text:
    Haynes L. Hackett, Appellee, v. Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 16,135.
    1. Negligence—when may be established by inference. While under the law in Illinois, the doctrine, res ipsa loquitur does not apply between master and servant, it- does not follow that courts or jurymen having before them all the conditions of an accident, cannot find negligence by inference from the evidence, without the necessity of- evidence by witnesses of what did or did not take place.
    2. Contributory negligence—acting upon sudden impulse. “One who does an act under an impulse or upon a belief created by a sudden danger attributable to another’s negligence, is not to be regarded as guilty of contributory negligence even though the act would be regarded as a negligent one if performed under circumstances not indicating such peril.’’
    3. Master and servant—what rislcs not assumed. “The jerks and jars given without warning to a brakeman who had received notice from competent authority and had been led to believe that no jerks would be made at the time, are -not usual and ordinary jerks, and it is not accurate to say their risk is assumed as an implied risk of service.’’
    4. Comity—when constitutionality of law of sister state will not be considered. The appellate court will not consider the question as to whether or not the law of a sister state is valid where both the supreme court of the state of enactment and the United States Supreme Coujrt have held such law to be valid-.
    5. Pleading—when one count sufficient to sustain verdict. If one count or more is sufficient to sustain a verdict it is enough, where the instructions are not so framed as to involve the possibility that the jury may have found the defendant guilty merely on a faulty count.
    6. Pleading—when declaration states cause of action under Employers Liability Act of Indiana. Held, that the declaration in this case stated clearly and with sufficient exactness a cause of action under the Employers Liability Act of Indiana.
    7. Verdicts—what may be considered in determining question of excessiveness. The fact that upon a former trial a larger verdict than that complained of was rendered is proper to be considered by the appellate court.
    8. Verdicts—when not excessive. Held, in this case, that a verdict for $30,000 in view of the terrible nature of the injury sustained, was not excessive.

      9. Instructions—when upon preponderance of evidence not erroneous. An instruction is not erroneous which advises the jury that the preponderance of evidence in a personal injury action is not necessarily determined alone by the number of witnesses testifying to a particular fact or state the facts, but that the jury should also take into consideration other matters enumerated.
    Action in case for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Marcus Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court. at the October term, 1909.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 29, 1912.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (Making opinion final).
    Gr. W. Kretzinger, L. L. Smith, E.C. Field, Winston Payne, Strawn & Shaw and H. R. Kurrie, for appellant.
    Morse Ives, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Brown

delivered the opinion of the court.

In the Superior Court of Cook county the plaintiff, Haynes L. Haekett, on March 8,1909, recovered a judgment of $30,000 against the defendant, the Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville Railroad Company. It was based on the verdict of a jury, assessing the amount as damages for personal injuries received by the plaintiff while a switchman in the employment of the defendant.

Before entering judgment on the verdict, the Court below denied a motion for a new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment made by the defendant.

The cause has. been brought here on appeal by the defendant and various assignments of error are made attacking the proceedings, the verdict and the judgment.

Both sides of the contention have been in this Court presented orally as well as by printed briefs and arguments. We have given to the "cause the diligent attention which its importance, arising both from the large amount of the judgment and the character of the ques- . tions involved, demanded, but notwithstanding the refinement and elaboration of argument with which the cause of appellant has been presented, we have not found difficult the decision of the questions of law and fact which have been presented.

As to the latter there seems to us little question.

The uncontradieted evidence showed this state of facts:

On February 4, 1907, the plaintiff, Haynes L. Hackett, then 29 years old, was a switchman in the emplby of the defendant, the Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville Bailway Company—'Usually known as “The Monon”—and had been for two years and a half at work for it in the railroad switch yard at Monon, Indiana. On that day he went to work in that yard at his usual occupation about six in the morning. At seven occurred the accident which was the occasion of tins suit. - By it he lost.both legs, which were, in consequence of injuries received by a stone car passing over them, necessarily amputated between the knee and the hip.

The cause and manner of the accident were these: The persons working in the yard in “switching cars, placing them and making up.trains” at the time, were the plaintiff, the engineer of a switching engine, the fireman of that engine, and one Lowe, the foreman of the yard, who had charge of the work as his regular duty and who gave orders to the plaintiff, who was helper and switchman, and to the engineer and fireman of the switching engine. A Mr. Gfwinn was the yard master and agent at Monon for the railway. He had an office in the station, but did not direct the work of switching cars in the yard further than to give the lists involved in the making up of trains to the foreman of the yard, Lowe, who did direct the switching and, as stated, gave to the engineer, foreman and switchman the orders necessary to carry it out, and himself also frequently set brakes.

On the morning and at the time in question, the crew foreman, engineer, fireman and switchman, were making up a Chicago local train. In doing so they “were switching cars in and out of different tracks and getting the cars in station -order for train No. 46, pulling cars out of the tracks and ‘kicking’ cars on the tracks.” The main line of the railroad runs about east and west. The switchyard lies south of it. A main lead track runs from north of east to south of west, off which run eight switch tracks parallel with the main track of the railroad, to the southerly one of which eight tracks the main lead track finally runs and in which it ends.

The switch tracks are numbered from 1 to 8, beginning with the track next south of the main track of the railway. Some switching was done before • seven o ’clock on the morning in question towards making up the desired train.

Just before the accident, cars in this process of switching were so arranged that there were eight cars —four box cars and four stone cars—attached to an engine headed northeasterly, standing on the main lead. The box cars were next to the engine. Lowe, the foreman, was standing by the cars near the junction of switch track 5 with the main lead and close to the coupling between the fourth and fifth car—the last box car and the first stone car.

The plaintiff having just thrown the number 6 switch, walked over from the south side of the lead to the north side of the lead and joined Lowe. Lowe said to him, “Haynes, I am going to cut these four cars off here and kick them in track No. 8. You go down there and get on them and ride them in the clear and stop them.” At the same time Lowe raised his hand and gave the engineer a “kick” signal to kick the cars in on track 8. There was a pin lifter connected with the couplers between the box car and the stone car. A pin lifter is an operating rod extending out from the corner of the car, so arranged and connected with the couplings that a man can disconnect them without getting between the cars. It extended north or west from the couplings here involved towards Lowe. The couplings were in good working order, £fs the plaintiff had occasion to notice, and had noticed that morning.

On receiving the order from Lowe, the plaintiff crossed over the lead between the switches 6 and 7 and passed in a southwesterly direction to the south side or the southeasterly side, as it might be called, of the main lead, stopping a little west of switch 7. He went to the southerly side of the main lead (which terminated in switch track No. 8), as he explained in his testimony, because cars were standing on switch track 7, so close to the clear that it was unsafe to attempt to mount a car passing onto track 8 from the north side. As the train backed in towards track 8 the plaintiff mounted the car that first passed him by its southeast corner, where there was a ladder to climb by. At that point he could not see whether the cut had been made as Lowe had told him it was to be. The car was moving at' the rate of four or five miles an hour. On getting to the top of the car, which was loaded with stone, he started to walk over the stone from the east to the west end of the car and there set the brake. When he was within six to eight feet of the end of the car and the train had moved perhaps 160 feet, he heard a click in the cars, glanced'around and saw that the cut which Lowe had said he was going to make had not been made. He received no other warning, but knew from the sound that the engine had slowed down towards a stop, without the cut, and realizing his danger made a grab for the brake. It was too late! “The slack” as-he expressed it, had come into the car; the car was violently jerked and the plaintiff was hurled over the end of the car and before it, and despite all his efforts to free himself the car passed over both his legs completely crushing them. The plaintiff, speaking from his experience as a switchman, testified: “If Mr. Lowe had cut those cars off at the time and place that he said he was to cut them off, this jerk from the slack in the cars would have been avoided. It wouldn’t have been there at all because if the cars had been cut off and the draw bars separated, the cars would have been allowed to roll at their own free will without this slack at the other end jerking them. There wouldn’t have been any jerk at all.” And indeed, the language of the Supreme Court of Indiana in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company v. Nicholas, 165 Ind. 679, a case where the facts were very similar to those in the case at bar, is warranted. “It is a matter of common knowledge that the sudden stopping of an engine propelling a train of cars will result in a violent jerk of the cars at the end of the train remote from the engine. ’ ’

“Kicking” cars onto a switch track is a usual and customary method of work in a railroad yard, and is done by giving momentum to the cars when they are shunted or backed on the track and allowing them, uncoupled from the engine, to roll, as the plaintiff says, at their own free will until the momentum is expended or they are stopped by setting the brakes.

In this case, according to the plaintiff’s testimony, he was, in mounting the most westerly car and attempting to go to the brake at the front end, following the custom of the yard and of his business. He says, “It was customary when we kicked a cut of cars any distance or shoved a cut of cars any distance around the yard anywhere, for a man to always be on the front end of the cut.” He further testified that Lowe had told him that when they were shoving a cut of cars around there on the main track or on the side tracks any distance, he was always to be on the front end of the cut to assure safety, and that there were frequently people about the yard picking up coal and section men working at the track.

The evidence adduced by the defendant on cross-examination of the plaintiff indeed tended to prove that even without any special order it was the duty of the plaintiff to have got on the car and set the brake, and it offered as direct evidence a rule of the Company as follows: “When a train is being pushed by an engine, except when shifting and making up trains in the yards, a flagman must be stationed in a conspicuous position on the front of the leading car so as to perceive the first sign of danger and immediately signal the engine man.” Mr. Gwinn, the yard master, however, testified that “the custom was to ride the head car on the main track or over any switches or going over street crossings. There was never any custom in the yard where there was no crossings, no wagon crossings nor street crossings of any character. At the place where Mr. Hackett was injured there were no street crossings.”

There is no contention that the cars were uncoupled, as Lowe said they were to be, nor that any warning was given to the plaintiff that they were not. •

Eliminating for the moment from the discussion the question arising from the common employment or fellow servant doctrine, as to the liability of the defendant—(a question which in this case is rendered by Indiana legislation, to be hereafter noted, a question of law involving the construction of a statute) and independently of the questions of pleading raised by the defendant, on which great emphasis is laid in the arguments in its behalf—we can see no reason why the jury should have failed to hold, as their verdict shows they did hold, that the negligence of Lowe was the cause of the accident, and that the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence contributing thereto. We could make this no clearer than the statement of facts before given has made it. Again, to quote from Railway Company v. Nicholas, supra: “It is a matter of common knowledge that the sudden stopping of an engine propelling a train of cars will result in a violent jerk of the cars at the end of the train remote from the engine. The conductor” —in the case at bar, the foreman who was controlling the movement of the train—“must have known this fact and its probable effect upon appellee, and his act in causing the train to be stopped in the manner and under the circumstances alleged was negligence. * * * It sufficiently appears that the conductor owed appellee the duty either to cut off the car himself or cause it to be done before giving the signal for a sudden stopping of the engine.”

It is indeed suggested in argument that the foreman may have “done everything needed tó uncouple the cars,” or that the “engineer may have slowed down without a signal and before the foreman thought the cars had sufficient momentum to justify cutting them off. ’ ’ But there was no attempt on the part of the defendant to prove either of these hypotheses, and the evidence as it stands was amply sufficient, in our opinion, to enable the jury to draw a legitimate inference that neither of them was true. While under the law as stated in Illinois the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply between employer and employee, it does not follow that courts or jurymen having before them all the conditions of an accident, cannot find negligence by inference from the evidence, without the necessity of evidence by eye witnesses of what did or did not take (place.

The jury were emphatically instructed, at the instance of the defendant, that the plaintiff could not recover unless he had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the foreman was negligent in failing to cut off the cars or in failing to give him warning of the danger; and we think they were justified in holding that such preponderance existed.

The jury were also correctly instructed as to contributory negligence, and we think that they were justified in finding that no such contributory negligence or want of due care on the part of the plaintiff appeared, either in mounting the car, in walking over the load to the front end, or in failing to throw himself down or sit down when the “click” came. As to the suggestion made by the defendant as to. the action of the plaintiff after hearing the ‘ click, ’ ’ the language of the Appellate Court of Indiana in Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Bossert, 44 Ind. App, 245, is certainly as applicable to this case as it was to that: “He acted in an emergency and to avoid peril. One who does an act under an impulse or upon a belief created by a sudden danger attributable to another’s negligence, is not to be regarded as guilty, of contributory negligence even though the act would be regarded as a negligent one if performed under circumstances not indicating such peril. ”

Nor is there any criticism arising out of the “assumption of risk” doctrine to be made of the verdict of the jury. They were instructed on this matter quite as favorably as the defendant had a right to ask, and the language of the Supreme Court of Indiana in C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Grossett, 172 Ind. 525, is apt for quotation here: “The jerks and jars given without warning to a brakeman who had received notice from competent authority and had been led to believe that no jerks would be made at the time, are not usual and ordinary jerks, and it is not accurate to say their risk is assumed as an implied risk of the service.”

By these eliminations our consideration of the liability of the defendant may be confined to the effect upon it of the “fellow servant” or “common employment” doctrine, as that doctrine is understood by the courts of Indiana, and expounded in the opinions of those courts introduced in evidence herein. Our duty is still further lightened by the fact that the counts of the declaration, founded on the common law doctrines of liability of the railroad, were successfully demurred to, and by the practical although not the express concession by the plaintiff that the foreman, Lowe, and the plaintiff might be so regarded as fellow servants that the railroad company would escape liability for the result of Lowe’s negligence, were it not for the Act of the Indiana Legislature, approved March 4, 1893, and entitled “An Act regulating liability of Railroads and other Corporations,” etc., and commonly known as the Employes Liability Act of Indiana.

The following is the First Section of this Act:

“Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana: That every railroad or other corporation except municipal, operating in this State, shall be hable in damages for personal injury suffered by an employe while in its service, the employe so injured being in the exercise of due care and diligence in the following cases:

First. Where such injury is suffered by reason of any defect in the condition of ways, works, plant, tools and machinery connected with or in use of the business of such corporation when such defect was the result of negligence on the part of the corporation or some person entrusted by it with the duty of keeping such way, works, plants, tools or machinery in proper condition.

Second. Where such injury resulted from the negligence of any person in the service of such corporation, to whose order or direction the injured employe at the time of the injury was bound to conform and did conform.

Third. Where such injury resulted from the act or omission of any person done or made in obedience to any rule, regulation or by-law of such corporation or in obedience to the particular instructions given by any person delegated with the authority of the corporation in that behalf.

Fourth. Where such injury was caused by the negligence of any person in the service of such corporation, who has charge of any signal, telegraph office, switch yard, shop, round house, locomotive engine or train upon a railway, or where such injury was caused by the negligence of any person, co-employee or fellow servant engaged in the same common service of any such corporation, the said person, co-employee or fellow servant at the time acting in the place and performing the duty of the corporation in that behalf, and the person so injured obeying or conforming to the order of some superior at the time of such injury, having authority to direct; but nothing herein shall be construed to abridge the liability of the- corporation under existing laws.”

' The plaintiff maintains that under the second subdivision of this Section he can recover from the defendant corporation “because his injury resulted from the negligence of a person in the service of the corporation to whose order or direction he at the time of the injury was bound to conform and did conform.” This contention is the especial basis of the third count of the declaration filed March 22, 1907, and of the first count filed October 5, 1908.

He also maintains that he should recover under the first paragraph of the fourth subdivision of the Section because “the injury was caused by the negligence of a person in the service of the corporation who had charge of * * * a switchyard. ’ ’ This is the especial basis- of the third count filed October 5, 1908.

Again he contends- that he has also a right of recovery under said first paragraph of said fourth subdivision, because “the injury was caused by the negligence of a person in the service of said corporation who had charge of * * * a locomotive engine * * * upon a railway.” This is relied on in the fifth count filed October 5, 1908.

And, further, he contends that he has a right of recovery under .said first paragraph of said fourth subdivision, because the injury was caused “by the negligence of a person in the service of said corporation who had charge of * * * a train * * * upon a

railway.” This contention is the particular basis o.f the seventh count filed October 5, 1908, and of both the first and second counts filed November 7,1908.

There are other counts in the declaration, to which the general issue was pleaded and on which the case went to the jury, but they are practically if not expressly abandoned by the plaintiff—most of them because they contained allegations that there was a custom, under the circumstances detailed, to warn the brakeman of danger, and because there was no evidence adduced of said custom.

It is therefore on these seven counts—the 3rd of March 22, 1907, the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 7th of October 5, 1908, and the 1st and 2nd of November 7, 1908—that the plaintiff now relies to justify the judgment.

The questions for us to decide, arising from the contentions of the respective parties, are therefore these:

First: Is the Employers Liability Act of Indiana, on which the right of action is predicated by the plaintiff, a valid and constitutional enactment governing this case?

Second. If the Act is constitutional, does any one of the counts before mentioned sufficiently state a cause of action under it as to be good after verdict?

Third. Was there evidence sufficient to go to the jury to sustain the allegations of said count?

Fourth. Were there any errors in the instructions to the jury which necessitate a reversal of the judgment?

Fifth. In view of all the evidence, was the verdict clearly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence ?

Sixth. Are the damages assessed by the verdict so excessive as to demand a reversal or remittitur?

Although the unconstitutionality of the statute in question, both as respects the Federal Constitution and •the Constitution of Indiana, is asserted by the defendant, we cannot see how it can be even plausibly maintained that we should assent to the proposition. The Supreme Court of the United States in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company vs. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, has unequivocally declared the Act not in contravention of the Constitution of the United States, and has gone even farther in its holdings as to the persons for whose benefit it may be invoked than the Supreme Court of Indiana, and, apart from any question as to how far we can take notice of the Constitution of Indiana, which is not in evidence in this case, the Supreme Court of Indiana in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Rogers, 168 Ind. 483, used this language:

‘ ‘ It was held by this Court in Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1; Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Houlihan, 157 Ind. 494; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Lightheiser, 168 Ill. 438; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Collins, 168 Ill. 467; Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. v. Boss, 169 Ind. 3, that as applied to railroads said Fmployers Liability Act was not in violation of the 14th amendment of the Constitution of the United States or of any provision of the Constitution of this State. In Pittsburgh, etc. B. Co. v. Boss, supra, we said: ‘The validity of this Act, so far as it applies to railroads, was upheld in the case of Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1, and that holding has been twice reaffirmed since this appeal was filed, * * * and the constitutionality of the law must be regarded as settled. ’ Following the case of Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. v. Boss, we hold that the constitutionality of said law must be regarded as settled, and it will not be considered in this case.”

To urge that because in subsequent cases, Indianapolis Traction Co. v. Kinney, 171 Ind. 612, and Cleveland, etc.. R. Co. v. Foland, 174 Ind. 411, the Supreme Court of Indiana as a matter of construction held that ‘ ‘ to keep within constitutional limitations the statute must.be construed as designed exclusively for the benefit of those who are in the course of their employment exposed to the particular dangers incident to the use and operation of railroad engines and trains and whose injuries are caused thereby,” and further held that the “rule in this State and the reason for the statute and the basis on which its constitutionality is grounded is that of the hazards attending the operation of trains,”—we should overrule the Supreme Court of Indiana and declare that as applied to a person exposed to and injured in consequence of the hazards of his occupation on a railroad, the Act is in violation of the Constitution of Indiana, involves a refinement of reasoning which we cannot follow.

As to the second question involved, namely, whether any one of the counts relied on by the plaintiff sufficiently states a cause of action as to be good after verdict, we are manifestly not obliged in this discussion to consider all said counts. But in reviewing the case we have done so and have concluded that each of the seven is so sufficient to sustain the judgment.

But if one count or more is thus sufficient, it is enough in a case like this, where the instructions, as we hold, are not so framed as to involve the possibility that the jury may have found the defendant guilty merely on a faulty count. Practice Act of Illinois, Section 78; United States Bolling Stock Company v. Chadwick, 35 Ill. App. 474.

To avoid unnecessary prolixity in this opinion, therefore, we shall, pro hac vice, ignore all but the 7th count filed October 5, 1908, and the 2nd count filed November 7, 1908, which for convenience we will denominate Counts A. and B. respectively.

Count A. (1) sets up the Employers Liability Act in full; alleges (2) that the plaintiff on the day of the accident was employed by the defendant as a brakeman and switchman in a switchyard of the defendant at Monon; (3) that there was then in the service of the defendant in the switchyard a foreman; (4) that the plaintiff was engaged in the performance of his duties as a brakeman and switchman and working under the orders of the foreman; (5) that there was in the switchyard a train of eight cars coupled' to one another in a train, with a locomotive engine attached to one end of the train, standing upon a main lead; (6) that the foreman had charge of said train; (7) that the foreman notified the plaintiff that he was going to uncouple from said train the four cars farthest from the engine and “kick” said cars onto a certain switch track; (8) that the foreman ordered the plaintiff to stop said four cars after they had run in on said switch track; (9) that said foreman did not kick said cars into the switch track or cause the same to be done, but gave to the engineer a “kick” signal and caused the cars to be started and shoved into said track without uncoupling the said four cars from the train; (10) that in obedience to said order of the foreman and in the performance of his duty as switchman and brakeman the plaintiff went on the car farthest from the engine and prepared to set the brake on the forward end of the car; (11) that said foreman knew or ought to have known that the plaintiff was obeying said order and preparing to' set the brake on said car; (12) that said foreman knew or ought to have known that said car was liable to stop suddenly or its speed to be suddenly slacked, and the car violently jerked; (13) that said foreman knew or ought to have known that the car had become, by reason of his not uncoupling said cars, a place of great danger to the plaintiff; (14) that said foreman had ample time to notify the plaintiff that the said cars had not been uncoupled and to warn him of his danger; (15) that the foreman negligently and carelessly failed to notify the plaintiff that the said cars had not been uncoupled, and failed to warn him of the danger; (16) that plaintiff did not know and in the exercise of due care and diligence for his _own safety would not have known that said cars had not been uncoupled and his place on the cars attended with danger; (17) that said cars were suddenly and violently jerked, and by reason of the negligence and carelessness of said foreman in failing to warn the plaintiff, the plaintiff was unable to protect himself against the jerk and was thrown with great violence from the car and was run over and injured.

It is manifest that the primary object of a pleading is fulfilled in this count. It so clearly explains the wrong complained of that no one, lawyer or layman, certainly no one who knew or had explained to him the technical meaning of “kicking cars,” as the phrase is used in railroad circles, could fail to understand just what was claimed. It is- also manifest that it states a very clear case of negligence against the foreman, and brings it home to one who is alleged to have been in the service of the defendant corporation and in charge of a train.

But the defendant insists that it does not state a cause of action under the Employers Liability Act of Indiana, because (a) the facts averred show that the foreman was not in charge of a train; (b) that there is no special order averred, and the negligence is shown to be that of a fellow servant; (c) that the negligence is not so alleged as to show that it was negligence in an act of control, which it is maintained it must be to render the defendant liable under the terms of the Act; and (d) that there are no facts averred showing negligence on the part of the foreman. It is said that the foreman “did not order plaintiff to get on the car, and for aught that appears did not even know that he was on the car;” also that “no facts are stated showing any knowledge by the foreman that a failure to cut off the cars involved any peril to the plaintiff.”

•To the first of these contentions the defendant’s argument cites Thyng v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 156 Mass. 13. The Court decided in that case merely that it was not the negligence of a person in charge of the train by which the person was injured and on which he worked, that caused the accident, and that the statute of Massachusetts could not be applied merely because two cars broke apart which had been previously put together in a switching yard, and because there a conductor of a switching engine had charge of making up freight trains. But the Court expressly says: “A conductor of a switch engine which is drawing several ears under his direction may be for the time in charge of a train consisting of the engine and cars,” and cites Dacey v. Old Colony Railroad, 153 Mass. 112, to that effect. To the same purport are Caron v. Boston & Albany Ry. Co., 164 Mass. 523; Shea v. N. Y. etc. R. Co., 173 Mass. 177, and Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Ross, 169 Ind. 3.

We hold that Lowe was in charge of the train mentioned in the count, and that the allegations of the count that after ordering the plaintiff to stop said cars on the switch track and-telling him that he was going to uncouple them, the foreman gave a “kick” signal to the engineer, but did not uncouple the cars, are sufficient allegations of facts to support an inference of negligence in an act of control, and to bring the case within the Act, especially after verdict. But moreover, we do. not hold that the negligence must be in an act of control. Despite the argument made to the contrary by counsel for defendant, we fail to see that the Supreme Court of Indiana in Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company v. Williams, 168 Ind. 276, did not expressly hold that it would be “a fallacious and untenable” position that “would make the statute meaningless” to hold that “the negligence of one in charge or control of a train for which a liability is imposed” by the Act, must be “negligence in doing some act which is an act of charge or control of a train” rather than merely “a negligent act occurring at a time when the doer of the act is in charge or control of a train.” In the face of this decision a prior decision by the Appellate Court of Indiana or decisions of other courts on different statutes are not important. But in this case we consider the question academic.

As for an averment of knowledge on the part of the foreman that the' plaintiff was on the car, it is implied in the statement that the foreman knew that the plaintiff was “obeying the order” “to stop the cars on the south track, ’ ’ and ‘ to set the brake on the car.” The knowledge of plaintiff’s position need not have been actual, if it was constructive. Clear Creek Stone Co. v. Carmichael, 37 Ind. App. 413.

So, also, is there an averment that, under the circumstances of the kick signal without uncoupling, the car was liable to jerk violently and to become a place of peril to the plaintiff, a fact which the Supreme Court of Indiana in the Nicholas case, supra, practically says indeed is “a matter of common knowledge.’’

We think the circumstances averred sufficiently showed the duty to warrant a general allegation of negligence. C. & E. R. Co. v. Lain, 170 Ind. 84.

As to the objection that such order as is averred was not special, and therefore, under such Indiana decisions as Indianapolis Street Ry. Co. v. Kane, 169 Ind. 25, the statute could not be held to apply, it seems to us to spring from a misconception of what it is necessary to state to make a cause of action under the first paragraph of the Fourth subdivision of Section 1. It is not necessary to show or allege an order of any kind. The order which is alleged in this count is proper to consider as one of the. facts and circumstances which show the duty and the negligence of the foreman, but it is not in itself the basis of the right of recovery in the plaintiff.

In B. & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Little, 149 Ind. 167, in Indianapolis Union Ry. Co. v. Houlihan, 157 Ind. 494, in Thacker v. O., I. & L. Ry. Co., 159 Ind. 82, and in C. I. & I. Ry. Co. vs. Williams, 168 Ind. 276, and in other cases the Supreme Court of Indiana has decided that the first paragraph of the • Fourth subdivision of the Act is complete in itself. In Indianapolis Union Ry Co. v. Houlihan, supra, a part of the language of the Court is: “From the words used and the structure and scope of the Act, we are of the opinion that the concluding clauses of the Fourth Subdivision limit and qualify only the liability expressed in the second part of the fourth subdivision, and that railroad companies are answerable for the negligence-of their servants in charge of signals, telegraph offices, switch yards, shops, round houses, locomotive engines and trains upon their railways to their employes the same as strangers.”

But we must not be understood as expressing an opinion in this case that the order averred and proved was not a special one, nor that under other subdivisions of the Section and under the second part of the Fourth, a case is not stated in the declaration or not proven in the evidence. As we have heretofore said, it is not necessary for us to express an opinion either way on these contentions.

Turning now to the second count filed November 7, 1908, which we have designated B., we find the same allegations of the existence of the statute in question as in Count A. and the same allegations of the employment of the plaintiff and of the' foreman in theswitchyard by the defendant, of the situation of the train and of the foreman’s charge of it. The count, then proceeds: “The plaintiff by order of the fore-man went upon one of the cars to set the brake thereon, * * * and said foreman then and there so negligently and carelessly ran and managed said train that the speed of said train was suddenly slackened and the cars thereof violently jerked; * * *' the plaintiff was then and there in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety * * * and by reason of said negligence and carelessness of the foreman” the plaintiff was injured.

Defendant’s counsel say “the pleading does not make a case within any of the provisions of this Act. ’ ’ We fail to see why it does not. The allegation of the negligence is more general than in count A., but we think, in view of the considerations we have already referred to, they are entirely sufficient both as averring constructive knowledge on the part of the foreman of the dangerous position of the plaintiff and as alleging a negligent management by the foreman of the train.

We do not think it necessary to discuss the question whether any defects in the two counts mentioned were cured by the verdict, for we consider them as good even as against special demurrers. But it is certainly the law of this State, often declared, that many declarations which are defective statements of a cause of action, and which on proper demurrer could not be sustained, are good after verdict. Especially is this true in actions of tort for negligence, where the fault of the declaration is the generality of the statement concerning the negligence. A somewhat elaborate statement of the Illinois decisions on this doctrine can be found in the opinion in Grace & Hyde Co., v. Sanborn, rendered in this court (124 Ill. App. 472), concluding with the quotation of the language of the Supreme Court in Sargent Co. v. Baublis, 215 Ill. 428: ‘‘ On demurrer a declaration is construed against the pleader, but after verdict all intendments and presumptions are in his favor. ’ ’• Tried by this test, even the technical objections suggested by the defendant to the soundness of the counts in question fade away.

The Alabama cases which are cited to show that the foreman’s name should have been mentioned, we do not regard as of binding authority nor approving themselves to right reason. In any event, they could not apply to objections to a declaration raised after verdict.

What we have heretofore said indicates sufficiently our answer to the Third principal question before us —“Was there evidence sufficient to go to the jury to sustain the allegations of any count of the declaration!”; and to the Fifth—“Was the verdict clearly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence!”

The evidence explained (if explanation was needed) the term “kick;” showed the order—whether it were general or special—of the foreman, from which, in connection with the usual course of work in the yard (which there was certainly evidence tending to prove), the knowledge bv- the foreman of the dangerous position of the plaintiff might fairly and legitimately be inférred by the jury; it tended to prove even that the foreman had reason to know that the plaintiff, when the engine would slow down or stop, would be nóar the foremost end of the car; it tended to prove that the plaintiff had reason to suppose that the place would be reasonably safe for him, and that he was therefore in the exercise of due care in taking it, and it tended to prove that he was not notified or warned of any extraordinary danger, and that the foreman did not, although the means were at his hand, uncouple the cars as he had notified the plaintiff he was intending to do. It showed also that the foreman was in charge and control of the train and its movements. We think the jury were justified in the finding, implied by their verdict, that the foreman was guilty of negligence and that the plaintiff was not, and that the foreman was in charge of the train. Such a finding rendered inevitable, under the Act, the conclusion that the defendant was liable.

The defendant maintains, however, that even if the defendant can be held liable, the judgment should be reversed because the damages are so excessive as to show passion and prejudice—so excessive that the error could not be cured by a remittitur. The damages assessed by the jury are very large—much larger undoubtedly than would have been sustained in earlier years, even in such a case, by the Court of last resort in Illinois. But the standards set by that Court have changed in later years, and in view of the terrible nature of the injuries—as- severe as a man could well suffer—we do not feel justified in interfering with the decision of the jury on this ground. The jury were, as we think, properly instructed on the subject of damages, and we must assume that they meant to make them only compensatory, not punitive. The measure of compensation cannot he reduced to the mathematical formula which the appellant’s criticisms suggest. The jury were not bound, even in considering the income of which the plaintiff was likely to be deprived, to estimate it as probably remaining for life, had he not been injured, at the same figure. Nor were they confined to the question of a probable future earning power even.

In considering the contention that the verdict must have been the result of passion and prejudice, we may not overlook the fact that the record shows that it was given at a second trial, and that at the first trial the jury which, like this one, had the plaintiff before them, assessed the damages at forty thousand dollars.

The final matter for us to consider is the question:

“Were there any errors in the instructions to the jury which necessitate a reversal of the judgment?”

We have no hesitation in answering this question in the negative. The most serious objections to the instructions which we find upon examination of them, are that some of them, given at the instance of the defendant, are too favorable for the defendant to be consistent with what we think the correct construction of the Employers Liability Act of Indiana. But of these, of course, the appellant does not and cannot complain.

Its objections to those of which it does complain are hypercritical.

' The first instruction, which advised the jury that the preponderance of evidence in a case is not necessarily determined alone by the number of witnesses testifying to a particular fact or state of facts, but should also take into consideration other matters enumerated, was neither inaccurate nor misleading in this case. Even in the materially different form (which left out the word “also”) in which the general idea was expressed, which was criticised in Ry. Co. v. Lawlor, 229 Ill. 621, we do not know of any case in which it by itself worked a reversal. By the use in this case of the word in the Lawlor case omitted, the instruction seems to avoid the ground upon which the criticism was placed in that case. That the instruction should have misled the jury into believing, to quote from appellant’s brief, that “in determining the right to recover the amount of damages might be considered,” is inconceivable.

Instruction 2 has been frequently approved. See Electric Co. v. Rooney, 138 Ill. App. 275, 294. We have never in this Court commended Instruction 3, but it has been frequently approved by the Supreme Court and its correctness has been thus established. Chicago City Railway Co. v. Fennimore, 199 Ill. 9; see Chicago & Eastern Ill. R. R. Co. v. Fowler, 138 Ill. App. 352, 360 (reversed on another point).

As to instruction 5, we see no objection to it. It has been approved by the Supreme Court and this Court. We do not deem it within the bounds of probability or even possibility that it could have misled the jury. The instructions concerning damages, taken together, furnished the jury with an accurate statement of the law in relation thereto.

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Presiding Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    City of Chicago, Defendant in Error, v. Poney Moore, Plaintiff in Error.
    Gen. No. 16,198.
    1. Ordinances—power of city to prohibit sale of intoxicating liquors. Held, that a city has power to prohibit the sale or giving away of intoxicating liquors in theatres, etc., regardless of whether it has power to authorize the mayor to grant a special permit so to do.
    2. Ordinances—effect where reiterates statute. That an ordinance is a reiteration of a statute does not make the ordinance void.

      3. Ordinances—effect of defective complaint. Even though the complaint filed may be defective, a prosecution for a violation of a city ordinance as a 5th class case is not affected as no written complaint is necessary to authorize such prosecution.
    4. Ordinances—when evidence presumed to support conviction. In default of any bill of exception showing the evidence, it is to be presumed that whatever the complaint, the evidence justified the verdict that the defendant had violated the ordinance and justified the judgment based on such verdict.
    Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Judson F. Going, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1&10.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 29, 1912.
    Louis Greenberg, for plaintiff in error.
    George H. White, for defendant in error; Harry M. Seligman, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice

Brown delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error, Moore, was convicted by a jury of a violation of Section 117 of the Revised Municipal Code of Chicago and his fine assessed by the jury at fifty-five dollars. He sues out this writ of error in an attempt to reverse the judgment for fifty-five dollars and costs against him in favor of the City of Chicago and entered on this verdict. He assigns for error (reversing the order in which his counsel have stated the points):

First. That Section 117 of the Municipal Code is a void ordinance.

Second. That the complaint failed to charge a Violation of Section 117 of the Municipal Code.

The first point is differently stated, however, by him. His assignment of error is: “The ordinance

of the City of Chicago granting special permits to sell intoxicating liquors is void.”

His brief and argument phrases the point in these three forms:

“The Mayor is not given authority to issue special permits to sell intoxicating liquors.”
“The Legislature did not confer authority upon the Mayor to issue special permits to sell intoxicating liquors.”
“Hurd’s Revised Statutes, Section 63, Clause 46” (referring undoubtedly to this Section and Clause in the City and Villages Act) “does not authorize the municipality to pass an ordinance giving the Mayor the power to grant special permits to sell intoxicating liquors. ’ ’

We do not think that the question shown by the language used by counsel for plaintiff in error to be the one he wishes to discuss, arises in this case.

The effect of a permit granted by the Mayor is not in question. The plaintiff in error did not have any permit to sell, void or valid, so far as appears, from the Mayor or Council or from anybody or person whatever.

Section 117 of the Municipal Code is as follows:

“It shall not be lawful for any person to sell or give away any spirituous, vinous, malt or other intoxicating liquors in any theatre, hall, building, structure or premises in which public entertainments are given for gain, nor in any room or rooms connected with the same, without a special permit from the Mayor, under a penalty of not more than one hundred dollars for each offense.”

Whether or not the City Council had power, under the police power or under the City and Villages Act, to pass an ordinance giving the Mayor authority to grant permits to sell or give away spirituous liquors in the places named in this ordinance, it had, we think, power from both of these sources to pass an ordinance forbidding such sale or giving away in these places named. This is what the ordinance did, so far as- we are concerned with it in this ease. It did not cover the ground completely and forbid such sale or gift entirely; but the power to do the greater thing covers the power to do the lesser. It forbade the sale under certain conditions, and it was under those conditions that the verdict and judgment here, in the absence of any bill of exceptions, show that Moore sold or gave away spirituous liquor. Therefore he was guilty under this ordinance. Even if the ordinance is a reiteration of statute law, that does not make it void as an ordinance. Nor do the words in the ordinance, “without a special permit from the Mayor,” whatever the authority or want of authority of the Mayor to grant special permits, prevent the ordinance from containing a valid prohibition when no such permit is granted.

As to the second point, it does not matter whether the written complaint was defective or not. It charged the plaintiff with selling or giving away liquors in violation of Section 117, etc., but in specifying the place as “a hall in the rear of 41 West 31st street,” did not allege that the hall was a place “in which public entertainments are given for gain.”

No written complaint was necessary in this case to authorize its prosecution. It was a case of the fifth class, and could have been prosecuted by the City without any written pleadings if it had chosen to summon instead of to arrest the defendant, (Sec. 49 of the Municipal Court Code). To justify the arrest or a warrant for the arrest, a written complaint had to be made, but the right to make the arrest is not in question here. What is questioned is the validity of the judgment rendered after the defendant was in court and had given a recognizance for his appearance. In default of any bill of exceptions showing the evidence, it is to be presumed that whatever the complaint, the evidence justified the verdict that the defendant had violated the ordinance, and justified the judgment based on said verdict. The suit was not a criminal but a civil one. City of Chicago v. Streeter, 152 Ill. 463. The practice and rules concerning such actions do not differ under the Municipal Court Act from those applicable to such actions before Justices of the Peace before the Municipal Court Act was passed.

This Court, speaking through Judge Moran, in the case of Chicago v. Kenney, 35 Ill. App. 57, very clearly expressed its views concerning the law in a similar ease, and held that however a defendant charged with violating a city ordinance was brought before a magistrate, the magistrate would have jurisdiction of the parties and might proceed to the trial and determination of the case.

In Harbaugh v. City of Monmouth, 74 Ill. 367, the Supreme Court said in relation to a violation of a city ordinance against selling liquor: “It was a matter of no moment whether the complaint was technically correct or not; the real question before the jury was whether there had been a sale by appellant in violation of law, without regard to whether the evidence corresponded with the complaint or not.”

The same case is not entirely without bearing on the validity of the ordinance. The identical question was not involved, but an analogous one seems to have been.

The ordinance, the violation of which was asserted, was against the sale of liquors absolutely. The power given by the Legislature to the City of Monmouth was to prohibit such sale “except for medicinal, mechanical and manufacturing purposes.” The Supreme Court says, p. 370: “Even if it were true, as contended, that the ordinance embraced sales that the Council had» no power to prohibit, we perceive no reason why it may not be enforced to the full extent that the City Council had power to legislate on the subject.”

In the Monmouth ease the City Council was alleged to have gone beyond its power of prohibition; hut the ordinance, it was held, even in such case, was good so far as it fell within that power. In the present case it is alleged, in effect, that the City Council did not go to the full extent of its power. Why is the ordinance not good as far as it goes in that power?

The judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

Affirmed.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Brown

text:
    James Marwick et al., Defendants in Error, v. Maxwell Edgar, Plaintiff in Error.
    Gen. No. 16,205.
    1. Municipal court—what proceedings not subject to review. The action of a judge of the municipal court in setting aside an order entered by another judge thereof while contrary to the rules of the municipal court involves a question of practice, and the action of the judge in setting aside such order will not be reviewed except to prevent a failure of justice.
    2. Municipal court—effect of rules upon question of jurisdiction. Rules adopted by the municipal court do not make or abolish jurisdiction, although they control practice and procedure.
    Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Hosea W. Wells, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1910.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 29, 1912.
    Nathaniel Bacon, for plaintiff in error.

      Frederic P. Vose, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Brown

delivered the opinion of the court.

A judgment against the plaintiff in error and in favor of the defendants in error for one hundred and fifty dollars and costs was entered by the Municipal Court of Chicago on July 7, 1909. The judgment was in a suit of the fourth class on contract. It was em tered by default, the defendant (the plaintiff in error here) having been served with process and duly called, and not appearing either by person or attorney. This judgment was entered by Judge Freeman K. Blake of the Municipal Court.

The Municipal Court Act (Section 211) provides that as there are no stated terms of the Municipal Court, judgments of that Court final in their nature shall be vacated, modified or set aside only upon appeal or writ of error or by a bill in equity, or by a petition to said Municipal Court setting forth grounds for vacating, setting aside or modifying the same which would be sufficient to cause the same to be vacated, set aside or modified by a bill in equity, unless a motion is made to the Municipal Court within thirty days after the entry of the judgment, in which case it may be vacated in the same manner and to the same extent as a judgment of a Circuit Court on a motion made during the term at which the same was rendered in such Circuit Court. It is, however, provided further that all errors in the proceedings in such case which might have been corrected at common law .by the writ of error coram nobis may be corrected by motion, or the judgment may be set aside in the manner provided by law for similar cases in the Circuit Court.

On the fifth day of August, 1909, which was within thirty days of the entry of the judgment, a motion was filed by the defendant, Edgar, in the office of the Clerk of the Municipal Court to vacate the order of judgment and two affidavits filed therewith, one by Edgar and one by his attorney, asserting that the defendant believed he had a meritorious defense to the suit, and that the default was occasioned by the fact that the attorney was called out of town before the suit was reached, and that the defendant being out of the city also did not receive a message from his attorney to him until after the default and judgment were entered.

This motion to vacate was by Chief Justice Olson of the Municipal Court denied on August 12, 1909, on which date it was first brought to the attention of the Court otherwise than by said filing.

August 17, 1909, the defendant Edgar filed a petition addressed to the Municipal Court, referring to the two affidavits above mentioned, and praying that “no further proceedings be had under the judgment rendered against this defendant until the further order of this” (the Municipal) “Court, and that this defendant may be given a trial by jury herein on such terms” as to the Court might seem just, and that the petitioner might have such other and further relief as justice might require..

On August 20, 1909, this petition was denied by Chief Justice Olson in the Municipal Court, and at that time Edgar was fined for contempt of court for making certain remarks in the presence of the Court.

On August 25, 1909, a document was filed by said Edgar in the Municipal Court, purporting to be “an answer to a rule to show cause why he should not be attached for contempt of court,” (although no such rule is shown anywhere in the record), coupled with a motion that the plaintiffs in the case of Marwick et al. v. Edgar might be ruled to show cause, if they could, in writing, within five days after service of notice of a rule on their attorney why a jury trial in that case should not be had.

On August 31, 1909, on a hearing before Chief Justice Olson, the said Chief Justice stated that if said defendant would file a bond to pay any judgment which might be entered against bim in the Municipal Court, the Court would “enter an order vacating the judgment and place the case down for a jury trial before his Honor Judge Wells.”

On September 3, 1909, the following order was entered by Chief Justice Olson:

“This day came the parties to this cause by their attorneys respectively, and thereupon on motion of the defendant and on his filing a bond herein for three hundred dollars as security, it is ordered by the Court that the order of default and judgment thereon entered herein on the 7th day of July, A. D. 1909, be and the same hereby is vacated and set aside, and that the defendant have leave to appear herein and demand a trial by jury herein instanter. It is therefore ordered by the Court that this cause be and the same hereby is postponed and set for trial before Judge Wells on the 21st day of September, A. D. 1909, at 9:30 A. M.”

The next order appearing in the record (and this appears only in the Bill of Exception) is as follows:

“This cause coming on to be heard on the 22nd day of October, 1909, in the City of Chicago, County and State aforesaid, before his Honor Hosea W. Wells, one of the Judges of said Court, Frederick P. Yose by Willard C. McNitt appearing for the plaintiff, and Nathaniel Bacon appearing for the defendant, said cause having been called for trial and the plaintiff having announced that he was ready for trial, but the defendant having objected to a trial on the ground that this Municipal Court of Chicago had no jurisdiction to try the ease, and having been heard on said objection, the Court thereupon gave to said defendant the election of going to trial upon the issues raised in the pleadings or letting the judgment heretofore entered on July 7, Í909, stand as the judgment of this Court, and the defendant thereupon refused to make such election, and if appearing to the Court that the order heretofore entered on September 3rd, 1909, by Ms Honor CMef Justice Olson, setting aside the judgment of July 7th, 1909, was entered more than tMrty days after said judgment, and that the Court had no jurisdiction to enter such an order, the tMrty days having elapsed in wMch the Court had jurisdiction to change, modify and set aside its orders, it is hereby ordered by the Court on motion of plaintiff that the order of September 3rd, A. D. 1909, by Chief Justice Olson setting aside the judgment of July 7, A. D. 1909, is set aside, vacated and held for naught and expunged from the record in said cause.
Hosea W. Wells,
Judge.”

The Bill of Exceptions or Additional Statement of Facts presented by the plaintiffs and signed by Judge Wells shows that after the order of September 3, 1909, entered by Judge Olson, namely, on October 19, 1909, the cause appeared on the trial call of the Municipal Court before Judge Wells, and it appeared that an immediate trial could be had before Judge Gremmill. Thereupon the cause was transferred to Chief Justice Olson for re-assignment, who thereupon assigned the cause to Judge Gremmill’s court for trial. On October 22nd the cause again appeared upon the trial call of Judge Wells, and it appearing to- Judge Wells that the cause had not been disposed of, but had been re-assigned by the CMef Justice to Judge Wells’ Branch of the Court for trial, it was again called for trial. Both sides appeared, and the Counsel for defendant objected to a trial of said cause, stating for reason that the Court had no jurisdiction to try said cause,, and for further reason that Judge Gremmill had on October 20th refused to hear said cause on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to try it. It was stated by the Court that no order had been entered of record by Judge Gremmill. Counsel for the defendant then presented a document to the Court wMch declared that the defendant “acting under duress,” “submitted to the calm consideration and decision of the Court whether the decision of said Court rendered by his Honor Judge Gemmill in said cause ought to be rendered or amended or changed in any way except by the Appellate Court of Illinois according to law,” and that the defendant “protested against being compelled to further appear in said court in said cause.”

It was following these proceedings that the order of Judge Wells last shown was entered.

A statement of the “Questions of Law” involved and the decisions of the Court thereon incorporated in the “Bill of Exceptions,” shows that Judge Wells held that Judge Olson had no jurisdiction to enter the order of September 3rd, that it was void, and that he, Judge Wells, had power to vacate it. A further question was stated thus: “Was the action of Judge Wells in setting aside the order entered by Chief Justice Olson in violation of Buie 5 of the Municipal Court?”

Buie 5, of which the Municipal Court Act requires us to take judicial notice, is as follows:

“One or more judges shall be designated by the Chief Justice to hear motions in the First District, and all motions in civil cases pending in said district, whether of course or contested, except motions for new trial and motions subsequent thereto or motions arising during the actual trial of a case, and except motions to vacate or set aside any order or finding made by some other judge, shall be heard and disposed of by such motion judge or judges. These last mentioned motions shall be heard only by the judge who made the • order or finding sought to be set aside, if such judge is hearing'eivil cases in the District, otherwise the motion judge may hear such motions. ’ ’

The assignment of error in this Court is that “The Municipal Court of Chicago, the Hon. Hosea W. Wells, , Associate Judge presiding, erred in making the order and in entering the order dated October 22,1909, as set forth,” etc.

The record we have detailed is certainly peculiar and the proceedings in several respects irregular.

Two facts, however, stand out beyond question. The defendant had no legally sufficient excuse for his nonappearance on July 7,1909, and after he had procured the order of September 3, 1909, setting the judgment of July 7th aside, he was much more desirous to take advantage of technicalities to avoid a trial than to submit to a trial on the merits.

It is true that Buie 5 of the Municipal Court seems to render irregular an order of Judge Wells setting an order of Chief Justice Olson aside, but so it seems to render irregular an order of Judge Olson setting Judge Blake’s judgment aside. Buies of Court do not make or abolish jurisdiction, although they control practice and procedure. If the order of September 3rd was void, as Judge Wells held, then the judgment of July 7th is in force, and there is no error shown in it. If the order of September 3rd was not void, then the cause was pending in the Municipal Court before Judge Wells on October 22nd, and he had jurisdiction to set aside and vacate the order of September 3rd. If in doing so he acted irregularly or erroneously under the rules of the Municipal Court, it was a matter of practice in said Court that he was in error about, and the Municipal Court Act says that we shall not interfere to give relief in such a case “unless such relief is necessary to prevent a failure of justice.”

We are not satisfied that any injustice has been done or that the judgment resulted from “substantial errors of said Municipal Court.” It is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.


text:
    G. D. Cohn, Plaintiff in Error, v. Adams Express Company, Defendant in Error.
    Gen. No. 16,251.
    1. Common carriers—when law of sister state governs. Where a shipment is made in New York, and no part of the transaction takes place in Illinois, the law of New York will govern the contract relations of the parties and the right of the carrier to limit its common law liability unless the law of New York be superseded by the higher authority of a federal enactment.
    2. Comity—effect of decisions of courts of sister states. If a decision of the court of last resort of a sister state involved the construction of a federal statute binding in all states such decision will not necessarily be adopted as correctly interpreting the law, unless the reasoning thereof is approved by the courts of this state.
    Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1910.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 29, 1912.
    R. G. McDonald, for plaintiff in error.
    Charles B. Elder, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Brown

delivered the opinion of the court.

Gr. D. Cohn was in November, 1906, engaged in the clothing business in Cleveland, Ohio, under the name of the “Fitwell Clothing Parlors.” In that month he ordered from the Leon Mann Company of New York a quantity of rain coats. Their value, or at least their cost price, was $228. December 3, 1906, two packages containing the goods in question were delivered in New York by the Mann Company to the Adams Express Company, consigned to the plaintiff at Cleveland, Ohio. The goods in one package were worth $126.50, and those in the other $161.50. The first package was duly received by the plaintiff, the consignee. The second one was never received by him, and the Adams Express Company is unable to state what became of it. The Adams Express Company on October 3, 1907, made a tender of $50 to settle the claim for the lost goods, but it was declined and this suit was brought in the Municipal Court of Chicago. The plaintiff claimed at least $161.50. It was agreed by the parties that it could be considered that the defendant had made a tender of $50 and interest and paid the same into court. It was conceded at the trial that if as a matter of law the plaintiff was not entitled to recover more than $50 and interest, it would be proper to direct a verdict for the plaintiff for that amount and to enter judgment for that amount without costs. The trial Judge, holding the law to be as indicated, therefore instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not recover more than $50, and interest, and the defendant having agreed that the interest up to the time of the tender amounted to $3.50, a verdict for $53.50 in favor of the plaintiff was rendered and judgment was entered for that amount. This judgment the plaintiff attacks in this Court, asserting that in peremptorily instructing the jury to assess the plaintiff’s damages at only $53.50 the Municipal Court erred.

But one question is really involved: Does the law of New York govern the rights of the parties in this controversy? It is conceded by counsel for plaintiff that by the law of New York, unless said law was superseded as to interstate shipments by Section 20 of the Inter-State Commerce Act of the United States (commonly known as the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act, being Amendment of June 29, 1906, to the Act of Congress of February 4, 1887), the plaintiff could not recover in the Courts of New York more than fifty dollars under the circumstances shown by the evidence, and to be hereinafter stated, as to an asserted limitation of liability by the defendant.

It is, however, maintained by the plaintiff that for two reasons the law of New York does not govern:

First. Because it is against our public policy and in violation of the Act of March 27, 1874, entitled “An Act to Fix the Liability of Common Carriers Beceiving Property for Transportation,” which reads as follows:

“Be it enacted, etc. That whenever any property is received by a common carrier to be transported from one place to another, within or without this State, it. shall not be lawful for such carrier to limit his common law liability safely to deliver such property at the place to which the same is to be transported by any stipulation or limitation expressed in the receipt given for such property.”

Second. Because Section 20 of the Inter-State Commerce Act of the United States, hereinbefore mentioned, overrides, if it does not change, so far as interstate shipments are concerned, the law as declared by the Courts of New York concerning the limitation of liability by carriers. That Section provides :

“That any common carrier, railroad or transportation company, receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed. Provided, that nothing in this Section shall deprive the holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.”

In the case at bar the shipment was under the following circumstances and terms: One Hindleman was in charge of the shipping department of Leon Mann Company. He delivered the two packages in question to a driver of the Adams Express Company and knew that each one contained goods worth more than fifty dollars. The driver was the one usually receiving goods from him and Leon Mann Company. A book of printed Express Company receipts, with blanks to be filled on occasion, had been kept and used by Hindleman and the Mann Company in the transaction of business between them and the Express Company for two or three years. Hindleman had never read “what is on the back of these receipts” and did not know that there was a limitation of the amount of liability on the back.. There was, however, (in small print) such a limitation on the same page as the receipt proper, and the entire printed portion of the receipt was duplicated on the reverse side of the page.

The printed provision referred to Was as follows:

“In consideration of the rate charged for carrying said property, which is regulated by the value thereof and is based upon a valuation of not exceeding fifty dollars unless a greater value is declared, the shipper agrees that the value of said property is not more than fifty dollars unless a greater value is stated herein, and that the Company shall not be liable in any event for more than the value so stated nor for more than fifty dollars if no value is stated herein. ’ ’

Concerning this clause and the increased charge in case of increased valuation, Leon Mann of the Mann Company had talked with an agent of the Adams Express Company, by which the Mann Company shipped considerable freight. This increased charge was at the rate of ten cents additional on every $100 or fraction thereof over $50. If no value was stated and where the value stated did not exceed $50, the rate was $1.75 per 100 pounds, which was the rate fixed for the package herein involved. It was handled as ordinary freight. Where the value is declared to be over $50, extra precautions against loss are taken by the Express Company. The receipt bore in pronounced type at its head the statement, “The Company’s charge is based upon the value of the property, which must be declared by the shipper.”

Hindleman filled in the blanks in the receipt in question before delivering the packages to the Express Company, writing in the date, “12/03/06,” the description as “Two Pkges” and the name of the consignee. When the goods were delivered, the driver for the Express Company signed his name in the proper column as receiving the same from the Company. Nothing was said about the value.

The shipment was made in New York, and no part of the transaction even was to be made in Illinois. It is settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State that under these conditions the law as declared in New York will govern the decisions of our courts unless superseded by the higher authority of ‘a valid Federal enactment. The law of Illinois in particulars in which it differs from that of New York is not therefore in question. Coats v. C. R. I. & Pacific R. R. Co., 239 Ill. 154, and cases therein cited.

Under the law of Illinois it may be that it would have been necessary to prove the actual knowledge and assent of the shipper to the limitation on the receipt to make it binding on him. It was not so necessary under the law of New York, as is abundantly proven by the evidence concerning the law of New York in the record and as is conceded by the plaintiff in error. The giving and accepting of the receipt in question was, under the law as declared by the Courts of New York, in the absence of fraud or imposition, the contract of shipment, and the rights of the parties were determined by its terms if they were not contrary to law.

Nor “since the merchandise in this case was received by the appellant and the contract for its carriage made in another State/7 does the “restriction contained in Chapter 27 of the Revised Statutes of this State concerning the right of a carrier to limit its common law liability apply. Ellison v. Adams Express Company, 245 Ill. 410, p. 413.

It might be noted that in the Ellison case a similar transaction and loss were held by the Supreme Court to give no right of recovery whatever to the shipper, on the ground that the delivery by him of the goods to the carrier without valuation was intentionally in violation of the Inter-State Commerce Act, in order to secure the lower rate for carriage. The case differs, however,' from that at bar, in that there was in it evidence of an express intention not to state the value, and of instructions from the consignor to the shipping clerk to that effect.

The only question left in the case at bar therefore is as to the effect on the limitation as to value of the 20th Section of the Inter-State Commerce Act, hereinbefore quoted.

When the briefs and arguments for the respective parties were filed in this cause, the Municipal Court of the City of New York had decided in Greenwald v. Weir, that this Section did not change the law of New York as to the right of the carrier to limit or fix the valuation of the shipment, but referred only to the additional liability imposed by the Act on the initial carrier for losses on connecting lines. This decision had been reversed by the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of New York in Greenwald v. Weir (111 New York Supplement, 235), which held—one of the three Judges dissenting—that the provision of the Hepburn Act involved was general in its operation and allowed no limitation of liability as to value. This decision of the Appellate Term had been in turn reversed by the-Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York for the First Department. Greenwald v. Weir, 115 New York Supplement, 311. The Appellate Division unanimously held that the only “liability imposed” by the Section of the Hepburn Act in question was a new liability on the initial carrier for a loss occurring on the line of a connecting carrier, and that it was merely exemption from the liability thus “imposed,” for which the- carrier was forbidden to contract with the shipper.

The cause was carried by the shipper to the New York Court of Appeals, where it was pending/ when the Briefs and Arguments were filed herein. Counsel for the plaintiff in error said in their argument that they confidently expected that the court of last resort in New York would in turn reverse the Appellate Division. This expectation, however, was disappointed. In Gfreenwald v. Barrett, 199 New York Beports, 170 (a change in the Presidency of the Express Company interested accounting for the difference in the entitlement of the case), the New York Court of Appeals, June 17, 1910, affirmed by a unanimous court the decision of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, holding that it “was obvious that the purpose of the provision of the Hepburn Act was merely to render the initial carrier in the case of interstate transportation over connecting lines liable to the lawful holder of its receipt or bill of lading for any loss or injury to the property shipped, whether such loss or injury occurred after the goods had passed out of the hands of the initial carrier or not, and to prevent interstate carriers from exempting themselves from liability for the loss of property or damage thereto after it had passed into the hands of another carrier to be transported to its destination,” and that “the language of the enactment did not disclose any intent to abrogate the right of common carriers to regulate their charges for carriage by the value of the goods, or to agree with the shipper upon, a valuation of the property carried.”

If we are to consider the effect of the Hepburn Act on the law of New York as settled by the Courts of New York, this is in itself conclusive, without reference to its soundness in reason, as it is the utterance of the Court of last resort of that State. It is argued, however, with force, that as the question involves the construction of a Federal Statute, binding in all the States, the decisions and opinions on it of the Courts of New York are valuable in the Courts of Illinois only for the reasoning they contain.

Trying them by this test, however, we come to the same conclusion. The reasoning of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York and of the New York Court of Appeals seems to us sound. But it is not the only high authority to the same effect.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the Supreme Court of New Jersey have' decided the question in the same way. Bernard v. Adams Express Co., 205 Mass. 254; Travis v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 79 N. J. Law 83. These cases were decided before the opinion in Greenwald v. Barrett was handed down by the New York Court of Appeals, but the reviewing Court in each of them approves of the decision of the Appellate Division in that case and of the opinion of Mr. Justice Scott therein.

It follows that we hold the judgment of the Municipal Court of Chicago correct, and it is affirmed.

Affirmed.


author: Mr. Justice Smith

text:
    Paul Smolikowski, Defendant in Error, v. Frank J. Laibe, Plaintiff in Error.
    Qen. No. 15,348.
    1. Municipal court—when two judgments not shown against defendant. Held, under the record in this ease that the first judgment rendered against the defendant was set aside and that only one judgment remained of record against him.

      2. Pleading—effect of filing general issue upon pending demurrer. If a demurrer is pending and the defendant files a plea of the general issue to the whole declaration he thereby waives such demurrer, and it is not error to enter judgment without disposing of such demurrer.
    3. Pleading—when non-disposition of dermrrer cannot he complained of. Where there is no bill of exceptions and so far as the record shows the defendant went to trial without a demurrer to a part of a declaration being disposed of, he will not be heard to complain of the action of the court in rendering judgment against Mm without disposing of such demurrer.
    4. Abatement—when substitution of plaintiffs proper. Held, that upon the death of the original plaintiff in tMs action the substitution made was proper under section 23 of chapter 1 of the Revised Statutes.
    5. Interest—when allowance upon note proper. After the maturity of a note which does not bear interest an. allowance of interest at the statutory rate is proper.
    Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Heard in tMs court at the October term, 1909.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 29, 1912.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme. Court (Making opinion final).
    J. W. Sutton, for plaintiff in error.
    Thomas J. O’Hare, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Smith

delivered the opinion of the pourt.

This was a suit by V. Przewlocki for the use of the plaintiff, here defendant in error, against the defendant, here the plaintiff in error, on a promissory note as follows:'

“$800 • Borne, Dec. 23rd, 1889.
Within five years from date I promise to pay to the order of Very Bev. V. Przewlocki, Superior General of the Congregation of the Besurrection, the sum of eight hundred (800) Dollars, without interest, value received.
Attest David Pennesy. " P. J. Laibe.”

On August 18th .the defendant filed a demurrer to the declaration. On August 19th judgment was entered against the defendant by default. On August 26,1903, on motion of the plaintiff, it is said because of errors in spelling some of the names of the parties, the judgment of August 19th was vacated and set aside. Default of the defendant was taken and judgment entered against him. On September 19, 1903, on a stipulation of the parties, “the judgment heretofore on August 19, 1903, rendered herein” was set aside and vacated and plaintiff given leave to file an additional declaration herein “instanter.” On the same day the plaintiff filed an amended declaration. On October 2nd the defendant filed a plea of the general issue with an affidavit of merits to the whole of the plaintiff’s demand; also a plea of set-off for services rendered' by the defendant to the plaintiff. Various motions were made and orders followed" pertaining to a bill of particulars. On March 27,1906, the case was called for trial and dismissed for want of prosecution. On April 12, 1906, on stipulation the said order of dismissal and judgment entered thereon was vacated, and the cause reinstated and placed on the trial call. On May 25, 1906, the case was again called for trial. The death of Przewlocki was suggested of record, and an order entered that Paul Smolikowski be substituted as plaintiff and amendments made accordingly. The issues were submitted to a jury, who found for the plaintiff and assessed the damages at the sum of $1,225.75, and the Court entered judgment against the defendant therefor, and February 18, 1909, the defendant sued out this writ of error.

We do not agree with the defendant that there are now two judgments against the defendant in this case, one of August 26, 1903, and one of May 25, 1906. It is manifest that the “judgment heretofore rendered” that was set aside and vacated by the order of September 19, 1903, was the only judgment then of record in the case, that of August 26, 1903, and that the parties so understood and intended, and the date of August 19th in the order of September 19, 1903, was clearly a clerical mistake.

It is claimed it was error to enter the judgment of May 25, 1906, because there was at the time an undisposed of demurrer to the original declaration, and the counts filed September 19, 1903, were additional counts and not an amended declaration. Even if it be considered that the said counts so filed were additional counts, the defendant’s position cannot be sustained, for he filed a plea of the general issue to the whole declaration, thereby waiving the demurrer. I. C. R. R. Co. v. Patterson, 69 Ill. 650. It may also be observed that there is no bill of exceptions, and so far as the record shows the defendant went to trial on these pleadings, and he would not be heard here on this objection. Devine v. C. C. Ry. Co., 237 Ill. 278.

Complaint is made of the substitution of the plaintiff on the death of Przewlocki. This was the proper procedure under Section 23, Chapter 1, (Abatement) of the Eevised Statutes.

The defendant claims that the jury allowed interest at the legal rate of five per centum per annum from the date the note became due to the day of the verdict. The note by its terms was without interest. The allowing of interest is urged as contrary to the terms of the contract, and therefore error. Interest is the creature of the statute. Schwitters v. Springer, 236 Ill. 271, and cases there cited. The defendant agreed to pay eight hundred dollars on or before December 23, 1894. He did not pay the- same, and therefore violated his contract. Under such circumstances interest from the maturity of the note is allowed in the nature of damages for the detention of the debt and is governed by Section 2, Chapter 74 (Interest) Eevised Statutes, providing that five per centum per annum shall be allowed o.n promissory notes after they become due.

The judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.