source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Chief Justice SAYLOR.

license: Public Domain

text:
    139 A.3d 154
    IA CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (RHODES) Appeal of: Jeffrey Rhodes.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 5, 2016.
    Decided May 25, 2016.

      Thomas C. Baumann, Esq., Pittsburgh, for Jeffrey Rhodes.

      Daniel King Bricmont, Esq., Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Coleman, L.L.C., Pittsburgh, for Pennsylvania Association For Justice.
    Terry Lee M. Bashline, Esq., Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, Philadelphia, for IA Construction Corporation and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
    Amber Marie Kenger, Esq., Workers Compensation Appeal Board, for Workers Compensation Appeal Board.
    SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
   OPINION

Chief Justice SAYLOR.

This appeal centers on the validity of a workers’ compensation judge’s decision to reject opinion testimony from an independent medical witness presented by an employer and insurer, in the absence of any contrary evidence adduced by the claimant.

Background

The matter arises in the context of Section 306(a.2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 511.2, which was promulgated in 1996 as a component of the General Assembly’s efforts to address the rising costs of the workers’ compensation liability scheme. See Gardner v. WCAB (Genesis Health Ventures), 585 Pa. 366, 368 n. 1, 888 A.2d 758, 759 n. 1 (2005). Per the statute, after a workers’ compensation claimant has received total disability benefits for a period of 104 weeks, the insurer is to request an impairment rating evaluation, or an IRE, which is a medical examination directed toward assessing the degree of a claimant’s impairment attributable to a compensable injury. See 77 P.S. § 511.2(1). “Impairment,” in this context, connotes an anatomic or functional abnormality or loss resulting from a compensable injury that is reasonably presumed to be permanent, id. § 511.2(8)(i), as distinguished from “disability,” which more broadly concerns the loss of earnings capacity, see Dillon v. WCAB (Greenwich Collieries), 536 Pa. 490, 501, 640 A.2d 386, 392 (1994) (explaining that the concept of “disability” under the Act encompasses both capacity to work and job availability). See generally Diehl v. WCAB (I.A.Constr.), 607 Pa. 254, 277-79, 5 A.3d 230, 244-45 (2010) (elaborating upon the distinction between impairment and disability).

As a consequence of an effective impairment rating of less than 50 percent, the designation of the claimant’s disability is converted from total to partial, thereby limiting the insurer’s otherwise continuing liability to benefits payable throughout a maximum, closed-end period of 500 weeks. See 11 P.S. § 511.2(7). Accordingly, one main purport of the statute is that a claimant whose condition may continue to meet the conventional definition of total “disability”—a concept centered on overall earnings capacity encompassing both physical capacity and job availability—may nevertheless be limited in the time frame during which he or she may receive workers’ compensation benefits. See Diehl, 607 Pa. at 280, 5 A.3d at 246 (explaining that an employer/insurer is not required to produce evidence of earning power or job availability to support conversion of a disability designation from total to partial under Section 306(a.2), based on an effective impairment rating of less than 50 percent). See generally David. B. Torrey & Andrew E. Greenberg, 6 West’s Pa. Practice Series, Workers’ Compensation: Law and Practice, § 6:41 (3rd ed. 2008) (“[T]he 500 weeks provides a horizon with regard to the claimant’s entitlement and the employer’s liability.”).

Of additional significance to the present matter, a duly rendered impairment rating is automatically effective if the employer/insurer requested the examination within 60 days after the expiration of the 104-week period prescribed by the statute. See Gardner, 585 Pa. at 373, 888 A.2d at 762 (construing Section 306(a.2)(1), 77 P.S. § 511.2(1)). However, where, as here, the employer/insurer submits a later request for an IRE, the effect of the rating assessment is not automatic. Rather, such opinion must be vetted through the traditional administrative adjudicatory process, upon the employer/insurer’s submission of a petition for modification of benefits. See id. at 382, 888 A.2d at 768.

In 2005, the appellant, Jeffrey Rhodes (“Claimant”) suffered injuries in a vehicular accident, while in the course of his employment with the employer-appellee, IA Construction Corporation (hereinafter referred to with the company’s insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., collectively, as “Employer”). Claimant filed a claim petition under the Act. See 77 P.S. § 711.

In 2007, a workers’ compensation judge granted this petition and awarded total disability benefits, see id. § 511(1), finding that Claimant had sustained work-related injuries, including traumatic brain injury with organic affective changes, persistent cognitive problems, memory impairment, posttraumatic headaches, posttraumatic vertigo or impaired balance, and musculoskeletal or myofascial neck and back injuries.

Several years later, Employer filed a specialized notice under governing administrative regulations designed to initiate the impairment rating process. See 34 Pa.Code § 123.102(e). The Department of Labor and Industry’s Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (the “Bureau”), in turn, designated M. Bud Lateef, M.D., a physician maintaining board certifications in physical, rehabilitation, and pain medicine, to conduct an IRE. Subsequently, based on the results of the ensuing examination—and given that the IRE had been requested outside the period associated with a rating accorded automatic effect—Employer filed a petition seeking to modify the workers’ compensation benefits payable to Claimant. See 77 P.S. § 772.

To develop a record, Employer proceeded with a deposition of Dr. Lateef, who assigned an impairment rating of 34 percent to Claimant. The physician testified that he had examined Claimant and reviewed various medical records. According to Dr. Lateef, he confirmed three primary present diagnoses, which he described as traumatic brain injury, a cervical condition in the nature of a herniated disc, and a spinal condition resulting in gait dysfunction. Dr. Lateef explained that he assigned a discrete impairment rating to each of these conditions, which, together, comprised the 34 percent “whole person impairment rating” under the Sixth Edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (the “AMA Guides”). Deposition of M. Bud Lateef dated Feb. 10, 2011, in Rhodes v. IA Constr. Corp., No. 390-891992 (DLI, Bur. of Workers’ Comp.), at 14. The physician further opined that Claimant had reached a maximum level of medical improvement.

In hearings before a workers’ compensation judge (the “WCJ”), Employer presented Dr. Lateefs deposition testimony and the physician’s underlying report. Claimant did not testify on his own behalf, nor did he present medical testimony or other evidence.

The WCJ denied Employer’s modification petition, rejecting Dr. Lateefs impairment rating opinion. Initially, the WCJ expressed a concern that Dr. Lateef had inappropriately “lumped” an array of discrete injuries into three categories. Decision of WCJ Cheryl A. Ignasiak in Rhodes v. IA Constr. Corp., Claim No. 2847534, slip op. at 3 (DLI, Workers’ Comp. Office of Adjudication Sep. 26, 2011). In this regard, the WCJ referred back to the series of injuries accepted by the workers’ compensation judge in the initial claims determination and criticized Dr. Lateef for failing to adequately account for all of these.

The WCJ then focused her concern upon the significant portion of Claimant’s impairment rating attributable to cognitive issues. In her estimation, Dr. Lateefs assessment of cognition was an unduly limited one, since he performed only a cursory examination and otherwise relied upon only a limited range of medical records. In the circumstances—and particularly since Dr. Lateef specialized in physical medicine and pain management, not neurology—-the WCJ indicated that she was unpersuaded by his opinion.

On Employer’s appeal, the WCAB affirmed in a divided opinion. The majority relied substantially on the principle that a WCJ, as the factfinder, appropriately determines the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented. See Rhodes v. IA Constr. Co., No. A11-1631, slip op., at 4 (WCAB Nov. 5, 2013) (“The Judge chose to place great weight on the fact that Dr. Lateef was not more qualified in dealing with traumatic brain injuries and we won’t disturb her determination.”). The dissenting members, on the other hand, observed that, procedurally, the IRE had been conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Act. Furthermore, they attributed significance to the fact that employers do not participate in the process of selecting IRE physicians, and that such function is administered by the Bureau. See 77 P.S. § 511.2(1) (specifying that IRE physicians are to be “chosen by agreement of the parties, or as designated by the department”). Although the dissenters acknowledged that “Dr. Lateefs report could have been greatly improved upon,” Rhodes, No. A11-1631, slip op., at 8 (Frioni, Chairman, dissenting), they nevertheless were sufficiently convinced by the report and associated opinion testimony.

On further appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed in a published decision. See IA Constr. Corp. v. WCAB (Rhodes), 110 A.3d 1096 (Pa.Cmwlth.2015). From the outset of its analysis, the intermediate court stressed that Dr. Lateef met the WCA’s stated qualifications for IRE physicians and that he followed the statutorily-prescribed methodology for conducting the examination. See id. at 1101-02 (citing 77 P.S. § 511.2(1)). The court took the position, therefore, that the WCJ lacked the authority to reject the physician’s testimony on the basis that cognitive impairment was outside the area of his specialization. See id. at 1102 (opining that rejection of an impairment rating based on a mismatch between the particular specialization of an examining physician and a claimant’s condition “would impose standards in excess of those set forth in Section 306(a.2)(l) of the Act”). Although the court acknowledged that applicable regulations permit evaluating physicians to refer claimants to specialists, see id. at 1100 (referencing 34 Pa.Code § 123.105(b)), it dismissed the relevance of those regulations upon the observation that such referrals are within the examiner’s discretion.

In terms of the remaining reasons provided by the WCJ in support of her finding that Dr. Lateef s testimony was unpersuasive, the Commonwealth Court posited, based on the requirement that factual findings must be supported by substantial evidence, that “a WCJ’s opinion as to the insufficiency of an IRE cannot stand without some record support.” Id. at 1102. Noting Claimant’s failure to adduce evidence on his own behalf, the intermediate court found the record to be lacking in these material regards. Along these lines, the court explained that the WCJ did not reference any provisions of the AMA Guides or other evidence in support of her conclusions that Dr. Lateef mischaracterized or improperly grouped Claimant’s injuries or that he erroneously calculated the impairment rating. See id.

We allowed this appeal to address the issue, as framed by Claimant, of “[wjhether the Commonwealth Court overstepped its appellate function in making credibility judgments which is the sole function of the Workers’ Compensation Judge.” IA Constr. Corp. v. WCAB (Rhodes), 632 Pa. 611, 121 A.3d 981 (2015) (per curiam). Generally, agency-level decisions—such as those of the WCJ and WCAB here—are to be affirmed on appeal so long as the essential findings are supported by substantial evidence and there has been no constitutional violation, procedural irregularity, or error of law. See 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. WCAB (Marlowe), 571 Pa. 189, 199, 812 A.2d 478, 485 (2002).

Presently, Claimant contends that the Commonwealth Court usurped the function of the WCJ, as fact-finder, by assigning greater weight to Dr. Lateefs opinion testimony than was attributed to such evidence at the agency level. According to Claimant, the WCJ supplied appropriate supporting justifications for her judgments, based upon her determinations that Dr. Lateef “was not the proper specialist to perform the IRE and he did not properly assess all of the conditions that were disabling Claimant.” Brief for Claimant at 21. Claimant maintains that, because Employer had not requested an IRE within the 60-day time frame specified in Section 306(a.2)(1), Dr. Lateefs testimony had no special effect, but rather, merely served as evidence in the proceedings on Employer’s modification petition. Similarly, Claimant’s amicus, the Pennsylvania Association for Justice, particularly criticizes the Commonwealth Court for treating Dr. Lateefs status as a qualified impairment rating examiner as foreclosing the rejection of his testimony by the fact-finder on its substantive merits. See Brief for Amicus Pa. Ass’n for Justice at 10 (positing that the qualifications for an IRE physician as set forth in Section 306(a.2)(1) “go to competency” but “do not ... require that the ‘qualified’ witnesses’ opinions be accepted as true or accorded more legal weight or credibility than any other type of evidence” (citing Diehl, 607 Pa. at 279, 5 A.3d at 245)).

Employer, on the other hand, stresses that Dr. Lateef was qualified to render an impairment rating evaluation per the standards set forth in Section 306(a.2) and in agency regulations, and that his examination was performed in accordance with the prescribed medical guides. As such, and consistent with the Commonwealth Court’s determination, Employer maintains that the WCJ lacked the authority to reject his opinion testimony in the absence of any contrary evidence adduced by Claimant. See, e.g., Brief for Employer at 19 (“[I]t was incumbent on the claimant to prove that the failure to consult with another specialist somehow resulted in a lowered impairment rating, and not just a lowered rating, but that a revised rating would have met the 50% threshold if another specialist had been consulted.”). It is also Employer’s position that any challenge to Dr. Lateefs qualifications was waived, as Claimant never objected to the Bureau’s selection of the physician.

Employer acknowledges that “[ujsually, the Workers’ Compensation Judge has the power to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, as a valid exercise of her fact-finding function.” Brief for Employer at 12. Employer nonetheless asserts that this standard is not presently applicable, because: 1) Claimant produced no contrary evidence of any kind; and 2) independent ratings examiners are chosen by the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, not employers. In the latter regard, Employer recognizes that the Bureau’s regulations allow for optional specialist referrals, but it notes that such referrals are within the discretion of the IRE physician. Employer also repeatedly asserts that Dr. Lateef accorded Claimant “the maximum rating permitted under the AMA guidelines.” Brief for Employer at 7-8; see also id. at 16, 19. Based upon this representation, Employer deems it irrelevant whether or not Dr. Lateef was a specialist in assessing traumatic brain injuries.

In terms of the WCJ’s concern with “lumping,” Employer counters that there was no evidence presented that the categorizations selected by Dr. Lateef were not entirely consistent with the AMA Guides. To the degree that the WCJ expressed a concern that the physician had not rated all of the conditions accepted as injuries by the initial workers’ compensation judge in the claim adjudication, Employer finds this to be inconsistent with the nature of impairment ratings, which focus on the examinee’s current condition. See id. at 19-20 (“The IRE produces a snapshot of the claimant’s condition at the time of the IRE, not a survey of the claimant’s work-related injuries from the date of the injury to the date of the exam.” (citing Westmoreland Reg’l Hosp. v. WCAB (Pickford), 29 A.3d 120, 128 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011))).

Broadly speaking, Employer charges that upholding the WCJ’s decision would be tantamount to overturning the governing substantial-evidence review standard and “would allow a Workers’ [Compensation] Judge to use her own medical opinions, and untested knowledge outside of the record, in order to make a decision, and then hide behind a curtain that claims that all decisions are ultimately credibility decisions, and never should be disturbed.” Brief for Employer at 21.

Discussion

A. General Observations Concerning Section 306(a.2)

Before proceeding to the merits, we pause to reflect on Section 806(a.2) as a whole. As previously observed, the enactment imposed a cost-containment regime focused upon “impairment,” as opposed to “disability,” the latter of which traditionally was the core of the workers’ compensation scheme. See generally Torrey & Greenberg, 6 West’s Pa. Practice, § 6:1. As with other instances of experimental legislation, conceptual and other difficulties with the impairment rating scheme have become evident over time. For example, the statute facially contemplates the initiation of a mandatory, determinative impairment rating evaluation process within a specific, narrow time frame. See 77 P.S. § 511.2(1). However, the AMA Guides preclude such a rating unless and until the examinee has reached maximum medical improvement. See Combine v. WCAB (Nat’l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp.), 964 A.2d 776, 779-80 & n. 3 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008).

Throughout the balance of the statute, the drafters appear to have assumed that the initial rating will always have been accomplished as directed, even though this will not be possible in all cases. For example, on its face, Section 306(a.2) authorizes subsequent impairment rating examinations to assess whether “the employe’s condition improves to an impairment rating that is less than fifty per centum,” 77 P.S. § 511.2(5) (emphasis added), thus appearing to contemplate a baseline established by an initial rating. Similarly, Section 306(a.2)(6) references the “status of the impairment,” which may be determined through an ongoing series of medical evaluations. Id. § 511.2(6).

Ultimately, the statute pronounces that “[i]n no event shall the total number of weeks of total disability exceed one hundred four weeks for any employee who does not meet a threshold impairment rating that is equal to or greater than fifty per centum impairment,” per the applicable guides. Id. § 511.2(7). Again, this language seems to give no account for circumstances in which an impairment rating is impossible or no examination has occurred for some other reason. Moreover, despite the severe and explicit repercussions of this last provision upon claimants’ entitlement to continuing benefits, even in instances in which suitable employment is unavailable, no mechanism is provided in the statute for claimants to seek and obtain an IRE on his or her own account.

In light of the incongruities arising from the face of the statute, the judicial decisions interpreting it cannot be fully reconciled with the enactment as a whole. For example, while Section 306(a.2)(6) explicitly affords insurers the right to compel “independent medical examination^] in accordance with the provisions of Section 314 to determine the status of impairment,” id. § 511.2(6)—and Section 314 plainly provides that examiners “shall be selected and paid for by the employer,” id. § 651—the courts have nevertheless determined that impairment rating examiners must be selected by the Bureau. See, e.g., Lewis v. WCAB (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.), 856 A.2d 313, 319 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004); accord Diehl, 607 Pa. at 278, 5 A.3d at 245 (indicating, via citation to Section 306(a.2)(l), that the qualifications of a physician authorized to perform an IRE include designation by the Bureau or selection by the parties). This disharmony presumably derives from the fact that, by reason of impossibility or otherwise, many initial IREs simply do not occur immediately after the 104-week period as Section 306(a.2)(l) directs. Thus, the provision for reviewing “the status of impairment” has been employed to serve as a catchall for both initial and ongoing reviews, 77 P.S. § 511.2(6).

These many difficulties suggest, very strongly, that this is an area of law that is ripe for legislative review, so that the statute can be clarified and improved; fairness may be enhanced, as it must, in the midst of the many compromises and trade-offs inherent in a workers’ compensation liability scheme; and the manifest intentions of the policy-making branch can be put into effect, subject to the limits of the Constitution.

Of necessity, our present decision is rendered in the context of the existing statute and the prevailing law as it has developed to this point.

B. Credibility, Persuasiveness, Weight, and Deference

As previously noted, the question which Claimant has presented on appeal is couched in terms of the “credibility” of Dr. Lateefs opinion. IA Constr. Corp., 632 Pa. at 611, 121 A.3d at 981. However, the WCJ’s opinion is framed in terms of the persuasiveness of the opinion and the weight that was accorded to it.

In the arena of administrative adjudication and otherwise, the term “credibility” has different connotations depending upon the context. The word is sometimes used, in its broadest sense, as a synonym for persuasiveness. In other instances, however, it is employed to focus on essential truth telling, encompassing the fact-finder’s assessment of witness demeanor. See Kopack v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 946, 953 (7th Cir.1982) (elaborating upon this distinction). Here, particularly because Dr. Lateefs testimony was presented to the WCJ in the form of a written deposition, we treat Claimant’s use of the term “credibility” in the broader sense.

This consideration points up another distinction applied in some courts, since, in some jurisdictions, demeanor-based judgments at an agency fact-finding level are accorded special deference on judicial review; whereas, fact-based conclusions derived from depositions and other written materials are given lesser or no deference. See, e.g., Davidson v. Horton Indus., Inc., 641 N.W.2d 138, 142 (S.D.2002) (citation omitted). Under the prevailing law as it has developed in the Pennsylvania workers’ compensation setting, however, a workers’ compensation judge is generally deemed to be the “ultimate finder of fact and the exclusive arbiter of credibility and evidentiary weight.” Daniels v. WCAB (Tristate Transp.), 674 Pa. 61, 76, 828 A.2d 1043, 1052 (2003) (quoting Thompson v. WCAB (USF&G Co.), 566 Pa. 420, 426-27, 781 A.2d 1146, 1150 (2001)) (emphasis added). In other words, Pennsylvania appellate tribunals accord broader deference to fact-based determinations of workers’ compensation judges than is afforded in some other jurisdictions.

Indeed, some jurisdictions apply an uncontradicted medical evidence rule in workers’ compensation cases, per which such evidence is generally binding on the fact-finder. See, e.g., Nunez v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 108 N.M. 186, 769 P.2d 99, 101 (Ct.App.1988). There is presently no doctrinal equivalent within the Pennsylvania workers’ compensation scheme, however, and neither the Commonwealth Court nor Employer has presented a developed explanation as to why we should depart from the existing jurisprudence and supplant the “traditional administrative process” into which IRE-based modification petitions have been channeled, per the previous line of decisions. Diehl, 607 Pa. at 279, 6 A.3d at 245; Gardner, 585 Pa. at 380, 888 A.2d at 766.

Indeed, in Diehl this Court specifically determined that an IRE under Section 306(a.2)(6) “is entitled to no more or less weight than the results of any other examination.” Diehl, 607 Pa. at 279, 5 A.3d at 245. Accordingly, to the degree that the Commonwealth Court has fashioned, essentially, an uncontra-dicted medical evidence rule, we disapprove its decision.

In response to Employer’s position that such disapproval is tantamount to an evisceration of substantial-evidence review, we disagree. As this Court has explained previously, the substantial-evidence facet of the appellate review of administrative agency adjudications simply may not apply to scenarios in which a prevailing party presented no evidence. See Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc., 571 Pa. at 200-01, 812 A.2d at 486. Rather, such matters often turn upon the weight attributed by the fact-finder to the evidence presented by the party bearing the burden of proof. See id. It is for this reason that the Commonwealth Court had fashioned a particularized “capricious disregard standard of review” to serve as a check against untenable rejections of uncontradicted evidence. See id. (discussing Russell v. WCAB (Volkswagen of Am.), 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 436, 550 A.2d 1364 (1988)).

Here, Employer bore the burden to establish grounds for modification. See Vista Int’l Hotel v. WCAB (Daniels), 560 Pa. 12, 28-29 n. 11, 742 A.2d 649, 658 n. 11 (1999) (discussing the traditional allocation of the burden upon employers to demonstrate grounds for modification after the claimant has demonstrated a compensable work-related injury in the first instance). Furthermore, the WCJ was free to accept or reject Employer’s evidence. In our view, the fairness considerations arising out of the fact that, under prevailing judicial interpretations of Section 306(a.2), the Bureau (and not employers) selects IRE physicians, are insufficient to justify a judicial policymaking decision to implement a specialized approach to IREs conducted under Section 306(a.2)(6). Accord Diehl, 607 Pa. at 279, 5 A.3d at 245.

There is one additional relevant check extending to fact-finding determinations in the workers’ compensation arena, in that workers’ compensation judges are required to issue developed, reasoned decisions. See 77 P.S. § 834; Daniels, 574 Pa. at 67, 828 A.2d at 1046. It is in this particular respect that this Court has drawn a distinction between oral testimony and the submission of written materials such as depositions. See id. at 67-68, 78-79, 828 A.2d at 1046, 1053. Nevertheless, we have recognized that appellate courts must “be sensitive in not imposing an unwieldy standard of articulation upon the adjudication process,” and thus, in the latter instances, they are to look simply for “the actual objective basis for the credibility determination.” Id. at 75, 78, 828 A.2d at 1052, 1053.

C. The Specialization Concern

At this juncture, we express our agreement with Employer’s position that two of the three of the WCJ’s explanations supporting her rejection of Dr. Lateefs impairment rating opinion are unconvincing as stated. As Employer observes, to the degree that the WCJ's decision harkened back to the full range of Claimant’s initial work-related injuries, it was facially in tension with the nature of an IRE, which assesses the examinee’s present condition. In this regard, medical improvements occurring between the time of the initial injury and the examination may resolve impairments; indeed, as noted, the doctrinal underpinnings of the Medical Guides are rooted to the occurrence of maximum improvement and “permanency,” see AMA Guides §§ 2.5e, 2.5f.

We also agree that the WCJ’s concern with “lumping” medical conditions is too underdeveloped to be accorded controlling significance. The AMA Guides themselves establish broad categories of impairments tied to functional sub-units of a whole person, such as the nervous system. See AMA Guides, Ch. 13. Accordingly, in furtherance of a reasoned decision, the WCJ should have explained how Dr. Lateefs categorizations were inconsistent with those he was required to implement, per such guidelines.

Our decision thus turns upon the degree to which the WCJ’s concern with Dr. Lateefs out-of-specialty opinion relative to traumatic brain injury serves as a sufficient basis for a reasoned rejection of his testimony. In this regard, although Employer treats the WCJ’s decision as entirely superficial, Employer itself presents a shallow argument in its repeated assertion that Dr. Lateef accorded the maximum impairment rating available to Claimant’s brain injury. See Brief for Employer at 7-8, 16, 19. In point of fact, the physician assigned the maximum rating available within the class of impairment that he selected (“Moderate abnormalities”), but higher percentages attend more severe classifications. See AMA Guides, Table 13-8. For this reason, most assuredly, 20 percent impairment is not necessarily “the maximum rating permitted under the AMA guidelines.” Brief for Employer at 7-8.

Superficiality was also the basis for the WCJ’s concern with Dr. Lateefs examination relative to Claimant’s brain injury. The examination appears to have centered on Claimant’s ability to say his own name, describe his present location, supply the correct date, spell a word backwards, and identify the President of the United States. See Deposition of M. Bud Lateef dated Feb. 10, 2011, in Rhodes, No. 390-391992, at 10. According to the AMA Guides, however, an examination for neurological impairment “should be based on a detailed mental status examination, often in concert with neuropsychological assessment and testing.” AMA Guides § 13.3d. Like the WCJ, we find little in Dr. Lateefs deposition or report to suggest that such a detailed mental status examination was undertaken. Cf. Rhodes, No. A11-1631, slip op., at 7 (Frioni, Chairman, dissenting) (recognizing that “Dr. Lateefs report could have been greatly improved upon”).

It is also significant that, like Employer’s presentation to this Court, Dr. Lateefs testimony does not elaborate on the differences in impairment attaching to the different classes of neurological impairment (which are normal and mild, moderate, severe, and most profound abnormalities). An apparent question, not answered by the physician, is what sort of additional impact on activities of daily living would be required to move from the “moderate abnormalities” classification attributed to Claimant, justifying the up to 20 percent impairment rating, to the “severe” or “most profound” abnormalities classifications, warranting up to 35 and 50 percent impairment ratings, respectively. See AMA Guides, Table 13-8.

In the above landscape, we decline to deem the WCJ’s concerns with Dr. Lateef s opinion “unreasoned.” While we recognize that employers lack control over the IRE process within the prevailing administrative scheme, claimants have as little or less control. To the degree that there is an element of unfairness associated with the Bureau’s handling of individual IRE physician assignments, this would appear to be a systemic concern most appropriate to administrative and/or legislative consideration. In the meantime, Employer will simply need to do its best to communicate its case-specific concerns to the Bureau, at least to the extent that it wishes to pursue the series of ongoing impairment rating examinations of Claimant authorized by Section 306(a.2)(6).

Notably, our decision that a workers’ compensation judge may validly accord lesser weight to an underdeveloped, out-of-specialty opinion regarding the degree of impairment associated with traumatic brain injury is consistent with the approach of other jurisdictions that do not apply an uncontradicted medical evidence rule. See, e.g., Adams v. Massanari, 55 Fed.Appx. 279, 284 (6th Cir.2003) (explaining that, as a general rule at least, an administrative law judge “may discredit the opinion of a physician that is outside her area of expertise” (citing Turley v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 524, 527 (8th Cir.1991))).

In summary, this Court has previously determined that physicians’ impairment rating opinions pertaining to IREs conducted under Section 306(a.2)(6) are subject to vetting through the “traditional administrative process.” Diehl, 607 Pa. at 279, 5 A.3d at 245; Gardner, 585 Pa. at 380, 888 A.2d at 766. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court erred in its conclusions that a workers’ compensation judge lacks the authority to reject uncontradicted testimony by an IRE physician and that, in the present case, the WCJ was required to identify substantial contrary evidence in the record to support such rejection.

The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for reinstatement of the workers’ compensation judge’s adjudication, as affirmed by the WCAB.

Justices BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY and WECHT join the opinion.

      . Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736 (as amended 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.1, 2501-2626) (the “WCA” or the “Act”).

      . In Protz v. WCAB (Deny Area Sch. Dist.), 124 A.3d 406 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc), the Commonwealth Court held that Section 306(a.2)’s prescription for impairment ratings to proceed under the “most recent edition” of the AMA Guides effected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. See id. at 416. While this issue has been otherwise accepted for review by this Court, see Protz v. WCAB (Derry Area Sch. Dist.), 635 Pa. 198, 133 A.3d 733 (2016) (per curiam), it was not raised in the present case and will not be considered in this appeal.

      . Claimant initially lodged a hearsay objection relative to the report, which, at the time, the WCJ sustained. See N.T., Sep. 16, 2010, at 6. Later, however, such objection was apparently withdrawn, see Deposition of M. Bud Lateef dated Feb. 10, 2011, in Rhodes, No. 390-391992, at 14, and the WCJ admitted the report into evidence. See N.T., Apr. 18, 2011, at 5.

      . The statute is remarkable in this provision for ongoing, biannual review for improvement of conditions, that, medically, must be deemed to be permanent before an impairment rating may be assigned in the first instance.

      . In this respect, we agree with Claimant's amicus that the Commonwealth Court incorrectly intermixed expert witness qualifications with the weight to be accorded to such a witness's testimony by a workers’ compensation judge. This distinction is also relevant to Employer’s waiver argument—although Claimant may have waived any objection to Dr. Lateef’s qualifications as an examiner, he did not surrender his ability to maintain that the physician’s opinion was substantively unpersuasive.

      . Ultimately, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this opinion, this Court determined that such review could extend to circumstances in which the evidence was contradicted, as a component of the appellate courts’ responsibility to review whether an agency-level decision is in accordance with law. See Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc., 571 Pa. at 203-04, 812 A.2d at 487-88.

      . We have often remarked upon the superior resources available to the General Assembly in policymaking ventures. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 605 Pa. 269, 301 & n. 27, 989 A.2d 313, 333 & n. 27 (2010) (referencing the broader tools available to the legislative branch, such as policy hearings and comprehensive investigations); Naylor v. Twp. of Hellam, 565 Pa. 397, 408, 773 A.2d 770, 777 (2001) (recognizing the General Assembly’s superior ability to examine social policy issues and determine legal standards so as to balance competing concerns); Program Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Dauphin Cnty. Gen. Auth., 593 Pa. 184, 192, 928 A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (2007) ("[I]t is the Legislature’s chief function to set public policy and the courts’ role to enforce that policy, subject to constitutional limitations.”).

      . We do caution that workers' compensation judges should be sensitive to the character of the impairment rating process, which focuses on the entire body of the examinee. Thus, by its nature, the evaluation in most cases will require a review of cross-specialty considerations. Our decision here focuses on the discrete nature of brain injuries in that they often implicate specialized assessment measures, see AMA Guides § 13.3d, the undisputed fact that Claimant suffers from at least a moderate brain injury, and the import of such injury to the overall impairment rating.


author:
Justice BAER.
     Chief Justice SAYLOR,

text:
    139 A.3d 165
    PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION v. ANDREW SEDER/THE TIMES LEADER. WNEP-TV, Channel 16; Times Shamrock; Times News, LLC; The Associated Press; Reading Eagle Company; PPL Electric Utilities Corporation; Pocono Mountain Media Group; Philadelphia Media Network, LLC, PA Media Group; Lancaster Newspaper, Inc.; Calkins Media Inc., Intervenors, Appeal of Andrew Seder/The Times Leader; Associated Press; Calkins Media Inc.; Lancaster Newspaper Inc.; PA Media Group; Philadelphia Media Network, LLC; Pocono Mountains Media Group; Reading Eagle Company; and Times News, LLC. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Scott Kraus/The Morning Call. WNEP-TV, Channel 16; Times Shamrock; Times News, LLC; The Associated Press; Reading Eagle Company; PPL Electric Utilities Corporation; Pocono Mountain Media Group; Philadelphia Media Network, LLC, PA Media Group; Lancaster Newspaper, Inc.; Calkins Media Inc., Intervenors, Appeal of Scott Kraus/The Morning Call; Associated Press; Calkins Media Inc.; Lancaster Newspaper Inc.; PA Media Group; Philadelphia Media Network, LLC; Pocono Mountains Media Group; Reading Eagle Company; and Times News, LLC.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Nov. 18, 2015.
    Resubmitted Jan. 20, 2016.
    Decided May 25, 2016.

      Donna M.J. Clark, Esq., Energy Association of Pennsylvania, for Energy Association of Pennsylvania, amicus curiae.
    Melissa Bevan Melewsky, Esq., Pennsylvania NewsMedia Association, for Pennsylvania NewsMedia Association and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.
    Joshua D. Bonn, Esq., Harrisburg, Craig James Stauden-maier, Esq., Nauman, Smith, Shissler & Hall, L.L.P., for Andrew Seder/The Times Leader; Scott Kraus/The Morning Call, Assoc. Press; Calkins Media, Inc., et al.
    Steven K. Brainbridge, Esq., Bohdan R. Pankiw, Esq., Harrisburg, Eric Albert Rohrbaugh, Esq., PA Public Utility Commission, for Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.
    Nathaniel J. Byerly, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Open Records, for Office of Open Records.
    James John Kutz, Esq., David Bruce MacGregor, Esq., Christopher Trent Wright, Esq., Post & Schell, P.C., Paul Edwin Russell, Esq., PPL Services Corporation, Allentown, for PPL Electric Utilities Corporation.
    SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice BAER.

This appeal presents the issue of whether Subsection 385(d) of the Public Utility Code (“Code”), 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d), requires the Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) to disclose a “tip letter” and an investigative file associated with a settlement agreement entered into by PPL Electric Utilities Corporation (“PPL”) and the PUC’s Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement (“I & E”), which was approved by the PUC’s Commissioners (“PUC Commissioners”). For the reasons that follow, we hold that Subsection 335(d) clearly and unambiguously obligates disclosure. We, therefore, respectfully reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order, which held that disclosure was not required, and reinstate the final determinations of the Office of Open Records (“OOR”).

The factual background underlying this matter is undisputed. On October 29, 2011, a snowstorm affected PPL’s service area, causing over 388,000 PPL customers to experience disruption in their electrical service. In November of 2011, the PUC received an anonymous tip letter supposedly authored by a PPL employee. The tip letter alleged that PPL violated its priority-ranking policy when restoring power after the October 2011 snowstorm.

Soon thereafter, I <& E conducted an informal investigation of PPL based upon the tip letter and concluded that PPL may have violated 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501, as well as PPL’s internal policies regarding service restoration priority. The investigation resulted in PPL and the PUC, through I & E, entering into a settlement agreement, which the PUC Commissioners were required to consider for approval. Under the agreement, PPL did not admit to any wrong doing; however, it agreed to take corrective action to safeguard against a similar incident occurring in the future. In addition, the parties agreed that PPL would pay a civil settlement fee of $60,000.

To facilitate the PUC Commissioners’ consideration of the settlement agreement, I & E prosecuting attorney Michael Swindler made available to the PUC Commissioners a transmittal letter, the settlement agreement, and the parties’ statements in support of the agreement. PUC’s Motion to Submit Affidavit, 1/28/2014, Exhibit A (Affidavit of Michael Swindler). I & E did not turn over any other documents to the PUC Commissioners for their deliberations regarding the settlement agreement. Id. In addition, I & E and PPL agreed to treat the tip letter as a confidential document. Id.

In August of 2013, the PUC Commissioners held a public meeting regarding the settlement agreement and issued an order requesting public comments. The PUC received no comments, and the PUC Commissioners approved the settlement agreement in October of 2013. The settlement agreement and the parties’ supporting statements were made public; however, the details regarding the tip letter and most of I & E’s investigative material were not released to the public.

In the meantime, on August 28, 2013, Appellant Scott Kraus, a reporter for the Allentown-based newspaper The Morning Call, made a Right-to-Know-Law (“RTKL”) request asking the PUC to provide him with all documents related to the settlement, including the tip letter. Around the same time, Appellant Andrew Seder, a reporter for Wilkes-Barre newspaper The Times Leader, also requested the PUC to make available to him the tip letter. The PUC denied both requests.

In its denial letters, the PUC explained that it must provide “public records” pursuant to the RTKL. See 65 P.S. § 67.301(a) (stating that “[a] Commonwealth agency shall provide public records in accordance with this act”). The RTKL defines “public record” as a “record, including, a financial record, of the Commonwealth or local agency that[, inter alia,] is not exempt from being disclosed under other Federal or State law[.]” 65 P.S. § 67.102. The PUC, espousing distinct rationales, has taken the general position that the sought-after records are exempt from disclosure under Subsection 335(d) of the Code, which is the focus of this appeal and provides:

(d) Release of documents.—In addition to any other requirements imposed by law, including the act of June 21, 1957 (P.L. 390, No. 212), referred to as the Right-to-Know Law, and the act of July 3,1986 (P.L. 388, No. 84), known as the Sunshine Act, whenever the commission conducts an investigation of an act or practice of a public utility and makes a decision, enters into a settlement with a public utility or takes any other official action, as defined in the Sunshine Act, with respect to its investigation, it shall make part of the public record and release publicly any documents relied upon by the commission in reaching its determination, whether prepared by consultants or commission employees, other than documents protected by legal privilege; provided, however, that if a document contains trade secrets or proprietary information and it has been determined by the commission that harm to the person claiming the privilege would be substantial or if a document required to be released under this section contains identifying information which would operate to the prejudice or impairment of a person’s reputation or personal security, or information that would lead to the disclosure of a confidential source or subject a person to potential economic retaliation as a result of their cooperation with a commission investigation, or information which, if disclosed to the public, could be used for criminal or terroristic purposes, the identifying information may be expurgated from the copy of the document made part of the public record. For the purposes of this section, “a document” means a report, memorandum or other document prepared for or used by the commission in the course of its investigation whether prepared by an adviser, consultant or other person who is not an employee of the commission or by an employee of the commission.

66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d) (footnotes omitted).

When the PUC first denied Appellants’ requests, it based its decision on the portion of Subsection 335(d) which states that, if a document subject to public disclosure contains information that would lead to the disclosure of a confidential source, would subject a person to potential economic retaliation, or would operate to impair a person’s reputation, then “the identifying information may be expurgated from the copy of the document made part of the public record.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d). The PUC contended that the records sought by Appellants contain information that, in fact, would lead to the disclosure of a confidential source, would subject a person to potential economic retaliation, and would operate to impair a person’s reputation. In terms of redacting this information, the PUC asserted, “[D]ue to the form and brevity of the letter, redaction of the identifying information as to both the confidential source and the accused person is not practical.” Letter of PUC Right-to-Know Officer Rosemary Chiavetta, dated October 4, 2013. Accordingly, the PUC took the position that, because redaction was not practical, the entire document was not subject to disclosure.

Appellants filed separate appeals with the OOR, where they argued, inter alia, that Subsection 335(d) actually obligates the PUC to disclose the tip letter and related investigative files. The PUC, however, reiterated that the sought-after records were exempt from disclosure under Subsection 335(d) for the same reasons that the PUC cited in its denial letters to Appellants. The OOR agreed with both Appellants and held that Subsection 335(d) requires the PUC to disclose redacted versions of the requested documents. Thus, in relevant part, the OOR’s final determinations granted Appellants’ appeals. The PUC appealed both cases to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court consolidated the appeals and allowed several parties to intervene, including PPL.

In the Commonwealth Court, the PUC and PPL renewed the PUC’s contention that Subsection 335(d) does not require the disclosure of the sought-after documents. However, the focus of their argument shifted away from the redaction portion of the subsection and onto the definition of “commissioner” as that word is used in the context of the subsection. More specifically, the PUC and PPL argued that, when Subsection 335(d) utilizes the term “commission” in referring to the public release of “any documents relied upon by the commission in reaching its determination,” “commission” means “the PUC Commissioners,” not the PUC in its entirety, because only the PUC Commissioners can make determinations or otherwise take official action under the Sunshine Act. PUC’s Commonwealth Court Brief at 16. The PUC and PPL averred that the sought-after documents were not submitted to the PUC Commissioners during their consideration of the settlement agreement; thus, because the PUC Commissioners did not rely on the documents when they approved the settlement agreement, Subsection 335(d) does not require disclosure of those documents. See 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d) (providing that “any documents relied upon by the commission” shall be made part of the public record and released publicly).

Appellants maintained before the Commonwealth Court that the plain language of Subsection 335(d) directs the PUC to disclose the pertinent documents. In support of their stance, Appellants argued that, as used in Subsection 335(d), “commission” means the entire PUC, not just the PUC Commissioners. In this regard, Appellants highlighted that the Code defines “commission” as “[t]he Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission of this Commonwealth.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 102.

The Commonwealth Court ultimately reversed the OOR’s final determinations, crediting the contention of the PUC and PPL that the use of “commission” within Subsection 335(d) does not mean the entirety of the PUC, but rather, at times, is limited to the PUC Commissioners. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Seder, 106 A.3d 193 (Pa.Commw.2014). In reaching its decision, the Commonwealth Court opined that, pursuant to Subsection 335(d), the PUC must disclose documents relating to an investigation if the following two prerequisites are met: “(1) the commission has made a decision, entered into a settlement with a public utility or taken any other official action under the Sunshine Act and (2) the commission relied upon the documents in making its determination.” Id. at 198. The Commonwealth Court identified that the key question before the court was who constitutes the “commission” in the context of these sentences of Subsection 335(d). Id. at 198-99.

The Commonwealth Court then held that the use of “commission” in the portion of Subsection 335(d) that mentions “documents relied upon in reaching its determination” refers to the PUC Commissioners, not the entire PUC as argued by Appellants. The court concluded that this result is dictated by the fact that only the PUC Commissioners have the authority, by majority vote, to make a decision, enter into a settlement, and take official action. Id. at 199. In support of this conclusion, the court cited Subsection 301(d) of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 301(d). This statutory subsection provides, in relevant part, that “[a] majority of the members of the commission ... shall constitute a quorum and such majority, acting unanimously, shall be required for any action, including the making of any order or the ratification of any act done or order made by one or more of the commissioners.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 301(d).

The Commonwealth Court further observed that Subsection 335(d) defines “document” as “a report, memorandum or other document prepared for or used by the commission in the course of its investigation.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d). As to the use of “commission” in this instance, the court asserted that “commission” can mean either the PUC Commissioners or PUC staff. According to the court, documents prepared by PUC staff nonetheless are disclosable only if the PUC Commissioners relied upon them in their decision-making process.

In applying its holding regarding the definition of “commission” to the facts of this case, the Commonwealth Court explained that the first perquisite triggering disclosure pursuant to Subsection 335(d) was satisfied when the PUC Commissioners approved the settlement agreement. However, the court determined that the second prerequisite for disclosure was not fulfilled because the PUC Commissioners did not have access to or rely upon the requested documents when they approved the settlement agreement. The court supported this determination by citing to Michael Swindler’s affidavits. After finding that Subsection 335(d) does not require the disclosure of the requested documents, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the RTKL also does not mandate the disclosure of the pertinent documents.

Appellants petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal. We granted the petition, primarily to review the propriety of the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Subsection 335(d). The parties do not dispute that the records which Appellants requested qualify as “documents” for purposes of Subsection 335(d). See 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d) (defining “a document” as “a report, memorandum or other document prepared for or used by the commission in the course of its investigation whether prepared by an adviser, consultant or other person who is not an employee of the commission or by an employee of the commission”); see also PPL’s Brief at 31 (“Thus, all PUC documents prepared by or for the Commissioners or PUC staff are considered ‘documents’ for purposes of [Subsection 335(d) ].”). Instead, the primary dispute in this appeal is what the General Assembly intended when it utilized “commission” within the context Subsection 335(d).

Appellants take the position that “commission,” as used in Subsection 335(d), means the entire PUC. As they did in the Commonwealth Court, Appellants support their position by-relying on the Code’s definition of “commission” as meaning “[t]he Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission of this Commonwealth.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 102. Appellants insist that, when “commission” is assigned its proper meaning, Subsection 335(d) clearly and unambiguously requires the PUC to disclose publicly the tip letter and related investigative materials because the whole of the PUC relied upon those documents in reaching its determination to enter into the settlement agreement with PPL.

Appellants bolster their argument by citing to Subsection 335(d)’s introductory clause, which states that the mandates of Subsection 335(d) are in addition to any other requirements imposed by law, including the RTKL and the Sunshine Act. 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d). In contrast to Subsection 335(d), the RTKL exempts from disclosure investigative files. 65 P.S. §§ 67.708(b)(10)(i)(A) and (b)(17). Thus, in Appellants’ view, the General Assembly included this introductory clause in Subsection 335(d) to make clear that the subsection provides broader access to PUC documents, such as the investigative files sought by Appellants, than is required by the RTKL and the Sunshine Act.

In light of Appellants’ opinion of the General Assembly’s intent in enacting Subsection 335(d), they characterize as irrelevant the fact that the PUC and PPL agreed to keep the tip letter confidential. Indeed, Appellants and their amici maintain that Subsection 335(d) achieves the policy aim of making dealings between the PUC and public utilities transparent.

The PUC and PPL believe that, for purposes of Subsection 335(d), public disclosure of PUC investigative materials is mandatory only when the PUC Commissioners rely upon those materials in taking official action pursuant to the Sunshine Act, such as when they approved the settlement agreement in this case. In this regard, the PUC and PPL renew the argument that they made in the Commonwealth Court. They take the position that, when Subsection 335(d) refers to “any documents relied upon by .the commission in reaching its determination,” “commission” must mean “the PUC Commissioners” because, pursuant to the Sunshine Act, only the PUC Commissioners are authorized to take “official action” and to make “determinations” to approve or disapprove proposed settlement agreements in public meetings. PUC’s Brief at 7 (citing 66 Pa.C.S. § 301(d)).

The PUC and PPL contend that, when Subsection 335(d) is interpreted in this manner, it becomes clear that the PUC is not required to disclose the sought-after records because the PUC Commissioners did not rely upon them in their decision-making process. Rather, in taking their official action by approving the settlement agreement, the PUC Commissioners solely relied upon the settlement agreement and the parties’ supporting statements, all of which are available to the public.

The PUC and PPL cite as support for their argument the regulations which govern the PUC’s resolution of informal investigations. In particular, the PUC and PPL highlight that Subsection 3.113(b) of Title 52 of the Pennsylvania Code, 52 Pa.Code § 3.113, distinguishes between permissible actions for PUC staff and official actions taken by the PUC Commissioners at a public meeting. For example, Subsection 3.113(a) grants “Commission staff’ the discretion to conduct informal investigations “in appropriate circumstances regarding the condition and management of a public utility or other person subject to its jurisdiction.” 52 Pa.Code § 3.113(a). Subsection 3.113(b)(3), on the other hand, dictates what official actions, per the Sunshine Act, must be taken when resolving informal investigations, such as “the Commission” considering a settlement at a public meeting. 52 Pa.Code § 3.113(b)(3). The PUC and PPL point out that only the PUC Commissioners consider settlement agreements at public meetings. The PUC and PPL aver that, under this regulation, only documents relied upon by the PUC Commissioners in their official agency actions, such as approving a settlement agreement at a public meeting, are subject to disclosure. See 52 Pa.Code § 3.113(b)(3) (providing that “[ejxcept for staff reports and other documents covered by a specific legal privilege, documents relied upon by the Commission in reaching its determination shall be made part of the public record”).

Regarding public policy, the PUC, PPL, and their amicus contend that their interpretation of Subsection 385(d) aligns with the RTKL’s noncriminal-investigation exemption to disclosure of public records. This provision of the RTKL exempts from access otherwise disclosable agency records which relate to non-criminal investigations. 65 Pa.C.S. § 67.708(b)(17). The provision specifically precludes access to agencies’ “investigative materials” concerning non-criminal investigations. 65 Pa.C.S. § 67.708(b)(17)(ii). The PUC and PPL also believe that their interpretation of the subsection allows for sufficient transparency of the PUC’s dealings with public utilities without substantially interfering with public utilities’ willingness to cooperate with PUC investigations and to enter into settlement agreements. After applying the appropriate statutory analysis, we agree with Appellants’ interpretation of Subsection 335(d).

Issues of statutory interpretation present this Court with questions of law; accordingly, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Shafer Elec. & Const. v. Mantia, 626 Pa. 258, 96 A.3d 989, 994 (2014). The interpretation of Subsection 335(d) is guided by the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. Pursuant to the Statutory Construction Act, the object of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s intention. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). When the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Furthermore, “if the General Assembly defines words that are used in a statute, those definitions are binding.” Pennsylvania Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 593 Pa. 580, 932 A.2d 1271, 1278 (2007).

As Appellants highlight, the General Assembly defined “Commission” as “[t]he Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission of this Commonwealth” and did not limit that term to encompass only the PUC Commissioners. 66 Pa.C.S. § 102. We are bound by that definition in construing Subsection 335(d). Moreover, interpreting “Commission” to mean “the PUC” in its entirety harmonizes the statutory subsection because reference to “the PUC” necessarily includes both I & E and the PUC Commissioners, which the context of the subsection as a whole requires.

The General Assembly specified that the public release of documents under Subsection 335(d) is necessary when “the commission” relies upon them “in reaching its determination.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d). Subsection 335(d) likewise contemplates that, in reaching its determination, the “commission” will conduct an investigation and will, inter alia, take official action. I & E conducts investigations, and the PUC Commissioners take official action. Id. Consequently, in order for Subsection 335(d)’s use of “commission” to include the various tasks that only specific divisions of the PUC can undertake, as well as decisions which only the PUC Commissioners can make, “commission” must mean the entirety of “the PUC.”

We further observe that adoption of the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Subsection 335(d) leads to an unreasonable result. Specifically, the first sentence of Subsection 335(d) states, in part, “[W]henever the commission conducts an investigation of an act or practice of a public utility and ... takes any other official action ... with respect to its investigation, it shall make part of the public record and release publicly any documents relied upon by the commission in reaching its determination!;.]” 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d) (emphasis added).

Because I & E is the only division of the PUC that conducts investigations and the PUC Commissioners exclusively take official action, the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Subsection 335(d) would require the use of the word “commission” to mean simultaneously and variously “I & E” and “PUC Commissioners.” We refuse to read such an inconsistency into the statutory provision. Indeed, such an interpretation is unreasonable, and we must presume that the General Assembly, in enacting Subsection 385(d), did not intend an unreasonable result. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (“In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute the following presumptions, among others, may be used ... [t]hat the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.”).

On the other hand, applying the definition of “commission” as adopted and defined by the General Assembly in Section 102 of the Code to mean the entirety of the PUC, the subsection makes complete sense. In this regard, Subsection 335(d) provides that, whenever the PUC conducts an investigation of a public utility’s act and enters into a settlement with the public utility, the PUC shall make part of the public record and release publicly any documents relied upon by the PUC in reaching its determination, which includes both the investigation and the eventual action. 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d). The statutory language makes clear that “a document” means, inter alia, any document used by the PUC in the course of its investigation, regardless of who prepared the document. Id.

Here, there is no dispute that the PUC “conduct[ed] an investigation of an act” of PPL and that the PUC “enter[ed] into a settlement with” PPL, as required by Subsection 335(d). Moreover, a review of the record, including the PUC’s filings, leaves no question that the tip letter constituted a document, as the PUC’s I & E utilized the letter in the course of its investigation. See, e.g., PUC’s Petition for Review, 12/3/2013, at ¶ 13 (“The PUC’s [I & E] then initiated an investigation ... and investigated the allegations of the tip letter.”). Additionally, I & E’s investigative file by its very nature demonstrates that it consists of documents that the PUC used in the course of its investigation. See also PUC’s Motion to Submit Affidavit, 1/28/2014, Exhibit A (Affidavit of Michael Swindler) (“As I & E’s prosecuting attorney, I am familiar with the whistle-blower letter and the other requested materials, including their relationship to I & E’s subsequent investigation. During the investigation, I prepared documents solely for use in the investigation.... ”).

Thus, the remaining question is whether the documents were “relied upon by the [PUC] in reaching its determination” to settle with PPL for purposes of Subsection 335(d). It is indisputable at this juncture that the PUC relied upon the sought-after documents when making its determination to enter the settlement agreement with PPL, which included both I & E’s investigation and the PUC Commissioners’ official action. Indeed, in the responses it filed in the OOR, the PUC essentially conceded that it relied upon the documents in reaching its decision to enter into the settlement agreement. See Kraus v. PUC, Docket No. AP 2013-1986, Response of the PUC, dated October 31, 2013, at ¶ 6 (“Section 335(d) of the Public Utility Code provides for disclosure of documents relied upon by the PUC in its actions; however it provides a specific exemption from disclosure for the identifying information contained in the Tip Letter and some of the other documents associated with the Commission investigation.”).

We conclude that the clear and unambiguous language of Subsection 335(d) demonstrates that the General Assembly intended the PUC to make part of the public record and release publicly the documents sought by Appellants. This interpretation of the statute is consistent with the overall intent of the Legislature in enacting Subsection 335(d). More specifically, Subsection 335(d) is a public disclosure law that evinces the General Assembly’s desire to effectuate transparency, above and beyond that which is required by the RTKL, in the government’s dealings with public utilities.

In this regard, we observe that the object of the RTKL is to empower the citizens of this Commonwealth with access to information concerning government activities. SWB Yankees LLC v. Wintermantel, 615 Pa. 640, 45 A.3d 1029, 1042 (2012). Yet, as mentioned above, the RTKL exempts from disclosure investigative files related to agencies’ non-criminal investigations. 65 P.S. §§ 67.708(b)(10)(i)(A) and (b)(17). By-providing that the disclosure mandates of Subsection 335(d) supplement the access to records provided by the RTKL, the General Assembly signaled that transparency is of particular importance in the context of the PUC’s governing relationship with public utilities. Governmental transparency is of paramount significance when the PUC enters into settlement agreements with public utilities, as such agreements are negotiated behind doors closed to the public. The disclosure requirements of Subsection 335(d) allow the public to view that which informs the PUC’s decisions to enter into settlement agreements with public utilities.

Lastly, in this subsection, the Legislature wisely allows for expurgation from a publicly disclosed document, inter alia, “information that would lead to the disclosure of a confidential source or subject a person to potential economic retaliation as a result of their cooperation with a commission investigation[.]” 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d). Thus, in this case, the OOR acted appropriately by allowing for permissible redaction of the documents which it directed the PUC to disclose.

For these reasons, we reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order and reinstate the final determinations of the OOR.

Justices TODD, DONOHUE and WECHT join the opinion.

Chief Justice SAYLOR files a dissenting opinion in which Justice DOUGHERTY joins.

Chief Justice SAYLOR,

dissenting.

Because the term “commission” is a defined term under the Public Utility Code, the majority finds itself bound to interpret the word, as used in Section 335(d), as pertaining not only to official action by the Commissioners but also to a wide range of subordinate actions by the PUC as a whole, encompassing its investigative arm. See Majority Opinion, at 583, 139 A.3d at 173.

Throughout the Public Utility Code, however, there are numerous instances in which the Legislature used the term “commission” in a fashion that only could refer to the Commissioners. For example, the “commission” is empowered to make certain appointments, 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 304-306; the “commission” sets rules for excluding certain evidence at hearings, id. § 332(b); and the “commission” may preside at the reception of evidence, id. § 335(a). The Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement (“I <& E”) has little to do with any of these functions. Accordingly, and consistent with the Commonwealth Court’s reasoning, it seems clear that the General Assembly often has utilized the term “commission” to refer to the tier of the Public Utility Commission concerned with the subject matter at hand.

Given such context-dependent use of the term “commission,” I am not persuaded that the definitional language relied upon by the majority is dispositive. Moreover, I find Section 335(d) to be ambiguous in material regards.

On the one hand, Section 335(d) reasonably may be read to extend its disclosure requirement to the stage at which a settlement agreement is “enter[ed] into,” 66 Pa.C.S, § 335(d), which in this case occurred at the staff level. See Joint Settlement Agreement dated Mar. 25, 2013, in PUC v. PPL Elec. Util. Corp., No. M-2013-2275471 (PUC), at ¶¶ 9, 27 (attesting that I & E and PPL were duly authorized to execute the settlement agreement, and that the agreement had been “entered into,” albeit that it was conditioned upon the Commissioners’ subsequent approval under Section 3.113 of Title 52 of the Pennsylvania Code). On the other hand, Section 335(d) classifies entry into settlement agreements as being within the category of “official action” as defined in the Sunshine Act, see 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d) (conditioning mandatory disclosure upon, inter alia, “ent[ry] into a settlement ... or any other official action, as defined in the Sunshine Act” (emphasis added)), a classification which excludes administrative action such as I & E’s entry into a settlement agreement.

In this regard, the Sunshine Act defines “official action” as follows:

(1) Recommendations made by an agency pursuant to statute, ordinance or executive order.
(2) The establishment of policy by an agency.
(8) The decisions on agency business made by an agency.
(4) The vote taken by any agency on any motion, proposal, resolution, rule, regulation, ordinance, report or order.

65 Pa.C.S. § 708. A core requirement of this open-meetings regime is that “[ojfficial action and deliberations by a quorum of the members of an agency shall take place at a meeting open to the public[.]” Id. § 704. The concept of “agency business” subject to such requirement, however, expressly excludes “administrative action,” defined as “[t]he execution of policies relating to persons or things as previously authorized or required by official action of the agency adopted at an open meeting of the agency.” Id. § 703.

I & E’s entry into a settlement agreement plainly is not the type of activity subject to the terms of the Sunshine Act’s open-meetings requirement, because it is a form of routine administrative action by an executive arm per preexisting authority (namely, authorization per Section 3.113 of Title 52 of the Pennsylvania Code). Therefore, material disharmony arises from Section 335(d)’s depiction of “entry” into a settlement as being within the purview of “official action” for purposes of the Sunshine law. 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d).

Ordinarily the plain language of an enactment offers the best guide to discernment of legislative intent. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Where the terms of a statute are ambiguous, however, courts generally apply salient principles of statutory construction, including evaluation of the occasion and necessity for the statute under review, contemplation of the object to be attained, and appreciation for the consequences of particular interpretations. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).

With such considerations in mind, I agree with the PUC, PPL, and their amicus that Section 335(d) has an open-meetings orientation, given its express cross-reference to the Sunshine Act and associated “official action” nexus. 66 Pa. C.S. § 335(d). In my judgment, the Legislature’s underlying purpose was to ensure that the public record associated with official action (such as the Commissioners’ approval of the I & E/PPL settlement) transparently reflects the basis for the associated decision-making. Accord PUC v. Seder, 106 A.3d 193, 199 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014) (“Section 335(d) is essentially an open docket provision solely concerned with providing access to the reasoning and bases for actions taken by the PUC, a goal which is accomplished through disclosure of the documents relied upon by the Commissioners and issuance of the opinion and order approving the settlement.”). In this respect, I also agree with the PUC, PPL, and their amicus that the requirement attaches at the tier of the Commission at which relevant “official action” is taken.

Along these lines, I credit the Commonwealth Court’s position that “commission” means “Commissioners” in scenarios, such as this one, where only the Commissioners are empowered to undertake the official action in question. See id. Accordingly, although Section 335(d) facially addresses the agency’s “entry” into a settlement agreement, given the official-action overlay in Section 335(d), I do not believe that the General Assembly contemplated attachment of the disclosure requirement upon the mere administrative action entailed in the entry into a conditional settlement agreement.

I recognize that the policy considerations regarding disclosure here are mixed. Nevertheless, at least under prevailing intermediate court precedent not subject to the present appeal, the anonymous tip letter and the I & E investigative file are the type of materials which are exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Right to Know Law (“RTKL”) as records of a non-criminal investigation. From the terms of Section 335(d), I discern no intention on the part of the Legislature to override the policy underlying such an exclusion in the utility setting, other than in circumstances in which investigative materials would be included as a basis for “official action” on the Commission’s part. 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d). Construction of the statute in this fashion allows public review of the basis for settlement approval decisions, and for the Commission to be subject to public scrutiny and criticism in instances in which records might not convey adequate or sound bases for decisions. I do not believe, however, that the statute manifests an intention to open what otherwise would be confidential investigative files, outside the scope of the RTKL’s mandatory disclosure requirements, where such materials simply were not relied upon by the tier of the Commission undertaking official action.

Again, I emphasize that the RTKL remains fully applicable to PUC records that are not subject to Section 335(d)’s requirement of disclosure, albeit the prevailing law in this case is that the particular materials in question are subject to an applicable RTKL exemption.

In summary, I respectfully dissent, as I would hold that Section 335(d) does not require that the anonymous tip letter and I & E investigative file be made part of the record of the approval of the I & E/PPL settlement agreement and released publicly.

Justice DOUGHERTY joins this dissenting opinion.

      . This case was reassigned to this author.

        . Section 1501 in part provides:
      Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and reasonable service and facilities, and shall make all such repairs, changes, alterations, substitutions, extensions, and improvements in or to such service and facilities as shall be necessary or proper for the accommodation, convenience, and safety of its patrons, employees, and the public. Such service also shall be reasonably continuous and without unreasonable interruptions or delay, Such service and facilities shall be in conformity with the regulations and orders of the commission. Subject to the provisions of this part and the regulations or orders of the commission, every public utility may have reasonable rules and regulations governing the conditions under which it shall be required to render service....
      66 Pa.C.S. § 1501.

      . Act of Feb. 14, 2008, P.L. 6, No. 3 (as amended 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104).

      . In support of this contention, the PUC offered affidavits from Michael Swindler. As noted above, Michael Swindler is an I & E prosecuting attorney. His affidavits confirmed the PUC's contention.

      . The court also permitted the following parties to intervene: WNEP-TV, Channel 16; Times Shamrock; Times News, LLC; The Associated Press; Reading Eagle Company; Pocono Mountain Media Group; Philadelphia Media Network, LLC; PA Media Group; Lancaster Newspaper, Inc.; and Calkins Media, Inc.

      . Act of Oct. 15, 1998, P.L. 729, No. 93, § 1 (as amended 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716).

      . Prior to issuing its opinion, the Commonwealth Court allowed the PUC to supplement the record with additional affidavits from Michael Swindler, which confirmed that the PUC Commissioners did not rely on the requested documents.

      . In its denial letters to Appellants and in its appeals to the OOR and the Commonwealth Court, the PUC also maintained that the sought-after records were exempt from disclosure pursuant to various provisions of the RTKL. Because the OOR determined that Subsection 335(d) required disclosure of these records, it did not address the PUC’s arguments regarding the RTKL.

      . The Pennsylvania NewsMedia Association and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press jointly filed a brief in support of Appellants.

      . The Energy Association of Pennsylvania filed a brief in support of the PUC and PPL.

      . See 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d) ("In addition to any other requirements imposed by law, including the act of June 21, 1957 (P.L. 390, No. 212), referred to as the Right-to-Know Law, and the act of July 3, 1986 (P.L. 388, No. 84), known as the Sunshine Act, whenever the commission conducts an investigation of an act or practice of a public utility and makes a decision, enters into a settlement with a public utility or takes any other official action, as defined in the Sunshine Act, with respect to its investigation, it shall make part of the public record and release publicly any documents relied upon by the commission in reaching its determination!].]").

      . As the majority recognizes, Appellants’ arguments resting upon the Public Utility Code’s definition of "documents” as subsuming investigative information add little, since Section 336(d) requires disclosure only of documents "relied upon by the commission in reaching its determination.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 335(d). I find this qualifying language to be dispositive here, per my analysis above.

      . I make no suggestion that the present scenario represents such an instance, as such matter is outside the scope of the present review. I note only that, in two written opinions, the Commission put the matter out for public comment, notified the Office of Consumer Advocate and the Office of Small Business Advocate, and ultimately considered the ten factors to be evaluated in the settlement approval process per its regulations at Section 69.1201 of Title 52 of the Pennsylvania Code, 52 Pa.Code § 69.1201. See PUC v. PPL, No. M-2013-2275471, slip op. (Pa. PUC Aug. 29, 2013); PUC v. PPL, No. M-2013-2275471, slip op. (Pa. PUC Oct. 31, 2013).


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    139 A.3d 178
    Brian GORSLINE, Dawn Gorsline, Paul Batkowski and Michele Batkowski v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF FAIRFIELD TOWNSHIP v. Inflection Energy, LLC and Donald Shaheen and Eleanor Shaheen, his Wife, Intervenors. Petition of Brian Gorsline, Dawn Gorsline, Paul Batkowski and Michele Batkowski.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    June 20, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 20th day of June, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by Petitioners, are:

(1) Does the Commonwealth Court’s decision below, that an industrial shale gas development is similar to and compatible with uses expressly permitted in a[n] R-A District, conflict with this Court’s decision in Robinson Township?
(2) Did the Commonwealth Court commit an error of law in deciding that an industrial shale gas development is similar to and compatible with a “public service facility!’ in an R-A District when the Township made no factual finding or legal conclusion to that effect, the record contains no substantial evidence to support that determination, and the company’s own witness testified that shale gas development was not similar to a “public service facility” in an R-A District?
(3) Did the Commonwealth Court improperly decide that MarkWest Liberty Midstream, wherein it held that a compressor station is similar to and compatible with a “public service facility” in a Light Industrial District, also compels the conclusion that an industrial shale gas development is similar to and compatible with a “public service facility” in an R-A District designed for quiet, residential development and not industrial land uses?
(4) Did the Commonwealth Court commit an error of law by relying on prior conditional use approvals that the Township issued for uses not expressly permitted in the R-A District, in order to support its decision that an industrial shale gas development is similar to and compatible with uses expressly permitted in the R-A District?