text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. John Niederhauser, Plaintiff in Error.
    Gen. No. 8,201.

      Heard in this court at the May term, 1930.
    Opinion filed September 24, 1930.
    John R. Snively, for plaintiff in error.
    William D. Knight, State’s Attorney, and A. B. Louison, Assistant State’s Attorney, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff in error was indicted, tried and convicted in the circuit court of Winnebago county on an indictment charging him, together with William Alonzo Bridges, George E. Wolfe and Boy Bittner, with conspiracy.

The indictment consisted of three counts. The first count charged that plaintiff in error and the others of said parties “unlawfully, wickedly and maliciously did conspire, combine, confederate and agree together, unlawfully, feloniously and violently, by force and intimidation, the money of the Seward State Bank, a corporation, from the person and immediate presence of the persons then and there having the custody and charge of said money, to take, steal, rob and carry away. ’ ’ The second count was substantially the same as the first, except that it also set forth in some detail' the means used and the things done in connection with said charge of conspiracy. The third count charged that said parties “did conspire, combine, confederate and agree together, unlawfully to feloniously steal, take and carry away the money of the Seward State Bank, a corporation, the same being lawful money of the United States of America, of great value, a more particular description of which said money, and the precise amount and value of which is to the grand jurors here unknown,” etc.

The verdict returned by the jury found plaintiff in error guilty and fixed “the punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary as provided by law.” Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were made by plaintiff in error, which motions were overruled. The court rendered judgment that plaintiff in error be confined in the penitentiary for a period of not less than one nor more than five years, and that he pay a fine of $1,000 and one-third of the costs of said proceeding. To reverse said judgment, this writ of error is prosecuted.

It is first contended that the court erred in overruling a motion made at the October, 1929, term of said court, to dismiss said proceedings as to plaintiff in error for want of prosecution.

The affidavit filed in support of said motion set forth that on May 31, 1929, plaintiff in error was arrested and committed to the county jail; that an indictment was returned against him and the others of said parties on June 20, 1929, and he was arraigned on June 21, 1929, being at the April term of said court; that on April 10, 1929, one of the regular days of said April term, it was ordered that a special term be called to convene on July 1, 1929; “that said term of said court had jurisdiction of said offense, and that said case was not brought to trial at said special July term of this court”; that plaintiff in error had been continuously confined to said county jail and had not been admitted to bail; “that said delay has not been caused.by any application on his part, nor has he done anything at any of said terms of court to delay the trial of his said case.”

Said motion was denied, and the ruling thereon is assigned as error. It is insisted that, under the provisions of section 18, Division XIII of the Criminal Code, Cahill’s St. ch. 38, ¶ 771, plaintiff in error should have been tried at said special term; that, not having been so tried, he was entitled to be discharged.

Sections 10 and 11, Cahill’s St. ch. 37, ¶¶ 91 and 92, provide as follows:

“If a special term is appointed at a regular term, an order to that effect shall be entered on the records of the court.

“If the appointment or call of such special term specifies the causes or particular ^matters that will be heard at such term, the business of .such term shall be confined to such causes or matters. If no specification is made, the term shall be deemed to be for the trans.action of all business that may be done at a regular term."

Section 13 of said chapter provides that when a special term is called, notice thereof shall be given by the clerk, which “notice shall state the time and place of holding the court, and, in general terms, what matters may be heard at such term. ’ ’

Section 16 of said chapter provides, among other things:

“Unless otherwise directed by the court or judge, or judges, a grand and petit jury shall be summoned to attend such special term, in like manner as if the same were a regular term.”

The order calling said special July term provided “that no jury shall be called for said term.” The notice given by the clerk as to said special term stated that “no jury will be called for said term.”

In People v. Pueschell, 337 Ill. 84, the court at page 94, in discussing the provisions of said statute as applied to a special term, says:

“The regular terms of the circuit court of Lake county began on the first Mondays of March, October and December. The plaintiff in error was committed on May 19, 1927, and hence there was no term of the court which had jurisdiction of the offense charged within four months of that date. The first term succeeding the commitment of the plaintiff in error was the October term. A special term was convened on the 2nd day of May, 1927, seventeen days before the plaintiff in error was committed, but the order by which the term was called expressly provided that no grand or petit jury should be summoned for it..... No petit jurors were drawn for the special term.”

A special term of court must be called at a regular term, at which time the court calling such term has the power to order that neither a grand nor a petit jury shall be called at such special term. When such an order is made, the business to be transacted at such special term is thereby limited to matters which do not require a trial by jury. The court would have no power at the special term to enlarge the scope of its business, which was fixed by the order calling it, entered at the prior regular term. We therefore hold that the court did not err in denying said motion.

It is next contended that the court erred in overruling the motion to quash said indictment and each count thereof. As to the first and second counts, it is insisted that the same are fatally defective for the reason that they fail to disclose the names of the persons referred to, and that it is not averred that the money mentioned therein was lawful money of the United States, or that it had a value.

Neither the first nor the second count of the indictment names the persons whom it is alleged plaintiff in error and the other of said defendants conspired to rob. Neither do they state that the names of such persons were to the grand jurors unknown. We therefore hold that each of said counts is fatally defective in this respect, and that the court erred in overruling the motion to quash said counts. Lowell v. People, 229 Ill. 227-236; Wharton’s Crim. Law, vol. 2, sec. 1396.

We do not think the other objection urged against said counts is well taken, as the statute provides that “robbery is the felonious and violent taking of money, goods or other valuable thing from the person of another, by force or intimidation.” It is not necessary to aver or prove the value of the money alleged to have been taken in a charge of robbery. Neither would this be necessary in a charge of conspiracy to commit robbery. “The word ‘money,’ in its generic sense, covers everything which by common consent is made to represent property, and passes currently from hand to hand.” People v. Clark, 256 Ill. 14-23; People v. Jordan, 303 Ill. 316-318. The court did not err in overruling the motion to quash as to the third count. In fact, no complaint is made in the argument of counsel as to said count.

It is next insisted that the court erred in permitting the witness Walter Julian to testify, over objection, to his conversation with one Nello Lazzerini, held out of the presence of plaintiff in error. Lazzerini was not named in the indictment as a co-conspirator, nor was it averred that there were any conspirators whose names were unknown. The court erred in overruling the objection to said testimony. Sullivan v. People, 108 Ill. App. 328-337.

In this connection it is also insisted that the court erred in admitting statements made by the defendant Bridges, after his arrest, out of the presence of plaintiff in error, over his objection.

Where the evidence discloses that a conspiracy exists, then all that is said and all that is done by any of the conspirators in furtherance of the common design, is admissible in evidence against all of said conspirators, even though they were not present at the time such things were done or said by their confederates. Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1-237. This rule, however, does not extend to making confessions by one co-conspirator admissible in evidence against another, over his objection, as one person cannot confess for another. People v. Anderson, 239 Ill. 168-180; People v. Buckminster, 274 Ill. 435-444; People v. Young, 316 Ill. 508-511; People v. Swift, 319 Ill. 359-364; People v. Sweetin, 325 Ill. 245-252; People v. Barragan, 337 Ill. 531-536. Neither are narrative statements made by a conspirator with reference to what has been done and said by himself or his co-conspirators, admissible against the others. Spies v. People, supra.

Counsel for defendant in error insists that the confession or statement by Bridges did not refer to plaintiff in error by name. While this is true, still, upon the objection being made, the court should have distinctly informed the jury that nothing in the alleged confession of Bridges should be taken as any evidence against any of the other defendants.

“The rule is that evidence of admissions or confessions of a codefendant is competent on a joint trial where such evidence is limited in its application by the ruling of the court and by instructions to the codefendant making the confession or admission.” People v. Swift, supra, 364, citing People v. Buckminster, supra; People v. Anderson, supra; Crosby v. People, 137 Ill. 325; Ackerson v. People, 124 Ill. 563.

The court erred in failing to so limit the effect of such admission, and we are not prepared to say that such error was not prejudicial.

It is next insisted that there was no competent proof that the Seward State Bank was a corporation, and that such proof was necessary to support the averments of the indictment.

Corporate existence may be proved either by its charter or certificate of incorporation, or by user. Neither character of proof was made in this case. George N. Chambers testified that he was the cashier of the Seward State Bank; that H. S. Smith was president, S. P. Halsey vice president, and Jeannette Smith was assistant cashier. He was asked this question: “Witness, I will ask you if on the 31st day of May of this year the Seward State Bank at Seward, Illinois, was doing business as a corporation under the laws of the State of Illinois?” An objection to this question was overruled and the witness answered: “It was.” He was then asked: “For how long a period of time had it been doing business as such corporation?” Over objection, he answered: “The bank was organized in the spring of 1921.” He was then asked: “And it has been doing business as a corporation since that time?” He answered, “It has.” He was also asked; “What is the corporate name of the Seward State Bank?” He answered: “Seward State Bank of Seward, Illinois.”

These statements of the witness were in the nature of conclusions, and the court erred in overruling the objection to said questions and in failing to strike the answers. There was no proof of corporate user. There was, therefore, no competent evidence of the incorporation of the Seward State Bank. People v. Fryer, 266 Ill. 216-220; People v. Krittenbrink, 269 Ill. 244-245; People v. Struble, 275 Ill. 162-165; People v. Pernalshy, 334 Ill. 38, 39. This being an essential part of the People’s case, the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.

It is also insisted that prejudicial error occurred in the opening argument of the assistant State’s Attorney. The argument complained of was unwarranted. The court, however, sustained an objection to the same. In view of the admission made by counsel for defendant in error that the argument was not proper, it will, in all probability, not occur on the retrial of the case. It is therefore unnecessary.for us to further discuss the same.

It is also insisted that the court erred in giving the eleventh, twelfth and sixteenth instructions given on behalf of the People, and in giving the instruction as to the form of the verdict.

As to the eleventh and twelfth instructions, it is contended that these instructions in effect singled out the witness Bittner and classified him as an accomplice. Bittner was one of the parties indicted. We are not prepared to say that the evidence did not warrant the jury in finding that he was a co-conspirator. The court did not err in giving said instructions.

It is contended that the effect of instruction No. 16 and the instruction as to the form of the verdict, was to allow the jury to find any one of said defendants guilty and the others not guilty, whereas, if there was a conspiracy, the jury must have found more than one defendant guilty. Conceding the correctness of plaintiff in error’s contention with reference to the law, his interests were not prejudiced by the giving of said instructions, but were rather benefited thereby, and he is in no position to complain as to the giving of said instructions.

It is next insisted that the court erred in refusing to give plaintiff in error’s refused instructions No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Plaintiff in error’s first refused instruction was with reference to the proof necessary to be made of the corporate existence of the Seward State Bank. No instruction was given covering this matter, and it was a subject on which the jury should have been instructed. However, the instruction tendered was not carefully guarded, as its effect was to submit to the jury mixed questions of law and fact, and for that reason we are not prepared to say that the court erred in refusing the same. As to the other refused instructions complained of, it is only necessary to say that, so far as said instructions stated correct principles of law, they were covered by the given instructions.

Lastly, it is insisted that the court erred in imposing a fine in addition to the penitentiary sentence, the jury not having.found that a fine should be imposed. Counsel for defendant in error practically concedes that the imposition of a fine was not warranted, but insists that the fine may be disregarded. As the cause will have to be reversed and remanded, it is not necessary for us to discuss this question. It is only necessary to say that the imposition of such fine was erroneous. Cahill’s St. ch. 38, ¶ 781; Shields v. People, 132 Ill. App. 109-139; People v. Schneider, Gen. No. 8,085 (opinion filed in this court July 7, 1930.)

For the reasons above set forth, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed and the cause will be remanded.

Reversed and remanded.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Jones

license: Public Domain

text:
    Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank, Appellant, v. Daniel P. McCambridge et al., Appellees.
    Gen. No. 8,225.

      Heard in this court at the May term, 1930.
    Opinion filed October 4, 1930.
    John A. Dougherty, for appellant; Byron Tyler and John F. Denissen, of counsel.
    Arley Hunts, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.

This appeal was taken to review an order of the circuit court of Grundy county, approving the report of a receiver and ordering distribution,

The Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank was the holder . and owner of a note for $24,000, executed and delivered to it by Daniel P. McCambridge and his wife, Emma McCambridge, and secured by a mortgage on certain farm lands in Grundy county. A bill was filed to foreclose said mortgage and all proper parties were made defendants. Among them was J. W. McKindley, trustee, under a trust deed executed by the said McCambridges, to secure the payment of four notes aggregating $3,000 with interest. The trust deed was subject to the lien of the above-mentioned mortgage. The notes secured by the trust deed were owned by the First Trust & Savings Bank of Morris, Illinois. The trustee and the holder of the notes secured by the trust deed filed an answer and cross-bill, praying for the foreclosure of the mortgage.

A decree for foreclosure was entered June 2, 1928. It found that the mortgage was a prior lien and the trust deed a junior lien upon the incumbered premises. It found the amounts due the respective parties and directed a sale to pay the indebtedness and costs. On the same day, but prior to the entry of the decree for foreclosure, Arthur W. Buck was appointed receiver to collect rents and profits of the premises during the pendency of the foreclosure proceedings. The appointment was made on motion of the First Trust & Savings Bank of Morris and the said trustee. The land was sold by the master on July 14, 1928, to the complainant, Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank, for the full amount of debt, interest, and costs due the complainant. The master’s report of sale was approved the same day. Therefore, unless the premises were redeemed within the time allowed by law, the complainant would be entitled to a deed on October 14, 1929.

The controversy in this case has grown out of an order of court, entered August 25, 1928, authorizing the receiver to lease the premises for a term beginning March 1, 1929, and expiring February 28, 1930, on the following terms: $5 per acre for pasture land payable October 1, 1929, one-half of the corn, and two-fifths of all small grain. The petition of the receiver for authority to so lease the land recited that the equity of redemption would expire on October 14, 1929, but alleged that all crops on the demised premises would be harvested before that time. Upon the entry of the order granting him such authority, he leased the farm to Vincent McCambridge upon the terms prescribed by the court, except the lease contains no provision requiring the tenant to remove the crops within said time.

On October 14,1929,15 months from the date of sale, no redemption had been made, no cash rent had been paid by the tenant, and no corn had been severed. The oats rent consisting of 706 bushels had been paid to the receiver and was stored in a bin on the premises.

A master’s deed to complainant was executed October 24, 1929, and recorded October 28, 1929. The record is not clear as to whether the deed was delivered on the date of its execution or not. The receiver filed a report on January 13,1930, covering the period from the date of his appointment to December 10,1929. He reported the collection of the oats rent and also the collection of the corn rent from 98 acres, and stated that the corn was fully matured before October 14, 1929, but only a portion thereof had been harvested before October 28, 1929, the date the master’s deed was recorded. The report further stated that the cash rent had not yet been paid and prayed that the court would approve the report, fix the receiver’s fees, order distribution, and generally direct him as to his duties.

Both banks filed objections to the receiver’s report and upon a hearing the court found that only a portion of the corn raised on the premises had been picked prior to October 28, 1929; that the remainder thereof was then standing in the field fully matured and no longer drawing sustenance from the soil; that none of the corn had been harvested on October 14, 1929, and only 30 bushels had been harvested by October 24, 1929; and that 240 bushels had been severed by October 28, 1929. The court approved the report of the receiver, ordered him to pay the taxes for 1929, charged, the Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank a pro rata amount of fire insurance premium, directing him to collect the cash rent from the tenant, and to sell the rent oats and corn and divide the net proceeds in the following manner: One-third thereof to the complainant, Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank, and two-thirds to the First Trust & Savings Bank of Morris. The appeal was taken by the complainant.

The 12 separate errors assigned on the record by the Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank are so interrelated that many of them can be considered together. The first assignment of error is that the court erred in finding it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties to the cause. It is urged in this connection that after the period of redemption has expired, a receiver has no right, title, or interest in the lands, or in the crops standing and unsevered. While such rule is well established, it cannot be,extended so as to deprive the court of jurisdiction of both subject matter and parties in order that the affairs of the receivership may be finally and equitably concluded. When a court of equity once acquires jurisdiction, it will retain it until the rights of the parties have been determined and adjusted. (Huston v. Weed, 242 Ill. App. 495.)

The chancellor erred in authorizing a lease of the premises beyond the expiration of the period of redemption. A purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale is usually entitled to possession when he receives his deed (Bennett v. Matson, 41 Ill. 332); and the general rule is that all unsevered crops on the premises at such time go to him. (Sugden v. Beasley, 9 Ill. App. 71; 42 C. J. 251, sec. 1896 et seq.) So if a receiver makes a lease to a tenant for a term extending beyond the redemption period, without the acquiescence of the purchaser, the purchaser will not be deprived of his right to possession of the land when he receives his deed. Here the purchaser did not openly acquiesce in or assent to the lease, but it failed to object to the order of the court granting authority to the receiver to make the lease. It was the complainant and the moving party in the suit. A party properly in court is chargeable with notice of all subsequent steps taken in the cause. (Phenix Banking Co. v. Owens, 250 Ill. App. 1; Niehoff v. People, 171 Ill. 243; Hamberg v. Morgan, 263 Ill. 616; West Frankfort Building & Loan Ass’n v. Muir, 237 Ill. App. 122; Nostwick v. Kranz, 240 Ill. App. 1; Bird-Sykes Co. v. McNamara, 252 Ill. App. 262.) Where a party to a suit becomes the purchaser at a judicial sale, he is still governed by the rules of procedure applicable to his case and is not to be regarded as a mere stranger to the proceedings. The complainant should have objected to the order of the circuit court authorizing the execution of a lease extending beyond the period of redemption, but it failed to do so and it would now be extremely inequitable to take away from the tenant his portion of the corn crop, simply because he did not sever it before the master’s deed was executed and delivered.

If complainant’s contention should be sustained it would get the entire crop with the exception of 30 bushels. On the other hand, if it had objected to the entry of the order, the chancellor undoubtedly would not have entered it, but would have authorized a leasing for a term to expire with the period of redemption. Such an order would have protected both the tenant and the receiver.

In view of all the circumstances, we think the chancellor was correct in not awarding all of the standing crop to the purchaser. For the same reasons, the chancellor was justified in directing the receiver to dispose of all crops in order that an equitable distribution of the proceeds of their sale might be made among the parties interested. The tenant was clearly entitled to his share of the crops. The receiver was equally entitled to the landlord’s share of the corn and small grain. He was entitled to pasture rent to October 14, 1930, and the court’s order concerning a division of such rent, when collected, is substantially correct. There was no error in the court’s ruling with reference to the payment of taxes. If complainant was unwilling to accept a transfer of the insurance policy upon a ratable division of the premium, the chancellor should have directed the receiver to cause a cancellation of the policy and a return of the unearned premium. The expense of carrying insurance during the period of redemption should be borne by the receiver and the court should not have imposed any of it upon the purchaser. However, in view of the fact that the purchaser was given the privilege of accepting the policy for his own use or of causing it to be canceled and receiving the return premium, the error in the court’s order is not sufficiently grave to work a reversal.

. The order directing the grain rents to be divided between the receiver and the complainant in the proportion of two-thirds and one-third appears equitable and just.

We regard the order of the chancellor as being substantially correct and it is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.


author: Mr. Justice Jett

text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. George Schneider, Jr. et al., Plaintiffs in Error.
    Gen. No. 8,085.

      Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed July 7, 1930.
    Rehearing denied October 15, 1930.
    Martin M. Ward and David R. Joslyn, Jr., for plaintiffs in error; Martin M. Ward, of counsel.
    Charles W. Hadley, Special State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Charles P. Barnes, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.

George Schneider, Jr., Henry Sohst and Michael Schneider, alias Mike Snyder, plaintiffs in error, and others were indicted by the grand jury of McHenry county charged with a conspiracy to violate the Illinois Prohibition Act, Cahill’s St. ch. 43, ¶ 1 et seq. A motion to quash the indictment was made, argued and overruled. Plaintiffs in error then made a motion that they be furnished with a bill of particulars. The motion for a bill of particulars was by the court denied.

A jury trial was had and the jury returned separate verdicts as to each of the plaintiffs in error, finding them guilty of a conspiracy in manner and form as charged in the indictment. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled, and the court sentenced plaintiff in error, George Schneider, Jr., to imprisonment at the Illinois State Farm at Vandalia for a period of 12 months and to pay a fine of $2,000; plaintiff in error Henry Sohst was sentenced to imprisonment at the Illinois State Farm at Vandalia for a period of 6 months and to pay a fine of $1,000; and plaintiff in error, Michael Schneider, alias Mike Snyder, was sentenced to imprisonment at the Illinois State Farm at Vandalia for a period of 6 months and adjudged to pay a fine of $1,000. Plaintiffs in error sued out this writ of error in order to have the record reviewed.

Plaintiffs in error rely upon and argue three reasons for a reversal which are as follows: (1) That the indictment should have been quashed; (2) that the State should have been ruled to furnish a bill of particulars; and (3) that the jury should have been instructéd that they could impose a jail sentence or a fine or both. We will consider the reasons argued for a reversal in the order as above named.

The indictment consists of two counts. In the first it is charged that the defendants therein named entered into a criminal conspiracy “to then and there do illegal acts injurious to the administration of public justice and injurious to the public police and public morals, good order and welfare.” It is further charged in said count that the illegal act which they conspired to commit was, “the offense of unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly manufacturing, selling, bartering, transporting, delivering, possessing and furnishing in McHenry County aforesaid, in violation of the Illinois Prohibition Act, for beverage purposes, large quantities of intoxicating liquor, to-wit, whiskey, wine, beer and distilled spirits, all of which should then and there be fit for use for beverage purposes and all of which should contain one-half of one per centum and more of alcohol by volume; being then and there, not any of the articles or preparations enumerated in paragraphs (á), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of Section Four (4) of said Illinois Prohibition Act, said manufacturing, selling, bartering, transporting, delivering, possessing and furnishing of intoxicating liquor, as aforesaid, being then and there unlawful and prohibited,- contrary to the form of the statute.”

The second count charges that the defendants conspired to commit an illegal act by maintaining and operating, a common nuisance, “in a certain house, building, structure and place in the said county of McHenry ... by manufacturing, selling, bartering, transporting, delivering, possessing and furnishing . . . large quantities of intoxicating liquor, "to-wit: whiskey, wine, beer and distilled spirits, all of which were then and there fit for use for beverage purposes, and all of which contained one-half of one per centum and more of alcohol by volume, contrary to the form of the statute.”

In order to determine the sufficiency of the indictment it is important to keep in mind the provisions of the statute defining the offense, together with the language of the indictment. That part of the conspiracy statute, Cahill’s St. ch. 38, ¶ 116; sec. 139 (Second sub-section 46), ch. 38 of the Criminal Code, Smith-Hurd statute 1929, page 981 (as amended in 1919), that is applicable in the instant case reads as follows: “If any two or more persons conspire or agree together . . . to do any illegal act injurious to the public trade, health, morals, police or administration of public justice ... or to commit any felony, they shall be deemed guilty of a conspiracy.”

In People v. Glassberg, 326 Ill. 379, the indictment charged a conspiracy to do an illegal act, injurious to the public trade, in the language of the statute above cited. On motion in arrest of judgment the indictment was sustained. At page 388 it was said: “This court has therefore often held that an indictment is sufficient which charges the offense in the language of the statute, and it is not necessary to allege the means by which the unlawful act is to be accomplished, as a conspiracy to do an unlawful act by any means is an indictable offense. (People v. Blumenberg, 271 Ill. 180; People v. Buckminster, 282 Ill. 177; Chicago, Wilmington & Vermilion Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421; Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 9.)” At page 389 the court further said: “Neither was it necessary that the object of the conspiracy constitute an offense against the criminal law for which an individual might be indicted and convicted. (Smith v. People, supra.) It is sufficient if the object of the conspiracy is charged to be any illegal act which by reason of the combination has a harmful effect upon society and the public. It is not necessary that the language of the indictment be grammatically exact if the offense with which the defendants are charged is stated plainly enough to be readily understood by the jury and to enable the defendants to properly prepare their defense. (People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23.) ”

In People v. Lloyd, supra, the indictment charged a conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States. A motion was made to quash the indictment. The motion was denied and in the opinion at pages 43 and 44 it was said: “Some of the language used in this indictment and in the statute on which it is based may not be grammatically exact, but such exactness is not required. (People v. Blumenberg, supra.) We have held that the statute clearly defines the offense, and where that is true, and the indictment charges the offense substantially in the language of the statute, the indictment is sufficient. To hold that the indictment does not state a public offense would be to say that the statute defines none. The language of the statute and of the indictment being substantially the same, the latter must be understood in the same sense as the former. (People v. Malley [Cal.], 194 Pac. 48.) The offense with which plaintiffs in error are charged is stated plainly enough to be readily understood by the jury, and plaintiffs in error were sufficiently informed to properly prepare their defense. This is all the law requires. (People v. Robertson, 284 Ill. 620; People v. Krause, 291 Ill. 64; State v. Hennessey [Wash.], 195 Pac. 211.) ”

In People v. Warfield, 261 Ill. 293, the indictment - charged a conspiracy in the language of the statute. The sufficiency of the indictment was raised in the court below. In discussing the indictment the court at page 300 used the following language: “In an indictment for conspiracy to commit a felony, it is only necessary to designate the felony intended to be committed by such description as will apprise the defendants of the exact charge upon which they will be tried, and it is not required that the felony be described with the same accuracy as would be required in an indictment for the felony itself. So, where the statute in making it a crime to conspire to commit a certain misdemeanor, designates the misdemeanor by its common or popular name, without describing all the elements necessary to constitute the misdemeanor, an indictment charging such conspiracy need not allege all the elements necessary to constitute the misdemeanor contemplated by the conspiracy. It is sufficient if it describes the misdemeanor by the same designation employed in the statute fixing the punishment for the conspiracy. A conspiracy to obtain money or property by false pretenses is a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor, as the term ‘to obtain money by false pretenses’ is the common and well understood designation of a misdemeanor for the commission of which a punishment is fixed by our statute. We perceive no reason why in an indictment for conspiracy to commit this misdemeanor the intent should be alleged any more than in an indictment for a conspiracy to commit a felony.”

In Gallagher v. People, 211 Ill. 158, the indictment charged conspiracy “to do a certain illegal act, injurious to the administration of public justice.” A motion was made to quash the indictment which the court overruled. In sustaining the indictment the court at page 166 said : “Under many decisions of this court, it has been held that an indictment shall be deemed sufficient which states the offense in the terms and language of the statute creating it, provided such statute sufficiently defines the nature of the offense to be charged, and it is only when the statute itself does not define the nature of the offense sufficiently to notify the defendants of the crime with which they are charged, that the allegation in the words of the statute will , be held insufficient. Taking this indictment and its various counts as a whole, we are of the opinion that the defendants were sufficiently informed as to the nature of the offense with which they were charged and the court committed no error in overruling the motion to quash.”

In drawing the indictment, the pleader, in describing the offense the plaintiffs in error were charged with conspiring to commit, went more into detail than the rule requires. The charge is as full and complete as would be required in an indictment for a violation of the prohibition law. It is unnecessary to quote from or to cite further authorities in support of the indictment. The indictment not only designates the offense the plaintiffs in error are charged to have conspired to commit but it goes further and describes all the elements necessary to constitute the particular offense. The court, therefore, did not err in denying the motion to quash the indictment and each count thereof.

It is next urged by the plaintiffs in error that the State should have been ruled to furnish them with a bill of particulars. The general rule is that when an indictment sufficiently informs the defendant of the offense with which he is charged, there is no need of a bill of particulars.

In People v. Poindexter, 243 Ill. 68, the indictment charged a conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses and by means of the confidence game. A motion for a bill of particulars was granted and the people filed a bill of particulars in which it was stated, “that the People would offer evidence to prove that the defendants conspired together to obtain $3,000 in money by means of the confidence game, the particulars of which were more fully set out in the indictment. ’ ’ The trial court denied the motion to furnish a further or additional bill of particulars. In discussing the action of the court in denying the motion for a further bill of particulars at page 70 it was said: “If the plaintiffs in error were entitled to a bill of particulars this one was of no advantage to them for it furnished no information not contained in the indictment. But a defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars as a matter of right. The requiring of it rests in the sound discretion of the court. It is only where the indictment does not sufficiently advise the defendant what it is with which he is charged or where it appears that he cannot properly prepare his evidence without a bill of particulars, that the court will require one to be furnished. (Gallagher v. People, 211 Ill. 158; DuBois v. People, 200 Ill. 157; Kelly v. People, 192 Ill. 119.)”

In People v. Graves, 331 Ill. 268, it was urged that reversible error was committed by the trial court in overruling the motion for a bill of particulars, but the court in sustaining the ruling of the trial court in refusing to require the prosecution to file a bill of particulars, at pages 273 and 274 said: “Complaint is made that the trial court erred in refusing to require the prosecution to furnish a bill of particulars. When the charge against an accused person is so general or indefinite that he cannot properly prepare his defense a bill of particulars should be ordered. When, however, the indictment sufficiently informs the defendant of the offense charged against him there is no need for such a bill. (People v. Poindexter, 243 Ill. 68.) Whether the People shall be required to furnish a bill of particulars in a given case rests in the discretion of the trial court, and it is only in cases where it is clear that there has been an abuse of this discretion that the denial of a motion for such a bill is error. (People v. Birger, 329 Ill. 352; People v. Munday, 280 Ill. 32; People v. Poindexter, supra; People v. Smith, 239 Ill. 91; DuBois v. People, 200 Ill. 157.) The indictment in the instant case sufficiently apprised plaintiff in error of the charge made against him, and hence there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a bill of particulars.”

It only requires a reading of the indictment to become convinced that the plaintiffs in error were particularly informed of the nature and character of the charge that had been preferred against them. The indictment goes into detail in making the charge against the plaintiffs in error. They were informed in plain language of the nature and character of the offense. The indictment not only charges a conspiracy to do illegal acts injurious to the administration of public justice, public police, public morals, good order and welfare, but it sets out the offense plaintiffs in error conspired to commit in apt language, so definite and certain that no bill of particulars was necessary to inform them of the charge made against them. The court did not abuse its discretion nor commit error in denying the motion for a bill of particulars.

It is also urged by the plaintiffs in error that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the form of the verdict. It will be observed that the only complaint made in this respect is that the trial court did not instruct the jury that they — the jury — could fix the punishment at imprisonment in the county jail, or by fine or both in case the jury reached a verdict of guilty and did not impose a penitentiary sentence. The penalty for conspiracy as provided by the section of the statute on which this prosecution is based, Cahill’s St. ch. 38, ¶ 116, is as follows: “And every such offender, whether as individuals or as the officers of any society or organization, and every person convicted of conspiracy at common law, shall be fined not exceeding $2,000 or shall be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding one year, or shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term of not less than one year and not exceeding five years, or may be so fined and so imprisoned in the county jail or penitentiary.”

The jury were instructed to return a separate verdict as to each defendant. Instructions with forms of verdicts were submitted by the court for each defendant. The jury were instructed that in the event they found the defendants guilty and imposed a penitentiary sentence they could, if they saw fit, also impose a fine not exceeding the sum of $2,000, and verdicts in form to correspond to those instructions were submitted, thus giving to the jury forms of verdict for penitentiary sentences with or without a fine. No complaint is made by the plaintiffs in error as to the instructions and form of the verdict given relative to penitentiary sentences. The forms in this respect were in accord with the statute. The jury were also told that if they found a verdict of guilty and did not impose a penitentiary sentence then, in that event, they should return as their verdicts finding each defendant guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment. The verdicts returned by the jury found each of the plaintiffs in error guilty of conspiracy in manner and form as charged "in the indictment. Cahill’s St. ch. 38, ¶ 781; section 756 of ch. 38, Smith-Hurd St. 1929, page 1071 provides that: ‘‘When the punishment may be either by imprisonment in the ‘ penitentiary or by confinement in the county jail, with or without fine, if the jury will not inflict the punish- • ment of imprisonment in the penitentiary, they shall simply find the accused guilty, and the court shall fix the time of confinement in the jail or fine, or both, as the case may require.” This statute was in force at the time the plaintiffs in error were charged with the commission of the conspiracy in question and at the time of the trial.

It has been seen that when a person is convicted of conspiracy the punishment shall be a fine not exceeding $2,000, or be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding one year, or shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year and not exceeding five years, or may be so fined and imprisoned in the county jail or penitentiary. Under this statute, plaintiffs in error, if found guilty by the jury, and a penitentiary sentence was to be imposed, the jury could also impose a fine not exceeding $2,000. It was for the jury to say if they agreed upon a penitentiary sentence what the amount of fine should be if they saw fit to also impose a fine. Section 756 quoted above concludes with the following: “If the jury will not inflict the punishment of imprisonment in the penitentiary, they shall simply find the accused guilty, and the court shall fix the time of confinement in the jail, or fine, or both, as the case may require. ” In the instant case the jury did not see fit to return a verdict against the plaintiffs in error fixing the punishment in the penitentiary or by fixing the punishment in the penitentiary and imposing a fine not exceeding the amount of $2,000, but returned a general verdict finding the plaintiffs in error and each of them guilty of conspiracy in manner and form as charged in the indictment. After the jury returned the verdict the duty of the court was made plain by the statute".

It is insisted by plaintiffs in error that the opinion of this court in People v. Paddock, 228 Ill. App. 403, supports their contention. The form of the verdict in the Paddock case was not based upon the statute that is the basis for the indictment in this proceeding. In the instruction in the Paddock case as to the form of the verdict, the court told the jury that if they found the plaintiff in error guilty they should fix his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five years, or by a fine not exceeding $2,000, or by both fine and imprisonment. In the decision in that ease we said, “The form of the verdict, as given in this case, was not in accordance with the 1919 amendment of the statute with reference to conspiracy, and was not in accord with the provisions of paragraph 781 of the Criminal Code. It made no reference to imprisonment in the county jail, and the jury were not informed that the punishment could be by imprisonment in the county jail, but they were told that the punishment must be either imprisonment in the penitentiary, or by fine or by both. For this reason the instruction as given was erroneous.” Paragraph 781 of the Criminal Code referred to in the Paddock case is the same as paragraph 756 heretofore set out in this opinion. In the instant case forms of verdict were provided for the jury in the event they saw fit to fix the punishment in the penitentiary, or by fine and in the penitentiary, and if they failed to so fix the punishment they were at liberty to return a general verdict as they did, the punishment in that event to be by fine or imprisonment in the county jail or both fine and imprisonment. There is nothing in the opinion in the Paddock case which sustains the contention of the plaintiffs in error or is in any way in conflict with what we have said in this opinion. We are of the opinion that no error was committed by the trial court . in the submission of the instructions to the jury as to the form of the verdict the jury might return.'

No questions were argued other than the ones we have considered. While a number of reasons were assigned for a reversal of the judgment only the three we have discussed were urged by the plaintiffs in error in this court. All assignments of error other than those argued were waived.

We conclude, therefore, that the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry county should be affirmed which is accordingly done.

Judgment affirmed.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

text:
    Otis Cipperly, Appellee, v. Frank Carmack, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,140.

      Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed July 19, 1930.
    Rehearing denied October 15, 1930.
    • William D. Knight and William L. Pierce, for appellant.
    Hall & Dusher, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was brought in the circuit court of Winnebago county, by Otis Oipperly, appellee, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, against Frank Carmack, appellant, hereinafter called defendant, to recover for injuries sustained in a collision in which the car driven by the defendant collided with the car of the plaintiff.

A jury trial was had resulting in a finding in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000.

Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were filed, argued and denied.

Judgment was rendered on a verdict of the jury in favor of plaintiff, and against the defendant, in said sum of. $5,000.

The defendant prosecutes this appeal in order to have the record reviewed.

The declaration consists of two counts. The first count charges general negligence; in the second, it. is charged that, the defendant wilfully and wantonly ran, drove, managed, operated, and controlled his automobile so that on account thereof, the automobile of the defendant ran into and struck the automobile of the plaintiff and thereby severely and permanently injured the plaintiff, from which he suffered great pain and will continue to do so in the future.

To the declaration the defendant pleaded the general issue and a special plea averring that the plaintiff at the time of the injury was in the employ of Tolmie Brothers, copartners, engaged in the business of erecting, altering, and demolishing structures, and in thé construction and excavation work, and engaged in a hazardous business in which statutory and municipal ordinances and regulations were imposed for regulating, guarding, using and placing machinery and appliances, for protection for the safeguarding of its employees; that the plaintiff was injured while engaged in the duties of his employment; that Tolmie Brothers had elected to be bound by the provisions of the Workman’s Compensation Act, Cahill’s St. ch 48, ¶ 201 et seq., then in force, and that the plaintiff had received and accepted from his employer, payment on account of compensation for such alleged injuries; and that the defendant on the date of said alleged injury, and on the date of the filing of the plea, was engaged in the business of conducting a garage in the City of Rockford, an enterprise in which sharp-edged cutting tools and grinders were used and an enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinances and regulations are imposed for the regulation, guarding, use and placing of machinery and safeguarding of employees or the public therein, and averring that the plaintiff had no right to bring this action, and that the right of action belonged to his employer at the time under the rules of subrogation.

To the special plea the plaintiff filed a demurrer, which was by the court sustained, and the defendant asked leave to file an amended special plea. The amended special plea filed by the defendant in addition to what was set up in the first special plea to which a demurrer was sustained, averred that the plaintiff was injured while driving a truck which was the property of Tolmie Brothers, his employer, from the office of the building inspector in the city hall in the City of Rockford, at which office he had been for his employer to consult with the building inspector, with reference to a building permit, and was on his way back to the office of Tolmie Brothers, his employer, when the accident in question occurred and that the injury complained of arose out of, and in the course of, his employment; that said Tolmie Brothers had elected to be bound by the provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and that the plaintiff had received and accepted said compensation for said alleged injury from the Tolmie Brothers, and that Tolmie Brothers only could bring the action; that the defendant on the date of the alleged injury was, and at the time of the filing of the plea, engaged in the business of an enterprise in which he conducted a garage at 426 South Church Street, Rockford, Illinois, and storage yard on Charles Street Road on the outskirts of the City of Rockford, and that he is in the business of repairing automobiles and selling used automobiles, and automobile parts; that he employs four men besides himself in said business; that in his garage in the City of Rockford, there is used and operated, an emery operated by electricity and that in his business an electric drill and chain hoist are used; that there is a State law regulating guarding use of the emery wheel and drill, and that there is a certain ordinance regulating the location of garages in the City of Rockford and also an ordinance regulating the storage and use of gasoline in said city; and that the public comes to the garage and storage yard, that the defendant was driving from his garage on South Church Street, Rockford, Illinois, to his storage yard on Charles Street Road for extra parts for a repair job on which he was working and for extra parts for a purchaser, when the accident in question took place; that it arose out of, and in the course of, his employment and for the reason that plaintiff had accepted compensation from Tolmie Brothers, his employer, he has no right to bring said action, that it belongs to the said Tolmie Brothers, his employer, at the time of the injury, and Tolmie Brothers only, could bring the action.

To this amended special plea the plaintiff filed a general and special demurrer which was sustained.

It will be observed that the plea intermingles the business conducted outside the City of Rockford on a country place with some business averred to be conducted in the City of Rockford; there is nothing shown in the plea that the defendant stored gasoline such as was mentioned in any ordinance. The plea also on its face shows that the defendant was not in such a situation as to be brought within the Workmen’s Compensation Act, for it shows conclusively that he was traveling away from his garage and toward his country place at the time the accident happened, and was not in any way engaged in work that would bring him within the act at the time of the injury. The plea also is based upon the ground that the plaintiff had no right to bring this action, for the reason that he had accepted compensation from his employer. The plea also states that the action belongs to Tolmie Brothers. The plea shows that the defendant was conducting his business as an individual and not as a corporation; that he was the employer and not an employee.

We do not understand the rule to be that an employer under such circumstances as set up in the amended special plea could escape liability for his own negligent act, because the business which he was operating was such as would bring him in connection with his employees under the Compensation Act. The protection of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is not available to a negligent third party merely because he happens to be an employer of labor and as to his employees is within the statute. The negligent acts of an employer in the careless operation of an automobile which he was driving, going to and from his place of business, causing injury to an employee of another, are not within the protection of the Compensation Act. Podgorski v. Kerwin, 144 Minn. 313, 175 N. W. 694; Smale v. Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 160 Wis. 331, 151 N. W. 803.

It will further be observed that it is averred in the amended special plea that the plaintiff had accepted compensation from Tolmie Brothers, his employers, and that he had no right to bring this action, that it belonged to the said Tolmie Brothers.

An employee who has been injured by the negligent act of a third person can bring an action to recover therefor, notwithstanding he may have been paid compensation under the Compensation Act. Gross v. Cuneo Press, Inc., 251 Ill. App. 560-563; Cox v. United States Coal & Coke Co., L. R. A. 1918 B, 1118.

The Compensation Act does not purport to protect an employer merely because he is such from acts of personal.negligence which he commits to other persons although the other person happens to be employed by a third person who is under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The fact that the business of the employer comes within the act does not change his legal relations towards one injured by his personal negligence entirely away from his place of business.

In order to be within the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it is necessary that the accident arise “out of” and “in the course of” the employment. The accident that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff in this proceeding did not arise “in the course of” any employment in which the defendant was engaged nor “in the course of” any employment in which the plaintiff was engaged in so far as the defendant was concerned.

We are of the opinion that the court did not commit any error in sustaining the demurrer to the amended special plea. The evidence shows that the defendant was traveling along a busy street in the City of Rockford in his automobile; that he not only ran into the car of plaintiff, but that he struck two other automobiles which were parked on the other side of the street; that the defendant left his own side of the street and went to the opposite side and struck plaintiff’s automobile and two other automobiles and then veered across the street to the right side thereof” over the curb and up on the sidewalk before he brought his car to a stop. The appellant was traveling in an easterly direction, and he should have been on the southerly side of the street; he was going so fast that to avoid another accident he turned into the north side of the street and the injury to the plaintiff was occasioned.

We have examined the evidence as abstracted. From such an examination we are of the opinion that in so far as the finding of the jury on the question of negligence of the defendant and the due care of the plaintiff, just prior to, and at the time of, the collision that occasioned the injury to the plaintiff, the findings of the jury are sustained by the evidence.

It is urged by the defendant that the court erred in not withdrawing the wilful count of the declaration from the consideration of the jury as the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a finding under said count. The record shows that the instructions given to the jury bearing upon the law of the case, all had to do with the question of the negligence of the defendant and due care on the part of the plaintiff. The question with reference to the wilful and wanton conduct was not submitted to the jury by the instructions. The rule is that the trial court should not permit the pleadings in civil actions to be taken by the jury when it retires to consider of its verdict and a reviewing court must assume that the court did its duty in this respect and did not allow the pleadings to be taken by the jury when it was sent out to consider of its verdict. Lerette v. Director General, 306 Ill. 348-355; Bernier v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 296 Ill. 464-472. Since the question involved with reference to wilful and wanton conduct was not submitted to the jury by the instructions and as we are to presume that they did not have the pleadings in the case, we think there was no error committed in this respect.

It is next insisted by the defendant that there Was a variance between the allegations of the declaration and the proof. The record discloses that at the time the evidence was heard it was not objected to on the ground of variance; that there was no motion to strike the evidence on account of a variance. It was raised in this court for the first time.

The defendant, therefore, is not in a position to raise the question of variance in this court.

The record shows that two juries have passed upon the facts in this case with a finding in each instance in favor of the plaintiff. On the first trial, the jury assessed the plaintiff damages at $50. The plaintiff thereupon moved for a new trial which was granted. On the second hearing, the damages were fixed at $5,000, on which verdict judgment was rendered by the trial court who saw and heard the witnesses. After a careful investigation of the record in this cause, we are of the opinion that no reversible error was committed- in the trial thereof and the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago county will be affirmed, whicb is- accordingly done.

Judgment affirmed.


text:
    Stana Absher and Emil Absher, Appellees, v. Carnation Milk Products Company, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,214.
    Heard in this court at the May term, 1930.
    Opinion filed August 27, 1930.
    Rehearing denied October 15, 1930.
    Mammenga & Kerr, for appellant.
    H. A. Brooks and Edward A. Jones, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.

The record shows that on September 6, 1928, a man by the name of Thomas Harvey obtained a judgment against Stana Absher and Emil Absher, appellees, for $139.43, before a police magistrate of Ogle county. On the same day an affidavit was filed and an execution was immediately issued and returned by the officer to whom it was delivered “No property found.”

The record discloses that on the same day on which the judgment was obtained before the police magistrate for said sum of- $139.43, and on which execution was issued, Harvey filed an affidavit with the said police magistrate by virtue of which a garnishment summons was issued against Carnation Milk Products Company, appellant.

It is further shown-that on September 11,1928, judgment was rendered against the appellant as garnishee for $129.64. The record further discloses that on September 13, 1928, Stana Absher and Emil Absher, appellees, prayed for and perfected an appeal from the judgment rendered against them by the police magistrate on the 6th day of September, 1928, to the circuit court of Ogle county, and that on a trial in the circuit court on the 2nd day of May, 1929, judgment was rendered in favor of Stana Absher and Emil Absher, appellees, against the said Thomas Harvey in the sum of $61.58. It is further stipulated that on October 12, 1928, while the appeal prosecuted by appellees was pending in the circuit court of Ogle county, the appellant paid the police magistrate on the judgment secured in the garnishment proceeding $129.64. Appellees brought suit against the Carnation Milk Products Company, appellant, for $129.64,' the amount they claimed appellant owed to them, before one John B. Swift, a police magistrate of the City of Polo, Illinois, from whom a change of venue was taken to One Robert M. Brand, a justice of the peace, before whom a judgment was obtained against the appellant for said sum of $129.64. Appellant appealed to the circuit court of Ogle county where, on a hearing, judgment was rendered against appellant for $129.64.' To reverse said judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

The question presented on this record is as to whether appellant as garnishee by paying said judgment in garnishment while an appeal was pending in the circuit court on the suit brought by Harvey against Stana Absher and Emil Absher, appellees, did so at its peril.

Cahill’s St. ch. 79, ¶ 116; section 116, chapter 79, Smith-Hurd’s Statute, in relation to appeals from a justice of the peace, among other things provides:— “When the bond is filed with the justice . . . he shall suspend all proceedings in the case and if execution shall have been issued he shall recall the same.”

Cahill’s St. ch. 79, ¶ 120; section 120 of said chapter 79, Smith-Hurd’s Statute, reads as follows: — “No execution shall be issued by a justice of the peace in any civil action until after the expiration of twenty days from the date of the judgment on which such execution is to be issued, unless the party applying for the same, his agent or attorney, shall make oath that he believes that the debt will be lost unless execution be issued forthwith. If such oath be made, then the execution shall be issued immediately and levied. But no sale of any property under such execution shall take place within twenty days from the date of the judgment, nor shall the issuing of such execution deprive either party of the right to appeal.”

The appeal was perfected by appellees to the circuit court within 20 days from the date of the judgment. In view of the provisions of the statute allowing 20 days in which to appeal, the appellant in paying said judgment rendered against it as garnishee without making an investigation as to whether or not an appeal had been prosecuted, did so at its risk.

In appealing, appellees complied with a positive provision of the statute and when they did so they were under no obligations to notify appellant that they had perfected an appeal.

The case of Harvey against appellees had been removed to the circuit court by appeal for almost a month before appellant paid the judgment rendered against it in the garnishment proceeding.

No steps had been taken to enforce the judgment in garnishment, but it was voluntarily paid by appellant. We conclude, therefore, that the judgment in the circuit court should be affirmed which is accordingly done.

Judgment affirmed.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

text:
    First District.
    Illinois Standard Manufacturing Company, appellee, v. Ernest Reich and Henry Blech, appellants.
    Gen. No. 34,476.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the June term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 18, 1930.
    Louis Greenberg and Herman Herson, for appellants. Frank H. T. Potter and Haight, Adcock & Banning, for appellee; Charles E. Lewis, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Wilson

text:
    Chicago Title & Trust Company, complainant, v. Tower Building Corporation et al., defendants. Holman D. Pettibone, Receiver, appellee, v. James H. Hooper, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,352.
    Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the June term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 25, 1930.
    A. G. Dicus, for appellant. Edward Blackman, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Edward T. Blair, appellant, v. City of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 33,873.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.

      Shannon & Morrill, for appellant. Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, Gotthard A. Dahlberg, Wm. T. Crilly and Joseph J. Thompson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Matehett

text:
    William G. McCormick, appellant, v. City of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 33,874.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Shannon & Morrill, for appellant. Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, Gotthard A. Dahlberg, Wm. T. Crilly and Joseph J. Thompson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    University of Chicago, appellant, v. City of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 33,875.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the .first district at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Shannon & Morrill, for appellant. Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, Gotthard A. Dahlberg, Wm. T. Crilly and Joseph J. Thompson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles F. Grey et al., appellants, v. City of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 33,876.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Shannon & Morrill, for appellants. Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, Gotthard A. Dahlberg, Wm, T. Crilly and Joseph J. Thompson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    C. F. Hurburgh, defendant in error, v. Ernest J. Batten, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 34,049.

      Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Ernest J. Batten, pro se; Frederick Mains, of counsel. No appearance for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Anita McCormick Blaine, appellant, v. City of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 34,079.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    George A. Mason, for appellant; Angus Roy Shannon and Henry E. Mason, of counsel. Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, Gotthard A. Dahlberg, Wm. T. Crilly and Joseph J. Thompson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Foreman Trust & Savings Bank, appellant, v. City of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 34,080.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    George A. Mason, for appellant; Angus Roy Shannon and Henry E. Mason, of counsel. Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, Gotthard A. Dahlberg, Wm. T. Crilly and Joseph J. Thompson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Le Roy D. Kellogg, appellant, v. City of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 34,081.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    George A. Mason, for appellant; Angus Roy Shannon and Henry E. Mason, of counsel. Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, Gotthard A. Dahlberg, Wm. T. Crilly and Joseph J. Thompson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    August Von Glahn and Laura Von Glahn, his wife, appellants, v. City of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 34,082.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    George A. Mason, for appellants; Angus Roy Shannon and Henry E. Mason, of counsel. Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, Gotthard A. Dahlberg, Wm. T. Crilly and Joseph J. Thompson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John K. Law, appellee, v. The Brunswick-Balke-Collender Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,103.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied and opinion slightly modified July 11, 1930.
    Ryan, Condon & Livingston, for appellant. Cavender, Milchrist & Kaiser, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Lucien G. Yoe and Clarence S. Wadsworth, appellants, v. City of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 34,187.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    George A. Mason, for appellants; Angus Roy Shannon and Henry E. Mason, of counsel. Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, Gotthard A. Dahlberg, Wm. T. Crilly and Joseph J. Thompson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Hans Lehman, plaintiff in error, v. Grace Helen Lehman, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 34,212.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Bernard J. Juron, for plaintiff in error. Wm. Sherman Stahl and Ernest Stout, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Outdoor Lighting Service, Inc., appellee, v. Harold Shlensky, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,236.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    William Levine, for appellant. Rathje, Wesemann, Hinckley & Barnard, for appellee; Francis E. Hinckley, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George Smith, appellee, v. Frank Anderson, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,261.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Ashcraft & Ashcraft, for appellant; Russell F. Locke, of counsel. Marcus A. Colberg, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Coulter Lumber Company, appellee, v. Hyman Feinberg, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,298.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    James R. Quinn, for appellant. A. L. Schapiro, for appellee; W. G. Lesemann, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George J. Katsigiannis, appellee, v. Central Trust Company of Illinois, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,309.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11, 1930.
    Fisher, Boyden, Bell, Boyd & Marshall, for appellant; Hayden N. Bell, Louis H. German and William G. Blood, of counsel. Charles Waldman, for appellee; Clyde C. Fisher, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice McSurely

text:
    Edna Witherstine, administratrix of the estate of Howard H. Witherstine, deceased, appellant, v. Carl Liedholm et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 34,085.

      Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Ernest A. Eklund and Frederick J. Bertram, for appellant. Helmer, Moulton, Whitman & Holton, for appellees; Charles R. Holton and Herbert R. Tews, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Jack T. Loeffel, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 34,100.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Julius J. Goldfine, for plaintiff in error. John A. Swanson, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; James L. Henry and Herman S. Weinberg, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Henke-Schmitz, Inc., appellee, v. John Schmitz and Marie Schmitz, appellants.
    Gen. No. 34,105.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11, 1930.
    Louis W. Reinecker, Jr., for certain appellant. Edward Hershenson, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Margaret Johnson, appellee, v. The National Life & Accident Insurance Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,127.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11, 1930.
    Roderick H. O’Connor, for appellant. Joseph R. Gibson, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Fritz Kral, appellant, v. Harry Vasels, appellee.
    Gen. No. 34,136.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Harry Z. and Bernard Perel, for appellant. Irving G. Zazove, for appellee; John B. King, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Jeannette Eckstein, a minor, by Henry P. Eckstein, her next friend, appellee, v. Checker Taxi Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,167.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11, 1930.
    Lester L. Bauer, for appellant; Ernest D. MacDougall, of counsel. Isadore Wolf, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Y. Baptiste (otherwise known as M. M. Muguerditchian), appellee, v. Vartan V. Pedian and Abram Bedrosian, trading as Vartan V. Pedian Company, appellants.
    Gen. No. 34,230.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Townley, Wild, Campbell & Clark, for appellants; Charles V. Clark and Frederick D. Carroll, of counsel. Balford Quintín Shields, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John C. Armstrong and H. J. Conrad, appellees, v. William Brietzke, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,239.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11, 1930.
    Litsinger, Healy & Reid, for appellant; James A. O ’Callaghan, of counsel. Darrow, Smith, Cronson & Smith, for appellees; William W. Smith, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Harry E. Rabin, appellee, v. The Midland Tailors, Inc., appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,273.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Hyman A. Pierce, for appellant. Wetten, Pegler & Dale, for appellee; Milton Gerwin, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice O’Connor

text:
    Louise Wilson, appellant, v. Frank E. Wilson, appellee.
    Gen. No. 34,118.

      Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Harry A. Sewell, for appellant. Joseph H. Wright, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Jennie B. Benson, appellee, v. Harry Salvat et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 34,130.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    John A. Bloomingston, for appellants. David K. Tone, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Michigan Central Railroad Company, defendant in error, v. Louis Feinstein, trading as L. Feinstein & Company, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 34,199.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11, 1930.
    O’Connell, McGlinn & O’Gallagher, for plaintiff in error; Kieran P. O’Gallagher and Leo N. McGlinn, of counsel. Winston, Strawn & Shaw, for defendant in error; Bryce L. Hamilton, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Hyman Friedstein, appellee, v. Henry H. Hart, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,258.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Leon J. Ell, for appellant; Irwin S. Rubelle and Charles Liebman, of counsel. Hume & Kennedy, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Atlas Copper & Brass Manufacturing Company, appellee, v. Trans-Continental Freight Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,276.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Pruitt & Grealis, for appellant. Albert H. Fry, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Samuel H. Anschell, appellant, v. Sig. J. Rice, appellee.
    Gen. No. 34,294.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11, 1930.
    Wolfsohn & Fireman, for appellant. Martin M. Ward, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Samuel H. Anschell, appellant, v. Sig. J. Rice, appellee.
    Gen. No. 34,295.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11, 1930.
    Wolfsohn & Fireman, for appellant. Martin M. Ward, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Scanlan

text:
    Victor E. Krajci, defendant in error, v. Carl Doscotch et al., plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 33,951.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the December term, 1929.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11,
    Corinne L. Rice, Simpson & Baker and Alvin Glen Hubbard, for certain plaintiffs in error. No appearance for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Louis B. Harris, appellee, v. C. W. Schuppenhauer, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,131.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Cheney, Evans & Peterson, for appellant; Albert Peterson, of counsel. Perlman, Goodman & Scolnik, for appellee; Bernard T. Hecht, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    L. Stahl, appellee, v. The Chicago Custom Garment Company, Inc., appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,140.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Gustav E. Beerly, for appellant; John F. Diffenderffer, Jr., and James M. Gillespie, of counsel. Holland F. FlaHavhan, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Edward J. Rus et al., appellants, v. Grace M. Duncan et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 34,149.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Robert H. Holmes, for appellants. Martin H. Finneran and Daniel A. Roberts, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Laura Barton, appellee, v. Harry Koch, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,171.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11, 1930.
    Louis H. Dembo, for appellant. John A. Swanson, State’s Attorney, for appellee; Edw. E. Wilson and John Holman, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Barnes

text:
    John Manak and Martin Ondrus, trading as California Plating Works, appellees, v. Julius Oronowsky, trading as Ability Plating Works, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,107.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Alex M. Golman, for appellant; Benjamin M. Washer, of counsel. Cohen, Tomas & Cohen, for appellees; Irwin H. Goldman, of counsell
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Hyman J. Himelstein, appellee, v. Lawrence Avenue National Bank, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,116.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.

      Teller, Levit, Silvertrust & Levi, for appellant. Andalman, Laby & Andalman and N. A. Lawrence, for appellee; Maxwell N. Andalman, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James M. Fort et al., appellees, v. Consuelo R. DeMedinah et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 34,143.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Louis J. Du Rocher, for appellants. John R. McCabe and Harry Hoffman, for appellees; Harry Hoffman, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frank J. Higgins, appellee, v. William A. Bobula et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 34,152.
    Heard in the second division of .this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Leo M. Tarpey, for appellants. Finn & Miller, for appellee; Robert S. Cook, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Gridley

text:
    Max Gecht et al., appellants, v. Russell Firebaugh et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 34,001.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the December term, 1929.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Gallagher, Shulman & Abrams, for appellants. Sherman C. Spitzer and Norbert B. Tyrrell, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Francis Dwyer, appellee, v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,068.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    John L. McInerney, for appellant; Edward H. Murnane, of counsel. Elmer W. Arch and Patrick L. McArdle, for appellee; E. J. McArdle, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    F. L. Weinberg, appellee, v. U. S. Leather Goods Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,110.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Bassler, Bippus, Rose & Burt, for appellant. James D. Templeman, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Alfred L. Reese and Ada K. Reese, complainants and appellees, v. James W. McCormack et al., defendants. James W. McCormack et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 34,119.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Abram Z. Zeitlein, for appellants. Earl J. Walker, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Consolidated Products Company, Inc., appellee, v. U. S. Reduction Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,128.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11, 1930.
    Rudolph Wolfner and Leslie H. Whipp, for appellant. Teller, Levit, Silvertrust & Levi, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Jacob I. Glickerman, trading as Independence Plumbing & Heating Company, complainant and appellee, v. McKay & Robbins, Inc., now known as P. W. McKay & Company et al., defendants, on appeal of Frank C. Voisinet, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,137.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Elliott & Gaudas, for appellant; James A. Kealey, of counsel. Koven & Perlman, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    2747 Milwaukee Avenue Building Corporation, appellee, v. Ben B. Bisco, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,146.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.

      Golan & Hall, for appellant. Harold S. Lansing and Blanksten, Freeman & Freeman, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Priscilla A. Gairing, executrix of the last will of Carl F. Gairing, deceased, appellee, v. W. J. Newman Wrecking Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,155.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    . Lambert K. Hayes and Leonard F. Carmody, for appellant. Hubert E. Page, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Michael Lack, appellee, v. Anna Lack, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,355.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 30, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 11, 1930.
    Leopold Saltiel, for appellant. Marvin W. Wallaeh, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Hebel

text:
    Chicago Title & Trust Company, appellee, v. The Cass Street Building Corporation, defendants, on appeal of Rudolph Lederer, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,381.
    Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the June term, 1930.
    Opinion filed July 2, 1930.
    Perlman, Goodman & Scolnik, for appellant; Avern B. Scolnik, of counsel. Altheimer & Meyer, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hebel

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Rudolph Fischman et al., defendants in error, v. Charles E. Scharf, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 34,044.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed July 7, 1930.
    W. J. Lewis, for plaintiff in error. Lefkovits & Lefkovits, for defendants in error.

   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Rudolph Fischman et al., defendants in error, v. Frank C. Roe, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 34,046.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed July 7, 1930.
    W. J. Lewis and Charles C. Mull, for plaintiff in error. Lefkovits & Lefkovits, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    William O. Goodrich Company, appellant, v. Peterson Core Oil Manufacturing Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 34,264.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed July 7, 1930.
    Rehearing denied July 15, 1930.
    Walter E. Moss, for appellant; Rolla Babcock, of counsel. Samuel Block, for appellee; George A. Gordon, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James J. Brown Plastering Company, appellee, v. Nathan Grossman, appellant.
    Gen. No. 34,241.
    Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the April term, 1930.
    Opinion filed July 7, 1930.
    Goodnow, Allaben & Snewind, for appellant; C. D. Snewind, of counsel. A. S. & E. W. Froehlich, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John J. Nolan, appellant, v. Joseph E. Lindquist et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 34,141.
    Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed July 10, 1930.
    John F. Higgins and
    Myer H. Gladstone, for appellant. Kern, Stiefel & Stiefel, for certain appellee; Charles W. Stiefel, Jr., of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Second District.
    John J. Drury, appellee, v. Henry C. Diehl et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 8,177.

      Heard in this court at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 23, 1930.
    John H. Savage and James G. Holbrook, for appellants. Luther B. Bratton, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Rex Slater and Lucille Bushong, appellants, v. Federal Life Insurance Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,154.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed June 11, 1930,
    Rehearing denied August 27, 1930.
    R. D. Robinson, for appellants. Marsh, Lewis & Thompson, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Michael Gleason, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 8,182.
    Heard in this court at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 11, 1930.
    H. A. Brooks, for plaintiff in error. Mark C. Keller, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Walter Tucker, appellee, v. Hall Motor Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,200.
    Heard in this court at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 11, 1930.
    Large & Reno, for appellant. Hall & Dusher, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Guy Jones, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 8,096.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed June 11, 1930.
    Rehearing denied August 27, 1930.
    Pattison & Luney and Robert W. Besse, for plaintiff in error. Vincent A. Bell, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Jacob J. Ludens, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles Moore, appellee, v. George Barrett, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,147.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed June 11, 1930.
    Ridgely & Ridgely, for appellant. Horace H. Baker, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Joe Calderotta, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 8,163.
    Heard in this court at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 17, 1930.
    Knight, Swenson & Penny and Anthony S. Ingrassia, for plaintiff in error. William D. Knight, State’s Attorney, and Alfred B. Louison, Assistant State’s Attorney, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Margaret Umbdenstock, administratrix of the estate of John Umbdenstock, appellee, v. Mallott Wholesale Grocery Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,157.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed June 17, 1930.
    John A. Bloomingston and Samuel J. Howe, for appellant. Hadley & Weaver, for appellee; Willard E. Cain and John S. Woodward, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Daniel Kelly, appellee, v. John Palmer, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,164.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed June 17, 1930.
    Clarence W. Heyl and E. V. Champion, for appellant; Willard B. Gaskins and Heyl & Heyl, of counsel. Frederick F. Beckman, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Verda Hess, appellee, v. Joe Cusmano, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,172.
    Heard in this court at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed June 17, 1930.
    Arthur H. Shay, for appellant. Robert A. Barnes, State’s Attorney, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    In re Estate of Warren Beckwith et al., appellants, v. Harry J. Cooper, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,189.
    Heard in this court at the February term, 1930.
    Opinion filed July 7, 1930.
    Worcester & Lord, for appellants. Peffers & Wing, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Emilio Amidei, appellee, v. Nick Brandonisio, appellant. Alfonso Digani, appellee, v. Nick Brandonisio, appellant. Lino Cabri, appellee, v. Nick Brandonisio, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,102. Gen. No. 8,103. Gen. No. 8,104.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed July 19, 1930.
    Louis R. Connell, for appellant; B. M. Shaffner, of counsel. J. A. Miller, for appellee; Sidney H. Block, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Oscar Haeberle, Trustee, v. Commonwealth Silica Company et al.
    Gen. No. 8,143.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed July 19, 1930.
    Arthur H. Shay and Butters & Butters, for certain appellant. R. A. Green, for appellee Commonwealth Silica Co.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Oscar Haeberle, Trustee, v. Commonwealth Silica Company et al.
    Gen. No. 8,144.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed July 19, 1930.
    Arthur H. Shay and Butters & Butters, for certain appellant. R. A. Green, for appellee Commonwealth Silica Co.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    William F. Beckman, appellee, v. Brechter H. Alberts et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 8,081.

      Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed August 4, 1930.
    Rehearing denied October 15, 1930.
    Frank J. Burns and James T. Burns, for certain appellant. W. H. Dyer and John H. Beckers, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Boggs

text:
    Louis Perucco, administrator of the estate of Mario Sciarini, deceased, plaintiff in error, v. Zefarano Gondolphi, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 8,116.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed August 4, 1930.
    S. P. Wall and Butters & Butters, for plaintiff in error. Hollerieh & Hurley, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Walter J. Cooney, appellee, v. Wood Brothers Thresher Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,209.
    Heard in this court at the May term, 1930.
    Opinion filed August 4, 1930.
    Rehearing denied October 15, 1930.
    J. J. Ludens, for appellant. Sheldon & Brown, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    T. E. Burnside, administrator of the estate of Bessie B. Burnside, deceased, appellee, v. George K. Slough, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,234.
    Heard in this court at the May term, 1930.
    Opinion filed August 4, 1930.
    Lawrence, Nelson & Neagle, for appellant. Chiperfield & Chiperfield and Marsh, Lewis & Thompson, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mike Manoogian, appellee, v. I. C. Rasmussen and M. R. Rasmussen, trading as Rasmussen Brothers, appellants.
    Gen. No. 8,130.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed August 11, 1930.
    Hall & Hulse, for appellants; Albert L. Hall and Minard E. Hulse, of counsel. Charles F. Hille, for appellee; Doherty & Fitzpatrick and J. Ward Fitzpatrick, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Amantine Martens, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 8,205.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1929.
    Opinion filed August 11, 1930.
    Schriver & Schriver, for plaintiff in error. Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and Benjamin S. Bell, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Dan H. McNeal, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Joseph H. Felderer, administrator of the estate of Andrew Wagner, deceased, appellant, v. Frank Dietz, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,229.
    Heard in this court at the May term, 1930.
    Opinion filed August 15, 1930.
    Rehearing denied October 15, 1930.
    George V. McIntyre, Sidney H. Block and Jack E. Bairstow, for appellant. Clarence W. Diver and Cassels, Potter & Bentley, for appellee; Kenneth B. Hawkins, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Lulu Jordan, appellee, v. A. H. Nordell, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,236.
    Heard in this court at the May term, 1930.
    Opinion filed August 15, 1930.
    Large & Reno and W. J. Berry, for appellant. Hinchcliff, Miller & Thomas, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Herbert M. Livingston, administrator of the estate of Louis N. Wente, deceased, appellee, v. Jacob C. Lutz, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,196.
    Heard in this court at the May term, 1930.
    Opinion filed September 2, 1930.
    Gerald A. Connor and Arley Munts, for appellant. Wm. K. Bracken and Milton Schwind, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.