author: Justice BAER. Justice STEVENS,

text:
    114 A.3d 385
    Charles H. CHAMBERLAIN, Appellee v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Nov. 18, 2014.
    Decided April 27, 2015.

      Judith Marie Gilroy, Esq., PA Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Gerard Matthew Mackarevich, Esq., Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Thomas Christopher Zipfel, Esq., Department of Labor and Industry, Arthur F. McNulty, Esq., for Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.
    George Robert Studzinski, Esq., York, MidPenn Legal Services, for Charles H. Chamberlain.
    CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice BAER.

This appeal presents the issue of whether a claimant sentenced to house arrest is “incarcerated” for purposes of Section 402.6 of the Unemployment Compensation Law (UC Law), and, thus, is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Mindful of the remedial purpose of the UC Law, the Commonwealth Court held that a claimant sentenced to house arrest is not “incarcerated” under Section 402.6. Because the terms and conditions of the claimant’s house arrest did not otherwise prevent him from satisfying the statutory requirements for obtaining unemployment compensation benefits, the Commonwealth Court reversed the denial of benefits. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

For ease of discussion, we begin by examining the pertinent provisions of the UC Law. Significantly, Section 401 sets forth the “[qualifications required to secure compensation.” 43 P.S. § 801. Section 401(d) mandates that the claimant “[i]s able to work and available for suitable work.” Id. § 801(d)(1). Further, Section 401 lists additional qualifications including, inter alia, the receipt of wages for employment for an enumerated period, participation in an active search for suitable employment, and submission of a valid application for benefits after having been unemployed for one week. Id. § 801.

Section 402.6 (Ineligibility of incarcerated employe) disqualifies a claimant from receiving benefits and provides:

An employe shall not be eligible for payment of unemployment compensation benefits for any weeks of unemployment during which the employe is incarcerated after a conviction.

Id., § 802.6.

Here, the record establishes that in July of 2012, Charles H. Chamberlain (Claimant) was unemployed and was receiving unemployment compensation benefits. On October 2, 2012, he pled guilty in Magisterial District Court to the summary offenses of operating a vehicle without a valid inspection, and driving with a suspended license. Relating to the latter conviction, Claimant was sentenced to sixty days in the Keystone House Arrest Program (from November 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012) with the condition that if he failed to comply, he would serve sixty days in the York County Prison. Claimant was also required to attend reemployment eligibility assessment classes via CareerLink. The terms of Claimant’s house arrest restricted him to the home of his sister, but permitted him to work, run errands, and Christmas shop.

On November 28, 2012, as relevant herein, the local service center of the Office of Unemployment Compensation Benefits issued a notice of determination that Claimant’s sentence of house arrest disqualified him from receipt of benefits because he was “incarcerated after a conviction” under Section 402.6. Claimant appealed the finding of disqualification and, on January 14, 2013, a hearing was held before a referee for the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (UCBR). At the hearing, testimony was presented from Judy Will, an investigator for the Internal Audit Division of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry (Department), and Claimant. Will testified that the Department interpreted Section 402.6 as disqualifying a claimant who has been convicted of a crime and incarcerated, regardless of whether the claimant was under house arrest, in a halfway house, or any other place “in lieu of’ prison.

Claimant testified that during his house arrest, he spent no time in prison or any other state correctional institution, but rather lived at his sister’s residence, and had permission to work, run errands, and shop for Christmas. Indeed, he stated that he actually worked nine of the sixty days while on house arrest, and reported his work to the local service center. Claimant emphasized that he was sentenced to intermediate punishment through a county program in lieu of incarceration, and relied upon provisions of the Sentencing Code, Sections 9721 (sentencing generally) and Section 9763 (sentence of county intermediate punishment), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9721 and 9763, which define a sentence of county intermediate punishment as an alternative to a sentence of total or partial confinement in a correctional institution, and set forth various conditions a court may attach to a sentence of county intermediate punishment.

By decision and order dated January 15, 2013, the referee concluded that Claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits during the period he was on house arrest. Citing no authority for the proposition, the referee interpreted Section 402.6 as rendering a claimant ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits whenever he is convicted of a crime and “incarcerated,” regardless of where the claimant serves his “incarceration.”

Claimant filed a timely appeal with the UCBR, claiming that the referee misapplied the law and that the referee’s decision was not supported by the record. The UCBR affirmed the referee’s decision, adopting its findings and conclusion of law that Claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits under Section 402.6.

Claimant thereafter appealed to the Commonwealth Court, reiterating his claim that house arrest does not constitute “incarceration” for purposes of Section 402.6 of the UC Law. Emphasizing that the UC Law was intended to be remedial in nature and liberally construed, Claimant argued that the plain meaning of “incarcerated” simply does not encompass living at home. Moreover, he again relied upon the aforementioned provisions of the Sentencing Code, which provide for various sentencing alternatives and categorize a sentence of house arrest differently from a sentence of confinement in prison.

Finally, Claimant analogized the term “incarcerated” in Section 402.6 of the UC Law to the term “imprisonment” in former Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(e) (repealed), which this Court had previously interpreted as not being equivalent to house arrest for purposes of determining parole eligibility. See Commonwealth v. Kriston, 527 Pa. 90, 588 A.2d 898, 899 (1991) (holding that “it would grossly distort the language used by the legislature if we were to conclude that the term ‘imprisonment’ means merely ‘staying at home.’ The plain and ordinary meaning of imprisonment is confinement in a correctional or similar rehabilitative institution, not staying at home.”) (emphasis omitted).

In response, the UCBR argued that the phrase “incarcerated after a conviction” in Section 402.6 of the UC Law should be construed in the same manner as that phrase has been interpreted in cases involving nearly identical language in the disqualification provision for incarcerated claimants under Section 306(a.l) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WC Act), i.e., to encompass a sentence of house arrest. See Moore v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Babcock & Wilcox Co.), 811 A.2d 631, 634 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (holding that a claimant sentenced to house arrest with work release is “incarcerated after a conviction” and is disqualified from receiving workers’ compensation benefits under Section 306(a.l) of the WC Act because a claimant on house arrest is in the constructive custody of the Commonwealth, his liberty is significantly limited by security measures, and unauthorized departures may result in criminal sanctions).

The UCBR asserted that other workers’ compensation cases have held that “incarceration after a conviction” encompasses more than imprisonment in a correctional facility. See Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hendrie), 565 Pa. 493, 776 A.2d 951, 955 (2001) (holding that a claimant who was sentenced to five years’ probation with the condition of involuntarily commitment in a psychiatric facility was “incarcerated” for purposes of the WC Act because the prisoner remained confined in the constructive custody of the Commonwealth and was removed from the workforce as a result of his criminal sentence); Brinker’s International, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Weissenstein), 721 A.2d 406, 410 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (holding that “incarcerated” in Section 306(a)(2) of the WC Act should not be construed to mean only confinement in jail, but also encompasses a defendant incarcerated at a detention and alcohol recovery facility who is eligible for work release).

The Commonwealth Court reversed the UCBR’s determination that house arrest was equivalent to “incarceration” for purposes of Section 402.6 of the UC Law, and concluded that Claimant was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. Chamberlain v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 83 A.3d 283 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014). The court emphasized that the UC Law was intended to be remedial in nature and protect workers who had suffered a loss of income due to separation from employment through no fault of their own. Id. at 292 (citing Section 3 of the UC Law (declaration of public policy), 43 P.S. § 752; Preservation Pennsylvania v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 673 A.2d 1044 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996)).

The Commonwealth Court distinguished the cases relied upon by the UCBR, which were governed by the WC Act. It emphasized the different purposes underlying the two statutes — that under the WC Act, a claimant is entitled to compensation for a loss of earning power that is caused by a work injury; while under the UC Law, a claimant is generally provided economic security when he is unemployed through no fault of his own and is able and available for work. Chamberlain, 83 A.2d at 292.

The court found it noteworthy that, unlike in Moore, where the Commonwealth Court ruled that a claimant sentenced to house arrest with work release was ineligible for workers’ compensation benefits because he was “incarcerated” under Section 306(a)(2) of the WC Act, the terms of Claimant’s house arrest placed no restrictions on his ability to work. Id. Thus, it concluded, the rationale employed by the Commonwealth Court in Moore and by this Court Henkels & McCoy, Inc., i.e., that the General Assembly intended to preclude the payment of workers’ compensation benefits to claimants who have been removed from the work force, is not applicable here where Claimant was available for work while on house arrest. The court further noted that it would contravene the remedial purpose of the Act to interpret “incarcerated” as encompassing house arrest when this Court in Kriston held that house arrest is not equivalent to incarceration for purposes of sentence credit. Id.

Significantly, the Commonwealth Court clarified that it was not holding that an individual sentenced to house arrest is eligible for unemployment benefits as a matter of law. Rather, it held only that “house arrest is not ‘incarceration’ that renders a claimant ineligible for unemployment compensation under [S]ection 402.6 of the [UC] Law.” Id. at 292-93 (footnote omitted). The court recognized that a claimant under house arrest may be subject to conditions that disqualify him from benefits under other provisions of the UC Law, but reiterated that the terms of Claimant’s house arrest did not impact his ability to go to work. Id. at 293 n. 11. Under the facts presented, the court concluded there was no evidence refuting Claimant’s assertions that he was genuinely attached to the labor market. Id. at 293. It stated, “although the Department bore the burden of proof in the proceeding, Claimant was the only party to present evidence concerning the circumstances of his house arrest, and his unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence lend no support to the Department’s position.” Id.

This Court granted the UCBR’s petition for allowance of appeal to address whether the Commonwealth Court erred by holding that Section 402.6 of the UC Law did not disqualify Claimant from receiving unemployment compensation benefits during the period he served his sentence of house arrest. The UCBR, as Appellant, contends that the Commonwealth Court’s holding that house arrest is not “incarceration” for purposes of Section 402.6’s automatic disqualification provision deviates from appellate court precedent, which defines “incarceration” expansively to include house arrest. Moore, supra (holding that a claimant sentenced to house arrest with work release is “incarcerated after a conviction” and ineligible for benefits under Section 306(a.1) of the WC Act).

As below, it further contends that the Commonwealth Court’s holding is contrary to cases acknowledging that “incarceration” encompasses sentences in addition to those involving confinement in a correctional facility. See Henkels & McCoy, Inc., supra (holding that a claimant who was sentenced to five years’ probation with the condition of involuntarily commitment in a psychiatric facility was “incarcerated” for purposes of the WC Act because the prisoner remains confined in the constructive custody of the Commonwealth); Brinker’s International, Inc., supra (holding that “incarcerated” in the disqualification provision of the WC Act should not be construed to mean only confinement in jail, but also encompasses a defendant incarcerated at a detention and alcohol facility who is eligible for work release).

Additionally, the UCBR asserts that the Commonwealth Court’s holding is inconsistent with precedent that interprets interchangeably the incarcerated employee disqualification provisions of the UC Law and the WC Act. See Kroh v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 711 A.2d 1093, 1094 n. 4 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (in rejecting an equal protection challenge to Section 402.6 of the UC Law based on the disparate treatment of claimants who had been convicted of crimes, the Commonwealth Court acknowledged that Section 306(a)(2) of the WC Act removed all doubt concerning the disqualifying effect that incarceration has on the entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits).

The Commonwealth Court erred in the instant case, the UCBR submits, by concluding that the enumerated workers’ compensation cases were inapplicable based on distinctions between the WC Act and the UC Law. It maintains that any discrepancy between the two statutory schemes is illusory for purposes of this case because both statutes: (1) set forth eligibility requirements for the receipt of public benefits; (2) provide, in very similar language, that incarcerated individuals are disqualified from receiving benefits; and (3) have been applied consistently by appellate courts. Thus, the UCBR contends, there is no distinction warranting disparate treatment between a workers’ compensation case and an unemployment compensation case for purposes of determining whether house arrest constitutes “incarceration.” It acknowledges that house arrest is an alternative sentence to confinement in prison pursuant to the Sentencing Code, but submits that such distinction is not dispositive of whether house arrest should be considered “incarceration” under Section 402.6 of the UC Law.

The UCBR also refutes the Commonwealth Court’s findings that this case is unlike Moore because the terms of Claimant’s house arrest did not impact his ability to go to work and because Claimant was genuinely attached to the labor market while on house arrest. According to the UCBR, these findings are erroneous as Claimant was subjected to virtually the same level of confinement as the claimant in Moore in that he received prior permission to leave the house for work purposes, and would have been imprisoned had he violated the terms of his house arrest.

The UCBR challenges the Commonwealth Court’s mere consideration of a claimant’s “ability to work” to conclude that he is not “incarcerated,” positing that such construction would render Section 402.6 meaningless because the “able and available for work” standard was the governing law for incarcerated claimants in Section 401(d)(1) of the UC law before Section 402.6 was adopted, and the Legislature enacted Section 402.6 to remedy the “mischief’ resulting from previous case law permitting an incarcerated person on work release to obtain unemployment compensation benefits. See Greer v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 310, 392 A.2d 918, 920 (1978) (holding in a pre-Section 402.6 case that a prisoner on work release could, under certain circumstances, be eligible for UC benefits under Section 401(d)(1) if a factual inquiry showed that he was both available for work and attached to the labor market while incarcerated).

In support of this contention, the UCBR relies on a comment made by the proponent of Section 402.6, Representative William Lloyd, stating:

I learned to my surprise ... that it is possible now, if you are convicted and you are in prison and you qualify for work release and your employer does not want you back, you then get unemployment compensation. The businessman in my district and the employees in that company do not think that is right; I do not think that is right either, and I think we ought to change the law.

Statement of Representative William Lloyd, 1996 Pa. Legis. Journal, House, p. 835 (May 13,1996).

The UCBR interprets the legislative commentary as demonstrating that Section 402.6 was enacted to deny unemployment compensation benefits to any claimant who, although “able and available” for work, is nonetheless serving a sentence of confinement after conviction. The UCBR emphasizes that even though Claimant may have been capable of seeking work and leaving the home to earn wages, he nonetheless was serving a criminal sentence that entailed restrictions, and his violation of those restrictions would have resulted in incarceration in the county prison. It concludes that under the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation, Section 402.6 would have no real significance other than to duplicate the “able and available” analysis of Section 401(d)(1).

Finally, the UCBR argues that the Commonwealth Court relied inappropriately on this Court’s decision in Kriston, supra, where we held that time spent in an electronic home monitoring program is not “imprisonment” for purposes of crediting a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for driving under the influence of alcohol. The import of Kriston, the UCBR argues, is that a defendant may not enjoy the amenities of a sentence of house arrest and later seek to use such time to satisfy a specified term of “imprisonment.” It submits that such holding does not indicate that house arrest is distinct from incarceration for purposes of eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits — an issue that Kriston does not in any way address.

Claimant responds that the Commonwealth Court was correct in holding that house arrest does not constitute “incarceration,” which would result in automatic disqualification from the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to 402.6 of the UC Law. Contrary to the UCBR’s contentions, he submits, this holding does not conflict with any existing precedent as there is no case that interprets “incarcerated” in Section 402.6 as encompassing house arrest. The decisions relied upon by the UCBR, Claimant asserts, involve an entirely different statute, the WC Act, which is not at issue here, and cannot create binding precedent in unemployment compensation cases.

To illustrate, Claimant emphasizes that while the UC Law requires the “compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own,” 43 P.S. § 752, the purpose of the WC Act is to provide benefits to employees who suffer work-related injuries. He asserts that each statute has different eligibility requirements, and that workers’ compensation benefits, unlike unemployment compensation benefits, are based on an employment relationship, an injury that arose in the course of employment, and the employer’s surrender of their defenses to civil actions in exchange for the claimant’s relinquishment of an action in tort. By contrast, he submits, the UC Law is unconcerned with tort liability or civil causes of action, and is designed as insurance against the burden of indigence resulting from the economic insecurity of involuntary unemployment. Id. Accordingly, Claimant concludes, workers’ compensation and unemployment compensation benefits are not so similar that the Commonwealth Court was bound to follow the workers’ compensation cases that interpret the term “incarceration.”

Even if this Court were to consider the workers’ compensation cases as persuasive, Claimant maintains, the instant facts are clearly distinguishable. First, he argues that Moore (where the Commonwealth Court held expressly that house arrest with work release constitutes “incarceration” under the WC Act’s disqualification provision) is distinguishable because the liberty of the individual seeking benefits in that case was much more restricted than the instant case, where Claimant actually worked nine days and was permitted excursions from home with prior approval, such as running errands and going Christmas shopping. Claimant further points out that in Henkels cfe McCoy Inc., the only authority of this Court relied upon by the UCBR, the claimant was denied workers’ compensation benefits because his probationary sentence subjected him to involuntarily commitment to a psychiatric hospital, and, thus, his loss of earnings did not result from injury, but rather from his criminal sentence. Here, Claimant was not institutionalized, but was subject to house arrest, the terms of which did not hamper his ability to work. •

Further, Claimant contends, the legislative remarks relied upon by the UCBR do not suggest that “incarceration” in Section 402.6 was intended to include house arrest as they reflected a concern over the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits by incarcerated prisoners on work release. An individual incarcerated in prison, but permitted to leave for designated hours to work, Claimant maintains, is far different from one not in prison at all, but rather confined to his home and permitted to leave for various reasons, including work. He submits there are no legislative comments indicating that Section 402.6 was intended to apply to a claimant on house arrest. Claimant further discounts the UCBR’s argument that Section 402.6 was a legislative response to the Commonwealth Court’s holding in Greer (the pre-Section 402.6 case that permitted an incarcerated claimant on work release to obtain unemployment compensation benefits) as the Legislature’s adoption of Section 402.6 occurred 18 years after Greer had been decided.

In Claimant’s view, the UCBR’s interpretation of “incarcerated” would defeat the remedial purpose of the UC Law, which is to provide benefits to those who become unemployed through no fault of their own and who remain realistically attached to the workforce. The UCBR’s position, Claimant asserts, further blurs the distinctions in the sentencing alternatives of total confinement, partial confinement and intermediate punishment, which the General Assembly created in Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code, set forth at n. 4, supra.

Finally, Claimant argues, the Commonwealth Court was correct in relying on this Court’s decision in Kriston, which held that the term “imprisonment” did not include house arrest with electronic monitoring for purposes of determining credit for time served, but rather implies confinement in a correctional or similar rehabilitative institution. He finds our holding in Kriston significant as this Court gave a common sense meaning to a word synonymous to the undefined statutory term at issue herein.

Because the inquiry before us is exclusively one of statutory interpretation, we begin our analysis by examining the canons of statutory construction. In interpreting a statute, our primary goal is “to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id. § 1921(b). We must interpret words in a statute according to their “common and approved usage.” Id. § 1903. Additionally, we construe every statute “if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Id. § 1921(a); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2) (“the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain”).

"When the words of a statute are not explicit, we may ascertain the intent of the General Assembly by considering the occasion and necessity for the statute; the circumstances under which it was enacted; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained by the legislation; the former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects; the consequences of a particular interpretation; the contemporaneous legislative history of the provision; and the legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute. Id. § 1921(c).

Keeping in mind these canons, we return to the language of Section 402.6, which, as noted, states:

An employe shall not be eligible for payment of unemployment compensation benefits for any weeks of unemployment during which the employe is incarcerated after a conviction.

43 Pa.C.S. § 802.6.

Upon review of the parties’ arguments, we agree with Claimant that his sentence of house arrest following his conviction of driving with a suspended license did not render him “incarcerated” pursuant to Section 402.6, and, therefore, he was not precluded from obtaining unemployment compensation benefits on that ground. Initially, we deem the issue one of first impression as no appellate court decision has examined whether house arrest constitutes incarceration for purposes of Section 402.6 of the UC Law.

Because the term “incarcerated” is not defined in that statute, it must be construed in accordance with its common and ordinary meaning. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). It is well-established that the common and approved meaning of a word may be ascertained from an examination of its dictionary definition. See Commonwealth v. Hart, 611 Pa. 531, 28 A.3d 898, 909 (2011). The common definition of the term “incarcerate” means “[t]o put in into jail,” or “[t]o shut in; confine.” The American Heritage College Dictionary at 431 (4th Ed.2004); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 760 (defining incarceration as “[ijmprisonment; confinement in a jail or penitentiary”). Because “incarceration” could be commonly understood to mean either imprisonment or the more broad definition of confinement, we conclude that the word is ambiguous, and proceed to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly in enacting Section 402.6. See Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 776 A.2d at 955 (recognizing that the undefined term “incarceration” is commonly defined to include both “imprisonment” and “confinement,” and that confinement need not be limited to a jail or penitentiary).

Accepting, for purposes of argument, that an individual could be “incarcerated” in an institution other than a county or state correctional facility, the precise question presented here is whether the legislature intended the automatic disqualification provision to apply to individuals who, following a conviction, have been sentenced to home confinement with work release. In determining whether the Legislature intended for the disqualification provision in Section 402.6 to extend to home confinement circumstances such as house arrest, we consider first the occasion and necessity for the UC Law and the mischief that Section 402.6 was intended to remedy.

The UC Law was enacted to alleviate the economic insecurity resulting from unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals and welfare of Pennsylvania citizens. 48 P.S. § 752 (Declaration of public policy). The statute requires “the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.” Id. “[T]he provisions of the [UC Law] must be liberally construed to provide the broadest possible benefits to those who experienced forced unemployment.” Renne v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 499 Pa. 299, 453 A.2d 318, 321 n. 4 (1982).

Prior to the enactment of Section 402.6 in 1996, there was no specific provision in the UC Law disqualifying an incarcerated employee from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Under these circumstances, eligibility determinations were made by adhering to Section 401(d)’s requirement that the claimant is able and available for suitable work. In Greer v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 310, 392 A.2d 918 (1978), a case which predated the adoption of Section 402.6 by eighteen years, the claimant had been receiving unemployment compensation benefits when he was incarcerated for violation of a support order. The sentencing order placed the claimant in the prison work release program and conditioned his release upon his either obtaining employment or paying the support arrearages in full. While the claimant was free to leave prison to go to work, he had to be accompanied by prison officials for purposes of seeking a job.

Both the referee and the UCBR ruled that the claimant was ineligible for benefits under Section 401(d)’s “able and available for suitable work” standard, finding that he was not free to seek employment because he could not leave the prison alone for purposes of obtaining work and, thus, was not realistically attached to the labor force. The Commonwealth Court in Greer reversed, finding that the claimant was receiving benefits at the time of his incarceration, had no restrictions on his availability to work, and made every effort to find a job, but was unsuccessful. It emphasized that the claimant’s release from prison was expressly conditioned upon his obtaining employment, and the mere fact that the claimant was required to be accompanied by a prison official when he left the prison to find work did not warrant the denial of benefits. The court explained that each case must be examined on its own facts, as not all prisoners in work release programs would be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Accordingly, the status of the law prior to the enactment of Section 402.6 was that an employee incarcerated in prison and on work release could be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if he was, inter alia, able and available for work.

While the General Assembly did not act expeditiously after the Commonwealth Court’s 1978 pronouncement in Greer, it ultimately changed the legal landscape by amending the UC Law in 1996 to per se disqualify from benefits those claimants who were “incarcerated after a conviction.” The proponent of the legislation, Representative William Lloyd, made the following illustrative comment when he offered the amendment for a vote.

Mr. Speaker, this amendment would put into the Unemployment Compensation Law a prohibition which is similar to one which we inserted into the workers’ compensation law in 1993. Specifically, this amendment says that someone who is incarcerated after a conviction does not receive unemployment benefits.
I learned to my surprise a month or so ago from a business in my district that it is possible now, if you are convicted and you are in prison and you qualify for work release and your employer does not want you back, you then get unemployment compensation. This businessman in my district and the other employees in that company do not think that is right; I do not think that is right either, and I think we ought to change the law.

Statement of Representative William Lloyd, 1996 Pa. Legis. Journal, House, p. 835 (May 13,1996).

This comment suggests that Section 402.6 was enacted to change the law originally established by the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Greer by precluding unemployment compensation benefits to those claimants who are incarcerated in prison and eligible for work release. See Kroh, 711 A.2d at 1096 n. 7 (noting that it could be argued that the General Assembly’s enactment of Section 402.6 of the UC Law “overruled” judicial decisions such as the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Greer, which permitted a claimant incarcerated in prison and participating in the work release program to obtain unemployment compensation benefits).

There is no evidence to suggest that Section 402.6 was intended to disqualify claimants who were not incarcerated in a prison or an alternative institutional setting, but rather were sentenced to the less severe sanction of home confinement. Pennsylvania’s criminal justice system is premised upon graduated punishment dependent upon the severity of the crime, and, generally, it is fair to assume that a defendant sentenced to house arrest with work release has committed a less serious offense than an individual incarcerated after a criminal conviction. Absent clear language or legislative intent to disqualify claimants sentenced to home confinement, and considering the remedial purposes underlying the UC Law, we hold that Section 402.6’s preclusion of benefits does not apply to claimants on house arrest.

We reach this conclusion in light of precedent of this Court acknowledging the stark differences between incarceration and home confinement. As relied upon by Claimant and the Commonwealth Court below, this Court in Kriston, supra, construed the term “imprisonment,” which is a synonym and accepted dictionary definition of “incarceration,” as used in Section 402.6. The issue in Kriston was whether, for purposes of parole eligibility, a defendant’s time spent in an electronic home monitoring program should be credited towards his mandatory minimum sentence for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) under former 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, which had required a minimum term of “imprisonment” of thirty days if the defendant had a prior DUI conviction. Because the term “imprisonment” was not defined in the statute, we looked to its common and ordinary meaning.

Finding that “it would grossly distort the language used by the legislature if we were to conclude that the term ‘imprisonment’ means merely ‘staying at home,’ ” 588 A.2d at 899, this Court held that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of imprisonment is confinement in a correctional or similar rehabilitative institution, not staying at home.” Id. (emphasis in original). We reasoned that the “qualitative differences” between one confined in an institution and one confined in his home “are too numerous and obvious to require elaboration,” id. (footnote omitted), and that the General Assembly would not have intended for the term “imprisonment” to be “so diluted in effect as to encompass home monitoring programs.” Id. at 900.

We further cited provisions of the Sentencing Code, which demonstrated a legislative intent that, unlike home confinement, sentences of imprisonment or incarceration are to be served in institutional settings. See e.g. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9755(a) (directing that a court imposing a sentence of partial confinement shall specify “whether the confinement shall commence in a correctional or other appropriate institution”); id. § 9755(c) (permitting a court imposing a sentence of partial confinement to grant the privilege of leaving the “institution” for various reasons including employment and education); and id. § 9756(a) (directing a court imposing a sentence of total confinement to specify “whether the sentence shall commence in a correctional or other appropriate institution”). This Court concluded in Kriston that if the General Assembly had intended for one convicted of a second DUI offense to stay at home, it would not have employed the word “ ‘imprisonment,’ which, by its plain and ordinary meaning and by legislative references to confinement found in the Sentencing Code, must be taken to mean confinement in an institution.” Id., at 900-Ol.

This Court has also recognized the differences between incarceration and home confinement in subsequent cases. See Commonwealth v. Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 874 A.2d 12, 22 (2005) (holding that because of the differences between incarceration and home confinement as set forth in Kriston, a defendant confined to his home is not in “custody,” thus, time spent subject to an electronic home monitoring bail program is not time spent in “custody” for purposes of credit under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760); Commonwealth v. Wegley, 574 Pa. 190, 829 A.2d 1148, at 1151-52 n. 8 (2003) (while concluding that a sentence of home monitoring constituted “official detention” for purposes of the escape statute, the Court nevertheless acknowledged the differences between confinement at home and incarceration, noting that only a person sentenced to home confinement enjoys unrestricted freedom of activity, movement, and association, and can eat, sleep, make phone calls, watch television and entertain guests at his leisure). Accordingly, based on the aforementioned precedent, we conclude that house arrest is sufficiently distinguishable from “incarceration” so as to render Section 402.6’s ineligibility provision inapplicable here.

The particular cases relied upon by the UCBR, which involve the similarly-phrased disqualification provision for incarcerated employees under the WC Act, do not command a different result. In Henkels & McCoy Inc., supra, this Court examined Section 306(a)(2) of the WC Act, which, at the time stated that “[njothing in [the WC Act] shall require payment of compensation for any period during which the employe is incarcerated after a conviction.” 77 P.S. § 511(2). The issue on appeal was whether the claimant was “incarcerated after a conviction” when he was serving a sentence of probation with the special condition of involuntary commitment to a state psychiatric hospital.

Similar to our analysis in the instant case, we recognized that “incarceration” is commonly defined to include both “imprisonment” and “confinement,” and found that such definitions do not limit the confinement to a jail or penitentiary. 776 A.2d at 955. We held that a criminal sentence of involuntary commitment to a psychiatric institution constituted “incarceration” because the claimant remained in the custody of the Commonwealth and because it was the criminal sentence (and not the work injury) that removed the claimant from the work force. We found instructive the decision in Brinker’s International Inc., supra (also relied upon by UCBR), where the Commonwealth Court held that “incarceration after a conviction,” as set forth in the WC Act’s disqualification provision, should not be limited to a claimant incarcerated 100 percent of the time, but also applied where the claimant was in a work release program while incarcerated in a detention and alcohol recovery facility.

Thus, pursuant to Henkels & McCoy, Inc., and Brinker’s International, Inc., one convicted of a crime and sentenced to incarceration in an institution (such as a psychiatric hospital or alcohol rehabilitation facility) is “confined” or “imprisoned” to such an extent so as to be “incarcerated” for purposes of eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits. That level of confinement in this unemployment compensation case is absent, where Claimant was not sentenced to incarceration in any type of institution, but rather was confined to a home, a sentencing alternative that we have already concluded is far different from incarceration or confinement in a correctional facility or other institutional setting.

The Commonwealth Court’s decision in Moore, while distinguishable on the ground that it was interpreting the WC Act and not the UC Law, is more factually similar to the instant case than Henkels & McCoy, Inc. and Brinker’s International, Inc. as it, like the instant case, involved a claimant sentenced to house arrest with work release. In Moore, the claimant’s employer unilaterally ceased paying workers’ compensation benefits on the ground that the claimant was “incarcerated after a conviction” pursuant to Section 306(a.l) of the WC Act. The claimant sought reinstatement of his workers’ compensation benefits, contending that house arrest with work release did not constitute “incarceration.”

Claimant was denied reinstatement of benefits, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed based on Henkels & McCoy, Inc. and Brinker’s International, Inc. The Commonwealth Court in Moore held that “[l]ike those confined to residential inpatient rehabilitation facilities and psychiatric hospitals, an individual on house arrest is in constructive custody.” Id., 811 A.2d at 634. The court emphasized that the claimant’s liberty and movements were significantly limited by security measures and that unauthorized departure from the home may result in criminal sanctions of contempt. Id.

We recognize there are distinctions between the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Moore and the instant case, particularly, as noted, that Moore is interpreting the WC Act, and not the UC Law at issue here. Accordingly, we decline to consider the soundness of the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Moore until such time as the issue is squarely before us.

In conclusion, we emphasize the same clarification as did the Commonwealth Court at the end of its opinion below, i.e., that we are not holding that all claimants on house arrest are eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Instead, we merely rule that house arrest does not constitute “incarceration” for purposes of the disqualification provision set forth in Section 402.6 of the UC Law. The Commonwealth Court concluded that Claimant’s unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence demonstrated that, under the terms and conditions of Claimant’s sentence of house arrest, he was able and available to work, and that he, in fact, worked nine days during the period he served his sentence of house arrest. Thus, Claimant’s sentence of house arrest did not prevent him from otherwise satisfying the requisites for obtaining unemployment compensation benefits.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court, which reversed the denial of benefits.

Former Chief Justice CASTILLE did not participate in the decision of this case.

Chief Justice SAYLOR, Justices EAKIN and TODD join the opinion.

Justice STEVENS files a dissenting opinion.

Justice STEVENS,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision to affirm the Commonwealth Court decision that a criminal sentenced to house arrest is not “incarcerated” under Section 402.6 of the Unemployment Compensation Law (UC Law). For the reasons discussed infra, I would reverse the Commonwealth Court.

Rather, I would hold that criminals sentenced to house arrest after a conviction are “incarcerated” for purposes of Section 402.6 of the UC Law and thus are ineligible for unemployment compensation during the time of such house arrest.

Surely the Pennsylvania legislature did not intend a policy to provide unemployment benefits at the expense of Pennsylvania taxpayers to someone who is serving time, albeit on house arrest, for a crime.

The majority relies heavily on Commonwealth v. Kriston, 527 Pa. 90, 588 A.2d 898 (1991) where appellant was sentenced to thirty days’ to twenty-three months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to his second DUI offense. After serving ten days of the sentence in a prison facility, appellant was transferred by the prison warden into an electronic home monitoring program without the knowledge or consent of the trial court. Appellant spent twenty-six days in the home monitoring program and subsequently filed a petition seeking parole, which the trial court denied on the basis that appellant had served only ten days of the mandatory thirty day minimum sentence in prison. This Court was tasked, therefore, with determining whether a defendant’s time spent on house arrest could be credited towards his mandatory minimum sentence for driving under the influence (DUI).

As the majority indicates, this Court found “it would grossly distort the language used by the Legislature if we were to conclude that the term ‘imprisonment’ means merely ‘staying at home.’ ” Kriston, 588 A.2d at 899. As this Court explained in Commonwealth v. Wegley, 574 Pa. 190, 829 A.2d 1148 (2003), Kriston stood for the proposition that “the comforts and amenities of the home are too far removed from the experience of institutional confinement to satisfy the Legislature’s determination that certain offenses should carry serious punitive consequences.” Wegley, 829 A.2d at 1151.

In Wegley, while appellant was serving a term of home confinement, he removed his electronic monitoring device and fled from his residence and was subsequently charged with escape pursuant to Section 5121(a) of the Crimes Code, which provides, in part, “A person commits an offense if he unlawfully removes himself from official detention ...” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5121(a). Appellant asserted that his home confinement did not amount to “official detention” for purposes of the criminal offense of escape. While acknowledging this Court’s holding in Kriston as well as the stark differences between home confinement and confinement in a prison setting, this Court nevertheless found that a sentence of home confinement following a conviction constituted “official detention” for purposes of the escape statute. This Court explained that Kri-ston “dealt with the question of whether various different settings were sufficiently prison-like to entitle an individual who spent time in them to credit under the Sentencing Code against a mandatory sentence of incarceration,” but did not address the separate question of whether, “in spite of the amenities and nonrehabilitative temptations present in the home, an offender ... who is restricted to his home ... is subject to detention.” Wegley, 829 A.2d at 1151-1152 (internal citations omitted). This Court ultimately found “[S]ince [Appellant] was detained within the confines of his home as part of his sentence of punishment for forgery, and remained within the state’s custody, he was subject to detention.” Id. at 1152.

As Wegley makes clear, Kriston was decided on the premise that an individual sentenced to home confinement should not be permitted to take advantage of the more lenient sentence of home confinement when a DUI sentencing provision clearly called for more punitive consequences.

The mere fact that a criminal on house arrest may be liberally permitted to leave home to attend work, as was the case instantly, does not obviate the fact that the individual is serving a sentence following a conviction.

In this case the criminal is enjoying all the amenities of a house arrest as opposed to stark imprisonment in a state institution. He should not be rewarded with unemployment compensation during that time period.

      . Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, added by the Act of October 30, 1996, P.L. 738, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802.6.

      . This Section states:
      § 801. Qualifications required to secure compensation Compensation shall be payable to any employe who is or becomes unemployed, and who—
      (d)(1) Is able to work and available for suitable work....
      43 P.S. § 801(d)(1). In this opinion, we refer to this section by both its statutory designation and as the “able and available for work standard.”

      . Section 402 of the UC Law, 43 P.S. § 802, also sets forth ineligibility provisions, which are not at issue here.

      . Section 9721 states, in relevant part:
      (a) General rule.- — In determining the sentence to be imposed the court shall, except as provided in subsection (a. 1) [relating to mandatory minimum sentences], consider and select one or more of the following alternatives, and may impose them consecutively or concurrently:
      (1) An order of probation.
      (2) A determination of guilt without further penalty.
      (3) Partial confinement.
      (4) Total confinement.
      (5) A fine.
      (6) County intermediate punishment.
      (7) State intermediate punishment.
      42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a).
      Section 9763 provides that in imposing a sentence of county intermediate punishment, the court shall specify the term, which may not exceed the maximum term for which the defendant could be confined, and the program to which the defendant is sentenced. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763(a). Section 9763 further lists conditions which the court may attach to the defendant's intermediate punishment sentence including, inter alia, to be devoted to a specific occupation or employment; to participate in a community service program; to undergo counseling or available medical or psychiatric treatment; to attend educational or vocational training programs; to reside in a rehabilitative facility; to not possess a firearm without written permission; to make restitution; to pay a fine; to participate in drug or alcohol treatment programs; to remain within the premises of the defendant’s residence during the hours designated by the court; and to be subject to electronic monitoring. Id. § 9763(b).

      . The referee additionally assessed a five-week fraud overpayment of unemployment benefits in the amount of $1,719 based on Claimant’s purported failure to disclose to the local service center that he was incarcerated. The UCBR, however, ultimately reversed the assessment of penalty, concluding that Claimant did not make any intentional misstatement, but rather did not believe that living in his sister’s home constituted "incarceration.” The fraud issue was not appealed, and is no longer in this case.

      . Section 306(a.l) of the WC Act provides that “[n]othing in this act shall require payment of compensation ... for any period during which the employe is incarcerated after a conviction ...” 77 P.S. § 511.1.

      . In its reply brief, the UCBR argues that Claimant focuses mistakenly on the Section 401(d) standard of whether he was "available for employment,” rather than the Section 402.6 standard of whether he was "incarcerated after a conviction.” It also clarifies that it is not contending that the workers’ compensation cases are binding in this unemployment compensation case, but only that they are persuasive because the disqualification provisions in the WC Act and the UC Law are virtually identical. The UCBR also responds that Claimant's view of the Legislative comments on Section 402.6 is unduly restrictive, and disputes his contention that the concerns were limited only to incarcerated prisoners on work release. It submits there is little distinction between an individual confined in a prison who is eligible for work release and one confined in a home with electronic monitoring who is permitted to leave for work. Finally, the UCBR argues that the general provision declaring the remedial purpose of the UC Law should not govern the specific provision disqualifying incarcerated claimants from receiving benefits.

      . In our review of unemployment compensation cases, we must consider "whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether there was a violation of the constitution or agency procedure or an error of law.” Diehl v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (ESAB Group, Inc.), 618 Pa. 592, 57 A.3d 1209, 1216 (2012) (citing Temple University v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 565 Pa. 178, 772 A.2d 416, 418 n. 1 (2001)). As with any question of statutory interpretation, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. SEIU Healthcare Pa. v. Commonwealth, 628 Pa. 573, 104 A.3d 495, 506 (2014).

      . As emphasized infra, even if a claimant's criminal sentence does not per se disqualify him from benefits under Section 402.6, his sentence may contain restrictions that render him unable or unavailable to work, thereby precluding him from unemployment compensation benefits under Section 401(d).

      . Although irrelevant to the legal issue presented herein, notwithstanding the Kriston Court’s interpretation of "imprisonment,” we ultimately granted the defendant in Kriston credit for time served in an electronic home monitoring program on equitable grounds because, prior to entering the program, prison authorities assured him that he would receive credit for such time.

      . This provision was later amended, employing nearly identical language, and now appears at 77 P.S. § 511.1.

      . The Commonwealth Court below held that Moore was distinguishable because the terms of Claimant’s house arrest placed no restrictions on his ability to work and Claimant was not removed from the work force. While we acknowledge that the claimant in Moore was also on house arrest with work release, as noted, we leave for another day the consideration of these arguments in the context of the WC Act.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice TODD.

license: Public Domain

text:
    114 A.3d 401
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Noel Matos MONTALVO, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted June 10, 2014.
    Decided April 27, 2015.

      Jeffrey Charles Marshall, Esq., Marshall & Smith, PC, for Noel Matos Montalvo.
    James Patrick Barker, Esq., Jennifer Anne Peterson, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, Amy Zapp, Esq., for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice TODD.

This is a capital appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County denying Appellant Noel Matos Montalvo’s petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. For the reasons that follow, we are constrained to vacate the order and remand this matter to the PCRA court for further proceedings, as discussed below.

I. Factual and procedural background

Appellant is the brother of Milton Montalvo (“Milton”). In 1995, Milton and his common law wife, Miriam Ascencio (“Miriam”), moved from Puerto Rico to York County, Pennsylvania. The couple frequently fought, and, around March 1998, Milton moved out of the couple’s apartment. On the evening of April 18,1998, Miriam was seen at a local bar with a friend, Nelson Lugo a/k/a Manuel Santana (“Nelson”). At some point during the evening, Miriam and Nelson left the bar and walked to Miriam’s apartment. Later that evening, Vincent Rice, Miriam’s next-door neighbor, was awakened sometime after 11:30 p.m. by the sound of breaking glass on the common porch he shared with Miriam. Rice reported hearing Milton shout “open the door,” after which he heard additional noises coming from the apartment. The following day, April 19, 1998, Rice looked through the window of Miriam’s apartment and observed a man lying on the floor; at this point, he summoned the police.

When the police arrived at the scene, they observed that one pane of a four-pane window in the door to Miriam’s apartment was broken; the broken pane was the closest to the door lock. Upon entering the apartment, the officers discovered Nelson’s body in the kitchen and Miriam’s body in the bedroom. Nelson had defensive wounds on his hands, his fingers were nearly severed, and he had a lipstick inserted in his mouth. Nelson’s autopsy revealed that he died from a stab wound to the chest. Miriam had a broken nose, stab wounds to her eyes, and her head was nearly severed from her body. She was naked from the waist down, and her underwear was around her face. She was lying with her head on a pillow, and a high-heeled shoe was found under her buttocks. Miriam’s autopsy revealed that she died from sharp force and blunt force injuries to her head and neck.

According to the trial testimony of Chris Ann Arrotti, a chemist employed with the Pennsylvania State Police, forensic testing was conducted on more than 70 items collected from the crime scene; approximately 17 of those items contained traces of human blood. Of the items that contained traces of human blood, two of the items contained traces of blood which did not belong to either victim: a white cloth bag found on a sofa bed near Miriam’s body, and a kitchen window blind. The blood on both of those items was determined to belong to Milton Montalvo. Milton Montalvo’s blood also was found on glass that remained in the broken window pane, and a hair collected from Nelson’s hand was determined to belong to Milton Montalvo. There was no blood, hair, or fiber evidence that linked Appellant to the scene of the murders.

An arrest warrant was issued for Milton, and, in 1999, he was captured in Florida, and extradited to York County to stand trial for the murders of Miriam and Nelson. Ultimately, he was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of burglary, and, on February 14, 2000, he was sentenced to death. Approximately two months before Milton was arrested, Detective Roland Comacho, purportedly based on a statement given to him by Esther Soto, sought and obtained an arrest warrant for Appellant, charging him as a possible accomplice or participant in the murders. Appellant remained a fugitive until 2002, at which time he was discovered living under an assumed name, with an altered appearance, in Hudson County, New Jersey. Appellant was extradited to York County to stand trial, at which he was represented pro hac vice by Francis Cutruzzula, Esquire. Frank Arcuri, Esquire served as local counsel.

In his opening statement at Appellant’s trial, the prosecutor suggested that Appellant wanted to kill Miriam because he “was angry with Miriam because the ties with Milton had broken down,” and because Miriam knew that Appellant “was living in this country under an alias having escaped from parole for automobile theft in Puerto Rico.” N.T. Trial, 3/13/03, at 421. The Commonwealth further posited that the victims’ different injuries demonstrated that two different weapons were used — a knife and some other blunt object — and, therefore, that there must have been two assailants.

In addition to the above-described testimony of Vincent Rice, Miriam’s next-door neighbor, the Commonwealth presented at trial the testimony of Miriam’s downstairs neighbor, Fedelio Morrell. Morrell testified that, on the night of the murders, sometime between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m., he saw Milton at Miriam’s door, and heard him tell her to open the door. Morrell also heard Milton shout that he had seen someone go into Miriam’s apartment. Morrell recounted that, approximately 20 minutes later, he heard a woman’s voice say “call the police, call the police,” id. at 603, and then he fell asleep. Morrell testified that, 20 minutes after he fell asleep, he heard “noise on the floor and on the walls and something being dragged.” Id.

The Commonwealth also presented Nici Negron, who operated a towing business, as a witness. Negron testified that Milton called him at around midnight on April 18, 1998, and when he arrived approximately one-half hour later at the location Milton specified, he observed Milton, “a pregnant [woman], and Milton’s brother” inside or nearby Milton’s Dodge van. Id. at 505-06.

Patricia Ascensio, Miriam’s niece, was also called as a witness by the Commonwealth. Patricia testified that she and her boyfriend, Angel Santos (“Angel”), went to Appellant’s apartment at approximately 9:00 p.m. on the evening of the murders so that Appellant’s wife, who was known as “Ketty” or “Kathy,” could do Patricia’s hair. Patricia stated that she saw Milton at the apartment at approximately 9:30 p.m., but that Milton left at around 10:00 p.m. N.T. Trial, 3/13/03, at 483. Patricia testified that she and Angel left the apartment at approximately 11:00 p.m., and the only individuals present when they left were Appellant, Ketty, and Appellant’s son. Id.

As the Commonwealth was unable to locate Angel Santos at the time of trial, the parties agreed to allow Angel’s statements to Detective Lisa Daniels to be introduced through Detective Daniels’ testimony. According to the police report prepared by Detective Daniels, Angel reported that he and Patricia were at Appellant’s apartment with Appellant and Appellant’s wife at approximately 12:30 a.m. on the morning of April 19, 1998; that Milton arrived sometime later and appeared “upset,” “agitated,” “hyped,” and “sweating profusely”; that Milton asked Appellant, and then Angel, for $20; that Milton left the apartment between approximately 1:15 and 1:30 a.m. on the morning of April 19; and that he and Patricia left the apartment at approximately 2:00 a.m. that same morning. City of York Police Dep’t Supplement to Complaint Report, 4/19/98; N.T. Trial, 3/13/03, at 580-81.

The only evidence presented by the Commonwealth to connect Appellant to the murders was the testimony of Esther Soto (“Esther”). Esther testified that, on the afternoon of April 18, 1998, Milton visited the grocery store she operated with her husband at the time, Miguel Soto (“Miguel”). Esther testified that Milton used the store’s telephone to call Miriam about unemployment checks she had received in the mail, that an argument ensued, and that she heard Milton shouting at Miriam over the telephone. As Milton was shouting at Miriam, Appellant entered the store and approached Milton. According to Esther, after Milton ended his telephone call, she heard him tell Appellant that he wanted to kill Miriam. Appellant told Milton to “leave it to him,” and stated that he would kill Miriam himself. N.T. Trial, 3/14/03, at 619.

Esther recounted that, later that evening, after she and Miguel were asleep, Milton and Appellant arrived at their house. Esther stated that she remained in bed while Miguel opened the door, and then she overheard Milton and Appellant describe to Miguel how they murdered Miriam and Nelson. Esther also testified that she recalled hearing Appellant tell her husband that he killed Miriam by cutting her throat, stabbing her in the eyes, and kicking her as she lay on the floor. According to Esther, Milton and Appellant wanted to stay at her house, but she and Miguel told them they could not stay; Miguel then gave them some money, and Milton and Appellant stated they were going to Florida. Id. at 623.

Esther claimed that, a day or so after the murders, she saw in the newspaper a telephone number for individuals who had information regarding the murders, and that, approximately two weeks after the murders, she called the police. Thereafter, Esther gave a recorded statement to Detective Comacho, telling him that she had overheard Milton tell Miguel that he killed Nelson, and that she overheard Appellant tell Miguel that he killed Miriam. Id. at 626-28.

On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Esther regarding her testimony that she called the police two weeks after the murders, when, in fact, she did not give a statement to Detective Comacho until December 12, 1998, nearly eight months later. Although Esther initially indicated that she did not remember, id. at 660, she then admitted that she only contacted police at that time because she was “trying to get [her] van back” after it was taken into custody by Detective Comacho. Id. at 661.

Additionally, after Esther admitted on direct examination that, when testifying at Milton’s trial, she repeatedly stated that she did not remember any statements made by Appellant, defense counsel asked Esther whether, in light of her changed testimony at Appellant’s trial, she was admitting to lying during her testimony at Milton’s trial. Id. at 638. Esther repeatedly stated that she “doesn’t lie,” and she maintained that she did not believe that claiming she didn’t remember something was the same as lying. Id. at 638-39. Defense counsel also confronted Esther with, inter alia, the fact that, at Milton’s preliminary hearing on May 20, 1999, Esther testified that Milton, not Appellant, told her and her husband on the morning of April 19, 1998 that Milton killed Miriam. Id. at 647. Esther responded: “I get nervous that day. I was so nervous all the time I’m nervous. I’m not the same person, okay.” Id. at 649.

When asked by defense counsel if she lied when she testified at Milton’s trial that Detective Comacho had “forced” her to change her testimony at Appellant’s trial; that Detective Comacho “forced her to give the statement” that she gave; that the detective told her that if she didn’t “say what he said[,] my business would be closed and I would go to jail and I won’t see my kids,” id. at 639^40, Esther responded, “[f]or me that is not lying.” Id. at 640. When asked if she saw Detective Comacho in the courtroom at Appellant’s trial, Esther identified him, and when asked “is that the detective that forced you to give this statement back in December of 1998?,” she replied: “[y]es.” Id. at 666.

Esther’s testimony also conflicted with the testimony given by her husband Miguel Soto, a defense witness. Miguel testified that, in the early morning hours of April 19, 1998, his wife woke him up because someone was knocking at the door. N.T. Trial, 3/18/03, at 245. Miguel answered the door to Milton and Appellant. Id. When asked what, if anything, Milton said to him when he opened the door, Miguel replied, “Milton told me — I don’t want to say this — that he had killed his wife.” Id. Miguel testified that Milton did not explain how he killed his wife, but simply stated that “he had problems with the police because he had killed his wife,” and that “he had to leave and he wanted to know if he could leave his brother — and that’s when I found out [Appellant] was his brother — could stay at my house.” Id. Miguel testified that Esther was upstairs when Milton made this statement. Id. at 246. After approximately 25 minutes, Miguel told them he did not want any problems and that Esther did not want them staying in the house, so they left. Id. at 247. When asked on cross-examination why he did not go to the police, Miguel explained that he intended to go to the police, but Esther convinced him not to do so because it would cause problems. Id. at 248-49. Miguel testified that he told Detective Coma-cho that Milton admitted to killing his wife when Miguel was interviewed by the detective nine months later, in November 1998, when he had problems obtaining the registration for his vehicle. Id. at 263.

In March 2003, more than three years after Milton was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of Miriam and Nelson, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder for the death of Miriam, second-degree murder for the death of Nelson, conspiracy to commit murder, and burglary. At the penalty phase of trial, the jury found two aggravating circumstances — that Appellant killed Miriam during the perpetration of a felony, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(6), and Appellant had been convicted of another murder committed either before, or at the time of, the offenses at issue, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(ll). The jury also found two mitigating factors — that Appellant had no significant history of prior criminal convictions, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(1), and Appellant was a good worker, attended church, and was a good son to his mother, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(8) (the “catch-all” miti-gator). Ultimately, the jury determined the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and recommended a sentence of death.

On April 14, 2003, the trial court imposed a sentence of death in connection with Miriam’s murder, a sentence of life imprisonment for Nelson’s murder, and concurrent terms of 10 to 20 years incarceration each for burglary and conspiracy to commit murder. Appellant filed a direct appeal to this Court, during which he was represented by Gerald Anthony Lord, Esquire. On appeal, Appellant raised a variety of claims, including claims alleging ineffectiveness of trial counsel. On September 24, 2008, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, holding, inter alia, that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims must be deferred to post-conviction proceedings pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002). Commonwealth v. (Noel) Montalvo, 598 Pa. 263, 956 A.2d 926 (2008).

On July 27, 2009, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. On November 5, 2009, Attorney Lord was granted leave to withdraw and Jeffrey Marshall, Esquire, was appointed to represent Appellant. Attorney Marshall filed an amended PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf on February 1, 2010. Then, on April 29, 2011, Attorney Marshall filed a supplement to the amended PCRA petition. Between March and September 2011, the PCRA court, by Judge Sheryl Ann Dorney, conducted four days of hearings, and, on January 29, 2013, by opinion and order, Judge Dorney dismissed Appellant’s amended PCRA petition. On February 27, 2013, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court, and subsequently filed a statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On May 16, 2013, Judge Dorney issued an opinion disposing of Appellant’s 15-plus claims raised on appeal, in many instances simply referring to her January 29, 2013 opinion and order.

On August 23, 2013, Appellant filed a motion to amend and supplement his Rule 1925(b) statement. As Judge Dorney had retired effective August 1, 2013, the matter was assigned to Judge Michael E. Bortner, who, on November 27, 2013, granted Appellant’s motion to amend his 1925(b) statement. On December 2, 2013, Appellant filed an “Amended and Supplemental Statement of Matters Complained of Under [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) ]”. On December 3, 2013, Judge Bortner filed a single-page order denying Appellant PCRA relief, and stating, “[t]his Court defers to the reasoning and decision entered by the Honorable Judge Dorney of the York County Court of Common Pleas on January 29, 2013.” Order, 12/3/13. The matter is now before this Court, wherein Appellant raises the following claims:

1. The court’s failure to provide Petitioner with the resources necessary to develop and present evidence supporting his claims involving the denial of his constitutional rights violated Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his rights under Article I, Sections 1, 6, 9, 13,14, 25, and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
2. The Court erred in denying relief where counsel’s abject failure to investigate or prepare in any manner for Petitioner’s penalty hearing violated Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his rights under Article I, Sections 1, 9, 13 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
3. The court erred in denying relief where, as a result of court error, prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel, the sentencing jury was misinformed that its sentencing verdict would be a recommendation but that ultimate responsibility for Petitioner’s death sentence rested elsewhere, in violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711; Article I, Sections 9 and 13; and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these claims.
4. The court erred in denying relief where, as a result of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and court error, irrelevant non-statutory aggravation was presented and considered by the jury in reaching its sentencing determination in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his rights under Article I, Sections 1, 6, 9 13, 14, 25 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
5. The court erred in denying relief where the penalty phase jury instructions violated the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Sections 1, 6, 9,13,14, 25 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
6. The court erred in denying relief where the jury was not instructed, in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments that, under Pennsylvania Law, a sentence of life imprisonment means life without possibility of parole.
7. The court erred in denying relief where, as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct and court error, the jury did not hear evidence of Petitioner’s innocence and Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death despite his innocence in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his rights under Article I, Sections 1, 6, 9, 13, 14, 25 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
8. The court erred in denying relief where the prosecution’s election to pursue inconsistent theories of prosecution by first claiming that Petitioner’s co-defendant was the actual murderer during the co-defendant’s trial and then arguing that Petitioner was the murderer in Petitioner’s subsequent trial violated Petitioners Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his rights under Article I, Sections 1, 6, 9, 14, 25, 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
9. The court erred in denying relief where the selection of a death qualified jury where Petitioner is innocent of death and Milton Montalvo’s jury verdict precluded the Commonwealth from seeking death, violated Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his rights under Article I, Sections 1, 9, 13, 14, 25 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
10. The court erred in denying relief where, as a result of court error and ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner was denied a fair and impartial jury in violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and his rights under Article I, Sections 1, 6, 9 and 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
11. The court erred in denying relief where Petitioner was denied a fair and impartial jury in violation of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his rights under Article I, Sections 1, 9, 26 and 28 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the York County jury selection procedure systematically excluded minorities.
12. The court erred in denying relief where numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct, individually and collectively, deprived petitioner of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his rights under Article I, Sections 1, 6, 9, 13, 14, 25 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
13. The court erred in denying relief where the guilty phase instructions violated Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Trial and appellate counsels’ failures to litigate these errors constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
14. The court erred in denying relief where, as a result of court error, prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel, the jury was exposed to constitutionally prohibitive identification testimony in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and Article I, Sections 1, 6, 9, 13,14, 25 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
15. The court erred in denying relief where the admission of detective Comacho’s summary of Petitioner’s purported statement to the police after his illegal arrest violated Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his rights under Article I, Sections 1, 9, 13, 14, 25, and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
16. The Court erred in denying relief because the cumulative effect of the errors require grant of relief.

Appellant’s Brief at 4-6.

II. Analysis

In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s determination is “supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Rainey, 593 Pa. 67, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (2007). To be entitled to PCRA relief, an appellant must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2); his claims have not been previously litigated or waived, id. § 9543(a)(3); and the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial or on direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational, strategic, or tactical decision by counsel. Id. § 9543(a)(4). An issue is previously litigated if “the highest appellate court in which [the appellant] could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” Id. § 9544(a)(2). An issue is waived if appellant “could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, ... on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” Id. § 9544(b).

In order to obtain relief on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must satisfy the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Pennsylvania, we have applied the Strickland test by requiring that a petitioner establish that (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001). In other words, prejudice is assessed in terms of whether the petitioner has shown that the demonstrated ineffectiveness sufficiently undermines confidence in the verdict. Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 586 Pa. 527, 896 A.2d 508, 516 n. 10 (2006). Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance, and, if a claim fails under any required element of the Strickland test, the court may dismiss the claim on that basis. Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282, 291 (2010).

Of critical relevance to the present appeal, this Court repeatedly has explained that, in order to enable appellate review, PCRA courts are required to provide a “legally robust discussion, complete with clear findings of fact where required.” Commonwealth v. Dennis, 597 Pa. 159, 950 A.2d 945, 957 (2008) (“A generic statement that the record proves [PCRA] claims collectively non-meritorious tells us too little to support review.”); see also Commonwealth v. Weiss, 604 Pa. 573, 986 A.2d 808, 816 n. 4 (2009) (“a fact-finding court should support its determinations with sufficient explanations of the facts and law, including specific citations to the record for all evidence on which it relies, and to the legal authority on which it relies, to facilitate appellate review”); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 600 Pa. 1, 963 A.2d 409, 435 (2009) (holding that, where PCRA court failed to explain the basis for its conclusion that claims were meritless, we could not conduct meaningful appellate review).

Where a PCRA court fails to support its holding with sufficient explanations of the facts and law, or fails to provide an adequate opinion addressing all of the claims raised in a PCRA petition, including factual and credibility disputes, a remand is appropriate. See Weiss, 986 A.2d at 816 (remanding the matter to the PCRA court to address the “salient inquiry” of whether appellant received a fair trial, which will “necessarily entail a review of all the evidence presented at trial”); Daniels, supra (remanding matter to PCRA court for opinion addressing all of PCRA petitioner’s claims); Commonwealth v. Peoples, 599 Pa. 254, 961 A.2d 109, 110 (2008) (per curiam) (remanding to the PCRA court with directions “to resolve areas of material factual controversy and credibility disputes via numbered factual findings and to provide properly framed legal conclusions grounded in the criteria governing claims of deficient attorney stewardship”). In addition, such a remand may necessitate further proceedings below. See e.g. Peoples, supra; Commonwealth v. Beasley, 600 Pa. 458, 967 A.2d 376, 391 (2009) (upon remand to allow the PCRA court to address issues relating to the appellant’s claims of ineffectiveness, PCRA court may “take all action necessary to conform the record to the [layering requirements of Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 832 A.2d 1014 (2003)], including the admission of supplemental evidence.”); Commonwealth v. Roy Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 732 A.2d 1167, 1181 (1999) (because PCRA court failed to make an independent credibility determination regarding proposed testimony, and because the PCRA court as factfinder is in a superior position to make such determinations, PCRA court was directed, on remand, to conduct a hearing, and render its own, independent findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the credibility of the proposed testimony, as well as its impact on the truth-determining process).

Unfortunately, the PCRA court’s opinion in the instant case is deficient. In its January 29, 2013 Opinion and Order, issued after four days of hearings on Appellant’s PCRA petition, the PCRA court inexplicably quoted nearly verbatim, and sequentially addressed, the issues set forth in Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statements filed on direct appeal. See Statement of Issues Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 12/18/03; Amended Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 8/12/05. This discussion comprised the first 54 pages of the PCRA court’s 55-page opinion.

Moreover, the PCRA court did not discuss Appellant’s PCRA petition, or the appropriate standard for relief, until the last two pages of its opinion. The PCRA court’s discussion in that regard reads, in its entirety:

In the Motion before the Court, the Defendant primarily alleges ineffective assistance of all attorneys who represented him prior to his current counsel. In addition, the Defendant alleges prosecutorial misconduct, court error, illegal arrest and various constitutional violations as a result thereof, and multiple constitutional violations.
In order to receive relief under the Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, a Defendant must prove 1) that he has been convicted of a crime, 2) that he is currently serving a sentence, awaiting execution of a death sentence, or is serving a sentence that must expire before he may begin serving the sentence in question, 3) the conviction resulted from an enumerated constitutional or statutory violation, 4) the allegation(s) has/have not been previously litigated or waived, and 5) the failure to litigate the issue(s) previously was not the result of a rational, strategic or tactical decision by counsel.
When alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, a Defendant bears the burden of proof. Counsel is presumed to be effective and the burden is on the Defendant to prove otherwise. He must demonstrate that 1) the underlying substantive claim(s) has/have arguable merit, 2) that there was no reasonable basis for counsel’s action or failure to act, and 3) the Defendant suffered prejudice because of counsel’s ineffectiveness.
After considering the testimony from trial, the testimony and exhibits from the hearings on the Defendant’s present petition(s), arguments and briefs of counsel, we find that the Defendant has failed to prove that he is entitled to relief under the Post Conviction Collateral Relief Act.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/29/13, at 54-55.

Furthermore, in response to Appellant’s initial Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Judge Dorney issued a 7-page opinion which largely referred back to her January 19, 2013 opinion. Further complicating matters, following Judge Dorney’s retirement and the filing of Appellant’s amended supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Judge Bortner addressed the supplemental issues in a single-page order in which he merely deferred to the prior opinions of Judge Dorney, which, as observed above, were insufficient.

As a result of the PCRA court’s failures, this Court has no findings of fact, no determinations of credibility, and no legal conclusions regarding Appellant’s PCRA claims; in short, we have no basis upon which to conduct meaningful appellate review. In that there were more than 10 expert, lay, and other witnesses who testified at the PCRA hearings, including those noted above, see supra note 7, the lack of any credibility determinations by the PCRA court is particularly problematic in the instant case. Thus, we are constrained to remand this matter to the PCRA court. We recognize that, as Judge Dorney is no longer on the bench, the matter must be assigned to another judge. Further, we acknowledge that the judge to whom the matter is assigned will not have the benefit of having presided over Appellant’s PCRA hearings. Thus, for those claims the assigned judge is unable to resolve on the existing record, the judge is authorized to conduct additional hearings, and admit evidence, as necessary. Peoples, supra; Beasley, supra; Williams, supra.

The order of the PCRA court is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Chief Justice SAYLOR, Justices EAKIN, BAER and STEVENS join the opinion.

      . The various witnesses at Appellant’s trial provided different, and often inconsistent, estimations of the hour at which these events occurred.

      . Attorney Cutruzzula testified at Appellant's PCRA hearing that he met Appellant in the "bull pen” of the Hudson County Court House, following Appellant’s arrest. When there was no public defender available to handle Appellant’s extradition matter, the presiding criminal judge asked Attorney Cutruzzula to "stand in” and Attorney Cutruz-zula met with Appellant in the jury room to discuss his extradition rights. Appellant agreed to waive extradition, and Attorney Cutruzzula ultimately was retained to represent Appellant in his homicide trial in Pennsylvania. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 7/11/11, at 5-6.

      . Appellant claims that Angel confirmed the truth of the statements he made to police during his April 19, 1998 interview, but, contrary to representations contained in a police report prepared by Detective Comacho on February 1, 1999 in which Detective Comacho described an interview with Angel and Patricia on that date, denied ever speaking with police'about the murders after his initial April 19, 1998 interview. In support of this claim, Appellant submitted an affidavit from Alejandro Villasenor, a paralegal with the Federal Public Defender which represented Appellant during his federal habeas corpus proceedings, describing conversations he had with Angel.

      . Specifically, at Appellant’s trial, Detective Comacho testified that police had entered information regarding Milton Montalvo’s Dodge van into the National Crime Index Computer ("NCIC”) system, but erroneously entered the license plate of Miguel Soto’s van, a Ford Aerostar. N.T. Trial, 3/18/04, at 199. As a result, when Miguel attempted to obtain the required registration for his van, there was a "pop up NCIC hit” for the homicide involving Milton. Id. at 199. Miguel was instructed by PennDot personnel to go to the Lancaster City Police Department, where he was met by Detective Comacho and another officer. Detective Comacho interviewed Miguel, and, upon "figuring out that he had some sort of connection to Milton,” asked Miguel "what information ... he had about the homicide.” Id. at 200. According to Detective Comacho, Miguel stated that his wife, Esther, "also had information around,” and the detective told Miguel he needed to speak with Esther. Id. At that point, Detective Comacho drove to Miguel's store, where he took possession of Miguel’s van and placed it in the city garage. Detective Comacho reiterated to Miguel at that time that he "needed to talk to Esther.” Id. at 201. Several days later, Esther went in for an interview with Detective Comacho.

      . In this regard, Appellant’s conviction for the murder of Nelson was used as an aggravating factor for sentencing in Appellant’s conviction for the murder of Miriam.

      . On March 22, 2004, prior to sentencing, Mary R. Ennis, Esquire, entered her appearance as counsel for Appellant, and Attorney Ennis filed an Amended Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on Appellant’s behalf. Thereafter, Attorney Ennis was granted leave to withdraw as counsel, and, on May 17, 2007, Attorney Lord was appointed to represent Appellant.

      . Witnesses who testified at the PCRA hearings included, inter alia, Attorney Cutruzzula; Angel Santos; R. Robert Tressel, a crime-scene forensic expert; Detective Comacho; Detective Dennis Williams, who conducted several witness interviews; Detective Daniels, Attorney En-nis; Allen Fuentes, an interpreter who assisted with Detective Williams’ interview of Negron; and Attorney Lord.

      . Although Appellant identifies nineteen issues in his Statement of Questions, he indicates that three of those issues were abandoned or duplicative of other claims. Thus, we have not listed those issues herein, and only the remaining sixteen issues are set forth.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    114 A.3d 412
    LEHIGH VALLEY DUAL LANGUAGE CHARTER SCHOOL v. STATE CHARTER SCHOOL APPEAL BOARD. Bethlehem Area School District, Intervenor. Petition of Bethlehem Area School District, Intervenor.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 6, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 6th day of May, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, LIMITED TO the issues set forth below. Allocatur is DENIED as to all remaining issues. The issues, as stated by Petitioner, are:

(1) Whether or not the Panel’s Majority Opinion and Order presents issues of first impression to the extent that it permits a charter school to open a second location by amending its charter and/or confers CAB with jurisdiction to hear a charter school’s appeal from any and all denials to amend a charter school’s charter?
(2) Whether or not the Majority’s Opinion and Order has departed from accepted judicial practices or abused its discretion when it misapplied the rules of statutory construction and/or relied on dicta?


text:
    114 A.3d 412
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Timothy M. CURLEY, Petitioner.
    Nos. 27 and 28 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 6, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 6th day of May, 2015, the Application to File Under Seal and the Application for Leave to File Response are GRANTED, and the Application for Extraordinary Relief is DENIED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Petitioner’s challenges pending in the Superior Court. See Commonwealth v. Curley, 299 MDA 2015; Commonwealth v. Curley, 12 MDM 2015.

Justice STEVENS joins the Order in all respects, except that he would deny the application to file under seal.


text:
    114 A.3d 413
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Graham B. SPANIER, Petitioner.
    No. 29 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 6, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 6th day of May, 2015, the Application to File Under Seal and the Application for Leave to File Response are GRANTED, and the Application for Extraordinary Relief is DENIED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Petitioner’s challenges pending in the Superior Court. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 304 MDA 2015; Commonwealth v. Spanier, 15 MDM 2015.

Justice STEVENS joins the Order in all respects, except that he would deny the application to file under seal.


text:
    114 A.3d 413
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Gary Charles SCHULTZ, Petitioner.
    Nos. 30 MM 2015, 33 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 6, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 6th day of May, 2015, the Application to File Under Seal is GRANTED, and the Application for Extraordinary Relief is DENIED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Petitioner’s challenges pending in the Superior Court. See Commonwealth v. Schultz, 280 MDA 2015; Commonwealth v. Schultz, 14 MDM 2015.

Justice STEVENS joins the Order in all respects, except that he would deny the application to file under seal.


text:
    114 A.3d 413
    In re Nomination Petition of Franklin A. BENNETT, III, Candidate for Office of Judge of the Municipal Court for the First Judicial District (Philadelphia County). Appeal of Joyce M. Cross. In re Nomination Petition of Franklin A. Bennett, III, Candidate for Office of Judge of the Court of Common Pleas for the First Judicial District (Philadelphia County). Appeal of Joyce M. Cross.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted April 17, 2015.
    Decided May 7, 2015.

      Kathleen Marie Kotula, Esq., PA Department of State, for Department of State, Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation.
    City Commissioners of Philadelphia, pro se.
    Jeffrey Brent Datz, Esq., Green, Silverstein & Groff, LLC, Joshua H. Roberts, Esq., Philadelphia, Datz & Associates LLC, for Joyce M. Cross.
    Nizar M. Abed, Esq., Abed Law, for Franklin A. Bennett, III.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 7th day of May, 2015, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    114 A.3d 795
    Laure G. WALSH, Respondent v. John R. WALSH, III, Petitioner.
    No. 47 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 24, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 24th day of April, 2015, the Petition for Review is DENIED.


text:
    114 A.3d 795
    James SAMPLE, Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 18 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 24, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 24th day of April, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED. To the extent the “Petition for Writ [of] Habeas Corpus,” treated as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus, seeks to compel the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County to comply with this Court’s September 16, 2014 order, see Sample v. Commonwealth, 104 EM 2014, the petition is GRANTED. The court is DIRECTED to adjudicate Petitioner’s Post Conviction Relief Act petition within 30 days.


text:
    114 A.3d 795
    John P. KAROLY, Jr., Appellant v. Michael MANCUSO, Esquire Assistant District Attorney and Eric Kerchner, Detective and Christopher Jones, Esquire Assistant District Attorney, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 27, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 27th day of April, 2015, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    114 A.3d 796
    Terrence BETHEA, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PA. State Police, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 27, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 27th day of April, 2015, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.