text:
    Com. v. Poole
    10/07/2015
    279 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 450


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Com. v. Ranger
    09/29/2015
    163 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 50 A.3d 243


text:
    Com. v. Rascoe
    11/10/2015
    349 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1121


text:
    Com. v. Reddy
    09/29/2015
    229 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1139


text:
    Com. v. Robertson
    10/14/2015
    468 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 444


text:
    Com. v. Rosen
    10/07/2015
    488 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 444


text:
    Com. v. Rouse
    10/07/2015
    439 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1133


text:
    Com. v. Rugg
    09/29/2015
    120 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 387


text:
    Com. v. Santiago
    09/29/2015
    282 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1056


text:
    Com. v. Schaffer
    11/03/2015
    333 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 446


text:
    Com. v. Schirmer
    09/30/2015
    231 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 697


text:
    Com. v. Simmons
    10/07/2015
    403 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 460


text:
    Com. v. Simmons
    10/14/2015
    513 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1129


text:
    Com. v. Smith
    10/14/2015
    157 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1118


text:
    Com. v. Smith
    11/10/2015
    423 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1144


text:
    Com. v. Smith
    11/04/2015
    270 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1067


text:
    Com. v. Stephens
    10/07/2015
    152 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1128


text:
    Com. v. Stultz
    09/30/2015
    428 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 114 A.3d 865


text:
    Com. v. Taylor
    09/28/2015
    82, 83 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 702


text:
    Com. v. Thomas
    09/28/2015
    97 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 382


text:
    Com. v. Thomas
    09/30/2015
    470 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 375


text:
    Com. v. Thomas
    10/01/2015
    149 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1128


text:
    Com. v. Thompson
    09/28/2015
    180 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 378


text:
    Com. v. Vancliff
    10/14/2015
    422 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 447


text:
    Com. v. Veasley

    10/07/2015
    241 WAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied November 20, 2015.

   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1062


text:
    Com. v. Wilkerson
    09/29/2015
    292 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1054


text:
    Com. v. Williams
    11/02/2015
    138 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 394


text:
    Com. v. Wilson
    09/29/2015
    222 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1056


text:
    Com. v. Winfree
    10/07/2015
    318 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1055


text:
    Com. v. Wright
    09/29/2015
    250 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 106 A.3d 152


text:
    Com. v. Wunder
    10/14/2015
    365 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 435


text:
    Com. v. Zaledzieski
    11/10/2015
    392 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Conway v. Walker Nell Partners, Inc.; Walker Nell Partners, Inc.
    10/14/2015
    289 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1139


text:
    Cornelius v. Menio
    10/14/2015
    122 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 113 A.3d 344


text:
    Grace, In re Estate of
    10/07/2015
    170 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 113 A.3d 360


text:
    Housing Opportunity Partners Reo, LLC v. Mehalshick; Mehalshick, In re

    09/30/2015
    465, 466 MAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied December 25, 2015.

   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1052; 120 A.3d 1053


text:
    J.S.S., In re Adoption of; P.A.S., In re
    11/04/2015
    391 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 107


text:
    K.L. v. G.L.
    10/14/2015
    378 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1137


text:
    L.C. v. S.C.

    10/06/2015
    499 EAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied November 9, 2015.

   Denied

No. 1802 EDA 2015


text:
    Leoni v. Leoni
    10/14/2015
    397-400 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 385


text:
    M.X.O., In re; T.A., In re; A.M.O., In re
    10/09/2015
    342, 343 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 457, 125 A.3d 458


text:
    Markovsky v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.; Markovsky, In re
    09/29/2015
    162 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 107 A.3d 749


text:
    Medved v. Auto Shower II, Inc.
    09/29/2015
    158 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1119


text:
    Mellow v. Silverblatt
    10/07/2015
    396 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 435


text:
    Moser v. Estate of Renninger; Renninger, In re
    11/10/2015
    440 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 1107


text:
    Stopyra v. Peco Energy Co.; Bank of America, N.A., In re
    10/14/2015
    310, 311 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1061


text:
    Susquehanna Bank v. Cooper
    10/14/2015
    115 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 444


text:
    Tradex USA Corp. v. Gleemer Glass
    09/30/2015
    395 MAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 518 EDA 2015


text:
    Veloric v. Doe; Heffler, In re
    10/14/2015
    664 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 465


text:
    Williams v. Kerestes

    10/14/2015
    507 MAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied November 13, 2015.

   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1141


text:
    Bibbus v. W.C.A.B. (Wood Co.)
    10/07/2015
    514 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Brown v. Wenerowicz

    09/30/2015
    531 MAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied November 9, 2015.

   Denied

No. 630 CD 2015


text:
    Burns v. Blair County, Pa.
    10/07/2015
    140 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 112 A.3d 690


text:
    C.O. Revocable Family Trust v. City of Pittsburgh Zoning Bd. of Adjustment
    10/07/2015
    225 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 111 A.3d 817


text:
    Cerciello v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review
    11/04/2015
    448 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Colonial Intermediate Unit #20 v. Colonial Intermediate Unit #20 Educ. Ass'n
    09/29/2015
    305 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 109 A.3d 371


text:
    Derry Street Pub, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Police
    09/29/2015
    312 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 111 A.3d 1240


text:
    Electors and Residents of Swatara Tp., In re; Swatara Tp., Com’rs, In re
    10/14/2015
    336 MAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 528 CD 2015


text:
    Gadson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole
    09/28/2015
    115 WAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Gehan v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole
    10/07/2015
    457 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Hadid v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review
    10/07/2015
    345 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Hartline v. Public School Employees' Retirement Bd.
    10/14/2015
    138 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Hayes v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole
    10/13/2015
    125 MAP (2014)
   Denied

No. 344 MD 2014


text:
    Liberty Manor Personal Care Home v. Department of Public Welfare; The Penn Care Group, Inc., In re
    10/14/2015
    187 WAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Lichtman v. Nutter
    09/30/2015
    348 EAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 210 CD 2015


text:
    Murphy v. Pennsylvania State Police

    11/03/2015
    233 WAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied December 7, 2015.

   Denied


text:
    Stark v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., LLC
    10/07/2015
    234 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 116 A.3d 760


text:
    Thomas v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole
    11/10/2015
    459 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Thompson v. W.C.A.B. (Stivers Temporary Personnel)
    09/29/2015
    148 EAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Westerman v. W.C.A.B. (K-Mart Corp.)
    10/07/2015
    389 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Westhead v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review
    09/29/2015
    238 EAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    126 A.3d 1281-1286
    Begley v. Rhoads & Sinon LLP
    10/29/2015
    467 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1049


text:
    Boback v. Ross
    10/30/2015
    175 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 114 A.3d 1042


text:
    Boehm v. Riversource Life Ins. Co.
    12/01/2015
    239 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 117 A.3d 308


text:
    C.L.A., In re Interest of
    10/22/2015
    366 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1053


text:
    Cigna Corp. v. Executive Risk Indem., Inc.
    10/13/2015
    111 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 111 A.3d 204


text:
    Com. v. Adams
    11/16/2015
    361 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 454


text:
    Com. v. Alwan
    10/22/2015
    291 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 113 A.3d 353


text:
    Com. v. Arnold
    10/29/2015
    247 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1043


text:
    Com. v. Bailey
    10/22/2015
    178 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1132


text:
    Com. v. Bair
    10/26/2015
    258 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1054


text:
    Com. v. Baker
    10/27/2015
    429 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 435


text:
    Com. v. Bennett
    11/16/2015
    243 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 454


text:
    Com. v. Berrios
    10/27/2015
    391 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1137


text:
    Com. v. Bizzel
    12/01/2015
    639 EAL (2014)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 107 A.3d 102


text:
    Com. v. Boyd
    11/16/2015
    346 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 469


text:
    Com. v. Bright
    11/17/2015
    374 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 450


text:
    Com. v. Brodbeck; Com. v. Leahy
    11/16/2015
    502-504 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1125


text:
    Com. v. Brown
    11/02/2015
    213 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1058


text:
    Com. v. Burton
    11/17/2015
    439 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 439


text:
    Com. v. Calderon
    10/27/2015
    358 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 446


text:
    Com. v. Caldwell
    11/16/2015
    408 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 117 A.3d 763


text:
    Com. v. Campbell
    10/27/2015
    206 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1142


text:
    Com. v. Costello
    10/27/2015
    297 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 442


text:
    Com. v. Crenshaw
    12/01/2015
    487 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1141


text:
    Com. v. Deboise
    11/16/2015
    470 EAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 70 EDM 2015


text:
    Com. v. Delacruz
    10/27/2015
    371 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 450


text:
    Com. v. Diaz
    11/16/2015
    495 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1142


text:
    Com. v. Dodd
    10/26/2015
    241 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1045


text:
    Com. v. Droz
    10/27/2015
    455 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1066


text:
    Com. v. Elkington
    10/26/2015
    294 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1124


text:
    Com. v. Gamble
    10/23/2015
    418 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 380


text:
    Com. v. Garcia
    11/17/2015
    351 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 450


text:
    Com. v. Gibbs
    12/01/2015
    414 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1124


text:
    Com. v. Graham
    10/13/2015
    150 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 109 A.3d 733


text:
    Com. v. Griggs
    10/27/2015
    431 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 436


text:
    Com. v. Hawkins
    11/17/2015
    193 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 453


text:
    Com. v. Herring
    12/01/2015
    522 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 85


text:
    Com. v. Hines
    10/22/2015
    357 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1056


text:
    Com. v. Howard
    10/29/2015
    133 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1125


text:
    Com. v. Ialongo
    12/01/2015
    488 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1136


text:
    Com. v. Jacobs
    10/27/2015
    214 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1119


text:
    Com. v. Jefferson
    12/01/2015
    513 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 95


text:
    Com. v. King
    11/16/2015
    267 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 443


text:
    Com. v. Kulp
    10/22/2015
    379 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1137


text:
    Com. v. Lewis
    10/23/2015
    219 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 440


text:
    Com. v. Martinez
    10/29/2015
    285 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1056


text:
    Com. v. Massey
    11/16/2015
    255 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1149


text:
    Com. v. Maute
    10/29/2015
    251 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1046


text:
    Com. v. McMiller
    11/16/2015
    272 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1149


text:
    Com. v. Metts
    10/19/2015
    272 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1063


text:
    Com. v. Miszler
    10/29/2015
    259 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1052


text:
    Com. v. Mitchell
    10/27/2015
    402 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 449


text:
    Com. v. Mitchell
    10/29/2015
    178 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1043


text:
    Com. v. Montanez
    10/29/2015
    194 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1050


text:
    Com. v. Moore
    11/17/2015
    236 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 452


text:
    Com. v. Motter
    11/02/2015
    205 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 387


text:
    Com. v. Oakman
    10/26/2015
    586 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1145


text:
    Com. v. Olivo-Noble
    10/29/2015
    234 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 695


text:
    Com. v. Olmeda
    10/29/2015
    221 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 390


text:
    Com. v. Pappas
    10/26/2015
    299 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1118


text:
    Com. v. Piccolo
    12/01/2015
    534 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1123


text:
    Com. v. Phu T Chim
    11/16/2015
    449 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1140


text:
    Com. v. Quach
    10/23/2015
    248 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 455


text:
    Com. v. Ramos
    10/27/2015
    442 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 441


text:
    Com. v. Reese
    11/16/2015
    497 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1124


text:
    Com. v. Reyes-Guitierrez
    10/29/2015
    153 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1055


text:
    Com. v. Ritchey
    12/01/2015
    294 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1135


text:
    Com. v. Ross

    11/17/2015
    226 WAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied December 24, 2015.

   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 448


text:
      Com. v. Ryals
    11/02/2015
    230 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 447


text:
    Com. v. Salter
    10/26/2015
    127 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1047


text:
    Com. v. Samuels
    11/16/2015
    446 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1141


text:
    Com. v. Schlott
    10/23/2015
    201 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 436


text:
    Com. v. Scott
    12/01/2015
    502 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 464


text:
    Com. v. Shadle

    10/26/2015
    297 WAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied December 1, 2015,

   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1148


text:
    Com. v. Simmons
    10/27/2015
    253 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1123


text:
    Com. v. Simmons-Rivera
    10/27/2015
    438 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 441


text:
    Com. v. Smith
    12/01/2015
    624 EAL (2014)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 113 A.3d 358


text:
    Com. v. Stalter
    10/27/2015
    401 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1141


text:
    Com. v. Steele
    11/02/2015
    227 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 390


text:
    Com. v. Tai Dinh
    11/16/2015
    413 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1125


text:
    Com. v. Talbert
    10/27/2015
    338 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1117


text:
    Com. v. Thomas
    10/26/2015
    273 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1049


text:
    Com. v. Tiburcio
    10/27/2015
    460 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super,, 122 A.3d 451


text:
    Com. v. Tschudi
    11/16/2015
    335 WAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 719 WDA 2015


text:
    Com. v. Villanueva
    11/16/2015
    432 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1128


text:
    Com. v. Villatoro
    10/29/2015
    211 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 386


text:
    Com. v. Wagner
    10/13/2015
    594 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 457


text:
    Com. v. Wallace
    11/17/2015
    381 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1126


text:
    Com. v. Ware
    11/02/2015
    158 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 389


text:
    Com. v. Weeks
    10/29/2015
    474 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 452


text:
    Com. v. Williams
    10/29/2015
    241 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1136


text:
    Com. v. Wilson
    10/29/2015
    383 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1117


text:
    Delage Landen Financial Services, Inc. v. Voices of Faith Ministries, Inc.
    10/27/2015
    407 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1143


text:
    E.G. & G. Realty, Inc. v. Youn Sang Kim
    10/13/2015
    155 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super,, 113 A.3d 351


text:
    Fairway Consumer Discount Co. v. Laskowski
    11/16/2015
    530 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 457


text:
    Freeman-Rhodes v. Swanger
    10/27/2015
    188 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1135


text:
    Gorman v. Aria Health
    11/17/2015
    356 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1047


text:
    Gress v. Gress
    11/16/2015
    548 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 393


text:
    Harvey v. Palumbo; Con-way Freight, Inc., In re
    10/27/2015
    196 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 388


text:
    Link v. Link
    10/27/2015
    181 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 369


text:
    Matusek v. Bruno
    11/23/2015
    153 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 370


text:
    O'Brien v. Dela Pena
    11/02/2015
    200 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 445


text:
    Richardson v. Kolsun
    10/13/2015
    118 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 373


text:
    S.O., In re Adoption of; E.C.B., In re; T.A., In re
    11/13/2015
    740 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 107


text:
    S.R.T., In re Interest of; W.Y.O., In re
    11/02/2015
    475 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 436


text:
    Schader v. Schader
    10/27/2015
    370, 371 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 374; 120 A.3d 1049


text:
    Stewart v. Fedex Exp.
    11/17/2015
    186 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 114 A.3d 424


text:
    Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Devicaris
    11/17/2015
    330, 331 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1066


text:
    Wicker v. Korman Services, Inc.
    11/17/2015
    355 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1126


text:
    Wygant v. General Elec. Co.
    12/01/2015
    228-230 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 113 A.3d 310


text:
    Feister v. W.C.A.B. (Mellinger Transp., Inc.); Mellinger Transp., Inc., In re
    11/16/2015
    434, 475 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Friedman v. W.C.A.B. (Temple University Hosp.); Temple University Hosp., In re
    11/17/2015
    290 EAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Gallagher v. W.C.A.B. (Trib Total Media, Inc.)
    10/29/2015
    110 WAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Haines & Kibblehouse, Inc. v. Department of Transp.; Haines & Kibblehouse, Inc., In re
    11/02/2015
    216 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Murphy v. W.C.A.B. (Ace Check Cashing Inc.)
    11/02/2015
    137 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 110 A.3d 227


text:
    State Employees' Retirement System v. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform
    10/27/2015
    281 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 113 A.3d 9


text:
    Tobler v. W.C.A.B. (Verizon Pennsylvania Inc.)
    12/01/2015
    465 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 120 A.3d 448


text:
    525 Lancaster Ave Apts, LP v. Berks County Bd. of Assessment Appeals; Berks County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, In re
    10/27/2015
    304 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 111 A.3d 1231


text:
    SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    128 A.3d 218-222
    Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co.; Travelers Indem. Co., In re
    12/07/2015
    441 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 115 A.3d 342


text:
    Burda v. Burda

    06/30/2015
    271 MAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied August 13, 2015.

   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 687


text:
    C.L., In re Adoption of; D.L., In re
    12/07/2015
    429, 430 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 133 A.3d 78


text:
    Com. v. Abram
    12/02/2015
    278 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1138


text:
    Com. v. Afshar
    12/07/2015
    276 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1132


text:
    Com. v. Alston
    12/10/2015
    536 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 93


text:
    Com. v. Alston
    12/16/2015
    478 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 452


text:
    Com. v. Barksdale
    12/11/2015
    351 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 463


text:
    Com. v. Bradwell
    12/16/2015
    377 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1050


text:
    Com. v. Brooks
    12/10/2015
    500 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1120


text:
    Com. v. Brown
    12/01/2015
    396 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 133 A.3d 81


text:
    Com. v. Brown
    12/04/2015
    443 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 442


text:
    Com. v. Brown
    12/07/2015
    667 MAL (2017)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 466


text:
    Com. v. Brown
    12/07/2015
    198 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1141


text:
    Com. v. Carothers
    12/01/2015
    327 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1123


text:
    Com. v. Dancy
    12/01/2015
    627 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 459


text:
    Com. v. Dapra
    12/10/2015
    363 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 88


text:
    Com. v. Davis
    12/07/2015
    476 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 551


text:
    Com. v. Defilippo
    12/07/2015
    305, 306 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1148


text:
    Com. v. Dejesus
    12/10/2015
    650 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 95


text:
    Com. v. Dennis
    12/16/2015
    227 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1130


text:
    Com. v. Dennison
    12/01/2015
    642 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 459


text:
    Com. v. Diehl
    12/02/2015
    291 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1149


text:
    Com. v. Ellis
    12/10/2015
    528 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 98


text:
    Com. v. Gallagher
    12/10/2015
    571 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 104


text:
    Com. v. Gey
    12/16/2015
    496 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1136


text:
    Com. v. Grant
    12/16/2015
    511 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1125


text:
    Com. v. Greece
    12/02/2015
    153 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 452


text:
    Com. v. Harris
    12/16/2015
    400 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1121


text:
    Com. v. Harrison
    12/11/2015
    518 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1118


text:
    Com. v. Homan
    12/16/2015
    532 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1129


text:
    Com. v. Hunter
    12/01/2015
    598 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 449


text:
    Com. v. J.V.S.
    12/16/2015
    591 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 436


text:
    Com. v. Johnson
    12/02/2015
    445-447 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 450


text:
    Com. v. Jones
    12/16/2015
    254 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1119


text:
    Com. v. Jones
    12/16/2015
    479 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 465


text:
    Com. v. Konopki
    12/16/2015
    395 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 454


text:
    Com. v. Leonard
    12/11/2015
    358 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 84


text:
    Com. v. McKinley
    12/01/2015
    386 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 102


text:
    Com. v. Middleton
    12/01/2015
    621 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 451


text:
    Com. v. Miller
    12/16/2015
    308 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 465


text:
    Com. v. Moore
    12/02/2015
    401 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1123


text:
    Com. v. Neppach
    12/02/2015
    256 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1123


text:
    Com. v. Noll
    12/07/2015
    604 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 446


text:
    Com. v. Parks
    12/07/2015
    485 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 450


text:
    Com. v. Quiles
    12/16/2015
    415 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 87 A.3d 884


text:
    Com. v. Robinson
    12/16/2015
    461 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 438


text:
    Com. v. Rodriguez
    12/07/2015
    486 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 458


text:
    Com. v. Rogal
    12/16/2015
    444 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 994


text:
    Com. v. Rogers
    12/02/2015
    435 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1140


text:
    Com. v. Roles
    12/01/2015
    334 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 122


text:
    Com. v. Sanchez
    10/27/2015
    286 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1058


text:
    Com. v. Schneider
    12/01/2015
    341 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1134


text:
    Com. v. Scuderi
    12/02/2015
    352 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1047


text:
    Com. v. Singleton
    12/11/2015
    523 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 96


text:
    Com. v. Smith
    12/16/2015
    383 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 101


text:
    Com. v. Talbert
    12/16/2015
    663 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 81


text:
    Com. v. Thompson
    12/07/2015
    504 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 99


text:
    Com. v. Thompson

    12/07/2015
    662 MAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied January 11, 2016.

   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 466


text:
    Com. v. Tyson
    12/01/2015
    537 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 119 A.3d 353


text:
    Com. v. Venable
    12/02/2015
    419 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 439


text:
    Com. v. Watson
    12/16/2015
    533 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1130


text:
    Com. v. Wheeler
    12/16/2015
    316 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 442


text:
    Com. v. Williams
    12/02/2015
    409 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 460


text:
    Com. v. Williams
    12/07/2015
    711 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 100


text:
    Com. v. Williams
    12/16/2015
    554 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1126


text:
    Com. v. Wilson
    12/02/2015
    263 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 111 A.3d 747


text:
    Com. v. Wloczewski
    12/16/2015
    583 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1148


text:
    Com. v. Woods
    12/16/2015
    612 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 451


text:
    Com. v. Yarsunas
    12/16/2015
    453 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 446


text:
    Com. v. Zamichieli
    12/02/2015
    441 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1135


text:
    Com. v. Zayas
    12/07/2015
    558 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 131 A.3d 95


text:
    Crock v. Craig
    12/01/2015
    375 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 450


text:
    D.E.G. v. R.A.G.
    12/01/2015
    768 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 133 A.3d 65


text:
    Fitness Essentials, L.L.C. v. Nill
    12/11/2015
    345 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1121


text:
    Guarnieri v. Guardian Warranty Corp.
    12/16/2015
    458 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1120


text:
    Estate of Jackson v. Jackson
    12/16/2015
    300 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1147


text:
    K.J., In re
    12/01/2015
    573 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 449


text:
    L.S. v. J.R.
    12/07/2015
    613 EAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 1239 EDA 2015


text:
    N.G. v. C.G.
    12/01/2015
    792 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 133 A.3d 66


text:
    Rourke v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.
    12/16/2015
    575 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 87


text:
    Willis, In re Estate of; Willis, In re

    12/01/2015
    284, 285 WAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied January 7, 2016.

   Denied

Pa.Super., — A.3d -


text:
    Wishnefsky v. Evans
    12/07/2015
    634 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 446


text:
    Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC
    12/01/2015
    762 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 124 A.3d 317


text:
    Wyse v. Leone
    12/02/2015
    251 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1118


text:
    Eastern Logistics, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Jenkins)
    12/16/2015
    669 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Frazer Tp. v. Frazer Tp. Police Ass’n
    12/01/2015
    323 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 118 A.3d 494


text:
    Gibraltar Rock, Inc. v. New Hanover Tp.; New Hanover Tp., In re
    12/16/2015
    508 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 118 A.3d 461


text:
    GAI Consultants, Inc. v. Homestead Borough; Borough of Homestead, In re
    12/11/2015
    313 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 120 A.3d 417


text:
    Jenkins v. City of Philadelphia; Greenway Plaza, LLC, In re
    12/16/2015
    519 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 122 A.3d 509


text:
    Martinez v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole
    12/01/2015
    655 MAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 1134 CD 2015


text:
    Reed v. W.C.A.B. (Allied Signal, Inc.)
    12/16/2015
    427 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 114 A.3d 464


text:
    Rivera v. W.C.A.B. (Pro Pallet, LLC)
    12/16/2015
    515 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Rule v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review
    12/07/2015
    495 EAL (2015)
   Denied


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    128 A.3d 1183
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Appellee v. D. Bruce HANES, in his Capacity as the Clerk of the Orphans’ Court of Montgomery County, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 16, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of December, 2015, the parties’ Joint Application to Discontinue Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A. 1973(a) is GRANTED. The Motion to Present Oral Argument filed by James D. Schneller, pro se, is DISMISSED as moot.


text:
    128 A.3d 1183
    In re Nancy White VENCIL. Petition of Pennsylvania State Police.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 16, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of December, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues are:

(1) Did the Superior Court err when it held that the standard of proof to be employed by the trial court in a sufficiency review hearing for a Section 302 involuntary commitment is clear and convincing evidence in light of the existing case law, and the exigent nature of Section 302 commitments?
(2) Did the Superior Court err when it held that a petitioner who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of a Section 302 involuntary commitment was entitled to a de novo review by the trial court pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2)?

The Application for Leave to File Post-Submission Communication is DENIED.


author: Chief Justice SAYLOR.

text:
    128 A.3d 1183
    DOCTOR’S CHOICE PHYSICAL MEDICINE & REHABILITATION CENTER, P.C. (LaSelva), Appellee v. TRAVELERS PERSONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Oct. 7, 2015.
    Decided Dec. 21, 2015.

      Scott B. Cooper, Esq., Schmidt Kramer, P.C., James C. Haggerty, Goldberg, Schleifer & Kupersmith, P.C., for Pennsylvania Association For Justice, Amicus Curiae.

      Thomas A. McDonnell, Esq., Summers, McDonnell, Hudock & Guthrie, P.C., Daniel L. Rivetti, Esq., Robb Leonard Mulvi-hill, L.L.P., for Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania, Inc. and Pennsylvania Defense Institute, Amici Curiae.
    Jessica Margaret Heinz, Esq., Ernest Frank Koschineg III, Esq., Cipriani & Werner, P.C., for Travelers Personal Insurance Company.
    Mary Ann Kennedy Claraval, Esq., Robert F. Claraval, Esq., Claraval & Claraval, for Doctors Choice Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Center, P.C., (LaSelva).
    SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Chief Justice SAYLOR.

This appeal concerns ongoing controversy over the availability of attorneys’ fee awards against insurance companies that have invoked the peer-review provisions of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, which also was the context of this Court’s recent decision in Herd Chiropractic Clinic v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 619 Pa. 438, 64 A.3d 1058 (2013).

In 2004, Angela LaSelva sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident. She treated with David G. Novatnak, D.C., a licensed chiropractor practicing with Appellee Doctor’s Choice Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Center, P.C. (“Provider”). Provider submitted invoices for the services directly to Ms. LaSelva’s first-party benefits insurance carrier, Appellant Travelers Personal Insurance Company (“Insurer”), as required per the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(a). See generally Herd, 619 Pa. at 440, 64 A.3d at 1060 (relating that Section 1797(a) of the MVFRL requires providers to seek remuneration directly from insurance carriers and bars provider recourse against covered patients relative to the difference between the provider’s ordinary charges and those paid by insurers).

Insurer later requested peer review through IMX Medical Management Services (“IMX”), a peer review organization (“PRO”). See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(b)(1). See generally Herd, 619 Pa. at 441, 64 A.3d at 1060 (explaining that the MVFRL establishes a process by which insurers may contest their obligations to fund treatment via implementation of a “peer review plan,” entailing contracts with “peer review organizations” approved by the Insurance Department to evaluate the reasonableness and necessity of treatment). IMX, in turn, enlisted Mark Cavallo, D.C., to conduct the peer review, and Dr. Cavallo issued a report deeming certain of the treatments provided by Dr. Novatnak to have been unnecessary. Based on this report, Insurer denied reimbursement for the treatment aspects couched as excessive.

Provider opposed this withholding and commenced a civil action against Insurer in the court of common pleas. Among other things, the complaint alleged that all treatments undertaken through Provider were reasonable and necessary and that the review conducted by IMX did not comport with the mandates of Section 1797 of the MVFRL. Furthermore, Provider asserted that IMX failed to comply with requirements of the Pennsylvania Code directing PROs to apply national or regional norms in their determinations or, where such norms do not exist, to establish written criteria to be used in conducting reviews. See 31 Pa.Code § 69.53(e). As relevant here, the complaint included a specific demand for attorneys’ fees per Section 1797(b)(6) of the MVFRL, which prescribes:

If, pursuant to paragraph (Ip), a court determines that medical treatment [was] medically necessary, the insurer must pay to the provider the outstanding amount plus interest at 12%, as well as the costs of the challenge and all attorney fees.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(b)(6) (emphasis added). Material to the present case, the cross-referenced paragraph—Section 1797(b)(4)—pertains only to court challenges of carrier with-holdings where “the insurer has not challenged [the reasonableness or necessity of treatment] before a PRO.” Id. § 1797(b)(4) (emphasis added).

After conducting a bench trial, the common pleas court entered a verdict in Provider’s favor, encompassing an award of attorneys’ fees of approximately $39,000. In its supporting analysis, the common pleas court initially expressed substantial misgivings about the peer-review process, as follows:

The peer review process established under the MVFRL has long been viewed with suspicion by our courts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has discerned that because only the insurer participates in the peer review process, any claim of neutrality is suspect. The Court stated, “the detachment and neutrality required of a fact-finder is conspicuously absent in the contractual relationship between a PRO and an insurer.” Terminato v. Pennsylvania National Ins. Co., [538 Pa. 60, 68,] 645 A.2d 1287, 1291 (1994).... The insurance company initially pays the PRO for its services and the insured plays no role in the selection process, further confirming that PROs have a strong financial incentive to appear fair in the eyes of the insurance company. As such, the Courts have determined that a PRO does not have the characteristics of an independent body for which the Legislature would seek judicial deference. [See Lehman v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 140 P.L.J. 78, 82 (C.P. Allegheny 1992) ].

Doctor’s Choice Physical Med. & Rehab. Ctr., P.C. v. Travelers Pers. Ins. Co., No. 2008 CV 16214, slip op. at 4-5, 2012 WL 11943694 (C.P. Dauphin Dec. 13, 2012). According to the court, the circumstances at hand present “a classic example of that well-founded suspicion[.]” Id. at 5.

The common pleas court then specifically rejected Dr. Ca-vallo’s report and associated opinions for various reasons, including his failure to proceed according to national or regional norms or pre-established written criteria. See, e.g., id. at 7 (“It was apparent to the Court during the trial that IMX and Dr. Cavallo had not complied with Section 69.53(e) governing PRO standards for operation, thus rendering Dr. Ca-vallo’s peer review report not only invalid but a clear abuse of the peer review procedure[;] ... likewise [the report] displayed a rather blatant disregard by IMX for even minimal safeguards for fairness and accuracy envisioned by the Act.”), Moreover, the court determined that all treatments rendered by Dr. Novatnak were reasonable and necessary in providing essential management of the pain deriving from Ms. LaSelva’s injuries.

The verdict against Insurer pre-dated the issuance of this Court’s decision in Herd, which held that Section 1797 of the MVFRL does not serve as a basis for attorneys’ fee awards on provider challenges to peer-review determinations. See Herd, 619 Pa. at 461, 64 A.3d at 1066. The carrier invoked Herd during the post-trial motions process, and, in response, the common pleas court vacated the award of attorneys’ fees. In its order, the court deemed itself bound by Herd but nonetheless took the opportunity to reiterate its position that the review conducted by Dr. Cavallo was “devoid of any validity,” such that “no valid peer review was ever accomplished.” Order dated June 21, 2013, in Doctor’s Choice, No. 2008 CV 16214, at 2. Additionally, the court opined as follows: “[T]his patently unjust result is solely within the purview of the General Assembly to remedy, and we encourage our Legislature to immediately address this matter.” Id. at 3.

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the decision to strike the fee award. See Doctor’s Choice Physical Med. & Rehab. Ctr., P.C. (LaSelva) v. Travelers Pers. Ins. Co., 92 A.3d 813 (Pa.Super.2014). Centrally, the intermediate court focused on the common pleas court’s determination that no valid peer review determination had been realized, given Dr. Cavallo’s failure to ground his analysis in national norms, regional norms, or pre-established written standards as required per Section 69.53(e) of the Pennsylvania Code. See, e.g., id. at 817-18. In such circumstance, the court reasoned, fee-shifting was required by Section 1797(b)(6), notwithstanding Herd.

The Superior Court acknowledged that, per the plain-meaning interpretation of Section 1797 applied in Herd, “only an insurer’s refusal to pay that is not based on a peer review determination under Section 1797(b) implicates [an] attorney fee award[.]” Id. at 817. Because, however, the common pleas court had determined that the review conducted by Dr. Cavallo did not comport with the statutory and regulatory requirements governing the performance of peer review, the intermediate court refused to recognize, for purposes of Section 1797(b)(4), that Insurer had “challenged [the reasonableness and necessity of treatment by Dr. Novatnak] before a PRO.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(b)(4). In this regard, the court construed the statutory term “challenged before a PRO” as necessarily “encompassing a valid completed peer review.” Doctor’s Choice, 92 A.3d at 819 (emphasis added); see also id. at 822.

In support of this construction, the Superior Court relied on Levine v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co., 69 A.3d 671, 679 (Pa.Super.2013) (holding that an insurer’s denial of payment of provider invoices based on an independent medical examination concerning a lack of causal relation of an injury to an accident did not encompass a review of the reasonableness and necessity of subsequent treatments in the nature of peer review for purposes of Section 1797). In this regard, the intermediate court read Levine very broadly as establishing that a carrier’s referral of provider invoices for contested treatment to a PRO “must result in a peer-reviewed determination upon which an insurer can rely in deciding whether to pay the bills.” Doctor’s Choice, 92 A.3d at 820. Responding to Insurer’s argument that deficiencies in peer review occasioned by a PRO should not be attributed to insurance carriers, the court admonished that “insurers are presumed to possess a full understanding of the nature of a valid peer review and its attendant procedures and requirements.” Id. at 821 (referencing 31 Pa.Code § 69.52(a) and (e)). Moreover, the court noted that carriers are uniquely positioned to hold PROs accountable for any breaches of their contracts, see id. at 822; whereas, medical services providers lack any such recourse.

Finally, the Superior Court indicated that interpreting the phrase “challenged before a PRO” in Section 1797(b)(4) to mean the simple act of advancing a challenge would be absurd. See id. at 821. The intermediate court opined, without further explanation, that such interpretation would render the remaining provisions of Section 1797 concerning the actual determinations of PROs meaningless. See id.

We allowed appeal to evaluate the correctness of the Superi- or Court’s construction that Insurer “has not challenged” the reasonableness and necessity of treatment before a PRO, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(b)(4), even though the carrier did in fact submit relevant treatment records to a PRO for peer review in a timely fashion. Our consideration is plenary. See, e.g., Six L’s Packing Co. v. WCAB (Williamson), 615 Pa. 615, 629, 44 A.3d 1148, 1157 (2012).

Presently, Insurer observes that the word “challenge” is commonly defined as “to dispute” or “to question.” Reply Brief for Appellant at 2 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 223 (7th ed.1999)). It is the carrier’s core position that it did precisely that when it submitted Provider’s invoices to a PRO for peer review. Furthermore, Insurer maintains that the Superior Court’s contrary construction of the phrase “challenged before a PRO,” as it appears in Section 1797(b)(4), conflicts squarely with this Court’s determination that “[t]here is ... simply no express statutory authorization for fee shifting on provider challenges to peer-review determinations.” Herd, 619 Pa. at 451, 64 A.3d at 1066.

From the perspective of Insurer and its amici the Pennsylvania Defense Institute and Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania, allocating the consequences of deficiencies in peer review to the insurance industry effectively requires carriers to oversee the regulatory compliance of PROs. They observe, however, that the Legislature expressly has directed such oversight responsibility to the Insurance Department. See Brief for Appellant at 18 (citing 31 Pa.Code § 69.55); accord Brief for Amici Pa. Def. Inst. & Ins. Fed’n of Pa. at 4 (“[T]he promulgation and amendment, as well as the interpretation, of regulations connected with the peer review process are within the purview of the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance which is the sole policing authority of Peer Review Organizations[.]”). Insurer also cautions that carriers must refrain from involving themselves in the review process to “avoid potentially biased peer reviews.” Brief for Appellant at 20; see also id. at 22 (“Once [Insurer] made the referral to IMX, the peer review process was out of its hands, as it should be.” (citing 31 Pa.Code § 69.55(b)(1))); Brief for Amici Pa. Def. Inst. & Ins. Fed’n of Pa. at 7 (“The Superior Court’s holding essentially punishes [Insurer] for utilizing an approved PRO, where approval can only come from the [Insurance] Department.”). In this regard, Insurer also highlights that the Pennsylvania Code requires PROs to provide a certificate of independence when applying to the Insurance Department for approval to provide peer review services. See 31 Pa.Code § 69.55(b)(1).

As to the Levine decision, Insurer distinguishes the case as entailing a scenario in which a carrier had not submitted the specific bills at issue to a PRO for review, but rather, inappropriately relied upon a prior independent medical examination to deny payment. See Levine, 69 A.3d at 679. According to Insurer, although this independent medical examination had been obtained through a PRO, this circumstance was idiosyncratic and wholly inconsequential to the decision.

Responding to criticisms lodged by Provider and its amicus of the peer review scheme, Insurer asserts that these “seek only to cloud the straightforward issue presented to this Court, namely, whether the Superior Court improperly interpreted § 1797 to allow attorneys’ fees even when an insurer has ‘challenged’ the treatment at issue before a PRO, despite the Herd holding.” Reply Brief for Appellant at 3. It is Insurer’s position that the abstract claims of bias are misdirected, as these sorts of broader systemic concerns should be raised before the political branch.

Provider, on the other hand, and its amicus the Pennsylvania Association for Justice, view fee-shifting as the norm under Section 1797 and the unavailability of fee awards upon challenges submitted to peer review as “a very narrow exception to the mandatory award of attorney fees at § 1797(b)(4) and (6).” Brief for Appellee at 11. In this vein, they find it to be entirely appropriate to deem the concept of a “challenge” within Section 1797(a)(4) as subsuming not only the submission of provider invoices to a PRO, but also a fully realized, valid peer-review determination. See, e.g., id. at 25 (“Unless all the Legislative and the Insurance Department requirements are met an analysis is not a peer review.”). Provider and its amicus reference a series of other statutes as reflecting the proposition that the term “challenge” means “submission of an issue for proper procedural review and a procedurally correct result.”

Provider and its amicus also stress that insurance companies are sophisticated entities; carriers are required to apprehend the requirements of the written analysis accomplished as a core facet of the peer review process, see 31 Pa.Code § 69.52(a); they maintain contractual relationships with PROs and can require them to perform valid peer reviews; and they have the ability to assert breach-of-contract claims if PROs deliver invalid reports which cause carriers financial harm. Consistent with the Superior Court’s rationale along these lines, Provider and its amicus emphasize that medical services providers lack any such remedy, but instead, must sue carriers.

Additionally, Provider and its amicus strongly differ with Insurer’s contention that the Superior Court’s decision places carriers in the position of regulating PROs. From their perspective, material violations of the Pennsylvania Code were apparent from the face of Dr. Cavallo’s report and were subject to ready apprehension and redress by Insurer. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 21 (“All [Insurer] had to do was a cursory review by a prudent person familiar with [applicable] [regulations to determine the report was invalid.”).

Throughout their submissions, Provider and its amicus harken back to the tone of the Terminato decision questioning the fairness of the peer review process. See, e.g., id. at 16 (“The Legislature as a matter of public policy mandated an award of attorney fees to help the health care provider when confronted with exactly the ‘scorched earth’ tactics insurance carriers use to deny payment of medical bills that are as a matter of fact reasonable and necessary.” (referencing Herd, 619 Pa. at 458-59, 64 A.3d at 1071 (Baer, J., dissenting))). It is their position that fee shifting serves as a means for counteracting bias and, more broadly, ensuring fairer peer review. See, e.g., id. at 38. Along these lines, Provider asserts that insurance companies often refuse payment as a tactic to reduce verdicts and the settlement value of personal injury cases. According to Provider, “[t]his is an extraordinary example of system failure.” Id. at 42.

In Herd, this Court explained that Pennsylvania law embodies the American rule, per which there can be no recovery of attorneys’ fees from an adverse party in litigation, absent express statutory authorization, clear agreement by the parties, or some other established exception. See Herd, 619 Pa. at 450, 64 A.3d at 1066 (citing Merlino v. Delaware Cnty., 556 Pa. 422, 425, 728 A.2d 949, 951 (1999)). Like Herd, this case centers upon whether there is “explicit” statutory authorization within Section 1797 for fee-shifting where a carrier has tendered a timely challenge to the reasonableness or necessity of treatment to a PRO. Id. at 450-51 nn. 10 & 11, 64 A.3d at 1066 nn. 10 & 11 (emphasis added). Upon review, we agree with Insurer and its amici that there is no such explicit authorization.

The Superior Court’s construction of the statutory term “challenged before a PRO” as necessarily “encompassing a valid completed peer review,” Doctor’s Choice, 92 A.3d at 819 (emphasis added), does not reflect direct application of explicit language. Along these lines, as Insurer has explained, a conventional understanding of the word “challenge” is more modest. See generally 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (explicating that, when the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, their plain meaning is the governing indication of legislative intent). Moreover, the term is otherwise plainly utilized within Section 1797 merely to signify a carrier’s submission of provider invoices to a PRO for review. See, e.g., 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(b)(1) (establishing a general rule that a “challenge” must be made to a PRO within ninety days of the insurer’s receipt of a provider’s bill for treatment or services); id. § 1797(b)(3) (delineating that, if an insurer “challenges” provider invoices within thirty days of receipt, the carrier need not tender payment pending a determination by the PRO).

Even within the four corners of Section 1797(b)(4), provider challenges and insurer challenges bear parallel treatment. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(b)(4) (“A provider of medical treatment ... may challenge before a court an insurer’s refusal to pay for past or future medical treatment ..., the reasonableness or necessity of which the insurer has not challenged before a PRO.” (emphasis added)). In either event, there simply is no express language in the statute signifying that a “challenge” necessarily encompasses ensuing, completed, valid review.

In substance, we believe that the Superior Court’s broader construction of the concept of a challenge was policy driven. However, as this Court explained in Herd:

[F]ee shifting raises a host of mixed policy considerations in and of itself, which this Court has found are best left to the General Assembly, in the absence of contractual allocation or some other recognized exception to the general, American rule. The Legislature’s failure to adjust Section 1797 over time as imperfections have been revealed by experience, while unfortunate, does not alter the functions ascribed to our respective branches of government. Accordingly, in the absence of a demonstrated constitutional infirmity, courts generally must apply plain terms of statutes as written; they are to confine their efforts to effectuate legislative intent—above and beyond the prescription of written laws—to ambiguous provisions; and they are to enforce the longstanding responsibility allocated to the pol-icymaking branch to provide for fee shifting, when it is deemed appropriate, through explicit pronouncements.

Herd, 619 Pa. at 451-52, 64 A.3d at 1066-67.

As noted above, the Superior Court also asserted, without any developed explanation, that a plain-meaning interpretation of the word “challenged” as it appears in Section 1797(b)(4) would render the remaining provisions of the statute concerning the actual determinations of PROs meaningless. See Doctor’s Choice, 92 A.3d at 821. In point of fact, however, every provision within Section 1797 addressing determinations retains meaning while according “challenge” its ordinary connotation. For example, an insurer may request a reconsideration of a PRO’s initial “determination” per Section 1797(b)(2). 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(b)(2). A carrier that initiates a challenge within 30 days need not pay provider invoices pending the “determination.” Id. at § 1797(b)(3).

In this regard, fee-shifting simply is not the overarching thrust of the enactment. Rather, this dynamic is a discrete facet, and, throughout the statute, the concept of “determination” plainly retains meaning independent of the fee-shifting inquiry. Respectfully, it is the Superior Court’s cryptic pronouncement of “absurdity” that lacks foundation.

As to the Levine decision, the dispositive analysis turned on the fact that the independent medical examination in issue concerned the causal association between an injury and an accident, not the reasonableness or necessity of later treatment. See Levine, 69 A.3d at 679. The case does not fairly stand for the broader proposition that the reasonableness and necessity of treatment is not “challenged before a PRO,” for Section 1797(a)(4) purposes, even though a carrier in fact did advance a timely challenge.

Finally, none of the statutes referenced by Provider or its amicus as examples of similar applications of the word “challenge” utilizes the term to mean a contest that is resolved properly by the body charged with making a determination. See supra note 3. Ultimately, the disposition of this appeal turns on a straightforward understanding of a “challenge” and the appreciation that “[t]here is ... simply no express statutory authorization for fee shifting on provider challenges to peer-review determinations.” Herd, 619 Pa. at 451, 64 A.3d at 1066.

This Court remains cognizant of the shortcomings of the peer-review regime. We have no reasonable means, however, of assessing the degree to which these may be offset by the benefits of cost containment and potentially lower insurance premiums available to the public at large. Rather, the Legislature is invested with the implements to conduct investigations, hearings, and open deliberations to address such salient policy matters. Accord Seebold v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 618 Pa. 632, 653, 57 A.3d 1232, 1245 (2012). In such landscape, we decline to deviate from conventional statutory interpretation to advance directed policy aims.

The order of the Superior Court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for reinstatement of the modified verdict.

Justices EAKIN, BAER, TODD and STEVENS join this opinion.

      . Act of Feb. 12, 1984, P.L. 26, No. 11 (as amended 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701-1799.7) (the "MVFRL”).

      . The principal amount of the award was approximately $28,000. Statutory interest of twelve percent was also awarded, as well as costs.

      . Brief for Appellee at 13 (citing 25 P.S. § 3146.8, 53 P.S. § 10916.1, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(e)(5), 23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(c)(3)(i), 20 Pa.C.S. § 908(a), and 77 P.S. § 774.2); Brief for Amicus Pa. Ass’n for Justice at 17 (same).

      . We recognize that, in one instance, Section 1797 utilizes the term “challenge” as a broader shorthand encompassing the services of provider attorneys in advancing and vindicating a court challenge. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(b)(6). We have previously noted, however, that Section 1797 is not clearly written throughout. See Herd, 619 Pa. at 451, 64 A.3d at 1066. Given the strict principle of statutory interpretation applicable to fee shifting, however, ambiguities militate in Insurer's favor here. Accordingly, the unconventional usage of the concept of a challenge in Section 1797(b)(6) does not impact its more ordinary application in the previous subsections of the statute or otherwise segue into an explicit authorization of attorneys' fees in scenarios in which carriers have commenced timely peer-review challenges.

      . In any event, the intermediate-court decision in Levine is not binding upon this Court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sneed, 587 Pa. 318, 330 n, 12, 899 A.2d 1067, 1075 n. 12 (2006).

      . While the portrait depicted by Provider and its amicus spotlights the legitimate concern about unscrupulous insurers, it downplays the phenomena of unnecessary medical services and overbilling which, unfortunately, are also salient considerations in any balanced public-policy debate. The adjudicatory system, operating as it does on conventions such as decision-making by a mere preponderance of the evidence to facilitate the resolution of discrete civil controversies, is ill equipped to render broader legislative-type judgments with large-scale consequences.


author: Justice EAKIN. Chief Justice SAYLOR,

text:
    128 A.3d 1191
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Raymond W. FARABAUGH, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 8, 2015.
    Decided Dec. 21, 2015.

      SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice EAKIN.

The Commonwealth appeals from the Superior Court’s order finding appellee Raymond Farabaugh is not required to register as a sexual offender. Upon review, we are constrained to reverse.

In 2011, appellee pled guilty to indecent assault, graded as a second-degree misdemeanor. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(8), (b)(1). On June 28, 2011, the trial court sentenced him to two years probation; at the time of sentencing, the law did not require appellee to register as a sexual offender. Later that year, amendments to Megan’s Law added crimes to the list defined as sexually violent offenses, and established a three-tiered system for classifying such offenses and their corresponding registration periods. See Act of December 20, 2011, P.L. 446, No. 111, § 12 (effective December 20, 2012) (Megan’s Law IV). The 2011 amendments became effective December 20, 2012; they applied to individuals who, as of that date, were convicted of a sexually violent offense and were incarcerated, on probation or parole, or subject to intermediate punishment. See id. (codified as amended at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13). Thus, appellee was subject to the reporting and registration requirements, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(2), and, as a Tier-II sexual offender, id., § 9799.14(c)(1.3), was required to register for 25 years, id., § 9799.15(a)(2).

After Megan’s Law IV went into effect, appellee filed a “Petition to Enforce Plea Bargain/Habeas Corpus,” arguing that ordering him to comply with the new registration and reporting requirements violated his plea agreement and various state and federal constitutional provisions. The trial court denied the petition, and appellee appealed to the Superior Court.

On March 14, 2014, while the appeal was pending in the Superior Court, after the parties had submitted their briefs, the governor signed Act 19 into law, amending the provisions of Megan’s Law again; the Act was effective immediately and made retroactive to December 20, 2012. See Act of March 14, 2014, P.L. 41, No. 19, §§ 7-8. Relevant to this appeal, Act 19 added the following provision, in pertinent part: “For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘sexually violent offense’ ... shall not include ... [a] conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. § 8126 (relating to indecent assault) where the crime is graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree.” Id., § 3 (codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(3.1)(ii)(B)).

The Superior Court panel sua sponte addressed Act 19, holding the above language exempted appellee from the requirements of Megan’s Law. The panel interpreted paragraph (3.1) as excluding convictions of indecent assault as a second-degree misdemeanor from every class of registrants in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13. Thus, the panel reasoned appellee “effectively never was[] subject to the Megan’s Law registration requirements” because Act 19 was made retroactive to December 20, 2012—the effective date of Megan’s Law IV, which appellee was challenging. Commonwealth v. Farabaugh, No. 1198 WDA 2013, unpublished memorandum at 4, 105 A.3d 36 (Pa.Super. filed June 17, 2014). As a result, the panel determined appellee’s constitutional issues were moot, vacated the trial court’s order, and remanded.

The Commonwealth filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal, and we granted review of the following question:

Whether the Superior Court erred, while acting sua sponte, when it incorrectly found that new amendments to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13 excluded the crime of [ijndecent [a]ssault (18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(8)) from list [sic] of mandated sex offender registry crimes.

Commonwealth v. Farabaugh, 629 Pa. 312, 105 A.3d 655 (2014) (per curiam) (alterations in original); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 724. As this issue involves statutory construction, which is a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Stotelmyer, 631 Pa. 213, 110 A.3d 146, 149 (2015) (citation omitted). “The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id., § 1921(b).

The General Assembly passed Act 19 in response to this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 624 Pa. 53, 84 A.3d 603, 605 (2013), which struck down prior amendments to Megan’s Law because the act in which they were contained violated the single-subject rule, Pa. Const. art. III, § 3. See generally Act of March 14, 2014, P.L. 41, No. 19, § 1 (codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(b)(3)) (“It is the intention of the General Assembly to address the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 624 Pa. 53, 84 A.3d 603 (2013), by amending this subchapter in [Act 19].”). As amended by Act 19, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13 is composed of 15 paragraphs, two of which are relevant for this appeal— paragraph (2) and paragraph (3.1), which provide:

The following individuals shall register with the Pennsylvania State Police ... and otherwise comply with the provisions of this subchapter:
(2) An individual who, on or after the effective date of this section, is, as a result of a conviction for a sexually violent offense, an inmate in a State or county correctional institution of this Commonwealth, including a community corrections center or a community contract facility, is being supervised by the Pennsylvania Board of Proba tion and Parole or county probation or parole, is subject to a sentence of intermediate punishment or has supervision transferred pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Supervision in accordance with section 9799.19(g).
* * *
(3.1) The following:
(i) An individual who between January 23, 2005, and December 19, 2012, was:
(A) convicted of a sexually violent offense;
(B) released from a period of incarceration resulting from a conviction for a sexually violent offense; or
(C) under the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole or county probation or parole as a result of a conviction for a sexually violent offense.
(ii) For purposes of this paragraph, the term “sexually violent offense ” shall have the meaning set forth in section 9799.12 (relating to definitions), except that it shall not include:
(B) A conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126 (relating to indecent assault) where the crime is graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree or where the conviction occurred between January 22, 2006, and January 1, 2007, when the crime is graded as a felony of the third degree.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(2), (3.1) (emphasis added).

The parties agree that appellee meets the criteria of both paragraph (2) and paragraph (3.1). See Appellee’s Brief, at 11; Commonwealth’s Brief, at 18-19. The Commonwealth argues the Superior Court panel erred in interpreting paragraph (3.1) as excluding appellee’s conviction from every class of registrants in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13, including paragraph (2); indecent assault convictions are excluded only from the class of registrants in paragraph (3.1), and because appellee is a paragraph (2) registrant, the panel erred in holding he does not have to comply with Megan’s Law.

The exclusion of indecent assault from the term “sexually violent offense ” applies only “[f]or purposes of this paragraph [.] ” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(3.1)(ii) (emphasis added). As the Commonwealth points out, “paragraph” is a technical term that must be analyzed and defined according to its “peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903. In this regard, the Commonwealth cites 101 Pa.Code § 23.26, which provides: “Whenever internal divisions are necessary, ... paragraphs [shall be identified] by Arabic numerals ... contained within parentheses[.]” Id. The Commonwealth urges the Court to interpret § 9799.13 consistently with the manner in which we interpreted “paragraph” in Rump v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 551 Pa. 339, 710 A.2d 1093, 1096-97 (1998).

Additionally, the Commonwealth argues the two paragraphs do not conflict. It construes paragraph (3.1) as applying only to “offenders (1) whose convictions occurred during the enumerated Megan’s Law III time period and (2) who are not also still subject to imprisonment or supervision as of December 20, 2012.” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 18. “This interpretation is in accord with the express intent of Act 19,” the Commonwealth contends, “which was to respond to the Neiman decision—not to more generally limit [the] retroactive application” of the registration and reporting requirements. Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(b)(3)). But, if we were to determine there is a conflict, the Commonwealth argues the paragraphs are reconcilable. Specifically, while some offenders, like appellee, meet the criteria for paragraph (2) and paragraph (3.1), the Commonwealth asserts “mere overlap between provisions of a statute[,] without more[,] does not mean the paragraphs are irreconcilable.” Id., at 19 (citing Cedarbrook Realty, Inc. v. Nahill, 484 Pa. 441, 399 A.2d 374, 383 (1979) (“[A] showing] that the two statutory schemes are different and may be overlapping ... does not amount to irreconcilability under Pennsylvania law.”)).

Appellee first argues this Court’s decision in Neiman “was not the sole purpose of Act 19” because Act 19 made two additional changes to Megan’s Law. Appellee’s Brief, at 7 (“[A] ... loophole was closed ... [and] credit was given to offenders who were required to register prior to [Act 19] for the time periods upon which they had registered before the passage of [Act 19].” (citations omitted)). Appellee posits that because he fits the criteria of paragraph (2) and paragraph (3.1), the provisions are in conflict, and the conflict is irreconcilable. Therefore, appellee argues paragraph (3.1) should be construed as an exception to the general rule in paragraph (2), because paragraph (3.1) is more specific and was enacted after paragraph (2), and nothing suggests the legislature intended for paragraph (2) to control. Id., at 11 (quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933) (“If the conflict between [ ] two provisions is irreconcilable, the special provisions shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted later and it shall be the manifest intention of the General Assembly that such general provisions shall prevail.”).

Appellee contends the Commonwealth’s interpretation of § 9799.13 would require this Court to read words into the statute. Id., at 12 (“The key language missing from [paragraph] (3.1) would state that individuals who were subject to imprisonment and supervision and who’s [sic] imprisonment and supervision has ended prior to December 19, 2012[,] would be exempt under [paragraph] (3.1).”). Finally, appellee argues that ruling for the Commonwealth would have two unintended consequences. First, appellee claims it would “put individuals like [a]ppellee in a separate and distinct class from individuals who were convicted of [i]ndecent [a]ssault as [a misdemeanor of the [s]econd [d]egree during the pendency of Megan’s Law III but were not require [sic] to register.” Id., at 18. Second, appellee claims the Commonwealth’s interpretation of paragraph (2) would mandate registration “but for the continued supervision or imprisonment of the individual[,]” which he asserts would “eradieat[e]” this Court’s holding that Megan’s Law registration and reporting requirements are a collateral, civil consequence of a criminal conviction. Id., at 18-19 (citing Commonwealth v. Leidig, 598 Pa. 211, 956 A.2d 399 (2008)).

To understand the meaning of the “for purposes of this paragraph” language “entails an understanding of how the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes are arranged.” Rump, at 1096. Most statutes are “subdivided into subsections, paragraphs, subparagraphs, and other such minor subdivisions as may be required for clarity of expression and uniformity of style.” Id. (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 301(c)). Section 23.26 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Style Manual, 101 Pa. Code §§ 21.1 et seq., titled “Internal divisions of sections,” provides:

Whenever internal divisions are necessary, subsections shall be identified by lower case letters, paragraphs by Arabic numerals, subparagraphs by lower case Roman numerals, clauses by capital letters and subclauses by capital Roman numerals, all contained within parentheses, as follows:
Terminology Ilhistrative Symbol
Subsection (a)
Paragraph (1)
Subparagraph (i)
Clause (A)
Subelause (I)

Id., § 23.26 (emphasis added). Moreover, “we must assume that the General Assembly knew what a paragraph meant in terms of constructing a statutory provision[.]” Rump, at 1097.

Based on these principles, we hold the Superior Court erred in finding Act 19 excluded appellee from registering as a sexual offender. It is clear that provision (3.1) of § 9799.13 is “a paragraph since it is illustrated by an Arabic numeral.” Id. If the legislature intended the paragraph (3.1) exception to apply to each class of registrants in § 9799.13, it would have used the phrase “for purposes of this section>” but that is not what the statute says, and we may not read words into an unambiguous statutory provision. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). The phrase “for purposes of this paragraph” demonstrates the exclusion applies only to paragraph (3.1), as the word “paragraph” in this context is a technical term with a specific meaning. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903.

We reject appellee’s contention that paragraph (2) and paragraph (3.1) are irreconcilable. Paragraph (2) applies to individuals, like appellee, who were still serving sentences on December 20, 2012, whereas paragraph (3.1) pertains to individuals who were convicted, released from prison, or were on probation or parole between January 23, 2005, and December 19, 2012—the day before the effective date of Megan’s Law IV and Act 19. Accordingly, we hold the second-degree-misdemeanor-indecent-assault exception applies only to paragraph (3.1); thus, the Superior Court erred in concluding appellee did not have to comply with the reporting and registration requirements of Megan’s Law.

Order reversed; case remanded to the Superior Court to address the issues appellee preserved for appeal; jurisdiction relinquished.

Chief Justice SAYLOR and Justices BAER, TODD and STEVENS join the opinion.

Chief Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion in which Justice TODD joins.

Chief Justice SAYLOR,

concurring.

I join the majority opinion and write, in particular, to elaborate on the genesis of paragraph (3.1), which I find to be especially relevant.

Initially, the majority concludes (correctly in my view) that paragraphs (2) and (3.1) are not in conflict, as the restricted definition of “sexually violent offense” only applies within the context of the latter. See generally Cedarbrook Realty, Inc. v. Nahill, 484 Pa. 441, 459, 399 A.2d 374, 383 (1979) (explaining that two provisions are only irreconcilable if they cannot operate concurrently). This, however, raises the question of why the General Assembly would employ a specialized and limited definition of sexually violent offense for paragraph (3.1) only, and not for paragraph (2). To understand the Legislature’s motivation in this regard, it is helpful to review a portion of the history of Megan’s Law in Pennsylvania as it relates to this case.

As the majority observes, Act 19 of 2014 was intended, in substantial part, to account for the circumstance that, in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 624 Pa. 53, 84 A.3d 603 (2013), this Court invalidated Act 152 of 2004 (“Megan’s Law III”) predicated on a single-subject violation. See id. at 75, 84 A.3d at 616; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(b)(3) (setting forth Act 19’s legislative intent with regard to Neiman). See generally Majority Opinion, at 19, 128 A.3d at 1193. Megan’s Law III, in turn, had required registration by persons convicted of indecent assault under Section 3126 of the Crimes Code, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126, but only where the offense was graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree. See Act of Nov. 24, 2004, P.L. 1243, No. 152, § 8, codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(a)(1) (expired December 20, 2012, per 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.41).

The December 20, 2012 expiration date for such provision was imposed by Megan’s Law IV, also known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, see Act of Dec. 20, 2011, P.L. 446, No. 111 (as amended 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41) (“SORNA”), the relevant portion of which became effective one year after enactment, on December 20, 2012. See id. § 18(2). Although Neiman was decided after Section 9795.1 expired, absent Act 19 Neiman would have interfered with one of SORNA’s objectives, namely, to place Pennsylvania into compliance with the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10 (relating to purposes of subchapter). See generally In re J.B., 630 Pa. 408, 411-13, 107 A.3d 1, 3 (2014). It would have done so by retroactively eliminating the registration periods for certain offenders under Megan’s Law III—including individuals subject to Section 9795.1—which in turn were extended by SORNA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a) (imposing lengthy registration periods for Tier I, II and III sexual offenders); id. § 9799.14 (reflecting that indecent assault is a Tier I, II, or III offense depending on which subsection of Section 3126 is involved); cf. id. § 9799.15(a.1) (providing credit for time registered prior to December 20, 2012). Thus, the Legislature faced a situation in which Neiman invalidated a statute which had already expired and been replaced, but whose effects remained beyond its expiration date—in the form of prior registration periods which had to continue in existence in order to be extended by SORNA. Inasmuch as the Assembly could do nothing to restore the now-expired Megan’s Law III as such, it enacted legislation designed to continue in force SORNA registration requirements for offenders whose registration periods began during Megan Law Ill’s governance.

Notably, Section 9795.1 went into effect on January 23, 2005. See Megan’s Law III § 19(5). Thus, because the ten-year registration requirement under Section 8 of Megan’s Law III was imposable between January 23, 2005 and December 19, 2012—the day before Section 9795.1 expired—it seems evident the General Assembly sought to preserve the effect of that provision via the specific wording of paragraph (3.1)— which by its terms applies to anyone who, during that interval, was convicted of a sexually violent offense or under probationary or parole supervision as a result of the conviction of a sexually violent offense. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(3.1)(i). Moreover, since Section 8 of Megan’s Law III, as it pertains to individuals convicted of indecent assault, only encompasses convictions graded as first-degree misdemeanors, the legislative effort to preserve Megan’s Law III registrants as SOR-NA registrants required a restricted definition of “sexually violent offense” for purposes of paragraph (3.1)—namely, one which would exclude persons convicted of indecent assault graded as a second-degree misdemeanor, since those individuals would not have been required to register under Megan’s Law III.

Paragraph (2) stands on a different footing, as it was included in Section 9799.13 at the time SORNA was enacted. Thus, the legislative goal as it pertains to paragraph (2) did not relate to recovering registration periods that would otherwise have been lost due to Neiman—as, indeed, it was enacted two years before Neiman was decided. Rather, paragraph (2) must also be understood in light of SORNA’s stated purposes which, as noted, are set forth at Section 9799.10, 42 Pa.C.S. These include, not only bringing Pennsylvania into substantial compliance with the Adam Walsh Act, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10(1), but more particularly, “requiring] individuals who are currently ... supervised with respect to probation or parole or registrants under this subchapter to register with the Pennsylvania State Police ....” Id. § 9799.10(4) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the temporal targeting of paragraph (2) is couched in terms of individuals under supervision “on or after the effective date of this section [i.e., December 20, 2012].” Id. § 9799.13(2) (emphasis added). Because paragraph (2) was included in Section 9799.13 at the time SORNA was enacted, it incorporates SORNA’s general definition of “sexually violent offense” and—unlike with paragraph (3.1)— there is no need to alter that definition for a special, historical purpose.

Justice TODD joins this concurring opinion.

      . The panel noted appellee waived three other issues for failing to raise them in the trial court. Id., at 3-4 & n. 2.

      . Section 9799.13 is not divided into subsections. See 101 Pa.Code § 23.26 (“Internal divisions of sections,” discussed infra).

      . However, the legislature’s express statement of intent was to the contrary. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(b)(3) (“It is the intention of the General Assembly to address the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 624 Pa. 53, 84 A.3d 603 (2013), by amending this subchapter in [Act 19].”).

      . Parenthetically, it defies logic that the legislature would exclude all convictions for 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(8) from every class of registrants in § 9799.13, when that crime continues to be listed as a Tier-II sexual offense, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(c)(1.3).

      . Further, paragraph (3.2), which also was added by Act 19, refers to "paragraph (3.1),” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(3.2), thereby buttressing the conclusion that the legislature intended the indecent-assault exclusion to apply only to paragraph (3.1), not the entire section.

      . To the extent Appellee suggests paragraph (3.1) "is applicable” but he is then affirmatively "removed from” its scope, Brief for Appellee at 11—thereby purportedly creating a conflict with paragraph (2)—I believe such characterization is misleading. To my mind, paragraph (3.1) is not "applicable” at all due to its restricted definition of "sexually violent offense.”

      . Act 19 was passed two days before the expiration of Neiman’s grace period pursuant to which the invalidation of Megan’s Law III was suspended for 90 days. See Neiman, 624 Pa. at 75, 84 A.3d at 616.


text:
    128 A.3d 1199
    Gregory KINNARD Jr., Petitioner v. Kelly LAWVER, Adams County Clerk of Courts, Respondent.
    No. 168 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 21, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the “Emergency Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto Complaint” is DENIED.


text:
    128 A.3d 1199
    Juan VILLANUEVA, Petitioner v. Judge Bruce F. BRATTON and Stephen E. Farina, Prothonotary, Respondents.
    No. 170 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 21, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED. The Prothonota-ry is DIRECTED to strike the name of the jurist from the caption.


text:
    128 A.3d 1199
    Sarah E. SMITH, Petitioner v. “Judge” Joy Reynolds McCOY, Respondent.
    No. 171 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 21, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto and the Application for Appointment of Counsel are DENIED. The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to strike the name of the jurist from the caption.


text:
    128 A.3d 1200
    Gregory POWELL, Petitioner v. The COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 128 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 21, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief are DISMISSED. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 537 Pa. 167, 642 A.2d 453 (1994) (explaining that hybrid representation is not permitted). The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to forward the filings to counsel of record.


text:
    128 A.3d 1200
    Mr. Jason PARKER, pro se, Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
    No. 137 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 21, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2015, the Application for Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    128 A.3d 1200
    The JEWISH HOME OF EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH and Pennsylvania Health Policy Board, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 21, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2015, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    128 A.3d 1201
    Harold HOWARD, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 21, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2015, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    128 A.3d 1201
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Mr. Jason PARKER, Petitioner.
    No. 136 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 21, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Petition is GRANTED, and the Application for an Immediate Hearing and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are DENIED.


text:
    128 A.3d 1201
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. TAP PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS, INC.; Abbott Laboratories; Astrazeneca PLC; Astrazeneca, Holdings, Inc.; Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals LP; Astrazeneca LP; Bayer AG; Bayer Corporation; SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline; Pfizer, Inc.; Pharmacia Corporation; Johnson & Johnson; Alza Corporation; Centrocor, Inc.; Ethicon, Inc.; Janssen Pharmaceutical Products, L.P.; McNeil-PPC, Inc.; Ortho Biotech, Inc.; Ortho Biotech Products; L.P.; Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc.; Amgen, Inc.; Immunex Corporation; Bristol-Myers Squibb Company; Baxter International Inc.; Baxter Healthcare Corporation; Immuno-U.S., Inc.; Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Aventis Behring, L.L.C.; Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Boehringer Ingelheim Corporation; Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Ben Venue Laboratories; Bedford Laboratories; Roxane Laboratories; Schering-Plough Corporation; Warrick Pharmaceuticals Corporation; Schering Sales Corporation; Dey, Inc., Appellees. Donna A. Boswell, Esq., Ann M. Vickery, Esq., and Joseph A. Young, Esq., Intervenors. Cross Appeal of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (@ 21 MAP 2015).
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 21, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2015, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.

Justice STEVENS did not participate in the decision of this case.


text:
    128 A.3d 1202
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. TAP PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS, INC.; Abbott Laboratories; Astrazeneca PLC; Astrazeneca, Holdings, Inc.; Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals LP; Astrazeneca LP; Bayer AG; Bayer Corporation; SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline; Pfizer, Inc.; Pharmacia Corporation; Johnson & Johnson; Alza Corporation; Centrocor, Inc.; Ethicon, Inc.; Janssen Pharmaceutical Products, L.P.; McNeil-PPC, Inc.; Ortho Biotech, Inc.; Ortho Biotech Products; L.P.; Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc.; Amgen, Inc.; Immunex Corporation; Bristol-Myers Squibb Company; Baxter International Inc.; Baxter Healthcare Corporation; Immuno-U.S., Inc.; Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Aventis Behring, L.L.C.; Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Boehringer Ingelheim Corporation; Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Ben Venue Laboratories; Bedford Laboratories; Roxane Laboratories; Schering-Plough Corporation; Warrick Pharmaceuticals Corporation; Schering Sales Corporation; Dey, Inc., Appellees. Donna A. Boswell, Esq., Ann M. Vickery, Esq., and Joseph A. Young, Esq., Intervenors. Cross Appeal of Johnson & Johnson, Alza Corporation, Centocor, Inc., Ethicon, Inc., Janssen Pharmaceutical Products, L.P., McNeil-PPC, Inc., Ortho Biotech, Inc., Ortho Biotech Products, L.P., and Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. (Collectively, the “Johnson & Johnson Defendants”) (@ 20 MAP 2015).
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Dec. 21, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2015, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.

Justice STEVENS did not participate in the decision of this case.