author: Per Curiam —

text:
    Commonwealth versus National Mutual Aid Association.
    1. A mutual aid association of the state of Ohio is not a foreign insurance company, within the meaning of the Act of April 4th 1873, and is not liable to the penalty imposed by said act on foreign insurance companies for transacting business within this state without authority of law.
    2. Said association is within the exception contained in the 54th section of the Act of May 1st 1876, which divests the control of the insurance commissioner over “ beneficial associations.”
    3. It seems, that the insurance coininisioner has no authority to make a settlement for penalty against a foreign insurance company without first giving the company notice of his intention to make it.
    May 17th 1880.
    Before Merour, Gordon, Panson, Truniiey and Sterrett, JJ. Sharswood, C. J., and Green, J., absent.
    Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin county; Of May Term 1880, No. 204.
    This was an appeal of the National Mutual Aid Association of Columbus, Ohio, from the settlement of the insurance commissioner and state treasurer, to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin county.
    ’The insurance commissioner of this Commonwealth settled an account, which was approved by the state treasurer, for penalty of $1000, incurred by the National Mutual Aid Association of Columbus, Ohio, which did business as an insurance company, as the Commonwealth claimed, without having received authority for that purpose from the commissioner.
    The Commonwealth sought to impose upon the association a penalty of $500 for transacting said business in December 1879. The business complained of was the admission of Louis N. Kramer of Scranton, Pa., to membership in said association.
    Proceedings were also instituted against S. A. Hollister, agent, to recover a like penalty of $500 for forwarding to the association the application of Kramer for membership.
    The appeal and specifications of- objections .by the association were as follow’s:
    1. The settlement is erroneous and illegal because the said association did not, during the months of December 1879, and January 1880, or either of them, transact any business within the state of Pennsylvania for which any authority from the insurance commissioner, under the Act of April 4th 1873, was requisite, and it is, therefore, not liable for the whole, or any part, of the penalty in said settlement charged.
    2. The association is not an insurance company, and is, therefore, not subject to the provisions of the Act of April 4th 1873, nor to any of the penalties prescribed by the said act, and the said settlement hereby appealed from is erroneous and illegal, because it charges the said association with such a penalty.
    3. The association is excepted out of the operations of the Act of April 4th 1873 by the terms of the supplement to said act, approved May 1st 1876, particularly by the fifty-fourth section thereof, in which it is enacted that “ this act, and the act to which this is a supplement, shall not apply to the beneficial associations that provide aid for the family or heirs of a deceased member, whether issuing policies containing a guaranteed sum of insurance or not, nor to associations issuing policies not containing a guaranteed sum of insurance.” The transaction of business for the said association requires no authority from'the insurance commissioner under the Act of April 4th 1873, and the said settlement hereby appealed from, because it charges said association with a penalty for transacting business without such authority is erroneous and illegal.
    4. The association had complied with the requirements of the Act of April 22d 1874, and was in the months of December 1879, and January 1880, and still is, duly authorized to do business in the state of Pennsylvania, and the said settlement, hereby appealed from, is erroneous and illegal, because therein a penalty is charged for the transaction of business duly authorized by law.
    5. The said settlement is erroneous and illegal, because the insurance commissioner, not having previously notified the association or any officer or agent thereof to pay the said penalty, he was not authorized by law to settle any account whatever, or commence any proceeding against the said association.
    6. The said settlement is erroneous and illegal, because there is no authority of law for the charge of $1000 therein made, and the association is not'bound to pay the same, or any part thereof.
    The insurance commissioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is authorized by the Act of Assembly of 4th April 1873, Pamph. L. 1873, p. 20, to settle and collect penalties against insurance companies and insurance agents for transacting business within this state without authority of law.
    The sections which confer upon him this power are the 14th and 15th sections, and they contain this language, viz.:
    Sect. 14. That any person or persons, or corporation, receiving premiums, or forwarding applications, or in any other way transacting business for any insurance company or association not of this state, without having received authority agreeably to the provisions of this act, shall forfeit and pay to the Commonwealth the sum of $500 for each month, or fraction thereof, during which such illegal business was transacted, and any company not of this state doing business without authority, shall forfeit a like sum for every month, or fraction thereof, and be prohibited from doing business in this state until such fines are fully paid.

      Sect. 15. The taxes, fines and penalties provided in this act shall, in case of non-payment, after notice from the commissioner, be collected as taxes upon corporations or individuals are now collected by law, and for this purpose the insurance commissioner shall have all the powers now conferred by law upon the auditor-general in the settlement of accounts, subject, however, to the approval of the state treasurer, and to the right of appeal as in other cases.
    Under the authority of these sections the insurance commissioner upon the 4th of February 1880 settled the account against the association for the sum of $1000, for “transacting business during the month of December 1879, in the state of Pennsylvania for an insurance company not of this state, entitled the ‘ National Mutual Aid Association,’ of Columbus, Ohio, without having received authority agreeably to the provisions of said act.”
    This account was, on the same day, approved by the state treasurer.
    The narr. and plea were in debt. The case was tried by the Court of Common Pleas, without a jury, under the provisions of the Act of April'22d 1874.
    The court, Pearson, P. J., found the facts as follows:—
    “ This proceeding was commenced by a settlement or decree made by the insurance commissioner and state treasurer againt S. A. Hollister and ‘ The National Mutual Aid Association of Columbus, Ohio,’ for penalties.on account of alleged violation of the laws regulating insurance in Pennsylvania, all of which sufficiently appears in the narr. and other papers on file. We find the penalties are both incurred for doing the same act; if a recovery can be had against the one party, it can against the other also. In investigating the law and facts of this case, we shall' treat of the complaint against the corporation alone.
    “ We find from the facts proved, that ‘ The National Mutual Aid Association of Columbus, Ohio,’ is a corporation created by the laws of that state for the purposes and with the. powers mentioned in its charter. That it .has no fixed or permanent capital, is not bound to pay any certain sum for the benefit of the heirs, widow or devisees of a member on his death, but to act as agents in collecting one dollar from each member then living, so far as the same can be obtained, and to pay over eighty-five per cent, of each sum thus collected. That the initiatory fee of ten dollars is not in the nature of a premium exacted to pay losses, but to cover expenses of all kinds, such as office rent, counsel fees, clerk hire, for agents, &c. ; that said corporation was created under the Act of April 20th 1872, as amended by the Act of April 3d 3875 (Pamphlet Law's of Ohio), and that there is another general law of that state regulating life insurance on wholly different principles, requiring a large and fixed capital, well secured, enacted on the 27th of April 1872.
    f‘ffe further find that under the laws of Pennsylvania, this would be considered a beneficial association to provide aid for the family and heirs of a deceased member, and is not an association issuing policies containing a guaranteed sum of insurance, and that the policy issued to Louis N. Kramer, on account of which this suit was instituted, is in the nature of one by a mere beneficial association, and is not for a fixed and definite sum of money in case of death.
    “ We find that this corporation of Ohio is in the nature of a mere aid society ; that there is no fixed sum for insurance, but the amount which may be collected and paid over is entirely uncertain, and that it has no fixed capital, and received no certificate or license from the insurance commissioner to transact business in this state.
    “ But we further find that on the 14th day of November 1879, it gave notice in due form to the secretary of the Commonwealth, showing its title and object, the location of its office, and names of it's authorized agents, and obtained the certificate of the secretary under the seal of the Commonwealth of the filing of such statement.
    “We find that neither the insurance commissioner or state treasurer gave any notice to ‘ The National Mutual Aid Association of Columbus, Ohio,’ or to S. A. Hollister, of the time and place when the penalties would be collected from them, or either of them, but the same was settled and adjudged against them without any previous notice whatever, but some time after this was done, they were both duly served by mail with notice that the same had been settled against them, in time for each to take an appeal, which was done. The foregoing we find to be the facts proved, the evidence of which is to be found in the notes of testimony, the various documents given in evidence, and the Pamphlet Laws of the state of Ohio.”
    The conclusions of law, of the court, were as follows: “ The facts, if correctly found in the present case, go far in determining the law which must govern it. We have found that the company sued is not technically a mutual life insurance company, hut is no , more than 4 a mutual aid association,’ of which we have hundreds in Pennsylvania, generally on a smaller scale than the defendant, but of the same general character. We have beneficial associations all over the manufacturing or mining portions of the state, generally incorporated, and long in existence. One, at least, in our vicinity starting with a thousand members, each agreeing to pay one dollar on the death of a member towards relieving his fajnily, kindred or legatees. No one thought of their being insurance companies, or coming under the jurisdiction of our insurance commissioner. It is obvious that the same is the case in the state of Ohio. They are there created by different laws, passed within a few days of each other, yet entirely different in their provisions and structure. That state, like our own, has an insurance commissioner, with laws similar to ours, yet their Supreme Court has decided that companies incorporated, as the one under consideration, for ‘ mutual protection’ is not an insurance company. True, that would not be binding in our state if the company came within our laws, yet, in our opinion, it does not.
    “ The company has no capital, it is not bound to pay any fixed sum on the death of a member, but only so much as is voluntarily paid by those surviving, from whom there is no means of collecting by law, and of the sums thus paid fifteen per cent, is to be retained to cover expenses. The company considers itself merely the agent to collect and receive the money from living-members for the use of the deceased. In the State of Ohio v. The Mutual Protective Society, the Supreme Court of that state decided, in 26 Ohio Rep. 19, that a company precisely like this was not a mutual insurance company. This brings the company within the 54th section of the Act of May 1st 1876, which entirely takes away the jurisdiction of our insurance commissioner from all control over ‘beneficial associations,’ of which we deem this to be one. Therefore the action of that officer was coram non judice.

      “ It is urged, however, that this section applies to domestic companies alone, not to foreign. It is very general in its expressions, covers all, and we can see no reason for so limiting it. We are told that this section was not in the original bill as presented, but was inserted by the legislature on its passage. If so, it showed that the law-making power considered the bill too general, and required restriction, therefore the section should receive the more extended construction, so as to effect the intention.
    “ It is obvious from the whole evidence that this company did not designedly violate our laws. It had, as a corporation, reported itself to the secretary of the Commonwealth, and obtained his certificate. It could find nothing in our laws which would establish it an insurance company, even of the mutual character. It was clearly no more than a ‘mutual aid association,’ by the laws of Ohio, and was not obliged to obtain the certificate of the insurance' commissioner by the laws of Pennsylvania. It was therefore, to say the least of it, harsh to inflict the penalty on the company and its agent. It was unlawful.
    “ There is another point which must be settled eventually, and may as well be done in this case. The insurance commissioner claims the power to make a decree ex parte, which he calls a settlement, against both the company and the individual that they shall pay the amount of the penalty imposed by law for transacting business in this state without- his license; this without any previous notice or claim. We do not believe that the legislature ever so intended. It is so claimed because it is said that the auditor general has such power under the Act of 1811. On carefully reading that law it might well be doubted whether it was so intended in regard to anything but the settlement of taxes and the failure to make reports. The discretionary power is clearly given to that department to so settle accounts for taxes, when from the smallness of the claim or other causes it is deemed expedient, from which the practice has grown up so to do in all cases, and it is now clearly settled that the right exists, and that the settlement is conclusive unless appealed from within thirty days after notice. But we are not at present aware of any case where this has been applied to the recovery of a bare naked penalty. On reading the act we find great pains taken to enable the auditor general to compel the attendance of parties, production of books and papers, &c., and although power to impose penalties is conferred in some cases, yet they contemplate notice.
    “ The insurance commissioner and state treasurer, perhaps, have the same power under the fifteenth section of the Act of April 4th 1873, as the auditor general, yet that section declares that fines arid penalties provided for in this act shall, in case of non-payment after notice from the commissioner, be collected as taxes upon corporations or individuals. Yet the ground on which companies and officers are bound to ex parte settlements without notice and held liable, as decided in several cases, is, that they take their charters and commissions with notice that the power is so conferred; yet 'that can scarcely apply to those created by the laws of other states or to private individuals. It may be well questioned whether, under the Constitution of this state, such power can be conferred. It is not proceeding by due course of law. We cannot help doubting whether the legislature ever intended to authorize the recovery of these large penalties without notice, hearing or trial, and in the present case we think that notice was expressly required. For this reason, as well as those already given, we are of the opinion that the state is not entitled to recover either of the penalties claimed, and shall give judgment against the state in both cases.”
    The Commonwealth excepted to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, the exceptions reciting portions of the foregoing findings of facts and law. Argument being waived on the exceptions the court overruled them, and ordered judgment to be entered according to the decision filed. The Commonwealth then took this writ, and assigned this action of the court for error.

      Lyman D. Gilbert, Deputy Attorney-General, and Henry W. Palmer, Attorney-General, for the Commonwealth.
    The legislature has power to exclude all foreign corporations from its soil, or to impose such conditions as it may see proper upon them in the transaction of their business within her limits: Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters 519. The legislature of this Commonwealth, by the Acts of 4th April 1873, Pamph. L. 20, and 1st May 1876, Pamph. L. 53, has established an insurance system, and has excluded from this state foreign insurance companies which were unable to comply with the requirements of these Acts of Assembly.
    The Act of 1873 prescribes the terms and conditions under which companies of other states may engage in the business of life insurance or assurance within this state. They must have certain assets to enable them to meet their liabilities at maturity, and must obtain the certificate of the insurance commissioner, showing that these conditions have been complied with. This act excludes all companies unable to comply with these conditions, without reference to the particular plan or system upon which their business may be conducted. It prescribes a rule of solvency for all companies, and debars all others which cannot conform to it.
    If the words “beneficial association” can be construed to cover the case of this company then why not that of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, the largest company in the country, which is purely mutual', and is beneficial, if any company is. Every argument in behalf of the defendant company is an argument for the free admission of all life companies. We contend this is an insurance company within the meaning of our insurance system. It possesses franchises which make it an insurance company within the letter arid spirit of our laws. Its corporate privileges are to be considered in deciding to what class of corporations to assign this company.
    The notice to be given by the insurance commissioner was not of an intention but of an act, and it was not to precede the settlement or statement of an account, but only its collection.
    In Commonwealth v. Runk et al., 2 Casey 235, it was expressly decided that “ in a settlement made by the auditor general and state treasurer, under the Act of 30th March 1811, of the taxes due by a corporation, it is not necessary that a preliminary notice of the time of settling an account shall be given.”
    In Germania Life Insurance Company v. Commonwealth, 4 Norris 513, this court decided the express point that the insurance commissioner has the power of the auditor general to settle accounts. We, therefore, submit that the insurance commissioner is not required by any rule of law to give notice of his intention before he settles an account for penalties; that the ikct of 22d April 1874, Pamph. L. 108, did not and was not designed to remove restrictions imposed upon the transaction of business within this state by foreign insurance companies; that this association is both by its charter and its system of business a foreign insurance company, prohibited from doing, business within this Commonwealth because it cannot give such guarantees of solvency as the law exacts of foreign companies; and that having, without authority of law, transacted business as a life insurance company is liable to the penalties as stated in the settlement made against him.
    May 31st 1880,

      M. H. Olmsted and J. W. Simonton, for defendant in error.—
    The association falls within both clauses of the exception in the Act of 1876. First, it is “a beneficial association that provides aid for the family or heirs of a deceased member;” and secondly, its'certificates, if they may he called policies at all, are “ policies not containing a guaranteed sum of insurance.”
    It is contended that this supplementary act does not apply to foreign aid associations, because only foreign insurance companies are mentioned in its title. In this we concur. There was no occasion for mention in the title of companies to which the act was not intended to apply, but lest the term “insurance companies’-’ should be construed to embrace aid associations, the fifty-fourth section was inserted for the express purpose of manifesting the legislative intention to exclude them entirely from the operation of the insurance laws.
    Sect. 15, of the Act of 1873, provides that the taxes, fines and penalties imposed by said act shall in cases of non-payment, after notice from the commissioner, be collected, &c. In this case no notice had been given, and consequently, the commissioner was not authorized to treat this penalty as a tax and settle an account for it.
    The settlements made under the Act of 1811, in the cases referred to by plaintiff in error, were for taxes, for the settlement of which a time was fixed by law, and of which parties were required to take notice. The Act of Assembly did not in express terms require the auditor general to give any notice, but even under that act, where no definite time of settlement was fixed in the act, it was held by this 'court in Commonwealth v. Fitler, 12 S. & R. 279, that a settlement by the auditor general could hot be sustained unless previous notice had been given to the party.
   The judgment of the Supreme Court was entered,

Per Curiam —

This is an attempt to impose a penalty on the defendant fpr an alleged violation of the law's regulating insurance companies in this Commonwealth. It is a corporation created by the law's of the state of Ohio. Although it possesses some of the features of an insurance company, yet it is there held not to be a mutual insurance company: State of Ohio v. Mutual Protective Society, 26 Ohio Rep. 19. It is substantially a beneficial or mutual aid association. It has no fixed capital. It is not bound to pay any fixed sum on the death of a member, but so much only as may voluntarily be paid by the surviving members. It cannot be enforced by law. Each person is required to pay a fee of ten dollars on his admission as a member: but “ no assessments can be made for carrying on the business of the association.” The effort is to make it liable under the provisions of the Act of 4th April 187 3, yet it is clearly excepted from the operation of that act by the Act of 1st May 1876, Pamph. L. 58. The fifty-fourth section of the latter act declares that “ this act and the act to which this is a supplement, shall not apply to the beneficial associations that provide aid for the family or heirs of a deceased member, whether issuing policies containing a guaranteed sum of insurance or not, nor to associations issuing policies not containing a guaranteed sum of insurance.” The defendant is clearly within this exception. It is held not to be an insurance company in the state where it is created, and even if we were to think otherwise here, yet it is not that kind of a .company so as to subject it to the penalty prescribed by the Act of 1873.

Judgment affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Gordon

license: Public Domain

text:
    Harner’s Appeal. Bickel’s Estate.
    1. A. advanced money to B. and took his judgment therefor. The money was advanced on the faith of an entry of satisfaction of a judgment which was prior to A.’s judgment. Upon the application of the equitable assignee of the prior judgment the court struck off the entry of satisfaction. In the distribution of the proceeds of a sheriff’s sale of B.’s real estate. Held, that A. was entitled to be paid in full before the prior judgment could participate in the distribution.
    2. The satisfaction being regulai-ly marked upon the docket, and so marked by the authority of one who, prima facie, had full power so to do, this was all A. was required to look to ; it was not his business to inquire about equities to which he was not a party and of which he had no knowledge.
    May 21st 1880.
    Before Mercur, Gordon, Paxson, Trunket, Sterrett and Green, JJ. Siiarswood, C. J., absent.
    Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin county: Of May Term 1879, No. 157.
    Appeal of Frederick D. Hamer from the decree of the court distributing the proceeds of the sheriff’s sale of the real estate of Tobias Bickel. Before the auditor, John H. Weiss, Esq., the fund arising from the sale was claimed by the holders of two judgments, one' in favor of the Lykens Valley Bank for $9000, on bond and warrant entered March 12th 1873, and one in favor of Ilarner, the appellant, for $3000, on bond and warrant entered August 80th 1875. The auditor found that the judgment of the bank was given to secure existing and proposed discounts. On May 1st 1875, the Lykens Valley Bank was succeeded by the First National Bank of Millersburg, and the unpaid notes of the former bank were transferred to the national bank, and at maturity these notes were replaced by others and the old notes surrendered.
    Doubts arose as to whether the bond given by Bickel to the Lykens Valley Bank was of any validity as a security for the payment of the notes held by the national bank against Bickel. After several conferences, it was arranged between the board of directors of the national bank and Bickel that the latter should give a new bond to the national bank in the sum of $9000, and should be credited on his indebtedness with seventeen shares of the capital stock of the said national bank at the price he paid for it, viz., $115 per share.
    This new bond was entered of record, but not until September 11th 1875.
    On the 22d of September 1875, Harner obtained a bond with warrant of attorney to confess judgment against Tobias Bickel for the sum of $3000, which bore interest from September 22d 1874, which matured one year thereafter, and upon "which judgment was entered August 30th 1875, to No. 51, Nov. Term 1875. Bickel was previously indebted to Harner in the sum o-f $560, for which the latter held the former’s note. Bickel desired to borrow more money from Harner, but the latter declined the loan of any further sum, because of the judgment which the Lykens Valley Bank held against him. Bickel there told him that this judgment would be satisfied. On the day of the date of the judgment, Harner gave Bickel his note in the sum of $2240, which, with the sum of $560 already due from Bickel to him, made up the sum of $3000, the amount of the judgment. He agreed to advance the balance of the money as soon as the bank judgment should be satisfied. He advanced no money to Bickel until he ascertained from the prothonotary that the judgment of the Lykens Valley Bank was satisfied, and, finally, did advance and pay the amount of his note $2240, with interest, when he learned satisfaction was entered. Harner made no inquiry of the bank as to whether the judgment would be satisfied, nor by what authority it was satisfied. He-knew it was not satisfied when he took, nor when he entered of record his own judgment. He did not see (for he made no search), that the First National Bank had entered their judgment against Bickel, and he said that if he had noticed this judgment, he would not have given any money, unless he had previously asked the officers of the bank. He did not acquaint the officers of the national bank at any time with the fact that he had not given any money to Bickel at the time he obtained the judgment against him. He said that his judgment was the first, and, therefore, began to advance the money to Bickel.
    The judgment given by Bickel to the Lykens Valley Banking Company was marked satisfied by the prothonotary, on September 30th 1875, in pursuance of an authority to him directed by G. M. Brubaker, who was president of said bank, and who continued to act in that capacity during its existence, and of the chartered Lykens Valley Bank until January 1874; and by the direction of S. P. Auchmuty, the attorney for the bank at that time, who suggested the entry of satisfaction as per authority of Brubaker on the back of the certificates.
    On the 20th of June 1876, a rule to show cause why the entry of satisfaction should not be stricken off was granted. On the 14th of September 1876, the satisfaction entered was stricken off by the court, but without prejudice to the rights of intervening creditors, and with leave for the defendant, Bickel, to move to vacate the order.
    On the 14th of December 1876, the defendant filed a motion to vacate and to reinstate the entry of satisfaction. On December 29th 1876, the court refused the motion, and directed, in an opinion filed the same day, that the' order rescinding the satisfaction should stand good, and that the judgment be reinstated, but to be without prejudice to the rights of F. D. Harner or other creditors whose claims can be shown to intervene between the time of entering satisfaction and the application to have the judgment satisfied, and the decision neither to prejudice nor benefit his or their claims, and with leave to the plaintiff to issue execution. Thus the judgment given by Bickel to the First Lykens Valley Bank for $9000 on the 22d of August 1871, and kept in their safe until March 12th 1873, and then entered of record, was satisfied September 30th 1875. The judgment given by Bickel to the First National Bank in the same sum, dated September 1st 1875, was entered of record in Dauphin county, as above mentioned, September 11th 1875.
    The auditor, inter alia, reported :
    “ The bank held a judgment in this large amount unsatisfied, and knowing this, Earner obligated himself to advance the money upon his own judgment when the former should bo satisfied. It was the least possible hardship to require of him the exercise of ordinary diligence, both as to search and inquiry, before he made advances, in order to be protected against an unauthorized satisfaction. In order, therefore, to enable Harner to claim any superior right, it was incumbent upon him to ascertain by what authority the judgment of the Lykens Valley Bank was satisfied, and failing in this, he has no standing as a prior claimant upon the fund. Equity will not permit a claim to be predicated upon laches.”
    The auditor then awarded the fund to the First National Bank upon the old judgment. Harner filed exceptions, when the court, Pearson, P. J., made the following decree:
    “And now, to wit, July 13th 1878, it is ordered, by the court that, upon the filing of a recognisance in favor of the Commonwealth for use of F. D. Harner, in the sum of $5000, with two recognisors to be approved by the prothonotary and taken by him, conditioned for the payment to said Harner of such sum as may finally be decreed and adjudged to him after the determination of his appeal to the Supreme Court in this case, upon his judgment No. 51, November Term 1875, entered August 20th 1875, for $3000, the money to be paid out to the distributee, viz.: The First National Bank of Millersburg, Pa., in accordance with the foregoing report.”
    Harner then took this appeal, and alleged that the court erred in making the above decree and in striking off the entry of 'satisfaction from the record of the Lykens Yalley Bank judgment.

      Fleming ¿f- McOarrell, for appellant.
    The court had no right to strike off the entry of satisfaction. The whole controversy was one of fact depending on the testimony of many witnesses who gave conflicting statements, and the court should have sent the question to a jury: Humphreys v. Rawn, 8 Watts 78.
    We contend that the facts gave Harner an undoubted right, both in law and in equity, to have payment of the amount advanced by him as above stated, before anything could be awarded to the First National Bank, by virtue of the equitable title which it claimed to the Lykens Valley Bank judgment, but which it failed to assert or-make known in any way until long after Harner had parted with his money upon the faith of the record showing that the judgment had been satisfied.
    The auditor concludes that Harner was bound to acquaint the First National Bank with the arrangement between Bickel and himself before he advanced his money. This was requiring him to do an impossible thing, because there was not a scintilla of evidence to show that Harner knew, or had even had an intimation, that the national bank claimed any interest in the judgment until long after he had loaned money to Bickel. He obtained the prothonotary’s statement that the judgment was satisfied. He looked at the docket and saw for himself that the judgment was satisfied. The record showed that the judgment was in favor of a partnership. The authority for the entry of satisfaction was the original certificate of the judgment, with direction to satisfy endorsed thereon, and signed by Brubaker, one of the partners. Harner knew that ,one partner had authority to satisfy the partnership judgment, and that the signature of Brubaker, the partner, was genuine. He was not bound to make further inquiry: Moroney’s Appeal, 12 Harris 372; Magawv. Garrett, 1 Casey 322; Goepp v. Gortiser, 11 Id. 133.

      J. W. Simonton, for appellee.
    The action of the court in striking off the entry of satisfaction cannot be questioned in'this proceeding by Harner. That was a controversy between the bank and Bickel, and did not concern Harner. The order striking off the entry of satisfaction was made “without prejudice to the rights of intervening creditors,” and if Harner is an intervening creditor whose rights are prejudiced by the order, then, as to him, it does not exist; if he is not, he has no interest in the matter.
    June 21st 1880.
    There is no chance for the operation of any principle of equity in Harner’s favor, for the reason that at no time when he did anything in the matter, had he even an apparent lien prior to that of the bank. Thus, when he took and entered his judgment and gave his. note, August 30th 1879, the lien of the first $9000 judgment of the bank was in full force, standing untampered with upon the record. Again, when he advanced the money on this judgment, October 11th 1875, and thereafter, the lien of the second $9000 judgment held by the bank was in full force, and patent upon the record. Hence, when he took the judgment and gave his note, he had full notice of a prior lien; and when he actually paid the money he had the same.
    Harner, therefore, obtained his lien when he took and entered his judgment against Bickel, and gave his note to Bickel for the amount to be advanced, viz.: August 30th 1875, and as at this time the first judgment for $9000 in favor of the appellee stood in full force, he took subject to it. This being so, he could not gain priority over it, by virtue of the fact that it was afterwards, without the knowledge or consent of the appellee, marked satisfied on the record. This would be, not to commit a fraud himself, but to take advantage of the fraud of another.
    Further, when Harner actually made the advances, which was not until October 1875, and afterwards, the second $9000 judgment of appellee had been entered, namely, on September 11th 1875. Hence, if his lien is to date from the time the advances were actually made, they were made subject to the lien of this second judgment, and then the principle also referred to in Taylor v. Cornelius, 10 P. F. Smith 196, as settled by Ter Hoven v. Kerns, 2 Barr 96, and Bank of Montgomery County’s Appeal, 12 Casey 170, will apply, that where a lien is taken to secure future advances, but the lien creditor is under no contract to make the advances, the lien dates from the actual advance of the money.
   Mr. Justice Gordon

delivered the opinion of the court,

The original Lykens Valley Bank, to which Bickel executed the judgment, which forms the subject of the present controversy, as collateral security for certain notes which it discounted for him, was a partnership., and of this partnership Brubaker was not only a member, but president. Prima facie, therefore, he, as agent of this association, had full power either to assign or satisfy this judgment: Dubois’s Appeal, 2 Wright 231. Harner’s judgment, in amount $3000, was entered on the 30th of August 1875, and had been executed in September 1874. The consideration, therefor, was an account owing by Bickel to Harner, amounting to $560, and Harner’s note for $2250, payable as. soon as payment might be required after the Lykens Valley Bank judgment should be satisfied, but not before. This note, as appears from the audit- or’s report, was fully paid, according to the agreement of the parties, though not until after the 11th of September 1875, the date of the entry of the appellee’s judgment. This latter circumstance, however, is of no account, since Harner’s note and previous account were sufficient consideration for his judgment: Moroney’s Appeal, 12 Harris 872. Now, as soon as the judgment of the Lykens Valley Bank was satisfied that of Harner stood first, and the appellee, finding the lien of its judgment thus outranked, made application to have the satisfaction, just spoken of, taken off, on the ground that that judgment belonged to it as the successor - to the rights and obligations of the former Lykens Valley organization. To this proceeding Harner could not lawfully object; that was a matter for the parties themselves; they, without the court’s interposition, could have taken off this satisfaction, but whether taken off by themselves or by the court, the status of Bickel’s judgment was not affected thereby. As to him, the satisfaction remained, and it should so have been treated by the court below. The auditor, singularly enough, fell into the error of supposing it to be Harner’s duty to make inquiry of the Eirst National Bank, the appellee, as to its claims to the old judgment, but as that bank had, in fact, no assignment of that judgment marked on the'record,it was certainly not Harner’s duty to make inquiries about secret equities of which he had no knowledge. There was the satisfaction regularly marked upon the docket, and so marked by the authority of one who, prima facie, had full power so to do. This was all Harner was required to look to; it was not his business to inquire about rights and equities to which he was not a party and of which he had no knowledge: Springfield Building and Loan Association’s Appeal, MS. If the appellee desired to give notice' of its rights, and put the old judgment beyond the power of the partners of the original association, it should have taken an assignment and put that assignment on the docket. The duty rested -with it to see to its own judgment, that it was properly presented on the record, and failing in this, it must bear the consequences of its own neglect; it cannot cast them upon one who is in no default: Ridgway, Budd & Co.’s Appeal, 3 Harris 177. It is clear, therefore, that Harner’s right to the money, now in the court below for distribution, is superior to that of the appellee, and that the decree of the court below was erroneous.

The decree of the court below is now reversed and vacated, at the costs of appellee, and a re-distribution is ordered according to the principles stated in the above opinion.


text:
    Kilgore versus The Commonwealth.
    1. The Act of April 3d 1872 provided that tavern licenses in Allegheny county should be issued by the treasurer of said county. Certain fees were named in the act, and a subsequent section provided that “ one-fourth of all such sums received by the treasurer as aforementioned” should be paid, to the state, and the other three-fourths to the use of the county. By the Act of April 12th 1875, it was provided “ that licenses for sales of liquors, when not otherwise provided for by special law, may be granted by the Court of Quarter Sessions of the proper county.” This act also fixed the fees, which were all made payable to the Commonwealth, and the rates were less than those contained in the Act of 1872. The Act of 1875 repealed no act specifically, except the Act of March 27th 1872, which was known as the “ Local Option Law.” During the years 1875 and 1876, the treasurer of Allegheny county issued the tavern licenses as under the Act of 1872, but collected the fees at the rates fixed by the Act of 1875. In the settlement of his accounts, the accounting officers of the Commonwealth charged him with all the fees received during these years. On an appeal therefrom, Held, that the Act of April 3d 1872 was not in any respect repealed by the Act of 1875. Held, further, that the fees having been collected in pursuance of the rates fixed by the Act of 1875, the provisions of the Act of 1872 that three-fourths of the fees should go to the county of Allegheny, did not apply, and that they were all payable to the Commonwealth.
    2. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny county, at the instance of the county of Allegheny, issued an injunction enjoining the county treasurer not to pay, and restraining the state treasurer from collecting said fees : Held, that the court had no jurisdiction, and that these proceedings were no bar to the action of the state officers in this case.
    May 21st 1880.
    Before Merour, Gordon, Paxson, Trunkey, Sterrett and Green, JJ. Sharswood, C. J., absent.
    Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin county: Of May Term 1879, Nos. 16 and 17.
    These were appeals taken May 26th 1876, by Samuel Kilgore, treasurer of the county of Allegheny, from the settlement of his account as such county treasurer, by the auditor general and state treasurer of the Commonwealth, to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin county. By agreement filed in the cases, after issue joined, the parties thereto dispensed with trial by jury and submitted the decision of the cases to the court, subject, nevertheless, to review by writ of error, as prescribed by the Act of April 22d 1874, Pamph. L. 109.
    It appeared that Kilgore was treasurer of Allegheny county during the years 1875 and 1876, and in that capacity issued all the tavern licenses, and collected the fees therefor. The Act of Api-il 3d 1872, Pamph. L. 843, entitled An Act to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors in the county of Allegheny, repealed all the laws relating to the sale of liquor in said county, except certain special laws prohibiting sales in bo roughs or townships, and provided that no sales of liquor should be lawful unless made in the manner thereinafter provided. The second section authorized the treasurer of said connty, upon payment to him of the license fees, and the receipt of a bond, to grant licenses. The third section provided in what quantities liquor should be sold, and prohibited its sale in places of amusement. The fourth section classified distilleries and breweries. The fifth section classified the vendors, and fixed the amount of the license for each class, and the sixth section did the same for hotels and taverns. The seventh section was as follows: “ The one-fourth of all such sums received by the treasurer as aforementioned, for licenses, to-be for the use of the state, to meet the demands on the state treasury; and the other three-fourths for the use of said county, in meeting the expenses incident to the granting of licenses, and in building, erecting and completing the Allegheny county workhouse, in said county, and for enlarging, improving, maintaining and keeping the same in repair.”
    Sect. 2 of the Act of April 12th 1876, Pamph. L. 40, provides, “ That licenses for sales of liquors, when not otherwise provided for by special law, may be granted by the Court of Quarter Sessions of the proper county, at the first or second session in each year, and shall be for one year.”
    By the third section of the same act the license fees were made considerably larger than those theretofore charged throughout the state, but less than those paid in Allegheny county under the provisions of the Act of 1872. The Act of 1875 also made the fees payable to the use of the state. The third section also contained this proviso : “ Provided, that no license shall be less than $50 ; and provided further, that any person licensed the present or any portion of a year, shall pay a fro rata share of the license fee, and the authority granting the license shall designate the classification for that year.”
    Kilgore continued to issue licenses after the passage of the Act of 187 5, and after January 3d 1875, the fees charged were those fixed by said Act of 1875. In the settlement made by the accounting officers of the Commonwealth, he was charged with the whole amount of the fees received from tavern licenses. He objected, alleging that he should have been allowed a credit for a portion of the same as due the county of Allegheny.
    The defendant offered in evidence the exemplification of the record of a suit in equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny county, wherein the county of Allegheny was plaintiff, and the treasurer of Allegheny and the treasurer of the state defendants. The bill was filed September 10th 1875, and an injunction was granted commanding Kilgore, as treasurer of Allegheny county, to hold three-fourths of all sums received by him as tavern licenses for the use of the county of Allegheny, to be applied as directed by the Act of April 3d 1872, and enjoining the state treasurer from receiving the same, and not to institute suit against said Kilgore to enforce payment of the same. The attorney-general, for the Commonwealth objected to the admission of this exemplification in evidence, inter alia, on the ground that “the courts of Allegheny county had no jurisdiction in the case, or authority to enjoin the state treasurer or county treasurer from paying or receiving the money claimed by the Commonwealth.”
    The record was received in evidence by the court, without prejudice to either party, the effect thereof to be determined in the final decision.
    The court found there was due the Commonwealth on the first appeal $65,362.52, being the whole net amount received by defendant from January 3d 1875 to December 1875, for tavern licenses, with interest less a credit of one-fourth of the whole amount collected which had been already paid. In the second appeal, there was found due the sum of $65,841.09, which was calculated on the same basis. The defendant excepted to the findings of facts, and the conclusions of law which exceptions the court overruled. Pearson, P. J., filing the following opinion:—
    “ There is no dispute as to the facts in this case, but the defendant contends that the price or rate of license for inns or taverns, in Allegheny county, is changed by the third section of the Act of 3875, but that no other provision of the Act of 1872 is altered or repealed. After the most careful examination, I am clearly of the opinion that the Act of 1875 does not, in any particular, alter or change that of 1872. There is no clause o.r provision in it which has any bearing on the earlier statute. The Act of 1872 was intended as a full and perfect provision as to most of the state taxes in Allegheny county, the subjects of taxation, and the rate of assessment, and, where the object was omitted, it would have to be taxed and rated, for state purposes, under the general laws. It is contended that, under the provisos in the third section of the Act of 1875, the tax on inns and taverns was changed in that county. There is nothing in the provisos that even hints such a change. On the contrary, the whole of the Act of 1875 leaves in full force all special statutes. We may take it as a legal axiom that statute laws are not to be repealed by implication. To have that effect, there must be a strong repugnancy between them: The King v. Justices of Middlesex, 6 M. & S. 279. There must be an irreconcilable inconsistency: Bank v. Commonwealth, 10 Barr 448. A general law will seldom repeal a special one : Dyer v. Covington Twp., 4 Casey 186. A general statute, without-negative words, will not repeal a previous one which is particular, though there be some inconsistency between them: Brown v. Commissioners, 9 Harris 37. Later statutes, which are general, do not repeal an earlier one which is particular: Bounty Accounts, 20 P. F. Smith 96; which cites very many of the English cases. Implied repeals are not favored: Erie v. Bootz, 22 Id. 199. And there must be so strong an inconsistency that they cannot stand together: Egypt Street, 2 Grant 455. The law never favors repeals by implication: Shinn v. Commonwealth, 8 Id. 205 ; Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 221. Such is the language of all the cases and text writers. We would say that these rules were universal, but for two of our own decisions under the tax laws of the state, where the principle was disregarded: Iron City Bank v. Pittsburgh, 1 Wright 340. This bank was, by the terms of its charter, exempted from taxation for a certain period ; yet a general law was held to-embrace it, which taxed the Pittsburgh banks. The other is the case of the Commonwealth v. Fayette County Railroad, 5 P. F. Smith 452, which had a special exemption until the earnings would pay the' stockholders six per cent, on their investment; yet, as the corporation was created subject to the Act of 1849, it was held to be embraced in a general law taxing railroad companies on their dividends. No one doubts the power of the legislature to impose the tax, notwithstanding the exemption clause ; but did it do it by a general law? We would say that, on general principles, the special exemption was not revoked by implication under a general tax law of railroads. It required some special enactment, pointing to the particular road. We are clearly of the opinion that no part or portion of 'the special act relating to the taxation of inns and taverns, in the county of Allegheny, is altered or revoked by the Act of 1875. There is no allusion to the Act of 1872, and no inconsistency between the two laws. The error in the present case arises from the county authorities imposing the tax under the Act of 1875, instead of that of 1872. Had they adhered to every portion of that law, they could have successfully claimed to have the money appropriated under the seventh section of the act, which gives one-fourth of the sums received by the treasurer for license to the use of the state, to meet the demands on the state treasury, and three-fourths thereof to the county of Allegheny, to aid in completing the workhouse. By the course pursued, the county of Allegheny wishes to tax under one law, and claim three-fourths of the money raised under another. This we consider inadmissible.
    The attorney-general contends that, if the taxes had been assessed under the Act of 1872, the state would have received as much money from its fourth as it can gain by taking the whole under the rate imposed.- It is conceded by the defendant’s counsel that there is a great difference between the taxes imposed under the two laws. How much, they do not know, and the same is not in proof by either party. If that were known with reasonable certainty, the court could adjust the difficulty with approximate accuracy. Possibly it might have been approached by giving in evidence the sums raised from licenses in 1873 and 1874, but there was no attempt to make the proof, each party relying on the principles of law, and construction of the different statutes for which they contended. The court is obliged to decide the case on the evidence before it. The seventh section of the Act of 1872 we do not consider is repealed, but stands in full force; but the sums received for tavern licenses were either under the Act of 1875, or the general laws of the state, therefore, do not come within either the words or spirit of the act, which says, “ the one-four.th of such sums received by the treasurer, as aforementioned, for license, to be for the use of the state,” &c. All of the previous sections had fixed the high rates of taxation, as before stated. No part of the money now in controversy was so received, therefore cannot be claimed for Allegheny county; but, being collected from the citizens for tavern licenses, must be distributed and appropriated as in other cases under the general laws. Allegheny county can again collect and -receive her three-fourths of the license money for inns and taverns, by making i'ts future assessments and collections under the Act of 1872, unless that law has been repealed.
    “ The proceedings in equity in Allegheny county are -no bar to the action of the state officers in the present case. That court could not, by injunction, prevent the state treasurer from acting with the auditor-general in settling and collecting the money decided by them to be due to the Commonwealth; nor could it even enjoin the treasurer of Allegheny county from paying over money which he had collected for the state. If such a course could lawfully be pursued, the finances of the Commonwealth would be .thrown into strange confusion. On the same principle, the treasurer of every county in the state could be prevented by the courts from paying any money into the state treasury collected under a law which they choose to consider unjust or unconstitutional. It was intended by the framers of our laws, that all questions affecting the revenue, or claims by or against the Commonwealth, should be first heard by the accounting department under the Act of March 30th 1811, and if the party claimant or defendant against the state was dissatisfied, an appeal was given under the restrictions therein provided.- That appeal was to be decided at the seat of government where the public offices were kept, and the state officers could give the business their attention without neglecting their other public duties. They would thus have all of the reports to the departments, papers, books and public documents at one place, where they could be used on the trial without inconvenience or loss of time. It is sufficient for us that such is the settled law, and we consider the bill in equity in the Common Pleas of Allegheny county coram non judice. That court had no jurisdiction in the case, and its pending injunction is a nullity, affords no protection to the county treasurer, and has no binding effect whatever on the state treasurer.
    “ We will only add to what has been already said, that the 2d section of the Act of 1875, shows clearly that no change was intended in Allegheny county by the two provisos at the end of the 3d section, as it contains a provision exempting cases provided for by special laws, and alludes to the licenses to be granted by' the courts at the first and second terms. Those in Allegheny county were, under the Act of 1872, granted by the treasurer at four different periods of the year. There was no intention to make any alteration in Philadelphia or Allegheny county, in any particular, and the Act of 1875 contains no repealing clause.”
    Kilgore took this writ, and alleged that the court erred, inter alia, as follows:
    2. Having found and determined that the Act of April 3d 1872, Pamph. L. 843, is not repealed, “but stands in full force,” the court erred in deciding that “ the sums received for tavern licenses were either under the Act of 1875, or the general laws of the state, therefore do not come within either the words or spirit of the Act of 1872, which says, ‘ the one-fourth of such sums received by the treasurer, as aforementioned, for license, to be for the use of the state.’ ”
    3. The court erred in deciding that the money in controversy, having been “ collected from the citizens for tavern licenses, must be distributed and appropriated, as in other cases, under the general laws” of the Commonwealth’.
    4. The court erred in not deciding that the money in controversy, being three-fourths of the sums received by the treasurer of the county of Allegheny for tavern licenses — the other one-fourth having been paid into the state treasury — was, under the Act of April 3d 1872, for the use of the county of Allegheny, and should be appropriated accordingly.
    f. The court erred in overruling and disregarding the evidence contained in the exemplification of the record in the proceedings for an injunction.
    After argument, the Supreme Court made 'the following order:
    Per Curiam. — These cases are ordered to be re-argued before a full bench.
    Attention to the following questions is requested, in addition to the question referred to in the paper-books:
    Is the special Act of 1872, relating to Allegheny county, repealed in whole or in part by the general Act of 1875 ?
    If in part only, does the repeal extend beyond the mere change .of the rates of assessment?
    Has the treasurer of Allegheny county any power to assess, except under the Act of 1872 ?
    If he has, what law confers and regulates this power.
    Has the change of the rate of assessment, in the third section of the Act of 1875, any operation upon the power to assess beyond the rate itself?

      A. M. Brown and S. H. Geyer, for plaintiff in error.
    The power of the treasurer of Allegheny county to grant licenses to keep hotels, inns and taverns, is vested in him under the second section of the Act of 1872, and this power is clearly recognised, as we think we have shown, by the second and third sections of the Act of 1875. If we are correct in our view of the meaning of the second and third sections of the Act of 1875,- it then follows that the sixth section of the Act of 1872 is modified or repealed, so far as the classification and rates of assessment therein contained differ with the classification and rates of assessment contained in section third of the Act of 1875.
    • It will hardly be contended that the legislature has not the power by general law to change the rate of assessment as established by the sixth section of the Act of 1872; the question here is, has it done so by the passage of the Act of 1875 ? If it has, then it is clear that the treasurer of Allegheny county was bound to respect that change, and to exercise his authority under the Act of 1872, in granting licenses, so as to conform to the change of the rate of assessment, as made by the third section of the Act of 1875.
    If, then, the Act of 1875 only changes the Act of 1872, as to classification and rates of assessment of tavern licenses, it seems to us that the treasurer of the county was bound to collect the license fees as fixed by the third section of the Act of 1875, and to appropriate the money so collected, as directed by the seventh section of the Act of 1872, and this he has'done.
    The Act of 1875 is a general statute to restrain and regulate the sale of liquors, and we contend it repeals all repugnant or inconsistent provisions in the Act of 1872. A special local statute is not repealed by a general law containing no inconsistent provisions : Dyer v. Covington Twp., 4 Casey 186; but a general law repeals a local or special law so far as the latter is inconsistent with its provisions: Keller v. Commissioners, 21 P. F. Smith 413; Nasser v. Commissioners, 1 Casey 126; Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 545; Gwinner v. Lehigh & Del. G. Railroad Co., 5 P. F. Smith 126; Johnston’s Estate, 9 Casey 511; Commonwealth v. Commissioners of Allegheny, 4 Wright 348; Commonwealth v. CrossCut Railroad Co., 3 P. F. Smith 62; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 2 Casey 446; Norris v. Crocker, 13 Howard 429.
    If the legislature did not intend that other authority than the Court of Quarter Sessions could grant licenses, as classified and rated by the third section of said act, why was the language “ the authority granting the license shall designate the classification for that year” used ? If it had intended to confine the granting of licenses to the Courts of Quarter Sessions in counties where no provision was made by special law for granting them, then the language of the proviso referred to would naturally have been “ and the court” (not “ the authority”) “granting,” &c. It is plain that this word “authority” was used for a purpose, and that was to include any person or officer who had power or authority at the date of the passage of this Act (1875) by special law to grant licenses as well as to include the Courts of Quarter Sessions.
    June 21st 1880.
    The Common Pleas of Allegheny county had authority .to grant the injunction in the proceeding in equity: Commonwealth v. Supervisors, 5 Casey 121; McIntyre v. Perkins, 9 Phila. R. 484; Pittsburgh v. Kelly, 33 Leg. Int. 118; Cummings v. Sheble, 1 Phila. R. 492; Long v. Dickinson, 31 Leg. Int. 36; Mott v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 6 Casey 9.

      Lyman JD. Gilbert, Deputy Attorney-General, and Henry W. Palmer, Attorney-General, for the Commonwealth.
    The Act of 1875 does not repeal the Act of 1872 in whole or in part, because the Act of 1872 is special and the Act of 1875 is general, making no allusion to special acts except in the second section, by which they are retained in force. It does not repeal the Act of 1872 in whole or in part, because the Act of 1875 contains no repealing clause and no negative words, and cannot, therefore, by implication,, repeal a former act, unless there is a strong repugnancy between them.
    The.Act of 1872 is supplied by the Act of 1875, if affected at all (except so far as saved in the second section, viz.: as to the power of the treasurer to grant licenses). If the Act of 1875 is to be construed as a general act on the subject of granting licenses, introducing a new system, and repealing special acts by implication, then it should have effect in all its parts ; and as the money collected under it is in every other instance paid to the state, the licenses from Allegheny should be thus paid.
    The change of rate in the Act of 1875 has no effect on the power of the treasurer to assess, whether the rate be changed for Allegheny or not, because the Act of 1875 grants power to the Quarter Sessions to license only “when not otherwise provided by law.” The contention on the part of the plaintiff is that the Act of 1872 is in full force, except as to the rate to be paid for licenses in Allegheny county. We think one of two positions must; be assumed, either the Act of 1875 supplied the Act of 1872 in all its provisions, save that relating to the authority to grant, which was specifically excepted, or it did not effect it in any way. In either case the money in controversy belongs to the state.
   Mr. Justice Gordon

delivered the opinion of the court,

The Act of April 3d 1872, Parnpln L. 843, is in its terms a special or local act, intended to apply only to the county of Allegheny. The seventh section thereof appropriates, to the use of the state, one-fourth of the license fees by the act authorized, and the balance to the use of the county to be used, after payment of expenses, in building and maintaining a workhouse. The section referred to is dependent for its force and efficacy upon the preceding sections; this is obvious from its language which is as follows : “ The one-fourth of all such sums received by the treasurer, as aforementioned, for license, to be for the use of the state, .* * * and the other three-fourths for the use of said county.” It follows if, as the defendant below contends, the preceding sections are repealed by the Act of 1875, so also must be the seventh section, because the very source from which the county is to get its appropriation is thus cut off. As under this theory the “ sums aforesaid” could have no existence, clearly the county could get nothing. If then we concede the defendant’s proposition, that is, that the Act of 1872 has been repealed by the Act of 1875, his ground for resisting the claim of the Commonwealth is swept from under him. It is true it is contended that the Act of 1875 repealed that of 1872 only so far as classification and the rates of assessment are concerned, leaving the seventh section of the latter-named act still in force. This, however, is an attempt to engraft, by an unwarranted implication, part of a general act upon one that is purely local, and this anomalous patchwork has for its only object the giving to the county of Allegheny three-fourths of the license fees raised under the Act of 1875. This cannot be; if this county is not so entitled under the Act of 1872, it is not entitled at all, for all such fees raised under the Act of 1875 belong to the state. That act contains in itself a uniform system designed to raise revenue for the use of the Commonwealth, and not for any local purposes whatever, and in it there is not so much as a hint towards the Allegheny act. The claims of Allegheny cpunty for a portion of the funds in the hands of the defendant must, therefore, be regarded as groundless. As these funds, confessedly, were collected under the Act of 1875, they belong to the state, and to the state they must go. As to the remaining and incidental question, we have only to say that neither directly nor by implication does the Act of 1875 repeal that of 1872, and we cannot see how, in view of the multitudinous decisions of this court, directly bearing upon the doctrine here involved, any one could come to a different conclusion. To discuss a point so obvious would be to no purpose, especially in view of what has been so well said upon the subject by the court below.

Judgments affirmed.