text:
    133 A.3d 733
    Mary Ann PROTZ v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (DERRY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT). Petition of Derry Area School District.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 22, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 22nd day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by petitioner, is:

Does Section 306(a.2) of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act unconstitutionally delegate the State Legislature’s lawmaking authority in violation of Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by incorporating the most recent edition of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment ?


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    133 A.3d 733
    Mary Ann PROTZ, Petitioner v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (DERRY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT), Respondents.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 22, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 22nd day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by petitioner, is:

Whether the Commonwealth Court—after properly determining that Section 306(a.2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act was unconstitutional—erred in remanding the case to the Workers’ Compensation Judge with instructions to apply the Fourth Edition of the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment when neither Section 306(a.2) nor any other section of the Act ever references the Fourth Edition and its usage was not sanctioned by the Pennsylvania Legislature.


text:
    133 A.3d 733
    W. Lowell STARLING and Nancy Starling, Respondents v. LAKE MEADE PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 23, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 23rd day of March 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by petitioner, are:

1. Whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in holding that a fee simple owner of a private road who grants an easement over that road extinguishes its fee simple ownership of the road?
2. Whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pa.R.C.P. 1035 when the court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and directed the entry of injunctive relief in favor of the respondents and did so without considering the facts of record found by the trial court, without considering the record in the light most favorable to petitioner, and where there are genuine issues of material fact precluding the entry of judgment in the respondents’ favor?
3. Whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that extrinsic evidence can vary property boundaries on a recorded subdivision plan?

Justice DONOHUE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    133 A.3d 734
    Megan L. SHINAL and Robert J. Shinal, Her Husband, Petitioners v. Steven A. TOMS, M.D., Respondent.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 23, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 23rd day of March 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, limited to the following issues raised by Petitioners, reproduced here verbatim:

1. Is the plaintiff in a civil trial entitled to a for cause strike of prospective jurors with close familial, situational or financial relationships with the defendant’s employer, whether direct or indirect, when the claimed negligence of the defendant occurred in the course and scope of the defendant’s employment?
2. Can a panel of the Superior Court create new law and require counsel in a civil trial to motion the court to allow an additional peremptory challenge each time a for cause challenge of a potential juror is denied and/or object continuously after the initial motion to strike the potential juror for cause is denied in order to preserve the issue for appeal?
3. May a court in a medical malpractice trial alleging lack of informed consent by the surgeon ignore Pennsylvania common law and the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act, 40 P.S. §§ 1303.101 et seq., and charge the jury that information received from the non-physician “qualified staff’ at the hospital can be considered in deciding whether the surgeon obtained the informed consent of the patient for surgery.

The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED with respect to Petitioner’s fourth stated issue.


text:
    133 A.3d 735
    William CURTIS, Petitioner v. Mary CANINO, Hearing Examiner, Respondent.
    No. 9 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 23, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 23rd day of March, 2016, the Petition for Review is DENIED.


text:
    133 A.3d 735
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Ernest R. WHOLAVER, Jr., Petitioner.
    No. 11 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 23, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 23rd day of March, 2016, the Application for Leave to File for Reconsideration Nunc Pro Tunc is DENIED.


text:
    133 A.3d 735
    Frank LEE, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 14 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 23, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 23rd day of March, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief, to the extent it seeks mandamus relief, are GRANTED. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is DIRECTED to adjudicate Petitioner’s pending filing within 90 days.

The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to serve this order on the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.


text:
    133 A.3d 736
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia, Denis P. Cohen, Respondents v. Donald BETHEA, Petitioner.
    No. 15 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 23, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 23rd day of March, 2016, the Application for Extraordinary Jurisdiction, the “Motion Objection to Superior Court Order[s],” and the “Motion to Adjudicate Criminal Contempt” are DENIED, and the Prothonotary is DIRECTED to strike the name of the jurist from the caption.


text:
    133 A.3d 736
    Brahim BANKS, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 16 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 23, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 23rd day of March, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus are DISMISSED. See Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282 (2010) (explaining that hybrid representation is not permitted). The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to forward the filings to counsel of record.


text:
    133 A.3d 736
    Lawrence HILL, Petitioner v. COMMON PLEAS COURT OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 12 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 23, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 23rd day of March, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of

Mandamus are GRANTED. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is DIRECTED to adjudicate Petitioner’s pending filing within 90 days.

The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to serve this order on the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.


text:
    133 A.3d 737
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Lorne Brett HOPKINS, Jr., Respondent.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 24, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 24th day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by petitioner, is:

Whether, under Pennsylvania law, a search warrant should be invalidated and the resulting evidence suppressed where an affiant truthfully and accurately recites statements made by a self-incriminating co-defendant in an affidavit of probable cause, but the falsity of the co-defendant’s statements could not be discovered prior to the issuance of the search warrant?

Justice WECHT did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    133 A.3d 737
    Cal HEIDELBERG Jr., Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 29, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of March, 2016, we VACATE the Order of the Commonwealth Court. We REMAND this case to the Commonwealth Court for further consideration in its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 763 (providing that an appeal from an order of a Commonwealth agency is directed to the Commonwealth Court’s appellate jurisdiction) and 42 Pa.C.S. § 708(c) (providing that where a complaint in the nature of mandamus is commenced against a government unit objecting to a governmental determination, where the proper mode of relief is an appeal from that determination, the court shall regard it as an appeal from that determination).


text:
    133 A.3d 738
    Daniel L. SPUCK, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 29, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of March, 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    134 A.3d 50
    In the Interest of D.C.D., a Minor. Petition of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 29, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29 day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by petitioner, is:

(1) In interpreting Juvenile Court Rules 631 and 632; does a Juvenile Court abuse its discretion when it terminates delinquency supervision of a Juvenile Sex Offender early, despite also making a contemporaneous finding that the juvenile has a need for continued supervision and treatment requiring placement at a residential treatment facility based upon the escalating violations of sexually offending other patients while in a different Residential Treatment Facility.


text:
    134 A.3d 50
    In re the Nomination Petitions of Marc GRAMMES as Candidate for State Representative in the 183rd Legislative District. Alice J. Walls, Mark A. Cuth and Adam J. Swift III, Objectors. Appeal of Marc Grammes.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted March 23, 2016.
    Decided March 29, 2016.
    Kathleen Marie Kotula, Esq., Pennsylvania Department of State, for Kathleen Kotula.
    Matthew Todd Croslis, Esq., Croslis Law Offices, LLC, Allentown, for Marc Grammes.
    Lawrence M. Otter, Esq., Harrisburg, for Alice J. Walls, Mark A. Cuth, and Adam J. Swift, III.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of March, 2016, the order of the Commonwealth Court dated March 9, 2016, granting the Petition to Set Aside Nominating Petition of Marc Grammes as Candidate for State Representative in the 183rd Legislative District is AFFIRMED.


text:
    134 A.3d 51
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Darrin Orlando MATHIS, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 30, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 30th day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by petitioner, is:

Whether, as a matter of first impression, the Superior Court erred in affirming the trial court’s decision denying [petitioner’s] motion to suppress evidence where state parole agents lacked authority and subsequently reasonable suspicion to detain [petitioner] and conduct an investigative detention in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

The parties are directed to separately address in their briefs the subsumed and alternate claims respecting (1) the authority of parole agents, and (2) whether reasonable suspicion existed to support a seizure and a subsequent weapons frisk.


text:
    134 A.3d 51
    Eugene R. YENCHI and Ruth I. Yenchi, Husband and Wife, Respondents v. AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL, INC., Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc., Riversource Life Insurance Company and Bryan Gregory Holland, Petitioners.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 30, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 30th day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, rephrased for clarity, are as follows:

(1) Whether the Superior Court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Petitioners on the grounds that Respondents had not adduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties; and
(2) Whether the Superior Court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court with respect to Petitioners’ motions in limine and granting Respondents’ request for a new trial on their fraudulent misrepresentation and Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law claims.


text:
    134 A.3d 51
    Carmon ELLIOTT, Appellant v. Ted CRUZ, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 31, 2016.
    Kathleen Marie Kotula, Esq., PA Department of State, for Kathleen Kotula.
    Einer Elhauge, Pro Se.
    Mary Brigid McManamon, Pro Se.
    Victor Williams, Pro Se.
    Roger J. Bernstein, Esq., J. David Farrell, Esq., for Car-mon Elliott.
    Robert N. Feltoon, Esq., for Ted Cruz.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 31st day of March, 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby AFFIRMED. Victor Williams’s pro se Notice to Intervene as Appellant is DENIED. Appellant’s Application for Oral Argument is DENIED.


text:
    134 A.3d 52
    In re Objection to Nomination Petitions of Jared SOLOMON to be a Candidate Democratic Party Nomination for Office Member of those of Representatives for 202nd District. Appeal of Mark Cohen.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted March 24, 2016.
    Decided April 5, 2016.
    Kathleen Marie Kotula, Esq., PA Department of State, for Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation.
    City Commissioners of Philadelphia, Pro Se.
    Robert E. Paul, Esq., Paul, Reich <& Myers, P.C., Philadelphia, for Mark Cohen.
    Kevin Michael Greenberg, Esq., Flaster Greenberg, P.C., Philadelphia, for Jared Solomon.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 6th day of April, 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby affirmed in part and vacated in part. The portion of the order denying the Petition to Set Aside the Nomination Petition of Jared Solomon is affirmed. The portion of the order imposing costs against Mark Cohen is vacated and remanded. See In re Nomination Petition of Farnese, 609 Pa. 543, 17 A.3d 357 (2011). On remand, we direct that the Commonwealth Court’s final order assessing costs shall reference costs by category and the amounts assessed, and shall include a rationale for the imposition of such costs.


text:
    134 A.3d 446
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Shawn Lamar BURTON, Respondent.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 6, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 6th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue is:

Does Superior Court’s published en banc decision contravene established precedent in concluding a hearing was necessary to determine whether [Respondent acted with due diligence in invoking the after-discovered facts exception to [the] time bar by (1) creating an exception for pro se petitioners to the long-standing rule presuming that publicly available information cannot be deemed unknown for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(h) where a petition has been filed beyond 60 days of the date the information entered the public domain, and by (2) shifting the burden of pleading and proof to the Commonwealth under such circumstances?

Justice DONOHUE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    134 A.3d 446
    James PARKER, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 25 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 6, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 6th day of April, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    134 A.3d 446
    Raheem BROWN, Petitioner v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ex rel., Respondents.
    No. 23 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 6, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 6th day of April, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Application for an Immediate Hearing are DENIED.


text:
    134 A.3d 447
    Florence MASON, Petitioner v. Hon. Giovanni CAMPBELL, J.C.P., Christopher Boltinghouse, R. Seth Williams, Respondents.
    No. 19 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 6, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 6th day of April, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Complaint/Petition in Mandamus is DENIED.


text:
    134 A.3d 447
    Leon LEWIS, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 27 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 6, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 6th day of April, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief, to the extent it seeks a writ of mandamus compelling adjudication of Petitioner’s pending PCRA petition, are GRANTED. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is DIRECTED to adjudicate Petitioner’s pending filing within 90 days.

The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to serve this order on the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.


text:
    134 A.3d 447
    Trust Under Agreement of Edward Winslow TAYLOR. Petition of Elise W. Carr, Edward W. Carr, Ian N. Carr, Richard R. Carr, Caroline T. Carr, W. Sewell Wallace, Suzanne T. Wallace, Jennifer A. Wallace-Collins, Evan S. Wallace, Christopher G. Wallace, Samuel H. Wallace, Hope T. Wallace & Anthony T. Wallace.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 12, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 12th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue presented by petitioner and rephrased for clarity is whether the Superior Court erred in holding that trust beneficiaries may circumvent the requirements for removal of a trustee in Section 7766 of the Trust Act, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7766, by amending the trust under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7740.1.


text:
    134 A.3d 448
    The BELGRAVIA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION v. 1811 BELGRAVIA ASSOCIATES. Petition of O'Donnell & Naccarato, Inc.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 12, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 12th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal and Application to Correct/Modify the Record are DENIED.


author: Justice CHRISTINE DONOHUE.

text:
    134 A.3d 448
    Anthony TORTORICE, v. John FINCH, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 12, 2016.
   ORDER

Justice CHRISTINE DONOHUE.

AND NOW, this 12th day of April, 2016, Petitioner’s Emergency Petition for Review is denied as MOOT.


text:
    134 A.3d 448
    Gary H. POWELL v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, Joe Krentzman & Sons, Inc., Intervenor. Petition of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 13, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 13th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue as stated by petitioner is:

Should a Commonwealth agency be required to allow a suspended attorney to represent a party in its hearings and proceedings?

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel’s Application for Leave to File as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED. Andrew J. Ostrowski’s Application to Intervene is DENIED.


author: Justice WECHT.

text:
    134 A.3d 1027
    OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner v. Brian J. PRESKI, Respondent.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 9, 2015.
    Resubmitted Jan. 20, 2016.
    Decided March 29, 2016.

      Ms. Elaine Bixler, Pro Se.
    Paul J. Killion, Esq., Harrisburg, Amelia C. Kittredge, Esq., Disciplinary Board of Supreme Court of PA, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
    G. Alexander Bochetto, Esq., Thomas E. Groshens, Esq., Bochetto & Lentz, P.C., for Brian J. Preski.
    SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice WECHT.

This matter comes to us following the issuance of a Report and Recommendation by the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (“Board”). From 2000 to 2007, Brian J. Preski served as the Chief of Staff to State Representative John Perzel, the Majority Leader (and later the Speaker) of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. During his tenure as a public servant, Preski conspired to misappropriate millions of dollars in public resources for his own personal and political gain. In its report, the Board detailed its factual findings and recommended that Preski be disbarred. Because the evidentiary record abundantly supports the Board’s findings and recommendation, we disbar Preski from the practice of law in this Commonwealth.

For six years, in his capacity as a state official and in collusion with Perzel and others, Preski used state employees and public funds to develop sophisticated data collection and processing software for partisan political campaigns. That conspiracy, which the media dubbed “computergate,” had three discrete components. First, Preski and his cohorts misused public employees and resources to advance campaign efforts. Second, they used taxpayer funds to purchase campaign-related software, data, and services from outside technology vendors. Third, Prestó and Perzel formed two consulting companies in an effort to profit personally from those taxpayer-financed technologies.

The conspiracy began in November 2000 when Perzel very narrowly won his bid for re-election. The slight victory prompted Perzel to explore emerging technologies that could improve his future campaigns. After the election, Perzel and Prestó commissioned state employees from the Republican Information and Technology Office (“RIT”) to develop a “Blue Card” system, a massive electronic database of voter demographics and attitudes obtained from door-to-door interviews. The system would group voters with similar preferences and predict how a particular citizen would cast his or her vote, if at all. Armed with this information, Perzel’s campaign could target its messaging to specific voters and could ensure that key constituencies got to the polls on Election Day. For Perzel, having such a system in place for the 2002 election became a top priority.

Prestó and his co-conspirators held meetings regarding the development of Blue Card during the workday at the Capitol in Harrisburg. The RIT dedicated significant employee hours, resources, and equipment to the creation of the database, all at taxpayers’ expense. Indeed, this work became so commonplace that the assignments largely went unquestioned by RIT staff. The RIT was able to create a somewhat rudimentary application that served as proof of the Blue Card concept.

In addition to squandering equipment and the time and efforts of public servants, Prestó and his colleagues also paid outside technology vendors directly from the public till. When Perzel sought to improve Blue Card by developing a backend “enterprise database” to aggregate and store data from multi-pie sources, he put Preski and Bill Tomaselli, another House employee and trusted political operative, in charge of the project. On January 1, 2002, Preski signed a $2,000,000 contract with GCR, Inc. (“GCR”), a Louisiana-based technology company, to develop the new database. Although that contract, by its terms, purported to be for legislative “reapportionment assistance,” GCR’s actual task was to create a system that would help Perzel and his colleagues win elections and retain their party’s majority in the House. GCR exclusively received public funds in satisfaction of the January 1, 2002 contract.

After GCR completed the system, Preski signed subsequent high dollar contracts for GCR’s ongoing services. For instance, GCR developed a campaign tool for the House Republican Caucus knows as The Edge in the months leading up to the 2002 election. That application, financed entirely by the Commonwealth’s taxpayers, allowed users to generate a list of voters who fit certain criteria, and then predicted which of them would vote in the general election. Preski, who served as the manager of Perzel’s 2002 re-election campaign, personally had access to The Edge. In October 2002, Preski forwarded a new GCR contract to the House Billing Clerk, and directed that GCR’s monthly invoices, each in the amount of $200,000, be paid with funds from the RIT’s “computer budget.”

Although still a work-in-progress, Blue Card was operational during the 2002 election. Perzel won his bid for re-election, and he considered Blue Card to be a success. Over the next several years, Preski oversaw a seemingly endless series of improvements to Blue Card along with the development of related software. For example, Perzel and Preski retained Aristotle International, Inc. (“Aristotle”) to add new features and improvements to Blue Card. Preski and Perzel reviewed and approved every contract that the House Republican Caucus entered into with Aristotle. From 2003 to 2008, Aristotle received $6,200,000 in public funds, most of which was for campaign-related services. In 2004, Preski also personally approved a $50,000 payment to yet another vendor, Weiss Micromarketing Group (“Weiss”), which specializes in “segment data,” ie., the classification of voters into “lifestyles” in order to better target direct mail, persuade undecided voters, and predict election results.

Perzel, Preski, and Tomaselli formed a political consulting company called Greystone in an effort to profit personally from the publicly funded technology and expertise that they had developed in conjunction with GCR. On the morning after the 2002 election, Tomaselli sent an email to Preski expressing his desire to continue working on Blue Card. Preski responded: “Consider it done. We need you to do it, Billy, because we proved [the] Greystone concept in multiple districts last night, and I’m sure you’re aware it will make us millionaires.” Disciplinary Hearing Transcript (“D.H.T.”), 2/27/2014, at 218.

A few months later, Perzel sent Tomaselli to serve as the field coordinator for Sam Katz’ Philadelphia mayoral campaign, where Tomaselli would review and approve consulting contracts for the campaign. GCR and Greystone submitted to the Katz campaign a joint proposal for campaign consulting services totaling $2,208,846. When Tomaselli told the president of GCR that he did not want to approve the proposal, Preski met with Tomaselli and pressured him, albeit cryptically, to approve the bid, reminding him that “sometimes you got to do some things you don’t want to do, ... friends are friends.” Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board, 4/20/2015, at 11. GCR’s president then called Tomasel-li and told him that he had been given his “marching orders” and would need to approve the GCR/Greystone proposal. Tomaselli ignored this directive.

In July 2010, following a grand jury investigation, the Pennsylvania Attorney General charged Preski with twelve counts each of theft by unlawful taking or disposition, theft of services, theft by deception, theft by failure to make required disposition of funds received, criminal conspiracy, and conflict of interest. Preski proceeded to a jury trial, which commenced on September 28, 2011. On October 5, 2011, the fourth day of his trial, Preski pleaded guilty to three counts of conflict of interest, two counts of theft of services, and five counts of criminal conspiracy. The trial court sentenced Preski to twenty-four to forty-eight months’ imprisonment and imposed a consecutive five-year term of probation, a $37,600 fine, and $1,000,000 in restitution.

Following Preski’s guilty plea and sentencing, this Court entered an order placing Preski on temporary suspension pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 214(f)(1), and referring the matter to the Board for further proceedings. A Hearing Committee assigned by the Board held disciplinary hearings on January 30, 2014, February 27, 2014, and March 13, 2014. At those hearings, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) entered into evidence Preski’s indictment, the testimony from his criminal trial, and numerous news articles discussing Preski’s conduct, trial, and conviction. Preski presented eight character witnesses, numerous character reference letters, his sentencing memorandum, his resume, and his personal calendars from the years that his criminal activity occurred. Preski also testified on his own behalf.

The Hearing Committee concluded that Preski violated Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(b), which states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. The committee also concluded that Preski was subject to discipline pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement 203(b)(1), which provides that a criminal conviction shall be grounds for discipline.

The committee found nine aggravating factors and two mitigating factors in this case. The nine aggravating circumstances that the Hearing Committee noted were that Preski acted in concert with Perzel to plan, direct, and control a “corrupt swindle of the taxpayers”; Preski directed staff members under his supervision to participate in the conspiracy; Preski attempted to use the technology that he purchased with stolen taxpayer funds for his own personal pecuniary gain; Preski held a highly visible position of public trust; Preski failed to take full responsibility for his crimes; Preski’s attempts to convince the Hearing Committee that Perzel forced and/or bullied him into committing the crimes were incredible; Preski brought disrepute upon the bar; Preski failed to withdraw from the conspiracy; and Preski did not take responsibility for the fact that he was a leader and instigator of the conspiracy. The two mitigating circumstances that the Hearing Committee considered were Preski’s lack of disciplinary history and his significant contributions to the House of Representatives, and to the people of Pennsylvania, throughout his career.

Emphasizing the magnitude, duration, and cost of Preski’s crimes, the Hearing Committee characterized this matter as “one of the most serious political corruption cases in our disciplinary jurisprudence,” and recommended that Preski be disbarred. Hearing Committee Report, 7/25/2014, at 34. Pre-ski then filed a brief on exceptions and requested oral argument before the Board. Following argument, the Board recommended that Preski be disbarred, noting that the facts of this case were strikingly similar to those in ODC v. Foreman, 1543 DD 3 (Pa.2014) (disbarring an attorney and former legislative aide who participated in a scheme to use public employees and funds for partisan political purposes). Preski, believing that these circumstances do not warrant disbarment, filed a petition for review with this Court. This matter is now ripe for final disposition.

“In attorney discipline matters we exercise de novo review, and we are not bound by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee or the Board, though we give them substantial deference.” ODC v. Chung, 548 Pa. 108, 695 A.2d 405, 407 (1997). The ODC bears the burden of establishing attorney misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. ODC v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1236 (2012). Because discipline is imposed on a case-by-case basis, we must consider the totality of facts presented, including any aggravating or mitigating factors. Id. at 1238. Despite the fact-intensive nature of this endeavor, we strive for consistency so that similar misconduct “is not punished in radically different ways.” ODC v. Lucarini, 504 Pa. 271, 472 A.2d 186, 190 (1983).

It is well established that a criminal conviction itself is a basis for discipline. See Pa.R.D.E. 203(b)(1) (grounds for discipline); ODC v. Costigan, 526 Pa. 16, 584 A.2d 296, 300 (1990). Thus, the issue in this case is not whether discipline is warranted, but whether we should impose disbarment, a sanction that is reserved for only the most egregious ethical violations, as the Board recommends. ODC v. Jackson, 536 Pa. 26, 637 A.2d 615, 619 (1994). In determining the appropriate measure of discipline, we remain cognizant that disciplinary sanctions are not designed for their punitive effects, but rather are intended to protect the public from unfit attorneys and to maintain the integrity of the legal system. ODC v. Christie, 536 Pa. 394, 639 A.2d 782, 785 (1994).

We agree with the ODC that the pertinent facts of this case are nearly identical to those in Foreman, where we ordered disbarment rather than imposing a five-year suspension. In that case, Foreman was the Chief of Staff to the Minority Whip of the House Democratic Caucus. Foreman supervised numerous public employees and had the power to allocate public funds, employees, and resources. Foreman’s scheme, which the media labeled “bonusgate,” involved the use of Commonwealth resources for partisan political purposes. Much like Preski, Foreman “was a central participant in a concerted pattern of illegal conduct in which taxpayer dollars, equipment and other resources were misdirected to campaign efforts.” Foreman, No. 164 DB 2009 at 10.

The Board in Foreman found six mitigating factors. Notwithstanding Foreman’s central role in the bonusgate conspiracy, he assisted the Commonwealth in its investigation and prosecution. After pleading guilty to multiple felonies, Foreman testified against his former colleagues. Foreman also expressed sincere remorse for his crimes, took full responsibility for his actions, had no prior record of discipline, devoted significant time to volunteer activities, and presented evidence of his good character. Nevertheless, the Board recommended that Foreman be disbarred, concluding that this mitigating evidence could not overcome Foreman’s fundamentally dishonest conduct, which illustrated a lack of integrity. We accepted the Board’s recommendation and entered an order disbarring Foreman.

Instantly, the Board was guided by our order in Foreman, noting that the cases factually are similar, but that the mitigating evidence presented in Foreman was far more compelling than the mitigating circumstances present in this case. The Board also considered the fact that, unlike Foreman, Preski failed to take full responsibility for his criminal conduct. According to the Board, Preski attempted to minimize his substantial role in the computergate conspiracy by suggesting that he was merely an inattentive supervisor. Specifically, Preski testified throughout the hearing that he was “willfully blind” and “not the watchdog [he] should have been.” D.H.T., 2/27/2014, 50, 85. He also testified that he “turned a blind eye” and “didn’t do anything to stop” his staff from misusing public resources. Id. at 84, 85, 165. Citing this testimony, the Board concluded that Preski “has not accepted responsibility for his misconduct and has not demonstrated recognition of the gravity of his acts.” Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board at 29.

Preski argues that Foreman is inapposite because the evi-dentiary record does not support the Board’s conclusion that Preski failed to accept responsibility for his convictions. He directs us to portions of the disciplinary hearing transcript where he conceded that he was “part and parcel” of the computergate conspiracy and took responsibility for his misconduct. Id. at 145-146, 196. Notwithstanding these passing declarations, the hearing transcript reveals that Preski repeatedly understated the breadth of that misconduct. See, e.g., id. at 83-84 (“I failed to do my job, to follow up with what was going on [in the RIT], and the best that I can say is that I knew that the people down there were at times doing campaign work.”); 85 (stating that he “turned a blind eye,” “became willfully blind,” and “did nothing to stop” the misuse of public resources); 87 (“I was given a great job as a supervisor of a lot of people, and I relied on them to do their jobs and to do it properly.”); 89 (“I never checked to make sure that [Aristotle was] getting paid from the campaign to create those programs.”); 91 (“It was my job to supervise Tomaselli as he went forward with the [Weiss] project. I failed.”).

Preski also misrepresented his role in Greystone. He testified that Greystone was only a vehicle for his wife to serve as a paid campaign consultant, and characterized it as “her thing.” Id. at 64. This was incorrect. In his criminal case, Preski pleaded guilty to, inter alia, “attempting to use [] public resources for specific personal pecuniary gain in setting up a corporation called Greystone and attempting to profit from public resources through that corporation.” Guilty Plea Transcript, 10/5/2011, 10. Preski predicted that Greystone would make him and Tomaselli “millionaires.” He also pressured Tomaselli, in his capacity as field coordinator for the Katz mayoral campaign, to approve a seven-figure proposal that included Greystone’s services.

Preski’s attempt to distinguish this case from Foreman by challenging the Board’s finding that he failed to accept responsibility for his convictions is unpersuasive. The record before us plainly illustrates Preski’s lack of candor before the hearing committee. Moreover, even if Preski had accepted complete responsibility for his crimes, disbarment still would be warranted. See Foreman, supra (disbarring attorney despite his expression of “sincere remorse” and his acceptance of responsibility for his crimes).

Finally, Preski disputes the Board’s determination that his misconduct caused disrepute to the bar. The Board noted that Preski’s crimes “were widely reported throughout the Commonwealth” and that this publicity “was particularly damaging because it became an integral part of a media narrative that described pervasive corruption among politicians in the Pennsylvania Legislature.” Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board at 28. Preski emphasizes that none of the media reports that the Board relied upon (including some that explicitly identified Preski as a “Philadelphia lawyer”) “purported] to associate Preski’s misconduct or his convictions with his status as a lawyer. To the contrary,” Preski argues, “the articles consistently portray[ed] Preski as a secondary player whose involvement was based on his status as Perzel’s top aid[e] or Chief of Staff.” Brief for Preski at 36-37. In short, Preski evidently believes that only conduct associated with one’s “status as a lawyer” is capable of tarnishing the reputation of the bar. This, too, is incorrect.

Preski was a highly visible figure in law and government. His status as a member of the bar was no secret. Before he was hired as Perzel’s chief of staff, Preski was an Assistant District Attorney in Philadelphia. In the House of Representatives, Preski held a prominent position of public trust. He supervised over 900 state employees, including attorneys, research analysts, and support staff. He wielded significant control over an annual state budget of more than $26 billion, and he routinely met with the Governor, with state and local elected officials, and with United States Senators. He served on several boards of directors and was the Vice Chair of this Court’s Criminal Procedural Rules Committee. To suggest that his misconduct does not speak to the integrity of the profession is to defy logic and common sense.

Preski’s fraud against the public at large is no less reprehensible than a practitioner’s theft of client funds. If anything, the transgressions of a lawyer who is also a public servant are even more injurious to the reputation of the bar because they bring dishonor both to the profession and to our democratic institutions. Public trust is an indispensable prerequisite to the effective administration of government. When a public official violates that trust, he or she undermines the integrity of the entire system. Considering the unprecedented scope, duration, and cost of Preski’s criminal conduct, any sanction short of disbarment here would necessarily suggest that disbarment is virtually never warranted in cases of public corruption. This we decline to do. “[S]ome conduct is simply too egregious and requires disbarment to protect the integrity of the profession and judicial tribunals.” ODC v. Czmus, 586 Pa. 22, 889 A.2d 1197, 1203-04 (2005).

We order that Preski be disbarred from the practice of law in this Commonwealth, retroactive to April 25, 2012. Preski shall comply with the provisions of Pa.R.D.E, 217, and pay costs to the Board pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 208(g).

Justices BAER, TODD and DONOHUE join the opinion.

Justice DOUGHERTY concurs in the result.

Chief Justice SAYLOR dissents, as he favors imposition of a five-year suspension.

      . All told, GCR received $9,286,000 in public funds between 2001 and 2008.

      . Perzel and Preski, without Tomaselli, later formed another political consulting company called SKP. With the exception of a single $10,000 consulting fee from a local political campaign, SKP proved to be as fruitless as Greystone.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3921(a), 3926(a)(1), 3922(a)(1), 3927, 903, and 65 Pa.C.S. § 1103(a), respectively.

      . See also ODC v. Foreman, No. 164 DB 2009 (D.Bd.Rpt. May 19, 2014), available at http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Disciplinary Board/out/164DB2009-Foreman.pdf.

      . Preski also argues that, unlike in Foreman, the Board capriciously discredited the testimony of his character witnesses. We need not discuss this contention at length because it is clear that the Board did no such thing. See Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board at 30 ("Eight witnesses from [Preski’s] professional and community life testified. Each witness was credible and truthful.”).


author: Chief Justice SAYLOR.

text:
    134 A.3d 1034
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Kevin MURPHY, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Oct. 6, 2015.
    Resubmitted Jan. 20, 2016,
    Decided March 29, 2016.

      Robert Steele Bell, Esq., Mark D. Bolkovac, Esq., for Kevin Murphy.
    James Thomas Lazar, Esq., John W. Peck, Esq., Greens-burg, Westmoreland County District Attorney’s Office, Amy Zapp, Esq., Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
   OPINION

Chief Justice SAYLOR.

This is a capital direct appeal.

On April 23, 2009, in Loyalhanna Township, Westmoreland County, Appellant shot and killed his mother, Doris Murphy, his sister, Kris Murphy, and his aunt, Edith Tietge. He was charged with multiple counts of murder, and the Commonwealth tendered notice of its intention to pursue the death penalty. In a trial before a jury in 2013, Appellant was convicted of the first-degree murder of each of the victims; the jurors returned a death verdict in the ensuing penalty proceedings. Appellant pursued post-sentence relief in the trial court, which was denied, and this direct appeal followed.

I. Evidentiary Matters

Three of the five challenges to the judgment of sentence presently raised by Appellant center on the adequacy of the Commonwealth’s evidence of his guilt. Initially, there is no question that most of the elements of first-degree murder are established relative to the obviously intentional and malicious killings of Appellant’s family members. See generally Commonwealth v. Maisonet, 612 Pa. 539, 546, 31 A.3d 689, 693 (2011) (explaining that, to obtain a first-degree murder conviction, the Commonwealth must prove that: a human being was unlawfully killed; the defendant was the killer; and the defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill (citing, inter alia, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2601, 2602(a))). Appellant claims, however, that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate, adequately, his identity as the killer.

At trial, the Commonwealth proceeded on the theory that Appellant’s motive for murdering his family members was to eliminate difficulties deriving from their disapproval of Appellant’s romantic relationship with a married woman, Susan McGuire, whom Appellant wished to bring to live at his residence. See, e.g., N.T., Apr. 24, 2013, at 473-74, 501-03; N.T., Apr. 26, 2013, at 835-838. By way of some elemental background, it is undisputed that Appellant, his mother (Doris), and his sister (Kris) lived together, and that Kris was an employee at Appellant’s business, Ferguson Glass, where Doris and Appellant’s aunt (Edith) volunteered. Of further significance to the case, the business premises was adjacent to a farm owned by Appellant’s uncle, Roy Martin, where Appellant assisted with the farm work.

The prosecution presented testimony from John Krivascy, a friend of Appellant’s, who explained that, a few months prior to the killings, Appellant called seeking advice about acquiring a gun, explaining that he wished to shoot groundhogs. See N.T., Apr. 25, 2013, at 534.

Commonwealth witness Charles Modrey, who was Appellant’s neighbor, testified that shortly before the day of the murders, Appellant had related that he had a “girlfriend that was coming” to his residence, but that Doris and Kris disapproved. Id. at 548. Furthermore, according to Mr. Modrey’s account, Appellant proceeded to inquire whether the witness knew anyone who could help “get rid of his problem.” Id. at 550.

Evidence was adduced to the effect that, in the days immediately before the killing, a .22 caliber pistol owned by Appellant was brought to the Ferguson Glass business premises, although no firearm had otherwise ever been kept there. See N.T., Apr. 23, 2013, at 281-85. Witnesses testified that, subsequently, Appellant gave varied accounts to explain why the weapon was present. See, e.g., N.T., Apr. 24, 2013, at 470 (reflecting testimony from an investigating officer that Appellant had indicated that the handgun was present for protection); id. at 472 (reflecting another officer’s testimony that Appellant had said that the pistol was taken to the premises so that he could shoot a raccoon that had been trapped on the farm premises).

The Commonwealth showed that, during the morning of April 23, 2009, Appellant told an employee that he was “shooting at birds and got a gun burn on his hand.” N.T., Apr. 24, 2013, at 325-326, 332-333.

The prosecution further established that, on that day, Susan McGuire was served with divorce papers and that she and Appellant communicated. See id. at 474; N.T., Apr. 29, 2013, at 1053-1054; accord N.T., May 2, 2013, at 1658 (reflecting Appellant’s testimony during the defense case that Susan McGuire had called in the afternoon on April 23, 2009, and said that she had been served with divorce papers).

The Commonwealth also presented evidence that, that afternoon, Appellant took measures to keep other individuals away from the Ferguson Glass business premises. For example, a hunter who normally parked at the entranceway to the Martin farm (which, again, was adjacent to the glass business) related to the jury that Appellant had authorized him to drive across a portion of the Martin farm over which the hunter normally walked. See N.T., Apr. 24, 2013, at 373-374. Around four o’clock in the afternoon, Appellant called a driver who was on his way to deliver glass to inquire as to his anticipated arrival time. See id. at 359.

Upon returning from an animal auction in the early evening, Mr. Martin discovered the victims’ bodies in the Ferguson Glass shop and summoned Appellant from the farm. See id. at 407. When ambulance personnel arrived, Appellant, in his words, was “worked up,” and he was taken to the hospital. Id. at 408.

Law enforcement officers testified that, in their interviews with Appellant at the hospital, he repeatedly indicated that an employee was present when he purportedly had shot at a bird. See N.T., Apr. 24, 2013, at 412, 427, 460. When confronted with the employee’s denial of this assertion, Appellant merely said “well, I thought he was.” Id. at 427. An investigating officer testified that Appellant told him that the pistol had been on the premises for several weeks, see id. at 410, when, in fact, it had been brought to the premises only a few days before. The officer related that Appellant said that, after shooting the handgun at a bird, he placed the firearm in a Tupperware container on a shelf in a storage room and that no one else knew that the weapon had been left in such location. See id. at 412, 518.

The lead investigator examined Appellant’s finger but did not see any burn. See id. at 459-60. Appellant gave inconsistent accounts about where he put empty shell casings after having shot at a bird. Compare id. at 505 (reflecting testimony of one investigator that Appellant told her that he threw the shells in a dumpster), with N.T., Apr. 25, 2013, at 564-567 (reflecting another officer’s attestation that Appellant said that he threw the shell casings over a steep hillside). Further, evidence was adduced to the effect that police were unable to locate shells in either place. See N.T., Apr. 29, 2013, at 1031-1032.

In the ongoing police investigation, no sign of forced entry into the Ferguson Glass premises was found; moreover, Doris Murphy’s purse, containing several hundred dollars, remained on a countertop. See N.T., Apr. 23, 2013, at 138, 167, 233. Investigators discovered the pistol used in the killings in a catch-basin to a belt sander. See id. at 260.

A forensic DNA supervisor testified that Appellant’s DNA was present on the handgun. N.T., Apr. 25, 2013, at 681-682. Another analyst confirmed the presence of gunshot residue on Appellant’s hand deriving from a test taken soon after the killings. See N.T., Apr. 26, 2013, at 768.

The Commonwealth also presented testimony of Appellant’s confession, after his arrest, to a fellow prisoner at Westmore-land County Prison, John Meighan. According to Meighan, Appellant admitted that he planned and executed the three murders per the request of Susan McGuire. See id. at 850-855. Meighan testified that Appellant had also confided to him that Susan McGuire had advised Appellant to fire the handgun earlier in the day while being observed by an employee. See id. at 853.

Appellant testified in his own defense, denying any participation in the killings. On cross-examination, however, he admitted to various omissions and lies in his statements to police investigators. See, e.g., N.T., May 1, 2013, at 1597-1603, 1610, 1618-1619. He also presented testimony from an emergency medical technician to the effect that his blood pressure and heart rate were elevated when he was taken to the hospital, and he was flushed and sweating profusely. See id. at 1378. An inmate from Westmoreland County prison gave testimony suggesting that Meighan had learned details concerning Appellant’s circumstances from news media. See id. at 1403-1405. A firearms examiner attested that it was possible to be burned by the type of handgun involved in the killings. See id. at 1477. Roy Martin also offered his account of the events on April 23, 2009, with particular emphasis on an explanation for why he remained at the auction until it concluded, while denying on cross-examination that Appellant told him to do so. See N.T., Apr. 30, 2013, at 1168-1173, 1293-1294. Mr. Martin further indicated that his family had encountered difficulties in the past with Mr. Modrey. See N.T., Apr. 30, 2013, at 1144. Finally, the defense presented several character witnesses.

In the first of his three claims centered on the adequacy of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Appellant contends that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. He indicates that there was very little physical evidence presented by the prosecution, some of which, from his perspective, was equally consistent with his innocence. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 86 (“While DNA evidence and gun residue analysis indicated [Appellant] fired, handled, or was in close proximity to the revolver when discharged, it is hardly surprising for a gun owner to handle his gun.”). In terms of the physical evidence, Appellant also highlights the presence of DNA from an unknown individual on the murder weapon.

Appellant suggests that the Commonwealth’s case rested primarily on the testimony of Charles Modrey and John Meighan. As to Mr. Modrey, Appellant observes that the witness had not related to police his account of Appellant’s desire to eliminate a problem until a year after the murders and that the witness was known to have had difficulties with Appellant and his family. See N.T., Apr. 25, 2013, at 553. Appellant also describes the content of the conversation related by Mr. Modrey as “innocuous” and postulates that the witness may have been confused. Brief for Appellant at 88.

Regarding Meighan, Appellant attacks his testimony as “self-serving and contrived.” Id. at 89. After enumerating Meighan’s crimen falsi convictions, Appellant pronounces that such witness’s testimony was and is entitled to “no weight.” Id. It is Appellant’s position that this Court should contrast such evidence “with the heavy evidence of [Appellant] getting along with and being protective of his family; being highly emotional at the scene and being given Valium to calm down; and the 911 audio of [Appellant] acting hysterically in the background.” Id. In light of this summary, Appellant asserts that “[t]he great weight of the evidence supports [Appellant’s] non-guilt.” Id.

The Commonwealth responds with emphasis on the prevailing review standard, which relegates weight-of-the evidence considerations to the finder of fact, in the first instance, and then to the discretion of the trial court which had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 319-20, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (2000). The Commonwealth explains that, to grant a new trial based on weight-of-the-evidence concerns, it must appear that “the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of justice.” In re J.B., 630 Pa. 124, 156, 106 A.3d 76, 95 (2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 622 Pa. 91, 116, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (2013)).

In addressing the trial proofs, the Commonwealth highlights the motive evidence concerning Appellant’s desire to live with Susan McGuire at his residence and the victims’ disapproval of the relationship; the conveyance of Appellant’s pistol to the Ferguson Glass premises in close proximity to the murders for reasons Appellant was unable to explain consistently; the fact that this weapon then was used to perpetrate the killings; Appellant’s exclusive knowledge of the location of the firearm prior to the murders; Mr. Modrey’s testimony that Appellant wished to solicit assistance in eliminating his problem with his relatives; and Meighan’s depiction of Appellant’s jailhouse confessions. In the totality, and considered in light of the defense case, the Commonwealth maintains that there simply is nothing relative to the guilty verdicts that shocks the conscience.

Upon our review, we agree with the Commonwealth’s position. As previously explained, disturbance of a jury verdict on weight-of-the-evidence grounds would be appropriate only in an exceptional case where the evidence weighs very heavily against the conviction. Here, however, per the trial court’s review of the record, and ours, we do not find that the jury lost its way or embarked upon a manifest miscarriage of justice by convicting Appellant on the three counts of first-degree murder. In terms of Meighan’s testimony, the jurors were made aware of the witness’s entanglements in the criminal justice system, including his crimen falsi convictions, see N.T., Apr. 26, 2013, at 879-80, he was subject to extensive cross-examination, see id. at 884-943, and Appellant’s counsel took pains to cast suspicion upon the testimony in his closing remarks, see, e.g., N.T., May 3, 2013, at 1720-1721. Furthermore, the jurors were entitled to treat Appellant’s admitted omissions and lies in his statements to police as evidence of his consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 532 Pa. 265, 275, 615 A.2d 716, 721 (1992). Moreover, the Commonwealth presented a collage of other evidence supporting a finding of Appellant’s guilt, and, thus, the matter was properly for the jury. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief on Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence claim.

The remaining challenges to the adequacy of the Commonwealth evidence fall within the category of evidentiary sufficiency. Again, the establishment of most of the elements of first-degree murder is manifest and undisputed, and the sole controversy is over proof of identity. As such, our analysis of evidentiary sufficiency overlaps materially with the weight-of-the evidence review set forth above. Viewed in its totality, we find, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable jury to find all elements of the crimes of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Reed, 605 Pa. 431, 436, 990 A.2d 1158, 1161 (2010) (setting forth the prevailing review standard governing sufficiency claims).

Appellant advances one additional sufficiency argument, grounded upon the aspirational goal in the capital arena to a heightened standard of reliability in fact-finding procedures, given the severity of the penalty of death. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (“In capital proceedings ..., this Court has demanded that fact-finding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of reliability.”). In particular, Appellant contends that, because a majority of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at trial was circumstantial, the need for “heightened reliability” in capital cases precludes the imposition of a death sentence here and instead necessitates that we vacate and remand for entry of a sentence of life in prison without parole.

Appellant has not developed his argument adequately for this Court to contemplate granting the requested relief. Appellant does not deny that the jury applied the applicable standard of proof, namely proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. He likewise cites to no authority preventing or limiting the use of circumstantial evidence in any phase of capital proceedings, or otherwise requiring more or greater proof than that required to satisfy the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard when circumstantial evidence is presented in any phase. As such, he provides us with no basis to vacate the judgment of sentence.

II. Suppression

Appellant claims that the suppression court erred in denying his pretrial motion to exclude from evidence his statements to police made while at the hospital and, later, at a police station, given that he was under the influence of a powerful medication and labored under emotional distress. He asserts that he suffered a panic attack after encountering the bodies of his family members, as evidenced by the fact that an emergency medical technician found him to be flushed and perspiring profusely and recorded his elevated heartbeat and blood pressure readings. Additionally, Appellant relies on testimony from a psychiatrist, Christine Martone, M.D., that he presented at a suppression hearing. In this regard, Dr. Martone testified that the effect of Appellant’s panic attack, coupled with an administration of five milligrams of Valium while being transported to the hospital, deprived Appellant of the ability, subsequently, to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently make statements or give consent. See N.T., Apr. 30, 2013, at 13.

Appellant also highlights that law enforcement officers failed to consult with medical personnel before interviewing him. Further, he points to anecdotal observations during the interviews that he tended to look down or away, to speak only when prompted, and to appear emotionless as supportive of the psychiatrist’s opinion. As an overview, Appellant relates that he:

was in the embarrassing position of wearing a hospital gown, not having access to his house, and having no transportation to get home, he was subjected to multiple interviews by several troopers over a 10-hour period, was confronted with another’s statement which contradicted his statement in one respect, and was in the presence of at least one officer shortly after 9:00 p.m. on April 23, 2009 until he arrived home after 7:00 a.m. on April 24, 2009.

Brief for Appellant at 85. In the totality, he complains of “coercive conduct and deliberate ignorance of [Appellant’s] medical condition.” Id.

Appellant’s reliance on Dr. Martone’s opinion at this stage of the proceedings, however, is in derogation of the applicable standard on appellate review pertaining to denial of a suppression motion, pursuant to which we consider only so much of the defense evidence as remains uncontradicted. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 615 Pa. 354, 374, 42 A.3d 1017, 1028 (2012).

At the suppression hearing, each of several interviewing officers testified to Appellant’s calmness, cooperativeness, alertness, coherency, and ability to render extensive oral and written accounts throughout the process. See, e.g., N.T., Aug. 15, 2011, at 46-50. Each of the investigators testified to his or her experience with individuals under the influence of controlled substances and to his or her observation that Appellant did not appear to be so affected. See, e.g., id. at 82. They also confirmed the regularity of the interview processes, including the fact that Appellant was treated in a professional fashion and not subjected to coercive measures (other than encountering mere expressions of disbelief relative to a few of his responses). Such testimony was credited by the suppression court, see Opinion and Order dated Oct. 7, 2012, in Commonwealth v. Murphy, No. 1991 C 2010, slip op. at 16-20 (C.P. Westmoreland), and presents an adequate basis for denial of a suppression motion premised on a claim that statements and consents were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Accord Commonwealth v. O’Bryant, 479 Pa. 534, 540, 388 A.2d 1059, 1062 (1978). Furthermore, the suppression court was not obliged to believe the forensic psychiatric opinion presented by Appellant.

Based on the above, we conclude that the suppression court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in denying Appellant’s motion to exclude evidence of his statements.

III. Penalty

In Appellant’s final argument, he asserts that, because the aggravating circumstances found by the jury in the penalty proceedings overlapped, the jury impermissibly “double-count[ed]” the aggravation. Brief for Appellant at 72.

As a preliminary observation, we note, however, that “counting” of aggravators is relevant only for purposes of the initial eligibility process, in which eligibility for the death penalty is established upon the finding of any single aggravator. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). The remaining assessment, if mitigation also is found, entails a weighing—not a counting—process. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reyes, 600 Pa. 45, 53-54, 963 A.2d 436, 441-42 (2009). Notably, the jury at Appellant’s trial was so instructed, consistent with the governing law. See N.T., May 7, 2013, at 238.

In any event, as the Commonwealth observes, Appellant did not lodge a relevant objection at trial and, therefore, any residual concerns about this issue must await post-conviction review. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

IV. Statutory Review

At this stage, we are required to affirm Appellant’s capital judgment of sentence unless we find it to have been the product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, or that the Commonwealth’s evidence does not support at least one aggravating factor. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3). After reviewing the record, we are persuaded that the sentence imposed upon Appellant was not the product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, but rather, resulted from the evidence that Appellant deliberately and maliciously killed the victims, as well as the jurors’ appropriate service of their function in capital litigation per the governing statutory scheme. Finally, the evidence plainly established both aggravating circumstances found by the jury, given the multiple killings involved. See supra note 8.

The judgment of sentence is affirmed, and the Prothonotary is directed to transmit the record to the Governor in accordance with Section 9711(i) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(i).

Justices BAER, TODD, DONOHUE and DOUGHERTY join the opinion.

Justice WECHT did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

      . It appears that the jury considered tire imposition of the death penalty relative to the victims on a unitary basis. In imposing sentence, the trial court attached the death verdict to the killing of Doris Murphy and imposed life sentences based on the convictions for the other two murders. No issues are presently raised concerning this approach.

      . At trial, the Commonwealth presented undisputed testimony from a pathologist confirming both the cause and manner of the deaths, in which each of the three victims was shot in the head. See N.T., Apr. 29, 2013, at 979-1015.

      . Appellant’s sister, Kris, physically carried the firearm into the building. See id.

      . In terms of the account of the raccoon, the evidence showed that such an animal recently had been caught in a trap on the farm premises. On cross-examination in the defense case, however, Appellant's uncle explained that he had killed it with a rifle that he owned and maintained on the farm premises. See N.T., Apr. 30, 2013, at 1283-84.

      . Mr. Martin also testified, during cross-examination in the defense case, that Appellant had told him to stay at an animal auction that afternoon until a cow that Mr. Martin had brought was sold. See N.T., Apr. 30, 2013, at 1237. He also acknowledged that he may have told police previously that Appellant had said to stay until the auction concluded. See id. at 1293-94.

      . The Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant was feigning a panic attack to gain time to collect his thoughts. See N.T., Apr. 26, 2013, at 856.

      . Presumably, the intent was to account for any physical evidence of Appellant's contact with the weapon that day. Accord N.T., Apr. 26, 2015, at 854 (reflecting Meighan’s testimony that the purpose was to use the employee "as an alibi that he was handling the gun that morning”).

      . The aggravators in question are set forth in Sections 9711(d)(10) and (11) of the Sentencing Code. Compare 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9711(d)(10) (designating as an aggravating circumstance conviction of an offense for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable), with id. § 9711(d)(11) (specifying that conviction of another murder before or at the time of the offense in issue constitutes an aggravating circumstance).


text:
    134 A.3d 1042
    In re Nomination Petition of Jess JOHNSON, Candidate for Representative in the General Assembly from the 192nd Legislative District at the April 26, 2016 Democratic Primary Election. Appeal of Morgan Cephas.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 8, 2016.
    Kathleen Marie Kotula, PA Dept, of State, for Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation, Participants.

      Robert Thomas Vance Jr., Law Offices of Robert T. Vance, Jr., Philadelphia, for Morgan Cephas, Appellant.
    Zachary Cryder Shaffer, Montoya Shaffer, LLC, for Jess Johnson, Appellee.
    BEFORE: SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 8th day of April, 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby AFFIRMED.


text:
    134 A.3d 1043
    In re Nomination Petitions of Brian A. GORDON as a Democratic Candidate for Congress in the 2nd Congressional District. Appeal of Pamela Gabell and John Packard.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted March 30, 2016.
    Decided April 11, 2016.
    Kathleen Marie Kotula, PA Dept, of State, for Kathleen Kotula, Participants.
    Lawrence M. Otter, Harrisburg, Eric S. Steckerl, College-ville, for John Packard and Pamela Gabell, Appellants.
    Brian Anthony Gordon, Gordon & Ashworth, P.C., Philadelphia, pro se.

      BEFORE: SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 11th day of April, 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    134 A.3d 1043
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent, v. Preston STROMAN, Petitioner.
    No. 24 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 15, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Leave to File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc and the Petition for Appointment of New Counsel are GRANTED.

This matter is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which is directed to appoint new counsel within 45 days. A Petition for Allowance of Appeal shall be filed within 30 days of new counsel’s appointment.


text:
    134 A.3d 1044
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Prentice THOMAS, Petitioner.
    No. 37 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 15, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Leave to File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is GRANTED.

This matter is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which is directed to appoint new counsel within 45 days. A Petition for Allowance of Appeal shall be filed within 30 days of new counsel’s appointment.


text:
    134 A.3d 1044
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Garnell GRANT, Petitioner.
    No. 34 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 15, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Leave to File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is GRANTED.

This matter is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which is directed to appoint new counsel within 45 days. A Petition for Allowance of Appeal shall be filed within 30 days of new counsel’s appointment.


text:
    134 A.3d 1044
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Jarvis PAYTON, Petitioner.
    No. 26 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 15, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2016, the Application for Writ of Extraordinary Relief and the Application for an Immediate Hearing are DENIED.


text:
    134 A.3d 1044
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Warren S. EVANS, Petitioner.
    No. 7 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 15, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2016, the Application to Exceed Word Count Limitation is DENIED.

Justice DONOHUE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    134 A.3d 1045
    Thomas DARTOE, Petitioner v. Superintendent, Michael OVERMEYER AT, SCI-Forest, and the District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia, and the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania, Respondents.
    No. 10 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 15, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are DISMISSED. See Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282 (2010) (explaining that hybrid representation is not permitted).

The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to forward the filings to counsel of record.


text:
    134 A.3d 1045.
    Mark A. BROWN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 29 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 15, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief, to the extent it seeks a writ of mandamus, are GRANTED.

The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is DIRECTED to adjudicate Petitioner’s pending filing within 90 days.

The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to serve this order on the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.


text:
    135 A.3d 175
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Tyrone JONES, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 18, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 18th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED limited to the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence violates the prohibition against mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). As a result of the recent holding that Miller must be applied retroactively by the States, Montgomery v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Superior Court’s order is VACATED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings consistent with Montgomery. Allowance of appeal is DENIED in all other respects.

To the extent necessary, leave is to be granted to amend the post-conviction petition to assert the jurisdictional provision of the Post Conviction Relief Act extending to the recognition of constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States which it deems to be retroactive. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b) (1) (iii).

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    135 A.3d 175
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. David Edward RICKER, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 18, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 18th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:

Whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court wrongly held, in a published opinion of first impression, that a defendant does not have a state or federal constitutional right to confront the witness against him at a preliminary hearing and that a prima fade case may be proven by the Commonwealth through hearsay evidence alone, which is what the trial and magisterial district courts concluded in Petitioner’s case?

Justice DONOHUE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    135 A.3d 176
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Qu’eed BATTS, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 19, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 19th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, LIMITED TO the following issues raised by Petitioner:

1. In Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed mandatory life without parole for juveniles (LWOP), and instructed that the discretionary imposition of this sentence should be “uncommon” and reserved for the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”
i. There is currently no procedural mechanism to ensure that juvenile LWOP will be “uncommon” in Pennsylvania. Should this Court exercise its authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution to promulgate procedural safeguards including (a) a presumption against juvenile LWOP; (b) a requirement for competent expert testimony; and (c) a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof?
ii. The lower court reviewed the Petitioner’s sentence under the customary abuse of discretion standard. Should the Court reverse the lower court’s application of this highly deferential standard in light of Miller?
2. In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the basis for its individualized sentencing requirement was Graham’s comparison of juvenile LWOP to the death penalty. The Petitioner received objectively less procedural due process than an adult facing capital punishment. Should the Court address the constitutionality of the Petitioner’s resentencing proceeding?

The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED with respect to Petitioner’s third stated issue.


text:
    135 A.3d 176
    Mr. Jason PARKER, Petitioner v. Municipal Court Judge Rayford A. MEANS, Respondent.
    No. 32 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 20, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 20th day of April, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the Application for an Immediate Hearing are DISMISSED. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 537 Pa. 167, 642 A.2d 453 (1994) (providing that hybrid representation is not permitted).

The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to forward the filings to counsel of record and to strike the name of the jurist from the caption.


text:
    135 A.3d 177
    In re Petition of the TRUSTEE OF the ROOSEVELT-BENTMAN TRUST FOR AMERICAN VOTERS on Behalf of SENATOR A, Senator B and Representative C. Petition of Peter J. Wirs, Trustee.
    No. 28 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 20, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 20th day of April, 2016, the Application for Exercise of King’s Bench Powers, the Application for Expedited Disposition, the “Rule Nisi (Order to Show Cause),” and the Application for Leave to Reply to Answer are DENIED.


text:
    135 A.3d 177
    Rasheem HALL, Petitioner v. Jacqueline F. ALLEN, Admin. Judge Philadelphia County, Court of Common Pleas, Post Trial Unit, Respondent.
    No. 31 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 20, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 20th day of April, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED, and the Prothonotary is DIRECTED to strike the name of the jurist from the caption.


text:
    135 A.3d 177
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Thomas M. REED, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 22, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 22nd day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, rephrased for clarity, are:

1) Are the recent SORNA statutes (42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10, 9799.13 and 9799.14 and related provisions) punitive in nature and do they violate the ex post facto provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution?
2) Do the SORNA statutes violate fundamental due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?
3) Do the SORNA statutes violate the separation of powers doctrine under the Pennsylvania Constitution?
4) Was lifetime Megan’s Law registration not part of petitioner’s original guilty plea, and therefore, should petitioner’s original plea, which only called for a ten-year Megan’s Law requirement, be enforced?

The Prothonotary is directed to schedule briefing and argument in this matter together with the following matters presenting related issues: Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 181 MAL 2015 and Commonwealth v. Muniz, 684 MAL 2015.


text:
    135 A.3d 178
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Jose M. MUNIZ, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 22, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 22nd day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by petitioner, are:

1) Does applying [42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14] retroactively violate the Federal Constitution?
2) Does applying [42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14] retroactively violate the Pennsylvania Constitution?

The Prothonotary is directed to schedule briefing and argument in this matter together with the following matters presenting related issues: Commonwealth v. Reed, 557 WAL 2014 and Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 181 MAL 2015.


text:
    135 A.3d 178
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent, v. Taurus Kenyata GILBERT, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 22, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 22nd day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by petitioner, are:

1) Does the application of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10 et seq., to [petitioner] violate [petitioner’s] procedural due process rights under the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions, when [petitioner] was no longer serving a criminal sentence at the time SORNA became effective?
2) Does SORNA violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution when SORNA’s purpose or effect is so punitive that it constitutes a retroactive increase in punishment when applied to [petitioner]?
3) Does SORNA violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania when SORNA’s purpose or effect is so punitive that it constitutes a retroactive increase in punishment when applied to [petitioner]?

The Prothonotary is directed to schedule briefing and argument in this matter together with the following matters presenting related issues: Commonwealth v. Muniz, 684 MAL 2015 and Commonwealth v. Reed, 557 WAL 2014.


text:
    135 A.3d 578
    In re Nomination Petition of John H. MORLEY, Jr. as Candidate for the Democratic Nomination for Senator in the General Assembly from the First Senatorial District, Objection of Gaetano Piccrilli; Michael Weiss and Karen Greenberg. Appeal of John H. Morley, Jr.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted April 7, 2016.
    Decided April 19, 2016.
    Kathleen Marie Kotula, Esq., PA Department of State, for Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation.
    City Commissioners of Philadelphia, Pro Se.
    John H. Morley, Jr., Pro Se.
    Kevin Michael Greenberg, Esq., Flaster Greenberg, P.C., Philadelphia, for Michael Weiss, Gaetano Piccrilli, and Karen Greenberg.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 19th day of April, 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court granting Gaetano Piccrilli, Michael Weiss, and Karen Greenberg’s Petition to Set Aside the Nomination Petition of John H. Morley, Jr. is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED. The Commonwealth Court shall direct the Secretary of the Commonwealth to reinstate the name of John H. Morley, Jr. on the ballot for April 26, 2016 Democratic nomination for Senator in the General Assembly in the First Senatorial District.

Opinion to follow.


text:
    135 A.3d 578
    Derrick Dale FONTROY, I, Appellant v. John WETZEL, Jamey Luther, Edward Evens, Donald Gelmann, Bill Mailman, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 25, 2016.
    Derrick Dale Fontroy, I, pro se.
    Jeffrey M. Paladina, PA Dept, of Corrections, Mechanics-burg, for John Wetzel, Jamey Luther, Edward Evens, Donald Gelmann, Bill Mailman, Appellees.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 25th day of April, 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    135 A.3d 578
    PG PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. d/b/a the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Appellant v. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION and the Pennsylvania Department of Education, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 25, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2016, Appellant’s Application for Oral Argument is DENIED, Amicus’ Application for Oral Argument is DENIED, and the Order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby AFFIRMED.


text:
    135 A.3d 579
    Samuel W.B. MILLINGHAUSEN, III, Appellant v. Karen M. DRAKE, Joy A. Capka, Maryann Direnzo, Robert L. Hyslop, Jr., Theresa M. Hyslop, John Does 1-4, and XYZ CORP., Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 10, 2015.
    Resubmitted Jan. 20, 2016.
    Decided April 25, 2016.
    Samuel W.B. Millinghausen III, Law Offices of Samuel W.B. Millinghausen III, pro se.
    Thomas J. Wagner, Amy Lynn Wynkoop, Law Offices of Thomas J. Wagner, L.L.C., Philadelphia, for Karen M. Drake, Joy A. Capka, et al., Appellees.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 25th day of April, 2016, this appeal is dismissed as having been improvidently granted.

Justice WECHT dissents.


text:
    135 A.3d 579
    Horatio M. NIMLEY, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (“DOC”), Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 25, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 25th day of April, 2016, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    135 A.3d 580
    Robert C. McCULLIGAN, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE and, Charles Steinmetz, PSP Statetrooper, Individual and Official Capacity and, Michael J. Minanno, PSP State Trooper, Individual and Official Capacity and, Anthony J. Spagnoletti, Montgomery County Detective, Individual and Official Capacity and, Walter Zdunowski, Montgomery County Detective, Individual and Official Capacity and, Erick Echevarria, Montgomery County Detective, Individual and Official Capacity, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 25, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 25th day of April, 2016, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    135 A.3d 580
    Jane DOES 1-5, and Intervenor, Appellants v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, and Professional Standards and Practices Commission, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 25, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 25th day of April, 2016, the order of the Commonwealth Court is

AFFIRMED.


text:
    135 A.3d 580
    Richard Ralph FEUDALE, Appellant v. AQUA PENNSYLVANIA, INC. and Department of Conservation and Natural Resources of the Commonwealth of PA, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 25, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 25th day of April, 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    135 A.3d 581
    DISCOVERY CHARTER SCHOOL, Respondent v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA and School Reform Commission, Petitioners.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 26, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by Petitioners, are:

(1) Did the Commonwealth Court err when it created an extra-legislative scheme for amending charters that is not contained in the Charter School Law?
(2) Did the Commonwealth Court err when it held that, although the Charter School Law does not authorize amendments to charters, a charter school has a right to amend its charter at any time to change its charter’s terms without evaluation of the proposed amended terms by a school district under the [Charter School Law’s] provisions governing charter applications?
(3) If charter amendments are permissible, did the Commonwealth Court err when it held that, although the Charter School Law does not authorize displacement of a school district governing body’s authority with respect to amendment applications, that governing body should be deemed to deny an application if that body fails to act on it within an unspecified time and to thereby forfeit that authority to the State Charter School Appeal Board?


text:
    135 A.3d 1016
    SALADWORKS, LLC and Wesco Insurance Company v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (GAUDIOSO and Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund) Petition of Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 3, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 3rd day of May, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, rephrased for clarity, is whether a franchisor may be subject to liability as a statutory employer under Section 302(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act?


text:
    135 A.3d 1016
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Victoria LIVINGSTONE, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 3, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 3rd day of May, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:

Did the Superior Court err when it affirmed the judgment of the trial court in holding that the interaction between Trooper Frantz and Petitioner was a mere encounter where Trooper Frantz approached the vehicle from a distance of approximately 100 yards with his emergency lights activated, pulled beside Petitioner, and immediately began questioning Petitioner on the scene[?]

Stated alternatively:

Where a Police Officer approaches a voluntarily stopped motorist with emergency lights activated, would a reasonable motorist feel that she was not free to leave prior to the approaching officer stopping to interact with her, or, simply passing her by?

The parties are directed to address the potential application of a community caretaking rationale in the present circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 362 P.3d 1232, 1236 (Utah 2015). The presentations may include any relevant issue preservation considerations, particularly in light of the Commonwealth’s burden in a suppression context. See, e.g., In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073, 1086 (2013).


text:
    135 A.3d 1017
    In re Nomination Petition of Joseph VODVARKA as a Candidate of the Democratic Party for the United States Senate in the Primary Election of April 26, 2016. Appeal of Joseph Vodvarka.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 19, 2016.
    Kathleen Marie Kotula, Esq., Pennsylvania Department of State, for Kathleen M. Kotula.
    Paul Anthony Rossi, Esq., for Joseph Vodvarka.
    Robert McCarthy Palumbos, Esq., Philadelphia, James Manly Parks, Esq., Duane Morris, L.L.P., for Joseph A. Sestak, Jr.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 19th day of April, 2016, the March 30, 2016 order of the Commonwealth Court granting Joseph A. Ses-tak’s Petition to Set Aside the Nomination Petition of Joseph Vodvarka is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED. The Commonwealth Court shall direct the Secretary of the Commonwealth to reinstate the name of Joseph Vodvarka on the ballot for the April 26, 2016, Democratic Primary election for United States Senate.

Opinion to follow.


text:
    135 A.3d 1017
    VALLEY FORGE TOWERS APARTMENTS N, LP; Morgan Properties Abrams Run Owner LP; KBF Associates, LP; Gulph Mills Village Apartments LP; and the Lafayette at Valley Forge LP v. UPPER MERION AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT and Keystone Realty Advisors, LLC. Petition of Valley Forge Towers Apartments N, LP; Morgan Properties Abrams Run Owner LP; KBF Associates, LP.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 26, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioners, is:

[The School District] deliberately chose commercial properties, such as Petitioners’, for selective assessment appeals, but did not appeal assessments of any single-family-home properties, although the latter are significantly underas-sessed. The Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits disuniformity in taxation. Is a school district’s decision to appeal property assessment insulated from review because, inter alia, the school district has a statutory right to file appeals and can identify an economic reason for its appeals?


text:
    135 A.3d 1018
    Elmer DAVENPORT, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 35 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 5, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 5th day of May, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.