promotions made over the two-and-one-half-year period shows that 25 promotions or upgrades were granted to Librarian II and III levels at the CPL Main Library. Of these 25 promotions, 24 white librarians and 1 black librarian were promoted. A total of 61 promotions or upgrades to Librarian II and III levels were made in the entire CPL system, which includes the Main Library and all of its branches. Of these 61 promotions, 47 white librarians, 10 black librarians, 3 Asian librarians, and 1 Hispanic librarian were promoted. The percentage rates of promotion for the four groups represented in the 61 promotions is as follows: whites, 77.05 percent; blacks, 16.39 percent; Asian, 4.92 percent; and Hispanic, 1.64 percent.

The statistical evidence on the number of eligible applicants for these promotions shows that there were 81 librarians eligible for Librarian II as of January 1, 1981, broken down as follows: 63 whites amounting to 77.78 percent; 11 blacks amounting to 13.58 percent; 5 Asians amounting to 6.17 percent; and 2 Hispanics amounting to 2.47 percent. As of January 1, 1982, 89 eligible librarians break down as follows: 69 whites amounting to 77.53 percent; 12 blacks amounting to 13.48 percent; 6 Asians amounting to 6.74 percent; and 2 Hispanics amounting to 2.25 percent. As of 1983, 91 eligible librarians break down as follows: 71 whites amounting to 78.02 percent; 12 blacks amounting to 13.19 percent; 6 Asians amounting to 6.59 percent; and 2 Hispanics amounting to 2.2 percent. These statistics represent the number of Librarian I’s who were employed for at least one year prior to the relevant time period. The number also represents librarians for the entire CPL system, including the Main Library and all branch libraries.

Other statistical evidence reveals percentages of racial composition for all persons qualified to be librarians in the Chicago area, according to Census for Population and Housing for the Chicago Metropolitan area. The racial composition is as follows: whites, 87.1 percent; blacks, 8.1 percent; Asians, 2.7 percent; and Hispanics, 1.7 percent. In addition, the overall percentages of persons employed within the CPL reflects the following statistics: whites, 76.4 percent; blacks, 17.1 percent; Asians, 4.4 percent; and Hispanics, 2.0 percent. In addition, there is statistical evidence which shows the average number of years elapsed between the date of beginning employment and the date of promotion: whites, 4.03 years; blacks, 5.13 years; Asians, 7.08 years; and Hispanics, 6.08 years.

Plaintiff also presented expert testimony regarding the required job description and interview questions for the position of Librarian II in the Business/Science/Technology division, which is the position which Regner applied for each time. Defendant submitted job descriptions and interview questions for the positions of Management Materials Librarian and Economics and Finance Librarian, both of which positions are in the Business/Science/Technology Division. In addition, defendant has provided the ratings of Regner and those selected for these two positions.

II. DISCUSSION

Under Title VII, the plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Furnco Construction Corporation v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). After a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the employer to “prove that he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race.” Id. at 577, 98 S.Ct. at 2950. In cases alleging discrimination in promotions, the plaintiff makes a prima facie case by proving that the defendant’s promotional practice “selects applicants for ... promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from the pool of applicants.” Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 406, 425, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2366, 2375, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). When a plaintiff relies on statistical evidence to demonstrate the disparate impact of an allegedly discriminatory practice, the statistical disparity demonstrated must be “significant” or “substantial.” Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977); Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921, 926 (7th Cir.1982).

In the present case, plaintiff relies solely on statistical evidence to establish her prima facie case. Therefore, the Court will focus chiefly on the number of promotions and their composition as compared to the pool of eligible applicants in order to determine if the proper statistical evidence supports Regner’s disparate impact theory.

1. Statistical Evidence

Plaintiff attempts to make her case for disparate impact by comparing the number of minorities chosen out of all 25 promotions at the Main Library with the number of minorities present in the pool of eligible librarians for the entire CPL system, including the branch libraries. The number of minorities (1) compared to the number of promotions (25) at the Main Library yields a minority percentage of 3.85 percent. Plaintiff compares this percentage with the minority percentage in the pool of eligible applicants for the entire CPL system, which is 22 percent. Comparing 22 percent with 3.85 percent, the plaintiff concludes that there is a significant disparity between defendant’s promotional practice and the racial pattern contained in the pool of eligible applicants. In order for defendant’s promotional practice to match the racial pattern in the applicant pool, the defendant had to promote 5-6 minority librarians instead of just one.

Defendant argues that the plaintiff uses the statistical evidence in a deceptive manner because she uses only promotions from the Main Library and then compares those figures to an applicant pool which encompasses eligible librarians in the entire CPL system, including the branch libraries. In order to present fair statistical evidence, defendant contends that the number of promotions should encompass the entire CPL system. If the number of promotions from the entire CPL system is used, the minority percentage of promotion is almost 23 percent, which slightly exceeds the minority percentage in the pool of eligible applicants.

In addition, defendant argues that, since the plaintiff is a Filipino and therefore an Asian, the minority percentage only for promoted Asians should be used in comparison to the minority percentage for Asians in the pool of eligible applicants. The Asian percentage of promotions for the entire CPL system is 4.92 percent, as compared with the Asian percentage of eligible applicants, which is 6.17 percent, according to plaintiff’s statistics. Comparing 4.92 percent to 6.17 percent, the defendant concludes that there is not a significant disparity because one additional Asian librarian promoted would destroy any disparity and therefore plaintiff has failed to make out her prima facie case.

When statistical evidence is .used to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the proper comparison is between the composition of the relevant work force (Librarian I’s promoted or upgraded to Librarian II) and the qualified population in the relevant labor market. Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 963 (D.C.Cir.1979), citing Hazelwood School District v. United States, supra, 433 U.S. at 308, 97 S.Ct. at 2741. In a promotion case such as this case, absent discriminatory promotion practices, the proportion of the protected group in each of the job classifications and grade levels should be approximately equal to the proportion of the protected group with the minimum necessary qualifications for promotion in the employer’s labor force as a whole. Davis v. Califano, supra, 613 F.2d at 964; see also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n. 20, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1856-57 n. 20, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); Metrocare v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 679 F.2d 922, 930 (D.C. Cir.1982); Paxton v. Union National Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 564 (8th Cir.1982). Therefore, the relevant labor market is made up only of persons qualified for the promotions at issue. Metrocare v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, supra, 679 F.2d at 930; see also Movement For Opportunity v. General Motors, 622 F.2d 1235, 1245, 1258 (7th Cir.1980); EEOC v. United Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d 147, 154 (4th Cir.1980).

In the present case, the pool of eligible applicants encompasses all Librarian I’s employed by the CPL, including those in the branch libraries, who have at least one year of experience as a professional librarian. The Court finds that it is proper to exclude from the applicant pool qualified librarians not employed by the CPL because the CPL’s promotional practices concentrate on promotion from within the entire CPL system, as opposed to lateral hiring. Johnson v. Uncle Ben’s, Inc., 628 F.2d 419, 425 (5th Cir.1980). Therefore, in this promotion case, the organization in which the plaintiff is an employee, the CPL, is the relevant labor market. Davis v. Califano, supra, 613 F.2d at 965.

The more crucial issue involving the statistical evidence in this case is whether the Main Library only or the entire CPL system, including the branch libraries, should be used in examining the number of Asians promoted in relation to the total number of promotions to Librarian II. While the Court finds that the applicant pool should be limited to qualified librarians within the entire CPL system, it is reluctant to further limit the number of promotions to the Main Library. Plaintiff argues that the number of promotions. should be limited to promotions occurring at the Main Library and should not include promotions in the branch libraries. In support of this argument, plaintiff in her affidavit contends that professional advancement is best at and her field of specialization is centered at the Main Library. The Court rejects the plaintiffs argument to limit the number of promotions to the Main Library for two reasons.

First, the Court finds that qualified librarians from the entire CPL system, including the branch libraries, may apply for promotions at the Main Library. In addition, qualified librarians from the Main Library may apply for promotions throughout the entire CPL system. Therefore, the free flow of promotions within the entire CPL system does not justify limiting the number of promotions in this case to a specific library branch or a specific division of the library.

Second, the Court finds that plaintiffs reliance on the disparate impact theory as the sole basis for her discrimination claim prevents her from arguing for promotion statistics limited to the Main Library. It is uncontested that the plaintiff applied for four promotions, which were all in the Business/Science/Technology division. Plaintiff has alleged no overt discriminatory acts in relation to the interviewing procedure for these four promotions. It is clear that plaintiff could not make a prima facie case of discrimination based on these four promotions alone, but rather must rely on the disparate impact of defendant’s promotional procedure on a larger group of applicants. At the same time she invokes this impact theory on a larger group of applicants in relation to a larger number of promotions, plaintiff seeks to limit the number of promotions to the Main Library in order to show a significant or substantial statistical disparity. The Court believes that it would be improper to allow the plaintiff to gerrymander the statistical evidence in this way. Therefore, the Court finds that the appropriate number of promotions encompasses the entire CPL system, including the branch libraries.

Comparing the Asian percentage of promotions or upgrades to Librarian II within the entire CPL system with the Asian percentage of eligible applicants (Librarian I’s with one year of professional librarian experience) within the entire CPL system, the Court finds that the Asian promotion percentage of 4.92 percent and the Asian qualified applicant percentage of 6.17 percent do not demonstrate a significant or substantial statistical disparity. The Court’s finding is bolstered by the fact that one additional promotion of an Asian librarian to Librarian II would eliminate any disparity between the defendant’s promotional practices and the Asian percentage of qualified applicants. Having failed to demonstrate the alleged disparate impact of CPL’s promotional practices, plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination and therefore defendant’s motion for summary judgment on her claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e is granted.

The Court rejects plaintiff’s argument based on statistics regarding time-in-grade for promotions from Librarian I to Librarian II for two reasons. First, there is no evidence of the time period over which plaintiff’s time-in-grade statistics have been gathered. The Court is concerned with 61 promotions which occurred approximately over a two-and-one-half-year period. Since the plaintiff’s time-in-grade statistics cover 100 promotions, the Court assumes that they exceed the-two-and-one-half-year period and therefore cannot be accurate statistics in this case.

Second, plaintiff cites Freeman v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 398, 403 (D.C.Cir.1982) for the proposition that time-in-grade statistics can be used as a basis for determining liability in a single plaintiff case. In Freeman, the court held that, where the plaintiff had achieved the promotion in question, she must show that she was promoted at a slower rate than others similarly situated but outside of her protected group. Id. In the present case, plaintiff has not been promoted and has not shown the qualifications necessary to gain a Librarian II promotion over other candidates. In this situation, the Court rejects the use of time-in-grade statistics, representing others who have been promoted, as the sole basis for a prima facie case of discrimination, especially in light of the Court’s finding that plaintiff has shown no disparate impact caused by defendant’s promotional practices.

III. CONCLUSION

Since the plaintiff has failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination, and since the statistical evidence here is uncontested on cross-motions for summary judgment, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ALLEN SHARP; Chief Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Mary A. CLEM, Personal Representative of the Estate of Cary Lee Clem, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
    No. S 83-430.
    United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.
    Jan. 29, 1985.

      Gerald A. Kamm, South Bend, Ind., Robert L. Dalmbert, Columbus, Ind., for plaintiff.
    R. Lawrence Steele, Jr., U.S. Atty., Donald P. Moroz, Asst. U.S. Atty., South Bend, Ind., Patrick O. Cavanaugh, Trial Atty., Torts Branch, Civ. Div., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant.
   MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP; Chief Judge.

This case is an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. filed by plaintiff to recover damages from the United States for the wrongful death of her husband while at the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Park. This matter was tried by the court without a jury on November 29, 1984 and the parties were given until December 10, 1984 to file final memoranda in support of their positions. Because of the difficult legal questions presented in this case, further oral argument was held in this case on December 21, 1984 and the matter was taken under advisement. The parties were given until January 7, 1985 to file supplemental briefs which they have done. This Memorandum and Order contains the findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

On July 28, 1982, Mr. and Mrs. Clem and their daughter visited the Indiana Dune National Lakeshore Park (Park) in Northwest Indiana. The Park is located on property owned by the United States of America and is operated under the auspices of the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior (NPS). The authorized boundary of the Park consisted of approximately 13,000 acres maintained by approximately 50 employees of the federal government. The Clems were not required to pay any type of fee in gaining admission to the Park and its various facilities.

Shortly after their arrival at the Park at approximately 11:00 to 11:30 A.M. on July 28, 1982, the Clems went to the Park’s Visitor Center, to which they were directed by various signs located both within and outside the authorized boundary of the Park. At the Visitors Center, Mr. Clem picked up a brochure, which included a map of the Park, and he and Mrs. Clem viewed a film which described the environs of the Park and its activities. The film also contained a safety message about swimming in Lake Michigan. The brochure/map that the decedent obtained and reviewed on July 28, 1982 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 39), is only available from the NPS upon request. The map depicted in the brochure indicated which beaches were under the supervision of lifeguards. The brochure also contained the following written provisions:

Swimming. Beaches with parking are' at West Beach (parking fee in summer), Kemil Road, Central Avenue, and Mt. Baldy. Be careful — Lake Michigan waters can be treacherous. Lifeguards work West Beach and Kemil Road during summer. West Beach has showers, bathrooms, and concessions. The others have portable toilets (no water).
The best place to begin your visit to the Lakeshore is at its Visitor Center 5 kilometers (3 miles) east of Indiana 49 on U.S. 12 at Kemil Road. Here you find information, maps, public telephones, activity schedule and free “Singing Sands Almanac” newspaper, an auditorium slide and tape program, book store, library, and a short loop nature trail through wooded dunes. Open daily except on December 25, January 1 and Thanksgiving.
Park Rangers. Rangers are on duty to help you enjoy yourself and to help protect both you and the lakeshore; ranger stations are shown on the map.

Mr. and Mrs. Clem decided to visit Mt. Baldy because it was the largest dune in the Park, to explore the dunes and beach area. Mt. Baldy is a sand dune located in the extreme eastern section of the Park. Nearby is one of five beaches located on land adjacent to Lake Michigan and was and is within the authorized boundary of the Park. Only two of the five beaches, West Beach and Kemil Road, were guarded beaches in the Summer of 1982. Mt. Baldy was, and remains, an unguarded beach area pursuant to the Indiana Dunes General Management Plan of 1980.

At approximately 1:15 P.M. on July 28, 1982, the Clems arrived at Mt. Baldy and noticed a sign posted near the parking lot entrance which contained, along with other information, the following language “Use caution-Lifeguards not Provided.” Father Raymond Schulte, a Roman Catholic Priest, who often swam at Mt. Baldy, testified with respect to the sign as follows:

Q. What does the term “use caution” mean to you, Father?
A. I would say not go out over your head.
Q. How about — what does it mean when it says “Lifeguard not provided” to you?
A. Kind of swimming at your own risk.

After discussing the significance and the meaning of this sign, the Clems proceeded to the beach area where they observed 40 or 50 people in the water and on the beach. The Clems did not notice any signs on the beach advising them of existing water conditions or prohibiting swimming.

Shortly after 1:30 P.M., Mr. and Mrs. Clem and their daughter entered the waters of Lake Michigan for the first time. They had never been to the Park before and none of them had ever before been swimming in Lake Michigan. The waves at this time were between 2 and 4V2 feet in height, with an undertow condition present. Mr. Clem proceeded to go out swimming past the sandbar and after a while he came back to his wife and daughter. At that time, Mrs. Clem proceeded out to the sandbar. When she attempted to swim back to shore but was unable to make any progress, she called for assistance. Her husband and another young man attempted to assist her but their efforts were ineffective. Father Schulte and his friend who were swimming on the sandbar approximately 40 yards from shore, heard shouting and proceeded out deeper to assist the Clems who were another 40 to 50 yards out further from shore. Father Schulte and his friend found they could not help them and swam back to the sandbar and shouted for help. Some additional people from shore brought inner tubes out to assist. Mrs. Clem eventually got to shore but her husband was caught in the undertow and drowned. Mr. Clem was pronounced dead shortly after the resuscitation efforts of other swimmers and Michigan City medical technicians proved unsuccessful.

In July of 1982, the Park employed beach and parking lot attendants, maintenance personnel and Park technicians, commonly referred to as rangers. On July 28, 1982, two rangers were assigned to patrol the Eastern District of the Park. In addition to patrol, they also had a multitude of other tasks to perform. All staffing and personnel decisions which relate to this case were made by the office of the Chief Ranger acting under the authority of the Park’s Superintendent. Funding for the Park’s operations stem directly from congressional appropriations allotted to the Department of the Interior. It is within the funding constraints imposed by Congress that the Park must operate.

The Park maintained a radio communication system so that lifeguards, rangers and various stations, including the “Visitor Center”, could be kept up-to-date on current events. Shortly after 10:00 A.M., the West District, which was a guarded beach, radioed to the Dispatcher that the beach was closed because of a bad undertow. The East District lifeguard at Kemil Road Beach also notified the Dispatcher that they had closed the beach because of bad undertow shortly after 10:00 A.M.

It was the unwritten policy of the Park in July of 1982 for rangers to check all easily accessible beaches, including Mt. Baldy Beach so as to warn swimmers of dangerous conditions that were known. On July 28, 1982 various park rangers, after being advised of the guarded beaches being closed for swimming because of the bad undertow proceeded to follow the Park policy and notify individuals using the unguarded beaches of. the danger of strong undertow.

The plaintiff, Mrs. Clem, prior to instituting this lawsuit, filed a claim for wrongful death of Cary Lee Clem with the United States of America, Department of the Interior, National Park Services. Said claim was denied by defendant. At the time of his death, Mr. Clem was 35 years old and was employed by Reliance. Electric in a supervisory capacity.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Federal Tort Claims Act (F.T.C. A.), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2671 et seq., constitutes a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 769, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941). In conferring jurisdiction on federal district courts with respect to tort claims against the government, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) specifically provides:

[T]he district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages ... for ... personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act of omission occurred.

This section, in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 2674 permits the United States to be held liable only in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual would be under similar circumstances. See Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319, 77 S.Ct. 374, 376, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 (1957); see also Proud v. United States, 723 F.2d 705, 706 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 3536, 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984). Since the alleged negligent acts and omissions of the NPS occurred in Indiana, the United States’ liability is governed by the substantive law of that state.

In order to recover in a negligence action under Indiana law, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence three elements: (1) a duty on the part of the defendant in relation to plaintiff; (2) failure on the part of the defendant to conform its conduct to the requisite standard of care required by the relationship; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff resulting from that failure. Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604, 610-11, 308 N.E.2d 701 (1974); Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Wilson, 408 N.E.2d 144 (Ind.App.1980); Palace Bar, Inc. v. Fearnot, 269 Ind. 405, 381 N.E.2d 858 (1978); City of Indianapolis v. Parker, 427 N.E.2d 456 (Ind.App. 1981). At the end of the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence in this case, the defendant moved, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for dismissal of this case on the ground that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate any right to relief for several reasons, namely:

1. As landowner of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Park, the United States is entitled to the immunity provided by I.C. § 14-2-6-3, inasmuch as the decedent was gratuitously engaged in a recreational activity at the time of the subject incident;
2. The purportedly negligent acts and omissions of the National Park Service, which serve as the principal bases for plaintiffs’ case, are shielded by the discretionary function exception to the F.T. C.A. Specifically, the decisions of the National Park Service to issue or not issue warnings pertaining to the conditions of Lake Michigan, the content of the signs posted at the Mt. Baldy area, and the decisions to provide lifeguards and rescue equipment only at a limited number of designated beach areas all constitute discretionary acts within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a);
3. The United States did not breach an actionable duty owed to the plaintiff’s decedent so as to render it negligent;
4. Even if the defendant was negligent, there has been no showing that such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s decedent’s death;
5. The decedent voluntarily assumed any risks incident to swimming in Lake Michigan off the shores of an unguarded beach area; and
6. The decedent was contributorily negligent in his drowning death.

The court overruled defendant’s motion for dismissal at that time. The defendant renewed its motion at the close of all the evidence on the same grounds and the court reserved ruling thereon. The issues presented by defendant will be addressed separately.

A. INDIANA RECREATIONAL USE STATUTE

Indiana Code Section 14-2-6-3 provides as follows:

Any person who goes upon or through the premises including, but not as a limitation, lands, caves, waters, and private ways of another with or without permission to hunt, fish, swim, trap, camp, hike, sightsee, or for any other purposes, without the payment of monetary consideration, or with the payment of monetary consideration directly or indirectly on his behalf by an agency of the state or federal government, is not thereby entitled to any assurance- that the premises are safe for such purpose. The owner of such premises does not assume responsibility for nor incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act or failure to act of other persons using such premises. The provisions of this section shall not be construed as affecting the existing case law of Indiana of liability of owners or possessors of premises with respect to business invitees in commercial establishments nor to invited guests nor shall this section be construed as to affect the attractive nuisance doctrine. Nothing in this section contained shall excuse the owner or occupant of premises from liability for injury to persons or property caused by the malicious or illegal acts of the owner or occupant.

The Indiana legislature’s reason for enacting this statute is apparent: to encourage landowners to open their property to the public for recreational purposes free of charge, which purpose must be borne in mind when construing a statute so as to avoid negation of the legislature’s intent. See Schwartz v. Zent, 448 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. App.1983). In Schwartz, the Indiana Court, of Appeals acknowledged that in the absence of ambiguity, the court was compelled to “give effect to the plain meaning of the language employed by the legislature.” Id. at 39. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals declined the invitation to narrowly construe the statute, which foretells the Indiana courts’ intention to broadly construe I.C. § 14-2-6-3 in order to fully effectuate its purpose.

In the case presently before the court, the evidence clearly establishes that the Clems were swimming in Lake Michigan in an area adjacent to Mt. Baldy beach at the time of the incident. As such, they were engaged in an activity explicitly covered by the statute. Second, assuming without deciding that the United States was the owner of the property for the purpose of deciding this issue, the only issue remaining is whether any of the exceptions stated in the statute are applicable in this case.

The Clems paid no admission fee nor was one paid on their behalf, in gaining access to the Park or to its various facilities. Thus, no economic benefit was derived by the federal government so as to trigger operation of the statute’s consideration exception. Further, there is no issue involving an attractive nuisance nor allegations by the plaintiff that the alleged injury was caused by any malicious or illegal acts of the federal government. Accordingly, if the Clems were to come within any exception contained in the statute, it would have to be with respect to Indiana case law relating to business invitees in commercial establishments or invited guests. The plaintiff basically concedes that the business invitee in commercial establishment exception does not apply but maintains that the invited guest exception is applicable.

Under Indiana law, a person entering upon the land of another comes on to the land either as an invitee, a licensee or a trespasser. Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Co., 400 N.E.2d 1142, 1145 (Ind.App. 1980). An invitee is a person who goes on to the.land of another at the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant either to transact business or for the mutual benefit of the invitee and the owner or occupant. Id. at 1146; Hammond v. Allegretti, 262 Ind. 82, 311 N.E.2d 821 (1974); Mullins v. Easton, 176 Ind.App. 590, 376 N.E.2d 1178 (1978); Verplank v. Commercial Bank, 145 Ind.App. 324, 251 N.E.2d 52 (1969). A licensee is one who enters the premises of another for his own convenience, curiosity or entertainment. Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Co., 400 N.E.2d at 1146; Xaver v. Blazak, 181 Ind.App. 245, 391 N.E.2d 653 (1979); Pierce v. Walters, 152 Ind.App. 321, 283 N.E.2d 560 (1972). Inasmuch as the parties basically agree that the Clems were not trespassers, this court must determine which of the two categories defined above encompasses the status of the Clems on July 28, 1982 and how that status relates to the Indiana statute in question.

In support of the position that the Clems were “invited guests” of the Park, the plaintiff cites several cases involving premises upon which public entertainment was involved in which the courts found that the users of such premises were invitees. See, e.g., Bearman v. University of Notre Dame, 453 N.E.2d 1196 (Ind.App.1983); Rouch v. Bisig, 147 Ind.App. 142, 258 N.E.2d 883 (1970); Pfisterer v. Grisham, 137 Ind.App. 565, 210 N.E.2d 75 (1965). A review of those cases, however, clearly indicates that the presence on the premises of the individuals involved arose out of a business- purpose and the determination of whether they were invitees or licensees did not arise.

The evidence in the case presently before the court clearly indicates that the Clems were licensees, not invitees. The Clems entered the Park and used the facilities there for their own 'entertainment. They were not on the Park’s premises to transact business, do some act to benefit the NPS nor do some act that was a mutual benefit to them and the NPS. Although the plaintiff argues that an implied invitation arose due to the acts and conduct of the NPS, including the facts that the Park was maintained for the use of the public, the Park maintained a Visitors Center, employed rangers, posted various directional signs and maintained parking lots and toilet facilities, these facts do not constitute an “implied invitation” within the meaning of invitee. 21 I.L.E. Negligence § 33, p. 290. Rather, the Clems’ presence on the premises of the Park, if by “implied invitation” was more in the nature of a social guest which under Indiana law has only the rights of a licensee, not an invitee. See, e.g., Mullins v. Easton, 176 Ind.App. 590, 376 N.E.2d 1178 (1978). Accordingly, the Clems had the status of licensee under Indiana law.

The last issue with respect to the application of I.C. § 14-2-6-3 to this case is whether the Clems status as licensee comes within the “invited guest” exception of the statute. As indicated above, Indiana law basically recognizes three categories of persons entering upon the premises of another: invitee, licensee and trespasser. The Indiana legislature, however, used the terms “business invitees in commercial establishments” and “invited guests” in defining exceptions to the statute. Although the business invitee exception clearly falls within the invitee classification under Indiana law, this court must determine what the legislature meant by “invited guest.”

The courts in Indiana have not construed the statutory provision in question nor can this court find any Indiana case law interpreting or defining the term “invited guest.” This court must therefore attempt to determine what the term “invited guest” means under Indiana law. In light of the broad interpretation of the statute in Schwartz v. Zent, supra, and the underlying policy of the statute, this court finds that the Indiana legislature did not mean to create a broad exception by using the term “invited guest”, but rather intended the exception to apply to only those included in the invitee category under Indiana law. The Clems do not fall within the traditional notion of invitee, and this court does not construe the statute to include a licensee within the exception. Accordingly, I.C. § 14-2-6-3 constitutes a prima facie defense and bars any recovery by the plaintiff in this action.

B. BREACH OF DUTY

As shown in the previous section hereof, the Clems entered the Park as licensees. As such, they took the land as they found it and cannot hold the owner thereof liable for any defects in the condition of the land. The only affirmative duty a land owner owes to a licensee is to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring him or acting in a way which would increase the licensee’s peril. A showing by the licensee of mere negligence on the part of the land owner will not be enough to insure him recovery. Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Co., 400 N.E.2d at 1146; see e.g., Xaver v. Blazak, 181 Ind.App. 245, 391 N.E.2d 653 (1979); Pierce v. Walters, 152 Ind.App. 321, 283 N.E.2d 560 (1972); Fort Wayne National Bank v. Doctor, 149 Ind.App. 365, 272 N.E.2d 876 (1971).

In the case presently before the court, there are no allegations nor any evidence that Mr. Clem’s death was caused by any wilful or wanton act of the NPS. Rather, the evidence showed that Mr. Clem’s death was caused by drowning while swimming in Lake Michigan. Thus, even assuming the NPS was negligent in some way, the NPS did not breach any duty owed to the Clems as a matter of law and plaintiff cannot recover for the death of Mr. Clem against the NPS.

C. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Under Indiana law, contributory negligence is a complete defense, Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 967 (7th Cir.1983); see Koroniotis v. LaPorte Transit, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 656, 660 (Ind.App.1979), and is defined as,

the failure of a person to exercise for his own safety that degree of care and caution which an ordinary reasonable and prudent person in a similar situation would exercise.

Kroger Co. v. Haun, 177 Ind.App. 403, 379 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (1978). Further, the basis of the contributory negligence doctrine is the assumption that negligence charged against the other party is admitted or established by proof. 21 I.L.E. Negligence § 81, p. 337. The question of contributory negligence is to be determined and governed by the same objective standards, tests and rules as are employed for determining the negligence of a defendant. See Cartwright v. Harris, 400 N.E.2d 1192, 1194 (Ind.App.1980); Kroger Co. v. Haun, supra. Thus, if decedent’s actions in this case were unreasonable under the circumstances so as to constitute lack of ordinary care, and contributed to his death to any degree, the plaintiff is barred from recovery. See, Koroniotis v. LaPorte Transit, Inc., 397 N.E.2d at 660.

The standard of care which Mr. Clem was bound to exercise in regard to his own contributory negligence is reasonable care for a person of like age, intelligence and experience under similar circumstances. Rouch v. Bisig, 147 Ind.App. 142, 258 N.E.2d 883, 889 (1970). In this ease, the similar circumstances include the dangers inherent in bodies of water which under Indiana law, even young children are presumed to understand and appreciate. See, e.g., Martin v. Shea, 463 N.E.2d 1092 (Ind.1984); Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Co., 400 N.E.2d at 1146.

The evidence in this case reveals that Mr. Clem was 35 years old at the time of the incident and was employed in a supervisory capacity at Reliance Electric. Mr. Clem reviewed a brochure provided by the NPS which advised him that the waters of Lake Michigan could be treacherous and also saw a film which contained a safety message pertaining to swimming. The brochure further informed him as to which of the beach areas were guarded and which ones were not. When the Clems arrived at the Mt. Baldy area, they encountered a sign which read “Use caution-Lifeguards not Provided,” which sign they read and discussed. Nevertheless, they proceeded over the hill to the beach area to swim even though they were relatively inexperienced swimmers and had never swam in Lake Michigan and thus were not familiar with natural propensities such as undertow of a large body of water.

Based on this evidence, the court finds that Mr. Clem did not exercise reasonable care for a person of like age, intelligence and experience under similar circumstances, and thus was contributorily negligent. Although Mr. Clem may not have known of the specific danger of undertow on July 28, 1982, a person of like age, intelligence and experience, or lack thereof with respect to large bodies of water, exercising reasonable care would not have gone swimming at Mt. Baldy, an unguarded area.

D. INCURRED RISK

Incurred risk is a defense to a claim of negligence separate and distinct from the defense of contributory negligence and is based upon the proposition that one incurs all the ordinary and usual risks of an act upon which the actor voluntarily enters, so long as those risks are known and understood by the actor. Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc. v. Gibbs, 460 N.E.2d 992, 996 (Ind.App.1984); Power v. Brodie, 460 N.E.2d 1241, 1242 (Ind.App. 1984). As stated by the court in Power, incurred risk

involves a mental state of venturousness on the part of the actor, Gates v. Rosenogle, (1983) Ind.App., 452 N.E.2d 467, 473; Colaw v. Nicholson, (1983) Ind.App., 450 N.E.2d 1023, 1029; Kroger, 177 Ind.App. at 409, 379 N.E.2d at 1009, and demands a subjective analysis into the actor’s actual knowledge and voluntary acceptance of the risk, Gates, 452 N.E.2d at 473; Colaw, 450 N.E.2d at 1029; Antcliff v. Datzman, (1982) Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 114, 120, trans. denied; Moore v. Moriarty, (1981) Ind.App., 415 N.E.2d 779, 782; Kroger, 177 Ind.App. at 409, 379 N.E.2d at 1008. “By definition ... the very essence of incurred risk is the conscious, deliberate and intentional embarkation upon a course of conduct with knowledge of the circumstances____” Gerrish v. Brewer, (1979) Ind.App., 398 N.E.2d 1298, 1301. “It requires much more than the general awareness of a potential for mishap. Incurred risk contemplates acceptance of a specific risk of which the plaintiff has actual knowledge.” Colaw, 450 N.E.2d at 1029 (emphasis supplied). While the failure to recognize a danger or risk readily discernible to the reasonable and prudent man under like or similar circumstances may constitute contributory negligence, it cannot be said to constitute incurred risk because “it should never be considered a voluntary incurrence of a known risk.” Kroger, 177 Ind.App. at 410, 379 N.E.2d at 1009 (emphasis supplied); (“to hold that one may voluntarily incur a risk of which he had no actual knowledge, yet was required to know in the exercise of ordinary care, is a perversion of the doctrine.”)
460 N.E.2d at 1243.

In the case presently before the court, the application of the incurred risk doctrine depends upon a determination of what the risk was. The plaintiff argues that the Clems did not know about the undertow condition and therefore did not have knowledge and understanding of the risk. The risk in this case, however, is much broader than that. The Clems made a conscious, deliberate and voluntary decision to go swimming in Lake Michigan at Mt. Baldy Beach, an unguarded beach. They had been warned that the waters of Lake Michigan could be treacherous and had viewed a film which contained a safety message about swimming in the Lake. They had read and discussed a sign that clearly stated that no lifeguards were on duty and thus were aware that no professional help was provided in the event that they encountered trouble. Under Indiana law, one of the recognized risks of swimming, particularly in a large body of unfamiliar water of unknown propensities, is drowning. See Martin v. Shea, 463 N.E.2d 1092 (Ind.1984); Crist, Inc. v. Whitacre, 147 Ind.App. 16, 258 N.E.2d 165, 168 (1970). Added to this knowledge on the part of the Clems is the additional knowledge they had, and thus the acceptance of the risk that the waters could be treacherous, even though they may not have known every aspect that made them so as well as the risks inherent in swimming at an unguarded beach. Accordingly, the doctrine of incurred risk applies and prevents recovery by plaintiff in this action.

This is a case where the human heart strings pull in one direction and the law compels a contrary conclusion. Juries are always told that sympathy cannot be the basis of a decision. The same idea must apply to eases tried by a court without a jury.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Trial Rule 41(B) motion for dismissal is hereby GRANTED. SO ORDERED.

      . This court notes that I.C. § 14-2-6-3 was amended by the Indiana legislature in 1983. However, the changes made were merely grammatical and did not change the substance of the statute.

      . Although this court assumed for purposes of this decision that the United States was the owner of the property, such an assumption could be questioned in light of the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. See Garner v. City of Michigan City, 453 F.Supp. 33 (N.D. Ind. 1978).

      . Although the plaintiff has attempted to argue in one of her briefs that the defendant acted maliciously toward plaintiff in this case, the record contains no allegations nor evidence of any such conduct on the part of the defendant.

      . In 1983, the Indiana General Assembly adopted a comparative fault statute, I.C. 34-4-33 — 1 et seq. which became effective on January 1, 1985. That statute, however, cannot be applied retroactively and this case must be decided under the law as it existed in July 1982.

      . The plaintiff argues that the failure of the NPS to specifically warn them of the undertow condition existing in Lake Michigan on July 28, 1982 was prima facie negligence on their part and cites Davis v. United States, 716 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.1983) in support thereof. That case, however, was decided under Illinois law, not Indiana law which is controlling in this case. In Illinois, the law of comparative negligence is applicable whereas in Indiana, the doctrine of contributory negligence was applicable. Second, although the issue of whether the warning was sufficient is common to both cases, the nature of the allegedly undisclosed danger is quite different. An undertow or rip current can occur at any time anywhere in the lake whereas the location of the rocks as in Davis was constant. Therefore, the type of warning necessary may be different. This court is not required, however, to decide this issue or whether the discretionary function exception of the F.T.C.A. applies here.

      . A specific risk involves only the ordinary and usual risks inherent in a given act. Kroger, 177 Ind.App. at 408, 379 N.E.2d at 1008, quoting Stallings v. Dick, (1965), 139 Ind.App. 118, 129, 210 N.E.2d 82, 88, trans. denied (1966).


author: FEIKENS, Chief Judge.

text:
    WIDGER CHEMICAL CORPORATION and Surface Treatments, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. CHEMFIL CORPORATION, Diversey Corporation, Diversey Wyandotte Corporation, and Diversey S.A. N.V., Defendants.
    Civ. A. No. 84-CV-1618-DT.
    United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.
    Jan. 29, 1985.

      Ernie L. Brooks, Mark A. Cantor, Brooks & Kushman, Southfield, Mich., for plaintiffs.
    Raymond E. Scott, Kevin J. Heinl, Cullen, Sloman, Cantor, Grauer, Scott & Rutherford, P.C., Detroit, Mich., for Chemfil Corp.
    Paul Sherr, Birmingham, Mich., for Diversey Corp., Diversey Wyandotte, and Diversey S.A. N.V.; Allan E. Lapidus, John R. Obiala, Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, Chicago, 111., of counsel.
   MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEIKENS, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs, Widger Chemical Corporation and its subsidiary Surface Treatments, Inc., filed this antitrust and intentional interference with business relations action against defendants Chemfil Corporation, Diversey Corporation, Diversey Wyandotte Corporation and Diversey S.A. N.V. On November 9, 1984, a hearing was held on defendants Diversey S.A. N.V. and Diversey Corporation’s motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction. At that hearing, plaintiffs agreed to dismiss Diversey S.A. N.V. without prejudice. I denied Diversey Corporation’s motion to dismiss. This opinion supplements that ruling.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Widger Chemical Corporation (Widger) and its subsidiary Surface Treatments, Inc. (STI), sell specialty chemical products for treating and cleaning metals. Defendants Chemfil Corporation (Chemfil) and Diversey Corporation (Diversey) sell competing chemical products. Plaintiffs allege that Diversey and Chemfil have entered into “an overall scheme to stifle competition in [certain chemical pjroducts in the domestic and foreign market ...” in violation of the Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982). Complaint ¶21. Plaintiffs also claim that defendants intentionally interfered with the advantageous business relations of Widger and STI. Complaint 1132. Plaintiffs allege that four acts are part of, and manifest the alleged scheme to restrain trade: First, Diversey and Chemfil entered into a license agreement to distribute Chemfil products through Diversey’s subsidiaries located throughout the world. Second, Chemfil obtained a preliminary injunction against Widger and STI in a lawsuit filed in Oakland County Circuit Court (Chemfil v. Surface Treatments, Inc., No. 82-252363 (Feb. 16,1984)). Chemfil filed suit against Widger, STI, and others, alleging, in part, theft of trade secrets and proprietary information. Widger and STI were enjoined from selling or licensing certain confidential formulas to third persons. Third, plaintiffs allege that representatives of Widger and Chemfil misrepresented the nature of the Oakland County proceedings as a suit for illegally breaking a patent to the Michigan Office of Economic Development (OED) in Belgium. That office promotes Michigan businesses throughout Europe. As a result of the misrepresentation, plaintiffs argue, OED refused to represent Widger. Finally, plaintiffs argue that while Inmont Corporation was negotiating for the purchase of Widger, counsel for Chemfil sent a letter to Inmont including a “copy of the Preliminary Injunction entered by the Court for your information.” The preliminary injunction entered by the Court, however, differed from the one sent to Inmont. Diversey moves to dismiss, arguing that it has insufficient contacts with Michigan, and therefore, it is not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction.

Diversey (defendant) pleads that it is a Canadian corporation which has never sold any products, been qualified or registered to do business, or maintained an office, telephone listing, or bank account in Michigan. The license agreement Diversey entered into with Chemfil concerns distribution of Chemfil products outside of the United States. Defendant further pleads that no Diversey shareholder, director, employee or agent has ever lived in Michigan, nor has Diversey ever owned any real or personal property located in Michigan. (Affidavit of John Pick, Senior Vice-President of Diversey). The license agreement between Diversey and Chemfil, however, was negotiated in Troy, Michigan, and by its own terms, is subject to the laws of Michigan. Pursuant to that license, Diversey makes payments to Chemfil in Michigan. (Deposition of Malcolm Pemberton). 1 must decide whether these contacts suffice for assertion of in personam jurisdiction over Diversey.

II. DISCUSSION

The in personam jurisdictional reach of a federal court hearing a federal question case, such as this one, may be determined by the law of the state in which the court sits. Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 376 n. 2 (6th Cir.1968); Mad Hatter, Inc. v. Mad Hatters Night Club Co., 399 F.Supp. 889, 890 (E.D.Mich.1975). The Michigan long-arm statute, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 600.-715 (West 1981), provides in part:

The existence of any of the following relationships between a corporation or its agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the courts of record of this state to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over such corporation and to enable such courts to render personal judgments against such corporation arising out of the act or acts which create any of the following relationships:
(1) The transaction of any business within the state.
(2) The doing or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort.

This statute has been interpreted to reach to the extent permissible under the due process clause. Williams v. Garcia, 569 F.Supp. 1452, 1454 (E.D.Mich.1983); Chrysler Corp. v. Traveleze Industries, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 246, 249 (E.D.Mich.1981); Schneider v. Linkfield, 389 Mich. 608, 209 N.W.2d 225 (1973); Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. 195, 188 N.W.2d 623 (1971). I find that either subsection of the long-arm statute cited above can be applied constitutionally to obtain in personam jurisdiction over Diversey.

Where a state’s long-arm statute reaches to the extent permissible under the due process clause, the relevant inquiry is whether exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutional. Southern Machine, 401 F.2d at 377-78. The United States Supreme Court has articulated the due process limitations on obtaining personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in three cases: Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Based on this line of cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit articulated three criteria for determining the limits on in person-am jurisdiction based on a single act :

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.

Southern Machine, 401 F.2d at 381. See also Welsh v. Gibbs, 631 F.2d 436, 439-40 (6th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981, 101 S.Ct. 1517, 67 L.Ed.2d 816 (1981).

Initially, I note that the burden of establishing jurisdiction is on plaintiff. Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927 (6th Cir.1974). This burden, however, is relatively slight, and the Court must consider the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Welsh v. Gibbs, 631 F.2d 436, 439 (6th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981, 101 S.Ct. 1517, 67 L.Ed.2d 816 (1981); Williams v. Garcia, 569 F.Supp. 1452 (E.D.Mich.1983). I now turn to consideration of each part of the test for establishing personal jurisdiction over defendant.

First, defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting or causing consequences in Michigan. Defendant entered into a contract with a resident Michigan corporation, which alone, may satisfy the requirement of acting or causing consequences in the forum. See Chrysler Corp. v. Traveleze Industries, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 246, 250; Microelectronic Systems Corp. v. Bamberger’s, 434 F.Supp. 168, 170-71 (E.D.Mich.1977). In addition, defendant negotiated this agreement, which by its terms is subject to Michigan law, in Troy, Michigan. See Health Care Industries, Inc. v. Logan Park Care Center, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 360 (S.D.Ohio 1983) (Defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in Ohio because “[djefendant was the one to initially contact [pjlaintiff in Ohio, and several meetings to negotiate the contract took place between the parties, in Ohio____”). Diversey also sent at least two letters to Chemfil, and makes periodic payments to Chemfil under the license agreement. Thus, defendant has purposefully “avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1239.

Second, plaintiffs’ antitrust and intentional interference with advantageous business relations claims arise out of defendant’s activities in Michigan. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the license agreement between Chemfil and Diversey is part of an overall scheme to restrain trade. As evidence of this scheme, plaintiffs cite a November 6, 1981, letter from Diversey's Vice-President for Marketing to Chemfil’s President indicating that the parties would meet “to map out [their] strategy for introducing Chemfil technology internationally.” It is this strategy, of which the license is a part, which plaintiffs allege restrains trade.

Defendant argues, however, that plaintiffs’ causes of action do not arise out of defendant’s transaction of business in Michigan (Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 600.-715(1)), specifically the license agreement, since plaintiffs are not a party to the contract which is the primary basis for jurisdiction. Defendant attempts to distinguish Traveleze Industries and Microelectronic Systems by arguing that in each of those cases, the plaintiff was a party to the contract upon which jurisdiction was based, and the lawsuit was brought to enforce that contract. Here, plaintiff is a stranger to the contract, and, defendant argues, there is no relation between the contract and this cause of action.

I reject defendant’s contention that a cause of action arises out of a defendant’s transaction of business in the forum only if the plaintiff is a party to any contracts defendant may enter. The “minimum contacts” analysis is concerned not with defendant’s contacts with the plaintiff, but with the “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 251, 78 S.Ct. at 1238 (“[A] defendant may not be called upon to [defend a suit in a foreign tribunal] unless he has had the ‘minimum contacts’with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.” (emphasis added)); International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 159 (The due process clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties or relations.”). Here, defendant negotiated and entered into a license agreement, and mapped out a strategy for introducing Chemfil products internationally. This transaction of business in Michigan allegedly injured plaintiffs. Thus, I find that plaintiffs’ causes of action arise out of defendant’s “transaction of ... business within” Michigan, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 600.715(1).

Moreover, it is clear that defendant has done acts in Michigan “resulting in an action for tort.” Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 600.715(2), and this provides an independent basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. That section is applicable here because both plaintiffs’ antitrust and intentional interference claims sound in tort. See Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1236 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893, 102 S.Ct. 388, 70 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris Corp., 432 F.Supp. 337, 344 (E.D.Mich.1977). When defendant negotiated and entered into a license agreement with Chemfil, it allegedly engaged in tortious activity in Michigan, and that activity has resulted in this lawsuit. Accordingly, defendant’s contacts fall within the reach of § 600.715(2). I therefore conclude that defendant’s contacts, whether viewed as transaction of business in Michigan or as acts resulting in an action for tort, satisfy the second part of the Southern Machine test.

Finally, I must determine whether “defendant [has] a substantial enough connection with [Michigan] to make the exercise of jurisdiction ... reasonable.” Southern Machine, 401 F.2d at 381. This Court has previously asserted jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in two breach of contract actions based largely on the defendant’s contract with a corporation located in Michigan, for the sale of goods manufactured in Michigan. Traveleze Industries; Microelectronic Systems. These cases rest in part on the view that when a defendant enters into a contract with a Michigan resident, the defendant has created an economic impact in Michigan which may justify assertion of jurisdiction. This notion of “economic impact” is quite broad and should not be equated with

the narrower concept of financial gain or loss in the forum____ The purposeful action test of Southern Machine, supra, 401 F.2d at 381, is not intended to require ... that to be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of a state, a nonresident corporation must actively conduct an income-generating enterprise in that state. To the contrary, it is designed only
“... to insure that the defendant has become involved with the forum state through actions freely and intentionally done. It seeks to avoid the assertion of jurisdiction in a situation where all contacts result entirely from a decision made by plaintiff as was the case in Hanson v. Denckla. [357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958) ]” In-Flight Devices Corp., supra, 466 F.2d at 228.

Davis H. Elliot Co. v. Caribbean Utilities Co., 513 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (6th Cir.1975).

Defendant contends, however, that unlike the defendants in Microelectronic Systems and Traveleze, it did not contract to purchase goods manufactured in Michigan, and any impact it had on Michigan is insufficient to justify assertion of jurisdiction. I disagree. Defendant freely and intentionally said “yes” to Michigan when it chose to negotiate and enter into the license agreement in Michigan, and to make payments under that agreement to Chemfil in Michigan. This activity clearly had an impact on this state’s commerce. See Health Care Industries, Inc. v. Logan Park Care Center, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 360 (S.D.Ohio 1983) (West Virginia defendant had substantial enough connection with Ohio where defendant negotiated with plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, in Ohio, for the construction of a nursing home in West Virginia.); Hyatt International Corp. v. Inversiones Los Jabillos, C.A., 558 F.Supp. 932 (N.D.Ill.1982) (Jurisdiction over South American defendants was constitutional where defendants sent letters, made telephone calls, and traveled twice to Chicago to negotiate construction of hotels in South America.); Mercantile Financial Corp. v. UPA Productions, 551 F.Supp. 672 (N.D.Ill.1982) (Illinois Court’s jurisdiction over California defendant was constitutional in a breach of a release action where the release was negotiated and executed in Illinois.).

Ultimately, whether defendant’s contacts with Michigan are substantial enough to justify assertion of personal jurisdiction depends on this state’s interest in resolving the present conflict. Once the first two criteria for jurisdiction have been satisfied, it is only the unusual case where that interest does not exist. Southern Machine, 401 F.2d at 384. These facts do not present that unusual case. Michigan certainly has an interest in providing a forum in which its residents may obtain relief from allegedly unlawful conduct pursued in Michigan. Accordingly, I find that plaintiffs have satisfied the third part of the three-part test for in personam jurisdiction.

III. CONCLUSION

I hold that plaintiffs have shown that defendant has the requisite minimum contacts with Michigan to justify this Court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendant. This conclusion rests on plaintiffs’ satisfying the three-part test articulated in Southern Machine, and subsequent cases interpreting that decision. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction was denied following the hearing on this matter.

An appropriate order may be submitted.

      . A court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in one of two ways: First, a court may exercise "specific jurisdiction” over the defendant when the cause of action arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Second, where the defendant carries on a continuous and systematic part of its business in the forum, a court may exercise "general jurisdiction” over a defendant for causes of action not arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, - U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Since I hold that plaintiffs' causes of action arise out of defendant’s contacts with Michigan, I need not consider whether defendant would be subject to this Court’s general jurisdiction under Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 600.711 (West 1981).