author: Lehman, J.

text:
    Rapid Transit Subway Construction Company, Appellant, v. The City of New York, Respondent.

      (Argued October 6, 1931;
    decided July 19, 1932.)

      Albert J. Kenyon, Frank D. Allen and James L. Quackenbush for appellant.
    The trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff was a mere agency or instrumentality of the railroad company and that the acts and conduct of the railroad company in connection with any material phase of the work in question may be considered and given weight as affecting the rights and duties of the plaintiff under its contract with the city, and in holding that the plaintiff was completely dominated by the railroad company and could be legally charged with any alleged acts or defaults of the railroad company. (Matter of Brown, 130 Misc. Rep. 865; Matter of Green, 231 N. Y. 237; Brock v. Poor, 216 N. Y. 387; Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254; Peterson v. C., R. I. & Pac. R. R. Co., 205 U. S. 364; Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., 24 Fed. Rep. [2d] 718; 30 Fed. Rep. [2d] 812; Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Transportation Co., 31 Fed. Rep. ]2d] 265; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 115 U. S. 587; United States v. D. & H. R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 414; Berkey v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 244 N. Y. 84; Stone v. Cleveland, C., C. & S. L. Ry. Co., 202 N. Y. 352; United States v. D., L. & W. R. R. Co., 238 U. S. 516; McKay Co. v. Savery Hotel Co., 184 Iowa, 260; Union Sulphur Co. v. Freeport Texas Co., 251 Fed. Rep. 634.) The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claim for interest as damages on amounts of money admittedly due plaintiff under the terms of its contract from the date of payment fixed by the contract until the date of payment; such damages arising because of defendant’s breach of its contract in failing on completion of the work to state from actual measurements the whole amount of work done by plaintiff and the amount due it and to make payment within ninety days. (Matter of Burke, 191 N. Y. 437; Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. American Can Co., 258 Fed. Rep. 363; Holden v. Freedman’s Sav. & T. Co., 100 U. S. 72; Lowe v. Turpie, 37 L. R. A. 223; Leopold v. City of New York, 184 App. Div. 244; 229 N. Y. 555; Grote v. City of New York, 190 N. Y. 235; Tuzzeo v. American Bonding Co., 226 N. Y. 171; Bradley v. McDonald, 157 App. Div. 572; 218 N. Y. 351; Roebling’s Sons Co. v. City of New York, 110 App. Div. 366; McGovern v. City of New York, 202 App. Div. 317; 235 N. Y. 275; 236 N. Y. 508.) The trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that plaintiff was entitled to interest on claims allowed by the court only for the period from the date of filing plaintiff’s claim with the Comptroller of the defendant to date of judgment. (Shepard v. City of New York, 216 N. Y. 251; McGovern v. City of New York, 202 App. Div. 317; 235 N. Y. 275; Roebling Sons v. City of New York, 110 App. Div. 366; Brooklyn Public Library v. City of New York, 222 App. Div. 422; 250 N. Y. 495.)

      Arthur J. W. Hilly, Corporation Counsel (Charles Blandy, Willard S. Allen, Frank R. Rubel and Charles V. Nellany of counsel), for respondent.
    The plaintiff, in the doing of the work, was a mere agency or instrumentality of the railroad company, and the acts and conduct of the railroad company, under the contract, may be considered, and given weight, as affecting the rights and duties of the plaintiff under its contract with the city. (Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota Civic Assn., 247 U. S. 490; Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Pam, 232 N. Y. 441; Berkey v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 244 N. Y. 84; Davis v. Alexander, 269 U. S. 114.) No error was committed by the trial court in dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for interest on the various amounts of money or in holding that plaintiff was entitled to interest, on certain of its claims, only from the date when the plaintiff filed these claims with the Comptroller of the city of New York. (Dock Contractor Co. v. City of New York, 296 Fed. Rep. 377; Taylor v. Mayor, 67 N. Y. 87; Sweeny v. City of New York, 173 N. Y. 414; Ryan v. City of New York, 179 App. Div. 181; O’ Keeffe v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 297; Smith v. Board of Education, 208 N. Y. 84; McGovern v. City of New York, 236 N. Y. 508; Litchfield Const. Co. v. City of New York, 244 N. Y. 251.) The trial court correctly disallowed and dismissed plaintiff’s claim for $4,665.05 for ducts through manholes. (Hopkins v. City of New York, 217 App. Div. 790.)
   Lehman, J.

On or about August 7, 1914, the city of New York, acting by the Public Service Commission, entered into a contract with the plaintiff, Rapid Transit Subway Construction Company, whereby the plaintiff agreed to furnish at unit prices all the labor and materials necessary for the construction of a part of the Seventh Avenue-Lexington Avenue Rapid Transit Railroad, known as Route 5, Section 7, in accordance with the terms of the contract and the plans and specifications incorporated in it.

The contract required the plaintiff to begin actual work within sixty days after the date of delivery of the contract and to complete the work within thirty-one months after such delivery and, in the event of delay in completion of the work, beyond the period prescribed or beyond the period to which such time may be extended by resolution of the Commission for good cause shown,” the plaintiff agreed to pay the sum of three hundred dollars as stipulated damages for each day’s delay. According to the certificate of the engineer of the Public Service Commission the work was completed on November 1st, 1918, more than eighteen months after the expiration of the period prescribed in the contract, but the Commission duly extended that period by resolution.

The contract provides that “ whenever in the opinion of the Engineer the Contractor shall have completely performed the contract the Engineer shall so certify in writing and in duplicate to the Commission, and in his certificate shall state from actual measurement the whole amount of work done by the Contractor * * *. Upon the receipt of such certificate the Commission shall forthwith prepare and certify two final vouchers * * *. One of such final vouchers shall be payable by the City. * * * The City shall pay the amount due on such voucher payable by it on or before the expiration of ninety (90) days after the acceptance of the work herein agreed to be done by the Contractor and the filing of a certificate of the completion and acceptance of the work in the office of the Comptroller signed by the Engineer and the Commission.”

Promptly after the work was completed the plaintiff requested that a certificate of the completion and acceptance of the work should be prepared and signed. The final certificates and vouchers for payment were not prepared and signed till December 7th, 1920, more than two years after the date of completion.

During the interval the engineer made five partial estimates of the work, theretofore performed by the contractor, for which the contractor had not been paid. The plaintiff received payments aggregating $66,045.44 upon such partial estimates. The final estimate and certificates showed that a balance of $61,119.65 remained due and payable to the plaintiff from the city of New York. The plaintiff claimed that a much larger amount was due for work under the contract and as damages for various alleged breaches by the city of its own obligations under the contract. The contract provides that “ The acceptance by the Contractor of the final payment by the City aforesaid * * * shall be and shall operate as a release to the City from all claim and liability to the Contractor for anything done or furnished for, or relating to the work. * * * ” The plaintiff refused final payment for its work and presented its claim to the Comptroller. Then it began this action. Thereafter, under a special agreement with the city, it received from the city the sum of $61,000, leaving only the sum of $119.65 due to it under the final certificate.

The complaint herein sets forth six causes of action involving numerous items of work for which, the plaintiff urges, it has not been paid in accordance with the terms of the contract and, in addition, several claims for damages for alleged defaults by the city under the contract. It demands judgment for sums which, with interest as claimed by the plaintiff, would amount to approximately one million dollars. After a protracted trial, a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was directed for the sum of $84,949.17. From the judgment entered on that verdict the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division which modified the judgment by addition of the sum of $119.65, concededly due to the plaintiff under the final certificate, which through inadvertence had not been included in the original judgment.

Since the defendant did not appeal, we are concerned now only with those claims and items set forth in the complaint which were not allowed in the final certificate and for which recovery was denied by the courts below. The appellant urges that the trial judge erred in denying recovery for a considerable number of unrelated items. Each of these items must be examined separately, but in most instances the questions presented are narrow. The most serious questions, both in the amount involved and in the importance of the governing legal principles, relate to the denial of recovery for alleged neglect of the city in failing to furnish, within a reasonable time, drawings and directions which were required for the prompt and orderly performance of the work.

In Litchfield Construction Co. v. City of New York (244 N. Y. 251, 261) this court held that, under a similar contract, the city was liable for damages caused to the contractor, by the failure of the engineer of the Commission to furnish, with reasonable promptness, such directions and drawings as under the contract he was required to give. He acts for the city, and a duty may be implied under such circumstances that he should act with due promptness, and not by delay or other act of commission or omission unreasonably hinder progress.” The same rule applies here, and so the trial justice correctly held. The contract was signed in August, 1914. The contractor was required to construct a section of a subway railroad under the street. In the construction of the railroad steel beams and columns were required. Those beams and columns could be supplied only after they had been fabricated in accordance with “ shop drawings ” prepared by the contractor and approved by the Commission, and the contractor could not prepare such drawings until the Commission had furnished to it working drawings and plans. The section of the subway railroad which the plaintiff was required to erect was, for convenience, divided into seven subsections. Drawings were furnished by the Commission for subsection 5 before the work of excavation, under the contract, was begun. Steel for that subsection was supplied by the mills before the excavation had progressed to the point where the erection of the steel could be begun. Work there proceeded in the order, and according to the method, planned in advance by the contractor, and the work in that subsection was completed within the stipulated period of thirty-one months. The drawings for subsections 1 to 4, to the south of subsection 5, and for subsections 6 and 7 to the north, were received from the Commission between July and December, 1915; i. e., more than fifteen months after the plans were furnished for subsection 5. The evidence produced by the plaintiff indisputably establishes that the delay was due to the fact that the Commission did not even begin the preparation of the necessary drawings till months after the contract was signed. It also appears that, as a result, the work could not be carried on as originally planned and its completion was delayed. Nevertheless the trial court denied the plaintiff any recovery for such delay, on the ground that, in fact, such delay caused no damages, and, at least as to subsections 1 to 4, that the delay was caused rather by the Interborough Rapid Transit Company, which controlled the plaintiff through stock ownership, than by the defendant. We can, in this opinion, state only the salient considerations upon which the trial judge reached these conclusions.

The Interborough Rapid Transit Company was the record and actual owner of all the stock of the plaintiff, except a few shares which were registered in the names of plaintiff’s directors to enable them to qualify. In March, 1913, the city of New York entered into a contract, known as Contract number 3,” with the Interborough Rapid Transit Company, by which that company agreed to share the expense of the construction of a rapid transit railway and to operate the railway, when completed, in conjunction with other routes already operated by it. The earnings of all the routes so operated were then to be placed in a common fund and divided, in the manner specified in the contract, between the city and the company, after certain preferential payments were made to the company.

That contract provides, among other things:

“Article 5. The precise number and the general location of tracks, and dimensions and other characteristics of the railroad, are generally indicated on the contract drawings and plans which bear date the 25th day of January, 1913 * * *. The railroad is to be constructed generally in accordance with such contract drawings and with the specifications (differing, however, so far as necessary to care for varying conditions) included in the form of contract adopted by the Commission on September 1, 1910, for the construction of various sections of Subdivision 1 of the Lexington Avenue Branch.
“Article 6. The Commission reserves the right during the progress of the work of construction to make such modifications, alterations or revisions of the plans or changes in the specifications * * * as may in the judgment of the Commission be found necessary to best serve the public interest.”

It was further provided in that contract, as part of article 9, fixing the obligation of the parent company to contribute toward the expense of the construction of the sub-way, that

The forms of such construction contracts shall be generally similar to those heretofore adopted by the Commission for the portion of Subdivision 1 of the Lexington Avenue Branch already under construction (differing so far as necessary to provide for varying conditions), except that the Lessee shall also be a party thereto for the purpose of disbursing its contribution toward the cost of construction. Each such contract shall specify an amount to be fixed by the Commission, beyond which the Lessee shall not be liable thereunder. Upon the adoption of the form of contract, together with the specifications and contract drawings, the Commission before advertising- for proposals shall transmit a copy of the same to the Lessee, and within ten (10) days after such receipt, or within such further time as the Commission may allow, the Lessee shall return the same to the Commission with its criticisms or suggestions. The Commission shall thereupon consider any such criticisms and suggestions and its decision thereon shall be final and binding upon the Lessee. Proposals for making such contracts shall then be invited by the Commission in the form and manner required by Section 36 of the Rapid Transit Act.”

In conformity with the last quoted provision, before bids were asked for the construction of section 7 of the new subway, the form of the proposed contract, together with specifications and contract drawings, was actually transmitted to the Interborough Rapid Transit Company. The papers were returned by it promptly with a suggestion that the contract should contain certain formal provisions which the company thought necessary for its own protection, but the Rapid Transit Company made no suggestions or criticisms in regard to the specifications or working drawings. Then the Commission advertised for proposals, and the contract was awarded to the plaintiff as the lowest bidder and delivered to oit in August.

The Interborough Rapid Transit Company signed contracts for the construction of sections of the rapid transit railway because it was required under its own contract with the city to pay a part of the cost of construction. Otherwise it undertook no obligations in connection with the construction of the subway. The Rapid Transit Company, which was to operate the railway, when constructed, was interested equally with the city in obtaining contracts for the construction on terms which would provide a suitable railway at as low a cost as possible. Therefore, the city had agreed that before advertising for proposals, the “ form of contract with the plans and specifications should be submitted to the operating company in order to afford that company opportunity for criticism and suggestion. The" operating company was under no obligation to the city to make any criticisms or suggestions, if it did not choose to do so for its own benefit. The city did not agree that the Commission would accept any suggestions or criticisms, if made. The obligations of both parties were fully carried out in this regard when the city submitted the form of contract, with drawings or specifications, to the Rapid Transit Company and that company returned them with such suggestions as it chose to make. When contracts were awarded for construction the Public Service Commission, alone, had the duty and the power to prepare further plans and drawings and to give directions for the work.

The “ contract drawings annexed to the contract showed in a general way the location of the tracks, but were, concededly, insufficient to enable orders to be given by the contractor for the fabrication of the steel, and the city was under the duty to furnish other drawings for that purpose, within a reasonable time after the construction contract was executed and delivered. It claims that it could not prepare the necessary drawings until the location of the railway tracks and switches had been definitely determined. The city could fix the location of the tracks either alone or after consultation with the Interborough Rapid Transit Company. The contractor, in entering into a contract to construct the railway within a fixed period, had the right to assume that the location of the tracks either had been, or would be, determined in time to permit construction to proceed in an orderly way. Failure of the city, or even the city and the operating company, acting together, to determine the location of the railway tracks would ordinarily not excuse the failure of the city to perform its contractual duty to a contractor who had agreed to build the railway.

The trial judge, though, of course, recognizing the general rule, held that it did not apply in this case in so far as the delay was due primarily to act or neglect of the operating company; because the contractor here is a corporation controlled by, and so closely identified with, the operating company that the separation into two corporate entities should be disregarded and fault of either may be attributed to the other.

Before considering the legal consequences which might fall upon the plaintiff corporation from an act or default of its parent corporation, we must determine how far the acts of the parent corporation contributed to the failure of the city to perform its contractual duty to the subsidiary corporation. The parent company promptly returned to the Commission the “ form of contract together with the specifications and contract drawings ” which had been submitted to it in April, 1914, pursuant to the terms of Contract No. 3. At that time it made no criticism of the alignment of the tracks, so far as such alignment was shown on the contract drawings, and made no suggestions as to how the tracks and switches should be laid out. Not until October 26th, 1914, did the city or the Public Service Commission again submit to the Interborough Rapid Transit Company any drawings, showing proposed location of the tracks and switches. Then the Public Service Commission sent to the Inter-borough Rapid Transit Company track alignment drawings ” for a portion of the route above Forty-second street with a letter stating: “ Will you kindly indicate on one set of these plans the speeds at which you propose to operate over the various curves and the location of the regular and emergency cross-over.” Months of discussion followed as to the proper arrangement of the tracks at that point, before plans were prepared which met with the approval of the Interborough Rapid Transit Company. On March 2, 1915, such plans were at last agreed upon and approved.

Doubtless the Interborough Rapid Transit Company knew, even at the time when the form of contract was submitted to it for criticisms and suggestions, that the location of switches and cross-overs would dictate, to some extent, the position of the steel columns, and thus the length of the space between the columns and of the beams resting upon the columns and necessitate the fabrication of columns and beams of varying weights and size. Therefore, drawings for the fabrication of the columns and beams at such points could not be prepared until the location of the switches and cross-overs was determined. We must assume, for there is evidence to that effect, that the contract drawings submitted to the Interborough Rapid Transit Company in April, 1914, with the form of contract showed sufficiently the proposed location of the switches in the subsections north of Forty-second street, to enable that company to criticise those drawings. The courts below have held that then the Rapid Transit Company was under a duty to approve the location of the switches as shown on the drawings or to suggest changes. Since the Rapid Transit Company did not suggest any changes till after more detailed track alignment plans were submitted to it in October, and did not finally approve the amended plans until March, it has been held that the Rapid Transit Company failed to perform its duty till that date, and the intervening delay was due, wholly, to its fault.

That conclusion rests upon a misconstruction of those provisions of Contract No. 3 between the Interborough Rapid Transit Company and the city to which we have referred above. No duty was thereby placed upon the Rapid Transit Company to criticise the location of the switches or to suggest changes, and when it returned the form of contract and the contract drawings without such criticism, the city might proceed in accordance with those contract drawings and presumably would do so, unless it asked for further criticism or suggestions. If these plans proved defective and later required amendment, such amendment might add to the expense of the construction of the railway. None the less, as we have already pointed out, the Rapid Transit Company assumed no duty to the city to avoid such expense, which both would share. At least until detailed track alignment drawings were again voluntarily submitted to the company in October, the delay in the preparation of working drawings was wholly due to the fault of the Commission, and is not excused by any act or default of the Rapid Transit Company. Until that time neither the plaintiff nor the operating company which controlled the plaintiff, by any act or neglect, hindered the defendant in the performance of its duty to prepare and deliver detailed drawings for the construction of the railway, nor had either lulled the defendant into inaction.

Thereafter the question assumes a different aspect. Even .if the Commission was then under no duty to the Interborough Rapid Transit Company to ask further approval of track alignment drawings, it chose to do so, and even if the Interborough Rapid Transit Company was then under no duty to examine the plans and make suggestions for changes, it chose for its own protection to examine the drawings submitted. Having assumed to act, it was then under a duty to act reasonably. There is some evidence that it delayed unreasonably, and the defendant endeavored to show that this delay was due not merely to negligence but to calculation, because indirectly the operating company would profit through postponement of the date of completion of the construction of the new railway route and the beginning of its operation. We do not analyse that evidence in this opinion. It permits no such inference, and the trial judge stated in his opinion that he would not make such finding. The delay, though not calculated to hinder the progress of the construction work, nevertheless naturally did have that effect, and the Interborough Rapid Transit Company understood that the preparation of the plans and drawings for construction at that point would await a new determination of the location of the tracks.

The plaintiff, demanding damages caused to it by such delay, asserts that it is an entity entirely distinct from the Interborough Rapid Transit Company which owns its stock, and is not concerned with the causes of the delay or chargeable with the act or neglect of the parent company. The city made a contract with it and not with the parent company, and the city has breached that contract. If in truth the plaintiff and the Interborough Company must for all purposes be regarded as distinct and unrelated entities, then there is no escape from the conclusion that proof that the Interborough Company contributed to or even willfully caused that delay, is irrelevant.

A corporation is a creature of the law, endowed with a personality separate and distinct from the personality of those who own its stock and elect its directors. “ The corporation in respect of corporate property and rights is entirely distinct from the stockholders who are the ultimate or equitable owners of its assets.” (Brock v. Poor, 216 N. Y. 387, 401.) “ Many a man incorporates his business or his property and is the dominant and controlling feature of the corporation. He may do so for the very purpose of escaping personal liability, and he may do so as a cover if in fact the corporation really exists — is doing business as permitted by the laws of this state or the state of its incorporation, in other words, is a person recognized by the law.” (Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 262.) That is true equally where the corporation is controlled by a natural or an artificial person. Here the plaintiff does exist as a corporation. It has its own assets and property. Some, perhaps all, of its officers are the same persons who occupy similar offices in the parent company; but it maintains its own organization and has an independent life. Its separate personality may not be disregarded. (Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84.) These rules have been consistently applied where liability for wrong done by the corporation is asserted against a controlling stockholder. Disregard of the dual personality of corporation and stockholder would, in such case, defeat one of the principal purposes for which the law has created the corporation. In some cases, it is true, the owner of corporate stock, who controls the corporation, has been held responsible for the act of the corporation (Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Assn., 247 U. S. 490; Davis v. Alexander, 269 U. S. 114), but in those cases the stockholder did not merely use its control of the corporation in the normal and usual manner, but used the corporation as an agent for the transaction of part of the stockholder’s business. There liability rested, not upon a disregard of the independent personality of the corporation, but upon the principle of respondeat superior applicable even where the agent is a natural person.

The trial judge has found that the plaintiff is a mere agency of the Interborough Rapid Transit Company in the transaction by that company of its corporate business. There is no evidence that the Rapid Transit Company, though in control of the plaintiff, participated in the management of its affairs in other than the usual and normal manner. It hoped through stock ownership to absorb the profits derived by the plaintiff from the transaction of business, but that business was the plaintiff’s business, transacted by it for its own profit, not the business of the Rapid Transit Company transacted by it through the plaintiff’s agency. Moreover, even though a principal may be charged with responsibility for the acts of its agent, here the alleged agent has been charged with responsibility for the acts of the alleged principal. The problem here presented is in this respect novel.

We have said: “ Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where control is less than this, we are remitted to the tests of honesty and justice. (Ballantine, Parent & Subsidiary Corporations, 14 Calif. Law Review, 12, 18, 19, 20.) The logical consistency of a juridical conception will indeed be sacrificed at times when the sacrifice is essential to the end that some accepted public policy may be defended or upheld. * * * At such times unity is ascribed to parts which, at least for many purposes, retain an independent fife, for the reason that only thus can we overcome a perversion of the privilege to do business in a corporate form.” (Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., supra, at p. 95.) Here we are relegated to the tests of honesty and justice,” and no rigid yardstick has ever been fashioned which will measure honesty and justice.

It is not claimed here that the plaintiff is insolvent or even that it has any unpaid creditors. Recovery of damages will eventually enure to the sole benefit of the Rapid Transit Company through its stock ownership. To the extent that such damages are caused by wrongful act or neglect of the Rapid Transit Company, a recovery would enable it to draw profit from its own wrong at the expense of the city. That result, following from adherence to “ the logical consistency of a juridical concept,” would clearly constitute a perversion of the privilege to do business in a corporate form. True, for actionable wrong by the Rapid Transit Company, the city might in its turn recover damages from that company, and thus restore to itself some or all of the profit which the Rapid Transit Company had gained by its own wrong. Then, perhaps, the courts might find a means of avoiding multiplicity and circuity of action, without ascribing unity to the corporation and its sole stockholder. We do not now consider such question. Here, as we have pointed out, the Rapid Transit Company was guilty of no wrong towards the city, at least until it delayed approval of the track alignment drawings submitted to it in October, 1914, and it may be doubted whether thereafter even unreasonable delay would constitute an actionable wrong, for the city could have proceeded at any time with the construction, without waiting for such approval.

Undoubtedly, however, the Interborough Rapid Transit Company understood that so long as the alignment drawdngs were held by it for criticism, and the location of the tracks remained undetermined, no drawings for the fabrication of the steel would be prepared by the city. It knew that though the delay might cause damage to the contractor, the expense, which it must share, of subsequent alteration of the structure because of error in the location of the tracks might thereby be avoided. It chose to participate in delaying the construction rather than to assume the risk of additional expense due to later alteration. If it were itself the plaintiff asking damages for delay under the construction contract, then, clearly, its own acquiescence in that delay would bar recovery. Now recovery for any damages caused by the delay in which it acquiesced and even participated will enure to its own benefit ■— though even now by the exercise of its control of the plaintiff it might direct the waiver by the plaintiff of such damages. Exemption from liability for wrong committed by the corporation whose stock it owns is inherent in the privilege, accorded to it by law, of conducting its business in corporate form; exemption from the consequences of its own acts working injustice upon parties with which it deals is a perversion of that privilege. Then, though juridically there is no unity between the corporation and its sole stockholder, the law should not entirely disregard the factual connection between the two. If the parent company were a party to an action in equity, the court might compel it, as controlling stockholder of the corporation, either to reimburse the defendant for the damages caused by delay in which it participated, or, since as sole stockholder it alone will profit by such* damages, to cause the corporation to waive such damages. In such case the courts should disregard juridical forms and treat corporation and sole stockholder as a unit, in order that unjust enrichment at the expense of a third party may be avoided. A different solution of the problem might be required if the rights of minority stockholders or creditors were affected. That we do not decide now. The courts below erred in holding that the entire delay in the preparation of the drawings was due to the wrong of the Rapid Transit Company, but the plaintiff should not be allowed to recover damages for delay or neglect of the city after the retention and examination by the Rapid Transit Company of the track alignment plans submitted to it in October, 1914, in so far as the Rapid Transit Company participated or acquiesced in such delay to serve its own purposes.

What we have said applies only to delay in preparing the drawings for subsections 1 to 4. The delay in preparing drawings for subsections 6 and 7 was due, so far as this record shows, solely to the fault of the Commission. There no change in the location of the tracks and switches was considered, and the Rapid Transit Company did not participate or acquiesce in the delay. Recovery was denied the plaintiff for that delay on the ground that the delay caused no damages. We find that the evidence shows conclusively that the delay did cause damage.

The contract provided (Section 18): “ No work shall be begun until the Commission shall issue to the contractor a permit authorizing him to proceed. No permits for excavation will be issued until the contractor has given satisfactory assurance to the engineer that the structural iron and steel and other material needed for construction will be available. The contractor must conduct his work so as to avoid advancing the excavation at any place ahead of the delivery on the work or on property owned or leased by the City of the structural iron and steel required for such place, unless otherwise permitted by the Engineer. If the contractor elects and is permitted to advance the excavation ahead of such iron and steel delivery, it will become necessary for him to support and maintain the trenches until the iron and steel can be obtained; this he shall do entirely at his own risk and expense. The permits are to be in such form and shall cover such portions of the work as the Commission shall prescribe.”

The meaning of this provision is clear. It contemplated that deliveries of structural iron and steel would be made as the excavation proceeded, so that the necessity of erecting temporary timber support for the trenches and the street surface would be avoided, but if such delivery was not made, the contractor might, with the permission of the engineer and at his own risk and expense, continue the work of excavation. In this case, the contractor promptly began the excavation, relying upon the obligation of the city to furnish drawings, in time for the contractor to order the steel and obtain delivery as the excavation proceeded. In December, 1914, it became evident that the work could not proceed in the manner originally contemplated, and though no special permit was given to the contractor, it was allowed to proceed with the excavation and protect the work by timbers. In that way it was hoped the completion of the work would be facilitated. In September, 1915, the plaintiff abandoned further excavation.

At that time a large part of the excavation had been completed by the use of the so-called timbering process, which is used when excavation and steel construction do not proceed simultaneously, and the street surface over the parts excavated was supported by timber. There is evidence that if the contractor had not abandoned further excavation at that time, it could have continued the steel work expeditiously after the steel was delivered, and in that way could have completed the contract without substantial delay. Therefore, the trial judge held that delay in the delivery of the drawings caused no damage for which the city must respond.

That conclusion is not supported by the evidence. Assuming that the delay in furnishing the drawings would have caused the plaintiff no damage if it had proceeded to complete the excavation, using the timbering method, it did concededly cause damage when that method was abandoned, and the question remains whether the plaintiff was justified in abandoning that method. In September, 1915, on another branch of the new subway which was being constructed by other contractors by the same method, there was a serious cave-in. A surface car passing over the street above a trench which was supported by temporary timber construction fell into the trench, with a large loss of life. Then both the contractor and the city began to question the safety of the timbering method of construction. There were numerous conferences between the plaintiff’s engineers and the city’s engineers. One of the plaintiff’s engineers stated that the plaintiff could and should proceed with the excavation. All the others disagreed with him, and the plaintiff stopped further excavation. It is said in the city’s brief that the evidence would support a finding that this change of construction was done for purposes of delay. That is not the fact. Although no formal order was given by the city to stop this construction, it is not disputed that informal orders were given, and so the trial judge stated in his opinion. Nevertheless, he found that the plaintiff, having undertaken to proceed in advance of delivery of steel, by the use of timbering supports, made an “ election ” under the terms of the contract, and cannot complain because subsequent events made that election unprofitable. If the so-called election had been made voluntarily by the plaintiff for its own profit, and the city had permitted the plaintiff to finish the construction in the manner elected ” by the plaintiff, the conclusion of the trial justice would have been correct, but since the so-called election was forced upon the plaintiff by the city and did not delay the completion of the work, and the city itself refused to permit completion under the system elected, it seems plain that the conclusion of the trial judge that the contractor was not damaged by the delay in furnishing the drawings is not supported by the evidence.

We have examined with care all the claims of the plaintiff that recovery for other items alleged in the complaint' was erroneously denied, though space cannot be found in this opinion for detailed analysis. We find error in regard to only one other claim. The engineer should have included in his measurement of duct feet,” for which the contractor was entitled to payment under Schedule Item 127, the space within the manholes which form an integral part of the ducts for electric wires. The judgment should include the sum of $4,665.05 for this item.

The only question which we must still consider is whether interest on all sums due to the plaintiff from the city runs from the date when the claim was filed with the Comptroller or whether the city is liable for interest on these sums, as well as interest upon the value of securities withheld, from an earlier date. In Taylor v. Mayor of New York (67 N. Y. 87, 94) this court held that no interest could be allowed on a contractual claim for salary until after demand upon the disbursing officer of the city. There we said: The city government is not required to seek out those who have claims against it, and pay them even when due. It is to be presumed that all proper liabilities will be paid upon demand. The Charter prohibits any action against the city until thirty days after the claim has been presented to the Comptroller.” The rule that interest will not run against the city until demand upon the disbursing officer has been reiterated in subsequent cases. (Sweeny v. City of New York, 173 N. Y. 414; O’ Keeffe v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 297.) In Smith v. Board of Education (208 N. Y. 84, 86) the same rule was applied in an action against the Board of Education, the court stating: “ It must be regarded as well settled that a claim against a municipality, although liquidated and due afc a definite date, does not draw interest until demand has been made for its payment, unless it is otherwise agreed. This rule is independent of any statutory requirement such as the familiar one that notice of claim must be served on the municipality some time before suit can be commenced thereon.” In no subsequent case has this court consciously departed from that rule, although, perhaps, cases might be cited where the appellants failed to suggest this point adequately, and judgments which included interest running from an earlier date have been affirmed.

The plaintiff urges that a different rule should be applied in this case, because it made timely demand for a final certificate upon the engineer, and that officer delayed in furnishing the certificate for over two years. Under the terms of the contract there was nothing due to the plaintiff from the city until ninety days after the engineer had given the final certificate. The engineer had a reasonable time to grant such a certificate, and it may be that after refusal to grant a certificate or delay so long continued as to amount to a refusal, the plaintiff could bring an action without procuring the certificate. Nevertheless, the demand on the engineer for a certificate was not a demand for the payment of an accrued claim upon an officer of the city authorized to pay claims. Until the claim was filed with the Comptroller, no such officer had any notice that any moneys were due to the plaintiff, and certainly no officer had been called upon to pay the plaintiff’s claim. It follows that the courts correctly held that interest on the plaintiff’s claim runs only from the date when the claim was filed with the Comptroller, and demand made upon him.

The action should be severed and the judgments of the Appellate Division and the Special Term, in so far as they deny recovery upon the causes of action for delay of the city in furnishing drawings and directions, should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. The judgments of the Appellate Division and of the Special Term upon the remaining causes of action should be modified by including in the amount awarded to the plaintiff the sum of $4,665.05, with interest from the date of demand, and as modified affirmed, with costs to the appellant.

Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Kellogg, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ., concur.

Judgment accordingly.

       Cardozo, Ch. J., heard the argument but resigned before the decision; Crouch, J., was not a member of the court at the time of argument, hence did not participate in the decision.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    In the Matter of the Accounting of The National City Bank of New York, as Trustee under the Will of John Schliemann, Deceased, Appellant. John T. Brennan, as Special Guardian for George Lohman et al., Respondents.

      (Argued May 31, 1932;
    decided July 19, 1932.)

      Conrad Saxe Keyes for appellant.
    The will indicates that the testator contemplated that the trust company should perform a separate function as trustee distinct from that as executor. (Greenland v. Waddell, 116 N. Y. 234; Matter of Waterman, 60 Misc. Rep. 292; Matter of Waninger, 120 App. Div. 273; 190 N. Y. 527; Cooke v. Platt, 98 N. Y. 35; Ward v. Ward, 105 N. Y. 68; Laytin v. Davidson, 95 N. Y. 263; Matter of Johnson, 170 N. Y. 139; Phoenix v. Livingston, 101 N. Y. 451; Olcott v. Baldwin, 190 N. Y. 99; Matter of Mason, 98 N. Y. 527; Matter of Crawford, 113 N. Y. 560; Matter of Willets, 112 N. Y. 289.) After the accounting by the executor, the continued management by the trust company was as trustee. (Laytin v. Davidson, 95 N. Y. 263; Hurlburt v. Durant, 88 N. Y. 121; Matter of Mason, 98 N. Y. 527; Phoenix v. Livingston, 101 N. Y. 451; Matter of Willets, 112 N. Y. 289; Matter of Crawford, 113 N. Y. 560; Olcott v. Baldwin, 190 N. Y. 99.) Where the will directs the performance of executorial duties such as the payment of debts and legacies, and then directs the holding of the residue in trust for one or more beneficiaries, double commissions are proper. (Matter of

      Crawford, 113 N. Y. 560; Matter of Mason, 98 N. Y. 527; Laytin v. Davidson, 95 N. Y. 263; Phoenix v. Livingston, 101 N. Y. 451.)

      John T. Brennan for respondents.
    The terms of the will contemplated a continued holding by the executor as such throughout the trust period. (Johnson v. Lawrence, 95 N. Y. 154; Laytin v. Davidson, 95 N. Y. 263; McAlpine v. Potter, 126 N. Y. 285; Matter of Vanneck, 175 App. Div. 363; Leask v. Beach, 173 App. Div. 873; Matter of Clinton, 12 App. Div. 132; Matter of Hogeboom, 219 App. Div. 131; Matter of Abrahams, 136 Misc. Rep. 538; Matter of Ziegler, 218 N. Y. 544.)
   Lehman, J.

John Schliemann bequeathed the entire residue of his estate to Peoples Trust Company, in trust, to sell his real estate and securities and to invest and reinvest the proceeds in first mortgages upon real property in the city of New York, during the lifetime of his sons Julius and John. The duty was placed upon the trustee to set aside “ out of the said securities so invested by it ” a fund sufficient to produce the sum of two thousand dollars a year, and another fund sufficient to produce the sum of six hundred dollars a year, and to pay annually said sums to his wife and to his son August, respectively, during the lifetime of each. The testator directed that all the remainder of the income of the trust funds should be paid in equal shares to his three other children, Julius, John and Anna, or in case of the death of any of them leaving issue, to such issue. Upon the death of both Julius and John, the trustee was directed to pay over the principal of the trust fund, in equal shares to the issue of John and Julius and to Anna or her issue, after provision for the purchase of annuities for the testator’s wife and son August should either be then living. In case of the death of all the children without issue, the testator directed the trustee to pay the principal of the fund to his brothers and sisters and their issue. In the succeeding and final paragraph of the will, the testator appointed People’s Trust Company as executor of the will.

The will was admitted to probate on December 14,1911. On March 17, 1913, a decree was entered settling the accounts of People’s Trust Company as executor, awarding commissions to it as executor, and directing it to transfer to itself as trustee the residuary fund created by the will. Since that time The National City Bank has become, by merger, the successor of the People’s Trust Company, and has carried out the trust duties imposed by the will. The City Bank has now filed a petition asking that it be permitted to resign as trustee, that its accounts be settled and proper commissions awarded to it and that City Bank-Farmers Loan and Trust Company, with which it is affiliated, be substituted as trustee in its place. The special guardian for infant remaindermen has filed objections to- the payment to the trustee of any commissions on principal on which commissions have already been received by People’s Trust Company. The Surrogate in his decree awarded such commissions and the Appellate Division modified the decree in that respect and awarded commissions on no part of the' principal upon which full commissions had been awarded and received by the executor.

If the testator, in the residuary clause of the will, had named as trustee a person or corporation other than the executor appointed in the succeeding clause of the will, the executor would have been entitled to a full commission on the principal of the estate when the assets were paid over to the trustee; and the trustee would have been entitled to one-half commission for receiving the principal, and another one-half commission upon the termination of the trust and the payment of the proceeds. The only question presented on this appeal is whether the same commissions should be paid where one person, natural or corporate, is named as trustee and executor. The circumstance that petitioner succeeded the original executor has no bearing upon this question, for, concededly, it is entitled to no commissions to which the original trustee would not have been entitled. So, too, the trustee cannot, by resignation and the substitution, as trustee, of its corporate affiliate, impose upon the estate an obligation to pay to it any commissions other than those which would have been presently payable if it had not divested itself of its trust duties. If any commissions on principal are payable to the trustee, in addition to those paid to the same person as executor, then the trustee would now be entitled to one-half commission for the performance by it of the trust duty of receiving and investing the principal. That is what it is asking here. It does not claim, and, obviously, would not be entitled to payment of the other half commission on principal, which could not become payable till the trust estate is distributed, and would then go to the substituted trustee.

That the same person may be entitled to compensation as executor, and also as trustee, in respect to the same estate, or some part thereof, is undoubtedly true, but does not follow in every instance where trust duties are imposed upon an executor. Where, by the terms or true construction of the will, the two functions with their corresponding duties coexist, and run from the death of the testator to the final discharge; interwoven, inseparable and blended together, so that no point of time is fixed or contemplated in the testamentary intention at which one function should end and the other begin, double commissions on both cannot properly be allowed. (Johnson v. Lawrence, 95 N. Y. 154, 159.)

There is a large field in which a testator may determine how his estate shall be held and administered. He may, within the limits imposed by law, postpone the time for distribution of some, or all of, the assets of his estate and direct that until such time the person, appointed to administer and distribute the estate, shall hold such assets and apply the income as directed by the will. To carry out such purpose he must, at times, attach to the office of executor certain trust power and functions; but in such case there is but one office and the holder of the office is entitled only to the commissions allowed by law for the performance of the duties of that office. An executor is not entitled to commissions for distributing the principal of the estate until he has completed such distribution and no longer has title to its assets. A trustee is not entitled to commissions for receiving the principal of a trust fund until title to such fund has passed to him. That is true alike where one person is appointed as executor and trustee or where different persons hold each office. The title to the assets, in either case, is, at all times, in the holder of a particular office and cannot at any time be divided between the simultaneous holders of two offices. Thus the problem presented in each case is whether a point of time is fixed or contemplated in the testamentary intention ” at which title to the assets of the estate shall no longer remain in the executor but shall pass to the trustee under the will.

That problem is simple where separate persons are named as executor or trustee, for the trustee’s functions begin only when title passes to the trustee, and the time when such functions begin is fixed at the point where there is actual severance of the trust fund from the general assets of the estate. Evidently a testator must have contemplated such severance where he has named different persons to perform the functions of separate offices. The problem is more difficult and complicated when the same person is named as both executor and trustee. Then double commissions can be awarded to a person claiming to hold both offices only where a testamentary intent is apparent to create a trust fund to be held by a trustee after severance from the general assets of the estate. “A will must go further than to admit of double commissions, and must clearly and definitely indicate an intention of the testator to end the executor’s duty at some point of time, and require him thereupon to constitute and set up one or more several trusts, to be held and managed as such for the interest of the beneficiary.” (McAlpine v. Potter, 126 N. Y. 285, 289.) Even then, double commissions may not be awarded unless .the performance of the duties of a trustee has actually begun either by a real severance of the trust fund from the general assets, or a judicial decree which wholly discharges the executor and leaves him acting and liable only as trustee.” (Johnson v. Lawrence, supra at page 162.)

These principles have been clearly laid down in the opinions by Finch, J., in the cases cited. The decisions in other cases which have come before this court illustrate the application of these principles to particular cases. They do not materially limit or extend the general rules, for in each case determination of the testamentary intent depended upon the construction placed upon the language of a particular will, and no two cases are in all respects analogous. In Johnson v. Lawrence (supra); McAlpine v. Potter (supra); Matter of Slocum (169 N. Y. 153); Matter of Ziegler (218 N. Y. 544) double commissions were denied. They were allowed in Laytin v. Davidson (95 N. Y. 263); Matter of Mason (98 N. Y. 527); Matter of Willets (112 N. Y. 289); Matter of Crawford (113 N. Y. 560); Matter of Johnson (170 N. Y. 139); Olcott v. Baldwin (190 N. Y. 99); Matter of Martin (196 N. Y. 415), though in the last case only as against beneficiaries bound by an earlier decree. The courts have, never attempted to formulate fixed tests, which can be applied in all cases, to determine testamentary intent. That must always be gathered from the will read as a whole. In those cases where double commissions were denied, the testator had made no distinction between functions which those named as executors or as executors and trustees should perform by virtue of their dual offices. There the wills not only postponed division and distribution of the estate but contemplated that from the death of the testator the estate should be held by the executors, pending such division and distribution. Every duty resting upon those holding title to the estate was imposed upon the executors from the date of death, and every function and power to be exercised by them was intrusted to them from the same date. In those cases where double commissions were allowed, the directions given were different, and there were indications in the will that after the persons named as executors had fully completed administration of the estate, except as such administration might otherwise include distribution, they should hold the residue of the estate in separate trust funds or in one fund, which was to be invested and used for the purposes set forth in the will until final distribution was made. Thus the court could discern a clear intention of the testator that at a fixed period those named as executors and as trustees should hold the property as trustees.

■ Here, perhaps even more clearly than in many of the cases cited, the will shows that the testator intended to differentiate between the functions of People’s Trust Company as executor and its functions as trustee. He did not merely attach to the office of executor functions ordinarily exercised by a trustee, but bequeathed his estate to the People’s Trust Company in trust to dispose of his real estate and securities and to invest the proceeds in specified manner and out of the securities so invested by it ” to set apart two specific funds for the benefit of persons who might not share in the final distribution. Indeed the testator contemplated that perhaps none of the persons who shared in the income of the trust fund or funds could share in the final distribution. Then he appointed the People’s Trust Company as executor of the estate, giving to it no specific powers except a power to sell. Evidently he contemplated that the duties of the trustee should begin when the bequest in trust took effect, and it could take effect only when the executor had administered the estate and held the remainder, not by virtue of appointment as executor, but under the trust bequest. That time became fixed by the earlier decree discharging the accounting party as executor and directing it to hold the estate as trustee.

We need not now decide whether the earlier decree constituted an adjudication binding upon the parties that the estate was thereafter held by People’s Trust Company as trustee. Sufficient that the will shows a testamentary intention that the trustee should hold by virtue of the bequest to it and not as executor, and the decree carries out that intent.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the decree of the Surrogate’s Court affirmed, with costs in the Appellate Division and in this court payable out of the estate.

Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Kellogg, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ., concur.

Ordered accordingly.


text:
    Emilio Rebora et al., as Adjusters and Trustees for Navigazione Generale Italiana, Respondents, v. British and Foreign Marine Insurance Company, Ltd., Appellant.
    (Submitted February 15, 1932;
    decided March 15, 1932.)
   Motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 258 N. Y. 379.)


text:
    Caroline M. Gavin, Appellant, v. Peter Aiken, as Executor of Mary J. Driver, Deceased, Respondent, Impleaded with Another.
    (Submitted March 14, 1932;
    decided March 22, 1932.)
   Motion to amend remittitur denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 258 N. Y. 595.)


text:
    Joseph Frankenberger, Respondent, v. Alexander Schneller et al., as Executors of Bernhard Schneller, Deceased, Appellants.
    (Submitted March 14, 1932;
    decided March 22, 1932.)
   Motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 258 N. Y. 270.)


text:
    Christian Sautter, Jr., Respondent, v. John C. Fulmer et al., as Executors of and Trustees under the Will of Jacob Ange, Deceased, Appellants. W. Strong Cloher et al., as Executors of William H. Cloher, Deceased, Respondents, v. John C. Fulmer et al., as Executors of and Trustees under the Will of Jacob Ange, Deceased, Appellants. William I. Taber, Respondent, v. John C. Fulmer et al., as Executors of and Trustees under the Will of Jacob Ange, Deceased, Appellants. T. Harvey Ferris, Respondent, v. John C. Fulmer et al., as Executors of and Trustees under the Will of Jacob Ange, Deceased, Appellants; George W. Gammel, Respondent, v. John C. Fulmer et al., as Executors of and Trustees under the Will of Jacob Ange, Deceased, Appellants. First Bank and Trust Company of Utica, as Executor of John H. Siemers, Deceased, Respondent, v. John C. Fulmer et al., as Executors of and Trustees under the Will of Jacob Ange, Deceased, Appellants. Carrie B. Sherman, Respondent, v. John C. Fulmer et al., as Executors of and Trustees under the Will of Jacob Ange, Deceased, Appellants.
    (Submitted March 14, 1932;
    decided March 22, 1932.)
   Motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 258 N. Y. 107.)


text:
    M. Arthur Helfhat, Respondent, v. J. Norman Whitehouse et al., Copartners, under the Firm Name of Whitehouse & Co., Appellants.
    (Submitted March 14, 1932;
    decided March 22, 1932.)
   Motion by appellants for reargument of motion to compel restitution denied.

Motion by appellants for a resettlement of the order of this court dated February 16, 1932, granted; return of said order requested and when returned it will be amended so as to provide that restitution is not ordered as against the attorneys.

Motion by respondent for reargument of motion made by appellants for order of restitution or resettlement of said order denied. (See 258 N. Y. 608.)


text:
    Bush Terminal Company, Respondent, v. The City of New York, Appellant.
    (Argued March 14, 1932;
    decided March 29, 1932.)

      Arthur J. W. Hilly, Corporation Counsel (Sigmund F. Sarnowski and Joseph P. Reilly of counsel), for appellant.

      Harper A. Holt and Abner J. Grossman for respondent.
   Order of the Appellate Division reversed and that of the Special Term affirmed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division, and the question certified answered in the negative on the authority of Davidson v. City of New York (221 N. Y. 487); no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Mary Tonkin, Appellant, v. Timothy A. Leary, as President Justice of the Municipal Court of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.
    (Argued March 14, 1932;
    decided March 29, 1932.)

      H. Eliot Kaplan, John Kiikland Clark and Albert De Roode for appellant.

      Edward Ward McMahon, William J. O’Shea, Jr., Edward McLoughlin and Edward D. Burns for respondents.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    In the Matter of the Claim of Sol Glicksman, Respondent, against New York Rapid Transit Corporation, Appellant. The State Industrial Board, Respondent.
    (Argued March 14, 1932;
    decided March 29, 1932.)

      A. A. Kraus and George D. Yeomans for appellant.

      John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Joseph A. McLaughlin, John R. O’Hanlon and Abraham Brekstone of counsel), for respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    In the Matter of the Claim of Edna Tallman, Respondent, against Colonial Air Transport, Inc., et al., Appellants. The State Industrial Board, Respondent.
    (Argued March 15, 1932;
    decided March 29, 1932.)

      T. Carlyle Jones and Bernard J. Vincent for appellants.

      John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Joseph A. McLaughlin and Isaac Frank of counsel), for respondents.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    In the Matter of the Claim of George Yeannelis, Respondent, against Michael Menides, Doing Business under the Name of Excellent Painting and Decorating Company, Respondent, and Samuel Diamond et al., Appellants. The State Industrial Board, Respondent.
    (Argued March 15, 1932;
    decided March 29, 1932.)

      T. Carlyle Jones and Bernard J. Vincent for appellants.

      John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Joseph A. McLaughlin, Roy Wiedersum and John R. O’Hanlon of counsel), for respondents.
   Appeal dismissed, with costs, the record not indicating that any constitutional question was raised below (Purdy v. Erie R. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 42, 50; Nod-Away Co. v. Carroll, 240 N. Y. 252); no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    In the Matter of the Claim of Frances Brozovich, Respondent, against Hotel Pennsylvania et al., Appellants. The State Industrial Board, Respondent.
    (Argued March 15, 1932;
    decided March 29, 1932.)

      William B. Davis and E. C. Sherwood for appellants.

      John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Joseph A. McLaughlin and Isaac Frank of counsel), for respondents.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    In the Matter of the Claim of Anna Kostyum, Appellant, against F. C. Sheldon Slate Company, Respondent. The State Industrial Board, Appellant.
    (Argued March 15, 1932;
    decided March 29, 1932.)

      Walter A. Fullerton and James D. Connor for Anna Kostyum, appellant.

      John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Joseph A. McLaughlin, Roy Wiedersum and John R. O’Hanlon of counsel), for the State Industrial Board, appellant.

      Herbert F. Hastings, Jr., and Everett F. Warrington for respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    In the Matter of the Claim of Beryl M. Proper against William A. Polley et al., Doing Business under the Firm Name of Polley Brothers et al., Respondents. The State Industrial Board, Appellant.
    (Argued March 15, 1932;
    decided March 29, 1932.)

      John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Joseph A. McLaughlin and John O’Hanlon of counsel), for appellant.

      Herbert F. Hastings, Jr., and Everett F. Warrington for respondents.
   Order affirmed, with costs against the State Industrial Board; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Anna U. Davis, Respondent, v. Carrie Uhl, as Executrix of Frederick P. Uhl, Deceased, Appellant.
    (Submitted March 28, 1932;
    decided March 29, 1932.)

      William T. Mulcahy for motion.

      Merle I. St. John, opposed.
   Motion denied, without costs.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Judah Bleiman, Appellant.
    (Submitted March 28, 1932;
    decided March 29, 1932.)

      William F. X. Geoghan, District Attorney (Henry J. Walsh of counsel), for motion.

      Charles M. Joseph, opposed.
   Motion granted.


text:
    In the Matter of Joseph F. Kelly, Respondent, against The Board of Education of the City of New York, Appellant.
    (Argued March 16, 1932;
    decided March 31, 1932.)

      Arthur J. W. Hilly, Corporation Counsel (J. Joseph Lilly, Henry J. Shields and Cornelius Bregoff of counsel), for appellant.

      Austin B. Mandel for respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Robert J. Bulkley et al., Respondents, v. The Positype Corporation of America et al., Appellants, Impleaded with Another. (Actions 3 and 4.)
    (Argued March 16, 1932;
    decided March 31, 1932.)

      R. Randolph Hicks and Lloyd F. Thanhouser for appellants.

      Enos Throop Geer, James B. Alley and James F. Dealy for respondents.
   Judgment in each action affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    J. Clarke Dean et al., Copartners under the Firm Name of Dean, Onativia & Co., Appellants, v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Respondent.
    (Argued March 16, 1932;
    decided March 31, 1932.)

      Max D. Steuer, William F. Unger and Samuel Silverman for appellants.

      Fred Boehm and Jacob Linett for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Dissenting: Lehman, J. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    In the Matter of the Estate of Fred A. Dittrich, Deceased. Benjamin H. Dittrich, as Executor of Fred A. Dittrich, Deceased, Appellant; Clara B. Ketchum, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of M. Helena Dittrich, Deceased, Respondent.
    (Argued March 17, 1932;
    decided March 31, 1932.)

      Prescott D. Perkins for appellant.

      Harry A. Yetter for respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs payable out of the estate; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Wager S. Kelly, Appellant, v. Louis J. Halle et al., Respondents.
    (Argued March 17, 1932;
    decided March 31, 1932.)

      David M. Neuberger for appellant.

      Frederick H. Wood and H. Struve Hensel for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    William Pilkington, Respondent, v. Atwell, Gustin, Morris, Inc., and Terry & Tench Company, Inc., Appellants.
    (Argued March 17, 1932;
    decided March 31, 1932.)

      Clarence S. Zipp and E. C. Sherwood for Atwell, Gustin, Morris, Inc., appellant.

      Leo C. Weiler, Thomas E. Nolan and William E. Lowther for Terry & Tench Company, Inc., appellant.

      Benjamin C. Loder, J. Austin Lyons and Owen E. Reilly for respondent.
   Judgment as to defendant Atwell, Gustin, Morris, Inc., affirmed, with costs. Judgment as to Terry & Tench Company, Inc., reversed and new trial granted, with costs to abide the event, on the ground that it does not appear from the evidence that the act of the superintendent was within the scope of his employment; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    In the Matter of Louis J. Cifelli, Appellant. Fred H. Rubin et al., Respondents.
    (Argued March 28, 1932;
    decided March 31, 1932.)

      Monroe J. Cahn and Humphrey J. Lynch for appellant.

      Fred H. Rubin and Hurlbert McAndrew for respondents.
   Order affirmed, without costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Lehman and Kellogg, JJ.


text:
    Van Rensselaer Halsey et al., Individually and as Copartners under the Firm Name of C. D. Halsey & Co., Respondents, v. Clinton D. Winant, Defendant, and W. A. Harriman & Company, Inc., Appellant.
    (Submitted March 29, 1932;
    decided March 31, 1932.)
   Motion to amend remittitur denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 258 N. Y. 512; 259 N. Y. 562.)


text:
    Jacob J. Kirshenbaum, Respondent, v. General Outdoor Advertising Company, Inc., Appellant, and Elizabeth W. Chapman, Appellant and Respondent.
    (Submitted March 28, 1932;
    decided March 31, 1932.)
   Motion for reargument and to amend remittitur denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 258 N. Y. 489.)


text:
    John A. Stirnweis, Respondent, v. Charles Caccioppo, Appellant.
    (Submitted March 28, 1932;
    decided March 31, 1932.)
   Motion for a reconsideration and reargument of the motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 258 N. Y. 68, 632.)


text:
    Thomas J. Smith, Respondent, v. Richard E. Weldon et al., Appellants.
    (Submitted March 28, 1932;
    decided March 31, 1932.)
   Motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 257 N. Y. 619.)


text:
    In the Matter of the Application of James A. Tillman, Respondent. Borris M. Komar, Appellant.
    (Argued March 14, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Borris M. Komar, appellant in person.

      J. Sidney Bernstein for respondent.
   Order of the Appellate Division and that of the Special Term reversed, with costs in all courts, and the matter remitted to the Special Term with directions to fix appellant’s hen on the basis of quantum meruit, on the authority of Matter of Tillman (259 N. Y. 133); no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    James Elgar (a Corporation), Respondent, v. Maryland Casualty Company, Appellant, and Marcy Place Holding Corporation et al., Respondents.
    (Submitted March 18, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Thomas J. Meehan, Jr., for appellant.

      Noah A. Stancliffe and William F. McDermott for plaintiff-respondent.

      David I. Shapiro for defendants-respondents.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion. (See 259 N. Y. 621.)

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Charles Shaftan, Respondent, v. Lillian M. Shaftan, Appellant.
    (Submitted March 18, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Frank J. Rinaldi and Frank J. Zeccola for appellant.

      Louis Mishell for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, without costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ruth Brown and John Dawson, Appellants.
    (Argued March 21, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Cecile Scheuer, Charles A. Hickey and Vincent Auleta for Ruth Brown, appellant.

      Moses A. Sachs, John A. Bell, Jr., Francis J. Mahoney and J. M. Cohen for John Dawson, appellant.

      Thomas C. T. Crain, District Attorney (Robert C. Taylor of counsel), for respondent.
   Judgments of conviction affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Lehman, J., dissents and votes for reversal as to Ruth Brown on the ground that there is no evidence of premeditation and deliberation, but concurs as to John Dawson. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Anna I. Magid et al., Copartners under the Firm Name of A. I. Magid Company, Respondents, v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, Appellant.
    (Argued March 21, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Wharton Poor and Herbert K. Stockton for appellant.

      Frank I. Finkler for respondents.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs, on the authority of Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (254 N. Y. 407); no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Lloyd R. Martindale, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. Griffin, Defendant-Appellant, and James B. McEneany et al., Defendants-Respondents.
    (Argued March 21, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      John J. Scully for appellant.

      W. Clyde O’Brien for respondents.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Chase Brothers Company, Respondent, v. Rochester Nurseries, Inc., Appellant.
    (Argued March 21, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Byron A. Johnson for appellant.

      George S. Van Schaick and Nelson Warner for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    W. C. Franklin et al., Copartners under the Firm Name of Franklin & Carey, Respondents, v. Thomas F. Lee, Appellant.
    (Argued March 22, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Joseph A. Nickerson and William E. Mills, Jr., for appellant.

      M. E. Harby and Henri C. Jacques for respondents.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    William H. McDonald, Respondent, v. Amsterdam Building Company, Appellant.
    (Argued March 22, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      David Morgulas and M. Carl Levine for appellant.

      Thomas F. Frawley for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Church E. Gates and Company, Appellant, v. The City of New York et al., Respondents.
    (Argued March 22, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Wilberforce Sully, Jr., and Frank W. Chambers for appellant.

      Arthur J. W. Hilly, Corporation Counsel (Alfred D. Jahr and Edwin J. Talley of counsel), for respondents.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Samuel Hershkowitz, Appellant.
    (Argued March 23, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Irving Schneider and J. B. Engel for appellant.

      William F. X. Geoghan, District Attorney (Thomas J. Sefton and Henry J. Walsh of counsel), for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Louis Hutter, Respondent, v. William J. Rodenbach, Appellant, Impleaded with Another.
    (Argued March 23, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Bernard Hershkopf and Charles Eno for appellant.

      Harry A. Schwartz for respondent.
   Appeal dismissed, with costs, on the ground that the judgment appealed from is not final; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Frank J. Deegan, Respondent, v. Frank Hungerford, Appellant.
    (Argued March 23, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      J. Stanley Carter for appellant.

      Frank L. Wiswall and Carl O. Olson for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Dissenting: O’Brien, J. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Ivan Selig, Respondent, v. Edwin F. Werring et al., Individually and as Copartners under the Firm Name of Schiff, Werring & Co., Appellants, Impleaded with Another.
    (Argued March 24, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Alexander Pfeiffer and Joseph Lotterman for appellants..

      Harris Berlack and Frank Aranow for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion. (See 259 N. Y. 587.)

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Ronald A. Bush, Appellant, v. Lloyd J. Goodno, Respondent.
    (Argued March 18, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      James O. Moore and William J. Brock for appellant.

      Harold J. Adams and Percy R. Smith for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Rose Licciardi, Respondent, v. Importers and Exporters Insurance Company of New York, Appellant.
    (Submitted March 24, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      William L. Clay for appellant.

      Arthur V. D. Chamberlain for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    Lena Peck, as Administratrix of the Estate of Morris Peck, Deceased, Respondent, v. Benjamin J. Weil et al., Individually and as Executors of and Testamentary Trustees under the Will of Jonas Weil, Deceased, Appellants, Impleaded with Others.
    (Argued March 24, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Albert R. Eberlein and Benjamin C. Loder for appellants.

      Herbert A. Canter for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Edith Baruch, an Infant, by Abram Baruch, Her Guardian ad Litem, et al., Respondents, v. Freida Fox et al., Appellants.
    (Argued March 24, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Lyman A. Spalding and William J. Nolan for appellants.

      Sol H. Sleppin for respondents.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Francis W. Kelly et al., Doing Business under the Name of Edward F. Kelly, Respondents, v. Louis Leavitt, Appellant.
    (Argued March 24, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Herman Shulman, Mortimer Hays, Jacob J. Podell, Arthur Abrams and David L. Podell for appellant.

      Harold R. Medina, Henry Vollmer, George C. Wildermuth and William F. McNulty for respondents.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion. (See 259 N. Y. 629.)

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Emma P. Shourds, Appellant, v. Thomas H. Armstrong, Respondent.
    (Argued March 24, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Heiby W. Ungerer for appellant.

      George P. Decker and Herbert J. Menzie for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    In the Matter of Rose S. Geller, Respondent. Mark H. Schneider, Appellant.
    (Argued March 25, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Mark Henry Schneider and Seymour E. Ehrenzweig for appellant.

      Irving D. Lipkowitz and George W. Israel for respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg and O’Brien, JJ.


text:
    John H. Flint, an Infant, by William H. Flint, His Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. Louis Bubie, Appellant.
    (Submitted March 25, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      John J. Scully for appellant.

      Harold W. Turner for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg and O’Brien, JJ.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dominick Odierno and Frank Giordano, Appellants.
    (Argued March 28, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Jacob Shientag for appellants.

      Charles B. McLaughlin, District Attorney (Sol. Boneparth and Herman J. Fliederblum of counsel), for respondent.
   Judgment of conviction as to each defendant affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    The Dwelle-Kaiser Company, Plaintiff, v. C. H. Frid, Doing Business under the Firm Name of Frid-McLeod Construction Company, et al., Defendants, National Bank of Fredonia, Appellant, and Jamestown Stone and Marble Corporation et al., Respondents.
    (Argued March 29, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      William C. Carroll and Kenneth W. Glines for appellant.

      Joseph F. Rice and Ross A. Spoto for respondents.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    James D. Clifford, Appellant, v. Firemen’s Mutual Benefit Association of the City of New York, Respondent.
    (Argued March 29, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Joseph R. Jackson, John J. Curtin, Adelbert P. Rich and Wesley S. Sawyer for appellant.

      Joseph A. McNamara and Thomas J. Kavanagh for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Margaret Goldman, Respondent, v. George A. Carden et al., Individually and as Copartners under the Firm Name of Carden, Green &Co., Appellants, Impleaded with Others.
    (Argued March 29, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Martin A. Schenck and William J. Carr for appellants.

      Herman Shulman, Mortimer Hays, Charles E. Rhodes and David L. Podell for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Morris Kupferschmidt, Respondent, v. First National Bank of Woodridge, Appellant.
    (Argued March 30, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Morris Kanfer and Arthur Rosenberg for appellant.

      Ellsworth Baker for respondent.
   Judgment modified so as to provide judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $1,839.10, with interest from the 6th day of April, 1922, and as so modified affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    In the Matter of the Accounting of the New York Trust Company, as Substituted Trustee for Margaret L. Winslow, under the Will of James Winslow, Deceased. Lanier McKee et al., as Executors of and Trustees under the Will of L. Lanier Winslow, Deceased, et al., Appellants; Arthur W. Little et al., Respondents.
    (Argued March 30, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      William Lloyd Kitchel, M. Glenn Folger and J. Delafield DuBois for Lanier McKee, the New York Trust Company, as executors, etc., under the will of L. Lanier Winslow, deceased, and L. Lanier Winslow, Jr., et al., infants, appellants.

      Harland B. Tibbetts for Arthur W. Little, Jr., respondent.

      Cornelius P. Cotter for Winslow Little, respondent.

      Harold R. Medina and Rufus C. Van Aken for the New York Trust Company, as substituted trustee for Margaret L. Winslow under will of James Winslow, deceased, respondent.

      Herman Aaron for Mary R. Braman, amicus curiæ.

      Harrison Tweed and John E. Lockwood for Milbank, Tweed, Hope and Webb, amici curiæ.

   Order affirmed, with costs payable out of the estate; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Frank F. Tripi, Respondent, v. Andrew Cocca et al., Appellants.
    (Argued March 30, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Leo F. Donnelly for appellant.

      Henry Stern and Michael P. Geraci for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    In the Matter of Horace M. Grossman et al., as Executors of Marie Forrest, Deceased, Appellants. Joseph A. Broderick, Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York in Charge of The Bank of United States, Respondent.
    (Argued March 30, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Max L. Schallek and Alfred Englander for appellants.

      Warren C. Fielding, Arthur Ofner, Joseph F. Hunter and Carl J. Austrian for respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Oliver F. Counter, Appellant, v. New York Telephone Company, Respondent. Emma Counter, Appellant, v. New York Telephone Company, Respondent.
    (Argued March 30, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      James S. Kiley and Jere M. Cronin for appellants.

      Charles J. Herrick for respondent.
   In each action judgment of the Appellate Division reversed and that of the Trial Term affirmed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division. Held, the question of negligence was properly submitted to the jury. No opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Morris Rosner, Appellant, v. Jacob Reisberg et al., Respondents, Impleaded with Others.
    (Submitted March 31, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Benjamin F. Spellman, Samuel W. Dorfman and Harold Dublirer for appellant.

      David S. Romanov, Eugene B. Sullivan and Joseph M. Klein for respondents.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Gilbert H. Crawford, as Receiver of Roland Steel Company, Inc., Appellant, v. John Detjens, Respondent.
    (Argued March 31, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Harold E. Lippincott and Albert G. Avery for appellant.

      Frederick G. Fischer for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Alice P. Wilkinson, as Administratrix of the Estate of Orrin D. Wilkinson, Deceased, Respondent, v. Ralph Boehm et al., Appellants.
    (Argued March 31, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Charles B. Sullivan for William Haas, appellant.

      Douglas S. Rider for Ralph Boehm and Harry Haas, appellants.

      Lester Robert Smith, for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    In the Matter of the Assignment of Paramount Finishing Corporation to Thomas O. Scheckell et al., Appellants. Manufacturers Trust Company, Respondent.
    (Submitted March 31, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Edward W. Drucker for appellants.

      Leonard G. Bisco and Henry Landau for respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Crane and Kellogg, JJ.


text:
    George H. Jackson, Appellant, v. The Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., Respondent.
    (Submitted March 31, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Nathan D. Shapiro and Leon J. Shapiro for appellant.

      Bertrand L. Pettigrew for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Not sitting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    In the Matter of the Application of Alexander & Reid Company et al., Appellants. Irving Trust Company, as Trustee, et al., Respondents; In the Matter of the Application of Alexander & Reid Company et al. Libby’s Hotel Corporation et al., Appellants; Irving Trust Company, as Trustee, et al., Respondents.
    (Argued March 14, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Clarence J. Shearn for motions.

      Charles L. Craig opposed.
   Motions denied with leave to renew on argument of appeals.


text:
    Isadore Scheinberg et al., Respondents, v. Scheinberg Estates, Inc., et al., Appellants.
    (Submitted March 14, 1932;
    decided April 26, 1932.)

      Abraham H. Simon for motion.

      Jay Leo Rothschild opposed.
   Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs and ten dollars costs of motion, on the ground that the judgment appealed from is not final.


text:
    Peter H. McNulty et al., Copartners under the Firm Name of McNulty Bros., Respondents, v. Theresa C. Kammerer, Appellant, Impleaded with Another.
    (Submitted April 25, 1932;
    decided May 3, 1932.)

      James F. T. Delaney for motion.

      Thomas D. Austin opposed.
   Motion to dismiss appeal denied.

Motion for leave to amend notice of appeal nunc pro tunc denied as unnecessary. (Civ. Pr. Act, § 105; Rosenberg v. General Realty Service, Inc., 259 N. Y. 123.)


text:
    Van Rensselaer Halsey et al., Individually and as Copartners under the Firm Name of C. D. Halsey & Co., Respondents, v. Clinton D. Winant, Defendant, and W. A. Harriman & Company, Inc., Appellant.
    (Submitted April 25, 1932;
    decided May 3, 1932.)
   Motion for reargument of motion to amend remittitur and to amend remittitur denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 258 N. Y. 512; 259 N. Y. 525.)


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joseph Robarge, Appellant.
    (Submitted April 25, 1932;
    decided May 3, 1932.)

      Howard B. Donaldson, District Attorney, for motion.
    No one opposed.
   Motion granted and appeal dismissed.


text:
    In the Matter of the Transfer Tax upon the Estate of A. Albert Sack, Deceased. Industrial Trust Company of Providence, Rhode Island, as Executor, Appellant; State Tax Commission, Respondent.
    (Argued April 25, 1932;
    decided May 3, 1932.)

      Seth T. Cole for motion.

      Francis H. Warland opposed.
   Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs and ten dollars costs of motion.


text:
    In the Matter of the Proceeding under the Grade Crossing Elimination Act for the Elimination of a Grade Crossing at Altamont. The Delaware and Hudson Railroad Corporation, Appellant; The Public Service Commission of the State of New York, Respondent.
    (Submitted April 25, 1932;
    decided May 3, 1932.)

      Sherman C. Ward for motion.

      Alfred D. Kelly opposed.
   Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs and ten dollars costs of motion.


text:
    Giovanni Girardon, Appellant, v. Romolo Angelone, Respondent.
    (Submitted April 25, 1932;
    decided May 3, 1932.)

      Samuel Brand for motion.
    No one opposed.
   Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs and ten dollars costs of motion, on the ground that no final judgment has been entered which judicially settles the controversy between the parties and is reviewable here on appeal. (Van Arsdale v. King, 155 N. Y. 325; Kenyon v. Robin, 231 N. Y. 604; Dupay v. Galbina, 235 N. Y. 557.)


text:
    In the Matter of the Claim of Arthur S. MacClelland, Respondent, v. Dodge Brothers et al., Appellants.
    (Argued April 25, 1932;
    decided May 3, 1932.)

      Daniel F. Dunn for motion.

      George S. Kelly opposed.
   Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs and ten dollars costs of motion.


text:
    In the Matter of the Public Service Interstate Transportation Company, Inc., Respondent, against Public Service Commission of the State of New York et al., Appellants.
    (Submitted April 25, 1932;
    decided May 3, 1932.)
   Motion for a reargument denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 258 N. Y. 455.)


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Howard Du Bois, Defendant, and Harry Duignan, Appellant.
    (Submitted April 25, 1932;
    decided May 3, 1932.)

      Henry J. Walsh for motion.

      John J. O’Brien opposed.
   Certificate allowing appeal vacated, motion to dismiss appeal granted and appeal dismissed.


text:
    In the Matter of Alter Glicksberg, Respondent. Joseph A. Broderick, as Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York, Appellant.
    (Submitted April 25, 1932;
    decided May 10, 1932.)

      Arthur Ofner, Warren C. Fielding, Julius L. Neidle and Carl J. Austrian for appellant.

      Aaron J. Funk for respondent.
   Order of the Appellate Division reversed and that of the Special Term affirmed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division, on the authority of Matter of Littman (258 N. Y. 468); no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    In the Matter of Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation, Appellant, against H. Morgenthau, Jr., et al., Constituting the Water Power and Control Commission of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.
    (Argued April 25, 1932;
    decided May 10, 1932.)

      R. L. vonBernuth, W. F. Reardon and A. T. Clearwater for appellant.

      Arthur J. W. Hilly, Corporation Counsel (Frank T. Fitzgerald of counsel), for the city of New York, respondent.

      John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Charles E. McManus of counsel), for Water Power and Control Commission, respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ. Dissenting: Kellogg, J.


text:
    Edna W. Johnson et al., as Administrators de Bonis Non of the Estate of Hannah E. Taylor, Deceased, Respondents, v. Florence C. Woodson et al., Defendants, and Brevoort Savings Bank, Appellant.
    (Submitted April 25, 1932;
    decided May 10, 1932.)

      C. Elmer Spedick for appellant.

      Thomas L. Driscoll for respondents.
   Appeal dismissed, without costs, on the ground that no appeal of right lies to this court; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    In the Matter of Factory Mutual Liability Insurance Company of America, Respondent, against George S. Van Schaick, as Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York, Appellant.
    (Argued April 26, 1932;
    decided May 10, 1932.)

      John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Harold Greenstein of counsel), for appellant.

      Louis J. Wolff, Felix Hebert and David Rumsey for respondent.
   Appeal dismissed, with costs, on the ground that the order appealed from is not a final order; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    In the Matter of Weisberg-Goldman Corporation et al., Appellants; American Stove Company, Respondent.
    (Submitted April 26, 1932;
    decided May 10, 1932.)

      Frank Weinstein and Samuel J. Levinson for appellants.

      Jean A. Fitzsimmons for respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    In the Matter of Metropolitan Apartments, Inc., Respondent; Otis Elevator Company, Appellant.
    (Argued April 26, 1932;
    decided May 10, 1932.)

      Henry W. Eaton, Talbot M. Malcolm and Francis A. Devin for appellant.

      Abraham M. Grill, Samuel Mann, Maurice Feldman and Thomas E. Shea for respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    In the Matter of the Claim of Charles A. White, as Administrator of the Estate of Aniela Polowski, Deceased, Appellant, against Donner Steel Company, Inc., Respondent. The State Industrial Board, Respondent.
    (Argued April 26, 1932;
    decided May 10, 1932.)

      Thomas L. Newton and William C. White for appellant.

      William M. Fay for Donner Steel Company, Inc., respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    In the Matter of the Claim of Elizabeth Ruzsjak, Respondent, against Metal Stamping Company et al., Appellants. The State Industrial Board, Respondent.
    (Submitted April 26, 1932;
    decided May 10, 1932.)

      Clarence B. Tippett for appellants. ,

      Thomas D. Kenney for the claimant-respondent.

      John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Joseph A. McLaughlin of counsel), for the State Industrial Board, respondent.
   Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    In the Matter of the Claim of Mary Patriaka, Appellant, against Westchester County Park Commission et al., Respondents. The State Industrial Board, Respondent.
    (Submitted April 26, 1932;
    decided May 10, 1932.)

      Isidor Enselman and David Gorfinkel for appellant.

      Grant C. Fox for Westchester County Park Commission et al., respondents.
   Order affirmed, without costs; no opinion.

Concur: Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien, Hubbs and Crouch, JJ.


text:
    In the Matter of the Accounting of Margaret N. Taylor et al., as Executors of William J. Taylor, Deceased, Appellants. Theron H. Sammis, as Special Guardian, Appellant; W. Russell Osborn, Respondent.
    (Submitted May 2, 1932;
    decided May 10, 1932.)

      W. Russell Osborn for motion.

      Harry W. Mack and Theron H. Sammis opposed.
   Motion denied.