author: Justice EAKIN. Justice STEVENS,

text:
    118 A.3d 370
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Nathan COOLEY, III, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Oct. 8, 2014.
    Decided June 15, 2015.

      Carolyn Ann Castagna, Esq., Brian J. Zeiger, Esq., Levin & Zeiger, L.L.P., for Nathan Cooley, III.
    John T. Adams, Esq., Christopher Baer Connard, Esq., Alisa Rebecca Hobart, Esq., Melissa Joy Noyes, Esq., Berks County District Attorney’s Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice EAKIN.

This Court granted review to consider whether appellant was subject to custodial interrogation during an encounter with parole agents, such that their failure to issue Miranda warnings violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The courts below admitted appellant’s statements at trial, concluding appellant was not in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes and thus not entitled to Miranda warnings. We conclude appellant’s interaction with parole agents included custodial interrogation, making admission of the statements error, which was not harmless. Thus, we are constrained to vacate appellant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

On June 30, 2011, while appellant was on parole following a drug conviction, his parole agent, Agent McCartin, received a voicemail from the father of appellant’s fiancée, who stated appellant possessed and had been discharging firearms, and may have been selling drugs at his home. Agent McCartin testified he found the voicemail reliable because the caller identified himself and his relationship to appellant, and knew of appellant’s recent approved vacation to Virginia.

On July 6, 2011, appellant went to the parole office to meet with Agent McCartin. Upon appellant’s arrival, Agent McCartin handcuffed him and searched him for weapons, finding none. Agent McCartin informed appellant that he and other agents were going to search his home for firearms and drugs based on a “course of action[.]” N.T. Trial, 5/10/12, at 96-97. He asked appellant if contraband would be found in his home; appellant became nervous and said he was unsure what agents would discover. Another parole officer, Agent Heidlebaugh, asked him whether firearms would be found in his home; appellant admitted a gun was in a drawer under the living-room couch. The agents transported appellant, still in handcuffs, to his home.

Four parole agents, including McCartin and Heidlebaugh, conducted the search. They recovered a .40 caliber handgun from the drawer identified by appellant and an empty .22 caliber handgun case from appellant’s bedroom. They also seized $3,200, one pound of marijuana, and plastic baggies. When confronted with the drugs, appellant admitted they were his. After completing the search, the agents asked where his vehicle was; appellant gave a location, but when the agents drove there, his vehicle was not there. Back at the parole office, agents saw a vehicle and asked appellant if it was his; he confirmed it was. The agents asked appellant whether he had a firearm in the vehicle; he admitted there was one under the passenger seat. The agents took his keys, entered the car, and seized a .22 caliber handgun. From the time of his arrival at the parole office, during the search of his home, and until he returned to the office with the agents, appellant remained in handcuffs and was never given Miranda warnings.

Appellant was charged with two counts each of persons not to possess firearms, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), and firearms not to be carried without a license, id., § 6106(a)(1), and one count each of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and possession of marijuana, id., § 780—113(a)(31)(i). Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking to suppress the statements made to the parole agents, which the suppression court denied. A jury convicted appellant on all counts; he was sentenced to five to ten years imprisonment followed by seven years’ probation. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which was denied. He appealed, claiming his statements to the parole agents should have been suppressed because he was never given Miranda warnings.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court held Miranda warnings were not required because appellant was neither in custody nor interrogated. The court determined that appellant was detained at the parole office based on suspected parole violations, but was not subject to an arrest or its functional equivalent. The court primarily relied on 61 Pa. C.S. § 6153(d)(5), which allows a parole agent to detain a parolee who is present during a property search. The court noted appellant “was detained for the agents’ safety before the subject of the informant’s tip has been broached.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/12, at 11. It concluded, “According to established safety protocols, [appellant] remained detained while the parole agents conducted the approved residential search. This detention and questioning by parole agents pursuant to their statutorily defined authority is not the functional equivalent of an arrest that would require the agents to administer Miranda warnings[.]” Id., at 11-12.

The Superior Court affirmed, holding Miranda warnings were not required during questioning by the parole agents because appellant’s statements were merely part of a parole interview rather than a custodial interrogation. Commonwealth v. Cooley, No. 1588 MDA 2012, unpublished memorandum at 12, 83 A.3d 1060 (Pa.Super. filed August 7, 2013). The court stated Miranda warnings are only required when there is custodial interrogation, which is defined as “ ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” Id., at 11 (quoting Miranda, at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602). It noted custody is equivalent to “a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id. (citation omitted). The court reviewed various factors and found the mere fact appellant was handcuffed was insufficient to show he was arrested.

The court also determined there was no custodial interrogation because appellant “was not taken to an unfamiliar or coercive environment, there was no use of force or threat of force, and the detention did not last for more than a few hours.” Id., at 12. It concluded appellant’s interactions with the parole agents at the office merely constituted a parole interview, during which Miranda warnings are not usually required. Id., at 12-13. It also concluded detention in conformity with § 6153(d)(5) was not the functional equivalent of an arrest. Id., at 11-13. Thus, the court held the suppression court did not err in admitting appellant’s statements regarding the firearms and drugs. Id., at 13.

We granted allocatur to determine “[w]hether there was custodial interrogation, such that the failure to issue Miranda warnings violated [appellant]’s Fifth Amendment rights, requiring suppression of statements made.” Commonwealth v. Cooley, 624 Pa. 403, 86 A.3d 230 (2014) (per curiam). In reviewing a ruling on a suppression motion, our standard of review is well settled: We are bound by the suppression court’s factual findings if supported by the record; however, we review the suppression court’s legal rulings de novo. Commonwealth v. James, 620 Pa. 465, 69 A.3d 180, 186 (2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Briggs, 608 Pa. 430, 12 A.3d 291, 320-21 (2011)).

Appellant contends a parole agent must issue Miranda warnings to a parolee when he is in custody and questioned about new crimes. He asserts his status as a parolee does not limit his Fifth Amendment rights, and he retained such rights throughout. Appellant asserts the use of restraints, coupled with the length of detention and the accusations of new crimes, further establishes he was in custody. He argues the agents’ acts constituted custodial interrogation, and therefore he was entitled to Miranda warnings at the parole office, his home, and in the agents’ vehicle.

Appellant argues both the Superior Court and the trial court improperly relied on United States v. Randolph, 210 F.Supp.2d 586 (E.D.Pa.2002), for the proposition that “[p]arole agents in any event may without Miranda warnings question parolees.” Id., at 589 n. 8. Appellant notes Randolph is not binding on this Court and claims the statement relied on by the courts is dictum, as that case involved the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment. See id., at 589 & n. 3 (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984)). Alternatively, appellant alleges Randolph actually supports the notion that Miranda warnings are required when a parolee is interrogated about new crimes.

Appellant contends Commonwealth v. Knoble, 615 Pa. 285, 42 A.3d 976 (2012), indicated a probationer may invoke Fifth Amendment rights in response to questions about new crimes. See id., at 981-82. He asserts we opined in Knoble that statements made to probation or parole agents concerning new crimes must be suppressed if such statements were compelled by threat of probation or parole revocation. Noting we ultimately held Knoble was not in custody, appellant asserts there is custody in this case.

Appellant also claims the Superior Court erred in relying on 61 Pa.C.S. § 6153(d)(5). He asserts that section only involves the Fourth Amendment, and lawfulness of detaining a parolee during a home search is immaterial to a Miranda analysis. Lawfulness of custody neither determines the constitutionality of interrogation nor the need to administer Miranda warnings. Appellant points out that police arrived during the search but never spoke to him, though they filed the criminal charges; he posits that had he been handcuffed by police, he would unarguably have been in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings prior to interrogation. He argues the agents were required to do the same because “[p]ermitting police officers to look the other way while a parole agent conducts an unwarned custodial interrogation is unjust.” Appellant’s Brief, at 25.

The Commonwealth concedes parolees and probationers do not lose Fifth Amendment rights merely because of their status, but contends appellant was not in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes. The Commonwealth notes appellant had been on parole for 17 months without incident and was aware of the rules regarding his supervision; no weapons or other show of force was utilized, and the search was executed without undue delay. The Commonwealth contends the totality of the circumstances overcomes any inference of custody solely from the use of handcuffs.

The Commonwealth claims 61 Pa.C.S. § 6153 detention does not rise to the level of custody for Miranda purposes. The Commonwealth argues the detention of parolees is important for agents’ safety during their supervisory process, asserting “[a] precedent that the mere handcuffing of an individual elevates an interaction from detention into custody, requiring the safeguards of Miranda, without other factors demonstrating either force or compulsion, would severely handicap the entire parole process.” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 19.

The Commonwealth claims this case is similar to Murphy, which held because a probation interview is non-custodial, a probationer’s failure to invoke the Fifth Amendment during a probation interview makes his statements admissible. See Murphy, at 429-34, 104 S.Ct. 1136. The Commonwealth notes the apparent difference between Murphy and this case—the fact appellant was handcuffed upon his arrival at the parole office—but argues such a distinction is not dispositive because: (1) the use of handcuffs alone is not determinative of custody; (2) appellant was restrained for the agents’ safety based on the tip received; and (3) appellant was detained for the limited purpose of verifying the tip’s veracity. Thus, the Commonwealth asserts appellant’s detention—both at the parole office and during the search—was not the functional equivalent of an arrest. As the Fifth Amendment was not self-executing, appellant’s failure to invoke his rights rendered his statements admissible.

The Fifth Amendment provides “no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himselfi.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. This prohibition not only permits an individual to refuse to testify against himself when he is a defendant but also “ ‘privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’ ” Murphy, at 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973)). The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is generally not self-executing, and ordinarily an individual must assert the privilege for subsequent statements to be considered “compelled” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Murphy, at 427, 104 S.Ct. 1136; Knoble, at 979. However, the Fifth Amendment is self-executing where an individual is subject to custodial interrogation without being given Miranda warnings. Murphy, at 429-30, 104 S.Ct. 1136; Miranda, at 467-69, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue presented. A parolee does not lose the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination merely because of conviction of a crime. Murphy, at 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136. Parolees, like any other individual, must be given Miranda warnings when subject to custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation is defined as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way[,]” Miranda, at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and the Commonwealth does not contest that appellant was questioned by law enforcement officers; the only dispute is whether he was in custody.

An individual is in custody if he is “physically denied his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by the interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 556 Pa. 216, 727 A.2d 1089, 1100 (1999) (citations omitted). Regarding custody, the United States Supreme Court has further held the “ultimate inquiry is ,.. whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (citation omitted). The standard for determining whether an encounter is custodial is an objective one, focusing on the totality of the circumstances with due consideration given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the individual being questioned. Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 555 Pa. 86, 723 A.2d 143, 148 (1998) (Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court) (citation omitted).

In Murphy, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether “a statement made by a probationer to his probation officer without prior warnings is admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding.” Murphy, at 425, 104 S.Ct. 1136. As part of Murphy’s probation, he was obligated to participate in a sex-offender treatment program, report to his probation officer as required, and be completely honest with the officer. Id., at 422, 104 S.Ct. 1136. The probation officer was notified that during his treatment, Murphy admitted to a previous rape and murder. Id., at 423, 104 S.Ct. 1136. The probation officer arranged a meeting with Murphy and told him about the information she had received expressing the belief this information evinced a need for further treatment. Id., at 423-24, 104 S.Ct. 1136. During the meeting, Murphy admitted to the rape and murder, for which he was eventually arrested. Id., at 424-25, 104 S.Ct. 1136.

The Supreme Court indicated the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination does not preclude voluntary incriminatory statements, and a probationer must claim the privilege if he desires its protection; otherwise, his statement will not be considered “compelled.” Id., at 427, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943)). The Court noted “the general obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully did not in itself convert Murphy’s otherwise voluntary statements into compelled ones ... unless he invokes the privilege and shows that he faces a realistic threat of self-incrimination.” Id. The Court pointed out that while there are well-known exceptions to this general rule, such exceptions contain “some identifiable factor ... denying] the individual a ‘free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.’ ” Id., at 429, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657, 96 S.Ct. 1178, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976)).

The Court concluded Murphy’s meeting with his probation officer did not amount to custody for Miranda purposes, as there was no formal arrest or its functional equivalent. Id., at 429-30, 104 S.Ct, 1136. In finding no custody, the Court “emphasize[d] that Murphy was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at the end of the meeting[,]” and opined that “[a] different question would be presented if he had been interviewed by his probation officer while being held in police custody or by the police themselves in a custodial setting.” Id., at 429 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 1136. As Murphy was not in custody and did not assert the privilege, the Court held his incriminating statements were admissible. Id., at 440, 104 S.Ct. 1136.

This Court addressed a factually similar case in Knoble. Knoble was on probation and was required to complete a sex-offender program, but was terminated from the program for being dishonest during therapeutic polygraph tests; he was arrested for violating probation. At Knoble’s probation-revocation hearing, a sex-offender counselor testified Knoble, after failing the polygraph, admitted he had been dishonest about his sexual history, victimized other minors, and was guilty of a sexual offense against a minor for which he had been previously acquitted. Id. This Court granted review, and noted “[t]he current situation appears to us even less imposing than that in Murphy [,]” holding Knoble’s Fifth Amendment privilege was not self-executing because he was not subject to custodial interrogation. Id., at 980-81, 42 A.3d 976. We found Knoble was not in custody because there was no police supervision for his therapy, his treatment was out-patient, and he attended independently. Id., at 981, 42 A.3d 976. We also concluded he was not “ ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, [because] he knew the terms of his probation, was aware of his ability to challenge the terms prior to beginning his treatment, and failed to raise any such challenge either before or during questioning.” Id.

The trial court and the Superior Court relied on Randolph in holding a parole interview is not the equivalent of custodial interrogation, such that agents may question parolees without Miranda warnings. Cooley, at 12 (citing Randolph, at 589 n. 3); Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/12, at 11 (same); Suppression Court Opinion, 3/26/12, at 5 (same). The opinion in Randolph only dealt with the Fourth Amendment and a motion to suppress physical evidence; the opinion noted “[a]t the oral argument today, Randolph withdrew his request to suppress statements[.]” See Randolph, at 588 & 589 n. 3. Yet, after determining the Fifth Amendment was not at issue, the court further opined that “[p]arole agents in any event may without Miranda warnings question parolees.” Id. In support of its determination, the court quoted a footnote from Murphy:

“Just as there is no right to a jury trial before probation may be revoked, neither is the privilege against compelled self-incrimination available to a probationer. It follows that whether or not the answer to a question about a residential requirement is compelled by the threat of revocation, there can be no valid claim of the privilege on the ground that the information sought can be used in revocation proceedings. Our cases indicate, moreover, that a State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding[ ] and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination.”

Id. (quoting Murphy, at 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1136).

This quotation concerned the Supreme Court’s inquiry whether a probationer’s failure to assert his privilege against self-incrimination would be excused when a probation officer “either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation[.]” Murphy, at 435, 104 S.Ct. 1136. The footnote pertained to the use of a probationer’s statements in revocation proceedings and addressed whether Murphy was deterred from asserting the privilege by a reasonably perceived threat of probation revocation. See id., at 435 & n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1136; see also Randolph, at 589 n. 3.

Appellant’s challenges to application of Randolph are well taken. The case is not binding precedent, the language was dictum, and the Fifth Amendment was not at issue there. Further, Randolph involved a threat of parole revocation, which is not present here. Thus, we find that both the trial court’s and the Superior Court’s reliance on Randolph was misplaced.

While Murphy and Knoble are factually distinguishable because neither involved actual custody, we find portions of Murphy’s reasoning particularly instructive. The Murphy Court “emphasize[d] that Murphy was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at the end of the [probation] meeting[,]” and it noted “[a] different question would be presented if he had been interviewed by his probation officer while being held in police custody[.]” Murphy, at 429 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 1136. As quoted above, the Murphy Court determined a state may insist on answers to incriminating questions “as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding [.]” Id., at 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (emphasis added). The Murphy Court further explained:

A state may require a probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect his probationary status; such a requirement, without more, does not give rise to a self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the questions put to the probationer, however relevant to his probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution.

Id., at 435, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (emphasis added).

The Murphy Court also addressed the difference between custodial interrogation and a routine probation interview, determining a probationer must invoke his privilege against self-incrimination when questioned during the latter, as the privilege is not self-executing, and a probation requirement to appear at the meeting and be completely honest does not violate a probationer’s Fifth Amendment rights. See id., at 429-37, 104 S.Ct. 1136. The Supreme Court noted a prearranged probation meeting in an atmosphere familiar to the probationer does not involve the psychological ploys of custodial arrest. Id., at 433, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (citing Miranda, at 456-57, 86 S.Ct. 1602). The Court determined “Murphy was not physically restrained and could have left the office,” and any compulsion he may have perceived from ending the probation meeting “was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.” Id.

It is beyond cavil that no mere parole interview took place here. Appellant had been on parole for 17 months without incident, and just returned from an approved out-of-state vacation. There is no evidence any prior meeting involved handcuffing, but appellant was immediately restrained upon arrival. This may be understandable and legal, but that does not make it less custodial. Appellant was then accused of crimes for which he was not on parole; there was no “interview” or dialogue related to the conditions of his parole or parole violations. While the use of handcuffs is not disposi-tive of a custody analysis, and we still must conduct a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the use of restraints is “generally recognized as a hallmark of a formal arrest.” United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir.2004) (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 215 & n. 17, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)). It is difficult to credit any suggestion that appellant, or anyone else, would have felt free to leave here.

After handcuffing, appellant was searched; nothing was found. There is no evidence the agents felt threatened after that, but the restraints were not removed. No one told appellant he was not under arrest or that he was restrained pursuant to routine policy. Instead, the parole agents stated he was being investigated for new crimes; their interrogation and search was unquestionably aimed at crimes for which he was not on parole. At that point, the parole agents’ conduct was the functional equivalent of that of police officers.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find a reasonable parolee would not feel free to terminate the encounter and leave the parole office. Therefore, we hold appellant was subject to custodial interrogation, and because the privilege was self-executing, the parole agents’ failure to administer Miranda warnings violated appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights. As a result, appellant’s statements should have been suppressed, and it was error for the courts below to admit them.

In determining whether this error requires the grant of a new trial, we must consider whether the error was harmless. Appellant claims the admission of his incriminating statements substantially prejudiced him because an essential element of his crimes was possession, and his statements identified the location of the firearms and admitted possession of the firearms and drugs. “An error is harmless if it could not have contributed to the verdict. In other words, an error cannot be harmless if there is a reasonable possibility the error might have contributed to the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 961 A.2d 119, 143 (2008) (citation omitted). It is the Commonwealth’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Id. (citation omitted). The Commonwealth does not argue the physical evidence was sufficient to support the convictions or that the verdict would be the same if appellant’s statements were suppressed. The Commonwealth makes no argument concerning harmless error; thus, it has failed to meet its burden. For these reasons, we find this error was not harmless, as we cannot determine beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict.

In sum, we hold appellant was subject to custodial interrogation such that his parole agents’ failure to issue Miranda warnings violated his Fifth Amendment rights, the courts below erred in failing to suppress his incriminating statements, and such error was not harmless. Thus, appellant is entitled to a new trial consistent with the guidelines set forth in this opinion.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for new trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Former Chief Justice CASTILLE and former Justice McCAFFERY did not participate in the decision of this case.

Chief Justice SAYLOR, Justice BAER and Justice TODD join the opinion.

Justice STEVENS files a dissenting opinion.

Justice STEVENS,

dissenting.

I differ with the majority’s conclusion that the use of handcuffs transformed Appellant’s interaction with parole agents at his pre-arranged meeting into the functional equivalent of an arrest for Miranda purposes, and thus, I respectfully dissent.

Preliminarily, as the majority acknowledges, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of Fifth Amendment application to probationers in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). As part of his probation, Murphy was required to, inter alia, participate in a sex offender treatment program, report to his probation officer as required, and honestly answer questions posed to him by his probation officer. Id., at 422, 104 S.Ct. 1136. At some point, the probation officer was advised that during a counseling treatment session, Murphy admitted to committing a previous rape and murder. Id., at 423, 104 S.Ct. 1136. With the intent of questioning Murphy about the previous incident, and knowing she would report Murphy’s incriminating statements to the police, the probation officer set up a meeting with Murphy. Id. The probation officer opened the meeting by informing Murphy she had received information from the counselor regarding Murphy’s admission to the prior crimes, and in response, Murphy admitted to her that he had committed the rape and murder. Id., at 423-24, 104 S.Ct. 1136. The probation officer told Murphy she had a duty to report the information to the authorities, and Murphy was later arrested and charged with first degree murder. Id., at 424-25, 104 S.Ct. 1136.

In analyzing whether, in the absence of Miranda warnings, Murphy’s statements to the probation officer were admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court relevantly concluded Murphy was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes. Id., at 430, 104 S.Ct. 1136.

In so holding, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to discuss why Murphy (a probationer who attended a prearranged meeting with his probation officer) was not in custody. Specifically, the Supreme Court emphasized that:

Not only is custodial interrogation ordinarily conducted by officers who are ‘acutely aware of the potentially incriminatory nature of the disclosures sought,’ ... but also the custodial setting is thought to contain ‘inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.’ To dissipate ‘the overbearing compulsion ... caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody,’ the Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being suitably warned of his right to remain silent and of the consequences of his failure to assert it. We have consistently held, however, that this extraordinary safeguard ‘does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed.’
Even a cursory comparison of custodial interrogation and probation interviews reveals the inaptness of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analogy to Miranda. Custodial arrest is said to convey to the suspect a message that he has no choice but to submit to the officers’ will and to confess. It is unlikely that a probation interview, arranged by appointment at a mutually convenient time, would give rise to a similar impression. Moreover, custodial arrest thrusts an individual into ‘an unfamiliar atmosphere’ or ‘an interrogation environment ... created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner.’ Many of the psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capitalize on the suspect’s unfamiliarity with the officers and the environment.

Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-433, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (quotations and citations omitted).

Thus, the Supreme Court pointed to the following factors in rejecting the claim Murphy was in custody: (1) Murphy’s regular meetings with his probation officer should have served to familiarize him with her and her office and to insulate him from psychological intimidation that might overbear his desire to claim the privilege; (2) the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation deriving in large part from an interrogator’s insinuations that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained was lacking; and (3) Murphy was not physically restrained and could have left the office such that any compulsion he might have felt from the possibility that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator. Id., at 433, 104 S.Ct. 1136.

In distinguishing Murphy from the instant case, and thus concluding Appellant was in custody when he was handcuffed at the parole office, the majority concludes “no mere parole interview took place here.” Majority Opinion at 134, 118 A.3d at 379. To support this conclusion, the majority points to the fact Appellant was “accused of crimes for which he was not on parole; there was no ‘interview’ or dialogue related to the conditions of his parole or parole violations.” Id. However, my review of Murphy reveals substantially similar questioning occurred in that case, and thus the instant case is not violative of the Fifth Amendment on this basis.

Additionally, the majority points to the fact Appellant was handcuffed at the parole office. Majority Opinion at 134-35, 118 A.3d at 378-79. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority that the parole agent’s use of handcuffs removed the instant parole interview out of the realm of Murphy and transformed it into the functional equivalent of an arrest for which Miranda safeguards were warranted. This Court has held that the use of handcuffs on an individual is not disposi-tive of whether the individual is in custody, and as indicated supra, in Murphy the absence of handcuffs was just one factor considered by the Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 247 n. 2, 643 A.2d 61, 68 n. 2 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1005, 115 S.Ct. 1317, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995).

In the instant case, Appellant voluntarily arrived for a prearranged meeting at the parole office, where had had been on many occasions. He met with the parole agent, who had been supervising Appellant for approximately eighteen months. The supervision of Appellant during this time period included, inter alia, urine screens, office visits, and searches of Appellant’s approved residence. Appellant had been on parole for this period without incident and had recently returned from an out-of-state travel pass. Upon arriving at the parole office, the agent handcuffed Appellant, told him he had received information Appellant was in possession of firearms, and informed Appellant his approved residence would be searched. When asked if firearms would be found in his home, Appellant admitted there was a gun in a drawer under the living-room couch.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, I find Appellant was not in custody at the parole office. Similar to the defendant in Murphy, Appellant was not in an unfamiliar atmosphere, he was not in isolation, and he was familiar with the parole agent. While Appellant was handcuffed for the parole agent’s safety, there is no indication the parole agent insinuated the interrogation would continue until Appellant confessed and there was no aggressive, confrontational show of force. Simply put, the use of handcuffs does not, in my mind, tip the scale in this case from a non-custodial parole interview to the functional equivalent of an arrest. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

      . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

      . The Commonwealth later withdrew one firearms count.

      . Appellant also filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence, but for purposes of this appeal, appellant only challenges admission of his statements.

      . The opinion denying appellant's motion to suppress contains analysis substantially similar to the Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Suppression Court Opinion, 3/26/12, at 5-6.

      . In its entirety, § 6153(d)(5) provides:

        (d) Grounds for personal search of offender.—

      (5) The offender may be detained if he is present during a property search. If the offender is not present during a property search, the agent in charge of the search shall make a reasonable effort to provide the offender with notice of the search, including a list of the items seized, after the search is completed.

        Id., § 6153(d)(5).

      . Appellant notes this is an issue of first impression before this Court but points to other jurisdictions that have held Miranda warnings are required during custodial interrogation by a parole agent regarding new crimes. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13 (citing United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Bland, 908 F.2d 471, 472-74 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Deaton, 468 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir.1972); United States v. Steele, 419 F.Supp. 1385, 1386-87 (W.D.Pa.1976); State v. Lekas, 201 Kan. 579, 442 P.2d 11, 16 (1968); People v. Elliott, 295 Mich.App. 623, 815 N.W.2d 575 (2012); and State v. Davis, 67 N.J. 222, 337 A.2d 33, 35 (1975)).

      . Appellant proposes Steele is persuasive, as it "provides a cogent rule that clarifies how Miranda applies to a custodial interrogation of a suspect on probation or parole about new crimes.” Appellant’s Brief, at 18 (quoting Steele, at 1386-87) ("[T]he proper rule is that while statements made to a probation or parole officer without the Miranda warnings being given are properly admitted in a parole revocation hearing where various types of hearsay may be used to inform the court as to the parole violation, [ ] when these statements are used to prove an entirely separate offense against the defendant and he is in custody and under the compulsion of discussing matters with his parole or probation officer, Miranda warnings must be given before such testimony can be admitted ... in the trial involving the separate offense.”).

      . "We have held Article I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords no greater protections against self-incrimination than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Knoble, at 979 n. 2 (citation omitted).

      . Another exception to the need to assert the privilege exists when “the government in any way asserts that a probationer’s claiming of the privilege would lead to probation revocation[.]” Knoble, at 982 (citing Murphy, at 435, 104 S.Ct. 1136). Appellant does not allege this exception here.

      . "[O]ne of the primary stages of sex offender treatment is for an individual to take a sexual history therapeutic polygraph in order to objectively assess a participant's self-reported sexual history.” Knoble, at 978.

      . Parolees may not feel free to terminate a parole meeting and leave the parole office before the meeting has ended; however, as Murphy noted, “any compulsion [a parolee] might ... fe[el] from the possibility that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation [is] not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.” Murphy, at 433, 104 S.Ct. 1136; see also Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1190, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) ("[T]he [] question [is] whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.”).

      . Handcuffing appellant was entirely reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, though it resulted in custody for purposes of Miranda. Likewise, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6153 allows his detention during the home search. However, the lawfulness of custody does not mean there was no custody, and as such does not preclude appellant’s Fifth Amendment claim. We also observe the burden of reciting Miranda warnings is not an onerous one.

      . A court views the totality of circumstance in each case; we accordingly limit our holding to the facts presented here and recognize the outcome might be different with factual variations. We also express no opinion as to whether the privilege is self-executing when, during a routine interview or home search, a probationer or parolee is required to answer questions that may incriminate him in a future criminal prosecution.

      . We acknowledge appellant, in his brief, argued in the alternative that his sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), as he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1. See Appellant’s Brief, at 9 n. 1. Because we remand for a new trial, we need not address appellant’s claim and do not express any opinion as to that issue.

      . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

      . As it relates to Appellant's remaining statements, which he made at his approved residence and prior to the search of his vehicle, I would find any error with regard to the admission thereof to be harmless. Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 961 A.2d 119 (2008).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    118 A.3d 383
    David Lee BURNETT, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and Pennsylvania Board of Adult Parole/Probation, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    June 15, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of June 2015, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby AFFIRMED.


text:
    118 A.3d 383
    Randolph TORRE, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    June 15, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of June, 2015, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    118 A.3d 383
    Jeremy BANEY, Appellant v. CLERK OF COURT and Court Administrator of Clinton County, Appellees.
    No. 114 MAP 2014.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    June 15, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of June, 2015, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    118 A.3d 383
    Michael Levant JOHNSON, Appellant v. Cheryl KINNEY and Chester County Clerk of Courts, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    June 15, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of June, 2015, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.


text:
    118 A.3d 384
    Patrick J. HOPKINS, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, PA, and District Attorney of Philadelphia County, PA, Respondents.
    No. 57 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    June 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of June, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the Petition for Extraordinary Relief and/or Habeas Corpus Relief are DISMISSED. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 537 Pa. 167, 642 A.2d 453 (1994) (providing that hybrid representation is improper). The Pro-thonotary is DIRECTED to forward the filings to counsel of record.


text:
    118 A.3d 384
    Thomas McDONOUGH, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA, Respondent.
    No. 51 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    June 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of June, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Application for an Immediate Hearing and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus are DENIED.


text:
    118 A.3d 384
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Anwar S. ALI, Petitioner.
    No. 46 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    June 29, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 29th day of June, 2015, the Application for a Stay, the Application for an Immediate Hearing, and the Application for Extraordinary Relief are DENIED.


text:
    118 A.3d 385
    Al FLORA, Jr., and Adam Kuren and Steven Allabaugh, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Petitioners v. LUZERNE COUNTY of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Robert C. Lawton, County Manager, in his Official Capacity, Respondents. Al Flora, Jr., and Adam Kuren and Steven Allabaugh, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Petitioners v. Luzerne County of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Robert C. Lawton, County Manager, in his Official Capacity, Respondents.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    June 30, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 30th day of June, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, LIMITED TO the issues set forth below. Allocatur is DENIED as to all remaining issues. The issues, as stated by Petitioners, are:

(1) In a matter of first impression, do petitioners state a claim for constructive denial of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, based on chronic and systemic deficiencies in the operation of Luzerne County’s Office of the Public Defender that deprive them and the class they seek to represent of their right to effective assistance of counsel? See Pa. R.A.P. 1114(b)(3), (4).
(2) Do Petitioners state a claim of mandamus to compel Respondents to provide adequate funding for Luzerne County’s Office of the Public Defender, as required by the Commonwealth’s Public Defender Act, 16 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9960.1-9960.13 (hereinafter the “Public Defender Act”)? See Pa. R.A.P. 1114(b)(2).


text:
    118 A.3d 385
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Michael STEVENS, Respondent.
    No. 43 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    July 2, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 2nd day of July, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DISMISSED. Only final orders of the Superior Court may be challenged through allocatur review. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 724(a). The Superior Court’s remand order, which specifically noted that jurisdiction was retained, was not final. See Pa.R.A.P. 1112(b) (defining a final order, for purposes of allocatur, as one which “concludes an appeal, including an order that remands an appeal, ... unless the appellate court remands and retains jurisdiction”).


author: Chief Justice SAYLOR.

text:
    118 A.3d 1091
    Sheryl SEARS; Ronald J. Guiney; Florence Spanos; Barbara L. Miller; Randell Devlin; Kathleen Devlin; Sallye Fiscus; Nicholas Balandiat; Loretta E. Maierhofer; Mary Gallagher; Daniel Cecchetti; Michele Yamshon; Vicki L. Mazzaferro; Madeline Martucci; Gary Carpinello; Karen Carpinello; Diane Holbert; Arthur W. Cunningham, Jr.; Dana Cunningham; Dolores Lobiondo; Michael Lobiondo; Carol Kuhns; Tammy Bevan; Alicia Rager; Teresa Liberato; Valerie Benko; John C. Egan; Tammy Gross; Blanche Hoover; Joseph D. Steiner; Cynthia Brazen; Susan Antoszewski; Angela Stetz; Bonnie Zuzo; Carol Weiss; Linda Saunders; Louise Schneider; Linda Gorsuch; Alex J. Deritis, Sr.; Sharon Thir; Becky Thir; Barbara Sims; Frank Sims; Carol L. Devers; Debbie A. Kraft; Deborah A. McGrady; Jeff C. Miller; David Lipstein; Bonnie Lipstein; Thomas R. Haberman; William A. Roth; David Dawson; Victoria D. Hartsek; Jeanine Richards; Kelly Richards; William Ainsworth; William Briggs; Lorraine Capalbo; Chris Iams; Ronald Kaplan; Joan O’Shea; Kimberly Thomas; Bianca Willis; Shawn Willis; Pamela R. Alwine; Barbara A. Beam; Beverly A. Corcoran; James J. Corcoran; Kristyn L. Corcoran; Billye Glenn; David McKee; Christina A. Miller; Particia Vargulish; Dora M. Alexander; and Joda L. Schena, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. Tom WOLF as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Randy Albright as Secretary of Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Mike Turzai as Speaker of the House; Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Joseph B. Scarnati, III, as President Pro Tempore of the Senate; and Department of Treasury of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Appeal of Mike Turzai as Speaker of the House; Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Joseph B. Scarnati, III, as President Pro Tempore of the Senate. Sheryl Sears; Ronald J. Guiney; Florence Spanos; Barbara L. Miller; Randell Devlin; Kathleen Devlin; Sallye Fiscus; Nicholas Balandiat; Loretta E. Maierhofer; Mary Gallagher; Daniel Cecchetti; Michele Yamshon; Vicki L. Mazzaferro; Madeline Martucci; Gary Carpinello; Karen Carpinello; Diane Holbert; Arthur W. Cunningham, Jr.; Dana Cunningham; Dolores Lobiondo; Michael Lobiondo; Carol Kuhns; Tammy Bevan; Alicia Rager; Teresa Liberato; Valerie Benko; John C. Egan; Tammy Gross; Blanche Hoover; Joseph D. Steiner; Cynthia Brazen; Susan Antoszewski; Angela Stetz; Bonnie Zuzo; Carol Weiss; Linda Saunders; Louise Schneider; Linda Gorsuch; Alex J. Deritis, Sr.; Sharon Thir; Becky Thir; Barbara Sims; Frank Sims; Carol L. Devers; Debbie A. Kraft; Deborah A. McGrady; Jeff C. Miller; David Lipstein; Bonnie Lipstein; Thomas R. Haberman; William A. Roth; David Dawson; Victoria D. Hartsek; Jeanine Richards; Kelly Richards; William Ainsworth; William Briggs; Lorraine Capalbo; Chris Iams; Ronald Kaplan; Joan O’Shea; Kimberly Thomas; Bianca Willis; Shawn Willis; Pamela R. Alwine; Barbara A. Beam; Beverly A. Corcoran; James J. Corcoran; Kristyn L. Corcoran; Billye Glenn; David McKee; Christina A. Miller; Particia Vargulish; Dora M. Alexander; and Joda L. Schena, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. Tom Wolf as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Randy Albright as Secretary of Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Mike Turzai as Speaker of the House; Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Joseph B. Scarnati, III, as President Pro Tempore of the Senate; and Department of Treasury of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Appeal of Tom Wolf as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Randy Albright as Secretary of Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Eric Weisblatt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Honorable Tom Wolf, as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Honorable Randy Albright, as Secretary of budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Honorable Christopher Craig, as Acting Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and Department of the Treasury of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Appeal of Honorable Tom Wolf, as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Honorable Randy Albright, as Secretary of Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Eric Weisblatt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Cross Appellant v. Honorable Tom Wolf, as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Honorable Randy Albright, as Secretary of Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Honorable Christopher Craig, as Acting Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and Department of the Treasury of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Cross Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Nov. 19, 2014.
    Decided June 19, 2015.

      Robert Samuel Kitchenoff, Esq., Edward Skipton, Esq., David H. Weinstein, Esq., Weinstein, Kitchenoff & Asher, L.L.C., Philadelphia, for Eric Weisblatt.
    Thomas Walter Dymek, Esq., Harrisburg, Jonathan F. Bloom, Esq., Ian Michael Long, Esq., Karl Stewart Myers, Esq., Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, LLP, Philadelphia, for Samuel Smith, Speaker of the House of Rep. & Joseph Scarnati, President Pro Tempore of the Senate.
    Linda Cadden Barrett, Esq., Kathleen Granahan Kane, Esq., Sean Andrew Kirkpatrick, Esq., John G. Knorr, III, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, Brian D. Zweiacher, Esq., PA Governor’s Office of General Counsel, for Tom Corbett, Governor & Charles Zogby, Secretary of Budget.
    William R. Caroselli, Esq., Susan A. Meredith, Esq., Pittsburgh, Lauren C. Fantini, Esq., Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy, L.L.C., David Samuel Senoff, Esq., Philadelphia, for Sheryl Sears et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.
    Kathryn Maria Cerulli, Esq., Jennifer Langan, Esq., Craig S. Schwartz, Esq., PA Treasury Department, for Robert M. McCord.
    Leila Elizabeth Ely, Esq., Weinstein, Kitchenoff & Asher, L.L.C., Philadelphia, for Eric Weisblatt in 23 MAP 2013.
    CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Chief Justice SAYLOR.

These consolidated direct appeals concern Appellees’ efforts to resurrect a defunct state-run health insurance program.

By way of essential background, this case involves challenges to amendments to the Fiscal Code, which, inter alia, defines the powers and duties of the Department of Revenue and the Treasury Department relative to the disbursement or disposition of Commonwealth funds. See 72 P.S. § 2. In conjunction with annual appropriations processes, the General Assembly has employed omnibus amendments to the Fiscal Code, for many years, as the enabling mechanism for financing state government operations and various programs. See, e.g., Act of July 6, 2010, P.L. 279, No. 46 (encaptioned “Fiscal Code-Omnibus Amendments” and providing, inter alia,, for the implementation of the operating budget of the Commonwealth for the fiscal year 2010-2011).

Appellees were recipients of state-subsidized, low-cost health insurance via the adultBasic program, which was previously administered by the Department of Insurance and made available to certain qualifying adults in Pennsylvania. The program historically received the bulk of its funding from the proceeds of a 1998 multi-state master settlement agreement between forty-seven states—including the Commonwealth— and several major tobacco product manufacturers in the United States.

The allocation and distribution of funds received annually by the Commonwealth under this accord was initially administered outside of the Fiscal Code, via the Tobacco Settlement Act. Per this enactment, such monies were deposited into a special fund denominated the Tobacco Settlement Fund (the “Fund”), see 35 P.S. § 5701.303(a) (repealed). The TSA also provided for appropriations calculated annually using defined formulas. See 35 P.S. § 5701.306(b) (repealed). As relevant here, thirty percent of the funds were allocated, collectively, to adultBasic and another health-related program which provides medical assistance benefits for workers with disabilities, known as “MAWD.” See 35 P.S. § 5701.306(b)(1)(vi) (repealed).

Of particular significance to the present appeals, the TSA’s adultBasic provisions also specified:

Subsidization of the benefit package [of adultBasic] is contingent upon the amount of the appropriations to the program and limited to eligible adults.... Nothing under this section shall constitute an entitlement derived from the Commonwealth or a claim on any funds of the Commonwealth.

35 P.S. § 5701.1303(c) (emphasis added).

In the years after the passage of the TSA, in conjunction with the annual budget process and through the vehicle of the omnibus amendments to the Fiscal Code, the Legislature directed a series of one-time transfers of tobacco settlement monies from the Fund. Such redirection was initially undertaken primarily in furtherance of health-related purposes, albeit ones outside the purview of the TSA. See supra note 5. As relevant to the present litigation, for purposes of fiscal years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012, the General Assembly again used modifications to the Fiscal Code to override the TSA’s requirements for tobacco settlement monies. The amendments in question were contained in the Act of July 6, 2010, P.L. 279, No. 46 (“Act 46”) (adding Sections 1715-M of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. § 1715-M), and the Act of June 30, 2011, P.L. 159, No. 26 (“Act 26”) (adding Section 1715-C of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. § 1715-C). One effect of the amendments was to divert tobacco settlement funds more generally to other fiscal priorities of the Commonwealth. For example, Act 46 required a transfer of $250,000,000 to the Commonwealth’s General Fund. See 72 P.S. § 1715-M(b)(5). At least partially on account of the loss of essential funding, adultBasic ceased operations in February 2011. See N.T., Apr. 12, 2011, at Exh. P-5 (reflecting a termination notice provided to a previous adultBasic subscriber).

In March 2011, Appellees Cheryl Sears and seventy-four other former recipients of adultBasic (the “Sears Appellees”) filed an original-jurisdiction petition for review in the Commonwealth Court, styled as a class action. The petition and amendments designated as respondents: the Governor of Pennsylvania and the Secretary of Budget (collectively, the “Executive Appellants”); the Senate, the House of Representatives, and various legislative leaders (the “Legislative Appellants”), and the Department of Treasury. As amended, the petition contended, inter alia, that the redirection of tobacco settlement monies under Acts 46 and 26 violated the TSA’s requirements for appropriation and allocation of tobacco settlement funds. See 35 P.S. § 5701.306. The petition also asserted that these enactments offended various provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution governing legislative processes, including the general requirement that no bill shall be passed containing more than a single subject. See Pa. Const. art. III, § 3. Appellees sought declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief retroactively reestablishing the adultBasic program and reimbursing the program over two hundred million dollars.

In April 2011, Appellee Eric Weisblatt commenced a separate original-jurisdiction proceeding in the Commonwealth Court, also styled as a class action, proffering materially similar allegations and claims for relief, in the relevant respects. Appellee Weisblatt, however, named only executive-branch officials and agencies as defendants.

Appellees in both proceedings moved for a preliminary injunction to preclude the Treasury from disbursing the tobacco settlement monies which were due to be received that month as appropriated per Act 46. Relief was denied by the court, however, upon its finding that the harm asserted by Appellees was neither immediate nor irreparable. See Sears v. Corbett, Nos. 121 & 157 M.D. 2011, slip op. at 11 (Pa.Cmwlth. Apr. 20, 2011) (single-judge memorandum). The court reasoned that the harm had already occurred, given the termination of the adultBasic program several months earlier, and moreover, the requested relief would not restore Appel-lees’ insurance or resurrect adultBasic. See Sears, Nos. 121 & 157 M.D. 2011, slip op. at 11-12. Finally, the court determined that greater harm would inure to the Commonwealth were relief to be afforded, since the General Assembly had redirected monies, per Act 46, in order to balance the budget as required by the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id. at 12 & n. 12 (citing Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 12). According to the court, judicial interference with this regime would adversely affect the operation of government, services, and programs. See id. at 13.

Subsequently, Appellants filed preliminary objections. In particular, they relied on the TSA’s prescription that “[nothing under this section [pertaining to adultBasic benefits] shall constitute an entitlement derived from the Commonwealth or a claim on any funds of the Commonwealth.” 35 P.S. § 5701.1303(c). Furthermore, several of the appellants invoked sovereign immunity to the extent that Appellees sought to compel the restoration of adultBasic in the absence of legislative appropriations or to hold them responsible for any effects of its termination.

On June 27, 2012, the Commonwealth Court issued a divided, en banc opinion in the Sears case, which sustained the preliminary objections pertaining to several of the Sears Ap-pellees’ claims, while deeming others meritorious and/or subject to further consideration. See Sears v. Corbett, 49 A.3d 463 (Pa.Cmwlth.2012). In terms of sovereign immunity, the majority distinguished between those suits seeking to compel affirmative action on the part of state officials or to recover money or property, and those asking to restrain state officials from performing affirmative acts. See id. at 471 (citing Phila. Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 410 Pa. 571, 576, 190 A.2d 111, 114 (1963)). Only the latter, the majority explained, was excepted from the application of sovereign immunity. See id.

The Commonwealth Court majority next applied this distinction to the Sears Appellees’ request for an order mandating that all future tobacco settlement monies be deposited in accordance with the TSA, the Fund be reimbursed these monies, and the adultBasic program be reinstated retroactively. Given that the Legislature already had provided for redirection of the relevant funds, the majority reasoned, the Legislative Appellants would be required to take affirmative action to effectuate a remedy. See id. at 472-73. Accordingly, the majority concluded that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred relief as against the legislative respondents and sustained the preliminary objections in this regard. See id. at 473.

The majority, however, regarded the relief requested relative to the Executive Appellants as in the nature of a restraint from carrying out the dictates of the Acts 46 and 26 amendments. See id. (“Should this Court ultimately conclude that the aforementioned Acts were unconstitutional, we could certainly direct Respondents Corbett and Zogby to refrain from enforcing this legislation,”). Given the permissibility of a prohibitory injunction impacting the sovereign, the majority overruled the Executive Appellants’ preliminary objections in such regards.

In response to the argument that the Sears Appellees lacked any entitlement to adultBasic benefits, the majority credited their position that the non-entitlement language in Section 1303 of the TSA had a limited and directed purpose, in that it “was meant [only] to address the expiration of the annual [tobacco settlement fund] payments in 2025 or a substantial decrease in [such payments].” Id. at 474. Viewed as such, the majority reasoned, the TSA did not preclude the Sears Appellees from challenging the diversion of tobacco settlement monies from adultBasic. See id. Conceptually, the majority also perceived a material difference between claiming entitlement to monies and challenging redirection of such funds away from a particular program. See id. (“[The Sears Appellees] are not alleging an entitlement, nor are they asserting a claim to Commonwealth Funds. Rather, [they] are challenging the redirection of [tobacco settlement] monies away from the Fund.”).

The majority proceeded to determine that Acts 46 and 26 were inconsistent with the Pennsylvania Constitution’s single-subject provision. See Pa. Const. art. III, § 3. Initially, the majority mentioned the salient purpose of Article III, Section 3—which is to prevent what were considered by early framers to be pernicious practices of the past—as encapsulated within the following passage from this Court’s decision in City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 575 Pa. 542, 838 A.2d 566 (2003):

[O]mnibus bills ... permitted the passage of hidden legislation and allowed “logrolling”—that is, “embracing in one bill several distinct matters, none of which could singly obtain the assent of the legislature, and procuring its passage by combining the minorities who favored the individual matters to form a majority that would adopt them all.” As a corollary, the single-subject requirement prevents the attachment of riders which could not become law on their own to popular bills that are certain to pass. Also, a bill addressing a single topic is more likely to obtain a considered review than one addressing many subjects.

Id. at 574-75, 838 A.2d at 586 (citations omitted). See generally id. at 573, 838 A.2d at 585 (“Article III’s general purpose is ‘to place restraints on the legislative process and encourage an open, deliberative and accountable government.’ ” (quoting Pa. AFL-CIO ex rel. George v. Commonwealth, 563 Pa. 108, 119, 757 A.2d 917, 923 (2000))). Further, the majority recognized that, in giving effect to the above aims while also extending appropriate deference to the legislative branch, this Court had devised a “practical germaneness test” as the litmus for constitutional compliance with the single-subject requirement. Sears, 49 A.3d at 475 (citing City of Phila., 575 Pa. at 579, 838 A.2d at 589 (reflecting that Article III, Section 3 requires that legislation possess some “single unifying subject to which all of the provisions of the act are germane”)).

Applying this test, the Commonwealth Court majority found that both Acts 46 and 26 encompassed multiple diverse subjects, including ones unrelated to the Commonwealth’s operating budget. For example, the majority explained that Act 46 contains various sections pertaining to “building/construction permits, heritage areas and the establishment of a heritage area program within the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, victims of crime and the establishment of a Special Juvenile Compensation Fund, and semi-annual reports of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.” Sears, 49 A.3d at 478.

Judge Simpson authored the dissent, which Judge McGinley joined. Relying on Section 1308(c) of the TSA, the dissent found that “the TSA established the adultBasic program, but it placed express limits on privileges of eligible adults.” Sears, 49 A.3d at 487 (Simpson, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent stressed the statutory non-entitlement language. See id. (quoting 35 P.S. § 5701.1303(c)).

Judge Simpson acknowledged the Sears Appellees’ suggestion that they were not alleging an entitlement or making a claim to Commonwealth funds, as well as their argument that the non-entitlement language was merely intended to address a financial shortfall expected around 2025, when the tobacco settlement payments were expected to subside. The dissent replied, however:

By whatever name, [the Sears Appellees] seek return of funds from the Commonwealth’s General Fund back to an account where it will be available for the adultBasic program. The plain language of Section 1303 does not enable them to do so. Nor does the plain language even hint that non-entitlement begins in 2025. To the extent that the majority reaches a different conclusion, I respectfully part company.

Id. at 488.

Several weeks after the Commonwealth Court’s issuance of its opinion in Sears, the court issued a divided decision in the companion case of Weisblatt. See Weisblatt v. Corbett, 53 A.3d 91 (Pa.Cmwlth.2012) (en banc). Countervailing expressions were presented incorporating the reasoning and conclusions set forth in the Sears majority and dissenting opinions. See id. at 92-93.

Subsequently, the parties filed cross-motions for summary relief, and the Sears and Weisblatt cases were consolidated. In March 2013, the Commonwealth Court, by way of an unpublished single-judge opinion, denied class certification but awarded partial summary relief in Appellees’ favor. See Sears v. Corbett, 121 & 157 M.D. 2011, slip op., 2013 WL 864449 (Pa.Cmwlth. Mar. 4, 2013). As to Appellees’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, the court considered itself bound by the previous decision on preliminary objections discerning violations of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and other prescriptions of such charter. In this regard, the court referenced the “law of the case” doctrine. See Sears, 121 & 157 M.D. 2011, slip op. at 23 (“Law of the case means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of the decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case.” (quoting In re Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 715 A.2d 1219, 1223 n. 10 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998))). Based upon this principle as applied to the previous decision on preliminary objections, the court declared Acts 46 and 26 to be unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the Executive Appellants and the Treasury from enforcing the provisions of these enactments on a prospective basis. See id.

The Commonwealth Court also found the prior decision controlling relative to Appellees’ request for mandamus relief to compensate for the lapse of funding in previous years. In this regard, the court highlighted that such relief would require legislative action, which, by virtue of sovereign immunity, was beyond the court’s authority to direct. See id. at 28. Thus, the court denied the salient requests for mandamus relief.

The Commonwealth Court further directed that the Executive Appellants and Treasury were to appropriate “30% of the Fund to ‘health investment insurance pursuant to Chapter 13 and for the purchase of Medicaid benefits for workers with disabilities pursuant to Chapter 15,' i.e., the MAWD and adultBasic Program, as required by Section 306(b)(1) (vi) of the TSA.” Sears, 121 & 157 M.D. 2011, slip op. at 28. The court issued this directive because the Executive Appellants had submitted an uncontradicted affidavit indicating that the entire thirty percent of the TSA funds were to be allocated to MAWD for the 2013-2014 fiscal year. The court ruled that such allocation was impermissible, however, given that the TSA required a division of funds between the two programs. See id. at 28-29.

The Legislative and Executive Appellants lodged appeals, and Appellee Weisblatt filed a cross-appeal to challenge the denial of retrospective relief. Per Rule of Appellate Procedure 1736(b), an automatic supersedeas prevented immediate operation of the Commonwealth Court’s order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1736(b). Appellees asked this Court to vacate the supersede-as, but their request was denied.

During the pendency of the appeals, additional omnibus amendments to the Fiscal Code were enacted into law, which, inter alia, effectuated a repeal of the allocation formula provided in the TSA, replacing it with a funding stream dedicated solely to MAWD. See Act of July 18, 2013, P.L. 574, No. 71, §§ 14, 20(5) (“Act 71”) (adding Sections 1711-A.l through 1713-A.l of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. §§ 1711-A.1-1713-A.1, and repealing Sections 303, 306, and 307 of the TSA, 35 P.S. §§ 5701.303, 5701.306-5701.307). The result is to formally displace adultBasic funding within the terms of the TSA itself. See id. In light of these amendments, Appellees renewed their request for relief from the supersedeas, which was again denied.

Presently, Appellants’ lead argument remains that specific admonitions by the Legislature within the terms of the TSA itself—namely, that funding to adultBasic was conditional and nothing in the TSA provisions establishing the program was intended to establish an entitlement or support a claim against the Commonwealth—foreclose Appellees’ challenges in their entirety. Appellants dismiss the Commonwealth Court majority’s explanation for the non-entitlement language, in which the majority posited that the provision was intended to address the program’s sunset upon the full consummation of the tobacco settlement arrangement, as being entirely extra-statutory. See Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 33 (“As Judge Simpson correctly observed, the statutory text does not even ‘hint that non-entitlement begins in 2025.’ ” (quoting Sears, 49 A.3d at 488 (Simpson, J., dissenting))). Rather, it is Appellants’ position that the plain language of the TSA conveys the General Assembly’s anticipation of, and accounting for, the possibility for future shifts among fiscal priorities. Furthermore, like Judge Simpson, Appellants regard the majority’s distinction between challenging a redirection of funds and laying a claim to the same funds as illusory.

Even if this were not the case, Appellants observe, Appel-lees’ action cannot possibly result either in the reestablishment of the adultBasic program or the reinstatement of the funding stream for the program contained in the original 2001 enactment, since adultBasic ceased operations four years ago. Moreover, they stress, the TSA’s original funding formula has since been repealed by the General Assembly, and any sought-after relief in the form of reimbursement is barred by the doctrines of Sovereign Immunity and Speech or Debate Immunity. Accord Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 14 (referencing the passage of Act 71 in 2013, after which “there is no longer any statutory mechanism for funding of adultBa-sic”); Brief for the Executive Appellants at 47 (“Enjoining the enforcement of the adultBasic provisions today has no practical meaning or effect, as there is nothing left to enforce.”). For the above reasons, the Legislative Appellants couch Ap-pellees’ action as both “meritless and pointless.” Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 8.

The Legislative Appellants also urge this Court to resolve the ease on such basis as to avoid “plung[ing] into the thorny bramble of constitutional procedure otherwise presented here.” Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 25; accord id. at 35 (“Because [Appellees] have no entitlement to adultBasic benefits or Commonwealth funds, the Court should exercise judicial restraint and decline to opine on the academic constitutional questions regarding Acts 46 and 26.”). In this regard, the Legislative Appellants invoke the maxim that difficult constitutional questions should be avoided if another avenue for disposition is present. See, e.g., MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. PUC, 577 Pa. 294, 311, 844 A.2d 1239, 1249 (2004) (“The ‘canon of constitutional avoidance’ provides that when a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.” (citations omitted)). Additionally, they highlight the Commonwealth Court’s determinations applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Speech and Debate Clause. According to the Legislative Appellants, havoc would result were this Court to disturb the practice of employing omnibus-style amendments to the Fiscal Code to implement the Commonwealth’s budget. They relate that “[t]his is a matter of deep concern not only to the General Assembly, but also to the People of the Commonwealth, who rely on a government funded by these laws amending the Fiscal Code each and every day.” Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 27.

Along these lines, the Legislative Appellants explain that Acts 46 and 26 did much more than simply allocate tobacco settlement monies, in that such enactments implemented the Commonwealth budgets for the applicable fiscal years and provided for a host of other fiscal matters. Given such breadth of applicability, the Legislative Appellants reiterate that “budgetary chaos could erupt throughout the Commonwealth,” should Appellees’ position be sustained. See id. at 39. According to the Legislative Appellants:

Such potential unintended consequences only reinforce the public policies that underlie the Legislative Immunity and Sovereign Immunity doctrines, all of which require that the Court exercise restraint from interfering with the legislative, budgetary, and policy decisions and activities of the coordinate Branches of government.
The overwhelming gravity of these weighty constitutional issues, along with the potential for disastrous, unintended consequences, should give this Court great pause before delving into the domains of the Legislative and Executive branches that have been entrusted to them by the People, through the Constitution.

Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 39; cf. Brief for the Executive Appellants at 31 (“Taking the omnibus bill and dividing it into a vast sea of smaller bills, all of which would need to be passed at the same time, would likely increase the chance of confusion and obfuscation by scattering the amendments across multiple pieces of legislation.”). In a similar vein, the Executive Appellants also raise justiciability concerns under the political-question doctrine. See Brief for the Executive Appellants at 54 (“[T]he appropriation of Commonwealth funds is vested in the legislature and any challenges to its decisions in that regard are non-justiciable political questions based on the separation of powers.” (footnote and citations omitted)).

Should this Court reach the merits, it is Appellants’ position that Acts 46 and 26 each had a unifying subject, namely, implementation of the Commonwealth’s operating budget. According to the Legislative Appellants, “[b]ecause the Commonwealth’s budget touches all corners of the Commonwealth, impacting virtually every aspect of governmental, commercial, and day-to-day life in Pennsylvania, it is of course necessary for the Fiscal Code enactments to address a multitude of different programs, initiatives, objectives, special funds, agencies, and other matters.” Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 45.

Appellees, on the other hand, contend that the “entitlement” language of Section 1303(a) has no bearing on their standing to pursue judicial redress. In this respect, Appellees emphasize that the primary source of funds for adultBasic was tobacco settlement monies, which Appellees appear to distinguish from “funds of the Commonwealth,” as to which the TSA indicated they have no claim. See Brief for Appellees at 35 (“[T]he subsidy is to be obtained from Tobacco Settlement proceeds, not ‘from the Commonwealth.’ ”).

Appellees also maintain the distinction, adopted by the Commonwealth Court majority, between challenging a redirection of monies and laying a claim to the same funds. See, e.g., id. at 37-38 (“[A]ppellees are not claiming that the benefits provided by the adultBasic program were an unconditional entitlement from the Commonwealth. Rather, they are challenging how the General Assembly took away funding for a program that the Tobacco Act mandated was to be funded by Tobacco Settlement money.”). On this subject, Appellees also fault Appellants for “conflat[ing] specific laws relating to entitlement programs with the more fundamental question of legal standing.” Brief for Appellees at 36-37; see also id. at 37 (“For the [Appellants], the words of Section 5701.1303(c), to the effect that adultBasic is not an entitlement program, have a talismanic power that immunizes the General Assembly’s actions relating to the administration of the Tobacco Settlement Fund from judicial oversight.”).

In terms of standing, Appellees observe that, in William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975), the Court explained that, while there have been iterations of the litmus suggesting the requirement of a legal right, “this test proved unsatisfactory, and has now been generally discarded.” See id. at 200, 346 A.2d at 285 (footnotes and citations omitted). Under the prevailing standard, Appellees explain, a party is aggrieved when his interest is direct, substantial and immediate, with the Court defining these terms as follows:

A party has a substantial interest in the outcome of litigation if his interest exceeds that of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law. The interest is direct if there is a causal connection between the asserted violation and the harm complained of; it is immediate if that causal connection is not remote or speculative.

City of Phila., 575 Pa. at 560, 838 A.2d at 577 (footnotes and citations omitted). Here, Appellees contend that their interest is substantial because their health insurance was lost; the interest is direct since, in absence of the challenged Fiscal Code amendments, they believe the adultBasic program would have retained funding; and it is immediate in light of the direct pecuniary harm they suffered.

Appellees’ central position is that Acts 46 and 26 reflect “the precise type of legislation that Article III, § 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was intended to prevent—omnibus bills containing a mixture of distinct and independent subjects which will not be subject to the enhanced scrutiny a single-topic bill would undergo.” Brief for Appellees at 20. Appel-lees’ contention, on this point, is that Acts 46 and 26 “deal with virtually every aspect of life in Pennsylvania, certainly encompassing all levels of state and local government and all who interact with or are governed by them.” Id. at 24; cf. supra note 15. Furthermore, Appellees highlight the understanding, on the part of this Court, that “it would be a serious dereliction on our part to deliberately ignore a clear constitutional violation.” Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, 178, 507 A.2d 323, 333 (1986).

Appellee Weisblatt, in his capacity as the cross-appellant, has filed a separate set of briefs arguing in favor of retrospective monetary relief.

At the outset, we observe that these appeals raise substantial justiciability concerns. Under Article VIII, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the General Assembly is charged with the obligation to adopt a capital budget for each fiscal year. See Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 13. The process obviously entails a myriad of difficult policy decisions, among competing interests, in determining fiscal priorities and attendant allocations. Adoption of a budget, of course, would be a hollow act in the absence of an implementing mechanism, here, the Fiscal Code. Accordingly, the Legislature urges that it is a matter of necessity that it proceed via omnibus-style amendments to amend the Fiscal Code, as part of the annual budget process.

Given the impact on many and varied interests, see, e.g., supra note 15, the omnibus approach facially appears to test the limits of the practical germaneness litmus which this Court conventionally applies to assess single-subject challenges. Moreover, without any limitations whatsoever, the practice would seem to be susceptible to the “logrolling” concern underlying Article III, Section 3's single-subject requirement. Accordingly, in an appropriate case, we may be required to determine whether judicial intervention is possible and/or appropriate and, if so, what may be the appropriate standards.

Nevertheless, we agree with Appellants and Judge Simpson that the appeals presently before us are not such cases. In the absence of a constitutionally-recognized, individual interest, the Legislature may sanction judicial redress or foreclose it. Cf. Weaver v. Harpster, 601 Pa. 488, 517, 975 A.2d 555, 572 (2009) (“[I]t is not the role of this Court to create a private cause of action where the General Assembly has decided not to create a right or a remedy[.]”); Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 557 Pa. 340, 348, 733 A.2d 623, 627 (1999) (“This court will not engraft a private cause of action onto the statute without further guidance from the General Assembly.”). In terms of adultBasic, from the outset, the Legislature expressed the manifest intention that subscribers should have no claim against Commonwealth funds. See 35 P.S. § 5701.1303(c). The Commonwealth Court, then, should not have permitted the legislative and executive branches to be haled into court based upon such prohibited claims. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 Yale J. on Reg. 297, 308 (1996) (“[Entitlements versus non-entitlements programs are distinguished in terms of beneficiaries’ capacity to enforce their interest in the states’ fulfillment of programmatic promises.”).

The Commonwealth Court majority’s dilutions of the operative non-entitlement language—e.g., “[n]othing under this section shall constitute an entitlement derived from the Commonwealth or a claim on any funds of the Commonwealth,” 35 P.S. § 5701.1303(c)—are unpersuasive. As Judge Simpson explained, there simply is no sunset-based qualification upon these proscriptions, and it exceeds the judicial role to inject such a limitation. See, e.g., Frazier v. WCAB (Bayada Nurses, Inc.), 616 Pa. 592, 599, 52 A.3d 241, 245 (2012) (“When examining a statute, we are bound by its plain language; accordingly, we should not insert words into the [a]ct that are plainly not there.”). Moreover, funds “of the Commonwealth” plainly are at the forefront of Appellees’ claims, since the monies in issue derived from the master settlement agreement with tobacco product manufacturers, and the Commonwealth is the party-in-interest to such accord. See 35 P.S. § 5673 (defining the “Master Settlement Agreement” as an agreement between “the Commonwealth” and leading tobacco product manufacturers). Furthermore, it is the Commonwealth which received the funds, as recognized in the TSA itself. See id. § 5701.303(a) (repealed) (providing for the depositing in the Tobacco Settlement Fund of “all payments received by the Commonwealth pursuant to the Master Settlement Agreement”). Finally, like Judge Simpson, we see no material difference between making a claim on funds of the Commonwealth and challenging the redirection of such monies to other fiscal priorities. See Sears, 49 A.3d at 488 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (“By whatever name, [Appellees] seek return of funds from the Commonwealth’s General Fund back to an account where it will be available for the adultBasic program.”).

As to the underlying legislative intent, when the General Assembly pronounced that the TSA’s adultBasic provisions did not furnish a basis for a claim against Commonwealth funds, we believe that it expected that the Commonwealth should not be sued by subscribers relative to the program’s receipt of such funds. In our view, the Legislature particularly would not have thought that persons with no entitlement to make a claim on Commonwealth funds could pursue an action in a court of law bringing the entire scheme for implementing the Commonwealth budget into question. Moreover, were we to ignore the statute’s plain direction in this regard, the specter of litigation would serve as a substantial deterrent to the allocation of funding to non-entitlement programs.

Finally, we recognize that Appellees might qualify to seek judicial redress under the general principles of standing reflected in the William Penn Parking Garage decision, which recognizes as sufficient interests short of the possession of a legal claim. See William Penn Parking Garage, 464 Pa. at 202, 346 A.2d at 286. That decision, however, did not involve a scenario in which claims were explicitly prohibited by the Legislature.

In light of the absence, on Appellees part, of any entitlement to adultBasic benefits and the related statutory prohibition against the assertions of claims on funds of the Commonwealth, we hold that Appellees lacked standing to pursue the relief requested in their petitions for review.

The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and its opinions on preliminary objections and summary relief are vacated.

Former Chief Justice CASTILLE did not participate in the decision of this case.

Justices EAKIN, BAER, TODD, and STEVENS join the opinion.

      . Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 343, No. 176 (as amended 72 P.S. §§ 1-1804).

      . See generally Act of June 22, 2000, P.L. 394, No. 54 (as amended 35 P.S. §§ 5671-5675) (the "Tobacco Settlement Agreement Act”).

      . Act of June 26, 2001, P.L. 755, No. 77 (as amended 35 P.S. §§ 5701.101-5701.5103) (the "TSA”).

      . MAWD apparently received priority over adultBasic relative to tobacco settlement funds, as no particular formula was provided in the TSA for division between these two programs, but MAWD benefits are in the nature of an entitlement. See 35 P.S. § 5701.1503(c) (providing, upon the satisfaction of certain conditions specified in MAWD, that the department or its designee “shall provide to the worker medical assistance benefits” (emphasis added)).

      . See Act of June 29, 2002, P.L. 614, No. 91, § 18 (adding Section 1721-A to the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. § 1721-A (expired)); Act of July 7, 2005, P.L. 174, No. 41, § 2 (reenacting amended Section 1721-A, 72 P.S. § 1721-A (expired)); Act of July 5, 2006, P.L. 296, No. 66, § 2 (adding Section 1715-C of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. § 1715-C); Act of July 17, 2007, P.L. 141, No. 42, § 4 (adding Section 1715-G of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. § 1715-G); Act of July 4, 2008, P.L. 629, No. 53, § 8 (adding Section 1715-1 of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. § 1715-1); Act of October 9, 2009, P.L. 537, No. 50, § 5 (adding Section 1715-Kof the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. § 1715-K).

      . For a period of time beginning in 2005, some of the dissipation of funding to adultBasic was offset by subsidization from Pennsylvania’s Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans as part of their non-profit missions pursuant to the Community Health Reinvestment Agreement. See generally Act of July 5, 2006, P.L. 296, No. 66 (containing, inter alia, a superseded version of Section 1715-C(b) of the Fiscal Code); accord
        H.R. 500, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa.2011). Such agreement, however, expired in 2010. See id.

      . See generally 72 P.S. § 302 (defining the "General Fund” as "[a]ll monies received by the Treasury Department from the Department of Revenue, or from any other source, which are not by this act required to be credited to any other fund”).
      Notably, the Legislature has continued, in subsequent years, to apply similar practices of redirecting tobacco settlement monies away from the Tobacco Settlement Fund through the vehicle of omnibus amendments to the Fiscal Code. See Act of July 2, 2012, P.L. 823, No. 87, § 14 (adding Section 1715-G of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. § 1715-G), Act of July 18, 2013, P.L. 574, No. 71, §§ 14-15 (adding Sections 1711-A.l through 1713-A.l of the Fiscal Code and repealing Sections 303, 306, and 307 of the TSA, 35 P.S. §§ 5701.303, 5701.306-5701.307).

      . The Commonwealth Court has found that the adultBasic program also terminated because MAWD had been consuming an increasing portion of the tobacco settlement funds dedicated to it and adultBasic collectively, and on account of the expiration of the subsidization stream under the Community Health Reinvestment Agreement. See Sears v. Corbett, 121 & 157 M.D. 2011, slip op. at 13-14 (Pa.Cmwlth. Apr, 20, 2011) (single judge memorandum).

        . See generally Warehime v. Warehime, 580 Pa. 201, 209-10, 860 A.2d 41, 46-47 (2004) (discussing the requirements for preliminary injunc-tive relief, including the requirements that relief is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be compensated by damages).

      . The court also observed that the executive branch had advised subscribers of other available healthcare insurance alternatives. See id. at 10.

      . The Commonwealth Court majority also found that the Speech and Debate Clause found in Article II, Section 15 of the Pennsylvania Constitution foreclosed any type of judicial order directing the General Assembly to enact new legislation. See Sears, 49 A.3d at 481-82.

      . The majority opinion also disposed of various other claims advanced by Appellants. We have chosen to focus on the single-subject aspect to streamline the discussion, particularly since our disposition, below, centers on the threshold question of the impact of the TSA’s prescription that the statute simply does not form the basis for a claim.

      . The class certification aspect is not directly relevant to the present appeals and will not be discussed further.

      . See, e.g., Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 28 ("The Tobacco Settlement Act is crystal clear: the continuation of benefits under the adultBasic program is statutorily conditioned upon subsequent decisions to be made by the General Assembly and the Governor as to whether and how much to appropriate to that program.”); id. at 34 ("The only interpretation that gives full meaning to this statutory non-entitlement language is one that construes the language just as it reads: the General Assembly did not, by establishing adultBasic to provide a non-mandated and gratuitous benefit to eligible adults, create in [Appel-lees] any claim to adultBasic benefits or any claim to Commonwealth funds,”); Brief for the Executive Appellants at 55 ("Section 1303(c) specifically provides that no individual in the adultBasic program has an entitlement to benefits or permits any claim to a fund of the Commonwealth.”).

      . As examples, the Legislative Appellants reference: funding for public health and welfare, including autism services, lupus programs, breast cancer screening, arthritis outreach, children and youth programs, and county human services, see 72 P.S. §§ 1725-L, 1729-B, 1729-L; funding for volunteer fire companies and ambulance services, and for the Pennsylvania State Police, see 72 P.S. §§ 1733-B, 1733-L, 1799-E; requisitions for funding of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, 72 P.S. § 1501; grants provided by the Juvenile Court Judges Commission, see 72 P.S. § 1712-E; funding for public school education, higher education, and education for blind and deaf students, see 72 P.S. § 1722-B, 1722-L, 1738-L, 1738-E; funding for services for the blind to be administered by the Department of Labor and Industry, see 72 P.S. § 1727-L; educational tax credits for small businesses, see 'll P.S. §§ 1601-H, 1602-H (repealed); economic development, including the Neighborhood Improvement Zone Fund, Keystone Opportunity Zone, Keystone Special Development Zone, and Gaming Economic Development and Tourism Fund, see 72 P.S. §§ 1604-B (repealed), 1601-F (repealed), 1604-F (repealed), 1605-B (repealed), 1719.1-E; audits of disbursed funding, see 72 P.S. §§ 1502, 1701-0; the investment of Commonwealth monies, see 72 P.S. §§ 301.1, 505; issuance of bonds to refinance debt, see 72 P.S. § 1601-G; and creation of restricted receipt accounts for the purpose of administering federal grants, impacting justice assistance, aid to volunteer fire companies, land and water conservation, education of the disabled, library grants, homeless adult assistance, assistance to severely disabled persons, transportation for the elderly and disabled, disaster relief, and historic preservation, see 72 P.S. §§ 1716-C, 1719-M. See Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 37-38 & n. 23.

      . The Legislative Appellants also take issue with Judge Pellegrini's application of the law-of-the-case doctrine, noting, inter alia, that the principle does not operate as an inflexible command relative to decisions made at different stages of a proceeding. See Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 30 (citing Riccio v. Am. Rep. Ins. Co., 550 Pa. 254, 261, 705 A.2d 422, 425 (1997)). In any event, presumably Judge Pellegrini continued to support the substantive merits of the decision on preliminary objections, since he was a member of the en banc panel and joined the majority decision. See Sears, 49 A.3d at 468.

      . Appellees also challenge the Legislative Appellants’ standing to appeal, since the Commonwealth Court held that no relief could be awarded against them. We decline, however, to credit this position. The Sears Appellees named the houses of the General Assembly and legislative leaders as respondents in their lawsuit, and Appellees secured a judicial determination that several of the Assembly’s enactments were unconstitutional. Thus, the Legislature is a party litigant with a manifest interest in the outcome of the appeals, and we will entertain its arguments which, in any event, overlap substantially with those advanced by the Executive Appellants. As to the Executive Appellants, whose standing is challenged by the Appellee Weisblatt, they are subject to an explicit order of the Commonwealth Court requiring them to refrain from enforcing the provisions of Acts 46 and 26 and, thus, plainly are aggrieved.

      . In this regard, our present opinion is consistent with the decision in Commonwealth v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 607 Pa. 406, 8 A.3d 267 (2010). In that case, this Court recognized that the general standing principles fashioned by the judiciary may yield to the will of the General Assembly when the question is one of standing under a specific statutory regime. See Janssen, 607 Pa. at 420, 8 A.3d at 275.


text:
    118 A.3d 1105
    Seth STEINMAN, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. 56 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    July 8, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 8th day of July, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED.


text:
    118 A.3d 1105
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Justin HEARD, Petitioner.
    No. 58 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    July 8, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 8th day of July, 2015, the Petition for Leave to File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is GRANTED. Petitioner is DIRECTED to file his Petition for Allowance of Appeal within thirty days of this order.


text:
    118 A.3d 1106
    Carl ROBINSON, Petitioner v. PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, Respondent.
    No. 59 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    July 8, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 8th day of July, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief is GRANTED to the extent it seeks mandamus relief, and the common pleas court is DIRECTED to dispose of the pending petition within 90 days.


text:
    118 A.3d 1106
    Luther DRAYTON, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PHILADELPHIA, CRIMINAL DIVISION, and its President Judge, Respondent.
    No. 60 EM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    July 8, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 8th day of July, 2015, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.


text:
    118 A.3d 1106
    David KNELLER, Petitioner v. Marsha C. STEWART, Respondent.
    No. 63 MM 2015.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    July 8, 2015.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 8th day of July, 2015, as Petitioner may pursue redress in a civil action, mandamus relief is not available. See Relosky v. Sacco, 514 Pa. 339, 523 A.2d 1112 (1987) (holding that a petitioner may not obtain mandamus relief unless he establishes the absence of another adequate remedy). As such, the Petition for Review in the Nature of Mandamus is DENIED, and the Application to Disqualify Counsel is DISMISSED as moot.