text:
    Richard Haaff, by J. J. Haaff, Appellee, v. Rea Hart and B. B. Page, Appellants.
    Gen. No. 6,602.
    1. Mines and minerals, § 66

      —what is liability of quarry owners for injuries to pedestrian falling i/nto excavation or unprotected opening. The owners of a stone quarry cannot make an excavation or leave openings unprotected near a private way devoted to public use, without liability for injuries sustained by pedestrians falling into them.
    2. Roads and bridges, § 24

      —when existence of public way is question for jury. Testimony that a well-worn path existed along a fence built around a quarry and that the path was used by the public in general, although contradicted by the defendant’s witnesses, equal in number, and partially contradicted by photographs introduced in evidence, is sufficient to warrant leaving the question of the existence of a public way to the jury. Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. Robert K. Welsh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 4, 1919.
    Fisher, North, Welsh & Linscott, for appellants.
    J. E. Goembel and Roy F. Hall, for appellee.

      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

   Mr. Justice Carnes

delivered the opinion of the court.

In April, 1916, and for years prior thereto, the appellants, Hart and Page, owned, operated and controlled a stone quarry in the City of Rockford, Illinois. They had a large, deep excavation with a perpendicular wall at their property line, and maintained a fence along the side of it to protect people on the adjoining land from falling over the precipice. For some time prior to April 17, 1916, there was a “v” shaped hole in the ground extending under the fence a little from the pit onto the adjoining land. On that day Richard Haaff, the appellee, in the evening, was with a companion going from one point to another in the city walking on the adjoining land near the fence when he fell into that hole and to the bottom of the pit, receiving severe injuries. He was a stranger to the location and did not know of the hole before he fell. He brought this action on the case and had a verdict and judgment of $5,000, from which this appeal is prosecuted. Appellants’ counsel say they stand on one proposition: That the court erred in not directing a verdict for the defendants, that under the evidence there is no liability, and the case should be reversed without remanding; that they do not care to have it reversed to be retried.

The controlling question to which counsel for both sides principally devote their briefs is whether there had been sufficient public travel along this course to evidence a temporary devotion to public use.

The declaration charged as negligence that the defendants had made an excavation extending west to their property line taking out stone to a depth of 90 feet below the surface of the earth, leaving a perpendicular wall; that there was and had been for a long time on the land of another adjoining said excavation an open way on which there was a path used by the public and by a large number of persons daily for many years, which use was well known to the defendants; that the defendants carelessly failed and neglected to properly guard the west line of the excavation and to properly and safely fence the same so persons using said path would be protected from falling into the excavation; but that the defendants allowed a large hole to become washed from said excavation to and across said open way and path so that one walking upon the path might step into the hole and fall down the west side of the excavation; that said hole had been there for a long time but was not known to the plaintiff. A demurrer to the declaration was overruled, and the general issue was pleaded.

The court instructed the jury, at the instance of the defendants, that the fact that others had at times passed along the place in question prior to April 17, 1916, did not of itself give the plaintiff the right to do so unless such use by other persons had been so general and of such length of time as to ripen into a permissive public use; that the defendants were under no duty to protect their stone quarry from any person or persons who were idlers, or were there at the time in question for their own private purposes, or to satisfy mere idle curiosity, or for the purpose of loitering; and if the plaintiff was not at the time in question on a pathway or roadway that had previously been used by the public for a path of travel or thoroughfare, they should find the defendants not guilty; that even though the defendants were negligent in permitting the hole to exist, still the plaintiff was bound to exercise ordinary care and caution for his own safety; and if the plaintiff at the time was using the premises not upon a pathway commonly used and which had been used by the public, then the plaintiff assumed all the risk of going and being upon the land which would be occasioned by the hole in question; that no failure on the part of the defendants to prohibit the use of the strip of land in question by the public could be construed as an invitation to the public to use it for a highway; that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the strip of land where he was walking was used as a passageway by the public, and that such fact was known or, by the exercise of ordinary care, would have been known to the defendants; that the defendants owed no duty to any persons walking along the land on the west side of the quarry unless the public used the same as a pathway or highway to go back and forth on their lawful business; and the defendants owed no duty to a person who went upon the land in question without invitation or consent, either express or implied, of the owners or occupants of the same; and if there was no pathway which had for some time been used by the public adjacent to the hole in question, the plaintiff entered upon the premises at his own peril, and there could be no liability on the part of the defendants ; that the burden was on the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time in question there existed a path which had been open for some period of time to the. use of the public as and for a passageway, and that the public had so used it, and that this fact was known to the defendants, or, by the exercise of ordinary care, would have been known.

The instructions as a whole informed the jury that the strip of land in question could not become a public highway or public place of travel from the mere fact that idlers and trespassers frequented it, but that it might become a place of public travel by continued use by the public in walking along there in passing from one public street to another in the city; that the defendants were under no obligation to make the place safe for trespassers or idlers, but if the property had been for a considerable time used by the public as a path going from one place to another, and the defendants knew that fact, they were under a duty to exercise care not to make it unsafe. There is no complaint that the court erred in giving or refusing instructions, and no claim that the declaration, if proven, does not make a case for the plaintiff. The questions of law are familiar to the profession except perhaps the application of principles to excavations and dangerous places near a private way used by the public. The Appellate Court of the First District said, without citing authorities, in Pisko v. United Breweries Co., 181 Ill. App. 542; “There is no logical difference between dangerous ‘excavations adjoining highways and those adjoining much traveled and commonly used private ways.’ ” And it adds that the cases cited in the arguments of both parties agree in that position. In speaking of the same subject in a note in 26 L. R. A. 686, the author says if the circumstances have been such as to amount to a devotion of the property temporarily to the public use, care must be taken not to make it unsafe. “Nothing which amounts to a trap can be placed where the public has been in the habit of resorting. ’ ’ An extensive review of the authorities may be found in that note, and while, as the author suggests, they may not be in entire harmony, we are of the opinion that the law is as indicated by the holdings of the trial court in overruling the demurrer to the declaration and in instructions to the jury. A further discussion and review of the authorities is found in 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 733, mostly devoted to excavations and obstructions near a public highway; but it is there again noted that where the public passes over private property for a long time with the implied permission of the owner, or those in control of the same, and where it might be said that a portion of the property was temporarily devoted to public use, the owner, or those in control, cannot, without liability, make excavations or leave openings unprotected so close to the line of such way as to render travel thereon unsafe.

A large number of witnesses were called by each party on the question whether there was a path that had been for a long time used by the public along this fence line where appellee was injured. It appears without contradiction that there was another path or road parallel to the one in question and quite a distance from it that could be used and was much used for public travel in going to and from places which might be reached by the use of this route along the fence; that from time to time many people were seen along and near this fence line, but whether idlers and curiosity seekers, or a part of the public using that line for travel in going from place to place, is the question raised in reading all the evidence. If the testimony of appellee’s witnesses is believed, that course had for a long time been used by pedestrians in going from one place to another in the city, and such, use was evidenced not only by the fact that people had been seen by the witnesses so traveling, but also there was a marked path worn by the feet of the travelers along that fence line. Appellants ’ witnesses testified that there was no path visible at that place; that it was not used by the traveling public except as they might go there from motives of curiosity. In short, there was a direct conflict in the evidence, and whether there was a passageway and path at that place depends upon which witnesses are believed. There is little difference in the number testifying on each side of this proposition. If appellee’s witnesses are credited, there was a course of public travel there that brought the case within the rule of law fixing liability on appellants for the injury. It clearly was not a condition of testimony warranting the trial court in directing a verdict for the defendants; neither is it a condition of evidence warranting our reversing the case with a finding that the facts are as claimed by appellants. There is no question as to the extent of the injury, or the amount of damages awarded.

Appellants suggest that the evidence does not sustain the allegation of plaintiff’s due care.for his own safety, but there is no ground for argument that the evidence so far fails as to warrant the trial court’s directing a verdict, or this court’s reversing without remanding on that ground. Photographs of the situation are in evidence, and when they are considered along with the other testimony on the question of the path there may be some room for contention that the question whether there was general public travel along that line should be submitted to another jury. But as appellants do not desire that, we have only considered whether on this record the judgment should be reversed with a finding of facts; and being of the opinion that it should not and cannot be done, the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Carnes

license: Public Domain

text:
    Charles L. Schultz, Appellee, v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 6,613.
    1. Damages, § 117

      —when verdict for personal injuries is excessive. A verdict for $13,000 for injuries necessitating an operation to remove a portion of the small intestines is considered excessive, in view of evidence showing that the plaintiff spent only one month in the hospital, that he made a good recovery, and controverted testimony on his ability to work.

      2. Evidence, § 22

      —what not judicially noticed. The Appellate Court will not take judicial notice that the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company is engaged chiefly in interstate commerce and that intrastate commerce was only incidental.
    3. Evidence, § 437

      —when hypothetical question improper as inapplicable to facts. In an action for personal injuries, by which the plaintiff has been compelled to have a portion of his intestines removed, it is erroneous to ask a hypothetical question assuming a person who has had no trouble with his bowels, when plaintiff has testified to having had diarrhea regularly before the accident.
    4. Railroads, § 697

      —when evidence as to failure to have air “coupled up” admissible under declaration. Evidence that the defendant railroad company did not have the air “coupled up” on its train is admissible, under an allegation in an action for personal injuries received at a grade crossing charging that the defendant negligently, carelessly and improperly operated and conducted its train.
    5. Railroads, § 773a

      —when instruction on right of recovery for. injuries because of failure to keep air coupled up is erroneous. In an action for personal injuries sustained in a grade crossing accident, it is erroneous to charge that the plaintiff cannot recover “solely” because of the defendant’s failure, if any, to have the air on its train coupled up, as this infers that such failure was a material factor to be considered, one element going to make up the negligence charged.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Arthur W. De Selm, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 4, 1919.
    O’Donnell, Donovan & Brat, for appellant; Winston, Strawn & Shaw, of counsel.

      Harry C. O’Brien and Pence B. Oer, for appellee; David A. Orebaugh, of counsel.

      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

   Mr. Justice Carnes

delivered the opinion of the court.

Charles L. Schultz, the appellee, 50 years old, in the employ of Timroth Teaming Company, a truck driver, in September, 1916, drove a heavy truck onto the tracks of the appellant railroad company at a street crossing in the City of Joliet, where he came in collision with an engine and was severely injured. He brought this action on the case, charging in his declaration of three counts; (1) improper running and operation of the engine; (2) carelessly running the engine across the highway with crossing gates open; and (3) carelessly leaving the crossing gates open, leading Tiim to believe that he would be in no danger in going upon the tracks. He alleged in each count that his employer was not operating under or subject to the terms and provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act [the Act of 1913 as amended in 1915, Callaghan’s 1916 St. Supp. [¶ 5475(1) et seq.], and that he, himself, was at the time in the exercise of due care for his own safety. The general issue was pleaded.

He introduced evidence supporting the charges of appellant’s negligence and the allegations of his own care. Appellant’s evidence is in direct conflict therewith, and supports its theory that the occurrence was the result of appellee’s carelessness in driving upon the track while its servants were in the exercise of ordinary care in handling the engine. A reading of the record leaves much room for question whether appellee’s allegations of appellant’s negligence and his own care are either of them sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. Giving weight to the fact that the jury and trial judge were better able than ourselves to judge of the credibility of witnesses that testified before them, we only say that the evidence on those points was so conflicting and doubtful that a verdict for appellee should only be permitted to stand on a record otherwise free from material error.

Appellee’s injury required a serious surgical operation in the removal of a portion of his small intestines. He testified that he had ever since been unable to work. He was able to go home from the hospital in less than a month. The physicians who performed the operation testify that he made a good recovery, and there is apparently credible medical testimony that there is nothing in his present condition which should prevent him from performing manual labor. His counsel only claim here that he is probably permanently disabled. He had a verdict and judgment for $13,000. We are inclined to the opinion that because of the unusual character of the operation and the impression made on laymen by its description, the verdict was much larger than it would have been for an equally damaging injury of some kind more familiar to the members of a jury, and more readily understood by them.

It is claimed by appellant, and practically conceded by appellee, that the Timroth Teaming Company, appellee’s employer, was engaged in an extrahazardous business as defined by section 3 of the Compensation Act [Callaghan’s 1916 St. Supp. ¶ 5475(3)], and that its election to be bound by the act is conclusively presumed in the absence of proof of rejection of its provisions in the manner there specified. Appellee undertook to prove his allegations that it had rejected those provisions, but there is no evidence of notice to its employees of its election; therefore, it is claimed by appellant that on this record we are to presume it was so bound. It is agreed by counsel if appellee and his employer and appellant were each subject to the act, there could be no recovery in this action, on the authority of Keeran v. Peoria, B. & C. Traction Co., 277 Ill. 413, and Friebel v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 280 Ill. 76, 16 N. C. C. A. 390. But appellee’s counsel say there is still a right of recovery here under the second paragraph of section 29 of the Act [Callaghan’s 1916 St. Supp. ¶ 5475(29)] if appellant was not so subject, and they add, “the sole question to be now determined, therefore, is whether appellant was subject to the act.” They insist that appellant was not because they say it was an interstate carrier and subject to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, unless its servants, whose negligence it is claimed caused the injury, were at the time engaged in intrastate commerce, and they argue it is sufficient that the record shows that appellant was generally engaged in interstate commerce, because they say if at this particular time its servants were engaged in intrastate commerce, the burden was on appellant to show that fact. It is not claimed that the evidence shows appellant is a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce, but it is insisted no such evidence is necessary, because it is said the court should judicially know that fact. They cite St. Louis Bridge & Tunnel R. Co. v. People, 127 Ill. 627, where the court, in speaking of certain railroads, said it would take judicial notice of the fact that most of them are long lines extending to considerable distances through the State; that the number of trains and bulk of traffic passing over them daily is comparatively limited; and Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Jenkins, 174 Ill. 398, where it is said to be the duty of courts to take “judicial notice of the general business affairs of life, and of the manner in which ordinary railroad business is conducted, and of the every-day practical operation of them”; and cases in the State courts of Kansas and Texas announcing general principles in a measure supporting their contention. The only case cited in which the direct question is decided is State v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 212 Mo. 658, where it was held that courts would take judicial notice of that fact. We know of no other reported case where that question has been discussed by the court. The authorities are numerous on the question of what courts will and will not take judicial notice of; so numerous that they are not in entire accord. Courts take judicial notice of certain geographical facts, like the location of a river, and that it is navigable. Following that principle they have taken notice of the location of railroads within the State, and sometimes beyond the State, and to some extent the method of operating trains on those roads. These are geographical and physical facts. It does not necessarily follow that such notice should be taken of the kind and character of business carried on by the owners of the roads. Whether a corporation is engaged in interstate commerce is sometimes a difficult question to answer, as a reference to cases cited and discussed in 12 Corpus Juris, page 121, will show. There can hardly be a rule that courts will take judicial notice in easy cases and require proof in hard ones. In the present case we are asked not only judicially know that appellant is engaged in interstate commerce, but to further know that it is engaged in it to such an extent that intrastate commerce would be an exception in its course of business, and therefore to presume that at the time in question it was not engaged in intrastate commerce. Some railroad corporations are principally engaged in interstate com-' merce, and others are principally, but not entirely, engaged in intrastate commerce. We are of the opinion that we cannot take judicial notice that appellant was engaged in interstate commerce, and much less can we assume that intrastate commerce was only an incident to its general business. But as there are other sufficient reasons requiring a reversal of the judgment, and as the matter need not be left without evidence on another trial, we will not undertake such an extended examination and discussion of principles and authorities as we would deem necessary were the result to depend on that decision.

Appellee to prove that his present condition was caused by the injury introduced an expert witness, who was asked to assume a person “whose stomacb and bowels had never given him any trouble before”. The question was objected to because it assumed the plaintiff never had stomach or bowel trouble, which was contrary to the evidence, and the objection overruled. That ruling is urged as error because appellee had testified that “before the accident every morning he did have a little diarrhea, but it came from drinking so much water uptown”; and also testified that he had a little diarrhea the morning he was hurt, and had had it before from drinking water. One of the conditions that he complains of since the injury is diarrhea. We think it was error to permit the assumption in the hypothetical question that he had not been troubled with it before the injury. Appellee’s counsel say it was not important because the disorder before the injury was not an organic trouble, but it would have been easy to frame a question strictly according to the facts, leaving the expert to judge whether they were important.

Testimony was admitted over appellant’s objection that the “air on defendant’s train was not connected or coupled up.” It is argued that this evidence was improperly admitted because there was no such charge in the declaration. We are inclined to the opinion that the general charge in the first count that the defendant “negligently, carelessly and improperly ran, operated, propelled and conducted one of its said engines and trains of cars,” etc., permitted proof of failure to have the air coupled if the proper management of the train at that time and place required it to be coupled. Whether or not it did was a question of fact for the jury under the evidence. Appellant offered an instruction that the plaintiff could not recover because of the failure, if any, to have the air connected or coupled up. The court modified this instruction by inserting the word “solely,” so that it read: “The plaintiff cannot recover a verdict in this case ‘solely’ because of the failure, if any, to have the air on defendant’s train connected or coupled up.” This left the jury to infer that in the opinion of the court the failure to have the air coupled was a material factor to be considered by them as one element going to make up the negligence charged. This was error.

We are of the opinion that under the uncertain condition of the evidence as to the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff’s care and the extent of the injury, these errors require a reversal of the judgment. It is therefore reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed, and remanded.


author: Mr. Justice Niehaus

text:
    Mercy Hospital and Mercy Orphan Asylum, Appellant, v. J. Joseph Wright, Executor, et al., Appellees.
    Gen. No. 6,616.
    1. Appeal and error, § 960

      —when transcript prevails over certified copy of order of appeal. On motion to dismiss an appeal on the ground that a joint appeal was perfected by only one party, the transcript reciting that only one party prayed appeal, will prevail over a certified copy of the order of appeal showing a joint appeal taken.
    2. Trusts, § 130

      —when person designated executor in will is trustee. The fact that an executor in a will is directed to perform certain duties with reference to the estate covering a number of years, and is referred to as executor, does not change his status to that of executor where he is clearly acting as trustee.
    3. Executors and administrators, § 523

      —when executor not entitled to compensation or allowance for expenses in caring for property. An executor empowered to take charge of an entire estate and turn over rents and profits to the life tenant during her lifetime has no duties as executor as to the real estate, and is not entitled in his final account to allowances for compensation or expenses incurred in the management of the real property; these matters belong to his account as trustee rather than executor.

      4. Executobs and administbatoes, § 526

      —when executor not entitled to allowance for attorney’s fees and expenses. An executor empowered to take charge of an entire estate and turn over rents and profits to the life tenant during her lifetime has no authority as executor to hire attorneys in proceedings for a conservator for the life tenant and cannot receive credit in his final account as executor, for attorney’s fees and expenses so created.
    5. Executobs and administbatoes, § 520

      —when executor not entitled to credit for taxes on real estate. An executor empowered to take charge of an entire estate and turn over rents and profits to the life tenant during her lifetime cannot include, in his final account as executor, a credit for taxes on the testator’s real estate not due and payable until some time after the testator’s death; these matters belong to his account as trustee.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane county; the Hon. Charles F. Ibwin, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed April 4, 1919.
    R. W. Clifford, for appellant.
    John S. Huey, for appellee Wright, executor, and John S. Huey, pro se, claimant.
    John A. Russell, pro se.

    Harry G. Hempstead, for Frank Rockwell.

      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic section number.

      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.

In this case a preliminary motion was made by John A. Russell, on the assumption that he was a party in interest, to dismiss the appeal, which motion was joined in by J. Joseph Wright, whose account as executor is involved in this litigation. The dismissal of the appeal is asked on the ground that a joint appeal by Mercy Hospital and Mercy Orphan Asylum and the Board of Education of District No. 87, St. Charles, Hlinois, was prayed and allowed; and that this joint appeal was perfected only by one of the parties, namely, Mercy Hospital. The parties making the motion attached thereto a copy of the order of appeal certified to as correct by the clerk of the Circuit Court, which shows that apparently a joint appeal was taken as claimed; but the transcript of the record filed in this court certified to by the clerk shows that the Mercy Hospital only prayed the appeal, which was also perfected by the Mercy Hospital. We are bound under these circumstances to take the recitals concerning the appeal which appear in the transcript of the record on file as correct, and the motion is therefore denied.

Charles H. Haines died July 24, 1914, leaving an estate of variously estimated value of from $300,000 to $500,000. The deceased was unmarried, and left no child nor children surviving him, his aged mother, Harriet S. Haines, being his sole heir at law. He left a last will and testament in which J. Joseph Wright was named as executor, and he was afterwards duly appointed as such executor by the Probate Court. By the terms of the will the deceased testator bequeathed to his mother, Mrs. Harriet Haines, all the net income of his entire estate, real, personal and mixed, for the full term of her natural life, and the executor named was authorized by the will to take and hold all of said estate intact during the term of the natural life of the mother, and to collect the rents, issues and profits of said estate, and to pay the same over to the mother as fast as collected, retaining, however, sufficient to pay all taxes, insurances and other legitimate expenses connected with the proper management of the estate, and in any event to pay over to the mother all of the net income at the end of each year after the death of the testator. The appellant, Mercy Hospital and Mercy Orphan Asylum, with the Board of Education for District No. 87, St. Charles, Hlinois, were residuary legatees under the will, the Mercy Hospital taking two-thirds, and the Board of Education taking one-third, of the residuary estate. The appellee, J. Joseph Wright, after his appointment as executor, duly qualified as such and took charge and possession of all the property, real and personal, and proceeded to carry into effect the provisions of the will which related principally to the management of the estate with a view of carrying into effect the trust provisions, and paying over to the mother the net income during her lifetime. The mother died on the 23rd day of March, 1915. In March, 1916, the executor filed his account as executor of the estate in the Probate Court. Objections were filed by the Mercy Hospital, one of the residuary legatees, to the executor’s account. The account was approved with certain modifications made by the court. An appeal was thereupon taken and perfected to the Circuit Court, where another hearing was had and a somewhat different finding was made by the court in reference to the matters contested. The Mercy Hospital, as residuary devisee and legatee, appealed from the order of the Circuit Court approving the executor ’s account. The contention on appeal relates principally to four items in the account. The appellant claims that the allowance of $5,000 fees for the executor’s services was excessive compensation; that the allowance of $5,000 for the fees of the executor’s attorney, J ohn S. Huey, was also excessive; that there was no legal ground for the allowance to Prank A. Rockwell of $2,083; and that the allowance of $1,500 credit for amount charged for the services of John A. Russell in the matter of the application to appoint a conservator for Mrs. Haines, the mother of the testator, was not legal. It is apparent from the proofs made concerning the character and value of the services rendered by the several parties that they relate principally to the trust estate created by the terms of the will, and practically all the duties which are imposed by the terms of the will on the appellee Wright also pertained to the trust estate; and all matters pertaining to a trust estate are within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court of equity. While it is true that the will calls upon the executor to perform these duties, nevertheless, he could only perform them in his capacity as trustee; and the fact that he is called executor instead of trustee does not in any manner change the character of the duties, nor the official function in which he acted. Mullanny v. Nangle, 212 Ill. 247. As executor the appellee Wright had no duties whatever, with reference to the real estate; the personal property was ample and sufficient to settle the debts of the testator and the costs of the administration of the estate. It is evident, therefore, that the executor as such would have no right to claim fees for services in the management and disposition of the real estate and the rents and profits thereof. His claim for compensation, which was allowed, however embraces fees for services rendered not only as executor in the settling of the personal estate but for services rendered as trustee as well, and it is apparent that the court in allowing the $5,000 for his compensation as executor took into account all the services which he rendered in the estate as trustee, and it is not possible to tell what part of the amount was allowed by the court for trustee services and how much the court allowed for executor services. We are of opinion that the court could only legally allow the executor compensation for the services which he performed in the capacity of executor, and that the evidence heard on the question of the amount due should have been limited to that. The amount allowed as a credit for John S. Huey’s services as attorney is practically in the same category. Most of the services for which the executor paid Huey were services rendered for the appellee Wright as trustee, and in reference to the real estate of the testator, and in connection with the management of the trust estate. The same objection to the allowance of the Huey fees as a credit holds good against the item of the claim for the special legal services of Frank A. Rockwell. The record discloses that all of Rockwell’s services, with perhaps one slight exception, pertained to real estate matters, and to the trust estate, and therefore practically the entire credit claimed should be disallowed. Nor do we find any legal basis for allowing credit to the executor for the $1,500 item of attorney’s fees in the matter of the application to appoint a conservator for Mrs. Haines. It was not within the scope of the duties of appellee as executor to employ counsel for this purpose. The question of whether or not Mrs. Haines should have had a conservator had nothing whatever to do with the administration of the personal estate of the deceased testator, even though it might have been evident that the parties making the application for conservatorship had an ulterior object in view, namely, of attacking the will of the deceased through the conservator, if appointed. This credit item should therefore have been disallowed. The question of what would be a proper compensation to the trustee for his services, as such, or what would be the proper amount to be allowed for the services which attorneys rendered the trustee in the management of the trust estate, are not before us for consideration. The only matters before us concern the compensation of the executor, as such, and to what extent the items of credit claimed by the executor in his report may be legally allowed.

The appellant has also made objection to the credit claimed for the taxes of the year 1914. These taxes were assessed against the real estate of the deceased testator, and were not due or payable until 6 months after the death of the testator; they never became, therefore, a personal obligation against him, nor a debt against his personal estate. Sexton v. Sikking, 90 Ill. App. 667. The taxes of 1914 were properly chargeable to the trust estate as a matter of law. Blair v. Johnson, 215 Ill. 552; Hanna v. Palmer, 194 Ill. 41. And under the terms of the will they were properly payable out of the rents, issues and profits of the trust estate. This credit item claimed should, therefore, have been disallowed. It is obvious that the real estate taxes of the year 1915 were not an obligation of the personal estate of the testator, and this credit item claimed should also have been disallowed.

As to how much compensation should be allowed the executor for his services, as such, and how much he should be allowed as a credit for fees for his attorneys in the executorship are questions primarily for the lower court to pass upon; and this court is not in position from the state of the evidence in the record to determine these matters; the case is therefore reversed and remanded for another hearing to ascertain and determine the proper amount to be allowed the executor as compensation in accordance with the views herein expressed, and the proper amount of credits which he should be allowed for attorneys’ fees in the administration of the personal estate, as well as any other proper credits to which he may be entitled; and the court is directed to disallow the $1,500 item of attorneys’ fees in the matter of the conservatorship contest ; also to disallow the credit items for the taxes of the years 1914 and 1915. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Reversed and remanded with directions.


author: Mb. Justice Niehaus

text:
    Henry Muntz, Appellant, v. Henry Schmidt, Appellee.
    Gen. No. 6,628.
    1. Bills and notes, § 165

      —when person liable as indorser and not as guarantor. Under sections 63 and 64 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (J. & A. ff 7702, 7703), one who places his name on a promissory note without restrictive words before delivery, is liable as an indorser and not as a guarantor, although he had previously promised to guarantee the note.
    2. Bills and notes, § 433

      —when parol evidence inadmissible. Parol evidence is not competent in an action on a promissory note to show that an accommodation indorser had in fact agreed to become liable as guarantor.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane county; the Hon. Clinton P. Ibwin, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 4, 1919.
    John A. Bussell and E. E. Kenyon, for appellant.
    B. S. Egan, "John M. Baymond and John K. New-hall, for appellee.

      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

   Mb. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was brought by the appellant, Henry Muntz, in the Circuit Court of Kane county, against ¡the appellee, Henry Schmidt, to recover the amount due on a promissory note for $7,000, made by the Elgin National Brewing Company, payable to the order of the appellant, and indorsed before its delivery to the appellant, by the appellee and Frank A. G-oecke. The case was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and the finding and judgment of the court was in favor of the appellee, whereupon an appeal was prayed and perfected. The proof shows that on or about April 12, 1911, the appellant loaned the Elgin National Brewing Company, of which the appellee was then president, $7,000 upon the promissory note in question, which was dated April 12, 1911, by which the brewing company promised to pay to the order of the appellant the sum of $7,000 twelve months after the date, with 6 per cent interest per annum. Frank A. Groecke and the appellee indorsed the note by placing their signatures on the back thereof without indicating by appropriate words or otherwise their intention to be bound in any other capacity than that of indorsers. The note thus made and indorsed was accepted by the appellant for the $7,000, which he loaned to the brewing company. On the trial the appellant offered to prove by parol evidence that the undertaking of the appellee in indorsing the note in question was that of a guarantor. The parol offered was objected to, but the court allowed the proof offered to be made, subject to the objection. The proof offered and admitted amounts to this: That Mr. Groecke, who was vice president and manager of the brewing’ company, had several conversations with’ the appellant concerning a loan of $7,000 which Mr. Groecke wanted the appellant to malee to the brewing company; that the appellant finally made up his mind to help the parties out, and on one occasion before the note in question was made went to the office of the brewing company concerning the matter of this loan, and Groecke and Schmidt were both there, and that he then told them that he would loan the money, but would have to have Mr. Schmidt as guarantor, and that Schmidt agreed to it. This was all that occurred upon the occasion in question; afterwards, on April 12,1911, Groecke came to appellant’s office in reference to the loan and presented him the note in question with the signatures on the back, and he accepted the note and gave him a check for $7,000. The note was not paid by the brewing company when it became due, nor at any time after that; no notice of its dishonor was given to the appellee as required by the statute to hold the appellee, and make him liable as indorser. No suit was commenced against the appellee until 3 years after the maturity of the note. If the appellee by placing his signature on the back of the note in question assumed the obligation of indorser, the appellant had no right of recovery against him because he failed to give the statutory notice of the dishonor of the note; but if the obligation of the appellee was that of guarantor, such notice was not required. We are of opinion that the obligation assumed by the appellee under the facts proven was that of indorser. Sections 63 and 64 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (J. & A. ¶¶ 7702, 7703) define the liability incurred by a party who places his signature upon a promissory note otherwise than as maker, and expressly provide that he shall be deemed an indorser unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words an intention to be bound in some other capacity. In this case the appellee at the time he placed his signature upon the back of the instrument did not indicate any intention to be bound in any other capacity than that of indorser; and therefore under the statute his liability was that of an indorser, and the appellant accepted the note under these conditions. The fact that the appellant told the appellee upon a previous occasion that he would not loan the money unless the appellee guaranteed the note cannot be regarded as of controlling importance, in view of the fact that he did actually loan the money and accept the note without requiring the appellee to become guarantor. We are of opinion that the parol evidence offered was not competent and did not change the liability incurred by the appellee, in placing his signature on the note under the statute. Where the law attaches a certain liability to the act of a party, in placing his signature to a note, such liability cannot be changed by parol evidence; and parol evidence is inadmissible to change the terms of a contract which the law has fixed. Hately v. Pike, 162 Ill. 241; Kopf v. Yordy, 200 Ill. App. 409; First Nat. Bank of Arcola v. Heeb, 188 Ill. App. 194; 8 Corpus Juris, p. 74, secs. 121, 122. The findings of the court therefore that the appellee was an indorser, and as indorser was not liable, were correct; and a judgment was properly rendered for the appellee. The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

text:
    First District.
    The People of the State of Illinois for use of George Mosher et al., trustees under the last will and testament of Diana R. Chaffee, deceased, plaintiffs in error, v. Myron W. Whittemore, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 24,053.
    Action upon an executor’s bond. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 4, 1918.
    King, Brower & Hurlbut, for plaintiffs in error. No appearance for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mary M. Fenner, appellee, v. Anton J. Cermak, bailiff of Municipal Court, and Everett W. Maynard, appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,058.
    Trial of right of property. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John Richardson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 4, 1918.
    Adams, Crews, Bobb & Wescott, for appellants. Davis, McDonnell & Sager, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Taylor

text:
    Samuel E. Moist, trading as Union Piano Company, appellant, v. Joseph Friedman, appellee.
    Gen. No. 23,961.
    Action upon assignment of wages. Verdict and judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Charles N. Goodnow, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 4, 1918.
    Vincent D. Wyman, Harry C. Kinne and Charles E. Carpenter, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    City of Chicago, appellee, v. P. J. Burns, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,028.
    Conviction for maintaining common gambling house in violation of Chicago Code. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John A. Mahoney, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed December 4, 1918.
    Edward H. Morris, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ford & Parker Teaming Company, appellee, v. Tractor Transport Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,061.
    Action to recover for damages caused by collision between two trucks. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry P. Dolan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 4, 1918.
    MaeChesney, Becker, Angerstein & Rollo, for appellant; Nathan William MaeChesney, Thomas C. Angerstein, Robert P. Rollo and George W. Angerstein, of counsel. Garnett & Garnett, for appellee; Cyrus L. Garnett, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mae E. Graborski, appellee, v. Chicago Auto Sales Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,082.
    Action for breach of contract in sale of automobile below minimum authorized price. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Wells M. Cook, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 4, 1918.
    Marshall E. Gallion, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Thomson

text:
    City of Chicago, defendant in error, v. John W. Stamos, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 24,005.
    Action to recover a penalty for violation of section 2019 of the Revised Municipal Code of Chicago, prohibiting disorderly houses. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to.the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Frank H. Graham, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 4, 1918.
    Peden, Kahn & Murphy, for plaintiff in error; R. C. Merrick, of counsel. Samuel A. Ettelson and Harry B. Miller, for defendant in error; Daniel Webster, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    D. M. Crane et al., trading as A. E. Peters & Company, plaintiffs in error, v. Max L. Teich and Carl C. Roessler, defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 24,015.
    Bill to foreclose mechanic’s lien. Decree for complainant McKean for $28 and bill dismissed as to other complainants. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar E. Heard, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 4, 1918.
    John B. Dandridge, for plaintiffs in error. A. G. Dieus, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. John Reed, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 24,059.
    Conviction on charge of pandering. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John K. Prindiville, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 4, 1918.
    Rehearing denied December 17, 1918.
    William R. Fetzer, for plaintiff in error. Maelay Hoyne and Edward E. Wilson, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Jerome O. Bancroft et al., appellees, v. Winifred C. Veltman et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,496.
    Order appointing receiver without notice. Interlocutory appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. Foell, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 4, 1918.
    Cavender & Kaiser, for appellants. Daniel V. Gallery, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice McSurely

text:
    Nicholas Berwick et al., defendants in error, v. Oscar G. Foreman et al., trustees of Police Pension Fund of City of Chicago, plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 24,339.
    Mandamus to secure pension from police pension fund. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. Walker, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918. Transferred to Supreme Court as involving validity of a statute.
    Opinion filed December 5, 1918.
    S. A. Ettelson, James W. Breen and Roy S. Gaskill, for plaintiffs in error. Joseph B. Bentel and Grant Newell, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

text:
    Frank L. Boehme, appellant, v. Ashton G. Stevenson. Wilbur S. Scudder, intervening petitioner, appellee.
    Gen. No. 23,634.
    Attachment. Judgment finding title in intervening petitioner. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry P. Dolan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Jesse Wilcox and Charles H. Meacham, for appellant. Channing L. Sentz, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John F. Devine, administrator of the estate of Francisco Mazzei, deceased, appellee, v. Chicago Railways Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,728.
    Action to recover for death of employee struck by employer’s street car while engaged in excavating between tracks. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917.
    Reversed with finding of facts.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    P. L. McArdle and Charles Le Roy Brown, for appellant; John B. Guilliams, of counsel. Busch, Liessman & Roemer, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Winifred Fisher, administratrix of the estate of George Fisher, deceased, defendant in error, v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 23,760.
    Action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act to recover for death of engineer killed upon engine running into turntable pit. Judgment for plaintiff for $10,000. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. H. Sterling Pomeroy, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917. .
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    M. L. Bell and A. B. Enoch, for plaintiff in error. Burry, Johnstone & Peters and Frank T. Ransom, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Joseph Bandzera, by Wiktoria Kania, appellee, v. Standard Steel Car Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,777.
    Action to recover for injuries to minor employee, employed more than 48 hours per week, in violation of the Indiana statute. Judgment for plaintiff for $15,000. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Edward M. Mangan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917. Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Affirmed on remittitur; otherwise reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Rehearing denied January 3, 1919.
    Fred Crumpaeker and Schuyler F. Lynn, for appellant. Beach & Beach and M. C. Zaeharias, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Clifford A. Rainford, appellee, v. Chicago City Railway Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,795.
    Action to recover for personal injuries by a street ear conductor who was struck by ear on adjoining track while crossing street to arrange for lunch. Defendant had rejected compensation act. Judgment for plaintiff for $4,500. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Busby, Weber & Miller, Franklin B. Hussey and Arthur J. Donovan, for appellant; John B. Guilliams, of counsel. James C. MeShane, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mathias B. Becker, administrator of the estate of Richard Raymond Levis, deceased, appellee, v. Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company and Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Company, appellants.
    Gen. No. 23,831.
    Action to recover for death of driver of automobile struck by train at street intersection. Judgment for plaintiff for $10,000. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917. Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Rehearing denied January 6, 1919.

      Winston, Payne, Strawn & Shaw, for appellants; John D. Blaek, of counsel. C. Helmer Johnson, for appellee; James D. Power, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ida Zuckerman, appellee, v. Morris Jacobson, appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,889.
    Forcible entry and detainer against gratuitous occupant of premises. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the H'on. Charles H. Goodnow, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    M. M. Jacobs, for appellant. Jonas O. Hoover, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    City of Chicago, defendant in error, v. Charles E. Kellogg, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 24,007.
    Action to recover penalty for maintaining a disorderly house. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William H. Gemmill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Louis A. Heile, for plaintiff in error. Samuel A. Ettelson and Harry B. Miller, for defendant in error; Daniel Webster, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Hattie Ahlander, appellee, v. Hildor Ahlander, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,046.
    Bill for divorce on ground of cruelty. Decree for complainant, with alimony. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. David M. Brothers, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918. CertioraVi denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Ernest Saunders, for appellant. Sonnenschein, Berkson & Lautmann, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Yetta Miller, appellee, v. David L. Golden et al., on appeal of Beverly A. Clark, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,386.
    Order appointing a receiver upon foreclosure of a trust deed. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Rehearing denied and additional opinion on rehearing filed January 9, 1919.
    James H. Tilton, for appellant; William Slack, of counsel. Lems & Lewis, for appellee; G. Fred Rush, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    S. Puglisi and C. C. Beatty, appellants, v. Alesandro Conforti and Margarita Conforti, appellees.
    Gen. No. 24,436.
    Order dissolving a temporary injunction restraining interference with business sold by defendants. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. William Fenimore Cooper, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Henry & Robinson, for appellants. James R. Quinn and David Jetzinger, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Matchett

text:
    Elbridge Hanecy, appellee, v. Benjamin E. Page, appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,781.
    Action by assignee of stock to recover moneys withheld from proceeds of sale of same. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Arnold Heap, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Miller, Starr, Brown, Packard & Peckham, for appellant. William A. Rogan, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    L. C. H. E. Zeigler, appellee, v. Frederick W. Getty, appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,812.
    Action to recover for breach of covenant, in a lease, to furnish hot water. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Sheridan E. Fry, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Rehearing denied January 3, 1919.
    William B. Moak, for appellant. Bulkley, More & Tallmadge, for appellee; W. M. Doherty, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    C. H. Fellows, appellee, v. Fidelity & Casualty Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,834.
    Action upon an indemnity policy against robbery. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917.
    Affirmed on remittitur of interest; otherwise reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Winston, Strawn & Shaw, for appellant; John D. Black and A. Liddon Shepherd, of counsel. Chilton P. Wilson, for appellee; Charles A. Atkinson, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mac Catsoloz, appellee, v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,851.
    Action by an employee to recover for personal injuries based on master’s failure to supply sufficient assistants. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Arnold Heap, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917.
    Reversed with finding of facts.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Rehearing denied January 6, 1919.
    J. A. Connell and Thomas J. Lawless, for appellant. William Scott Stewart, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Maryland Casualty Company, appellee, v. Garden City Sand Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,880.
    Action upon contract to indemnify plaintiff against liability upon an appeal bond executed at defendant’s request. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John R. Newcomer, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Rehearing denied January 6, 1919.
    Edwin C. Crawford, for appellant. Kelly, Hale, ha.mma.nn & Coolidge, for appellee; J. F. Dammann, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Liquid Carbonic Company, plaintiff in error, v. Herman P. Pollatz, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 23,956.
    Replevin. Judgment finding title in plaintiff subject to a lien. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John R. Newcomer, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Stuart B. Krohn, for plaintiff in error. M. M. Jacobs, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    E. Z. Zipperman, plaintiff in error, v. B. S. Wilson, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 23,991.
    Action on a note. Judgment for defendant. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Hugh R. Stewart, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Reversed with judgment here.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Frederick A. Bangs and Richard H. Colby, for plaintiff in error. William B. Moak, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Standard Oil Company, appellee, v. Keystone Oil & Manufacturing Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,014.
    Action to recover for damages to truck caused by collision with another truck. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Samuel H. Trude, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Truman H. Miner and Alfred Roy Hulbert, for appellant. Stewart, Martyn & Daugherty, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Allessandro Conforti, appellee, v. Bank of Commerce and Savings (impleaded with Joseph Baiata), appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,550.
    Interlocutory injunction on bill for specific performance restraining transfer of bank deposit. Interlocutory appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    King, Brower & Hurlbut, for appellant. C. H. McDermott and C. L. Cassiday, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Porto Rico Fruit Exchange, appellee, v. Michigan Central Railroad Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,044.
    Action by consignee of fruit for loss of shipment by fire while in possession of carrier as warehouseman. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Sheridan E. Fry, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Winston, Strawn & Shaw, for appellant; Frank H. Towner, of counsel. Joseph M. Connery, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Joseph Martin, appellee, v. Michigan Central Railroad Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,072.
    Action for breach of contract to carry live stock. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. J. J. Cooke,.Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed December 24, 1918.
    Winston, Strawn & Shaw, for appellant; Frank H. Towner and Nahum Morrill, of counsel. Charles A. Butler, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James T. Swaggerty, appellee, v. Eulah Swaggerty, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,075.
    Bill for divorce on ground of adultery. Cross-bill on ground of cruelty. Decree for complainant and cross-bill dismissed. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. David M. Brothers, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Edgar A. Jonas, for appellant. Frank T. Jordan, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Noah A. Lehman, appellant, v. George P. Bent Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,085.
    Action for breach of contract. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Arnold Heap, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Dillard B. Baker, for appellant. Thompson, Tyrrell & Chambers, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Martin Quinn, appellee, v. Edward A. Perreault, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,104.
    Action to recover for damage to an automobile. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Charles N. Goodnow, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Lambert & Mayer, for appellant. James F. Hutchison and George W. Underwood, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McDonald

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Matehett

text:
    Herman Emmerman, appellee, v. Benjamin F. J. Odell, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,091.
    Action upon a contract for the exchange of flat buildings. Set-off by defendant. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry P. Dolan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Benjamin F. J. Odell, pro se. Edward Drobnis, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Leo DeTroy, appellee, v. Harry Cregar, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,098.
    Action for conversion of an automobile. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Frederick B. Boos, for appellant; Edward H. Morris, of counsel. Frank W. Swett, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Laura H. McKaig et al., plaintiffs in error, v. Ebenezer Appleton et al., defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 24,012.
    Bill to contest a will. Decree sustaining validity of will. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    William Bitchie and King, Brower & Hurlbut, for plaintiffs in error. Stein, Mayer & Stein, for Mary A. Cornish. Bobert F. Pettibone, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Beardslee Chandelier Manufacturing Company, assignee of Chicago Chandelier & Bronze Company, appellee, v. T. W. Parsche, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,076.
    Action to recover balance due for materials and labor. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Edward T. Wade, Judge, presiding: Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Reversed with finding of fact.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Donald L. Morrill, for appellant. Vose & Page, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Orr-Laubenheimer Company, appellant, v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,086.
    Action for damages resulting from delay in shipment of a carload of bananas. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry M. Fisher, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Stewart Beed Brown, for appellant. Lee J. Frank, J. M. Hamill and C. P. Hamill, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Morris Goldwasser et al., trading as M. Goldwasser & Sons, appellees, v. Abraham Siegel and Max Siegel, trading as Siegel Brothers, appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,096.
    Action to recover purchase price of goods sold. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. D. H. Wamsley, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Bisendrath & Solomon, for appellants. James MeKeag, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Henry Peter Larsen, appellee, v. Chicago Railways Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,928.
    Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in alighting from a street car. Judgment for plaintiff for $1,509. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917. Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Rehearing denied January 15, 1919.
    William H. Symmes and Prank L. Kriete, for appellant; John R. Guilliams and Philip Rosenthal, of counsel. Otto Christensen and M. Emmet Clare, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    A. Heym, appellee, v. Richard J. McCormick, on appeal of John A. McCormick, individually and as executor, appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,037.
    Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John Richardson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded on authority of opinion, ante, p. 33, with which this case was consolidated.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Thomas P. Burke and Roy C. Merrick, for appellants. Vincent D. Wyman, Harry C. Kinne and Charles E. Carpenter, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Genevieve M. Goodwillie, appellee, v. T. G. Warden, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,102.
    Action to recover for damages to an automobile sustained in a collision with another car. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John Richardson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Garnett & Garnett, for appellant; Cyrus L. Garnett, of counsel. Litsinger, Healy & Reid, for appellee; James J. Finn, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles Diessner, appellee, v. Wakefields’, Incorporated, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,165.
    Action on a note. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. J. J. Cooke, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.

      Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Maurice G. Cohen, for appellant; Myer J. Stein, of counsel. Rathje, Lawlor & Connor, for appellee; Edwin D. Lawlor, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    St. Juosupo Suziedotinio Draugyste S. M. P., corporation, plaintiff in error, v. Joseph Ridikos and Izidorius Nausiedas, defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 24,040.
    Action against the surety upon an indemnity bond. Judgment for defendants. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Hugh R. Stewart, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Busch, Liessmann & Roemer, for plaintiff in error. William A. Rogan, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Michigan Avenue Trust Company, defendant in error, v. Myer J. Stein, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 24,065.
    Action upon promissory notes. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William N. Gemmill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Maurice Cohen, for plaintiff in error. William B. Denmark, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Steve Kulisiowsky, appellee, v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,099.
    Action by railroad employee for injuries suffered on being struck by train while working on viaduct. Judgment for plaintiff for $15,000. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed on remittitur; otherwise reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed December 31, 1918.
    Edgar R. Hart and Ira G. Belden, for appellant; William G. Wheeler, of counsel. David K. Tone, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Dibell

text:
    Second District.
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. City of Sterling, appellee, v. County of Whiteside et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 6,541.
    Petition for mandamus to compel defendant county to appropriate money to pay one-half of cost of bridge over Rock River. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Whiteside county; the Hon. James S. Baume, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1918.
      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).

      Affirmed.
    Opinion filed July 25, 1918.
    Rehearing denied October 9, 1918.
    J. J. Ludens, for appellants. Philip H. Ward, for appellee; Henry C. Ward, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dibell

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles E. Smith, appellee, v. Frank C. Bellrose, appellant.
    Gen. No. 6,446.
    Assumpsit to recover royalties on sand removed under provisions of lease. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle county; the Hon. Edgar Eldredge, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1917.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed July 25, 1918.
    Rehearing denied October 9, 1918.
    Browne & Wiley and H. M. Kelly, for appellant. L. W. Brewer and Butters & dark, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Carnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Hugo Albert Weskalnies, appellant, v. John F. Hesterman, sheriff, appellee.
    Gen. No. 6,438.
    Replevin to recover goods taken under execution. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of DuPage county; the Hon. Mazzini Slusser, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed July 25, 1918.
    Rehearing denied and opinion modified and refiled October 9, 1918.
    Bunge & Harbour,.for appellant. Joseph Reuss and Mighell, Consul & Allen, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Emma Seidel, appellee, v. Harry Rosenblum, appellant.
    Gen. No. 6,576.
    Action to recover purchase price of goods sold. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the County Court of Lake county; the Hon. Perry L. Persons, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed July 25, 1918.
    Rehearing denied October 9, 1918.
    E. V. Orvis, for appellant. A. P. Beaubien, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Anna Berg, appellee, v. Moline Consumers Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 6,567.
    Action by pedestrian to recover for personal injuries sustained by being struck by a motor truck. Judgment for plaintiff for $1,999.99. Appeal from the City Court of Moline; the Hon. C. O. Dietz, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1918. Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making-opinion final).
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1918.
    Rehearing denied November 13, 1918.
    Shallberg & Harper, for appellant. W. R. Moore, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dibell

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    E. B. Conover et al., appellees, v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 6,563.
    Action against a carrier to recover for damage to corn caused by delay in transit. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. John M. Niehaus, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1918.
    Niehaus, J., took no part.
    Stevens, Miller & Elliott and Graham & Graham, for appellant; Charles R. "Webber, Morrison R. Waite and William A. Eggers, of counsel. H. L. Child, for appellees; Wilson, Warren & Child and Heyl & Heyl, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Carnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mueller Grain Company, appellee, v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 6,570.
    Action against a carrier to recover for damage to corn caused by delay in transit. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. John M. Niehaus, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1918.
    Affirmed on remittitur.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1918.
    Niehaus, J., took no part.
    Graham & Graham and Jack, Irwin & Jack, for appellant; Charles R. Webber, Morrison R. Waite and William A. Eggers, of counsel. Clarence ,W. Heyl and Harry C. Heyl, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Carnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    E. B. Conover et al., appellees, v. Vandalia Railroad Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 6,571.
    Action against a carrier to recover for damage to corn caused by delay in transit. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. John M. Niehaus, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1918.
    Affirmed on remittitur.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1918.
    Niehaus, J., took no part.
    Page, Hunter & Page and Graham & Graham, for appellant; Charles R. Webber, Morrison R. Waite and William A. Eggers, of counsel. H. L. Child, for appellees; Wilson, Warren & Child and Heyl & Heyl, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Carnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Nellie L. Francis et al., appellees, v. A. B. Sheadle et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 6,549.
    Bill to construe a will to determine whether legatees took personalty absolutely or for life only. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ogle county; the Hon. Richard S. Farrand, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1918. Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1918.
    J. C. Seyster and C. E. Gardner, for appellants. Henry C. Warner, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    F. H. Hooker, sheriff of Knox county, appellee, v. C. D. Briggs, appellant.
    Gen. No. 6,584.
    Trover by sheriff to recover value of property sold as to levy on execution. Judgment for. plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox county; the Hon. George W. Thompson, Judge, presiding, Heard in this court at the April term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded,
    Opinion filed October 10, 1918.
    Marsh & Rice, for appellant. Welsh & Zetterholm, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    J. H. Anderson, appellant, v. Illinois Rural Credit Association, appellee.
    Gen. No. 6,542.
    Replevin to recover promissory notes. Judgment for defendant on plaintiff abiding by motion to strike plea in abatement. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Warren county; the Hon. Robert J. Grier, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1918.
    Reversed with directions.
    Opinion filed October 17, 1918.
    Safford & Graham and Hanley & Cox, for appellant. De Mange, Gillespie & De Mange, G. M. Huey and L. E. Murphy, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.


author: Per Chriam.

text:
    Uma B. Bersell, appellee, v. City of Rock Island, appellant.
    Gen. No. 6,606.
    Action to recover damages for injury to real property caused by city cutting down a street in front of plaintiff’s property. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. William T. Church, Judge,' presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 24, 1918.
    John K. Scott, for appellant. Philip H. Wells, Kenworthy, Dietz, Shallberg, Harper & Sinnett, for appellee.
   Per Chriam.


text:
    Fred Enderlin, appellee, v. Henry Hornbostel et al. Emil E. Thiel et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 6,579.
    Bills for foreclosure of mortgage. Decree making part of the principal a lien upon the fee and balance of the principal and interest a lien upon the life estate. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake county; the Hon. Claire 0. Edwards, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1918.
    Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
    Opinion filed November 8, 1918.
    Newton R. Gilmore, for appellants. E. J. Heydecker, for appellee; Cooke, Pope & Pope, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dibell

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Dover

text:
    First District.
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Hazel Smith, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 24,411.
    Information charging defendant with a violation of section 270 of the Criminal Code (J. & A. If 3962), in being a common night-walker. Judgment of conviction. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Sheridan E. Fry, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Joseph W. Sehulman, for plaintiff in error. Maclay Hoyne and Edward E. Wilson, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dover

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Dever

text:
    James S. Jackson, appellee, v. Edward C. Kohler and Henry A. Kohler, appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,452.
    Action by a broker for commission negotiating a contract for the exchange of property. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John Richardson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Rehearing denied February 10, 1919.
    Stedman & Soelke, for appellants. Louis Salinger, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dever

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    J. A. Elliott, appellant, v. G. H. Adamick et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 24,517.
    Bill for purpose of securing delivery to complainant, or to permit him to inspect contents, of a safety deposit box in the vault of one of the defendants. Decree for defendants. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Delbert A. Clithero and Frank Wentworth Swett, for appellant. Gardner, Foote & Burns, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dever

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Anna S. Anderson, appellee, v. Ella M. Banta, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,556.
    Action against a landlord to recover for personal injuries sustained by a tenant through the breaking of a step in a common stairway. Judgment for plaintiff for $500. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Rehearing denied February 10, 1919.
    Ashcraft & Ashcraft, for appellant; E. M. Ashcraft, of counsel. John A. Swanson and Walter A. Brendecke, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dever

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    American Paper Products Company, appellee, v. C. A. Watson & Sons, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,574.
    Action to recover damages for breach of contract in refusing to accept goods purchased. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Samuel H. Trade, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Rehearing denied February 10, 1919.
    Hoyne, O’Connor & Irwin, for appellant. Edward L. England, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dever

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Everts Wrenn, appellant, v. Joseph H. Strong, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,583.
    Action to recover commissions on renewal premium on a life insurance policy. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John R. Newcomer, Judge, presiding. Heard in thifi court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.

      Norman. K. Anderson and Benjamin Clarke, for appellant; Samuel ToplifE, of counsel. Adams, Crews, Childs & Bobb, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dever

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Holdom

text:
    Margaret Hanreddy, executrix of the estate of Joseph Hanreddy, deceased, defendant in error, v. City of Chicago, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 23,571.
    Action to recover for work and material in repairing street; counterclaim by defendant for repairs claimed to have been made under contract with plaintiff. Judgment for plaintiff for $7,400.29. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John R. Caverly, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Samuel A. Ettelson, for plaintiff in error; Leon Hornstein, of counsel. Ryan, Condon & Livingston, for defendant in error; Irvin I. Livingston and Nathan S. Blumberg, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Anna D. Olson, plaintiff in error, v. John G. Olson, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 24,022.
    Bill for divorce on grounds of cruelty and habitual drunkenness. Bill dismissed for want of equity. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. Thompson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1917.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    A. G. Dicus, for plaintiff in error. Julian C. Ryer, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James Ozello, plaintiff in error, v. Albert Hoefeld et al., defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 24,185.
    Bill for cancellation of lease and to restrain enforcement of judgment by confession for rent. Bill dismissed for want of equity. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Frederick A, Smith, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Rehearing denied February 10, 1919.
    Thomas W. Prindeville and Thomas J. O’Hare, for plaintiff in error. Adler, Lederer & Beck, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Heywood Brothers & Wakefield Company, appellee, v. Reuben Levine, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,302.
    Action to recover purchase price of goods sold. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Arnold Heap, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Milton Hart, for appellant. Joseph M. Griffen, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    American Sales Book Company, appellee, v. Ira Barnett & Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,361.
    Action to recover purchase price of goods sold. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John F. Haas, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    M. A. Milkewitch, for appellant. M. E. Adams, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion ‘ of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Edwin L. Harvey, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 24,430.
    Indictment for conspiracy to obtain money from the next of kin of a deceased person. Judgment of conviction. Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph Sabath, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Landon & Holt, for plaintiff in error. Maclay Hoyne, Edward E. Wilson and Walter Stanton, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frances Prachthauser, plaintiff in error, v. Frederick Prachthauser and Frank A. Vogler, defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 24,446.
    Trover to recover value of automobile. Judgment for defendants. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Edmund K. Jareeki, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    William A. Jennings, for plaintiff in error; George E. Kanary, of counsel. Bates, Hicks & Folonie, for defendant in error Frederick Prachthauser. Otto G. Kneeht and Ernest Saunders, for defendant in error Frank A. Vogler.
   Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Benjamin Moore & Company, appellant, v. R. F. Kinsella, trading as Kinsella Varnish Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,533.
    Action to recover purchase price of goods sold. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. D. H. Wamsley, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Edward L. England, for appellant. Boss C. Hall and Osear H. Olsen, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John Fritzman, appellee, v. John R. Richardson et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,559.
    Trespass for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment. Judgment for plaintiff for $2,000. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Martin M. Gridlev, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed with finding of fact.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    John B. McCabe and Gustav E. Beerly, for appellants; Gustav E. Beerly, of counsel. Darrow, Baily & Sissman, for appellee; J. L. Baily, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice MeSurely

text:
    John P. O’Connor et al., appellants, v. High School Board of Education of Evanston High School District et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 23,470.
    Bill to have election declared void, and to restrain issuance of bonds and tax levy. Decree for defendants. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jesse A. Baldwin, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Howard T. Wilcoxon and William Sherman Carson, for appellants. Wilson, Moore & Mcllvaine, for appellees; Nathan G. Moore, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mary Brady, plaintiff in error, v. Consumers’ Company, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 24,063.
    Action by passenger to recover for personal injury sustained in collision with motor truck. Judgment for plaintiff for $25. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    J ohn T. Byrnes, for plaintiff in error. J ohn A. Bloomingston, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    City of Chicago, appellee, v. George Waters, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,198.
    Prosecution for violation of municipal ordinance. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John A. Mahoney, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Rehearing denied and additional opinion on rehearing filed February 10-, 1919.
    Ryan & Lewis, for appellant. Samuel A. Ettelson and Harry B. Miller, for appellee; Daniel Webster, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Wesley I. Thomas, trading as Royal Broom Company, plaintiff in error, v. John E. Kavanagh et al., trading as Kavanagh Bros. & Company, defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 24,449.
    Action to recover for breach of contract in failing to deliver goods purchased. Judgment for defendants. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Wells M. Cook, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    A. F. W. Siebel, for plaintiff in error. Paden & Kropf, for defendants in error; Oscar A. Kropf, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Me Surely

text:
    Fred C. Aiken, appellant, v. Peter Dicken and Frederick Schepler, trading as Dicken & Schepler, appellees.
    Gen. No. 24,514.
    Action to recover rent alleged to have been collected by defendants. Judgment against defendant Schepler, and action dismissed as to defendant Dicken. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chingo; the Hon. John F. Haas, Judge, presiding. Heard in this

      court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and judgment here.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Howe, Fordham & Kreamer, for appellant; Albert C. Fordham, of counsel. No appearance for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Me Surely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George Zakos, by Christ Kapimalis, appellee, v. Peter Lalogos and Mike Gerulas, trading as Lincoln Grocery & Market Company, on appeal of Peter Lalogos, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,526.
    Action to recover wages. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John K. Prindiville, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Rehearing denied February 10, 1919.
    George J. Crane, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Me Surely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    American Paper Products Company, appellee, v. National Clock & Manufacturing Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,562.
    Action to recover purchase price of goods. Defendant claimed that plaintiff was a foreign corporation, and had not complied with the State law. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John Richardson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 27, 1919.
    Anderson, Anderson & Anderson, for appellant. Edward L. England, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Me Surely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Whiting Paper Company, appellee, v. Proudfit Loose Leaf Sales Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,131.
    Action in attachment on ground that defendant was about to dispose óf property to hinder and delay creditors. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John Richardson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 29, 1919.
    William Y. Baird, for appellant; Grant Newell, of counsel. Mergentheim, Altheimer & Mayer, for appellee; Morton A. Mergentheim, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Thomas H. Kelly, appellee, v. Supreme Court of the Independent Order of Foresters, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,139.
    Action on a fraternal benefit certificate. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Joseph P. Rafferty, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 29, 1919.
    Charles F. Vogel, for appellant. Morse Ives and Charles C. Bodenstab, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Hyman J. Himmelstein, appellee, v. Riley-Schubert-Grossman Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,151.
    Action to recover balance of salary due. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Martin M. Gridley, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 29, 1919.
    Fred Lowenthal, for appellant. Bernard J. Brown, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice O'Connor

text:
    Herbert Boiler Company, appellee, v. American Heating & Plumbing Corporation and Richard Curran. Richard Curran, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,179.
    Action to recover balance due on purchase price of materials. Judgment for plaintiff against defendant Curran, and in favor of defendant Heating Company. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Wells M. Cook, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed January 29, 1919.
    Edward J. Kelley, for appellant. Hurley & Baer, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O'Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.