author: Justice DONOHUE.

text:
    140 A.3d 1
    S & H TRANSPORT, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF YORK, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Nov. 17, 2015.
    Resubmitted Jan. 20, 2016.
    Decided May 25, 2016.

      Alan Charles Green, Esq., Rees Grifiths, Esq., CGA Law Firm, York, for S&H Transport, Inc., Appellant.
    Donald Byrne Hoyt, Esq., York, Jason R. Sabol, Esq., for City of York, Appellee.
    SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice DONOHUE.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether freight brokerage services are excepted from local business privilege taxation under the “public utility” exception found in Section 301.1(f)(2) of the Local Tax Enabling Act (“LTEA”), Act of December 31, 1965, P.L. 1257, as amended, 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(2). The Commonwealth Court concluded that S&H was not excepted. We affirm the Commonwealth Court’s decision because we conclude that the rates of the common motor carriers with whom S&H does business are not fixed and regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (“PUC”), and thus the entire exception is inapplicable.

The facts are not in dispute. S & H is an intrastate, interstate and international freight broker headquartered in the City. S & H receives freight shipment orders from manufacturing customers and then negotiates contracts for carriage with licensed common carriers which are public utilities and regulated by the PUC. According to S & H’s controller, it is the middleman between the customer and the carriers. S & H invoices its customers for payment. The payment includes the charges it negotiates with the carrier for the utility service (cost of shipment) together with taxes and fees. S & H then remits payment to the common carrier and retains the freight brokerage commission. Because it collects the entire balance, S & H’s records include the gross receipts from freight shipment transactions before payment is made to the carriers. As a result, the gross receipts do not include deductions for the shipment costs. See Stipulation of Uncontested Facts, 12/10/13, ¶¶ 2, 4 6-7.

Section 301.1 of the LTEA, 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(a.l)(l), authorizes political subdivisions to levy a tax on the privilege of doing business in the jurisdiction of the local taxing authority. Section 301.1(f) of the LTEA, however, prohibits local authorities from collecting or levying any taxes on certain types of goods and transactions enumerated in sixteen subsections. The “public utility” exception, at issue here, is found in Section 301.1(f)(2) of the LTEA:

(f) Such local authorities shall not have authority by virtue of this act:

(2) To levy, assess or collect a tax on the gross receipts from utility services of any person or company whose rates and service are fixed and regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission or on any public utility services rendered by any such person or company or on any privilege or transaction involving the rendering of any such public utility service.

53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(2).

For the years 2007 through 2011, S & H filed business privilege tax returns with the City. S & H paid the annual $25 Business Privilege and Mercantile License fees. S & H did not report any income to the City for business privilege tax purposes for those years, however, because it believed it fell within the “public utility” exception in Section 301.1(f)(2) of the LTEA.

In November 2011, the City conducted an audit of S & H’s business privilege tax returns. The City assessed a business privilege tax on S & H’s gross receipts in the amount of $118,346.88 for the years 2007-2011. S & H appealed and the tax-assessment appeal hearing officer upheld the City’s assessment following a hearing.

S & H appealed to the trial court, arguing that pursuant to Section 301.1(f)(2) of the LTEA, the City was not authorized to assess or collect the business privilege tax. S & H argued, and the City agreed, that Section 301.1(f)(2) of the LTEA contains three clauses, each of which creates a distinct exception. S & H claimed that it fell within the third clause because it derives its gross receipts from transactions that involve the rendering of a public utility service, namely the interstate and intrastate shipment of goods by licensed common carriers regulated by the PUC. S & H asserted that it participates in, or is “involved” in, the “rendering” of the public utility services provided by common carriers because it negotiates the carrier’s charges, it collects from the shipper the carrier’s charges, it transmits the charges to the carrier, and the amount S & H invoices its customer includes the actual charge for the services being provided by the carrier. S & H also emphasized that it pays taxes on freight shipments and is regulated by the PUC through its registrations with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and the Unified Carrier Registration (UCR). The City conversely emphasized that S & H acts only as the “middleman” between shippers and the carriers and is neither a common carrier nor a public utility. According to the City, the common carrier itself, rather than the freight broker, is the party directly “involved” in the “rendering” of the public utility service.

After a non-jury trial, the trial court concluded that it was “clear and unambiguous” that S & H’s gross receipts were “tax exempt” under the third clause of Section 301.1(f)(2) of the LTEA. Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/14, at 4. According to the trial court, S & H “collected gross receipts on transactions involving the rendering of any such public utility service” since the property carriers S & H used to transport freight are public utilities. Id.

In a published decision authored by President Judge Pelle-grini and joined by Judge Leadbetter, the Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. The majority initially noted that Section 301.1(f)(2) of the LTEA “generally prevents local governments from taxing subjects involved in the rendering of public utility services.” S & H Transport, Inc. v. City of York, 102 A.3d 599, 601 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014). It found that the first clause— “[t]o levy, assess or collect a tax on the gross receipts from utility service of any person or company whose rates and services are fixed and regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission” — prohibits a tax on the utility as measured by gross receipts. Id. at 601. The second clause — “on any public utility services rendered by any such person or company” — prohibits a local government from imposing a tax on the customer, as measured by the amount billed to the customer for the services. Id. Finally, with respect to the third clause, — “any privilege or transaction involving the rendering of any such public utility service” — the majority viewed the issue as “whether this clause applies only to prohibit levying a business tax on the public utility for the privilege of engaging in public utility services or whether it extends to all parties that engage in the business of buying public utility services.” Id. at 601-02.

Addressing that question, the majority observed that the entity “rendering” the public utility service is the one that transmits, delivers or furnishes transportation of property, which the majority described as the “hallmark” of public utility service as a common carrier. Id. at 602-03. S&H negotiates a price to facilitate the transportation of the shippers’ goods to provide better rates, but does not itself transmit, deliver or furnish transportation of any property. Id. As a result, affording the words “involve” and “render” their plain and ordinary meaning, the majority concluded that S&H was not “involved” in the “rendering” of “any public utility service.” Id. Judge Leadbetter joined President Judge Pellegri-ni’s opinion, but wrote separately to explain that because the rates of the common carriers contracted by S & H are not “fixed and regulated” by the PUC, S & H does not qualify for an exception under the third clause of Section 301.1(f)(2), as the reference in that clause to “such public utility service” refers to the public utility services described in the first clause of that provision. Id. at 603 (Leadbetter, J., concurring).

Judge Simpson dissented, indicating that “the words ‘shall not have authority’ have been construed to be a limitation on the power to tax so that doubts relating to their construction are resolved in favor of the taxpayers.” Id. at 604 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (quoting Golden Triangle Broad., Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 547, 377 A.2d 839, 842 (1977) (en banc), aff'd, 483 Pa. 525, 397 A.2d 1147 (1979)). Judge Simpson insisted that the majority’s construction of the word “involved” in the third clause was too narrow, and that S&H, whose revenues were derived solely from freight delivery by carriers regulated by the PUC, was thus “involved” in the “rendering” of public utility services. Id. at 604-605. (Simpson, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Simpson disagreed with Judge Leadbetter’s contention that the reference to “such public utility service” in the third clause refers to the public utility services described in the first clause. Instead, Judge Simpson would have applied the last antecedent rule, pursuant to which “courts should generally apply qualifying words to the words immediately preceding them, not to other words, phrases or clauses more remote.” Id. at 605 n. 2 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(b); Commonwealth v. Packer, 568 Pa. 481, 798 A.2d 192 (2002)). Applying the last antecedent rule, Judge Simpson would have found that the term “such” in the third clause refers to the phrase “any public utility service” in the second clause, “not to remote language in the first clause.” S & H Transport, 102 A.3d at 605, n. 2 (Simpson, J., dissenting).

In a footnote, the majority disagreed with Judge Simpson’s focus on the word “involved,” reasoning that if this interpretation was accepted, “all truck stops could not be taxed because they are ‘involved’ in public utility services because they supply the tracks with gas.” Id. at 603 n. 10. The majority further reasoned that because brokers are specifically excluded from the definition of a “common carrier” in the PUC Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 102, S & H is, “by definition, not so involved.” S & H Transport, 102 A.3d at 603 n. 10. The majority also rejected Judge Simpson’s position that the term “such” in the third clause refers to the “services” in the second clause. Id. (“[Bjeeause the PUC no longer regulates ‘the rates and services’ of trucking companies ... if [Judge Simpson’s] interpretation is adopted, that would lead to the anomalous result that freight brokers would not be subject to the tax but tracking companies would be.”).

This Court granted allocatur to consider the following issues presented by S & H:

(1) Whether the City [of York] may include, in its tax assessment on [S & H], gross receipts from freight-brokerage services provided to entities engaged in public utility services that are [excepted] from the City’s Business Privilege Tax because those entities are regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission?
(2) Whether entities whose rates were once, but are no longer, regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission still enjoy the [exception] from Municipal taxation articulated in 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(2)?

5 & H Tramp., Inc. v. City of York, 631 Pa. 293, 111 A.3d 169 (2015) (per curiam).

S & H argues that the Commonwealth Court incorrectly determined that S & H was not “involved” in the “rendering” of “public utility” services. Initially, S & H claims that in the intermediate court, neither party raised, argued or briefed the question of whether S & H was “involved” in the “rendering” of “public utility” service. It contends that, to the contrary, the parties tacitly agreed that S & H was involved in the rendering of non-rate regulated common carrier services, S 6 H claims that since “public utility” is not defined in the LTEA, the exception from local taxation in the LTEA must be read in pari materia with the policy objectives expressed in the provisions of the PUC Code. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932. Reading Section 301.1(f)(2) in pari materia with Section 2501(a) of the PUC Code, S & H contends that freight brokers are unquestionably “involved” in the “rendering” of public utility services.

Next, S & H urges that the “public utility” exception in Section 301.1(f)(2) is not limited to rate-regulated public utilities. Embracing Judge Simpson’s application of the last antecedent rule, S & H submits that the term “such” in the third clause refers to the phrase “any public utility service” in the second clause. Accordingly, S & H’s preferred interpretation of Section 301.1(f)(2) would provide an exception from local taxation in three circumstances: where gross receipts are derived from a utility service whose rates of service are fixed and regulated by the PUC; where gross receipts are derived from any public utility service rendered; or where gross receipts are derived from any privilege or transaction involving the rendering of any public utility service.

In response, the City supports the Commonwealth Court’s focus on the words “involved,” “render” and “public utility” as restricting the scope of the exception in the third clause of Section 301.1(f)(2). The City asserts that the Commonwealth Court correctly concluded that the entity that renders the public utility service is the one that transports the goods, and that because S & H does not participate in the actual transportation of goods, it is not involved in the rendering of public utility service. Finally, the City insists that even if S & H is involved in the rendering of a public utility service, S & H still does not qualify for the “public utility” exception under the second or third clauses because the rates it negotiates and charges its customers are not fixed and regulated by the PUC. Under the City’s preferred interpretation of the Section 301.1(f)(2) exception, an entity must be a public utility whose rates are fixed and regulated by the PUC.

As this case presents issues of statutory interpretation, they are questions of law over which our review is plenary and de novo. Fish v. Township of Lower Merion, 633 Pa. 705, 128 A.3d 764, 769 (2015). The Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501-1991, makes clear that the “polestar” of construction is determining the intent of the legislature. Griffiths v. W.C.A.B. (Seven Stars Farm, Inc.), 596 Pa. 317, 943 A.2d 242, 254 (2008); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). When the language of the statute is clear, that language is dispositive of legislative intent and thus vitiates the need for further interpretation. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). Statutes or parts of statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or things. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932(a). In construing the language within a statute, we must give effect to every word of the statute. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(2); American Airlines, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Board of Finance and Review, 542 Pa. 1, 665 A.2d 417 (1995); see generally Commonwealth v. Ostrosky, 589 Pa. 437, 909 A.2d 1224, 1232 (2006) (citing Holland v. Marcy, 584 Pa. 195, 883 A.2d 449, 456 (2005) (plurality) (“[W]e cannot assume that the legislature intended any words to be mere surplus-age.”)).

This case involves the interpretation of a statutory exception from local taxation for public utilities found in Section 301.1(f)(2) of the LTEA which, as noted above, provides as follows:

(f) Such local authorities shall not have authority by virtue of this Act:

(2) To levy, assess or collect a tax on the gross receipts from utility services of any person or company whose rates and service are fixed and regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission or on any public utility services rendered by any such person or company or on any privilege or transaction involving the rendering of any such public utility service.

53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(2).

As developed, S & H is claiming the exception as a freight broker that negotiates contracts for carriage with licensed common carriers. These carriers are regulated by the PUC and defined as public utilities under the PUC Code. Common carriers are regulated under the PUC Code in varying degrees. Broadly speaking for the purpose of our analysis, there are two categories of common carriers: those whose rates are regulated by the PUC and those whose rates are not regulated by the PUC.

Passenger carriers (with a seating capacity of fifteen or more) and carriers of household goods in use (moving companies), both of which deal directly with the consuming public, are regulated regarding rates, geographical area, customer service, safety and insurance. Passenger carriers and household goods carriers must file a tariff specifying their applicable rates and charges, and must seek PUC approval for any change in rates. 52 Pa.Code § 3.381(e). On the other hand, common carriers of property (trucking companies) are regulated for safety and insurance requirements only. Property carriers are not required to file a tariff and thus, their rates are not fixed and regulated by the PUC. See 52 Pa.Code § 23.1(b) (“This Chapter [relating to Tariffs of Common Carriers] applies to motor carriers except common carriers of property.”).

The parties to this action agree that the common motor carriers for which S & H provides freight brokerage services are property carriers, i.e., shippers of manufactured goods and property other than household goods. As such, they are common carriers that are non-rate regulated public utilities. While their service is regulated by the PUC, their rates are not fixed and regulated.

Turning to interpretation of the statute, we find that Section 301.1(f)(2) is clear and unambiguous. Excepted from local taxation under the first clause are: “gross receipts from utility service of any person or company whose rates and services are fixed and regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.” 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(2). To fall within the ambit of the first clause of Section 301.1(f)(2), the person or company’s rates and services must be fixed and regulated by the PUC. The common motor carriers with whom S & H does business (property carriers) do not fall within the scope of the first clause of Section 301.1.(f)(2) because their rates are not fixed and regulated by the PUC. The City is not barred from imposing local business privilege taxes on them.

The second clause provides an exception from local taxation on “services rendered by any such person or company.” Id. (emphasis added). It is clear to this Court that the phrase “any such person or company” refers back to the person or company “whose rates and services are fixed and regulated” by the PUC in the first clause. The use of the word “such” in the second clause requires the reference back to the first clause, where “such person or company” is described. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McClintic, 589 Pa. 465, 909 A.2d 1241, 1250 (2006) (the word “such,” a demonstrative adjective, “refers to an antecedent, or a category of things previously mentioned.”). Thus, under the second clause, the City is prohibited from taxing any services rendered by a person or company whose rates and service are fixed and regulated by the PUC. If, as S & H argues, the second clause was intended to apply to any public utility service (whether rate-regulated or not), the word “such” would constitute mere surplusage.

The third clause, principally at issue here, prohibits local taxation of “any privilege or transaction involving the rendering of any such public utility service.” 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(2) (emphasis added). Again it is clear that word “such” in the phrase “any such public utility service” refers to the “services” described in the second clause — which, in turn, refers to the persons or companies identified in the first clause, i.e., those whose rates and service are fixed and regulated by the PUC. As a result, the third clause provides an exception from local taxation for any transaction or privilege involving the rendering of public utility services that are provided by a person or company whose service and rates are fixed and regulated by the PUC. Because the rates of the freight carriers with which S & H contracts are not fixed and regulated by the PUC, S & H may not benefit from the exception in the third clause regardless of whether it is “involved in the rendering” of such service. As a result, we need not decipher the meaning of that statutory phrase.

With respect to common motor carriers, the various exceptions from local taxation in all three clauses of Section 301.1(f)(2) apply only if a common motor carrier’s rates and services are fixed and regulated by the PUC. In our view, this interpretation is both the product of a straightforward application of the rules of statutory interpretation and, importantly, consistent with the primacy of the PUC’s rate-making authority. Balancing the needs of consumers and utilities, the PUC Code authorizes the PUC to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be “just and reasonable.” 66 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301. To that end, Section 1303 of the Public Utility Code provides that no public utility shall, “directly or indirectly,” receive “a greater or less rate for any service rendered or to be rendered by such public utility than that specified in the tariffs of such public utility applicable thereto.” 66 Pa.C.S.A. § 1303 (emphasis added). If local taxing authorities were permitted to tax rate-regulated services, the providers of those services would effectively receive rates lower than those specified in their filed tariffs. While one obvious purpose of the LTEA is to permit local taxing authorities to impose business privilege taxes, the exceptions in Section 301.1(f)(2) are intended to provide an appropriate limitation to eliminate any interference with the PUC’s rate-making authority.

In its second issue, S & H contends that the Commonwealth Court’s holding, which resulted in the application of the exception to only rate-regulated common carriers, contains an implicit assertion that the “public utility” exception of the LTEA has been repealed as the result of rate deregulation. S & H states:

When the Pennsylvania Legislature wrote the LTEA, there is perhaps no way they could have foreseen the changes that have taken place in the industries considered public utilities over the past four decades. However, the Legislature has treated these ancillary entities as though they are exempt from taxation ever since deregulation began to make headlines in the 1970s. The Legislature has had ample opportunity to change Section 301.1(f)(2) of the LTEA if they believed that a change was necessary, and have not done so. Accordingly, the holding of the Commonwealth Court contains an implied assertion that the Public Utility Exemption [sic] provision in the LTEA has been impliedly repealed as the result of rate deregulation. Specifically, the provisions of the Public Utility Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 102, which define public utility services broadly, and Section 301.1(f)(2)[,] which prohibits the local taxation of receipts derived from the rendering of public utility services[,] would be significantly altered based solely on the change in circumstances surrounding the nature of public utility regulation.

Brief of S & H at 22-23.

S & H’s argument lacks merit. Nothing in the LTEA suggests that a person or company whose rates were once regulated by the PUC is forever shielded from local taxation. As discussed, the language of the public utility exception of the LTEA is clear. Only persons or companies whose rates are fixed and regulated by the PUC are excepted from local taxation, along with the services of such public utility and the transactions and privileges involving such public utility services. If, for whatever reason, such as deregulation, the PUC no longer fixes and regulates that person or company’s rates, then that person or company is not entitled to the benefit of the exception from local taxation.

The order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.

      . City of York’s ("City”) Business Privilege Tax is a tax on the privilege of doing business in the City. Persons desiring to do business in the City are required to obtain a business privilege/mercantile license and pay a tax on gross receipts. City of York Business Privilege and Mercantile Tax Ordinance ("Ordinance”) §§ 343.01-343.99. The business privilege tax is imposed at a rate of three and one-half mills or three dollars and fifty cents per one thousand dollars of gross volume of business. Ordinance, § 343.02(a). In the underlying litigation, S&H Transport, Inc. ("S & H”) raised a number of challenges to the City’s business privilege tax assessment, including the taxability of S & H and the inclusion of certain amounts in gross receipts (e.g., amounts not attributable to activities within the City and amounts that S&H did not retain but paid to the freight carriers). In this appeal, we address only whether the City is barred from imposing a business privilege tax under the "public utility” exception,

      . The Public Utility Code, ("PUC Code”), 66 Pa.C.S.A. § 102, defines "public utility” as "(1) Any person or corporations now or hereafter owning or operating in this Commonwealth equipment or facilities for: ... (iii) Transporting passengers or property as a common carrier.” In turn, "common carrier” is defined as:
      Any and all persons or corporations holding out, offering, or undertaking, directly or indirectly, services for compensation to the public for the transportation of passengers or property, or both, or any class of passengers or property, between points within this Commonwealth by, through, over, above, or under land, water, or air, and shall include forwarders, but shall not include contract carriers by motor vehicles, or brokers, or any bona fide cooperative association transporting property exclusively for the members of such association on a nonprofit basis.

        Id. Because the definition of "common carrier” excludes brokers, S & H is not itself a public utility.

      . Section 204(D)(3) of the City's Business Privilege and Mercantile Rules and Regulations (“Regulations") and Section 343.02(c)(3) of the City's Ordinance also contain a virtually identical provision excepting "utilities” from the business privilege tax. The pertinent provision of the City’s Ordinance states:

        Utilities. No such tax shall be assessed and collected on the gross receipts from utility service of any person or company whose rates of service are fixed and regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, or on any public utility service rendered by any such person or company or on any privilege or transaction involving the rendering of any such public utility service.
      Ordinance, § 343.02(c)(3),

      . See Section 102 of the Regulations.

      . The City’s Regulations require the filing of a business privilege tax return whether or not tax is due. Regulations, § 202,

      . Intrastate trucking involves the picking-up and dropping-off of shipments where both the origin and destination are in Pennsylvania. The PUC is the Pennsylvania authority that regulates intrastate trucking,

      . S & H holds a freight brokerage license issued by the FMCSA.

      . Pennsylvania, through the PUC, participates in the federal Unified Carrier Registration Act ("UCR Act”), 49 U.S.C. § 13901. The UCR Act applies, inter alia, to freight brokers. Section 14504a of the UCR Act requires filing with the PUC information relating to financial responsibility and its local agent for service of process.

      . The trial court’s use of the word "exempt” here is incorrect. As we explained in Lynnebrook and Woodbrook Associates, L.P. v. Borough of Millersville, 600 Pa. 108, 963 A.2d 1261 (2008), our jurisprudence distinguishes between the concepts of a tax exemption and a tax exception:
      Where we determine the breadth of a taxing statute — whether a taxing authority is permitted by law to levy a particular tax — we consider whether a tax exception exists, and the presumption is in favor of the taxpayer. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(3). By contrast, where we determine whether a person or property fits under a statutory provision enumerating exemptions from such taxing authority, we consider whether a tax exemption exists, and the presumption is in favor of the taxation authority. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(5).

        Id. at 1265.
      The authority to tax, granted under Section 301.1(a) and (a.l) of the LTEA, is expressly limited by Section 301.1(f)(2). This statutory language, which acts to restrict the power of the taxing authority, must be construed as a tax exception — not a tax exemption. Any reasonable doubt concerning the meaning of statutory language involving an exception is resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Lynnebrook, 963 A.2d at 1265.

      . In light of its holding, the trial court did not consider S & H's other issues.

      . Section 2501(a) of the PUC Code provides, in relevant part:
      (a) Declaration of policy. — ... It is hereby found as a fact, after due investigation and deliberation, that the service of common carriers by motor vehicle, forwarders, contract carriers by motor vehicle, and brokers, including the procurement and provision of motor vehicles and other facilities for the safe transportation of passengers or property over the highways, are so closely interwoven and interdependent, and so directly affect each other, that in order effectively to regulate such common carriers by motor vehicle and forwarders, and to provide a proper and safe highway transportation system in the public interest, it is necessary to regulate the service of such contract carriers by motor vehicle and brokers, including the procurement and provision of motor vehicles and other facilities for the safe transportation of passengers or property over the highways, in the manner set forth in this chapter.
      66 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a).

      . S & H points to Ernest Renda Contracting, Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 516 Pa. 325, 532 A.2d 416 (1987), a case in which this Court held that the "public utility” exception to the Commonwealth’s "use tax” under 72 P.S. § 7201(o)(4) extended to municipal utilities even though such entities are not, in a strict sense, a public utility regulated by the PUC. S & H suggests that Section 301.1(f)(2) of the LTEA follows this line of thought when it uses the phrase "any public utility service." S & H contends that the word "any” in the second clause covers a separate legislatively defined class of services held out to the public without necessarily being the subject of PUC rate regulation.

      . The rates of property carriers were once, but are no longer, fixed and regulated by the PUC. Cf. Andrew Downer Crain, Ford, Carter, and Deregulation in the 1970s, 5 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 413, 415-37 (2007) (providing a comprehensive overview of the efforts of Presidents Ford and Carter to deregulate the transportation industry, and noting the growing consensus at the time that both the industry and consumers would benefit from deregulation).

      . In In re Brock, 312 Pa. 92, 166 A. 785 (1933), this Court examined the adjective "such” in a statute that began: "In case of the insolvency of any such individual, partnership, or unincorporated association, acting as a private banker....” Id. at 787. Appellants in that case argued that this phrase referred to any individual or partnership. This Court disagreed, stating that to ignore the word "such” was "to affront both grammar and public policy.” Id. at 788. The Court explained further:
      'Such' i.e., 'that kind' of individual, partnership, etc., as used in that sentence can mean only the individual, etc., who has been duly licensed as a private banker. If the word 'such' does not mean that, it has no place or purpose whatever in the act. If the sentence quoted means what appellants contend it means, the word ‘such’ is entirely superfluous and should be deleted so that the sentence would read: ‘In case of the insolvency of any individual,’ etc., 'acting as a private banker,’ etc. For us to delete a word from an act so as to give it a different meaning is for us to engage in legislation.

        Id. at 787-88.

      . Section 1303 provides:

        No public utility shall, directly or indirectly, by any device whatsoever, or in anywise, demand or receive from any person, corporation, or municipal corporation a greater or less rate for any service rendered or to be rendered by such public utility than that specified in the tariffs of such public utility applicable thereto. The rates specified in such tariffs shall be the lawful rates of such public utility until changed, as provided in this part. Any public utility, having more than one rate applicable to service rendered to a patron, shall, after notice of service conditions, compute bills under the rate most advantageous to the patron.
      66 Pa.C.S.A. § 1303,


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    140 A.3d 639
    In re Nomination Petition of Joseph VODVARKA as a Candidate of the Democratic Party for the United States Senate in the Primary Election of April 26, 2016. Appeal of Joseph Vodvarka.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted April 11, 2016.
    Decided April 19, 2016.
    Opinion Filed June 23, 2016.

      Kathleen Marie Kotula, Esq., Pennsylvania Department of State, for Kathleen M. Kotula.
    Paul Anthony Rossi, Esq., for Joseph Vodvarka.
    Robert McCarthy Palumbos, Esq., Philadelphia, James Manly Parks, Esq., Duane Morris, L.L.P., for Joseph A. Sestak, Jr.
    SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice DONOHUE.

Joseph Vodvarka (“Candidate”) appeals from the divided en banc decision of the Commonwealth Court, which set aside his nomination petition as a candidate of the Democratic Party for the United States Senate in the primary election held on April 26, 2016. By order dated April 19, 2016, we reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court and ordered that the Candidate be placed on the election ballot. For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that the signature of a registered voter whose name appears in the SURE registry may not be stricken from a nominating petition solely because the address set forth on the nominating petition is different from the address at which the signer is currently registered to vote.

The facts in this case are not disputed. On February 16, 2016, Candidate filed a nominating petition, containing 2744 signatures, to be a candidate for the nomination of the Democratic Party for the office of United States Senator. On February 23, 2016, Joseph A. Sestak (“Objector”) filed a timely petition to set aside the nominating petition, alleging that the nominating petition did not contain at least 2000 valid signatures of registered Pennsylvania Democrats as required by 25 P.S. § 2872.1(2). The Commonwealth Court ordered representatives of the parties to meet at the Lancaster County Board of Elections to review the signatures on the nominating petition. On March 11, 2016, the parties struck certain signatures by agreement, leaving 2186 signatures remaining. The parties then entered into a stipulation, agreeing that 461 signatures contained a name and signature matching that of a person registered to vote in the county, but the address on the nominating petition did not match the address of record in the Commonwealth’s SURE registry for the individual of that name. The parties further stipulated that whether these 461 signatures should be struck presents a “common and singular question of law” determinative of Objector’s challenge.

Before the Commonwealth Court, Objector contended that the 461 signatures in question must be stricken pursuant to this Court’s 2001 decision in In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty, 564 Pa. 671, 770 A.2d 327 (2001), and its progeny, including In re Nomination Papers of Nader, 580 Pa. 22, 858 A.2d 1167 (2004), In re Nomination Petition of Gales, 618 Pa. 93, 54 A.3d 855 (2012), and In re Lunny, 615 Pa. 460, 44 A.3d 1 (2012) (per curiam), rev’g In re Nomination Petition of Lunny, 170 M.D. 2012 (Pa.Commw., April 5, 2012) (unpublished memorandum). In Flaherty, this Court, relying on a prior analysis of Pennsylvania’s statutory registration requirements in In re Nomination Petition of Wesley, 536 Pa. 609, 640 A.2d 1247 (1994), held that “absent extraordinary circumstances,” a signature on a nominating petition must be stricken if the address accompanying the signature does not match the address at which the elector is currently registered, unless at the time of signing, a removal notice had been filed notifying election officials of the change of address. Flaherty, 770 A.2d at 333.

The Commonwealth Court first reviewed this Court’s decisions in Flaherty, Nader, Gales and Lunny, concluding that “it is for our Supreme Court to overrule that line of cases.” In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka, 135 A.3d 246, 261 (Pa.Commw.2016) (hereinafter, “Vodvarka II”). The Commonwealth Court also reviewed its own more recent decisions on this issue, including a 2010 case involving the same two parties involved in the present appeal. See In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka, 994 A.2d 25 (Pa.Commw.2010) (“Vodvar-ka I ”). Citing to this Court’s “continued adherence to Flaherty, including in Nader, Gales and Lunny,” the Commonwealth Court decided that it had to strike the 461 signatures identified in the parties’ stipulation and rule in favor of Objector.

Until the Supreme Court [overrules Flaherty and Nader,] we will continue to apply those cases as [this court] did in [Vodvarka I ] and the many cases applying [Vodvarka I ]. As such, we reiterate the presumption that a signature on a nomination petition is valid, and an objector has the burden of proving defects in a nomination petition. An objector may prove a defect by showing that an individual’s address on the petition does not match the address in the voter registration records. At that point, the burden shifts to the candidate to produce evidence to show why the signature should not be stricken — i.e., that extraordinary circumstances existed.

Vodvarka II, 135 A.3d 246, 261-62.

Herein, we address the “common and singular question of law” framed by the parties in their stipulation. This Court may only reverse a Commonwealth Court’s order concerning the validity of challenges to a nomination petition if the Commonwealth Court’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence in the record, there was an abuse of discretion, or there was an error of law. See In re Nomination Petition of Driscoll, 577 Pa. 501, 847 A.2d 44, 49 (2004). We must be mindful of the established public policy in this Commonwealth to protect the elective franchise, and thus, the Pennsylvania Election Code must “be liberally construed to protect a candidate’s right to run for office and the voters’ right to elect the candidate of their choice.” Weiskerger Appeal, 447 Pa. 418, 290 A.2d 108, 109 (1972). Nomination petitions are presumed to be valid and an objector has the burden of proving that a nomination petition is invalid. Dris-coll, 847 A.2d at 49. The placement of this burden on an objector recognizes that there is a presumption that the signatures on a petition are valid. In re Creighton, 899 A.2d 1166, 1168 (Pa.Commw.), aff'd per curiam, 586 Pa. 652, 896 A.2d 583 (2006).

Section 2868 of the Election Code, which governs the collection of signatures on a nomination petition, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

§ 2868. Manner of signing nomination petitions; time of circulating
Each signer of a nomination petition shall sign but one such petition for each office to be filled, and shall declare therein that he is a registered and enrolled member of the party designated in such petition: Provided, however, That where there are to be elected two or more persons to the same office, each signer may sign petitions for as many candidates for such office as, and no more than, he could vote for at the succeeding election. He shall also declare therein that he is a qualified elector of the county therein named, and in case the nomination is not to be made or candidates are not to be elected by the electors of the State at large, of the political district therein named, in which the nomination is to be made or the election is to be held. He shall add his residence, giving city, borough or township, with street and number, if any, and shall legibly print his name and add the date of signing, expressed in words or numbers....

25 P.S. § 2868.

Our present task requires us to determine whether the 461 individuals whose signatures are challenged, all of whom continued to reside in the named county but not at the same address as the one listed in the Commonwealth’s SURE registry, satisfied the requirements of Section 2868. The Election Code defines the term “qualified elector” as “any person who shall possess all of the qualifications for voting now or hereafter prescribed by the Constitution of this Commonwealth, or who, being otherwise qualified by continued residence in his election district, shall obtain such qualifications before the next ensuing election.” 25 P.S. § 2602(t); see also 25 P.S. § 2811 (“Qualifications of Electors”). The phrase “registered and enrolled member of a political party” is defined as “any qualified elector who shall be registered according to political designation, in accordance with the provisions of the registration act.” 25 P.S. § 2602(u). Voter registration is presently governed by Part IV of Title 25 (relating to elections) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes. See 25 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1101-3302 (hereinafter, “Act 2002-3”).

Accordingly, to sign Candidate’s nominating petition in accordance with section 2868, the 461 individuals at issue here each had to declare (1) that he or she was a “qualified elector of the county” designated on the nominating petition, and (2) that he or she was a registered voter of the party for which the candidate seeks the nomination. 25 P.S. § 2868. Each signer also had to state his or her residence (giving city, borough or township, with street and number, if any), print and sign his or her name, and add the date of signing. Id. The present case requires that we focus on whether the 461 individuals who signed Candidate’s nominating petition were registered to vote, and whether the signers’ inclusion of an address on the nominating petition other than the one currently in the SURE registry made the signatures invalid.

Reviewing the relevant statutes, no provision either in the Election Code or in Act 2002-3 mandates that the address provided on a nominating petition must match the address in the SURE system. Section 2868 of the Election Code does not require the signer of a nominating petition to state the address at which he or she resided at the time of that voter’s registration. Instead, section 2868 requires only that he or she “add his residence, giving city, borough or township, with street and number, if any.” 25 P.S. § 2868. Similarly, Act 2002-3 affirmatively provides that a registered elector’s change of address, even if not promptly reported to election officials, does not affect his or her registration status or entitlement to vote in the next election, 25 Pa,C.S.A. §§ 1501(b)(2), 1901(d), 1902. No provision in Act 2002-3 states, or even suggests, that a change of address renders an elector ineligible to sign a nominating petition. Finally, no clear policy basis exists to support a matching address requirement, as the Election Code and Act 2002-3 should be read, to the extent possible, to include rather than exclude citizens in the electoral process, including the process of selecting potential candidates for office through the signing of nominating petitions. See Weiskerger Appeal, 290 A.2d at 109.

For these reasons, and based upon the stipulation of the parties that all 461 individuals who signed Candidate’s nominating petition were qualified electors and registered Democrats of the county designated on the nominating petition, if we were deciding this case on a clean slate, we would promptly reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court. As the Commonwealth Court recognized, however, this case is not being decided on a clean slate, as the matching address requirement perseveres as a result of this Court’s 2001 opinion in Flaherty. Vodvarka II, 135 A.3d 246, 261. Our decision in Flaherty was based upon the application of now-repealed voter registration legislation, specifically, the Pennsylvania Voter Registration Act, 25 P.S. §§ 961.101-961.5109 (repealed) (hereinafter, the “1995 PVRA”). Act 2002-3, which repealed the 1995 PVRA, was primarily intended to be merely a codification of the legislation it replaced, with only minor language and definitional changes. See Act 2002-3 (Historical and Statutory Notes). Accordingly, Flaherty ⅛ matching address requirement for nominating petitions was based upon this Court’s application of voter registration laws substantially similar to those in effect today (in Act 2002-3), and thus necessitates our attention herein.

To determine whether Flaherty remains controlling law, we must review the law extant at the time of that decision, beginning with our 1994 ruling in Wesley. In that case, Dennis Hinton (“Hinton”) was a circulator of signatures on the nominating petition of Dennis Wesley, who sought the nomination of the Democratic Party in the May 1994 primary election for United States Congress in the first congressional district. The issue presented was whether Hinton was a qualified elector and registered voter in Philadelphia County when he signed the circulator affidavits. Wesley, 640 A.2d at 1248. Hinton registered to vote in September 1991, listing his address as 600 E. Church Lane, Apt 8-D, in Philadelphia. He registered to vote again on March 2, 1994, this time under a new name (Salim Azim) that he had subsequently adopted for religious reasons. Id. When registering in March 1994, Azim (a/k/a Hinton) listed his address as 5230 Pulaski Street, also in Philadelphia, and stated that he had moved to this new address approximately one and one-half to two years ago. Id. at 1250. Because Azim (a/k/a Hinton) had signed the circulator affidavits on February 28, 1994, two days before submission of his second voter registration on March 2, 1994, Azim’s registration status in Philadelphia County depended upon the status of his first (September 1991) registration. Id. at 1249-50.

This Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision that Azim (a/k/a Hinton) was not a registered elector at the time he signed the circulator affidavits. We determined that Hinton’s failure to file a removal notice promptly advising election officials of his move from 600 E. Church Lane, Apt 8-D to 5230 Pulaski Street had resulted in the termination of his September 1991 voter registration:

At the time that a person registers as an elector, he must specifically set forth, under penalty of perjury, information pertaining to his place of residence. The registration process requires that the applicant indicate the street and number of his residence; the location or number of the room, apartment, flat, or floor that he occupies if his residence is a portion only of the house; and the length of his residence in the State or district. 25 P.S. § 623-20(e)(4)~ (6); see also 25 P.S. § 623-20.3(b)(4)-(7). Moreover, the Election Code provides that the registration commission shall send inspectors to conduct street canvasses in order to verify the residence of those registered. 25 P.S. § 623-20.4(f). Clearly, this inspection is intended to maintain the integrity of the election process by insuring that the qualified elector actually resides at the address listed on his voter registration. Absent extraordinary circumstances, a removal notice is required to be filed whenever a qualified elector changes his residence so that his new address comports with the sworn information maintained by the registration commission. See 25 P.S. §§ 623-21, -24, -28, -29. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court correctly concluded that Azim’s voter registration terminated as a result of his failure to file a removal notice indicating his change of residence.

Id. at 1250. The statutory citations in this excerpt were to the First Class City Permanent Registration Act, 25 P.S. §§ 623-1-623-46 (repealed), then in effect for elections in Philadelphia. The specific provisions cited included section 623-28, which precluded an elector from voting in the next election if he or she had changed addresses but not filed a removal notice within thirty days of said election; and section 623 — 20.4(f), which permitted election commissions to conduct neighborhood canvassing to cancel the voter registration of anyone not residing at the address listed on his or her voter registration card. See also 25 P.S. § 623-33 (permitting cancellation of voter registrations for failure to respond to a notice sent to individuals identified during canvassing).

Six years after Wesley, this Court decided Flaherty. In Flaherty, Mary Flaherty filed a nomination petition for the Democratic nomination for Judge of the Commonwealth Court, a position requiring at least 1000 valid signatures, including 100 from each of at least five counties. 25 P.S. § 2872.1(10). As a result of challenges to numerous signatures, an objector contended that Flaherty did not satisfy the requirement of at least 100 signatures from each of five counties, including, in particular, the signatures submitted from Erie and Philadelphia Counties. Flaherty, 770 A.2d at 329-30. Of importance for present purposes, the objector challenged the signatures of seven electors from Erie County and nine electors from Philadelphia County on the grounds that the addresses of these sixteen electors on the nominating petition did not match the address stated on their voter registration cards. Id. at 333.

In ruling that the lack of matching addresses constituted grounds to strike the sixteen signatures, this Court in Flaherty reaffirmed its reasoning in Wesley, namely that the failure to timely file a removal notice within thirty days of an election results in the termination of that elector’s voter registration. Id. at 333-34. While replacing Wesley ⅛ statutory citations with counterparts in the subsequently enacted 1995 PVRA, this Court in Flaherty nevertheless retained the rationale espoused in Wesley, citing repeatedly to Wesley and a Commonwealth Court case that followed Wesley:

A person is required to indicate, under penalty of perjury, his or her place of residence in order to register as an elector. 25 P.S. § 961.501. Furthermore, when electors move either within the same county or to another county within the Commonwealth, they must notify the registration commission of their new address by filing a removal notice generally no later than 30 days preceding an election. 25 P.S. §§ 961.901-961.902. Indeed, the registration commission must verify the residences of registered electors to insure that the qualified elector actually resides at the address listed on his voter registration card. 25 P.S. §§ 961.906-961.907; In re Nomination Petition of Wesley, 536 Pa. at 615, 640 A.2d at 1249; In re Pittsburgh Home Rule Charter, 694 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Commw.1997). Thus, absent extraordinary circumstances, electors who declare a residence at an address different than the address listed on their voter registration card are not qualified electors at the time they sign a nomination petition unless they have completed the removal notice required by the Voter Registration Act. [Wesley ], 536 Pa. at 612-14, 640 A.2d at 1249; In re Pittsburgh Home Rule Charter, 694 A.2d at 1131-32.
⅜ * *
[B]oth this Court and the Commonwealth Court have issued decisions .,. that have found that electors must notify authorities of a change in address in order to remain a qualified elector. In re Wesley, 536 Pa. at 615, 640 A.2d at 1247; In re City of Pittsburgh Home Rule Charter, 694 A.2d at 1132. Where electors fail to properly notify authorities of a change in address, those electors’ voter registrations are terminated and thus, they are clearly disqualified from signing a nomination petition as a registered and enrolled elector. 25 P.S. § 2868; In re Wesley, 536 Pa. at 615, 640 A.2d at 1247; In re City of Pittsburgh Home Rule Charter, 694 A.2d at 1132.

Id. at 333-34. As in Wesley, the statutory provisions cited in Flaherty included the requirement to file a removal notice within thirty days of an election (sections 961.901 and 961.902), and the provisions authorizing, inter alia, neighborhood canvassing to identify registered voters who no longer resided at the address listed on their registration card (sections 961.906 and 961.907).

In both Wesley and Flaherty, the Court directed its attention to whether the signer was, at the time of signing, registered to vote in the election for which the nomination was sought, and looked to compliance with voter registration requirements under the then-applicable voter registration legislation to make that determination. In both cases, this Court concluded that the signers in question had not filed removal notices in accordance with statutory requirements, and thus, their voter registrations had been terminated and they were not registered voters at the time of signing.

This Court’s 1994 decision and rationale in Wesley was supported by statutory authority. In 1994, the voter registration acts then in effect were the First Class City Permanent Registration Act, 25 P.S. §§ 623-1-623-46 (repealed), and the Permanent Registration Act for Cities of the Second Class, Third Class, and Boroughs, Towns, and Townships, 25 P.S. §§ 951-1-951-46 (repealed), both of which were originally enacted in 1937 (hereinafter, collectively, the “1937 PRAs”). The 1937 PRAs required an elector changing addresses to file a removal notice at least thirty days prior to a primary, general or municipal election in order to vote in that election. 25 P.S. §§ 628-28; 951-26. While not automatic, the failure to file a removal notice could result in the speedy cancellation of the voter’s registration. The 1937 PRAs contained multiple provisions permitting the systematic purging of voter registration registries, including through neighborhood canvassing and “check-ups of registers.” Neighborhood canvassing permitted election commissions to direct individual commissioners (or appointed “inspectors of registration”) to canvass the buildings in their district, and to leave notices at every residence where the elector could not be found. 25 P.S. §§ 623-33, 951-31. Similarly, registry check-ups permitted election commissions to send notices requesting address verification to electors at the addresses on their registration cards, and required that notices be sent to all electors who had not voted within the past two calendar years. 25 P.S. §§ 623-32, 623-40, 951-30, 951-38. If the voter did not respond immediately to these notices (in all instances, within thirty days), the 1937 PRAs required the election commission to cancel the voter’s registration. Id.

Flaherty’s reliance in 2001 on Wesley and its rationale was in error. In the years between Wesley and Flaherty, Pennsylvania’s voter registration laws changed significantly. The impetus for this change was the enactment of the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 20501-20511 (hereinafter, the “NVRA”) in 1993 (effective January 1, 1995). The NVRA set forth a series of new requirements for voter registration for elections for federal office, with the stated purposes of, inter alia, increasing the number of citizens eligible to vote in federal elections and to maintain accurate and current voter registration rolls for such elections. 52 U.S.C.A. § 20501. Of specific relevance to the question presented in this case, section 8 of the NVRA prohibits states from removing the name of any registered voter from a voter registry list based upon a change of address unless either (1) the registrant confirms in writing that he or she has moved to an address outside of the registrar’s jurisdiction, or (2) he or she failed to respond to a notice and does not vote in the next two general federal elections (a minimum of four years). 52 U.S.C.A. § 20507(b)(2), (d), (f). Also of importance here, the NVRA requires states to permit an elector to vote even if he or she failed to notify the registrar of a change of address prior to the date of the election. 52 U.S.C.A. § 20507(e). The elector may vote upon providing oral or -written affirmation of the change of address to an election official. Id.

These provisions of the NVRA were clearly inconsistent with their counterparts in the 1937 PRAs. In Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Ridge, 1995 WL 136913 (E.D.Pa. March 30, 1995), a suit challenging Pennsylvania’s lack of compliance with the NVRA, the Commonwealth agreed to a series of stipulations regarding inconsistencies between the NVRA and the 1937 PRAs. One such stipulation was that, unlike under section 8 of the NVRA, in Pennsylvania, “voters who move within a county are not allowed to vote on the day of election unless they have re-registered or filed a removal notice with the registrar regarding the change thirty days before the election, or have moved within thirty days of the election.” Id. at *5. The federal district court found, as a matter of law, that “the provisions of Pennsylvania law for voters who move in the same county are contrary to the [NVRA].” Id. at *9.

Because the NVRA applies only to federal elections, Pennsylvania remained free to continue to follow the 1937 PRAs in elections for state and local offices. To do so, however, would have created substantial administrative and financial challenges, as it would have required election commissions in Pennsylvania to maintain separate voter registries for two different electorates (one for federal elections and a second for state and local elections). See Welker v. Clarke, 239 F.3d 596, 599 (3d Cir.2001). Accordingly, in June 1995, this Commonwealth enacted the 1995 PVRA, which adopted the voter registration requirements in the NVRA, thus permitting the state to maintain a single voter registry for all elections (federal, state, and local). See Kuznik v. Westmoreland County Board of Commissioners, 588 Pa. 95, 902 A.2d 476, 490-92 (2006) (the Election Code provides a unitary election system for federal and state offices and procedures for voting in state elections are to conform to federal requirements in order to prevent separate federal and state voting systems).

The 1995 PVRA repealed the 1937 PRAs, but it carried over some provisions in a modified form. For example, the 1995 PVRA retained the requirement in the 1937 PRAs to file a removal notice within thirty days of an election, but added a new provision permitting the elector to vote at his or her former polling place even if he or she had not complied:

An elector who removes residence from one place to another within the same county and who has not yet filed a removal notice with the commission shall be permitted to vote once at the elector’s former polling place following removal if, at the time of signing the voter’s certificate, the elector files with the judge of election a signed removal notice properly filled out....

25 P.S. § 961.901(b)(2). Moreover, section 1902 of the 1995 PVRA permitted voters who had moved within a county, or to another county in the state, to vote at his or her former polling place merely by providing “written affirmation ... of the new address before an election official....” 25 P.S. § 961.1902.

In sections 961.906 through 961.912, the 1995 PVRA carried over the provisions in the 1937 PRAs permitting the systematic cancellation of voter registrations (including registry “check-ups” and neighborhood canvassing). 25 P.S. § 961.906 (“Checkup of registers”); 25 P.S. § 961.907 (“Canvass of registered electors”); 25 P.S. § 961.910 (“Failure to vote”). In section 961.5103(a), however, the 1995 PVRA gave the Secretary of the Commonwealth the power to suspend these sections upon a determination that they were inconsistent with the requirements of the NVRA. 25 P.S. § 961.5103(a). On July 15, 1995, fifteen days after enactment of the 1995 PVRA, the Secretary of the Commonwealth, by notice published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, suspended sections 961.906 through 961.912 “for all elections.” 25 Pennsylvania Bulletin 2844 (July 15, 1995).

Upon suspension of these carryover provisions, Chapter 19 of the 1995 PVRA became effective. 25 P.S. § 961.5103(b). Chapter 19 of the 1995 PVRA, entitled “Provisions Contingent on Federal Law,” adopted the fundamental requirements of section 8 of the NVRA. Of significance here, while section 961.1901(a)(4) permitted election commissions to conduct “voter removal programs” to the extent consistent with the NVRA, pursuant to section 961.1901(d)(1), a change of address could not result in the cancellation of a voter’s registration except in specifically limited circumstances:

(d) Cancellation of registration.—
(1) A commission shall not cancel the registration of an elector on the ground that the elector has changed residence unless any of the following apply:
(i) The elector confirms in writing that the elector has changed residence to a location outside the county in which the elector is registered.
(ii) The elector:
(A) has failed to respond to a notice described in paragraph (2); and
(B) has not voted nor appeared to vote and, if necessary, corrected the commission's record of the elector’s address, in an election during the period beginning on the date of the notice and ending on the day after the date of the second general election for Federal office that occurs after the date of the notice.

25 P.S. § 961.1901(d)(1).

Unfortunately, in Flaherty, this Court failed to identify the changes to Pennsylvania’s voter registration laws occasioned by enactment of the 1995 PVRA. Unlike under the 1937 PRAs in effect when we decided Wesley, under the 1995 PVRA, the failure to file a removal notice could no longer result in swift termination of a voter’s registration, as receipt of a notice from an election commission could result in registration cancellation only if the voter did not respond to the notice and failed to appear and vote in the next two general federal elections (a period of at least four years). 25 P.S. § 961.1901(d)(1). Moreover, also unlike the 1937 PRAs, under the 1995 PVRA, the failure to file a removal notice thirty days in advance of an election did not preclude the elector from appearing at his or her former polling place and voting in that election — dispelling any notion that the failure to file a removal notice resulted in the termination of the voter’s registration (since the elector would not be entitled to vote if not still registered). 25 P.S. §§ 961.901(b)(2), 1902. Finally, our citation in Flaherty to sections 961.906 and 961.907 of the 1995 PVRA did not provide the intended support for the stated termination rationale, as the Secretary of the Commonwealth had suspended these provisions in accordance with her legislative authority. 25 P.S. § 961.5103(a); 25 Pennsylvania Bulletin 2844 (July 15,1995).

For these reasons, we conclude that Flaherty must be overturned to the extent that it imposes a matching address requirement in connection with signatures on a nominating petition. To the extent (if any) that our subsequent decisions in Nader and Gales are inconsistent with the present decision, they are also overturned.

As indicated hereinabove, in 2002, the General Assembly repealed the 1995 PVRA and re-enacted it substantially intact as Act 2002-3. As was the case with the 1995 PVRA, Act 2002-3 retains the provisions from the 1937 PRAs permitting the cancellation of voter registrations pursuant to, inter alia, registry “check-ups” and neighborhood canvassing. 25 P.S. §§ 1506-1512. As was also the case with the 1995 PVRA, section 1513(a) of Act 2002-3 gave the Secretary of the Commonwealth the power to suspend these sections upon a determination that they were inconsistent with the requirements of the NVRA. 25 Pa.C.S.A. § 1513(a). On March 17, 2002, the effective date of Act 2002-3, by notice published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, the Secretary of the Commonwealth suspended sections 1506 through 1512 of Act 2002-3. 32 Pennsylvania Bulletin 1360 (March 17, 2002).

As a result, Chapter 19 of Act 2002-3, which contains only minor variations from Chapter 19 of the 1995 PVRA, is currently in effect. 25 Pa.C.S.A. § 1513(a). Sections 1501(b)(2) and 1902 permit an elector to appear at his former polling place and vote even if he or she did not file a removal notice in advance of the election. 25 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501(b)(2), 1902. Section 1901(a)(4) requires that programs designed to remove electors from voter registries must comply with the NVRA, and section 1901(d)(1) provides that a voter’s registration may not be cancelled unless the registrant confirms in writing that he or she has moved to an address outside of the registrar’s jurisdiction, or he or she failed to respond to a notice and does not vote in the next two general federal elections (a minimum of four years). 25 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1901(a)(4), 1901(d)(1). As was true at the time Flaherty was decided, the failure to file a removal notice, without more, does not result in cancellation of a voter’s registration, and thus no basis exists for a matching address requirement for nominating petitions.

Based upon the foregoing, as well as the stipulation between the parties that the only asserted basis for striking the 461 signatures on Candidate’s nominating petition is that the addresses on the nominating petition do not match the address on record in the SURE system for the individual of that name, Objector has not met his burden of proof in this case. For this reason, we entered the order dated April 19, 2016, reversing the order of the Commonwealth Court.

Chief Justice SAYLOR and Justices BAER, TODD, DOUGHERTY and WECHT join the opinion.

      . SURE is the acronym for the Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors. 25 Pa.C.S.A. § 1222. The SURE system allows for electronic searching for registered voters by name and party, and permits a signature to be retrieved for comparison to confirm registration status without the need to input an address. An individual who signs a nominating petition can be identified in the SURE system by first and last name, and his or her identity and registration status can be confirmed by matching the elector’s signature with the signature in the SURE system.

      . Such signatures are often referred to as "NRA entries,” designating that they are "not registered at the address” set forth on the nominating petition.

      . Objector also filed a challenge to 220 signatures because the municipality recorded on Candidate’s nomination petition did not match the municipality on file for the voter in the SURE system. The Commonwealth Court rejected these challenges and Objector has not appealed that determination.

      . 25 P.S. §§ 2600-3571 ("Election Code”).

      . Section 2868 applies to "nominating petitions,” which must be filed for a candidate to be placed on the ballot in primary elections of the major political parties (as defined in 25 P.S. § 2831). In contrast, section 2911 of the Election Code provides for the nomination of candidates for public office who were not members of a major political party within thirty days of the primary election. 25 P.S. § 2911. Section 2911, unlike section 2868, does not expressly require each signer to be a registered voter. Id. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth Court has held that to be a "qualified elector” under section 2911, the signer must be registered to vote. In re Nominating Papers of Rogers, 908 A.2d 942, 946 (Pa.Commw.2006) (“[W]e conclude that, under [section 2911], persons signing a candidate's nomination papers must be a registered voter.”); see also Rogers v. Corbett, 468 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir.2006); but see In re Nomination of Nader, 860 A.2d 1, 580 A.2d 134, 143 (2004) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (stating that the registration requirement "simply does not exist for signers and affiants relative to nomination papers for an independent political body”). A federal court recently held that requiring individuals signing nominating papers to be registered to vote does not violate First Amendment protections. Green Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 89 F.Supp.3d 723, 751 (E.D.Pa.2015) (ruling that Pennsylvania has "a compelling interest in requiring registration to vote as the only means by which a nomination paper signature can be readily compared with the voter’s registration in the event of an objection”).

      6. Article VII, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
      Every citizen 21 years of age [lowered to 18 years of age by the twenty-sixth amendment to the United States Constitution], possessing the following qualifications, shall be entitled to vote at all elections subject, however, to such laws requiring and regulating the registration of electors as the General Assembly may enact.
      1. He or she shall have been a citizen of the United States at least one month.
      2. He or she shall have resided in the State 90 days immediately preceding the election.
      3. He or she shall have resided in the election district where he or she shall offer to vote at least 60 days immediately preceding the election, except that if qualified to vote in an election district prior to removal of residence, he or she may, if a resident of Pennsylvania, vote in the election district from which he or she removed his or her residence within 60 days preceding the election.
      Pa. Const, art. VII, § 1.
      The parties have not raised any issues relating to the 461 challenged signers' status as "qualified electors” pursuant to the constitutional requirements in Article VII, Section 1 (or the related statutory requirements in section 2811 of the Election Code), and thus we likewise will not address any such issues.

      . Because the primary election at issue here is for nomination to an office by the electors of the State at large, electors on Candidate’s nominating petition did not need to declare that they were qualified electors of a particular political district. 25 P.S. § 2868.

      . In 1994, a circulator of a nominating petition was required to be a registered member of the party and a resident of the relevant political district. 25 P.S. § 2869. Residency requirements for circulators have since been ruled unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re Stevenson, 615 Pa, 50, 40 A.3d 1212 (2012) (recognizing that Morrill v. Weaver, 224 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D.Pa.2002), is binding in this Commonwealth).

      . In re Pittsburgh Home Rule Charter, 694 A.2d 1128 (Pa.Commw.1997)

      . In both cases, this Court erroneously confused electors who were qualified to vote with electors who were registered to vote. Wesley, 640 A.2d at 1250 ("A circulator of a nomination petition must be a duly registered member of the relevant political district.... [T]he failure of a circulator to be a qualified elector is a fatal defect to those petitions filed by that circulator.”); Flaherty, 770 A.2d at 333 ("[E]lectors must notify authorities of a change in address in order to remain a qualified elector.”).
      Pursuant to Article VII, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution {see supra n. 6), a person is qualified to vote if they meet the three constitutional qualifications (age, citizenship and residency) in subsections 1, 2, and 3. PA. Const, art. VII, § 1. A qualified elector may register to vote by satisfying legislatively-enacted voter registration requirements. See In re Nomination of Nader, 580 Pa. 134, 138-39, 860 A.2d 1 (2004) (Saylor, J., dissenting). As explained hereinabove, section 2868 imposes two separate requirements to sign a nominating petition: the signer must be a "qualified elector of the county,” and a "registered and enrolled member of the party” for which the candidate seeks the nomination. 25 P.S. § 2868. A person may remain qualified to vote even if his or her registration has been cancelled.

      . The only exception to this rule was if a non-Philadelphia voter moved from one address to another within the same election district (a precinct within a second or third class city or a borough, town, or township). 25 P.S. § 951 — 26(b). In this limited circumstance, the change of address did not require transfer of the registration card from one precinct to another.

      . In addition to canvassing and check-ups, the 1937 PRAs also authorized election commissions to request information from public utility companies (electricity, gas, water, or steam) regarding customers who had terminated service, and to send notices to those electors. 25 P.S. § 951-29. Notices could also be sent based upon information set forth in periodic reports received from real estate brokers and rental agents identifying individuals who had moved from their prior residence. Id.

      . 25 P.S. § 961.5106(a).

      . Section 961.5103, entitled "Applicability of Provisions,” provided as follows:
      (a) Suspension — To the extent that the Secretary of the Commonwealth determines that the [NVRA] prohibits the cancellation of registration for elections for Federal office because of a failure to vote as provided in section [961.910], the provisions of sections 906 through 912 are suspended. The suspension shall become effective upon publication of notice of the determination in the Pennsylvania Bulletin.”
      (b) Effect on Chapter 19 — Should the provisions of sections 906 through 912 be suspended as provided in subsection (a), the provisions of Chapter 19 shall be effective during the period of suspension.”
      25 P.S. § 961.5103.

      . Subsection 961.1901(b)(1) established a national change of address system, pursuant to which information provided by the United States Postal Service was used to ascertain possible changes of address and generate confirmation mailings pursuant to which the elector may verify or correct address information. 25 P.S. § 961.1901(b)(1). Subsection 961.1901(b)(2) permitted neighborhood canvassing to identify possible changes of address. 25 P.S. § 961.1901(b)(2). Section 961.1901(b)(3) permitted an election commission to send a notice to any elector who had not voted for the past five years. 25 P.S. § 961.1901(b)(3).
      Incongruously, and probably mistakenly, section 961.1901(b) retained a provision from the 1937 PRAs permitting the immediate cancellation of a voter’s registration if he or she failed to respond, within seven to fifteen days, to a notice left during neighborhood canvassing. 25 P.S. § 961.1901 (b)(2)(iii). This provision was identical to section 961.907, which (as noted hereinabove) was suspended by the Secretary of the Commonwealth in July 1995. 25 Pennsylvania Bulletin 2844 (July 15, 1995); 25 P.S. § 961.5103(a). This provision was also inconsistent with section 961.1901(b)(4), which permitted the immediate cancellation of a voter’s registration only at the request of the elector or upon confirmation of the elector’s death. 25 P.S. § 961.1901(b)(4). In any event, the effect, if any, of section 961.1901(b)(2)(iii) was blunted entirely, since, as discussed supra, under both section 8 of the NVRA and section 961.1901(d)(1) of the 1995 PVRA, the cancellation of a voter’s registration based upon a change of address was severely circumscribed. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 20507(b)(2), (d), (f); 25 P.S. § 961.1901(d)(1), 1902.

      . See also In re Lunny, 615 Pa. 460, 44 A.3d 1 (2012) (per curiam), rev’g In re Nomination Petition of Lunny (Pa.Cmwlth., No. 170 M.D. 2012, filed April 5, 2012). As a per curiam order, Lunny had no stare decisis effect. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 604 Pa. 198, 985 A.2d 928, 938 (2009).

      . Accordingly, since July 15, 1995, the provisions contained in the 1937 PRAs permitting cancellation of voter registrations for the failure to file removal notices have remained suspended, and the provisions of Chapter 19 have remained in effect.