author: Me. Justice Huffman

text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. John E. Speroni, Plaintiff in Error.
    Gen. No. 8,650.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1934.
    Arthur H. Shat and Egbert W. Besse, for plaintiff in error.

      Otto Keener, Attorney General, L. L. Winn, State’s Attorney, and Jacob Cantlin, Assistant State’s Attorney, for defendant in error.
   Me. Justice Huffman

delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff in error was convicted at the December term, 1932, of the county court of Whiteside county upon two counts of an information, charging him with violation of the Illinois Prohibition Act. The first count charged defendant in error with unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, and the second count charged him with unlawfully selling intoxicating liquor. He was found guilty upon both counts and a fine was assessed against him of $750, upon each count, and he was sentenced to' serve 90 days in jail, upon each count. The defendant below prosecutes this writ of error urging divers causes for reversal.

Since the conviction herein, and pending this writ of error, the act under which the defendant in error was convicted has been repealed without a saving clause in favor of prosecutions then pending for violations of said act, committed prior to its repeal. As stated in Vance v. Rankin, 194 Ill. 625, the court of review will take judicial notice of said repeal, and “It is well settled that if a statute giving a special remedy is repealed without a saving clause-in favor of pending suits, all suits must stop where the repeal finds them. If final relief has not been granted before the repeal went into effect, it cannot be after. If a case is appealed, and pending the appeal, the law is changed, the Appellate Court must dispose of the case under the law in force when their decision is rendered. The effect of the repeal of a statute is to obliterate the statute repealed as completely as if it had never been passed, and it must be considered as a law that never existed, except for' the purposes of those actions or suits which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it was an existing law. This rule holds true until the proceedings have reached a final judgment in the court of last resort, for that court, when it comes to pronounce its decision, conforms it to the law then existing, and may therefore reverse a judgment which was correct when pronounced in the subordinate tribunal from whence the appeal was taken, if it appears that pending the appeal a statute which was necessary to support the judgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal.” Vance v. Rankin, supra, 627, 628.

It was further said in the above case on page 629 of the opinion, “the repeal of a statute conferring jurisdiction takes away all right to proceed thereunder unless it is expressly saved, and it carries with it all prosecutions pending thereunder, and except for the purposes of such suits as are begun, prosecuted and concluded while it is an existing law, the statute repealed is as if it never existed.”

In the case of Merlo v. Johnston City & Big Muddy Coal & Mining Co., 258 Ill. 328, the court on pages 332, 333, of its opinion states: “The effect of repealing statutes upon pre-existing causes of action has been frequently considered by the courts of this and other jurisdictions and certain rules applicable thereto have become well established. It is a well settled rule of the common law that if a statute giving a special remedy is unconditionally repealed without a saving clause in favor of pending suits, all actions must stop where the repeal finds them, and if final relief has not been granted before the repeal went into effect, it cannot be afterwards. Where a case is appealed and pending the appeal the legislature changes the law upon which the action is based, the Appellate Court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered,” The following cases are to the same effect: People v. Madison, 280 Ill. 96; People v. Gunn, 281 Ill. 244; People v. New York Cent. R. Co., 282 Ill. 458; Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 290 Ill. 227; McCann v. Retirement Roard, 331 Ill. 193, 202.

It is with reference to statutes defining crimes and providing their punishment that repeals operate with the utmost freedom. It is said that in such cases the extinction of the statute is understood to be an indication that the sovereign power no longer desires the former crime to be punished or regarded as criminal, 25 R C. L. 941; and further, if a penal statute is repealed pending an appeal or writ of error, and before the final action of the Appellate Court,' it will prevent an affirmance of a conviction, and the prosecution must be dismissed or the judgment reversed. 25 R C. L. 942.

It was held in the case of Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322, that where a criminal statute was repealed without a saving clause, pending an appeal by defendant, from a conviction thereunder, such, defendant could not be convicted under the act after the same was repealed, in the absence of a saving clause, and it was said that the court of review must take notice of the law as it existed at the time of its final judgment, and that this principle applied where the law was repealed pending an appeal or writ of error from the judgment of an inferior tribunal. This same rule is observed in State v. Thomas, 149 La. 654; Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588.

The judgment in a criminal case cannot be considered as final and conclusive pending the removal of the cause to a court of review. If this were not so, there would be no use taking the appeal or suing out the writ of error. We are of the opinion that where the act appealed from is repealed, during the pendency of such appeal, and without a saving clause as to pending cases thereunder, a court of review is bound to consider such cases and decide them in accordance with the law at the time of its final judgment; and in the absence of any saving clause as to pending suits for violation, the court of review is without power to pronounce, enforce or inflict punishment for the violation of a statute that no longer exists and for which no punishment is provided by law.

There is no vested right in a public law which is not in' the nature of a private grant. Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 290 Ill. 227, 232. The legislature clearly had the right to abrogate the act in question, and we do not consider that any vested right existed thereunder, by virtue of sec. 4 of ch. 131 of the statute, Cahill’s St. ch. 131, ¶ 4, after the absolute repeal of such act by the legislature, without any provision as to prosecutions then pending.

It was stated by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., supra, on page 232 of its opinion, as follows: “It is well settled that if a statute giving a special remedy is repealed without a saving clause in favor of pending suits, all suits must stop where the repeal finds them. If final relief has not been granted before the repeal went into effect it cannot be after. If a case is appealed and pending the appeal the law is changed, the Appellate Court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered. The effect of the repeal of a statute is to obliterate the statute repealed as completely as if it had never been passed, and it must be considered as a law that never existed, except for the purposes of those actions or suits which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it was an existing law. Pending judicial proceedings based upon a statute cannot proceed after its repeal. This rule holds true until the proceedings have reached a final judgment in the court of last resort, for that court, when it comes to pronounce its decision, conforms it to the law then existing, and may therefore reverse a judgment which was correct when pronounced in the subordinate tribunal from whence the appeal was taken, if it appears that pending the appeal a statute which was necessary to support the judgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal.”

It is urged by defendant in error that the prosecution in this case is saved by sec. 4 of ch. 131 of Cahill’s Revised Statutes of Illinois. This section reads as follows: “No new laws shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former law or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceeding. If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect. This section shall extend to all repeals, either by express words or by implication, whether "the repeal is in the Act making any new provision upon the same subject or in any other Act.”

It will be observed that this section begins with the words: “No new law shall be construed . . . ,” and further on in the section, contains the following verbiage, ‘ ‘ or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceedings. ’ ’ From the reading of this section we believe it is intended to apply only to new acts of legislation amending existing acts, or to subsequent legislation which by repugnant provisions therein repeals or changes certain portions of an existing act. We do not understand that this section contemplates a complete extinction of an old act, without any new or subsequent legislation created to take its place. Therefore, it does not apply in this instance.

The Supreme Court of this State in the ease of Farmer v. People, 77 Ill. 322, on page 324 of its opinion, in referring to this section and in construing the meaning thereof, states that the same, “although not clearly expressed, means that, although the suit or prosecution may have been commenced under the repealed law, it shall, after the repealing law takes effect, proceed in conformity with the law then in force.” It is thus manifest that said sec. 4 was construed to apply only where the repealing act is of an amendatory nature, or a new act upon the same subject matter, containing provisions repugnant to the existing act, which by their very nature, effect a.repeal of those provisions in such former act. This same section was under consideration by the Supreme Court in the case of People v. Zito, 237 Ill. 434, in which case an amendatory act having to do with the regulation of the practice of pharmacy, was involved. The defendant was convicted and during the pendency of his appeal and while the case was before the Appellate Court for its decision, the legislature amended the section of the statute under which the defendant was being prosecuted. The defendant entered his motion in the Appellate Court to have the judgment reversed on grounds that the amendatory act operated as a repeal of the sections under which he was being prosecuted, and that such amendatory act contained no saving clause for pending prosecutions under the old act. It was there held that the amendatory act did not purport to repeal the sections under which defendant was being- prosecuted, but only provided for more stringent provisions against the sale of cocaine. In that case, the court in its opinion on page 438, in referring to said sec. 4 of ch. 131, states: “It provides that certain rules shall be observed unless the construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the same statute, and there have been some cases where it could not be applied. ’ ’ The above court in the same case on page 439 of its opinion, after again stating that the provisions of sec. 4 are only to be observed where such construction would not be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, says, “It would not be competent for the legislature to limit by the general act its own legislative powers, and where a contrary intent is expressed, the general provisions of chapter 131 do not apply. ’ ’ In every instance that we have been able to find, where section 4 has been applied, it has been with reference to a new and subsequent legislative act, which affected directly or by repugnant matter, an existing act.

It is apparent that sec. 4 of chap. 131 is intended to apply alike to civil and criminal cases. It is equally apparent from the foregoing authorities that section 4 does not apply to civil cases when the statutory act granting the remedy is repealed outright without a saving clause. The same rule will prevail in criminal prosecutions for violation of statutory acts, when such acts are repealed absolutely and without an express saving clause. It then becomes the same as if it had never existed, and there is no amendatory act, or new act, in existence in order to meet the provisions of section 4 to the effect, “that the proceedings thereafter shall' conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceedings,” which language clearly indicates that there must be some subsequent act, tailing the place of the former act, under which the action may proceed, and such action shall then conform, so far as practicable, to the new law in force at the time such proceedings are carried forward to a final judgment.

The judgment of the county court of Whiteside county is reversed.

Jtidgment reversed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Presiding Justice Edwards

license: Public Domain

text:
    James Kelley et al., Appellants, v. George P. Baggott et al., Appellees.

      Opinion filed December 26, 1933.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    D. F. Moore and Wirt Herrick, for appellants.
    Moses Pulverman, Williams & Harrison and Ferrell & Hat, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Edwards

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellants brought an action of trespass on the case, as general depositors of the Zeigler State Bank, previously closed as insolvent, against appellees, the directors of such institution, to recover for loss of their deposits.

The declaration, consisting of a single count, in substance charged that the bank was operating as such between October 1, 1929, and December 4, 1930, on which latter date it was closed by the auditor of public accounts, as insolvent; that relying upon the solvency of the bank, appellants, during such period of time, deposited therein $3,281.20; that during such time, appellees were directors, and under the duty of ascertaining and knowing the financial condition of the bank, of examining, at times, into its affairs, of using ordinary care in having the assets carried on its books at a reasonable value, and to so hold same out to the public; that appellees could, by the exercise of ordinary care, have known that the bank was insolvent, before and during the time such deposits were made; that appellees neglected and failed to examine into the condition of such bank, and to cause its assets to be carried on the books at their reasonable cash value ; but on the contrary, carelessly and negligently held the bank out to the public, during such time, as solvent; that they permitted the assets to be carried on the books at grossly excessive values, and permitted such assets to be so held out to the public; that, as a consequence, appellants were deceived and defrauded into making such deposits, and continuing as creditors, during all of said time, with the result that their deposits were lost.

To this declaration a general and special demurrer was filed, which was sustained by the court. Appellants stood by their declaration, and judgment was rendered against them, from which they have appealed.

Appellees insist that the declaration amounts to charging a cause for fraud and deceit, while appellants assert that the action, as set forth, is to recover damages from the bank directors, as being guilty of negligence in permitting an insolvent bank to be held out as solvent, and thereby inducing them to make deposits therein, which were lost by reason of such insolvency. The character of an action is determined by the allegations of the declaration, rather than by the form adopted by the pleader. People ex rel. Ellis v. Healy, 128 Ill. 9.

A careful examination of the declaration convinces us that it charges appellees with having occasioned appellants a loss by negligently permitting the Zeigler State Bank to be held out as solvent, when it was not, whereby they were induced to become depositors therein, and as a consequence suffered a loss. Holding, as we do, that it was not for fraud and deceit, but rather to recover for a loss resulting from the negligence of the directors, we shall consider it as against the objections which are urged, upon the assumption that it is intended to charge such a ground of action.

Appellees contend that bank directors are not liable directly to depositors for negligence in managing the affairs of a bank, but if it should be held they are accountable therefor, then the omission which will create the liability must be gross, and that the declaration only charges ordinary negligence.

In Delano v. Case, 17 Ill. App. 531, an action very similar to the instant case, after a discussion of many authorities, the court concluded: “There are many risks and uncertainties against which a prudent business man never expects the directors or managers of banks to insure him. He knows that for the usual hazards of business he must look to the bank alone. That for the ordinary negligence of directors, they are responsible alone to their principal, bnt for such gross negligence or incompetency as shows a reckless disregard of their duty to care for and protect the funds committed to their charge, we think they are directly responsible to the depositor.” This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Delano v. Case, 121 Ill. 247.

The rule was declared in Holmes v. McDonald, 226 Ill. 169, at page 176: “It seems to be a well settled rule that directors, trustees and officers of a corporation are bound to manage the affairs of the corporation with at least ordinary care and prudence, and are liable for loss occasioned by their failure to do so. In accepting such a position the trustee or director undertakes that he possesses and will exercise at least the ordinary knowledge, skill and judgment requisite to the discharge of his duties and that he will be liable for gross negligence.”

The leading and authoritative case of Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, declares the law upon the subject to be: “Without reviewing the various decisions on the subject, we hold that directors must exercise ordinary care and prudence in the administration of the affairs of a bank, and that this includes something more than officiating as figureheads. They are entitled under the law to commit the banking business, as defined, to their duly authorized officers, but this does not absolve them from the duty of reasonable supervision, nor ought they to be permitted to be shielded from liability because of want of knowledge of wrong-doing, if that ignorance is the result of gross inattention.” And to the same effect are United Society of Shakers v. Underwood, 9 Bush (Ky.) 609, 614, and Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287.

In Murphy v. Candor, 263 Ill. App. 226, at page 234, the court, in discussing the relations between depositors and directors, states: ‘ This suit is based solely upon the right of a stockholder in a defunct bank to sue the directors for the fraudulent management of the same. An entirely different situation exists in reference to depositors and other creditors of the bank. They should, and do, have a right of action against the directors and officers of a bank for their negligence and fraudulent use of the funds intrusted to them if a loss has been incurred to such creditors and depositors by such negligence.”

Appellees insist that the doctrine declared in Delano v. Case, supra, has been, by implication, overruled in the recent cases of Becker v. Billings, 304 Ill. 190, at page 198, and Cutter v. Hicks, 268 Ill. App. 161. We are unable to find, in the Billings case, any statement which apparently overrules the precept of Delano v. Case, while in the Gutter case, at the bottom of page 179, in speaking of the appellee, who had brought a suit to set aside a deed as fraudulent, in behalf of certain minors for whom he was guardian, and defining his duties, as to the creditors of the bank, the court said: “If he were negligent as president or director of the bank, this receiver, appellant, or the creditors, have their action against him.” Here is an unqualified recognition of the creditor’s right of action against a director for loss sustained through his negligence. This is in full accord with, rather than against, the rule as declared in Delano v. Case, supra.

It appears to be the law in this State, as well as in other jurisdictions, including. the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court, that bank directors are directly liable to depositors for loss sustained by the latter, resulting from the gross neglect, or the reckless disregard of duty, of the former.

It is insisted that even though such be the law of Illinois, yet the declaration is insufficient for the reason that the only charge is ordinary negligence, and that to comply with the rule, the negligence or inattention must be averred to be gross.

In an action, on the case, to recover compensatory damages, it is sufficient to allege that the acts or omissions complained of resulted from the negligence or carelessness of the defendant. It is not necessary that the declaration charge the negligence to have been gross, and where the right of recovery depends upon the existence of gross or wilful negligence, the matter is said to be one of proof and not of pleading. Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Phillips, 66 Ill. 548; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Carter, 20 Ill. 390, 391; 45 Corpus Juris, 1090, sec. 662.

Within the rule of the authorities last cited, the allegation, as to negligence, was sufficient, even though, as we hold, the appellants, upon the trial, in order to warrant a recovery in their favor, would be required to prove that appellees had been guilty of gross negligence, or a reckless -disregard of duty, as such bank directors.

Appellees, as a further ground of "special demurrer, claim that insolvency of the bank is not sufficiently charged. It appears the declaration .avers that on December 4, 1930, the auditor of public accounts, after examination, found the bank to be insolvent and closed same, and that-it has since remained closed. We regard this as a sufficient averment of the bank’s insolvency at the date it was closed.

It is also urged that there is no averment of its insolvency during the period appellants were making their deposits. It is alleged that appellees could, by exercising ordinary care, have known, that the bank was insolvent, before and during the time the deposits were made. This charges such fact inferentially, and we think is an adequate averment of the,bank’s insolvency during such period.

It is further insisted that the allegations relative to insolvency are conclusions, and that no facts are pleaded from which it might be deduced that the bank was financially irresponsible. The period of time covering the alleged insolvency is from October 1, 1929, to December 4, 1930, — something like 14 months. In order to set out items of fact showing insolvency, during all of such time, it would be necessary to allege the amount of assets and liabilities each day of such period, which would render the declaration protractedly redundant.

In State v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 246 Ill. 188, at page 236, the court, in discussing the subject, said: “The rule in common law pleadings is, that whenever the enumeration of particulars would lead to great prolixity, a general statement is sufficient.” Citing in support, Smith v. Boston, C. & M. R. Co., 36 N. H. 458, and Andrews’ Stephen’s Pl, 2nd Ed., sec. 223. We regard the averments as sufficient to comply with the rule just stated. Moreover, to have so pleaded the various items, as indicated, would in effect have been to plead the evidence, upon which appellants would necessarily rely to sustain the averments, which is never necessary nor proper. Duncan v. Dazey, 318 Ill. 500; 49 Corpus Juris 40, sec. 16.

The contention is further made that the averments with reference to the fair, cash, market value of the assets, and that they were carried on the books at grossly excessive values, during such times, are likewise conclusions, and not based upon any pleaded facts, from which such deduction might be drawn. To have specially pleaded the market value of the respective assets, and the book value of such, from day to day, over a period of 14 months, would have given rise to the same objection existing in the case of the alleged insolvency of the bank, as above referred to, and rendered the declaration prolix, and replete with pleaded items of evidence.

“More particularity ,in pleading is not required than the nature of the subject is reasonably susceptible of.” Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, at page 172.

In Miller v. S. S. Kresge Co., 306 Ill. 104, at page 107, the court said: “The main purpose of a pleading in courts of law is accomplished when by reasonably intelligible allegations the opposing party is advised of the case to be made against him. ’ ’

Other special grounds of demurrer were assigned; they, however, were not argued by appellees, hence will be deemed waived. Keyes v. Kimmel, 186 Ill. 109; Lingle v. West Chicago Park Com’rs, 222 Ill. 384.

For the reasons stated, we are of opinion that the declaration sufficiently states a cause of action against appellees, for negligent discharge of their duties as bank directors, by which a loss was occasioned to appellants, and that the demurrers to the declaration should have been overruled.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court, with directions to overrule the demurrers to appellants’ declaration.

Reversed and remanded with directions.


text:
    B. O. Sumner, Appellee, v. John L. Smysor, Appellant.

      Opinion filed December 26, 1933.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    Geo. B. Rhoads, for appellant.
    Sumner & Lewis, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Edwards

delivered the opinion of the court.

On June 30, 1932, appellee and appellant entered into a written contract for the sale of 261.11 acres of land in Lawrence county, owned by the latter; consideration, $6,000; $500 down, and balance to be paid within 30 days; vendee to have option of paying within such time, $4,000 in cash, and giving mortgage for $1,750, running two years, with interest at seven per cent.

The following clause of the contract was the basis of this suit: “It is further agreed that the vendor shall furnish an abstract of title showing a merchantable title to said premises, and deliver to the purchaser, within the said thirty days, a warranty deed for the same, free from all liens and encumbrances except the lien of taxes for the year 1932, and in the event that it is necessary for a court proceeding to remove any clouds to make a merchantable title to the same, the said vendor shall be liable in the sum of not to exceed $200.00 for the expense of such suit.”

The same day, the vendor (appellant) executed a warranty deed and deposited same in escrow at the First National Bank of Lawrenceville, to be delivered to the vendee upon the fulfillment of the terms of the contract, and also delivered an abstract of title to the vendee.

On July 7, appellee advised appellant, by letter, that there were defects of title, specifying two: a break back in 1836, when 80 acres were conveyed to Nicholas Johnson, and no subsequent conveyance shown by him ; also, that there were certain drainage taxes in the amount of $923.74 due upon the premises, and which were not shown upon the abstract; stating in such letter: “Of course you will be liable for them, and of course they should be deducted from the purchase price.” Later, on July 16, appellant, accompanied by his attorney, Judge Tohill, went to the office of appellee for a conference.

The testimony as to what was said here conflicts, appellee stating that he informed appellant of the drainage taxes, and said he wanted them paid, to which the latter replied that he would not do anything* about it; also that he (appellee) mentioned other defects of title, and stated that a suit to remove clouds would not bar the rights of any interested parties under disability; that the title could not be made good, and demanded the return of the earnest money. Judge Tohill testified that he did not recall appellant saying that he refused to pay the taxes, and also stated that nothing was said about terminating, the contract; furthermore, that he did not remember of appellee’s asking for his money back, but that Smysor said he wanted to consider the matter.

Appellant, in his deposition, stated that he said nothing about calling the deal off, or returning the down payment; that appellee asked two or three times to cancel the trade, and for the return of his money; that appellant replied that before he could decide, he wished to talk privately with his attorney; that he and the attorney left for the latter’s office, and while there — within 30 minutes of the conclusion of the conference — was served with the summons in this suit.

Later, on July 27, appellant wrote appellee, telling him that he had instructed the bank to pay the drainage taxes, out of the 'purchase price, and to let appellee have the $200 to quiet the title, as provided by the contract. He also, on the same day, wrote the bank, giving it directions to the same effect.

The suit was brought in assumpsit, to recover the $500 earnest money, to which was pleaded the general issue. At the close of appellee’s case, appellant moved for a directed verdict, which was overruled. At the close of all the evidence, each party moved for a directed verdict. That of appellant was overruled, while the court sustained that of appellee, and directed a verdict in the sum of $519.14, being the earnest money, with interest thereon. Judgment was rendered upon the verdict, and this appeal perfected therefrom.

Both parties having moved for a directed verdict, the effect was to submit the cause to the court for trial without a jury; as held by this court in Hungate v. New York Life Ins. Co., 267 Ill. App. 257.

Appellee takes the position that the abstract failed to show a merchantable title in appellant, and that he had the right, in consequence of such fact, to rescind the contract, and sue to recover the earnest money.

Whether such contention is correct, depends upon the construction of the written agreement of sale, which is to be interpreted to ascertain the intention of the parties, and which is to be gathered from a consideration of the entire contract. The rule governing in such case is stated in Geithman v. Eichler, 265 Ill. 579, at page 585: “The intention is to be determined from the language employed, when read in the light of the context of the instrument and such surrounding circumstances as will aid the court in arriving at the true intent and meaning of the parties. Druecker v. McLaughlin, 235 Ill. 367, at page 372; Goodwillie Co. v. Commomoealth Electric Co., 241 Ill. 42. It is also allowable to look to the interpretation the parties themselves have placed upon the agreement, for assistance in determining its true meaning. Storey v. Storey, 125 Ill. 608; Vermont St. M. E. Church v. Brose, 104 Ill. 206.”

The contract, tested by the rule just stated, in our opinion does not support the theory of appellee. It will be observed that the agreement requires appellee to make the full payment, either in money, or partly in money, and the balance in the form of mortgage, within 30 days after June 30, 1932. Appellant was obligated to furnish, within such time, a warranty deed for the premises, which were to be free from all liens and incumbrances, except the lien for taxes for the year 1932; also to furnish an abstract showing a merchantable title, the time for which was not 'specifically fixed, but it is evident same was to be provided within such 30-day period. Also, if it appeared from such abstract that there were clouds upon the title, which would require a suit to remove, in order to make it merchantable, then and in such case the vendor would be liable for the expense of same, to an amount not exceeding $200.

Appellee, himself a lawyer, drew the contract, hence it may be assumed that he inserted each clause advisedly, and for a purpose.

It seems apparent that the parties contemplated that if appellant, within the 30 days, should tender appellee an abstract and a warranty deed, with the title free of all liens and incumbrances except the taxes for the year 1932, then appellee was bound to take the title, and pay the purchase price, within such period of time; and that if the abstract disclosed a title which was, for other reasons, not merchantable, and there were clouds which would require a suit to remove, in order to render the title merchantable, the vendor would stand the expense of same up to the sum of $200.

Obviously this is true, otherwise why the insertion of the clause as to the suit to confirm the title ? Manifestly, such action could not be instituted and carried to a decree, within 30 days. Moreover, it seems clear that appellee should bring the suit for such purpose, as the contract provides that appellant, in such situation, should be liable for the expense of same. Liable to whom? It could only be to the vendee, the appellee herein. If it had been the thought of the parties that examination of the abstract, disclosing á nonmerchantable title, would give rise to an immediate right of rescission on the part of appellee, then the clause, as to suit to quiet title, is meaningless, and we cannot ascribe to the parties an intention to insert in their contract a provision which could serve no purpose. In addition, the parties seem to have so regarded it, as evidenced by the fact that appellant, in his conversation with appellee, insisted that the clause should cover all clouds, aside from liens and incumbrances; also, in his letter of July 27, 1932, he expressly states that he so understood the matter, gave directions to the bank to pay the taxes, and allow appellee the $200 for the suit to quiet title.

Appellee, in his letter of July 7, 1932, indicates that he likewise so interpreted the contract. Therein, he stated that he had looked over the abstract, and that there was a break in the title, which would require a suit to remove, in the event he should try to secure a federal loan on the land, and that there were unpaid drainage taxes against the premises, which, appellant was liable for, and which should "be deducted from the purchase price, and that he hoped to hear from appellant soon.

Here, after an examination of the abstract, appellee was calling attention to certain defects of title, and suggesting how same should be corrected. This does not indicate that he regarded the contract as giving him an immediate right of rescission if the contract failed to disclose a merchantable title, but on the contrary, evidences his understanding that appellant was to pay the drainage taxes, and that the other defects in the chain of title should be taken care of, as provided in the clause relative to quieting" title.

On July 16, 1933, appellee refused to take the title, demanded repayment to him of the.earnest money, and on the same day brought suit for its recovery. This showed his intention to treat the contract as rescinded. Sluka, v. Bielicki, 335 Ill. 202. Appellant, on such date, still had 14 days in which to pay the taxes and tender the deed. We think the weight of the evidence clearly shows his willingness and purpose of so doing; also, that he was desirous of having the title, as to the clouds, made merchantable, by the suit to quiet the same; hence he was not, on such date, in default, and appellee had no right to rescind the contract, nor sue for the return of the down payment.

For which reason the judgment is reversed.

Judgment reversed.


author: Mr. Justice Stone

text:
    Howard B. Haines et al., Appellees, v. Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Company., Inc., et al., Appellants.

      Opinion filed December 26, 1933.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    Leahy, Saunders & Walther, Chester Farthing and Judson Harriss, for appellants.
    L. P. Harriss and Isaac K. Levy, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Stone

delivered the opinion of the court.

Complainants, appellees here, minority stockholders of Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Company, Inc., filed their bill in chancery in the circuit court of Perry county against the defendants, Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Company, Inc., C. W. Sheehan, Lottie Sheehan, Georgp Rountree, Louis Kern McCollum and Walter J. Forester, officers and directors of said Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Company, Inc., alleging that on or about August 27, 1927, and prior to the incorporation of said appellant, Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Company, Inc., a certain agreement was entered into by and between T. S. Cousins, J. T. Stephens, George Thomas, C. W. Sheehan and J. D. Byrne on the one part and the said C. W. Sheehan on the other part wherein it was agreed by and between said parties that' said T. S. Cousins, J. T. Stephens, George Thomas, C. W. Sheehan and J. D. Byrne were to be the directors and C. W. Sheehan was to be the president and general manager of the Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Company, Inc., which was then in process of organization as a corporation; that C. W. Sheehan was to be retained as such president and general manager for a period of 10 years from the date of the incorporation of said company at a salary of $250 per month; said agreement further providing that should said Sheehan die or become incompetent to manage the affairs of said company, then said compensation provided to be paid to him was to be paid to his wife, and that she was to assume the presidency and management of said company during the term of said agreement; that said agreement further provided that it would not be necessary for Sheehan to remain in the City of DuQuoin where the company had its offices and to have active supervision of the affairs of said company, but that he might direct the management thereof in such a manner as he should deem proper; that the Sheehan Cash Grocery Stores mentioned in said agreement was not incorporated, but that the defendant Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Company, Inc., was organized as a corporation as aforesaid; that said written agreement was never ratified at any meeting of the stockholders or any meeting of the board of directors of the company prior to the filing of this bill; that ever since the incorporation of said company, it had paid to C. W. Sheehan the sum of $250 each month as provided in said written agreement, the first payment being for the last half of November, 1927. The payment as aforesaid was admitted by appellants on the trial; that the aggregate amount paid to the said Sheehan by reason of said contract, was $13,125 up to March 28, 1932, the date of the filing of the bill of complaint.

Said bill further alleges that said C. W. Sheehan and Lottie Sheehan, his wife, resided at El Paso, Texas; that said C. W. Sheehan admitted residing outside of the State of Illinois since said company was incorporated; that said C. W. Sheehan had rendered and performed practically no services whatever in behalf of said company since its incorporation; that no compensation was authorized to be paid said C. W. Sheehan by any by-laws or by any resolution of the company prior to the filing of the bill; that ever since the incorporation of said company its business and affairs had been actually managed by certain other parties and that the company had been compelled to pay and had paid large sums of money to other persons for services rendered and performed in the actual management of the stores and business of the company and that during all that time, the said C. W. Sheehan had been far removed from the stores and business of the company, and had rendered practically no services whatever for the company; that said written agreement was not signed by all the stockholders of the company; that appellees did not obtain their respective share of stock in the company from the said T. S. Cousins, J. T. Stephens, C. W. Sheehan or J. D. Byrne or from either of them, but that they obtained their said stock direct from said company and paid said company for the same.; that said T. S. Cousins, J. T. Stephens, George Thomas and J. D. Byrne did not have issued to them and did not obtain from said company all the shares of stock for which they originally subscribed; that appellees at the time they became stockholders in said company did not know of the existence of said agreement and did not learn of the same until a few months prior to the time they filed their bill of complaint; that said written agreement was contrary to public policy and is otherwise void as to appellees; that said payments of $250 to said C. W. Sheehan were improper and were not authorized and were wrongfully made to him and said C. W. Sheehan wrongfully and improperly received from said company, prior to the filing of said bill of complaint, the aggregate sum of $13,125 on account of said monthly payments; that C. W. Sheehan should account to said company for the same; that said C. W. Sheehan had also wrongfully and improperly received from said company the sum of $1,722.31 in payment of hospital bills, railroad fare, hotel bills and divers other personal and private bills and expenses of the said C. W. Sheehan; that the said C. W. Sheehan did not pay cash for his shares of stock in said company, but paid for the same in property; that the property turned over to the company by C. W. Sheehan was estimated to be worth $43,000 and that said Sheehan was given in payment of same 430 shares of common stock in the company of the par value of $100; that appellees, at the time they became such stockholders, did not have any knowledge or any information as to what said Sheehan paid for his stock in the company; that said written agreement is injurious and oppressive to said company and is void and should be canceled ; that C. W. Sheehan has wrongfully and improperly received from the company, on account of the improper, wrongful and unauthorized payments aforesaid, the aggregate sum of $14,847.31, and that he should pay that amount back to the company; that said Sheehan owns the majority of the stock in said company, and that a majority of the directors and officers of said company are controlled by the said Sheehan; that the said Sheehan, Lottie Sheehan, George Rountree and Louis Kern McCollum who constitute more than a majority of the board of directors of said company and who are the officers of said company are controlled by the said Sheehan.

The bill then prays for a cancellation of the said contract and a decree requiring appellee Sheehan to pay back the said sum of $14,847.31. It further prays that an injunction be issued restraining said company and its officers from paying any further sums to the said Sheehan on account of the aforesaid contract.

Appellants answered the bill defying all of the material allegations in toto except as aforesaid; they admitted the making of the contract and the payments of the money as alleged in the bill. The court entered its decree finding substantially all the facts as pet out in the bill to be true and ordered and decreed that said contract be canceled; that appellees be enjoined from paying any further sums of money to the said Sheehan as prayed and that appellee Sheehan pay back to said company the said sum of money so found to be due and owing by him. Appellant Sheehan has appealed to this court assigning as errors that the decree is contrary to the law; is against the manifest weight of the evidence; that the court erred in not dismissing the bill for want of equity, and in finding the equities with appellees; that the court erred in finding that it was useless to request the directors to take action against said C. W. Sheehan because, the said Sheehan dominated the board of directors; that the court erred in finding that the complainants and each of them did not have knowledge of Sheehan’s salary contract prior to the purchase of their stock; that the court erred in canceling 'Sheehan’s salary contract and in requiring Sheehan to pay back the money he had received; that the court erred in finding Sheehan’s salary contract void; also in not finding that Sheehan’s salary contract had been adopted by the corporation; that the court erred in finding that complainants purchased treasury stock and in finding that Sheehan did not earn his salary; that the court erred in not finding that the Sheehan contract was a part of the purchase price of Sheehan’s stores; that the court erred in not requiring the complainants to offer to put Sheehan in status quo.

The evidence shows that commencing in 1921 with a small stand C. W. Sheehan and his wife built up a chain of five grocery stores, located in DuQuoin, Tamaroa, Pinckneyville, Dowell and Cutler, Illinois; that by 1927, C. W. Sheehan was sole owner of the business, and had an income of $18,000 per year; that in 1927, Sheehan was stricken with tuberculosis; that it became necessary for him to form a corporation and get out from under the load he was carrying. Accordingly, defendants went into conference on the question of organizing a corporation, the result of which was that appellant Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Company, Inc., was organized; that its assets consisted of the property formerly held by Sheehan which he turned in to the company and cash was to be paid in by the other subscribers. For the property turned in by Sheehan he was to receive $43,000 in stock and a 10-year salary agreement. This salary agreement was signed by the same men who became the first board of directors and who subscribed for the stock. It was prepared by a lawyer five days before the company was incorporated; a copy of said agreement was at all times left in the company’s safe. Complainants acquired their stock in 1928. They were induced to buy it by stockholders other than Sheehan.

Complainants, to show they purchased their stock direct from the company, offered their respective checks payable to the Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Company, Inc., together with the indorsements on the back; they also offered their respective shares of stock which do not show that they were assigned by a prior shareholder. To offset this, defendants offered the articles of incorporation which showed all the stock paid for and subscribed; they also offered the testimony of Hiley Ward, the corporation’s secretary, the testimony of the lawyer who drew the contract and incorporated the company, the testimony of Stephens, one of the original incorporators, and the method of the original stockholders, in transferring the shares through the secretary.

The evidence shows that the Sheehan salary contract was at all times filed with the company’s papers in the main office in DuQuoin; that it was a part of the purchase price paid to Sheehan for his business; that at all times Sheehan’s salary of $250 per month was paid, pursuant to the agreement; that the company’s minutes of December 6, 1929, and Sheehan’s letter in the minutes of December 20, 1929, discussed the Sheehan contract. Defendants offered other evidence to show that each individual appellee long had actual knowledge of Sheehan’s contract without protest.

The evidence also shows that the expense account with which Sheehan is charged was incurred by Sheehan by trips to and from DuQuoin, Illinois, and were made when the business required it. The evidence is conflicting as to just how much time and attention Sheehan gave to the business. The company was paying dividends of about eight per cent and had paid a four per cent dividend by the fall of 1932. The original articles of incorporation showed the names and addresses of the subscribers to the capital stock and the amount subscribed and paid in by each, as follows:

No. of Amount

Name shares subscribed Am’t paid in

T. S. Cousins 425 $ 4,250.00 $ 4,250.00

J. D. Byrne 425 4,250.00 4,250.00

Geo. W. Thomas 425 4,250.00 4,250.00

C. W. Sheehan 4300 43,000.00 ' 43,000.00

J. T. Stephens 425 4,250.00 4,250.00

The $43,000 stock which went to Sheehan was not paid for in cash but by the transfer to the company of the five retail grocery stores which Sheehan owned. All of the stock subscribed by the other incorporators was not paid for entirely when the company was incorporated.

This record discloses beyond dispute that before and on August 27, 1927, an understanding was arrived at by and among all the subscribers to stock of the Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Company, Inc., in and by which defendant Sheehan was to have a 10-year contract at the rate of $250 per month as manager of the concern to be incorporated; that in the event of his death the concern should pay Mrs. Sheehan the same salary, as manager, during the remaining period of the 10 years. Much discussion was had concerning the justice of this contract, it being finally definitely agreed that said contract should be entered into as a part of the consideration for Sheehan’s transferring his stores to the corporation to be organized. In accordance therewith, the contract was entered into by all the incorporators, who afterward became the first directors of the corporation. These parties were in the act of forming a corporation. They were agreeing upon the value of the Sheehan stores, and upon the general plan upon which the corporation was to be organized and conducted. So long as nothing was agreed upon which was inconsistent with the statute or immoral in itself there can be no objection to the contract on the score of public policy. Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 Ill. 589; Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 Ill. 301; Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416; Lorillard v. Clyde, 86 N. Y. 384; Brictson Mfg. Co. v. Close, 280 Fed. 297. The case of Teich v. Kaufman, 174 Ill. App. 306, is distinguishable from the Kantzler case, supra, in that that agreement was one made between directors to the detriment of stockholders whose interests it was their duty to guard; whereas in the case at bar, the contract was a part of the consideration which moved appellant to put his stores into the business. At the time of signing the contract, there were no stockholders and all persons interested were represented; consequently there was no one to whom the organizers owed any duty as cestui que trust or otherwise. The same distinction exists as to the case of Hall v. Woods, 325 Ill. 114.

The contract was not void as urged by complainants. Whether it was so inequitable as to entitle complainants to have it rescinded must be determined upon other grounds.

It is urged by complainants that they bought the stock they hold direct from the company and not as assignees of any other stockholder. The record shows that the entire stock of $60,000 was subscribed when the company was chartered. Sheehan took $43,000; the other four incorporators each took $4,250, so that there was no stock left in the treasury. However complainants got their stock they had to get it from stock that had already been subscribed. It is true their certificates came direct from the company but this necessarily had to be so. They could not take the stock as a direct assignment from someone who held it. The transfer could only be made by the seller turning in his certificates having them canceled and having new certificates issued by the company. The shares were only transferable on the books of the company. The issuing of their stock by the secretary of the company does not prove that in purchasing their stock complainants dealt directly with the company. The stock which they hold had been subscribed by somebody under conditions which took into consideration the Sheehan contract. They would have to deal with someone who had subscribed for the stock, else under no condition could the secretary sell them their stock. There was none for sale. Whatever system or understanding there was between those who had subscribed for the stock and the secretary of the company by which the certificates would be issued to subsequent purchasers the record does not satisfactorily disclose, but the stock must ultimately come from the company. It is true that all the subscribed stock had not been paid for when complainants bought theirs but it had been contracted for. This placed it beyond the power of the company to resell it without the consent of the person who had purchased it. The sale by one who has subscribed for stock which has not been issued to him and having it issued to his buyer direct from the company is not an unusual transaction. Complainant, Kunz, was a resident of DuQuoin; he was induced to buy stock by Cousins. Is it not a reasonable conclusion that Kunz bought some of the stock subscribed by Cousins ? William Thomas became interested through Cousins and bought his stock the next day after his brother George had subscribed. He was an intimate friend and employee of Cousins.

Kohler had been in Sheehan’s employ and also in the employ of the Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Company, Inc., after its incorporation, Haines was an intimate friend of Cousins and Cousins induced him to buy his stock. Whom did he buy it from if not from Cousins, the man who induced him to buy? The original subscribers took their stock, subject to the obligations of the corporation placed upon it at the time of organization. They could not lessen these obligations by a resale. If they perpetrated a fraud upon their respective purchasers, that is a question not to be dealt with here. The purchaser of shares of stock acquires' no greater rights than his vendor. He holds by the same title and subject to the same liability. Shares of stock are merely choses in action and the successive owners acquire only the right held by their predecessors in title. Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14; Bilhuber v. Bilhuber-Wawak Co., 245 Ill. App. 552.

Complainants claim that they had no knowledge of the Sheehan contract. The corporation was organized on September, 1927; the contract was entered into in August, 1927. Complainants Thomas and Kunz became stockholders about the 15th of February, 1928; Kohler became a stockholder about June 20, 1928; complainant Thomas purchased his sto6k the next day after his brother bought his. The bill in this case was not filed until 1932. This seems a long time for stockholders to remain in ignorance of the conditions of a concern in which they have been stockholders, from which they have received dividends and in whose management they have participated. In weighing the statements of complainants that they had no knowledge of the Sheehan contract until shortly before the bringing of the suit, we have to consider other circumstances in evidence.

Haines was a banker at Tamaroa. One of the stores of this company kept its account there. Defendant Stephens testified that he discussed the Sheehan contract with Haines. Complainant Kohler drove with Sheehan and Stephens from DuQuoin to St. Louis on the occasion of Sheehan’s leaving for the south. Stephens and Sheehan both testify that on the way they discussed the contract; that during the discussion Kohler said he wanted some of the stock. Kunz says that he knew that Sheehan was being paid for what he did. Thomas is a brother to one of the original stockholders. The minutes of the company of December, 1929, show a copy of a letter sent to Thomas by Sheehan, discussing the contract and the expenses incurred by Sheehan. This letter obviously was prompted by a request from the board of directors made at its meeting December 6, 1929. At that time and place the contract was referred to and it was claimed that the expenses were not warranted by the contract. The secretary was then instructed to write to Mr. Sheehan calling upon him for an explanation. She evidently did so. Sheehan replied on December 18, 1929, sending a copy of his reply to Thomas and a copy to Mayor.

It is possible that this letter remained in the files of the company and did not come to the knowledge of the stockholders, bnt not probable. It seems improbable that Thomas and Mayor did not disclose this letter to the others who were interested. It must also be borne in mind that this contract was at all times among the files of the company and copies were made for each of the directors.

A fair consideration of all the evidence on this subject of knowledge leads us to believe that the great weight of evidence is to the effect that complainants had knowledge of the Sheehan contract long before the starting of this suit; that with that knowledge they acquiesced in the management of the corporation, drew their dividends on their stock, but, at no time made any effort to have their grievances adjusted by powers within the corporation. In our judgment the chancellor in finding that appellees had no knowledge of the Sheehan contract found such fact against the weight of the evidence. Complainants ought not therefore be heard to bring this suit. They could not in any event participate in any recovery, could there be á recovery. Complainants say that they bring this suit on behalf of all other stockholders similarly situated, yet they do not disclose the names of such persons nor can the court determine whether there are such persons and if so, whether they are similarly situated. We must therefore determine the issues here upon the standing of complainants themselves. We are constrained to the belief that if there are other stockholders who have been- deceived by the organization of this corporation and its management, these complainants have participated in such deception by their long acquiescence in the conduct of the company. Complainants are not now in a position to speak for such innocent parties if there are such. There are no such stockholders as far as this record indicates, and to allow complainants to benefit because of a wrong-doing of this corporation is to allow them to benefit by a wrong in which they participated if a wrong was done. Furthermore, complainants have made no move toward placing Sheehan in the position in which he was when the contract was made.

In our judgment the trial court erred in its findings on the three major points which control this lawsuit: (1) in finding that the Sheehan contract was void as against public policy; (2) in finding that complainants bought their stock from the corporation direct and not from other stockholders; (3) in finding that complainants had no knowledge of the Sheehan contract until 1932. A decree based upon erroneous findings cannot be sustained when such findings are on matters which are controlling in the case.

The decree of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court with instructions to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill for want of equity.

Reversed and remanded with directions.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

text:
    Adolph Goldschmidt et al., appellees, v. D. E. Waggoner et al., defendants, on appeal of Ratsky Service Station, Inc., appellant.
    Gen. No. 35,796.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Rehearing denied December 27, 1933.
    Needham, Hubbard & Mulks, for appellant. Mergentheiin & Lee, for appellees; Edgar Bernhard, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    H. E. Wackerle, appellee, v. Louis Nies et al., defendants. Louis Nies, appellant.
    Gen. No. 35,876.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Rehearing denied December 27, 1933.
    Winston, Strawn & Shaw, for appellant; Charles J. MeFadden, Harold A. Smith and Frank B. Gilmer, of counsel. Edward D. Feinberg, 'for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John Davies, appellee, v. Edwin E. Husak and C. D. Root, trading as Husak and Root, appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,305.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Rehearing denied December 27, 1933.
    Caplow, Hallen & Caplow, for appellants; Maurice L. Davis, of counsel. Eugene F. Jewett, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Anna Plesha, a minor, by South Chicago Savings Bank, appellee, v. Grand Carniolian Slovenian Catholic Union of the United States of America, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,326.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Frank J. Jones, for appellant. Ralph F. Kompare, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Blatchford Building Corporation, appellee, v. M. E. Wood, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,335.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Louis C. Horner, for appellant. Weightstill Woods, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Chicago City Bank and Trust Company, appellee, v. William Kaufman et al., defendants, on appeal of Sarah Hoffman, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,342.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Edelson & Paullin, for appellant; Hyland J. Paullin, of counsel. Wells & Liddell, for appellee; Lauritz P. Hwass, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Alice Gwalda, appellee, v. Federal Life Insurance Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,351.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Rehearing denied and opinion slightly modified December 27, 1933.
    Loucks, Eckert & Peterson, for appellant. Slakis & Spence, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Hebel

text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. John E. Northup, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 35,880.

      Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    John E. Northup, pro se. Benjamin C. Bachrach, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    H. Roy Berry, defendant in error, v. Frances Mary Berry, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,401.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Barratt O ’Hara and B. M. Steiner, for plaintiff in error. Litsinger, Healy, Reid & Bye, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Peter Vrettos, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,425.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    W. G. Anderson, for plaintiff in error. Thomas J. Courtney, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Otho S. Pasig and Edward E. Wilson, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Personal Loan and Savings Bank, appellee, v. Clara Berger et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,450.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Henry N. Miller, for appellants. Reginald C. Darley, for appellee; Osear G. Wahlgren, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Walter James Gregor, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,469.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Rehearing denied December 27, 1933.
    W. G. Anderson and J. E. Clayton, for plaintiff in error. Thomas J. Courtney, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Edward E. Wilson, Grenville Beardsley and Albert J. Woll, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, appellee, v. Rudolph Mourek, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,805.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Rehearing denied December 27, 1933.
    Michael B. Roderick, for appellant. Thomas J. Courtney, State’s Attorney, for appellee; Edward E. Wilson, Grenville Beardsley and J. Albert Woll, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Thomas D. Collins et al., appellees, v. John M. Pratt et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,940.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Russell, Murphy & Quigley and Deming, Jarrett & Mulfinger, for appellants. John K. Murphy and David S. Eisendrath, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John Burnham et al., appellees, v. John Lenc et al., defendants, on appeal of Helmer Lidstrom and Hulda Lidstrom, appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,963.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Rehearing denied December 27, 1933.
    Edelson, Edelson & Wise, for appellants. Dunbar & Rich, Joseph S. Perry and Kirby H. Wells, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Wilson

text:
    Hugh Scott, appellee, v. Max S. Sickle, Jr., appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,564.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    E. R. Hartigan, for appellant. Beegun & Stenn, for appellee; Walter E. Moss and Max E. Beegun, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Thomas F. Myers, Jr., appellee, v. North Shore Park District of Cook County et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,599.
    Opinion filed December 13, 1933.
    Kopald, Weinshenk & Katz, for appellants; Maurice T. Weinshenk and Sidney D. Missner, of counsel. Louis D. David, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice McSurely

text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. John Wikstrom, defendant in error, v. James M. Feron, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,950.
    Opinion filed December 14, 1933.
    Michael L. Carmody, for plaintiff in error. L. A. Wescott, for defendant in error. Robert E. Cantwell, Jr., amicus curiae.

   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Sullivan

text:
    S. Mathosian et al., appellants, v. B. Kevorkian et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 36,547.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    M. M. Gross, for appellants; Henry L. Graf, of counsel. William J. McGah, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    O. A. Christensen, complainant, v. Ray Peters et al., defendants. August S. Fritz, appellant, v. Walter T. Larson, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,625.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Augustine L. Schaf, for appellant; Millard R. Powers, of counsel. De Witt B. Bayer, for appellee; Norman Asher, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Carmela Staffa, administratrix of the estate of John Sposato, deceased, appellant, v. Jerome Fisher, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,645.

      Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Harry A. Silverstein, for appellant; Ben Copple, of counsel. Church, Haft, Robertson, Crowe & Spence, for appellee; Burt A. Crowe, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Virginia Ann Conover, appellee, v. Clara K. Michelson, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,719.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Miller, Gorham, Wales & Adams, for appellant. Wetten, Pegler & Dale, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frank J. Kerber and Anna Kerber, plaintiffs in error, v. Oscar B. McGlasson, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 36,754.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    John E. Burch and Edward McTiernan, for plaintiffs in error. Michael L. Carmody, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Harriet A. Rife, appellee, v. William H. Rife, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,156.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Glenn P. Sayers, for appellant. Frank H. Graham and Ina M. R. Campbell, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    City of Chicago, appellee, v. Eagle Taxi Company et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 37,220.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.

      Julian C. Ryer, for appellants. William H. Sexton, Corporation Counsel, for appellee; Joseph F. Grossman and Martin H. Foss, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Gridley

text:
    Sky Projector Corporation, appellee, v. Aerograph Company of America et al., defendants. Gregor Melikov et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,586.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    John F. Higgins, Myer H. Gladstone and Arnold N. Frieder, for appellants; Myer H. Gladstone, of counsel. Gallagher, Rinaker, Wilkinson & Hall, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Emil Fagerstrom and Hannah Fagerstrom, as assignees of Henry Gross, defendants in error, v. Roman I. Smook, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,613.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Louis Greenberg, for plaintiff in error. Fein & Stone, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Leona Koenig, appellant, v. Naif Nassar et al., defendants. Cosmopolitan State Bank, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,672.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Blech & Herson, for appellant; Louis Greenberg, of counsel. Rubens, Fischer, Mosser & Barnum, for appellee; Harry H. Barnum, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The Press Company, appellee, v. Harris Wrecking Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,722.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Rehearing denied January 10, 1934.
    Robert R. Seher, for appellant; James M. Gwin, of counsel. White & Hawxhurst, for appellee; Bernard Hoban, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ludwig Kitzendorf, administrator of the estate of Mary Kitzendorf, deceased, defendant in error, v. Phillip Gollner, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,741.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Edward H. Morris, for plaintiff in error. No appearance for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Barney Franklin, appellee, v. Samuel Bernstein et al., defendants. Samuel Bernstein, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,208.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Bernard J. Brown, for appellant. Johntry & Fitzgerald, for appellee; John H. Johntry, John O’C. Fitzgerald and George F. Ort, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Scanlan

text:
    Max Rodnick, plaintiff in error, v. Harry Tuveson, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 36,490.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    John A. Bloomingston, for plaintiff in error; Roy S. Gaskill, of counsel. Kirkland, Fleming, Green & Martin, for defendant in error; Weymouth Kirkland, David Jacker and William H. Symmes, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles E. Graydon for the use of Max Weber, trading as Motor Car Service Company, defendant in error, v. Louis Dinato et al., defendants. Florence M. Danforth and Leon C. Danforth, plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 36,511.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Cohon & Goldstein, for plaintiffs in error. Harris F. Williams and Robert C. Baumgartner, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court,


text:
    Cornelia Building Corporation, appellant, v. Harry Blum, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,668.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Maxfield Weisbrod, for appellant. Morris Kompel, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Seanlan

text:
    Rudolf Fischer, complainant, v. Edwin N. Edlund et al., defendants. Rena A. Evensen and Ella E. Emrath, appellants, v. William H. Mellin, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,709.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    DeWitt B. Bayer, for appellants. McCarthy & Toomey, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Morris Zalman, defendant in error, v. Mrs. E. R. Solomon, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,757.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Welch & Hoffman, for plaintiff in error. Brodkin & Bieber, for defendant in error; Abraham Teitelbaum, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Jacob Warner, appellee, v. Hyman Soboroff, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,767.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Hyman Soboroff, pro se. Harry Tobin, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Park Lane Hotel Company, appellant, v. Frank Weinberg, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,807.

      Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Slottow & Leviton, for appellant; Charles Levitón and David Paley, of counsel. Paul H. Leffmann, for appellee; Harry L. Mitchell and Samuel Spira, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frank C. Rathje, appellee, v. Edward Reiff and Bertha Reiff, appellants.
    Gen. No. 37,179.
    Opinion filed December 29, 1933.
    Greenfield & Reiff, for appellants; Jack A. Cohon, of counsel. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Chicago Title and Trust Company, appellee, v. Edwin F. Kuhlmann et al., defendants. Arnold J. Wieck and Alma Wieck, appellants.
    Gen. No. 37,250.
    Opinion filed January 9, 1934.
    William A. Rogan, for appellants; William C. Burns, of counsel. Russell, Murphy & Quigley, for appellee; Edward Contorer, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

text:
    Herbert E. Mitler, appellee, v. Fire Insurance Company of Chicago, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,800.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Fisher, Boyden, Bell, Boyd & Marshall, for appellant; David A. Watts, of counsel. Markheim & Allie, for appellee; A. R. Miller, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Julius A. Bisno et al., appellants, v. The Northern Trust Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,934.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Harold J. Finder, for appellants. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Nelle E. Powers, defendant in error, v. Joseph Garfield, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,944.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Maxfield Weisbrod, for plaintiff in error. Walter W. Williams, A. C. Lewis and Carter Harrison, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    E. A. Hinrichs and Company, appellee, v. Ernest Ricketts, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,991.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Murray Miller, for appellant. Zane, Morse, Zimmerman & Norman, for appellee; George E. Wiekens and Franklin D. Trueblood, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Gust Plakotos, appellee, v. David Germain et al., appellants, on appeal of John Orphan, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,006.
    O’Connor, J., dissenting.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Eugene P. Kealy and H. I. Parsons, for appellant; Fay Warren Johnson, of counsel. Wetten, Pegler & Dale, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Edward Glickauf, appellee, v. The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (of Hamilton, Ohio), appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,017.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Dent, Weiehelt & Hampton, for appellant. Henry A. Steinberg, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Overman Cushion Tire Company, Inc., appellant, v. General Tires, Inc., appellee.
    Gen. No. 37,076.

      Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Cassels, Potter & Bentley, for appellant; Ralph F. Potter, John D. DeFoe and E. Douglas Sehwantes, of counsel. Michael L. Oarmody, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, appellee, v. W. P. Cooney and T. S. Korshak, trading as Cooney & Korshak, and Maryland Casualty Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,142.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Rehearing denied January 29, 1934.
    O’Connell, McGlinn & O’Gallagher, for appellant. Hay & Brown and Erwin W. Roemer, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Lamson and Goodnow Manufacturing Company, appellee, v. L. P. Larson, Jr. Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,169.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Rehearing denied January 29, 1934.
    Edward T. Heineman and Henry K. Loeb, for appellant. Abrams & Abrams, for appellee; Abraham H. Mailer and Irving I. Abrams, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice MeSurely

text:
    William S. Kuhn, Jr., appellee, v. William Van Doren Wright et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,803.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Winston, Strawn & Shaw, for appellants; Edward W. Everett and Charles J. Calderin, of counsel. Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, for appellee; Frederic Burnham and Miles G. Seeley, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Gertrude Cummings, appellee, v. Emmet Whealan et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,985.

      Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Rehearing denied January 29, 1934.
    Thomas J. Courtney, State’s Attorney, for appellants; Hayden 1ST. Bell, Robert S. Cushman and Jacob Shamberg, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel. R. E. Blackwood, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    National Bond and Investment Company, defendant in error, v. Frank Tafel, Jr., plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 37,008.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    W. G. Anderson, for plaintiff in error. John W. Creekmur, Nolan H. Tepper and Milton Silberg, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered' the opinion of the court.


text:
    Rusnak Brothers, Inc., appellant, v. H. A. MacTavish and Mrs. H. A. MacTavish, appellees.
    Gen. No. 37,035.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Klayf & Sonnenschein, for appellant; Clyde C. Fisher, of counsel. No appearance for appellees.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Cornelius Marks, appellee, v. Jones Transfer Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,038.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Joseph H. Hinshaw, for appellant; Oswell G. Treadway, of counsel. A. L. Williams, for appellee; George H. Sugrue, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Virginia Thompson, a minor, by her next friend, James Thompson, appellee, v. Joseph Guaranguano and Jefferson Ice Company, defendants, on appeal of Jefferson Ice Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,047.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    'Rehearing denied January 27, 1934.
    Sanders, Childs, Bobb & Wescott, for appellant; W. L. Bourland and F. M. Hartman, of counsel. Finn & Miller, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Raymond F. Hayes, appellee, v. Taylor Washing Machine Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,056.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Oliver J. Chambers, for appellant. Daniel P. Nagle, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Joe Bacigalupo and Commercial Credit Company, appellees, v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,065.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Eckert & Peterson, for appellant; A. R. Peterson and Owen Rail, of counsel. Owen, O ’Brien, MeKeown & Allan and David Brandwein, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice O’Connor

text:
    Emma M. Chadwick, appellee, v. Federal Life Insurance Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,824.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Eckert & Peterson, for appellant; Tom Deeming, of counsel. John A. Bloomingston, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Lucille Saliba, defendant in error, v. William Weber, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,990.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Rehearing denied January 29, 1934.
    W. G. Anderson and S. T. Sutton, for plaintiff in error. No appearance for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Leon Segel and Leon Stitzenberg, appellees, v. Jacob Boos and Henry Boos, appellants.
    Gen. No. 37,002.

      Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Rehearing denied January 29, 1934.
    Friedman, Schimberg & Alster, for appellants; S. H. Alster and Bernard Witney, of counsel. Christian C. H. Zillman, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    U. Giolli, appellant, v. Serafino Silvestri and Filomena Alfano, appellees.
    Gen. No. 37,010.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Frank A. Ramsey and Edward Schatz, for appellant. No appearance for appellees.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Chicago Title and Trust Company, appellee, v. Clarendon Beach Hotel Company et al., defendants, on appeal of Fred E. Hummel, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,050.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Rehearing denied January 27, 1934.
    Louis Cohen and John W. Day, for appellant. Brown, Fox & Blumberg and A. Edmund Peterson, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Anne Neely, appellee, v. Yellow Cab Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,068.
    Opinion filed January 15, 1934.
    Rehearing denied January 27, 1934.
    Barrett, Barrett, Costello & Barrett and Samuels, Greenberg, Wolfe & Solomon, for appellant; John W. Costello, Edward Wolfe and Robert E. Barrett, of counsel. Nicholson, Snyder, Chadwell & Fagerburg, for appellee; John R. Nicholson and James I. Johnson, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Lewis K. Eastman, appellee, v. M. F. Walsh et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,811.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1934.
    Otto Kerner, Attorney General, for appellants; Earl B. Dickerson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel. Stuart B. Krohn, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    June Mooney, appellee, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,062.
    Opinion filed February 5, 1934.
    Hoyne, O’Connor & Rubinkam, for appellant. John A. Bloomingston, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frank J. Broucek, appellant, v. John H. Ehardt, appellee.
    Gen. No. 37,133.
    Opinion filed February 5, 1934.
    John A. Cooke and Morris J. Drezner, for appellant; John F. Lax, of counsel. Ben Aronin, for appellee; Ely R. Harelilc, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Cornelius Burke, appellant, v. Continental Life Insurance Company of St. Louis, Missouri, appellee.
    Gen. No. 37,151.
    Opinion filed February 5, 1934.
    Owens & Owens, for appellant. W. T. ApMadoe, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The Northern Trust Company, complainant, v. Margaret Phelan et al., defendants. Margaret Phelan, appellant, v. The Northern Trust Company et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 37,154.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1934.
    Rehearing denied February 19, 1934.
    Cutting, Moore & Sidley and William P. Sidley, for appellant; Edward D. MeDougal, Jr., James F. Oates, Jr., and George Ragland, Jr., of counsel. Trade & Kahane, for appellee Northern Trust Co. Wilson & Mellvaine, for appellee New York Hospital. Butz, Von Ammon & Marx, for appellees Bernice E. Sutherland and Caroline Van Lennep. Thomas J. Peden, for appellee Grover M. Hermann.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Richard L. Williams, defendant in error, v. Foreman-State Trust and Savings Bank, executor of the estate of Lucas R. Williams, deceased, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,965.
    Opinion filed February 5, 1934.
    Rehearing denied February 19, 1934.
    Nicholson, Snyder, Chadwell & Fagerburg, for plaintiff in error; John R. Nicholson and Russell Grecnaere, of counsel. Warren Pease, for defendant in error; J. Arthur Johnson, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Cline C. Brosius for the use of Charles W. Lamborn and Charles E. Heckler, appellee, v. John P. Stephany, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,041.
    Opinion filed February 5, 1934.
    Seymour N. Cohen, for appellant. Charles W. Lamborn, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice 0 ’Connor

text:
    The Gomberg Company, appellee, v. Julius M. Kahn, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,082.
    Opinion filed February 5, 1934.
    Bernstein, Zolla & Bernstein, for appellant; Ralph M. Schwartzberg, of counsel. Harry P. Bovshow, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice 0 ’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    F. A. Bosco, appellee, v. Maciej Noga and Stanley Noga, appellants.
    Gen. No. 37,091.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1934.
    Edward S. King and Carl Miller, for appellants; Edward S. King, of counsel. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John A. Tessner and Sophie Tessner, appellees, v. L. F. Zygmunt and Company, Inc., appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,100.
    Opinion filed February 5, 1934.
    Peden, Melaniphy, Ryan & Andreas, for appellant; John C. Melaniphy, of counsel. J. Arthur Kealy, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Emily Armour, appellee, v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 35,582.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Loesch, Scofield, Loesch & Burke, for appellant. Joseph D. Ryan and Louis P. Miller, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Oscar J. Bodelson, plaintiff in error, v. Jacob Adler, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 36,181.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Andrew R. Sherriff, for plaintiff in error. Silber, Isaacs, Silber & Woley, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mae F. Quinliven, appellee, v. George W. Sheehan et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,295.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Myer H. Gladstone, George F. Ort, John H. Johntry and John O. Fitzgerald, for appellants; Louis N. Blumenthal, of counsel. Irving G. Zazove, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Oscar Nelson, auditor of public accounts, v. Brainerd State Bank. In re Petition of Sheridan Brothers, Inc, et al., appellees, v. Irwin T. Gilruth, as receiver of Brainerd State Bank, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,369.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Kirkland, Fleming, Green & Martin, for appellant; Adrian L. Hoover and Dudley F. Jessopp, of counsel. Tuseher, Schulze, Conlon & Friedman, for appellees; Bernard A. Conlon and Arnold D. McMahon, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Davina Gray, appellant, v. Estate of Grace Nixon Price, deceased, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,378.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Chas. M. Peirce, for appellant. Ryan, Condon & Livingston, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Central Republic Bank and Trust Company, appellee, v. William K. Roberts et al., defendants, on appeal of Abraham Baer, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,433.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Shulman, Shulman & Abrams, for appellant; Meyer Abrams, of counsel. Sonnenseliein, Berkson, Lautmann, Levinson & Morse, for appellee; Isaac E. Ferguson, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Walter W. Leahy, appellee, v. Otto C. Kraemer, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,444.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    Hershenson & Hershenson, for appellant; Harry G. Hershenson and Arthur Abraham, of counsel. Albert S.-Barney, for appellee; Stuart B. Krohn, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Aetna Acceptance Company, defendant in error, v. R. H. Davis, trading as Davis Motor Sales, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,473.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    Goldman, Allshouse & Healy and Ramlose & Edwards, for plaintiff in error; Robert G. Dreffein and George A. Edwards, of counsel. William S. Kleinman, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Central Republic Bank and Trust Company, complainant-appellant, and Lott Hotels, Inc., defendant-appellant, v. Joseph F. Connery, receiver, appellee. Gen.
    Nos. 36,507-36,509.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    Poppenhusen, Johnston, Thompson & Cole and Harris F. Williams, for appellants; Edward R. Johnston, of counsel. Michael F. Ryan, for appellee; H. J. Rosenberg, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Joseph Kanski et al., plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 36,938.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Charles P. R. Macaulay, for plaintiffs in error. Otto Kerner, Attorney General, for defendant in error; J. J. Neiger, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Courtney, State’s Attorney, Edward E. Wilson and Grenville Beardsley, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Robert W. Riedy, appellee, v. Health-Mor Sanitation Systems, Inc., appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,526.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Wetten, Pegler & Dale, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois for the use of Abraham H. Patek, appellee, v. Henry Blech et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,536.

      Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Victor Ohrenstein and Herman Herson, for appellants. Coburn, Kearney & Coburn, for appellee; A. H. Patek and Archie Coburn, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The West Side Trust and Savings Bank, appellant, v. Abe Lopoten, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,555.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    John M. Lee and Joseph B. Alexander, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Herman Guth and Hattie Guth, appellees, v. Greenebaum Sons Bank and Trust Company and John D. Clancy, appellants.
    Gen. No. 36,570.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    John D. Clancy, pro se. Joseph A. Weber, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Gordon Leineke, a minor, by Sophia E. Leineke, his mother and next friend, appellee, v. Robert Salisbury, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,580.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    Cassels, Potter & Bentley, for appellant; Ralph F. Potter, Leslie H. Vogel and E. Douglas Sehwantes, of counsel. Royal W. Irwin, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mercantile Discount Corporation, appellant, v. John J. Conway, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,589.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Samuel Simon, for appellant; Aronin & Ehardt, of counsel. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Benjamin G. Kilpatrick, appellant, v. Chicago Lawn Safe and Securities Company et al., defendants. Irwin T. Gilruth, receiver of Chicago Lawn State Bank, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,601.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Richard S. Folsom and Jacob G. Grossberg, for appellant; James Hamilton Lewis, of counsel. Kirkland, Fleming, Green & Martin, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Milton S. Yondorf and Adolph Hammel, defendants in error, v. Michael J. Bartley and Cecelia Bartley, plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 36,608.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Herman S. Landfield, for plaintiffs in error. Sidney J. Wolf, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    W. Francis Burns, appellee, v. Ovson Egg Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,633.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    I. J. Berkson, for appellant; Ben A. Stewart, of counsel. Maxfield Weisbrod, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    B. Given, appellant, v. Sam Hartzen, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,643.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Irving L. Block and Norman B. Feinberg, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The West Side Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago, appellee, v. Anna Wershkoff et al., defendants, on appeal of Anna Wershkoff, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,214.

      Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    Edelson, Edelson & Wise, for appellant. Thomas J. Carroll and Earl V. Brown, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Margaret Hills, appellee, v. Chicago Motor Coach Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,191.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Rehearing denied February 26, 1934.
    William C. McHenry and Weber, Miller, Deffenbaugh & Donovan, for appellant; John E. Kehoe, of counsel. Church, Haft, Robertson, Crowe & Spence, for appellee; Egbert Robertson and Burt A. Crowe, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Helen Hammerstein, defendant in error, v. Walter W. Duft, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,495.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Ekern & Meyers, for plaintiff in error; Luther F. Binkley and Barnabas F. Sears, of counsel. Joseph D. Ryan and Justin C. Webster, for defendant in error; Joseph D. Ryan and Louis P. Miller, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Max Bernstein and J. A. Albert for the use of Louis Portman, defendants in error, v. Newart Company, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,614.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Henry H. Koven, for plaintiff in error. Isadore J. Goldman, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George L. Niederst, defendant in error, v. Thomas D. Crowley, trading as Thomas D. Crowley and Company, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,626.

      Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Andrew E. Sherriff, for plaintiff in error. Walter E. Beebe, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Clara A. Crozier, complainant, v. Freeman Coal Mining Company et al., defendants. James W. McElvain et al., cross complainants, appellees, v. Freeman Coal Mining Company et al., cross defendants, on appeal of Maclay Hoyne, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,662.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Winston, Strawn & Shaw, for appellant; John D. Black, of counsel. Kemper K. Knapp, for certain appellee. John J. Healy and John H. S. Lee, for certain other appellees.
   Mr. Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Elinore Fitzsimmons, appellee, v. Almore Dye House, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,682.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Cochrane & George, for appellant. William A. Hanson, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles E. Mallers, appellee, v. Yellow Cab Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,742.
    Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    . Samuels, Greenberg, Wolfe & Solomon, for appellant; Sidney M. Glick, of counsel. Joseph H. Hinshaw, for appellee^ Oswell G. Tread-way, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Clara A. Crozier, complainant, appellee, v. Freeman Coal Mining Company et al., defendants. James W. McElvain et al., cross complainants, appellees, v. Freeman Coal Mining Company et al., cross defendants, on appeal of Maclay Hoyne, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,958.

      Opinion filed February 7, 1934.
    Winston, Strawn & Shaw, for appellant; John D. Black, of counsel. Kemper K. Knapp, for certain appellee. John J. Healy and John H. S. Lee, for certain other appellees.
   Mr. Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Jerry Fixa et al. v. Paul H. Burglund et al. Benjamin Kohout, receiver, appellee, v. Joe Panek, appellant.
    Gen. No. 37,157.
    Opinion filed February 15, 1934.
    A. G. Dieus, for appellant. George A. Novak, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

text:
    Second District.
    Fred Griffel et al., appellees, v. Laurits M. Larsen et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 8,640.
    Opinion filed January 19, 1934.
    Gerald C. Snyder, for appellant Laurits M. Larsen. Paul MaeGuffin, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe-

text:
    Embert Erickson, administrator of the estate of Earl J. Erickson, deceased, appellant, v. Fred Ball, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,675.
    Opinion filed January 19, 1934.
    Rehearing denied April 2, 1934.
    Alexander J. Strom and Harold C. Sewell, for appellant. Wm. Biester, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe-

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Grace Hayden Walker, appellant, v. Marian Niles Hayden et al., defendants. First Galesburg National Bank and Trust Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,695.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1934.
    Bull, Lytton & Olson and Hardy, Hardy & Hardy, for appellant; Follett W. Bull and Norman A. Broholm, of counsel. Woolsey, Stiekney So Lucas, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

delivered the opinion of the court.