source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM

license: Public Domain

text:
    160 A.3d 755
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Clarence Tyrone TAYLOR, Petitioner
    No. 501 MAL 2015
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Filed October 20, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 20th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, the order of the Superior Court is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison, 636 Pa. 395, 143 A.3d 891 (2016).


text:
    160 A.3d 755
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Caleb Daniel FOX, Petitioner
    No. 343 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    DECIDED: October 20, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 20th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, the order of the Superior Court is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison, 636 Pa. 395, 143 A.3d 891 (2016).

Justice Wecht did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 755
    Bart KELLY, Petitioner v. William C. ERBEY, Scott Anderson, and Ocwen Financial Corp., Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Respondents
    No. 488 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 756
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. William R. PERKINS, Petitioner
    No. 433 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 756
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Rommell DOMINGUEZ-CRUZ, Petitioner
    No. 428 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 756
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Nafis Antuan FAISON, Petitioner
    No. 424 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 767
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Russiu STEWART, Petitioner Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Russiu Stewart, Petitioner
    No. 407 MAL 2016
    No. 408 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 757
    Renae HAMM and Alvin Hamm, Petitioners v. Nathan HANDWERK and Glen Handwerk, Respondent
    No. 384 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 757
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Matthew Scott DIEHL, Petitioner
    No. 368 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 758
    Kenneth N. MILLER, Petitioner v. STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent
    No. 412 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 758
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. John Robert CAMPAS, Petitioner
    No. 361 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 758
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Frankie Willie MAINES, Petitioner
    No. 372 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 758
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Darin WRIGHT, Petitioner
    No. 337 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 759
    John M. MORLEY Jr., Petitioner v. Stacey Anne COLLAZZO, Respondent
    No. 327 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 759
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Jonathon HAMLETTE, Respondent
    No. 317 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 759
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Roy HOLLOWAY, Petitioner
    No. 335 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 760
    Allen FEINGOLD and Ruth Wallace, Petitioners V.State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., Petitioners v. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., David Rohde, Law Offices of David Rohde, Marc Rickles, Joseph Hankins, and Britt, Hankins & Moughan, Respondents
    No. 326 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 760
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Ralph D. JOHNSON, Petitioner
    No. 311 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 760
    Leroy N. BERRY, Lawrence H. Duppins, William J. Malizia, Jr., Aaron J. Stanford on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Petitioners v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Respondent
    No. 276 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 761
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Quran HERRINGTON, Petitioner
    No. 269 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 761
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Ryan GLOVER, Petitioner
    No. 265 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 761
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. I. Dean FULTON, Petitioner
    No. 220 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 761
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Markea GOLPHIN, Petitioner
    No. 200 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 762
    Charlesretta MEADE, Robert N.C. Nix, Honorable Russell M. Nigro, Honorable Alan K. Silberstein, Anthony Lewis, Jr., and Molly Goldsmith, Personal Representative of the Estate of Howard M. Goldsmith, Deceased, Respondents v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Petitioner Charlesretta Meade, Robert N. Nix, Honorable Russell M. Nigro, Honorable Alan K. Silberstein, Anthony Lewis, Jr., and Molly Goldsmith, Personal Representative of the Estate of Howard M. Goldsmith, Deceased, Respondents v. City of Philadelphia, Petitioner
    No. 87 EAL 2016
    No. 120 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 25, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal, Cross Petition for Allowance of Appeal, and Application to Submit Brief Reply in Support of their Petition for Allowance of Appeal are DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 762
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Eric RAMBERT, Petitioner
    No. 329 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 763
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Odell EPPS, Petitioner
    No. 328 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 763
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Tony BURTON, Petitioner
    No. 251 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 763
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Jason James HARPER, Petitioner
    No. 293 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 764
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. John Wesley LEGGETT, Petitioner
    No. 286 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal and Application to File Supplement are DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 764
    CITY OF ARNOLD, Pennsylvania, Respondent v. WAGE POLICY COMMITTEE OF the CITY OF ARNOLD POLICE DEPARTMENT, o/b/o Pamela Cimino, Petitioners
    No. 238 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, rephrased for clarity, is:

Is a dispute between a union and a municipality arising out of a surviving spouse’s pension benefit arbitrable under the Collective Bargaining by Policemen or Firemen Act, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.10, where the benefit was afforded to the surviving spouse of a police officer or firefighter statutorily, and incorporated into the parties collective bargaining agreement?


text:
    160 A.3d 764
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Ronald Charles BACHNER, Petitioner
    No. 280 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 765
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Tommaso SCULCO, Petitioner
    No. 520 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 765
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Isaiah S. VALENTI, Petitioner
    No. 516 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,


text:
    160 A.3d 765
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Donald MILES, Petitioner
    No. 510 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 765
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Lenne LARUE, III, Petitioner
    No. 515 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 766
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Shawntay Lee HANDY, Petitioner
    No. 448 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 766
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. James Lee TROUTMAN, Petitioner
    No. 523 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 26, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 766
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Raymond Leroy ERWIN, Jr., Petitioner
    No. 244 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 27, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 767
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Edward L. DOMES, Petitioner
    No. 252 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 27, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 767
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Victor HOLLINGSWORTH, Petitioner
    No. 280 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 27, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 767
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. David THOMPSON, Petitioner
    No. 267 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 27, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 768
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Miguel Angel PAGAN, Petitioner
    No. 434 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 27, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 768
    Daniel VERMEYCHUK, Petitioner v. PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION, Respondent
    No. 369 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 27, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal and Application for Leave to File a Reproduced Record are DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 768
    Debra BURKE, Petitioner v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, Respondent
    No. 279 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 27, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 769
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Jermall E. JOHNSON, Petitioner
    No. 289 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 27, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal and Application for Relief are DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 769
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Garyling SANDERS, Petitioner
    No. 301 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 31, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 31st day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 769
    IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF J.R., a Minor Petition of: P.C., Father
    No. 641 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 31, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 31st day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 769
    CADLES OF GRASSY MEADOWS, II, LLC, Substituted Plaintiff to Brown Bark I, L.P., Assignee of Sovereign Bank, Successor by Merger to Main Street Bank, Respondent v. BET SHAVEI-TZION a/k/a Bet Shavei-Tzion, International and/or Bet Shavei-Tzio, Ltd., International, Petitioner
    No. 475 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 31, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 31st day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 770
    P.M., Respondent v. K.W., Petitioner
    No. 679 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    October 31, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 31st day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 770
    Antonio SIERRA, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee
    No. 27 WAP 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Notice of Appeal is QUASHED. The Application for Relief, Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, and Pro Se Notice to be Heard Before a Judge are DISMISSED AS MOOT.


text:
    160 A.3d 770
    D.K.D., Respondent v. A.L.C., Petitioner
    No. 330 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 771
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Lavelle MILLS, Petitioner
    No. 200 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 771
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Christopher R. WILLIAMS, Petitioner
    No. 336 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal and Application of Supplemental Authority in Support of Petition for Allowance of Appeal are DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 771
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Frank LUCAS, Petitioner
    No. 172 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 772
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Thomas HENDERSON, Petitioner
    No. 243 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 772
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Larry Scott KNIPPLE, Petitioner
    No. 176 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 772
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Hasan S. HARRIS, Petitioner
    No. 342 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 772
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. $1793.00 IN CASH Petition of: Cedric Daniels
    No. 430 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 773
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Marlon GARTH, Petitioner
    No. 182 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 773
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Robert Carl YEAGER, Petitioner
    No. 337 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 773
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Keith CALDWELL, Petitioner
    No. 264 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 773
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Robert A. BOGDAN, Petitioner
    No. 167 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 774
    Jason Robert PAUL and Joan Paul v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES OF THE COMMONWEALTH; Somerset County Child Protective Services; Executive Branch of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Office of Attorney General; and Somerset Borough Police Department Petition of: Jason Robert Paul
    No. 255 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 774
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Nathaniel J. MCINTYRE, Petitioner
    No. 169 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 774
    GERMANTOWN CAB COMPANY, Petitioner v. PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY, Respondent
    No. 215 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 775
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Willilam Lee L. BAKER, Petitioner
    No. 202 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 775
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Montana NIXON, Petitioner
    No. 155 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 775
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Michael WHITMIRE, Petitioner
    No. 195 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 775
    BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC v. Sean KEEFE and Kim Lee Petition of: Kim Lee
    No. 489 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 776
    Carol LEVY, Petitioner v. Robert JOHNSON and Imperial Home Inspections, LLC, Respondents
    No. 474 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 776
    John BAILEY, Petitioner v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (COMMONWEALTH OF PA/SCI CAMP HILL), Respondent
    No. 360 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 776
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Noel CUEVAS, Petitioner
    No. 306 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 777
    PHOENIXVILLE FEDERAL BANK & TRUST, Respondent v. Francis J. PULEO d/b/a RFJ & Associates and Triple T Farms, Petitioners
    No. 507 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    160 A.3d 777
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Damar PARKER, Petitioner
    No. 274 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   PER CURIAM:

And now, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal and Petitioner’s Motion to Remand to Trial Court Pursuant to Decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Sean Ciccone, 2016 PA Super 149, 2016 WL 3902841 (2016), are DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 777
    Thomas SIGDA, Petitioner v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (BUONO BROTHERS BAKERY), Respondents
    No. 286 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 778
    ESTATE OF Geraldine MANTELL, Deceased Petition of: Richard Howden
    No. 503 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 778
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Michael DRAWBAUGH, Petitioner
    No. 557 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 778
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Sean David O’CONNER, Petitioner
    No. 427 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 779
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Kevin Mark HAGENS, Petitioner
    No. 396 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 779
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Richard Allen HAINLEY, Petitioner
    No. 480 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 779
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Joseph Earl BAILEY, Sr., Petitioner Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Joseph Earl Bailey, Sr., Petitioner Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Joseph Earl Bailey, Sr., Petitioner
    No. 260 MAL 2016
    No. 261 MAL 2016
    No. 262 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 1, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 780
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Kobina A.A. ANDERSON, Petitioner
    No. 358 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 780
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Margarita GARABITO, Petitioner
    No. 322 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 780
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. John E. MINNICK, Petitioner
    No. 290 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 781
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Kevin BURTON, Petitioner
    No. 278 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 781
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Markeith AIKENS, Petitioner
    No. 268 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by petitioner is:

(1) Did the court illegally sentence [Aikens] on unlawful contact with a minor graded as an F-l when it should have been graded as an F-3?

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 781
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Ricky MALLORY, Petitioner
    No. 258 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 782
    Tracey Ann STERLING, Respondent v. Kai Ward LYMAN, Petitioner
    No. 218 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 782
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Robert E. COUSAR, Petitioner
    No. 252 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 782
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Luis T. GAUTHIER, Petitioner
    No. 189 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 782
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. John Joseph KOEHLER, Jr., Petitioner
    No. 147 EM 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the matter is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County for disposition of Petitioner’s PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(a) (“Original jurisdiction over a proceeding under this subchapter shall be in the court of common pleas.”).


text:
    160 A.3d 783
    Lora Jean WILLIAMS; Gregory J. Smith; CVP Management, Inc. d/b/a or t/a City View Pizza; John’s Roast Pork, Inc. f/k/a John’s Roast Pork; Metro Beverage of Philadelphia, Inc. d/b/a or t/a Metro Beverage; Day’s Beverages, Inc. d/b/a or t/a Day’s Beverages; American Beverage Association; Pennsylvania Beverage Association; Philadelphia Beverage Association; and Pennsylvania Food Merchants Association, Petitioners v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Frank Breslin, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Philadelphia Department of Revenue, Respondents
    No. 148 EM 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Motion for Leave to File a Reply is GRANTED, and the Application for Extraordinary Relief or the Exercise of King’s Bench Powers is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 783
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Paul Len SCHAFFER, Petitioner
    No. 324 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 783
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Kevin LUSTER, Petitioner
    No. 296 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 784
    Betty Welles CAMPBELL, Executrix of the Estate of Samuel P. Campbell, Sr., and Betty Welles Campbell, in her Own Right v. A.O. SMITH CORPORATION, in Its Own Right and as Successor in Interest to the Clark Controller Company and A.O. Smith Corporation; A.W. Chesterton Company; AGCO Corporation, as Successor in Interest to Allis Chalmers Corporation; Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, as Successor by Merger to Buffalo Pumps, Inc.; Ajax Magnethermic Corporation; Allied Glove Corporation; American Optical Corporation; American Standard Company, Inc.; Armstrong International, Inc., Armstrong Pumps, Inc.; Aqua-Chem, Inc., Cleaver-Brooks Division; Aurora Pump Company; Beazer East, Inc. in Its Own Right and as Successor to Koppers Company, Inc. and Other Related Companies Including Thiem Corporation, Beazer USA, Inc., and Beazer, PLC; Blackmer Pump Company; BW/IP International Inc., f/k/a Borg Warner Industrial Products, Individually and as Successor in Interest to Byron Jackson Pumps; Cashco, Inc.; Catalytic Construction Company; CBS Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, f/k/a Viacom Inc., Successor by Merger to CBS Corporation, a Pennsylvania Corporation, f/k/a Westinghouse Electric Corporation; Champlain Cable Corporation, as Successor in Interest to Hercules Inc; Columbus McKinnon; Commonwealth Edison Company; Copes-Vulcan, Inc; Crane Co.; Crown Cork & Seal Company; Dezurik, Inc.; Dravo Corporation; Durametallic Corporation; Eaton Corporation, as Successor in Interest to Cutler Hammer, Inc. Eichleay Corporation; Electrolux Home Products; Elsa Benson, Inc; Exelon Corporation; Flowserve U.S., Inc., f/k/a Flowserve FSD Corporation, as Successor to Durco International, Duriron Company and Durametallic; FMC Corporation, Individually and on Behalf of Its Former Peerless Pumps; Foseco, Inc.; Foster Wheeler Corporation; General Cable Corporation; Georgia Pacific Corporation; Genuine Parts Company; Goulds Pumps, Inc; Greene Tweed & Company; Grinnell LLC; Hedman Resources Limited; Honeywell, Inc., Honeywell International, Inc., formerly known as Allied Signal, Inc., as Successor in Interest to the Bendix Corporation; IMO Industries, Inc., f/k/a IMO Delaval, Inc., f/k/a Transamerican Delaval, Inc., f/k/a Delaval Turbine, Inc., Delaval Turbine, Inc., Devalco Corporation; Industrial Holdings Corporation f/k/a Carborundum Company; Ingersoll Rand; Insul Company, Inc.; ITT Corporation, f/k/a ITT Industries; Joy Technologies f/k/a Joy Manufacturing Company d/b/a Joy Manufacturing Company, Inc; Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc.; Mallinckrodt US LLC, in Its Own Right and as Successor in Interest to Imcera Group, Inc., and International Minerals and Chemical Corporation, and as Successor in Interest to E.J. Lavino; Marley Cooling Tower; McCann Shields Paint Company; McCarls, Inc.; McJunkin Red Man Corporation, in Its Own Right and as Successor in Interest to McJunkin Corporation; Met-Pro Corporation and Its Dean Pump Division Metropolitan Life Insurance Company a/k/a Metropolitan Insurance Company; Milwaukee Valve Company; Mine Safety Appliance Company; Minnotte Contracting Corporation; Morgan Engineering, in Its Own Right and as Successor in Interest to Alliance Machine Company; Nagle Pumps, Inc; Oakfabco, Inc.; Oglebay Norton Company, and Its Division Ferro Engineering; Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Phelps Dodge Industries, Inc; Powell Valve Company; Power Piping; Premier Refractories, Inc., f/k/a Adience, Inc, Successor in Interest to Adience Company, LP, as Successor to BMI, Inc.; Riley Stoker Corporation; Rockwell Automation, Inc., in Its Own Right and as Successor in Interest to Allen Bradley; Safety First Industries, Inc., in Its Own Right and as Successor in Interest to Safety First Supply, Inc.; Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc., formerly known as Norton Company; Sargent & Lundy, LLC; Spirax Sarco, Inc; Square D Company; Tasco Insulation, Inc., f/k/a/ the Asbestos Service Company; the Electric Controller and Manufacturing Company; Thiem Corporation, and Its Division, Universal Refractories; Treco Construction Services, Inc., f/k/a the Rust Engineering Company; Tyco Flow Control Company, LLC as Successor in Interest to Crosby Valve; Unifrax Corporation f/k/a Carborundum; Union Carbide Corporation and Its Linde Division; United Conveyor Corporation; United States Steel Corporation; Washington Group Internation, f/k/a Raytheon Engineers and Contractors, Inc., and all Its Domestic Subsidiaries, Including the Badger Company, Inc., Whiting Corporation; Yarway Corporation; Yeomans Chicago Corporation, in Its Own Right and as Successor in Interest to Morris Pumps, Inc., Zurn Industries, Inc., a/k/a Erie City Iron Works Petition of: Mark Campbell, Samuel Campbell Jr., Thomas Campbell, Christine Noonan and Deborah Sullivan
    No. 304 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 786
    Steven GARDNER, Petitioner v. Warden Mark CAPOZZA, SCI Pittsburgh, Secretary John E. Wetzel, Respondents
    No. 273 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 786
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Demetrious Darron FLEMING, Petitioner
    No. 265 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 786
    ALBERT GALLATIN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Avonworth School District, South Park School District, and West Allegheny School District, Respondents v. The PENNSYLVANIA CYBER CHARTER SCHOOL, Petitioner
    No. 240 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 787
    Earl D. HALL Sr.; Betty Jane Hall; and Earl D. Hall, Jr., on behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Petitioners v. CNX GAS COMPANY, LLC, in Its Own Right and as Successor-in-Interest to Consol Gas Company, LLC, Respondent
    No. 188 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 787
    Eric STEWART, Petitioner v. Raymond BANACH, Lawrence Flansburg and Westfall Township, Respondents
    No. 525 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 787
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Jeffrey J. TILLMAN, Petitioner
    No. 556 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 788
    George ANTONAS, Petitioner v. Socrates VASSILIADIS and E. Vassiliadis, Respondents
    No. 522 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 788
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Michael T. DEGILIO, Petitioner
    No. 512 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 788
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Garrett Steven BROWN, Petitioner
    No. 315 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 788
    Jeremy ROBINSON, t/d/b/a Psu Knowhow, Petitioner v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, Office of Unemployment Tax Services, Respondent
    No. 397 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 789
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Hristos DIMOU, Petitioner
    No. 300 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 789
    Jeffrey A. WRIGHT v. LOWER SALFORD TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL POLICE PENSION FUND, Lower Salford Township Board of Supervisors, Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund Trustees and Standard Insurance Company Petition of: Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund, Lower Salford Township Board of Supervisors and Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund Trustees
    No. 294 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 2, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 789
    K.G.M. and R.M. v. J.A.V. (Deceased) and S.V. Petition of: S.V.
    No. 366 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 3, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 3rd day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 790
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Brandon Michael WEIDOW, Petitioner
    No. 298 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 790
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Raymond Franklin PEAKE, III, Petitioner
    No. 454 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 790
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Ralph ROGERS, Petitioner
    No. 453 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 791
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Eric Christopher HILL, Petitioner
    No. 447 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 791
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Donnell RIDDICK, Petitioner
    No. 527 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 791
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Ronald Stuart KAMARER, Petitioner
    No. 478 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 791
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Sheldon Blair CULBREATH, Petitioner
    No. 452 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 792
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Paul Joseph BEGNOCHE, Petitioner
    No. 435 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 792
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. David Phillip PIERGROSSI, Petitioner
    No. 401 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 792
    JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Respondent v. Francis X. MURRAY, Petitioner
    No. 429 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justices Wecht and Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 793
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Charles SHIELDS, Petitioner
    No. 371 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 793
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Roscoe PARRISH, Jr., Petitioner
    No. 295 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 793
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Miguel ALICEA, Petitioner
    No. 296 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 793
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Marvin L. FLAMER, Petitioner
    No. 255 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 8, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 794
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Zamar SWIFT, Petitioner
    No. 261 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 9, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 794
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Lee Herbert WAGNER, Petitioner
    No. 253 WAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 9, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 794
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Kenneth Lee BEAVER, Petitioner
    No. 318 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 9, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 795
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Jholy IDY, Petitioner
    No. 277 EAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 9, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,


text:
    160 A.3d 795
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Lesley A. SCOTT, Petitioner
    No. 490 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    November 9, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.


text:
    160 A.3d 795
    M.A., Appellee v. M.G., Appellant
    No. 17 WAP 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    DECIDED: November 15, 2016
    Erica Nicole Burns, Esq., Richard Ducote, PC, for M.G., Appellant.
    Carla Schiff Donnelly, Esq., for M.A., Appellee.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

The appeal is DISMISSED as having been improvidently granted.


text:
    160 A.3d 796
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. George Theodore REYNOLDS, Petitioner
    No. 702 MAL 2015
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    DECIDED: November 15, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, LIMITED TO Petitioner’s lifetime registration issue. The Superior Court’s order in this regard is VACATED and this matter is REMANDED for imposition of a fifteen-year reporting requirement under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SOR-NA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison, 636 Pa. 395, 143 A.3d 891 (2016). Allocatur is DENIED as to all remaining issues.

Justice Donohue did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    160 A.3d 796
    Andrew COLLINS, as Executor of the Estate of Richard A. Collins, Deceased v. MANOR CARE OF LANCASTER, PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare Health Services-Lancaster, HCR Manor Care, Inc., HCR Healthcare, LLC, HCR Healthcare II, LLC, HCR Healthcare III, LLC, Manorcare Health Services, Inc., Manor Care, Inc., Lancaster General Rehabilitation Services, Inc., d/b/a Lancaster Rehabilitation Hospital, LLP, CRH of Lancaster, LLC, and Lancaster General Health Petition of: Manor Care of Lancaster, PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare Health Services-Lancaster, HCR Manor Care, Inc., HCR Healthcare, LLC, HCR Healthcare II, LLC, HCR Healthcare III, LLC, Manorcare Health Services, Inc., Manor Care, Inc.
    No. 550 MAL 2015
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    DECIDED: November 15, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED for reconsideration in light of Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 637 Pa. 163, 147 A.3d 490 (2016).


text:
    160 A.3d 797
    Susan J. COSGROVE and Howard G. Eshleman, as Co-executors of the Estate of Irene M. Eshleman, Respondents v. MANOR CARE OF LANCASTER, PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare Health Services-Lancaster, HCR Manor Care, Inc., Manorcare Health Services, Inc., and Manor Care, Inc., Petitioners
    No. 549 MAL 2015
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    DECIDED: November 15, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED for reconsideration in light of Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 637 Pa. 163, 147 A.3d 490 (2016).


text:
    160 A.3d 797
    Brandon HETRICK, Executor of the Estate of: William Washington, Deceased, Respondent v. MANORCARE OF CARLISLE PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare Health Services, Carlisle, and HCR Manorcare, Inc., and Manorcare, Inc., and HCR Healthcare, LLC, and HCR II Healthcare, LLC, and HCR III Healthcare, LLC, and HCR IV Healthcare, LLC, Petitioners
    No. 506 MAL 2015
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    DECIDED: November 15, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, the order of the Superior Court is VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for further proceedings in light of Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., et. al., 637 Pa. 163, 147 A.3d 490 (2016).


text:
    160 A.3d 798
    Lorraine L. DAVIS, Executrix of the Estate of: John J. Hudson, Deceased v. HCR MANORCARE, LLC; Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC d/b/a ManorCare Health Services-Lancaster; ManorCare Health Services, Inc. a/k/a ManorCare Health Services, LLC; Manor Care, Inc.; HCR ManorCare, Inc.; HCR IV Healthcare, LLC.; HCR III Healthcare, LLC; HCR II Healthcare, LLC; HCR Healthcare, LLC; HCRMC Operations, LLC; Heartland Employment Services, LLC; The Lancaster General Hospital and Lancaster General Health Petition of: HCR ManorCare, LLC; Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC d/b/a ManorCare Health Services-Lancaster; ManorCare Health Services, Inc. a/k/a ManorCare Health Services, LLC; Manor Care, Inc.; HCR ManorCare, Inc.; HCR IV Healthcare, LLC.; HCR III Healthcare, LLC; HCR II Healthcare, LLC; HCR Healthcare, LLC; HCRMC Operations, LLC; Heartland Employment Services, LLC
    No. 210 MAL 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    DECIDED: November 15, 2016
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, the order of the Superior Court is VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for further proceedings in light of Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., et al., 637 Pa. 163, 147 A.3d 490 (2016).


author: JUSTICE MUNDY

text:
    161 A.3d 160
    CITY OF PITTSBURGH, Appellee v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, FORT PITT LODGE NO. 1, Appellant
    No. 18 WAP 2016
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    ARGUED: November 1, 2016
    DECIDED: MAY 22, 2017

      Gretchen Kirstin Love, Esq., Campbell Durrant Beatty Palombo & Miller, P.C., for Pennsylvania Municipal League, Amicus Curiae.
    Eric Carl Stoltenberg, Esq., Lightman Welby & Stolten-berg, LLC, for Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, Appellant.
    Joshua Martin Bloom, Esq., Joshua M. Bloom and Associates, P.C., for International Association of Fire Fighter, Local No. 1, Appellant Amicus Curiae.
    Wendy Kobee, Esq., City of Pittsburgh Law Department, Alex Michael Lacey, Esq., Clifford B. Levine, Esq., Alice Birmingham Mitinger, Esq., Cohen & Grigsby, P.C., for City of Pittsburgh, Appellee.
    SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
   OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY

In this discretionary appeal, we consider whether a home rule municipality may amend its home rule charter to eliminate mandatory subjects of bargaining as defined by the Police and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act, commonly known as Act 111, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.10; the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act (“PLRA”), 43 P.S. §§ 211.1-215.5; and applicable case law.

Appellant, the Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 (“FOP”) is the exclusive collective bargaining representative for the police officers of Appellee, the City of Pittsburgh (“City”), pursuant to Act 111 and the PLRA.

The FOP and the City are parties to a collective bargaining agreement that ran from January 1, 2010 through December 31, 2014. Section 18(S) of the agreement provides, in relevant part:

If, during the term of this agreement ... the Pennsylvania State Legislature enacts legislation relating to ... residency requirements for police officers in cities of the second class, the parties may reopen the contract to negotiate and/or arbitrate under these limited conditions. The Panel shall retain jurisdiction to address such issues if agreement cannot be reached by the parties.

Agreement, 1/01/10-12/31/14, at 92.

The City is subject to the Policemen’s Civil Service Act (for Cities of the Second Class), 53 P.S. §§ 23531-23540, which prior to October 24, 2012, provided:

A person applying for appointment shall not be required to be a resident of the city at the time of application for original appointment. The person shall, however, be required to become a bona fide resident of the city at the time of the employment, and city residency must be maintained for the entire period of employment.

53 P.S. § 23532 (repealed).

However, the General Assembly repealed the residency mandate on October 24, 2012, through the enactment of Act 195 of 2012, which now provides, “[a] city of the second class may require a police officer to become a bona fide resident as a condition of employment.” 53 P.S. § 23532.

In light of Act 195, the parties met to bargain the residency issue. Because they were unable to reach an agreement, the arbitration panel was reconvened, and held hearings on June 28, 2013 and September 23, 2013. At the commencement of the first hearing, the City objected to the arbitrability of the residency issue. N.T. Hrg, 6/28/13, at 5. On July 29, 2013, the City submitted a brief to the panel on this topic. Meanwhile, on July 23, 2013, the Pittsburgh City Council passed a resolution to place a referendum on the upcoming general election ballot asking the voters whether the City’s home rule charter should be amended to require all City employees and officials, including police and fire personnel, to maintain their domicile within the City. Voters approved the home rule charter amendment on November 5, 2013.

On March 14, 2014, the arbitration panel issued a Supplemental Interest Arbitration Award, which provided that the City-only residency requirement would immediately discontinue and be replaced with the following provision: “Officers shall be required to reside within a twenty-five (25) air-mile radius from the City-County Building.” Supplemental Interest Arbitration Award, 3/14/14, at 4. One member of the three-member panel dissented.

The City filed a timely petition for review in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, seeking to vacate the supplemental award because the panel acted without jurisdiction and exceeded its authority under Act 111.

Writing for the trial court, Judge Robert J. Colville noted that an arbitration panel may direct a municipality to do anything that it is lawfully empowered to do. Relying on Township of Moon v. Police Officers of the Township of Moon, 508 Pa. 495, 498 A.2d 1305 (1985), Judge Colville determined that residency is a term and condition of employment for police officers and is thus a matter within the jurisdiction and authority of an Act 111 arbitration panel. Because the Act 195 amendments placed residency within the City’s control, an interest arbitration award could modify the residency requirement.

The trial court also rejected the City’s argument that the interest arbitration award was unconstitutional because it required the City to act in a manner contrary to the amended home rule charter. Judge Colville noted that a home rule charter “cannot supersede Act 111, a statewide statute.” Trial Ct. Op., 7/9/14, at 10. In support of this conclusion, the court relied on Section 2962(c) of the Home Rule Charter Law, which provides that a municipality is precluded from exercising “powers contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by statutes which are applicable in every part of this Commonwealth.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(c)(2). The trial court noted that “Act 111 is a statute applicable to all municipalities throughout the Commonwealth.” Trial Ct. Op., at 11. The trial court further noted that Section 2962(c)(5) of the Home Rule Charter Law prohibits a home rule municipality from enacting “any provision inconsistent -with any statute heretofore enacted prior to April 13, 1972 affecting the rights, benefits or working conditions of any employee of a political subdivision of this Commonwealth.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(c)(5). Because the General Assembly enacted Act 111 in 1968, and it affects the rights, benefits and working conditions of municipal employees by allowing them to bargain or arbitrate to set the terms of their employment, the trial court concluded that the home rule charter cannot restrict the scope of collective bargaining issues under Act 111, including residency. Accordingly, the trial court affirmed the supplemental interest arbitration award.

The City appealed, and a divided en banc Commonwealth Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Judge Bonnie Bri-gance Leadbetter, noted that the General Assembly, through the Home Rule Charter Law, gave home rule municipalities broad powers “to undertake any action they desired, and that such action should be upheld unless it was specifically denied by the Constitution, a statute or the home rule charter itself.” City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 129 A.3d 1285, 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). After observing that a home rule charter is the equivalent of a constitution, the court relied on Spencer v. City of Reading Charter Bd., 97 A.3d 834, 840 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) for the proposition that “provisions of a home rule charter have the force and status of an enactment of the legislature.” City of Pittsburgh, 129 A.3d at 1289. The court concluded that no statewide law prohibits the home rule charter from requiring the City’s employees to live within its borders. It explained that although Act 111 allows an arbitrator to impose any non-managerial conditions and conditions of employment, unless removed from discussion or award by other laws, “an arbitration panel can only award that which the public employer, in this case, the City, its Mayor and its Council, have the power to agree to and nothing more.” Id. at 1290. Because the residency requirement is included in the home rule charter, which “has the force and status of an enactment of the General Assembly,” id., City officials lost the ability to bargain away residency requirements. Accordingly, the arbitrators’ award would require the City to commit an illegal act.

In reaching this conclusion, the court partially overruled its opinion in City of Wilkes-Barre v. City of Wilkes-Barre Police Benevolent Association, 814 A.2d 285 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), in which it held that “[w]hen Act 111 applies, neither a home rule charter, nor an enactment by a home rule municipality may change the ability to bargain about residency.” Id. at 290. The majority faulted the City of Wilkes-Barre court for failing to recognize that a home rule charter has the force and effect of a state statute, thus superseding general Act 111 requirements for bargaining over terms and conditions of employment.

Judge Robert Simpson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Judge Kevin Brobson and Judge Anne E. Covey, noting that where a conflict exists between a statute of general application such' as Act 111 and a home rule charter provision, the state statute prevails. Judge Simpson observed that he would have reached this result even without City of Wilkes-Barre because the limitations placed on home rule municipalities by the Home Rule Charter Law, and the application of the principles of express preemption, indicate the General Assembly intended state statutes of general application to supersede inconsistent home rule municipality enactments. The dissenting opinion further stated that the majority erred by citing Spencer for the proposition that a home rule charter provision is the equivalent of a state statute. Rather, the dissenting opinion noted that Spencer held “a home rule charter provision has the force and effect of an enactment of the municipality’s legislative body.” City of Pittsburgh, 129 A.3d at 1293 (Simpson, J. dissenting).

We granted allocatur to consider whether a home rule municipality may amend its home rule charter to eliminate mandatory subjects of bargaining as defined by Act 111, the PLRA and other applicable law, and whether a municipality’s home rule charter provision eliminating a mandatory subject of bargaining for its police officers is preempted by Act 111. City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 635 Pa. 663, 139 A.3d 1257 (2016) (order).

We review an Act 111 interest arbitration award under a narrow scope of review, limited to (1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) whether the arbitrators exceeded their power; and (4) whether a deprivation of constitutional rights occurred. Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 634 Pa. 326, 129 A.3d 1221, 1227 (2015).

The FOP argues that the City is subject to several restrictions set forth in the Home Rule Charter Law, including Section 2962, which provides in relevant part:

§ 2962. Limitation on municipal powers
(c) Prohibited powers.—A municipality shall not:
(2) Exercise powers contrary to or in limitation or enlargement of powers granted by statutes which are applicable in every part of this Commonwealth.
(6) Enact any provision inconsistent with any statute heretofore enacted prior to April 13, 1972, affecting the rights, benefits or working conditions of any employee of a political subdivision of this Commonwealth.
(e) Statutes of general application.—Statutes that are uniform and applicable in every part of this Commonwealth shall remain in effect and shall not be changed or modified by this subpart. Statutes shall supersede any municipal ordinance or resolution on the same subject.

53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(c)(2),(5) & (e).

The right of Pittsburgh police officers to engage in collective bargaining derives from Act 111, Section 9 of which specifically defines the scope of its application to include home rule charter municipalities.

The provisions of this act shall be applicable to every political subdivision of this Commonwealth notwithstanding the fact that any such' political subdivision, either before or after the passage of this act, has adopted a home rule charter.

43 P.S. § 217.9. As such, the FOP asserts that Act 111 limits municipal powers as set forth in Section 2962 of the Home Rule Charter Law.

Here, the Commonwealth Court majority recognized that the City’s legislative authority is limited by Section 2962, but determined that residency is not specifically identified in Section 1 of Act 111 or any other statute. Therefore, it is not protected by the limitations on municipal powers set forth in the Home Rule Charter Law. However, the FOP maintains that the collective bargaining rights set forth in Section 1 are intentionally broad, and do not limit police officers to bargaining over specific topics such as wages or insurance. Section 1 provides:

Policemen or firemen employed by a political subdivision of the Commonwealth or by the Commonwealth shall, through labor organizations or other representatives designated by fifty percent or more of such policemen or firemen, have the right to bargain collectively with their public employers concerning the terms and conditions of their employment, including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement, pensions and other benefits, and shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act.

43 P.S. § 217.1.

This Court has held that “residency, as a legitimate condition of employment is within the scope of collective bargaining.” Township of Moon, 498 A.2d at 1313. Accordingly, the FOP argues that by precluding bargaining over this working condition, the home rule charter amendment interferes with the officers’ Act 111 rights. The City, as a home rule charter municipality, shall not enact any provision inconsistent with a statute enacted prior to 1972 “affecting the rights, benefits or working conditions” of its employees. 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(c)(5). All criteria are present here. First, Act 111 predates 1972, having been enacted in 1968. Second, it specifically created the right for police officers to bargain over and arbitrate for their working conditions. Third, residency is a working condition. See Township of Moon, 498 A.2d at 1313. Fourth, the charter amendment is “inconsistent with” the officers’ right to bargain or arbitrate the residency issue. Therefore, the FOP asserts that the charter provision requiring domicile within the city limits violates Section 2962(c)(5).

The FOP further argues that the charter provision violates Section 2962(c)(2) of the Home Rule Charter Law, which prohibits the City, as a home rule charter municipality, from acting to limit “any powers granted by statutes which are applicable in every part of this Commonwealth.” Act 111 clearly applies in every part of the Commonwealth, providing officers with the power to bargain over and arbitrate working conditions. The charter amendment limited these powers by removing a working condition as a bargainable subject, and thus is contrary to Section 2962(c)(2).

The FOP further notes that the opinion of the Commonwealth Court fails to address the requirement of Section 2962(e) that uniform statutes of statewide application may not be modified. Because the Commonwealth Court’s decision permits a home rule charter municipality to divest officers of the right to bargain over a condition of employment, contrary to Section 1 of Act 111, the FOP asserts that the home rule charter amendment violates Section 2962(e).

The FOP also relies on Article IX, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which provides, in relevant part:

Municipalities shall have the right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters. ... A municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time.

Pa, Const, art. IX, § 2.

The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that home rule charters and amendments thereto are subservient to the limitations imposed by the General Assembly. Section 2962 of the Home Rule Charter Law, which provides that statutes of general application, “shall not be changed or modified,” is such a legislatively imposed limitation. Because Act 111 is a uniform statute applicable throughout the Commonwealth, the FOP maintains the home rule charter amendment that removes residency as a subject of arbitration is unenforceable.

In contrast to the FOP, and consistent with the Commonwealth Court, the City argues that adoption of a charter provision by the electorate is equal in force and effect to a statute. The City relies on In re Addison, 385 Pa. 48, 122 A.2d 272 (1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 956, 77 S.Ct. 353, 1 L.Ed.2d 316 (1957), where this Court stated, “a constitutionally permissible adoption of a municipal charter is not one whit less in dignity than a statute of the legislature granting a charter.” Id. at 276.

The City asserts that with Act 195 the General Assembly gave it the right to determine, as a matter of local concern, whether to impose a residency requirement on police officers. Once the home rule charter was amended to include a residency requirement, it insists residency was no longer a term or condition of employment subject to collective bargaining under Act 111. The following arguments raised by the City are all based on this premise.

The City notes that a home rule municipality “may exercise any powers and perform any function not denied to it by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, by statute or by its home rule charter.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2961. It asserts that none of the limitations on municipal powers set forth above in Section 2962 of the Home Rule Charter Law restrict it from imposing a residency requirement for employees.

Although the City recognizes that Act 111 is “applicable in every part of this Commonwealth,” 53 Pa.C.S. § 9262(c)(2), it maintains that the residency requirement is not contrary to, and does not limit any power that Act 111 grants. The City relies on Washington Arbitration Case, 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437 (1969), where this Court held, “[t]he essence of our decision is that an arbitration award may only require a public employer to do that which it could do voluntarily.” Id. at 442. Here, the City argues the home rule charter residency provision, authorized by Act 195, did not contradict an Act 111 arbitrator’s inherent powers, which are limited by what a public employer can and cannot do.

Likewise, the City recognizes that Act 111, which was enacted prior to April 13, 1972, “affect[s] rights, benefits or working conditions of any employee of a political subdivision.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(e)(5). However, it maintains that the home rule charter’s residency requirement for all City employees is not inconsistent with Act 111, and, as a legitimate act of a home rule municipality, is not prohibited under Section 2962(e)(5).

The City further posits the limitation articulated in Section 2962(e), that uniform statutes “shall remain in effect and shall not be changed or modified by this subpart,” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(e), is inapposite because determinations about Act 111 bargaining obligations over a particular matter are case-specific inquiries. Borough of Ellwood City v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 606 Pa. 356, 998 A.2d 589, 598 (2010). It asserts that a change in a statutory scheme can create a managerial prerogative, authorize local action and thereby change bargaining rights about working conditions.

The City asserts that in 2012, when the General Assembly considered amending the explicit requirement of residency as a condition of employment, it could have retained the “shall” language mandating residency for police officers, 53 P.S. § 23532 (repealed), or deleted the “shall” provision without further amendment; or added, as it did, the provision, “[a] city of the second class may require a police officer to become a bona fide resident as a condition of employment.” 53 P.S. § 23532. The City maintains that under the controlling principles of statutory construction, the new language must be read as the General Assembly’s grant of authority to the City to decide whether to require residency. The City argues that the General Assembly authorized it, and not an Act 111 arbitrator, to decide whether to require residency.

The City’s position can be summarized as follows: where a home rule charter provision establishes a residency requirement, the subject of residency is removed from the collective bargaining requirements of Act 111. Essentially, the home rule charter transforms residency from a subject of bargaining into a managerial prerogative. Accordingly, the arbitration panel lacked the authority to order the elimination of the residency provision. However, the FOP suggests this position is untenable in light of the fact that resolution of this matter is grounded in Act 195, which amended the relevant section of the Policemen’s Civil Service Act (for Cities of the Second Class) to provide “a city of the second class may require a police officer to become a bona fide resident as a condition of employment.” 53 P.S. § 23532.

We agree with the FOP that the provision of authority to a municipality to take action with regard to a bargainable subject, as Act 195 does here, does not give the municipality the ability to place those subjects out of the reach of an interest arbitration panel. In Chirico v. Board of Supervisors for Newtown Township, 518 Pa. 572, 544 A.2d 1313 (1988), this Court reviewed an arbitration award creating a disability pension fund benefit equal to 65% of an officer’s final average salary. The Township appealed the award, asserting that such a benefit, which surpassed the 50% benefit applicable to regular retirements, exceeded the arbitrator’s authority. The Court focused on the Municipal Police Pension Law, 53 P.S. § 767-778, which governs pensions for police officers in boroughs, towns and townships with three or more full-time officers. Section 771 of the Act provides:

In the case of the payment of pensions for permanent injuries incurred in-service and to families of members killed in-service, the amount and commencement of the payments shall be fixed by regulations of the governing body of the borough, town or township.

53 P.S. § 771.

The Law vested the township supervisors with the authority to fix the amount and commencement of any disability payments. This Court held that the statutory language allowed the township supervisors to fix the disability pension benefit at 65% of final average salary if they wished to do so. Because the supervisors had this authority, the arbitrators also had this authority. Chirico, 544 A.2d at 1317. Contrary to Chirico, the City argues that the language permitting the City to establish residency restrictions converts residency from a bargainable subject into a matter of managerial prerogative. However, the new language of Act 195 recognizes the modification of residency as legal, by providing that the City “may require” officers to become residents. Thus, where a municipality has the authority to set or not to set a residency restriction, the Act 111 interest arbitration panel has the same authority. Accordingly, the arbitration panel did not compel the City to engage in an illegal act when it modified the residency requirement.

The question of whether a topic is a subject of bargaining or a managerial prerogative under Act 111 was analyzed by this Court in Ellwood City, supra, where we concluded that a matter is considered a managerial prerogative where it is part of the public employer’s “essential managerial responsibilities,” id. at 600, “such as decisions regarding the programs of the employer, standards of services, overall budget, use of technologies, organizational structure and selection and direction of employees.” Id. at 601. Such functions are “inherently managerial in nature.” Id. A restriction on where police officers live is not an entrepreneurial topic. Township of Moon, 498 A.2d at 1313. Once a subject is deemed a mandatory subject of bargaining, it is only removed from the authority of an Act 111 interest arbitration where a statute has mandated a particular result. Id.

With the enactment of Act 111 in 1968, the General Assembly provided that police officers and firefighters have “the right to bargain collectively with their public employers concerning the terms and conditions of their employment.” 43 P.S. § 217.1. To ensure that home rule municipalities would not abrogate this right, the General Assembly enacted Section 9 of Act 111, specifically providing that the act is applicable to every political subdivision in the Commonwealth, regardless of its adoption of a home rule charter. Consistent with Act 111, Sections 2962(c)(2),(5) and (e) of the Home Rule Charter Law place limitations on home rule municipalities. Section 2962(c)(2) precludes exercise of powers contrary to or in limitation or enlargement of powers granted by statutes applicable in every part of the Commonwealth. Because Act 111 specifically applies to every political subdivision, any act by a municipality that is contrary to Act 111 is prohibited. Although not specified in the statutory language of Act 111, our case law has clarified that residency is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Accordingly, the home rule charter provision requiring residency is at odds with an act of statewide application. Section 2962(c)(5), which prohibits enacting any provision inconsistent with a statute enacted prior to April 13, 1972 “affecting the rights, benefits and working conditions of any employee of a political subdivision]!,]” is implicated here because Act 111 of 1968 was enacted before that date, and affects the rights, benefits or working conditions of employees. As there is a patent inconsistency between Act 111, which provides for bargaining over residency, and the home rule charter provision that removes residency as a subject of bargaining, the home rule charter provision violates Section 2962(c)(5). In addition, Section 2962(e) provides that statutes that are uniform and applicable in every part of the Commonwealth shall remain in effect, and shall not be changed or modified. Because the home rule charter amendment changed or modified Act 111 by removing residency as a subject of collective bargaining, it violates Section 2962(e) as well. Thus, based strictly on Section 2962 of the Home Rule Charter Law, the FOP is entitled to relief.

Furthermore, the right to engage in home rule flows from Article IX, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which permits a home rule municipality to “exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time.” Pa. Const. art. IX, § 2. In Spahn v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 602 Pa. 83, 977 A.2d 1132 (2009), we noted, “[t]hus ‘by constitutional mandate the General Assembly may limit the functions to be performed by home rule municipalities.’ ” Spahn, 977 A.2d at 1143-44 (quoting Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 545 Pa. 279, 681 A.2d 152, 156 (1996)).

Spahn arose under the First Class City Home Rule Act, 53 P.S. §§ 13101-13157. Like Section 2962 of the Home Rule Charter Law, which applies in the instant matter, the First Class City Home Rule Act provides, “[njotwithstanding the grant of powers in this act, no city shall exercise powers contrary to or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by the acts of the General Assembly which are ... applicable in every part of the Commonwealth.” 53 P.S. § 13133. Accordingly, this Court concluded that “local ordinances enacted pursuant to the local Charter are subordinate to the Home Rule Act when the matter at issue is one of statewide concern, and where the two conflict, then the subordination mandate of the Home Rule Act takes precedence and controls.” Spahn, 977 A.2d at 1144.

Pursuant to Article IX, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, home rule charters are subservient to limitations imposed by the General Assembly. Section 2962(e) provides that “statutes that are uniform and applicable in every part of this Commonwealth shall remain in effect and shall not be changed or modified.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(e). Because Act 111 is “applicable to every political subdivision of this Commonwealth,” 43 P.S. § 217.9, the charter amendment modifying rights under Act 111 is unenforceable.

We also granted allowance of appeal to determine whether a municipality’s home rule charter provision eliminating a mandatory subject of bargaining for its police officers is preempted by Act 111. As this Court noted in Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. City of Philadelphia, 627 Pa. 470, 101 A.3d 79 (2014) (SEPTA):

In a series of cases beginning with our decision in [Department of General Services v.] Ogontz [Area Neighbors Ass’n., 505 Pa. 614, 483 A.2d 448 (1984)], this Court has held that a Commonwealth agency’s challenge to a municipality’s exercise of authority over it does not represent “a contest between superior and inferior governmental entities, but instead a contest between two instrumentalities of the state.” See Ogontz, supra at 452; County of Venango v. Borough of Sugarcreek, 534 Pa. 1, 626 A.2d 489, 490 (1993); Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 566 Pa. 180, 778 A.2d 1205, 1210 (2001). That is, because the legislature authorized the creation of both entities, and set the limits of each entity’s authority, our task is to determine, through an examination of the relevant statutes, which entity the legislature intended to have preeminent powers. Ogontz, supra at 452. In short, “[t]he problem, essentially, is one of statutory interpretation.” Id, Our standard of review of such a question of statutory interpretation is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Hazleton, supra at 1213. As identified in Hazleton, our opinion in Ogontz, supra sets forth the analytical process a court is to follow to determine which entity the legislature intended to have preeminent powers over a given area of regulation.
The first step requires the reviewing court to determine, through examination of the statutes, which governmental entity, if any, the General Assembly expressly intended to be preeminent. Id. In the event there is no such express legislative mandate, the second step requires the court “to determine legislative intent as to which agency is to prevail ... turning] to the statutory construction rule that legislative intent may be determined by a consideration, inter alia, of the consequences of a particular interpretation.”
Hazleton, supra at 1210, (quoting Ogontz, supra at 455 (citing in turn 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(6)) (emphasis omitted).

SEPTA, 101 A.3d at 86.

Express preemption occurs “where the statute includes a preemption clause, the language of which specifically bars local authorities from acting on a particular subject matter.” Hoffman Mining Co., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Adams Township, 612 Pa. 598, 32 A.3d 587, 593 (2011). Here, a review of the authority previously relied upon leads us to conclude that express preemption clearly applies in this matter. Section 2962 of the Home Rule Charter Law contains three explicit preemption clauses, see supra at 415-16, 161 A.3d at 165-66. Section 2962(e) prohibits home rule charter municipalities from taking any action that changes or modifies a uniform statute of statewide application. Section 9 of Act 111 makes clear that it is “applicable to every political subdivision of this Commonwealth.” 43 P.S. § 217.9. Furthermore, Section 2962(e) explicitly provides that “[statutes shall supersede any municipal ordinance or resolution on the same subject.” 53 P.S. § 2962(e). By including the word “supersede,” the General Assembly emphasizes that statutes of statewide application predominate over enactments of home rule municipalities.

Section 2962(c) provides that a municipality may not limit “powers granted by statutes which are applicable in every part of this Commonwealth.” 63 Pa.C.S. § 2962(c)(2). Accordingly, the City’s ability to remove a subject of collective bargaining created by Act 111 is preempted.

Section 2962(c)(5) prohibits the enactment of “any provision inconsistent with any statute heretofore enacted prior to April 13, 1972, affecting the rights, benefits or working conditions of any employee of a political subdivision of this Commonwealth.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(c)(2). Public sector collective bargaining rights are set forth in Act 111, which became effective in 1968, and the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA), 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301, which became effective in 1970. Thus, the General Assembly has preempted home rule municipalities from undermining collective bargaining rights under Act 111 and PERA.

Accordingly, the order of the Commonwealth Court permitting a home rule municipality to redefine subjects of collective bargaining is contrary to Act 111, and therefore is reversed. The order of the trial court affirming the March 14, 2014 supplemental interest arbitration award directing that officers shall be required to reside within a twenty-five mile radius from the City-County Building is reinstated.

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion.

Justice Todd did not participate in the decision of this case.

      . The Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law (Home Rule Charter Law), 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 2901-2984, defines "[h]ome rule charter,” in relevant part, as "[a] written document defining the powers, structures, privileges, rights and duties of the municipal government and limitations thereon." 53 Pa.C.S. § 2902.


text:
    160 A.3d 171
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. George Ivan LOPEZ, Appellant
    No. 706 CAP
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    SUBMITTED: January 24, 2017
    George Ivan Lopez, pro se.
    Kelly M. Sekula, Esq., for Appellee.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2017, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is AFFIRMED.


text:
    161 A.3d 172
    GREEN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA and Cheri Honkala, Appellants v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF COMMISSIONS, ELECTIONS AND LEGISLATION and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellees
    No. 11 MAP 2017
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    SUBMITTED: February 23, 2017
    DECIDED: March 3, 2017

      Samuel C. Stretton, Esq., Law Office of Samuel C. Stretton, for Appellants.
    Howard Greeley Hopkirk, Esq., Kenneth Lawson Joel, Esq., Nicole Jeanne Radziewicz, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Kathleen Marie Kotula, Esq., Pennsylvania Department of State, Joshua D. Shapiro, Esq., for Appellees.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 3rd day of March, 2017, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.

Opinion to follow.

Justices Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht dissent.