author: Mr. Justice Jones

text:
    Second District.
    Milton Halowell, administrator, plaintiff in error, v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 7,569.
    Action for death by wrongful act of defendant’s train colliding with automobile in which plaintiff’s intestate was riding. Judgment for defendant. Error to the Circuit Court of La Salle county; the Hon. Joe A. Davis, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the April term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 21, 1927.
    Rehearing denied April 6, 1927.
    A. E. Butters and Roger H. Clark, for plaintiff in error. Woodward, Hibbs & Pool, for defendant in error; Daniel Taylor, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Presiding Justice Partlow

license: Public Domain

text:
    William H. Fiser, appellee, v. Chicago & North Western Railway Company and the City of Rockford, appellants.
    Gen. No. 7,727.
    Action for damages to an automobile. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. Edward D. Shurtleff, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 7, 1927.
    Hyer & Gill and David D. Madden, for appellants. Roy F. Hall, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Partlow

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Jett

text:
    Samuel J. Sloan, administrator of the estate of Homer Sloan, deceased, appellee, v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railway Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,622.
    Action for death by wrongful act of defendant’s train in colliding at crossing with automobile in which plaintiff’s intestate was riding. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Iroquois county; the Hon. Frank L. Hooper, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the April term, 1926.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 17, 1927.

      Free P. Morris and Roscoe C. South, for appellant; Homer T. Dick, of counsel. Dyer & Dyer and J. W. Kern, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Barney Petlick and Jane Doe, otherwise known as Mrs. Barney Petlick, plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 7,676.
    Prosecution for violation of Prohibition Act. Conviction and sentence of Jane Doe; Barney Petlick not guilty. Error to the County Court of Lake county; the Hon. Perry L. Persons, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 17, 1927.
    James G. Welch, for plaintiff in error, Jane Doe. Ashbel V. Smith, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Sidney H. Block, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ed Slyman, administrator of the estate of Rose Slyman, deceased, appellee, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Inc., appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,702.
    Action on life insurance policy. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the County Court of Peoria county; the Hon. W. W. Wright, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 17, 1927.
    Miller, Elliott & Westervelt, for appellant. Roscoe Herget, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James W. Foraker, appellee, v. P. H. Slocum, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,655.
    Action for personal injuries from automobile collision. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Frederick A. Hill, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the April term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 13, 1927.
    Donovan, Bray & Gray, for appellant. R. C. Schoenstedt, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. James E. Allen, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 7,664.
    Conviction of adultery. Error to the' Circuit. Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. E. D. Reynolds, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 13, 1927.
    William L. Pierce, for plaintiff in error. William D. Knight, State’s Attorney, and Alfred B. Louison, Assistant State’s Attorney, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    H. D. Morgan, appellant, v. Reuben Baily Carson et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 7,674.
    Bill to have deeds declared mortgages and to have right to redeem. Dismissed for want of equity. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. John M. Niehaus, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the April term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 13, 1927.
    W. O. Pendarvis, for appellant. J. W. Maple, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

text:
    Cynthia J. Case, appellant, v. Charles V. Weddell, appellee.
    Gen. No. 7,639.
    Action for money obtained through false representations. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Kalb county; the Hon. John K. Newhall, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the April term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 26, 1927.
    Rehearing denied June 30, 1927.
    Harry S. Mecartney and Harvey Gunsul, for appellant; J. J. Kilgallon, of counsel. Archie G. Kennedy, for appellee; Thomas M. Cliffe, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    S. B. Geiger, appellant, v. City of Rockford, appellee.
    Gen. No. 7,678.
    Action to recover for work and material furnished under written contract. Judgment for defendants. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. Edward D. Shurtleff, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed May 31, 1927.
    Early & Early, for appellant. David D. Madden, Corporation Counsel, and George T. Liddell, City Attorney, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ernest J. Galbraith, administrator de bonis non of the estate of Michael Harrigan, deceased, appellee, v. Maggie Harrigan, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,690.
    Appeal from judgment overruling objections to reports of public administrator and for distribution. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. John M. Niehaus, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Corrected and affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 31, 1927.
    Howard White, for appellant. Irwin L. Puller, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Crow

text:
    Third District.
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Lynn Beckham, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 8,012.
    Conviction and sentence for violation of Prohibition Act. Error to the Circuit Court of Champaign county; the Hon. Pranklin H. Boggs, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1927.
    Lynn S. Corbly and Lott R. Herrick, for plaintiff in error. Roy R. Cline, State’s Attorney, and G. C. Hodson, Assistant State’s Attorney, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Crow

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Niehaus

text:
    Ira D. Kelsheimer, appellant, v. Dessa Kelsheimer, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,032.
    Bill for divorce on ground of desertion. Dismissed for want of equity. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign county; the Hon. Franklin H. Boggs, Judge", presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1927.
    C. E. Beach, for appellant. Schneider & Schneider, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Maud A. Lindsey, appellee, v. John H. Lindsey, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,048.
    Bill for separate maintenance. Order for maintenance, suit money and solicitor’s fees pendente lite. Appeal from the City Court of Canton; the Hon. Charles B. Adams, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1927.
    Burnett M. Chiperfield, Claude E. Chiperfield and Robert B. Chiperfield, for appellant. Glenn Ratcliff, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Shurtleff

text:
    W. J. Lateer, appellee, v. Jennie C. Neil et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 8,026.
    Appeal from order denying motion to open a judgment entered in vacation on note sued on. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Shelby county; the Hon. Franklin R. Dove, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1927.
    A. J. Steidley, for appellants. Ward & Pugh, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Columbia Weighing Machine Company, appellant, v. Alvin Henkel and Enno Henkel, appellees.
    Gen. No. 8,056.
    Assumpsit to recover contract price of goods sold. Judgment for defendants. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. William B. Wright, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1927.
    M. J. McMurray, for appellant. Hill & Bullington, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Bloomington Auto Sales Company et al., appellees, v. Indemnity Company of America, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,027.
    Bill to reform policy insuring against liability from operating automobiles. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. Edward Barry, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 22, 1927.
    A. E. & R. C. De Mange, for appellant. Sigmund Livingston, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Bessie Ervin and Tymore Feeback, plaintiffs in error, v. The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 8,034.
    Conviction and sentence for adultery. Error to the County Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. W. T. Henderson, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 22, 1927.
    Robert R. Rodman, for plaintiffs in error. Elmer O. Furrow, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Louis J. Bremer and O. W. Longenecker, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frank E. Yeazel, appellant, v. Frank Bowman, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,043.
    Action on judgment note. Judgment for plaintiff that confession judgment stand. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. Augustus A. Partlow, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 22, 1927.
    Fleming & Henderson, for appellant. Gunn, Penwell & Bindley, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Edward H. Richter, trading as E. H. Richter and Sons, appellee, v. Indian Refining Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,053.
    Action for damages from fire caused by negligent filling of gasoline tank. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. E. S. Smith, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 22, 1927.
    Oscar John Dorwin and Brown, Hay & Stephens, for appellant. Oscar J. Putting, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mary A. Bergman et al., appellees, v. Sarah J. Rhodes et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 8,058.
    Bill for division of land among heirs, instead of sale. Decree for sale of premises as in statutory partition. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macoupin county; the Hon. Frank W. Burton, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed April 22, 1927.
    Rehearing denied June 24, 1927.
    Vaughn & Nevins and Bishop & Claiborne, for appellants. Knotts & Knotts and Rinaker & Rinaker, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Jasper W. Stringer and Melvina Stringer, appellants, v. T. E. Burner and D. L. Burner et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 8,033.
    Bill to rescind contract of realty purchase for fraud, and for equitable lien for payment made. Dismissed for want of equity. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Hancock county; the Hon. George C. Hillyer, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed in part and decree modified.
    Opinion filed April 22, 1927.
    Scofield & Bell and Wallace J. Black, for appellants; C. M. West, of counsel. Williams & Williams, Mack & Mack, Hartzell, Cavanagh & Martin and O’Harra, O’Harra & O’Harra, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

text:
    Fourth District.
    Jennie Eckman, appellee, v. John Wildt, appellant.
    Action for realty broker’s commission. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. Wilbur A. Trares, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Robert Ferdinand Tunnell, for appellant. F. J. Manning and S. A. Bleisch, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Joe A. Hubele, appellee, v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, appellant.
    Action for killing and injuring live stock. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of White county; the Hon. Julius C. Kern, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Farmer & Klingel, for appellant. Conger & Elliott, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Roy Modlin, appellee, v. Alva Arrowsmith, administratrix of the estate of Arthur Arrowsmith, deceased, appellant.
    Judgment for claimant against estate for care of deceased. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. William B. Wright, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Holt & Holt, for appellant. Russell Wilson, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    S. F. Cates, appellee, v. Rolla M. Treece, appellant.
    Suit for money had. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the City Court of West Frankfort; the Hon. J. P. Mooneyham, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Trobaugh & Church, for appellant. J. E. Carr and Geo. Sawyer, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Antonia Shimkus, appellant, v. Standard Oil Company, appellee.
    Action for personal injuries from, automobile. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. William F. Borders, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Louis Beasley and Edward C. Zulley, for appellant. Kramer, Kramer & Campbell and R. E. Costello, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    H. P. Hotz, appellee, v. James U. Duffin, appellant.
    Forcible detainer. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. Louis Bernreuter, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    J. B. Harris, for appellant. Edward L. Maher, for appellee; Frank E. Sebastian, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    M. W. Cockrum, appellee, v. Charles Gualdoni et al., appellants.
    Action on purchase price promissory notes. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Franklin county; the Hon. Julius C. Kern, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Williams & Lewis and R. E. Smith, for appellants. Layman & Johnson, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Christina Bolk, executrix, appellee, v. Ben Albers, appellant.
    Action for death by wrongful act. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clinton county; the Hon. Franklin B. Dove, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the March term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Rehearing denied March 23, 1927.
    W. G. Murphey and A. B. Lager, for appellant. C. A. McNeill and P. K. Johnson, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Boggs

text:
    Robert Belino, plaintiff in error, v. John Petty et al., defendants in error.
    Bill to set aside conveyances as fraudulent. Dismissed for want of equity. Error to the Circuit Court of Bandolph county; the Hon. Louis Bernreuter, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Thomas F. Smith, for plaintiff in error. Everett Lewis and J. Fred Glister, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ernest Jenkins, appellant, v. Robert Jenkins et al., appellees.
    Bill for contribution from co-sureties. Dismissed for want of equity. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Saline county; the Hon. A. E. Somers, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926,
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.

      Charles H. Thompson and K. C. Ronalds, for appellant, John W. Browning and Oral P. Tuttle, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Citizens State & Trust Bank, appellee, v. Henry Eimers and Albert Eimers, appellants.
    Action on promissory notes. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. Louis Bernreuter, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed on remittitur of $317.82 within 20 days of filing date of opinion; otherwise reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    J. I. Beck, for appellants. Terry, Gueltig & Powell and W. P. Early, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frances Volluz, appellee, v. May E. McGee, appellant.
    Assumpsit to recover payment on realty sales contract. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. William F. Borders, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Kramer, Kramer & Campbell and R. E. Costello, for appellant. R. B. Hendricks, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Robert L. Patton, trustee, appellant, v. Savilla Shipman, appellee.
    Action on promissory notes. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lawrence comity; the Hon. C. H. Miller, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Confirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Shaw & Huffman and McGaughey, Tohill & McGaughey, for appellant; Noah M. Tohill, of counsel. Gee & Gee, for appellee; Wm. McCarty, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr, Justice Boggs

text:
    John Duffner, appellee, v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, appellant.
    Action for personal injuries and damage to automobile from collision with freight train. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the City Court of Granite City; the Hon. M. R. Sullivan, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    D. E. Keefe, for appellant; H, N. Quigley and S. W. Baxter, of counsel. Bandy & Forth, for appellee.
   Mr, Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Albert Senciper, appellee, v. H. C. Massey and Roy W. Massey, trading as Massey Brothers, appellants.
    Assumpsit for balance due on contract for services. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the City Court of Granite City; the Hon. M. R. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Harry Faulkner, for appellants. Wm. M. P. Smith, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Higbee

text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. T. W. Hall, appellant, v. George Sweazey, appellee.
    Quo warranto to test right of defendant to hold office. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of White county; the Hon. Julius C. Kern, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Joe A. Pearce, State’s Attorney, and Chas. T. Randolph, for appellant. Roy E. Pearce, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Edward Johnson, appellee, v. Joseph Feraud and August Feraud, trading as Feraud Brothers, appellants.
    Assumpsit on account stated. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the City Court of Granite City; the Hon. M. R. Sullivan, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    J. C. Steele and Wm. M. P. Smith, for appellants. Bandy & Forth, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Irene Durbin, appellee, v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railway Company, appellant.
    Trespass on the case for personal injuries suffered in automobile colliding with train. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Cir; euit Court of Effingham county; the Hon. Thomas M. Jett, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Rehearing denied March 23, 1927.
    Harry S. Parker, George Bauer, Donald B. Craig and Fred H. Kelly, for appellant; Homer T. Dick, of counsel. A. H. Ranes, Byron Piper and Corinne L. Rice, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    William J. Veach, appellee, v. J. W. Stegmeyer and C. D. Robinson. Weber Implement and Automobile Company, appellant.
    Bill for recovery of money fraudulently obtained. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. Silas Cook, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    T. A. O’Connor, for appellant. T. M. Webb, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Albert Kell, appellee, v. Thomas J. Armstrong and Sylvester C. Garrison, trading as Armstrong & Garrison, appellants.
    Action for damages for breach of contract of purchase. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. F. R. Dove, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Reversed and remanded
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Holt & Holt, for appellants. Wham & Wham, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr, Justice Higbee

text:
    Claude Welch, by C. W. White, appellee, v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, appellant.
    Trespass for destruction of automobile by train through railway’s negligence. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. William F. Borders, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Fordyce, Holliday & White and Whitnel & Browning, for appellant. Louis Beasley and Edward C. Zulley, for appellee.
   Mr, Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Henry Pinkstaff and Ella Pinkstaff, appellees, v. James Pinkstaff, appellant.
    Assumpsit for amount duo under oral contract. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lawrence county; the Hon. J. C. Eagleton, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Gee & Gee and P. W. Barnes, for appellant. Shaw & Huffman, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Jennie Kerins, appellee, v. James R. Pruitt et al. Henry Bergman and Theresa Louise Bergman, appellants.
    Bill for foreclosure. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    W. E. Knowles, for appellants. H. Grady Vien, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John P. Keim, appellee, v. Henry T. Renshaw et al., appellants.
    Bill to foreclose mortgage. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the March term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Original opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Rehearing denied and opinion modified and refiled March 23, 1927.
    Ralph Cook and Charles A. Karch, for appellants. Otto F. Leffler and Turner, Holder & Bullington, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Per curiam.

text:
    Henry Wardein and Henry J. Wardein, Jr., appellants, v. Euphrasia D. Quintal, appellee.
    Appeal dismissed for failure to write upon or attach to the record an assignment of errors before final submission of the cause. Appeal from the City Court of Alton; the Hon. L. D. Yager, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    Rehearing denied March 23, 1927.

      J. P. Streuber and Wm. M. P. Smith, for appellants. Wm. P. Boynton, for appellee.
   Per curiam.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Florence E. Elam, appellee, v. George Stanbery, appellant.
    Appeal from finding in bastardy proceeding affirmed for lack of sufficient abstract by appellant and for lack of reversible error. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Bond county; the Hon. Silas Cook, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926. Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 19, 1927.
    F. M. Guinn, Brown & Burnside and Bobt. E. Wright, for appellant. J. H. Allio, State’s Attorney, and Albert, Webb & Albert, for appellee.
   Per curiam.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. James Ogg, plaintiff in error.
    Conviction and sentence for violation of Prohibition Act. Error to the County Court of Marion county; the Hon. W. G. Wilson, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the March term, 1927.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 15, 1927.
    Charles H. Holt, for plaintiff in error. C. F. Dew, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Dick Norman, plaintiff in error.
    Conviction and sentence for violating Prohibition Act. Error to the County Court of Saline county; the Hon. John W. Browning, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the March term, 1927. Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 15, 1927.
    Alpheus Gustin, for plaintiff in error. C. T. Flota, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice

text:
    Eldorado Wholesale Corporation, appellee, v. John Terzis et al., appellants.
    Suit for goods sold. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Saline county; the Hon. A. E. Somers, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the March term, 1927.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 15, 1927.
    K. C. Ronalds, for appellants. Summers & Summers, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice

Barry delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Paul Albrecht, appellant, v. Omphgent Township and Christ Bunte, appellees.
    Action for damages from defective bridge. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. H. F. Gillham, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the February term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 15, 1927.
    R. F. Tunnell, for appellant. Terry, Gueltig & Powell, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    William E. Schneider, appellee, v. Fort Dearborn Casualty Underwriters, appellant.
    Action on policy indemnifying against damage caused by automobile: Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. Silas Cook, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 15, 1927.
    Geers & Geers, for appellant. Beasley & Zulley, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James F. Keeley and John Keeley, trading as Keeley Brothers Contracting Company, plaintiffs in error, v. Illinois Glass Company, defendant in error.
    Action for damages for refusal to complete building contract. Judgment for defendant. Error to the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. J. F. Gillham, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 15, 1927.
    McGlynn & McGlynn, for plaintiffs in error. E. J. Verlie, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Hazel Millard, appellee, v. Arcade Furniture Company, appellant.
    Action for personal injuries on poorly lighted stairway. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. M. R. Sullivan, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 15, 1927.
    Pope & Driemeyer, for appellant. Farthing & Farthing, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Harry Clark and Irwin Hatridge, plaintiff in error.
    Conviction and sentence for violation of section 1 of “An Act for the protection of bank depositors.” Error to the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
    Opinion filed April 15, 1927.
    Rehearing denied July 29, 1927,
    Turner, Holder & Bullington and H. J. Bandy, for plaintiff in error. Jesse R. Brown, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Larner Leeds, appellant, v. Glen Nading and Paul Nading, appellees.
    Replevin for personalty wrongfully detained. Judgment against plaintiff. Appeal from the County Court of Wabash county; the Hon. F. N. Parish, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the March term, 1927.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 15, 1927.
    Frank Fornoff, for appellant. Stoltz & Lamkin, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Thomson Taylor, P. J., and O’Connor, J.,

text:
    Louise Knaack, Appellee, v. Clifford Knaack, Executor of the Estate of Christian Knaack, Deceased, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 31,301.
    1. Divorce — suit money allowed on bill of review of decree. Under Cahill’s St. eh. 40, Tf 16, providing for payment of attorney fees to a wife to enable her to maintain or defend a divorce suit, although a bill of review by a wife to set aside a divorce decree obtained by her husband is in the nature of an appeal, yet it is so far ancillary to the original suit for divorce as to be included in the spirit of the statute and to permit her to obtain suit money for the purpose.
    2. Divorce — to whom suit money should be paid. The order of the trial court for payment of suit money in a divorce matter “to complainant’s solicitor, for use of complainant,’’ is erroneous under Cahill’s St. eh. 40, H 16, providing that such money shall be paid to the wife or into court for her use.
    Appeal by defendant from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph Sabath, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1926. '
    Reversed.
    Supplemental opinion filed June 13, 1927.
    Original opinion filed April 6, 1927.
    Fisher, Boyden, ICales & Bell, for appellant; Thomas H. Fisher, of counsel.
    Hugo Radau, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.

By this appeal the defendant executor seeks to reverse an order of the superior court of Cook county, requiring the now deceased, Christian Knaack, to “pay to complainant’s solicitor fór use of complainant, $100 solicitor’s fees.” This order was entered by the trial court in the course of a bill of review proceeding, by which the complainant sought to have a decree.of divorce, which had been procured against her by her husband, Christian Knaack, vacated and set aside.

The complainant, Louise Knaack, filed a bill for divorce against her husband. He then filed a cross-bill. That case went to a hearing and resulted in a decree granting the husband a divorce on his cross-bill. This decree was entered on December 29, 1925. At the following term of the trial court, namely, on January 29, 1926, the complainant filed her “bill in the nature of a bill of review to impeach decree for fraud, ’ ’ wherein she sought to have the decree of divorce, which her husband had secured, vacated and set aside, on the ground that neither the complainant nor her solicitor had received any notice that the divorce case had been placed upon the trial calendar, and for that reason she had not been present in court at the time the divorce case was reached and heard and the decree, in favor of her husband, awarded.

The defendant, Christian Knaack, filed his answer to the bill of review and on the same day complainant made a motion for temporary alimony and solicitor’s fees, and also that her husband be required to deliver certain wearing apparel to her, and that the cause be placed on the trial calendar. The court continued the motion for temporary alimony and the motion involving the wearing apparel; ordered that the cause be placed on the trial calendar for hearing, and further ordered that the defendant “pay to complainant’s solicitor for use of complainant $100 solicitor’s fees.” The defendant prayed an appeal from the latter order, involving solicitor’s fees, which was allowed. Subsequently, Christian Knaaek died and Clifford Knaaek, as executor of his estate, was substituted as party defendant in this cause, for the purpose of urosecuting the appeal.

The right of complainant in this case, to solicitor’s fees, rests upon the provisions of section 15 of the Divorce Act, Cahill’s St. ch. 40, 16. That section provides that: “In all cases of divorce the court may require the husband to pay to the wife, or pay into court for her use during the pendency of the suit, such sum or sums of money as may enable her to maintain or defend the suit; and in every suit for a divorce, the wife, when it is just and equitable, shall be entitled to alimony during the pendency of the suit. And in case of appeal or writ of error by the husband, the court in which the decree or order is rendered, may grant and enforce the payment of such money for her defense, and such equitable alimony during the pendency of the appeal or writ of error, as to such court shall seem reasonable and proper.” The appellant contends that the present proceeding, in the nature of a bill of review, seeking to vacate a decree of divorce, is not in itself “a case of divorce” within the meaning of that phrase, as used in the first part of section 15, but that it is a proceeding in the nature of an appeal or writ of error, which is covered by the latter part of section 15, and, therefore, that she is not entitled to solicitor’s fees under the statute, which only provides an allowance for solicitor’s fees “in'case of appeal or writ of error by the husband, ’ ’ and not where the wife is the moving party in the appeal or writ of error.

It is no doubt true that in some sense a bill in the nature of a bill of review, in which it is sought to vacate a decree of divorce previously entered, is a proceeding in the nature of an appeal or writ of error. But we are of the opinion that such a proceeding must be considered as so far ancillary to the original suit for divorce as to be included within the spirit and terms of the statute providing for the payment of alimony and solicitor’s fees “in a case of divorce,” as was held in the case of Elzas v. Elzas, 83 Ill. App. 523; 183 Ill. 160. In that case this court said: “It would be inconsistent to suppose that it was intended” (by the statute) “to thus protect her interests and rights on the original trial and to leave her helpless to protect them when attacked by a bill presented to the same court, the purpose of which was solely to reverse the decree of divorce rendered in the original suit. The language of the statute is broad; it being ‘in all cases of divorce ’ that the provision is made to apply. We hold, therefore, that this preceding” (a bill of review seeking to have a divorce decree vacated) “is ‘a case of divorce, ’ within the spirit and terms of the statute, and that upon the appeal in such proceeding the court had power to enter the order for payment of solicitor’s fees.” In the Elsas case, a wife sued her husband for divorce and a decree was entered in her favor. Thereafter, the husband presented his petition for leave to file a bill of review, seeking to vacate the decree of divorce because of error of law apparent on the face of the record and because of newly-discovered evidence. Upon a hearing of the petition the court denied the leave prayed for and dismissed the petition. The husband perfected an appeal from that order. Thereafter, the court ordered the husband to pay his wife $200, as and for her solicitor’s fees to enable her to defend the appeal. The husband then perfected his appeal from the order for solicitor’s fees. The question in that case, therefore, involved the right of the wife to solicitor’s fees from the husband, in connection with his appeal from an order entered in the bill of review proceeding. That right was controlled by the provisions of the latter part of section 15, of the Divorce Act. To entitle the wife to solicitor’s fees under those provisions, it was necessary that the appeal be an appeal from an order entered in “a case of divorce.” It was the contention of the husband in that case that a bill of review, seeking to vacate a decree of divorce, was not “a case of divorce,” but was a separate, original proceeding in equity. In the course of its opinion in the Elsas case, the Supreme Court referred to some of the features of original bills and bills not original and the distinctions between the two, and called attention to another class of bills, which are of a mixed nature and sometimes partake of the character of both original bills and bills which are not original, an example of the latter being bills of review brought for the purpose of vacating a decree which the court said were “considered as strictly a continuance of the former bill, but (also) in the nature of original bills.” The court pointed out that the end to be subserved by a bill of review grounded on newly-discovered evidence is not to be distinguished from that designed to be accomplished by a petition for rehearing, the latter being appropriate prior to the entering of the decree or within the term at which the decree was entered, and the former method being appropriate after the term at which the decree was entered, and that “such a petition was a part or continuation of the original suit, and so, a bill for review for newly-discovered facts, is not different in its nature or effect. ’ ’ The court held that the bill of review in that case involved the determination of the marriage relation by a decree of divorce, “and, whether technically classified as a bill not an original bill or a bill in the nature of an original bill, its connection with and effect upon the continuation of the marriage relation between the parties is so unmistakable that it must be regarded as a ‘case of divorce,’ within the meaning of those words as employed in our statute.”

The court did not decide in the Elsas case, as contended by counsel for the defendant, that a bill of review proceeding is not only a “case of divorce” but that it is also an appeal within the meaning of section 15 of the Divorce Act. The court there was called upon to decide as to the validity of an order against a husband, for solicitor’s fees, to enable his wife to defend against her husband’s appeal from an order entered in the trial court, in a bill of review proceeding. Such an order would not be valid unless the proceeding in the trial court in which the order had been entered, from which the husband was appealing, was ‘ ‘ a case of divorce.” The court held that it was, but it did not hold that the proceeding in the trial court was also in the nature of an appeal. No such question was presented in that case.

Of course, if the bill of review proceeding in the circuit court, which was involved in the Elsas case, was “a case of divorce” within the meaning of section 15 of the Divorce Act, so as to warrant the entering of an order against the husband for solicitor’s fees, in connection with his appeal from an order entered in that proceeding, under the latter part of section 15, it would follow that the bill of review proceeding was “a case of divorce” such as would make an order for either temporary alimony or solicitor’s fees proper, in the circuit court, under the first part of section 15 of the Divorce Act. Whereas, in the Elsas case, an order for solicitor’s fees, on appeal of the husband, from an order entered in the bill of review proceeding, was before the court, in the case at bar there is involved an order for solicitor’s fees entered in the original proceeding in the trial court and having no connection with an appeal by either party.

The bill filed by the complainant, in the nature of a bill of review wherein she sought to vacate the decree of divorce, was based on an alleged situation which would have been the proper basis of a motion or petition for a rehearing if made within the term at which the decree was entered. The proceeding was one that affected the regularity of the original decree. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the proceeding involved in the case at bar is similar to the proceeding in the trial court in the Elsas case, and that, as in that case, it must be considered as “a case of divorce,” within the meaning of the provisions of section 15. The right of the wife to an order for solicitor’s fees is governed by the provisions of the first part of section 15, rather than the latter part. That being the case, the trial court had the power to make an order for solicitor’s fees.

But, the order appealed from cannot stand for another reason. The trial court erred in directing the amount specified to°be paid “to complainant’s solicitor, for use of complainant.” Anderson v. Steger, 173 Ill. 112; Callies v. Callies, 91 Ill. App. 305; Lynch v. Lynch, 99 Ill. App. 454; Miles v. Miles, 102 Ill. App. 130; Werres v. Werres, 102 Ill. App. 360; Harris v. Harris, 109 Ill. App. 148; Anderson v. Anderson, 124 Ill. App. 613; Kowalski v. Kowalski, 127 Ill. App. 154; Prise v. Prise, 197 Ill. App. 609; Heizer v. Heizer, 207 Ill. App. 126. The statute distinctly provides that a husband may be required to pay such sum of money as may enable the "wife to maintain or defend her suit, “to the wife” or “into court for her use.” The order appealed from in the case at bar was not brought within the provisions of the statute, by requiring that the amount specified in the order be paid to complainant’s solicitor “for use of complainant.”

For the reasons we have given, the order of the superior court is reversed.

Order reversed.

Taylor, P. J., and O’Connor, J.,

concur.

Supplemental Opinion Filed on Petition For Rehearing.

We have heretofore, on the sixth day of April, 1927, filed an opinion in this case. On April 16,1927, a petition for rehearing was filed by the plaintiff, which petition was duly allowed. After a re-examination of the issues presented, and the cases to which our attention has been called, we have concluded not to alter the decision which we announced in the opinion above referred to. Such decision and opinion are, therefore, hereby reaffirmed.

In addition to the foregoing, we would say, as to the cases of Turner v. Turner, 104 Ill. App. 253, and Pike v. Pike, 123 Ill. App. 553, referred to in the petition for rehearing, that we find nothing in the Turner case, contrary to what we have said in our opinion heretofore filed, beyond a parenthetical remark made by the writer of the opinion in the Turner case, which had nothing to do with the issue there involved; and, further, that we are unable to agree with the holding in the Pike case. The wording of the statute, with reference to the payment of solicitors ’ fees by a defendant in a divorce case, is entirely clear, and there should be no difficulty about complying with the requirement which the statute makes, and that was not done in the case at bar.

For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in the opinion previously filed, the order of the superior court is reversed.

Order reversed.

Taylor, P. J., and O’Connor, J., concur.


author: Mr. Justice Thomson

text:
    Richard J. Moore, Charles P. Molthrop, Appellee, v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company, commonly known as Nickel Plate, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 31,375.
    1. Attorneys and counselors — service on corporation of notice of lien. Service of notice of an attorney’s lien must be personal and service thereof upon the attorney for a corporation will not suffice.

      2. Attorneys and counselors — service on agent of notice of lien. Service of notice of an attorney’s lien upon one who signed as agent without adding for whom, but on a notice addressed to the corporation and to him as its agent, in absence of denial of the signature or of his authority as agent, will be held valid.
    3. Appeal and error — objection to attorney’s lien notice not raised until appeal. A corporation cannot object on appeal to the service of a notice of attorney’s lien upon them after permitting the notice and receipt by their agent to be introduced in evidence without objection at the trial.
    4. Attorneys and counselors — lien under unsigned contract. An attorney’s acting upon a contract of employment obviates the necessity of his signing it before he serves notice of lien upon the defendant to his client’s action.
    5. Champerty and maintenance — attorney’s employment at instance of mutual acquaintances. Persuading an acquaintance to employ an attorney who is one’s friend or own attorney does not constitute champerty and maintenance.
    6. Champerty and maintenance — paid investigator of attorney securing contract of employment of latter. That one hired by an attorney as investigator on a per diem basis secures for him a contract of employment from one who had already been persuaded to consult the attorney by friends and client, does not constitute champerty and maintenance, there being no arrangement between the attorney and his investigator for a division of the fee.
    7. Champerty and maintenance — attorney’s advancing costs and expenses. A contract of employment of an attorney on a share basis which was silent as to expenses of the action was not ehampertous even though the attorney advanced court costs and expenses on the theory that the client would repay him.
    Appeal by defendant from the Superior Court of Cook county: the Hon. Hugo Pam, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed June 13, 1927.
    G-lennon, Cary, Walker & Murray, for appellant; Sidney C. Murray and Marvin A. Jersild, of counsel.
    Rose & Symmes, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.

By this appeal the defendant Railroad Company seeks to reverse a judgment for $2,541.67, recovered against it in the superior court of Cook county by C. P. Holthrop on an intervening petition filed by the latter, wherein he claimed the amount recovered, pursuant to the provisions of an agreement between him and the plaintiff, Moore, in which the latter retained Holthrop to represent him as his attorney, in a claim for damages against the Railroad Company, agreeing to pay said Molthrop one-third of any amount that might be recovered on said claim, either as a result of a suit or compromise.

Charles P. Molthrop is a practicing lawyer in the City of Chicago. Moore was injured in a wreck which involved one of the trains of the defendant company in the State of Indiana. He was taken to a hospital at Gary, Indiana. At that time there was another patient in the hospital whose name was Stroud. He had also been injured and had a claim pending against another railroad, and Molthrop was representing him in the prosecution of his claim. One Stabb was apparently a friend of Stroud and went to the hospital to see him frequently. Stabb was also an old client of Molthrop Who had represented him in some similar litigation about 12 years before. A day or two after Moore was taken to the hospital he asked Stroud what he was there for and the latter said he had been hurt and had a suit pending in Cook county. Moore asked him who his lawyer was and he told him. Moore then said: “I wonder if he would take my case or whether it could be sued in Illinois. ’ ’ Stroud said he did not know but that his friend Stabb would be in to see him and that this same lawyer had represented Stabb at one time and that Stabb could probably give the information he was seeking. The next, time Stabb came in to see Stroud they both went to see Moore, who then repeated about the same conversation he had previously had with Stroud. Stabb then told Moore that he did not know what the situation was hut that he would call up Molthrop and find out. Stabb later called Molthrop over the telephone and asked him if.hé could come to Gary and talk with Moore. Molthrop replied that his engagements here were such that he could not do that but that he would send a man named Davis who had been in his employ for 12 or 14 years. At Molthrop’s direction Davis went to Gary and had a talk with Moore, which resulted in Moore signing a power of attorney employing Molthrop as his lawyer and authorizing him to represent him in connection with his claim against the defendant. This power of attorney was executed on September 17, 1924. It provided that Molthrop’s compensation was to be on a contingent basis — he to receive nothing in case nothing was realized on the claim but if anything was realized then he was to receive one-third of the amount recovered, either by suit or compromise — and by the terms of the power of attorney, Moore directed the defendant to pay one-third of any sum that might be determined upon by.way of settlement, to Molthrop. When Davis returned from Gary with this power of attorney, he delivered it to Molthrop, who later directed Davis to go to the scene of the accident and take certain photographs, and investigate the matter thoroughly. Davis proceeded to make this investigation and was gone a week or ten days on that work, interviewing everybody he could find in the locality where the wreck occurred, who could give any information. On October 17,1924, Molthrop served written notice’ on the defendant of his agreement with Moore, which notice contained a copy of that agreement in full. This notice was addressed: “To New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company, commonly known as Nickle Plate, and W. H. Cunningham, Assistant General Freight Agent, and Glennon, Cary, Walker & Murray, 536 La Salle Station, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for said railroad.” This notice advised the parties that Molthrop claimed a lien for his services rendered and to be rendered in the matter of Moore’s claim against the railroad company, “pursuant to statute in such case made and provided.” The original of this notice, as introduced in evidence in the trial court, contained an acknowledgment of its receipt by the parties to whom it was addressed, said acknowledgment being as follows:

“Received a copy of the above notice this 17th day of October, A. D. 1924.
“Glennon, Cary, Walker & Murray,
“Attorneys for New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company.
“W. H. Cunningham,

“Assistant General Freight Agent.” On October 30, 1924, Molthrop instituted an action at law in the name of Moore against the defendant railroad company, in the superior court of Cook county. Summons was duly issued and served on “E. T. Glennon, Agent.” The plaintiff’s declaration was filed on December 24, and on January 6, 1925, a plea of the general issue was filed by “Glennon, Cary, Walker & Murray, Attorneys for Defendant.”

. It appears from the record that Moore had no funds and Molthrop advanced the court costs. He also had Moore brought to Chicago and had him examined by several doctors and had some X-ray photographs taken, and Molthrop advanced the costs in that connection also. In the course of time there were a number of conferences between Molthrop and both the local, and general claim agents of the defendant,' with a view to the possible settlement of Moore’s claim. Moore was unwilling to accept less than $15,000, and the highest offer the claim agents made was $8,000 or $9,000. Moore intimated that he might be willing to take $12,000, but they were unable to get any nearer together. The case reached the trial call and was set at the head of the call for December 14, 1925. The last conference between Molthrop and the claim agents occurred about December 5 or 6, 1925. On December 9, Molthrop received a letter from his client advising him that he had settled his case and did not consider that he owed Molthrop anything. Molthrop then sent Davis down to Indiana to see what had happened and discovered that on December 7, a suit had been instituted in Moore’s behalf against the defendant, at Fort Wayne, Indiana, based on this claim, and on the same day a judgment had been entered in Moore’s favor for $7,625, and costs, which judgment had been satisfied in full. Molthrop then filed his intervening petition in the superior court case, wherein he claimed that the defendant company was indebted to him to the extent of one-third of the amount of the settlement which had been put through by the railroad company with Moore, under the provisions of the Attorney’s Lien Act, Cahill’s St. ch. 13, fí 13. Evidence was submitted by the respective parties to the trial court, at the conclusion of which the court made a finding for the intervening petitioner and entered the judgment appealed from.

In support of its appeal the defendant contends that the petitioner failed to either allege or prove proper service of notice of his lien upon the defendant as required by statute. It has been held that the service of a notice for attorney’s lien must be personal service, as the law prescribes in the case of service of process; that the personal service of such notice should follow the law as to the service, where the party is a corporation; and that, therefore, service of such notice upon an attorney for the party against whom the lien is sought to be enforced is not sufficient." Jackson v. Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co., 186 Ill. App. 531; Reynolds v. Alton, G. & St. L. Traction Co., 211 Ill. App. 158. As to the service of the notice on Cunningham, it is contended that the petition alleges service upon “W. H. Cunningham, Assistant General Freight Agent,” but does not allege that Cunningham was the Assistant General Freight Agent of the defendant company. In our opinion this contention is without merit. The notice is addressed to the defendant railway company by name “and W. H. Cunningham, Assistant General Freight Agent,” and receipt of the notice so addressed is signed “W. H. Cunningham, Assistant General Freight Agent.” No contention is made to the effect that the signature of Cunningham is not his genuine signature, or that he, in fact, is not the Assistant General Freight Agent of the defendant railway company. Moreover, we are of the opinion that the defendant is in no position to raise a question as to the sufficiency of the notice here. In its answer to the petition the defendant made a general denial of service as alleged in the petition, but when the proof was being put in, service of the notice was practically conceded. Thé petitioner was on the stand and without objection testified that he caused this notice to be-served on Glennon, Cary, Walker & Murray, and also on Cunningham, Assistant General Freight Agent. The notice was then produced and offered in evidence, counsel for petitioner remarking: ‘ ‘ This, I think, has their signature on it, ’ ’ whereupon counsel representing the defendant said: “That is all right,” whereupon the notice, with the acknowledgments of receipt of notice, was received in evidence, without objection. The notice of claim for lien was not admissible unless it had been served upon the defendant, as the statute requires. In view of the circumstances referred to above, the defendant-is not in a position to contend now that the service of the notice was defective.

The defendant contends further that the petitioner is not in a position to enforce his lien because there was no valid contract existing between him and the plaintiff at the time the petitioner served notice of his lien* as claimed by him, on October 17. In our opinion, the record demonstratés the contrary. The signature of Molthrop was not necessary to complete the contract between him and the plaintiff, nor in order to constitute a complete and binding contract between them was it necessary that Molthrop expressly assent to it after Moore had signed it. It became a complete and binding contract as soon as Molthrop acted under it, which, under the undisputed evidence, was as soon as Davis returned to Chicago with it. Molthrop testified that when Davis brought back the power of attorney signed by the plaintiff, “I instructed Mr. Davis to then commence preparation of this case and investigate it thoroughly.” He then testified that Davis proceeded to do so, consuming a week or ten days in his investigation. There can be no question of the fact that under the evidence in this case Molthrop acted under his contract of employment prior to the date of notice of the lien. On that date there was, therefore, a binding contract between him and his client.

The defendant contends further that the contract between Molthrop and the plaintiff will not support an action for the recovery of attorney’s fees, because it was the result of acts constituting maintenance and champerty. In our opinion, the evidence in this record fails to show that anything was done by Molthrop which was in any way improper in bringing about his employment by the plaintiff in this case. Both Stabb and Stroud were clients of Molthrop, and, according to the uncontradicted evidence, Moore learned about Molthrop by asking Stroud what he was in the hospital for, and Stroud told him he had been injured and that he had a lawyer who was representing him in a claim he had, and that this lawyer was the petitioner. The only witness other than the petitioner was the plaintiff and he gave no evidence to the contrary. He testified that he first saw Davis in the hospital at Gary and that Davis told him he was representing a firm of lawyers and advised him to have some one investigate his case immediately; that he told Davis he didn’t want anybody right then, until he had talked it over with his wife; that his wife came to see him the next day and he talked the situation over with her and thought it would be advisable to have some one; that he saw Davis again that afternoon and signed the contract and power of attorney and told Davis how the accident happened. He said that he did not send for Davis but that he had talked with Stabb and the latter told him that Molthrop was representing Stroud, who was then in the hospital, and that he thought Molthrop was a very good lawyer and that one of his representatives was coming over to see Stroud shortly and he would have him come up to see Moore, and later Davis came in. Moore admitted on cross-examination that he knew Stroud at the hospital and had visited with him.

In our opinion there is nothing shown by the evidence in this case which would constitute champerty. The evidence shows that Davis was a member of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen. For some 10 or 12 years he had been in the employ of Molthrop as an investigator on a per diem basis. Neither Stabb nor Stroud were in Molthrop’s employ. Moore was without funds and had a wife to support. Apparently he and Davis became friendly and Davis loaned him various amounts aggregating ultimately something between $700 and $800. As Davis made these loans to Moore the latter gave Davis judgment notes. This course of dealing between Davis and Moore was unknown to Molthrop until some months after the transactions had taken place. There was no arrangement between Davis and Molthrop concerning a division of fees in this case.

The fact that Molthrop advanced the court costs when this case was instituted against the defendant company and that he also advanced certain expenses incident to the X-ray photographs and possibly the fees of the doctors who examined the plaintiff in Chicago (although the latter is not clear from the record) in our opinion, would not make out a case of champerty. The contract between the parties was silent on the question of court costs or other necessary incidental expenses, and Molthrop testified that no express arrangement had been made between him and the plaintiff in regard to the question of defraying the expenses of the litigation. On the evidence in this record it would seem to be entirely clear that the amounts Molthrop paid out were advancements made by him in behalf of his client, for which the latter would be liable. Before a case of champerty will be made out, it must be shown that a lawyer entered into an agreement with his client to represent him in certain litigation and agreed to pay the costs and expenses of the litigation himself. Such is not the case where the lawyer makes advancements of these amounts for his client’s use. 11 C. J. ¶ 27, p. 245; Christie v. Sawyer, 44 N. H. 298; Wallace v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 112 Iowa 565. In the Christie case the court said: “So long as the law gives countenance and encouragement to the employment of attorneys and counsel, to aid suitors in the prosecution and defense of their supposed rights, it cannot be deemed maintenance for professional men to render their services to those who need them, for the usual and customary compensation. Nor is it material whether the party is in good credit, and able to pay for those services, as the case proceeds, or the counsel has to rely for his compensation upon the success of a cause he believes well founded; It is usual, and in many cases unavoidable, that the expenses incident to a controversy are paid by the attorney in the cause. Such advances are constantly recovered in actions for costs, and there can be no pretense that the payment of such proper and legal expenses, in good faith, constitutes maintenance, whether they are expected to be paid at once, or from the proceeds of the cause.” Quoting from Shapley v. Bellows, 4 N. H. 355, the court went on to say: “It is not uncommon that attorneys commence actions for poor people, and make advances of money necessary to the prosecution of the suit, upon the credit of the cause. Thus a man in indigent circumstances is enabled to obtain justice in cases where, without such aid, he would be unable to enforce a just claim.” The court also quotes another authority with approval, to the effect that “there is no doubt but that an attorney may lawfully prosecute or defend an action in the court, wherein he is an allowed attorney, in behalf of anyone by whom he shall be especially retained, and that he may assist his client by laying out his own money for him, to be repaid again.” In the Wallace case it was not denied that the lawyers involved had made advancements in the way of paying the filing fee which was due when the case was instituted, and for the attendance of witnesses and for other necessary expenses incident to the preparation and trial of the case, “but,” the court said, “this is not sufficient evidence of an illegal and immoral contract, for but few cases of any kind are handled by the most exact and conscientious of the profession where they are not called upon to do many or all of the things complained of here, and where they do not hesitate to make these advancements without thought of wrong, and in most instances without thought of how or when repayment will be made.”

Counsel have called our attention to North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100. The question there presented for the decision of the court was whether a cause of action arising from a tort was assignable, and the court held that it was not. In the course of a dissenting opinion the member of the court who wrote that opinion referred to the fact that it was claimed that an agreement which was there involved violated the rule against maintenance and champerty. A lawyer was a party to that agreement and its.terms were such that the client expressly agreed to pay the court costs and necessary expenses. It was also agreed that a part of the thing recovered was to be paid as attorney’s fees. The court said that the latter was not sufficient to make out a case of champerty, but “it must also be shown that the costs and expenses of the suit, or some part of them, are paid or agreed to be paid by the attorney.” Aside from the fact that what the court there said is found in a dissenting opinion, we believe that it may not reasonably be made to apply to costs or incidental expenses advanced by the attorney for the use of his client. The writer of the dissenting opinion in the case referred to, cited Thompson v. Reynolds, 73 Ill. 11; West Chicago Park Com’rs v. Coleman, 108 Ill. 591; and Phillips v. South Parh Com’rs, 119 Ill. 626. In the Thompson case, the lawyer entered into an agreement with his client to institute all necessary proceedings to ascertain and fix the rights of the latter, and in that connection the lawyer agreed “that he should pay all necessary expenses, and receive one-half of whatever should be realized.” That contract was held to be champertous and void. In .the Coleman case, the record failed to show that the attorneys involved had undertaken.to pay any part of the client’s expenses or costs in the maintenance of certain litigation, which the court held was a complete answer to the claim that the contract involved ivas champertous. The court quoted Ohitty on Contracts (10th Am. Ed.), page 754, where that author defines champerty to be: “A bargain with a plaintiff or defendant to divide the land or other matter sued for, between them, if they proceed at law, whereupon .the champertee is to carry on the party’s suit at his own expense.” In the Phillips case, the court said that the contract there involved, “lacked one essential element to render it champertous, and that is, that the attorneys should prosecute the litigation at their own costs and expense. Had the contract provided that the attorneys should carry on the litigation for a share of what they might recover, at their own cost and expense, then the contract might have been champertous and void. (Citing the Thompson case and the Coleman case.) Such, however, is not the case. The written contract, which alone fixes and determines the rights and duties of the parties, contains no provision whatever requiring the attorneys or the park commissioners to pay the costs or expenses of .the litigation. The fact that the park commissioners may have advanced Phillips money which was used in the prosecution of the litigation, has no bearing on the question.”

For the reasons, we have given, the. judgment of the superior court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Taylor, P. J., and.O’Connor, J., concur.