author: Justice TODD.

text:
    131 A.3d 977
    FREEDOM MEDICAL SUPPLY, INC., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellant v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 9, 2015.
    Resubmitted Jan. 20, 2016.
    Decided Feb. 16, 2016.

      Marcia Mary Waldron, Esq., for United States Court of Appeals For The Third Circuit.
    Robert David Greenbaum, Esq., Robert D. Greenbaum & Associates, L.L.C., Robert Samuel Kitchenoff, Esq., Philadelphia, Weinstein Kitchenoff & Asher, L.L.C., Dean Eric Weis-gold, Esq., Dean E. Weisgold, P.C., for Freedom Medical Supply, Inc., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated.
    James T. Moughan, Esq., Philadelphia, Britt, Hankins & Moughan, Tiffany Lynne Powers, Esq., for State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice TODD.

Section 1797(a) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”) states that a provider of medical products to automobile accident victims is entitled to reimbursement from automobile insurers, and where, as here, there is no federally-determined Medicare fee for a product, reimbursement is limited to “80% of the provider’s usual and customary charge.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(a). The MVFRL does not define the phrase “usual and customary charge,” but the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance (“Department”) has promulgated regulations defining it as “[t]he charge most often made” by similarly-situated providers, 31 Pa.Code § 69.3, adding that:

In calculating the usual and customary charge, an insurer may utilize the requested payment amount on the provider’s bill for services or the data collected by the carrier or intermediaries to the extent that the data is made available.

31 Pa.Code § 69.43(c) (emphasis and footnote added). In this matter presented on certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, we consider whether this latter language requires insurers to calculate a provider’s usual and customary charge for a product predicated on the two bases provided for therein, or merely permits using those bases, among others. After careful review, we hold that it permits, but does not require, insurers to do so.

From 2010 to 2012, Appellant Freedom Medical Supply, Inc. (“Freedom”), provided electrical muscle stimulators (“EMSs”) and portable whirlpools to automobile accident victims covered by Appellee State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and/or State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (collectively, “State Farm”). Notably, although Freedom purchased these items for relatively little cost, it applied significant markups. As found by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania herein, Freedom purchased the EMSs for approximately $20 to $30 each, yet charged approximately $1,525 to $1,600 each, and purchased the whirlpools for approximately $40 each, yet charged approximately $525 each. Because neither the EMSs nor portable whirlpools have a federally-determined Medicare fee, Freedom sought reimbursement from State Farm for 80% of the foregoing charges.

State Farm, viewing Freedom’s charges as excessive, conducted its own review of the usual and customary charges for the products and used its findings therein to calculate reimbursements. As described by the district court in this matter:

First, [State Farm] conducted an individualized inquiry for each device by researching the make and model of the EMS and [w]hirlpool being dispensed. In connection with this review, [it] contacted ... providers located in the Philadelphia area to determine their prices for both products. [It] learned that EMS models for which State Farm was being billed by providers were all of a like kind and quality, and were priced similarly.
Next, [it] purchased EMS[s] and [whirlpools from providers in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia counties in Pennsylvania, and Camden and Gloucester counties in New Jersey, to determine an average price for these devices. For the EMS[s], [State Farm] based [its] average price on the purchase of five different models from ten different sellers, including internet sources, which ranged from $93.95 to $246.95. [It] then added a six percent Pennsylvania sales tax. [State Farm] concluded that the average price for the EMS is $151.10 with 80% of that charge being $120.88. For the [whirlpool, [State Farm] based [its] average price on the purchase of devices from eight different providers, with prices ranging from $54.79 to $106.65. Again, [it] added a six percent Pennsylvania sales tax. [State Farm] determined that the average price for the [whirlpool is $97.19, with 80% of that charge being $77,75.
Beginning in June 2010, State Farm began paying [Freedom] $120.88 and $77.75 respectively as the reimbursable amount for the EMS and [whirlpool, which is 80% of the usual and customary charge for each device based on [State Farm’s] research and calculations.

Freedom, Medical Supply, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2014 WL 626430 at *2 (E.D.Pa. filed Feb. 18, 2014) (citations omitted).

On February 3, 2012, Freedom filed a class action on behalf of itself and similarly-situated providers in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, arguing, as pertinent herein, that State Farm had violated the MVFRL and 31 Pa.Code § 69.43 because its calculation of Freedom’s reimbursements was not predicated on either of the two bases provided for in the regulation: (1) Freedom’s requested payment amount on its bill for services; or (2) data collected by the carrier or intermediaries. State Farm removed the case to United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where it argued that Section 69.43(c) merely permitted it to make a calculation predicated on the bases provided for therein, but did not require it to do so, so long as its calculation was consistent with the MVFRL’s other provisions and Section 69.3’s definition of the “usual and customary charge” for a product.

Ultimately, the district court agreed with State Farm, and granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment on that basis. See Freedom Medical Supply, supra. Observing that no Pennsylvania court had yet determined whether Section 69.43(c) was permissive or mandatory, the court found the regulation’s plain language demonstrated that it was permissive. Specifically, the District Court found that the Department’s use of “may,” rather than “shall,” in the last clause of Section 69.43(c) clearly imparted discretion on an insurer as to whether or not to make its calculation of usual and customary-charges predicated on the bases provided for therein:

Since the word “may” is not synonymous with the word “shall,” which would make the use of one of the two methods mandatory, under a plain reading of Section 69.43, State Farm is permitted to use one of the two methods noted, but it is not required to do so. Rather, State Farm has the option to look to other provisions of the Pennsylvania Code for guidance on what is a “usual and customary charge,” and is not restricted to the two means provided in Section 69.43.

Id. at *5.

Freedom appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which, noting that no Pennsylvania court or agency has addressed the question, sought to certify it to this Court. We granted certification to answer the following question:

May an insurer use methods not specifically identified in [the MVFRL] to calculate the “usual and customary” charge for devices and services not listed on the Medicare Fee Schedule for purposes of determining the amount to be paid to providers of those devices and services?

Freedom Medical Supply, Inc. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., - A.3d -, 6 EM 2015 (Pa. filed Mar. 9, 2015) (order). Because the certified question is one of statutory and regulatory interpretation, a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Bowling v. Office of Open Records, 621 Pa. 133, 75 A.3d 453, 466 (2013).

We begin our inquiry with a brief history of recent Pennsylvania law as it pertains to the scope of a medical product provider’s entitlement to reimbursement from insurers under our motor vehicle insurance laws. In 1974, the General Assembly supplanted the extant system of providing medical treatment via a fault-based insurance system, enacting the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (“No-Fault Act”), Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176. The General Assembly declared the Act’s purpose as establishing “at reasonable cost to the purchaser of insurance, a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims.” Id. § 102(b). Pursuant to the No-Fault Act, automobile accident victims were entitled to a certain level of coverage for “[allowable expense,” defined as “reasonable charges incurred for, or the reasonable value of’ “reasonably needed” medical and rehabilitative care. Id. §§ 103, 202. Thus, under the No-Fault Act, costs of medical products were reimbursable to providers by no-fault insurance only where their services were “reasonably needed and used” for medical purposes and only to the degree the providers’ charges were “reasonable.” Id.

In 1984, however, the General Assembly repealed the No-Fault Act and replaced it with the first version of the MVFRL, Act of Feb. 12, 1984, P.L. 26, No. 11 § 3, as amended by Act of Feb. 12, 1984, P.L. 53, No. 12 (codified at 75 Pa.C.8. §§ 1701 et seq.). The MVFRL abandoned the term “allowable expense” in favor of the term “[mjedical benefit,” defined as “[a]ll reasonable and necessary expenses for medical treatment and rehabilitative services, including, but not limited to ... medical supplies.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1712(1) (1984). Additionally, the MVFRL provided that a provider “shall not make a charge for ... products ... in excess of the amount” it “customarily charges for like ... products ... in cases involving no insurance.” Id. § 1797(a) (1984). Thus, in repealing the No-Fault Act and enacting the first version of the MVFRL, the General Assembly retained the requirement that a provider’s products be reasonably necessary and reasonably priced, and further provided that a provider could not charge a higher price under the MVFRL than it did on the open market.

Finally, in 1990, the General Assembly enacted a series of amendments to the MVFRL commonly referred to as “Act 6,” Act of Feb. 7, 1990, P.L. 11, No. 6, amending Section 1712(1) to redefine “medical benefit” as follows:

Subject to the limitations of section 1797 (relating to customary charges for treatment), coverage to provide for reasonable and necessary medical treatment and rehabilitative services, including ... medical supplies.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1712(1) (1990). Moreover, Act 6 modified Section 1797(a) into its current form, which reads as follows:

§ 1797. Customary charges for treatment
(a) General rule.—A person or institution providing ... products ... to an injured person ... shall not ... request ... payment for the ... products ... in excess of ... 110% of the applicable fee schedule ... or the provider’s usual and customary charge, whichever is less. The General Assembly finds that the reimbursement allowances applicable in the Commonwealth under the Medicare program are an appropriate basis to calculate payment for ... products ... for injuries.... Future changes or additions to Medicare allowances are applicable under this section. If the commissioner determines that an allowance under the Medicare program is not reasonable, he may adopt a different allowance by regulation, which allowance shall be applied against the percentage limitation in this subsection. If a ... fee schedule ... has not been calculated under the Medicare program for a particular ... product ... the amount of the payment may not exceed 80% of the provider’s usual and customary charge.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(a) (emphasis added). As referred to above, the MVFRL does not define the term “usual and customary charge.” See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1702. However, the Department promulgated a regulation defining that term as “[t]he charge most often made by providers of similar training, experience and licensure for a specific ... product or service in the geographic area where the ... product or service is provided.” 31 Pa.Code § 69.3. Furthermore, Section 69.43(c) provides:

An insurer shall pay the provider’s usual and customary charge for services rendered when the charge is less than 110% of the Medicare payment or a different allowance as may be determined under § 69.12(b) (relating to exemption from payment limitations). An insurer shall pay 80% of the provider’s usual and customary charge for services rendered if no Medicare payment exists. In calculating the usual and customary charge, an insurer may utilize the requested payment amount on the provider’s bill for services or the data collected by the carrier or intermediaries to the extent that the data is made available.

31 Pa.Code § 69.43(c) (emphasis added).

Against this backdrop, the parties’ arguments are relatively straightforward. As a textual matter, and in contrast to the district court’s view, Freedom argues that Section 69.43(c) provides an either/or proposition: that reimbursements must be calculated either on the basis of a provider’s requested amount in its bill or on the basis of data from the carrier or intermediaries. It contends that reading Section 69.43 as merely permitting calculations predicated on these bases, but not excluding others that might otherwise comply with the MVFRL and Section 69.3, renders Section 69.43(c)’s language mere surplusage. Furthermore, Freedom submits that the General Assembly, in enacting Act 6, sought to depart from the uncertainty of assessing a provider’s charges for “reasonableness,” as under earlier statutes, and to replace it with “an objective method:” “[treatments for which a price is found on the Medicare fee schedule are to be reimbursed at 110% of the Medicare fee schedule amount, and Non-Medicare Treatments are reimbursed at ‘80% of the provider’s usual and customary charge.’ ” Freedom’s Brief at 5 (quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(a)). Freedom suggests that, unless that objective method prevails, insurers will be able to engage in flawed and/or bad faith calculations of reimbursements, and providers will lack the certainty the legislature sought to provide. Freedom asserts that State Farm’s calculations herein are evidence of such phenomenon, noting that its calculations led it to pay “11 different amount[s] to providers” for the subject medical products between June 2010 and January 2011, and that its reimbursement amounts counteract what it deems the MVFRL’s purpose in creating “non-volatile pricing” of medical products. Freedom’s Brief at 23.

State Farm, by contrast, argues that Section 69.43(c) merely illustrates two possible methods of calculation. State Farm claims that the term “may” imparts discretion, particularly in contrast to the Department’s use of “shall” in Section 69.43(e)’s two earlier clauses. In any event, State Farm contends that interpreting Section 69.43(c) as merely illustrative furthers the MVFRL’s goals of providing coverage to automobile accident victims and containing insurance costs. State Farm’s Brief at 19-20 (citing Sturkie v. Erie Ins. Co., 407 Pa.Super. 117, 595 A.2d 152 (1991) (noting the MVFRL’s primary aim is providing coverage to injured claimants); Pittsburgh Neurosurgery Assocs., Inc. v. Danner, 733 A.2d 1279 (Pa.Super.1999) (noting the MVFRL’s goal of containing automobile insurance costs)). State Farm submits that the potential for insurance industry chicanery is relatively low insofar as insurers must still comply with Section 69.3’s definition of “usual and customary charge”—specifically, “[t]he charge most often made by providers of similar training, experience and licensure for a specific ... product or service in the geographic area where the ... product or service is provided.” 31 Pa.Code § 69.3. Finally, State Farm notes that a ruling that Section 69.43 provides mandatory methods for reimbursement calculation could permit providers of products for which no Medicare fee applies, and for which no Medicare data has been collected, to engage in price gouging by requiring insurers to pay whatever amount such providers have billed.

The object of statutory and regulatory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); id. § 1502(a)(1)(ii) (providing that the Statutory Construction Act applies to “[ejvery document codified in the Pennsylvania Code except legislative, judicial, and home rule charter documents”).

Because “[gjenerally, the best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute,” Com., Ofc. of Governor v. Donahue, 626 Pa. 437, 98 A.3d 1223, 1237 (2014), we begin by considering the plain language of the statutes or regulations at issue. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”); id. § 1502(a)(1)(ii). In determining whether the language of the statutes and regulations is clear or ambiguous, we construe words and phrases “according to their common and approved usage” or, as appropriate, according to their “peculiar and appropriate” or statutorily provided meanings. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903.

With regard to whether Section 69.43(c) permits or requires calculations of reimbursement be predicated on one of the two bases provided therein, we find the regulations at issue reasonably capable of both constructions offered by the parties. Although, as the district court reasoned, the word “may,” as used in Section 69.43(c), clearly imparts discretion, the parties’ dispute concerns the objects of that discretion. Freedom contends State Farm has the discretion to choose between the provided bases. State Farm, on the other hand, contends it has the discretion, at its option, to choose one of those bases, or others. It notes, as the district court apprehended, that the Department could clearly have used the term “shall,” as it did in the prior two clauses of Section 69.43, to unambiguously require State Farm to use one of the two bases provided for in Section 69.43, but did not. Nevertheless, the Department’s use of “may” to confer discretion does not definitively detail the scope of that discretion, and nothing in the statutes or regulations at issue affirmatively forecloses either party’s construction, as we find both to be reasonable views as to what Section 69.43 provides. Thus, as the language is reasonably capable of either construction, we find that it is ambiguous in this regard. Accord Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County, 626 Pa. 563, 93 A.3d 806, 814 (2014).

Where statutory or regulatory language is ambiguous, this Court may resolve the ambiguity by considering, inter alia, the following: the occasion and necessity for the statute or regulation; the circumstances under which it was enacted; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained; the former law, if any, including other statutes or regulations upon the same or similar subjects; the consequences of a particular interpretation; and administrative interpretations of such statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). In doing so, we liberally construe statutes and regulations “to effect their objects and promote justice,” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c), and we presume to be erroneous any interpretation that leads to an absurd or unreasonable result, or which renders the statute ineffective or uncertain, or which favors private interests over the public interest, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1922(1), (4), and (5).

In our view, State Farm’s argument is more persuasive. As an initial matter, we note that, since the General Assembly adopted the No-Fault Act, the law in this area consistently implicated two major policy goals: providing coverage for injured persons and providing it at a reasonable cost to the purchaser. See No-Fault Act, § 102(b) (“[I]t is hereby declared to be the policy of the General Assembly to establish at reasonable cost to the purchaser of insurance, a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims.”); see also Pittsburgh Neurosurgery Assocs., Inc., 733 A.2d at 1282 (noting that Act 6 and its amendments to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(a) were intended to contain medical costs so as to reduce the rising cost of purchasing motor vehicle insurance “and the resultant increase in the number of uninsured motorists driving on public highways” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Contrary to these aims, Freedom’s suggested interpretation of Section 69.43 as providing exclusive methods of calculating reimbursements would permit providers of medical goods and services not contained on a Medicare fee schedule or the subject of the Medicare contractors’ data to set their prices and seek reimbursement for essentially any amount they choose to bill. See 31 Pa.Code § 69.43(c) (providing that an insurer “may utilize the requested payment amount” or carrier data). That is, in the absence of a Medicare fee schedule or carrier data, an insurer would have no other option other than relying on the provider’s bill. In our view, such a result could lead to the unjustified inflation of charges for medical products, exhausting accident victims’ coverage limits, and potentially depriving them of benefits for further necessary medical expenses, as well as increasing automobile insurance rates. In this regard, we find Freedom’s interpretation beneficial to a few private interests to the detriment of the public interest, contrary to our rules of construction. Cf. 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1921(c), 1922(1), (4), and (5).

Freedom’s interpretation is also inconsistent with the Department’s definition, in Section 69.3, of “usual and customary charge” as the “charge most often made” by similar providers. As noted, under Freedom’s construction of Section 69.43(c), in the absence of a Medicare fee or carrier data, reimbursements would have to be calculated based on the particular provider’s bill. Of course, a particular provider’s bill may be well below or well above the charge most often made by similarly-situated providers in the geographic region. Accordingly, the only way to bring Section 69.3 and Section 69.43(c) into harmony is to read the latter as permitting insurers to “utilize” the provider’s bill or data from the carrier as a relevant, but not controlling, measure of the appropriate “usual and customary charge” for the product at issue.

Freedom’s statutory history argument is also unpersuasive. As an initial matter, although Freedom appears to be correct that the legislature’s adoption of Act 6 signaled a move from calculating reimbursements based on a general “reasonableness” inquiry toward one based on more objectively verifiable data, it does not follow that it potentially mandated an assessment based on whatever providers deemed an appropriate amount to bill. Indeed, although Act 6 adopted some degree of reliance on federally-provided Medicare standards (where such standards exist), nothing in the text or purpose of Act 6 indicates that, in the absence of those standards, it sought to leave insurers at the whim of providers. Indeed, the General Assembly’s use of the language “usual and customary,” in Section 1797, suggests that market data and industry custom will come to bear on the appropriate amount of reimbursement.

Finally, we find dubious Freedom’s proposition that permitting insurers to conduct a review of market data in calculating reimbursements will lead to insurance industry chicanery and market uncertainty. As State Farm notes, even if it is not bound to calculate reimbursements predicated on the bases provided in Section 69.43(c), it must nevertheless comply with the remainder of the MVFRL and the Department’s regulations, including Section 69.3. In any event, given the effects of interpreting Section 69.43(c) as potentially granting providers the right to set their own rates of reimbursement, we find Freedom’s insurer manipulation concern of minor weight in comparison.

In light of the foregoing, and in answer to the question submitted, we hold that Section 69.43(c) permits, but does not require, that reimbursements be calculated predicated on the provider’s bill for services or the data collected by the carrier.

Question answered. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Chief Justice SAYLOR, Justices BAER, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY and WECHT join the opinion.

      . 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701 et seq.

      . The ''carrier” is not an insurance carrier, but, rather, an organization that contracts with the federal Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA”) to process Medicare Part B claims, and the "intermediaries” are organizations that contract with the FICFA to process Medicare Part A claims. 31 Pa.Code § 69.3. These federal contractors collect data "on Medicare procedure codes and Medicare payments,” which insurers may obtain at cost. See 31 Pa.Code § 69.41. The HCFA is now known as the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. See https:// www.cms.gov.

      . Freedom also argued that State Farm's methodology otherwise violated the MVFRL and 31 Pa.Code § 69.3’s definition of the "usual and customary charge" for a product on the ground that State Farm had selectively excluded certain similarly-situated providers who had similar charges for the products and had improperly included non-similarly-situated providers who had significantly lower charges for the products. Freedom further contended State Farm’s conduct in this regard constituted negligence.

      . The district court also found that State Farm's methodology did not otherwise violate the MVFRL and Section 69.3 or constitute negligence. Specifically, the court found that State Farm had properly considered market data in the Greater Philadelphia area and arrived at an average market price for the products at issue. Id. at *5-9.

      . Freedom also argues that the Department’s interpretation of Section 1797(a) via Section 69.43 was upheld by the Commonwealth Court in Hospital Ass'n, Inc. v. Foster, 157 Pa.Cmwlth. 363, 629 A.2d 1055 (1993), and that "[e]mbedded in the ... interpretation is the determination that the charge most often made by similar providers was to be established by an independent entity—the Medicare contractor. Had it been appropriate for the insurance company to make the determination, it would not have established the carrier’s data as the alternative to the specific billed amount.” Freedom’s Brief at 11. Freedom’s argument in this regard is question-begging: the Department’s intent in promulgating Section 69.43—i.e„ what is “embedded” in its interpretation—was not addressed in Foster and is the open question before this Court.

      . We note that, although Freedom’s argument is relevant in considering the proper interpretation of Section 69.43, the validity of State Farm’s methodology and the legality of its payments are not before this Court.

      . Although we note, as detailed supra, that Freedom has applied an exorbitant markup in its charges for the EMSs and portable whirlpools at issue herein, given the procedural posture of this case and the purely legal nature of the certified question before us, the propriety of this markup is not before us.

      . As noted supra, the question of whether State Farm has abided by the remaining provisions of the MVFRL, and particularly Section 69.3’s definition of "usual and customary charge,” is not before this Court, and we offer no view as to whether State Farm has done so,


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    131 A.3d 985
    Gregory ROBINSON, Appellant v. Superintendant HUNTINGDON and Department of Corrections, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 16, 2016.
    Gregory Robinson, Huntingdon, pro se.
    Theron Richard Perez, Maria Gerarda Macus, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Mechanicsburg, for Superinten-dant Huntingdon and Department of Corrections.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of February 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    131 A.3d 986
    Dwayne HILL, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 16, 2016.
    Dwayne Hill, Bellefonte, pro se.
    Suzanne Noelle Hueston, Raymond W. Dorian, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Mechanicsburg, for Department of Corrections.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of February, 2016, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    131 A.3d 986
    Harry DARBY, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 16, 2016.

      Harry Darby, Frackville, pro se.
    John Jason Talaber, Barbara L. Christie, Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, Harrisburg, for Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of February, 2016, the order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    131 A.3d 987
    Sehu-Kessa-Saa TABANSI, a/k/a Alfonso Percy Pew # BT-7263 Mental Health Inmate Stability Code C in propria personam/pro se, Appellant v. Warden: John KERESTES, Governor: Tom Corbett, Attorney General: Kathleen Kane, Secretary of Corrections: John E. Wetzel, Executive Deputy Secretary: Shirley Moore-Smeal, Regional Deputy Secretary: Klopotowsky, Reverend Joanne Turma, Priest Chutta Deputy Superintendent: Vuksta, Deputy Superintendent: Beggs Correctional Classifications Program Manager: MacKnight, Major Michael Damcre, Captain Lencovich, Lieutenant Butts, Lieutenant Wagner, Co. Batchert, Librarian Hesse, Unit Manager: Tobias, Counselor: Hoanungs, Unknown Kitchen Stewart: Jane Doe, Dietician Margaret Gerdon, Dietician Marcia Noles, Hearing Examiner Luquis, Program Review Committee: Ms. DeSanti, Ms. Griffin, Mr. Keller, Chief Grievance Coordinator Sogia: Ms. Dorina Varner, Chief Hearing Examiner: Ms. Robin Lewis, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Officials, Business Office Dorzinsky, Correctional Industries Ralph Eckly, Records Supervisor David Morgan, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 16, 2016.
    Alfonso Percy Pew, Camp Hill, pro se.
    Theron Richard Perez, Jeffrey M. Paladina, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Mechanicsburg, for Co. Batchert, Deputy Superintendent Beggs, Lieutenant Butts, Priest Chut-ta, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Officials, Tom Corbett, Major Michael Damcre, Ms. DeSanti, Jane Doe, Business Office Dorzinsky, Ralph Eckly, Margaret Gerdon, Ms. Griffin, Librarian Hesse, Counselor Hoanungs, Kathleen Kane, Mr. Keller, John Kerestes, Regional Deputy Secretary Klopotow-sky, Captain Lencovich, Robin Lewis, Hearing Examiner Lu-quis, Correctional Classifications Program Manager Mack-night, David Morgan, Marcia Noles, Shirley Moore-Smeal, Chief Grievance Coordinator Sogia, Unit Manager Tobias, Joanne Turma, Unknown Kitchen Stewart, Dorina Varner, Deputy Superintendent Vuksta, Lieutenant Wagner, John E. Wetzel.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of February, 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    131 A.3d 988
    Routha ROUSSAW, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 16, 2016.
    Routha Roussaw, Dallas, pro se.
    Timothy Paul Keating, Howard Greeley Hopkirk, Kenneth Lawson Joel, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of February, 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    132 A.3d 454
    Sean Lavelle BARLEY, Appellant v. Wayne J. GAVIN and Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 16, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of February 2016, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    132 A.3d 454
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Tyrone LOWE, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Nov. 12, 2015.
    Decided Feb. 16, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of February, 2016, the appeal is dismissed as having been IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    132 A.3d 454
    In re Kelly S. BALLENTINE, Magisterial District Judge District Court 02-2-01 Second Judicial District Lancaster County. Appeal of Kelly S. Ballentine, Magisterial District Judge.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 16, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of February 2016, the Order of the Court of Judicial Discipline is AFFIRMED.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    132 A.3d 455
    William Taylor REIL, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and its Bureau of Driver Licensing Leslie Richards, Secretary, Kara N. Templeton, Director of BDL, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Feb. 16, 2016.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of February, 2016, Appellant’s Notice and Demand for Oral Argument is DENIED, and the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.

Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


author: Justice EAKIN. Chief Justice SAYLOR,

text:
    132 A.3d 946
    CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD to the use of KEYSTONE HEALTH PLAN EAST, INC., Appellee. City of Philadelphia, Appellant v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the Use of Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., Appellee. City of Philadelphia, Appellant v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the use of QCC Insurance Company, Appellee. City of Philadelphia, Appellant v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the use of QCC Insurance Company, Appellee. City of Philadelphia, Appellant v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the Use of Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., Appellee. City of Philadelphia, Appellant v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the Use of Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., Appellee. City of Philadelphia, Appellant v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the Use of QCC Insurance Company, Appellee. City of Philadelphia, Appellant v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the use of QCC Insurance Company, Appellee. City of Philadelphia, Appellee v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the Use of Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., Appellant. City of Philadelphia, Appellee v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the Use of Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., Appellant. City of Philadelphia, Appellee v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the Use of QCC Insurance Company, Appellant. City of Philadelphia, Appellee v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the Use of QCC Insurance Company, Appellant. City of Philadelphia, Appellee v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the use of Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., Appellant. City of Philadelphia, Appellee v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the Use of Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., Appellant. City of Philadelphia, Appellee v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the use of QCC Insurance Company, Appellant. City of Philadelphia, Appellee v. City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board to the use of QCC Insurance Company, Appellant.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued March 10, 2015.
    Decided Dec. 21, 2015.

      Craig R. Gottlieb, Esq., City of Philadelphia Law Department, for City of Philadelphia.
    Stewart M. Weintraub, Esq., Jennifer Lauren Weidler, Esq., Chamberlain Hrdieka Attorneys At Law, for Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., QCC Insurance Company and City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board.

      SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
   OPINION

Justice EAKIN.

These cross-appeals involve tax credits and refunds for overpayments of the City of Philadelphia’s Business Privilege Tax (BPT). The City appeals from the Commonwealth Court’s decision affirming the award of credits to Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., and QCC Insurance Company (collectively, Taxpayers), who appeal from the same decision affirming the denial of their refund requests.

In 1985, pursuant to the First Class City Business Tax Reform Act, 53 P.S. §§ 16181-16193, the City enacted the BPT, which taxes the gross receipts and net income of every person engaged in business within the City. Phila. Code § 19-2603. Under Philadelphia Code § 19-2601, “person” includes corporations and “business” is defined as “[cjarrying on or exercising for gain or profit ... any trade, business, ... or commercial activity[.]” Id. As with federal income taxes, a tax return and payment are to be filed by April 15, which payment reflects the tax due for the prior year, less estimates and credits. Also due that date is an estimated tax payment for the year ahead. See BPT Regulations (BPTR) § 202A; Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/12, at 2.

Taxpayers, subsidiaries of Independence Blue Cross, engaged in business in the City and paid the BPT tax for years 2003 and 2004, in April 2004 and 2005, respectively; they received extensions and filed the actual BPT returns for those years in September 2004 and 2005, respectively. In accordance with Philadelphia Code § 19-2601, Taxpayers calculated their net income using their federal taxable income, commonly referred to as Method II. Id., Net Income (a)(2); see also BPTR § 404(1)(a). In 2008, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited the federal tax returns of Independence Blue Cross and its subsidiaries, including Taxpayers. The audit was concluded in February 2009, and revealed Taxpayers understated their deductions, and thus overstated their net income, for tax years 2003 and 2004. As required by BPTR § 205, Taxpayers filed amended BPT returns, collectively requesting approximately $6.5 million in refunds. See id. (requiring taxpayer using federal method to file amended return within 75 days of “final determination of corrected net income” by IRS).

The Philadelphia Department of Revenue agreed Taxpayers overpaid their taxes, but denied the refund requests as untimely, citing Philadelphia Code § 19—1703(l)(d), which provides:

Every petition for refund of moneys collected by the Department on or after January 1,1980, for or on behalf of the City or the School District of Philadelphia, including but not limited to any tax, ... shall be filed with the Department within S years from the date of payment to the City or the School District of Philadelphia or the due date, whichever is later.

Id. (emphasis added).

Taxpayers appealed to the Philadelphia Tax Review Board, arguing the net income corrections effectively reset § 19-1703(l)(d)’s “due date” since they had 75 days from the completion of the IRS audit to file the amended returns. The Review Board rejected Taxpayers’ argument, determining “due date” referred to the date the returns were initially due—April 15, 2004 and 2005, respectively. Tax Review Board Decision, 4/11/12, at 3-4. Notwithstanding this denial of refunds, the Review Board, sua sponte, awarded Taxpayers credits for their overpayments. Specifically, the Review Board concluded that because Philadelphia Code § 19-2610 requires the Department to establish regulations for credits “to be granted on any overpayment of estimated tax payment,” the Department was required to credit Taxpayers for overpayments for tax years 2003 and 2004. Tax Review Board Decision, 4/11/12, at 5 (quoting Phila. Code § 19-2610). Functionally, this meant Taxpayers received credits equal to their requested refunds. See N.T. Hearing, 12/29/11, at 8-11.

The trial court affirmed the Review Board’s decision. The court agreed Taxpayers’ refund requests were untimely but, unlike the Review Board, determined “due date” referred to the payment due date rather than the filing due date, finding § 19-1703(1)(d) was unambiguous because it did not mention returns. Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/12, at 6. While filing deadlines could be extended, and were here, the payment deadline remained April 15. The court further concluded no equitable exception to the three-year limitation applied because Philadelphia Code § 19—1703(1)(d) was a statute of repose, given that the provision delineated a period that began with a “definitively established event.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/12, at 8. Similarly, because the “plain, unambiguous language” of § 19-2610 “clearly expressed an] entitlement to a credit for any overpayment without providing” a limitations period, the trial court affirmed the Review Board’s credit determination. Id., at 9. The court opined the dichotomy regarding a limitations period for refunds but not credits made sense because the City could prospectively budget for credits, whereas refunds constituted an immediate liability.

Both parties appealed, and a divided three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed. Like the trial court, the Commonwealth Court determined the relevant refund and credit provisions were unambiguous. The majority agreed the absence of “return” in § 19—1703(l)(d) supported the conclusion that “due date” referred to the payment due date; thus, Taxpayers’ refund requests were untimely since they were not filed within three years of the payment due dates. The majority also agreed no equitable exception to the three-year limitation applied, observing the trial court’s conclusion comported with case law. City of Philadelphia v. City of Phila. Tax Review Bd. ex rel. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., Nos. 97-98 C.D. 2018, unpublished memorandum at 8-9, 2013 WL 6095552 (Pa.Cmwlth. filed November 18, 2013) (citing City of Philadelphia v. Tax Review Bd. ex rel. Phila. Fresh Food Terminal Corp., 945 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (concluding § 19-1703(1)(d) is statute of repose)); Phila. Gas Works v. Commonwealth, 741 A.2d 841, 847 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (“Neither the Board nor this [cjourt has power to alter the explicit time limitation ... in the [t]ax [c]ode based on equitable principles.” (citation omitted)).

The majority further held the trial court did not err in affirming the award of credits. Specifically, the court rejected the City’s argument that since Phila. Gas Works stated credits and refunds were interchangeable, § 19—1703(1)(d) applied logically to credits, as well as refunds. The court noted the underlying statute in Phila. Gas Works used the terms interchangeably, whereas the pertinent provisions in this matter used the terms distinctly. Moreover, as § 19—1703(1)(d) did not mention credits, the court reasoned the provision was unambiguous, and therefore, there was no need to ascertain legislative intent. And, even if the relevant provisions were ambiguous, the court concluded ambiguities were to be construed in Taxpayers’ favor. Keystone Health, at 13 (citing Skepton v. Borough of Wilson, 562 Pa. 344, 755 A.2d 1267, 1270 (2000)).

In dissent, President Judge Pellegrini agreed with the majority’s refund determination but disagreed with its credit conclusion, remarking there was no functional difference between credits and refunds because “in both [instances], someone has more money or less[.]” Id., at 2 (Pellegrini, P.J., dissenting). In his view, the majority’s position led to an absurd result since a party could seek credits in perpetuity, rendering the refund limitation period meaningless. Id., at 3 n. 2. We granted allowance of appeal to address both the credit and refund issues:

Was President Judge Pellegrini correct in dissent that the majority’s conclusion—that although there is a very strict three-year statute of limitations on requests for tax refunds, there is no statute of limitations at all on requests for tax credits—is “absurd” in that it allows taxpayers to pursue tax overpayments against the City “forever,” without any limiting principles whatsoever?
Whether, as a matter of law and equity, the Commonwealth Court correctly upheld the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas by denying Taxpayers BPT refunds [under the circumstances].

City of Philadelphia v. City of Phila. Tax Review Bd. ex rel. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., 625 Pa. 557, 93 A.3d 803 (2014) (per curiam) (alteration in original).

Taxpayers present three core arguments regarding refunds: (1) BPTR § 205 resets the three-year limitation; (2) any ambiguity as to whether “due date” applies to a payment or a return should be construed against the City because § 19-1703(l)(d) is a taxing statute; and (3) even if the refund requests were untimely, an equitable exception applies under the doctrine of recoupment.

First, Taxpayers aver BPTR § 205 when read in pari materia with § 19—1703(1)(d), dictates that the three-year limitation “must apply to all tax returns a taxpayer is required by law to file.” Taxpayers’ Brief, at 39. They submit their refund requests are timely because the three-year limitation either commences on the date the amended return is due or is extended until the amended return’s due date. As to their equitable argument, Taxpayers contend § 19—1703(l)(d) is a statute of limitations since it begins to run from the time of an injurious occurrence, namely, the overpayments, which they note were unknown until the IRS audit. Taxpayers maintain the net-income corrections and amended returns constitute a single transaction, see Household Consumer Disc. Co. v. Vespaziani, 490 Pa. 209, 415 A.2d 689, 694 (1980) (observing recoupment claim and main tax claim must arise from single transaction or taxable event to merit application of recoupment doctrine), and thus equitable relief is warranted. Taxpayers’ Brief, at 53.

Concerning credits, Taxpayers state applying the three-year limitation to claims for credits would effectively rewrite § 19— 2610 and BPTR § 202A, as the former plainly allows a credit for any overpayment and neither provision provides a time limitation. Noting § 19-1703(l)(d) does not mention credits, they argue City Council could not have intended § 19-1703(l)(d) to apply to credits for overpayments because both the BPT and the relevant credit provisions were enacted after § 19—1703(l)(d). Finally, given that a taxpayer has a vested right to a refund but must continue to engage in business to actually receive a credit, Taxpayers submit credits and refunds are materially different.

The City initially notes a party seeking a credit or refund must strictly comply with the applicable provisions so as to prevent fiscal uncertainty as both remedies arise from “legislative grace.” City’s Brief, at 25. The City asserts the majority’s conclusion allows credit requests in perpetuity. Remarking the decisions below placed too much emphasis on “any” in § 19-2610, the City argues the provision does not list a time limitation because it merely grants the Department authority to establish regulations for credits. Echoing President Judge Pellegrini, the City contends there is no meaningful distinction between the net effect of a credit and refund. The City argues the trial court’s prospective budgeting distinction is flawed because the purpose of a time limitation is to allow a governmental entity to conclusively extinguish a claim for retroactive payment—regardless of whether it is termed a credit or refund.

As to refunds, the City states the argument that BPTR § 205 resets the “due date” in § 19—1703(1)(d) is erroneous since § 19—1703(1)(d) concerns payments, not returns, and even if it does apply to returns, there is no indication the provision applies to amended returns. Further, the City argues Taxpayers’ contention that BPTR § 205 and § 19-1703(1)(d) must be read in pari materia lacks merit because: (1) the provisions do not relate to the same subject; (2) allowing BPTR § 205 to serve as an exception would swallow the three-year limitation since the regulation also applies to self-amended federal returns; and (3) Taxpayers should have known they overpaid the City.

Lastly, whether § 19—1703(l)(d) is characterized as a statute of repose or a statute of limitations, the City asserts equitable relief is foreclosed. The City avers denying such relief is consistent with DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Commonwealth, 885 A.2d 117, 120-21 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005) (concluding state refund provision is statute of repose and thus rejecting refund request despite event giving rise to request occurring after time limitation lapsed), as well as then-Justice Saylor’s concurring statement in our per curiam affirmance of that case, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Commonwealth, 592 Pa. 612, 927 A.2d 201, 203 (2007) (Saylor, J., concurring) (“[WJhere a statutory limitation provision is not merely ‘one of general application spanning all similar actions, but rather, derives from a specific proviso within a statute giving rise to the right sought to be vindicated,’ a plaintiff must demonstrate that the action has been brought within the time limit ... regardless of whether the provision is described as a statute of repose.” (citation omitted)).

As these issues involve matters of statutory interpretation, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Hacker, 609 Pa. 108, 15 A.3d 333, 335 (2011) (citation omitted). In interpreting local ordinances, we apply rules of statutory construction. See Bailey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 569 Pa. 147, 801 A.2d 492, 502 n. 19 (2002). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the enacting entity— presently, the Department and City Council. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Where a statute is unambiguous, its plain text will not be disregarded in furtherance of its spirit. Id., § 1921(b). Ambiguity arises where there are two or more reasonable interpretations. See Warrantech Consumer Prods. Servs., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 626 Pa. 218, 96 A.3d 346, 354-55 (2014) (“A statute is ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text under review.” (citation omitted)). Where ambiguity is found, a court may consider the factors listed in 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) to ascertain legislative intent. See id. Provisions imposing a tax are strictly construed, Id., § 1928(b)(3), with any ambiguity resolved against the taxing entity and in favor of the taxpayer, Greenwood Gaming & Entm’t, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Revenue, 625 Pa. 55, 90 A.3d 699, 710-11 (2014).

Where a limitations period begins with a definitely established event that is independent of an injurious occurrence or discovery thereof, the statute is considered to be one of repose. See Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 602 Pa. 627, 981 A.2d 198, 211 (2009). Unlike statutes of limitations, which are procedural, statutes of repose are substantive and thus wholly extinguish a party’s cause of action upon the expiration of the time period. See id. (citation omitted).

Considering these principles, we hold Taxpayers are not entitled to refunds since their requests were not filed within three years of the date the BPT payments were due. As § 19—1703(1)(d) does not mention returns, we agree with the Commonwealth Court majority that the provision is unambiguous. The only reasonable interpretation is to confine § 19-1703(1)(d) to the later of (1) the date of payment or (2) payment due date. Applying § 19—1703(1)(d) to the return due date, much less an amended return’s due date, would insert words where they do not appear. See Sears v. Wolf, 632 Pa. 147, 118 A.3d 1091, 1104 (2015) (citation omitted).

Likewise, we reject Taxpayers’ argument that BPTR § 205 resets the three-year limitation. Statutes are considered in pari materia “when they relate to the same ... class of persons or things.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(a). If possible, statutes in pari materia “shall be construed together.” Id., § 1932(b). We conclude § 19-1703(1)(d) and BPTR § 205 do not relate to the same class of things or persons. Section 19-1703(1)(d) deals with a petition for a refund for any tax collected by the City or the Philadelphia School District. See Phila. Code § 19-1703(1)(d). In contrast, BPTR § 205 encompasses the requirement to file an amended BPT return in limited sitúa-tions. Moreover, while § 19-1703(1)(d) deals with City taxpayers generally, BPTR § 205 applies to a discrete class of City taxpayers, ie., Method II BPT filers whose net income was subsequently adjusted. Broadly, both provisions deal with City taxpayers, but adopting Taxpayers’ logic would require every City tax provision and Department regulation to be read in pari materia—an untenable result given the diverse spectrum of taxes the City imposes. See generally Phila. Code, Title 19 (listing over 30 types of taxes).

Further, even if statutes are in pari materia, construing them together is required only “if possible.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(b). As stated by the City, construing § 19-1703(1)(d) and BPTR § 205 as one provision would allow a narrow cii-cumstance to swallow the general three-year limitation. As evidenced by their suggestion that the three-year limitation either commences on the due date of the amended return or is extended until the amended return’s due date, even Taxpayers cannot specify the precise result of reading the two provisions together. Under the former, Taxpayers would have had until 2012 to file their refund requests. Thus, we are unpersuaded by the argument that BPTR § 205 resets the three-year limitation in § 19—1703(1)(d).

Moreover, assuming arguendo § 19—1703(1)(d) is ambiguous, we are not required to construe the statute in Taxpayers’ favor. Only ambiguous provisions that impose a tax are to be construed in a taxpayer’s favor. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(3); Greenwood Gaming, at 710-11. Rather than imposing a tax, § 19-1703(1)(d) defines a time limitation for seeking a refund. Relatedly, we conclude § 19-1703(1)(d) is a statute of repose and thus reject Taxpayers’ equitable argument. The Commonwealth Court has previously addressed this issue. See Phila. Fresh Food, at 805 (“[S]ection 19-1703(1)(d) is a statute of repose.”). As mentioned supra, a statute of repose delineates a defined time that begins with a definitely established event, independent of the injury or its discovery. Abrams, at 211; see also Phila. Fresh Food, at 805. Contrary to Taxpayers’ position, the three-year limitation does not commence with the overpayments they claim are an injurious occurrence or discovery thereof. Instead, § 19-1703(1)(d) begins with a definite and independent event—the later of the payment date or the payment due date—and runs for three years. Hence, Taxpayers’ ability to pursue refunds was extinguished in 2007 and 2008, respectively, and relief under the recoupment doctrine is unwarranted. See Taxpayers’ Brief, at 58 n. 12 (conceding argument under recoupment doctrine would be “affected” if § 19—1703(1)(d) is statute of repose).

Applying these same principles to credits, we hold the Commonwealth Court did not err in affirming the Review Board’s award of credits to Taxpayers. Ambiguity here is found only if credits and refunds are the same thing, and whatever their similarities, they are not. “Store credit” is not the same as “your money back.”

The pertinent provisions discuss terms of “credits” and “refunds” distinctly. Section 19—1703(1)(d) discusses refunds. Section 19-2610 and its progeny, BPTR § 202A, see n. 2, supra, discuss “credits to be granted on any overpayment of [an] estimated tax payment.” Phila. Code § 19-2610. Whereas a refund involves an immediate liability to be paid by the City, a credit is an offset against future liability owed to the City. Stated otherwise, a refund must be paid promptly, while a credit allows the City to prospectively budget the liability—a difference we find material. There being no time limitation listed within the credit provisions, it is unreasonable to impute § 19—1703(1)(d)’s three-year limitation on claims for refunds to claims for credits—to do so would impermissibly rewrite the relevant provisions to insert a term where it does not exist. See Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 107 Pa.Cmwlth. 448, 529 A.2d 546, 551 (1987) (“[J]udicial rewriting ... however well intended [is] not legally warranted.”). Accordingly, as there is no ambiguity, there is no need to consider the matters listed in 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) to further ascertain legislative intent. See Keystone Health, at 12 n. 6 (“Here, there is no need to ascertain City Council’s intent. The word ‘credit’ is not present.”).

Discerning no ambiguity within the relevant provisions, which provide a time limitation only for refunds, we affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court in full.

Order affirmed; jurisdiction relinquished.

Justices TODD and STEVENS join the opinion.

Chief Justice SAYLOR files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice BAER joins.

Chief Justice SAYLOR,

concurring and dissenting.

I agree with the majority’s treatment of Taxpayers’ cross-appeal issue regarding the availability of refunds. I differ, however, with the decision to sustain the award of credits.

As to the matter of credits, initially, I agree with the majority that the Commonwealth Court erred in implementing a rule of construction favorable to Taxpayers. See Majority Opinion, at 122 n. 4, 132 A.3d at 954 n. 4. In the refunds/credits arena, the approach of construing ambiguities in favor of the government is based, in part, upon the principle that recompense for overpayments of voluntarily paid taxes (that is, taxes not paid under coercion or duress beyond mere adherence to the requirements of the law) is a matter of legislative grace and not entitlement. See, e.g., Land Holding Corp. v. Bd. of Fin. & Revenue, 388 Pa. 61, 65, 130 A.2d 700, 703 (1957) (explaining that “[t]he right to sue the Commonwealth for the recovery of money or taxes alleged to have been erroneously paid to it exists only by the grace of the Legislature[,]” and, accordingly, refund statutes are to be strictly construed).

I differ, however, with the majority’s depiction, substantively, that credits are entirely distinct from refunds, see Majority Opinion, at 120-22, 132 A.3d at 953-54, either generally or under relevant provisions of the Philadelphia Code. Indeed, the concept of the affordance of a refund by crediting an account due presently or in the future is so prevalent that this form of credit is often referenced as a “refund credit.” See, e.g., Royal Bank of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 705 A.2d 515, 517 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Pa. Retailers’ Ass’ns v. PUC, 64 Pa.Cmwlth. 491, 502 n. 12, 440 A.2d 1267, 1272 n. 12 (1982); cf. Caver v. Cent. Ala. Elec. Coop., No. CV 15-0129-WS-C, 2015 WL 5286501, at *5 n. 8 (S.D.Ala. Sept. 8, 2015) (“[T]he common ordinary meaning of the term ‘refunds’ embraces both cash and credit varieties.”). Accordingly, I find it likely that, when in imposing limitations on the availability of “refunds,” a government body also intends to restrict the availability of refund credits. At the very least, there is ambiguity in this regard which, as explained above, militates in favor of the taxing body.

Even if this were not the case in general application, Section 19-1703 itself explicitly employs the refund-crediting concept. In this regard, Subsections 19-1703(5) and (8) each contemplate that, upon the granting of a refund by the Department or the Tax Review Board “the account of [the] petitioner may be credited with the amount of such refund,” in lieu of the tender of a monetary payment. Phila. Code § 19-1703(5), (8). These provisions plainly allow a form of a credit, which is made available through the refund process and, accordingly, is explicitly subject to the limitations attending the availability of refunds. For this reason, I find the reliance by the majority and the intermediate court on the absence of the word “credit” from Section 19—1703(1)(d) to be unpersuasive. See Majority Opinion, at 121-22, 132 A.3d at 954 (quoting City of Phila. v. City of Phila. Tax Rev. Bd., Nos. 97-98 C.D. 2013, slip op., 2013 WL 6095552, at *6 n. 6 (Pa.Cmwlth. Nov. 18, 2013)). Again, City Council affirmatively provided for credits in Section 19-1703, but solely as a means to effectuate the refunds already subject to the express three-year repose.

Next, I turn to Taxpayers’ arguments grounded upon Section 19-2610 of the Philadelphia Code, Phila. Code § 19-2610 (requiring the Department to promulgate regulations to provide for credits to be granted on overpayments of estimated taxes), and Section 202(A) of the Department’s regulations, Phila. Bus. Peiv. Tax Reg. § 202(A) (implementing Section 19-2610 by prescribing that overpayments of a current tax year are to be applied first to the payment of an estimated tax for the tax year that follows or to other taxes due, then, in the absence of a refund, to future tax years). Upon review, I differ with Taxpayers’ contention that these provisions were intended to encompass allowance for credit claims beyond the time period permitted for seeking refunds. In this regard, I do not view the filing of an amended tax return as harkening directly back to estimated tax payments, because there is a material, intervening event, namely, the filing of an initial return. After the filing of the initial return—and its reconciliation of estimated tax payments with tax liabilities (particularly where this process encompasses provision of refunds or credits to taxpayers)—associated estimated tax payments can no longer be viewed in isolation, but rather, must be considered in light of the reconciliation which has occurred.

For this reason, when City Council required the Department to promulgate regulations to provide for credits to be granted for overpayments of “estimated tax payments,” Phila. Code § 19-2610, I find it unlikely that Council contemplated that such prescription would circumvent Section 19-1703(l)(d)’s three-year limitation and herald credit claims for overpayments submitted for the first time many years after the relevant tax year. Rather, while acknowledging that there is ambiguity, but applying a construction favorable to the government, I conclude that City Council intended for the reconciliation of estimated tax payments to be accomplished in tandem with the timely filing of an initial return. Thus, consistent with the City’s position, I believe that the only appropriate procedure for a timely recoupment request is to seek a refund under Section 19-1703.

I recognize the disparity arising out of the requirement for taxpayers to pay additional business privilege taxes, when implicated by a federal audit completed after the Section 19-1703(1)(d) limitations period has expired, and the enforcement of Section 19—1703(1)(d) to foreclose taxpayer refund claims submitted after such time. However, there simply is no salient requirement for equilibrium as between constraints upon the government (which represents the interests of the citizenry at large) and those affecting individual taxpayers.

Based upon the above, I would hold that, because Taxpayers failed to file their amended returns within the three-year period provided under Section 19-1703(l)(d), the availability of refunds and/or credits for their past overpayments was foreclosed. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court relative to the City’s appeal (concerning tax credits) and affirm the order as to Taxpayers’ cross-appeal (regarding refunds).

Justice BAER joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.

      . In 2012, the BPT was renamed the Business Income and Receipts Tax; as this action was already begun, we will refer to the former name.

      . Pursuant to § 19-2610, the Department enacted BPTR § 202A, which provides: "Any overpayment of the current tax year shall be applied first to the payment of an estimated tax for the tax year that follows or to other taxes due. A remaining balance, if any, shall be applied to future [BPT] years unless the taxpayer requests a refund amount." Id.

      . The doctrine allows “a party litigating a tax claim in a timely proceeding ... [to] seek recoupment of a related, and inconsistent, but now time-barred tax claim relating to the same transaction.” United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608, 110 S.Ct. 1361, 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990).

      . To the extent the panel majority opined that even if the provisions were ambiguous, they were to be construed in Taxpayers’ favor, id., at 13, the court erred. Like § 19—1703(1)(d), neither § 19-2610 nor BPTR § 202A imposes a tax, and thus, there is no requirement the provisions be construed in Taxpayers’ favor.

      . Accord Phila. Gas Works ex rel. City of Phila. v. Commonwealth, 741 A.2d 841, 846 n. 6 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (refusing to apply strict construction against the government because "the dispute in this matter concerns the time limitation for seeking a refund or a credit of the prepaid taxes, not the rate or imposition of the ... tax" (emphasis added)); see

        also Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 905 P.2d 338, 344 (1995) ("It is a general principle that tax statutes conferring credits, refunds or deductions are construed narrowly.”). See generally 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 2208 (2015) ("A refund of taxes is solely a matter of legislative grace, and any person seeking such relief must bring himself or herself clearly within the terms of the statute authorizing the same.”).

      . Along these lines, Taxpayers acknowledge in their briefs that the permissive offsetting of an amount to be refunded against any taxes presently due from the taxpayer “is the absolute essence of a credit and clearly distinguishable from the former option of a refund.” Brief for Appellees at 25. Indeed, Taxpayers accept that statutory terms which embody such an offsetting concept—but which do not employ the actual word “credit”—nevertheless "explicitly refer[] to credits.” Reply Brief for Appellees at 25. Thus, while they do not discuss Subsections 19-1703(5) or (8) in their submissions, Taxpayers' contentions are entirely consistent with the conclusion that such provisions expressly contemplate a form of a credit.

      . Notably, it is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that statutes are to be read as a whole. See, e.g., Bd. of Revision of Taxes, City of Phila. v. City of Phila., 607 Pa. 104, 124-25, 4 A.3d 610, 622 (2010).

      . The majority suggests that the City is able to budget prospectively for liability based on credits. See Majority Opinion, at 121-22, 132 A.3d at 954. From my point of view, the ability to do so (for a time period depending on factors outside the City’s control such as the extent of a taxpayer’s present liabilities subject to offsetting) is far less significant than the City’s apparently perpetual exposure to credits long after tax liabilities are believed to have been settled. Accord City of Phila. v. City of Phila. Tax Rev. Bd., Nos. 97-98 C.D. 2013, slip op., 2013 WL 6095552, at *7 & n. 2 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting).

      . This is amply demonstrated via reference to Appellee QCC Insurance Company’s amended 2003 Business Privilege Tax return. Although this return, filed in 2009, reflects the same estimated tax payments figure that QCC had indicated on the initial return ($4,558,765), compare R.R, 26a with R.R. 79a, in the amended return, the company needed to account for a refund of $401,979 tendered by the City in November 2004 based on overpayments asserted in the initial return. This reconciliation, then—and not the estimated tax payments figure—measured against QCC’s Business Privilege Tax liability, served as the basis for QCC’s refund claim advanced in its 2009 amended return for the 2003 tax year.
      Notably, the 2003 Business Privilege Tax form simply does not contemplate amended filings which require these sorts of reconciliations. Thus, QCC noted them by way of an annotation. See R.R. 79a. Consistent with my rationale above, I regard the form, Section 19-2610, and Section 202(A) as being analogous, in the sense that their content is geared primarily to the treatment of initial—and not later amended—returns.

      . Certainly, City Council could have been more specific, as well as provided particularized procedures for the submission of amended returns. The absence of such procedures, however, does not require that provisions which facially appear to relate to an initial reconciliation of estimated tax payments as such, accomplished by way of an initial return, should be expanded to encompass amended returns. Indeed, the Department's implementing regulation, Phila. Bus. Priv. Tax Reg. § 202(A), also is most naturally read to focus on the allowance of credits pertaining to the reconciliation occurring upon the filing of an initial return. See id. ("Any overpayment of the current year tax shall be applied first to the payment of an estimated tax for the tax year that follows or to other taxes due. A remaining balance, if any, shall be applied to future [tax] years unless the taxpayer requests a refund of the amount.”).

      . Viewed from the perspective of the Independence Blue Cross family of companies, the deductions to federal income tax liabilities overlooked by Taxpayers (i.e., the subsidiaries) apparently mirrored an understatement of net income by Independence Blue Cross (the parent). This appeal, however, does not concern whether Independence Blue Cross might be entitled to an offset for payments made by its subsidiaries relative to any additional local business privilege tax liabilities which Independence Blue Cross may have incurred on account of the federal audit. Taking a relaxed view of corporate formalities, at least, it would seem that the decisions in Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 55 S.Ct. 695, 79 L.Ed. 1421 (1935), and McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 575 Pa. 50, 834 A.2d 515 (2003), cited by Taxpayers, might be more relevant to this issue.