source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    114 A.3d 830
    Michael JAMES, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY; and Court of Common Pleas President Judge of Philadelphia County; and Court Administrator of Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County, Respondents.
    No. 29 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 12, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 12th day of May, 2015, the Application Leave to File Leave Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus are GRANTED.

The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County has failed to comply with the remand order of the Superior Court. See Commonwealth v. James, 116 EDA 2009, 990 A.2d 46 (December 14, 2009). The common pleas court is DIRECTED to adjudicate the remanded Post Conviction Relief Act matter within 60 days.

The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to serve the Commonwealth with a copy of this


text:
    114 A.3d 830
    Harold V. HOSKINS, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LYCOMING COUNTY, Judge N.L. Butts, Respondents.
    No. 62 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 12, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 12th day of May, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED, and the Prothonotary is DIRECTED to strike the name of the jurist from the caption.


text:
    114 A.3d 831
    DNB FIRST, N.A., Appellee v. William B. FRETZ Jr., Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued May 6, 2015.
    Decided May 12, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

The appeal is dismissed as having been IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.


text:
    114 A.3d 831
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. William CHILDS, Respondent.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 13, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 13th day of May, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue is:

Did Superior Court err by overturning a murder conviction on the ground that — contrary to the plain terms of the Statutory Construction Act — the trial judge should not have applied the law in effect at the time of the homicide?


text:
    114 A.3d 831
    Vincent P. NERTAVICH, Jr. v. PPL ELECTRIC UTILITIES, KTA, KTA-Tator, Inc., KTA/SET Environmental, S-E Technologies, Inc., Alexander Andrew, Inc., d/b/a Falltech, Alexander Andrew, Inc., Falltech, Thomas & Betts Corp., Thomas & Betts Corp., d/b/a or t/a Meyer Steel Structures, f/k/a I.T.T.-Meyer Industries, f/k/a Meyer Industries, Meyer Steel Structures f/k/a I.T.T.-Meyer Industries, f/k/a Meyer Steel Structures, ITT-Meyer Industries, Meyer Industries, Meyer Machine, Inc. and Winola Industrial, Inc. Petition of Vincent P. Nertavich, Jr.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 14, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 14th day of May, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED LIMITED TO the issues set forth below. Allocatur is DENIED as to all remaining issues. The issues, as stated by petitioner, are:

(1) In the face of the trial court’s cumulative review of, and conclusion that the record evidence of PPL’s operative control of the contractor’s work was sufficient to allow the issue of PPL’s liability to be presented to the jury, does the majority of the Superior Court panel conflict with Beil v. Telesis Construction, Inc. and § 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts?
(2) Did the majority of the Superior Court panel err in adding an element of proof for imposing liability on a property owner under § 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that was not contained in and is in conflict with Beil v. Telesis Construction, Inc. ?


text:
    114 A.3d 1035
    David LUSICK, Appellant v. Defacto Judge Pamela Pryor Cohen DEMBE et al., Appellees.
    No. 4 EAP 2014.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 12, 2015.
   ORDER

AND NOW, this 12th day of March, 2015, the above captioned appeal is quashed for failure to file a brief.


text:
    114 A.3d 1035
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Carey ABNEY, Relator/Petitioner v. FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CRIMINAL DIVISION V, First Judicial District Court of Common Pleas-Criminal Division, Prothonotary’s Office, Respondents.
    No. 27 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 12, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 12th day of May, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.


text:
    114 A.3d 1035
    Craig ELLIS a/k/a Raheem Amir, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 18, 2015.
    Raheem Amir, pro se.

      Alan Matthew Robinson, Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, Jason Anthony Lambrino, Pennsylvania Office of Chief Counsel, Harrisburg, for Board of Probation and Parole.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 18th day of May, 2015, the Notice of Appeal is hereby QUASHED as untimely.


text:
    114 A.3d 1035
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner, v. Scott Bradley KINGSTON, Respondent.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 19, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 19th day of May, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by petitioner, are:

(1) Does 18 Pa.C.S. Section 906 bar the imposition of sentences for three separate solicitations?
(2) If Section 906 of the Crimes Code bars sentences for combinations of inchoate offenses (attempt, solicitation, conspiracy), does it also bar sentences for separate attempts or separate solicitations?


text:
    114 A.3d 1036
    CENTRAL WESTMORELAND CAREER AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, PSEA/NEA, Colleen Conko, Sabine Lynn, Daniel Lusk, Matthew Morrell, and James Mark Schoming, v. PENN-TRAFFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT. Petition of Central Westmoreland Career and Technology Center Education Association, PSEA/NEA, Colleen Conko, Sabine Lynn, and Daniel Lusk.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 20, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 20th day of May, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by petitioner, is:

Whether the Commonwealth Court erred in affirming the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of the school district and denying summary judgment in favor of the furloughed teachers with respect to the teachers claim under subsection (b.l) of the Transfer of Entities Act, 24 P.S. § 11-1113 et seq., where the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that the furloughed teachers had no future reemployment rights under the Act effectively renders subsection (b.l), added through legislative amendment in 1991, to be meaningless and inconsistent with the School Code read in pari materia[?]


text:
    114 A.3d 1036
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. The REAL PROPERTY AND IMPROVEMENTS AT 2338 N. BEECHWOOD STREET, PHILADELPHIA, PA 19132 v. Takeela Burney. Petition of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 20, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 20th day of May, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, and the order of the Commonwealth Court is VACATED. See Commonwealth v. 605 University Drive, 628 Pa. 434, 104 A.3d 411 (2014). This case is REMANDED for consideration of Takeela Burney’s remaining appellate issues.


text:
    115 A.3d 309
    Joseph P. GUARRASI, J.D., Appellant v. Thomas Gary GAMBARDELLA, D.J. District Magistrate, 7-3-01 Individual and Official Capacity and Diane E. Gibbons, J., Common Pleas Court Judge Individual and Official Capacity, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 26, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 26th day of May, 2015, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby AFFIRMED. The Application for Leave to Amend Appellees’ Brief is DENIED.


text:
    115 A.3d 309
    The PENNSYLVANIA FEDERATION OF DOG CLUBS, the Federated Humane Societies of Pennsylvania, and the Humane League of Lancaster County, Appellants v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, and the Office of the Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 26, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 26th day of May 2015, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    115 A.3d 309
    Daniel L. BROWN, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 27, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 27th day of May, 2015, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    115 A.3d 310
    Ihor MALANCHUK, Petitioner v. Ilya SIVCHUK, etc., Respondent. Ihor Malanchuk, Petitioner v. Alex Tsimura, etc. and Tatyana Tsimura, etc., Respondents.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 27, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 27th day of May, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:

Did the Superior Court, en banc, err in quashing, as interlocutory, an appeal from an order granting summary judgment as to all claims and all defendants in one of two separate actions, consolidated under Pa.R.C.P. 213(a), where there was not a complete consolidation and merger of the actions?


text:
    115 A.3d 310
    Donald HARRIS, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 24 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of May, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.

Docket entries indicate that the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County has acted in compliance with the Superior Court’s April 10, 2010 remand order. See Commonwealth v. Harris, CP-51-CR-0902871-2003 (orders dated 8/15/2011; 4/23/2012; and 7/23/2012).


text:
    115 A.3d 310
    Mwangi SEKOU, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 35 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of May, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED.


text:
    115 A.3d 311
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Theodore WRIGHT a/k/a Curtis Price, Petitioner v. Tammy FERGUSON as Facility Manager SCI Benner; and the District Attorney of Philadelphia Co., Pa. and Kathleen Kane, Esq., Attorney General of Pennsylvania.
    No. 36 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of May, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.


text:
    115 A.3d 311
    EX REL. BARBARA BRYANT FOREIGN ESTATE, Petitioner v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA BOARD OF PENSIONS & RETIREMENT, Respondent.
    No. 38 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of May, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED.


text:
    115 A.3d 311
    Elbert JOHNSON, Petitioner v. The COURT OF PHILADELPHIA, Respondent.
    No. 39 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of May, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus are DISMISSED. See Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282, 293 (2010) (explaining that hybrid representation is not permitted). The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to forward the filings to counsel of record.


author:
Justice STEVENS.
      Justice BAER,

text:
    115 A.3d 835
    In re Nomination Petition of Michael W. BEYER, Candidate for the Democratic Nomination for the Office of Representative in the General Assembly for the 131st Legislative District. Appeal of David Eisenhauer and Linda Eisenhauer.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted April 24, 2014.
    Decided May 5, 2014.
    Filed April 28, 2015.

      Matthew Todd Croslis, David Charles Berger, Croslis Law Offices, L.L.C., Allentown, for Appellants.
    Adam Craig Bonin, Philadelphia, for Appellee.
    Kathleen Marie Kotula, PA Department of State, Harrisburg, for Bureau of Elections, Participants.
    CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice STEVENS.

In response to the pressing time demands of this primary election appeal, we entered a per curiam order on an expedited basis vacating the order of the Commonwealth Court and directing that Appellee Michael W. Beyer’s name be stricken from the primary ballot for the Democratic Party nomination for the Office of Representative in the General Assembly for the 131st Legislative District. See In re Nomination Petition of Beyer, 625 Pa. 341, 91 A.3d 1231 (2014). In the per curiam order, we stated that an opinion would follow, and we now augment the brief explanation appearing in our original mandate.

The Election Code, 25 P.S. § 2600 et seq., vests discretion in courts to amend a material defect apparent on the face of nomination petitions unless the defect manifests the candidate’s intent to mislead electors. See In re Nomination Petitions of McIntyre, 778 A.2d 746, 751 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001) aff'd sub nom. In re McIntyre, 564 Pa. 670, 770 A.2d 326 (2001) (holding wrongful intent precludes amendment). Here, Mr. Beyer circulated nomination petitions listing his present occupation as “lawyer” when he was a law school graduate neither authorized to practice law in any jurisdiction nor working with the law in any capacity. Deeming his description of occupation both materially defective and issued with the knowledge it could mislead electors as to his credentials for the office of lawmaker, we held the defect ineligible for amendment and precluded Mr. Beyer’s access to the ballot.

The record reveals that Michael W. Beyer timely filed nomination petitions with the Department of State seeking placement of his name on the ballot for Democratic Nomination for the Office of Representative in the General Assembly for the 131st Legislative District. Appellant Objectors, qualified electors residing in the 131st Legislative District, filed in the Commonwealth Court a petition to set aside the nomination petition on grounds that Mr. Beyer intentionally misrepresented his occupation as “lawyer” on both his Statement of Financial Interests (SOFI) and nomination petitions.

Judge Renée Cohn Jubelirer presided over the matter and conducted a hearing on April 11, 2014. At the hearing, Mr. Beyer confirmed he had graduated law school in May of 2013 but had yet to pass or even take any state’s bar examination. Consequently, he was not licensed to practice law at the time he circulated his nomination petitions. He listed his occupation as “lawyer,” he said, because he understood the definition of “lawyer” as found in the Oxford English Dictionary to include someone who studied the law. In addition, Mr. Beyer believed “occupation” meant “profession,” and because he understood “lawyer’ to mean someone who studies the law, he considers his profession to be that of a lawyer.” In re Nomination of Beyer, (Pa.Cmwlth., 150 M.D.2014, filed April 17, 2014) at 3. He therefore thought it fair comment to describe his profession or occupation as “lawyer” on his nomination petition.

Mr. Beyer testified that he never meant to imply he was a licensed, practicing lawyer, and he thus denied possessing the intent to deceive the electorate with his statement of occupation. In support of this testimony, Mr. Beyer alluded to a newspaper article that reported he was a law school graduate without suggesting he was licensed or practicing. In no personal dealing did he claim licensure or any other eligibility to practice law or represent clients in Pennsylvania, Mr. Beyer further testified. When electors asked him about his listed occupation, Mr. Beyer elaborated appropriately, he contended.

Drawing extensively from the rationale employed in a single-judge Commonwealth Court decision in In re Nomination Petition of Guzzardi (Pa.Cmwlth., No. 158 M.D.2014, filed April 15, 2014), a decision we subsequently reversed on unrelated grounds, see infra, the Honorable Renée Cohn Jubelirer determined that Mr. Beyer’s statement of occupation did not amount to a defect on the face of the petition. The term “lawyer,” she held, fairly includes those learned in the law though not licensed to practice the law, and the term “occupation” includes “one’s profession, particularly one that requires extensive training, regardless of whether one is actually active in that profession.” Beyer, 150 M.D.2014 at 3 (quoting Guzzardi, supra at 22).

Judge Cohn Jubelirer further opined that even if the statement of occupation were a misrepresentation, the resultant defect was not material to the nomination process because “[c]andidate credibly testified that he had no intention to deceive the electorate.” Id. at 12. Though she found that he likely used the title of “lawyer” to “enhance his stature with the electorate,” she accepted his explanation that he believed his having studied law and graduated law school in the past, alone, entitled him to claim the occupation. Id. Further probative of intent, the opinion continued, was that Mr. Beyer “explained [his use of the title ‘lawyer’] to an elector when the opportunity arose,” and the newspaper article identifying him as a law school graduate without implying he was licensed to practice law. Id. at 12-13. Accordingly, Judge Cohn Jubelirer concluded that the evidence would have dispelled concerns of wrongful intent so as to permit amendment under sections 976 and 977 (described more fully, infra) of the Election Code had the court found a defect in the first place. This timely appeal to our direct appellate jurisdiction followed.

Appellant Objectors contend the Commonwealth Court erred in failing to find that Mr. Beyer’s self-designation as a lawyer-by-occupation represented a material defect borne of the intent to mislead the electorate. In reviewing an order adjudicating challenges to a nomination petition, our standard of review permits reversal only where the findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence, where there was an abuse of discretion, or where an error of law was committed. In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty, 564 Pa. 671, 770 A.2d 327, 331 (2001). Moreover, in reviewing election issues, we must consider the longstanding and overriding policy in our Commonwealth to protect the elective franchise. In re Nomination Petition of Driscoll, 577 Pa. 501, 847 A.2d 44 (2004). In promoting that policy, this Court has made clear that the Election Code must “be liberally construed to protect a candidate’s right to run for office and the voters’ right to elect the candidate of their choice.” Id. at 49. Nevertheless, the policy of liberally reading the Code cannot be distorted to emasculate the requirements necessary to assure legitimate nomination papers. In re Farnese, 609 Pa. 573, 17 A.3d 375 (2011); McIntyre, 778 A.2d at 751.

Provisions of the Election Code relating to the form of nominating petitions and the accompanying affidavits are not mere technicalities, but are necessary measures to prevent fraud and to preserve the integrity of the election process. Famese, supra. A party alleging defects in a nominating petition has the burden of proving such defects, as nomination petitions are presumed to be valid. In re Nomination Petition of Gales, 618 Pa. 93, 54 A.3d 855 (2012).

We address first whether Mr. Beyer’s statement of occupation/profession represented a defect apparent on the face of his petition. As the General Assembly did not define either “occupation” or “profession” as those terms appear in the Election Code, we set out to construe them “according to the rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage[.]” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a).

One way to ascertain the plain meaning and ordinary usage of terms is by reference to a dictionary definition. Commonwealth v. Hart, 611 Pa. 531, 28 A.3d 898, 909 (2011). As noted by the court below, the Oxford English Dictionary defines a “lawyer” as “[a] person who practices or studies law; an attorney or a counselor.” The same dictionary, however, defines a “profession” as “[a] paid occupation, especially one that involves prolonged training and a formal qualification,” and assigns a principal definition to “occupation” as “[a] job or a profession.” A “job,” in turn is defined as “[a] paid position of regular employment.” In accordance with these definitions, the “occupation or profession of lawyer” for purposes of a nomination petition would comprise not only completion of prolonged training in law school but also acquisition of a formal qualification to practice law, which, in this Commonwealth, entails receiving a license to practice.

Formal reference sources discussing the scope of the occupation or profession of lawyer are scarce, but a survey of Pennsylvania’s Rules of Professional Conduct shows they presuppose a “lawyer,” as that term is used therein, to be one licensed to practice law. This point is perhaps best exemplified in Rule 5.3, “Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistance,” which addresses the responsibilities assumed by lawyers who employ or retain “nonlawyer assistance” in their practices. Insightful for our purposes is that Rule 5.3 designates law students as “nonlawyers,” regardless of their learned status and years of intense legal training. Indeed, no rule of professional conduct promulgated by this Court prescribing the conduct, duties, or responsibilities of “lawyers” includes a provision devoted to law school students or graduates who have yet to receive their formal license to practice.

During the hearing below, evidence of informal attitudes or common understandings was likewise scarce, but Mr. Beyer’s own testimony describing his interactions with electors lent insight into what he believed electors would expect of one claiming the occupation of lawyer. Specifically, his testimony revealed how electors’ mere observation of his stated occupation prompted him in all candor to offer a virtual retreat from the statement.

Q: You said people asked you — some of the people when you were getting signatures asked you about what you listed, lawyer, correct?
A: So, people would say — you know, they would look at the petition, and they would say, “Hey I see you’re a lawyer,” and I would say, “Oh, you know, I haven’t passed the bar yet, but I plan on taking it sometime in the next year.”

N.T. 4/11/14 at 56. This response indicates Mr. Beyer, himself, readily differentiated a lawyer from a law school graduate yet to take the bar, and suggests he believed electors would likely hold the perception that being engaged in the present “occupation or profession of lawyer” means actually working, or at least being eligible to work, as a lawyer in the ordinary course of one’s professional life.

In this respect, former Chief Justice Castille’s concurring opinion in In Re: Nomination Petition of Guzzardi, 627 Pa. 1, 99 A.3d 381 (2014) is most salutary in delineating the difference between a lawyer and a prospective lawyer in the context of stating one’s present occupation on a nomination petition. In Guzzardi, a gubernatorial candidate described his occupation as a “semi-retired businessman and lawyer” on his nomination petition and SOFI. In fact, though Mr. Guzzardi had practiced law for approximately forty years, he had assumed an inactive status for some period prior to and including the time he completed his petition. Of the five justices voting to strike Mr. Guzzardi’s petition as fatally defective under the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act because it was untimely filed, two amplified that they would have also deemed it disqualifying for a candidate on inactive status with the Pennsylvania Bar to describe himself as a “semi-retired lawyer,” a title that would lead the electorate to believe falsely that he still practiced law part-time.

In authoring his concurring statement, then-Chief Justice Castille incorporated his prior dissent in In re Rankin, 583 Pa. 38, 874 A.2d 1145, 1145-48 (2005), a case involving an inactive status candidate who listed her current occupation as “attorney/publisher”:

Words are a lawyer’s standard in trade, and lawyers should be held to their meaning. A former occupation is not a current occupation. A conditional or equivocal status is not an unequivocal one .... What respondent viewed as an “explanation” of her conduct at the hearing below, properly understood, was a confession.

Rankin, Id. at 1148 (Castille, J., dissenting) (citations omitted, emphasis added).

Applying this rationale to the “slightly different” facts of Guzzardi, the concurrence stated that “[a]s all Pennsylvania lawyers know, there is no ‘semi-retired lawyer’ status for members of the Pennsylvania Bar; attorneys are either active or inactive.” Guzzardi, supra at 389 (Castille, J., concurring). There was no reason to expect, the concurrence concluded, that electors who signed Guzzardi’s petition would have understood the meaning of the ambiguous term “semi-retired” as it related to one’s status with the Pennsylvania Bar. Id.

This rationale speaks to the statutory purpose behind the requirement that a candidate supply for the benefit of electors his present occupation or profession, and it dovetails with our reasons cited above for declaring the petitions defective in the case sub judice. Mr. Beyer described himself on the nominating petition as engaged in the present occupation of lawyer when his actual status was that of law school graduate not yet eligible to practice law. While the Oxford Dictionary may include within its definition of “lawyer” one who studies the law, a lawyer’s professional or occupational role in society transcends his prior studies in law school. The term “lawyer” as used to describe one’s occupation or profession for purposes of the Election Code is not an abstraction, and its scope should not expand so far as to include those who may wish to practice professionally in society but are not yet authorized to do so under our laws; a prospective occupation is not a current occupation. Accordingly, we deemed Mr. Beyer’s statement of occupation appearing on his nomination petitions defective.

The defect, moreover, manifested both a material and knowing misrepresentation so as to preclude the possibility of amendment and require that the petitions be set aside. In so deciding, we reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court.

According to section 977 of the Election Code, where a court finds that a nomination petition is defective pursuant to the provisions of section 976, the petition shall be set aside. See id. § 2937. Meanwhile, section 976 of the Election Code provides that “[n]o nomination petition, nomination paper or nomination certificate shall be permitted to be filed if ... it contains material errors or defects apparent on the face thereof, or on the face of the appended or accompanying affidavits.” Id. § 2936. Notably, section 977 also provides, however, that where “objections relate to material errors or defects apparent on the face of the nomination petition or paper, the court, after hearing, may, in its discretion, permit amendments within such time and upon such terms ... as the court may specify.” Id. § 2937.

Driscoll, supra at 49. Under its own jurisprudence, the Commonwealth Court has deemed defects “material” when they have the potential to mislead an elector. See In re Ford, 994 A.2d 9 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010); In re Nomination Petition of Delle Donne, 779 A.2d 1 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), aff'd 565 Pa. 561, 777 A.2d 412 (2001). Only where a candidate intended to mislead the electorate, however, is such a material misrepresentation grounds to preclude amendment of the nomination petition. See Driscoll, supra at 50-51 (citing State Ethics Comm’n v. Baldwin, 498 Pa. 255, 445 A.2d 1208 (1982)).

During the hearing below, Mr. Beyer asserted he did not intend to deceive the electorate about his occupation, and the Commonwealth Court credited that testimony. Our restrictive standard of review as cited above permits us to revisit this aspect of the court’s decision if, inter alia, it is unsupported by substantial evidence. The court predicated its inference of the candidate’s intent on two findings of fact: first, that Mr. Beyer sincerely believed he could properly call himself a lawyer, and, second, that he clarified any potentially misleading aspect to his petition when the opportunities to do so arose. We discern the first predicate regarding the candidate’s beliefs to be beside the essential point of whether he knew his petition as worded would likely mislead electors, and we discredit the second as belied by the substantial evidence of record.

Even accepting as the Commonwealth Court did that Mr. Beyer sincerely believed there was a place for “one who studies the law” within the definition of a “lawyer,” his own testimony revealed that he nevertheless knew his written statement of occupation held the potential to mislead electors. This is the critical point, as it was in this manner that his conduct met the scienter requirements for petition invalidation as expressed in Baldwin and its progeny. Specifically, responding to electors who observed “[s]o, you’re a lawyer?” with “[o]h, you know, I haven’t passed the bar yet but I plan on taking it next year” reflected an understanding that his usage of the term did not fit within society’s general idea of what a lawyer is. Indeed, his prepared response was the functional equivalent of an admission that he was not yet a lawyer as most electors would understand the term, and would not become one until such time that he passed the bar examination. Apparent in his own testimony, therefore, was his appreciation that electors would likely expect more of a “lawyer by occupation or profession” than having simply graduated law school. The Commonwealth Court seems to have identified this concern when it found the Candidate used the term “lawyer” to “enhance his stature” among electors. In re Beyer, supra at 12. To the extent the candidate knowingly used the term to suggest a professional status he had yet to attain, we agree. Mr. Beyer, through his statement of occupation, implied credentials material to the office of legislator that he simply did not yet possess. Yet, he persisted in circulating a nomination petition that he knew could mislead in this respect.

From the same testimony, however, the Commonwealth Court inferred the absence of wrongful intent because it showed, in the court’s opinion, that Mr. Beyer “explained [his use of the title ‘lawyer’] to an elector when the opportunity arose[.]” Id. at 12. Neither relevant authority nor the evidence of record supports the above premise that an opportunity to provide clear information about a candidate arises only when an elector broaches the topic. The court’s position on this point contradicts our jurisprudence recognizing the important role that accurate nomination petitions play in achieving the Election Code’s goal of an informed electorate freely supporting a candidate of their choice. See Driscoll, supra at 50. Every presentment of a petition for signature, therefore, represented an opportunity for Mr. Beyer to identify clearly his occupation, and the candidate knew his petition would likely promote misinformation on that very point. Yet, he implemented an “explain only if asked” approach. By neglecting this critical aspect of the record, the Commonwealth Court erroneously overlooked the many electors deprived of the benefit of Mr. Beyer’s sporadic and strictly reactive clarifications.

Evidence that a newspaper article identified him correctly as a recent law school graduate was likewise of dubious probity to the issue of intent, moreover, where the record indicates the report failed to address the topic of his occupation any further. That the candidate did not overtly claim or suggest he was a practicing lawyer in the article did not clarify for electors that he was, in fact, ineligible to practice. Consequently, the article left open to readers’ speculation the matter of whether the candidate was eligible to practice law, and as such had little if any bearing on the misleading nature of the petitions.

The court’s inference of the candidate’s intent, therefore, finds support in neither the evidentiary record nor relevant authority. The substantial evidence adduced at the hearing established that Mr. Beyer knew his statement of occupation held the potential to mislead electors about his credentials for the office of lawmaker. While he mitigated that potential in several isolated instances, the necessary implication of the evidence is that many electors remained uninformed by any clarification.

Based on the foregoing, we concluded that Mr. Beyer’s nomination petitions bore a facial defect, as he was not yet qualified to claim the present occupational or professional status of “lawyer.” The defect was both material to an elector’s decision to nominate a legislator and incurable by amendment because the candidate knew his representation had the potential to mislead signers about his credentials for the legislative office he sought. Having demonstrated as much, Objectors met their burden of disproving the presumptive validity of the contested nomination petition. Striking Mr. Beyer’s petition under such circumstances to avoid misleading the electorate was consistent with the Election Code’s purpose of protecting, and not defeating, a citizen’s vote. See Dayhoff v. Weaver, 808 A.2d 1002, 1006 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002). Accordingly, we issued our above-referenced per curiam order vacating the order entered in the Commonwealth Court and setting aside Mr. Beyer’s nomination petitions.

Former Chief Justice CASTILLE and former Justice McCAFFERY did not participate in the consideration or rendering of this opinion.

Chief Justice SAYLOR, Justices EAKIN and TODD join the opinion.

Justice BAER files a dissenting opinion.

Justice BAER,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissenting statement to the per curiam order striking Michael W. Beyer from the primary ballot for the Democratic Party nomination for the Office of Representative in the General Assembly for the 131st Legislative District. In re Nomination of Michael Beyer, 625 Pa. 341, 91 A.3d 1231 (2014).

To reiterate, I find it reasonable for this Court to rule prospectively that a candidate may only designate his occupation or profession as “lawyer” on nomination papers after he or she has graduated from law school, passed the bar exam, and is in good standing as an active member of the Pennsylvania Bar. However, at the time Candidate Beyer filed his nomination papers, neither a majority of this Court nor the Commonwealth Court had ever made such an express declaration. Notably, the opinions the majority finds persuasive in support of its determination that Candidate Beyer intentionally made a material misrepresentation are concurring opinions of Former Chief Justice Castille in In re Rankin, 583 Pa. 38, 874 A.2d 1145 (2005), and In re Nomination Petition of Guzzardi, 627 Pa. 1, 99 A.3d 381 (2014). These cases, however, involved election matters where the candidate was not removed from the ballot based on any misrepresentation of the candidate’s occupation. Thus, in my view, they cannot serve as affording candidates clear notice of what constitutes the occupation of “lawyer” for purposes of the Election Code.

In the instant case, the Commonwealth Court made a specific factual finding that Candidate Beyer had no intent to deceive the electorate by listing his occupation as “lawyer,” but rather believed that he was a lawyer because he had studied law and graduated from law school. The Commonwealth Court further relied upon Candidate Beyer’s candor in a newspaper interview, where he acknowledged readily that he was a recent law school graduate who had not yet taken the bar exam. Absent intent to deceive the electorate or a violation of a clear legal directive prohibiting him from representing his occupation as a “lawyer” upon graduation from law school, I cannot join the majority’s holding that Candidate Beyer committed a knowing and material misrepresentation warranting the striking of his name from the ballot.

      . Section 2912(b) of the Election Code provides, in pertinent part, that a candidate is required to specify his or her "profession, business, or occupation” on all nomination papers. 25 P.S. § 2912(b).

      . Notable about candidate’s activities at the time his petitions circulated is that he had not been engaged in the study of law since his graduation. There was no testimony that he was actively preparing for the bar examination, for he had not yet scheduled himself to take the bar, nor did he claim to be working with the law for a lawyer or a judge as a ''nonlawyer assistant.” See Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.3, infra. Instead, his only testimony relating to present occupation was that of a real estate consultant to his family, and even that claim was devoid of any indication that Mr. Beyer relied on or applied his legal training to impart legal advice in such endeavor.

      . Our courts have recognized that a candidate's intent to deceive electors by means of an otherwise immaterial defect on the face of the petition is in and of itself sufficient to set aside the petition under section 976 of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 2936. See McIntyre, 778 A.2d at 751. This is so because the wrongful intent to deceive the electorate is always material to the election process and should result in forfeit of one’s access to amendment. But, strictly speaking, the "materiality” of a defect for purposes of sections 976 and 977 (25 P.S. § 2937) extends beyond intentional acts to include any defect that may affect an elector's nomination decision, i.e., have the propensity to mislead an elector to nominate the candidate. We have recognized that section 977 permits a court, in its discretion, to amend material defects made without the intention to mislead. The Commonwealth Court below, therefore, erroneously limited the scope of "materiality” when it reasoned that the defect in question was not material to the nomination process in the absence of the candidate's intent to deceive.

      . Implicit in longstanding jurisprudence pertaining to the statutory requisite of facially apparent errors or defects is an expansive interpretation comprising misrepresentations both evident on the face of the petition and ascertainable only through evidence presented at a Section 977 hearing. Though an erroneous listing of the candidate’s primary residence, for example, was not apparent from simply reading the nomination petition, we nevertheless deemed it a defect eligible for amendment under the Section 976 and 977 scheme. See, e.g., Driscoll, 847 A.2d at 51-54 (Pa.2004). See also In re Nomination Petition of Hacker, 728 A.2d 1033, 1035 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) for similar treatment in the Commonwealth Court. It is by this convention that we assessed whether Mr. Beyer's listed occupation — the accuracy of which was likewise not plain on the face of the petition itself — represented a defect to be either set aside or amended.

      . These definitions are quite similar to those the court below referenced:
      The [Commonwealth Court in Guzzardi ] observed that the definition of "occupation” includes one’s profession or vocation (citing Webster’s Third International Dictionary 1560 (2002)).[It] further observed that "profession” is defined as " '[a] vocation requiring advanced education and training; esp., one of the three traditional learned professions — law, medicine and the ministry.’ ” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1329 (9th ed.2009)).

        In re Beyer, supra at 11.

      . 204 Pa.Code § 81.4et.seg.

      . The unpublished opinion below cites the proposition expressed in the single-judge, Commonwealth Court decision in Guzzardi, supra, that, in delineating the difference between an "attorney” and a "lawyer,” "the law student fresh from his school may well be termed a lawyer, but not an attorney.” This quote was taken from a 1909 South Dakota decision. While reasonable minds may, over one century later, still grapple with distinctions between these two designations, there is apparent to this Court no modern tendency among either licensed attorneys or lay persons to accord law school students the "occupational” or "professional” status of lawyer unless and until such time as an appropriate sanctioning institution deems them eligible to practice. As for the 1999 federal district court decision from California cited below for the proposition that a lawyer is one who is "learned in the law” though not necessarily licensed to practice, see Freedom Trust v. Chubb, 38 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1171 n. 1 (C.D.Cal. 1999), that position was expressed briefly in dicta questioning the use of the term "lawyer” rather than "attorney” in the California Evidence Code’s reference to the "lawyer-client privilege.” Notably, the federal judge’s commentary is thus at odds with a code enacted by a duly elected legislature, the California Business and Professional Code, defining a "lawyer” as a member of the state bar or admitted and eligible to practice in the highest court in any state, and the state court-promulgated California Rules of Professional Conduct 1-100(B)(3) in which the terms "attorney” and “lawyer" are synonymous with respect to requiring membership in the state bar.

      . Act of October 15, 1998, P.L. 729, No. 93 (as amended 65 Pa.C.S. § 1101-1113).

      . In Rankin, this Court entered a one-sentence per curiam order declining to review the Petition for Allowance of Appeal raising an emergency election issue.

      . A candidate’s experience working with the law relates materially to his or her qualifications for a seat in the General Assembly, and it is reasonable to view an unlicensed and unemployed law school graduate’s occupational profile in these respects as subordinate to and quite different from that of a lawyer. It was in this way that Mr. Beyer enhanced his stature with the nominating public through his false occupational listing.

      . The candidate's inability to deliver his clarification to all electors is critical, as it left many to rely exclusively on a materially defective petition. As observed by then Justice Castille in a similar occurrence in Rankin, supra:

      During the hearing, respondent testified as follows!:] "I tell everybody that I practiced law until four years ago, and then I began publishing the newspaper.” But, that is not what her nominating petitions demonstrate. Respondent did not have personal contact with every elector who signed her petitions to inform them, contrary to what the petition said, that she was actually a "formerly admitted attorney.” Instead, she created a false impression that respondent was a practicing attorney. How was the electorate to know that respondent was not admitted to practice in Pennsylvania?

        Id. at 1148 (Castille, J., dissenting).

      . Nor does the record specify when the respective news reports were published, creating the additional question of whether they were even available to electors prior to the filing deadline. Assuming they were published prior to the acquisition of signatures does not, in any event, affect our assessment that they lacked probity as to the issue before us.


author: Chief Justice SAYLOR. Justice EAKIN,

text:
    116 A.3d 844
    MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant v. Christos POLITSOPOULOS, Dionysios Mihalopoulos and Marina Denovitz, Appellees
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Oct. 7, 2014.
    Decided May 26, 2015.

      James C. Haggerty, Esq., Haggerty, Goldberg, Schleifer & Kupersmith, P.C., Philadelphia, for Pennsylvania Association for Justice, Amicus Curiae.
    Michael Hillel Sampson, Esq., George L. Stewart II, Esq., Reed Smith LLP, Pittsburgh, for Koppers Holdings; Matthews Int’l; Mine Safety Appliances; Dravo Corp.; EW Bowman Inc.; United Policyholders, Amicus Curiae.
    Robert Witold Jozwik, Esq., Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, P.C., Philadelphia, for Mutual Benefit Insurance Company.
    Neil Ernest Durkin, Esq., West Conshohocken, Bauer Law Firm, P.C., for Marina Denovitz.

      Christina Lee Hausner, Esq., Russell, Krafft & Gruber, L.L.P., Lancaster, for Christos Politsopoulos and Dionysios Mihalopoulos.
    CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Chief Justice SAYLOR.

This appeal concerns the scope of an employer’s liability exclusion in an umbrella commercial liability insurance policy.

Leola Restaurant maintained an umbrella commercial liability insurance policy with Appellant, Mutual Benefit Insurance Company, which contained an employer’s liability exclusion. This exclusion prescribed, inter alia, that the policy did not provide coverage pertaining to liability for injury to “[a]n ‘employee’ of the insured arising out of and in the course of ... [ejmployment by the insured[.j” Complaint, Ex. C, Employer’s Liability Exclusion. In addition, the policy contained a clause captioned “Separation of Insureds,” which provided, subject to exceptions not relevant here, that “this insurance applies ... [sjeparately to each insured against whom claim is made or suit is brought.” Id. at Ex. C, § V ¶ 14(b) (emphasis in original).

Leola Restaurant conducted its business on a property leased from Appellees Christos Politsopoulos and Dionysios Mihalopoulos (the “Property Owners”). The lease required the Property Owners to be “named as ... additional insured parties” on the liability policy. Id. at Ex. E, ¶ 1(d). While the Property Owners were not specifically designated on the declarations page of the umbrella policy, the instrument was designed to extend coverage to unidentified persons doing business with Leola Restaurant for whom the latter had agreed in writing to provide insurance. See id. at Ex. C, § III ¶ 2(f).

In December 2007, during the policy period, Appellee Marina Denovitz, an employee of Leola Restaurant, fell from an outside set of stairs and suffered injuries. She commenced a negligence action against the Property Owners in the common pleas court, asserting that they were negligent in maintaining the stairs in an unsafe and dangerous condition.

The Property Owners sought defense and indemnification from Appellant, per the umbrella policy. Appellant acknowledged that the Property Owners were insureds under the umbrella policy but nevertheless disclaimed coverage, invoking the employer’s liability exclusion. Based on the policy’s broad definition of “insured” to encompass named insureds to include Leola Restaurant, Complaint, Ex. C, § III ¶ 1, it was Appellant’s central position that Ms. Denovitz was an employee of “the insured,” for purposes of the exclusion (albeit she was not an employee of the Property Owners, ie., the insureds against whom a claim had been asserted). The Property Owners, on the other hand, took the position that the exclusion was unclear, and coverage should be deemed to be negated only upon injury to an employee of the specific insured seeking coverage. In particular, the Property Owners pointed to the separation-of-insureds clause providing that coverage extends separately to each insured against whom claims are asserted.

Appellant commenced a declaratory judgment action in an effort to vindicate its position that the exclusion pertained. Summary judgment was awarded in Appellant’s favor, with the common pleas court — per the Honorable Jeffrey D. Wright — explaining that it was bound by precedent with which it did not agree, in particular, Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Insurance Co., 426 Pa. 453, 233 A.2d 548 (1967) [hereinafter, “PMA ”].

The common pleas court explained that PMA’s holding reflected that the term “the insured,” as it appears in an employer’s exclusion appearing in a liability policy, encompasses the named insured, regardless of whether coverage was sought by a different insured. Thus, the court reasoned, the exclusion prevented coverage from extending to redress harm to Ms. Denovitz, since she was an employee of the named insured (Leola Restaurant), and her injuries were occasioned in the course of such employment, even though suit was brought against additional insureds, i.e., the Property Owners.

The common pleas court also observed that the PMA Court rejected the argument that a severability-of-interests clause— which provided that “the term ‘the insured’ is used severally and not collectively,” representing an analogue to the separation-of-insureds provision presently in issue — applied in a way that would undermine a broad application of the employer’s liability exclusion relative to claims asserted by employees of a named insured. See id., 233 A.2d at 551.

In the common pleas court’s view, however, absent the PMA overlay, the policy language used in both PMA and in the present case should be deemed ambiguous. The court continued to summarize several decisions of the Superior Court which, it believed, were consistent with such view and reflected a more apt treatment of insurance law. See, e.g., Maravich v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 350 Pa.Super. 392, 408-11, 504 A.2d 896, 905-06 (1986) (holding that a fire insurance policy exclusion eliminating coverage for losses deriving from “neglect of the insured ... to save and preserve property” applied only to defeat coverage relative to a neglectful insured and not any or all insureds (emphasis added)); McAllister v. Millville Mut. Ins. Co., 433 Pa.Super. 330, 338-41, 640 A.2d 1283, 1287-89 (1994) (distinguishing Maravich on the basis that the exclusionary terms in the policy at issue in McAllister applied by their terms more broadly to neglect by “an insured” or “any insured”).

Had it been free to discount PMA, the common pleas court explained, it would have implemented the following legal analysis centered upon the use of a definite article in conjunction with the term “insured” in the umbrella policy’s employer’s liability exclusion:

The use of the phrase “the” insured rather than “any” insured or “an” insured, particularly in a policy which contains a severability of interests clause, demonstrates that the interests of the different insureds were intended to be several rather than joint. In other words, the policy, as written by Mutual Benefit, provides for coverage to [the Property Owners] separate and independent from that to [Leola Restaurant]. Since Denovitz was not an employee of “the” insured Owners, the Employers’ Liability Exclusion should not be applied to preclude coverage to [the Property Owners] under the Umbrella Policy. At the very least, the use of “the” insured rather than “the named insured” or “any insured” makes the term ambiguous, and thus necessarily interpreted against [Appellant], as the insurer.

Mut. Benefit Ins. Co. v. Politopoulos, No. CI-10-02578, slip op. at 9 (C.P. Lancaster Feb. 2, 2012) (emphasis in original).

Notwithstanding this analysis and its point of view that PMA was “flawed and outdated,” id. at 10, the common pleas court considered itself bound by the decision. Accordingly, as noted, summary judgment was awarded in Appellant’s favor.

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed in a published decision. See Mut. Benefit Ins. Co. v. Politopoulos, 75 A.3d 528 (Pa.Super.2013). In the opinion, initially, PMA was distinguished on the basis that the insureds seeking coverage in that case were not named insureds, whereas, according to the intermediate court, in the present case “the [Property] Owners undisputedly were named insureds under the Umbrella Policy.” Id. at 535. The court then transitioned to a distinct proviso in the separation-of-insureds clause addressing named insureds and providing (subject to limited exceptions not applicable here): “[T]his insurance applies ... [a]s if each named insured were the only named insured [.]” Complaint, Ex. C, § V ¶ 14(a) (emphasis in original). Based on the unsupported pronouncement that the Property Owners were named insureds, see supra note 3, and the effect of the above language, the Superior Court reasoned that:

[w]hen determining coverage as to any one insured, the policy must be applied as though there were only one insured, i.e., the one as to which coverage is to be determined.
The plain, unambiguous language of the “Separation of Insureds” clause directs us to evaluate whether [the Property] Owners are insured under the Umbrella Policy as though they are the only named insured, an analytic conceit that is both clearer and stronger than a severability clause that simply identifies the insureds as “several” rather than “joint.” In no uncertain terms, the policy language directs us to evaluate coverage as though Employer does not exist.
An insured who does not exist cannot employ anyone. Thus, if the person injured is not employed by the lone insured as to whom coverage is to be tested, the Employers’ Exclusion simply does not come into play.

Politopoulos, 75 A.3d at 536-37 (emphasis in original).

Finally, the Superior Court opined that its reading of the umbrella policy “dovetails with the exclusivity of remedy for an employee under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Id. at 537 (citing 77 P.S. § 481). In this regard, the court elaborated, the Property Owners do not enjoy the protection of the exclusivity-of-remedies provision of that enactment and, therefore, they had ample reason to seek to insure themselves against liability to employees of Leola Restaurant. See Politopoulos, 75 A.3d at 537.

We allowed appeal both to address the apparent deficit in the Superior Court’s published opinion, see supra note 3, and to consider the scope of the exclusion in issue, particularly in light of the separation-of-insureds clause.

Initially, Appellant complains of the Superior Court’s material factual error in denominating the Property Owners named insureds under the terms of a policy which simply does not identify them as such on the declarations page or otherwise. See supra note 3. Furthermore, according to Appellant, the intermediate court “manufactured distinctions” between the language of the policies at issue in PMA and the present case in order to circumvent this Court’s precedent. Brief for Appellant at 12. Cf. Brown & Root Braun, Inc. v. Bogan, Inc., 54 Fed.Appx. 542, 546-49 (3d Cir.2002) (finding PMA controlling relative to operative policy terms, including a “modern” separation-of-insureds clause, materially identical to those presently in issue). But see Arcelormittal Plate, LLC v. Joule Tech. Servs., Inc., 558 Fed.Appx. 205, 211 & n. 4 (3d Cir.2014) (reserving judgment concerning the breadth of PMA, in light of the Superior Court’s decision in the present case). As a policy matter, Appellant finds the result of the Superior Court’s decision to be incongruous, since it effectively results in an entity or individual qualifying as an additional insured attaining greater liability coverage than afforded to the named insured who actually purchased the policy. Id. According to Appellant, the opinion also undermines the exclusivity provisions of the WCA by making employers and their insurers pay twice for injuries to employees.

Appellees, on the other hand, maintain that the separation-of-insureds clause is distinct from the severability-of-interests clause at issue in PMA and, therefore, must be afforded the meaning of the terms actually used, regardless of the propriety of the construction afforded to the language at issue in PMA. Cf. Brief for Amicus Pa. Ass’n for Justice at 10 (“This [separation-of-insureds] clause acts to separate the insureds such that the Employer’s Exclusion applies only to the insured employer not any insured under the policy.” (emphasis in original)). In particular, Appellees note differences between a standard automobile liability insurance contract with an omnibus provision (extending coverage to persons using the insured vehicle with the permission of the named insured) and a commercial general liability policy extending coverage to those having written agreements with the named insured, especially in terms of the contractual basis for coverage pertaining to additional insureds in the latter scenario. Accord Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 298 F.R.D. 219, 228-29 (E.D.Pa. 2014) (“We agree with the reasoning in Politopoulos that PMA ... does not control where, as here, the additional insured is covered by virtue of a contract requiring coverage and where the separation of insureds clause contains language providing for an analytical framework whereby we are to consider each insured as if it is the only insured.”). Further, Appellees contend that PMA does not contravene exclusivity under the Workers’ Compensation Act, where the Property Owners do not enjoy the benefit of immunity under such enactment and had ample reason to insure themselves against such liability.

Supplementing Appellees’ arguments, their amici offer sharper focus. Initially, a group of insurance policyholders elaborate on the common pleas court’s perspective concerning the use of the definite article “the” — as opposed to an indefinite form such as “an” or “any” — in connection with the word “insured.” In this regard, the Policyholder Amici stress that, in various provisos, the policy at issue employs each of these phrases to achieve distinct aims and effects. For example, these amici observe the term “the insured” is utilized in one proviso to articulate the insurer’s indemnity obligations and rights respecting bodily injury and property damage, as follows:

We will indemnify the insured for ultimate net loss in excess of the retained limit because of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies. We will have the right to associate with the underlying insurer and the insured to defend any claim or suit seeking damages for bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies.

Brief for the Policyholder Amici at 7 (quoting Complaint, Ex. C, § I ¶ 1(a)) (emphasis in original). Self-evidently, the Policyholder Amici assert, “the insured” in this passage refers to the particular insured against whom a claim has been asserted. Accord id. at 8 (“The provisions comprising the Insuring Agreement thus use the definite article (‘the’) to refer to, qualify, and differentiate the specific insured as to whom the insurer has certain rights (i.e., to associate in the defense) and as to whom its indemnity obligations are triggered, due, and owing.”). The Policyholder Amici contrast instances in which the policy employs the terms “an” or “any” insured, which they believe reflects the intent to capture the broader range of insureds, for example, in the policy’s pollution exclusion provisions. See Complaint, Ex. C, § 1 ¶ 2(h)(1)(c) (excluding coverage relative to injury or damage relating to pollutants dispersed “[a]t or from any premises, site or location which is or was at any time used by or for any insured” (emphasis adjusted)).

Amicus the Pennsylvania Association for Justice further contributes references to cases from other jurisdictions, concluding that the wide majority of jurisdictions take a narrower view of employer’s liability exclusions pertaining to employees of “the insured.” In particular, the Association highlights one federal court’s depiction of Pennsylvania’s contrary approach, as reflected in PMA, as being “archaic and isolated in the context of the laws of the federal union.” Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 472 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1203 (S.D.Cal.2007) (quoting, indirectly, Paul A. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 Harv. L.Rev. 1210, 1216 (1946)); see also id. at 1202 (observing that, “[i]n the current legal landscape, Pennsylvania belongs to a small minority of states that interpret employer’s liability exclusions broadly to bar coverage for lawsuits brought by employees of any named insured”).

Upon our review, preliminarily, we find that the Superior Court’s decision cannot be sustained on its terms, for the reasons explained by Appellant and set forth above. There simply is no basis in the umbrella policy to support the intermediate court’s treatment of the Property Owners as named insureds. Furthermore, the court’s broader analysis is clouded by this mislabeling and the court’s corresponding invocation of an inapplicable subparagraph of the separation-of-insureds clause. Accord Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Holcim (US), Inc., 744 F.Supp.2d 1251, 1271 n. 28 (S.D.Ala.2010) (“The portion of [a separation-of-insureds] clause stating that the insurance applies ‘as if each Named Insured were the only Named Insured’ has no conceivable bearing” on disputes involving persons and entities who are, at most, insureds or additional insureds but not named insureds (citation omitted)).

In considering the matter anew, we begin with the interrelationship between a separation-of-insureds clause and an employer’s liability exclusion. As explained, generally a separation-of-insureds clause indicates that insurance applies separately to each insured against whom claim is made. See, e.g., Complaint, Ex. C, § V ¶ 14(b). As a general rule, neither a separation-of-insureds clause nor its analogue, a severabilityof-interests provision, is to be interpreted in a manner which would subvert otherwise clear and unambiguous policy exclusions. See, e.g., Holcim, 744 F.Supp.2d at 1271-72 & n. 29 (collecting cases and explaining that “courts from many jurisdictions have emphasized that a separation of insureds provision is not designed to, and does not have the effect of, negating plainly-worded exclusions”); BP Am., Inc. v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 832, 839411 & nn. 32-44 (Okla.2005) (“[CJlearly most courts addressing the issue of whether a severability clause will render a clear and unambiguous exclusionary provision doubtful determine that the clear language of the exclusion must prevail.”); Am. Wrecking Corp. v. Burlington Ins. Co., 400 N.J.Super. 276, 946 A.2d 1084, 1089 (App.Div.2008) (explaining that a separation-of-insureds clause does not create ambiguity, but merely spreads protection among insureds, without negating plainly-worded exclusions). This widely-accepted understanding is consistent with one facet of this Court’s decision in PMA. See PMA, 426 Pa. at 459, 233 A.2d at 552 (commenting on the insignificance of modest variations among severability-of-interests clauses as compared with the importance of clarity in policy exclusions).

Accordingly, the appropriate focus here is less upon the specific wording of the separation-of-insureds clause than on the terms of the employer’s liability exclusion. See Holcim, 744 F.Supp.2d at 1271 (explaining that “the construction of [a separation-of-insureds] clause in conjunction with a particular contractual exclusion turns on the exclusion’s precise wording”); see also Abbeville Offshore Quarters Inc. v. Taylor Energy Co., 286 Fed.Appx. 124, 128 (5th Cir.2008). It is in this respect — namely, in the construction of the employer’s liability exclusion under review — that PMA departed from the wider body of decisional law.

Consistent with the explanation provided by Judge Wright of the common pleas court, and as further developed by the Policyholder Amici, a majority of jurisdictions recognize potential differences in meaning which may be taken from the selective use of definite and indefinite articles in association with the word “insured” as employed in insurance policy exclusions. See, e.g., Postell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 N.W.2d 35, 46 (Iowa 2012) (discussing instances in which an insurer “communicate[s] that, under [a] policy, the term insured does not always mean ‘any’ insured person, but sometimes, only ‘the’ insured claiming coverage”); Osbon v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 632 So.2d 1158, 1160 (La.1994) (“Courts in other jurisdictions generally focus on the article modifying the word ‘insured,’ specifically, ‘the’ insured, ‘an’ insured, and ‘any’ insured”). Such potential differences, where recognized by the courts, have been taken to reflect ambiguities, thus requiring construction of salient policy language on the terms most favorable to the insured. Accord, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Am. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 217 F.Supp. 688, 691 (E.D.Tenn.1963) (questioning why, if an insurance company intended for “the insured” to mean “any insured,” the insurer would not utilize the latter term).

PMA departed from this line of reasoning, relying primarily on two cases arising in the automobile liability insurance setting: Patton v. Patton, 413 Pa. 566, 198 A.2d 578 (1964), and Great American Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 412 Pa. 538, 194 A.2d 903 (1963). See PMA, 426 Pa. at 458-59, 233 A.2d at 551-52. Both held that a household exclusion in a motor vehicle liability policy pertained to family members of named insureds seeking recompense from omnibus insureds, by virtue of the exclusion’s direction to “bodily injury to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured.” Patton, 413 Pa. at 570, 198 A.2d at 580; Great Am., 412 Pa. at 540-41, 194 A.2d at 904 (emphasis added). PMA bluntly transposed the usage from this discrete context (which particularity encompasses the coupling of “the insured” with “any member of the family of the insured”) into the setting of an employer’s liability exclusion. Such transposition, and the manner in which it was accomplished, suggests that PMA stands for the proposition that the term “the insured” always signifies “all insureds” (and thus encompasses the named insured even where no claim has been asserted against the named insured), regardless of contextual cues or comparative usage across the wider terms of a policy. This is why Judge Wright reasonably believed that he was bound to extend PMA’s holding into the context of an employer’s liability exclusion appearing in a commercial liability policy, although he strongly disagreed with PMA’s approach as to such exclusion.

Upon consideration of the broader range of authorities and the reasoning which they provide — which were not overtly considered in PMA — we decline to extend PMA’s expansive construction of the term “the insured” to an instance in which a commercial general liability policy variously makes use of the terms “the insured” and “any insured.” Cf. Newman v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 361 Pa. 587, 591, 65 A.2d 417, 419 (1949) (explaining, in the interpretation of an insurance policy, “[t]he court must give effect to every word that can be given effect”). Rather, we are persuaded that, at least where a commercial general liability policy makes varied use of the definite and indefinite articles, this, as a general rule, creates an ambiguity relative to the former, such that “the insured” may be reasonably taken as signifying the particular insured against whom a claim is asserted. Accord Windt, 3 Insurance Claims and Disputes § 11.14 (“If the exclusion is written to apply to an employee of the insured, as opposed to any insured, ... the exclusion should not apply to a claim against an insured entity that is not the employer.”). Moreover, the separation-of-insureds clause, in this context, serves only to reinforce such an understanding. Accord Holcim, 744 F.Supp.2d at 1271 (collecting cases and explaining that “the distinction that surfaces time and again in the case law is that separation of insureds clauses affect interpretation of policy-exclusions using the term ‘the insured’ (essentially modifying that term to mean ‘the insured claiming coverage’), but have no effect on the interpretation of exclusions using the term ‘an insured’ or ‘any insured.’ ”); Postell, 823 N.W.2d at 46.

In summary, we conclude that the employer’s liability exclusion in the umbrella policy is ambiguous. Application of governing principles of insurance policy construction yields the understanding that the ambiguous exclusionary language pertains only to claims asserted by employees of “the insured” against whom the claim is directed, which understanding gains further support by reference to the policy’s separation-of-insureds provision. Since the Property Owners are not Ms. Denovitz’s employers, the employer’s liability exclusion is inapplicable.

The order of the Superior Court is affirmed, albeit on different grounds.

Former Chief Justice CASTILLE and former Justice McCAFFERY did not participate in the decision of this case.

Justices BAER, TODD and STEVENS join the opinion.

Justice EAKIN files a concurring opinion.

Justice EAKIN,

concurring.

I concur, though I do not find the policy language ambiguous. Both parties agree the property owners are “insureds” under the policy. Majority Op., at 630-31, 115 A.3d at 846. The separation-of-insureds provision provides the “insurance applies ... [separately to each insured against whom claim is made or suit is brought.” Commercial Umbrella Liability Policy, at 11 (emphasis omitted). That is, the clear language of the policy separates each “insured” from the other. As the restaurant is an insured distinct from the landowner, and as Ms. Denovitz was employed by the former, the employee-exclusion provision is inapplicable to the latter. I would affirm the Superior Court on this basis.

      . Additionally, the Property Owners claimed to have the status of insureds under a separate business owners policy issued by Appellant. The present appeal, however, concerns only the umbrella policy.

      . The particular policy at issue in PMA was a motor vehicle liability policy.

      . The Superior Court provided no explanation for why it viewed the Property Owners as named insureds, when their names do not appear on the declarations page of the umbrella policy. Parenthetically, as noted, the lease between Leola Restaurant and the Property Owners did contemplate that the latter would be "named” as additional insureds in an appropriate policy. Complaint, Ex. E., ¶ 1(d). The intermediate court, however, failed to address the apparent analytical gulf between the unconsummated "naming” of an additional insured and actual status as a named insured.

      . These amici include: Koppers Holdings Inc., Matthews International Corporation, Mine Safety Appliances Company, LLC, Dravo Corporation, E.W. Bowman, Inc., and United Policyholders [hereinafter the “Policyholder Amici "].

      . See also Penske Truck Leasing Co. v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 407 F.Supp.2d 741, 751 (E.D.N.C.2006) (”[W]here [an employer’s liability exclusion] bars coverage for bodily injury to [an employee of] ‘the’ insured, and the policy specifically designates the 'insured’ as the insured who is seeking coverage [via a separation-of-insureds provision], it would not be logical to bar coverage where an additional insured ... is being sued by an individual who may be an employee of the named insured but who is, vis-á-vis [the additional insured], merely a member of the general public.”); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Co., 99 F.Supp.2d 87, 101 (D.Me.2000) (determining that an employer's liability exclusion directed to claims asserted by employees of "the insured” did not apply to claims asserted by an individual who was not an employee of the particular insured against whom the claim was directed); Motorists Ins. Cos. v. BFI Waste Mgmt., 133 Ohio App.3d 368, 728 N.E.2d 31, 37 (1999) (same); Michigan Mut. Liability Co. v. Ohio Cos. Ins. Co., 123 Mich.App. 688, 333 N.W.2d 327, 332 (1983) (indicating, in the context of an automobile liability policy, that "the exclusion for injury to an employee of ‘the insured' deprives no one of coverage except with respect to his own employees” (quoting Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schuitema, 183 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla.Ct.App.1966)), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Century Mut. Ins. Co. v. League Gen. Ins. Co., 213 Mich.App. 114, 541 N.W.2d 272, 274-75 (1995)).
      Parenthetically, in terms oí "any insured” exclusions, the main controversy appears to center, not on whether the term unambiguously implicates any or all insureds, but upon whether such meaning should be narrowed to the insured against whom a claim is asserted in light of a separation-of-insureds clause. See, e.g., Allan D. Windt, 3 Ins. Claims and Disputes § 11:8 (6th ed.2014) (framing the different lines of authority). The great majority of courts, however, merely apply the rule that a separation-of-insureds clause does not negate the effect of a plainly worded exclusion. Accord id. (citing cases and explaining that, "as applied even independently to each insured, an ‘any insured’ exclusion unambiguously eliminates coverage for each and every insured”).

      . The courts’ task in insurance policy interpretation and construction is centered on ascertaining the intent of the parties to the agreement. See Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 557 Pa. 595, 606, 735 A.2d 100, 106 (1999) (citing Gene & Harvey Builders v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass’n, 512 Pa. 420, 426, 517 A.2d 910, 913 (1986)). Consistent with ordinary principles of contract interpretation, where a policy provision is ambiguous, it is generally construed against the insurance company as the drafter of the agreement. See id. This precept dovetails with the approach, reflected in decisions of our intermediate courts, that policy exclusions are to be construed narrowly in favor of coverage. See, e.g., Eichelberger v. Warner, 290 Pa.Super. 269, 275, 434 A.2d 747, 750(1981).

      . Notably, the PMA Court took pains to solidify the position that the term "the insured,” as used in an employers' liability exclusion, consistently encompasses named insureds. See, e.g., PMA, 426 Pa. at 456, 233 A.2d at 550 (“ ‘The insured’ ... merely has been interpreted as the language dictates, to include the named insured.”). Accordingly, although the PMA Court forcefully denied that it had equated the terms "the insured” and "any insured,” id. (" ‘The insured' has not been interpreted to mean ‘an insured’ or ‘any insured.'" (emphasis in original)), we are unable to discern any meaningful distinction between such permutations left in PMA’s wake (at least on the specific terms of the decision). Indeed, while Appellant may not say so explicitly, its present argument rests on the notion that PMA effectively made "the insured” and "any insured” interchangeable. Accord Costco, 472 F.Supp.2d at 1203 (commenting on the broad impact of PMA relative to the meaning of "insured” in any given context).

      . We have framed the above proposition in terms of a general rule, because other indications and contextual cues appearing in an insurance policy may serve to render the meaning of "the insured” more apparent. This seems to be the case relative to the household exclusion appearing in vehicle liability policies, as construed in Patton and Great American. See Patton, 413 Pa. at 570, 198 A.2d at 580; Great Am., 412 Pa. at 540-41, 194 A.2d at 904. Notably, in this regard, these decisions are consistent with the majority view that such exclusion encompasses liability for injuries to family members of the named insured, regardless of whether the tortfeasor also is an insured under the salient vehicle liability policy. See generally Steven Plitt, Daniel Maldonado, Joshua D. Rogers, and Jordan R. Plitt, 8 Couch on Ins. § 114:48 (3rd ed. 2014) ("The fact that the harm is caused by an omnibus insured does not affect the applicability of the policy exclusion of claims as to household members.” (footnote omitted)).
      A collateral consequence of decisions such as PMA which take a less circumspect approach, resting broad-reaching conclusions on limited reasoning, is that they foster efforts toward avoidance in the intermediate courts, which are often problematic in their own right. Examples pertinent to the present setting include the Superior Court's decision under review, see supra note 3, and Luko v. Lloyd’s London, 393 Pa.Super. 165, 176, 573 A.2d 1139, 1144 (1990). See Brown & Root Braun, 54 Fed.Appx. at 549 (observing that Luko "fails to distinguish PMA adequately”); Costco, 472 F.Supp.2d at 1202 (commenting that "the Luko court disregarded PMA ").

      . Appellant also argues that the umbrella policy provided a specific avenue to afford protection to the Property Owners, namely, the creation of an "insured contract" serving as an express exception to the employer's liability exclusion. See Complaint, Ex. C, Employer’s Liability Exclusion (rendering the clause inapplicable to "liability assumed by the insured under an ‘insured contract’ ’’). We disagree with Appellant’s position, however, to the degree to which it suggests that such prescription alleviates the ambiguities arising from the remaining text of the exclusion.
      In terms of Appellant’s contentions grounded in social policy, we find that the policy concerns are mixed. In this regard, it is self-evident both that an insurance company legitimately would wish to focus upon the narrowest avenue of benefits relative to claims asserted by employees of a named insured (i.e., workers’ compensation insurance), whereas, a lessor just as appropriately would seek to enjoy protection against the broadest range of claims (to include those asserted by employees of the lessee). Appellant's "double payment” argument downplays both this diversity in the interests present and the potential impact of an employer's subrogation rights relative to workers' compensation payments. See 77 P.S. § 671. Thus, we decline to afford the position controlling significance here.