author: Justice TODD.

text:
    136 A.3d 485
    Leo E. SHEDDEN and Sandra L. Shedden, Appellants, v. ANADARKO E. & P. COMPANY, L.P., Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Oct. 7, 2015.
    Resubmitted Jan. 20, 2016.
    Decided March 29, 2016.

      Kevin Jon Moody, Esq., Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas Association, for Pennsylvania Independent Oil & Gas Association, Amicus Curiae.
    David Jonathan Brann, Esq., for Leo Shedden and Sandra L. Shedden.
    Jared Dimock Bayer, Esq., Stephen A. Cozen, Esq., Cozen O’Connor, Philadelphia, Andrea Emilie Hammel, Esq., Cozen O’Connor, West Conshohocken, for Anadarko E & P Company, LP.
    SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.

      . We note, however, that other courts have applied the doctrine of estoppel by deed to leases, see, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Shulman, 331 F.Supp. 1024, 1029 (D.Md.1971) (applying Maryland law), including mineral leases, see, e.g., White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433, 443 (1942).

   OPINION

Justice TODD.

In this appeal, we consider whether the Superior Court properly applied the doctrine of estoppel by deed to conclude that an oil and gas lease between Appellee, Anadarko E. & P. Co., L.P. (“Anadarko”), and Appellants, Leo and Sandra Shed-den, covers the oil and gas rights to 100% of the property identified in the lease, notwithstanding the fact that, unbeknownst to them, Appellants owned only a one-half interest in the oil and gas rights to the property at the time the lease was executed, and, consequently, received a bonus payment only for the oil and gas rights they actually owned. Upon review, we affirm.

The facts of the instant case are undisputed. Appellants are the owners of a 62-acre parcel of land (the “Property”) located in Ward Township, Tioga County, which they purchased from Colgate University in 1990. Unbeknownst to Appellants, on February 21, 1894, Appellants’ predecessors in interest, Ezra and Emma Baxter (the “Baxters”), reserved by recorded deed one-half of the oil and gas rights to the Property. In May 2006, Appellants leased to Anadarko the oil and gas rights to the Property for a term of five years, expressly warranting title in all of the oil and gas. As consideration, Anadarko agreed to pay Appellants a bonus payment of $80 per acre. Anadarko sent Appellants a Lease Purchase Report and an Order of Payment reflecting a bonus payment of $80 per acre on 62 acres, totaling $4,960. Prior to tendering the bonus payment, however, Anadarko’s land agent discovered the Baxters’ 1894 reservation of one-half of the oil and gas rights to the Property, and informed Appellants that Anadarko would pay a bonus on only 31 of the 62 acres. Thereafter, Anadarko sent Appellants a revised Order for Payment, describing the subject Property as “a tract of land containing 62.00 gross acres, 31.00 net acres,” and indicating that, as consideration for the agreement, Anadarko would pay Appellants a total of $2,480. Order for Payment (R.R. at 19a). Appellants did not sign the revised Order for Payment, but subsequently accepted Anadarko’s payment of $2,480. Critical to the instant appeal, two years after executing the Lease, Appellants filed a motion to quiet title on the Baxters’ previously-reserved one-half interest in the oil and gas rights to the Property, which the trial court granted.

On March 31, 2011, Anadarko invoked the extension clause contained in the Lease by sending Appellants a check in the amount of $4,340, which represented an extension payment of $70 per acre on 62 acres. Appellants did not cash the check, however, based on their belief that Anadarko had leased the oil and gas rights to only one-half of the Property, and, thus, that Anadarko overpaid them by $2,170. On October 21, 2011, Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Lease “only pertains to oil and gas contained on 31 acres” of the Property. Complaint, 10/12/11, at 4 (R.R. 5a). In response, Anadarko filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Appellants were estopped, both by their contractual promises and by the doctrine of estoppel by deed, from denying that the Lease grants Anadarko 100% of the oil and gas rights to the Property.

In response to Anadarko’s motion for summary judgment, Appellants argued that they could not have leased to Anadar-ko 100% of the oil and gas rights to the Property because they owned only one-half of the rights thereto at the time the Lease was executed. Appellants further maintained that Ana-darko’s 2006 revised bonus payment of $80 on 31 net acres of the Property constituted a modification of the Lease. Appellants contended that, because Anadarko leased only one-half of the oil and gas rights to the Property, Anadarko could extend the primary term of the Lease only as to one-half of the oil and gas rights to the Property.

On April 16, 2013, the trial court granted Anadarko’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Appellants’ declaratory judgment action, concluding that the Lease “covers all oil and gas underlying the entirety of [Appellants’] 62-acre property ... and that the Primary Term of the Lease was timely and validly extended, and the Lease remains in effect according to its terms.” Trial Court Order, 4/16/13. In support of its order, the trial court observed that the Lease described the premises as:

containing for the purpose of calculating rentals and royalties, 62.00 acres whether actually containing more or less. In addition to the above described land, any and all strings or parcels of land adjoining or contiguous to the above described land and owned or claimed by LESSOR are hereby leased to LESSEE.

Lease at 1 (R.R. at 10a). Based on this language, the trial court determined that Appellants intended “to enter into a binding lease exclusively with Anadarko as to all 62 acres.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/19/13, at 3-4.

The trial court rejected Appellants’ argument that their receipt of a bonus payment equal to one-half of the agreed-upon sum for 62 acres modified the Lease such that it applied only to 31 acres, noting that Paragraph C.3 of the Lease provides: “[i]f LESSOR owns less than all of the oil and gas rights in the premises, LESSOR shall be entitled to only a share of the rentals and royalties equivalent to the proportion of such oil and gas rights owned by LESSOR.” Lease at 2 § C.3 (R.R. at 11A). Moreover, the trial court determined that, under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, Appellants’ subsequent acquisition of title to the previously-reserved one-half interest in the oil and gas rights to the Property passed to Anadarko under the terms of the Lease, and that Appellants’ covenant of warranty in the Lease estops them from arguing otherwise. Trial Court Opinion, 6/19/13, at 5-6.

The Superior Court, in a unanimous published opinion, affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Anadarko. Shedden v. Anadarko E & P Co., L.P., 88 A.3d 228 (Pa.Super.2014). Citing this Court’s decision in Dixon v, Fuller, 196 Pa. 349, 46 A. 553 (1900), and its own decision in Hennebont Co. v. Kroger Co., 221 Pa.Super. 65, 289 A.2d 229 (1972), the court noted that the doctrine of estoppel by deed is well established in this Commonwealth, and concluded that, pursuant thereto, “[Appellants] are barred from denying that the Lease covers all 62 acres of the leased premises.” Shedden, 88 A.3d at 233. The court found it immaterial that Appellants received a bonus payment of only one-half of the agreed-upon sum, noting that Paragraph C.3 of the Lease specifically provides that they were entitled to only the share of the rentals and royalties equivalent to the proportion of gas and oil they actually owned. Id. (citing Lease at 2 § C.3). Finally, the Superior Court held that Anadarko’s exercise of its contractual option to extend the Lease for an additional five years was timely, and covered all 62 acres of the Property.

We granted allowance of appeal to consider the propriety of the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Anadarko, based on its finding that, pursuant to the doctrine of estoppel by deed, Appellants are precluded from arguing that the Lease does not cover the oil and gas rights to the entirety of the Property, despite Appellants having initially received a bonus payment of one-half the agreed-upon sum.

Summary judgment is appropriate only where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294, 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (2010). An appellate court may reverse a grant of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 592 Pa. 458, 926 A.2d 899, 902 (2007). The issue as to whether there are genuine issues as to any material fact presents a question of law; thus, on that question, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id. at 903.

Appellants contend that the Superior Court erred in applying the doctrine of estoppel by deed to conclude that the Lease grants Anadarko the oil and gas rights to the entire 62 acres of the Property for two reasons. First, Appellants submit that application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed is not justified in this case because Anadarko was not prejudiced by Appellants’ misrepresentation in the Lease that they owned 100% of the oil and gas rights to Property. Second, Appellants contend that there was a “necessary and implied modification of both the consideration and the scope of the lease” as a result of Anadarko’s payment, and their receipt, of one-half of the agreed-upon bonus. Appellants’ Brief at 14.

As a finding that the Lease was modified by the parties would render the issue of estoppel by deed moot, we begin by addressing Appellants’ lease modification argument. Appellants emphasize that the revised Order for Payment described the Lease as covering only 31 net acres, and they argue that, by paying Appellants a bonus on only 31 acres, Anadarko “elected to forego any attempt to lease the remaining interest in the oil and gas which was reserved by Ezra and Emma Baxter,” and “knowingly accepted a lease of one-half of the oil and gas underlying [Appellants’] property.” Id. Appellants further aver that the concept of modification is in accord with Paragraph C.3 of the Lease, which provides for a proportional reduction in rents and royalties upon discovery that Appellants own less property than the Lease purports to convey.

In response, Anadarko asserts that its payment of a reduced bonus did not constitute a modification of the scope of the Lease, but, rather, was proper consideration for the interest actually conveyed by Appellants pursuant to the terms of the Lease. Specifically, Anadarko relies on Paragraph C.3 of the Lease, noting it provides that Appellants were entitled to a bonus payment only for the interest actually conveyed, i.e., one-half of the oil and gas rights to the Property.

An oil and gas lease is in the nature of a contract, and, thus, is controlled by principles of contract law. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 615 Pa. 199, 42 A.3d 261, 267 (2012). A contract, either oral or written, may be modified by a subsequent agreement which is supported by legally sufficient consideration, or a substitute therefor, and meets the requirements for contract formation. Kreutzer v. Monterey Cty. Herald Co., 560 Pa. 600, 747 A.2d 358, 362 (2000); see also Wilcox v. Regester, 417 Pa. 475, 207 A.2d 817, 821 (1965) (“An agreement may be modified with the assent of both contracting parties if the modification is supported by consideration.”).

We hold that the Lease between Appellants and Anadarko was not modified as a result of Anadarko’s payment of, and Appellants’ acceptance of, a bonus payment of one-half the originally agreed-upon sum. Anadarko originally agreed to pay Appellants an $80 per acre bonus for the oil and gas rights to the Property. Paragraph 3.C of the Lease provided, however, that if Appellants owned less than all of the oil and gas rights to the Property, they would be entitled to payment only in proportion to the oil and gas rights they actually owned. Pursuant to that paragraph, upon finding that Appellants owned only one-half of the oil and gas rights to the Property, under the express terms of the Lease, Anadarko was obligated to pay Appellants only one-half of the agreed-upon bonus payment—i.e., $40 per acre—and this was the exact consideration that Appellants received. Accordingly, rather than a modification of the Lease, Anadarko’s payment of a reduced bonus was in accord with its precise terms, and so cannot be considered as additional consideration or evidence of an agreement to modify the Lease.

Having concluded that the Lease was not modified as a result of Anadarko’s payment of a reduced bonus, we next consider whether, having quieted title to the entire Property, the doctrine of estoppel by deed precludes Appellants from asserting that Anadarko is entitled to only one-half of the oil and gas rights to the Property. Under the doctrine of estop-pel by deed,

[w]here one conveys with a general warranty land which he does not own at the time, but afterwards acquires the ownership of it, the principle of estoppel is that such acquisition inures to the benefit of the grantee, because the grantor is estopped to deny, against the terms of his warranty, that he had the title in question.

Jordan v. Chambers, 226 Pa. 573, 75 A. 956, 958 (1910); see also Hennebont, 289 A.2d at 233 (noting that, in Pennsylvania, doctrine of estoppel by deed precludes one who leases property which he does not own, but of which he later acquires ownership, from denying the lease on the basis he did not have ownership at the time the lease was executed).

Appellants do not dispute the viability of the doctrine of estoppel by deed in this context. However, they contend that, because estoppel by deed is an equitable doctrine, its application requires a finding of detrimental reliance by the grantee. Appellants’ Brief at 10-11 (citing Novelty Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Siskind, 500 Pa. 432, 457 A.2d 502 (1983), In re Estate of Tallarico, 425 Pa. 280, 228 A.2d 736 (1967), and Northwestern Nat’l Bank v. Commonwealth, 345 Pa. 192, 27 A.2d 20 (1942)). Appellants further note that, in Shell Oil Co. v. Trailer & Truck Repair Co., Inc., 828 F.2d 205 (3d Cir.1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit predicted that New Jersey courts would conclude that detrimental reliance is, in fact, an essential element of both equitable estoppel and estoppel by deed. Noting that Anadar-ko paid a reduced bonus upon learning of the Baxters’ 1894 reservation of one-half of the oil and gas rights to the Property, Appellants maintain that there can be no finding of detrimental reliance by Anadarko and that the doctrine of estoppel by deed does not apply.

In response, Anadarko contends that Appellants conflate the principles of equitable estoppel with those of estoppel by deed, and are improperly attempting to impose a requirement of detrimental reliance on the application of estoppel by deed where none exists. Specifically, Anadarko observes that there are three distinct types of estoppel—estoppel by record, es-toppel by deed, and equitable estoppel (also referred to as estoppel in pais)—and that estoppel by deed is a “technical legal theory” based on the grantor’s own covenant in the deed and divorced from the subjective elements of inducement and justifiable reliance. Anadarko’s Brief at 11-12 (citing In re Webb, 99 B.R. 283, 290 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1989) (“Estoppel by deed ... allows application of estoppel without any reference to the moral qualities of the party seeking to be estopped.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Solomon, 40 F.Supp. 62, 65 (E.D.Pa.1941) (“[T]he doctrine of estoppel by deed is a distinct kind of estoppel which does not require all of the elements of estoppel in pais.”)).

Anadarko further notes that, in Phillips v. Tetzner, this Court applied the doctrine of estoppel by deed despite a grantee’s lack of payment at the time the grantor obtained full legal title to the subject property. 357 Pa. 43, 53 A.2d 129, 131-32 (1947) (purchaser’s failure to tender consideration for a lease did not preclude application of estoppel by deed because tender of purchase money is excused “where such tender would be a useless and idle ceremony.”). Thus, Anadarko maintains that, notwithstanding its reduced bonus payment to Appellants, estoppel by deed is applicable here because Appellants warranted their title, conveyed less than what they warranted, and subsequently perfected title.

Appellants’ sole basis for arguing that the doctrine of estoppel by deed should not apply is their contention that, because Anadarko paid a reduced bonus upon learning of the Baxters’ 1894 reservation of one-half of the oil and gas rights to the Property, Anadarko failed to demonstrate detrimental reliance. However, unlike the doctrine of equitable estoppel, we find that the doctrine estoppel by deed does not require detrimental reliance. The doctrine of equitable estoppel

prevents one from doing an act differently than the manner in which another was induced by word or deed to expect. A doctrine sounding in equity, equitable estoppel recognizes that an informal promise implied by one’s words, deeds or representations which leads another to rely justifiably thereon to his own injury or detriment, may be enforced in equity.

Novelty Knitting Mills, 457 A.2d at 503 (emphasis added).

In contrast, the doctrine of estoppel by deed precludes one who conveys an interest in land that he does not own, but subsequently acquires the title thereto, from denying the validity of the first conveyance. Jordan, supra; Phillips, supra; Bowen v. A.R. Boyd Enterprises, Inc., 326 Pa. 385, 191 A. 137, 140 (1937) (under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, “when a vendor or mortgagor either sells or mortgages land which he does not own, and afterwards acquires title thereto, he is not permitted to set up this after-acquired title to defeat his previous grant or mortgage, for this would permit him to perpetrate a fraud upon his grantee or creditor.”); Daley v. Hornbaker, 325 Pa.Super. 172, 472 A.2d 703, 705 (1984) (“A grantor is estopped to assert anything in derogation of his deed, as against grantee.”).

While the doctrine of estoppel by deed is rooted in equity, its considerations are broader:

The principle is that when a person has entered into a solemn engagement by deed, he or she will not be permitted to deny any matter that he or she has asserted therein for a deed is a solemn act to any part of which the law gives effect as the deliberate admission of the maker; to him or her it stands for truth, and in every situation in which he or she may be placed with respect to it, it is true as to him or her. Estoppel by deed promotes the judicious policy of making certain formal documents final and conclusive evidence of their contents.

28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel by Deed or Bond, § 5 (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, we reject Appellants’ contention that detrimental reliance is a prerequisite for application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.

Herein, Appellants conveyed, through a lease, the oil and gas rights to the Property, expressly warranting their full title to all the oil and gas therein. After discovering that they owned less than all of the oil and gas rights to the Property, Appellants filed a motion to quiet title to the one-half interest in the oil and gas rights to the Property, ultimately perfecting their title to all of the oil and gas rights to the Property. Under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, Appellants may not deny the validity of their initial conveyance to Anadarko of all of the oil and gas rights to the Property. See Jordan; Bowen; Daley.

For the above reasons, we hold that the Superior Court properly affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Anadarko based on the doctrine of estoppel by deed.

Order affirmed.

Chief Justice SAYLOR and Justices BAER, DOUGHERTY and WECHT join the opinion.

Justice DONOHUE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

      . Although Appellants claim they were unaware of the reservation, they arguably had record notice, as the reservation was properly recorded, See Collins v. Phillips, 236 Pa. 386, 84 A. 854, 854 (1912) (a party has record notice where a deed is properly recorded). Nevertheless, the issue of Appellants’ knowledge of the reservation is not before this Court.

      . Specifically, the covenant of warranty in the lease stated: “The LESSOR covenants and agrees ... [t]hat LESSOR has full title to the premises and to all the oil and gas therein at the time of granting this Lease, and forever warrants title to the leasehold estate hereby conveyed to LESSEE.” Lease (hereinafter, "Lease"), 5/23/06, at 2 § B.2 (Reproduced Record ("R.R.”) at 11a).

      . We note that the parties and the lower courts sometimes characterize the interest conveyed to Anadarko via the lease as a one-half interest in the oil and gas rights to the entire Property, and at other times characterize it as a full interest in the oil and gas rights to 31 acres of the Property. For practical purposes, the amount of the bonus payment to which Appellants were entitled was the same—$40 per acre on 62 acres, or $80 per acre on 31 acres. However, as the Baxters’ reservation specifically reserved a one-half interest in the oil and gas rights to the entire Property, it is most accurate to describe the interest actually conveyed to Anadarko as a one-half interest in the oil and gas rights to the Property as a whole, rather than a full interest in one-half of the Property, i.e., 31 acres. Nevertheless, in order to accurately describe the parties' specific arguments and the analysis of the lower courts, we will utilize the terminology they use.

      . An oil and gas lease is considered a conveyance of a property interest. Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 513 Pa. 192, 519 A.2d 385, 387 n. 1 (1986).

      . The Pennsylvania Independent Oil & Gas Association filed an amicus brief in support of Anadarko, presenting substantially the same arguments as Anadarko. Notably, however, Amicus contends that, even if this Court holds that prejudice is required for application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed, Anadarko did, in fact, suffer prejudice as a result of “not having the sole and exclusive right to develop the oil and natural gas resources underlying all 62 acres .., unless and until the Lessors removed the cloud on their title.” Amicus Brief at 5.

      . But see Shell Oil Co., 828 F.2d at 209 (recognizing that some courts, including the court in In re Solomon, supra, have held that detrimental reliance is not an element of estoppel by deed, but stating that "[w]e know of no reason” for such a conclusion and opining that, "detrimental reliance is so obvious that courts may not bother to mention it.”); McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370, 372 (N.D.1985) (in case involving reservation of mineral rights, application of estoppel by deed requires, inter alia, that the party asserting estoppel relied directly upon such conduct or admissions, and will be injured by allowing the truth to be disproved). However, we note that, even if we were to follow the decisions of those courts which require a demonstration of detrimental reliance for the doctrine of estoppel by deed to apply, Appellants fail to support their suggestion that proof of detrimental reliance is limited to monetary loss. Cf. supra note 6.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice TODD. Chief Justice SAYLOR,

license: Public Domain

text:
    136 A.3d 493
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Claude DESCARDES, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 10, 2015.
    Resubmitted Jan, 20, 2016.
    Decided March 29, 2016.

      David Richman, Esq., Pepper Hamilton LLP, Philadelphia, for Pennsylvania Innocence Project and the Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Amicus Curiae.
    Bruce Richard Beemer, Esq., Kelly M. Sekula, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    William J. Honig, Esq., Norristown, for Claude Descardes.
    SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice TODD.

In this discretionary appeal by the Commonwealth, we consider whether Appellee Claude Descardes was entitled to seek review of his ineffectiveness of counsel claim, based on counsel’s failure to advise him of the collateral consequences of his guilty plea, via a petition for writ of coram nobis. We conclude that he was not, and, accordingly, vacate the Superi- or Court’s judgment to the contrary and dismiss Appellee’s underlying petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

In August 2006, Appellee, a Haitian national who held resident alien status in the United States, pled guilty to insurance fraud, a felony, and conspiracy to commit insurance fraud. Appellee was not advised prior to entering his plea that deportation was a collateral consequence of his plea pursuant to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (deportation is automatic upon a conviction for an aggravated felony). On November 30, 2006, Appellee was sentenced to one year of probation and a fíne, and did not appeal his judgment of sentence. He completed serving his probationary sentence in November 2007. In 2009, Appellee left the United States on personal business and, when he attempted to reenter the country, United States immigration officials denied him reentry due to his felony convictions.

On December 7, 2009, Appellee filed a counseled “Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis” asserting, inter alia, that his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the mandatory consequence of deportation, and seeking to have his conviction vacated and his guilty plea withdrawn. On March 12, 2010, the trial court, treating the filing as a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, dismissed it as untimely. The court further noted that, regardless, as this Court held in Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555 A.2d 92 (1989), counsel could not be held to be ineffective for failing to warn Appellee of the collateral consequences of his guilty plea, including deportation.

On May 26, 2010, Appellee filed a second Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). In Padilla, which was decided on March 31, 2010, the high Court held that criminal defense counsel has an affirmative duty to inform a defendant that the offense to which he is pleading guilty will result in deportation, effectively abrogating Pennsylvania’s longstanding rule, expressed in Frometa, that counsel may not be held ineffective for failing to inform a client of the collateral consequence of deportation as a result of a guilty plea. The trial court treated Appellee’s May 26 petition as a timely first PCRA petition, concluding that the petition fell within the exception to the one-year time requirement of the PCRA because Appellee was asserting a constitutional right recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court after the expiration of the one-year time requirement of the PCRA, and contending that the high Court had held that constitutional right applied retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S § 9545(b)(l)(iii). Relying on Padilla for the proposition that deportation is not a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, but is “part and parcel” of the punishment for the original crime, the trial court vacated Appellee’s conviction, and ordered that his plea of guilty be withdrawn. PCRA Court Opinion, 9/23/10, at 2.

The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, and a divided en banc panel reversed in a published opinion authored by Judge Jack Panella. Commonwealth v. Descardes, 101 A.3d 105 (Pa.Super.2014). Initially, the majority determined that the trial court erred in treating Appellee’s May 26 petition for relief as a PCRA petition because ,he had completed serving his sentence. Id. at 107-08. The majority concluded, however, that a writ of coram nobis “provides a way to collaterally attack a criminal conviction for a person ... who is no longer ‘in custody’ and therefore cannot seek habeas relief.” Id. at 109 (quoting Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1106 n. 1, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013)). Noting that Appellee’s specific ineffectiveness claim did not exist until the high Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla, by which time Appellee had completed serving his sentence and so the time period for filing a PCRA petition had expired, and that Appellee “continues to suffer the serious consequences of his deportation because of his state conviction,” the majority found that the PCRA “fails to provide remedy for” Appellee’s claim. Id. Thus, the majority held that the trial court should have treated Appellee’s petition as a coram nobis petition.

Notwithstanding its determination that the trial court should have addressed Appellee’s PCRA petition as a petition for coram nobis, the majority concluded that, under that writ, Appellee was not entitled to relief because, in Chaidez, the United States Supreme Court held that Padilla announced a new rule of constitutional law that does not apply retroactively and may not serve as the basis for a collateral attack on a conviction that became final before Padilla. Accordingly, the majority reversed the trial court’s order granting Appellee relief and remanded for further proceedings.

Judge Christine Donohue concurred in the result, and Judge Mary Jane Bowes authored a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, which was joined by Judge Judith Olson. Judge Bowes agreed with the majority’s determination that Appellee was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea either under the PCRA or through a writ of coram nobis. However, she disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that a coram nobis petition was a vehicle by which Appellee could seek review of his ineffectiveness of counsel claim. Relying on the Superior Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231 (Pa.Super.2004), Judge Bowes concluded that, because Appel-lee’s claim was cognizable under the PCRA, the fact that he was ineligible for relief because he was no longer serving his sentence did not entitle him to seek relief through a writ of coram nobis. In Judge Bowes’ view, the majority neglected to recognize the distinction between cognizability and eligibility, and expanded the writ of coram nobis beyond its original purpose of remedying factual errors, in contravention of the intent and language of the PCRA.

Both Appellee and the Commonwealth sought allowance of appeal. On April 7, 2015, this Court granted review of the Commonwealth’s petition, limited to the issue of whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s holdings in Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 548 Pa. 544, 699 A.2d 718 (1997), and Commonwealth v. Hall, 565 Pa. 92, 771 A.2d 1232 (2001), as well as the Superior Court’s own decision in Pagan. As this issue presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Weston, 561 Pa. 199, 749 A.2d 458, 460 n. 8 (2000).

By way of background, in 1966, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the Post Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”), Act of Jan. 25, 1966, P.L. 1580 (1965), No. 554, as amended, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, the predecessor to the PCRA. To be eligible for relief under the PCHA, a petitioner had to be “incarcerated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under a sentence of death or imprisonment or on parole or probation.” PCHA, § 3(b). The intent of the PCHA, as we explained in Sheehan, supra.

was not to abolish the common law remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis, but rather to promulgate an exclusive, well-defined procedure for the presentation of those grievances set forth in the Act by an aggrieved person who is under the duress of punishment, whether in prison or on parole or probation.

285 A.2d at 467. We further stated that “[a]ll claims previously cognizable on a common law writ, in circumstances not covered by the terms of the Act, may still be litigated by means of the common law writ. Merely because one is not incarcerated, on parole or probation does not [p]er se preclude a collateral attack on his conviction.” Id.

In 1988, however, the legislature replaced the PCHA with the PCRA. In so doing, the legislature significantly altered the eligibility requirements for collateral relief. Under the PCRA, an individual must be “currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime” in order to be eligible for relief. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(l)(i). Further, Section 9542 of the PCRA provides:

This subchapter provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief. The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis. This subchapter is not intended to limit the availability of remedies in the trial court or on direct appeal from the judgment of sentence, to provide a means for raising issues waived in prior proceedings or to provide relief from collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. Except as specifically provided otherwise, all provisions of this subchapter shall apply to capital and noncapital cases.

Id. § 9542 (emphasis added).

This Court has construed the above language as manifesting the legislature’s intent that the PCRA be the sole means by which an appellant may collaterally challenge his conviction. In Ahlborn, for example, the appellant pled guilty to three counts of driving under the influence and one count of accident resulting in death or injury, and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 48 hours to 69 months imprisonment. While he was still serving his prison sentence, the appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed, wherein the appellant alleged, inter alia, that he was misled regarding the nature and consequences of his plea. A PCRA hearing was scheduled, but the appellant completed serving his sentence and was unconditionally released from prison three days before the scheduled hearing. The PCRA court dismissed the appellant’s PCRA petition on the basis that he was no longer eligible for relief because he was not serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole. The Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal.

On appeal to this Court, the appellant asserted that, although he was no longer incarcerated, he continued to suffer the consequences of his conviction because his driver’s license was suspended and he faced the possibility of future sentencing and recidivist enhancements. He argued that, where convictions result in ongoing consequences beyond imprisonment, the legislature would not have intended that review under the PCRA would be unobtainable. In rejecting his argument, we acknowledged that, in Sheehan, swpra, this Court held that petitioners who did not meet the custody requirement under the language of the prior PCHA, “but who faced direct collateral civil or criminal consequences of their convictions, could nevertheless obtain review” through “common law writs of error coram nobis.” Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 721. However, we observed that

[ujnlike the PCHA, ... the PCRA contains express language which prevents a petition filed under the PCRA from being treated as a request for relief under the common law. The PCRA specifies that it is the sole means for obtaining collateral relief and that it supersedes common law remedies.

Id. at 721 (emphasis original).

In Hall, supra, we reiterated that the PCRA is the exclusive means for obtaining collateral relief. In that case, the appellee was convicted of various drug charges and, on May 30, 1996, was sentenced to 9 to 23 months incarceration. He did not file a direct appeal. On January 30, 1997, he filed a PCRA petition, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal. The PCRA court properly dismissed the petition as untimely, but included in its order a sua sponte notation that the order was without prejudice to allow the appellee to file a petition for appeal nunc pro tunc outside of the PCRA. The appellee filed such petition, which the PCRA court granted, and, thereafter, the appellee appealed his judgment of sentence to the Superior Court, raising a claim of trial court error. The Commonwealth filed a cross appeal, asserting that the PCRA court erred in granting the appellee permission to appeal nunc pro tunc after having dismissed his prior PCRA petition as untimely. The Superior Court determined that the PCRA court properly allowed the appellee to pursue reinstatement of his appeal rights nunc pro tunc outside of the PCRA. In so doing, the Superior Court recognized that the PCRA is intended to be the exclusive means for individuals to collaterally attack their convictions, but concluded the trial court’s order was consistent with dicta contained in its previous decisions in Commonwealth v. Petroski, 695 A.2d 844 (Pa.Super.1997), and Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 712 A.2d 288 (Pa.Super.1998), which gave “explicit recognition of a potential vehicle for relief from a failure to appeal claim outside the framework of the P.C.R.A.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 713 A.2d 650, 652 (Pa.Super.1998). The Commonwealth appealed, and this Court reversed the Superi- or Court’s decision.

Examining Section 9542 of the PCRA in its entirety, we noted:

The plain language of [Section 9542] demonstrates quite clearly that the General Assembly intended that claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under that Act. No other statutory or common law remedy “for the same purpose” is intended to be available; instead, such remedies are explicitly “encompassed” within the PCRA.

Hall, 771 A.2d at 1235 (emphasis original). We emphasized that we have “repeatedly and uniformly given effect to this plain language contained in the PCRA.” Id. (citing Ahlborn; Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 638, 641-42 (1998); Commonwealth v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12, 731 A.2d 581 (1999); Commonwealth v. Chester, 557 Pa. 358, 733 A.2d 1242 (1999)).

The pivotal question in Hall, we noted, was whether Hall’s particular claim—a request for permission to file a nunc pro tunc direct appeal based on counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in failing to file a direct appeal—was a claim that was cognizable under the PCRA. A claim is cognizable under the PCRA if the petitioner pleads and proves by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth; (2) he is serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole for the crime; and (3) his conviction resulted from one of seven enumerated errors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2), including ineffective assistance of counsel. Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 640-41. We held that Hall’s claim, based as it was on the ineffectiveness of counsel, “unquestionably” fell within the framework of the PCRA, and, therefore, that the PCRA was the sole means by which he could seek relief. Hall, 771 A.2d at 1235 (citing Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564, 569-70 (1999) (“the PCRA provides the exclusive remedy for post-conviction claims seeking restoration of appellate rights due to counsel’s failure to perfect a direct appeal”)).

With this background in mind, we turn our attention to the arguments of the parties in the instant case. The Commonwealth argues that the Superior Court’s holding is in contravention of this Court’s holdings in Ahlborn and Hall, as well as its own decision in Pagan, all of which provide that, where a claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the only avenue of review, even if the defendant is ineligible for relief because he is no longer serving a sentence. In this regard, the Commonwealth echoes Judge Bowes’ position that the majority conflated Appellee’s eligibility for PCRA relief with the cognizability of his claim, and suggests that, in doing so, the majority “opened the door to a potential floodgate of impermissible bifurcated review and also rendered the timeliness provisions of the PCRA meaningless under similar circumstances.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 9.

Finally, the Commonwealth asserts that the majority’s reliance on Chaidez for its determination that Appellee may challenge his conviction through a writ of coram nobis is misplaced. According to the Commonwealth, Chaidez is distinguishable because the defendant therein was convicted of federal charges and was able to collaterally attack her conviction through a petition for habeas corpus, the statute which, unlike the PCRA, does not expressly state that it is the sole means of obtaining collateral relief. The Commonwealth also notes that the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal habeas statute does not preclude a coram nobis petition. Commonwealth’s Brief at 16 (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954)).

Appellee, conversely, contends that the right of coram nobis persists. Appellee asserts that the Commonwealth ignores the third sentence of Section 9542 of the PCRA, which provides:

This subchapter is not intended to limit the availability of remedies in the trial court or on direct appeal from the judgment of sentence, to provide a means for raising issues waived in prior proceedings or to provide relief from collateral consequences of a criminal conviction.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. According to Appellee, the above language demonstrates that the legislature did not envision the PCRA as the only means of challenging the collateral consequences of a conviction.

Even in the absence of this sentence, Appellee maintains that he is entitled to coram nobis review because he was never eligible to seek relief under the PCRA, as his ineffectiveness of counsel claim was not recognized by the United States Supreme Court until after the PCRA became effective and the time period in which he could have filed a PCRA petition had expired. In this respect, he asserts that the facts of Ahlbom and Hall are distinguishable, and he contends that the present case is more akin to Commonwealth v. Stock, 545 Pa. 13, 679 A.2d 760 (1996) (holding that defendant could seek permission to file a nunc pro tunc appeal of his convictions outside of the framework of PCRA because he was never eligible for relief under the PCRA as he was never under a sentence of death or imprisonment or on parole or on probation).

The Pennsylvania Innocence Project and the Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed a joint amicus brief in support of Appellee suggesting, in the first instance, that this Court dismiss this matter for the reasons asserted by Appellee. Amicus further argues that, should this Court address the merits of this appeal, we should adopt a construction of the PCRA that “will provide at least one opportunity for collateral review of a constitutional claim, including a claim of innocence, to persons who have served their sentences, at least so long as significant collateral consequences flow from the conviction.” Amicus Brief at 13-14. Amicus notes that this Court “has been unwilling to cling to a literal reading of [the PCRA] at the expense of the values and objectives that underlie” the statute. Id. at 13. As an example of this Court departing from the plain language of the PCRA, Amicus offers this Court’s decisions allowing review of ineffectiveness of counsel claims under the PCRA even where the petitioner does not satisfy the PCRA’s requirement that the alleged ineffectiveness undermined the reliability of the truth determining process. Id. at 12 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth ex rel. Dadario v. Goldberg, 565 Pa. 280, 773 A.2d 126 (2001)).

Upon review, we reject Appellee’s arguments and the analysis of the Superior Court below. First, although Appellee cursorily avers that the third sentence of Section 9542 quoted above suggests that the legislature did not intend that a defendant be precluded from seeking, outside of the PCRA, relief from the collateral consequences of a conviction, we note that this same language was in Section 9542 when this Court held in Ahlbom that, despite the fact that the appellant continued to suffer the collateral consequences of his conviction—including a driver’s license suspension and the possibility of future sentencing and recidivist enhancements—the PCRA was the only method by which he could seek relief. Indeed, the language of Section 9542 has remained unchanged since that time. Furthermore, regardless of the legislature’s view as to the method for obtaining relief from collateral consequences in the abstract, the language of the PCRA clearly requires that an individual seeking relief from the judgment of sentence itself, as in the case herein, pursue his request for relief through the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (“This subchapter provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief. The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose.”). Thus, while Appellee’s ultimate goal may be to obtain relief from the collateral consequences of his conviction, he is seeking relief from his judgment of sentence; thus, the third sentence of Section 9542 is not relevant to the scenario presented in the case sub judice.

More centrally, we conclude that the Superior Court’s decision below is in conflict with Ahlborn, Hall, and our other PCRA jurisprudence, and, accordingly, we disapprove its analysis in that regard. As discussed above, this Court has consistently held that, pursuant to the plain language of Section 9542, where a claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral review. See Ahlborn; Peterkin; Hall; see also Commonwealth v. Turner, 622 Pa. 318, 80 A.3d 754, 770 (2013) (“The PCRA at Section 9542 subsumes the remedies of habeas corpus and eoram nobis.”). It is equally well established that Appellee’s claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, which is based on counsel’s failure to advise him of the collateral consequences of his plea, was cognizable under the PCRA. See, e.g., Dadario, 773 A.2d at 131 (ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining process cognizable under the PCRA); Turner, 80 A.3d at 770 (“Because Petitioner alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, her claims were cognizable under the PCRA and the writ of habeas corpus was not available.”). Indeed, Appellee, like the successful petitioner in Padilla,, could have asserted a claim that trial counsel was ineffective specifically for failing to warn him that he could be deported as a result of his plea.

Moreover, the fact that Appellee’s claim, had he raised it while still serving his sentence, would likely have been held to be meritless under Frometa, the prevailing law at the time, does not mean the claim was not cognizable under the PCRA. Indeed, as shown above, it clearly was. The fact that there was no legal support for Appellee’s ineffectiveness claim until after the time period for filing a PCRA petition had expired does not remove the claim itself from the purview of the PCRA. As noted by Judge Bowes in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, the Superior Court’s decision to the contrary allows for the “very type of bifurcated review” condemned by this Court and results in inconsistent treatment of petitioners seeking collateral relief:

Consider an example in which the Supreme Court of the United States or Pennsylvania adopts a new rule of constitutional law that is deemed worthy of retroactive application. A petitioner benefitting from the new decision comes forward with a claim for collateral relief. In such a case, the ensuing change in the legal landscape would permit an otherwise time-barred PCRA claim so long as the petitioner requests relief within 60 days of the new opinion. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9545(b)(1)(iii), 9545(b)(2). Nevertheless, the petitioner would be ineligible for PCRA relief if he were no longer serving a sentence. In these circumstances, the petitioner’s right to collateral relief under the PCRA would end, notwithstanding the recently bolstered merit of his contentions.
By allowing Appellee to pursue coram nobis relief outside of the PCRA, the majority’s decision gives Appellee greater post-conviction options in a situation where his ineffective assistance claim is untimely and he is ineligible for PCRA relief because he is no longer serving a sentence. In these circumstances, the majority’s decision serves as a judicial veto of the eligibility requirements of the PCRA and thus represents an unwarranted departure from the legislature’s clear statutory directives.

Descardes, 101 A.3d at 116-17. Thus, Appellee’s only method of obtaining collateral review was the PCRA.

Our decision in Stock does not support a contrary holding. In Stock, this Court held that the defendant, who was convicted in absentia of three summary traffic offenses and sentenced to pay fines, and whose attorney failed to file an appeal as requested, could seek permission to file a nunc pro tunc appeal of his convictions outside of the framework of PCRA because the defendant was never eligible for relief under the PCRA as he could not meet the PCRA’s requirement that he be “under a sentence of death or imprisonment or on parole or probation.” 679 A.2d at 764. Thus, our decision in Stock was premised on a determination that the defendant’s state constitutional right to appeal could only be vindicated outside of the PCRA:

Were we to decide that Appellant could not appeal nunc pro tunc despite the fact that his state constitutional right to appeal was denied him, Appellant would have no other recourse. His conviction would stand and he would be without remedy. Appellant is not able to vindicate his right to appeal via the Post Conviction Relief Act since he is not eligible to seek relief thereunder because he is not “incarcerated in this Commonwealth under a sentence of death or imprisonment or on parole or probation.”

679 A.2d at 764. Conversely, and as discussed above, Appel-lee herein could have raised in a PCRA petition an ineffectiveness of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to advise him of the consequences, including deportation, of his guilty plea. The fact such claim likely would have been rejected on its merits does not change the fact that it could have been raised under the PCRA.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude the Superior Court’s decision in the instant case is contrary to the decisions of this Court which hold that, where a petitioner’s claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral review. As a result, Appellee’s PCRA petition should have been dismissed because, as he was no longer incarcerated at the time it was filed, he was ineligible for PCRA relief, and, thus, both the PCRA court and the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

The judgment below is vacated and Appellee’s underlying PCRA petition is dismissed.

Chief Justice SAYLOR and Justices BAER and DOUGHERTY join the opinion.

Chief Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion in which Justice DOUGHERTY joins.

Justices DONOHUE and WECHT did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Chief Justice SAYLOR,

concurring.

I join the majority opinion and write only to elaborate on my own position concerning a few points.

First, I have some difficulty with the use of the term “collateral consequence” in the deportation setting. In this regard, the Supreme Court of the United States has explained: “Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence,” and “the collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill suited to evaluating” claims of deficient attorney stewardship centered upon advice about deportation. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1482, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010).

Secondly, while styled differently, in substance Appellee’s claim embodies an entreaty for Padilla to be applied retroactively. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 8 (“Descardes was never eligible to file for PCRA relief as the right to legal advice regarding the collateral consequence of deportation ... did not exist at the time the PCRA took effect.”). The PCRA, however, imposes express limitations on such claims, rendering relief available only where:

the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) (emphasis added). Per this prescription, it was the Legislature’s express intention to condition the availability of post-conviction relief in the face of new constitutional rulings upon the legal assessment of retroactivity by a court of last resort. Accordingly, in my view— however Appellee’s claim may be framed or reframed—for present purposes, the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision that Padilla is not retroactive is dispositive. See Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 357, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1113, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013).

Justice DOUGHERTY joins this concurring opinion.

      . A writ of coram nobis "is generally available to challenge the validity of a judgment based on facts not before the court when the judgment was entered.” Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35, 285 A.2d 465, 467 (1971).

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 4117.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.

      . In Pagan, the appellant filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, alleging he had been incompetent to plead guilty or stand trial. The trial court treated the petition as a PCRA petition and denied relief on the basis that the appellant was not serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole, as required to obtain relief under the PCRA. On appeal, the Superior Court rejected the appellant's claim that, because he could not obtain relief under the PCRA, he was eligible to seek relief via coram nobis, stating, “coram nobis relief does not become available merely because the PCRA refuses to remedy a petitioner's grievance; rather, we look at the claims a petitioner is raising.” 864 A.2d at 1233. Concluding that the appellant’s underlying substantive claim concerning his competency to enter a plea or stand trial was encompassed by the PCRA, the Superior Court held he could obtain relief only through the PCRA, and affirmed the trial court’s order. The Superior Court additionally noted that this Court "has made it clear that any collateral consequences flowing from a conviction will not provide the petitioner with an avenue for review outside of the PCRA.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 548 Pa. 544, 699 A.2d 718, 721 (1997)).

      . We denied review of Appellee’s claims that this Court should hold Padilla to apply retroactively in Pennsylvania and that we should conduct an analysis under Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991), to determine if Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides a coextensive, but retroactive, right under Padilla.

      . Appellee asserts in his brief that the "facts and limited holding” of the instant case "clearly indicate that it is not the proper case to review the Question Presented of whether this type of review conflicts with Ahl-bom and Hall," and suggests that this Court should dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted. Appellee’s Brief at 9. He further argues that, because this Court denied review of the second question raised in the Commonwealth's Petition for Allowance of Appeal ("Whether the Superior Court’s conclusion ... presents a question of substantial public importance requiring prompt resolution by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court”) and the Commonwealth was the verdict winner, the Commonwealth is not entitled to discretionary review. We disagree. In Commonwealth v. Allen, 630 Pa. 577, 107 A.3d 709 (2014), this Court granted review of a petition for allowance of appeal by the Commonwealth, despite the fact that the Commonwealth had prevailed below, because of the burden created by the published decision of the lower court. Here, the Superior Court’s published decision recognizes a right to collateral review of a particular ineffectiveness of counsel claim independent of the PCRA, and the Superior Court continues to issue decisions based on its en banc decision in the instant case. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 2194 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 6689984 (unpublished memorandum filed Nov. 2, 2015). Thus, while we recognize that our decision herein does not impact Appellee because, even if we were to affirm the Superior Court’s holding that he could seek collateral review through a writ of coram nobis, Appellee could not obtain relief on his claim because the United States Supreme Court held that its decision in Padilla does not apply retroactively and may not serve as the basis for a collateral attack on a conviction which became final before that decision, we deem it prudent to address this issue at this juncture. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837 A.2d 1157 (2003) (noting that the Commonwealth's appeal of the Superior Court’s decision construing an untimely serial PCRA petition as an extension of a timely previously-dismissed petition presented a question of importance implicating this Court's supervisory power, notwithstanding the fact that the Commonwealth was the prevailing party given that the Superior Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief).

      . Section 2 of the PCHA provided:
      This act establishes a post conviction procedure for providing relief from convictions obtained and sentences imposed without due process of law. The procedure hereby established shall encompass all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose that exist when this statute takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis. However, nothing in this act limits the availability of remedies in the trial court or on direct appeal.
      PCHA, § 2.

      . The Commonwealth also asserts that the writ of coram nobis is a procedural tool intended only to correct errors of fact, of which Appellee has alleged none. Commonwealth's Brief at 11 n. 5. Given our disposition, we do not address this argument.

      . Appellee further suggests that the legislature has “reaffirmed the vitality of coram nobis” in the provision of the Prisons and Parole Code relating to escaped inmate costs, which references "costs incurred in any proceedings on writs of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or other petitions arising out of any escape or crime or the trials therefor.” Appellee’s Brief at 16-17 (quoting 61 Pa.C.S. § 1162(a)(1) (enacted August 11, 2009)). We are unpersuaded by Appellee's argument, as he offers no explanation as to why the legislature’s supposed "recognition” of coram nobis petitions in the Prisons and Parole Code is relevant to this Court’s construction of the plain language of the PCRA.

      . The plain language of the statute appears to require the retroactivity decision to be made by the court that issued the underlying constitutional ruling in the first instance. Given that the Supreme Court of the United States has afforded state courts some latitude in fashioning their own retroactivity jurisprudence relative to federal constitutional rulings, see Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 282, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1042, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008), and that the policy basis for withholding the availability of relief under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) in scenarios in which this Court might provide for broader retroactive application is not immediately apparent, I reserve further comment on this point for consideration in an appropriate case.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    136 A.3d 976
    Aaron BROWN, Petitioner v. Honorable S. WOODS-SKIPPER, President Judge, Philadelphia County, Respondent.
    No. 39 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 12, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 12th day of May, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus are GRANTED. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is DIRECTED to adjudicate Petitioner’s pending filing within 90 days.

The Prothonotary is DIRECTED to serve this order on the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and to strike the name of the jurist from the caption.


text:
    136 A.3d 976
    Eugene LAMBERT, Petitioner v. Superintendent Trevor WINGARD, Respondent.
    No. 48 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 12, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 12th day of May, 2016, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.


text:
    136 A.3d 976
    ADAMS TOWNSHIP v. RICHLAND TOWNSHIP; Cambria County; Watkins Glen Properties, Inc.; Clarann Hillenbrand, Dorian Frazier and Joanne Frazier; Debra Kuhne; Thomas Costa and Pamela Costa; David Anderson and Jean Anderson; Robert Burnworth and Mary Burnworth; Roy Lowry and Debra Lowry; Virginia Chapman; Berwind Corporation; Paul Singer; Vincent Maxwell and Jessica Maxwell; and Nancy Leone. Petition of Richland Township.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 16, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of May, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by Petitioner, are:

1. Was it proper for the board of commissioners to consider the boundary as shown in the tax assessment records not as evidence of the location of the original line but as a practical alternative in order to resolve the continuing uncertainty as to the location of the boundary?
2. Was it proper for the board of commissioners—when faced with the inability to determine the original boundary—to consider the acquiescence of the municipalities to the boundary as reflected in the tax maps, the reliance by the landowners in the affected area on that tax map boundary, and the inducement of such reliance by the municipalities in order to resolve the continuing uncertainty as to the location of the original boundary?

Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Supplement Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED as moot.


text:
    137 A.3d 572
    David WILLIAMS and Jaimi Williams, H/W v. TRUGREEN LANDCARE L.L.C., TruGreen Lawncare, TruGreen Limited Partnership, TruGreen Corporation, TruGreen, Inc., the TruGreen Companies LLC, Service Master Consumer Services Limited Partnership, ServiceMaster Consumer Services Inc., ServiceMaster Holding Corporation, the ServiceMaster Company, Dickinson Fleet Management LLC, Dickinson Fleet Services Pennsylvania LLC, Dickinson Fleet Services Inc. LLC, Dickinson Fleet Services Inc., Dickinson Fleet Services LLC, Mann’s Garage d/b/a Manns Garage, Brooks Auto Repair, Randy’s Auto Repair d/b/a Randy’s Auto, Bob McCormick Ford Inc., Bob McCormick Ford, Dunkie Transport LLC, Petition of TruGreen Limited Partnership d/b/a TruGreen Chemlawn (Also Incorrectly Sued as “TruGreen Lawncare” and “TruGreen Corporation”), TruGreen, Inc., and TruGreen Companies LLC, (Collectively Hereinafter The “TruGreen”), Defendants David Williams and Jaimi Williams, H/W v. TruGreen Lawncare, TruGreen Limited Partnership, TruGreen Corporation, TruGreen Inc., The TruGreen Companies LLC, Service Master Consumer Services Limited Partnership, ServiceMaster Consumer Services, Inc., ServiceMaster Holding Corporation, The ServiceMaster Company, Dickinson Fleet Management LLC, Dickinson Fleet Services Pennsylvania, LLC, Dickinson Fleet Services. INC., LLC, Dickinson Fleet Services Inc., Dickinson Fleet Services, LLC, Brooks Auto Repair Petition of Dickinson Fleet Management LLC, Dickinson Fleet Services Pennsylvania, LLC, Dickinson Fleet Services Inc., LLC, Dickinson Fleet Services Inc., Dickinson Fleet Services, LLC.
    Nos. 58 EM 2016, 61 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 20, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 20th day of May, 2016, the May 5, 2016 single Justice Order temporarily staying the proceedings before the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in these matters pending this Court’s review is VACATED, and, upon review, it is ordered: the “Application of the TruGreen and ServiceMaster Entities for Leave to File a Reply” is GRANTED; the emergency applications for a stay are DENIED; and “Plaintiffs’ Request for Expedited Review” is DISMISSED as moot.

Justice BAER did not participate in the consideration or decision of these matters.


text:
    137 A.3d 572
    Kevin PITTMAN, Petitioner v. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Respondent.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 23, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 23rd day of May, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by petitioner, is:

Did the Parole Board abuse its discretion by summarily denying petitioner credit against his maximum sentence for time that he spent at liberty on parole following his recom-mitment as a convicted parole violator?


text:
    137 A.3d 573
    Alisha L. FORD, Petitioner v. AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 24, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 24th day of May, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue rephrased for clarity is

(1) Did the Superior Court err in affirming the summary judgment order and holding that the insurer’s underin-sured motorist coverage rejection form “specifically complies” with Subsection 1731(c) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(c)?


text:
    137 A.3d 573
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner, v. Alwasi YONG, Respondent.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 24, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 24th day of May, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:

Did the Superior Court—in contravention of the United States Supreme Court precedent and overwhelming supporting authority from this Court, the Superior Court itself, and virtually every federal and state court—err in holding that the Fourth Amendment does not permit a member of a close group of officers working as a team to act on the collective knowledge of that team, absent a directive or instruction issued by an officer who possesses probable cause?

Justice WECHT did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    137 A.3d 574
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Javier GONZALEZ, Petitioner.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 24, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 24th day of May, 2016, upon consideration of the Commonwealth’s Answer to the Petition for Allowance of Appeal, filed in response to this Court’s order of May 4, 2016 (see attached), and in view of the Commonwealth’s agreement that the matter be remanded to the PCRA court for appointment of new PCRA counsel, the petition for allowance of appeal is GRANTED, the order of the Superior Court is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the PCRA court for appointment of new PCRA counsel. The PCRA court is further ordered to direct new counsel to determine whether a colorable claim of counsel abandonment on direct appeal may be forwarded pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 930 A.2d 1264 (2007), and if so, to file an amended PCRA petition raising that claim. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

AND NOW, this 4th day of May, 2016, the Court has for consideration the pro se petition for allowance of appeal in this matter. The Commonwealth has elected not to file an answer, as is its right to do without prejudice under Pa.R.A.P. 1116(a).

ATTACHMENT

ORDER

Upon review it appears that petitioner, who is serving a substantial sentence, defaulted his direct appeal due to counsel abandonment, and did not invoke his collateral review rights under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, in a timely fashion. After petitioner filed a facially untimely pro se motion, PCRA counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition, which is not included in the present record.

In denying relief primarily on grounds of untimeliness, the PCRA court noted it had not granted counsel leave to amend the pro se pleading. Upon appeal, PCRA counsel was granted leave to withdraw, while identifying as a potential issue whether petitioner was entitled to PCRA review under the time-bar exception addressed in Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 930 A.2d 1264 (2007) (defendant claiming counsel effectively abandoned him on appeal may be entitled to application of exception to one-year PCRA time limitation). Petitioner was left to proceed pro se in the Superior Court.

A divided Superior Court panel denied relief, with the majority postulating, among other points, that as a matter of law, and even if assisted by new counsel, review was unavailable. Superior Court Majority Op. at 11. The dissent responded by suggesting the proper course was appointment of new counsel for purposes of determining whether a colorable Bennett claim could be forwarded. Superior Court Dissenting Op. at 1-3.

In his petition for allowance of appeal, petitioner now cites Bennett in support of his claim he should be entitled to a “limited extension” of the one-year PCRA time-bar in a situation that was beyond his control. Petition for Allowance of Appeal at 7. Under these unusual circumstances—including the counsel abandonment issues, the record deficiency, and the PCRA court’s denial of amendment—it would be of benefit to the Court to have the views of the Commonwealth on whether a remand to the PCRA court for appointment of new counsel would be appropriate, to determine whether a colorable Bennett claim in fact can be forwarded (subject, of course, to any factual or legal defenses also available to the Commonwealth).

Accordingly, the Commonwealth is hereby directed to file an answer to the instant petition for allowance of appeal within 30 days.


text:
    137 A.3d 575
    Mario L. DUNCAN, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Parole Agent, Schaup; Records Room Supervisor, Ronald J. Bajorek; and Norma M. Williams, et al., Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 25, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Mario L. Duncan, a state prisoner, was arrested while on parole and entered a negotiated guilty plea. In accordance with the negotiated plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 27 to 54 months’ imprisonment on his new offense, and ordered the sentence to run concurrently with his prior state sentence with 319 days’ credit for time served. However, Appellee Department of Corrections (DOC) computed Appellant’s new state sentence to run consecutively to the back time he was directed to serve as a consequence of his violation of parole on his original state sentence, citing 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(5) (“If a new sentence is imposed on the parolee, the service of the balance of the term originally imposed by a Pennsylvania court shall precede the commencement of the new term imposed ...”); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1) (permits credit “for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed ... ”). Appellant filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, claiming ineffective assistance of plea counsel with regard to the negotiated, but unenforceable, sentence. The petition was denied, and the denial was affirmed on direct appeal in an unpublished decision. (Notably, the Superior Court in a published opinion recently granted relief to a PCRA petitioner in similar circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 2016 WL 1072107 (Pa.Super.2016).)

Appellant then filed the instant Petition for Review, seeking mandamus relief in the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court, challenging DOC’s authority to disregard the trial court’s imposition of a concurrent sentence. DOC responds mandamus is not available to compel it to enforce what would be, by operation of the above statutes, an illegal sentencing order; therefore, Appellant’s new state sentence simply cannot be served concurrently with his state parole violation sentence and he is not entitled to double credit for the time he served prior to sentencing. See Fajohn v. Com., Dep’t of Corrections, 547 Pa. 649, 692 A.2d 1067, 1068 (1997); 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(5); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1).

“Mandamus is an extraordinary writ which will issue to compel performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there exists a clear legal right in the petitioner, a corresponding duty in the respondent, and want of any other adequate and appropriate remedy.” Relosky v. Sacco, 514 Pa. 339, 523 A.2d 1112, 1115 (1987) (citations omitted). Given the above statutes and the existing decisional law, DOC cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to enforce the sentencing order. See Fajohn, 692 A.2d at 1068. Therefore, mandamus is not available to compel the relief Appellant seeks. However, as DOC commendably notes, it appears Appellant may be permitted to seek modification of his sentence nunc pro tunc before the sentencing court, asserting he has not received the benefit of the guilty plea bargain negotiated with the Commonwealth and approved by the court. See id. at 1068 n. 1. See also Appellee’s Brief at 7 (Appellant may seek to withdraw his guilty plea nunc pro tunc). Accord Commonwealth v. Zuber, 466 Pa. 453, 353 A.2d 441, 444 (1976) (prosecutor has affirmative duty to honor promises made in exchange for defendant’s plea).

Accordingly, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any right Appellant may have, pursuant to Fajohn and Zuber, to seek modification of his sentence nunc pro tunc in the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County.


text:
    137 A.3d 577
    Jalil WILLIAMS, Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
    No. 38 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    May 25, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 25th day of May, 2016, the Application for Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    137 A.3d 1247
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Maurice McDONALD, Petitioner.
    No. 33 EM 2016.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    April 20, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 20th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.