author: Chief Justice SAYLOR. Justice BAER, Justice EAKIN,

text:
    128 A.3d 764
    George D. FISH, Stephen Hrabrick and Jonathan A. Briskin, Appellees, v. TOWNSHIP OF LOWER MERION, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 10, 2015.
    Decided Dec. 21, 2015.

      Kathleen Marie Thomas, Esq., Hladik, Onorato & Pearl-stine, LLP, Ambler, for Township of Lower Merion.

      Jennifer Walters Brown, Esq., Christopher Michael Curd, Esq., Flamm Walton PC, Allentown, for Radnor Township et al.
    Robert Michael Careless, Esq., Sean Patrick Kilkenny, Esq., Law Office of Sean Kilkenny LLC, David Jonathan Sander, Esq., Friedman Shuman P.C., for Mun. of Norristown, Whitemarsh Twp., East Norriton Twp., and Boro, of Jenkin-town.
    Frances Ann Fruhwirth, Esq., City of Allentown Solicitor’s Office, Susan Ellis Wild, Esq., Allentown, for City of Allentown.
    Allan Hyman Freedman, Esq., Pamela E. Lewis, Esq., Briskin & Lewis, Bryn Mawr, for George D. Fish, Stephen Hrabrick and Jonathan A. Briskin.
    SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Chief Justice SAYLOR.

In this appeal by allowance, we address whether the Local Tax Enabling Act’s prohibition on taxing leases precludes a municipality from applying its business privilege tax to businesses whose sole income consists of rent payments on leased real property.

Appellant Lower Merion Township is a township of the first class. Article IV of its municipal code requires every person—defined generally as an individual or a for-profit business entity—engaging in a business, trade, occupation, or profession in the Township to pay an annual business privilege tax calculated as a percentage of gross receipts. See Loweb Mebion Twp., Pa., Mun. Code art. IV, §§ 138-40,138-42 (1976). Each such person must also purchase and display a business registration certificate and file an annual tax return. See id. §§ 138-41, 138-45, 138-46.

Appellees Fish, Hrabrick, and Briskin (“Lessors”) each own one or more parcels of real estate in the Township that they rent to tenants pursuant to lease agreements. The Township notified Lessors that, for every such parcel, they were obligated to purchase a separate business registration certificate and pay the business privilege tax based on all rental proceeds. In this regard, the Township adopted the position that: (a) the leasing of real property constitutes a business, trade, occupation, or profession for purposes of Article IV of its code; and (b) each parcel was a discrete business location subject to registration, tax-return, and tax-payment requirements.

Lessors filed a complaint in the county court, naming the Township as defendant and seeking a declaratory judgment stating that, pursuant to the Local Tax Enabling Act (the “LTEA”), the Township’s business privilege tax could not be applied to rental proceeds from leases and lease transactions. Lessors did not challenge the validity of Article IV generally, as the LTEA authorizes the taxing authorities of various political subdivisions, including first-class townships, to “levy, assess and collect ... taxes ... on persons, transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects and personal property” within the subdivision’s jurisdictional limits. 58 P.S. § 6924.301.1(a). Rather, they observed that the LTEA’s general grant of power in this regard is subject to an exception stating that such local authorities lack the ability to “levy, assess, or collect ... any tax on ... leases or lease transactions!].]” Id. § 6924.301.1(f)(1). Lessors argued their real-property rental activities fall within the scope of this exception.

The parties eventually filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the Township’s motion, denied Lessors’ motion, and dismissed the complaint. The court issued an opinion explaining that it viewed the challenged tax as a gross-receipts tax and not a transactional tax such as the one disapproved in Lynnebrook & Woodbrook Associates, L.P. v. Borough of Millersville, 600 Pa. 108, 963 A.2d 1261 (2008) (holding that an ordinance imposing a flat $30.00 tax on the consummation of residential leases was prohibited by the LTEA). See Fish v. Twp. of Lower Merion, No. 2012-02530, slip op. at 3-4, 2013 WL 11033452 (C.P.Montgomery Dec. 26, 2013).

A divided en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed in relevant part. As pertains to the issue involved in this appeal, the court initially stated that Section 301.1(f)(1) of the LTEA, 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(1), does not reflect a tax exemption, but carves out an exclusion or exception from the Township’s taxing authority, meaning that any doubt about its reach should be resolved in the taxpayer’s favor. See Fish v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 100 A.3d 746, 750 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014) (en banc) (citing Lynnebrook, 600 Pa. at 117, 963 A.2d at 1266 (indicating that the statutory language in Section 301.1(f)(1) “should be construed as a tax exception—not a- tax exemption—and thus construed against the taxing authority”)). Applying this precept, and observing that the exception bars “any” tax on leases or lease transactions, the court concluded:

Regardless of title, there is no material difference between a tax scheme that imposes a 1.5 mill tax upon the receipt of each rent payment (arguably a transactional tax), and a scheme that imposes a 1.5 mill tax payment annually based on all rent receipts (characterized by the Township as a business privilege tax). The only differences are title and timing. ... Because the Township’s [business privilege tax] would tax Lessors’ lease revenue at a rate of 1.5 mills, it is a tax on leases or lease transactions and, thus, prohibited under the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 301.1(f)(1) of the LTEA in Lynnebrook.

Id. at 751 (footnote omitted).

President Judge Pellegrini authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Judge Leadbetter. The dissent distinguished Lynnebrook on the grounds that the tax in that matter was a flat tax expressly levied on lease transactions. The dissent indicated that the present tax, as it applies to Lessors, is imposed on the privilege of leasing property and not on leases or lease transactions themselves. In the dissent’s view, the majority should have accorded this distinction controlling significance, as Pennsylvania courts have viewed privileges and transactions as distinct subjects of taxation, see, e.g., Gilberti v. City of Pittsburgh, 511 Pa. 100, 106, 511 A.2d 1321, 1324 (1986), and the LTEA authorizes the Township to tax privileges. In support of its position, the dissent highlighted School District of Scranton v. Dale & Dale Design & Development, Inc., 559 Pa. 398, 741 A.2d 186 (1999), in which this Court upheld the application of a business privilege tax to a contractor that built residences notwithstanding that the LTEA prohibited localities from taxing the construction of, or improvements to, residential dwellings. See Fish, 100 A.3d at 753-54 (Pellegrini, P.J., dissenting).

We allowed further review to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in holding that the Township’s “business privilege tax could not apply to a business receiving gross receipts from the business of leasing real estate[.]” Fish v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 631 Pa. 450, 112 A.3d 1209 (2015) (per curiam).

The Township’s position largely echoes that of the Commonwealth Court dissent. It argues that: Lynnebrook is distinguishable as the tax there was levied directly on leases or lease transactions, and not on a privilege; this Court clarified in Gilberti that privileges and transactions are distinct subjects of taxation; and Dale should control the outcome here. The Township also maintains that the Commonwealth Court erred by failing to consider early decisions in which a city sales tax was held not to impermissibly duplicate a state-imposed mercantile tax, although the mercantile tax was calculated based on the taxpayer’s business volume. See, e.g., Blauner’s, Inc. v. City of Phila., 330 Pa. 342, 346, 198 A. 889, 892 (1938) (“The city tax is a levy on sales, the state tax is a levy imposed for the privilege of conducting a particular kind of business, albeit the amount of the tax is measured by gross sales.”). Finally, the Township contends that the Legislature understands “the distinction between a tax on something and a tax on privileges or uses related to that thing,” Brief for Appellant at 13, as illustrated by the LTEA’s manufacturing exception pursuant to which political subdivisions are precluded from imposing taxes on manufactured goods “or on any privilege, act or transaction related to the business of manufacturing.” 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(4). Since this same “privilege” prohibition does not appear in subsection (f)(1), the Township suggests that this Court should not read such provision as barring application of a general business privilege tax to a business whose revenue consists of rental income.

Several municipalities have submitted amicus briefs supporting the Township’s position. Their arguments are generally duplicative of those advanced by the Township, albeit they focus primarily on the distinction between taxing transactions and taxing privileges—or, alternatively, between direct and indirect taxation of lease income. They assert this Court’s case precedent clarifies that the LTEA permits indirect taxation, via a business privilege tax, of otherwise untaxable transactions or activities.

Lessors argue, first, that subsection 301.1(f)(1) should be read to expressly bar the tax in issue. They highlight Lynne-brook’s explanation that subsection (f)(1) represents an “unqualified prohibition on the taxation of leases.” Brief for Appellees at 3 (quoting Lynnebrook, 600 Pa. at 119, 963 A.2d at 1267). Quoting dictionary definitions of “lease,” Lessors submit that consideration is an essential and elemental component of a lease. Thus, they forward that a tax measured by such consideration is, in fact, a tax on leases. Lessors argue, moreover, that this premise is supported by Lynnebrook insofar as it held that a flat tax on lease transactions was disallowed by the pre-2008 version of the statute, which only facially precluded taxes on “leases.” See supra note 3. In further support of a broad reading of (f)(1), Lessors observe that subsection 301.1(f) contains numerous subsections, most of which proscribe taxation relative to certain subjects using the term “a tax” rather than “any tax.” See, e.g., 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(7) (precluding “a tax” on memberships in nonprofit organizations). Because the phrase “any tax” is used for (f)(l)’s lease-tax prohibition, Lessors reason that the Legislature must have intended an especially broad interpretation of that constraint. Relatedly, they argue that the “any tax” phraseology refers back to the types of taxes enumerated in the general grant of powers in subsection (a)(1), including privilege taxes. Lessors conclude that the phrase “any tax,” as employed in (f)(1), must therefore be understood to subsume business privilege taxes insofar as they are levied— directly or indirectly—on lease income.

Alternatively, Lessors maintain the tax challenged here is a business privilege tax in name only, at least as applied to their leasing activities. They cite to cases suggesting that the true measure of a tax is not its name but how it operates in practice. See, e.g., Shelly Funeral Home, Inc. v. Warrington Twp., 618 Pa. 469, 477, 57 A.3d 1136, 1141 (2012) (explaining that, “irrespective of how taxes are described, reviewing courts assess their validity based on how they operate in practice”); Commonwealth v. E. Motor Express, Inc., 398 Pa. 279, 297, 157 A.2d 79, 89 (1959) (“[I]n the last analysis the nature of the tax depends not upon its label, but upon its incidence, i.e., its practical operation and effect.”). Lessors state that, in practice, Article IV operates to tax the income from leases as demonstrated by the Township’s decision to consider each rental property a separate place of business. They contend that, while there have been cases in which a business privilege tax was upheld although it captured income from activities excepted from taxation, in virtually all such matters the tax was levied upon monies derived from multiple sources, so that the reviewing court found that it was not a tax upon the excepted activity. See, e.g., Cheltenham Twp. v. Cheltenham Cinema, Inc., 548 Pa. 385, 697 A.2d 258 (1997) (upholding a business privilege tax as applied to the gross receipts of a movie theater, notwithstanding that the taxing authority was barred from taxing the sale of movie tickets, where the theater earned its gross receipts from ticket and concession sales). They observe, again, that the present tax as applied to them is distinguishable in that it is only levied upon lease income.

The underlying facts are not in dispute. The issue in this appeal, as noted, is whether the exception appearing at Section 301.1(f)(1) of the LTEA, 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(1), bars application of the Township’s general business privilege tax to persons or businesses whose sole income consists of rental payments. More particularly, the question is whether the prohibition of “any tax on ... leases” precludes such application. This is an issue of statutory interpretation. As such, it is a question of law over which our review is plenary and de novo. See, e.g., In re D.L.H., 606 Pa. 550, 563, 2 A.3d 505, 513 (2010).

Initially, we reject Lessors’ assertion that the phrase “any tax” as it appears in subsection 301.1(f)(1) is broader in scope than “a tax” as used elsewhere in subsection 301.1(f). Although “any” and “a” are different words, there is no difference in substance between statutory language barring “any tax” on a subject and language barring “a tax” on that subject. Cf. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1902 (providing that, in statutory text, the singular includes the plural and vice versa). Nor are we persuaded by the suggestion that, to the degree “any tax” may refer back to the enumerated types of taxes that municipalities are otherwise authorized to enact, its use evidences a particularized legislative design to preclude application of a generalized business privilege tax to leasing activities. There is no textual support for this position and Lessors do not reference any decision in which such an interpretation has been endorsed. Moreover, such a reading would be in substantial tension with Fischer v. City of Pittsburgh, 383 Pa. 138, 118 A.2d 157 (1955), discussed below.

The Township’s textual argument is more compelling. As noted, the Township highlights that, in the manufacturing exception, the legislative body not only precluded municipal taxes on the manufacturing of goods, it also prohibited taxes “on any privilege, act or transaction related to” the manufacturing of such goods. 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(4) (emphasis added). The emphasized language would be superfluous if the legislative prohibition of “a tax on” manufactured goods had been intended, without more, to prohibit taxes on a business privilege “related to” the making of the goods. See generally Commonwealth v. Ostrosky, 589 Pa, 437, 450, 909 A.2d 1224, 1232 (2006) (citing Holland v. Marcy, 584 Pa. 195, 206, 883 A.2d 449, 456 (2005) (plurality) (“[W]e cannot assume that the legislature intended any words to be mere surplusage.”)); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2) (providing that courts should presume the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain). That being the case, we do not read subsection (f)(l)’s prohibition on lease taxes as encompassing a similar proscription as to privileges “related to” leases.

Additionally, the legislative decision to bar taxes on privileges, acts, or transactions relating to manufactured goods proved crucial in Fischer, where the Court stated that, absent such language, Pittsburgh’s earned-income tax would have been enforceable as against the owners of a manufacturing concern in the city. Reasoning, however, that selling manufactured products is a privilege, act, or transaction associated with manufacturing, the Court disallowed such enforcement. See Fischer, 383 Pa. at 142-44, 118 A.2d at 159-60. Conversely, in Dale, the Court dealt with circumstances directly analogous to those of the present case inasmuch as the exception at issue—a ban on municipal taxes on the construction of, or improvements to, residential dwellings, see 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(ll)—did not contain the expansive language of the manufacturing exception. A construction contractor involved solely in erecting residential dwellings questioned whether the city’s business privilege tax could be enforced against it. This Court held that the tax could be enforced against the contractor, explaining that it was a tax on the privilege of doing business within the city, and not a tax upon the construction of residential dwellings as such. See Dale, 559 Pa. at 403, 741 A.2d at 189 (quoting Middletown Twp. v. Alverno Valley Farms, 105 Pa.Cmwlth. 311, 315, 524 A.2d 1039, 1041 (1987)).

Dale’s reasoning is consistent with a line of cases distinguishing business privilege taxes (or mercantile license taxes, which are similar in nature) from taxes on transactions or sales. In Gilberti, for example, this Court emphasized that the LTEA lists transactions and privileges as two distinct subjects of taxation, and hence, a business privilege tax could be applied to transactions occurring outside the city limits so long as those transactions were attributable to an office in the city—whereas a transaction tax on such extraterritorial transactions would have been impermissible. See Gilberti, 511 Pa. at 106, 511 A.2d at 1324; see also F.J. Busse Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 443 Pa. 349, 279 A.2d 14 (1971) (holding that a business privilege tax levied on gross income, including income derived from the use of tangible property, did not duplicate a state tax on use of the same property, since the two taxes were levied upon different subjects); Blauner’s, Inc., 330 Pa. at 346, 198 A. at 892 (indicating that a city sales tax did not duplicate a state mercantile license tax since the city taxed sales whereas the state taxed the privilege of conducting business, notwithstanding that both taxes were measured by gross sales).

In light of this precedent, it is established law in Pennsylvania that business privileges and transactions are separate and distinct subjects of taxation. Additionally, the privilege tax here mirrors the Pittsburgh ordinance at issue in Gilberti, in that it is levied upon the privilege of doing business in the Township and, with certain exceptions not presently relevant, it is calculated based on gross receipts from transactions occurring anywhere—so long as they can be attributed to the Township.

This is not to say that a business privilege tax applicable only to leasing businesses would be permissible under subsection (f)(1). In this sense, we reaffirm Lynnebrook’s observation that subsection (f)(1) constitutes a tax exception to be broadly construed in favor of the taxpayer, as well as its ultimate holding that a tax directed specifically to lease transactions constitutes a prohibited tax on leases. Cf. In re Sch. Dist. of Hampton Twp., 362 Pa. 395, 397, 67 A.2d 376, 377 (1949) (“[A] tax on the privilege of employing property is, from a practical standpoint, the same in effect as a tax upon the property itself[.]”). We also agree, in the abstract at least, with the Commonwealth Court’s suggestion that there is no substantive difference between a tax upon the total of all rent payments and a tax on each individual rent payment. See Fish, 100 A.3d at 751. This is consistent with cases highlighted by Lessors, such as Shelly Funeral Home, which reiterate a longstanding precept that reviewing courts consider a tax’s practical operation, and not merely its label. See Pittsburgh Rys. Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 211 Pa. 479, 488, 60 A. 1077, 1089 (1905); see also Allfirst Bank v. Commonwealth, 593 Pa. 631, 643 n. 10, 933 A.2d 75, 82 n. 10 (2007) (citing cases).

The difficulty here is in the way the Commonwealth Court applied the principle. The court overlooked that, unlike the tax invalidated in Lynnebrook, the Township’s tax is not targeted to leases. It is, rather, a general business privilege tax which encompasses all for-profit businesses that offer services to the public within the Township’s borders. See Lower Merion Twp., Pa., Mun. Code art. IV, § 138-40 (1976). The question is whether businesses which derive their income only from leases must be excluded from the tax’s reach. Based on the precedent discussed above, clarifying that privileges and transactions are separate subjects of taxation, as well as the absence of any language in subsection 301.1(f)(1) prohibiting taxes on privileges, acts, or transactions related to leases, we conclude that the Township’s tax is enforceable relative to such businesses.

We acknowledge that the precedent on which we currently rely, including Dale, is in tension with other decisions which may be read to suggest that application of a generalized business privilege tax would be impermissible relative to a taxpayer whose revenues are derived exclusively from untaxa-ble transactions. One notable example is Cheltenham Cinema—decided two years before Dale—in which the Court suggested in dicta that if the taxpayer had obtained its income solely from movie tickets, it would have escaped liability under the township’s business privilege tax due to the LTEA’s ban on taxing movie admission sales. See Cheltenham Cinema, 548 Pa. at 389-90, 697 A.2d at 261; see also Busse, 443 Pa. at 355, 279 A.2d at 17 (containing analogous dicta relating to a prohibition on municipal taxation of tangible property). To the extent such dicta conflicts with Dale and our present holding, it is disapproved.

The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and the matter is remanded for reinstatement of the common pleas court’s order dismissing the complaint.

Justice BAER and Justice TODD join this opinion.

Justice BAER files a concurring opinion.

Justice EAKIN files a dissenting opinion in which Justice STEVENS joins.

Justice BAER,

concurring.

I join the majority opinion to the extent it holds that taxing the privilege of doing business as a landlord is not the same as taxing leases. We have consistently held that a business privilege tax is distinct from a transactional tax. See, e.g., Gilberti v. City of Pittsburgh, 511 Pa. 100, 511 A.2d 1321 (1986) (holding that levying a tax on the privilege of doing business is not the same as taxing the individual transactions of that business). However, that does not mean that a taxing authority may cloak a prohibited transactional tax merely by designating it a business privilege tax. See Shelly Funeral Home, Inc. v. Warrington Twp., 618 Pa. 469, 57 A.3d 1136, 1141 (2012) (providing that the substance of a tax should dictate the validity of the tax). Moreover, the fact that a taxing authority applies its business privilege tax to all businesses equally should not allow a taxing authority to impose an otherwise impermissible tax.

A business privilege tax must be distinguishable from a prohibited transactional tax for it to be valid. See School District of Scranton v. Dale & Dale Design & Development, Inc., 559 Pa. 398, 741 A.2d 186 (1999) (finding that taxing a residential contractor’s privilege of conducting business within the city, determined by the gross receipts of his business, is not a tax upon the construction of a residential dwelling); Cheltenham Twp. v. Cheltenham Cinema, Inc., 548 Pa. 385, 697 A.2d 258, 261 (1997) (finding that a business privilege tax on a movie theater was permitted despite a prohibition on a transactional tax on “admissions to motion picture theaters” because the business privilege tax did not tax “the identical subject matter” nor was it “measured by the same base” as the prohibited transactional tax).

The statute here prohibits “any tax ... on leases or lease transactions.” 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f). A lease is a contract. The prohibition does not purport to cover rental income or revenue derived from leases. It merely prohibits a direct tax on leases, as we found in Lynnebrook & Woodbrook Associates, L.P. v. Borough of Millersville, 600 Pa. 108, 963 A.2d 1261 (2008). The tax at issue is not a tax on leases. It is a tax on the privilege of doing business within the township. As I view the privilege of doing business as a landlord to be distinct from a tax on a lease, I agree that the tax at issue is not prohibited.

Justice EAKIN,

dissenting.

I agree with the Majority that a tax on a privilege and a tax on a transaction are categorically distinct in our Commonwealth. However, where the amount of a privilege tax is a fixed percentage of transactional income, it becomes a titular distinction with no actual difference. Where the tax on the “privilege” is determined to the penny by the amount of nontaxable income, one is not paying tax on a privilege at all—one is paying tax on lease income, which defeats the statutory prohibition.

The Majority’s interpretation of the Local Tax Enabling Act (LTEA), 58 P.S. § 6924.301.1, allowing the taxing body to exempt its tax from the prohibition of the statute, conflicts with our analysis in Lynnebrook & Woodbrook Assocs., L.P. v. Borough of Millersville, 600 Pa. 108, 963 A.2d 1261 (2008). In Lynnebrook, we unanimously found the provision to be “an unqualified prohibition on the taxation of leases.” Id. at 1267 (citation omitted). Apparently the “unqualified prohibition” is not so unqualified that it cannot be avoided simply by retitling it, vitiating the plain language of the LTEA’s prohibition. A tax is to be analyzed by its practical operation and effect, not merely by its label. Commonwealth v. E. Motor Express, Inc., 398 Pa. 279, 157 A.2d 79, 89 (1959). Stated another way, substance trumps labelling in the realm of tax law; what counts is what you do, not what you call it. What this municipal tax does, as applied to Appellees, is to impose a tax based solely on income from leases.

The LTEA, 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(a), grants municipalities the authority to tax “persons, transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects and personal property” within their respective jurisdictions; where it is unclear whether the legislature intended to permit municipal taxation of some privilege, act, or res, we must err on the side of strict interpretation against the government and exclude the subject from taxation until such time as the legislature issues a clear grant of authority. Marson v. City of Philadelphia, 342 Pa. 369, 21 A.2d 228, 230-31 (1941). Likewise, in Lynnebrook, we concluded § 6924.301.1(f)(1) was an exception to such authority, as opposed to an exemption; therefore, the provision must be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing authority. Lynnebrook, 963 A.2d at 1267; 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(5).

The Majority opines that legislative language barring taxation of “privileges, acts, or transactions,” stated elsewhere in the statute, serves as contextual indicia that the legislature intended taxation on the privilege of leasing to be permissible. Majority Op., at 714-15, 128 A.3d at 769-70. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, this reasoning is not without its allure, but appears contrary to our precedent. Specifically, in Lynnebrook, we determined that the exception provision was enacted by the legislature to remedy the “mischief’ caused when “overweening municipal authorities im-poste] taxes beyond the LTEA’s authorization.” Lynnebrook, 963 A.2d at 1267. To overween is to regard one’s own thinking too highly—as in trying to think of a way to elude a clear statutory prohibition by titling a tax on income as a tax on the privilege of earning that income.

Is there a difference between taxing income and taxing the privilege of income? In theory, they are distinguishable, as my colleagues aptly point out, but in practice, both involve exactly the same thing—paying the municipality a percentage of the profit from the lease. The only difference is title and timing, and if taxing authorities can avoid unambiguous legislative prohibitions simply by renaming the tax and rescheduling its collection, what is the purpose of the exception in the first place? Is this really construing the statute in favor of the taxpayer, who must now reflect, “There’s a statute that says my overweening municipality can’t tax my lease income, but I’m writing them a check to pay a ‘privilege’ tax based entirely on the same exact income they can’t tax? What kind of double talk is this?” If a landlord makes another dollar on a lease, they have to pay more tax—what increased, their privilege or their lease income?

If the privilege tax were a fixed amount, or scaled to some factor or category of income that is not excepted from taxation, the distinction between transaction and privilege would be defensible. However, the amount of the privilege tax here is precisely dependent on the amount of income from leases and nothing else at all. If we are to interpret in favor of the taxpayer, can we not see through the charade? When a tax by whatever name is manifestly a de facto tax on matters which the state does not allow a municipality to tax, let the scales fall from our eyes.

The Majority’s holding allows municipalities to rely on semantic distinctions to reframe ultra vires taxation, circumventing express legislative prohibitions and validating otherwise impermissible levies. Plainly put, after its holding here, the nominal reaffirmation that Lynnebrook is good law, to the extent that taxes levied directly on leases are still prohibited, is meaningless. The framework for collecting the prohibited tax by calling it something else is established. By engineering its lease tax in the guise of a privilege tax, indirectly collecting the same revenue it could not collect directly, the municipality may frustrate the legislature’s intention that lease income should be spared from local taxation.

The Bard once mused: “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene II. In the realm of tax law, the aphorism holds true, though the odor may be less honeyed. Irrespective of labels, taxation of lease income under the LTEA is prohibited; that tax smells the same, whether levied directly, as in Lynnebrook, or repackaged as an indirect privilege tax, as here. For whatever reason, municipal taxation on leases was barred, specifically, unequivocally, and clearly by the legislature; such is established by the plain language of the LTEA, and we should not place our imprimatur on municipal action that circumvents such an obvious legislative prohibition.

You cannot turn a duck into a goose by putting a sign that says “goose” around its neck—it’s still a duck.

Justice STEVENS joins this dissenting opinion.

      . Act of Dec. 31, 1965, P.L. 1257 (as amended 53 P.S. §§ 6924.101-6924.901).

      . Lessors also requested a declaration that Article IV’s business-registration mandate cannot be applied to their rental activities, or, in the alternative, that the Township cannot require a separate registration fee for each property. These requests were denied, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed the denial. As the Township is the Appellant, no issue involving business registration is presently before the Court.

      . Separately, the Township notes that the Commonwealth Court repeatedly referenced the LTEA’s prohibition on municipalities taxing "leases or lease transactions.” See, e.g., Fish, 100 A.3d at 751. The Township observes that a legislative change from "leases” to "leases or lease transactions” was effectuated by the Act of October 15, 2008, P.L. 1615, No. 130 ("Act 130”), which, notably, specified that the revision did not apply to municipalities taxing such transactions before July 1, 2008. See Act 130, § 4. The Township finds such limitation relevant because: at most, the tax challenged here is imposed on revenues derived from lease transactions, and not the mere existence of a lease; and the Township’s tax was enacted before July 1, 2008. In light of our disposition below, any perceived difference between "leases” and "leases or lease transactions” as the subject of a tax is of no present significance.

        . Fischer involved the manufacturing exception in the LTEA’s predecessor statute. That exception was, for present purposes, substantively identical to the one in the LTEA.

      . Where a business’s overall income was derived from multiple activities, only one of which was proscribed by the LTEA, this Court has held the proscribed income stream may be subsumed by the business’s overall revenue, and taxed indirectly. Cheltenham Twp. v. Cheltenham Cinema, Inc., 548 Pa. 385, 697 A.2d 258, 262 (1997). However, even where we did so, we expressly recognized, albeit in dictum, that the LTEA would prohibit applying that same tax to a business whose income stream was wholly derived from an activity excepted from taxation. Id. at 261. That is precisely the situation presented here.

      . Expression of one thing is the implied exclusion of another thing.

      . The Majority states a contrary holding would render the legislature’s use of the phrase "privileges, acts, or transactions” mere surplusage. Majority Op., at 713-14, 128 A.3d at 769. However, it neglects to give the same treatment to the legislature's choice of the term, “any” tax, although the legislature uses the distinct term, "a” tax, in other provisions of the LTEA. The Majority takes the position that there is no practical difference between "a” tax and “any” tax, comparing this distinction to the difference between singular and plural terms, which are used interchangeably in statutory text. Id. However, the plural of "a tax” is “taxes,” not "any tax.” Under the rules of statutory construction, we are obliged to give effect to all terms and provisions in a statute, wherever possible. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The Majority properly notes that we may not assume the legislature intended any words to be surplusage, and thus to give effect to all terms and provisions in the statute, we must interpret "a tax” to mean a specific tax, and "any tax” to mean a tax of whatever ldnd.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice TODD.

license: Public Domain

text:
    128 A.3d 774
    K.C. and V.C. v. L.A. Appeal of: D.M. and L.N.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Oct. 21, 2015.
    Decided Dec. 21, 2015.

      Richard Ellis Santee Jr., Richard Eugene Santee, Shay, Santee & Kelhart, Bethlehem, for Appellant.
    Harold J. Funt, Mosebach, Funt, Dayton & Duckworth, P.C., Bethlehem, Frances Gravish Sonne, Frances G. Sonne, Attorney-a-Law, P.C., Allentown, for Appellee.
    L.A., pro se.
    SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice TODD.

In this appeal by allowance, we are asked to determine whether an order denying a petition to intervene in a custody action is appealable as a collateral order as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. For the reasons that follow, we hold that such an order is, in fact, a collateral order appealable under Rule 313, and, thus, we reverse the Superior Court’s order quashing the appeal and remand to that court for consideration of the issues raised therein.

This case arises out of an action for the custody of L.A. (“Child”). Child was born on December 9, 2011, to L.A. (“Mother”) and Q.M. (“Father”). Several months later, Northampton County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed an emergency application for protective custody over Child. The trial court adjudicated Child dependent and granted CYS legal custody on February 9, 2012. CYS subsequently removed Child from Mother’s home and placed her in the care of Appellant D.M. (“Maternal Aunt”), and Appellant L.N., a friend with whom Maternal Aunt resided (collectively “Appellants”). Child lived with Appellants from February 10, 2012 to September 20, 2012, at which time the trial court granted Appellants and Father shared legal and physical custody over Child. The trial court later vacated its adjudication of dependency on April 4, 2013, awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody to Father, and awarded partial physical custody to Appellants every other weekend. Throughout the entire period during which he exercised custody over Child, Father resided with his mother and stepfather, Appellees V.C. and K.C. (“Paternal Grandparents”).

On June 6, 2013, nearly two months after he had been awarded primary custody, Father suddenly passed away. Paternal Grandparents began caring for Child, and, on June 13, 2013, they filed a complaint for custody against Mother, seeking sole legal and physical custody over Child so as to “preserve and maintain the status quo” and “so as not to disrupt the [CJhild’s living arrangements.” Complaint for Custody, at 3. Mother did not contest the matter; however, on June 25, 2013, Appellants filed a petition for intervention, wherein they asserted that they stood in loco parentis to Child and sought primary legal and physical custody. In response, Paternal Grandparents filed an answer and new matter in which they alleged that Appellants lacked standing under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324 to seek legal or physical custody over Child, claiming they were only temporary foster parents and, therefore, that they could not stand in loco parentis. On January 2, 2015, following a hearing, the trial court denied Appellants’ petition to intervene, noting that “relationships which are based on foster care do not give rise to in loco parentis status for purposes of custody.” Trial Court Order, 1/2/15, at 1 n.l.

Appellants appealed the order denying intervention to the Superior Court, which directed them to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed in light of the fact that the order did not appear to be final or appealable. In response, Appellants argued that the trial court’s order was final and appeal-able under Pa.R.A.P. 341, and, alternatively, that the order was a collateral order subject to an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 313. The Superior Court nevertheless quashed the appeal in a per curiam order dated April 10, 2015, concluding the trial court’s order denying the petition to intervene was “not a final order in the custody matter and thus not final or appealable.” K.C. and V.C. v. L.A., 499 EDA 2015, 1 (Pa.Super. filed 4/10/15) (order) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (“A final order is any order that: (1) disposes of all claims and of all parties”); G.B. v. M.M.B., 448 Pa.Super. 133, 670 A.2d 714 (1996) (holding order awarding father temporary partial custody prior to custody hearing was not final and appealable under Rule 341); Boise Cascade Corp. v. East Stroudsburg Savings Ass’n, 300 Pa.Super. 279, 446 A.2d 614 (1982) (quashing appeal from order denying intervention in action in assumpsit because order was not final)).

Thereafter, Appellants filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this Court, raising the issues of whether their appeal from the trial court’s order denying their petition to intervene was appealable as a final order under Rule 341 or, alternatively, as a collateral order pursuant to Rule 313. We granted allowance of appeal, limited to the following issue:

Whether an appeal from a trial court order denying a petition to intervene in a custody action is appealable as a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313 because the order is separable and collateral to the main cause of action, the right involved is too important to be denied review, and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case the claimed right will be irreparably lost[.]

K.C. and V.C. v. L.A., 632 Pa. 442, 121 A.3d 432 (2015) (order).

By way of background, prior to 1992, orders denying a party the right to intervene in an action were appealable as of right under Rule 341 because they “have the practical consequence of putting a litigant out of court,” and, thus, were viewed as final with regard to that party. Pa.R.A.P. 341, Note. However, the 1992 amendment to Rule 341 abandoned this liberal “final aspect” approach to finality by generally limiting appeals as of right to only those orders which “end[ed] the litigation as to all claims and all parties.” Id. As a result, appeals from several types of orders which were formerly permitted under Rule 341 were eliminated from the rule’s scope, including appeals from orders denying a party’s right to intervene. The Official Note to Rule 341 specifically identifies, inter alia, an order denying a party’s right to intervene as one such order which is no longer appealable as a final order under the rule.

Nevertheless, although Rule 341 specifically precludes a party from appealing an order denying intervention before the underlying action becomes final under Rule 341’s present formulation, the Official Note to Rule 341 also states that such an order may be immediately appealable as a collateral order under Rule 313 if it meets the criteria set forth in that rule. Otherwise known as the collateral order doctrine, Rule 313(b) provides that an interlocutory order is collateral and, therefore, immediately appealable, if it is: “[1] separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where [2] the right involved is too important to be denied review and [3] the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b); see also Commonwealth v. Wright, 621 Pa. 446, 78 A.3d 1070, 1077 (2013).

Before us, Appellants argue that the trial court’s order denying their petition to intervene in the custody proceedings is a collateral order appealable as of right under Rule 313, and, thus, that the Superior Court erred in quashing its appeal. With respect to the first prong of the collateral order doctrine, Appellants contend the order denying their petition to intervene is separable from the underlying custody action because it concerns the issue of whether they have standing to intervene, a question they claim is separate from the main issue in the custody proceeding regarding who should have legal and physical custody over Child.

Appellants next maintain that their right to intervene in the custody action is too important to be denied review because the issue of which parties may have standing in such proceedings implicates the best interests and welfare of children, Appellants’ Brief at 16 (citing G.B., 670 A.2d at 718 (highlighting the Commonwealth’s interest in children and the fact that custody orders have a “significant, important and immediate impact upon the welfare of children”)), which they note has been recognized by the legislature as important enough to prompt it to enact statutes specifically devoted to defining standing to file custody actions in 28 Pa.C.S. §§ 5324-5326.

Lastly, with respect to the final prong of the doctrine, Appellants assert that their right to intervene will be irreparably lost because, pursuant to In re Barnes Found., 582 Pa. 370, 871 A.2d 792 (2005), a party must appeal from an order denying intervention within 30 days of the entry of the order or it will lose its right to appeal the order entirely. Appellants further note that the denial of intervention precludes them from appealing the final custody order, as “one who is not a party to a proceeding is not permitted to appeal from a final order.” Appellants’ Brief, at 17 (citing Barnes, 871 A.2d at 794 (“failure to attain intervenor status forecloses a later appeal.”)). Appellants posit that, as a result, the Superior Court’s quashal of their appeal has placed them in a “Catch-22,” with no remedy at law by which to challenge the trial court’s interlocutory order denying intervention or to challenge the final custody order, a result they deem “absurd.” Appellants’ Brief, at 18-19.

We now turn to our analysis of the issue before us. The question of whether an order is appealable under Rule 313 is a question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Williams, 624 Pa. 405, 86 A.3d 771, 781 (2014). We construe the collateral order doctrine narrowly so as to avoid “undue corrosion of the final order rule,” Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264, 836 A.2d 42, 47 (2003), and to prevent delay resulting from “piecemeal review of trial court decisions.” Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 588 Pa. 405, 905 A.2d 422, 427 (2006).

As noted above, the collateral order doctrine permits an appeal as of right from a non-final collateral order if the order satisfies the three requirements set forth in Rule 313(b). With regard to the first prong of the collateral order doctrine, an order is separable from the main cause of action if it is “entirely distinct from the underlying issue in the case” and if “it can be resolved without an analysis of the merits of the underlying dispute.” Commonwealth v. Blystone, 632 Pa. 260, 119 A.3d 306, 312 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, as Appellants have noted, the order denying their petition for intervention concerns their standing to seek custody of Child under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324, a necessary threshold issue which must be determined before proceeding to the central question in the underlying custody action regarding who should exercise custody over Child. See Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth, 585 Pa. 196, 888 A.2d 655, 659 (2005) (“Prior to judicial resolution of a dispute, an individual must as a threshold matter show that he has standing to bring the action.”). As the issue of whether Appellants are among the individuals who have standing to seek custody under Section 5324 is a conceptually distinct legal question which has no bearing on the central issue within the custody action—who is entitled to physical and legal custody of Child in light of her best interests—we find that Appellants have established that the trial court’s order is separable from the main cause of action. See In re J.S., 980 A.2d 117, 121 (Pa.Super.2009) (finding order denying foster parents’ petition for intervention in a dependency action satisfied first prong of collateral order doctrine because “the determination of ... standing ... is peripheral to the substantive decisions affecting the child’s best interests, which is the polestar of all dependency proceedings.”); Moyer v. Gresh, 904 A.2d 958, 961 (Pa.Super.2006) (treating dismissal of a party from a child custody action as distinct from the merits of the custody action). Thus, Appellants have satisfied the first prong of the collateral order doctrine.

Next, with respect to the second prong of the doctrine, the importance prong, a right is important if “the interests that would go unprotected without immediate appeal are significant relative to the efficiency interests served by the final order rule.” Williams, 86 A.3d at 782. Notably, the rights involved must implicate more than just the individual parties in the matter, and, instead, must be “deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.” Blystone, 119 A.3d at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, it is undeniable that a decision regarding Appellants’ claimed right to standing to intervene in the custody proceedings will have a direct effect on Appellants’ ability to participate in the custody proceedings, and, thus, on Child, as, if Appellants are, in fact, entitled to intervene in the custody action, they could be awarded partial or full custody.

However, while Appellants’ claimed right to intervene in the custody action may, at first blush, appear to implicate only the individual parties involved, this right has important policy implications extending beyond this particular case, as the state has a “longstanding interest in protecting the health and emotional welfare of children,” and decisions regarding which parties have standing to participate in a child custody action directly impact the children involved in such actions. Hiller v. Fausey, 588 Pa. 342, 904 A.2d 875, 886 (2006). More specifically, in the context of child custody proceedings, the state has a “paramount concern” in “the best interest and permanent welfare of the child,” and has deemed all other considerations “subordinate to the child’s physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being.” In re Davis, 502 Pa. 110, 465 A.2d 614, 618 (1983); see also G.B., 670 A.2d at 718 (“Child custody orders are treated differently because they have significant, important and immediate impact upon the welfare of children.”).

Accordingly, Pennsylvania has a strong policy interest in ensuring that courts award custody to those individuals who are most equipped to serve the best interests and permanent welfare of the child, an aim only achievable if all parties who have a type of parental relationship with a child, i.e., have standing under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324, are permitted to participate in a child custody action. Thus, we find that the state’s paramount interest in the welfare of children and, as a result, in identifying the parties who may participate in child custody proceedings, demonstrates that Appellants’ claimed right to intervene satisfies the importance prong of the collateral order doctrine.

Lastly, we turn to the final prong: whether Appellants’ claimed right will be irreparably lost if review is postponed until after final judgment. In this regard, as noted, Appellants rely on Barnes, a case which concerned the restructuring of a charitable institution. Therein, an appellant seeking to participate in the orphans’ court proceedings was denied intervention, failed to appeal from the trial court’s order denying his petition to intervene, and, instead, lodged an appeal from the final order in the case. We quashed the appellant’s appeal because he had failed to obtain intervenor status and, thus, was not a party to the underlying action. See Barnes, 871 A.2d at 795. In so doing, we reasoned that “a common pleas court’s order denying intervention is one type of order which must be appealed within thirty days of its entry under Rule of Appellate Procedure 903, or not at all, precisely because the failure to attain intervenor status forecloses a later appeal.” Id. at 794 (emphasis added). We explained that requiring a party who has satisfied the requirements of the collateral order doctrine to timely appeal from the denial of intervention, rather than wait to appeal that denial after final judgment, was the preferred approach in such circumstances, as it would avoid the “risk [of] interference with trial court proceedings taken after the denial of intervention, a prospect far costlier than insisting that the applicant appeal the denial without waiting to see whether the outcome of the proceedings leaves intervention still desirable.” Id. at 795 (quoting Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 15A Fed Prac. & Proc. Juris.2d § 3902.1 (2005)).

While Barnes did not involve a child custody action, its language is broad and applies to any “common pleas court’s order denying intervention.” Barnes, 871 A.2d at 794. Moreover, the rationale behind requiring the immediate appeal of a denial of intervention in Barnes—namely, the risk of interference with subsequent trial proceedings—is even more pronounced in the context of a child custody action, given the significant interests at stake. We, therefore, find that Barnes applies to the trial court’s order in the instant case. Accordingly, because Barnes unequivocally requires any party who was denied intervention and who satisfies the requirements of Rule 313 to appeal from the order denying intervention within 30 days of its entry or lose the right to appeal the order entirely, Appellants’ right to appeal from the order denying intervention in the instant case will be manifestly lost if they are not permitted to appeal the order.

We recognize that this result may appear to be in tension with our goal of achieving the prompt resolution of child custody disputes, as permitting the piecemeal appeal of an order denying intervention may delay custody proceedings. However, we find this delay is preferable to the alternative of completely denying a party the right to file an appeal—given the possibility that the party does, in fact, have standing and should have been granted intervention—which then forces that party to file his or her own separate custody action in order to seek redress. Moreover, our courts are firmly committed to the prompt and efficient resolution of matters involving children, including child custody actions, as exhibited by our appellate rules and Internal Operating Procedures (“IOPs”), which have responded to the unique issues associated with appeals involving children—deemed “children’s fast track appeals”—by expediting such actions, “shortening] the time frames for all aspects of the appellate process.” G. Ronald Darlington et al., Pennsylvania Appellate Practice § 102:9.1. Indeed, our appellate rules and IOPs provide for not only an expedited briefing schedule for children’s fast track appeals, see Pa.R.A.P. 2185(a)(2), but also a reduced time period in which appellate courts are required to draft and circulate judicial opinions in such matters. See Supreme Court IOP § 4; Superior Court IOP § 65.42.

Accordingly, as Appellants’ appeal satisfies each of the three elements of the collateral order doctrine, we conclude that the trial court’s order denying intervention is an appealable collateral order as of right under Rule 313 and, consequently, that the Superior Court erred in quashing Appellants’ appeal. We, thus, reverse the order of the Superior Court and remand to that court for consideration of the merits of Appellants’ appeal.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Chief Justice SAYLOR and Justices EAKIN, BAER and STEVENS join the opinion.

      . This case comes before this Court as a children’s fast track appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedure § 4.

      . The trial court awarded Mother limited physical custodial rights in the form of supervised visitation through Catholic Charities. See Trial Court Order, 4/4/13, at 1.

      . Specifically, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324 sets forth the requirements for standing in custody actions, and provides that only a parent of the child, a person who stands in loco parentis to the child, or a grandparent who does not stand in loco parentis to the child and meets several other enumerated conditions may file an action for legal or physical custody of a child. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324.

      . The Superior Court did not address Appellants' alternative argument pertaining to Rule 313.

      . As we discuss below, Barnes contemplates that this appeal would be pursuant to Rules 312 or 313.

      . Appellants also contend that, if they are forced to wait to appeal the denial of intervention until after the custody action becomes final, and if they succeed on appeal, all of the parties will then be forced to undergo a second custody hearing, which they assert is "contrary to the goal of ... promptly resolv[ing] custody disputes.” Appellants’ Brief at 17. However, as we discuss infra, and as Appellants otherwise appear to recognize, such a result is not possible under Barnes because Barms does not permit an appeal from a denial of intervention after the underlying action becomes final.

      . Paternal Grandparents have elected not to file a brief in this matter.

      . This Court also indicated that the same requirement applies to a party appealing an order denying intervention under Rule 312. See Barnes, 871 A.2d at 794.


author: Chief Justice SAYLOR. Justice STEVENS,

text:
    128 A.3d 781
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Terell HALE, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 9, 2015.
    Decided Dec. 21, 2015.

      Hugh J. Burns Jr., Esq., Anthony V. Pomeranz, Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Karl Baker, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Victor Edward Rauch, Esq., for Terell Hale.
    SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Chief Justice SAYLOR.

Appeal was allowed to determine whether juvenile adjudications of delinquency qualify as “convictions” for purposes of grading within a particularized sentencing regime.

The case concerns Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6127. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. Subsection (a)(1) of this statute prohibits persons from possessing firearms if they have been convicted of certain crimes enumerated in subsection (b). See id. § 6105(a)(1). As relevant in the present case, one of the crimes specified in subsection (b) is aggravated assault, id. § 2702. See id. § 6105(b).

The proscription of subsection (a)(1) also extends to individuals who have engaged in specific conduct within a range of criteria described in subsection (c). See id. § 6105(a)(1), (c). As is also material to the present appeal, subsection (c)(7) extends the prohibition to those who were adjudicated delinquent based on conduct which would comprise one of a smaller grouping of enumerated offenses—also encompassing aggravated assault—if committed as an adult. See id. § 6105(c)(7).

Although a Section 6105 violation, by default, is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree, see id. § 6119, subsection (a.l)(l) elevates the offense grade to a felony of the second degree where the defendant was “convicted” of any felony offense enumerated in subsection (b). Id. § 6105(a.l)(l). Importantly, for purposes of the present ease, the subsection (a.l)(l) enhancement facially does not extend to the range of specific-conduct bases giving rise to the underlying firearms disability under subsection (c).

In 2011, Appellee was convicted, among other things, of a Section 6105 offense, apparently based upon his possession of a firearm and the fact of a previous juvenile adjudication in 2005 for conduct which would give rise to an aggravated assault conviction if committed by an adult. Prior to sentencing, the prosecution apparently took the position that the finding of delinquency should be considered a “conviction” for purposes of the subsection (a.l)(l) enhancement. Thus, the Commonwealth advocated in favor of the felony grading.

The sentencing court found this to be appropriate, premised on a different rationale. On appeal, however, the Superior Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. See Commonwealth v. Hale, 85 A.3d 570 (Pa.Super.2014). The intermediate court explained that the term “conviction” carries a discrete legal connotation that is not generally understood to encompass juvenile adjudications. See id. at 582. Indeed, the court observed, the Juvenile Act explicitly provides that such adjudications are not convictions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6354(a) (prescribing that “[a]n order of disposition or other adjudication in a proceeding under this chapter is not a conviction of a crime” (emphasis added)).

Furthermore, the Superior Court noted that a specific distinction is made, internally within the terms of Section 6105, between convictions and juvenile adjudications. For example, the statute initially keys the firearms prohibition to convictions, then separately extends the proscription, per subsection (c)(7), to certain individuals who have been adjudicated delinquent. Indeed, according to the intermediate court’s rationale, acceptance of the Commonwealth’s position would render subsection (c)(7) entirely superfluous. See Hale, 85 A.3d at 582 (“[Sjubsection (c)’s inclusion of juvenile adjudications subjecting a person to violations of the persons not to possess a firearm crime would be unnecessary if convictions under subsection (b) subsumed delinquent acts.”); accord Commonwealth v. Thomas, 743 A.2d 460, 468 (Pa.Super.1999) (holding that adjudications of delinquency were not convictions for purposes of a recidivist sentencing statute).

The Superior Court acknowledged this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Baker, 531 Pa. 541, 614 A.2d 663 (1992), which held that juvenile adjudications are admissible in capital sentencing proceedings in support of the aggravating circumstance that a defendant “has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9). The court reasoned, however, that the provision of the Juvenile Act distinguishing adjudications and convictions was enacted after Baker’s issuance; the capital sentencing regime entails the application of discretion in the fact-finding process; juvenile proceedings lack the trappings of criminal trials; and post-Baker proceedings have continued to distinguish between convictions and juvenile adjudications. See Hale, 85 A.3d at 584; accord Thomas, 743 A.2d at 465-68. While recognizing that sentencing courts may consider prior delinquency adjudications when selecting the range of a sentence within the appropriate grade, the Superior Court concluded that judges are not permitted "to disregard the language of the persons-not-to-possess statute, render portions of that statute surplusage, and increase the grading of the offense to a second-degree felony.” Hale, 85 A.3d at 585.

The Commonwealth sought allowance of appeal, which was granted to consider whether the Superior Court erred “by contradicting this Court’s precedent holding that prior adjudications of delinquency are relevant at sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Hale, 631 Pa. 458, 113 A.3d 1228 (2014) (per curiam ). Our review of this legal issue is plenary.

Presently, the Commonwealth vigorously maintains that Baker establishes a broad-scale, bright-line rule “that adjudications of delinquency are convictions for purposes of sentencing.” Brief for Appellant at 8. The Commonwealth highlights that Section 6105 repeatedly was amended after Baker’s issuance, yet the Legislature did not indicate that it intended a contrary approach to apply in the Section 6105 context. According to the Commonwealth, we should presume that the General Assembly intended the term “conviction” to subsume adjudications in all subsequent statutes addressing sentencing. See id. at 11 (citing, inter alia, Hunt v. PSP, 603 Pa. 156, 173 n. 15, 983 A.2d 627, 637 n. 15 (2009) (explaining that, “when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same subject intends the same construction to be placed upon such language”)). Furthermore, the Commonwealth observes, the Assembly otherwise has sanctioned the use of juvenile adjudications in sentencing, inter alia, by acquiescing in sentencing guidelines that require them to be used to calculate prior record scores for adult offenders. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) (requiring sentencing courts to consider guidelines for sentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing); 204 Pa.Code § 303.6(a) (explicitly providing for counting of certain “[pjrior juvenile adjudications” within a defendant’s Prior Record Score in discretionary sentencing determinations). The Commonwealth additionally complains that the Superior Court seemed more interested with the several dissenting positions advanced in Baker than with the dispositive holding of the prevailing majority. See Brief for Appellant at 12-13 (“[Wjhether an issue was ‘hotly contested’ is irrelevant to the decision’s precedential effect: Baker is a majority opinion of this Court that holds that a sentencer may consider adjudications of delinquency.”).

Appellee, on the other hand, contends that this appeal is based upon a false premise interposed by the Commonwealth, ie., that the Superior Court held that previous juvenile adjudications are irrelevant at sentencing. See Hale, 631 Pa. at 459, 113 A.Sd at 1228 (per curiam) (reflecting the question presented as framed by the Commonwealth in its allocatur petition). Rather, Appellee explains that the intermediate court explicitly held that previous adjudications of delinquency are relevant to certain aspects of sentencing. See, e.g., Hale, 85 A.3d at 585 (“[T]he court may sentence [Appellee] more harshly due to his prior juvenile record, but it must do so within the confines of a misdemeanor of the first-degree offense.”).

On the merits, Appellee’s arguments adhere closely to the Superior Court’s rationale. He highlights the explicit distinction, made within Section 6105’s own terms, between juvenile adjudication and convictions; the Juvenile Act’s specific admonition that an adjudication “is not a conviction,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6354(a); and the principle of statutory construction requiring penal provisions to be construed narrowly, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1). Appellee distinguishes Baker as discrete to the capital sentencing arena, involving a discretionary sentencing determination as opposed to a mandatory enhancement, and pertaining to a sentencing regime which does not internally distinguish between adjudications and convictions. Appellee observes that this Court has been careful to discuss Baker’s holding in terms specific to the death-penalty regime. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 330, 865 A.2d 761, 795 (2004) (discussing the Baker holding as pertaining “[i]n the context of the Death Penalty Statute” and “for purposes of establishing the aggravating circumstance that a defendant has a significant history of [violent] felony convictions”).

Finally, Appellee alludes to this author’s concern, as expressed in other cases, that Baker’s approach does not represent a narrow construction of the term “conviction,” as is peculiarly required under federal constitutional principles regulating capital punishment. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 20 n.4 (citing Commonwealth v. Daniels, 628 Pa. 193, 285-86 n. 3, 104 A.3d 267, 322 n. 3 (2014) (Saylor, J., concurring and dissenting)). Although Appellee maintains that it is unnecessary to address Baker on its own terms in order to resolve the present dispute, he asserts that “it is a decision ripe for reconsideration, for all the reasons stated by Chief Justice Saylor in Daniels as well as in the dissenting opinions of Justices Nix and Cappy” in Baker. Id.

Upon review, we agree with the Superior Court and Appel-lee on all of the material points discussed above. As noted, Baker arose in the context of a discretionary sentencing determination—not a mandatory grading enhancement—and certainly not an enhancement reposited within a statute that, on its terms, expressly distinguishes between convictions and adjudications. Moreover, Appellee is also correct that the Commonwealth’s framing of the issue overstates the breadth of the Superior Court’s decision, since, as the intermediate court explained, juvenile adjudications retain their relevance to discretionary sentencing determinations precisely because their consideration is expressly provided for in the Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., 204 Pa.Code § 303.6(a). The controlling point here is that Section 6105 does not proceed, along any such lines, to predicate the misdemeanor-to-felony enhancement upon adjudications of delinquency. Indeed, as emphasized by the intermediate court and Appellee, the consequence of a juvenile adjudication is otherwise addressed within the four corners of the statute. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(7). Accordingly, Section 6105 presents a context in which the legislative admonition that an adjudication of delinquency “is not a conviction” should be respected. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6354(a).

The Supreme Court of the United States recently discussed considerations relevant to determining the constitutionally appropriate range of legal consequences attaching to the acts of minors in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464-68, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (touching upon a litany of empirical information supporting the Court’s conclusion that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purpose of sentencing”). As a corollary, the case highlights the substantial policy considerations involved in determining culpability and the boundaries of attendant legal consequences for the actions of minors. In Pennsylvania, subject to the limits of the Constitution, such matters are generally reserved, in the first instance, to the General Assembly. See, e.g., Lance, 624 Pa. at 264-65 & n. 26, 85 A.3d at 454 & n. 26 (recognizing that the General Assembly’s ability to examine social policy issues and to balance competing considerations is superior to that of the judicial branch). For this reason, as well, we decline to superimpose the policy considerations underlying the Baker decision onto the mandatory enhancement requirement repo-sited in Section 6105(a.l)(l).

Here, we agree with the Superior Court and Appellee that the plain language of Section 6105(a.l)(l) should be enforced according to its terms. While this author maintains his own reservations about Baker, the present case is resolved more simply.

We hold that the concept of convictions, as embodied in Section 6105, does not encompass juvenile adjudications.

The order of the Superior Court is affirmed.

Justices EAKIN and BAER and TODD join this opinion.

Justice STEVENS files a dissenting opinion.

Justice STEVENS,

dissenting.

I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s decision to affirm the Superior Court’s order holding that a defendant’s past juvenile adjudication of delinquency for aggravated assault does not qualify as a “conviction” for purposes of applying the sentencing enhancement under the penalty provision of the persons-not-to-possess firearms statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a.l)(l). Therefore, I dissent.

This Court has held that a conviction is defined as “the ascertainment of the guilt of the accused and judgment thereon by the court.” Commonwealth v. Kimmel, 528 Pa. 107, 565 A.2d 426, 428 (1989). However, in the context of the Death Penalty Statute, this Court has accorded the term a broader reach, encompassing instances in which there has been a finding of guilt, even though a judgment of sentence has not yet been imposed. Commonwealth v. Beasley, 505 Pa. 279, 479 A.2d 460 (1984). A juvenile delinquency adjudication, which involves a finding that a juvenile committed a criminal act, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a), (b), has been treated as a conviction at the sentencing phase of a death penalty case to establish an aggravating circumstance. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 531 Pa. 541, 614 A.2d 663 (1992). Furthermore, this Court has found juvenile delinquency adjudications are admissible to rebut mitigating circumstances in death penalty cases. See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 532 Pa. 242, 615 A.2d 704 (1992).

The Commonwealth requests that this Court give the word “convicted” the same meaning in the instant statute as we have in the Death Penalty Statute. I agree with the Commonwealth’s viewpoint in this regard, and therefore, I would reverse the Superior Court’s order.

      . Parenthetically, subsection (a.l)(l) extends the same treatment to persons convicted of a felony under the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or a federal or other-state statute that may be regarded as an equivalent to a qualifying Pennsylvania conviction. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a.l)(l). These provisions are not relevant to the present appeal, however.

      . The one exception pertains to violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, which gives rise to the firearms disability where punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding two years, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(3), and also to the subsection (a.l)(l) enhancement when the drug crime was a felony, see id. § 6105(a.l)(l).

      . The trial record presented to the Court is not clear as to the basis for the Section 6105 conviction, given that the transcribed jury instructions provided in the original record submission do not reference the offense. See N.T., September 30, 2011, at 34-63. It is unclear whether a supplemental charge ensued, since the proceedings carried over to another day, but no corresponding transcript has been provided.

      . The arguments on this point were apparently developed during an off-the-record proceeding alluded to at the sentencing hearing. See N.T., December 19, 2011, at 4.

      . The court reasoned, in essence, that felony grading was the default requirement per Section 6105. See Commonwealth v. Hale, No. CP-51CR-0007307-2010, slip op. at 15 (C.P.Phila. Jan. 8, 2013). This reasoning has not been pursued by the Commonwealth on appeal and is beyond the scope of the present allocatur grant.

      . This Court oftentimes has explained that the holding of a decision must be read against its facts. See, e.g., Lance v. Wyeth, 624 Pa. 231, 264, 85 A.3d 434, 453 (2014).

      . 42 Pa.C.S, § 9711(d)(9) provides that, in death penalty cases, the following shall be considered an aggravating circumstance: "The defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.”


text:
    SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    123 A.3d 330-332
    C.A.R. v. R.E.M.
    09/10/2015
    266 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1126


text:
    Com. v. Adams
    09/11/2015
    263 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1044


text:
    Com. v. Bailey
    09/01/2015
    473 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 453


text:
    Com. v. Baker
    09/09/2015
    291 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 448


text:
    Com. v. Begnoche

    08/04/2015
    255 MAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied September 15, 2015.

   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 370


text:
    Com. v. Bryant
    09/09/2015
    126 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 493


text:
    Com. v. Burak
    09/11/2015
    154 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d460


text:
    Com. v. Dates
    09/09/2015
    430 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 441


text:
    Com. v. Depaula
    09/09/2015
    217 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1057


text:
    Com. v. Garfield
    08/24/2015
    284 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1061


text:
    Com. v. Hanson
    09/01/2015
    322 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1135


text:
    Com. v. Harvey
    08/17/2015
    130 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1051


text:
    Com. v. Havelt
    08/17/2015
    214 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 384


text:
    Com. v. Lewis
    08/17/2015
    149 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 687


text:
    Com. v. McAllister
    09/09/2015
    409 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1143


text:
    Com. v. Millender
    09/09/2015
    170 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1121


text:
    Com. v. Montes
    07/27/2015
    183, 184 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 375


text:
    Com. v. Ojeda
    09/09/2015
    376 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1143


text:
    Com. v. Oum
    08/17/2015
    105 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 458


text:
    Com. v. Parker
    09/09/2015
    282 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1136


text:
    Com. v. Reyes-Rodriguez
    09/01/2015
    246 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 111 A.3d 775


text:
    Com. v. Roll
    08/17/2015
    115 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 380


text:
    Com. v. Rush
    09/09/2015
    203 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1142


text:
    Com. v. Smith
    09/09/2015
    362 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1132


text:
    Com. v. Thomas
    09/09/2015
    348 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1123


text:
    Com. v. Wilson
    08/17/2015
    117 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 382


text:
    Com. v. Wormley
    09/09/2015
    227 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1061


text:
    Fox Subacute at Clara Burke v. Schneller

    08/04/2015
    254 MAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied September 8, 2015.

   Denied

Pa.Super., 106 A.3d 161


text:
    G.C., In re; Bedford County Children and Youth Services, In re; T.C., In re; C.C., In re
    08/18/2015
    210-212, 215, 262 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1145


text:
    Gunter v. Koons
    08/17/2015
    179 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 374


text:
    J.A., In re
    09/01/2015
    233 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 392


text:
    M.L. v. S.G.
    08/17/2015
    510 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1137


text:
    M.R.D. v. L.R.D.
    07/24/2015
    449 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 443


text:
    Parr v. Ford Motor Co.

    05/27/2015
    46 EAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied July 22,2015.

   Denied

Pa.Super., 109 A.3d 682


text:
    S.L.K., In re; H.C., In re
    07/24/2015
    368 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 440


text:
    Com. v. Real Property and Improvements Known as 4231 N. Reese Street Philadelphia, PA 19140; Soto, In re (4231 N. Reese Street.)
    09/09/2015
    211 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 111 A.3d 817


text:
    Fry, In re; Com., In re
    09/09/2015
    256 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth,, 110 A.3d 1103


text:
    Heckman v. Sanchez
    09/09/2015
    267 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 111 A.3d 816


text:
    SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    124 A.3d 308-310
    A.R.D., In re Adoption of; J.C., In re
    09/21/2015
    328 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 444


text:
    Barone v. Barone
    09/23/2015
    342 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1062


text:
    Brinkley v. Travelers Personal Ins.
    09/14/2015
    247 EAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 3111 EDA 2014


text:
    BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Immesberger
    09/21/2015
    287 EAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 733 EDA 2015


text:
    Coleman v. Sci-Albion
    09/21/2015
    235 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1144


text:
    Com. v. Alvarado
    09/14/2015
    244 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1120


text:
    Com. v. Barney
    09/23/2015
    374 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1064


text:
    Com. v. Battle
    09/23/2015
    693 MAL (2014)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 106 A.3d 168


text:
    Com. v. Brooks
    09/21/2015
    192 EAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 3268 EDA 2013


text:
    Com. v. Brown
    09/21/2015
    286 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 375


text:
    Com. v. Carder
    09/15/2015
    191, 192 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 435


text:
    Com. v. Cartagena
    09/15/2015
    203 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1057


text:
    Com. v. Cheeseboro
    09/21/2015
    404 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1125


text:
    Com. v. Cox
    09/23/2015
    208 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 115 A,3d 333


text:
    Com. v. Gesslein
    09/23/2015
    20 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 680


text:
    Com. v. Gist
    09/14/2015
    267 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1132


text:
    Com. v. Greenidge
    09/23/2015
    247 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 454


text:
    Com. v. Hogan
    09/15/2015
    270 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1128


text:
    Com. v. Hughston
    09/14/2015
    463 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 447


text:
    Com. v. Jiminez
    09/14/2015
    209 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 685


text:
    Com. v. Johnson
    09/21/2015
    255 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1123


text:
    Com. v. Kerins
    09/23/2015
    404 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1140


text:
    Com. v. King
    09/21/2015
    164 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 389


text:
    Com. v. Lellock
    09/18/2015
    172 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1139


text:
    Com. v. Mickel
    09/21/2015
    360 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1044


text:
    Com. v. Mullin
    09/23/2015
    469 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1066


text:
    Com. v. Palmero
    09/21/2015
    197 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1119


text:
    Com. v. Perel
    09/16/2015
    30 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 107 A.3d 185


text:
    Com. v. Piazza
    09/18/2015
    253 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1042


text:
    Com. v. Piner
    09/23/2015
    92 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 374


text:
    Com. v. Radecki
    09/18/2015
    132 WAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 121 WDM 2014


text:
    Com. v. Rivera-Montanez
    09/21/2015
    385 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1138


text:
    Com. v. Roberts
    09/15/2015
    383 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1135


text:
    Com. v. Taulton
    09/23/2015
    180 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1048


text:
    Com. v. Valentine
    09/23/2015
    800 MAL (2014)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 101 A.3d 801


text:
    Com. v. Vantassel
    09/21/2015
    238 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 442


text:
    Guenther v. Zaucha Family Ltd. Partners
    09/21/2015
    159 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1118


text:
    Joy v. The Cutler Group
    09/23/2015
    334 MAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 3372 EDA 2014


text:
    O’Brien v. Great Lakes Oncology Hematology, Inc.
    09/15/2015
    156 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 454


text:
    Peters v. National Interstate Ins. Co., Inc.
    09/16/2015
    157 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 108 A.3d 38


text:
    Travaline v. Travaline
    09/23/2015
    476 MAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 1111 EDA 2015


text:
    V.L.D.H., In re; A.R., In re
    09/15/2015
    454 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1143


text:
    City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1
    09/14/2015
    135 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 111 A.3d 794


text:
    Com. v. Halstead
    09/14/2015
    381 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 109 A.3d 372


text:
    Cook v. Pennsylvania, Dept. of Corrections
    09/14/2015
    354 MAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 2388 CD 2014


text:
    Hitner v. Office of Open Records and Bucks County Clerk of Courts

    09/21/2015
    435 MAL (2015)

      . Reargument En Banc Denied October 20, 2015.

   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 112 A.3d 701


text:
    Lichtman v. Castille
    09/14/2015
    363 EAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 64 CD 2015


text:
    Salvatore v. Dallastown Area School Dist.
    09/14/2015
    201 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 109 A.3d 372


text:
    Wortham v. Office of Administrative Review/Tax
    09/21/2015
    186 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 109 A.3d 372


text:
    SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    125 A.3d 775-779
    Angino & Rovner, PC v. Santander Bank, N.A.
    08/25/2015
    274 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d457


text:
    Atlantic Community Bankers Bank, Inc. v. Daniels
    08/25/2015
    295 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1058


text:
    Atlantic Nat. Trust Ltd. Liability Co. v. Ruddy
    08/19/2015
    242, 243 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1042


text:
    Bair v. Manor Care of Elizabethtown, PA, LLC
    08/21/2015
    118 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 108 A.3d 94


text:
    Com. v. Anderson
    08/31/2015
    131 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 385


text:
    Com. v. Anthony
    08/25/2015
    243 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1066


text:
    Com. v. Bidelman
    08/31/2015
    185 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1133


text:
    Com. v. Blenman
    08/26/2015
    189 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 386


text:
    Com. v. Brown
    08/31/2015
    134 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1060


text:
    Com. v. Brunner
    08/31/2015
    49 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 459


text:
    Com. v. Bucher
    09/23/2015
    408 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1045


text:
    Com. v. Collins
    08/28/2015
    156 EAL (2012)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 47 A.3d 1245


text:
    Com. v. Concordia
    08/26/2015
    604 MAL (2014)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 97 A.3d 366


text:
    Com. v. Cruz
    08/26/2015
    249 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1047


text:
    Com. v. Easton
    08/21/2015
    239 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1047


text:
    Com. v. Edgefield
    08/25/2015
    172 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 75 A.3d 541


text:
    Com. v. Eiland
    09/23/2015
    128 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d448


text:
    Com. v. Ellison
    08/26/2015
    189 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1053


text:
    Com. v. Footman
    09/23/2015
    221 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1063


text:
    Com. v. Glodzik
    08/31/2015
    335 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1118


text:
    Com. v. Graham
    08/25/2015
    276 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1124


text:
    Com. v. Hann; Weachter, In re
    08/31/2015
    248 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 111 A.3d 757


text:
    Com. v. Hart-Jones
    08/21/2015
    147 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 387


text:
    Com. v. Horn
    08/28/2015
    388 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super,, 120 A.3d 374


text:
    Com. v. Irvin
    08/21/2015
    190 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1051


text:
    Com. v. Johnson
    08/31/2015
    79 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 685


text:
    Com. v. Jones
    08/25/2015
    198 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1062


text:
    Com. v. Kerstetter
    08/31/2015
    101 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d443


text:
    Com. v. LaTorre
    08/25/2015
    232 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1136


text:
    Com. v. Maxwell
    08/31/2015
    65 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 26 A.3d 1194


text:
    Com. v. McKenzie
    08/31/2015
    52 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 442


text:
    Com. v. Mikelonis
    08/25/2015
    121 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 388


text:
    Com. v. Mohylsky
    08/19/2015
    382 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1058


text:
    Com. v. Morrison
    08/28/2015
    380 MAL (2014)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 104 A.3d 36


text:
    Com. v. Moses
    08/31/2015
    252 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1060


text:
    Com. v. Murdock
    08/31/2015
    369 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1133


text:
    Com. v. Noll
    09/23/2015
    332 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1064


text:
    Com. v. Paolino
    08/31/2015
    390 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 381


text:
    Com. v. Pennington
    09/23/2015
    58 MAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 2799 EDA 2013


text:
    Com. v. Printup
    08/31/2015
    432 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 442


text:
    Com. v. Rodgers
    08/19/2015
    309 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1124


text:
    Com. v. Ruedas; Com. v. Durham; Com. v. Beniguez; Com. v. Mateo; Com. v. Brown; Com. v. Falu; Com. v. Michenselder; Com. v. Hill; Com. v. Gorham; Com. v. Chireno; Com. v. Watts; Com. v. Moll; Com. v. Marques; Com. v. Hopkins; Com. v. Merrero; Com. v. Gonzalez; Com. v. Harrison; Com. v. Johnson; Com. v. Hall; Com. v. Calix; Com. v. Hector; Com. v. Hall; Com. v. Moore; Com. v. Clarke; Com. v. Malave; Com. v. Camacho; Com. v. Gonzalez; Com. v. Johnson; Com. v. Rodrigues; Com. v. Tamm; Com. v. Farrell; Com. v. Withrow; Com. v. Lopez; Com. v. Rodriguez; Com. v. Hayes; Com. v. Buckner; Com. v. Baez; Com. v. Dean; Com. v. Johnson; Com. v. Stewart; Com. v. Vargas; Com. v. Haynes; Com. v. Fernandez; Com. v. Serrano; Com. v. Aponte; Com. v. Rivera; Com. v. Acosta; Com. v. Anaya; Com. v. Brown; Com. v. Franks; Com. v. Devalle
    09/15/2015
    297-347 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 436; 122 A.3d 437; 122 A.3d 438; 122 A.3d 439


text:
    Com. v. Sanchez
    08/31/2015
    271 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1060


text:
    Com. v. Smith
    08/26/2015
    182 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1046


text:
    Com. v. Stewart
    08/19/2015
    298 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1123


text:
    Com. v. Van-Arsdale
    09/23/2015
    144 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d459


text:
    Com. v. Vaughn
    09/23/2015
    293 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1052


text:
    Com. v. Walker
    09/23/2015
    260 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 110 A.3d 1000


text:
    Com. v. Weipert; Com. v. Stewart; Com. v. Minnich; Com. v. Groff
    08/19/2015
    300-303 MAL 2015
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1059; 120 A.3d 1060


text:
    Com. v. Whitby
    08/19/2015
    290 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1058


text:
    E.M.S., In re Adoption of; E.D.E., In re; D.J.S., In re Adoption of
    08/26/2015
    245, 246 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 456


text:
    Hervert v. Hervert
    08/31/2015
    42 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d439


text:
    J.D., In re; J.J.B., In re
    08/19/2015
    480 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1120


text:
    Krepps v. Snyder
    08/31/2015
    314 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 112 A.3d 1246


text:
    M.W. v. D.S.G.; D.S.G., In re
    08/26/2015
    437 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 440


text:
    Navarra, In re Estate of
    08/25/2015
    167 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 113 A.3d 829


text:
    Pittman v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections
    08/31/2015
    368 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d442


text:
    S.A.S., Jr., In re; S.S., Sr., In re
    08/26/2015
    259 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1121


text:
    Santander Bank, N.A. v. King Drive Corp.
    08/25/2015
    259 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1143


text:
    Tecce v. Hally
    08/21/2015
    154 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super,, 106 A.3d 728


text:
    Village of Four Seasons Ass’n, Inc. v. Elk Mountain Ski Resort, Inc.
    08/31/2015
    80 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 103 A.3d 814


text:
    Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Frankel; Frankel, In re
    08/25/2015
    220 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 392


text:
    Council Rock School Dist., In re; LMC Properties, Inc., In re
    08/26/2015
    213 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 108 A.3d 201


text:
    Department of Environmental Protection v. Hatfield Tp. Mun. Authority; Chalfont-New Britain Tp. Joint Sewage Authority v. Com.; Dept. of Environmental Protection, In re; Landsdale v. Department of Environmental Protection
    08/31/2015
    69-72 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 105 A.3d 856


text:
    Dorsey v. Public Utility Com’n
    08/31/2015
    219 EAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Fayette Resources, Inc. v. Fayette County Bd. of Assessment Appeals
    08/31/2015
    31 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 107 A.3d 839


text:
    Gay v. Kinsley
    08/31/2015
    168 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., Ill A.3d 816


text:
    Interforest Corp. v. W.C.A.B. (Phillips)
    08/21/2015
    173 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Lichtman v. Glazer; Lichtman v. Vignola; Lichtman v. Williams
    09/23/2015
    366, 369, 370 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 111 A.3d 1225


text:
    Noble v. W.C.A.B. (Wimex Beauty Supply)
    08/25/2015
    152 EAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Noerr's Garage, Inc. v. Com., Dept. of Transp.
    08/31/2015
    277 MAL (2015)
   Denied

No. 2250 CD 2014


text:
    Scott v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review; Lifesteps, Inc., In re
    08/21/2015
    22 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Cmwlth., 105 A.3d 839


text:
    Sheils v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Educ.
    08/31/2015
    251 EAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Wallace v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole
    08/31/2015
    421 MAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    125 A.3d 1197-1204
    Abeln v. Eidelman
    10/07/2015
    325, 326 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 452


text:
    Bin Kang v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania
    10/14/2015
    391, 393, 394 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Nos. 96, 3371, 95 EDA 2015


text:
    C.R., In re Interest of
    10/14/2015
    352 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 113 A.3d 328


text:
    Com. v. Adams
    09/28/2015
    119 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 382


text:
    Com. v. Alexander
    10/14/2015
    250 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1122


text:
    Com. v. All
    10/14/2015
    263 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1140


text:
    Com. v. Alvarado-Lenhart
    10/14/2015
    172 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 113 A.3d 355


text:
    Com. v. Alvarez
    10/07/2015
    257 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1126


text:
    Com. v. Anderson
    11/04/2015
    268 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 125 A.3d 442


text:
    Com. v. Barnhart
    10/07/2015
    146 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1057


text:
    Com. v. Berrioz

    10/14/2015
    390 EAL (2015)

      . Reconsideration Denied November 16, 2015.

   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1136


text:
    Com. v. Bess
    09/30/2015
    375 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 455


text:
    Com. v. Bidwell
    09/29/2015
    245 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1047


text:
    Com. v. Bieros
    10/14/2015
    278 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1134


text:
    Com. v. Bowman
    09/29/2015
    350 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1118


text:
    Com. v. Bowra
    11/02/2015
    150 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 391


text:
    Com. v. Boynton
    10/14/2015
    584 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 457


text:
    Com. v. Brimage
    11/04/2015
    289 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1140


text:
    Com. v. Brown

    09/30/2015
    182 WAL (2015)

        . Reconsideration Denied November 17, 2015.

   Denied

Pa.Super., 111 A.3d 171


text:
    Com. v. Burks
    11/10/2015
    250 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1144


text:
    Com. v. Burnett
    10/07/2015
    235 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1063


text:
    Com. v. Burton
    09/28/2015
    163-167 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 375


text:
    Com. v. Carbone
    11/04/2015
    162 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 689


text:
    Com. v. Carter
    11/10/2015
    362 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 450


text:
    Com. v. Caterino
    11/04/2015
    253 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1126


text:
    Com. v. Cuadra
    10/07/2015
    451 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 443


text:
    Com. v. Davilla
    09/29/2015
    240 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super,, 121 A.3d 1131


text:
    Com. v. Devore
    10/14/2015
    264 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1125


text:
    Com. v. Dingle
    09/29/2015
    176 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1043


text:
    Com. v. Eakin
    11/10/2015
    237 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1053


text:
    Com. v. Ebersole
    10/14/2015
    384 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 441


text:
    Com. v. Edwards
    10/07/2015
    281 EAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Com. v. Engram
    10/14/2015
    204 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1144


text:
    Com. v. Finch
    09/28/2015
    141 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 684


text:
    Com. v. Foster
    11/04/2015
    260 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1126


text:
    Com. v. Fullman
    10/14/2015
    416 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 455


text:
    Com. v. Gibson
    10/14/2015
    200 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1144


text:
    Com. v. Glass
    10/14/2015
    107 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 458


text:
    Com. v. Gonzalez
    09/29/2015
    270 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 109 A.3d 711


text:
    Com. v. Greene
    10/07/2015
    265 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1058


text:
    Com. v. Hann
    09/29/2015
    373 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1135


text:
    Com. v. Haynes
    10/14/2015
    195 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super,, 116 A.3d 640


text:
    Com. v. Henderson
    11/04/2015
    129 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 699


text:
    Com. v. Henry
    09/29/2015
    254 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1124


text:
    Com. v. Hernandez
    10/07/2015
    204, 205 EAL (2015)
   Denied


text:
    Com. v. Hill
    11/10/2015
    353 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super,, 122 A.3d 457


text:
    Com. v. Hippensteel
    10/07/2015
    462 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 455


text:
    Com. v. Hollamon
    09/30/2015
    130 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1053


text:
    Com. v. Hollingshead
    10/14/2015
    101 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa,Super,, 111 A.3d 186


text:
    Com. v. Holloway
    09/30/2015
    287 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1061


text:
    Com. v. Holmes
    11/03/2015
    450 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1138


text:
    Com. v. Horan
    10/07/2015
    436 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super,, 122 A.3d 445


text:
    Com. v. Howard
    11/10/2015
    464 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 435


text:
    Com. v. Isler
    11/04/2015
    242 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1123


text:
    Com. v. Jackson
    10/07/2015
    411 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 460


text:
    Com. v. Jackson
    10/14/2015
    288 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 111 A.3d 1187


text:
    Com. v. Jackson
    11/10/2015
    357 EAL (2015)

   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 446


text:
    Com. v. James
    10/01/2015
    274 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1132


text:
    Com. v. Johnson
    09/29/2015
    258 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1048


text:
    Com. v. Johnson
    11/03/2015
    405 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1133


text:
    Com. v. Jones
    10/07/2015
    220 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1120


text:
    Com. v. Jones
    10/14/2015
    364 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 382


text:
    Com. v. Kalkbrenner
    09/28/2015
    65 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 118 A.3d 446


text:
    Com. v. Kearns
    09/30/2015
    323 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1063


text:
    Com. v. Keeling
    09/30/2015
    392 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1051


text:
    Com. v. Kemfort
    11/04/2015
    364 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1130


text:
    Com. v. King
    09/30/2015
    399 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1062


text:
    Com. v. Kovaleski
    11/10/2015
    406 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1146


text:
    Com. v. Lawrence
    11/10/2015
    396 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 455


text:
    Com. v. Lehew
    09/29/2015
    141 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1058


text:
    Com. v. Leon
    09/29/2015
    132 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 116 A.3d 703


text:
    Com. v. Love
    10/07/2015
    307 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1062


text:
    Com. v. Lynch
    09/30/2015
    452 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 383


text:
    Com. v. Martin
    11/03/2015
    336, 337 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 1150


text:
    Com. v. McBride
    09/29/2015
    228 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1065


text:
    Com. v. McLaine
    09/30/2015
    324 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1063


text:
    Com. v. Miles
    10/14/2015
    365 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 121 A.3d 1135


text:
    Com. v. Miller
    10/14/2015
    199 WAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 440


text:
    Com. v. Mills
    11/10/2015
    382 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 458


text:
    Com. v. Montanez
    09/28/2015
    129 EAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 372


text:
    Com. v. Normand
    11/04/2015
    471 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 122 A.3d 452


text:
    Com. v. Ortiz-Diaz
    09/28/2015
    187 MAL (2015)
   Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 381