author: Justice BAER. Chief Justice, SAYLOR, Justice STEVENS,

text:
    121 A.3d 964
    Timothy L. WATTS, Appellee v. MANHEIM TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 7, 2015.
    Decided Aug. 26, 2015.

      Robert M. Frankhouser, Jr., Esq., Hartman Underhill & Brubaker, L.L.P., Lancaster, David Michael Walker, Esq., for Manheim Township School District.
    Katherine Marie Fitz Patrick, Esq., Pennsylvania School Boards Association, Inc., for Pennsylvania School Boards Association.
    Timothy J. Reese, Esq., Lancaster, Reese, Samley, Wagen-seller, Meeum & Longer, PC, for Timothy L. Watts.
    SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice BAER.

We granted review to consider whether the Public School Code of 1949 mandates that a school district provide free transportation to a student from two different residences where the student’s parents share physical custody of the student and both parents reside within the school district. The Commonwealth Court held that the Manheim Township School District (“the School District”) must provide transportation to both parents’ residences. For the reasons set forth herein, we agree that the School District is required to provide free transportation to and from both parents’ residences in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court.

The facts of this case are not in dispute. Timothy L. Watts (“Father”) shares legal and physical custody of his child, C.W., with C.W.’s mother (“Mother”) on an alternating week basis pursuant to a court order. Both Father and Mother reside within the School District where C.W. attends public middle school. Father’s residence is approximately 4 ½ miles from C.W.’s school and Mother’s residence is approximately 5 ½ miles from the school. C.W.’s bus stop at Mother’s home is approximately 1.9 miles from Father’s residence.

Before 2010, the School District provided transportation services for its students to multiple locations, including residences, daycare facilities, and after school activities. The School District estimated that 400 students benefitted from transportation to multiple locations, with somewhere between 50 and 75 of these students being transported to multiple parents’ residences as a result of custody arrangements. The School District stated that it did not have information on how many students were subject to an alternating week custody arrangement like C.W.

At the beginning of the 2010-2011 school year, however, the School District instituted changes in its transportation policy which included eliminating transportation to and from more than one location per student, expanding the number of students required to walk to school, and increasing the route efficiency of its busses. The combined effect of these changes reduced the bus fleet by four busses, saving the School District approximately $200,000 per year. The School District does not indicate what portion of its savings was attributable to limiting students in shared physical custody arrangements to only one residence. Initially, the School District did not strictly enforce the “one seat per student” policy and instead provided bussing for C.W. to and from both parents’ residences during the 2010-11 and 2011-12 school years.

In the summer of 2012, the School District notified Father that it intended to enforce the new transportation policy, and although there was an available seat on an existing bus route with an established stop servicing Father’s home, the School District would only transport C.W. to and from Mother’s residence, as her address was listed as the default address on C.W.’s school paperwork. Because of Father’s work schedule, he had to hire a nanny to drive C.W. to Mother’s house so that C.W., a seventh-grader, did not have to walk over 1.9 miles to his bus stop. Father sent several letters to the School District and attended a school board meeting voicing his objection to the transportation policy, all to no avail. Subsequently, Father instituted the instant action seeking, inter alia, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to require the School District to provide transportation to and from both residences.

Father rested his complaint on Section 1361(1) of the School Code, which states, in relevant part:

The board of school directors in any school district may, out of the funds of the district, provide for the free transportation of any resident pupil to and from the kindergarten, elementary school, or secondary school in which he is lawfully enrolled....

24 P.S. § 13-1361(1) (Provide free transportation). Father argued that Section 1361(1) sets forth a statutory mandate which generally provides students with transportation to and from school to a pupil’s residence, and where, as here, C.W. is a “resident pupil” of two residences, transportation to both must be provided. In response, the School District argued that a student may have only one residence for purposes of the School Code and therefore Section 1361(1) required only that the School District provide transportation to that one residence. Alternatively, the School District asserted that it had discretion to limit C.W.’s transportation to and from one residence.

The trial court found for Father, determining that because C.W. resided with both parents equally, the School District is statutorily required to provide transportation for C.W. to and from both parents’ homes, pursuant to Section 1361(1). The court garnered support for its position from the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Wyland v. West Shore Sch. Dist., 52 A.3d 572 (Pa.Cmwlth.2012), which found that a student who is subject to a shared physical custody arrangement can be a resident pupil of two different school districts when each parent resides in one.

The trial court granted Father’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordered the School District to resume transportation from Father’s residence. Shortly thereafter, the trial court amended its order by granting a permanent injunction. The trial court limited its decision to the facts of this case, rendering it applicable only where: 1) both parents live in the same school district; 2) the student is subject to an equally-split, shared legal and physical custody agreement; and 3) a school bus already serves each residence and could accommodate the student without any further cost or adding an extra stop. The School District appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction. Watts v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., 84 A.3d 378 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014). Acknowledging that Section 1361(1) does not expressly state that a school district must provide transportation to and from a student’s residence, the court determined that the General Assembly’s use of the term “resident pupil” embodies the intention that transportation services be provided between the student’s residence and school.

To determine whether a student may have more than one residence for transportation purposes, the Commonwealth Court initially found this Court’s decision in In re Residence Hearing Before Bd. of Sch. Dir., Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 560 Pa. 366, 744 A.2d 1272 (2000) {Cumberland, Valley), to be instructive. In Cumberland Valley, the Cumberland Valley School District argued that students who moved with their mother into a townhouse in the district to be closer to their private school, while father maintained a residence outside of the district, were not residents of the Cumberland Valley School District as contemplated by the School Code, citing 24 P.S. § 13-1301 (“Every child, being a resident of any school district, [between specific ages], may attend the public schools in his district-”) and 24 P.S. § 13-1302(a) (“A child shall be considered a resident of the school district in which his parents or the guardian of his person resides.”). We rejected that argument and held that the term “resides” contained within Section 1302(a) “refers to a place where the custodial parent maintains a residence, and, contrary to the [school district’s] view, it need not be a primary residence or domicile.” Cumberland Valley, 744 A.2d at 1274.

The Commonwealth Court found additional guidance from its decision in Wyland, supra, which held that a student of separated parents who lived in two different school districts was a “resident pupil” of both school districts and entitled to transportation services from both school districts. Although recognizing that Cumberland Valley and Wyland did not address whether school districts must provide transportation to more than one residence within the same school district, the Commonwealth Court interpreted these eases as holding that “a child can have more than one residence for purposes of the School Code.” Watts, 84 A.3d at 385. The Court reasoned that “[i]t therefore follows that where ... a child has two residences within a school district, the school district must provide transportation services accommodating both residences.” Id. at 386.

As the School District conceded that C.W. is a “resident pupil” to whom the School District owes a duty of transportation and the court determined that C.W. has two residences within the district, the Commonwealth Court found that the School District must provide transportation accommodating both residences, and that, pursuant to the School Code, accommodating Mother’s and Father’s residences requires a bus stop no further than 1 ½ miles from each house. See 24 P.S, § 13-1362 (Distance to bus stop). Because the bus stop within 1 ½ miles of Mother’s residence is more than 1 ½ miles from Father’s residence, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the School District violated its mandate to provide transportation to and from school to C.W.’s residences.

Lastly, the Commonwealth Court rejected the School District’s argument that it had the discretion to limit C.W.’s transportation to and from Mother’s residence only. In the Commonwealth Court’s view, the School District has discretion to determine the manner in which it implements transportation services, but not to ignore the statutory mandate of the School Code, which, as explained, required that transportation be provided to school from both of C.W.’s residences.

The School District sought this Court’s discretionary review, and we granted its petition for allowance of appeal to address two issues:

(1) Does the Public School Code of 1949 require the Man-heim Township School District to provide transportation services to a resident pupil to and from more than one location within the school district?
(2) Did the Commonwealth Court err in interpreting In re Residence Hearing Before Bd. of Sch. Dir., Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 560 Pa. 366, 744 A.2d 1272 (2000), to mean that a child can have more than one residence for school purposes, including transportation services under Section 1361 of the Public School Code of 1949?

Watts v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., 627 Pa. 253, 99 A.3d 532 (2014).

The School District argues that a student may not have more than one residence under the School Code as a matter of law, and therefore it properly limited C.W.’s transportation to and from Mother’s residence only. Rather than analyzing sections of the School Code to support this contention, the School District simply asserts that no section of the School Code mandates it to provide transportation to multiple residences and then turns to a discussion of the case law relied on by the Commonwealth Court to decide the instant case, and in particular, this Court’s decision in Cumberland Valley.

The School District contends that the Commonwealth Court in Wyland, and consequently in this case, misinterpreted this Court’s holding in Cumberland Valley by reading that case as establishing that a student may have more than one residence under the School Code. Instead, the School District argues, Cumberland Valley merely defined the term “resides” and never reached the question of whether a student may reside in more than one residence. The School District believes that because we did not affirmatively state that a student may have more than one residence in Cumberland Valley, it follows necessarily that a student may not have more than one residence.

The School District alternatively argues that even if a student may have more than one residence under the School Code, the School District has the discretion to limit a student’s transportation to and from only one of the residences. In support, the School District contends that the case law analyzing Section 1361(1) (Provide free transportation) consistently defers to a school district’s broad discretion. Although the cases cited by the School District involved the location of bus stops and not whether a school is required to provide transportation to multiple residences, the School District, without analysis, purports it has the discretion to decide both where bus stops will be placed and whether the School District has to provide transportation to more than one residence.

The School District finds that Section 1331, which appears to be facially inapplicable, supports its discretion argument as it provides that where there is:

no public school with the proper grades in session within two miles by the shortest public highway of the residence of any child in a school district of [a specified class], such child shall be furnished proper transportation at the expense of the school district to and from a school with the proper grades.

24 P.S. § 13-1331 (Mandatory transportation). The School District claims that because of the phrase “proper transportation,” school boards have total discretion in making all transportation decisions and that “courts have consistently interpreted Section 1331 [where applicable] to mean that school boards retain the ability to exercise their discretion in determining what constitutes ‘proper transportation.’ ” School District’s Brief at 32 (citing Martin v. Garnet Valley Sch. Dist., 441 Pa. 502, 272 A.2d 913 (1971) (holding a school district properly exercised its discretion when it required a student to walk less than a mile on a windy road to the bus stop); Pollock v. Northern Potter Joint Sch. Bd., 9 Pa. D. & C.3d 31 (1976) (finding that the School Code did not require door-to-door transportation for a student)).

Turning to additional sections of the School Code to support its claim that it has discretion to decline transportation for a resident pupil to one of his two residences, the School District notes that it has the authority to require a student to walk up to 1 ½ miles to a bus stop. 24 P.S. § 13-1362 (Distance to bus stop). Here, the School District concedes that C.W.’s bus stop is within 1 ⅛ miles of Mother’s residence but nearly 2 miles from Father’s house. Notwithstanding that the bus stop within 1 ⅛ miles of Mother’s residence does not meet the 1 ⅜ mile restriction when C.W. is living at Father’s house, the School District submits that Father is required merely to drive to the bus stop serving Mother’s residence. Accordingly, the School District concludes that this construct constitutes “proper transportation.”

In addition to the School Code, the School District cites the State Board of Education’s regulations as conferring discretion upon the School District to provide transportation to only one residence. Particularly, the School District points to 22 Pa.Code § 23.4, which states the “board of directors of a school district is responsible for all aspects of pupil transportation programs” including, inter alia, the selection of means of transportation and the establishment of routes and schedules. Further, the School District finds support in the regulatory Section 11.11 which sets forth that “[transportation for students must be provided consistent with the policy of the school district that the students are attending.” 22 Pa.Code § 11.11(a)(2) (Enrollment Regulation).

Lastly, the School District does not believe that it abused its purported discretion here because the changes “help conserve and better allocate limited public funds.” School District Brief at 38. The School District finds it absurd and unreasonable to assert that the General Assembly intended it to bear the additional cost of providing “enhanced” transportation to some students merely to accommodate their “parents’ particular domestic circumstances.” Id. at 43.

In response, Father argues that the School Code, and the case law interpreting it, mandates that the School District provide transportation to both residences here. Father posits that, although Section 1361(1) (Provide free transportation) does not specify the origination point of transportation to be provided “to and from ... school,” the only logical interpretation of Section 1361(1) is that the transportation is to be provided from a student’s residence (or a bus stop within 1 ⅜ miles thereof) to the student’s school and back. Father asserts that as C.W. is a “resident pupil” of both parents’ residences, the School District must provide transportation to and from both residences.

Father submits that the School District’s interpretation of Section 1361(1) is impermissible because it is contrary to the legislature’s intent, which he believes is embodied in Section 1327 and the exceptions thereto. See 24 P.S. § 13-1327(a) (Compulsory attendance) (stating “every child of compulsory school age having a legal residence in this Commonwealth ... is required to attend a day school”). Because certain classes of school districts cannot compel attendance if they do not provide transportation to their students who live more than two miles from their school, see 24 P.S. § 13-1330(5) (Exceptions to compulsory attendance), Father finds the purpose behind providing transportation is to compel attendance. Additionally, Father highlights that those classes of school districts not included in the compulsory attendance exception are mandated to provide transportation to students who live more than two miles from school. See 24 P.S. § 13-1331 (Mandatory transportation), full text supra at 592, 121 A.3d at 969. Father offers that if we accept the School District’s argument here, then the purpose behind the transportation provisions will only be accomplished half of the time; C.W. will only be compelled to attend school during Mother’s periods of physical custody but not when he is living with Father.

In response to the School District’s alternative argument that its policy is within its discretion to determine what is “proper transportation,” Father argues that the cases the School District relies upon, see supra at 592-93, 121 A.3d at 969-70, are inapposite, contending that in citing Martin and Pollock, the School District fails to recognize that these cases only involved the manner of transportation services and not whether the school districts at issue were required to provide transportation in the first instance as is the question here. Thus, Father asserts that the School District only has discretion to decide the manner of transportation, not whether there will be transportation at all.

Father next posits that even assuming arguendo that the School District has discretion to decide whether to provide transportation to more than one residence, providing transportation only half of the time is not “proper transportation.” Similarly, Father advances, requiring a student to walk nearly two miles to a bus stop within 1 ½ miles of Mother’s residence would be an abuse of discretion, as it exceeds the 1 ⅛ mile limit set forth in Section 1362 (Distance to bus stops) when C.W. is at Father’s residence.

Lastly, in response to the School District’s argument that its changes to the transportation policy were necessary to conserve public funds, Father argues that the cost to the School District is irrelevant. To the extent that the School District’s budget is relevant, Father points out that the bulk of the School District’s savings likely stemmed from eliminating transportation to locations other than residences, as only 50 to 75 of 400 students were transported to multiple residences.

In this case, we are reviewing the trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction, pursuant to agreed-upon facts, and therefore we must determine whether the trial court committed an error of law, for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Buffalo Twp. v. Jones, 571 Pa. 637, 813 A.2d 659, 663-64 (2002). In order to establish a claim for a permanent injunction, the party must establish his or her clear right to relief. Id. at 663. As Father’s request for a permanent injunction rests upon a purported mandate within the School Code, this case presents a matter of statutory interpretation. The objective of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent behind the statute. 1 Pa.C,S. § 1921(a). When the plain language of a statute is clear and free from all ambiguity, it is the best indication of legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); see also Chanceford Aviation v. Chanceford Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 592 Pa. 100, 923 A.2d 1099, 1104 (2007).

When, however, the words of a statute are ambiguous, a number of factors are used in determining legislative intent, including the purpose of the statute and the consequences of a particular interpretation. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). Furthermore, “it is axiomatic that in determining legislative intent, all sections of a statute must be read together and in conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire statute.” Hoffman Mining Co., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp., Cambria Cnty., 612 Pa. 598, 32 A.3d 587, 592 (2011) (internal quotes and citation omitted); see also 1 Pa. C.S. § 1932 (statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the same persons or things, and statutes or parts of statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible). Lastly, we presume that the legislature did not intend an unreasonable or absurd result. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).

Generally, courts are restrained when reviewing matters of school policy and “should not function as super school boards.” Zebra v. Sch. Dist. of City of Pittsburgh, 449 Pa. 432, 296 A.2d 748, 750 (1972). However, school boards do not have unfettered discretion; courts have authority to interfere when a school board’s “action is based on a misconception of law, ignorance through lack of inquiry into facts necessary to form intelligent judgment, or the result of arbitrary will or caprice_” Hibbs v. Arensberg, 276 Pa. 24, 119 A. 727, 728 (1923). If such an abuse of discretion occurs, then it is amenable to the injunctive process, an equitable remedy in which the party seeking injunctive relief bears a heavy burden. Landerman v. Churchill Area Sch. Dist., 414 Pa. 530, 200 A.2d 867, 869 (1964).

With these general principles in mind, we turn to the relevant statutory provisions of the School Code, which are contained within Article XIII, titled “Pupils and Attendance.” First, we analyze the provisions governing transportation, beginning with Section 1361(1) (Provide free transportation). Section 1361(1) states that “[t]he board of school directors in any school district may ... provide for the free transportation of any resident pupil to and from the ... school in which he is lawfully enrolled_”24 P.S. § 13-1361(1). The School District does not dispute that it owes a duty of transportation to C.W. as a “resident pupil” based on Section 1361(1), as it has elected to provide transportation for its students. The contested issue is what this duty of transportation entails, and specifically, whether it requires transportation to Father’s residence.

Section 1361(1) (Provide free transportation) states that a student shall receive transportation “to and from” school. By using the language “to and from” school, Section 1361(1) does not state where the transportation begins and where it ends. As written, this portion of the statute could be construed to mandate transportation to and from school to wherever a student or his parent desires, whether this be his residence, daycare, or the front of the corner store.

Section 1361(1) itself, however, only applies to “resident pupils.” Thus, the duty to transport the student is trigged by his status as a resident of the school district, and necessarily his residence within the school district. It would be illogical to hold that the transportation that is provided is from some location other than the student’s residence. As further support that transportation for purposes of 1361(1) must be to and from school to a student’s residence, Section 1366 of the School Code sets forth how to compute any distance specified in the School Code. Specifically, any distance calculated “between the residence of any pupil and any public school to be attended by him” must be computed by removing the distance between the student’s “dwelling house” and the public road. 24 P.S. § 13-1366 (Computation of distances). Therefore, the relevant distances in the School Code are based entirely on the student’s residence. Thus, we conclude that when a school district elects to provide transportation pursuant to Section 1361(1) (Provide free transportation), the origination and termination point for the transportation is the student’s residence.,

Having established that Section 1361(1) transportation begins and ends at a student’s residence, we must next determine whether a student may have more than one residence for transportation purposes, keeping in mind that the singular form of “residence” in Section 1366 (Computation of distances) is not dispositive, See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1902 (providing that when interpreting statutes “[t]he singular shall include the plural, and the plural, the singular.”). As Section 1361(1) does not address the question before us, we look to other sections of the School Code and its regulations. We begin by reviewing the provisions dealing with enrollment, a matter that is intrinsically linked with residency.

Section 1301 establishes that “[e]very child, being a resident of any school district, [between specific ages], may attend the public schools in his district,...” 24 P.S. § 13-1301. The immediately following provision defines “resident”—“A child shall be considered a resident of the school district in which his parents or the guardian of his person resides.” 24 P.S. § 13-1302(a). Section 1302 does not explicitly contemplate a student whose parents do not live together. In 2004, the State Board of Education addressed this issue when it enacted Section 11.11(a) (Enrollment Regulation) of the regulations, which reads in relevant part:

§ 11.11. Entitlement of resident children to attend public schools.
(a) Entitlement.
(1) A school age child is entitled to attend the public schools of the child’s district of residence. A child’s district of residence is that in which the parents or the guardian resides. When the parents reside in different school districts due to separation, divorce or other reason, the child may attend school in the district of residence of the parent with whom the child lives for a majority of the time, unless a court order or court approved custody agreement specifies otherwise. If the parents have joint custody and time is evenly divided, the parents may choose which of the two school districts the child will enroll for the school year....
(2) Transportation for students must be provided consistent with the policy of the school district that the students are attending.

22 Pa.Code § 11.11(a).

By giving parents a choice between two school districts when the parents “have joint custody and time is evenly divided,” Section 11.11(a)(1) recognizes that a student can be considered a resident of both school districts and therefore have two residences. Obviously, it would be absurd to require, or even permit, a student to attend two school districts during alternating weeks. Hence, the regulation requires a student’s parents to choose one or the other district. The fact that a student must ultimately enroll in only one school district does not detract from the reality that he may reside in two locations. Thus, Section 11.11(a)(1) establishes that where the parents have shared physical custody of a student, that student has two residences for enrollment purposes.

Although Section 11.11(a)(1) informs our decision, its primary focus is enrollment and not transportation. Additionally, it involves choosing between two different school districts, which is not at issue here. To determine whether a choice between two residences within the same school district for transportation purposes is necessary, we review the purpose behind the statutory provisions relating to transportation, which we find within the sections regarding transportation in the “Enforcing attendance” section of Article XIII. See Article XIII (b) of the School Code.

Within Article XIII (b) of the School Code, Section 1327(a) sets forth that “every child of compulsory school age having a legal residence in this Commonwealth ... is required to attend a day school.” 24 P.S. § 13-1327 (Compulsory attendance). The School Code then provides that compulsory school attendance does not apply to a student who “resides two miles or more by the nearest public highway from any public school in session and no proper free transportation is furnished to such child to and from school.” 24 P.S. § 13-1330(5) (Exceptions to compulsory attendance); see supra at 594-95 n. 10, 121 A.3d at 971 n. 10 for full text. Necessarily, then, the purpose behind school-provided transportation is to facilitate students’ attendance. Logically, if students reside far from their school, the legislature has decided that a school district cannot mandate a student’s attendance unless transportation is provided.

Choosing between two residences within a school district for transportation purposes is qualitatively different from choosing which district to enroll in because, as this case illustrates, a student may logically maintain two residences within the same school district. Here, Mother and Father share legal and physical custody, with C.W. spending alternate weeks with each parent. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the legislature and the Department of Education intended for the School District to provide transportation to both residences in order to further the goal of compulsory attendance. Accepting the School District’s counter-argument, moreover, would tend to undermine the purpose behind the statute (mandatory attendance) as during the time C.W. resides with Father, which is half of his time, he would not be required to attend school given that Father lives more than two miles from C.W.’s school and the School District is refusing transportation. See 24 P.S. § 13-1330(5) (Exceptions to compulsory attendance). Thus, the School District’s view that providing transportation from Father’s residence is merely “enhanced” transportation is erroneous: transportation for half of the year is anything but enhanced, and, in fact, it is necessary to compel attendance.

Additionally, utilizing the same logic, we reject the School District’s argument that whether to provide transportation to Father’s residence is a decision that falls within its broad discretion. The School District does not have the discretion to decide whether to provide transportation for half of the time C.W. should be in school.

Moreover, the School District concedes that it cannot require C.W. to walk more than 1 ⅜ miles to his bus stop, pursuant to Section 1362 (Distance to bus stops), yet it asserts that it can require Father to drive more than 1 ½ miles to the bus stop. The School District cannot avoid a statutory prohibition by requiring a parent to drive where it cannot require a student to walk.

In closing, we note our holding is consistent with the purpose of the School Code, which we have stated is:

to provide all children residing within the Commonwealth with a good common school education. In carrying out this purpose the various school districts are merely the agents of the Commonwealth. In construing the school laws, therefore, that interpretation will be adopted which will be more likely to carry into effect this generous purpose. The child is the paramount object of our common school law. His education, and not the exact apportionment of its cost among various subdivisions of the Commonwealth, is its chief concern.

Harris v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 306 Pa. 546, 160 A. 443, 444 (1932) (internal quotes and citations omitted).

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the School District must provide transportation from and to both Mother’s and Father’s residences because: when the School District elected to provide transportation to students’ residences under Section 1361(1), it was required to do so to C.W.’s residence; C.W. has two residences by virtue of his parents’ equally shared physical custody; there is no provision requiring parents to choose a residence for transportation purposes (in contrast to enrollment); and students cannot be required to travel more than 1⅝ miles from their residence to the bus stop. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly granted Father’s permanent injunction because the School District here is mandated to provide C.W. with transportation to and from school to both of his residences.

Based on the foregoing, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.

Justice EAKIN and Justice TODD join the opinion.

Chief Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion.

Justice STEVENS files a dissenting opinion.

Chief Justice, SAYLOR,

concurring.

I agree with the result reached by the majority and write to explain why I believe such result should be limited to the circumstances presented.

The common pleas court made particularized findings and conclusions, and it ultimately stated that its holding was

limited to the specific factual circumstances before the [c]ourt: a situation wherein both parents live in the school district, the student is subject to an equally split joint legal and physical custody agreement, and a bus from the student’s school has available seats, already serves both homes and could accommodate the student without any further cost or adding an extra stop.

Watts v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., No. CI-12-17815, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, slip op. at 9 (C.P. Lancaster May 8, 2018); see Majority Opinion, at 588, 121 A.3d at 967 (summarizing these circumstances). The intermediate court, however, used the appeal as an opportunity to convert the decision into a broader ruling of law to the effect that, whenever “a child has two residences within a school district, the school district must provide transportation services accommodating both residences.” Watts v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist, 84 A.3d 378, 386 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014). The majority affirms that ruling.

Left to my own devices, I would hew more closely to the limitations as expressed by the county court, including, most notably, the present availability of a bus to and from Father’s home with an open seat that could be used by the student involved. See generally Maloney v. Valley Med. Facilities, Inc., 603 Pa. 399, 417, 984 A.2d 478, 490 (2009) (observing that judicial decisions are to be read against their facts to promote incremental development of the law “within the confines of the circumstances of cases as they come before the Court”). I find the existence of this circumstance material to the outcome because it means that accommodating C.W.’s living arrangements would not substantially add to the school district’s financial or administrative burden in providing free transportation to its students. Thus, the county court’s decision to provide relief, and the specific relief ordered, are closely tailored to the dispute’s underlying facts as they were developed of record. It is not evident to me that the same relief would be required in a different situation, such as where the school district was able to demonstrate that providing transportation to both residences would require the expenditure of funds far in excess of the private cost of transporting the student to school or the appropriate bus stop.

As for my broader concerns, I would observe that when students maintain two addresses in a school district, accommodating their living arrangements is likely to entail administrative costs above and beyond those associated with students who maintain a single address. Since the School Code does not speak directly to this situation, the question becomes whether the Legislature would have intended for this extra cost to be borne by the school district or the family. I find the question difficult to answer as it pertains to the Legislature which drafted the Code in 1949. That body did not evidently consider the possibility of multiple homes within a single school district, as evidenced by the Code’s failure to provide guidance relative to such circumstances.

In terms of the Code’s overall purposes, on one hand it does appear aimed at promoting school attendance, as the majority emphasizes; on the other hand, it gives school districts significant leeway in implementing such attendance. For example, the Code does not affirmatively require busing. Hence, a significant increase in the cost of busing might lead some school districts to discontinue the service, or, alternatively, to curtail educational programs or raise taxes. Accounting for such tradeoffs falls within the domain of the school district in the first instance, and it lies within the legislative sphere to balance the broader policy considerations associated with affording school districts discretion in this area. As such, absent further legislative guidance, I share the dissent’s concern with having the judicial branch make broadly-worded rulings that are likely to bind school districts on a widespread basis across Pennsylvania.

Justice STEVENS,

dissenting.

In determining that a student can have more than one residence from which they are entitled to free transportation to school, the Majority imposes a newly created duty upon school districts that is unsupported by any authority. Neither the School Code nor state regulations mandate that school districts must provide students with transportation to and from school from more than one location. While a school district may choose to offer free transportation from multiple locations, a district should not be compelled to do so without more specific legislative direction after public hearings.

Such a sweeping policy that will affect all Pennsylvania school districts should be left to the Legislature, which is better suited to thoroughly consider the implications of such a protocol. What will this policy cost taxpayers? Will a school district have to rearrange busing every week if parents share custody every other week? Questions abound but unlike the Legislature, this Court does not hold public hearings, does not have input from school administrators, school board members, bus drivers and other interested parties who can anticipate and consider the resulting consequences of this decision to Pennsylvania School Districts. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent as I conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting injunctive relief requiring the Manheim Township School District to provide such transportation.

The Majority correctly observes the plain language of the School Code does not provide any guidance on the issue of whether a student may have more than one residence for school purposes and does not explicitly contemplate a student whose parents do not live together. With respect to free transportation, Section 1361 of the School Code provides that “[t]he board of school directors in any school district may ... provide for the free transportation of any resident pupil to and from the ... school in which he is lawfully enrolled....” 24 P.S. § 13-1361. In a separate section of the School Code pertaining to attendance and school enrollment, Section 1302 provides that “a child shall be considered a resident of the school district in which his parents or the guardian of his person resides.” 24 P.S. § 13-1302(a).

As the best indication of the General Assembly’s intent in enacting a statute may be found in its plain language, this Court has emphasized that “it is not for the courts to add, by interpretation, to a statute, a requirement which the legislature did not see fit to include.” Karoly v. Mancuso, 619 Pa. 486, 510-11, 65 A.3d 301, 316 (2013) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 588 Pa. 429, 438, 905 A.2d 438, 443 (2006); Commonwealth v. Rieck Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52, 59-60, 213 A.2d 277, 282 (1965)). Nevertheless, the Majority’s statutory interpretation broadens and burdens a school district’s transportation responsibilities absent specific evidence of legislative intent to do so.

The State Board of Education regulations support the notion that parents must designate one home as the student’s residence for school purposes. In Section 11.11(a), the regulations clarify the enrollment procedure for a student whose parents live in different school districts:

When the parents reside in different school districts due to separation, divorce or other reason, the child may attend school in the district of residence of the parent with whom the child lives for a majority of the time, unless a court order or court approved custody agreement specifies otherwise. If the parents have joint custody and time is evenly divided, the parents may choose which of the two school districts the child will enroll for the school year.

22 Pa.Code § 11.11(a).

While acknowledging that a student may have physical residences in two school districts, Section 11.11 prohibits a student from enrolling in both districts by expressly requiring parents to choose one district of residence to use for school purposes. As the majority notes, “it would be absurd to require, or even permit, a student to attend two school districts during alternating weeks.” Majority Opinion, at 601, 121 A,3d at 975. As such, Section 11.11 mandates that parents designate which home will be considered the student’s residence for the purpose of school enrollment, even though the student technically resides in two districts.

This same logic extends to circumstances where a student lives in two residences within the same district. Parents must choose a residence for enrollment purposes to determine which neighborhood school their child will attend. It would be equally absurd to allow a student to attend two schools in the same district in alternating weeks based on their living arrangement.

The purpose of requiring parents to designate their child’s residence and school district for enrollment purposes is to determine the student’s eligibility for free school privileges, including transportation. The rule that a student cannot have more than one residence for enrollment purposes applies equally to the student’s entitlement to free transportation. A school district fulfills its obligation to provide free transportation to a resident student when it transports them to and from their designated residence in the school district in which the student is enrolled. Without any express legislative mandate to the contrary, we should not create different concepts for a student’s residence for enrollment and their residence for transportation purposes.

Free transportation to school from multiple residences in the district should not be dictated by this Court. The likely burden to the taxpayers and cost-benefit of such a rule should be examined carefully and decided by the elected state legislators. To determine whether it is appropriate to impose such a requirement on all the districts in the Commonwealth, it is necessary to evaluate in public hearings the various policy issues and consequences of mandating transportation to and from multiple residences for each student. Such a change in policy will present a logistical strain for school directors to create bus schedules while promoting efficiency and safety. Uncertainty and delays in bus arrivals will likely arise due to the daily addition or deletion of stops and may be cause for concern to the parents of other student riders. Constantly changing bus schedules increase the likelihood of a child getting on the “wrong” bus and arriving at an empty home. It will also be increasingly difficult for school districts to quickly determine which students are on a particular bus at a certain time in the case of an emergency.

Although the Majority does not address whether school districts will be required to provide transportation to students in situations where parents do not have equal joint custody, such problems will be amplified when districts are forced to accommodate parents’ variable and informal domestic arrangements with little notice.

Moreover, the economic impact on school district budgets should also be thoroughly evaluated. Even though the Majority attempts to minimize the Manheim Township School District’s saved costs from the elimination of such transportation, it is not realistic to extrapolate the statistics from one district and assume the same will be true for the rest of the districts in Commonwealth that vary in the size and the locational distribution of their population. Without input from the Department of Education and school administrators, it is impossible to predict the economic effect of this Court’s mandate.

As a result, I find this Court should exercise restraint and decline to dictate matters of school policy where the school district properly exercised its discretion in adopting a transportation procedure setting criteria for the eligibility of resident pupils for free transportation services. The Commonwealth Court has astutely observed that “[i]t is unfortunate that parents who live apart, whether by choice or necessity, face greater difficulties in meeting their responsibilities to their children.... Mitigating such hardships, however, is not the purpose of ... the School Code.” North Allegheny School District v. Gregory P., 687 A.2d 37, 40 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) (concluding that a school district is not required to provide a student transportation from the residence of both his father and his mother and when the father resided outside the district). Accordingly, I dissent.

      . 24 P.S, §§ 1-[ XXX-XX-XXXX ] ("the School Code”).

      , Because of the prolix statutory sections involved in this case, we will offer a parenthetical after each cited section to aid the reader in maintaining clarity.

      . For full text of 24 P.S. § 13-1362, see infra at 592-93 n. 7, 121 A.3d at 970 n. 7.

      . See supra at 587, 121 A.3d at 966 for the full text of Section 1361(1).

      . See School District's Brief at 34-35 (citing Chipman ex rel. Chipman v. Avon Grove Sch. Dist., 841 A.2d 1098 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (finding that Section 1361(1) did not require a school district to discontinue its use of transfer stations for non-public school students); Morningstar v. Mifflin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 760 A.2d 1221 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000) (holding a school district properly denied a parent’s request to reestablish a student's bus stop in front of her house); and Quasti v. N. Penn Sch. Dist., 907 A.2d 42 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (finding that a school district had broad discretion in affixing bus routes and the paths which students were required to walk to reach their bus stops)).

      . It appears that the School District does not fall under Section 1331 which applies only to students living in
      a school district of the fourth class, or in a township which is a school district of the third class, or in a borough which has a population of less than five hundred (500) inhabitants to the square mile and which is a school district of the third class....
      24 P.S. § 13-1331; see also 24 P.S. § 2-202 (designation of classes of school districts); and https://www.mtwp.net/about/district-demographics/ (setting forth the School District’s geographic size and population).

      . Section 1362 states in relevant part:

        The free transportation of pupils, as required or authorized by this act, or any other act, may be furnished by using either school conveyances, private conveyances, or electric railways, or other common carriers, when the total distance which any pupil must travel by the public highway to or from school, in addition to such transportation, does not exceed one and one-half (1 ½) miles, and when stations or other proper shelters are provided for the use of such pupils where needed, and when the highway, road, or traffic conditions are not such that walking constitutes a hazard to the safety of the child, as so certified by the Department of Transportation.
      24 P.S. § 13-1362.

      . 22 Pa.Code §§ 1.1-23.40.

      . The Pennsylvania School Boards Association ("Amicus ”) filed an amicus brief in support of the School District’s position. Amicus argues that the School Code and its regulations contain an unwritten "Single Residency Rule,” which limits a student to only one residence. Additionally, Amicus’ brief echoes the School District’s argument that this decision was consistent with the School District’s discretion in "adopting transportation policies and procedures to ensure the health, safety and welfare of all students in a reasonable manner, while maintaining fiscal responsibility.” Amicus Brief at 20.

      . Section 1330(5)'s full text reads as follows:
      The provisions of this act requiring regular attendance shall not apply to any child who—

      (5) Except in districts of the fourth class and those of the third class located wholly within the boundary lines of a township, or within the boundary lines of a borough which has a population of less than five hundred (500) inhabitants to the square mile, resides two miles or more by the nearest public highway from any public school in session and no proper free transportation is furnished to such child to and from school.
      24 P.S. § 13-1330(5).

      . We note that all school districts are required to file their budgets with the Pennsylvania Department of Education. See 24 P.S. § 2-218(a) ("An annual financial report shall be submitted to the Secretary of Education by each school district”). The School District has done so and placed its 2015-2016 budget online for public scrutiny, which shows expenditures of $86,528,116 expected for that school year. See http://www.mtwp.net/distric1/business-office/, Proposed Final 2015-2016 Budget PDE-2028. It is undisputed that the School District’s modification to its transportation policy affected 400 students and saved approximately $200,000 per year. Of these 400 students, the School District eliminated stops to more than one residence for 50-75 students because of physical custody arrangements. Assuming that the appropriate number is 75 students and the savings are equal per student, this represents 19% of the 400 students and therefore $38,000 of the $200,000 in savings. This $38,000 equates to a savings of 0.04% or 4/100 of 1% of the School District’s total 86.5 million dollar budget.

      . Section 1366 (Computation of distances) states in full:
      Where, by the terms of this act, or any other act, any distance is specified between the residence of any pupil and any public school to be attended by him, or any transportation is provided for within or beyond any particular distance, in computing such distance no allowance shall be made for the distance that the dwelling house of the pupil is situated off the public highway. All such distances shall be computed by the public highway from the nearest point where a private way or private road connects the dwelling house of the pupil with the highway to the nearest point where said highway touches the school grounds of the school to which the pupil has been assigned.
      24 P.S. § 13-1366.

      . This does not preclude a school district from providing transportation to locations other than a residence, but such transportation is not mandated by Section 1361(1).

      . We acknowledge that when a school district is required to provide transportation to a student’s residence, this transportation requirement does not entail door-to-door transportation directly to a student’s residence. Rather, Section 1362 permits a school district to provide transportation to a bus stop within 1 ½ miles of a student’s residence, See 24 P.S. § 13-1362 (full text at supra 592-93 n. 7, 121 A.3d at 970 n. 7). However, for ease of discussion, we will refer to the location of a student’s disembarkment from the school bus as his residence.

      . While the School Code and the child custody statute, 23 Pa.C.S, §§ 5301-5366, do not provide a definition of "joint custody,” the term is synonymous with "shared custody.” In re Wesley J.K., 299 Pa.Super. 504, 445 A,2d 1243, 1247 (1982). Under the child custody statute, shared custody is defined as follows:
      "Shared physical custody.” The right of more than one individual to assume physical custody of the child, each having significant periods of physical custodial time with the child.
      23 Pa.C.S. § 5322.
      Additionally, we note that the child custody statute does not provide a definition for or any reference to "evenly divided time.” It is not clear whether this phrase is limited to circumstances where each parent has exactly fifty percent of the child's time, or whether it means something less technical, similar to the definition of shared custody. However, because the parents here each have exactly fifty percent of C.W.’s time, it is unnecessary for us to analyze this distinction any further to decide this case. Thus, we leave such question for another day when it is directly before us, replete with briefing and oral argument.

      . Accordingly, we disagree with Amicus’, The Pennsylvania School Boards Association, argument that because Section 11.11(a)(1) has the effect that a student may enroll in only one school district, the regulation necessarily implies that a student may only have one residence, a concept that Amicus terms the “Single Residency Rule.”

      . The Section 1330(5) exception does not apply to students who reside in school districts of "the fourth class and those of the third class located wholly within the boundary lines of a township, or within the boundary lines of a borough which has a population of less than five hundred (500) inhabitants to the square mile.” Id. The immediately following provision, Section 1331 (Mandatory transportation), applies to those school districts excluded from the Section 1330(5) exception, and requires those school districts to provide transportation or lodging to its students who reside more than two miles from their respective schools. See 24 P.S. § 13-1331.

      . Although the concurring opinion’s concern for school districts' budgets is understandable, a rule requiring school districts to provide transportation to a student’s two residences only when such transportation is not an “administrative burden” to the school district is not supported by the School Code as written. As set forth at length above, this decision required us to conduct statutory interpretation. Interpreting the statute is not the same as broadening the statute. We have not added any language nor have we expanded the plain language of the School Code. As we should, we leave it to the legislature to determine whether adding an "administrative burden” consideration is appropriate.

      . As noted in the recitation of the issues raised on appeal, we also granted allowance of appeal to address the propriety of the lower courts’ reliance on our prior decision in Cumberland Valley. As demonstrated above, however, we have determined that C.W. has two residences without the need to analyze or rely on Cumberland Valley. Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to reach the question presented in the second issue raised on appeal.

      . The majority and the intermediate court both rest the two-residences predicate on the equal division of time between parents. See Majority Opinion, at 604, 121 A.3d at 976 ("C.W. has two residences by virtue of his parents' equally shared physical custody!.]”); Watts, 84 A.3d at 386 ("Because C.W.'s parents share joint and equal custody by court order, C.W. has two residences within the district.” (citation to record omitted)).

      . This would be a greater concern for rural school districts where students’ homes are farther apart. When living at a second residence, a student may not have access to an existing bus stop for other children, requiring a bus to go miles out of its way to pick up and drop off that one student, leading to delays that will affect all of the students riding that particular bus.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    121 A.3d 981
    IA CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (RHODES). Petition of Jeffrey Rhodes.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 26, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 26th day of August, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:

Whether the Commonwealth Court overstepped its appellate function in making credibility judgments which is the sole function of the Workers’ Compensation Judge?


text:
    121 A.3d 981
    Porfirio Placencia NUNEZ v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (QC QUALITY CONSTRUCTION, INC.) Petition of QC Quality Construction, Inc.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 26, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 26th day of August, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal and the Application for Supersedeas Pending Appeal are DENIED,


text:
    121 A.3d 981
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Trebor A. ADAMS, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 982
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Shareaf WILLIAMS, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 982
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Cory Alan DERR, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 982
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Cleonard George GILBERT, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 983
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Erik MESSNER, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 983
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Fernando PERES, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 983
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Kahlil BROCKINGTON, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 984
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Khalil A. BLAKENEY, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 984
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. William BATES, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 984
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Dennis James ALENOVITZ, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 984
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Stephen Eugene SHIFLER, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED, See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 985
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Demetrius Aaron HARDY, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 985
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Alejandro GUZMAN, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 985
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Jarrod Craig LAWSON, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 986
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Alejandro GUZMAN, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015),


text:
    121 A.3d 986
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Kip EDDINGER, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 986
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Andre Holmes MYERS, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    121 A.3d 987
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Korey C. HOLMES, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 360
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. David Lee MAYES, Jr., Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A,3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 360
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Ingrid RODRIGUEZ, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 360
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. William Stephen RISKO, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 360
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Arnett PENDERGRASS, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa, 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 361
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Edwin BURGOS, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 361
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Marcus Lamar WILLIAMS, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 361
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Neil Joseph BRISBIN, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 362
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Steven M. WEYANT, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 363
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Jermaine J. MORGAN, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 363
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Antonio HUNT, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
    Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

      Alexandre Neuerburg Turner, The Law Offices of Alexan-dre Turner, LLC, Philadelphia, for Antonio Hunt.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 363
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Preston HUNT, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
    Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Katrina Marie Young, Karl Baker, Peter Rosalsky, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, for Preston Hunt.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 364
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Anthony CARROLL, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
    Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Emma Reynolds, Karl Baker, Peter Rosalsky, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, for Anthony Carroll.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 364
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Bryant HAGGOOD, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.

      Hugh J. Burns, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Emily Camille Dust, Karl Baker, Peter Rosalsky, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, for Bryant Haggood.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 365
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Joshua JEAN, Appellee. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Joshua Jean, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
    Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

      Karl Baker, Ellen T. Greenlee, Owen W. Larrabee, James Aaron Streifer Temple, Stephen J. Fleury, Jr., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, for Joshua Jean.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is AFFIRMED in part as to the Commonwealth’s appeal at 37 EAP 2014, see Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015), and the case is REMANDED to the Superior Court for consideration of Joshua Jean’s appeal at 38 EAP 2014. This Court’s Order of January 12, 2016, which held Jean’s appeal in abeyance pending disposition of the Commonwealth’s appeal, is VACATED.


text:
    122 A.3d 365
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Walter KIRKLAND, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
    Hugh J. Burns, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Robert Patrick Link, LinkLaw, LLC, Philadelphia, for Walter Kirkland.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 366
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Taufeeq ZIYAD, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
    Hugh J. Burns, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Liam Joseph Riley, Karl Baker, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, for Taufeeq Ziyad.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 366
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. James STEWART, Appellee. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. James Stewart, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
    Hugh J. Burns, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Jules Norris Szanto, Ellen T. Greenlee, Owen W. Larrabee, Karl Baker, Jr., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, for James Stewart.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is AFFIRMED in part as to the Commonwealth’s appeal at 51 EAP 2014, see Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015), and the case is REMANDED to the Superior Court for consideration of James Stewart’s appeal at 52 EAP 2014.


text:
    122 A.3d 366
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Lamont BRODIE, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
    Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Jeremy-Evan Alva, Alva & Associates, Philadelphia, for Lamont Brodie.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 1029
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Daniel L. SPUCK, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 19, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 19th day of August, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal and Applications for Relief are DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1029
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Ross REID, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Aug. 31, 2015.
    Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Daniel Paul Alva, Alva & Associates, Philadelphia, for Ross Reid.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 1029
    In the Matter of RESUMPTION OF USE OF INDICTING GRAND JURIES IN DAUPHIN COUNTY. Petition of Richard A. Lewis, President Judge of Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas.
    No. 110 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 8, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 8th day of September, 2015, the Petition to Summon an Indicting Grand Jury is GRANTED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1029
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Victoria C. GIULIAN, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 9, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 9th day of September, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:

Did the Superior Court commit an error of law in finding that the Petitioner was not statutorily eligible to have her summary convictions expunged pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9122(b)(3) despite the fact that Petitioner has been free of arrest and prosecution for more than sixteen years following the convictions, over ten years longer than the statutory requirement?


text:
    122 A.3d 1030
    ESTATE OF Robert H. AGNEW, Margaret Alzamora, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Robert H. Agnew, William and Sheila Hennessy, H/W, Margaret Hennessy, James and Christine Hennessy, H/W and Paul and Eileen Janke, H/W, v. Daniel R. ROSS, Esquire, Megan McCrea, Esquire and Ross & McCrea, LLP. Petition of Daniel R. Ross, Esquire and Megan McCrea, Esquire.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 9, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 9th day of September, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by petitioners, are:

(1) Whether the Superior Court erred when it determined, in a published decision, contrary to Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983), as well as reported Superior Court decisions, Gregg v. Lindsay, 437 Pa.Super. 206, 649 A.2d 935 (1994), Cardenas v. Schober, 2001 Pa.Super. 253, 783 A.2d 317 (2001) and Hess v. Fox Rothschild, 20[0]7 PA Super 133, 925 A.2d 798 (Pa.Super.2007), an executed testamentary document naming a third party as a beneficiary was not a prerequisite for that third party to have standing to bring a legal malpractice action based on breach of contract as third party intended beneficiary of contract against the testator’s attorney?
(2) Whether the Superior Court so far departed from accepted judicial practices or abused its discretion in failing to apply the clear precedent of Guy v. Liederbach, as well as other reported Superior Court decisions, Gregg v. Lindsay, Cardenas v. Schober and Hess v. Fox Rothschild, when it determined an executed testamentary document naming a third party as a beneficiary was not a prerequisite for that third party to have standing to bring a legal malpractice action based on breach of contract as third party intended beneficiary of contract against the testator’s attorney?
(3) Whether the Superior Court erred when it determined, in a published decision, evidence of the intent of the promisor (the testator’s attorney) alone was sufficient to establish an issue of fact to defeat summary judgment on the issue of a third party’s standing to pursue a legal malpractice breach of contract action against a testator’s attorney?


text:
    122 A.3d 1031
    Melvin GREEN, Petitioner v. BUREAU OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 76 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 14, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 14th day of September, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1031
    Alfonzo B. SALLEY, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PHILADELPHIA COUNTY and its President Judge, Respondent.
    No. 79 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 14, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 14th day of September, 2015, the Application for Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1031
    Ronald MILBURN, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA, Respondent.
    No. 80 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 14, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 14th day of September, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1032
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Jasper WASHINGTON, Petitioner.
    No. 89 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 14, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 14th day of September, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1032
    James SCHNELLER, Petitioner v. PROTHONOTARY, SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent.
    No. 98 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 14, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 14th day of September, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and the Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis are DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1032
    Ex rel. Antonio BUNDY, Petitioner v. Barbara A. CERMELE, Prothonotary of City of Philadelphia, Respondent.
    No. 82 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 14, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 14th day of September, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1032
    Anthony JOHNSON, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, CRIMINAL DIV., JUDGE WILLIAM J. MAZZOLA et al., Respondents.
    No. 86 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 16, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of September, 2015, the Application to Invoke Extraordinary Jurisdiction is DISMISSED. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 537 Pa. 167, 642 A.2d 453 (1994) (explaining that hybrid representation is not permitted). The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to forward the filing to counsel of record and to strike the name of the jurist from the caption.


text:
    122 A.3d 1033
    Edward E. STEWART, III, Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
    No. 87 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 16, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of September, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Application for an Immediate Hearing are DISMISSED, See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 534 Pa. 176, 626 A.2d 1137 (1993) (holding that hybrid representation is impermissible). The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to forward the filings to counsel of record.


text:
    122 A.3d 1033
    Amro ELANSARI, Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, et al., Respondents.
    No. 101 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 16, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of September, 2015, the Application for Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1033
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Teron LEWIS, Petitioner.
    No. 102 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 16, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of September, 2015, the Petition for Leave to File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is DENIED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Petitioner’s right to seek similar relief through the Post Conviction Relief Act. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b) (explaining that, generally, a Post Conviction Relief Act petition shall be filed within one year of the date of when the judgment of sentence becomes final).


text:
    122 A.3d 1034
    John WILSON, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 84 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 16, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of September, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1034
    Carlos QUILES, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON OF PLEAS PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 85 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 16, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of September, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus are DISMISSED. See Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282 (2010) (stating that hybrid representation is not permitted). The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to forward the filings to counsel of record.


text:
    122 A.3d 1034
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent, v. Kareem BARNES, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 18, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 18th day of September, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED LIMITED TO the issues set forth below. Allocatur is DENIED as to all remaining issues. The issues, rephrased for clarity, are:

(1) Whether a challenge to a sentence pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), implicates the legality of the sentence and is therefore non-waivable.
(2) Whether contemporaneous convictions of possession with intent to deliver, pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-113, and possession of a firearm prohibited, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, allow application of the mandatory minimum sentence found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1 in light of our decision in Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36, 117 A.3d 247 (2015).


text:
    122 A.3d 1035
    BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f/k/a The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of CWALT, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust 2005-86CB, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate Series 2005-86cb c/o Bank of America, N.A., Respondent v. Dorothy HARTMAN, Petitioner.
    No. 91 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 18, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 18th day of September, 2015, the Application for Extraordinary Relief or Bang’s Bench Jurisdiction is DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1035
    Ronald WILLIAMS, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 90 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 18, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 18th day of September, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1035
    Johnuall BENDER, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 88 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 18, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 18th day of September, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief are DISMISSED. See Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282 (2010) (providing that hybrid representation is impermissible). The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to forward the filings to counsel of record.


text:
    122 A.3d 1036
    In re Appointment of a Receiver for the CHESTER UPLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT. Petition of Chester Community Charter School.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 21, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 21st day of September, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Reply in Further Support of Emergency Application for Extraordinary Relief is GRANTED, and the Emergency Application for Extraordinary Relief is DENIED. Furthermore, the Application of Amicus Curiae for Leave of Court to File Memorandum of Law in Support of Emergency Application for Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1036
    Daniel E. TAYLOR and William Taylor, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Anna Marie Taylor, Deceased v. EXTENDICARE HEALTH FACILITIES, INC. d/b/a Havencrest Nursing Center; Extendicare Holdings, Inc.; Extendicare Health Facility Holdings, Inc.; Extendicare Health Services, Inc.; Extendicare Reit; Extendicare, L.P.; Extendicare, Inc.; Mon Vale Non Acute Care Service, Inc. d/b/a the Residence at Hilltop; Mon-Vale Health Resources, Inc.; Jefferson Health Services, d/b/a Jefferson Regional Medical Center. Petition of Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., d/b/a Havencrest Nursing Center, Extendicare Holdings, Inc., Extendicare Health Facility Holdings, Inc., Extendicare Health Services, Inc., Extendicare Reit, Extendicare, L.P. and Extendicare, Inc.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 23, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 23rd day of September, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by petitioner, are:

(1) Does the Superior Court’s decision, which refused to compel arbitration of the arbitrable survival claim, violate the Federal Arbitration Act requirement that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract?”
(2) Does the Superior Court’s conclusion that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 213(e), require the consolidation of the otherwise arbitrable survival action with the non-arbitrable wrongful death action on grounds of efficiency violate the Federal Arbitration Act as it has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court which has consistently ruled that arbitration is required when there is an agreement to arbitrate even when compelling arbitration results in duplication and piecemeal litigation?


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    122 A.3d 1037
    LEHIGH VALLEY DUAL LANGUAGE CHARTER SCHOOL, Appellee v. BETHLEHEM AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 28, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 28th day of September, 2015, the Application to Dismiss is GRANTED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1037
    Michael STOKES, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 29, 2015.
    Michael Stokes, Frackville, pro se.
    Alan Matthew Robinson, Jason Anthony Lambrino, Harrisburg, for Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of September, 2015, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1037
    Robert STOCKTON, Appellant v. Chief Hearing Examiner-Robin M. LEWIS, John Wetzel, L. Oliver, J. Whitesel, D. Myer, Mandy J. Biser, M.A. Morder, John Fisher, C.O.R.G. Wertz, Captain Sunderland, Amy Himes, T. Miller, C.O. Bardt, Lt. Bard, C.O. Harpster, C.O. Willinsky, C.O. Wilson, C.O. Myers, Dept. of Corrections, J.L. Everhart, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 29, 2015.
    Ronald Stockton, Bellefonte, pro se.
    Theron Richard Perez, Laura J. Neal, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Mechanicsburg, for Lt. Bard, C.O. Bardt, Mandy J. Biser, Dept, of Corrections, J.L. Everhart, John Fisher, C.O. Harpster, Amy Himes, Robin M. Lewis, T. Miller, M.A. Morder, D. Myer, C.O. Myers, L. Oliver, Captain Sun-derland, C.O.R.G. Wertz, John Wetzel, J. Whitesel, C.O. Wil-linsky, C.O. Wilson.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of September, 2015, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby AFFIRMED.


text:
    122 A.3d 1038
    Rodmen R. FOSTER, Appellant v. Ms. Kathleen KANE, Attorney General for the State of Pennsylvania, Mr. Michael C. Potteiger, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, et al., and Mr. John E. Wetzel, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Sept. 29, 2015.
    Rodmen R. Foster, Philadelphia, pro se.
    Kathleen Kane, Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, pro se.
    Theron Richard Perez, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Mechanicsburg, for John E. Wetzel.
    Alan Matthew Robinson, PA Board of Probation & Parole, Harrisburg, for Michael C. Potteiger.
    Jason Anthony Lambrino, Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, for Michael C. Potteiger and John E. Wetzel.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of September 2015, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED. The Application for Leave to File Post-Submission Communication is DENIED. The Application for Leave to File Addendum in Support of Newly Discovered Evidence is DENIED.

Judgment entered