author: Justice SAYLOR.

text:
    105 A.3d 1181
    ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Jared WOLFE, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted July 18, 2014.
    Decided Dec. 15, 2014.

      Yen Tran Lucas, Esq., Pennsylvania Insurance Dept., for Insurance Commissioner, Amicus Curiae.
    Richard Bruce Morrison, Esq., Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, P.C., for Pennsylvania Defense Institute, Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel, Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania, Inc., American Insurance Association, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, Pennsylvania Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, and Association of America, Amici Curiae.
    Charles Scott Rybny, Esq., Curtin & Heefner LLP, for Pennsylvania Defense Institute, Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel, Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania, Inc., American Insurance Association, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, Pennsylvania Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, and Association of America, Amici Curiae.
    Marcia Mary Waldron, Esq., U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit, for United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
    The Honorable Kent Jordan, pro se.
    Sara Beth Richman, Esq., John Lawrence Schweder II, Esq., Philadelphia, Marshall Walthew, Esq., Butler, Pepper Hamilton LLP, for Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.

      William Philip Carlucci, Esq., Robert B. Elion, Esq., Williamsport, Elion, Wayne, Greico, Carlucci & Shipman, P.C., Michael Anthony Dinges, Esq., Dinges, Dinges & Waltz, LLC, for Jared Wolfe.
    Scott B. Cooper, Esq., Schmidt Kramer, P.C., Harrisburg, James C. Haggerty, Esq., Haggerty, Goldberg, Schleifer & Kupersmith, P.C., Philadelphia, for Pennsylvania Association for Justice.
    Luke E. Debevec, Esq., John Norig Ellison, Esq., Reed Smith LLP, Philadelphia, Andrew J. Kennedy, Esq., Indiana, Colkitt Law Firm, P.C., for United Policyholders.
    CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.

We accepted certification from a federal appeals court to clarify whether, under Pennsylvania law, an insured may assign the right to recover damages from his insurance company deriving from the insurer’s bad faith toward the insured.

In 2007, Jared Wolfe was injured when his vehicle was struck from behind by an automobile driven by Karl Zierle. Wolfe attributed blame to Zierle and demanded $25,000 from Zierle’s insurer carrier, Appellant Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, equating to half the liability limits under the applicable policy. Allstate counteroffered $1,200, which Wolfe refused.

Wolfe then instituted a personal injury action against Zierle seeking compensatory damages grounded in negligence. Allstate assumed Zierle’s defense while maintaining its additional right, under the policy, to effectuate a settlement. See Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. Auto Policy, R.R. at 442a (“We may settle any claim or suit if we believe it is proper.”).

In discovery, Wolfe confirmed that Zierle had been intoxicated at the time of the collision and secured leave of court to amend the complaint to advance a claim for punitive damages. Allstate, in turn, advised Zierle that indemnification for exemplary awards was unavailable under his policy and, therefore, Zierle might wish to consult with a personal attorney to address this aspect of the litigation.

Before trial, on at least one occasion, Wolfe again inquired into the possibility of settlement. Neither he nor Allstate made additional, material monetary concessions, however. A jury trial ensued, and Wolfe secured a verdict and judgment against Zierle comprised of $15,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. Allstate proceeded to satisfy the compensatory component of the judgment only. As to the punitive-damages portion, Wolfe and Zierle entered into an agreement whereby Wolfe committed to forbear from executing in exchange for an assignment from Zierle of all claims arising under the policy which he might possess against Allstate.

Relying upon this assignment, Wolfe proceeded to commence a civil action against Allstate in a Pennsylvania common pleas court, alleging that Allstate’s refusal to settle reflected bad faith on the carrier’s part. Wolfe sought damages under common-law contract theory, see Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 468, 134 A.2d 223, 227 (1957) (recognizing a cause of action grounded in contract theory for bad-faith refusal by an insurer to settle a third-party action), and per Section 8371 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371, which served to supplement the remedies previously available to insureds in certain scenarios involving bad-faith conduct by their insurers, inter alia, by authorizing punitive-damages awards. See generally Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos. Inc., 567 Pa. 386, 402, 787 A.2d 376, 386 (2001). Allstate removed the litigation to a federal district court.

During pretrial proceedings, Wolfe filed an amended complaint and Allstate pursued summary relief, asserting that, as a third party to the Allstate/Zierle insurance policy, Wolfe lacked standing to pursue damages under Section 8371. This position was grounded on two main premises. First, Allstate explained, under Ash v. Continental Insurance Co., 593 Pa. 523, 932 A.2d 877 (2007), Section 8371 created a form of an unliquidated tort claim. See id. at 536, 932 A.2d at 885 (holding, in determining the appropriate limitations period, that “an action under § 8371 is a statutorily-created tort action”). Second, per longstanding Pennsylvania law, unliquidated tort claims generally are personal and cannot be assigned to third parties. See, e.g., Sensenig v. Pa. R.R. Co., 229 Pa. 168, 172, 78 A. 91, 91 (1910) (“A right of action strictly personal is not assignable and the general doctrine is, both in law and equity, that a right of action for pure tort is not the subject of assignment^]”). Indeed, Allstate emphasized, two federal district judges in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently had applied these precepts in determining that claims for damages under Section 8371 are unassignable. See Feingold v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 11-6309, slip op., 2012 WL 1106653 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 3, 2012), aff'd, 517 Fed. Appx. 87 (3d Cir.2013); Feingold v. Liberty Mut. Grp., 847 F.Supp.2d 772 (E.D.Pa.2012), aff'd, 562 Fed.Appx. 142 (3d Cir.2014); accord Canale v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 13-4398, slip op., (E.D.Pa. Nov. 21, 2013).

The district court rejected Allstate’s contentions, however, relying upon a contrary pronouncement by the Superior Court in Brown v. Candelora, 708 A.2d 104 (Pa.Super.1998). See Wolfe v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 877 F.Supp.2d 228, 231 (M.D.Pa.2012) (citing Brown, 708 A.2d at 110). The district court did not discuss Brown’s reasoning or compare it with that of the Feingold courts. Rather, the district court merely observed that, in Haugh v. Allstate Insurance Co., 322 F.3d 227 (3d Cir.2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had cited Brown with approval. See id. at 239 (“Under Pennsylvania law an insured’s claims ... under section 8371 for punitive damages ... are assignable.” (citing Brown, 708 A.2d at 112)). This, the district court concluded, “rebuts [Allstate’s] contention that a finding that § 8371 claims sound in tort necessarily prohibits the assignment thereof.” Wolfe, 877 F.Supp.2d at 231.

The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury discerned bad-faith conduct on the part of Allstate. As relevant here, the jury awarded Wolfe $50,000 in punitive damages, as authorized under Section 8371.

Allstate commenced an appeal in the Third Circuit, in which the insurer maintained its position that Wolfe lacked standing. In light of the conflicting decisions in Pennsylvania and federal courts concerning the assignability of a right to damages under Section 8371, the Third Circuit lodged a certification petition in this Court, see Internal Operating Procedures of the Supreme Court § 8, which we granted. See Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 625 Pa. 53, 90 A.3d 699 (2014) (per curiam).

Presently, Allstate maintains that the two, undisputed premises which it raised in the district court (resting upon Section 8371’s grounding in tort theory and the personal character of unliquidated tort claims) dictate the outcome of our review. Allstate explains that the prohibition against assignment of tort claims has been interposed to preclude champerty, or the involvement of intermeddlers pursuing litigation for profit-making purposes. See, e.g., Marsh v. W. N.Y. & Pa. Ry. Co., 204 Pa. 229, 231, 53 A. 1001, 1002 (1903) (“ ‘[N]o encouragement should be given to litigation by the introduction of parties to enforce those rights which others are not disposed to enforce.’ ” (quoting Prosser v. Edmonds, (1835) 160 Eng. Rep. 196, 203 (K.B.))). In this regard, Allstate categorizes assignees who have received judgments in third-party tort actions as such intermeddlers, since, according to the carrier at least, their only legitimate expectation is to be compensated for their own injuries. Observing that such singular interest can be wholly vindicated in an assignable contract-based action against the tortfeasor’s insurer where there has been a bad-faith refusal to settle resulting in an excess verdict, see Cowden, 389 Pa. at 468, 134 A.2d at 227; Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 511, 223 A.2d 8, 13 (1966), Allstate denominates attempts to assign exemplary entitlements under Section 8371 as champertous. In this line of argument, Allstate highlights that Pennsylvania courts have manifested a particular aversion to assignment of personal causes of action seeking penalties. See, e.g., Sensenig, 229 Pa. at 173, 78 A. at 92 (“Counsel for appellant practically admit that the treble damages imposed by the act of 1883 are to be regarded as a penalty, and that the right to such damages is not assignable.”); Osborn v. First Nat’l Bank of Athens, 175 Pa. 494, 498-99, 34 A. 858, 859 (1896) (holding that the right to pursue a statutory penalty for charging usurious interest was unassignable).

Allstate recognizes that there are conflicting judicial decisions concerning the assignability of claims for damages asserted under Section 8371. Nevertheless, it views the disharmony as a byproduct of the controversy, prior to the 2007 decision in Ash, over whether such claims sounded in contract or tort. Again, it is Allstate’s position that the definitive pronouncement in Ash settled the entire landscape.

In terms of public policy, Allstate believes that sanctioning assignments of punitive-damages claims under Section 8371 would foster mischief by encouraging plaintiffs to pursue unreasonable settlement demands and advance bad-faith claims which otherwise never would have been initiated. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Allstate at 3 (“[T]he inevitable consequence of allowing assignment of § 8371 claims will be that persons bringing suits for injuries covered by a third party’s insurance will have powerful incentives to be unreasonable in pretrial settlement negotiations.”). According to Allstate:

Prohibiting assignment of § 8371 claims preserves a much better equilibrium among the interests of the various parties. The insured’s right ... to assign a common law contractual bad faith claim provides the insured with the bargaining chip to protect his personal assets from execution by the plaintiff. At the same time, assignment of the common law claim provides the plaintiff with a means to obtain the amount of the verdict — the only monies to which they the injured plaintiff has any legitimate claim. And, if the insured — the person § 8371 is meant to protect — feels aggrieved by the insurer’s actions, the insured can bring a claim under § 8371. This is the truly fair result.

Id. at 6; accord id. at 8 (“Allowing the injured claimants to pursue the tort based claims under § 8371 unreasonably tips [the] long established balance in favor of a party who needs no further protection.”). Allstate’s position, in these regards, is supported by its amici, including various insurance-industry organizations, which also view the assignment of claims for damages under Section 8371 as creating windfalls and perverse incentives. Further, according to amici, by insulating the judicial proceedings from the presence of an insured bearing personal culpability (which, as in Zierle’s case, can be substantial), assignments “will likely distort the factfinder’s perception ... by the inherent sympathies created by the innocent claimant’s injuries.” Brief for Amici at 7.

Wolfe and his amici, on the other hand, eschew a “mechanistic rule” based purely on the tort label affixed to claims for damages under Section 8371. Brief for Amicus United Policyholders at 17. Rather, their arguments center on the public policies supporting this Court’s determination that bad-faith claims grounded in contract theory are assignable. See, e.g., Gray, 422 Pa. at 511, 223 A.2d at 13 (reasoning that assignability “would put the claimant on more of an equal footing with the insured’s insurance company in settlement negotiations without tipping the balance against the insurer who can still refuse to settle in good faith”); Brown, 708 A.2d at 113 (positing that assignments “equalize[] the strategic advantages between the insured and the insurer,” where the insurer’s bad faith “exposes its policyholder to the sharp thrust of personal liability” (quoting Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 5 Cal.App.4th 1104, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 136 (1992))). Along these lines, Wolfe and his amici contend that permitting assignment of the totality of an insured’s rights against its insurer to an injured third-party plaintiff facilitates the orderly and complete determination of bad-faith claims in a more unitary fashion. The amici, in particular, also note that this Court maintains an emphasis on the public policy favoring litigation settlements. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus United Policyholders at 25 (citing Gray, 422 Pa. at 511, 223 A.2d at 13).

Furthermore, Wolfe contends, assignments serve Section 8371’s aim of deterrence. Cf. Brief for Amicus United Policyholders at 22 (“Punitive damages are intended to deter and punish bad faith, and those goals are served regardless of what party presses the claim against the insurance company.”). In this regard, Wolfe explains that many tortfeasors are essentially judgment-proof and, thus, lack the incentive to pursue damages under Section 8371 (since any resulting award would be vulnerable to seizure by the injured plaintiff in his capacity as judgment creditor). Even though they may be judgment proof, the argument continues, insureds nonetheless suffer substantial harm by virtue of insurer bad faith, in the form of impaired credit ratings and, in some instances, downsides associated with insolvency proceedings. See Gray, 422 Pa. at 506, 510, 223 A.2d at 10, 12 (discussing such considerations in determining that bad-faith claims grounded in contract theory are assignable). Moreover, as Wolfe and his amici see it, the General Assembly already has rejected Allstate’s position that compensatory damages for bad faith are sufficient to effectively combat bad faith on the part of insurance carriers. See, e.g., supra note 4.

According to Wolfe, “putting [the] claim into the hands of an injur[ed] plaintiff, already represented by counsel on the underlying claim, will ... serve the [salutary] purposes of encouraging good faith settlement negotiations, and punishing insurance carrier abuse.” Brief for Wolfe at 15. Wolfe and his amici also dismiss Allstate’s charge that a plaintiff taking an assignment engages in champerty, where it is the plaintiffs own personal injury action giving rise to an insured’s bad-faith refusal to settle, and the plaintiff foregoes execution in exchange for the right to pursue the panoply of remedies available to redress such wrongful conduct.

Finally, in discussing the legislative intent underlying Section 8371, amicus United Policyholders observes that, when the statute was enacted in 1990, the General Assembly was aware that, per the 1966 Gray decision, this Court had approved of the assignment of bad-faith claims for almost twenty-five years. See generally Birth Center, 567 Pa. at 403-04, 787 A.2d at 387 (applying a conventional principle of statutory construction in presuming that the legislative branch was familiar with the judicial decisions arising in the bad-faith context at the time Section 8371 was enacted). Thus, amicus asserts, if the Assembly had any concerns that statutory bad faith claims should not be assignable along with the common-law claims, it would have so indicated in the statute itself.

Upon consideration of the arguments presented, we agree with the proposition that the most appropriate way to approach the assignability issue is as a matter of statutory construction. Thus, the essential undertaking is to determine the intent of the Legislature through the language of its prescriptions, where possible. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a), (b). Where the words of a statute are not explicit, we employ principles of statutory construction, including, among other considerations: evaluation of the occasion and necessity for the statute under review, contemplation of the object to be attained, review of the previous legal landscape, and appreciation of the consequences of the particular interpretation. See id. § 1921(c)(1), (4)-(6). In terms of the former law, this Court continues to highlight the importance of considering the extant common law at the time of a statute’s enactment. See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 587 Pa. 408, 414-15, 900 A.2d 341, 344-45 (2003).

Section 8371 provides, in relevant part:

In an action arising under an insurance policy, if the court finds that the insurer has acted in bad faith toward the insured, the court may ... [a]ward punitive damages against the insurer.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8871. Since the statute says nothing about assignability of claims asserted per its provisions, we find that principles of statutory construction should apply.

The suggestion on Allstate’s side, particularly from its amici, is that statutory causes of action, by their nature, are allocated to particular interests by the Legislature, and, thus, transfers should not be sanctioned by the courts in the absence of express legislative approval. A countervailing circumstance here, however, is that the opening passage of Section 8371 — “[i]n an action arising under an insurance policy” — interweaves the statutory remedial scheme into the array of contract-based actions which already were assignable under the extant common law as of Section 8371’s enactment. See Gray, 422 Pa. at 511, 223 A.2d at 13. As such, to the degree that Section 8371 is regarded as “merely providing] an additional remedy and authorizing] the award of additional damages,” Birth Center, 567 Pa. at 402, 787 A.2d at 386, this would seem to be a simple case. Per this line of reasoning, the Legislature’s mere supplementation of remedies should not be deemed to evince an unstated desire to disrupt the preexisting degree of latitude in the assignment of underlying actions or to require the splitting of causes of action (a practice which is strongly disfavored, see Pa.R.C.P. No. 1020(d)).

The complexity arises, however, on account of the character of the statutory supplemental remedies involved. In designing Section 8371, the Legislature apparently was satisfied to leave in place the contract overlay which this Court had imposed on insurance bad-faith litigation, see Gray, 422 Pa. at 508, 223 A.2d at 11, but it chose to interpose additional conventions typically associated with tort law, see Ash, 593 Pa. at 536, 932 A.2d at 885. This aspect obviously puts into play the axioms upon which Allstate quite reasonably relies.

We recognize that the policy considerations (which are ably developed in the arguments of the litigants and their amici) are mixed in character. On balance, however, we find that consideration of the occasion and necessity for Section 8371, the object to be attained, the previous legal landscape, as well as the consequences of our interpretation, favor Wolfe’s position. Centrally, we simply do not believe the General Assembly contemplated that the supplementation of the redress available for bad faith on the part of insurance carriers in relation to their insureds would result either in a curtailment of assignments of pre-existing causes of action in connection with settlements or the splitting of actions. Certainly, if we are incorrect in our assessment in this regard, the General Assembly may seek to implement curative measures pertaining to future cases, subject to constitutional limitations.

We conclude that the entitlement to assert damages under Section 8371 may be assigned by an insured to an injured plaintiff and judgment creditor such as Wolfe. Having answered the certified question, we return the matter to the Third Circuit.

Justice EAKIN and BAER, Justices TODD and STEVENS join the opinion.

Chief Justice CASTILLE dissents.

      . See generally Toy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 593 Pa. 20, 39, 928 A.2d 186, 198 (2007) (explaining that, with Cowden, "Pennsylvania was joining the jurisdictions throughout the country that had held that an insurer may be liable for the entire amount of a judgment secured by a third party against the insured, regardless of any limitation in the policy, if the insurer’s handling of the claim, including a failure to accept a proffered settlement, was done in such a manner as to evidence bad faith on the part of the insurer in the discharge of its contractual duty”).

      . Wolfe also asserted a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. § 201-1-201-9.3, which is outside the scope of our present review.

      . See, e.g., Brief for Amici Pa. Defense Inst., Phila. Ass’n of Defense Counsel, Ins. Fed. of Pa., Inc., Am. Ins. Ass'n, Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am., and Pa. Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos. ("Brief for Amici”) at 4-7; id. at 14-15 (predicting, if this Court sanctions the district court’s approach to assignments, "a dramatic increase in litigation, as third-party claimants would sue for settlement delay and low offers, despite the lack of an excess verdict resulting in any exposure to the insured[,]’’ as well as a rise in insured losses which "may be passed along to policyholders in the form of higher premiums”).

      . Cf. Brief for Amicus United Policyholders at 23 ("The Legislature concluded that additional remedies were required to overcome insurance companies' inherent advantages in litigation expertise and resources to engage in coverage litigation[.]”).

      . See, e.g., Brief for Wolfe at 11 ("Neither judicial economy nor any other significant public policy would be advanced by a rule permitting the assignment of common law contract rights against a carrie[r] to an injured plaintiff after entry of judgment, but requiring the policyholder themselves [sic] to bring a separate action seeking damages under [Section] 8371.”); Brief for Amicus Pa. Ass’n for Justice at 8-9 ("Creating an artificial distinction between the contractual bad faith remedies and the statutory remedies with respect to assignments creates an unworkable and confusing dichotomy which otherwise confounds the orderly working of the insurance system in Pennsylvania.”); Brief for Amicus United Policyholders at 21 ("[I]t would make no sense to treat statutory bad faith differently from common law bad faith where the conduct of the insurer at issue is the same under both the common law and the statute.” (citing Birth Center, 567 Pa. at 410, 787 A.2d at 391)).

      . Accord Brief for Amicus Pa. Ass’n for Justice at 14 (“Assignments permit the injured party an expeditious route to recovery, grant the insured leverage to protect its interest and provide the insurer with an incentive to act in good faith.”); Brief for Amicus United Policyholders at 11 ("The right to make assignments protects the most financially vulnerable policyholders from opportunistic breaches by their insurance companies at the crucial moments when policyholders rightfully expect their insurers to protect them as their fiduciaries.”); id. at 30 ("[Tjhe core problem with Allstate's and the Insurance Industry's effort to bar assignments of statutory bad faith claims is doing so would shield insurers from a range of important remedies the Legislature designed to further public policy whenever a policyholder or insured is not financially capable of resolving an excess verdict caused by the insurer’s bad faith settlement practices.”).

      . Accord Brief for Amicus United Policyholders at 21 ("[The plaintiff] is directly affected by the insurer’s bad faith in failing to assist the policyholder in an earlier settlement, not an officious gambler with nothing at stake."); id. at 20 ("[Wjhether a bad faith claim is characterized as an action in tort or contract or both, vague assertions that public policy would be harmed by assignment of these claims due to ‘promotion of champerty,’ have not been borne out over years of experience with these assignments.”).

      . We realize that, conceptually, such overlay is by no means the only, reasonable treatment, and a number of other jurisdictions have recognized a common-law cause of action grounded in tort theory arising out of bad-faith conduct of insurance companies directed toward their insureds. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (1973); cf. Birth Center, 567 Pa. at 410-14, 787 A.2d at 391-93 (Zappala, J., dissenting, joined by Castille, J.) (positing that claims for bad-faith refusal to settle by insurers sound in tort). Relative to underlying principles, however, our decision today is constructed on the foundation of the present state of the law as it has developed in Pennsylvania.

      . Obviously, we have not undertaken to consider whether assignments should be viewed as substantive or procedural for separation-of-powers purposes, see Pa. Const, art. V, § 10(c) (delegating procedural rulemaking authority to this Court), because it is beyond the scope of our present inquiry. Our fundamental conclusion here is, simply, that we discern no legislative intent to preclude assignability of damages claims under Section 8371 to the degree these have been reposited into a preexisting liability scheme which permits assignments.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    105 A.3d 1188
    Christina GRIMES, Appellee, v. ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA, LLC, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 10, 2014.
    Decided Dec. 15, 2014.

      William R. Caroselli, Esq., Pittsburgh, David Samuel Senoff, Esq., Philadelphia, Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy, L.L.C., for Pennsylvania Association of Justice, Amicus Curiae.
    Carolyn Lee Carter, Esq., Michael D. Donovan, Esq., Philadelphia, Donovan Axler, LLC, Cary L. Flitter, Esq., Andrew Michael Milz, Esq., Narberth, Michael J. Quirk, Esq., Philadelphia, Williams Cuker Berezofsky, LLC, for National Consumer Law Center, National Association of Consumer Advocates, Community Legal Services, Amicus Curiae.
    Ralph Nathan Feldman, Esq., Michael P. Malakoff, Esq., Pittsburgh, Michael P. Malakoff P.C., for Neighborhood Legal Services, Association; Community Justice Project and Anew Community Institute, Amicus Curiae.
    Dorothy Alicia Hickok, Esq., Todd Nolan Hutchison, Esq., Philadelphia, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP, for Truck Renting and Leasing Association and the Industry Council for Vehicle Renting and Leasing, Amicus Curiae.
    Joseph Scott McFarlane, Esq., Philadelphia, for PA Business Council, PA Chamber of Business and Industry, and PA Food Merchants Association, Amicus Curiae.
    Theodore Henry Jobes, Esq., Abraham C. Reich, Esq., Philadelphia, Fox Rothschild LLP, for Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia.
    James Michael Alexander, Esq., James C. Haggerty, Esq., Haggerty, Goldberg, Schleifer & Kupersmith, P.C., Philadelphia, Gilbert F. McKnight IV, Esq., Nelson, Levine, deLuca & Horst, L.L.C., for Christina Grimes.
    Adrian Nathaniel Roe, Esq., Law Office of Adrian N. Roe, P.C., Charles B. Watkins, Esq., Pittsburgh, Law Office of Adrian N. Roe, P.C., for Class Action Overcharge Plaintiffs.
    CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (the “UTPCPL” or “Act”) provides a private cause of action to any person who, as a result of conduct that the UTPCPL prohibits, “suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal.” 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a). The Superior Court held here that Appellee Christina Grimes’s retention of counsel to institute this suit constituted such an “ascertainable loss.” We reverse.

The facts, which we have taken from Appellee’s pleadings, are as follows. Appellee signed a contract in December 2010, to rent a car from Appellant Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia, LLC (“Enterprise”). She agreed in the contract that she would pay for repairs for any damage the car incurred during the rental period, along with any administrative, loss-of-use, and diminishment-in-value fees. The contract set forth formulas for calculating the loss-of-use and diminishment-in-value fees. It also contained a power-of-attorney clause allowing Enterprise to request payment for any unpaid “claims, damages, liabilities, or rental charges” directly from Appellee’s insurance carrier or credit card company. When Appellee returned the car following the rental, an Enterprise employee informed her that she was responsible for a scratch on the car. Enterprise later sent Appellee a letter with an estimate for repairs and an invoice for administrative, loss-of-use, and diminishment-of-value fees, for a total of $840.42. Complaint, Exhibit A at 3 & ¶¶ 14-15.

Appellee, represented by counsel, instituted this action against Enterprise in June 2011, by filing a six-count complaint that included a claim for damages under the UTPCPL’s “catchall” provision. See 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi) (prohibiting “fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding”). The UTPCPL allows any person who, as a result of a UTPCPL violation, suffers “any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal,” to bring suit:

Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by [73 P.S. § 201-3] may bring a private action, to recover actual damages or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater. The court may, in its discretion, award up to three times the actual damages sustained, but not less than one hundred dollars ($100), and may provide such additional relief as it deems necessary or proper. The court may award to the plaintiff, in addition to other relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable attorney fees.

73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a).

Appellee’s complaint alleged that Enterprise had engaged in deceptive acts and had made misrepresentations by charging her unconscionable fees bearing no reasonable relationship to the costs of repairing the alleged damage to the car. Complaint ¶¶ 51, 56-58. She further averred that Enterprise had demanded payment and sought to collect directly from either her auto insurer or her credit card issuer, and alleged generally that she had suffered damages. Complaint ¶¶ 19, 20, 53, 59-60. Enterprise counterclaimed for the $840.42, and Appellee admitted in her reply to the counterclaim that she had not paid any part of the disputed sum.

Enterprise then moved for judgment on the pleadings, stating that if the court ruled in its favor, it would cease its collection efforts. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action. Regarding the UTPCPL claim, the court concluded that the pleadings did not establish a pecuniary loss, noting Enterprise’s praecipe to discontinue its counterclaims and its stipulation to cease its collection efforts. Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/12, at 2-3. Appellee appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court reversed as to Appellee’s UTPCPL claim, concluding that Appellee had sufficiently pled an “ascertainable loss.” Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Phila., LLC, 66 A.3d 330, 339 (Pa.Super.2013). The court considered Enterprise’s alleged threats to collect the $840.42 from Appellee’s auto insurance carrier and her credit card issuer, and Appellee’s hiring counsel to file suit to halt Enterprise’s collection efforts, to be sufficient to satisfy the “ascertainable loss” requirement. The court also pointed out that Enterprise had stipulated that it would cease its collection efforts only if the trial court granted its motion. In support of its decision, the Superior Court cited to a case it had decided in support of the proposition that this Court has engaged in the “consistent reminder that the UTPCPL ‘should [be] liberally construe[d] ... in order to effect the legislative goal of consumer protection.’ ” Grimes, supra, at 339 (quoting Fazio v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 62 A.3d 396, 405 (Pa.Super.2012)).

The Superior Court further supported its decision with a citation to Jarzyna v. Home Properties, L.P., 763 F.Supp.2d 742, 745 (E.D.Pa.2011). There, a landlord withheld a tenant’s security deposit and took steps to collect other sums, and the tenant brought a claim against the landlord under the UTPCPL. The federal district court concluded that the tenant had alleged an “ascertainable loss” because he had alleged that the landlord had unlawfully withheld his security deposit, and that the tenant had to retain counsel in order to obtain relief.

The Superior Court additionally cited Agliori v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 879 A.2d 315, 320 (Pa.Super.2005). In that case, a decedent’s estate had sued under the UTPCPL asserting that an insurer had used deceptive practices to persuade the decedent to surrender three life insurance policies so he could buy a single policy from the insurer. The Superior Court concluded that the estate had suffered an “ascertainable loss” because the death benefit from the surrendered policies would have exceeded the benefit under the new policy. The court stated that if it were to rule otherwise, “the deterrence value of the statute [would be] weakened, if not lost entirely.” Id. at 322. The Superior Court here cited Agliori’s reference to “the deterrence value of’ the UTPCPL to justify its conclusion that Appellee had properly pled an “ascertainable loss.” The court stated that, but for this suit, Enterprise would have “[presumably ... long since collected the disputed charges.” Grimes, supra at 339.

We granted review to consider the following question, as Enterprise phrased it in its Petition for Allowance of Appeal:

Whether the Superior Court erred when it held that a plaintiff may satisfy the UTPCPL’s “ascertainable loss” requirement by voluntarily hiring an attorney and allegedly incurring litigation costs to challenge allegedly wrongful conduct, even where, as here, the plaintiff paid no money to the defendant as a result of that conduct.

Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Phila., 624 Pa. 228, 84 A.3d 1058 (2014).

Before this Court, Enterprise argues that merely retaining an attorney to commence suit cannot satisfy the UTPCPL’s “ascertainable loss” element. Enterprise argues that if that proposition was correct, then anyone can meet the “ascertainable loss” requirement simply by finding a lawyer to bring a lawsuit, without actually suffering a loss of money or property. Enterprise criticizes the Superior Court’s application of the notion that the UTPCPL should be liberally construed as leading to a result that is contrary to the Act’s plain language. Enterprise maintains that because Appellee admits that she has never paid any of the disputed fees, she has not suffered an “ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal.”

Appellee responds that her retention of counsel satisfies the “ascertainable loss” requirement. She maintains that the availability under the UTPCPL of costs and attorneys’ fees does not bar “consideration of the expenditure” of such costs and fees as an “ascertainable loss,” if the costs and fees were a direct result of the act giving rise to the lawsuit. Appellee’s Brief at 45. She emphasizes that the General Assembly added the provision for costs and fees so that consumers who had been deprived of small amounts of money could afford to bring UTPCPL suits. Appellee argues that, in order to effectuate that purpose, we should construe the “ascertainable loss” requirement liberally and conclude that her allegations suffice. She also argues that we should not permit Enterprise to deprive her of standing by agreeing to cease its collection efforts, and thereby avoid the UTPCPL’s strictures. She asserts that such a ruling will weaken the enforcement of the Act’s provisions.

Because the issue comes to us on appeal from the grant of judgment on the pleadings, we are in effect faced with a demurrer to the pleadings. See Emerich v. Phila. Ctr. for Human Dev., Inc., 554 Pa. 209, 720 A.2d 1032, 1034 n. 1 (1998). Our review of the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is limited to whether the trial court committed an error of law or whether unresolved questions of material fact remained. Because the question of whether judgment on the pleadings was proper is a question of law, our scope of review is plenary. Bowman, 65 A.3d at 904. The question before us, then, is whether the factual allegations in Appellee’s pleadings, together with the allegations she has admitted in Enterprise’s pleadings, would be sufficient to support a verdict in Appellee’s favor.

We conclude that they would not. Appellee never asserted in her primary pleading, or admitted in a response to Enterprise’s pleadings, a loss of money or property due to Enterprise’s alleged UTPCPL violations. Indeed, she admitted that she has never paid anything toward the outstanding bill, and she has not argued that the unpaid bill, standing alone, meets the “ascertainable loss” requirement. Her assertion on appeal is that the mere retention of counsel constitutes an “ascertainable loss”; this assertion is insufficient to withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings because the assertion was never made in a pleading before the court below. See Pa.R.C.P. 1017(a) (limiting the pleadings in a civil action to a complaint; an answer; a reply if the answer contains either new matter, a counterclaim or a cross-claim; a counter-reply if the reply contains new matter; preliminary objections; and response to preliminary objections).

Even if Appellee had made the relevant allegations in a pleading, we hold that the mere acquisition of counsel would not suffice to satisfy the “ascertainable loss” requirement. Whether a relevant “ascertainable loss” was suffered here requires us to determine and effectuate the meaning the General Assembly intended to convey in its statutory language. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); Commonwealth v. Rushing, 627 Pa. 59, 99 A.3d 416, 423 (2014). If we conclude that the statutory language is ambiguous, we turn to the tools of statutory construction to determine the intended meaning. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c); Bricklayers of W. Pa. Combined Funds, Inc. v. Scott’s Dev. Co., 625 Pa. 26, 90 A.3d 682, 690 (2014). Statutory text is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. Warrantech Consumer Prods. Servs., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co. in Liquidation, 626 Pa. 218, 96 A.3d 346, 354-55 (2014). We also engage in certain presumptions when construing a statute, including the presumption that the General Assembly did not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1); Commonwealth v. Hall, 622 Pa. 396, 80 A.3d 1204, 1211 (2013).

Here, the operative statute initially provides for damages relative to “ascertainable loss[es],” then separately provides for awards of “costs and reasonable attorney fees.” 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a). This express authorization of attorney fees awards is “in addition to other relief provided in this section,” which “other relief’ encompasses the damages made available as compensation for ascertainable losses. The fees are derivative and consequential. Section 9.2(a)’s plain language makes it readily apparent that the General Assembly deemed ascertainable losses and attorneys’ fees to be distinct items for redress. Appellee’s construction of the “ascertainable loss” element as including attorney fees is unreasonable, and contradicted by the plain language of the statute. Moreover, as Enterprise has pointed out, Appellee’s reading would allow a plaintiff to manufacture the “ascertainable loss” required to bring a private UTPCPL claim simply by obtaining counsel to bring a private UTPCPL claim; we presume that such an unreasonable result was not intended by the General Assembly. Because Appellee’s argument is not premised upon a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language, neither her resort to the asserted purpose for which the Act allows costs and attorneys’ fees, nor the Superior Court’s reliance on the “deterrence value” of the UTPCPL, is persuasive. In either case, we would still be left with the untenable result that a plaintiff could incur an “ascertainable loss” simply by hiring counsel.

A similar infirmity attends Appellee’s additional assertion that Enterprise’s position will weaken enforcement of the Act. Moreover, that argument runs counter to the overall statutory scheme. The UTPCPL’s private right of action is not a general-purpose enforcement provision. Rather, the Act confers on the Attorney General and district attorneys the power to bring actions in the public interest to enforce the Act. See 73 P.S. § 201-4. Only those who can meet the requirements of the UTPCPL’s private cause of action may bring a personal action, and Appellee’s allegations simply do not satisfy the statutory “ascertainable loss” element.

The decisions in Jarzyna, supra, and Agliori, supra, also do not help Appellee’s cause. In both cases, the plaintiff had alleged a specific loss of money. In Jarzyna, the plaintiff asserted that his landlord withheld his security deposit; in Agliori, the plaintiff claimed that he had been deprived of insurance benefits. As for Enterprise’s stipulation, we do not dispute the general proposition that a defendant should not be permitted to evade a legal obligation by stipulating away a plaintiffs standing. But, the fact remains that it was Appellee who insufficiently pleaded an “ascertainable loss.” Thus, her UTPCPL claim cannot survive.

Finally, there is some force in the observations of other jurisdictions addressing similar provisions in state consumer protection statutes, that if attorneys’ fees were to be considered in the calculation of “ascertainable loss,” the explicit provision for the award of attorneys’ fees would be superfluous. See e.g., Jones v. Midland Funding, LLC, 755 F.Supp.2d 393, 398 (D.Conn.2010) (applying Connecticut law and holding that expenses incurred by a plaintiff in consulting an attorney and bringing suit do not constitute “ascertainable loss” under Connecticut consumer protection statute); C.A.R. Tow, Inc. v. Corwin, 76 Or.App. 192, 708 P.2d 644, 646 (1985) (“Although even a very small loss can qualify as an ‘ascertainable loss,’ ... attorney fees are not the type of loss that [the unfair trade practices statute] contemplates, because the legislature provided an independent basis for the recovery of attorney fees.” (citations omitted)).

The order of the Superior Court is reversed. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Former Justice McCAFFERY did not participate in the decision of this case.

Chief Justice CASTILLE, Justices SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD and STEVENS join the per curiam opinion.

      . 73 P.S. §§ 201-1-201-9.3.

      . Because we are reviewing the grant of judgment on the pleadings, we regard as true the well-pleaded allegations of Appellee’s pleadings, as she is the non-moving party, and consider against her only those factual allegations in Appellant’s pleadings that Appellee has admitted. Bowman v. Sunoco, Inc., 620 Pa. 28, 65 A.3d 901, 904 (2013) (quoting Pennsylvania Dept. of Banking v. NCAS of Delaware, LLC, 596 Pa. 638, 948 A.2d 752 (2008)).

      . Although we also granted review to consider whether a private plaintiff who alleges deceptive conduct under the UTPCPL's "catchall" provision need not plead or prove justifiable reliance, we will not address that question because the "ascertainable loss” issue is dispositive.


author:
Justice SAYLOR.
      Justice EAKIN,

text:
    105 A.3d 1194
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Jovon KNOX, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 8, 2014.
    Decided Dec. 15, 2014.

      Thomas N. Farrell, Esq., Pittsburgh, for Jovon Knox.
    Francesco Lino Nepa, Esq., Michael Wayne Streily, Esq., Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.

This appeal concerns a criminal defendant’s accountability for the illegal possession of a firearm by another, under accomplice-liability theory.

The facts underlying this appeal are cumbersome. In general, they reflect a recurring scenario in which a defendant (presently, Appellant) is charged with a possessory weapons offense deriving from the role of a firearm in a broader criminal undertaking, although, factually, another person (here, Appellant’s brother) actually possessed the weapon during the episode and the defendant himself was unarmed. See generally State v. Williams, 315 N.J.Super. 384, 718 A.2d 721, 722 (1998) (commenting on the frequency of the above fact pattern, which “surely must be a common problem, given the prevalence of multi-defendant cases, such as this, in which crimes are committed as to which accomplice liability is properly charged but wherein only one defendant may be carrying a weapon”).

The weapon offense presently at issue — “[flirearms not to be carried without a license” — pertains, inter alia, when an individual carries a concealed firearm on his person without a license. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1) (setting forth and elaborating upon this general rule, as well as delineating a series of exceptions). Obviously, such permutation, on facial terms, does not apply to unarmed co-perpetrators in a larger criminal undertaking who simply are not “carrying] a firearm concealed on or about [their] person.” Id. Nevertheless, the purport of the Superior Court’s present opinion is that the possessory weapons offense extends to persons who may be accomplices in the abstract. See Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 749, 759 (Pa.Super.2012) (determining, based on Appellant’s presence at the scene of a robbery in which his brother pulled a gun on the victim, conduct in fleeing the scene with his brother, and conduct in lying to police about his involvement, that Appellant “acted as [his brother’s] accomplice” and, as such, both “are criminally responsible for each other’s actions”). In substance, the Superior Court’s approach embodies the now-defunct common-law principle that each accomplice bears equal criminal responsibility for all acts of his associates or confederates committed in furtherance of a common design. See Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 554 Pa. 586, 595 n. 4, 722 A.2d 657, 661-62 n. 4 (1998) (alluding to this common-law, common-design principle in a context in which it was not controlling and, thus, with no assessment of its continuing longevity).

Per the express terms of the Crimes Code, however, accomplice liability has been made offense-specific. Accordingly, the general rule is that a person is an accomplice of another in the commission of “an offense” if, acting with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of “the offense,” he solicits the other person to commit it or aids, agrees, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it. 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c). The broader approaches — including the common-design theory and the related precept that an accomplice was liable for all of natural and probable consequences of the principal’s actions in the commission of a target offense— were supplanted by the General Assembly with the adoption of the Crimes Code and its incorporation of core restraints on criminal liability taken from the Model Penal Code. See generally Commonwealth v. Roebuck, 612 Pa. 642, 651-56, 32 A.3d 613, 618-22 (2011) (discussing the interrelationship between the culpability provisions of the Crimes Code and the Model Penal Code in terms of the treatment of accomplice liability).

In particular, the salient terms of Section 306 of the Crimes Code (“Liability for conduct of another; complicity”) are derived from Section 2.06 of the Model Penal Code, which expressly rejected the expansive common-design and natural- and-probable-consequences doctrines, refocusing liability for complicity squarely upon intent and conduct, not merely results. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.06 cmt. 6(b), at 312 (1985) (“[T]he liability of an accomplice ought not to be extended beyond the purposes that he shares. Probabilities have an important evidential bearing on these issues; to make them independently sufficient is to predicate the liability on negligence when, for good reason, more is normally required before liability is found.”). After the passage of the Crimes Code, status as an accomplice relative to some crimes within a larger criminal undertaking or episode no longer per se renders a defendant liable as an accomplice for all other crimes committed. See Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 578 Pa. 587, 607-08 & n. 11, 854 A.2d 489, 501 & n. 11 (2004). Rather, closer, offense-specific analysis of intent and conduct is required.

Accordingly, the Superior Court should have analyzed whether the evidence and reasonable inferences, taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, supported a conclusion that Appellant, acting with the intent to promote or facilitate his brother’s unlicensed carrying of a concealed firearm, solicited his brother to commit such offense or aided, agreed, or attempted to aid his brother in doing so. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 306(c), 6106(a)(1). In the absence of such a focused examination, the intermediate court’s broader assertion that, as accomplices, Appellant and his brother each were criminally liable for the other’s actions in the abstract is unsustainable.

Ordinarily, we would undertake sufficiency review on the appropriate terms or remand to the Superior Court in order for this to be accomplished. Presently, however, the trial court’s charge to the jury encompassed multiple, independent bases to support a conviction on the possessory weapons offense. In addition to accomplice liability, the court discussed such crime in terms of conspiratorial liability, as well as principal liability for the possessory weapons offense via theories of constructive and joint possession. See N.T., June 9, 2008, at 464-65. Since, however, there is no reviewable challenge to these additional liability predicates pending in this Court, each stands as an adequate and independent basis supporting Appellant’s conviction. See generally Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-60, 112 S.Ct. 466, 472-75, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (refusing to set aside a verdict on sufficiency grounds merely because the evidence may have been insufficient to sustain one of several alternative, independent grounds for the conviction presented to a jury). With regard to these grounds, we note only that there are conceptual difficulties in addressing each, particularly with regard to possessory weapons offenses, and, accordingly, it is essential for advocates to sharpen their presentations to the judiciary in this area of the law.

The order of the Superior Court is affirmed, albeit that the supportive reasoning regarding the possessory weapons offense is disapproved.

Former Justice McCAFFERY did not participate in the decision of this case.

Chief Justice CASTILLE, Justices BAER, TODD and STEVENS join the opinion.

Justice EAKIN files a concurring opinion.

Justice EAKIN,

concurring.

I disagree with the majority to the extent it suggests a conspiracy instruction can constitute an adequate and independent basis for a possession conviction when an individual is not charged with conspiracy to possess a firearm. Nonetheless, given appellant’s failure to contest the conspiracy instruction, I agree the possession conviction should be affirmed.

The conspiracy instruction here represents a legal error. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/09, at 6-7 (utilizing conspiracy theory to sustain possession conviction). While the jury could have found the evidence sufficient to convict appellant via joint and constructive possession, or via accomplice liability, the same cannot be said for conspiratorial liability. As the majority points out, the trial court gave the jury all three theories on which it could convict appellant of the firearms charge.

However, conspiracy is a distinct crime — it is not a statutory theory of liability for criminal acts of other people. If one conspires to commit a crime, one is guilty of conspiracy, but not the crime conspired. To be guilty of the underlying crime itself, one must actually commit that crime or be liable for it under another theory, such as accomplice liability, or here, constructive possession. Accomplice liability and constructive possession, unlike conspiracy, are not separate crimes but a means by which one may be responsible for criminal acts of another.

Thus, appellant here, not charged with conspiracy to possess the firearm, cannot be found guilty of possession via “conspiracy liability.” The trial court’s charge is therefore in error. Notwithstanding this, given appellant’s failure to challenge the conspiracy instruction as a legal error, rather than collaterally as a sufficiency claim, such a claim is not properly before this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Therefore, as the majority properly notes, the verdict is not assailable on the grounds before us, and I concur in affirming the possession conviction. I join the majority’s holding on the question for which we accepted review, namely, that illegal possession of a firearm may be based on an accomplice liability theory.

      . Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482 (as amended 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 110— 1110).

      . See generally Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 836-37 (D.C.2006) (alluding to the Model Penal Code’s rejection of the natural- and-probable-consequences approach); Michael G. Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: A Case Study in Failed Law Reform, 15 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 388, 395 (2010) (discussing the Model Penal Code’s rejection of the common-design doctrine); Wesley M. Oliver, Limiting Criminal Law’s “In for a Penny, In for a Pound" Doctrine, 103 Geo. LJ. Online 8, 9 (2013) (explaining that the imposition of broad-based criminal liability on accomplices for actions of others and results well beyond their contemplation "has been roundly criticized by academic and judicial commentators for at least a century").

      . There are statutory exceptions to this principle, most notably, the felony-murder rule. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b).

      . The Superior Court also cited this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Smith, 490 Pa. 329, 416 A.2d 494 (1980), for the proposition that "a defendant can be legally responsible for the illegal possession of a firearm under a theory of accomplice liability.” Knox, 50 A.3d at 758 (citing Smith, 490 Pa. at 333-34, 416 A.2d at 496-97). We take no issue with this assertion. Relative to Smith, we note only that the disposition was in response to a specific contention by the defendant that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he had any involvement whatsoever in a shooting perpetrated by a codefendant. See Smith, 490 Pa. at 333, 416 A.2d at 496. In rejecting this argument, the Court focused the two paragraphs containing its rationale upon the defendant's "words and actions at the time of the shooting,” which evidenced affirmative encouragement. See id. at 334, 416 A.2d at 497. For whatever reason, and presumably on account of the focus established by the litigants, the treatment in Smith was brief, relatively shallow, and lacking in focus upon the operative terms of Section 306 of the Crimes Code as they may relate to a possessory weapons offense. Thus, we do not believe the decision should be read to obviate a directed assessment of the controlling statutory scheme. Indeed, glossing over the statutory language would demonstrate little respect for its author, the General Assembly, which is the policymaking branch of government. Cf. Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, At Common Law and Under the Model Penal Code, 18 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 341, 400-14 (2001) (offering up staunch criticism of courts which have purportedly supplanted legislative efforts to implement directed approaches to criminal culpability taken from the Model Penal Code).

      . Conspiracy and accomplice liability are distinct concepts. See Roebuck, 612 Pa. at 642, 32 A.3d at 622-23.

      . As to accomplice liability, commentators frequently recount that this "is one of the most difficult topics to deal with properly.” Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine, 15 Berkeley J. Crim. L. at 389. The concepts of joint and constructive possession resonate more readily in the setting of crimes grounded on possession in the abstract, see, e.g., 35 P.S. § 780-113 (possession with intent to deliver), as contrasted with an offense permutation premised upon the specific conduct of “carr[ying] a firearm concealed about his person,” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1), which at least facially suggests a form of actual physical possession. In terms of conspiratorial liability, like accomplice liability, this has been impacted by the General Assembly’s adoption of concepts taken from the Model Penal Code. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 903 & Official Comment ("This section is derived from Section 5.03 of the Model Penal Code.”).

      . See, e.g., Williams, 718 A.2d at 724 (describing a "conceptual morass into which courts may be led,” relative to the imposition of criminal liability for possession of a weapon which a defendant did not physically possess).