author: Chief Justice SAYLOR. Justice BAER, Justice TODD,

text:
    115 A.3d 854
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Dennis BLAND, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 10, 2014.
    Decided May 26, 2015.

      Hugh J. Burns Jr., Esq., Michael Lee Erlich, Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Karl Baker, Esq., Victor Edward Rauch, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Dennis Bland.
    CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, and STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Chief Justice SAYLOR.

Presently, we consider the effectiveness of an anticipatory invocation of the Miranda-based right to counsel.

To provide context, we begin with a brief summary of settled legal principles. The text of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly establishes a right to counsel pertaining in the criminal-law context. See U.S. Const, amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”). This prescribed entitlement, however, attaches at critical stages only after the government initiates adversarial judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 198, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 2588, 171 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008).

Nevertheless, federal constitutional law recognizes a distinct right to counsel which may inure prior to the commencement of a criminal prosecution. Although such entitlement is not expressly indicated in the Constitution, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court found that it derived from the right against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. See generally Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 794, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2089, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009) (commenting on the non-textual, prophylactic character of the Miranda-based right to counsel). Furthermore, under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), once a defendant has validly invoked this Miranda-based right to have counsel present during questioning, interrogation must be suspended. See id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1885.

This appeal centers on the nature of a valid invocation of the Miranda-based right to counsel, specifically, in terms of whether the right must be asserted in close temporal proximity to custodial interrogation or may be effectively invoked remotely from such questioning.

Appellee, Dennis Bland, Jr., allegedly shot and killed Keron Remberan in Philadelphia, then fled to his mother’s house in Florida. After learning of Appellee’s whereabouts, police obtained an arrest warrant and notified Florida law enforcement. Federal authorities in Florida detained Appellee, who was seventeen years old at the time, and he was placed in a juvenile facility to await extradition to Pennsylvania.

The day after Appellee’s arrest, his father contacted the Defender Association of Philadelphia and apprised an attorney of his son’s circumstances. The lawyer sent a form letter via facsimile to Florida counsel representing Appellee in connection with the extradition proceedings, asking that Appellee sign and return the document. The letter reflected a very clear putative invocation of the Miranda-based right to counsel, as follows:

PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT I ... DO NOT WISH TO SPEAK WITHOUT AN ATTORNEY PRESENT.
I WISH TO BE REPRESENTED BY A LAWYER. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS I HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO FULLY DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF MY CASE WITH MY LAWYER ..., I STATE THE FOLLOWING TO YOU:
I DO NOT WISH TO BE QUESTIONED OR HAVE ANY DISCUSSION WITH THE POLICE.
I DO NOT WISH TO SPEAK TO YOU WITHOUT MY ATTORNEY PRESENT.
I WILL NOT WAIVE OR GIVE UP ANY OF MY RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA V ARIZONA, NOR WILL I GIVE UP ANY OF MY PENNSYLVANIA OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS EITHER ORALLY OR IN WRITING WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF MY LAWYER.

Commonwealth v. Bland, No. CP-51-CR-0012459-2008, slip op. at attachment C (C.P.Phila. Aug. 22, 2011) (capitalization and additional emphasis in original). Appellee signed the letter, and it was returned to the Defender Association, which forwarded copies to the Philadelphia Police Department’s homicide unit and the Office of the District Attorney.

Subsequently, Appellee waived extradition and was escorted to Philadelphia, where he remained in police custody. Six days after Appellee had signed the form sent by the Defender Association while he was in Florida, a detective provided him with Miranda warnings. During ensuing questioning, Appel-lee ultimately confessed to perpetration of the killing, and, after later consultation with his father, he also provided a written confession.

Appellee was charged with murder, firearms violations, and several related offenses, and the Defender Association was formally appointed as counsel. Appellee filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his written statement, claiming that police violated his rights under Miranda, as well as under Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which, like the Fifth Amendment, protects against self-incrimination. See Pa. Const, art. 1, § 9. Thus, Appellee sought an exclusionary remedy. See generally Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 567 Pa. 415, 434-35, 787 A.2d 394, 405 (2001) (explaining that suppression is appropriate to redress Miranda violations). After a hearing, the suppression court awarded relief and foreclosed the admission of Appellee’s confessions into evidence at his forthcoming trial, -without any independent treatment of state constitutional considerations.

In its opinion, the suppression court explained that Miranda ’s prophylactic measures — including its affordance of a right to counsel relative to in-custody interrogation — were intended to protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights from the “inherently compelling pressures” of the custodial environment. Bland, No. CP-51-CR-0012459-2008, slip op. at 6 (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 104-05, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1219, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (citation omitted)). Additionally, the court referred to the Edwards requirement that, once a detainee has invoked his Miranda based right to counsel during custodial interrogation, questioning must be suspended. See id. at 7-8 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1885).

In terms of the timing of Appellee’s invocation, the suppression court relied on broad language from Miranda specifying that, if an individual “indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking[,] there can be no questioning.” Id. at 8 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (emphasis added)). Applying this principle to Appellee’s circumstances, the court determined that — because he had personally asserted his rights by signing the non-waiver letter— Appellee had made an effective invocation, and uncounseled interrogation was proscribed even six days later.

The suppression court recognized that, in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), the Supreme Court of the United States had expressed some reservation about an expansive approach to when the right to counsel may be effectively asserted, explaining that it had “in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than ‘custodial interrogation.’ ” Id. at 182 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. at 2211 n. 3; cf. Montejo, 556 U.S. at 795, 129 S.Ct. at 2090 (“[N]oninterrogative interactions with the State do not involve the ‘inherently compelling pressures,’ that one might reasonably fear could lead to involuntary waivers.” (citation omitted)); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (“[T]he special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.”). The court was persuaded, however, that, in the absence of a definitive, binding holding to the contrary, an anticipatory invocation should be honored.

The Commonwealth lodged an interlocutory appeal in the Superior Court, and a divided, three-judge panel affirmed via memorandum decision, essentially applying the reasoning of the suppression court. See Commonwealth v. Bland, 1174 EDA 2011, slip op. (Pa.Super. Feb. 5, 2013). The majority acknowledged the opinions in Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 603 Pa. 92, 982 A.2d 483 (2009), and Commonwealth v. Romine, 453 Pa.Super. 42, 682 A.2d 1296 (1996) (en banc), both of which recognized that Miranda-based rights cannot be invoked anticipatorily. See Sherwood, 603 Pa. at 119-20, 982 A.2d at 500; Romine, 453 Pa.Super. at 54-55, 682 A.2d at 1302. According to the majority, however, Sherwood is consistent with the view that custody, rather than custodial interrogation, serves as the appropriate litmus for a valid invocation. See Bland, 1174 EDA 2011, slip op. at 11-12 (citing Sherwood, 603 Pa. at 119-20, 982 A.2d at 500 (“Since [the defendant] was not in custody when he made his statement about a lawyer, his alleged invocation of his right to counsel had no Fifth Amendment effect[.]”)). Moreover, the majority appeared to disregard Romine’s rejection of anticipatory invocations, merely because the decision had been referenced in Sherwood, see id. at 10, albeit that Romine, unlike Sherwood, did involve post-arrest statements. See Romine, 453 Pa.Super. at 46, 682 A.2d at 1298.

Then-President Judge Stevens authored the dissent. Initially, he recognized that custody is a necessary prerequisite to a valid assertion of Miranda rights. See Bland, 1174 EDA 2011, slip op. at 1 (Stevens, P.J., dissenting). Nevertheless, his reasoning followed a line of decisions from other jurisdictions holding that custody is not, in and of itself, a sufficient condition, since actual or imminent interrogation is also required. See id. at 8-9 (quoting Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1244-45, 1251 (3d Cir.1994) (“If a suspect does not wish to communicate with the police except through an attorney, he can simply tell them that when they give him the Miranda warnings.” (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180, 111 S.Ct. at 2210))).

According to the dissent, this requirement flows directly from the justification for implementing special safeguards in the first instance, which traces to Supreme Court of the United States’ concern with the inherently coercive effects of custodial interrogation. Accord Alston, 34 F.3d at 1246 (“The antipathy expressed in McNeil towards the anticipatory invocation of the Miranda rights is consistent with Miranda’s underlying principles. The Miranda right to counsel is a prophylactic rule that does not operate independent from the danger it seeks to protect against[.]”); State v. Warness, 77 Wash.App. 636, 893 P.2d 665, 668 (1995) (“The need for Miranda protection does not exist except in a custodial interrogation situation. The right cannot be invoked before it exists.”). Thus, President Judge Stevens concluded that, “[wjithout the compelling pressures of interrogation imminent, Appellee’s invocation of Fifth Amendment rights were merely anticipatory of custodial interrogation and, accordingly, not a valid exercise of constitutional rights.” Bland, 1174 EDA 2011, slip op. at 9-10 (Stevens, P.J., dissenting).

The Commonwealth petitioned for allowance of appeal, and we accepted review of the following issue:

Did Superior Court err by suppressing a confession that respondent gave after receiving Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1964), warnings because, six days prior to any police questioning, while in custody in another jurisdiction, he had signed a form antici-patorily declining to be interviewed?

Commonwealth v. Bland, 620 Pa. 583, 72 A.3d 263 (2013) (per curiam). As the question presented is solely one of law, our review is plenary.

In its arguments to this Court, the Commonwealth maintains the position taken by President Judge Stevens, contending that it is consistent with recent majority expressions of the Supreme Court of the United States, see, e.g., Montego, 556 U.S. at 797, 129 S.Ct. at 2091 (explaining that “[w]hat matters for Miranda and Edwards is what happens when the defendant is approached for interrogation, and (if he consents) what happens during the interrogation”), as well as with the approach of a majority of federal and state jurisdictions refusing to validate anticipatory invocations of the Miranda-based right to counsel. See Alston, 34 F.3d at 1243-49; see also supra note 2. The Commonwealth also complains that the Superior Court majority ignored the express and controlling precedent established by the en banc panel of the intermediate court in Romine, without supplying any substantive justification for such deviation.

Throughout its brief, the Commonwealth places main points of emphasis on McNeil’s apparent disapproval of anticipatory invocations, as well as the direct derivation of the Miranda-based right to counsel from a specific concern with the coercive aspects of custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 18 (“Miranda was intended [to] protect against ‘the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation[;]’ in the absence of imminent questioning, applying special prophylactic rules designed to counteract that specific danger makes little sense.” (quoting Alston, 34 F.3d at 1246) (emphasis omitted; alterations added)). Also criticizing the reliance on broad language taken from Miranda itself, the Commonwealth urges that such decision should be read according to its context. See id. at 21 (asserting that Miranda’s allusion to the appropriate invocation of a right to counsel “at any stage of the process” refers only to the process of custodial interrogation).

Additionally, according to the Commonwealth, the approach of rejecting anticipatory invocations maintains an appropriate balance between the rights of the accused and the compelling state interest in effective police investigations. In this regard, the Commonwealth posits that there is little harm in requiring that a suspect should await interrogation before asserting Miranda rights, since a detainee who “does not wish to communicate with the police except through an attorney ... can simply tell them that when they give him the Miranda warnings.” Brief for Appellant at 18 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180, 111 S.Ct. at 2210). On the other hand, the Commonwealth asserts, a permissive view of anticipatory invocation would hamper effective law enforcement, particularly since the entitlement to counsel during questioning is not offense specific. In this regard, the Commonwealth repeatedly highlights the substantial value of confessions to enforcement. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 18 (citing McNeil, 501 U.S. at 181, 111 S.Ct. at 2210 (explaining that “the ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good”)).

In terms of Appellee’s state constitutional claim, the Commonwealth observes that he has never claimed that there is any difference in the scope or applicability of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions relative to preemptive requests for counsel, thus resulting in waiver. Alternatively, the Commonwealth posits that there is nothing in the text or history of Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which would justify the suppression of Appellee’s statements or to otherwise sanction anticipatory invocations of counsel.

In response, Appellee initially focuses on various factual circumstances which are collateral matters relative to the general rule of law which he advocates. Upon proceeding to the essential point, Appellee urges that, once a suspect in custody asserts the Miranda right to counsel, law enforcement officials should be prohibited from approaching and interrogating the accused. Consistent with the reasoning of the suppression court, Appellee circles back to the broad language employed by the Supreme Court in Miranda. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (“If, however, [the detainee] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.” (emphasis added)). Appellee downplays McNeil and Montejo as expressing dictum, since the cases were resolved on unrelated grounds, and, similarly, categorizes the en banc Superior Court’s Romine decision as being solely a Sixth-Amendment case. Appellee also refutes the Commonwealth’s contention that a majority of jurisdictions decline to recognize anticipatory invocations of the right to counsel. See Brief for Appellee at 16-17. In this regard, Appellee presents his own collection of decisions, most relevantly, State v. Rose, 604 A.2d 24, 26-28 (Me.1992) (holding that a written request for counsel presented remote from interrogation represented a valid invocation of the Miranda-based right to counsel).

Alternatively, Appellee argues that, even if Miranda does not encompass anticipatory invocations, Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution should be read as more broadly sanctioning them. In furtherance of this position, Appellee observes that, although Pennsylvania’s right against self-incrimination previously has not been interpreted as extending beyond the bounds of its federal analogue (with the exception of reputation, see Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 4 U.S. 253, 3 Yeates 429, 4 Dali. 253, 1 L.Ed. 822 (Pa.1802)), the decisional law has not touched upon the discrete issue in this case. Given the evolving Miranda analyses proffered by the United States Supreme Court over the years, Appellee asserts that Pennsylvania has a strong interest in maintaining a coherent and stable body of law that reflects Miranda’s ostensible dictate to respect pre-interrogation demands for counsel. Cf. Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 575 Pa. 321, 342-43, 836 A.2d 76, 89 (2003) (“[T]he fact that the U.S. Supreme Court relaxed its scrutiny in this area ... is no reason for this Court to reconsider [our own jurisprudence].”). Accordingly, Appel-lee concludes that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides an independent source for suppression in this matter.

Upon our review, we agree with the essential position of the Commonwealth and then-President Judge, now-Justice, Stevens. As related above, recent complements of Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have sent a plain signal that the Miranda-based right to counsel should be constrained according to its express justifications, namely, to counterbalance the coercive environment of custodial interrogation which had been emphasized in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-58, 86 S.Ct. at 1618-19. See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 795, 129 S.Ct. at 2090; McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. at 2211 n. 3. Accordingly, our assessment, consistent with the weight of the authority, is that valid invocations of this Miranda right should be made in close temporal proximity to the circumstances giving rise to the relevant concern. Accord McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. at 2211 n. 3 (“Most rights must be asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against.”). We find further support for this determination in the observation that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit voluntary self-incrimination, but rather, only compelled self-incrimination. See Alston, 34 F.3d at 1244 n.3 (explaining that “it is only compelled self-incrimination, not self-incrimination per se, that is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment” (citing, inter alia, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630) (emphasis omitted)).

To the degree that a further cost-benefit assessment on our part is appropriate for purposes of federal constitutional law, we agree with the Commonwealth that the burden of invoking the right to counsel in close proximity to custodial interrogation is outweighed by legitimate law-enforcement objectives. See generally Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141, 129 S.Ct. 695, 701, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (explaining that “[t]he principal cost of applying [a new] rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free — something that offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system,” and thus, such a position “presents a high obstacle for those urging [the new rule’s] application” (citation and quotes omitted; alterations added)). In weighing the competing considerations of extended preemptive Fifth Amendment protections versus effective law enforcement, it is our conclusion that the widely-prevailing Miranda regime strikes an appropriate balance, and there is no presently apparent reason to expand it to encompass all custodial situations.

We acknowledge that there is some force to the argument that, when interrogation appears to be inevitable — such as in the present circumstances in which Appellee was accused of murder — custody should be the only prerequisite to invocation of Miranda counsel. However, Miranda and its progeny have been repeatedly extolled for the virtue in providing “bright-line” rules to both suspects and police in the custodial interrogation context. See, e.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2098, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (praising the “clear and unequivocal” guidelines Miranda provides to the law enforcement profession); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S.Ct. 490, 494, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (commending the bright-line rule of Edwards). Obviously, this advantage would be seriously undermined by individualized and varying analyses as to which crimes or factual circumstances would justify the belief that questioning is inevitable.

We also recognize Appellee’s argument that his approach is supported by the broader language employed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda. We cannot overlook, however, that the direction set by Miranda has been altered over the ensuing decades, apparently in light of the predominance of different approaches to the balancing of individual rights with effective law enforcement. See generally Thomas P. Windom, The Writing on the Wall: Miranda’s “Prior Criminal Experience" Exception, 92 Va. L.Rev. 327, 335-37 (2006) (positing that “[t]hough Miranda has been upheld— indeed, even constitutionalized — its numerous refinements have strayed from the original idealistic creation of the Warren Court”). In terms of federal constitutional law, the direction, at this point, seems plain enough. Accord McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. at 2211 n. 3; Alston, 34 F.3d at 1243-419; supra note 2.

The present dissenting opinion regards the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Edwards and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), as controlling. In both cases, however, the accused invoked his Miranda-based right to counsel in close association with custodial interrogation. See id. at 148-49, 111 S.Ct. at 488; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479, 101 S.Ct. at 1882. Thus, Appellee is not “just like the accused in Minnick,” Dissenting Opinion, at 668, 115 A.3d at 868-69, or in Edwards for that matter, since Appellee simply did not invoke his rights in close association with custodial interrogation; in point of fact, Appellee acceded to questioning at such time. For this reason, the Edwards and Minnick decisions no more stand as precedent for the proposition advanced by the dissent than McNeil does for the contrary proposition.

Instead, per the express explanation of the Supreme Court of the United States in McNeil, the issue remains one of first impression in that Court. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. at 2211 n. 3. Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion discounts the McNeil Court’s explanation, based upon its own view that the McNeil Court meant to say “custody” when it said “custodial interrogation.” See Dissenting Opinion, at 674, 115 A.3d at 872.

In our view, the dissent’s account of the discussion from McNeil is simply not accurate. In addition to the facial discrepancies between the passage from McNeil and the dissent’s recasting of it, the McNeil Court cited two previous opinions centered squarely on “interrogation” (and not upon custody, since the fact of custody was undisputed in both cases) in support of its observation that there is no precedent for a valid invocation of Miranda rights anticipatorily outside the context of “custodial interrogation.” See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. at 2211 n. 3 (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2650-51, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (plurality), and Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-303, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1688-91, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)). It would seem evident, therefore, that the McNeil Court’s inclusion of the word “interrogation” in “custodial interrogation” cannot be cast as a typographical or conceptual error.

We have acknowledged that our decision is not fully harmonious with the ideological perspective conveyed in Miranda. In our view, however, the approach of the dissent is as or more disharmonious with a number of more recent expressions by the Supreme Court of the United States, including the relevant expression from McNeil (albeit its status as dicta). Indeed, even the commentary referenced in the dissent confirms that an originalist approach to Miranda has been eschewed in subsequent majority decisions of that Court. See Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 773, 803 (2009) (contending that Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), was wrongly decided, because it is “inconsistent with the premise of Miranda ”).

In response to Appellee’s claim for approval of anticipatory invocations of a right to counsel under Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, on the arguments presented, we find that the textual similarity between the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, the history of our abiding by the United States Supreme Court’s Miranda regime as it has evolved, and the approach of other jurisdictions and salient policy considerations as reflected in our discussion above, favor continued alignment of our jurisprudence with that of its federal counterpart on the relevant point.

In summary, we hold that, to require a suspension of questioning by law enforcement officials on pain of an exclusionary remedy, an invocation of the Miranda-based right to counsel must be made upon or after actual or imminent commencement of in-custody interrogation.

The order of the Superior Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion, presumably, for trial.

Justice STEVENS did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.

Former Chief Justice CASTILLE and former Justice McCAFFERY did not participate in the decision of this case.

Justice EAKIN and BAER join the opinion.

Justice BAER files a concurring opinion.

Justice TODD files a dissenting opinion.

Justice BAER,

concurring.

Notwithstanding the appeal of the well-reasoned and thoughtful dissenting opinion of Madame Justice Todd, which outlines the opposing view, I join in full the majority opinion of Chief Justice Saylor because I find that it is more persuasively consistent with decisions of the United States Supreme Court, inferior federal courts, and our sister states.

I write further only to comment on the process that occurred here. While Dennis Bland (Appellee) was in Florida awaiting extradition, his father contacted the Defender Association of Philadelphia (Defender Association) and explained his son’s circumstances to an attorney. The attorney faxed a form, which is set forth in the Majority Opinion and tracks the classic Miranda protections, to Appellee’s Florida counsel, who was representing him in conjunction with extradition proceedings. Appellee signed the form, which his Florida counsel apparently returned to the Defender Association’s attorney, who then faxed copies of it to the Philadelphia police department’s homicide unit and the Office of the Philadelphia District Attorney, in an obvious attempt to invoke Appellee’s Miranda rights. It is this purported anticipatory invocation of his right to counsel by fax which leads to this case.

Neither the investigation of the homicide Appellee was charged with committing nor the attempted invocation of his constitutional rights should be trivialized by gamesmanship. In this respect, I find the anticipatory faxing of an alleged Miranda invocation prior to indicia of interrogation from an unknown lawyer to a police department of more than 7,000 (see www.phiIlypolice.com/about) and a District Attorney’s Office with more than 600 (see www.phila.gov/districtattorney/ about) to at least approach such gamesmanship. I recognize that the form of Appellee’s anticipatory invocation is not at issue in this case and, under different facts, a different result could be warranted. I therefore write to express my obvious distaste for the invocation-by-fax made in this case, and my observation that at best courts should look with skepticism at attempts to invoke constitutional rights by fax from counsel to police.

Justice TODD,

dissenting.

I consider Appellee’s written request to the Philadelphia Police Department explicitly stating that he did not wish to be questioned by officers from that department without the assistance of an attorney, made after he was taken into custody in Florida to face a murder charge lodged by the Philadelphia Police Department, to be a valid invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights under the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); thus, in my view, investigators from that department were required to honor his request for the assistance of counsel before and during their subsequent questioning of him. I further regard Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), as establishing a bright-line rule that police may not interrogate an individual being held in custody who has requested the assistance of counsel, until and unless counsel is provided to the individual. Unlike the Majority, I do not view dicta contained in the high Court’s later decision in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), as undercutting the necessity of compliance by police with this federal constitutional mandate. As it is not disputed that an employee of the Philadelphia Police Department disregarded Appellee’s written request for the assistance of counsel during interrogation, from my perspective, Appellee was unlawfully subjected to uncounseled interrogation by investigators from that department. Accordingly, I dissent from the Majority’s decision to the contrary.

In its historic Miranda decision, the United States Supreme Court recognized the necessity that police authorities inform an individual, who is being held in custody, of his or her right to consult with an attorney before police questioning begins, and also inform the individual who is being detained, prior to any questioning, of his or her right to have counsel present during any subsequent interrogation. Securing the right of an individual in the custody of the authorities to the assistance of counsel for coping with the process of custodial interrogation was deemed integral by the Court to protect the long-recognized basic right of every person, protected by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, not to be compelled to provide evidence against himself or herself. The Court observed that an individual who is taken into custody by police is held in isolation and cut off from all contact with the outside world, and that this deprivation of contact with traditional sources of support, such as family, friends, and community, makes the individual more susceptible to a variety of psychologically coercive interrogation techniques. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 448-58, 86 S.Ct. 1602. These techniques, the high Court found, can lead to false confessions. Id. at 453, 455 n. 24, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Thus, to ensure that the free will of an individual being held in custody is not overborne by these compulsive pressures, such that he or she is unable to freely and intelligently exercise his or her Fifth Amendment rights, the Court required a detained individual be given access to counsel, upon request, both prior to and during police interrogation. Id. at 470, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

The high Court also made clear in Miranda that, once a person in custody makes a request for the assistance of counsel, police are not then permitted to interrogate him or her until counsel has been provided and the detained person is given the opportunity to both confer with the attorney, and, also, to have the attorney advise him or her during any subsequent police interrogation. Id. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Notably, the Court did not place any restrictions on the manner in which an individual in custody could communicate a request to the police for the assistance of counsel for any subsequent interrogation in which the police might engage. Hence, the written request by Appellee in this matter for the assistance of counsel for any police questioning, which indisputably was delivered to and received by the homicide unit of the Philadelphia Police Department — members of which subsequently interrogated Appellee — was acceptable under the tenets of Miranda.

Most significantly, the high Court in Miranda did not indicate that an individual who is in custody had to make a request for counsel during police interrogation, or within a specific time frame preceding that interrogation, in order for the police to be bound by the request. Indeed, the Court indicated, as acknowledged by the Majority, a request for counsel made at “any stage” of the process must be honored by the police. See Miranda, 884 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“If, however, [an individual in custody] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.”). Moreover, the Court also specified that a request for the assistance of counsel made by an individual being held in custody at any time prior to the police beginning interrogation will be sufficient to guarantee the individual’s right to consult with an attorney before interrogation commences, and the right to have the attorney present during that questioning. See id., 384 U.S. at 470, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver.” (emphasis added)). Consequently, the Majority’s present conclusion that a request for the assistance of counsel made by an individual being held in custody must take place “in close temporal proximity to” police interrogation in order for the police to be required to honor it, Majority Opinion at 655-56, 115 A.3d at 861, finds no support in the Miranda decision itself, nor is it, in my view, compelled by the high Court’s subsequent jurisprudence in this area.

A decade and a half after Miranda, the high Court, in Edwards v. Arizona, supra, reaffirmed the fundamental principle espoused in Miranda that “an accused has a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880. In order to provide an additional safeguard against deprivation of that right occasioned by a failure of the custodial authority to honor a detained individual’s request for counsel, the Court established a bright-line rule that, when an individual being held in custody has “expressed his [or her] desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he or she] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him [or her], unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (emphasis added). The Court further held that any statements by an individual who is in custody, made in response to police questioning after the individual has requested the assistance of an attorney and before counsel is made available, are not admissible as evidence in a criminal trial unless it is clear that the detained individual, and not the police, voluntarily initiated the discussion. Id. at 485-87, 101 S.Ct. 1880.

Although in Edwards the individual in custody made the request for counsel during an initial interrogation, and the police re-initiated questioning of him a day later without providing him with the opportunity to consult with an attorney, the high Court did not suggest that it was limiting its holding only to situations in which a request for counsel is first made during or in close temporal proximity to the time of interrogation. As the Court later explained, its ruling was founded on a fundamental presumption that, if a person in custody has requested the assistance of counsel for custodial interrogation and the request is disregarded, a purported waiver by that person of his or her Fifth Amendment rights made during any subsequent interrogation is, ipso facto, not the product of a genuinely free choice. Id. at 487, 101 S.Ct. 1880; see also Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 787, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009); McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204. The Court explicitly recognized that such a rule is necessary because individuals in custody who assert their Fifth Amendment rights are frequently pressured into surrendering them before their request to consult with counsel is honored. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990) (observing that the Edwards bright-line rule is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.”); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam) (“In the absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through ‘badger[ing]’ or ‘overreaching’ — explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional — might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel’s assistance.”).

Thus, as the broad scope of the above-quoted language from Edwards makes clear, in all situations where a detained individual has requested the assistance of counsel, police are not permitted to conduct any interrogation after the request is made — even if, as in the case at bar, it is an initial interrogation — unless they first provide the detained individual the opportunity to consult with counsel, and to have counsel present during the interrogation. As in Miranda, the Court in Edwards did not set forth any specific time period before an interrogation that the request for counsel must be made in order for the police to be required to comply with it.

Indeed, in Smith, supra, the high Court seemingly rejected any such interpretation of Miranda and Edwards. In that case, the appellant — Smith—was arrested, and, while being given Miranda warnings, requested the assistance of counsel. Although the ultimate issue the high Court decided was whether subsequent equivocation by Smith, in response to further police questioning, on whether he desired an attorney vitiated his initial request for counsel (and the Court ultimately held that it did not), that tribunal expressly rejected the position taken by the lower court and the dissenting Justices that, because Smith was not subjected to interrogation at the time he requested counsel, this request did not obligate the custodial authorities to refrain from further questioning. The Court stated: “Such reasoning is plainly wrong. A request for counsel coming ‘at any stage of the process’ requires that questioning cease until counsel has been provided.” Smith, 469 U.S. at 97 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. 490 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602) (emphasis in Smith).

In the high Court’s jurisprudence after Edwards and Smith, it has applied the bright-line rule of Edwards to ensure that an individual taken into custody and given Miranda warnings will, in fact, be provided counsel upon request, prior to and during police interrogation. In Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), the Court ruled that Edwards governs situations where an individual who is arrested for one offense and given Miranda warnings, requests the assistance of counsel, but does not receive such assistance, and then is questioned at a later time about a separate offense. Key to the Court’s rationale in extending Edwards to exclude any statements given during such questioning was the importance it placed on the role of counsel in preventing an arrested individual’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination from being forsaken as the result of the inherently coercive pressures of custody and interrogation. The Court observed that, when a suspect requests counsel, it is presumed “[a]s a matter of law ... that he considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance.” Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683, 108 S.Ct. 2093. The Court noted that “[t]his discomfort is precisely the state of mind that Edwards presumes to persist unless the suspect himself initiates further conversation.” Id. at 684, 108 S.Ct. 2093. The Court found that the period of time which had elapsed between the incarcerated individual’s unfulfilled request for counsel and the interrogation — three days — created “a serious risk that the mere repetition of the Miranda warnings would not overcome the presumption of coercion that is created by prolonged police custody.” Id. at 686, 108 S.Ct. 2093. Consequently, the Court rejected the contention that, in such situations, “fresh sets of Miranda warnings will ‘reassure’ a suspect who has been denied the counsel he has clearly requested that his rights have remained untrammeled.” Id.

Significant for purposes of the instant matter was the high Court’s recognition in Roberson that “prolonged police custody” of an individual after his or her request for counsel has not been honored is, in and of itself, presumptively coercive because it overcomes the ability of the individual to make a genuinely free and unfettered choice regarding the exercise of his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when police commence the interrogation process. Here, the period of detention between Appellee’s initial request for the assistance of counsel, which police ignored, and his interrogation, was twice as long — six days — as that disapproved of by the Court in Roberson.

After Roberson, in Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), the high Court clarified and enhanced the Edwards rule by requiring counsel’s presence at any interrogation held after an individual in custody requests the assistance of counsel, even if the individual in custody has been given the opportunity to consult with an attorney. The Court noted that “[a] single consultation with an attorney does not remove the suspect from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his rights, or from the coercive pressures that accompany custody and that may increase as custody is prolonged.” Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153, 111 S.Ct. 486. The Court found that, to allow police questioning of an individual in custody in the absence of counsel, even if the individual has consulted with counsel, would be inconsistent with Edwards ’ objective “to protect the suspect’s right to have counsel present at custodial interrogation,” and would undermine Miranda’s determination that the presence of counsel at interrogation was vital to protect a detained individual’s Fifth Amendment rights from the dangers inherent in a “secret interrogation process.” Minnick, 498 U.S. at 154, 111 S.Ct. 486 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470, 86 S.Ct. 1602). Consequently, the Court ruled that the interrogation “was a formal interview which [the accused] was compelled to attend. Since [the accused] made a specific request for counsel before the interview, the police-initiated interrogation was impermissible,” and his statement to the deputy sheriff was inadmissible at trial. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 156, 111 S.Ct. 486. This decision thus constitutes another admonition by the high Court that the Fifth Amendment rights of an individual in custody who has requested the assistance of counsel to assist him or her in facing interrogation are violated if, thereafter, that individual is interrogated without counsel being present.

Relevant to the case sub judice, Appellee, then in custody and just like the accused in Minnick, made a request for counsel prior to interrogation by police, but he nevertheless was subjected to police questioning during which there was no attorney present with whom he could consult. Consequently, I consider Minnick to require the suppression of any statements Appellee made during this uncounseled interrogation. Indeed, pursuant to the teachings of Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick, our Court has previously held, in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 528 Pa. 516, 599 A.2d 200 (1991), that, even when a person, upon arrest, requested and received counsel, but detectives subjected him to an initial interrogation about a murder two days later -without ensuring that appointed counsel was present, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated, and the statements he made in response to police questioning were suppressed. Importantly, our Court in Santiago did not perceive the relevant constitutional analysis under the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of cases to depend on whether the uncounseled interrogation was the first one after the individual had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, or whether it was a second or subsequent police interrogation after such an invocation; rather, our Court found dispositive the fact that the defendant was in custody at the time the uncounseled interrogation took place. We stated, in this regard:

We attach no significance to the artificial distinction between “reinterrogation” and “initial interrogation.” For practical purposes, there is simply no difference from the suspect’s point of view concerning this distinction. All that the suspect knows is that he has been in continuous custody and that he is being interrogated again. Whether it happens to be an “initial” interrogation by certain officials is irrelevant. The suspect has already been interrogated at least once while he has been in custody, and thus, even this “initial” interrogation by ... police detectives is more properly classified as “reinterrogation.”

Santiago, 599 A.2d at 203 n. 10.

In my view, then, the polestar principle established by Miranda, Edwards, Minnick and Santiago is that any invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel by an individual while he or she is in custody must be honored before police can question that person. This is because, as these cases consistently recognize, an individual who is in custody is subject to the inherently coercive pressures attendant to that situation and its concomitant deleterious effect on the individual’s ability to exercise free will and to make truly voluntary decisions. By contrast, in non-custodial situations, there is no danger that, in responding to police questioning, the compulsive pressure created by the circumstances of detention will lead to an involuntary waiver by the individual of his or her Fifth Amendment rights. This is consistent with the high Court’s oft-expressed opinion that an individual who is not in custody possesses the freedom to terminate police questioning at any time, and, thus, can avoid the type of “police badgering” the high Court was concerned with preventing through the Miranda-Edwards line of cases. See, e.g., Montejo, 556 U.S. at 795, 129 S.Ct. 2079 (“When a defendant is not in custody, he is in control, and need only shut his door or walk away to avoid police badgering.”).

Thus, these cases consider a request for counsel by an individual in custody to be, in addition to the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right, an explicit acknowledgement that he or she requires the assistance of an attorney to deal with any police questioning which may take place thereafter while he or she remains in custody. Requiring interrogation to cease under these circumstances provides the individual in custody reassurance that he or she will have the assistance of counsel promised by the custodial authorities in the Miranda warnings, before having to face any interrogation by those same authorities. Consequently, in accordance with these decisions, I view Appellee’s request for the assistance of counsel, made while he was in custody, to have been a valid invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights which his interrogators were obliged to honor.

The Majority, however, departs from these decisions based on its reading of footnote 3 in McNeil as a predictive indication that the high Court would not consider Appellee’s invocation of his Miranda rights to have foreclosed further interrogation. As I explain at greater length infra, in addition to considering this footnote dictum, I respectfully differ from the Majority’s interpretation of it. In McNeil, the appellant was arrested on an armed robbery charge and was read his Miranda rights; however, he did not request the assistance of an attorney. Later, appellant appeared before a bail commissioner in a preliminary hearing. At this hearing, appellant was represented by a public defender, but said nothing during the proceeding. After the hearing, appellant was questioned by police three separate times without counsel, and given Miranda warnings before each of these interrogations; however, each time he was questioned, appellant waived his Fifth Amendment rights and gave statements incriminating himself in a murder. Subsequently, appellant sought suppression of the statements on the basis of his contention that his appearance at the preliminary hearing accompanied by counsel was, by itself, sufficient to invoke his Miranda right to counsel and, thus, required suppression under the Miranda-Edwards fine of cases.

The high Court rejected this argument. The Court agreed with appellant that his appearance at the preliminary hearing with counsel constituted a valid invocation of his right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment, but noted that there was a clear distinction between the “offense-specific” nature of the right to counsel guaranteed by that amendment and the general right for an individual in custody to the assistance of counsel to deal with the police which is secured by the Fifth Amendment, as was recognized in the Miranda-Edwards line of cases. The Court concluded that the latter right was not invoked by counsel’s mere presence at the bail hearing, explaining:

The purpose of the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee — and hence the purpose of invoking it — is to “protec[t] the unaided layman at critical confrontations” with his “expert adversary,” the government, after “the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified” with respect to a particular alleged crime. [United States v.] Gouveia, 467 U.S. [180], at 189, 104 S.Ct. [2292], at 2298 [81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) ]. The purpose of the Miranda-Edwards guarantee, on the other hand — and hence the purpose of invoking it — is to protect a quite different interest: the suspect’s “desire to deal with the police only through counsel,” Edwards, supra, 451 U.S., at 484, 101 S.Ct., at 1884. This is in one respect narrower than the interest protected by the Sixth Amendment guarantee (because it relates only to custodial interrogation) and in another respect broader (because it relates to interrogation regarding any suspected crime and attaches whether or not the “adversarial relationship” produced by a pending prosecution has yet arisen). To invoke the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a matter of fact, not to invoke the Mirandctr-Edwards interest. One might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel present concerning many matters, but not the matter under prosecution. It can be said, perhaps, that it is likely that one who has asked for counsel’s assistance in defending against a prosecution would want counsel present for all custodial interrogation, even interrogation unrelated to the charge. That is not necessarily true, since suspects often believe that they can avoid the laying of charges by demonstrating an assurance of innocence through frank and unassisted answers to questions. But even if it were true, the likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present is not the test for applicability of Edwards. The rule of that case applies only when the suspect “ha[s] expressed” his wish for the particular sort of lawyerly assistance that is the subject of Miranda. Edwards, supra, 451 U.S., at 484, 101 S.Ct., at 1884 (emphasis added). It requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police. Requesting the assistance of an attorney at a bail hearing does not bear that construction.

McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177-78, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (emphasis and alterations original).

Consequently, the actual controlling legal holding of McNeil, by which our Court is bound, is quite narrow— namely, in order for the clear protections of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel spelled out in the Mirandar-E dwards line of cases to apply, an individual who desires “the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police,” McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, must express that desire affirmatively. There is no question in the case at bar, as acknowledged by the Majority, that Appellee’s written assertion of his Miranda rights constituted “a very clear putative invocation of the Miranda-based right to counsel.” Majority Opinion at 647, 115 A.3d at 856.

Yet, the Majority herein disavows the validity of that invocation based on language in footnote 3 of the McNeil opinion, which, in my view, is non-precedential. In this footnote, the McNeil majority responded to conjecture by the dissent that the failure to treat an invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as equivalent to a general request for the assistance of counsel in dealing with police in all matters, a la Edwards, would, in the future, result in attorneys for an accused, or their clients at their direction, placing a statement on the record at a preliminary hearing “that will obviate the consequences of today’s holding.” McNeil, 501 U.S. at 184, 111 S.Ct. 2204. Although the dissent did not elaborate on the nature of such an “obviating” statement, the majority interpreted it to be an invocation of Miranda rights and responded:

We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than “custodial interrogation” — which a preliminary hearing will not always, or even usually, involve cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-602, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2650-2651, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (plurality opinion); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-303, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1688-1691, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). If the Miranda right to counsel can be invoked at a preliminary hearing, it could be argued, there is no logical reason why it could not be invoked by a letter prior to arrest, or indeed even prior to identification as a suspect. Most rights must be asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against. The fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, with similar future effect. Assuming, however, that an assertion at arraignment would be effective, and would be routinely made, the mere fact that adherence to the principle of our decisions will not have substantial consequences is no reason to abandon that principle. It would remain intolerable that a person in custody who had expressed no objection to being questioned would be unapproachable.

Id. at 182 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (emphasis original).

In my view, this footnote is nonbinding dicta as it addresses a legal question which was not before the Court, or central to its holding. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (only the holding of a prior opinion of the United States Supreme Court, and “those portions of the opinion necessary to that result,” are binding); Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 351 n. 12, 125 S.Ct. 694, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005) (“Dictum settles nothing, even in the court that utters it.”). Moreover, from my perspective, this footnote, when it is considered in conjunction with the opinion’s overall view of the Miranda-Edwards line of cases, constitutes nothing more than a reiteration by the high Court that the prospect of the loss of Fifth Amendment rights, which, as discussed above, is the central concern of the Miranda-Edwards line of cases, is simply not implicated in situations where an individual is not in custody and, thus, will not be subjected to its coercive effects during interrogation.

This interpretation is further bolstered by the fact that the high Court, in this footnote, explicitly chose as two of its three illustrative examples non-custodial situations, such as an individual’s assertion of Miranda rights by letter whenever he or she has not been arrested by police, or whenever he or she has not even been identified as a suspect. Its third example— invocation of Miranda rights at a preliminary hearing, which is conducted post-arrest — frequently involves non-custodial situations where the individual invoking such rights has been released on bail or his or her own recognizance at the time of the hearing. In any event, all of these examples are most unlike the factual circumstances of this case, where an individual who was indisputably in custody on a murder charge expressly requested the assistance of counsel and indicated that he did not wish to be questioned without counsel being present. In sum, this footnote does not control the question of whether this type of request for the assistance of counsel, made by an individual in custody, and for the purpose of “dealing with custodial interrogation,” McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, can be made only after an interrogation has begun, or in close temporal proximity to its commencement, in order for police to be obligated to honor it. Moreover, I regard the footnote to offer only equivocal guidance as to how the high Court might rule if squarely confronted with this question. See id. at 182 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (“The fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, with similar future effect.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, inasmuch as the high Court has recently re-affirmed that the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick, line of cases is “not in doubt,” see Montego, 556 U.S. at 794, 129 S.Ct. 2079,1 would find that they govern the disposition of this question, and that Appel-lee’s request was sufficient to have triggered the protections of those cases because it was made while he was in custody, and it was done with the express purpose of securing counsel’s assistance for any interrogation to which he would be subjected.

As the Majority acknowledges, bright-line rules have value in furnishing clear guidance to law enforcement, which is precisely what the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of cases provides in these situations. From my perspective, because this bright-line rule requires that police honor the request of an individual in custody for the assistance of counsel to deal with interrogation, made at any time while the individual is in custody, before commencing questioning of the individual, the lower courts properly applied it to exclude Appellee’s confession, since he was not provided the assistance of counsel prior to and during interrogation, as he clearly and unequivocally requested, and which was his federal and state constitutional right.

I, therefore, dissent.

      . As the basis for interlocutory appellate review, the Commonwealth certified in its notice of appeal that the suppression of Appellee’s inculpatory statement would terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).

      . See also United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1348 (11th Cir.1998) ("We find the reasoning of our fellow circuits persuasive and hold that Miranda rights may be invoked only during custodial interrogation or when interrogation is imminent.”); United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 338 (7th Cir.1994) (taking the view that there are certain "windows of opportunity” within which a defendant must assert his Miranda
        right to counsel); United States v. Wright, 962 F.2d 953, 955 (9th Cir.1992) (declining to sanction anticipatory invocations outside the context of custodial interrogation); People v. Villalobos, 193 Ill.2d 229, 250 Ill.Dec. 17, 737 N.E.2d 639, 642-45 (2000) (‘‘[A] majority of state courts have relied on the language in McNeil to hold that one cannot anticipatorily invoke the right to counsel prior to custodial interrogation.” (citations omitted)); Sapp v. State, 690 So.2d 581, 586 (Fla.1997) (explaining that "requiring the invocation to occur either during custodial interrogation or when it is imminent strikes a healthier balance between the protections of the individual from police coercion ... and the State's need to conduct criminal investigations”); Hoerauf v. State, 178 Md.App. 292, 941 A.2d 1161, 1173-76 & n. 13 (2008) (applying the suggestion from McNeil that "custody, absent interrogation, is insufficient” (citation omitted)); State v. Relford, 9 Neb.App. 985, 623 N.W.2d 343, 347 (2001) (collecting cases for the proposition that "[m]any state courts which have considered the issue have relied on the language in McNeil v. Wisconsin to hold that one cannot anticipatorily invoke the Miranda right to counsel prior to custodial interrogation” (citation omitted)). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orín S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 6.9(g) & n. 200 (3d ed.2014) (collecting cases).

      . See generally Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 109, 130 S.Ct. at 1222 (explaining that, once a valid invocation of the Miranda-based right to counsel has occurred, "[t]he [Edwards ] prohibition applies ... when the subsequent interrogation pertains to a different crime, when it is conducted by a different law enforcement authority, and even when the suspect has met with an attorney after [a prior] interrogation.” (citations omitted)).
      Parenthetically, such rationale from Shatzer reflects another aspect in which the jurisprudence deriving from the Fifth Amendment differs from the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, since the latter is offense specific. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175, 111 S.Ct. at 2207.

      . For example, Appellee discusses the circumstances that he was a juvenile at all relevant times; his letter-invocation was provided to the homicide unit of the Philadelphia police department; and an unknown employee of that unit apparently responded to Appellee's attempted assertion of his rights with the notation; "Ha, ha, ha.” Brief for Appellee at 8.

      . See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

      . In response, the homicide unit inscribed "ha, ha, ha” on the form and returned it to the Defender Association's lawyer. I do not condone such conduct.

      . Appellee was a juvenile at the time of his interrogation.

      . Appellee also argues to our Court that Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution independently protected his right to counsel in this situation, and the Majority rejects this claim. See Majority Opinion at 656-57, 115 A.3d at 861-62. Because Article I, Section 9 affords at least as much protection of the right against self-incrimination as does the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, given that the lower court decisions to exclude Appellee's confession were based entirely on their determinations that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the police, and because, as I explain infra, I consider their determinations to have been correct, I would find that Appellee was entitled to relief under the Pennsylvania Constitution as well.

      . As recently as 2009, the Court again recognized the vexing problem of false confessions by individuals held in custody, and their impact on our system of justice. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (observing that the pressures of custodial interrogation “can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed” (citing Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post—DNA World, 82 N.C.L.Rev. 891, 906-07 (2004))).

      . The arrested individual, Roberson, requested counsel immediately after being arrested and was not questioned at that time. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 678, 108 S.Ct. 2093. Roberson subsequently gave the challenged statement during questioning about the separate offense three days later, which was the first time he had been interrogated about that offense.

      . The accused, Minnick, was arrested and interrogated the following day by FBI agents during which he gave a statement and also requested a lawyer. After that interrogation, counsel was appointed for Minnick, and he consulted with that attorney 2 or 3 times. Two days later, Minnick was again questioned by a deputy sheriff without being granted the opportunity to have his attorney present at the interrogation. Although the lower courts suppressed the statements Minnick gave to the FBI agents, it did not apply Edwards to suppress his statements to the deputy sheriff.

      . In Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010), the high Court, while continuing to acknowledge the coercive effects of custody on an individual’s ability to make a genuinely free election to waive Fifth Amendment rights, held that a 14-day break in custody was sufficient to dispel such effects so that the Edwards’ presumption of involuntariness of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment did not apply. No such break in custody occurred in this case, as Appellee remained in custody from the time of his arrest until his interrogation by detectives from the Philadelphia homicide unit six days later; thus, in my view, Edwards and its progeny govern the disposition of this matter. See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 108, 130 S.Ct. 1213 ("The only logical endpoint of Edwards disability is termination of Miranda custody and any of its lingering effects.”).

      . McNeil was authored by Justice Scalia and joined by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices White, O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun.

      . See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204 ("[T]he particular sort of lawyerly assistance that is the subject of Miranda ... [is] the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.” (emphasis original)).

      . I acknowledge that some states' supreme courts and some federal circuit courts have interpreted this footnote from McNeil in a similar fashion as the Majority, and, correspondingly, have held that certain types of anticipatory invocations of Miranda rights did not require suppression of statements made during subsequent uncounseled interrogations. See, e.g., People v. Villalobos, 193 Ill.2d 229, 250 Ill.Dec. 17, 737 N.E.2d 639 (2000) (signing of form at bond hearing on marijuana charge, demanding a preliminary hearing, and which also contained a section entitled “notice of representation” purporting to bar the defendant’s participation in questioning on any other case without the presence of counsel was not a valid invocation of Miranda rights); United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 339 (7th Cir.1994) (store owner's unsuccessful attempt to contact attorney while handcuffed to ask about whether he should give consent to search did not constitute valid invocation of Miranda right to counsel since "[he] did not request an attorney immediately before, in response to, or during custodial interrogation") (emphasis omitted). However, as the parties have recited in their briefs, and as referenced by the Majority, there is a distinct split of authority on this question, which, from my perspective, indicates no clear governing legal consensus. Thus, in the absence of binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court to the contrary, I favor aligning with the high courts of our sister jurisdictions, and other federal circuits, that do not consider the McNeil footnote as a deviation by the high Court from its Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of decisions. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 604 A.2d 24, 27 (Me.1992) (holding that defendant’s act of circling a preprinted request for the assistance of counsel on a detainer form involving criminal charges lodged in Maine, while he was a prisoner in Arizona, was sufficient to invoke the protections of Miranda and Edwards; "[g]iven the fact that he was in custody and subject to interrogation, no rational purpose would be served by distinguishing between a request for counsel made before a Miranda warning and one made after such a warning.”); State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 695 A.2d 1301 (1997) (holding that defendant’s request to mother to call his attorney as he was being arrested at his home was a valid invocation of Miranda rights, such that statement given in an uncounseled interrogation later at the police station must be suppressed, and rejecting argument that questioning must be imminent in order for Edwards to apply); State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 412 S.E.2d 20, 26 (1992) (holding that, where defendant was in custody at the sheriff’s department but not yet interrogated, her request for counsel to the sheriff was, under Miranda, a valid invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights; ”[i]t would make little sense to require a defendant already in custody to wait until the onset of questioning or the recitation of her Miranda rights before being permitted to invoke her right to counsel.”), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 543 S.E.2d 823 (2001); Walker v. State, 795 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Okl.Ct.Crim.App.1990) (holding that Edwards applied to bar confession of a defendant who requested to speak with his attorney prior to being moved to a different county, even though the request was not made during any interrogation, due to the fact that defendant was questioned without counsel the next day after having been moved), and followed in Marquez v. State, 890 P.2d 980 (Okl.Ct.Crim.App.1995) (continuing to regard a pre-interrogation request for the assistance of counsel as governed by Edwards); State v. Hambly, 307 Wis.2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48, 61 (2008) (defendant's request for an attorney immediately upon being arrested and handcuffed by detectives investigating drug activity was an effective invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, since it was made while the defendant was in custody); U.S. v. Kelsey, 951 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir.1991) (holding that defendant's request for an attorney made while he was in custody as his house was being searched was a valid invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda and Edwards, even though he was not being interrogated by the police when he made the request, nor given Miranda warnings, noting the coercive effects of the circumstances of his detention and the passage of time before he was interrogated — three hours — during which his request for counsel was unfulfilled).

      . Unlike the Majority, I do not view application of the bright line rule articulated in the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of decisions in situations such as the instant matter to be an impediment to effective law enforcement. As the high Court has observed: "[n]o system [of criminal justice] worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, [constitutional] rights.” Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). Indeed, the Court has emphasized the vital role which the right to consult with an attorney regarding police interrogation serves under our Constitution in ensuring the proper functioning of our system of criminal justice:
      An attorney may advise his client not to talk to police until he has had an opportunity to investigate the case, or he may wish to be present with his client during any police questioning. In doing so an attorney is merely exercising the good professional judgment he has been taught. This is not cause for considering the attorney a menace to law enforcement. He is merely carrying out what he is sworn to do under his oath — to protect to the extent of his ability the rights of his client.

        Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480-81, 86 S.Ct. 1602. See also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) ("Whether it is a minor or an adult who stands accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that person in his dealings with the police and the courts. For this reason, the Court fashioned in Miranda the rigid rule that an accused's request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease.”).
      Application of the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick rule in cases such as the matter at bar, is, thus, eminently consistent with the high Court’s objective of protecting the basic constitutional right of every person to consult with an attorney prior to and during police interrogation, but it does not thwart the ability of the police to solve a crime. Although questioning individuals taken into custody remains a vital tool in solving crime, it is by no means the only means to do so, especially in light of substantial advances in modem forensic science. See, e.g., Professor Marcy Strauss, "The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda," 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 773, 829 n. 164 (2009) (observing that the increasing utilization of scientific technology such as DNA evidence has diminished the need for confessions and that "[t]he growth in scientific technology may render it less essential for law enforcement agencies to center an investigation on information ‘cajoled’ from a suspect, especially in the most serious of crimes like murder and rape.”). Notably, application of the Miranda-Edwards rule in these circumstances does not in any way preclude law enforcement from pursuing any and all other means of investigation at their disposal after an individual in custody has made a request for counsel to deal with any interrogation to which he or she may be subjected. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ("When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him.”). Moreover, an individual who has requested the assistance of counsel to deal with interrogation may still, at any time, reconsider that request and approach police to discuss the case with them even if counsel has not been provided. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880. Furthermore, and importantly, once counsel has been provided, police are free to renew their request to speak with the individual, and he or she may, after consultation with that attorney, agree to speak with police with the attorney present. Assuring access to counsel requested by an individual in custody merely serves to confirm that any statements given during a subsequent custodial interrogation are, in actuality, the product of a free and voluntary choice. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ("If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness.”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    115 A.3d 875
    Junius BURNO, Petitioner v. The COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEIGH COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 26 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of May, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    115 A.3d 875
    Casey DOOLEY, Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 31 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of May, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.


text:
    115 A.3d 876
    James EVERETT, III, pro se Cutis [sic], Petitioner v. Hon. Steven R. GEROFF, Phila. County; Supt. Jerome Walsh, SCI-Dallas; Mrs. Kathleen Kane, Atty. Gen. Penna.; Mr. Seth Williams, D.A. Phila County, Respondents.
    No. 32 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of May, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED, and the Prothonotary is DIRECTED to strike the name of the jurist from the caption.


text:
    115 A.3d 876
    Elmer DAVENPORT, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 33 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of May, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    115 A.3d 1278
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner, v. Daniel LABRAKE, Respondent.
    No. 37 EAL 2013.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    June 3, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 3rd day of June, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, and the order of the Commonwealth Court is VACATED. See Commonwealth v. Allen, 630 Pa. 577, 107 A.3d 709 (2014). The matter is REMANDED for consideration of Respondent’s remaining appellate issues.


author: Chief Justice SAYLOR.

text:
    115 A.3d 1278
    CLIPPER PIPE & SERVICE, INC., Appellee v. The OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.; Contracting Systems, Inc. II, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 7, 2015.
    Decided June 15, 2015.

      Marcia Mary Waldron, Esq., U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit, for United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
    Christopher Michael Curci, Esq., Walter H. Flamm, Jr., Esq., Robert Joseph Krandel, Esq., Flamm Walton PC, Blue Bell, for Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. and Contracting Systems Inc. II.
    Patrick Robert Kingsley, Esq., Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, L.L.P., Philadelphia, for Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.
    Patrick Timothy Henigan, Esq., Eckell, Sparks, Levy, Auer-bach, Monte, Sloane, Matthews & Auslander PC, Media, for Clipper Pipe & Service, Inc.
    SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Chief Justice SAYLOR.

We accepted certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to determine whether a Pennsylvania statute governing payments to contractors and subcontractors applies in the context of a public works project.

The subject statute is the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act, which confirms and establishes certain rights and duties among “owners,” “contractors,” and “subcontractors” with respect to “construction contracts.” 73 P.S. § 502. Within the enactment, “owner” is a pivotal term, given its centrality and pervasive appearance. For instance, “contractor” is defined as “[a] person authorized or engaged by an owner to improve real property.” Id. (emphasis added).

Under CASPA, “owner” is defined, in pertinent part, as “[a] person who has an interest in the real property that is improved and who ordered the improvement to be made.” Id. § 502 (emphasis added). “Person,” in turn, is defined as “[a] corporation, partnership, business trust, other association, estate, trust foundation or a natural individual.” Id. (emphasis added).

In 2010, the United States Department of the Navy entered into an agreement with Contracting Systems, Inc. II (“CSI”), per which the latter served as the general contractor for the construction of an addition to, and renovations of, the Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Training Center in the Lehigh Valley. CSI, in turn, subcontracted with Appellee, Clipper Pipe & Service, Inc. (“Clipper”), for the performance of mechanical and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning work.

Subsequently, Clipper filed suit against CSI and its surety, the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (collectively “Appellants”), in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting that CSI had failed to pay approximately $150,000 to Clipper, per the terms of their agreement. Among other claims, Clipper advanced one under CASPA.

Appellants moved for summary judgment, arguing that CASPA does not apply to public works projects, because a governmental entity does not qualify as an “owner” under the statutory definition, as such an entity is neither a “person” nor an “other association.” 73 P.S. § 502. Appellants acknowledged that a federal district court had predicted that Pennsylvania courts would find that a governmental entity may be an owner for purposes of CASPA. See Scandale Associated Builders & Eng’rs, Ltd. v. Bell Justice Facilities Corp., 455 F.Supp.2d 271, 281 (M.D.Pa.2006). They highlighted, however, the inconsistency of such prediction with several actual decisions issued by Pennsylvania state courts, albeit from the common pleas level. See, e.g., Hoffmeister v. Skepton Constr., Inc., 55 Northampton Cnty. Rep. 46, 48 (2006) (reasoning that CASPA did not apply to a Commonwealth public works project, because “a ‘person’ is specifically defined in [CASPA] with a limited list of entities that does not include any agency of state or local government”), ajfd per curiam, 943 A.2d 327 (Pa.Super.2007). Along these lines, Appellants noted that Pennsylvania courts had also considered CASPA in concert with Subchapter D of Chapter 39 of the Commonwealth Procurement Code, commonly denominated the “Prompt Pay Act,” another statutory regime directed at promoting prompt payment to contractors and subcontractors. See, e.g., Mastercraft Woodworking Co. v. Jim Lagana Plumbing & Heating Inc., 9 Pa. D. & C. 5th 251, 259-61 (C.P. Berks 2009). In this regard, Appellants explained, those courts had concluded that the Prompt Pay Act — and not CASPA — addresses public works projects. See, e.g., id.

The federal district court denied relief on Appellants’ motion. Among other aspects of its rationale, the court followed Scandale’s reasoning that a governmental entity may be an “owner” under CASPA, since the statutory definition of “person” does not exclude the federal government, and the purpose of CASPA is to protect contracting parties.

Clipper prevailed at an ensuing jury trial, and the district court awarded interest, penalties, and counsel fees, such as are made available by CASPA. See 73 P.S. §§ 505(d), 512. Appellants lodged an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Per this Court’s internal operating procedures, the federal appeals court subsequently applied for certification of a question of law, namely, “does [CASPA] apply to a project where the owner is a governmental entity, such as the federal government in this case?” Petition for Certification in Clipper Pipe & Service, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., No. 14-1716 (3d Cir. Oct. 24, 2014), at 8.

Presently, Appellants maintain that governmental bodies cannot be “owners” for purposes of CASPA, because the word “government” does not appear in the definition, and it is the Prompt Pay Act, not CASPA, which expressly governs public works projects. To the degree this is not plain from the face of CASPA, Appellants invoke principles of statutory construction. For example, Appellants urge that, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the phrase “other association,” as used in the definition of “person” (and, derivatively, “owner”) should take its meaning from the words which precede it, i.e., “[a] corporation, partnership, [or] business trust,” 73 P.S. § 502. Accord 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(b) (“General words shall be construed to take their meanings and be restricted by preceding particular words.”).

Additionally, Appellants note that the term “association,” as utilized in statutes enacted prior to December 7, 1994, refers to “any form of unincorporated enterprise owned by two or more persons other than a partnership or limited partnership.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991. According to Appellants, this definition is obviously directed to nonpublic entities. Finally, Appellants believe that it would be untenable for both CASPA and the Prompt Pay Act to apply simultaneously to a construction project, given that there are substantial differences in: the timing for provision of required notices, compare 73 P.S. § 511, with 62 Pa.C.S. § 3934; the rate of interest on delayed payments, compare 73 P.S. § 505, with 62 Pa.C.S. § 3932(c); and the burden of proof associated with penalty and attorneys’ fee awards, compare 73 P.S. § 512, with 62 Pa.C.S. § 3935. Accord, e.g., E. Coast Paving & Sealcoating, Inc. v. N. Allegheny Sch. Dist., 111 A.3d 220, 232 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2015) (concluding, based on the differences between CASPA and the Prompt Pay Act, that the latter, “not CASPA, governs construction contracts between a government agency ... and a contractor”); Hoffmeister, 55 Northampton Cnty. Rep. at 47 (“It is not reasonable that the General Assembly intended to regulate conduct with two different requirements for the same entitlement to a penalty for a contractor’s late payment to a subcontractor.”).

Finally, Appellants contend that application of CASPA to federal public works projects would contravene the principle of federal supremacy, per which states may not regulate the federal government. See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 434, 110 S.Ct. 1986, 1994, 109 L.Ed.2d 420 (1990) (“State law may run afoul of the Supremacy Clause in two distinct ways: The law may regulate the [federal] Government directly or discriminate against it, ... or it may conflict with an affirmative command of Congress.” (citing, inter alia, M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819))).

Clipper, on the other hand, does not accept that the identity of the owner is fundamental to the application of CASPA. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 4 (“The fact that a governmental entity is an owner is irrelevant where the contract at issue does not include a governmental entity as a party.”). Along these lines, Clipper references Imperial Excavating & Paving, LLC v. Rizzetto Construction Management, Inc., 935 A.2d 557 (Pa.Super.2007), as a decision which applied the terms of CASPA in determining the respective rights of a contractor and subcontractor on a public project. To the degree that identity is relevant to the status of an “owner” under CASPA, Clipper maintains that the federal government is both a “person” and an “other association,” since “the federal government is nothing more than an association of its citizens.” Brief for Appellee at 5; accord Scandale, 455 F.Supp.2d at 281. According to Clipper, this approach is consistent with the policy of liberal construction to be implemented in discerning the meaning of ambiguous remedial statutes. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c).

Clipper also stresses the salient policy underlying CASPA— in terms of protecting contractors and subcontractors and encouraging fair dealing among the parties to a construction contract — and observes that such salutary aims should not be confined to private projects. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 16 (“The manifest intention of the General Assembly was to protect subcontractors from the exact type of conduct [in which] a jury determined CSI engaged.”). Furthermore, while recognizing that application of CASPA to claims against the federal government might raise supremacy concerns, Clipper suggests that such concerns are alleviated since such application would be preempted by the federal Prompt Pay Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3907. Clipper does not find the Commonwealth-level Prompt Pay Act relevant, since it is addressed to contracts involving state and local governmental units, see 62 Pa.C.S. § 3902, not the federal government.

Finally, Clipper develops that, pursuant to recent amendments to Section 102 of the Associations Code, the term “association” expressly excludes governmental entities. See Act of Oct. 22, 2014, P.L. 2640, No. 172 (amending, inter alia, 15 Pa.C.S. § 102). It is Clipper’s position that such modification bolsters the conclusion that the Legislature did not previously intend to exclude governmental bodies from CASPA’s reach.

Upon review, we agree with Appellants’ position that CASPA does not apply in the context of public works projects. In the first instance, we find Clipper’s and the federal district courts’ proposition that the General Assembly may have intended the term “association” to encompass governments or governmental units to be unconvincing. Moreover, the United States and its Department of the Navy are dissimilar to a “corporation,” “partnership” “business trust,” “estate,” “trust foundation,” and “natural individual,” among which the term “association” appears. Cf. DEP v. Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 628 Pa. 17, 41, 102 A.3d 962, 976 (2014) (explaining that, per the doctrine of ejusdem generis, catchall phrases “should not be construed in their widest context”).

Even if this were not the case, another relevant rule of statutory construction prescribes that statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign. See, e.g., Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., 625 Pa. 563, 575-76, 93 A.3d 806, 814 (2014). See generally 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 62:1 (7th ed. 2015) (“Statutory provisions which are written in such general language that they are reasonably susceptible to being construed as applicable both to the government and to private parties are subject to a rule of construction which exempts the government from their operation in the absence of other particular indicia supporting a contrary result in particular instances.”). This approach derives, in part, from the immunity accorded to the government at common law (and presently reaffirmed by statute, see infra note 6). See generally 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 62:1 (“[T]he rule exempting the sovereign from the operation of the general provisions of a statute is premised on a policy of preserving for the public the efficient, unimpaired functioning of government.”). It is also grounded on the assumption that nonspecific statutes are most often directed to the affairs of the citizenry. See id. (“There is a further basis for the rule in that the purpose of most legislation is to govern, i.e., to direct the application of the power of government to arrange the affairs of people who are subject to it. For this reason most statutes are intended and understood to apply to members of the public instead of the government itself.”). Per the application of this principle, the federal government is not an “association” or a “person” or, derivatively, an “owner” for purposes of CASPA.

We recognize that the government is not directly involved in the present dispute between CSI, a contractor in the generic sense, and its subcontractor, Clipper. Nevertheless, our analysis circles back to the centrality of the concept of an “owner” to CASPA. Where there is no “owner” for purposes of CASPA — because a “person” did not commission the construction in the first instance, 73 P.S. § 502 (defining “owner” in terms of a person with an interest in real estate) — there also can be no “contractor” under the statute, given that a “contractor” must be engaged by an “owner.” Id. Whether by intention or oversight, the Legislature simply did not design CASPA to apply independently to subcontracts in scenarios in which the foundational contract resides outside its boundaries. Thus, although we do not discount that the policy of CASPA would seem to be served by applying it to the present circumstances, such application is too disharmonious with the statutory mechanics to support the extension.

In terms of the soon-to-be-effective amendment to the Associations Code, which will indicate expressly that the term “association” does not encompass governmental units, we differ with Clipper’s assumption that this necessarily reflects changed legislative intent. Other jurisdictions recognize that the purpose of amendments, in fact, may be to clarify what the governing legislature body intended from the outset. Indeed, interpretive judicial decisions, such as the federal district courts’ opinions pertinent to this case, are sometimes the impetus for such clarification.

In summary, we conclude that CASPA does not apply to a construction project where the owner is a governmental entity.

The matter is returned to the Third Circuit.

Justices EAKIN, BAER, TODD, and STEVENS join the opinion.

      . Act of Feb. 17, 1994, P.L. 73, No. 7 (as amended, 73 P.S. §§ 501-516) ("CASPA”).

      . Act of May 15, 1998, P.L. 358, No. 57 §§ 3931-3939 (as amended, 62 Pa.C.S. §§ 3931-3939).

      . In this regard, Appellants also reference the principle of statutory construction requiring that specific provisions control over general ones. See Brief for Appellants at 26 (‘‘Because the Prompt Pay Act is the more specific statute, and was enacted after the more general CASPA, the Rules of Statutory Construction require that the more specific language in the Prompt Pay Act prevail over the general language of ‘other association’ in CASPA.” (relying upon 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933)).

      . Act of Dec. 21, 1988, P.L. 1444, No. 177 (as amended, 15 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9507).

      . Accord Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 1866, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) ("We must apply to this text our longstanding interpretive presumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Bd. of Fin. & Revenue, 369 Pa. 386, 396-97, 85 A.2d 156, 163 (1951) ("[T]he word person is never generally construed to include a sovereign whether the United States or a State.” (internal citations omitted)).

      . In the Meyer decision, cited previously, the relevant principle of narrow construction was applied upon review of a legislative enactment which predated this Court’s decision to abrogate common-law sovereign immunity. See Mayle v. Pa. Dep’t of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 406, 388 A.2d 709, 720 (1978). Thus, strictly speaking at least, it remains an issue of first impression whether the precept should be extended into the context of a post-abrogation statute such as CASPA. Accordingly, we pause to explain why continued application is appropriate.
      Very soon after the issuance of Mayle, the General Assembly reaffirmed and reinstated the doctrine of sovereign immunity through a legislative enactment. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. Per the statutory regime, the Commonwealth "shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity ... and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.” Id. (emphasis added). Notably, this Court already has implemented this plain directive to maintain the traditional strict construction of statutes in derogation of sovereignty. See, e.g., Pyeritz v. PSP, 613 Pa. 80, 94, 32 A.3d 687, 696 (2011) ("The legislature's intent in enacting the Sovereign Immunity Act was to shield government from liability except as provided for in the statute itself, and we must apply a rule of strict construction in interpreting the exceptions." (emphasis added)).
      Furthermore, although Appellants have not specifically referenced the strict-construction precept in their arguments, application of the principle is entirely consistent with Appellants' position that general statutory terms such as “person” and "association” should not be construed to encompass the Commonwealth, at least in the absence of some specific evidence of a legislative intention supporting such an expansive construction. Moreover, we believe that our present reference to the relevant principle of narrow construction is salutary in terms of affording broader guidance, particularly given that several federal district courts have construed general terms to encompass the Commonwealth in a context in which there is no specific evidence that the Legislature intended such a construction. See, e.g., Scandale, 455 F.Supp.2d at 281.

      . In a similar vein, while recognizing the remedial nature of CASPA, we conclude that the policy of liberal construction has its limits as well.

      . Along these lines, the Michigan Supreme Court has explained that the principle suggested by Clipper:
      is a rule for construction of the amendment when ... the meaning of the statute before amendment is settled and the question presented is the meaning and effect to be given the amendment. The rule is not applied in reverse for the purpose of determining the meaning of the statute before amendment by presuming that it must have been something different than that which is the clear intent of the statute after the amendment.... While in many and perhaps most instances it undoubtedly is the legislative intent, in enacting an amendment, to change existing law, there are, as undoubtedly, other instances, particularly if uncertainty exists as to the meaning of a statute, when amendments are adopted for the purpose of making plain what the legislative intent had been all along from the time of the statute's original enactment.

        In re Detroit Edison Co., 350 Mich. 606, 87 N.W.2d 126, 130 (1957) (emphasis added); accord Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Neill, 296 N.C. 503, 251 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1979) ("In construing a statute with reference to an amendment, it is presumed that the Legislature intended either (1) to change the substance of the original act or (2) to clarify the meaning of it.”).