author: FULLAM, District Judge.

text:
    Marcy GREEN v. EDWARD J. BETTINGER COMPANY.
    Civ. A. No. 82-5579.
    United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 10, 1984.

      Alan M. Lerner, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

      Brenda Kinney, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
   MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FULLAM, District Judge.

On December 15, 1982, plaintiff, acting pro se, filed her complaint in this action alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex and age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and also alleging claims for breach of contract. Although plaintiff proceeded pro se, her initial pleading appears to have been the result of competent professional draftsmanship.

In January 1983, plaintiff filed a supplementary document, amending the complaint to reflect the fact that the defendant, originally named as a corporation, is actually a sole proprietorship. At the same time, plaintiff filed what can best be described as a conditional, or cautionary, application for the appointment of counsel. In that document, plaintiff stated that she would be unable to pay counsel except on a contingent fee basis; that she had discussed the case with several different lawyers; that the lawyers she deemed fully capable of handling the case were unwilling to do so on a contingent fee basis; and that she was not satisfied with the professional competence of the attorneys who were willing to handle the case on a contingent fee basis. She further stated that she was continuing her efforts to obtain private counsel, but wished to “alert” the court to the possibility that her efforts would prove unsuccessful, and that an appointment of counsel might become necessary. Eventually, when plaintiffs further efforts to obtain satisfactory counsel proved unavailing, this court appointed counsel to represent her, on November 7, 1983.

Following a pretrial conference on February 21, 1984, this court, by Order dated March 2,1984, fixed a trial date of June 11, 1984, with leave to the parties to pursue discovery in the interim. Apparently, plaintiff did serve interrogatories and requests for production of documents, which were responded to by the defendant on April 3, 1984.

On May 11, 1984, the defendant filed a comprehensive motion for summary judgment. On May 23, 1984, counsel for plaintiff requested a postponement of the scheduled June 11 trial, for a variety of reasons, principally related to other trial commitments. In that request, plaintiffs counsel stated that he wished to complete discovery in this case in July, and respond to the pending summary judgment motion in August. The defendant did not oppose the requested postponement. Accordingly, on May 30,1984, the parties were notified that the trial would take place on September 12, 1984.

By letter dated June 6, 1984, counsel for defendant granted plaintiffs counsel an extension of time until July 11, 1984, to file a response to the pending motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, plaintiffs counsel requested a further extension of time until August 15, 1984, and defense counsel acquiesced in that extension.

On August 6, 1984, plaintiffs counsel requested a further postponement of the trial until October 8, 1984. He stated that, because of the necessity of responding to the summary judgment motion by August 15, 1984, he would be unable to complete certain allegedly necessary additional discovery in advance of trial. The request was denied.

No response to the summary judgment motion was filed by August 15. On August 22, 1984, a member of my staff telephoned plaintiffs counsel to inquire whether he intended to respond to the pending motion. Eventually, on August 31, 1984, plaintiffs counsel filed a document entitled “Preliminary Response” to the motion for summary judgment; in essence, this document is merely a request for a further extension of time in which to respond to the summary judgment motion which had been pending since May 11, 1984.

In the August 22 telephone conversation, and in the preliminary response filed August 31, plaintiffs counsel asserted, for the first time, that certain alleged discovery disputes (not yet presented to this court) needed to be resolved, and additional discovery obtained, in aid of plaintiffs response to the motion for summary judgment. Counsel for the defendant, however, contends that the only discovery requests made by plaintiff which defendant is resisting aré few in number, and have nothing to do with the issues raised by the summary judgment motion.

Because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, because procedural defaults are disfavored, and because motions for summary judgment may not be granted by default in any event, I have concluded that the seeming dilatoriness of plaintiffs counsel in responding to the motion for summary judgment should be disregarded. On the other hand, if it is clear that the additional discovery allegedly being sought by plaintiff would add nothing of consequence to the existing record, and that there is no material factual issue to submit to a trier of fact, it is entirely appropriate to dispose of the case summarily, on the existing record.

The only “open” discovery matters alluded to in plaintiffs preliminary response are these: (1) defendant’s alleged refusal to disclose certain detailed financial information relating to salary levels in branches or departments other than that in which plaintiff was employed, and (2) the fact that the depositions of two of the principal employees of the defendant have not yet been transcribed. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is supported by lengthy and detailed affidavit, together with business records and other documentary evidence not disputed by plaintiff. The critical facts contained in the defense affidavit cover matters plainly within plaintiff’s own knowledge, and are not denied in her affidavit. The documents not yet produced would shed no light on these facts. While a written transcript of the depositions of defendant’s principals would be convenient and desirable, it is obvious that plaintiff and her counsel know what these witnesses said, and there is no suggestion that these witnesses said anything which would be helpful to plaintiff’s cause. In short, I am not persuaded that further delay would elicit any significant additional information.

The following facts are, on this record, undisputed:

The Bettinger Company is an unincorporated sole proprietorship, owned and controlled by Edward J. Bettinger, its president. The Bettinger Company is a personnel-placement business. Plaintiff was employed in the “temporary division,” which supplies temporary secretarial, clerical and data-proeessing workers to its customers. In addition, the company operates a permanent placement division, which functions as an ordinary employment agency.

The company has a total of 13 permanent employees. In the temporary division, there are two or three “outside” sales/marketing personnel, primarily involved in soliciting new business, customer-relations, contract negotiation, troubleshooting, and the like; and five in-house support personnel. Plaintiff was one of the “outside” sales/marketing employees; her formal job title was client service manager.

Plaintiff was first employed by the Bettinger Company in January 1972, when she was hired by Carl Berke, who then served as sales manager of the temporary division. In December 1972, plaintiff was discharged by Mr. Berke. Shortly thereafter, however, Mr. Berke left the employ of the Bettinger Company, and established his own competing business — a step which apparently posed a serious threat to the Bettinger Company, and which later resulted in litigation concerning Mr. Berke’s alleged violations of restrictive provisions in his employment contract with Bettinger.

In February 1973, plaintiff was rehired, this time by Mr. Bettinger himself, after discussions and negotiations which will be discussed later.

All of the permanent employees in the temporary division, including plaintiff, were compensated on the basis of a salary plus commissions. Plaintiffs salary was $165 per week, plus $25 for expenses, or a total of $180 per week. In addition, she was entitled to be paid a 1% commission on monthly client billings of the temporary division in excess of $30,000 per month and not exceeding $45,000 per month; 2% commission on monthly billings between $45,-000 and $55,000; and 3% commission on monthly billings in excess of $55,000.

From 1973 through 1975, the total billings of the temporary division did not reach the $30,000 per-month threshold, and plaintiff received no commissions during those years. And it was not until 1977 that monthly billings began to exceed the $55,-000 level.

In 1978, plaintiff was paid, in addition to her salary and expenses, commissions of $12,783, based on total billings for that year of $959,789. In 1979, her commissions were $19,764, on total billings of $1,178,783. And in 1980, her commissions were $25,940, on total billings of $1,386,-197.

Thus, plaintiffs total annual compensation (not including expense allowance) rose from approximately $12,000 in 1977 to $21,-863 in 1978, $28,844 in 1979, and $33,443 in 1980.

In 1977, Jeffrey Bettinger, son of the company president, joined the firm as an employee. It was the senior Bettinger’s hope and intention that his son would eventually succeed to the ownership and control of the family business. In 1980, having familiarized himself with the business and having performed to his father’s satisfaction, Jeffrey Bettinger was promoted to the position of sales/marketing manager, a newly created post which involved his continuing to perform services essentially similar to those performed by plaintiff (whose title was client service manager) but also involved additional responsibilities relating to supervision of the in-house staff.

As of January 1,1981, the following compensation arrangements prevailed for employees of the temporary division:

Name Weekly Compensation Comission Schedule
1% between $30,000 and $45,000; 2% between $45,000 and $55,000; 3% over $55,000 Marcy Green (plaintiff) $180.00
Jeffrey Bettinger (president’s son) $250.00 1% over $50,000
Elaine Hill $200.00 ½% between $40,000 and $50,000; 1% over $50,000
Deborah Dymond $200.00 ½% over $80,000
Eleanor Kramer $200.00 ½% over $65,000
Ann Kistner $220.00 None

For the year 1980, pursuant to the foregoing arrangements, plaintiff received a total of $33,443. Jeffrey Bettinger received a total of $22,481. The total compensation of the other three employees ranged from $10,292.50 to $11,555.

As can be readily perceived, the dramatic increase in plaintiffs compensation between 1978 and 1980, and the great disparity between plaintiffs 1980 compensation and that of other employees in the temporary division, are attributable to the fact that plaintiffs commission on billings in excess of $55,000 per month was 3%, while the commissions of the other employees was either 1% or ½%. So long as those commission arrangements prevailed, the disparities would grow worse as the business expanded, and the efforts of other sales and marketing personnel to increase the company’s business would inure principally to plaintiff’s benefit rather than their own.

In January 1981, expressing the view that the existing compensation arrangements did not accurately reflect the relative contributions of the various employees to the company’s success, and that the commission schedule which had been deemed appropriate in 1973 no longer made sense in view of the company’s changed circumstances, Mr. Bettinger proposed and implemented a new commission arrangement for plaintiff. Under the new arrangement, plaintiff was to be paid commissions of ½% on monthly billings between $10,000 and $50,000, and 1% on billings over $50,000.

Plaintiff objected to the change, claiming that it was in violation of her contractual rights. When Mr. Bettinger declined to alter his position, plaintiff retained counsel. Further attempts to negotiate an amicable resolution of the controversy were unsuccessful. Eventually, plaintiff was given a firm deadline for accepting the new commission arrangement. She refused to agree, and resigned from the defendant’s employ as of April 10, 1981.

Plaintiff was paid commissions in accordance with the new schedule from January 1, 1981/ until the date of termination. Plaintiff’s commissions, under the new schedule, amounted to approximately $4200 on total billings of slightly in excess of $500,000 during this period. If plaintiff had not resigned, and if the company’s billings had persisted at approximately the same level for the balance of 1981, plaintiff would have earned about $16,000 or $17,-000 in commissions under the new schedule, and would thus have received aggregate compensation in the range of $25,000-$30,000 for the year. Under the old schedule, plaintiff’s commissions would have been in excess of $11,000 for the January-March period, and in excess of $33,000 for the year. Her total compensation for the year would have been approximately $44,-000. Even under the new schedule, however, plaintiff would have continued to be the highest-paid employee in the temporary division.

I. Plaintiffs Claims for Breach of Contract

Plaintiff claims that the defendant’s unilateral modification of the commission schedule, and her “constructive discharge” for refusing to accept it, amounted to breaches of her contract of employment. It is clear, of course, that in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, an employer is free to determine the terms and conditions of employment, and may terminate the relationship at will. By the same token, if an employee is dissatisfied with the terms offered by the employer, the employee is free to resign. The question therefore is whether there was an enforceable contract between plaintiff and defendant which produces a different result in this case.

Before agreeing to return to the defendant’s employ in February 1973, plaintiff prepared and submitted to Mr. Bettinger a two-page document which she now relies upon as constituting her contract of employment. Although Mr. Bettinger professes to have no recollection of having initialed or otherwise approved this document, and states that he never regarded it as a binding contract, for purposes of ruling on the summary judgment motion, I assume that it was in fact initialed by him and that it accurately reflects the terms and conditions of plaintiffs employment, agreed to by both sides. It is nevertheless clear, as a matter of law, that the defendant did not breach this contract.

Most of the document in question is devoted to the “nuts and bolts” of plaintiffs job description and responsibilities, her concept of how the job should be performed, various prospective personnel changes, and plaintiffs precise relationship with other employees. So far as the record discloses, all of these minutiae either became reality or became irrelevant. For present purposes, we are concerned only with the provisions of the contract which may be said to have a bearing upon the duration of plaintiffs employment and the terms of plaintiffs compensation.

The contract does not purport to provide any specific term of employment. Plaintiff concedes that, therefore, she has always been an “at will” employee. Moreover, to the extent that the contract can be said to contemplate at least a reasonable duration of employment, there can be no doubt that the period of reasonableness has long since expired.

The only provisions relating to plaintiffs compensation and commission schedule are those which may be derived from the following language:

“9. The following is the salary and commission schedule I feel I will require as the Branch and the dollar volume stands now in center city, and for the additional dollar volume I feel sure I will help to add for the expansion of the business in the future. This is based on no less than three inside people (not including bookkeeping or Permanent staff, receptionists and secretarial and clerical support, etc.). It is also based on two outside people (which includes Carl Berke’s replacement). If at anytime, it is agreed that the two of us will negotiate a change to decrease this salary base and/or commission schedule, it is understood and agreed that I will be shown accurate figures and a certified financial statement as to profits, losses, and break even points, and what the actual expenses of the Temporary Dept. are. Then and only then we can negotiate, on what a reasonable cut in my commission or salary can be.
“Conversely, if staff is let go or they leave and are not replaced for prolonged periods of time and if this creates a loss of dollar volume and in turn less expense to the business, I will be shown accurate profit and loss statements, if this loss of dollar volume affects my commissions due to the prolonged loss of staff, I can request a reasonable increase in my commission schedule that is fair to me and fair to management and all the other team members. This agreement also refers to any fringe benefits like insurance, etc. and other items that are to be included along with my salary and commission schedule that have been promised after my hire.
“$165 per-week base salary
‘$30-$45,000 at 1% — $45-$55,000 at 2% over $55,000 at 3%.”

Preliminarily, it should be noted that this language does little more than establish the parties’ understanding of the compensation arrangement that would pertain at the start of plaintiff’s resumption of employment; that the schedule was premised upon the circumstance “as the Branch and the dollar volume stands now in center city ...” together with plaintiff’s subjective predictions of increases which she would be instrumental in producing; that plaintiff recognized the likelihood that changes in the schedule would be required as circumstances might change; and that the parties might later negotiate changes in the commission schedule which would be “fair to me and fair to management and all the other team members”. Plainly, the initial commission schedule was not fixed and immutable; and the employer’s agreement to negotiate in the future does not bind the employer to accept any particular future proposal.

Moreover, and more importantly, the defendant had the unquestioned right to termínate the entire agreement at any time. The undoubted right to terminate an at-will contract necessarily includes the right to insist upon changes in the compensation arrangements as a condition of continued employment.

I therefore conclude, as a matter of law, that plaintiff cannot prevail upon her breach-of-contract claims.

II. Plaintiffs Claims of Discrimination

Plaintiff was 42 years of age when she left defendant’s employ in April 1981. Her claims of discrimination may be summarized as follows: (1) that she was denied a promotion on the basis of age and/or sex; (2) that she was subjected to a reduction in compensation in January 1981 on the basis of age and/or sex; (3) that her resignation, stemming from the reduction in commissions, amounted to constructive discharge, and was based on age and/or sex; and (4) that, during the period of her employment by the defendant, she was denied equal pay for equal work, on the basis of age and/or sex. I perceive no arguable merit in any of these claims, nor any triable issues of fact pertaining to them.

The promotional opportunity to which plaintiff refers had to do with the advancement of Jeffrey Bettinger to the position of sales/marketing manager. For present purposes, I shall assume that, if plaintiff had been appointed to this position, it would have amounted to a promotion, since it apparently entailed additional managerial responsibilities and, arguably, a slightly higher perch on the executive ladder; it should be noted, however, that the new position paid considerably less than plaintiff’s existing position. Be that as it may, there are at least two reasons why plaintiff cannot prevail on the promotion issue. In the first place, the alleged discrimination occurred in April 1980. Plaintiff did not file discrimination charges with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission until June 28, 1981 (docketed with the EEOC on August 28, 1981). Any discrimination which may have occurred before October 25, 1980, is not actionable, given the 300-day limitations period. In the second place, the position of sales/marketing manager was specifically created for the owner’s son; the employer was not obliged to offer the post to anyone else, and did not in fact ever consider plaintiff or anyone else as a candidate for the post. In terms of conventional employment-discrimination jurisprudence, it can be stated either that plaintiff did not meet an essential qualification for the position (since she was not the owner’s son) and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case; or that the employer has established, beyond dispute, a non-discriminatory justification for the choice that was made. In short, an employer does not violate Title VII or any other anti-discrimination statute by grooming his son to take over the business.

Plaintiff’s other claims of discrimination are equally vulnerable. Plaintiff conceded, in her deposition, that she resigned because of the reduction in her commission arrangement, and that, if she had been willing to accept the new schedule, she could have continued in the defendant’s employ. On this record, no rational fact-finder could properly conclude that age or sex discrimination tainted the defendant’s decision to reduce plaintiff’s compensation schedule. The employer’s justification for the change — to maintain an appropriate relationship between plaintiff’s compensation and the results of her efforts, to rationalize the compensation schedule in light of the changed circumstances, to preserve the morale of other similarly situated employees, and to head off a potential, undeserved, windfall for plaintiff — is eminently reasonable, and plaintiff has offered nothing to dispute it.

After plaintiff resigned, at least some of her duties were assumed by a female employee who is older than plaintiff. It is perhaps arguable that some of the functions previously performed by plaintiff were taken over on a temporary basis by Jeffrey Bettinger. The post vacated by plaintiff remained vacant for only a couple of months, and her actual replacement in that position was, again, a female who is older than the plaintiff. Plaintiff would therefore face a virtually insurmountable obstacle in attempting to make out even a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. In any event, it is undisputed that the sole reason for plaintiff’s departure was her dissatisfaction with the new commission arrangement, the non-discriminatory justification for which is, as noted above, really beyond question.

Plaintiff’s Equal Pay Act claims fail for the rather obvious reason that there is absolutely no evidence, or possibility thereof, that plaintiff was paid less than similarly situated males or younger persons. Plaintiff was paid more than anybody else, and there was no truly comparable position in any event.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims. Judgment will therefore be entered in favor of the defendant.

      . The record establishes that the total annual billings of the temporary division in each of these years did not exceed $360,000. Thus, at least on average, the monthly billings did not reach the $30,000 level. In the absence of monthly breakdowns for those years, and in the absence of any contention by plaintiff to the contrary, I assume that no monthly billing exceeded $30,000, or, if it did, that plaintiff was paid whatever nominal commissions she may have earned. In any event, it is clear that plaintiff acquiesced in the compensation arrangement, and that the statute of limitations precludes any present assertion that she was not properly paid for those years.

      . Although the defendant earnestly contends otherwise, I have assumed, for purposes of ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, that the temporary employees supplied by the defendant to its clients should be treated as employees of the defendant, and that the defendant therefore had a sufficient number of employees to qualify as an "employer” subject to potential liability under Title VII and ADEA.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: HILLMAN, District Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    ANR PIPELINE COMPANY and ANR Storage Company, Plaintiffs, v. The MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, Defendant.
    No. G84-438 CA 5.
    United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, S.D.
    Sept. 10, 1984.

      Mika, Meyers, Beckett & Jones by John C. Jones, Grand Rapids, Mich., for plaintiffs.
    Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen. by Don L. Keskey, R. Philip Brown and Jeffrey S. Fishman, Lansing, Mich., for defendant.
   OPINION RE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO AMEND

HILLMAN, District Judge.

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC), an administrative body of the State of Michigan. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the State regulatory scheme which charges the MPSC with regulating the sale of securities by the plaintiffs, and request a declaratory judgment that the regulatory plan is unconstitutional. The matter is now before the court on plaintiffs’ motion to amend, and MPSC’s motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12.

Plaintiffs in this case, ANR Pipeline Co. and ANR Storage Co., engage in the purchase, transmission, storage and sale of natural gas. As natural gas companies, both are subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Among the methods for raising capital employed by plaintiffs include the issuance of stock and long term bonds. Therefore, plaintiffs are also regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

At the state level, plaintiffs are subject to the regulation of the MPSC. Under M.C.L.A. § 460.1, et seq., the MPSC has a broad range of regulatory powers over public utility companies operating in Michigan. Under M.C.L.A. § 460.301, the MPSC regulates the issuance and sale of securities by public utility companies. Plaintiffs have filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the state regulatory scheme. Although plaintiffs do not have a proposed public offering on file with either the SEC or MPSC, the MPSC has consistently exercised its jurisdiction over plaintiffs.

MOTION TO AMEND

Plaintiffs have moved to amend the complaint to add the three commissioners of the MPSC as individual defendants.

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after service of a responsive pleading, a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. Rule 15 goes on to state that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Since plaintiffs’ amended complaint seeks to add additional parties, Rule 21 is also applicable. It provides that, “[pjarties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.”

In addition, a pleading may be amended once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). A motion to dismiss, such as the one here, is not a responsive pleading within the meaning of the rules. Hanraty v. Ostertag, 470 F.2d 1096 (10th Cir.1972). The complaint was filed on April 25, 1984. The motion to amend was filed less than one month later, on May 21, 1984. There has been no unreasonable delay. Nor have defendants cited any prejudice that would result if the motion is granted. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint to add the individual commissioners as defendants is granted.

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant MPSC raises several arguments in support of its motion to dismiss. First MPSC argues that the court may not grant the relief requested under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because neither plaintiffs nor defendant are “persons.” Second, MPSC argues that it is immune from suit in federal court under the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution. Third, MPSC argues that plaintiffs have not made a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Fourth, MPSC contends that principles of federalism and comity demand that the court abstain from hearing this case. Finally, MPSC contends that plaintiffs have failed to establish a case or controversy.

A

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable ... in an action at law, [or] suit in equity____”

MPSC argues that, since section 1983 refers only to “persons” or “citizens,” plaintiffs may not sue under section 1983, nor may the MPSC be a section 1983 defendant. The Supreme Court, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936), held that “a corporation is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the equal protection and due process of law clauses.” Id. at 244, 56 S.Ct. at 446. Federal courts dealing with corporate claims under section 1983 have consistently concluded that a corporation is an “other person” for section 1983 as long as the corporation is suing in its own right. In Monell v. New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Court held that a municipal corporation was a person within the meaning of the civil rights statutes. The Court noted: “... it [is] well understood that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis.” Id. at 687, 98 S.Ct. at 2034.

The case of Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1938), cited by the MPSC in its brief, in support of its position that corporations are not persons, is inapplicable here. In Hague, the Court merely held that a corporation is not a citizen and, therefore, may not bring suit under the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 514, 59 S.Ct. at 963. Nothing in Hague compels the conclusion that a corporation is not a person for the purposes of section 1983. Indeed, almost every lower court which has considered the question has concluded, following Grosjean, that a corporation may bring an action under section 1983. Cf. Raymond Motor Transport v. Rice, 417 F.Supp. 1352 (W.D.Wisc.1976), rev’d on other grounds, 434 U.S. 429, 98 S.Ct. 787, 54 L.Ed.2d 664 (1977). Gentry v. Howard, 365 F.Supp. 567 (W.D.La.1973); Mini Cinema 16 of Fort Dodge v. Habbab, 326 F.Supp. 1162 (N.D.Ind.1970). It is clear then that the fact that ANR Pipeline and ANR Storage are corporations is not a bar to their section 1983 claims.

However, the MPSC’s argument that it is not a section 1983 defendant is correct. The eleventh amendment to the Constitution provides:

“The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State.”

Eleventh amendment immunity extends not only to the state, but also to state agencies. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed. 662 (1974). The Supreme Court recently had occasion to consider eleventh amendment immunity in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). In Pennhurst, the Court noted:

“This Court’s decisions thus establish that ‘an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.’ Employees [of Dept. of Public Health & Welfare], supra, 411 U.S. [279], at 280, 93 S.Ct. [1614], at 1616 [36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973) ]. There may be a question, however, whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named
as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U.S. 147, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981) (per curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. See, e.g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27, 54 S.Ct. 18, 21, 78 L.Ed. 145 (1933) (‘Expressly applying to suits in equity as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and prosecuted by an individual against a State’).”

Id., 104 S.Ct. at 908. In Alabama v. Pugh, cited by the Court above, and more recently, in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), the Supreme Court expressly held that the eleventh amendment is a jurisdictional bar to a section 1983 action against a state. Moreover, there can be little doubt that the MPSC, as an integral state agency, is entitled to the same immunity as the state itself. See Pennhurst, supra; Dagnall v. Gegenheimer, 645 F.2d 2 (5th Cir.1981); Savage v. Pennsylvania, 475 F.Supp. 524 (E.D.Pa.1979); Usury v. La. Dept. of Hwys, 459 F.Supp. 56 (E.D.La.1978). Therefore the 1983 claims against the MPSC are dismissed.

However, the fact that the MPSC itself is immune from suit under section 1983 does not require dismissal of the entire suit. The addition of the individual commissioners as defendants adds parties who do not enjoy the same eleventh amendment immunity as the MPSC. It is well settled that:

“[There is] an important exception to this general rule [of eleventh amendment immunity]; a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action is not one against the State. This was the holding in Ex parte Young, 209 US 123, 52 LEd 714, 28 S Ct 441 (1908), in which a federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota from bringing a suit to enforce a state statute that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is ‘void’ and therefore does not ‘impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.’ Id., at 160, 52 LEd 714, 28 S.Ct. 441 [at 454]. Since the state could not authorize the action, the officer was ‘stripped of his official or representative character and [was] subjected to the consequences of his official conduct.’ Ibid.”

Pennhurst, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 909.

This is precisely the exception that plaintiffs rely on. They argue that the regulatory scheme here is unconstitutional and, therefore, the individual members of the MPSC cannot enjoy eleventh amendment immunity. Therefore, the individual commissioners are proper defendants.

B.

The MPSC’s next argument is that section 1983 applies only to equal rights legislation, and that rights under the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause are not rights protected under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit recently examined this issue in Martin-Marietta Corporation v. Bendix Corporation, 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.1982). Citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), the Court recognized that a “right” secured by the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause was a “right” protected under section 1983:

“Martin-Marietta and United Technologies both state claims under section 1983. Each alleges, in part, that the provisions of the Michigan Take-Over Offers Act and the Michigan Uniform Securities Act, including the anti-fraud provisions, are violative of the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and that their enforcement by the State of Michigan and/or Bendix would deprive them of rights secured under the Williams Act and these constitutional provisions. Maine v. Thiboutot 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed 2d 555 (1980).”

Id. at 562.

Maine v. Thiboutot, cited above, established that the language of section 1983 encompasses a broad range of constitutional and federal statutory violations. At least one other court has considered the question of whether section 1983 protects rights secured under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses, and answered affirmatively. In Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 186 (3d Cir.1980), the court noted: “The present action is properly brought under § 1983 because it seeks redress for deprivations of constitutional rights secured by the commerce clause.” The rights protected by section 1983 are not as strictly circumscribed as the MPSC argues. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses are properly brought under section 1983.

C.

Defendant argues that the court should abstain from hearing the case until the question has first been presented to the MPSC. The MPSC argues that plaintiffs, having failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, are not entitled to federal relief. While it is true that plaintiffs do not currently have an application pending before the MPSC, defendant does not dispute that, in the past it has specifically, ruled that it has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs. See Order dated March 10, 1981, in Case No. U-67661 (ANR Pipeline Co.); Order, dated July 31, 1979, in Case No. U-6189 (ANR PL Co.); Order, dated September 11, 1979, in Case No. U-6257 (ANR PL Co.); Order dated March 2, 1982, in Case No. U-7108 (ANR PL Co.); Order dated March 31, 1983, in Case No. U-7572 (ANR PL Co.); Order, dated November 24, 1981, in Case No. U-7032 (ANR Storage Co.); and Order, dated May 18, 1983, in Case No. U-7617 (ANR Storage Co.). The MPSC has consistently asserted jurisdiction over the public offerings of plaintiffs and there can be no doubt that they will continue to do so.

Defendants base their abstention argument on the doctrines promulgated in the three leading abstention cases: Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943); and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). However, in reviewing a request to abstain, a court should keep in mind the ruling in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). There, the Supreme Court stated that abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception not the rule.

Under the doctrine enunciated in Pullman, when a state law is being challenged in federal court as unconstitutional and there are questions of state law which may be dispositive of the case, a federal court should abstain from deciding the case and allow the state courts to decide the state issues. Pullman abstention is appropriate in a case where the challenged state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary that would avoid or modify the necessity of reaching the federal constitutional question. Babbit v. UFW, 442 U.S. 289, 306, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2312, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979). The rationale behind the Pullman doctrine is the avoidance of unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions by allowing state courts an opportunity to interpret an ambiguous state statute so that it is constitutional. Harris County Commissioners Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 95 S.Ct. 870, 43 L.Ed.2d 32 (1977).

Pullman abstention, which the Court has described as applicable only in “narrowly limited, special circumstances,” Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248, 88 S.Ct. 391, 395, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967), does not apply when the state law is clear. Both the plain language of the statute, M.C.L.A. § 460.301, and subsequent interpretation of that statute by the Michigan Supreme Court make it clear that the statute applies to plaintiffs. See Michigan Gas Storage v. MPSC, 405 Mich. 376, 275 N.W.2d 457 (1979); Indiana and Michigan Power Co. v. State, 405 Mich. 400, 275 N.W.2d 450 (1979). In addition, the MPSC itself has asserted jurisdiction over the plaintiffs. This is not a case then, involving an ambiguous statute, and it is not a case for Pullman abstention. As the Supreme Court has noted:

“[w]here there is no ambiguity in the state statute, the federal court should not abstain but should proceed to decide the federal constitutional claim.”

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439, 91 S.Ct. 507, 511, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971). See also Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, supra; Cusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54, 94 S.Ct. 303, 306, 38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983).

Nor is this a case for Younger abstention. In Younger, the Supreme Court held that abstention is appropriate where, absent bad faith, harrasment or a patently invalid statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining a pending state proceeding. The Sixth Circuit recently had occasion to consider the propriety of Younger abstention in which there was no pending state proceeding. In WXYZ v. Hand, 658 F.2d 420, 423 (6th Cir.1981), the court noted:

“As it applies to this case, the abstention rule of Younger v. Harris, supra, and its progency is clear. Lacking extraordinary circumstances, a federal court cannot enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding. Park v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.1980). Subsequent decisions have expanded the range of state proceedings to which the rule is applicable. However, when no state proceeding is pending, and considerations of equity, comity, and federalism are therefore diminished, a federal court may consider constitutional challenges to state statutes and grant declaratory and injunctive relief.”

[Citations omitted.] The absence of pending state proceedings, which caused the WXYZ, Inc. court to reject a Younger abstention request has also been the ground for rejection in other cases. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, supra; HBO, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F.Supp. 987 (D.Utah 1982).

Finally, I conclude that Burford abstention is not required here. Burford involved an attack upon the validity of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission granting petitioner a permit to drill several oil wells. Jurisdiction was invoked on diversity and federal question grounds, the federal question being a constitutional due process challenge to the order. The Supreme Court, after recognizing that abstention may be appropriate both in cases of diversity and federal question jurisdiction, held that the federal court should have abstained from the case on the ground that the issues involved concerned a specialized aspect of a complicated regulatory system of local law, which should have been resolved by specialized local administrative bodies and courts. The Court listed two factors which justified abstention: (1) the presence of a complex state regulatory scheme which would be disrupted by federal court review; and (2) the existence of a state created forum with specialized competence in the particular area. Burford supra, 319 U.S. at 327, 332-33, 63 S.Ct. at 1104, 1106-07. Burford abstention is not appropriate “merely because resolution of a federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380, n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 673, 678, n. 5, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978). The state must exhibit an overriding interest in the subject matter, and the state must centralize review in a forum with special competence. Ada-Cascade Watch Co. v. Cascade Resource Recovery, 720 F.2d 897, 903 (6th Cir.1983).

The MPSC has not demonstrated an overriding state interest. The issuance of securities or long-term debt by an interstate natural gas company is a matter of national concern, and is regulated by the FERC and the SEC. Moreover, plaintiffs base their claim, at least in part, on the Supremacy Clause and federal preemption. These are not matters within the special competence of local courts. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Knudsen Corp. v. Nevada State Dairy Comm’n, 676 F.2d 374 (9th Cir.1982):

“Burford abstention is particularly inappropriate when the plaintiff’s claim is based on preemption, because abstaining under Burford would be an implicit ruling on the merits.”

Id. at 377.

Because neither Pullman, Younger or Burford abstention is necessary, I decline to dismiss this action on those grounds. In doing so, I obviously make no determination of the merits of plaintiffs’ claim, I merely conclude that this is an appropriate forum for that claim to be heard.

D.

The MPSC’s final argument for dismissal is that there is no actual case or controversy. Article 3, section 2 of the Constitution allows a federal court to act only on cases or controversies. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, applies only in a “case of actual controversy.” The classic statement of this Constitutional and statutory requirement was provided by the Supreme Court in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil, 312 U.S. 270, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941):

“The difference between an abstract question and a ‘controversy’ contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy. Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”

Id. at 273, 61 S.Ct. at 512.

Whether facts are sufficiently immediate and real to make an actual controversy is something that must be worked out on a case-by-case basis. Muller v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 404 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir.1968).

In this case there is no dispute that plaintiffs have issued securities and bonds in the past, and will continue to do so in the future. Nor is there any dispute over the fact that the MPSC has exercised jurisdiction over those public offerings. Enforcement of the Michigan statute is not just a threat. Repetitive enforcement of M.C.L.A. § 460.301 has occurred and there is no reason to believe it will not occur in the future. The MPSC’s opposition to this lawsuit attests to that fact. In such a situation, where there is a reasonable likelihood the parties will be involved in an identical dispute in the future, an actual controversy exists. See Terry v. Penn Central Corp., 668 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.1981). See also Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 76 (6th Cir.1972). On these facts, I conclude that an actual controversy exists.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint is granted. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

      . Plaintiffs argue that the MPSC is a proper person under section 1983 for purposes of injunctive or declaratory relief. They cite two cases in support of this argument, Harris v. Arizona Board of Regents, 528 F.Supp. 987 (D.Ariz.1981), and Weisbord v. Michigan State University, 495 F.Supp. 1347 (W.D.Mich.1980), both of which held state supported universities were "persons” for the purposes of section 1983. Putting aside for a moment the differences between a state university and a state regulatory agency, there is a split of opinion over whether an arm of the state as independent as a state university can be a “person” under section 1983. This court had occasion to consider that very question in An-Ti Chai v. Michigan Technological University, 493 F.Supp. 1137 (W.D.Mich. 1980). There I concluded that a state university was a state agency protected by the eleventh amendment, and could not be sued under section 1983. Id. at 1162. Other courts have concurred. See, e.g., Prebble v. Broderick, 535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir.1976); Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir.1971); Walsted v. University of Minnesota Hosp., 442 F.2d 634 (8th Cir.1971). In any event, I am convinced that the MPSC is an arm of the state protected by the eleventh amendment, and is not a "person" for the purposes of section 1983. Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that an action for an injunction or declaratory relief should be treated differently than. any other action under section 1983.