author: Justice EAKIN. Chief Justice SAYLOR,

text:
    131 A.3d 467
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Wayne A. SMITH, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Nov. 18, 2014.
    Decided Dec. 21, 2015.

      William Patrick Wismer, Esq., for Wayne A. Smith.
    William R. Toal III, Esq., John Joseph Whelan, Esq., Delaware County District Attorney’s Office, Amy Zapp, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice EAKIN.

Appellant appeals from the judgment of sentence of death imposed by a jury following the grant of a new penalty-phase hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

On November 18, 1994, Eileen Jones and appellant went to appellant’s nephew to borrow a car; the nephew gave him the keys, and appellant and Jones left together in the car. Appellant returned the car later that evening.

The next afternoon, appellant told his brother he murdered Jones in a nearby park by choking her with his hands and belt. Jones’s body was discovered November 22, 1994; the county medical examiner concluded the death was homicide by strangulation. After a search of appellant’s home, police officers recovered several newspapers from which articles regarding the recovery of Jones’s body had been removed.

Appellant was given Miranda warnings and waived his rights. He stated he borrowed his nephew’s car to purchase drugs, and Jones agreed to have sex with him in exchange for the drugs. Appellant and Jones went to a park, and appellant attempted to have sex with her. Appellant stated he choked Jones to death because he was concerned she would accuse him of rape. He disposed of her body in a nearby creek.

A jury found appellant guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Appellant appealed, and this Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence. Commonwealth v. Smith, 548 Pa. 65, 694 A.2d 1086, 1096 (1997). Appellant then filed a pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq., and counsel was appointed. Following a hearing, the PCRA court denied the petition. We affirmed the denial of guilt-phase relief, but vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty-phase hearing on the grounds that counsel provided ineffective assistance. Commonwealth v. Smith, 606 Pa. 127, 995 A.2d 1143, 1173 (2010). At that 2012 penalty-phase hearing, a jury sentenced appellant to death after finding the aggravating circumstance of a prior voluntary-manslaughter conviction, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(12), outweighed the mitigating circumstances of appellant’s emotional distress, id., § 9711(e)(2), and abusive childhood, id., § 9711(e)(8). Appellant timely appealed to this Court, raising the following claims of error:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying [ajppellant’s motion to bar the death penalty, after a delay of some 17 years, brought on ineffective assistance of counsel, during which valuable information was lost and defense witnesses died[.]
II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of [ajppellant’s prior homicide conviction[.j
III. Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony that [ajppellant read books on murder and how to commit the perfect crime[.j
IV. Whether the trial court erred in denying [ajppellant a mistrial where the Commonwealth expert witness told the jury that [ajppellant had been found guilty and place[d] on death row[.j
V. Whether the trial court erred in ordering the jury to resume deliberations after the jury stated it was unable to reach a unanimous verdictf.j
VI. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing [ajppel-lant to ask prospective jurors whether they could consider life imprisonment knowing [a]ppellant had been convicted of a prior homicide[.]

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

I. Motion to Bar the Death Penalty

Appellant contends the trial court committed legal error and abused its discretion by denying his pre-trial motion to bar the death penalty. He notes 17 years have passed from his May 1995 conviction to final sentencing in June of 2012, which, he argues, violated his rights to due process and a speedy trial. Further, he argues this delay amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellant states several of his potential witnesses died between the 2002 PORA proceedings and the 2012 new penalty-phase hearing. Moreover, appellant asserts Detective Lawrence Crews, who investigated the victim’s death in appellant’s 1980 voluntary-manslaughter case, could not recall certain facts regarding that conviction, depriving him of details which would have been helpful to the defense.

The trial court found appellant’s argument was a matter of first impression and looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. Specifically, the trial court looked to State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994 (Ind.2007), where the Supreme Court of Indiana applied the balancing test used by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), to determine whether the defendant’s rights to a speedy trial and due process were violated. In Azania, the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but the case was remanded for a new penalty-phase hearing. Azania, at 997. At the new penalty-phase hearing, 13 years after conviction, the jury returned a death sentence, which was affirmed. Id. The death sentence was again vacated, and, at the new penalty-phase hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to bar the death penalty. Id. The state appealed. Id.

The Supreme Court of Indiana, applying the Barker test, held the 13-year delay did not prejudice the defendant or violate his due process rights. See Azania, at 1005, 1010. The court noted any prejudice suffered by the defendant due to the passage of time did not rise to the level of violating due process. Id., at 1010. The defendant had the opportunity to present evidence, and the jury could consider any impact the passage of time had on a witness’s ability to testify.

Here, the trial court likewise applied Barker, and found the delay did not prejudice appellant or violate his due process rights. Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/13, at 6-12. The court focused much of its analysis on the fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant.

Addressing appellant’s claim that he was prejudiced by the delay because multiple witnesses died through the passage of time, the court found he did “not specify which [potential witnesses] would have testified ... on his behalf.” Id., at 8. Further, appellant did not describe any additional testimony they would have provided to assist him. Id. The court noted the testimony of these individuals was preserved by transcripts, which were read to the jury. Id. “[Without more specific allegations as to what testimony was eliminated by the passage of time, the mere general allegation that the read transcripts from prior testimony was not as powerful as live testimony is insufficient to establish sufficient prejudice to [appellant].” Id., at 8-9.

The trial court also addressed appellant’s claim that witnesses could not recall helpful details regarding his 1980 voluntary manslaughter conviction. See N.T. Sentencing, 6/18/12, at 80-82. Specifically, Detective Crews could not recall specific actions he took during that investigation. See id., at 87-88. The court concluded appellant again did not offer any specific mitigating information that was not provided by Detective Crews’s testimony. Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/18, at 10. Appellant merely claims the detective’s loss of memory prejudiced him, without discussing how any unstated information would have benefited the defense.

The trial court made the same conclusion regarding the testimony of Sonya Rollins, the sister of the victim in the 1980 homicide. In particular, Rollins could not recall specifics surrounding her brother’s death. See N.T. Sentencing, 6/18/12, 46-47, 50, 58-59. The court held a more “vivid recollection of the more horrific aspects of the underlying crime” would not have “assisted [appellant] in any manner.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/13, at 10. Appellant made no specific arguments regarding any mitigating evidence that was lost, and the court found no prejudice.

The trial court also found appellant’s complaint that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated was without merit, holding “the Eight[h] Amendment does not protect against delaying a sentence of death because those delays are designed to afford a defendant his constitutional right to appeal and cannot become grounds for an additional appealable issue.” Id., at 10-11 (citing People v. Simms, 192 Ill.2d 348, 249 Ill.Dec. 654, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1141 (2000)). The court noted appellant invoked his right to appeal and continued those appeals on multiple occasions. Id., at 12. “Therefore, [appellants complaint that the delay in his sentencing violates his due process rights, as well as his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments is unsubstantiated.” Id.

After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s decision regarding this issue. Prior testimony was preserved, absences and lapses in memory have not been shown to involve identifiable exculpatory, mitigating, or even helpful information, and in the end, appellant has not demonstrated legal prejudice. A question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Brown, 617 Pa. 107, 52 A.3d 1139, 1162 (2012) (citations omitted). Upon such review, we affirm the determinations and ruling of the trial court.

Additionally, appellant asserts he was prejudiced by the length of time he has spent on death row. Appellant has been on death row for over 18 years, and he argues his time spent there waiting to be executed constitutes a “wanton infliction of harm in violation of the Eight[h] Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Appellant’s Brief, at 18.

Appellant relies only on a dissenting statement by Justice Breyer in Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991-93, 123 S.Ct. 470, 154 L.Ed.2d 359 (U.S.2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). There, the Court denied certiorari when a deathrow inmate claimed the 27 years he served in prison awaiting his execution amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Id., at 990, 991-92, 123 S.Ct. 470. Justice Breyer, dissenting from the Court’s denial of certiorari, noted if the inmate was executed, he would have been “punished both by death and also by more than a generation spent in death row’s twilight.” Id., at 993, 123 S.Ct. 470.

This Court has rejected the notion that excessive delays in carrying out a death sentence constitute cruel and unusual punishment, opining an “appellant must show that the delay was a deliberate tactical move in bad faith by the Commonwealth and that he was prejudiced by it in order to establish a denial of due process.” Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 532 A.2d 385, 388 n. 2 (1987). Appellant has filed numerous appeals and has failed to produce any evidence that the challenged delay was a tactical move the Commonwealth made in bad faith. Therefore, the trial court appropriately denied appellant’s motion to bar the death penalty.

II. Evidence of Appellant’s Prior Voluntary-Manslaughter Conviction

In 1980, Rollins witnessed appellant fatally stab her brother, George Sutton. Appellant pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in admitting evidence of that case, arguing he was prejudiced by the presentation of facts and circumstances behind that conviction. Specifically, he claims “the Commonwealth agreed at the time of conviction, presumably after thoroughly investigating the matter, that [voluntary [mjanslaughter was appropriate. To present evidence now that demonstrated a brutal, unprovoked and malicious killing, a crime much worse than that agreed to by the Commonwealth, is simply not fair.” Appellant’s Brief, at 20.

In a capital case, the trial court is required to instruct the jury regarding the aggravating circumstances specified in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d), for which there is some evidence, id., § 9711(c)(1)(i). One of the aggravating circumstances included in subsection (d) is whether “[t]he defendant has been convicted of voluntary manslaughter ... committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.” Id., § 9711(d)(12). Appellant does not contend the trial court should have kept the voluntary-manslaughter conviction from the jury. Rather, he argues the underlying facts of his voluntary-manslaughter conviction should have been withheld from the jury.

This Court, in Commonwealth v. Beasley, 505 Pa. 279, 479 A.2d 460 (1984), stated:

Consideration of prior “convictions” was not intended to be a meaningless and abstract ritual, but rather a process through which a jury would gain considerable insight into a defendant’s character. The nature of an offense, as ascertained through examination of the circumstances concomitant to its commission, has much bearing upon the character of a defendant, and, indeed, without reference to those facts and circumstances, consideration of “convictions” would be a hollow process, yielding far less information about a defendant’s character than is relevant.
Convictions are defined by the essential and necessary facts upon which they are based, and judgments of sentence flow naturally from, and form an integral part of those convictions. Thus, reason impels that the construction of the term “convictions” ... permitís] consideration of the essential and necessary facts pertaining to the convictions, including the circumstances of the crimes and the sentences imposed.

Id., at 465.

Further, “the jury not only should, but indeed must know more than the mere fact of conviction if it is to carry out its sentencing role properly.” Commonwealth v. Flor, 606 Pa. 384, 998 A.2d 606, 623 (2010) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Rios, 591 Pa. 583, 920 A.2d 790, 814 (2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Marshall, 537 Pa. 336, 643 A.2d 1070, 1074 (1994)); Commonwealth v. Young, 536 Pa. 57, 637 A.2d 1313, 1320 (1993).

The admissibility of evidence is “within the sound discretion of the trial court ... [and we] will not reverse a trial court’s decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.” Flor, at 623 (citations omitted).

The voluntary-manslaughter conviction was the basis for an aggravating circumstance being pursued by the Commonwealth under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(12). As there are countless scenarios that could comprise this crime, the jury should know the facts behind the conviction to appropriately balance the (d)(12) aggravator against any mitigating circumstances; without the basic facts, the jury is short-changed. We And the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence.

III. Testimony About Appellant Reading Homicide Books

Appellant contends “the trial court erred in allowing evidence that around the time of the 1980 homicide of George Sutton, [a]ppellant read certain books” about homicide and how to commit the perfect crime. Appellant’s Brief, at 21. Specifically, appellant asserts the evidence had no probative value and was “extremely prejudicial.” Id., at 24. Appellant, however, did not raise his objections at trial.

“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). The record reveals appellant did not object when the trial court announced its ruling on the Commonwealth’s motions in li- mine regarding this evidence. See N.T. Sentencing, 6/18/12, at 4-14. Further, no objections were made during the penalty-phase hearing when the Commonwealth introduced the evidence. See id., at 38-46. Accordingly, this issue is waived.

IV. Motion for Mistrial

Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after Dr. John O’Brien, a Commonwealth witness, testified at the penalty-phase hearing that appellant had been previously convicted and sentenced to death. Appellant asserts he was prejudiced by this testimony because it signaled to the jury that he was already convicted and sentenced to death by an earlier jury. Further, he asserts Dr. O’Brien intentionally made the statement about being on death row to prejudice him.

Dr. O’Brien was asked questions regarding appellant’s prior diagnoses for depression and anxiety. N.T. Sentencing, 6/21/12, at 258-59. The prosecutor asked Dr. O’Brien, “[Y]ou have heard that [appellant] has been diagnosed with both depression and anxiety in the past, correct?” Id., at 259. Dr. O’Brien responded, “[TJhe only diagnosis of that that I have seen has been in the correctional records subsequent to his having been found guilty and put on death row.” Id. Appellant’s counsel immediately objected and moved for a mistrial, which was denied. Id., at 259-60. The trial court had a brief discussion with the prosecutor and appellant’s counsel on how to phrase a curative instruction for the jury regarding Dr. O’Brien’s statement. Id., at 260-65. The court then instructed the jury:

There was a reference through the witness about death row. Following a conviction of [f]irst[-d]egree [mjurder you are placed on death row. That’s what happens. You are not to draw any kind of inferences adverse to [appellant] or his guilt. That’s just something that happens. I just wanted to explain that to you.

Id., at 266-67.

We review the denial of a motion for mistrial under the abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v. Travag lia, 611 Pa. 481, 28 A.3d 868, 879 (2011) (citation omitted). “A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is required only where the challenged event deprived the accused of a fair and impartial trial.” Id. (citation omitted). In the instant case, the prosecutor asked Dr. O’Brien a question that was not such as would be expected to elicit a response about death row. The trial court provided a curative instruction to the jury after consulting with both parties, the gist of which is that appellant was on death row because of his arrest on this case, not some time prior. As such, the instruction dispelled the potential prejudice from a potential inference of prior criminality that formed the basis of the objection.

The law presumes juries follow a court’s instructions. Commonwealth v. Baker, 531 Pa. 541, 614 A.2d 663, 672 (1992) (citing Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 337 A.2d 873, 879 (1975)). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for a mistrial because it provided an immediate curative instruction. We agree that “[i]n light of the ... curative instruction and the unintentional elicitation from the Commonwealth, ... any prejudice the ‘death row’ reference may have caused was insufficient to require a mistrial.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/13, at 17. Moreover, there was no other reference to appellant’s status on death row for the remainder of the penalty-phase hearing. Therefore, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion for a mistrial.

V. Jury Instruction for Continued Deliberation

Appellant argues the trial court erred when it ordered the jury to continue deliberating after the jury informed the court that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. He asserts the court abused its discretion because the jury should have been discharged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(v), and he should have been sentenced to life imprisonment.

During deliberations, the jury sent out two questions for clarification. Later that afternoon, approximately four hours after deliberations started, the jury informed the court it was “ ‘unable to reach a unanimous sentencing verdict.’ ” N.T. Sentencing, 6/22/12, at 35. The trial court instructed the jury to continue deliberations, stating:

Ladies and gentlemen, this has been a four-day trial, which, as trials go, it’s not a particularly long trial. However, I think that you will probably share my conclusion that it’s been a very intense four days of testimony; a lot of expert witnesses, a lot of testimony, a lot of very complicated testimony. At this point in time, the [cjourt feels obligated to request that you return to your deliberations. I want to make sure that, in point of fact, we’ve exhausted the possibilities of arriving at a unanimous verdict. So, at this point in time, I’m going to ask you to go back. I would suggest that you ... start from the beginning, if you would; go over the aggravating circumstances; get that decided; go over the mitigating circumstances, and then review that with each other and see if you can resolve any outstanding differences and we’ll see how that goes. So, at this point, I’m going to send you back and ask that you return to your deliberations.

Id., at 38-39.

“The amount of time a jury is kept together to deliberate is within the discretion of the trial judge, and that decision will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Wharton, 542 Pa. 83, 665 A.2d 458, 461 (1995) (citation omitted). Further, this Court has previously held there is no abuse of discretion when a court instructs a jury to continue to deliberate a death sentence after a lengthy trial. See Commonwealth v. Chester, 526 Pa. 578, 587 A.2d 1367, 1381 (1991) (finding trial court did not coerce verdict of death by returning jury for deliberations after insistence that process was futile); see also Commonwealth v. Penn, 497 Pa. 232, 439 A.2d 1154, 1161 (1982) (finding no abuse of discretion after jury announced it was deadlocked after two days and returned verdict on fourth day). Here, the jury had to consider evidence regarding appellant’s prior voluntary-manslaughter conviction, emotional distress, and childhood abuse. The jury then had to weigh the evidence to determine if the aggravating circumstance of voluntary manslaughter outweighed the mitigating circumstances of emotional distress and an abusive childhood. Given the complex nature of all the evidence, the trial court did not . abuse its discretion by instructing the jury to continue deliberations.

VI. Voir Dire

Appellant argues the trial court denied him due process and the right to a fair and impartial jury by refusing to permit the following voir dire question: “ ‘You will hear that [appellant] was convicted, by plea of guilty, to the crime of [voluntary [manslaughter in 1980. Is there any one of you who feels that[,] because of the defendant’s prior convictions, that you would not consider a sentence of life imprisonment^]’ ” Appellant’s Proposed Voir Dire Questions, 6/11/12, No. 11. Appellant claims he should have been permitted to ask this specific question to “life-qualify” potential jurors pursuant to Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 736-37, 112 S.Ct, 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), as “[t]he proposed question does nothing more than identify potential jurors who cannot consider a sentence of life imprisonment for a second-time killer and asks only if the jurors can still consider life imprisonment despite the fact that [a]ppellant has previously been convicted of [voluntary [mjanslaughter.” Appellant’s Brief, at 48.

The Commonwealth contends the trial court properly precluded the question as it “sought to place before the jury information regarding a specific aggravating circumstance, appellant’s prior conviction for [voluntary [mjanslaughter, in order to learn what the prospective jurors’ likely decision would be regarding the specific facts to be established during the penalty[-]phase proceedings.” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 58. The Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v. Mattison, 623 Pa. 174, 82 A.3d 386 (2013), which held: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding the defendant’s proposed voir dire questions that would have disclosed Ms prior murder conviction before the jury’s determination of Ms gmlt; and (2) the defendant was not entitled to separate juries for the guilt and penalty phases of trial in order to “life-qualify” the penalty-phase jury. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 56-57; Mattison, at 397. The Commonwealth also cites Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831 (2003), in wMch we stated “[njeither counsel for the defendant nor the Commonwealth should be permitted to ask direct or hypothetical questions designed to disclose what a juror’s present impression or opirnon as to what his decision will likely be under certain facts which may be developed in the trial of a case.” Id., at 849. The Commonwealth further argues preclusion of the proposed question did not limit appellant’s ability to “life-qualify” the jury because appellant’s counsel, as well as the court itself, already “life-qualified” each potential juror. Commonwealth’s Brief, at 53-56.

The trial court concluded appellant’s claim failed as a matter of law because his voluntary-manslaughter conviction was an aggravating circumstance in his present case. The court reasoned “[ujnder [§ ] 9711(c)(1)(iv), the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance[.j” Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/13, at 22. Notwithstanding this was the incorrect standard as it did not account for the two mitigating circumstances, which would be weighed against the aggravator, we find the trial court’s decision to preclude the proposed voir dire question was proper.

“The scope of voir dire rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be reversed on appeal absent palpable error.” Commonwealth v. Karenbauer, 552 Pa. 420, 715 A.2d 1086, 1094 (1998) (citation omitted). “The purpose of voir dire is to ensure [a] ... competent, fair, impartial, and unprejudiced jury.” Id. (citations omitted).

The term “life-qualify” refers to the process to identify prospective jurors who have a fixed opinion that a sentence of death should always be imposed for a conviction of first-degree murder. Commonwealth v. Keaton, 556 Pa. 442, 729 A.2d 529, 542 n. 9 (1999). There is no constitutional requirement that each prospective juror be “life-qualified.” Id., at 543. However, if the defendant wishes to “life-qualify” any or all venirepersons, voir dire must include such an inquiry. Morgan, at 733-34, 112 S.Ct. 2222. In Morgan, the United States Supreme Court stated, “general questions of fairness and impartiality” are not sufficient to detect jurors who would automatically vote for the death penalty upon conviction, regardless of any mitigating factors. Id., at 735, 112 S.Ct. 2222. The Court noted:

[T]he belief that death should be imposed ipso facto upon conviction of a capital offense reflects directly on that individual’s inability to follow the law. Any juror who would impose death regardless of the facts and circumstances of conviction cannot follow the dictates of law. It may be that a juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining such dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent him or her from doing so. A defendant on trial for his life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective jurors function under such misconception.

Id., at 735-36, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (footnote and internal citations omitted).

Appellant’s proposed question is impermissible under Bo-mar as it is a question designed to elicit what the jurors’ reactions might be when presented with a specific aggravating circumstance. See Bomar, at 849 (“Neither counsel for the defendant nor the Commonwealth should be permitted to ask direct or hypothetical questions designed to disclose what a juror’s present impression or opinion as to what his decision will likely be under certain facts which may be developed in the trial of a case.”). Moreover, the jury is expressly permitted, under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(12), to consider appellant’s prior manslaughter conviction as an aggravating circumstance, and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (c)(i)(iv) sets forth precisely how the jury should consider aggravating circumstances in its deliberations. Therefore, the trial court followed the precise prescribed statutory scheme by permitting the Commonwealth to present appellant’s prior conviction as an aggravating circumstance.

Further, as the Commonwealth points out, each prospective juror was already “life-qualified” on appellant’s first-degree murder conviction. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 63-56 (citations omitted). Therefore, any juror who would impose death, regardless of the facts or circumstances surrounding the case, would have been identified and excluded.

Accordingly, the judgment of sentence is affirmed.

Former Chief Justice CASTILLE did not participate in the decision of this case.

Justices BAER and STEVENS join the opinion.

Chief Justice SAYLOR files a dissenting opinion in which Justice TODD joins.

Chief Justice SAYLOR,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent in this case centered upon the propriety of a death-penalty verdict. Primarily, I believe that the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to elaborate upon an aggravating circumstance via testimony from the sister of the victim of a previous killing and in refusing to allow material and appropriate life qualification questions during juror voir dire.

Initially, although I take no issue with the majority’s explanation that the Commonwealth is permitted to undertake some reasonable development of the facts underlying a conviction serving as an aggravating circumstance, I am not comfortable with the concept of “short-chang[ing]” a jury. Majority Opinion, at 49, 131 A.3d at 474. Evidentiary determinations are regulated by rules and precepts designed to maintain fundamental fairness and administered through the exercise of sound discretion by the trial courts. In the application, there are many instances in which relevant information—favorable to either the Commonwealth or the defense—properly is withheld from lay jurors. As such, and since the jurors have no personal stake in the matter, respectfully, I find the majority’s “short-changing” concept to be unsuited to the subject area.

Moreover, while developing facts pertinent to prior convictions serving as aggravating circumstances may be permissible in the abstract, doing so via contested testimony of a homicide victim’s close relative is, in my view, unduly prejudicial, particularly in a scenario in which the underlying conviction had been secured by guilty plea. Accord Brief for Appellant at 20 (“To present evidence now that demonstrated a brutal, unprovoked and malicious killing, a crime much worse than that agreed to by the Commonwealth, is simply not fair.”). Injection of eyewitness testimony relative to an aggravator merely centered on the fact of a conviction also fosters the potential for mini-trials concerning collateral facts. While, again, I recognize that the Commonwealth is to be afforded some latitude to present factual circumstances underlying previous convictions serving as aggravating circumstances, I believe that the development should be subject to judicious control by the trial courts and that the prosecution should be required to employ a less problematic methodology (such as introduction of the guilty plea colloquy).

Concerning the life qualification issue, I note that Appellant has presented an extensive argument predicated upon the insightful opinion of a federal district court in United States v. Johnson, 366 F.Supp.2d 822 (N.D.Iowa 2005). As Appellant relates, Johnson elaborately explains the difference between: 1) case-specific voir dire questions designed to determine whether jurors harbor some bias relative to critical facts to be demonstrated by trial evidence, and 2) interrogatories seeking to pre-commit jurors to a particular verdict. See id., at 845-49. Johnson concludes, appropriately in my view, that the former line of case-specific questions may, in fact, be constitutionally required to empanel a fair and impartial jury. See id., at 848 (explaining that a prohibition on such questions “may unconstitutionally impede a party’s ‘ability to exercise intelligently [a] challenge for cause against those biased persons on the venire who as jurors would unwaveringly impose’ either a life or death sentence after a finding of guilt.’ ” (quoting Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 733, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2232, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992))).

The majority appears to implicitly reject Johnson’s approach to case-specific questions based on the commonly-accepted admonition, as articulated in Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831 (2003), that “[njeither counsel for the defendant nor the Commonwealth should be permitted to ask direct or hypothetical questions designed to disclose what a juror’s present impression or opinion as to what his decision will likely be under certain facts which may be developed in the trial of the case.” Id., at 456, 826 A.2d at 849 (emphasis added); accord Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736, 754 (2012) (“[V]oir dire is not intended to pre-try the case on hypothesized facts and get jurors to commit to the outcome based on that speculative proof.”). I believe, however, that this rationale applies only to pre-commitment-type interrogatories (ie., category “2” in the above paragraph) and not to case-specific questions appropriately framed to inquire into juror biases relative to critical facts. See Johnson, 366 F.Supp.2d at 848-50; accord United States v. Fell, 372 F.Supp.2d 766, 773 (D.Vt.2005) (“A balance must be struck between seeking to discover biased jurors who could not be impartial given particular facts and getting jurors to commit to support a particular perspective on the evidence.”).

For my part, I would follow the lead of the California Supreme Court in People v. Cash, 28 Cal.4th 703, 122 Cal. Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332 (2002), which held that, by absolutely precluding case-specific questioning pertaining to the fact of a previous homicide during life qualification, “the trial court created a risk that a juror who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty on a defendant who had previously committed murder [or manslaughter] was empaneled and acted on those views, thereby violating defendant’s due process right to an impartial jury.” Id., 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d at 342-43.

I recognize that the form of case-specific questions geared to assessing juror biases should be controlled by trial courts, and that Appellant’s specific framing was not ideal, in that the interrogatory was not couched conditionally, in terms of what the trial evidence might show. See Johnson, 366 F.Supp.2d at 849 (explaining that case-specific questions “should be prefaced by ‘if the evidence shows’ or some other reminder that an ultimate determination must be based on the evidence at trial and the court’s instructions.” (emphasis in original)). Nevertheless, since the Commonwealth clearly had committed to pursuing the relevant aggravator and the Appellant’s proposed question did not require jurors to commit to a particular result, but rather, concerned whether they could fairly consider the evidence at large and the trial court’s instructions, I do not find this factor to be dispositive. Indeed, only a modest adjustment to the query was required to bring it into conformance with Johnson’s sound guidance.

A fair trial before an impartial factfinder is a fundamental component of due process of law. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 727, 112 S.Ct. at 2228-29. Voir dire is a primary mechanism by which the impartiality requirement is assessed and vindicated. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 1634, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (“Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled. Similarly, lack of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant’s right to exercise peremptory challenges where provided by statute or rule[.]” (citation omitted)). In my view, the majority’s wholesale rejection of Appellant’s position that reasonable, material, properly-framed case-specific voir dire should have been permitted squarely undercuts these core principles.

Justice TODD joins this dissenting opinion.

      . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct, 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

      . Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in 1980 for the stabbing death of his then-girlfriend’s brother.

      . In Barker, the United States Supreme Court established a balancing test to determine whether there was a violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial and due process. Barker, at 530-33, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The Court noted four factors to consider: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Id. Although the High Court did not regard any of the four factors as either a "necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial[,]” it opined courts are still required to engage in a “difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Id., at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182.

      . "The court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further deliberation will not result in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in which case the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.” Id.

      . Section 9711(c)(1)(iv) further provides the verdict must be death if "the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.” Id. In any other circumstance, including if the jury finds the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the sentence must be life imprisonment. Id.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    131 A.3d 480
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Darrell MYERS, Respondent.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 3, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 3rd day of February, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:

Did the Superior Court err in holding, in a published decision, that a warrant was required to obtain blood for a chemical test where the officer had probable cause to believe that the [Respondent] was driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, and [Respondent] did not affirmatively refuse consent?

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 480
    Michael C. DUFFEY, Petitioner v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (TROLA-DYNE, INC.), Respondents.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 3, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 3rd day of February, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:

Did the Commonwealth Court err in concluding that an Impairment Rating Evaluation (IRE), which is designed to rate the percentage of disability two years out from a work injury, was valid where the IRE only considered the injuries listed on the notice of compensation payable issued at the time of injury, and did not consider additional injuries that subsequently arose and were known at the time of the IRE but not yet formally added to the description of injury?

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 481
    Vamsidhar VURIMINDI, Petitioner v. Honorable Judge Diana ANHALT and Honorable Shelia Woods-Skipper and Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia, Respondents.
    No. 156 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 5, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 5th day of February, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus are GRANTED. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is DIRECTED to adjudicate Petitioner’s PCRA petition within 90 days.

The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to strike the names of the jurists from the caption and serve this order on the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 481
    Anthony SPINELLI, Jr., Petitioner v. Kathleen G. KANE, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Lawrence M. Cherba, Executive Deputy Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Laura A. Ditka, Chief Deputy Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondents.
    No. 184 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 5, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 5th day of February, 2016, the King’s Bench Petition and/or Application for Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.

Mr. Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 482
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Luis E.E. ANDUJAR, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 11, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 11th day of February, 2016, The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED on the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence violates the prohibition against mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). As a result of the recent holding by that Court that Miller must be applied retroactively by the States, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with Montgomery.

To the extent necessary, leave is to be granted to amend the post-conviction petition to assert the jurisdictional provision of the Post Conviction Relief Act extending to the recognition of constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States which it deems to be retroactive. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 482
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Jeffrey CRISTINA, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 11, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 11th day of February, 2016, The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED on the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence violates the prohibition against mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). As a result of the recent holding by that Court that Miller must be applied retroactively by the States, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with Montgomery.

To the extent necessary, leave is to be granted to amend the post-conviction petition to assert the jurisdictional provision of the Post Conviction Relief Act extending to the recognition of constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States which it deems to be retroactive. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 483
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. James Earl HOUSE, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 11, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 11th day of February, 2016, The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED on the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence violates the prohibition against mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). As a result of the recent holding by that Court that Miller must be applied retroactively by the States, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with Montgomery.

To the extent necessary, leave is to be granted to amend the post-conviction petition to assert the jurisdictional provision of the Post Conviction Relief Act extending to the recognition of constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States which it deems to be retroactive. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 483
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Keith JOHNSON, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 11, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 11th day of February, 2016, The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED on the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence violates the prohibition against mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). As a result of the recent holding by that Court that Miller must be applied retroactively by the States, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with Montgomery.

To the extent necessary, leave is to be granted to amend the post-conviction petition to assert the jurisdictional provision of the Post Conviction Relief Act extending to the recognition of constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States which it deems to be retroactive. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(l)(iii).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 484
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Arthur DUNN, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 11, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 11th day of February, 2016, The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED on the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence violates the prohibition against mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). As a result of the recent holding by that Court that Miller must be applied retroactively by the States, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with Montgomery.

To the extent necessary, leave is to be granted to amend the post-conviction petition to assert the jurisdictional provision of the Post Conviction Relief Act extending to the recognition of constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States which it deems to be retroactive. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (iii).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 485
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. David Johnathan FREEMAN, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 11, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 11th day of February, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED on the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence violates the prohibition against mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). As a result of the recent holding by that Court that Miller must be applied retroactively by the States, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with Montgomery.

To the extent necessary, leave is to be granted to amend the post-conviction petition to assert the jurisdictional provision of the Post Conviction Relief Act extending to the recognition of constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States which it deems to be retroactive. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (iii).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 485
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Aaron Claude PHILLIPS, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 11, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 11th day of February, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED on the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence violates the prohibition against mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). As a result of the recent holding by that Court that Miller must be applied retroactively by the States, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with Montgomery.

To the extent necessary, leave is to be granted to amend the post-conviction petition to assert the jurisdictional provision of the Post Conviction Relief Act extending to the recognition of constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States which it deems to be retroactive. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 486
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Edward Cruz GOUDY, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 11, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 11th day of February, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED on the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence violates the prohibition against mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). As a result of the recent holding by that Court that Miller must be applied retroactively by the States, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with Montgomery.

To the extent necessary, leave is to be granted to amend the post-conviction petition to assert the jurisdictional provision of the Post Conviction Relief Act extending to the recognition of constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States which it deems to be retroactive. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 487
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Robert Russell BULI, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 12, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 12th day of February, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED on the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence violates the prohibition against mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). As a result of the recent holding by that Court that Miller must be applied retroactively by the States, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with Montgomery.

To the extent necessary, leave is to be granted to amend the post-conviction petition to assert the jurisdictional provision of the Post Conviction Relief Act extending to the recognition of constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States which it deems to be retroactive. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).

Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    131 A.3d 487
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Steven JONES, Jr., Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 12, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 12th day of February, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED on the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence violates the prohibition against mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). As a result of the recent holding by that Court that Miller must be applied retroactively by the States, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with Montgomery.

To the extent necessary, leave is to be granted to amend the post-conviction petition to assert the jurisdictional provision of the Post Conviction Relief Act extending to the recognition of constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States which it deems to be retroactive. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).

Justice EAKIN and DONOHUE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


author: Chief Justice SAYLOR.

text:
    131 A.3d 971
    CENTRAL WESTMORELAND CAREER AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, PSEA/NEA, Colleen Conko, Sabine Lynn, Daniel Lusk, Matthew Morrell, and James Mark Schoming v. PENN-TRAFFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT. Appeal of Central Westmoreland Career and Technology Center Education Association, PSEA/NEA, Colleen Conko, Sabine Lynn, and Daniel Lusk.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Oct. 6, 2015.
    Re-Submitted Jan. 20, 2016.
    Decided Feb. 16, 2016.

      Katherine Marie Voye, Esq., PA State Education Association (PSEA), for Central Westmoreland Career, et al.
    Michael Louis Brungo, Esq., Maiello, Brungo & Maiello, L.L.P., Pittsburgh, for Penn-Trafford School District.

      Emily J. Leader, Esq., for Pennsylvania School Boards Association.
    SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
   Chief Justice SAYLOR.

In this discretionary appeal, we examine whether the Transfer between Entities Act—a provision of the Public School Code designed to protect teachers affected by inter-school transfers of educational programs—applies where the transferred students are placed into pre-existing classes and no new classes are added.

In terms of background, the Transfer between Entities Act, 24 P.S. § 11-1113 (the “Transfer Act”), imposes hiring obligations on receiving schools when a class or program is transferred from one school to another and a teacher is suspended at the sending school. This aspect of the act has existed since its inception, and provides:

(a) When a program or class is transferred as a unit from one or more school entities to another school entity or entities, professional employes who were assigned to the class or program immediately prior to the transfer and are classified as teachers ... and are suspended as a result of the transfer and who are properly certificated shall be offered employment in the program or class by the receiving entity or entities when services of a professional employe are needed to sustain the program or class transferred, as long as there is no suspended professional employe in the receiving entity who is properly certificated to fill the position in the transferred class or program.

24 P.S. § 11-1113(a).

As described more fully below, students attending math classes at one school were accommodated within existing math classes at another school. Central to this dispute is whether this circumstance implicated a 1991 addition to the Transfer Act which states:

(b.l) Professional employes who are classified as teachers and who are not transferred with the classes to which they are assigned or who have received a formal notice of suspension shall form a pool of employes within the school entity. No new professional employe who is classified as a teacher shall be employed by a school entity assuming program responsibility for transferred students while there is:
(1) a properly certificated professional employe who is classified as a teacher suspended in the receiving entity; or
(2) if no person is qualified under clause (1), a properly certificated member of the school entity pool who is willing to accept employment with the school entity assuming program responsibility for ¡transferred students ....

24 P.S. § 11-1113(b.1).

The Central Westmoreland Career and Technology Center, a public vocational-technical school (the “Vocational School”), provides career and technical training to high school students from numerous sending school districts within Westmoreland County, including Appellee Penn-Trafford School District (“Penn-Trafford”). For a number of years, the Vocational School taught math to students from the high schools in such districts who were enrolled in career and technical programs at the Vocational School (the “vocational students”). During this time, the sending school districts were providing the same math instruction to students in their high schools who were not enrolled at the Vocational School.

In early 2010, eight sending school districts, including Penn-Trafford, advised the Vocational School that, beginning with the 2010-11 school year, they would be providing math instruction to the vocational students at the students’ home high schools rather than sending them to the Vocational School for math. Due to these changes, the Vocational School curtailed its math offerings and suspended five certified math teachers: Colleen Conko, Sabine Lynn, Daniel Lusk, Matthew Morrell, and James Schoming. See generally 24 P.S. § 11-1124 (relating to causes for suspension). The Vocational School took the position that no transfer of courses or programs had occurred, and hence, the Transfer Act was not implicated. However, in response to a grievance filed by the Central Westmoreland Career and Technology Center Education Association, PSEA/NEA (the “Association”)—a labor organization representing the Vocational School’s professional employees—the Vocational School, per Section 1113(b.l), created a pool of suspended employees, consisting of the five furloughed math teachers, and sent their names and certifications to Penn-Trafford.

Meanwhile, at Penn-Trafford High School, the existing math classes had enough capacity to accommodate the vocational students. Thus, no new math classes were added for the 2010-11 school year. Separately, one of the high school’s math teachers, Brian O’Neil, resigned in March 2010 for reasons unrelated to the above circumstances. Penn-Trafford posted a job vacancy announcement to fill his position, and it interviewed nine candidates, including teachers Lusk and Lynn. Penn-Trafford ultimately hired a substitute teacher to fill the vacancy, and he stayed on as a long-term substitute for Mr. O’Neil during the 2010-11 school year.

These events led to correspondence between the Association and Penn-Trafford in the fall of 2010 reflecting that the parties disagreed over whether a program transfer had occurred so as to implicate the Transfer Act. The Association also expressed that, even absent a transfer, Penn-Trafford was obligated under sub-paragraph (b.l)(2) to hire math teachers, in the first instance, from the Vocational School’s pool of suspended teachers since the school district did not already have a suspended, certified teacher of its own to recall pursuant to sub-paragraph (b.l)(l). When correspondence failed to resolve the disagreement, the Association, as well as teachers Conko, Lynn, Lusk, Morrell, and Schoming (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a complaint in the county court. Plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment interpreting the Transfer Act to require Penn-Trafford to hire teachers from the Vocational School’s pool. They also sought lost wages and benefits due to Penn-Trafford’s failure to do so for the 2010-11 school year.

The parties engaged in discovery and, thereafter, filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The county court granted Penn-Trafford’s motion, denied Plaintiffs’ motion, and entered judgment in favor of Penn-Trafford. The court agreed with Penn-Trafford’s argument that, under the facts of the case, no transfer occurred so as to trigger the plaintiff teachers’ rights under the Transfer Act. The court noted, in this regard, that no math classes were “dismantled” at the Vocational School and then “reconstituted” at Penn-Trafford High School, and, moreover, no math classes were added at the high school. Cent. Westmoreland Career & Tech. Ctr. Educ. Ass’n, PSEA/NEA v. Penn-Trafford Sch. Dist., No. 1120 of 2011, slip op. at 4 (C.P. Westmoreland Dec. 4, 2013). As for precedent, the court relied on Hahn v. Marple Newtown School District, 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 60, 571 A.2d 1115 (1990), in which the Commonwealth Court addressed a similar situation and concluded that no “transfer” of math classes had taken place because there was no evidence the math classes in question “were taken” from one entity to another. Id. at 65, 571 A.2d at 1117; see also id. at 65, 571 A.2d at 1118 (explaining that the Transfer Act “was meant to protect professional employees whose positions were eliminated in one school entity and recreated in another[,] which is not what occurred here”).

A three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See Cent. Westmoreland Career & Tech. Ctr. Educ. Ass’n, PSEA/NEA v. Penn-Trafford Sch. Dist., No. 2336 C.D. 2013, slip op., 2014 WL 10298906 (Pa.Cmwlth. Dec. 11, 2014). The panel acknowledged that the General Assembly added paragraph (b.1) to the Transfer Act in the post -Hahn timeframe, and that the court had eventually interpreted paragraph (b.l) as imposing hiring obligations on receiving schools where a vacancy arises which is unrelated to the transferred program. See id. at 8-9 (citing and quoting Allegheny Intermediate Unit # 3 Educ. Ass’n v. N. Hills Sch. Dist., 155 Pa.Cmwlth. 211, 216-17, 624 A.2d 802, 804-05 (1993)). Still, the panel observed that: such rule is limited to schools which receive transferred programs of some sort; and, in Cook v. Chambersburg Area School District, 97 A.3d 419 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014), the court had reaffirmed Hahn’s understanding that the verb, to “transfer,” means to carry or take from one person or place to another. See Penn-Trafford, No. 2336 C.D. 2013, slip op. at 9 (citing Cook, 97 A.3d at 425); see also id. at 10 (explaining that “the Act is not triggered merely based on the fact that students cease to enroll at one school and instead enroll at another school” (quoting Cook, 97 A.3d at 426)). Based on its finding that no educational class or program was transferred from the Vocational School to Penn-Trafford High School, the panel approved the county court’s decision to enter judgment in favor of Penn-Trafford. See id. at 11.

President Judge Pellegrini dissented on the basis of his dissent in Cook, in which he interpreted paragraph (b.l) as imposing hiring obligations on schools that assume educational program responsibilities for transferred students. In the dissent’s view, these obligations exist—relative to teachers who have been formally suspended—whether or not a program or class has been transferred as a unit between schools. See Cook, 97 A.3d at 428-30 (Pellegrini, P.J., dissenting).

We allowed appeal to determine whether Section 1113(b.1) of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 11-1113(b.1), was intended to give employment priority to individuals who are members of a pool of furloughed teachers in the circumstances described above. See Cent. Westmoreland Career & Tech. Ctr. Educ. Ass’n, PSEA/NEA v. Penn-Trafford Sch. Dist., 631 Pa. 604, 114 A.3d 1036 (2016) (per curiam).

Plaintiffs assert Section 1113(b.1) requires any school which assumes “program responsibility for transferred students,” 24 P.S. § 11—1113(b.1), to offer employment to properly certificated teachers in a pool of furloughed employees regardless of whether the vacancy in question is related to the transfer. Plaintiffs contend that the intermediate court’s interpretation converts paragraph (b.l) into surplusage, as they state it is difficult to see what purpose a pool of furloughed employees would serve if employment prioritization is only triggered when a program is transferred as a unit. As applied here, Plaintiffs proffer that, because program responsibility for the mathematics instruction of vocational students was transferred to the school districts, including Penn-Trafford, the teachers in the pool retained employment priority as to vacancies occurring at such districts.

Plaintiffs also take issue with the Commonwealth Court’s reliance on Hahn in concluding that, for a furloughed teacher’s paragraph (b.l) rights to apply, a program must be dismantled at one school and reconstituted at another school. Plaintiffs suggest such a requirement is not supported by (b.l)’s text. They note, in any event, that Hahn was decided before the 1991 addition of paragraph (b.l), which they view as broadening the concept of a “transfer” for purposes of the Transfer Act. Further undermining Hahn’s applicability, Plaintiffs reference Allegheny Intermediate Unit’s, explanation that (b.l) was intended to ensure that teachers at entities other than school districts—such as vocational schools and intermediate units—would have increased protection at a time when many furloughs were anticipated due to the transfer of educational programming to school districts, which in turn resulted from a change in educational program funding. See Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 155 Pa.Cmwlth. at 218, 624 A.2d at 805.

Penn-Trafford initially observes that the Transfer Act, as applied in Hahn, requires that an educational class or program be transferred as a unit between school entities for furloughed teachers to have hiring priority. It suggests this still holds true in the wake of the 1991 legislation, for at least two reasons. First, Penn-Trafford notes that such legislation added the phrase, “as a unit,” to paragraph (a), thus demonstrating that “a transfer of a program or a class [is] still the primary focus” of the Transfer Act. Brief for Appellee at 23.

Second, Penn-Trafford contends that paragraphs (a) and (b.l) were meant to be read together, with a class or program transfer being the triggering event for either paragraph. In this respect, Penn-Trafford urges that, had the General Assembly intended to eliminate the need for a transfer of a program or a class as a unit under paragraph (b.l), it would have used more definitive prefatory language in (b.l) such as, “Notwithstanding the requirements of subsection (a), ....” Id. at 24. Absent such phraseology, Penn-Trafford agrees with the Cook court’s suggestion that the sole purpose of paragraph (b.l) is to add a second layer of protection whereby furloughed teachers are given priority to fill vacancies unrelated to the initial transfer. See id. (quoting Cook, 97 A.3d at 425-26); see also id. at 23 (quoting Cook, 97 A.3d at 425 (“[W]e find no language in the 1991 amendment to the Act that abrogates the requirement stated in Hahn that there be a ‘transfer’ of a program or class to a receiving school before a teacher may claim the protection of the [Transfer] Act.”)).

The Pennsylvania School Boards Association, as amicus curiae, adds that students transfer between school entities for various reasons, and their influx or departure will sometimes affect staffing. It forwards a reductio ad absurdum argument, noting that a minimal change consisting of a single student taking math at his or her home school rather than the associated vocational school could lead to the cancellation of one math class at the latter entity. It suggests the Legislature did not intend paragraph (b.l)’s hiring preference to be triggered in such event. In this regard, the School Boards Association argues more generally that paragraph (b.l) is structured to relate back to the transferred-as-a-unit language in paragraph (a), thus demonstrating that (b.l) pertains to a transfer of programs, not students. It concludes, accordingly, that not every movement of students is a transfer for purposes of the Transfer Act.

Resolving this appeal centrally requires ascertaining the meaning of paragraph (b.1) of the Transfer Act. The issue is one of statutory interpretation, a question of law over which our review is de novo and plenary. See In re D.L.H., 606 Pa. 560, 563, 2 A.3d 505, 513 (2010). There is little doubt that the definition of “transfer” employed by the Hahn decision— meaning, “to carry or take from one person or place to another,” Hahn, 132 Pa.Cmwlth. at 64, 571 A.2d at 1117—is in accord with the plain meaning of the word and, as such, is applicable here, since neither the Code nor the Statutory Construction Act otherwise defines the term. See 1 Pa,C.S. § 1903(a) (generally directing that words and phrases should be construed according to common usage). The contested issue is whether a transfer of students, as opposed to programs or classes, between entities is sufficient to invoke the employment protections afforded under paragraph (b.1).

A careful review of the statutory text reveals that, although the rights conferred under paragraph (a) are limited to situations in which a program or class is transferred as a unit, paragraph (b.l) is markedly different and does not suggest such a limitation. First, entrance into a pool of teachers can be predicated on the mere receipt of a formal notice of suspension. This condition, which is listed in paragraph (b.l)’s initial sentence, constitutes a separate and independent basis for inclusion in the pool, as demonstrated by the legislative use of disjunctive phraseology, As such, it applies even where no classes or programs have been transferred from the school entity in question.

More important, the operative facet of paragraph (b.l)—its second sentence—grants employment prioritization in situations where another school entity “assum[es] program responsibility for transferred students [.] ” 24 P.S. § 11—1113(b.1) (emphasis added). While this may occur when a class or program is transferred, it may also occur when students are transferred between identical or substantially similar educational programs, as occurred in the present matter. The Legislature appears to have intended to include this latter possibility because, unlike paragraph (a), paragraph (b.l) makes no mention of any transfer of classes or programs. Indeed, to the contrary, it does not refer to transferred classes at all and, instead, centers on the circumstance that a school entity assumes program “responsibility.” See generally Commonwealth v. Elliott, 616 Pa. 524, 534, 50 A.3d 1284, 1290 (2012) (observing that when the General Assembly uses different words or phrases in a statutory provision, a presumption arises that the legislative body intended those words or phrases to have different meanings).

Under these circumstances, it would be tenuous to read into the phrase, “assuming program responsibility for transferred students,” a requirement that a class or program must have been transferred as a unit. We therefore conclude the General Assembly intended the trigger for employment prioritization under paragraph (b.l) to be broader than that of paragraph (a). In particular, we find that the transfer of students and the assumption of program responsibility by the receiving entity are alone sufficient to implicate the protections conferred under paragraph (b.l).

The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justices BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY and WECHT join the opinion.

      . The Transfer Act is contained within the Public School Code of 1949. See Act of Mar. 10, 1949, P.L. 30 (as amended 24 P.S. §§ 1-101 to 27-2702) (the "Code”). It appears in Article XI(b) of the Code, which relates to employment of professional employees. The Transfer Act was added to the Code in 1982, and has been amended several times, most notably in 1991, as discussed below. It has often been referred to, imprecisely, as the "Transfer of Entities Act.”

      . These students continued to attend career and technical training at the Vocational School. The next year, two additional sending school districts took the same action.

      . Teachers Morrell and Schoming are no longer part of this litigation.

      . To the degree there is any remaining doubt based on the concept that a school entity’s assumption of program responsibility presupposes that a program has been transferred, we note that the Transfer Act is remedial legislation designed to protect the employment interests of furloughed professional school employees. Hence, the act is to be liberally construed to effectuate its objectives, with doubts resolved in favor of the conferral of such protection. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c).