text:
    Fairview Lodge No. 350, Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of Fairview, Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. John W. Gaddis, Executor, et al., Plaintiffs in Error.
    1. Wills, § 226*—what is fundamental rule of construction. The fundamental rule of construction of a will is to find and give effect to the intent of the testator.
    2. Wills, § 228*—examination of all of provisions of will to ascertain testator’s intent. In seeking the intent of a testator, all of the provisions of the will will be examined.
    3. Wills, § 240*—where technical construction mil stop. A technical construction of a will will not be carried to the extent of defeating the obvious intention of the testator.
    4. Wills, § 403*—when nonfulfillment of condition will not defeat residuary bequest. A residuary bequest to a Masonic Lodge, made on condition that a Masonic Association convey certain property to the Lodge; that “all” of the stockholders in the Association donate their shares of stock to the Lodge, and that the canceled certificates of stock be delivered to the testatrix executor, held not defeated by the fact that, although the property was conveyed and the Association was dissolved, two of the stockholders refused to donate their stock and to deliver their certificates to the executor.
    5. Wills, § 403

      —who not entitled to complain that condition on which residuary bequest was made, was not fulfilled. In malting a residuary bequest to a Masonic Lodge on condition that a Masonic Association would convey certain property to the Lodge and that the Lodge would pay off the indebtedness on the property, held that the testatrix intended that the Lodge should pay off the indebtedness out of the residuary fund and that the balance of the fund should become a trust fund for the purpose specified by the testatrix, and that the execution of the indebtedness provision was of no concern to the executor of the testatrix and those who were designated by the testatrix to take the residue in the event that the Lodge and Association did not accept it upon the terms and conditions specified.
    Error to the Circuit Court of Fulton county; the Hon. George W. Thompson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1919.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 21, 1919.
    W. B. Curran, Balph Dempsey, Burnett M. Chiperpield and Claude E. Chiperpield, for plaintiffs in error.
    Harvey H. Atherton and Lawyer & Hainline, for defendant in error.

      Sere Illinois Notos Digest. Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

   Mr. Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.

Mary C. Swegle, on May 30, 1918, departed this life leaving a last will and testament which was duly probated and one John W. Gaddis, named as executor therein, duly qualified as such. The first clause of her will directed that all her just debts be paid. The second bequeaths $500 to the Eeformed (Dutch) Church of Fairview, Illinois, as an endowment fund for the support of the minister. The third bequeaths to the Methodist Episcopal Church of Fairview $500 as a like endowment fund. The fourth bequeaths $500 to each of the following persons: Mary Catherine Luman, Lucy Ellen Swigert, Grace Gunnett Hoxworth, Carrie Gunnett Ulm, Mildred Schleich and Hazel Schleich. The fifth clause is as follows:

“Fifth: I give, devise and bequeath to Fairview Lodge No. 350, Ancient Free and Accepted Masons, of Fairview, Illinois, all the balance and residue of my estate, upon the following conditions; that the Fairview Masonic Association of Fairview, Illinois, deed and convey to said Lodge the building and lot now owned by them, being the East part of Lot Number Twelve (12) in the original plat of the Town of Fairview, in the County of Fulton and State of Illinois ; and provided further that all stockholders in said Masonic Association donate their share or shares of stock held by them in said Association to the said Fairview Lodge No. 350, A. F. & A. M. and the can-celled certificates of stock be delivered to my executor hereinafter named. That the said Lodge shall first pay of the indebtedness on said property and whatever balance is left in the residue of my estate is to form and placed in a trust fund, which is to loaned on real estate security and the proceeds of the interest and income' each year is to be equally divided between said Lodge and Fairview Chapter No. 99, Order of the Eastern Star, of Fairview, Illinois, for their support and maintenance. The said Lodge shall appoint or elect from their membership a trustee to handle the said trust fund.

“In case the said Lodge and said Masonic Association, within one year after my death, do not accept the residue of my estate upon the terms and conditions as above set forth, it is then my will that the residue of my estate be equally divided between the six persons named in the fourth clause of this, my will, upon the same conditions as there provided.

“I hereby direct, authorize and empower my executor, hereinafter named, to make sales of all my property, both real and personal, to deed and convey my real estate, at such times as in his judgment will be for the best interest of my estate, at public or private sale and divide the proceeds of sales and all my estate as I have hereinto directed.”

On July 3, 1918, the executor filed his final report in the County Court by which it is shown that, after paying all the costs and expenses of administration and the specific legacies mentioned in the second, third and fourth clauses of the will, there remained a residuary estate to be distributed of $11,293.01.

The Fairview Lodge filed its petition in the County Court in said estate, averring in substance that it had accepted the provisions made in clause 5 of said will within one year from the date of the death of the testatrix and that a substantial compliance with the provisions of such request had been made, and prays that an order be entered directing the executor to pay the residue of said estate to the Lodge. Upon a hearing in the County Court, the prayer of the petition was denied. ' An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court, where upon a hearing an order was entered directing the executor to pay the residuary estate to the Fairview Lodge. To reverse this order, plaintiffs in error have sued out this writ of error.

The proofs show that the Fairview Masonic Association was a corporation having a capital stock of $5,000, and owned the building and lot mentioned iñ the will. On this lot was a mortgage given to secure an indebtedness, of $2,500. At a meeting of the stockholders of the association on December 3, 1917, all the shares of stock were represented and a resolution was adopted to convey the property by a deed to the Lodge in order to comply with the conditions of the will. All the shares voted in favor of the resolution except ten. Bight of those voting in the negative were owned by A. J. Gunnett, the father of two of the plaintiffs in error. Carrie Gunnett Ulm and Grace Gunnett Hoxworth, the other tw'o shares voting in the negative were owned by Calvin J. Hooper. At the same meeting and by the same vote a resolution was adopted to dissolve the corporation. Subsequently, the real estate was conveyed to the Lodge, the indebtedness thereon paid and the Association dissolved. All the shares of stock were surrendered and delivered to the executor except the ten owned by Gunnett and Hooper.

It is contended by plaintiffs in error "that Fairview Lodge never required any interest in the residuary estate for the reason that two conditions precedent mentioned in clause 5 of the will had not been complied -with, viz.: (1) That all stockholders in said Masonic Association donate their share or shares of stock .held by them in said Association to the said Fairview Lodge," and, (2), that the canceled certificates of stock be delivered to the executor named in said will within one year after the death of the testatrix. It is insisted by counsel for plaintiffs in error that conditions precedent to the vesting of an estate must be strictly and literally complied with in every particular before the estate shall vest, and it is claimed that under the fifth clause of the will, the provision that “all” stockholders in said Masonic Association donate their share or shares of stock to the Fairview Lodge and the canceled certificates of stock be delivered to the executor were conditions precedent and have not been complied with for the reason that Gunnett and Hooper have never so donated their shares of stock nor delivered them to the executor.

The fundamental rule of construction of a will is to find and give effect to the intent of the testator and, in seeking the intent, all the provisions of the will will be examined. Guerin v. Guerin, 270 Ill. 239; Leary v. Kerber, 255 Ill. 433; Jordan v. Jordan, 274 Ill. 251. A technical construction will not be carried to the extent of defeating tlm obvious intention. Blackmore v. Blackmore, 187 Ill. 102; Johnson v. Askey, 190 Ill. 58; Webbe v. Webbe, 234 Ill. 442; Smith v. Winsor, 239 Ill. 567. The general intention of the testatrix shown by the fifth clause of her will undoubtedly to bequeath the residue of her estate to Fairview Lodge provided that the Masonic Association as a body would convey the real estate mentioned free of its incumbrance to the Lodge. We cannot sustain the contention that the testatrix intended that this bequest should depend upon the will or caprice of a minority of the shareholders. After the dissolution of the Masonic Association the shares of stock therein became valueless and their delivery to the executor could accomplish no purpose whatever. This provision is directory and advisory only and not mandatory.

It is further urged that because the mortgage executed by the Association was released and a new mortgage Was executed by the Lodge after the conveyance to it of the property, the Lodge has not complied with that provision in the fifth clause directing that the Lodge shall first pay off the indebtedness on said property and whatever balance is left of the residue of her estate is to form and be placed in a trust fund. The intention of this provision is that the Lodge shall pay off the indebtedness out of the residuary fund and the balance of said fund after the payment of this indebtedness shall become a trust fund for the purpose mentioned. In the execution of this provision, plaintiffs in error have no concern.

Some other points are raised by plaintiffs in error which we have considered, but deem it unnecessary to discuss. In our opinion, the construction placed upon the fifth clause of the will by the chancellor is correct and the decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Eldredge

license: Public Domain

text:
    T. J. Merrill, Appellee, v. J. B. Merrill, Appellant.
    1. Appeal and ebbob, § 1413*—when verdicts of successive 'juries conclusive. In an action of assumpsit to recover a balance claimed to be due as wages, where the evidence is conflicting as to whether or not the amount of wages was fixed at a certain sum, there being evidence in favor of the contention of each party, and two juries have found in favor of plaintiff’s contention that no sum was named, the verdict will not be disturbed on appeal on the ground that it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
    2. Limitation of actions, § 114

      —when defense waived. Where defendant, in an action of assumpsit for a balance due as wages, files a plea of set-off which is not limited to the time within 5 years before the institution of the suit, but is based upon all the accounts existing between the parties, he opens up on both sides the barred claims between himself and plaintiff and cannot avail himself of the defense of the statute of limitations.

      3. Appeal and erbob, § 1525

      —when instructions, subject to criticism, will not reverse. Even though some of the instructions given by the court may be subject to criticism, if, as a series, they present the law fully, the judgment will not be reversed.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Douglas county; the Hon. Franklin H. Boggs, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1919.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 21, 1919.
    P. M. Moore and Johh H. Chadwick, for appellant.
    Harvey G-ross, for appellee.

      See Illinois Notes Diprest, Vols. XI to XV, and. Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

   Mr. Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellee recovered a judgment in the sum of $800 against appellant in an action of assumpsit for a balance due him as wages earned as a clerk for appellant in the latter’s store. Appellant and appellee are brothers, and appellee, prior to his last employment, had worked for appellant for a period of about 20 years, when he went into the restaurant business in which he remained until 1906, when he was again employed as clerk by appellant. Appellant owned a general merchandise store in the Village of Hinsboro wherein he sold dry goods, clothing, millinery, shoes, groceries, hardware, paints, oils, wall paper, carpets and other household goods.

According to the testimony of appellee, on August 15, 1906, after he had left the restaurant business, he met appellant in front of the latter’s store and appellant asked to him to work again for him and that nothing was said at this time about what salary appellee should receive; that appellee should have the privilege of purchasing such goods as he desired at the store at the wholesale price and that he should keep his own accounts of the same; that appellee continued in this employment until May 7, 1915, when he was taken sick and discontinued working there; that no settlement of any account was ever made between them during that period of time and nothing was said about the amount of salary he was to receive. During this period of time,' appellee took out of the store groceries, provisions, dry goods, clothing, etc., from time to time and also drew at irregular intervals different amounts of cash, concerning all of which he charged himself on the books of appellant.

Appellant testified that the conversation between him and appellee concerning the employment of the latter took place inside the store in the presence of his son and that he told appellee that he would come back and work for him at $25 per month and have what goods he wanted at wholesale price. It is conceded that no settlement was ever made between the parties, the only point disputed between them being that appellant claims he hired him at $25 per month, while appellee claims that nothing was said in regard to what wages he was to get and was therefore entitled to what they were reasonably worth. Two trials of the case have been had, each of which resulted in a verdict for appellee. Appellant’s son corroborated his father in regard to the terms of the contract, and two other members of appellant’s, family testified that appellee, on different occasions, admitted he was getting $25 a month. There are a number of facts and circumstances appearing in evidence, however, which tend to corroborate appellee, and two juries having" decided the issues in his favor, the verdict will not be disturbed on the grounds that it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

The declaration consists of the common counts for labor performed. The appellant filed a plea of the general issue, plea of the statute of limitations, of set-off, of accord and satisfaction and of satisfaction and discharge. Eeplications were filed to these pleas by appellee. No questions are presented, in regard to the pleas of accord and satisfaction and satisfaction and discharge. It is earnestly insisted by appellant, however, that, under his plea of the statute of limitations, appellee could not recover anything prior to 5 years before the suit was brought and that under his plea of setoff, the evidence shows that appellee is indebted to appellant under the latter’s contention that the contract provided for a salary of $25 per month for the reason that the account was not a mutual account between the parties. The reason urged why the account was not a mutual one is that the books show that all the charges were made against appellee and none against appellant. Whether the account in fact was a mutual account or not is not necessary for us to decide because appellant cannot avail himself of the defense of the statute of limitations. The plea of set-off is not limited to the time within 5 years prior to the institution of the suit, but is based upon all the accounts existing between the parties. The account itself showing each particular item between August 15, 1906, and May 7, 1915, was introduced in evidence without objection and the total of the amount received by appellee in cash and in merchandise between these dates was stipulated in evidence by the parties. If it be assumed' that the account was not a mutual one and that part of it was barred by the statute of limitations for that reason, yet appellant could not avail himself of this defense for the reason he attempted to set off these accounts by credits which were also barred by the statute of limitations. Section 17 of the Limitation Act (J. & A. H 7212) provides that a defendant may plead a set-off or counterclaim barred by the statute of limitations, while held by him, to any action, the cause of which was owned by the plaintiff or person under whom he claims, before such set-off or counterclaim was so barred. • In construing this section, this , court held in the case of Brown v. Miller, 38 Ill. App. 262, that when a defendant avails himself of this section by pleading a set-off that is barred, he opens up on both sides the barred claims between himself and the plaintiff. To the same effect also is Steere v. Brownell, 124 Ill. 27.

The court gave eight instructions for appellee and seventeen for appellant. While some of the instructions given on behalf of appellee might be subject to criticism, yet as a series they presented the law fully to the jury, and we find no error which would justify a reversal of the judgment either in the giving or the refusing of the instructions.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Affirmed.


text:
    City of Sullivan, Appellee, v. Central Illinois Public Service Company, Appellant.
    1. Injunction, § 382*—when evidence will he stricken from record on appeal. On appeal from a judgment in a suit for an injunction entered in accordance with the findings of a master in chancery to whom the issues were referred, where the part of the record containing what purports to be evidence taken before the master is not signed by him nor is there any certificate by him that this evidence was all of the evidence heard by him, though it is followed by a certificate signed by a third person which states that “the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of all the evidence offered by the respective parties in the case at the hearing held before the master in chancery,” and the evidence is not preceded by any order in the record identifying it as a report of the master filed in the cause on a particular day, such evidence will be stricken from the record.
    2. Injunction, § 382

      —when pages will he stricken from record on appeal. On appeal from a judgment in a suit for an injunction,

      pages of the record which purport to set out the testimony of the witnesses heard by the court will be stricken from the record where there is no certificate of evidence preserving the evidence so heard, no certificate by the court that it was all of the evidence heard and nothing in the record to show that it contains all of the evidence heard upon hearing.
    3. Appeal and error, § 726*—necessity of preserving evidence in equitable proceeding. The presumption obtaining in actions at law, where the record fails to show that it contains all the evidence heard on the trial of the cause, that the evidence heard was sufficient to sustain the judgment, does not prevail in equitable proceedings, and the evidence in support of the decree must be preserved.
    4. Appeal and error, § 735*—when master’s report is part of record. In an equity proceeding, where the evidence is all heard by the master and he files his report in the cause, the report becomes a part of the record.
    5. Appeal and error, § 726*—how evidence in equity proceeding may be preserved. If the evidence in an equity proceeding is heard by the chancellor in open court, it may be preserved by a certificate of evidence or a finding of the facts in the decree.
    6. Appeal and error, § 1270

      —what is presumption when decree recites facts found by court. Where a decree recites the facts found by the court from the evidence, it will be presumed, in the absence of anything in the record showing the contrary, that the facts thus found were proved by competent evidence, and the finding cannot be reversed unless all the evidence heard on the trial is preserved.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Moultrie county; the Hon. Franklin H. Boggs, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1919.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 21, 1919.
    Vause, Hughes & Kiger, for appellant.
    J. K. Martin and E. J. Miller, for appellee.

      See Illinois Notes TMjtest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number,

      See Illinois izotes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

   Mr. Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.

By its amended bill filed in "the Circuit Court of Moultrie county, appellee prayed for a mandatory injunction to compel appellant to vacate the streets and alleys and to cease using its poles, lines, transformers and other property in the City of Sullivan. Appellant filed a cross-hill asking that prosecution of an ejectment suit theretofore brought by appellee against it for the same purpose be restrained. When the issues were settled, the cause was referred to Oscar F. Cochran, master in chancery, who heard some of the evidence, if not all of it, and made a report of his conclusions wherein he recommended that the prayer of the amended original bill be granted and also that the prayer of the cross-bill be granted, and a decree was entered in accordance therewith. An appeal was taken to this court and upon motion of appellee was transferred to the Supreme Court. That court, upon motion of appellant, transferred the case back to this court. City of Sullivan v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 287 Ill. 19.

Appellee now, in this court, has made a motion to strike pages 106 to 688%, inclusive, and pages 690 to 696, inclusive, from the record and to affirm the decree on the ground that no evidence has been preserved by the master’s report or certificate of evidence. The pages of the record between 106 and 688, inclusive, contain what purports to be evidence taken before the master. It is not signed by the master nor is there any certificate by him that this evidence was all the evidence heard by him, but on pages 688% is a certificate that “the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of all the evidence offered by the respective parties in the case at the hearing held before the master in chancery. ’ ’ This certificate is signed by one Nettie Bristow. Page 689 of the record shows that certain testimony was taken in open court on February 18, 1918. Pages 690 to 695, inclusive, purport to set out the testimony of the witnesses heard by the court at that time. There is no certificate of evidence preserving the evidence so heard before the court.The evidence is simply written into the record and there is no certificate by the court that it was all the evidence heard and there is nothing in the whole record to show that it contains all the evidence heard upon the hearing of the cause. A supplemental record has been filed which contains the findings of law and fact by the master in chancery, but there is nothing in the supplemental record which tends to show that the report of the findings of the master in chancery is based upon the evidence that appears in the record or that it was attached to the same and made a part thereof. There is nothing in the record anywhere by which this court can determine that it contains all the evidence which was heard upon the hearing. In fact, the record does not show that the evidence contained on pages 106 to 688, inclusive, and purporting to have been heard by the master in chancery, was ever filed in the case. This alleged report of the evidence commencing on page 106 of the record is not preceded by any order in the record identifying it as a report of the master in chancery filed in said cause on a particular day. As stated before, it is not signed by the master in chancery, and there is no authorized certification that it contains all the evidence heard by the master. In regard to the evidence heard before the court on pages 689 to 695, inclusive, there is no certification by anybody of any kind. The motion by appellee to strike from the record pages 106 to 688%, inclusive, and pages 690 to 696, inclusive, is sustained and said pages are hereby stricken from the record.

In an action at law where the record fails to show that it contains all the evidence heard on the trial of the case, there is a presumption of law that the evidence heard was sufficient to sustain the judgment. No such presumption prevails in equitable proceedings and the evidence in support of the decree must be preserved. Where the evidence is all heard by the master in chancery and he files his report thereof in said cause, such report becomes a part of the record. If the evidence is heard by the chancellor in open court, it may be preserved by a certificate of evidence or a finding of the facts in the decree. Where the decree recites the facts found by the court from the evidence, it will be presumed, in the absence of anything in the record showing the contrary, that the facts thus found Were proved by competent evidence, and the finding cannot be reversed unless all the evidence heard on the trial is preserved in the record and thus brought before the court. Jackson v. Sackett, 146 Ill. 646; Allen v. LeMoyne, 102 Ill. 25; Brown v. Miner, 128 Ill. 148. In the case of Allen v. Henn, 197 Ill. 486, the court held: “The certificate of evidence, found in the record, does not state that the evidence, set forth in the certificate, was all the evidence presented to and heard by the court upon the hearing below. The facts found by the decree, as above set forth, justified the court in entering the decree which it rendered. If there had been no certificate of evidence in the record, it would be presumed that the findings of the decree were warranted by the proofs heard by the court. But as the certificate of evidence does not purport to preserve all the evidence heard by the trial court, it must be presumed that there was sufficient evidence to warrant and sustain the findings. (Brown v. Miner, 128 Ill. 148; First Nat. Bank v. Baker, 161 Ill. 281.)” See also Washburn v. Scott, 233 Ill. 569.

The findings of fact in the decree fully sustain the chancellor in ordering the relief granted therein and' it must be presumed that the evidence sustains the decree.

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Affirmed.


text:
    E. Lowitz et al., partners, Appellees, v. M. E. McKittrick and I. McKittrick, Appellants.
    Appeal and error, § 800

      —when motion and decision thereon must he presented in hill of exceptions. The action of the court upon a motion can only be preserved for review when the motion and the decision thereon are presented in a bill of exceptions, and this rule applies notwithstanding the fact that exceptions do not have to be preserved.
    Appeal from the County Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. John B. Weaver, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1919.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 21, 1919.
    Whitaker, Ward & Pugh, for appellants.
    George W. Kenney, for appellees.

      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols, XI tp XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic anfl section number,

   Mr. Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellees sued appellant in an action of assumpsit in the County Court of Sangamon county. The declaration consists of the common counts with a copy of the count and affidavit of claim attached thereto. Appellants entered a limited appearance for the purpose of filing a plea to the jurisdiction of the court. The plea to the jurisdiction was stricken from the files on motion of appellees and a default judgment was entered against appellants for $240.10. Appellants now seek to have the action of the court in striking said plea from the files and entering judgment reviewed by this appeal. The entire hill of exceptions is as follows:

“Bill op Exceptions.
“Be it remembered, that afterwards, to-wit, on the 18th day of March A. D. 1919, there Was filed in the office of the Clerk of the County Court, in and for the County of Sangamon and State of Illinois, a bill of exceptions, in the case of E. Lowitz, et al. partners etc., plaintiff, against M. E. McKittrick and I.' McKittrick, defendants, which said bill of exceptions is a,s follows, to-wit:
Bill op Exceptions.
“Be it remembered, that on the 5th day of February, A. D. 1919, the plaintiff, by counsel, made a motion to strike defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction of the County Court of Sangamon County, State of Illinois, in the case of E. Lowitz, et ah, partners, etc., vs.
M. E. McKittrick and I. McKittrick, from the files, said motion being oral, and was on the following ground, to-wit:—
“General motion to strike plea from files on account of it not having attached proper affidavit of merit, and for judgment by default, because the appearance of defendants is general and not limited.
County of Sangamon „„
State of Illinois.
In the County Court,
To the February Term,
A. D. 1919.
E. Lowitz, et al, partners, etc.,
vs.
Assumpsit.
M. E. McKittrick and I. McKittrick.
“Forasmuch, therefore, as the matters and things above set forth do not fully appear of record, the defendants tender this, their bill of exceptions, and pray that the same may be signed and sealed by the judge of this court pursuant to the statute in such case made and provided, which is done accordingly this 18th day of March A. D. 1919.
J. B. Weaver,
Presiding Judge.”

There is nothing in this bill of exceptions showing any decision of the court upon the motion. In the case of Gaynor v. Hibernia Sav. Bank, 166 Ill. 577, it was said: “The only error alleged is that the court erred in striking the plea from the files, and it has been repeatedly held that such action of the court cannot be considered unless the motion, decision and an exception thereto are presented in a bill of exceptions, so that the error, if any, may appear from the record.” The cases announcing this rule are so numerous that any further citation of them is unnecessary. While exceptions do not now have to be preserved, yet the rule remains that the action of the court upon a motion can only be preserved for review when the motion and the decision thereon are presented in a bill of exceptions.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Affirmed.


text:
    Ivory W. Merritt, Jr., Appellee, v. C. B. Summers and Alice Summers, Appellants.
    1. Fences, § 6*—decision of viewers as competent evidence in action to recover part of cost of fence. In an action to recover the cost of building a part of a partition fence, the decision of the fence viewers rendered pursuant to and conforming to Hurd’s Rev. St. ch. 54, sec. 10 (J. & A. 5710) is competent evidence.
    2. Fences, § 6*—ivho has harden of proving that notice of petition for view w>as not served on defendant. In an action to recover the cost of building a part of a partition fence, the decision of fence viewers setting out the notice to defendant of the petition for a view and the affidavit of service of such notice is prima facie evidence of the service of the notice, and the burden is on defendants alleging lack of service to show that the notice was not served.
    3. Fences, § 6

      —what evidence sufficient to show service of notice of fence proceeding. The statute providing for the apportionment of the cost of line fences by viewers (see J. & A. If 5701 et seg.) does not provide any particular mode for serving notice of the proceeding nor how service shall be proved, and the affidavit of one that on a certain day he, personally, served said notice by delivering a true copy thereof to defendants in person is sufficient evidence of the service of the notice.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Coles county; the Hon. Wapthr Bbewek, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1919.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 21, 1919.
    Rehearing denied December 29, 1919.
    John T. Kincaid, for appellants; Albert C. Anderson, of counsel.
    Charles O. Lee, for appellee.

      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols, XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

   Mr. Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellee sued C. B. Summers and Alice Summers before a justice of the peace for the costs of building a part of a partition fence. Appellants made no defense before the justice of the peace, but took an appeal to the Circuit Court of Coles county, where the case was tried before the court without a jury and a judgment rendered by the court for $69.25. Appellee introduced the decision of two fence viewers filed with the town 'clerk of the Town of Hutton. As we understand this decision, it has attached to it and made a part thereof the original petition signed by appellee and addressed to the fence viewers of the Town of Hutton and to Clarence B. Summers and Alice M. Summers, appellants, in which is set forth that the partition fence between his lands and those of appellants was in a defective condition and should be rebuilt and repaired and stated that appellants had neglected and refused to keep and maintain their portion of said fence in proper repair to turn stock, etc., and requested that said fence viewers be called to determine what portion of the fence should be maintained by the appellants and what portion should be maintained by appellee and to direct that said fence he repaired and put in condition to turn stock, and that appellants select and designate within 8 days from the time notice thereof is served upon them a fence viewer to hear the foregoing matters and determine the same. There also appears to he attached to said decision a notice signed by appellee and directed to appellants notifying them that appellee filed said petition in the office of the town clerk February 20, 1918, and notifying them also to select one fence viewer to act with the one selected by appellee within 8 days from the receipt of said notice. To this notice is attached an affidavit of service wherein one John Ehrsam on oath states that he served a true copy of said notice on Alice M. Summers February 22, 1918, by delivering it to her in person, and that on the 23rd day of February, 1918, he delivered a true copy of said notice to Charles B. Summers in person. The decision sets out also all the further proceedings of the fence viewers, to which no complaint is made. "When this decision filed with the town clerk was offered in evidence, it was objected to by appellants on the ground that it was incompetent. Section 10 of chapter 54, Hurd’s Rev. St. (J. & A. jf 5710) provides as follows: “The decision of the fence viewers shall be reduced to writing; shall contain a description of the fence, and of the proportion to be maintained by each, and their decision upon any other point in dispute between the parties, submitted to them as aforesaid; and shall be forthwith filed in the office of the town clerk, or in the office of the county clerk in counties which shall not have adopted township organization.” Section 11 (J. & A. 5711) provides that if any person who is liable to contribute to the erection or reparation of a division fence shall neglect or refuse to do so, the injured party, upon giving the required notice, may build or repair the same at the expense of the other party.

Certainly, the decision of the fence viewers was competent evidence and without it no suit could have been maintained. The decision in this case is very carefully drawn and contains every step taken and all the proceedings, which appear to have been in strict conformity with the statutes in all respects.

Appellants offered no evidence on the trial, but contented themselves with a general objection to the decision of the fence viewers on the ground that it was incompetent. The basis of their claim is that there was no evidence that appellants were served with the notice heretofore mentioned. No specific objection was made that the reason of the incompetency of the decision was lack of proof of the service of the notice in question, thereby depriving the fence viewers of any jurisdiction in the matter. It has been held-that the notice under which fence viewers are selected is jurisdictional. Hale v. Andrews, 75 Ill. 252. The decision of the fence viewers sets out the notice and the affidavit of its service. This is, at least, prima facie evidence of the service of the notice, and the burden was upon appellants to show that there was, in fact, no service of such notice. The statute does not require any particular way in which such notice should be served or how • such sendee should be proved. The affidavit of a person that on a certain day he personally served said notice by delivering a true copy thereof to the defendant in person is sufficient evidence of the service of such notice. Appellants’ objections are highly technical and are in line with those mentioned in the case of Ketchum v. Stolp, 15 Ill. 341, which was a case of similar character and in which the court said: “All these objections are quite too technical for the administration of a neighborhood law like this, which was designed for the purpose of reasonable and practical justice, and to compel one neighbor to do justice to another. We think the judgment was right, and it must be affirmed.”

So, in this case, appellants concede that the fence needed to be repaired and raised no question upon the equitable division of the portions of the fence between them and appellee. They refused to repair or contribute their portion of the expense of its repair and seek to avoid liability on the ground that the proofs do not show that they were personally served with notice. We hold that the proofs do show prima facie that appellants were served with such notice and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Affirmed.


text:
    Tazewell County, Appellee, v. W. B. Cooney, Administrator, Appellant.
    1. Paupers, § 1*—who not within law making support of paupers a public charge. One who has sufficient means for his own support is not within the provisions of the law making the support of paupers a public charge, and the county has no authority to support him.
    2. Paupers, § 8*—when county may recover from pauper’s estate. A county may recover of the estate of one supported and maintained by it as a pauper the actual cost of such support and maintenance from the time when, through receiving a pension, he became financially able to support himself.
    3. Paupers, § 8

      —what not presumed when county attempts to recover from pauper’s estate. It will not be presumed that, because no attempt was made by the county to charge one whom it had received and maintained as a pauper for such support and maintenance, it intended such support to be a charitable gift for which no recovery can be had, upon its being developed after the death of such person that for a portion of the time he was so maintained he was financially able to support himself.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Tazewell county; the Hon. C. V. Miles, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1919.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 21, 1919.

      W. J. Reardon, for appellant.
    E. E. Black, for appellee.

      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vole, Si to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

   Mr. Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.

Henry Bradley became an inmate of the County Farm of Tazewell county in the year 1878 as a pauper. He lived there until he died April 26, 1917, during all of which time he Was supported by the county as a pauper. On or before February 17,1913, said Bradley was granted a pension of $24 per month, he having been a veteran of the Civil War. At the time of his death he had accumulated from this pension $1,338, which Was on deposit in the Tremont National Bank, and this sum of money comprised the assets of his estate at his death. It is stipulated that from the time he became an inmate of the County Farm until he commenced receiving his pension in February, 1913, he had no property of any kind and was, in fact, a pauper. After his death, appellant, public administrator of said county, was appointed administrator of his estate. The county filed a claim against his estate for the sum of $832, being the actual cost of Bradley’s maintenance at said institution for a period of 5 years immediately preceding his death. The claim was disallowed in the County Court, but upon appeal to the Circuit Court it was allowed for the sum of $697.38, said amount being the actual cost of his maintenance by the county from the time he-began to receive his pension, February 17, 1913, to the date of his death. The claim was allowed as of the seventh class and ordered to be paid in due course of administration.

It is urged by appellant that Bradley having been received by the county in the County Farm as a pauper and maintained as such until his death, it being a charitable transaction, there could be no implied promise to make reimbursement to the county. The policy of this State as evidenced by the act in regard to paupers is that the relatives of persons, where circumstances have unfortunately placed them in such a class, should support them and not the public generally. • When a pauper has no relatives who can support him, it is the duty of the county at public expense to supply such maintenance, but the county has no authority to support persons at public expense who are financially able to maintain themselves A person having sufficient means for his own support is not within the provisions of the law, making his support a public charge. City of Alton v. County of Madison, 21 Ill. 115. In the case of Dandurand v. County of Kankakee, 196 Ill. 537, it appeared that an insane person was returned to the Kankakee County Poor Farm and Insane Asylum from the State Hospital for the Insane. He had an estate of about $2,500, and his conservator, although' he knew that his ward was being maintained by. the county, did nothing to provide for him. The county brought suit to recover for the cost of his support and maintenance and recovered a judgment therefor in the County Court. In this case the Supreme Court held: “He was in need of board, care and medical attention, and was absolutely unfit to be at large, and the county furnished him that care. His conservator knew the facts and did not offer to provide for him elsewhere or take any steps to have any change made. We are of opinion defendant was impliedly liable for these necessaries so furnished him.”

The same principle applies to the case at bar.

It is also urged that because the county had never made any attempt to charge him for his support, it will be presumed that it intended such support to be a charitable gift for which no recovery can be had. The same contention was made in the Dandurand case supra, and was answered by the court as follows: “We think the intention does not enter into the case where the support is by a public body. If he was liable for his own support under the law, there was no officer who could form an intention that gratuitous service should be rendered, which would bind the county and release defendant from liability.”

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Affirmed.


text:
    Pearl Baughman et al., Appellees, v. Rhoda Ann Baughman et al., Appellants.
    1. Partition, § 13 8*—when complainant not entitled to solicitor’s fee. In a suit for partition, held that the proceeding was not an amicable one and that the defenses interposed were not simply formal, frivolous or vexatious but were substantial and in good faith, with the views on defendants’ part of protecting their interests and securing their just proportion of the properties, and that, consequently, it was inequitable that the decree therein should require defendants to pay any part of complainant’s solicitor’s fee.
    2. Infants, § 38*—eligibility of solicitor to appointment as guardian ad litem. The solicitor for a party to a suit who is not of legal age may be also appointed guardian ad litem for such party.
    3. Infants, § 41*—right of guardian ad litem to act as his own solicitor. A guardian ad litem who is a lawyer may act as his own solicitor. ,
    4. Infants, § 45*—attorney, acting as guardian ad litem and solicitor, as not entitled to fees in each capacity. Semble, that an attorney who acts as both guardian ad litem and solicitor for a minor party is not entitled to an allowance of fees in each capacity.
    5. Infants, § 45

      —when person acting as guardian ad litem and solicitor will, on appeal, be deprived of allowance for services as guardian ad litem. One to whom, a joint compensation has been allowed for acting as both solicitor and guardian ad litem for a minor litigant, will not be permitted on appeal, where an allowance in such dual capacity is held improper, to retain such allowance for his services as guardian ad litem.

      Appeal from the Circuit Court of Christian county; the Hon. Thomas M. Jett, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1919.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed October 21, 1919.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Leslie J. Taylor and W. B. McBride, for appellants; James M. Taylor, of counsel.
    J. E. Hogar, for appellees.

      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

   Mr. Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.

Sherman E. Baughman died intestate September 8, 1916, at his residence in the City of Taylorville, Christian county, Illinois. He had been twice married, his second marriage having taken place several years after the death of his first wife. By his first wife, he had six children who survived him at the time of his death. He was also survived by his second wife, Miranda E. Baughman, and one child, Pearl Baughman, appellees. Before his second marriage, he drew up an informal antenuptial contract which was signed by appellee, Miranda Baughman, but which does not appear to have been executed by himself and was decreed to be invalid. During his last illness, he started to arrange for a settlement of his property among his children by means of a contract and had advised and consulted with an attorney for that purpose, but the settlement was never consummated. At the time of Sherman E. Baughman’s death, his daughter by his second marriage, Pearl Baughman, was a minor, who would come of age in July, 1917. When he was seeking to settle his affairs by an agreement between his wife and his children during his last illness, Lome Bulpitt, a son-in-law of Mrs Miranda Baughman, who had married a daughter born to her through a former marriage, on behalf of his mother-in-law and his sister-in-law, Pearl Baughman, advised with Mr. John E. Hogan with reference to their rights in the property of Sherman. E. Baughman, in the event of his death. After the death of Sherman E. Baughman, Warren Baughman, one of his sons by his first wife, interviewed Mr. Hogan with a view of employing him to represent the interest of the children by the first marriage and was told by Mr. Hogan that he had already advised with the other parties.

After the death of Sherman E. Baughman, by arrangement between his widow and the children of his first wife, Ernest Hoover and Warren Baughman were appointed coadministrators, Ernest Hoover to represent the widow and her daughter Pearl and Warren Baughman to represent the interests of the children by the first marriage. Ernest Hoover employed Mr. Hogan as his attorney and Warren Baughman employed Mr. W. B. McBride and Mr. L. J. Taylor as his attorneys in administration of the estate.

On September 28, 1916, a bill for partition was filed by Pearl Baughman by her next friend, Lome Bulpitt, as complainant, in which her mother, Miranda Baughman, the heirs of Sherman E. Baughman by his first wife, the said administrators of the estate of Sherman E. Baughman, deceased, and several tenants were made parties defendant. Hpon the filing of said bill for partition, appellants employed William M. Provine as their solicitor to represent their interests in the suit for partition and Mr. Provine filed an answrer and cross-bill on their behalf. Mr. John E. Hogan, solicitor for the complainant in the bill, was appointed guardian ad litem for Pearl Baughman, minor. Miranda E. Baughman employed Mr. George T. Wallace as her solicitor, who prepared and filed her answer to the bill and cross-bill. Before the case was heard, on account of illness and death in his family, Mr. Provine withdrew as solicitor for appellants and they employed Mr. Taylor and Mr. McBride in his place.

In the answer and cross-bill of appellants, it is averred that the bill did not include all the real estate owned by Sherman E. Baughman at the time of his death and set out several lots and parts of lots in the City of Taylorville and the Village of Mt. Auburn in which Sherman E. Baughman owned undivided interests, and also that certain necessary parties defendant were not made parties to the bill; that the bill incorrectly described the farm land situated in Section 7, Township 14 North, Range 1 West of the 3rd P. M., in that the description included all of Section 7 while, as a matter of fact, a 2-acre tract therein had long since been conveyed and was not the property of Sherman E. Baughman at the time of his death; that by reason of the antenuptial contract, the widow, Miranda E. Baughman, was not entitled to dower; that Miranda. E. Baughman and Pearl Baughman took no interest in the real estate mentioned in the farm land described as Section 7 for the reason that all the purchase price for said section had been furnished by-the mother of appellants and that the lands had been purchased by Sherman E. Baughman for their mother and with her money, but taking title in himself and thereby taking title only in trust for her and that upon her death the title passed to appellants in fee simple free from any claim of dower or title by Miranda E. Baughman and Pearl Baughman.

The original bill was thereafter amended so as to correctly describe the lands in said Section 7 by omitting the 2-acre tract therein and also by including the omitted property mentioned in the answer and cross-bill and making additional necessary parties defendant.

A hearing was had upon the issues presented by the amended bill, the answers thereto, the cross-bill, the answers thereto and the replications to the respective answers. Much evidence was introduced by the respective parties. A decree was entered holding that the antenuptial contract was void and that the proof was not sufficient to establish a resulting trust, and finding that the interests of the parties in the real estate were as set out in the amended hill of complainant. Appellants prayed an appeal to the Supreme Court from this decree, but were unsuccessful in their contentions and the decree was affirmed. Baughman v. Baughman, 283 Ill. 55. After the case was remanded to the Circuit Court and redocketed, a petition was had and the real estate set off to the respective parties in accordance with their interests as found by the decree. Thereafter a motion was made by the solicitor and guardian ad litem of Pearl Baughman, as complainant, to tax solicitor’s and guardian ad litem’s fees in said cause as part of the costs of the proceedings. Evidence was heard upon this motion and the sum of $2,000 was allowed as a joint fee for the solicitor and guardian ad litem, one-seventh of which was to be paid by each of the principal defendants. This order in part is a.s follows: “This cause coming on to be heard upon the motion of the solicitor and guardian ad litem of complainant, to tax solicitor and guardian ad litem fee in said cause; and it appearing to the court that John E. Hogan was solicitor for the complainant and was also by appointment of this court, guardian ad litem of the infant complainant, and that the rights and interests of all parties in interest are properly set up in the bill of complainant herein, it is ordered that the sum of $2,000 which the court finds to be a reasonable fee for solicitor’s and guardian ad litem for complainant, be taxed as part of costs of this proceeding; and it is further ordered that the costs and expenses of this proceeding be paid by the parties in the following proportion, to-wit: * * * and that the same be paid within forty days of this date, and that in default thereof execution issue therefor.”

Appellants objected to the allowance of the taxing of these fees against them and this appeal is from the order allowing the same. The reasons urged why such fees should not he taxed are, (1) the original bill did not include all the real estate owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) it did not correctly describe the real estate owned in said Section 7; (3) all necessary parties not made defendants therein; (4) a substantial defense was made in good faith; (5) the fees for solicitor and guardian ad litem cannot lawfully be combined in one fee. From the view we take of this case, it is unnecessary to determine the merits of the first three contentions of appellants.

From the evidence in the record it is apparent that this was not an amicable proceeding. That appellants actually and in good faith believed that their mother furnished the money for the purchase of the lands in Section 7 and that a resulting trust was created thereby cannot be successfully controverted, and that they also believed in the validity of the antenuptial contract in good faith is apparent. In the case of Hynes v. Jennings, 262 Ill. 268, the court said: “The question when a court is authorized, under the statute, to tax a fee for complainant’s solicitor as costs in a partition suit has frequently been before this court. The rule to be deduced from the decisions is, that when the bill correctly sets up the rights and interests of the parties, and the suit is an amicable one, the statute authorizes the taxing of a fee; but where the complainant’s attitude towards the defendants is hostile, so that defendants are required to employ counsel to protect their interests, it would be inequitable to make them also pay complainant’s solicitor. Where the bill properly sets up the rights and interests of the parties, defendants cannot defeat the assessment of a solicitor’s fee as costs by a merely formal, frivolous or vexatious defense. It is not essential to defeat the assessment of a solicitor’s fee that the defense should be sustained, but it must be a substantial defense.”

In the case of Stortz v. Ruttiger, 249 Ill. 494, which was a suit for partition and in which the principal defense was a denial of the identity of the complainant which was unsuccessful, the court held: “The defense interposed by appellant was of a substantial character and was made in good faith. Under this state of the record appellee was not entitled to have her solicitor’s fees taxed as costs.” I

The suit at bar was not an amicable one. Even be-1 fore the death of the deceased, one of the appellants sought the advice of counsel for the complainant as: to what the rights of appellants would be in- case their! father died and he declined to advise them on the ground that he had already advised Bulpitt on behalf of complainant and her mother. He recognized at that time that the interests of the parties were diverse' and that he could not ethically give the advice sought.! Proofs further tend to show that after the death of the deceased and before this suit was brought, a meet-1 ing of all parties was arranged for the purpose of arriving at an agreement in regard to their respective' interests in the real estate, but that appellees failed to appear at the meeting. Two separate administrators of the estate of the deceased were appointed, one at the nomination of appellants and one at the nomination of appellees. These administrators employed different attorneys. After the suit was begun, appellants filed an answer and also a cross-bill. The defenses interposed to the bill by appellants while not successful were of a substantial character and were not simply formal, frivolous or vexatious. The property to be divided in this case was valuable. It consisted of a farm of 584 acres of the value of $125,560, and undivided interests in nine lots located in Taylor-ville and Mt. Auburn, some of which were residence properties and some business properties, and their value was fixed at $43,600, making the total value of the property sought to be partitioned $171,860. The commissioners reported that it was all subject to division and, under the direction of the court, the dower interest of the widow and the interests of the seven heirs were set oft by the commissioners. Appellants were entitled to six-sevenths of this property subject to the dower rights of the widow. They requested and the court directed to set off their undivided six-sevenths to all of them jointly. In the division of so much property among so many interests, defendants unquestionably had a right to employ counsel to see that such partition was impartially and fairly made and that their interests therein were protected. In the case of McMullen v. Reynolds, 209 Ill. 504, the court held: “Still, when the court can see that it is necessary for the defendánts to have counsel to protect their interests and to insure a just partition of their estate, and that the solicitor of the complainant represents alone the interests of the complainant, and that it would be inequitable to require the defendants to pay their own counsel and contribute towards the payment of complainant’s counsel also, the court should not tax complainant’s solicitor’s fee as costs and apportion the same among the parties in interest in the suit. ’ ’

In the case of Jones v. Young, 228 Ill. 374, it was held: “But here, as in the case of McMullen v. Reynolds, supra, the property to be divided was valuable, as finally appraised amounting to $124,000. The parties from the first were unable to agree upon the division. Counsel were employed by appellees, long before these proceedings were begun, to protect their interests and to secure their just proportion of the properties. It would be inequitable on this record to require the defendants in the partition proceeding uot only to pay their own counsel, but a part of the fees of complainant’s counsel.”

In our opinion it would be inequitable to compel appellants to pay six-sevenths of the solicitor’s fees of complainant or any part thereof.

Counsel for complainant requested and the court allowed $2,000 as a joint compensation for his services as solicitor and as guardian ad litem for complainant. We know of no reason why a solicitor for a party to a suit who is not of legal age should not be appointed also the guardian ad litem of that party, and we know of no reason why a guardian ad litem, if he is a lawyer, should not act as his own solicitor. In fact, it is common practice in equitable proceedings to appoint solicitors guardians ad litem, but we know of no rule of law which permits in such instance, where an attorney acts both as ■ solicitor and guardian ad litem for the same person, the allowance of fees in each capacity. However, if such were the rule, the parties Who had to pay them as part of the costs would undoubtedly have the right to know how much was allowed as a solicitor’s fee and how much as a guardian ad litem’s fee so they could avail themselves of their right to object to the amount thereof. In this case, there is no way of telling how much the chancellor allowed for services as solicitor or how much fdr services as guardian ad litem. It is inconceivable how services performed as solicitor for complainant could be separated from those performed in the capacity of guardian ad litem. The minor was the complainant and while the statute permits fees to be allowed to a guardian ad litem in chancery cases, it has no application to cases where the minor is the complainant and the guardian ad litem is her solicitor. It is urged by counsel for appellees that, if he is not entitled to solicitor’s fees, he should be allowed the amount for his services as guardian ad litem. We cannot sustain this contention, as to do so would be to indirectly allow solicitor’s fees which would be inequitable.

The decree of the Circuit Court appealed from is reversed.

Reversed.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

text:
    First District.
    Macavoy Advertising Company, appellee, v. George H. Leslie, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,515.
    Action to recover on advertising contract. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John Richardson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Clarence T. Morse, for appellant. W. Knox Haynes and Michael Feinberg, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Helen McCormick, appellee, v. Richard J. McCormick et al., on appeal of John A. McCormick, individually and as executor of the will of Margaret McCormick, deceased, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,528.
    Suit by wife for separate maintenance and for relief provided for in J. & A. St. If 6148, in case of abandonment. Decree for complainant,. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Denis E. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 19.18.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Thomas W. Flynn, Thomas F. Burke and Roy C. Merrick, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    M. Meyerhoff, appellant, v. Louis Vehon & Sons, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,547.
    Action to recover rent alleged to have been assumed by defendant. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Samuel H. Trude, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed with finding of fact and judgment here.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Walter A. Murray, for appellant. John L. Melnerney, for appellee. '
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Matehett

text:
    Regensteiner Colortype Company, appellee, v. Central Trust Company of Illinois, trustee in bankruptcy of Nicholas-Finn Advertising Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,569.
    Action to reeoxrer for labor performed and material furnished in printing booklets. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Hugh J. Kearns, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Moses, Rosenthal & Kennedy, for appellant; Walter Bachraeh, of counsel. Herman Prank and Louis Grollman, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Abraham Priess, appellee, v. William T. Woodley, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,578.
    Action to recover upon written guaranty of lease. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Blum, Wolfsohn & Blum, for appellant. Simeon Straus, Ira E. Straus and Peter Sissman, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ruby L. Winn, appellant, v. Chauncey Keep et al., trustees of the estate of Marshall Field, deceased, appellees.
    Gen. No. 24,594.
    Action to recover for personal injuries by being struck by swinging door while walking in corridor of office building. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed,
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    James D. Power, for appellant. H. L. Howard, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    St. Louis Estes, appellant, v. H. A. Varney, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,609.
    Action to replevy an automobile. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Edmund K. Jareeki, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Joel C. Carlson, for appellant. Brown, Brown & Brown, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mary Lyng and Gordon C. Ramsay, public administrator, appellees, v. Englewood Lodge No. 221, Loyal Order of Moose, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,645.
    Action by widow of deceased member of fraternal order to recover amount due her under by-law of the order. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John R. Newcomer, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    George H. Sugrue, for appellant. Daniel L. Madden and Roy C. Merrick, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion. of the court.


text:
    Val Blatz Brewing Company, appellant, v. Anton J. Cermak, bailiff of the Municipal Court of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,653.
    Action of replevin. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the lion. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Winston, Strawn & Shaw, for appellant; P. W. Pogue, of counsel. Ho appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Val Blatz Brewing Company, appellant, v. Anton J. Cermak, bailiff of Municipal Court of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,654.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded in accordance with opinion in ease Ho. 24,653, ante.

    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Winston, Strawn & Shaw, for appellant; P. W. Pogue, of counsel. Ho appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    In the matter of the estate of George C. Benton, deceased. C. W. Ward, executor, appellee, v. Chicago Title & Trust Company, administrator of the estate of Harriot B. Ward, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,663.
    Claim against decedent’s estate for conversion by decedent of shares of corporate stock. Judgment for claimant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. George F. Barrett, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Rehearing denied October 21, 1919.
    Fisher, Boyden, Kales & Bell, for appellant; Albert M. Kales and Darrell S. Boyd, of counsel. Montgomery, Hart & Smith, for appellee; Louis E. Hart and Irving Herriott, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    F. P. Smith, trading as F. P. Smith Tire & Iron Works, appellee, v. Art Metal Construction Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,685.
    Action to recover under contract for ornamental iron-work furnished by plaintiff to defendant. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Edward M. Mangan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Adams, Childs, Bobb & Wescott, for appellant. Miller, Gorham & Wales, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frederick Hildmann, appellee, v. George H. Seery et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,698.
    Suit to cancel and set aside overissued shares of corporate stock as result of mistake of fact. Judgment for complainant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Frederick A Smith, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.

      George M. Bagby, for appellants. Maní erre & Pratt, for appellee; Carl H. Zeiss, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Midland Automobile Company, appellee, v. Sunbeam Chemical Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,738.
    Action to recover on contract for use of fixtures and elevator, on assignment of lease. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Joseph P. Rafferty, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    H. G. Colson, for appellant. W. Knox Haynes and Michael Feinberg, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Felicie M. Modjeski, appellee, v. Ralph Modjeski, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,748.
    Suit by wife for separate maintenance. Decree for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. Foell, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Scott, Bancroft, Martin & Stephens, for appellant; Frank H. Scott, of counsel. Alden, Latham & Young, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Hedwig Bieschke, appellee, v. Chicago Railways Company et al., on appeal of Chicago Record Herald Company, appellant. Hedwig Bieschke, appellee, v. Chicago Railways Company et al., on appeal of Chicago Railways Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,754.
    Gen. No. 24,755.
    Action by street car passenger to recover for personal injuries sustained on alighting from car, by being struck by truck. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. J. C. Eagleton, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, for appellant, Chicago Record Herald Co. Harry P. Weber, George W. Miller and Arthur J. Donovan, for appellant, Chicago Railways Co.; John R. Guilliams and Thomas J. Symmes, of counsel. .Lawton & Peterson and Joseph G. Sheldon, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Barney Kluemann, appellee, v. Edmund A. Mohan, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,773.
    Action to recover balance due for services as carpenter. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John R. Newcomer, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed upon remittitur, otherwise reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.

      I. T. Greenaere and Alice Greenaere, for appellant. Dorothy Brody and Jacob Brisgall, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Barnes

text:
    Edward D. Howland et al., plaintiffs in error, v. Atwell Printing & Binding Company et al., defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 24,450.
    Suit by minority stockholders for dissolution of corporation, and other relief. Dismissal of bill for want of equity. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Thomas J, Young, for plaintiffs in error. Campbell & Eischer, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John Korinek, appellee, v. Joseph Kolar, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,534.
    Action for slander. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. L. McKinley, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Joseph C. Pisha, for appellant. Louis J. DuBocher, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    In re estate of Mary E. Chapin, deceased. Mabel Kamm, appellant, v. Bernard Villanga, executor of the estate of Mary E. Chapin, deceased, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,544.
    Suit for construction of provision of will providing for care of cemetery lot. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Eon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    James A. Donnelly, for appellant. Charles I. McNett, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Missouri Pacific Railway Company, appellant, v. Pieser-Livingston Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,557.
    Action by carrier to recover for undercharge on interstate shipment. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. E. J. Campbell, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed with findings of fact and judgment here for $43.36.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Jeffery, Campbell & Clark, for appellant; Stephen A. Cross, of counsel. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Citizens Bank of Michigan City, Indiana, appellant, v. Otto Scharmer, trading as Scharmer Construction Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,591.
    Action by assignee of account to recover thereon in its own name. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry Olson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1818.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Boyle, Mott & Miller, for appellant. Archibald Cattell and Carl A. Waldron, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Johanna Decker, trading as E. Decker & Company, appellant, v. C. C. Dyball and George O. Cotton, trading as Dyball & Cotton, appellees.
    Gen. No. 24,605.
    Action to recover damages because of misrepresentations and breach of implied warranty in sale of potatoes. Judgment for defendants. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Edmund K. Jarecki, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Rehearing denied October 12, 1919.
    Stewart Reed Brown, for appellant. Helmer, Moulton, Whitman & Whitman, for appellees; Charles R. Holton, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles C. Martens, appellee, v. The L. & M. Rubber Company et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,616.
    Suit to rescind contract and recover consideration paid. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry P. Dolan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    David H. Jackson, for appellants. Walter F. Heineman and Clayton W. Mogg, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Victor Koricenski, appellee, v. The Pullman Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,627.
    Action to recover for personal injury to employee resulting from fall from scaffold. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Frank Johnston, Jr., Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed with finding of fact.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Burry, Johnstone & Peters, for appellant. Lynn & Hallam, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Robert S. Iles and Robert D. Martin, appellees, v. Julius Heidenreich et al., on appeal of Ida M. Heidenreich, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,630.
    Creditors’ bill. Decree for complainants. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Denis E. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed with directions.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Farlin H. Ball and G. A. Buresh, for appellant. Robert S. lies, for appellees. „
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Garoufo Markos, appellee, v. John E. Traeger and Albertina Guderian, appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,651.
    Action of replevin. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Edmund K. Jarecki, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Paul J. Huxmann, for appellants. Robert E. Gentzel, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Avery A. Matheson, appellee, v. Baldwin County Colonization Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,660.
    Action by last indorser of promissory note against payee as first indorser. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry M. Eisher, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Sabath, Stafford & Sabath, for appellant; Charles B. Stafford and Thomas M. Zasadil, Jr., of counsel. Underwood & Smyser, for appellee; Hobart S. Bird, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Peter Rizzo, appellee, v. City of Chicago et al., on appeal of City of Chicago, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,683.
    Action to recover for personal injuries by being thrown from wagon because of defect in street. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Samuel C. Stough, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed on remittitur to $3,500.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Samuel A. Ettelson and William H. Devenish; for appellant; Edward J. Kelley, of counsel. George E. Gorman and John E. Crahen, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George J. Kuhn and Irving H. Mahler, copartners, trading as Globe Cotton Goods Company, appellees, v. P. F. Dela Hunt, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,707.
    Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Sheridan E. Ery, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed on striking bill of exceptions from record.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Herbert R. Lloyd, for appellafit. Adler, Lederer & Beck, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Linnie Lindsay, appellee, v. Railway Men’s International Benevolent Industrial Association, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,746.
    Action by widow of deceased member of fraternal benefit society to recover funeral benefits. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Joseph Z. Uhlir, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918,
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.

      William A. Maeintyre and James E. White, for appellant. Albert B. George, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Gridley

text:
    Illinois Surety Company, defendant in error, v. Fred B. Rhodes, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 24,396.
    Action by principal against' agent to recover balance due for premiums on surety bonds executed by defendant on behalf of plaintiff. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Wells M. Cook, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Rehearing denied and opinion modified October 23, 1919.
    John S. Burchmore and Oliver & Macartney, for plaintiff in error. Moses, Rosenthal & Kennedy, for defendant in error; Walter Bachraeh, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Albert J. Pardridge and Harold Bradley, appellees, v. Wilton B. Martin, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,531.
    Action to recover brokers’ commission for sale of real estate. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Sheridan E. Pry, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed with finding of facts.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Donald H. Mann, for appellant. D. K. Cochrane, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Royal C. Wise, plaintiff in error, v. National Oxygen Company, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 24,541.
    Action to recover sale price of oxygen and hydrogen compressor. Judgment for defendant. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Prank H. Graham, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    A. G. Dicus, for plaintiff in error. Fischer, Thornton, Fischer & Hazard, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Keeley Brewing Company, appellee, v. Annie Masla, also known as Annie Endeikis, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,551.
    Action to recover balance due for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph B. David, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Isidore Pried, for appellant. Meagher, Whitney, Ricks & Sullivan, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Louis H. Heinberg, plaintiff in error, v. Errett Bigelow and J. Carlton Abbott, defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 24,571.
    Action to recover for wrongful conversion of sum of money. Judgment for defendants. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry P. Dolan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Cavender & Kaiser, for plaintiff in error. Ransom E. Walker, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Economy Pumping Machinery Company, appellee, v. Swedish-American Telephone Manufacturing Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,581.
    Action to recover purchase price of goods sold and delivered. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry P. Dolan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Rehearing denied October 21, 1919.
    Morrill, Shannon & Triska, for appellant. Osborne, Cloud & Kline, for appellee; Wilson L. Kline, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Morris Patrick, appellee, v. Harry Boshes and Harris Levy, appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,624.
    Action under Dramshop Act, see. 9 (J. & A. If 4609), to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in attack by one caused by defendants to become intoxicated. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Frank J. Johnston, Jr., Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Rudolph Frankenstein, for appellants. Mo appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr.- Justice Gridley

text:
    George M. Ratner, appellee, v. M. Kaplan, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,633.
    Action to recover for services rendered as auditor and accountant. Judgment for plaintiff against one defendant, and dismissal as to the other. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John F. Haas, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    George B. Cohen, for appellant; Joseph H. Lawler, of counsel. Andalman & Cohen and Philip B. Levitón, for appellee.
   Mr.- Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    William Jenson et al., trading as Regelin, Jenson & Company, appellees, v. Raymond A. von Danden, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,639.
    Action by real estate brokers to recover commissions. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Rehearing denied October 21, 1919.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    William R. Brand, for appellant. Adler, Lederer & Beck, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    William Buchanan, appellee v. Chicago Heights Lumber Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,657.
    Action to recover damages for failure of defendant to accept and pay for lumber. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from thé County Court of Cook county; the Hon. J. J«. Cooke, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed with finding of facts.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Tatge & Tatge, for appellant; Robert F. Kolb, of counsel. Herbert A. Schryver, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Alonzo J. Cutler, appellee, v. Northern Trust Company, executor of the last will and testament of Charles W. Pardridge, deceased, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,688.
    Dismissal of common-law ease for want of prosecution. Judgment of dismissal set aside and cause reinstated. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Robert E. Crowe, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Rehearing denied October 21, 1919.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Thomas E. D. Bradley and Jacob Newman, for appellant. Henry S. Robbins, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Daniel Davis, appellee, v. Chicago City Railway Company et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,715.
    Action to recover damages for personal injuries in collision between street car and wagon in which plaintiff was riding, Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Hugo Pam, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term,* 1918.
    Reversed with finding of fact.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Charles LeRoy Brown, for appellants; J. R. Guilliams and Robert J. Slater, of counsel. Royal W. Irwin, for appellee; John E. Northup, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Perry J. Smith, appellee, v. Joseph Bernhard, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,741.
    Action to recover damages for wrongfully causing an employee to be discharged Ijy presenting to his employer a false assignment of wages. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Mazzini Slusser, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Frank Sehoenfeld, for appellant. Trainor & Trainor, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Complete Artificial Stone Company, appellee, v. Angeline Dyniewicz and Casimir W. Dyniewicz, appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,749.
    Action to recover on promissory note. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. J. J. Cooke, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    K. B. Czarneeki, for appellants. Roseoe L. Roberts, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    National Sewing Machine Company, appellee, v. Walger Awning Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,776.
    Action to recover for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Howard Hayes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Landon & Holt, for appellant; John B. Fruchtl, of counsel. Meyer Shapiro, for appellee. '
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles D. Gastfield, appellee, v. Alexander J. Johnson et al., Civil Service Commissioners of City of Chicago, appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,787.
    Mandamus for reinstatement of petitioner under Civil Service Act, to position of principal examiner. Judgment for pétitioner. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph B. David, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Apellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Samuel A. Ettelson, for appellants; Roy S. Gaskill, of counsel. Miller, Starr, Brown, Packard & Peekham, for appellee; Thomas McCall, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    In the matter of the estate of Erastus A. Barnes, deceased. Maria P. Barnes, claimant, appellee, v. Mary C. Barnes, administratrix, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,796.
    Claim against a decedent’s estate for costs assessed by Appellate Court. Judgment for claimant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. J. C. Eagleton, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Henry W. Magee and E. W. Adkinson, for appellant. Osear E. Leinen, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John E. Traeger for use of Anton J. Cermak, bailiff, and Abraham Keeshin, appellees, v. Oscar Hendry and Caroline Seidel, appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,825.
    Action on replevin bond. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry M. Fisher, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 10, 1919.
    Charles E. Gruenberg, for appellants. H. J. Rosenberg and Benjamin E. Cohen, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

text:
    The Plympton Press, defendant in error, v. Archarge Peacock Holdsworth and Fred James Holdsworth, plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 24,448.
    Action to recover oh promissory note against indorsers. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the lion. Robert B. Crowe and Hon. Osear E. Heard, Judges, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 15, 1919.
    Rehearing denied October 29, 1919.
    William E. Mason and Otto Gresham, for plaintiffs in error. Nelson, Little & Gordon, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Edward T. Page, appellant, v. Frank Gillman, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,516.
    Action to recover on promissory note. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry P. Dolan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 15, 1919.
    Clarence A. Samuel, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frank J. Meehan, appellee, v. Moir Hotel Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,535.
    Action to recover money deposited with defendant hotel company for safe-keeping, and belonging to guest. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry P. Dolan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 15, 1919.
    Carnahan, Elsdon & Slusser, for appellant. P. B. Flanagan, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James J. Reilly, administrator of the estate of Michael J. Missey, deceased, defendant in error, v. R. Wilson More, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 24,545.
    Action to recover damages for wrongful death by being struck by automobile. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. J. C. Eagleton, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed with finding of fact.
    Opinion filed October 15, 1919.
    Thomas Lindskog, for plaintiff in' error; George H. Mason, of counsel. Scott Osten Cavette and Charles C. Spencer, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Bertha M. Hahn, appellee, v. Herman Hahn, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,640.
    Suit for divorce. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. Henry Guerin, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 15, 1919.
    Michael E. Maher, for appellant; James L. Bynum, of counsel. Theodore Johnson, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ethel Melbye, appellant, v. Harry Melbye, appellee.
    Gen. No. 24,652.
    Suit for divorce. Dismissal of bill for want of equity. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph H. Fitch, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed October 15, 1919.
    L. J. Haigler, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the.opinion of the court.


text:
    Vaclar Matousek, appellee, v. Charles Stahulak, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,670.
    Action to recover for material and labor furnished in construction of building. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John R. Newcomer, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 15, 1919.
    Rehearing denied October 29, 1919.
    Lefkow & Lefkow, for appellant; K. B. Czarnecki, of counsel. H. M. Pierce, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice O’Connor

text:
    Marie H. L. Kleinfeldt, by William Kleinfeldt, appellee, v. Chicago Eye Shield Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 24,428.
    Action to recover for injury to hand of minor employee under 16 years of age, operating stamping machine. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Anton T. Zeman, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 15, 1919.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Burt A. Crowe, for appellant. Bulkley, More & Tallmadge, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ralph W. Condee (plaintiff), defendant in error, v. Michael Zimmer, sheriff (defendant) and Gustav Mueller. Gustav Mueller, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 24,445.
    Action of replevin. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 15, 1919.
    A. G. Dicus, for plaintiff in error. William A. Rogan, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Max Blum and Louis Nagler, appellees, v. Alexander Eisenstein and Samuel Isenstein, appellants.
    Gen. No. 24,495.
    Action by tenants a'gainst landlord to recover damages for failure to properly heat leased premises. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John K. Prindiville, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed October 15, 1919.

      Gustav E. Beerly, for appellants. Samuel J. Riehman, for appellee*.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James S. Deming, administrator of the estate of Zelich Leppa, deceased, plaintiff in error, v. Pinkus Adler, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 24,502.
    Action to recover for wrongful death by fall of plaster from ceiling of demised premises. Judgment for defendant. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles H. Bowles, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1918.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 15, 1919.
    Rehearing denied October 29, 1919.
    Charles C. Spencer and Arthur A. House, for plaintiff in error. Zimmerman, Garrett & Rundall, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.