author: PRICE, J., MANSFIELD, J.,

text:
    Derrick JACKSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
    No. 73081.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    May 17, 2000.

      David Cunningham, Houston, for appellant.
    Barbara A. Drumheller, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, for State.
   OPINION

PRICE, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which McCORMICK, P.J., and MEYERS, KELLER, HOLLAND, WOMACK, JOHNSON, and KEASLER, J.J., join.

Appellant was convicted of capital murder on March 12, 1998. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a). Pursuant to the jury’s answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.0711 §§ 3(b) and (e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. Art. 37.071 § 3(g). Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Art. 37.0711 § 3(j). Appellant raises eight points of error. We will affirm.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first two points of error, appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his capital murder conviction for killing more than one person in the same criminal transaction. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

The evidence at trial revealed that the victims, Forrest Henderson and Richard Wrotenbury, were singers in the Houston Grand Opera. Shortly before his death, Henderson toured with the opera in Scotland. Wrotenbury moved into Henderson’s Houston apartment to hous-esit while Henderson was out of the country and continued to live in the apartment after Henderson returned.

David Trujillo and Roger Lindgroff lived next door to Henderson and Wroten-bury. At around 10:30 p.m. on September 10, 1988, Trujillo heard music and Henderson’s voice through the common wall separating their apartments. Trujillo went to sleep around 2:00 a.m. and was awakened at 4:45 a.m. by the sound of Wrotenbury screaming several times, “Oh my God. No. No.” Trujillo also heard what sounded like someone being hit numerous times with a pipe or a baseball bat. After 30 minutes of silence, he heard the water running for about 45 minutes. Lindgroff started to knock on their neighbor’s door to see if there was a problem, but Trujillo called him baek inside. Trujillo never heard Henderson’s front door open or anyone leave. A person could enter or leave Henderson’s apartment via a separate stairwell, however, without having to pass by Trujillo’s door.

Trujillo explained that, before Wroten-bury moved in, he would see “street trash” going in and out of Henderson’s apartment, that the apartment was a rowdy place, and that there was always some kind of screaming and fighting going on over there. Since Wrotenbury had moved in, however, the rowdiness had subsided.

Besides the opera, Wrotenbury also worked as a music teacher at Deer Park Elementary School; but on Monday, September 12, 1988, he failed to appear for work At 9:00 a.m., the school principal contacted Henderson’s apartment manager to check on him. The manager unlocked Henderson’s apartment door and found nothing disturbed in the living room and kitchen. He proceeded to one of the bedrooms, pushed open the door, and saw a body covered with blood. He promptly left and called 911.

Police officers arrived at the apartment soon thereafter and detected no signs of forced entry. They found Henderson’s and Wrotenbury’s bodies in their respective bedrooms at opposite ends of the apartment. Henderson’s nude body was lying face-down in his bed, and Wroten-bury’s body, clad only a pair of swimming trunks, was lying on the floor of his bedroom. Absence of significant blood in the hallway connecting the two bedrooms indicated that neither victim left his room during or after the attacks. Police found a bloody metal bar in the hallway and a bloody knife in the kitchen sink. Blood was all over the bedroom walls, doors, and curtains. Both victims’ wallets were missing, and Henderson’s car was gone.

The forensic pathologist testified that Alan Wrotenbury suffered a severed carotid artery, cuts to the vertebrae, and at least three blows to the back of the head with a narrow blunt instrument consistent with a pipe. The force of one of the blows Wrotenbury received knocked out a tooth. Forrest Henderson had received a shallow, non-fatal cut to the neck, defensive wounds on both arms, a six-inch fracture of the skull from a blunt force, and multiple stab wounds to the torso. Fixed lividity in both bodies signified that both people had been dead for more than eight hours. Tests performed on both victims revealed no signs of drugs, alcohol, or semen.

Blood samples and 20 identifiable fingerprints were collected from the .crime scene, but the Houston Police Department (“HPD”) was unable to develop a suspect. In 1995, HPD upgraded to a new fingerprint system with an expanded database. The new system matched appellant with prints lifted from a beer can and a glass tumbler in Henderson’s bedroom. A bloody print found on Henderson’s bedroom door also matched appellant. An expert in blood-spatter interpretation testified that the bloody fingerprint could have been formed only by touching a blood drop while the blood was still wet — as opposed to a blood drop landing on an old fingerprint.

An HPD serologist testified that type-B blood was found on a bedroom door. Appellant is blood-type B; both victims were blood-type A. Only these blood types were detected at the crime scene. The State’s DNA expert testified that appellant’s DNA profile matched DNA isolated from blood stains on a red towel and a beige towel located in Henderson’s bathroom. The odds that another African-American would possess the same profile is one in 7.2 million. Further, DNA analysis could not exclude appellant as a contributor of the blood mixture covering the metal bar.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. Although our evaluation considers all evidence presented at trial, Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Wilson v. State, 863 S.W.2d 59, 65 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).

In his first point of error, appellant alleges that the fingerprint and DNA evidence does not establish him as the perpetrator because he could have left prints on the beer can and tumbler before the killings. Appellant further contends that he could have reentered the apartment after the killings to leave the bloody fingerprint on the door and his own blood on the bathroom towels. Appellant’s scenario does not establish that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

Appellant’s bloody fingerprint puts him in the apartment while the blood was still wet. Further, the discovery of blood consistent with appellant’s DNA profile on the towels and on the bloody bar leads to the reasonable conclusion that appellant was injured during the struggle with one or both of the victims. Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to find that appellant killed Wrotenbury and Henderson. Point of error one is overruled.

In his second point of error, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish that Henderson and Wrotenbury were killed during the course of the same criminal transaction. As support for this allegation, appellant relies on the testimony of (1) Trujillo that he did not hear Henderson’s voice after 10:30 p.m. and heard only Wrotenbury struggling several hours later and (2) the medical examiner that he could not pinpoint the time of death of either victim. Appellant argues that someone could have entered the apartment through the private staircase, killed Henderson, left the apartment, reentered the apartment, and killed Wroten-bury.

To convict appellant of capital murder, the jury in this case was required to find that appellant intentionally caused the death of two individuals, Forrest Henderson and Alan Wrotenbury, “during the same criminal transaction.” Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(6)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Because the legislature did not define the term “same criminal transaction,” we have interpreted that phrase to mean “a continuous and uninterrupted chain of conduct occurring over a very short period of time ... in a rapid sequence of unbroken events.” Rios v. State, 846 S.W.2d 310, 311-312 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1051, 113 S.Ct. 1946, 123 L.Ed.2d 651(1993); Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 997, 113 S.Ct. 595, 121 L.Ed.2d 533 (1992).

Here, both victims were killed in the same manner with the same weapons and were found dead in the same apartment. Although the medical examiner testified that only Henderson’s body showed signs of decomposition, he maintained that he could not determine who was killed first. He explained that Henderson’s struggle with the assailant could have caused increased secretion of acid in his system, thus accelerating decomposition. Based on our review of the record, we find that “the jury could rationally conclude appellant engaged in a continuous and uninterrupted process, over a short period of time, of carrying on or carrying out murder of more than one person.” Rios, 846 S.W.2d at 314. Appellant’s second point of error is overruled.

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

In his third point of error, appellant complains that' the trial court denied him a hearing under Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), after he challenged the reliability of the State’s DNA evidence. Specifically; appellant requested the court to determine whether “the DNA was collected and tested properly pursuant to accepted protocols, subjected to peer reviews, and properly calculated.” Appellant further points out that at trial he “also expressed concern over the match windows used in connection with RFLP DNA testing conducted by the state.”

We have stated numerous times that a trial court’s responsibility under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702 is to determine whether proffered scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable and relevant to assist the jury. See, e.g., Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573; Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 554-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The proponent of the scientific evidence bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the evidence is reliable. This is accomplished by showing: (1) the validity of the underlying scientific theory; (2) the validity of the technique applying the theory; and (3) proper application of the technique on the occasion in question. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573. We have emphasized that, before scientific evidence may be admitted, the trial court must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the proponent has established all three criteria. Id; Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 152 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Campbell v. State, 910 S.W.2d 475, 478-79 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1140, 116 S.Ct. 1430, 134 L.Ed.2d 552 (1996). This pre-admission determination is required whether the science at issue is novel or well established. Hartman v. State, 946 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); cf. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (holding that trial court’s “gatekeeping” function under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 applies to all expert testimony — not just scientific testimony).

In this case, defense counsel agreed to the general validity of DNA evidence under the first prong of Kelly but challenged the validity and application of the technique, under the second and third prongs of Kelly, used to identify appellant as a suspect. Before the State presented its DNA evidence, the court heard arguments from the State and appellant debating the reliability of the State’s evidence. Emphasizing that DNA evidence is based on a conceptually valid theory, the court informed the parties that it was not required under Daubert and Kelly to conduct a pre-admission hearing to determine whether HPD’s techniques were valid and properly performed in this case. The court interpreted the second two Kelly prongs as matters for the jury to decide:

[N]or am I persuaded that it is necessary for me to have a hearing to determine the specific manner and means in which collections occur, evaluations are conducted.
Certainly, that is permissible for you ■to present to a jury for the purposes of refuting whatever it is that the State claims. But it is not the matter of a subjective pre-trial hearing for the purposes of suppressing it because if there is a dispute, the resolution of the dispute must be done by the jury based on the credibility of the witnesses.

The defense then requested to call its expert to discuss the State’s DNA evidence:

I’m going to call Dr. Elizabeth Johnson and I’m going to ask her, specifically, based on the evidence given to us under the discovery orders, are there some specific protocols that are either miscalculated regarding the match windows and are those subject to peer review.
And, specifically, I’m going to ask her under the RFLP protocol, some specific questions regarding our discovery and our evidence that was given to us of the specific problems.
And then under the PCR, are there some specific problems. And that will .be it.

Before defense counsel could pursue these issues, however, the court intervened to question the defense’s expert when she took the stand:

THE COURT: Dr. Johnson, have you seen or had a chance to read whatever information [defense counsel] has supplied to you regarding this stuff?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I have.
THE COURT: From what you have seen, can you specifically say that there was anything done in terms of the collection, the keeping, the analysis, the conclusions, can you say from what you have, specifically, that there was any conduct that was incompatible with what you would say to be the ordinary accepted standards?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I can.
THE COURT: And what is that?
THE WITNESS: Based on what I have seen from the protocol supplied by the Houston Police Department, there are areas that I need clarification on.
THE COURT: Okay. Your answer is no. Your request for a hearing is overruled. Thank you ma'am.

The defense pressed on for a hearing on the second two Kelly prongs:

This is our request. That it requires a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the technique protocols used by the HPD lab in this case meet those standards, whether those standards that they used are subject to peer review and is there a problem with those.
... [W]e’re asking for the right to make this record regarding just specifically what we would have been asking you before we even get to the jury.
THE COURT: You have told me so far that you know of no specific situation that exists in terms of the collection, the retention and so on and so forth of the evidence about which you have a dispute.
You simply want to satisfy yourself that the methods used were, in fact, consistent with the scientific standards.

The court went on to explain that its reason for cutting off Dr. Johnson was her response that she needed some clarification about HPD procedures: “[w]ell, that tells me that there is no dispute. She doesn’t know enough and that this is investigatory as opposed to anything else.”

Counsel repeated that the defense had a specific dispute with HPD protocols and relayed specific concerns that Dr. Johnson expressed to him concerning the “match windows” used by HPD. Based on this discussion, the court concluded:

I’ll let you present whatever rebuttal evidence, impeachment evidence you care to the jury. In terms of an out-of-the-presence hearing, I’m not going to do it.... But please don’t misinterpret what I’m saying to be a refusal or an imposition of you being permitted to present this information to the jury.
I’m specifically saying I’m not doing that.

The trial court’s ruling deviated from Kelly and its progeny in two respects. First, it presumed that DNA evidence is admissible in general and shifted to the defense the burden of demonstrating that the State’s evidence was not reliable. Further, it refused to permit a hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine whether the evidence was admissible. Thus, the court erred in failing to determine the admissibility under Rule 702 by interpreting the second and third Kelly requirements as issues that the jury could consider in deciding what weight to give the State’s evidence.

Although we agree with appellant that the court-abandoned its “gatekeeping” function with respect to the last two Kelly requirements, we hold that in this case the error was harmless because the State’s DNA evidence was in fact reliable. Appellant urges that on cross-examination trial counsel undermined the State’s DNA evidence by revealing that the State did not use “reagent blanks to eliminate the possibility of cross-contamination” and that the allele, which was isolated from the metal bar and attributed to appellant, was weak and could not be ruled out as a “an ‘artifact’ or nonspecific showing of DNA testing.” Upon an independent review of the record, we find that the State’s DNA evidence was reliable and thus admissible.

Mary Childs Henry, a DNA analyst with the Houston Police Department performed the DNA extractions for the PCR and RFLP tests. She testified that she followed the protocol designated by the FBI at that time, which did not require reagent blanks. Although the protocol was later upgraded to include reagent blanks, use of these controls would have violated FBI protocol at the time she performed the tests. She explained that the protocol directed her to work only on one sample at a time to eliminate the possibility of cross-contamination.

Joseph Chu, a serologist with the HPD crime lab, testified that, from the mixture of DNA isolated from the metal bar, he identified an antigen that matched appellant’s DNA. He explained that the antigen was weak and could have been only a trace, but maintained that appellant could not be excluded as a source of DNA found on the bar. In Chu’s opinion, no cross-contamination or cross-hybridization occurred during the testing process.

Nothing in the trial testimony suggests that HPD serologists used invalid protocols or deviated from the proper protocols. Therefore, we find the State’s DNA evidence reliable and admissible under Kelly. Because the court’s failure to hold a hearing outside the jury’s presence did not result in the admission of unreliable evidence, the error did not have “a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (announcing the test for determining whether trial error affects a substantial right under Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946))). Accordingly, Rule 103(a) compels us to disregard this error. Appellant’s third point of error is overruled.

Appellant contends in his fourth point of error that the trial court should have excluded the State’s DNA evidence because the State violated a discovery order which required it to disclose the results of all scientific testing by March 5, 1998. Appellant complains that the State failed to timely turn over new statistical calculations of the frequency that the DNA profile of the blood on the two towels occurs in the population. Instead, the State informed appellant of the recalculations on the evening of March 10, the day before the State began presentation of its DNA evidence. Upon counsel’s objection to the tardy disclosure, the trial court asked how much time'the defense desired to look over the new calculations. Dr. Johnson, the defense expert, replied, “if they give me the figures and the type results, ... I don’t have that material — I would need a[n] hour or two hours to look at it.” The court granted appellant this additional time to review the information before the State presented its statistical evidence.

During the afternoon session of March 11th, Mary Childs Henry testified that she performed RFLP tests on DNA isolated from a beige and a red towel. The DNA profile of the blood on the towels matched appellant. The original frequency calculation that Henry performed indicated that one in every 5.8 million persons possesses this DNA profile. Henry explained that she used four probes to achieve this original calculation; however, two of the probes violated FBI protocol for inclusion in the frequency analysis. When she recalculated the statistics using only the two compliant probes, she arrived at a significantly different result of one out of 224 persons.

We have held that evidence willfully withheld from disclosure under a discovery order should be excluded from the trial. See Hollowell v. State, 571 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). There is no indication in the record, however, whether the HPD serologist’s failure to recalculate the frequency statistics earlier was done willfully or was merely an oversight. In any event, we have distinguished the harsh sanction imposed by Hollowell, where the State revealed the requested information in time for the defendant to use it on cross examination of the State's witness. See Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1989)(holding that State’s violation of a discovery order to disclose before trial any leniency arrangements with witnesses did not deny defendant a fair trial because the State revealed on direct examination the deal it made with a witness).

Here, appellant does not explain how he was harmed by the State’s failure to perform the recalculations earlier. He was afforded ample time for his expert to review the recalculations, and counsel was able to cross-examine the State’s witnesses with the new results. Because appellant was in no way prejudiced by the State’s failure to comply with the discovery order, we overrule appellant’s fourth point of error.

JURY ARGUMENT

Appellant’s fifth, sixth, and seventh points of error involve alleged improper jury argument by the State. Proper jury argument includes four areas: (1) summation of the evidence presented at trial, (2) reasonable deduction drawn from that evidence, (3) answer to the opposing counsel’s argument, or (4) a plea for law enforcement. McFarland, v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 844 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963, 113 S.Ct. 2937, 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993). To constitute reversible error, the argument must be manifestly improper or inject new, harmful facts into the case. Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Everett v. State, 707 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Here, we find that each of the challenged passages fits within one or more of the categories enumerated above.

In his fifth point of error, appellant contends that during final rebuttal argument the State impermissibly shifted the burden to the defense. Specifically, appellant complains of the following passage in which the State argued that no defense experts challenged its DNA evidence.

We had two samples from the door. We had a scraping and a swab, one of those is B type ... And don’t you know if there was anything wrong — I mean they’re accusing Mr. Bolding of lying about his results is what they’re doing here. Don’t you know if there was anything wrong or improper about those results — and understand, they don’t have to do anything. They can sit there like potted plants. But don’t you know if there was something wrong, they would have had one of those experts on the stand to tell you that that evidence wasn’t B type. And you can make an inference from that.
Then you come to the DNA. And it follows here as well. I mean, they haven’t had just one, but they’ve hád two experts looking at our DNA evidence. They’ve had one of them sitting in the courtroom listening to the testimony. Don’t you know if there was anything wrong with the results of those samples — []

Our review of the record reveals that the prosecutor’s comments were rebuttal to defense counsel’s argument attacking the State’s scientific evidence. Arguing that the State did not produce reliable evidence that the blood on the wall matched appellant, counsel pointed out that James Bolding, the State’s serology expert, waited ten years to conduct the tests revealing type-B blood on the wall. Counsel also implied that the defense DNA expert, who had been sitting at counsel table during the State’s presentation of its case, did not approve of the State’s DNA evidence; particularly, the dramatic change in the frequency statistics when the two noncompliant probes were eliminated. Counsel continued with arguments attacking the reliability of the PCR testing done on the metal bar, the State’s use of improper protocol, and the methods used to extract the DNA.

Defending the State’s scientific evidence, the prosecutor retorted that the defense would have called its expert to the stand if it had seriously disputed the State’s evidence. Thus, the prosecutor’s argument was merely a response to the defense’s assertions that the State’s scientific evidence was lacking. See McFarland v. State, 989 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). In this context, the challenged comments did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defense, particularly given the prosecutor’s repeated reminders to the jury that the defense was not required to present any evidence.

Moreover, the prosecutor’s argument did not amount to a prohibited reference to appellant’s failure to testify. We have held that the prosecutor may comment on the defendant’s failure to produce witnesses and evidence so long as the remark does not fault the defendant for exercising his right not to testify. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 491 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1106, 116 S.Ct. 1323, 134 L.Ed.2d 475 (1996); Livingston v. State, 739 S.W.2d 311, 338 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988). Here, reference to the defense’s failure to produce expert testimony was not improper. Appellant’s fifth point of error is overruled.

Appellant next asserts that during punishment-phase argument the prosecutor improperly commented on facts outside the record, as follows:

But here at punishment it is different. You get to hear more. You get to know the real Derrick Jackson. And you get to take into consideration his victims, the impact on the victims’ family and society. You get to look at all that. Now a life sentence to you — you and me would be a lot of punishment. I am going to suggest to you ...

Defense counsel interrupted with an objection that the prosecutor was interjecting his own opinion into the case. The court sustained the objection, instructed the jury to disregard, and ordered the prosecutor to rephrase. The prosecutor continued, “Let’s put it this way: A life sentence would be punishment for a lot of people, but not to Derrick Jackson.” Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for mistrial because the prosecutor’s comments about a life sentence “suggested that he has information about the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) to which the jury was not privy.” The record does not support this inference.

A prosecutor may not convey to the jury during argument that he possesses specialized knowledge or expertise about a contested factual issue in the case. Such comments pose a danger of influencing the jury’s opinion in deciding the issue. Johnson v. State, 698 S.W.2d 154, 167 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 87Í, 107 S.Ct. 239, 93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986); Boyd v. State, 643 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Maupin v. State, 930 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. refd). In evaluating whether the prosecutor interjected his personal opinion into the argument, we must consider the challenged remark in the context in which it appears. Gaddis, 753 S.W.2d at 398.

When we evaluate the prosecutor’s statements in the appropriate context, it is evident that his remark concerning a life sentence referred to appellant’s apparent contentment with the prison environment. The prosecutor began his argument, “Now, this phase of trial, it’s the punishment phase. It’s not the what’s best for Derrick Jackson phase.” He went on to summarize appellant’s punishment-phase evidence that appellant performed well in prison, reacted positively to the structured setting, and could accomplish many of his goals there, such as earning a GED. The crux of the argument, therefore, was that prison would not serve to punish appellant. Within this context, it is clear that the prosecutor’s statements comparing the punitive effect of a life sentence on appellant to a life sentence on people in general— such as the jurors — was based on appellant’s proffered evidence, as opposed to some specialized knowledge harbored by the prosecution. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s comments qualify as a permissible plea for law enforcement. Appellant’s sixth point of error is overruled.

In his seventh point of error, appellant contends that the prosecutor impermissibly argued facts outside the record and thus misconstrued the testimony of the defense’s mental health expert. The challenged portion is as follows:

And Dr. Wheeler is tremendously concerned about that kind of individual if they ever got out of the penitentiary. She’s testified in 12 capital murder cases for the Defense. And the person that did this scares the hell out of her. And she told you under oath that she would never want a person capable of doing all that on the streets of Harris County, Texas again.

Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was misstating Dr. Wheeler’s testimony. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the comment, but denied the defense’s motion for mistrial. The prosecutor continued, “She told you that in her opinion that kind of person would be capable of doing all of this again.” The trial court overruled appellant’s objection that this comment was outside the record. Appellant asserts that the trial court should have granted his motion for mistrial because the prosecutor impermissibly argued outside the record to undermine the defense’s expert witness.

Contrary to appellant’s assertion, however, the record reveals that the prosecutor’s argument was properly based on the evidence. During the punishment phase, the prosecutor questioned Dr. Wheeler:

Doctor, in your professional opinion, you wouldn’t want someone that’s capable of committing a capital murder where two people are lolled like you see in those pictures, stealing a purse from a lady, during an aggravated robbery, they shoot at somebody and then doing three more aggravated robberies [ ... ] a week later within an hour and a half, you wouldn’t want somebody like that back on the streets of Harris County, Texas would you?

Dri Wfiieeler replied, “No, I would not.” Wheeler also agreed on cross-examination that she would be scared of a person who had just committed these various crimes. Although the prosecutor’s characterization of Wheeler’s testimony is somewhat overstated, we find that this argument qualifies as a summation of the evidence, and thus is not improper. Appellant’s seventh point of error is overruled.

SENTENCING

In his eighth point of error, appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a motion for mistrial when the jury appeared unable to agree on sentencing. At the end of the punishment phase, the jury deliberated for about five hours and sent out a note indicating that they were deadlocked. After the court instructed them to continue their deliberations, they deliberated for another two hours at whieh time counsel for appellant moved for a mistrial. The court overruled the motion, and the jury recessed for the night. On the following day, the jury had deliberated for an additional four hours when they sent out a note stating, “What happens if we are 11 to 1 on special issue # 3?” The court again instructed them to continue deliberating. The jury returned a unanimous verdict 28 minutes later.

Article 37.0711, § 3(g) compels the trial court to enter a life sentence if the jury is unable to answer any special issue. See Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 961, 112 S.Ct. 426, 116 L.Ed.2d 446 (1991). The court may exercise its discretion to discharge the jury when “it has been kept together for such a time as to render it altogether improbable that it can agree.” Art. 36.31. Reversal is mandated only if the record reveals that the trial court abused its discretion in holding the jury for deliberations. Montoya, 810 S.W.2d at 166. In assessing abuse of discretion, we consider the length of the trial and volume of evidence submitted to the jury. Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 121 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). For instance, in Andrade v. State, 700 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1112, 106 S.Ct. 1524, 89 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986), the trial court instructed the jurors to continue deliberations when, after four- and-a-half hours, they indicated that they were deadlocked. The jury persisted with its deliberations for another eight hours before returning an unanimous verdict. Id. Given the nature of the capital case involved, this Court determined that the judge did not abuse his discretion in permitting the jury to deliberate for twelve hours. Id.

Likewise, in this case, the jury was charged with the task of answering questions that determine whether appellant would receive a sentence of life or death. When considering appellant’s motion for mistrial, the trial court explained that the guilt/innocence and punishment phases of trial had produced three-and-a-half days worth of evidence. Over this period of time, the jury heard testimony from 27 witnesses for the State and defense. During the punishment phase, the State produced evidence of the numerous violent crimes appellant committed. Appellant countered with" testimony from an expert concerning his psychological profile, from his parents that he was generally well behaved, and from his TDCJ barber school teacher that he had adapted well to prison life, was a good student, and had successfully completed 1400 hours of course work. The jury had to sort through this evidence and evidence presented at the guilt/innocence phase to determine whether the mitigating evidence compelled a sentence of life rather than death. See Art. 37.0711 § 3(e). We cannot say, given these circumstances, that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling appellant’s motion for mistrial seven hours into deliberations. Appellant’s eighth point of error is overruled.

In his final point of error, appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas death penalty scheme based on the “12-10” rule embodied in Article 37.0711, which prohibits the jury from learning that a hung jury on punishment results in a life sentence. See Aet. 37.0711 §§ 3(d), (f), and (i). He points out that in this case the jury was deadlocked twice during deliberations and had inquired as to the effect of a hung jury. Appellant is correct in his concession that this Court-has repeatedly rejected such an attack. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 992 S.W.2d 469, 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 644 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 994, 118 S.Ct. 557, 139 L.Ed.2d 399 (1997); Green v. State, 912 S.W.2d 189, 194 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1021, 116 S.Ct. 2556, 135 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1996). We overrule appellant’s ninth point of error.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

MANSFIELD, J.,

concurs in the judgment only on point three, , and otherwise joins the opinion.

      . Unless otherwise indicated, all future references to Articles refer to Code of Criminal Procedure.

      . Lindgroff was deceased at the time of trial.

      . Henderson’s car was involved in a burglary of a Montgomery Ward two to three days later. Police engaged in a high speed chase with the perpetrators, who wrecked the car and fled before police could catch them.

      . In keeping with this argument, appellant must have entered the apartment after all of this activity, left a bloody fingerprint on the bedroom door, cut himself, wiped his wound on the bathroom towels, locked the door, and •left.

      . Two types of DNA analysis were utilized in this case — PCR and RFLP. "PCR,” stands for "polymerase chain reaction," a method of multiplying DNA so that a profile can be obtained from a very small sample. "RFLP” stands for "restriction fragment length polymorphism,"a method of DNA analysis that produces a more discriminating profile but requires a larger DNA sample. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 910 S.W.2d 475, 479 n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).

      . The Texas Rules of Evidence (formed from the combined civil and criminal rules of evidence) became effective on March 1, 1998.

      .Appellant does not complain now of the match windows, protocol, or statistical analysis used. At trial, the court afforded Dr. Johnson, the defense expert, time to review the DNA 1ype strips and statistical figures that were in the State’s possession. Presumably, Johnson was satisfied with these because appellant did not call her to testify before the jury.

      . We are authorized to conduct a de novo review of this mixed question of law and fact because the admissibility issue does not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the State’s witnesses. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

      . Rule 103(a) provides that”[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.” Tex.R. Evid. 103(a).

      . Joseph Chu testified later that the statistical calculation based on the PCR test conducted on this same blood source indicated that the DNA would occur with a frequency of "one out of 7.2 million people among the black population.” Apparently no recalculations were performed on the genetic profile resulting from the PCR analysis.

      . Defense counsel interrupted with an objection that the State was shifting the burden of proof to the defense, and the court overruled the objection.

      . Appellant notes that the prosecution possessed information that the jury did not — that appellant would have become parole eligible in fifteen years if given a life sentence. Appellant did not raise this parole issue to the trial court; therefore, he has waived such an argument for appeal. See Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 292 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2914, 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991).

      . Appellant concedes that this error alone would not constitute reversible error but contends that the statements challenged in points of error five, six, and seven — when considered in combination — deprived him of a fair trial. Finding no error in the prosecutor’s argument, we reject appellant’s contention.

      . Appellant did not reassert his motion for mistrial at this time.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KELLER, J., WOMACK, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Virgil Euristi MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
    No. 73131.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
    May 17, 2000.

      Brian W. Wice, Houston, for appellant.
    Douglas Danzeiser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for State.
   OPINION

KELLER, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court

in which McCORMICK, P. J., and MEYERS, MANSFIELD and KEASLER, JJ., joined.

Appellant was convicted in April 1998 of three counts of capital murder arising from an episode occurring on October 1, 1996. Tex. Penal Code § 19.08(a)(7) & (8). Pursuant to the jury’s answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 87.071 §§ 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. Article 37.071 § 2(g). Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Article 37.071 § 2(h). Appellant raises nineteen points of error. We will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Veronica Fuentes lived in a trailer park in Brazoria County with her husband and their two children, Joshua and Cassandra, ages five and three. Sherry Graves was the landlord of the trailer park and lived in a house about forty to fifty feet from the Fuentes’ trailer. Veronica became estranged from her husband and at some point dated appellant, but Veronica and appellant eventually “broke up.” Several weeks before the murders from which this prosecution arose, Veronica told Graves that she was afraid of appellant, and if appellant showed up, Graves should call the Sheriffs office.

On October 1, 1996, at around 11:00 p.m., as Graves was lying in bed, she heard banging noises and screaming coming from the direction of the Fuentes’ trailer. She went to the Fuentes’ trailer and listened at the window. She heard Veronica say. “No Virgil. No. Please no. Just go. Just go.” An angry male voice referred to “your purse” and also to someone’s dad as “a cop.” Graves went to the front door and walked inside the living room area. She asked Veronica if she was okay. Sounding scared, Veronica responded, “Yes. Sherry, get help. Get help.” Graves told Veronica that she was going to call 911, and she dialed 911 as she walked back toward her house. John Gomez came to Graves’ house and mumbled, “Veronica’s gone crazy. Gun at kids’ heads.” Graves tried to explain to the 911 operator what was happening.

Graves then saw Veronica in the Fuentes’ front yard calling Virgil’s name, saying “No Virgil. Oh my God.” Graves then saw appellant shoot Veronica and Veronica fall to the ground. At this point, Gomez ran towards appellant, and appellant shot him. Graves ducked inside her home. Appellant ran off, passing within five to ten feet of Graves’ window. The floodlights were on, and Graves saw appellant fiddling with a “holster-looking belt.”

Robin Johnstone and her son Keith Burrow were neighbors of Veronica. John-stone heard knocking and went outside to investigate. She saw people running across the street, then heard gunshots, and saw Gomez running toward a garage. Then she saw appellant run in front of Graves’ house. She also noticed that appellant was wearing a gun holster around his waist.

Burrow saw appellant shoot Veronica. He saw who appellant was by looking through a gunscope that made images look nine times closer. .

The police arrived to find Veronica arid her two children dead from multiple gunshot wounds. The children were found dead in their bed. Veronica was lying in the front yard, with wounds from ten to twelve bullets. The police found Gomez still alive, with seven gunshot wounds. Sergeant Thomas Tolson asked Gomez, “Who did this?” Gomez replied, “Boyfriend, girlfriend. Boyfriend, girlfriend. Ex-boyfriend.” Tolson repeated the question, and Gomez replied, “Boyfriend, girlfriend, ex-boyfriend.” Then Tolson asked, “Did the ex-boyfriend do this? Who did that?” and Gomez responded, “Ex-boyfriend.” Gomez later died from the gunshot wounds.

Appellant fled to Del Rio. On October 2, 1996, at around 6:00 p.m., he called 911, claiming that he was hearing voices and he needed medical attention. Del Rio officers were dispatched to appellant’s location, and he was taken to a hospital. Appellant’s car was later found in Del Rio and searched.

Forensic examination and microscopic analysis revealed that all of the bullets found at the crime scene were fired from the same nine millimeter gun. Testimony showed that the magazine clips for this type of gun were capable of holding fifteen bullets apiece. A search of appellant’s room in his mother’s home revealed a gun box designed to house a nine millimeter gun. A gun belt appropriate for holstering such a gun was found in appellant’s car. The gun was never found.

II. GUILT/INNOCENCE

A. Voir Dire Issues

In points of error four and five, appellant complains about the trial court’s refusal to grant certain defense challenges for cause. Before an appellant can claim that he was harmed by a trial court’s denial of a defense challenge for cause, the record must show that (1) he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, (2) he requested more challenges, (3) his request was denied, and (4) he identified an objectionable person seated on the jury upon whom he would have exercised a peremptory challenge. Anson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), cert. dism’d, 525 U.S. 924, 119 S.Ct. 290, 142 L.Ed.2d 241 (1998); Broussard v. State, 910 S.W.2d 952, 956-957 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 826, 117 S.Ct. 87, 136 L.Ed.2d 44 (1996). The record shows that appellant exercised his fifteenth and final peremptory challenge on prospective juror King. The next prospective juror, Felan, was accepted by appellant and became the twelfth member of the jury. Appellant did not ask for additional peremptory challenges. Under these circumstances, appellant was not harmed by the denial of his challenges for cause. Points of error four and five are overruled.

B. Motions to Suppress

1. Search of the Mother’s Home

In point of error one, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of a police search of his mother’s home. The claimed basis for the search was that appellant’s mother consented to the search. Appellant challenges this basis for the search on two grounds. First, he claims that his mother’s consent was not voluntary. Second, he claims that his mother had no authority to consent to the search of his room. Neither of these claims were made in appellant’s motion to suppress. The motion simply alleged that the search “was conducted without consent, without a valid warrant, without probable cause” in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I § 9 of the Texas Constitution. Moreover, appellant advanced no argument before the trial court on the issues he now advances on appeal.

Appellant has procedurally defaulted his argument that his mother lacked the authority to consent to a search of his room. A party’s objection must state the grounds for ruling with “sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.” Tex.R.App. P. 33.1. The mother’s ownership of the house was at least prima facie evidence of her authority to allow law enforcement agents to search her home. The fact that appellant is an adult who resided in a room in that home does not necessarily negate his mother’s authority to consent to a search of that room. See Sorensen v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532, 533-534 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (mother in that case had authority to consent to a search of the adult defendant’s room). The focus of appellant’s motion and the pretrial hearing was on whether consent actually occurred, not on whether someone had the authority to consent. From this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court was made aware that appellant was contesting his mother’s authority to consent to a search.

We shall assume, without deciding, that appellant’s claim at trial that there was no consent fairly encompasses his claim on appeal that his mother’s consent was not voluntary; we will address the merits of the voluntariness issue. We review the record at a motion to suppress hearing under a mixed standard: (1) the historical facts and any application of law to fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor are viewed in the fight most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and (2) application of law to fact questions that do not turn upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor are reviewed de novo. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The record, viewing the historical facts in the fight most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, shows the following: Appellant lived in his mother’s home and had his own room. Police officers came to the home and asked appellant’s mother for consent to search appellant’s room. Appellant’s mother gave oral consent but refused to sign a written consent form. She was told by one of the officers that she did not have to allow a search, but she told the officers “Go ahead.” No threats of any kind were made, and officers testified that they had no reason to believe that appellant’s mother’s consent to search was not voluntary.

This evidence is sufficient to show that the mother’s consent was voluntary. Testimony that a person gave consent after being warned of the right to refuse consent is some evidence that the consent was voluntary. Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 831, 114 S.Ct. 101, 126 L.Ed.2d 68 (1993). Testimony by law enforcement officers that no coercion was involved in obtaining the consent is also evidence of the consent’s voluntary nature. Id.

Appellant’s mother and sister testified that the officers were never given permission to search appellant’s room. But the trial court was free to disregard this testimony and believe the police officers. Id.; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. Point of error one is overruled.

2. Search of Appellant’s Car

In point of error two, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his car. In his motion and on appeal, appellant alleges that law enforcement authorities obtained a gun belt from his car in violation of the Fourth Amendment and of Article 18.10.

Police discovered a grey, four-door, Mitsubishi automobile in Del Rio, and a license check revealed that appellant was one of the registered owners. H.M. Atchi-son, a detective with the Brazoria County Sheriffs Office, relayed to Don Weaver, an officer with the Del Rio police department, information from which . Officer Weaver drafted a search warrant and probable cause affidavit. The search warrant was approved by a magistrate in Val Verde County. The probable cause affidavit described the car in question as a “1990 Mitsubishi four door automobile, grey in color, bearing Texas license plate DNF-93C, vehicle identification number JA3CU26X0LU005115.” The affidavit mentioned the location of the car in Del Rio and stated that appellant was one of the registered owners of the vehicle. The affidavit also related the basis for believing the automobile contained evidence of a crime:

A woman named Sherry Graves, d/o/b/ 12-23-54, observed Virgil Martinez driving the said automobile. She stated in a voluntary statement to the Brazoria County Sheriffs Department that she observed Virgil Martinez drive the said automobile to the scene of the crime and she watched as Virgil Martinez shot Veronica Fuentes and John Gomez.

The affidavit listed a number of items that were expected to be found in the car, including a gun belt.

Consistent with statements in the probable cause affidavit, appellant’s car was parked in Del Rio on a public street, in front of a slaughterhouse. With the warrant in hand, on October 11, 1996, at around 11:45 p.m., officers-went out to the ear. One of the police officers shone a flashlight at and looked through one of the windows of the car. He saw a gun belt on the rear passenger floorboard, and a switchblade knife was seen in the center console between the front two seats.- The car was then towed by a wrecker service. The vehicle was later inventoried, and on October 12,1996, the gun belt was taken to Brazoria County. Later, the gun belt was delivered to a laboratory for scientific testing. On March 6,1997, a Val Verde County magistrate issued an order authorizing the removal of the gun belt from Val Verde County.

During the motion to suppress hearing, Graves testified that she did not describe the car appellant was driving at the time of the murder. When asked what car appellant usually drives, she described the car as a grey, four-door car. But she never described appellant’s car by its make, year, license plate number, or vehicle identification number. Detective Atchison admitted that Graves did not supply all the information about the car that was attributed to her in the probable cause affidavit. Atchison stated that the misstatements in the affidavit were probably his mistake.

Appellant argued to the trial court that the misstatements in the probable cause affidavit were knowing falsehoods that rendered the search warrant invalid under Franks v. Delaware. The State defended the search warrant but also argued that the gun belt was properly seized under the “plain view seizure” doctrine. The trial court granted appellant’s motion to suppress as to all evidence found in the car except the gun belt. During the hearing, the trial court said that appellant’s argument on the plain view seizure issue did not “hold[ ] water.”

On appeal, appellant contends that the warrant is invalid and that the plain view seizure doctrine does not apply. The State responds with three arguments: (1) the probable cause affidavit contains enough information to justify issuance of the warrant even after the inaccuracies are excised, (2) the gun belt was properly seized under the plain view seizure doctrine, and (3) appellant’s automobile was abandoned, so appellant no longer had an expectation of privacy in it or its contents. We agree with the State that the gun belt was properly obtained under the plain view seizure doctrine.

The plain view seizure doctrine requires a two-prong showing: (1) that law enforcement officials see an item in plain view at a vantage point where they have the right to be, and (2) it is immediately apparent that the item seized constitutes evidence — that is, there is probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity. Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1198, 117 S.Ct. 1556, 137 L.Ed.2d 704 (1997). Appellant concedes that the officers satisfied the first prong — that they were lawfully in a position to observe the gun belt in plain view. He contends only that it was not immediately apparent at the time that the gun belt constituted evidence of a crime. We disagree.

Law enforcement officers knew from a license check that appellant was one of the registered owners of the 1990 Mitsubishi. The Mitsubishi also matched Graves’ general description of a grey, four-door car that she had seen appellant drive. The officers were also armed with the knowledge that an eyewitness had identified appellant as the shooter of at least two of the victims of the crime in question, and so, he used a gun, which might have a matching gun belt. And, the car’s being found in Del Rio was evidence that appellant had used the vehicle to flee. Knowing all of those facts, the officers had probable cause to believe that the gun belt found in appellant’s car was associated with criminal activity. Indeed, under those facts, the officers had probable cause to believe that the car itself was associated with criminal activity, and they were justified, not merely in retrieving the gun belt, but also in seizing the car and all of its contents.

Appellant also argues that the gun belt should be excluded from evidence due to a violation of Article 18.10. Article 18.10 sets forth the procedures for returning a search warrant and disposing of property that has been seized:

Upon returning the search warrant, the officer shall state on the back of the same, or on some paper attached to it, the manner in which it has been executed and shall likewise deliver to the magistrate a copy of the inventory of the property taken into his possession under the warrant. The officer who seized the property shall retain custody of it until the magistrate issues an order directing the manner of safekeeping the property. The property may not be removed from the county in which it was seized without an order approving the removal, issued by a magistrate in the county in which the warrant was issued; provided, however, nothing herein shall prevent the officer, or his department, from forwarding any item or items seized to a laboratory for scientific analysis.

(Emphasis added). Appellant contends that officers violated Article 18.10 by removing property from Val Verde County to Brazoria County without prior approval from a Val Verde County magistrate. Appellant further contends that this alleged violation of Article 18.10 triggers Article 38.23’s provisions, requiring evidence obtained in violation of the law to be excluded. The State advances three responses: (1) the removal of the evidence meets the “scientific testing exception” contained in Article 18.10, (2) the Val Verde County magistrate’s order of March 6, 1997 retroactively cured any noncompliance with Article 18.10, and (3) any error was harmless under Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b).

We need not address the State’s arguments regarding the intricacies of complying with Article 18.10 or the harm that might be caused by a failure to comply because we find that Article 38.23 does not apply to violations of Article 18.10. Article 38.23(a) requires the exclusion of evidence “obtained ... in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas .... ” (ellipses inserted). Article 18.10’s requirement that property not be removed from the county applies only after the property has already been seized. The “obtaining” of a particular item of evidence is not a continuing act. That officers may move an item of evidence to an unauthorized location after it has been legally obtained does not vitiate the status of such evidence as having been legally obtained. Having found that the gun belt was legally obtained pursuant to a plain view seizure, we conclude that the removal of the gun belt from Val Verde County, even if unauthorized under Article 18.10, does not vitiate the status of that evidence as legally obtained. Point of error two is overruled.

C. Evidence

1. John Gomez’s Character

In points of error six and seven, appellant contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of John Gomez’s history of violence and mental illness. Appellant outlines testimony elicited in bills of exception from two witnesses: Joe Castro, Gomez’s uncle, and Juanita Gomez, Gomez’s grandmother. Appellant does not point to a particular rule of evidence authorizing this testimony; instead, he merely claims that the State “opened the door” to this evidence.

Initially, we observe that appellant has failed to preserve his claim as to Castro’s testimony. After Castro was questioned outside the presence of the jury, the trial court ordered a recess. After the recess, the trial court deferred its ruling:

Counsel, in reference to the request by the defense to question the witness Castro in reference to Mr. Gomez, I’m going to hold my ruling in abeyance and allow you, at a later date, at a later time in this trial, if you call it to my attention, I will determine whether or not I will allow it at that time. But at the present time, I am not overruling, I’m not granting the State’s objection they have to it. But I’m not going to allow it at this point in time.

Appellant objected to the trial court’s “not making a ruling at this time.”

After' the State rested, appellant reminded the trial court of appellant’s wish to introduce evidence of Gomez’s character for violence. The trial was recessed for the weekend. On Monday, the trial court asked defense counsel what character evidence he wanted to offer regarding Gomez. The trial court stated that it would not allow in juvenile records but would allow appellant to question witnesses, including Castro. Defense counsel responded that the testimony would probably come in through Juanita. Defense counsel made no subsequent attempt to introduce Castro’s testimony about Gomez’s character.

To preserve error on appeal, a party must obtain a ruling from the trial court or object to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A) & (B). The trial court never ruled on the admissibility of Castro’s testimony. Although appellant objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule at the time, after the State rested, the trial court gave appellant the opportunity to introduce Castro’s testimony. Error with respect to Castro’s testimony has not been preserved for review.

Appellant did properly preserve his claim with respect to Juanita’s testimony by eliciting her proposed testimony outside-the presence of the jury and obtaining a ruling excluding the evidence. We turn, then, to the merits of his claim with respect to her proposed testimony.

In his brief, appellant claims that the following testimony was improperly excluded (paraphrased and numbering inserted):

(1) Juanita denied that she had applied to have her grandson, John Gomez, committed to Harris County Psychiatric Hospital, although she admitted requesting that he receive psychiatric treatment.
(2) She denied that she had stated in a sworn pleading that her grandson had hurt people and would do it again because he would not take his medication.
(3) She acknowledged that her grandson was committed to the Harris County Psychiatric Hospital and that he had been on medication for several years.
(4) She did not know whether her grandson was committed because he would become physically aggressive with other people.
(5) She acknowledged that she had sought temporary health services for her grandson.
(6) She acknowledged that a defense exhibit reflected that her grandson had been suspended for three days for hitting a girl at school.

Character evidence is ordinarily inadmissible. Tex.R. Evid. 404(a). The defendant is permitted to introduce evidence of a pertinent character trait of the alleged victim of the offense on trial. Rule 404(a)(2). But, such evidence may only take the form of reputation or opinion testimony. Rule 405(a). Items (1), (3), (5), and (6) do not constitute reputation or opinion testimony. Item (4) involves a question that, arguably, might encompass opinion testimony, but the answer does not, as the witness stated she did not know. Item (2) arguably involves an opinion about character but that opinion, expressed in a legal pleading, was hearsay. See Tex.R. Evid. 801 & 802. Juanita was never asked for her opinion as to whether Gomez was a violent person. Nor was she asked whether Gomez had a reputation for being a violent person.

The sole reason advanced by appellant for admitting this testimony is that the State opened the door to this evidence with the following question and answer from Castro:

Q. Did he [John Gomez] take care of anyone, there, at that residence?
A. He took care of my mom and his mother.

Appellant contends that this testimony created a false impression that “Gomez had never been involved in aggressive and assaultive behavior with his family members” and that appellant was entitled to rebut this “false impression” with Gomez’s history of violence and mental illness.

This relatively innocuous testimony does not open the door to the presentation of specific instances of violent conduct or of Gomez’s history of mental health treatment. That Gomez took care of family members is hardly evidence of peaceable character. Taking care of a family member does not, in itself, reveal any information about whether the caregiver is peaceful or violent towards those in his care— much less towards others who are not even family members. But even if we were to find that this evidence had some small tendency to falsely confer an impression of peaceful character, the trial court would be well within its discretion in excluding appellant’s evidence under Tex.R. Evid. 403. Points of error six and seven are overruled.

2.Keith Burrow’s Character

In points of error nine and ten, appellant complains that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to impeach Keith Burrow with prior extraneous offenses. Appellant claims that he should have been allowed to cross-examine Burrow regarding two events: (1) Burrow’s giving a false name after an arrest, and (2) Burrow’s shooting his stepfather. Neither of these alleged offenses resulted in a conviction. Appellant claims the extraneous offenses are admissible under Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 611(b).

Rule 401 defines “relevant evidence,” and Rule 611(b) provides that “A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” These rules allow a party to introduce relevant evidence, including evidence regarding credibility, so long as there is no other rule requiring exclusion. In the present case, there is another rule that requires exclusion of the evidence— Texas Rule of Evidence 608. ■

Rule 608 limits the ability of a party to introduce evidence regarding the character of a witness. “Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose- of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness nor proved by extrinsic evidence.” Rule 608(b). The evidence appellant wished to offer did indeed constitute specific instances of conduct but were not prior convictions under Rule 609. The trial court properly excluded the evidence. Points of error nine and ten are overruled.

3.Veronica’s Out-of-Court Statement

In point of error eleven, appellant contends that the trial court erroneously admitted, in violation of the hearsay rule, Graves’ testimony that Veronica told her three weeks before the offense that she (Veronica) was afraid .of. a man named Virgil, and if anyone saw him, to call the sheriffs department. Appellant contends on appeal that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.

“Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Texas Rule of Evidence 801(d). If an item of evidence fails to meet this definition, then it is not hearsay. There are also hearsay exceptions, for items of evidence which meet the definition of hearsay but are nevertheless admissible. One exception to the hearsay rule is the declarant’s then existing mental or emotional condition:

A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declar-ant’s will.

Texas Rule of Evidence 803(3).

There are two aspects of Graves’ testimony: (1) Veronica’s statement that she was afraid of appellant, and (2) Veronica’s plea to Graves to call the sheriff if anyone saw appellant. Veronica’s statement that she was afraid of appellant was a statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, and therefore fell within the Rule 803(3) hearsay exception. Her request to call the sheriffs office, even if it may be characterized as a “verbal expression” under Rule 801(a), was not hearsay. The request was not admitted to show that the sheriffs office was called, but was admitted to show Veronica’s fear of appellant. Point of error eleven is overruled.

4.Gomez’s Out-of-Court Statement

In point of error twelve, appellant contends that the trial court erroneously admitted, in violation of the hearsay rule, Sergeant Tolson’s testimony that Gomez identified the shooter as “Ex-boyfriend.” Appellant contends that the statement does not meet the requirements for an “excited utterance” under Rule 803(2). We need not address whether the statement is an excited utterance, however, because Gomez’s statement clearly qualifies as a dying declaration. A statement meets the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable at the time of trial and the statement is “[a] statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death.” Rule 804(b)(2). Gomez was unavailable at trial because he was dead. Rule 804(a)(4). A declarant’s belief that death was imminent “may be inferred from the circumstances of the case, such as the nature of the injury, medical opinions stated to him, or his conduct.” Thomas v. State, 699 S.W.2d 845, 853 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). Gomez’s statement was made after he had been shot seven times — from which he never recovered — and his statement concerned the identity of the perpetrator. Given the severity of Gomez’s injuries and the manner in which they occurred, the circumstances were sufficient for the trial court to have inferred that Gomez believed his death was imminent. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Point of error twelve is overruled.

5. Phone Calls

In points of error thirteen and fourteen, appellant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motions for mistrial after sustaining his objections to testimony about phone calls. During the State’s direct examination of appellant’s mother, the prosecutor asked: “Did you know back on October 1st of 1996 that Veronica’s phone was blocked from receiving phone calls from your phone?” Appellant objected that the question assumed facts not in evidence. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the question. Appellant’s motion for mistrial was denied. Later, during the State’s direct examination of Veronica’s mother-in-law, the following colloquy occurred:

Q. State whether or not, if it’s within your personal knowledge, that your daughter ever hung up the phone— daughter-in-law ever hung up the phone on Virgil Martinez.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, objection. Leading, alleged extraneous matters.
THE COURT: Overruled. Let’s get the answer.
Q. You may answer.
A. Yes. She would hang up on him.
Q. How did you know she was hanging up on Virgil Martinez?
A. I would ask her, who was that you hung up on.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, object to hearsay at this point in time.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ask that the jury be instructed to disregard.
THE COURT: Members of the jury, you’re instructed to disregard the last question by the prosecutor and the partial answer by the witness.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, at this time we would move for a mistrial.
THE COURT: Denied.

“Ordinarily, a prompt instruction to disregard will cure error associated with an improper question and answer.” Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). We see nothing in the record before us to suggest that the questions and answers provided here were of such a nature that they could not be cured by an instruction to disregard. Points of error thirteen and fourteen are overruled.

D. Lesser offense

In point of error eight, appellant contends that the trial, court erred in refusing to give his requested instruction on the lesser offense of murder. Despite the forensic evidence showing that all four victims were shot with the same gun, the eyewitness testimony that appellant shot both Veronica and Gomez, and the evidence — both direct and circumstantial— showing that appellant wore a gun holster on the night of the killings, appellant claims that the following scenario was raised by evidence presented at trial: that Veronica shot the children, that she subsequently shot Gomez, and that afterwards, appellant shot Veronica. Appellant bases this claim on three things: (1) Gomez’s statement to Graves, ‘Veronica’s gone crazy. Gun at kids’ heads,” (2) what appellant perceives to be an admission by Graves in the 911 call that she had no knowledge of whether anyone had been shot, and (3) the fact that Graves never told the 911 dispatcher that she had seen appellant shoot Gomez or Veronica.

Even if we assumed that appellant’s interpretation of the facts was rational and that those facts raised the lesser included offense of murder, any error in that regard was harmless. The jury delivered three guilty verdicts, each on a separate count for capital murder: (1) murdering Veronica and Gomez during the same transaction, (2) murdering Joshua, a child under the age of sbq and (3) murdering Cassandra, a child under the age of six. One death sentence was assessed, based upon the three counts. Only count one is susceptible to the lesser included-offense theory advanced here — appellant could be guilty of non-capital murder as to count one if he killed Veronica or Gomez but not both. Counts two and three, each requiring only one victim, are not susceptible to appellant’s lesser-included offense theory, and each of the latter two counts, alone, is sufficient to support a death sentence. Moreover, the jury’s verdicts on counts two and three show that the jury did not believe the lesser-included offense scenario appellant now advances. Point of error eight is overruled.

E. Jury Argument

In point of error fifteen, appellant complains about the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial after sustaining a defense objection to a statement made by the prosecutor during argument. The prosecutor argued:

Veronica’s not here to tell you the reason why she was afraid and why the police called. But there’s evidence before you, she is afraid. And I tell you, common sense dictates, common knowledge that sometimes, spurned lovers kill the other person, particularly, when they come in and, perhaps, see her with another person.

Defense counsel objected: “Object to this. He’s arguing outside the record. Not in the evidence.” The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s last statement. Appellant’s motion for mistrial was denied.

Even when the prosecutor mentions facts outside the record during argument, an instruction to disregard will generally cure the error. Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). Assuming, without deciding, that the prosecutor’s argument was improper, that argument was not so extreme as to render ineffective an instruction to disregard. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s

instruction to disregard cured any error. Point of error fifteen is overruled.

III. PUNISHMENT

A. Parole

In points of error three and sixteen, appellant complains about the trial court’s refusal to permit the jurors to be informed, during voir dire and in jury instructions, that a capital murder defendant who receives a life sentence will not be eligible for parole for forty years. We have consistently decided this issue adversely to appellant’s position, and appellant makes no novel argument that would persuade us to deviate from our precedent. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 756 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Griffith v. State, 983 S.W.2d 282, 289 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 77, 145 L.Ed.2d 65 (1999). Points of error three and sixteen are overruled.

B. Voluntary Intoxication

In point of error seventeen, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to submit in the punishment phase jury charge an instruction on voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor. Appellant cites evidence presented in the punishment phase that he had admitted to consuming alcohol, PCP, and cocaine before he was picked up by the authorities, and that a psychiatrist subsequently prescribed for him Haldol, an anti-psychotic drug. But no evidence was presented that appellant used these drugs at or before the time of the offense or that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense. Absent such evidence, appellant was not entitled to a charge on intoxication as a mitigating factor. Rodriguez v. State, 899 S.W.2d 658, 668 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 946, 116 S.Ct. 385, 133 L.Ed.2d 307 (1995). Point of error seventeen is overruled.

In points of error eighteen and nineteen, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to State’s arguments involving matters outside the record. Appellant’s complaint involves the following colloquies:

PROSECUTOR: And based on this evidence, this — this rates as one of the worst crimes, one of the worst killings not only in Brazoria County but the . State of Texas.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, your honor. That’s not in the record.
THE COURT: Stay in the record, counsel.
PROSECUTOR: The evidence shows you, these were execution killings. 26 to 28 bullets. The family of the murdered victims, the family — the victims themselves, they cry out to you, for the death penalty in this case. There’s no more—
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, your Honor. Not in the record, either. Absolutely no evidence of that.
THE COURT: Overruled.
PROSECUTOR: Justice in this case requires you, because we told you from day-one, what we wanted was a fair jury, a jury that would do justice in this case.
You know, think about the nurses in the penitentiary. Think about the secretaries. Think about the guards.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, your Honor. Nothing in the record about nurses and secretaries.
THE COURT: Overruled.
PROSECUTOR: Think about the other people this defendant is going to come into contact with. Think about the other people that you can protect by giving the death penalty in this case.

There are two prosecutorial comments that appellant claims are outside the record: (1) that the victims and their families cry out for the death penalty, and (2) that prisons are staffed by nurses and secretaries. Appellant is correct that neither of those items appear in the record, but the comments can arguably be justified on other grounds: comment (1) as a plea for law enforcement and comment (2) as a statement of matters within the realm of common knowledge. See Guidry, 9 S.W.3d at 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)(pleas for law enforcement permissible); Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (common knowledge is an exception to the prohibition against arguing facts outside the record). However, we will assume, without deciding, that the comments are not covered by these arguable justifications, and address the issue of harm.

The first question is whether to assess harm under the standard for constitutional errors or for nonconstitutional errors. For arguments that strike over the shoulders of counsel, we have held that the harm standard for nonconstitutional errors — found in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) — applies. Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070,119 S.Ct. 1466, 143 L.Ed.2d 550 (1999). Mosley’s holding suggests that most comments that fall outside the areas of permissible argument will be considered to be error of the noneonstitutional variety. Comments upon matters outside the record, while outside the permissible areas of jury argument, do not appear to raise any unique concerns that would require us to assign constitutional status. We shall therefore apply the standard of harm for nonconsti-tutional errors.

Rule 44.2(b) provides that a non-constitutional error “that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” In Mosley, we held that determining harm under that standard in improper argument cases requires balancing the following three factors: (1) severity of the misconduct (prejudicial effect), (2) curative measures, (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct. Id. Appellant argues that this test applies to punishment, except that the third factor would involve the certainty of “the punishment assessed.” We agree that the Mosley test would apply to punishment, at least in a capital case, with the third factor so modified. We proceed to analyze the comments under the Mosley factors.

The degree of misconduct, if any, was relatively mild in the present case. The prosecutor’s comment that the victims and their families cry out for the death penalty appears to be intended as a plea for law enforcement. The jury was in a position to know that victims who are dead cannot presently cry out for the death penalty, and that, given the facts surrounding their deaths, no such cries were made before they died. Nor would the jurors be surprised to hear that the victims’ families would be upset with appellant or that they would want retribution. And the prosecutor did not attempt, through this argument, to convey any specific facts about the effect of the victims’ deaths upon their families. Instead, the prosecutor was pleading with the jury to give the death penalty because the record before the jury showed that the defendant deserved it. To the extent that the prosecutor conveyed facts outside the record, such facts had no tendency to adversely influence the jury against appellant beyond the influence exerted by a wholly legitimate plea for law enforcement.

The prosecutor’s comment that appellant could be- a threat to nurses and secretaries was also, at most, mildly improper. That prisons would employ personnel to treat medical problems and clerical workers to handle paperwork is a matter of common knowledge. Whether such persons would be nurses and seere-taries or would be other personnel performing such functions is of little significance. The prosecutor’s main point — that appellant would be a threat to non-prisoners in prison — was an entirely legitimate point to make. The first Mosley factor carries very little weight in the present case.

The second factor may be quickly dispensed with. There was no curative instruction, and the State did nothing to emphasize the allegedly erroneous comments made. The comments were a very small portion of the State’s entire argument at punishment.

The third factor weighs heavily in the State’s favor. Appellant’s crime was especially egregious. He killed not just one, but four people, including two small children. The apparent motive for these killings was jealousy over an ex-girlfriend. A former girlfriend testified at the punishment stage that appellant had exhibited aberrant behavior after their relationship ended: calling her names when she broke the relationship off, subsequently leaving messages on her voice mail at work, and calling her at home numerous times after she told him not to call. She also testified about a disturbing incident in which appellant came into her house uninvited with pizza for her children, slammed his fist on her kitchen table while uttering profanities about someone he used to date, and finally stormed back out after being asked several times to leave. After his arrest appellant threatened hospital attendants with a heavy plastic table knife, and appellant was caught concealing a welding rod while being transported during trial. There was also evidence at trial that appellant had attempted to fake insanity after he was arrested for the present offense. This evidence shows a volatile, obsessive, and non-repentant individual who would resort to violence — even extreme violence — when his relationships with women did not work out.

Given the mildness of the prosecutor’s comments and the strength of the evidence supporting appellant’s death sentence, we find that any errors associated with .those comments were harmless. Points of error eighteen and nineteen are overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

WOMACK, J., filed a concurring opinion.

PRICE, HOLLAND, and JOHNSON, JJ., concurred in the result.

WOMACK, J.,

filed a concurring opinion.

I join the judgment of the court and, except as to points of error 18 and 19, its opinion. In my view there was no error as to those points, and therefore the issue of harmless error need not be reached.

      . The offense statute provides, in relevant part:
      A person commits an offense if he commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(b)(1) and:
      (7) the person murders more than one person:
      (A) during the same criminal transaction; or ...
      (8) the person murders an individual under six years of age.

      . Unless otherwise indicated all future references to Articles refer to the Code of Criminal Procedure.

      . Appellant cites caselaw indicating that Article I § 9 confers more protection than the Fourth Amendment in requiring that voluntary consent be shown by clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. See State v. Ibarra, 953 S.W.2d 242, 244-245 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Accordingly, we review appellant’s claims in light of the more protective state standard.

      . Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).

      . Consequently, we need not address, and express no opinion about, the other arguments made by the parties.

      . Here, the trial court postponed its ruling and promised to rule at a later point in trial. Due to subsequent events, we need not address whether or not this postponement amounts to a "refusal to rule” that would preserve error under Rule 33.1.

      .In his brief, appellant also states that John Gomez's mental health records were included in his offer of proof. However, aside from the testimony above, appellant does not point to portions of the records he wished to introduce, what those portions would have said about Gomez’s character, or why they would be admissible.

      . The record indicates that Gomez's mother has Down’s Syndrome.

      . Rule 403 provides:
      Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,

        or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

      . These two points are consolidated for argument in appellant’s brief.

      .The trial court's instruction to disregard applied only to the prosecutor's last question and the witness' answer concerning how Veronica's mother-in-law knew that Veronica hung up the phone on appellant. But that question and answer suggests that the previous question and answer — that Veronica hung up the phone on appellant — may have been based solely upon hearsay. Assuming arguen-do that this testimony was in fact inadmissible hearsay, appellant failed to preserve error. That appellant failed to contemporaneously object on hearsay grounds to this previous question and answer may be excusable, since the prosecutor’s question was not obviously designed to elicit hearsay testimony. But, once the hearsay problem with the previous testimony became apparent, appellant was required to object and request curative action to preserve error. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1; Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1173, 117 S.Ct. 1442, 137 L.Ed.2d 548 (1997)(party must procure an adverse ruling to preserve error); Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 198-199 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)(plurality opinion), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 941, 113 S.Ct. 2418, 124 L.Ed.2d 640 (1993)(if evidence that appears to be admissible at the time later turns out to be inadmissible, complaining party must move to strike evidence at the time its inadmissibility becomes apparent). Appellant failed to request any curative action for this previous testimony.

      . When the 911 dispatcher asked Graves if anyone had been shot, Graves replied that she did not know and did not want to go outside to find out. At trial, Graves testified that she thought the dispatcher was talking about the children.

      . Appellant's proposed scenario is, at best, unlikely given the pattern of gunfire present on the 911 tape. While Graves conversed with Gomez, what appear to be muffled shots can be heard on the tape. These shots may have occurred when the two children were killed in the trailer. About 10 seconds after Graves' last comment to Gomez, a rapid round of twelve to fifteen gunshots can be heard. Shortly thereafter, a rapid round of approximately seven gunshots can be heard on the tape. This third round of gunshots would appear to be insufficient to create the ten to twelve gunshot wounds suffered by Veronica. Rather, Veronica's wounds were consistent with the second round of gunshots. The pattern of gunshots on the 911 tape indicates that Veronica was shot before Gomez, and after being shot, she would be incapable of shooting anyone. Add to the 911 evidence the fact that the bullets in all the victims came from the same gun and that appellant wore a gun holster that night, and appellant's theory of multiple shooters seems even more implausible.

      . A defendant is entitled to a mitigation instruction on intoxication in the punishment phase of a trial if there is evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication:
      (b) Evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication may be introduced by the actor in mitigation of the penalty attached to the offense for which he is being tried.
      (c) When temporary insanity is relied upon as a defense and the evidence tends to show that such insanity was caused by intoxication, the court shall charge the jury in accordance with the provisions of this section.
      Texas Penal Code § 8.04(b) & (c).

      . We note that the jury’s verdict on punishment was delivered within an hour and a half after deliberations began.