text:
    Thomas J. Tobin, appellee, v. H. Archibald Harris, trading as Archibald Harris & Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,534.
    Action to recover commissions. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Hugo Pam, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Louis P. Miller, for appellant. Ivor Jeffreys and Joseph R. Gibson, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

license: Public Domain

text:
    Motor Car Securities Corporation, appellant, v. H. B. Logan and G. N. Ringquist, trading as Lake Shore Auto Repair, appellees.
    Gen. No. 30,549.
    Replevin. Judgment for defendants. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Worth E. Cay lor, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and cause remanded.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Edward I. Rothbart and Seymour M. Lewis, for appellant; Wharton Plummer, of counsel. B. M. Shafiner, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr, Presiding Justice Thomson

text:
    The Citizens National Bank of Bowling Green, Kentucky, appellee, v. Alvin E. Bear, appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,604.
    Action upon promissory notes. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. George B. Holmes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Greatman & Markus, for appellant. Cheney, Evans & Peterson, for appellee; Eugene E. Dornbaugh, of counsel.
   Mr, Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. John Walsh, appellee, v. William E. Dever et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 30,629.
    Mandamus to compel approval of petition for billiard room license. Judgment for petitioner. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Walter P. Steffen, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, for appellants; Albert H. Teeder, Bernard A. Conlon and Joseph J. Thompson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles Lundmark, appellee, v. Charles Fischer, appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,648.
    Action to recover wages. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Albert B. George, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Harry A. Goldsmith, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice O’Connor

text:
    Stephan Mueller and Hugo Fuhlbrugge, plaintiffs in error, v. Albert Fuchs et al., defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 30,299.
    Bill for specific performance or lease covenants. Dismissed for want of equity. Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar Hebei, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    A. H. Ranes, Leo B. Lowenthal and Corinne L. Rice, for plaintiffs in error. Litsinger, Healy & Reid, for Albert Fuchs, defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Carl D. Kinsey, appellant, v. W. C. Zimmerman et al., trading as Zimmerman, Saxe & Zimmerman, appellees.
    Gen. No. 30,415.
    Action for rent. Judgment for defendants. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. George B. Holmes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Beversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Behearing denied May 18, 1926.
    Sehein & Beckwith, for appellant; Fred W. Bentley and George L. Sehein, of counsel. West & Eekhart, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    G. Lynn Osmer and Maurice E. Daley, appellees, v. Wm. J. McCarthy and Wm. J. McSweeney, trading as National Thrift System, appellants.
    Gen. No. 30,454.
    Action for breach of contract. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Theodore F. Ehler, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Rehearing denied May 18, 1926.
    Danaher & Garriott, for appellants. Chittick, Blankenship & Baltz, for appellees; C. L. Blankenship, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Violet Saal Roberts, formerly Violet Saal, appellee, v. Henry G. Saal, appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,472.
    Bill for divorce. Order requiring payment of costs and solicitor’s fees pursuant to decree. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. John J. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Rehearing denied May 18, 1926.
    George H. Kriete, for appellant. Albert Fink and John A. Russian, for appellee; Edward I. DeBolt, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Michael Zimmer, former sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, for use of Mayme Schwartz, appellee, v. Thomas F. Hanrahan et al., on appeal of Patrick Devery, appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,518.
    Action on replevin bond. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. D. H. Wamsley, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Ramsay, Konenkamp & DeWolfe, for appellant. Harry A. Biossat, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Chandra L. Singh, appellee, v. Ed Kallish and E. E. Cooper, defendants. Bankers State Bank, garnishee, appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,540.
    Garnishment proceedings. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Asa G. Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Philip A. Weinstein, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mabel A. Lilly, appellant, v. Archie F. Lilly, appellee.
    Gen. No. 30,566.
    Bills for separate maintenance or divorce. Decree for defendant on cross-bill. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Francis S. Wilson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925. Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Rehearing denied May 18, 1926.
    E. M. Seymour, for appellant. Frank W. Swett, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James G. Sotos and Angelos Pappas, trading as Chicago Market Company, appellees, v. John Kringas and Thomas Chikos, appellants.
    Gen. No. 30,577.
    Action for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Samuel H. Trude, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    James J. Gaughan, for appellants; James H. Mahoney, of counsel. J. Colvin Webb, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    C. F. Love & Company, appellee, v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,586.
    Action for breach of contract of carriage. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Theodore F. Ehler, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Rehearing denied May 18, 1926.
    Loesch, Scofield, Loesch & Richards, for appellant. Blum, Blum & DeLaney, for appellee; J. V. DeLaney, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    H. Ellis, appellee, v. Edmund A. Murphy, appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,595.
    Action for use and occupation of premises. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John F. Haas, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Walter T. Quigley, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Anton Nauseda, appellee, v. William E. Dever et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 30,626.
    Mandamus to compel issuance of retail beverage dealer’s license. Judgment for petitioner. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Harry B. Miller, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, for appellants; Albert H. Veeder, Michael L. Rosinia and Joseph J. Thompson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Louis M. Arnapol, appellee, v. Yellow Cab Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,664.
    Action for damage to automobile in collision. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. George O. Curran, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Rehearing denied May 18, 1926.
    Blake & Hanrahan, for appellant; Harris J. Blake, Jr., and James R. Hanrahan, of counsel. Webster, Holmes & Holmgren, for appellee; Charles D. Callahan, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    City of Chicago, appellee, v. Fred G. Biedenkapp, appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,679.
    Conviction of breach of peace. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John Richardson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    David J. Bentall, for appellant. Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, and Samuel E. Pincus, Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee; Eliot H. Evans, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Taylor

text:
    Chicago Title & Trust Company, administrator of the estate of Harriot Benton Ward, deceased, claimant and appellant, v. Charles W. Ward, executor of the estate of George C. Benton, deceased, defendant and appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,485.
    Judgment on mandate of Supreme Court in 319 Ill. 201. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John A. Swanson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed in part and judgment here with a finding of facts.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Fisher, Boyden, Kales & Bell, for appellant; Darrell S. Boyd and Roy P. Kelly, of counsel. Montgomery, Hart & Smith, for appellee; Louis E. Hart and Irving Herriott, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Leafgreen Construction Company, appellee, v. Oliver L. Watson, appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,552.
    Action to recover moneys paid to release mechanics’ liens. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John J. Lupe, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Robert F. Bradburn, for appellant. Alfred M. Cordell, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. John Martin, appellee, v. Nicholas R. Finn et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 30,623.
    Certiorari to review proceedings of civil service commissioners resulting in discharge of petitioner from police force. Record quashed. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Emanuel Eller, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed May 5, 1926.
    Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, and Francis J. Vurpillat, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for appellants. O’Connell, Herr & Arvey, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

text:
    Second District.
    Eric R. Nyman, appellee, v. Rockford & Interurban Railway Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,547.
    Action for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from' the Circuit Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. E. D. Reynolds, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Fisher, North, Linscott & Gibboney, for appellant. A. H. Ranes and Leo B. Loewenthal, for appellee; Large & Reno and Corinne L. Rice, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ernest Brook, trustee, and M. A. Carmack, appellees, v. Pistakee Boat and Engine Company et al. Pistakee Boat and Engine Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,578.
    Bill for foreclosure of trust deed. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake county; the Hon. Claire C. Edwards, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Rehearing denied July 5, 1926.
    Otto F. Ring and Eugene M. Runyard, for appellant. D. T. Smiley, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Catherine Witterstetter, appellee, v. J. Frank Deuel, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,598.
    Assumpsit for breach of contract. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the County Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. Fred E. Carpenter, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    David D. Madden, for appellant. Frank M. Ryan, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ursula Pauline, administratrix of the estate of Joe Pauline, deceased, appellant, v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 7,600.
    Action for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Bureau county; the Hon. Joe A. Davis, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Rehearing denied July 5, 1926.
    Josef T. Skinner and C. N. Hollerich, for appellant. Cairo A. Trimble and Perry D. Trimble, for appellee; Daniel Taylor, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Jett

text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Loretta Clark, appellee, v. Marcus Kays, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,507.
    Bastardy proceeding. Judgment of filiation. Appeal from the County Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. R. D. Mills, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Lee O’Neil Browne and A. E. Butters, for appellant. Russell O. Hanson, State’s Attorney, and Harold Butters, Assistant State’s Attorney, for appellee; Arthur H. Shay, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Bert W. Newton, administrator of the estate of George C. Newton, deceased, appellee, v. Illinois Oil Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,523.
    Action for death by wrongful áet. Former judgment of reversal modified. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. Neis A. Larson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    R. W. Olmstead, for appellant. J. Clinton Searle and Marshall & Marshall, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Otto J. Guelda, plaintiff in error, v. Charles Rockabrand, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 7,533.
    Action of trespass for assault upon the person. Judgment for defendant. Error to the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. Edgar Eldredge, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Lee O’Neil Browne and Butters & Butters, for plaintiff in error. Kelly, Kelly & Kelly, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Abe Berman, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 7,540.
    Conviction of violation of Prohibition Law. Error to the County Court of Boone county; the Hon. Richard V. Carpenter, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Fisher, North, Linscott & Gibboney, for plaintiff in error. F. A. Oakley, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Carl Blomgren and Elmer Reiling, trading as Moline Oakland Company, appellants, v. Andrew Stotmeister, appellee.
    Gen. No. 7,562.
    Replevin. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. Neis A. Larson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Rehearing denied August 5, 1926.
    Andrew Olson, for appellants. Stewart & Klingbiel and S. E. & George D. Long, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John W. Glascow, appellee, v. Family Wet Wash Laundry of Peoria, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,567.
    Action to recover compensation for services. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the County Court of Peoria county; the Hon. Glen J. Cameron, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the. October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Dailey, Miller, McCormick & Radley, for appellant; Emerson T. Anthony and R. H. Radley, of counsel. Quinn & Quinn, for appellee; Frank J. Quinn, C. V. O’Hern and E. T. O’Connor, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Thomas F. Mack, receiver, appellee, v. The Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Company, Limited, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,573.
    Action upon fire insurance policy. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mercer county; the Hon. William T. Church, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Rehearing denied April 19, 1926.
    D. A. Hebel and Bates, Hicks & Folonie, for appellant. Watson & Duvall, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George H. Koon, appellee, v. George W. Huff and George O. Teed, appellants.
    Gen. No. 7,591.
    Forcible entry and detainer. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the County Court of Lake county; the Hon. Perry L. Persons, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Rehearing denied April 21, 1926.
    James G. Welch, for appellant, George W. Huff. E. M. Runyard, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Gilbert Vennum, appellant, v. W. D. Littell, appellee.
    Gen. No. 7,594.
    Bill to restrain vacation and closing of highway. Dismissed for want of equity. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Iroquois county; the Hon. Frank L. Hooper, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    J. W. Kern and C. G. Hirschi, for appellant. W. Rufus Kendall and A. Fred Kendall, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The American Laundry Machinery Company, defendant in error, v. Aurora Wet Wash Laundry Company, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 7,597.
    Assumpsit to recover purchase price of machinery sold and delivered. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Circuit Court of Kane county; the Hon. William J. Fulton, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.

      Mighell, Gunsul & Allen, for plaintiff in error. Fred B. Shearer, for defendant in error; Charles Bentley Dickerson, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Partlow

text:
    William J. Baker, appellee, v. State Bank of Annawan, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,548.
    Action to recover money loaned. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry county; the Hon. William T. Church, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Rehearing denied April 27, 1926.
    Henry Waterman and Sturtz & Ewan, for appellant. Carl Melin and Kenworthy, Dietz, Shallberg, Harper & Sinnett, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Partlow

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Tri-City Artificial Ice Company, appellee, v. Sturtevant-Baker Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,557.
    Action for breach of contract. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. William T. Church, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 29, 1926.
    Rehearing denied and opinion slightly modified April 27, 1926.
    Kenworthy, Dietz, Harper & Sinnett, for appellant. Wood, McNeal & Warner and Marshall & Marshall, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Partlow

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    W. H. Shons, appellant, v. County of Ogle, Illinois, and Town of Byron, appellees.
    Gen. No. 7,485.
    Action to recover balance due upon contract for services. Judgment for defendants. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ogle county; the Hon. W. J. Emmerson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 1, 1926.
    Charles H. Green and Seyster & Fearer, for appellant. Martin V. Peterman, State’s Attorney, Roy F. Hall and James L. McDowell, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. James McClary, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 7,528.
    Prosecution for violation of Prohibition Law. Error to the County Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. Henry F. Ruel, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 1, 1926.
    E. P. Harney, for plaintiff in error. Anker C. Jensen, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Andrew Russel, appellee, v. Illinois State Bank of Crete et al., on appeal of William Saller, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,521.
    Receivership proceedings. Order allowing solicitor’s fee for services for receiver. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Dorr anee Dibell, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1926.
    Donovan & Bray and Rathje, Wesemann, Hinckley & Barnard, for appellant. C. S. Deneen, Roy Massena and W. D. Heise, for appellee; Snapp, Heise & Snapp, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Partlow

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    August Lang, administrator of the estate of Ellen Lang, deceased, defendant in error, v. Catherine Weich et al. Cecelia Lang, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 7,490.
    Proceedings to sell land to pay debts of decedent. Order disallowing claim against estate. Error to the County Court of Jo Daviess county; the Hon. Harry L. Heer, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 5, 1926.
    M. H. Cleary, for plaintiff in error. F. J. Campbell, for defendant in error; J. P. Frantzen, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Moe S. Robinson, appellee, v. American General Insurance Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,512.
    Action upon fire insurance policies. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Frederick A. Hill, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 5, 1926.
    Mack, Lowes & Leopold and Barr & Barr, for appellant. J. Harold Downey and John H. Savage, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Robert A. Thompson, appellee, v. John Bruch, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,534.
    Action for personal injuries and damage to automobile in collision. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle county; the Hon. Edgar Eldredge, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 5, 1926.
    Charles W. Helmig and Butters & Butters, for appellant. Coleman & Coleman and Kelly, Kelly & Kelly, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Albert Randall, sheriff of Peoria County, Illinois, for use of Citizens Ice & Cold Storage Company and Jennings Fruit Company, appellee, v. John A. Eck Company and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, appellants.
    Gen. No. 7,539.
    Debt on replevin bond. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. John M. Hiehaus, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 5, 1926.
    Jack, Irwin & Jack and Francis C. Vonachen, for appellants. Covey, Campbell & Covey, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    La Salle Extension University and W. E. McIntosh, justice of the peace. La Salle Extension University, appellant, v. John A. Gallagher, appellee.
    Gen. No. 7,546.
    Action upon note and contract. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone county; the Hon. Edward D. Shurtleff, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 5, 1926.
    Raymond D. Hall, for appellant. Alexander J. Strom, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    William Ketcham et al., appellants, v. School Trustees of Township No. 34, Range No. 8, Grundy County, Illinois, et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 7,551.
    Mandamus to compel apportionment of funds to school districts detached from community consolidated school district. Demurrers to petitions sustained. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Frederick A. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed April 5, 1926.
    D. R. Anderson, for appellants. Donovan, Bray & Gray, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Marie A. Baker, appellee, v. Edward Baker, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,554.
    Bill for divorce. Decree fixing permanent alimony. Appeal from the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. Edgar Eldredge, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 5, 1926.
    Arthur H. Shay, for appellant. Boys & Osborn, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Llewllyn C. Looker, appellee, v. Henry Buente, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,559.
    Action to recover compensation for services. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. Arthur W. Deselm, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 5, 1926.
    Rehearing denied July 5, 1926.
    Frank J. Burns and James T. Burns, for appellant. Luther B. Bratton, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John Bell, by William Bell, appellee, v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company and American Bottle American Bottle Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,664.
    Action for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. Edgar Eldredge, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 16, 1926.
    Rehearing denied July 5, 1926.
    Boys & Osborn, for appellant. Herbert H. Patterson and Butters & Butters, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Lillie M. Wilde, appellant, v. Balz Garman, appellee.
    Gen. No. 7,568.
    Action for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. Charles V. Miles, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 16, 1926.
    Henry Mansfield, David J. Cowan and John E. Cassidy, for appellant. Shurtleff & Niehaus, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Joe Bomassaro, appellee, v. The Empire Auto Insurance Association, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,583.
    Action on automobile fire insurance policy. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane county; the Hon. J. K. New-hall, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 16, 1926.
    George E. Warner, for appellant; D. J. Peffers, of counsel Sears & Solfisburg, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    General Motors Acceptance Corporation, appellant, v. A. J. Schaeffer et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 7,571.
    Replevin to recover possession of automobiles taken possession of under chattel mortgage. Judgment for defendants. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone county; the Hon. Edward D. Shurtleff, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 16, 1926.
    Robert W. Waugh, Alexander J. Strom and Krauss, Goldman & Allshouse, for appellant. William L. Pierce and P. H. O’Donnell, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Gust C. Bloom et al., appellees, v. Community Consolidated School District No. 76 of Henry County, Illinois, et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 7,580.
    Bill to enjoin erection of school building. Decree granted. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry county; the Hon. William T.' Church, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 16, 1926.
    T. W. Hoopes and Andrews & O’Connor, for appellants. Sturtz & Ewan, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Niehaus

text:
    Third District.
    Edward Gross, defendant in error, v. William W. Wheelock et al., plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 7,838.
    Action to recover damages for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Circuit Court of Pike county; the Hon. Harry Higbee, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1926.
    William Mumford, Barry Mumford, Silas H. Strawn and William L. Patton, for plaintiffs in error. Strubinger & Strubinger and Williams & Williams, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendants in error, v. Oliver Lindsey, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 7,895.
    Prosecution for violation of Prohibition Law. Error to the County Court of Morgan county; the Hon. Paul Samuell, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1926.
    Rehearing denied October 28, 1926.
    T. J. Sullivan and D. J. Staley, for plaintiff in error. Hugh Green, State’s Attorney, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George Darrah, appellee, v. Jesse W. Wade, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,905.
    Action for conversion. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pike county; the Hon. Harry Higbee, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1926.
    L. T. Graham, for appellant. Edwin Johnston, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    A. Vonruden, appellee, v. Wabash Railway Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,914.
    Action to recover damages for injuries to shipment of live stock. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the County Court of Christian county; the Hon. C. J. Vogelsang, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1926.
    Hogan & Reese, for appellant. James A. Merry, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George Underhill, appellee, v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,950.
    Action for damages by fire caused by sparks from locomotive. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. Frank Lindley, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1926.
    Covey & Woods, for appellant; John G. Drennan, of counsel. Peter Murphy and Anderson & Mangas, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Crow

text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Tony Brush, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 7,899.
    Conviction of violation of injunction against selling, storing or keeping intoxicating liquor. Error to the County Court of Christian county; the Hon. C. J. Vogelsang, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1926.
    John G. Friedmeyer, for plaintiff in error. Carl H. Preihs, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Crow

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Wiley M. Teal, appellee, v. Elizabeth W. Teal, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,934.
    Bill for divorce. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Witt County; the Hon. George A. Sentel, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1926.
    L. O. Williams and F. K. Lemon, for appellant. Herrick & Herrick, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Crow

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Shurtleff

text:
    Clara L. Janssen, cross-complainant, appellee, v. H. Fred Janssen, cross-defendant, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,932.
    Action for separate maintenance. Decree for cross-complainant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. E. S. Smith, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1926.
    Rehearing denied April 22, 1926.
    W. St. J. Wines, for appellant. John G. Friedmeyer and C. C. Bierman, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Lottie Askins, appellant, v. Verna Williams et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 7,944.
    Partition. Error assigned upon refusal to apportion solicitor’s fees of complainant against all interests in land. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Shelby county; the Hon. Franklin R. Dove, Judge., presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1926.
    J. E. Dazey and Ward & Pugh, for appellant. George B. Rhoads and John J. Baker, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Anna Crabtree, appellant, v. Lee S. Crabtree, appellee.
    Gen. No. 7,949.
    Bill for divorce. Dismissed for want of equity. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign county; the Hon. Franklin H. Boggs, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1926.
    C. R. Iungerich and Asa S. Chapman, for appellant. Green & Palmer, for appellee; George E. Martin and Oris Barth, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    H. D. Lutz, appellee, v. Harry Riley, sheriff, appellant.
    Gen. No. 7,937.
    Replevin to determine ownership of personal property. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Shelby county; the Hon. Harry C. Stuttle, Judge, presiding. Heard in this tiourt at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1926.
    Ward & Pugh, for appellant. Geo. B. Rhoads, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

text:
    Fourth District.
    J. P. Gallagher, defendant in error, v. Bailey Wilkinson, Sr., and Bailey Wilkinson, Jr., plaintiffs in error.
    Action to recover damages for injury to automobile in collision. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Circuit Court of Pulaski county; the Hon. A. E. Somers, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Fred Hood, for plaintiffs in error. C. L. Rice, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Sylvester Rizzutti, plaintiff in error.
    Conviction for unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor. Error to the County Court of Perry county; the Hon. J. G. Vankeuren, Judge, siding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    L. P. Harriss and L. A. Cranston, for plaintiff in error. J. E. Harris, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Owen Kibler, plaintiff in error.
    Conviction for carrying concealed weapon. Error to the County Court of Jasper county; the Hon. H. C. Davidson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    James P. Jack, for plaintiff in error. Homer Kasserman, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr, Presiding Justice Boggs

text:
    The McCaskey Register Company, appellant, v. William J. Clayton, appellee.
    Action for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. 'Silas Cook, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    T. A. O’Connor, for appellant. Felsen & Kane, for appellee.
   Mr, Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Jessie Adams, appellant, v. City of Centralia, appellee.
    Action for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. F. R. Dove, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Charles H. Holt, for appellant. L. H. Jonas and Noleman, Smith & Dallstream, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    William. M. Berry, appellee, v. J. J. Nevener, appellant.
    Action for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the City Court of Bast St. Louis; the Hon. Silas Cook, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed on remittitur.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Farmer & Klingel, for appellant. Beasley & Zulley, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Belle Pickering, administratrix of the estate of Charles E. Pickering, deceased, plaintiff in error, v. W. W. Wheelock et al., defendants in error.
    Action for wrongful death. Judgment for defendants. Error to the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. J. F. Gillham, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Wilbur A. Trares, for plaintiff in error. C. E. Pope and Silas H. Strawn, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    St. Louis Racine Rubber Company, appellee, v. Otis L. Boyd, appellant.
    Action for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the City Court of Alton; the Hon. L. D. Yager, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    William P. Boynton, for appellant. C. E. Ellison, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Barry

text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Mattie Becker, plaintiff in error.
    Conviction of selling intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. Error to the County Court of Perry county; the Hon. J. G. Vankeuren, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    L. A. Cranston, for plaintiff in error. J. E. Harris, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Henry J. Surmeier, appellant, v. Henry L. Gundlach et al., appellees.
    Bill to compel removal of dam. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    J. Paul Carter, for appellant. Louis Klingel, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    H. A. Foncannon, appellee, v. J. A. Lewis et al., appellants.
    Action upon promissory notes. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Franklin county; the Hon. J. C. Eagleton, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    H. F. Knox and Moses Pulverman, for appellants. Shaw & Huffman and William P. Seeber, for appellee.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
   Mr. Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Tony Voudrie, appellee, v. The East Side Levee and Sanitary District, appellant.
    Action to recover damages for injury to lands by flooding. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. Louis Bernreuter, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Rehearing denied March 31, 1926.
    J. L. Flannigen and John E. Hamlin, for appellant. Turner, Holder & Bullington, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Bennie Koonce, appellee, v. Samuel W. Andrews, appellant.
    Action to recover damages for personal injuries and damage to automobile in collision. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Bond county; the Hon. Louis Bernreuter, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    E. E. Schnepp, for appellant. Henry Meyer and J. M. Albert, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frank Berry, appellant, v. Jacob W. Elble et al., appellees.
    Bill to abate nuisance. Decree for defendants. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Williamson, Burroughs & Simpson, for appellant. William P. Boynton, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    D. L. Kacelieff, plaintiff in error, v. Walter A. Kelly, defendant in error.
    Interpleader on a fund claimed by plaintiff and defendant. Error to the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. J. F. Gillham, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.

      Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Harold J. Bandy, for plaintiff in error. D. G. Williamson, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Higbee

text:
    Maria Burkhardt, appellee, v. East St. Louis Rendering Company, appellant.
    Action for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. William F. Borders, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Pope & Driemeyer, for appellant. Beasley & Zulley, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered, the opinion of the court.


text:
    Gaerdner & Company, appellee, v. Louis Kalkbrenner, appellant.
    Trial of right of property. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the County Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. W. R. Weber, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    E. W. Kreitner, for appellant. Louis E. Wangelin, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Josephine Oulvey, defendant in error, v. Harvey S. Converse and Fannie Converse, plaintiffs in error.
    Assumpsit upon promissory note. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    W. E. Knowles, for plaintiffs in error. C. E. Pope and H. F. Driemeyer, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Edith White Tanner, appellee, v. Hammond E. White, appellant.
    Bill for divorce. Decree modifying former decree as to custody of infant child. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. John W. Preihs, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Charles H. Holt, for appellant. James Lingle, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    E. L. Damon, appellant, v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, appellee.
    Assumpsit to recover one-half of cost of paving alley. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. William B. Wright, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.

      Wham & Wham, for appellant. Noleman, Smith & Dallstream, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Independent Plumbing & Heating Supply Company, appellee, v. Edward C. Zulley et al., appellants.
    Suit to foreclose mechanic’s lien. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal "from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Rehearing denied March 31, 1926.
    Beasley & Zulley, for appellants. Clyde D. Miller, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John Huth, appellee, v. Olan King et al., appellants.
    Action for damages from noxious odors resulting from use of premises for slaughtering animals. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Franklin county; the Hon. Julius C. Kern, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    S. J. Gee and Williams & Lewis, for appellants. R. E. Smith and F. E. Trobaugh, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Martin Schnipper, sheriff, for use of R. H. Huschle, appellee, v. C. D. Robinson and Weber Implement & Automobile Company, appellants.
    Action upon replevin bond. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. Louis Bernreuter, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Rehearing denied March 31, 1926.
    T. A. O’Connor, for appellants. Webb & Webb, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Robbie M. Smith, appellant, v. Maude Robbs and Claude Robbs, appellees.
    Bill to reform contract and to enjoin prosecution of action at law. Bill dismissed. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pope county; the Hon. A. E. Somers, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 17, 1926.
    Geo. B. Gillespie and H. A. Evans, for appellant. Fowler & Rumsey and R. Taylor, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Higbee

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Jake Beckerman and Isadore Beckerman, plaintiffs in error.
    Conviction of conspiracy to defraud by burning insured goods. Error to the City Court of Granite City; the Hon. M. B. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 27, 1926.
    Chas. A. Karsch, for plaintiffs in error. Jesse B. Brown, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The National State Bank of Metropolis, appellee, v. O. W. Lyerla and John Marlow, appellants.
    Action on promissory note. Order denying motion to set aside judgment by confession. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Massac county; the Hon. A. L. Spiller, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 27, 1926.
    Charles C. Murrah, for appellants. H. A. Evans, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    L. Cohen Grocery Company, appellee, v. G. L. Limerick et al., appellants.
    Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Franklin county; the Hon. Julius C. Kern, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 27, 1926.
    J. E. Carr and George Sawyer, for appellants. Trobaugh & Church, for appellee; L. A. Cranston, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Theodore R. Dunn, appellee, v. Theodore A. Karr, Jr., executor of the last will and testament of Theodore Karr, Sr., deceased, et al., appellants. Theodore A. Karr, Jr., executor of the last will and testament of of Theodore Karr, Sr., et al., appellants, v. Theodore R. Dunn et al., appellees.
    Bill to remove cloud on title. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 27, 1926.
    F. J. Tecklenburg, for appellants. M. V. Joyce and Louis Zerwick, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Med Ledford, plaintiff in error.
    Conviction of violation of Prohibition Act. Error to the County Court of Saline county; Hon. A. G. Abney, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 27, 1926.
    W. W. Wheatley and Rufus Neely, for plaintiff in error. Charles T. Flota, State’s Attorney, and K. C. Ronalds, Assistant State’s Attorney, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr, Justice Barry

text:
    Wendel Page, appellant, v. Frank Blair, appellee.
    Action for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. F. R. Dove, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1925.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 27, 1926.
    Charles H. Holt, for appellant. W. G. Murphy, for appellee.
   Mr, Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Barnes

text:
    People ex rel. First National Pictures, Appellee, v. William E. Dever, Mayor, et al., Appellants.
    Gen. No. 30,634.
    1. Mandamus — sufficiency of evidence to support verdict of jury, in proceedings to compel issuance of permit for showing of motion picture. The verdict of a jury in mandamus proceedings to- compel issuance of an unlimited permit for the showing of a motion picture, that such picture is not immoral within the meaning of Chicago Municipal Code § 2787, held against the weight of the evidence.
    2. Mandamus — verdict of jury as conclusive of issue as to imr morality of motion picture within meaning of regulative ordinance. The verdict of a jury, in mandamus proceedings to compel issuance of an unlmited permit to show a motion picture, that such, picture is not immoral within the meaning of Chicago Municipal Code § 2787, is not conclusive upon the Appellate Court, nor does it preclude the court from applying accepted definitions of immorality in forming its own judgment as to the matter in issue.
    Appeal by defendants from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Hugo Pam, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division, of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 5, 1926.
    Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, for appellants ; James J. Coughlih, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel.

      Leesman & Roemer, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a mandamus proceeding. On submission of the issues to a jury there was a verdict for petitioner, and an order that a writ of mandamus issue, as prayed, against the mayor and superintendent of police, respectively, of the City of Chicago, directing them to grant a permit to exhibit in said city a moving picture or a photoplay called “Chickie,” of which petitioner is producer and owner. Respondents appeal from that order.

The issues arise on the application to such photo-play of certain city ordinances, as codified in the “Chicago Municipal Code of 1922.”

Section 2786 of said code provides that before granting a permit the superintendent of police shall inspect the picture or series of pictures, or cause them to be inspected, and either grant or deny a permit.

Section 2787, so far as applicable to the case before us, provides: “If a picture or series of pictures for the showing or exhibition of which an application for a permit is made, is. immoral * * *, it shall be the duty of the superintendent of police to refuse such permit, otherwise it shall be his duty to grant such permit. ’ ’

It also provides that in case of his refusal to grant such a permit an appeal may be taken to the mayor, whose action shall be final. There was such an appeal in this case and the refusal was upheld.

Section 2788 provides that where a permit has been refused under a provision of section 2787 because the picture “tends towards creating a harmful impression on the minds of children where such tendency as to the minds of adults would not exist if exhibited only to persons of mature age,” the superintendent of police may grant a special permit limiting the exhibítion of such picture or series of pictures to persons over the age of twenty-one years.

Aside from formal allegations not questioned, the petition sets forth the provisions of the city ordinances relating to the subject, and after describing scenes from the photoplay, and denying that it presents any characteristic or condition that would require a refusal of a permit under section 2787 of the code, the petition charges that the action in refusing the permit was “purely arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory. ’ ’

In their answer respondents admit the formal allegations, deny the picture is not immoral or obscene, and describe certain incidents and scenes of the picture as immoral and justifying a refusal of an unlimited permit, averring it would create a harmful impression on the minds of children, particularly adolescents.

There was proof of inspection and censorship of the picture as provided for by the ordinance, and of the opinion of the censors that a special permit only should be granted as provided under section 2788. The only other evidence adduced consisted of the film and its projection on the screen before the court and jury. The film has been certified to us as an exhibit in the case, and also projected on the screen before us.

The only point raised on the appeal is that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, and merely goes to one question of fact, whether the picture is “immoral” in the sense in which that term is used in the ordinance. There being no proof of any act or motive indicating caprice or an arbitrary exercise of power in refusing an unlimited permit, and defendant having been offered a limited permit, it is clear that the refusal of an unlimited permit was based on .the conclusion of the censor or censors that the photoplay is immoral as tending to create a harmful impression on the minds of children.

We are at once confronted with the question of what is meant by the word “immoral” in the ordinance. Considering a like ordinance it was said in Block v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, that no definition could be formulated which would afford a better standard than the words of the ordinance, and that while people may differ on the subject of what is immoral “the average person of healthy and wholesome mind knows well enough what the words ‘immoral’ and ‘obscene’ mean and can intelligently apply the test to any picture presented to him.” Seizing upon this observation, which is more or less a truism, appellee would have the verdict left undisturbed on the theory that a jury must represent the “average person of healthy and wholesome mind.” We cannot accept this conclusion as á criterion for our own judgment. While such decision gives no definition of immorality, and there was apparently no necessity therefor in that case, it is not to be inferred therefrom that in determining a disputed fact as to what is immoral recourse may not, be had to accepted definitions. The word “immoral”' in its legal and commercial sense is defined in the Century Dictionary as “contrary to good order or public welfare.” As aptly said in a note on p. 621, vol. 1, Rapalje and Lawrence’s Dictionary: “When we call a thing immoral in a legal sense, we do not mean so much that it is ethically wrong as that, according to the understanding of reasonable men, it would be a scandal for a court of justice to treat it as lawful or indifferent, though the transaction may not come under any positive prohibition or penalty.”

It is in this sense of its relation to public welfare that the word must be regarded as used in statutes and ordinances intended to create and promote such welfare. The two sections referred to must be considered together in ascertaining its meaning. So considered, they manifestly contemplate as the first determining factor whether the picture is of a character that forbids an unlimited permit because of a tendency to create a harmful impression in point of morals on the minds of children or persons under the age of twenty-one. If so, then the test forbids a permit un-. der section 2787, but not necessarily under section 2788. While the ordinance unquestionably has in view the protection of public morals it recognizes a difference between adults and minors as to the impressionability of their minds, and that what would have an immoral influence upon the latter might not reasonably have any such effect on the former. Any one familiar with the danger of immoral suggestions to children, especially in their adolescence, would not question the wisdom of excluding them from exhibitions which addressed such suggestions to their immature minds.

While the question of whether a photoplay is immoral within the intendment of the ordinances so construed is ultimately one of fact there are no hard and fast lines of demarcation upon which it may be determined, and whether or not there is a sound discretion vested in the censors, we would be indisposed to interfere with the exercise of what seems to be a sound judgment in passing upon the question.

As before stated, we have viewed' the picture, and concur in the judgment of the censors that while its character is perhaps not such as tends to create a harmful impression on the minds of adults it presents scenes, suggestions and sentiments of immorality calculated to create such an impression on the minds of adolescent children.

In support of this conclusion we need not recite the story in full or go into details, further than to indicate the general tenor of the play and its underlying theme.

It may be tersely described as presenting scenes in which an appeal to sexual passion is the central feature. Chickie, a young, poor girl, working in an office, engages the attention of a young man across the court of a building and first meets him a,t a party in the luxurious home of a worldly woman, a friend of a wealthy roué. The latter had planned the gathering there of a fast set of young people, evidently votaries of the “new freedom” with its flexible morals. At his instigation an office companion of Chickie, another intimate, sophisticated acquaintance of his, asked Chickie to the party where, being out of her social station and without suitable attire for the occasion, she is furnished with expensive attire by the hostess. So garbed, she descends the stairway to1 join! the gathering, only to find that most of its members had disappeared into secluded comers, behind curtains, or on a sofa, in dark or dimly-lighted rooms, where she catches glimpses of couples in embraces and other attitudes suggesting most pointedly the sexual appeal. Shocked by these scenes she finds herself confronted by the roué and evidently realizes that she is the object of his desire for a new conquest. Frightened by the scenes and the repulsive looks and manner betraying his lascivious design, she flees, but is overtaken in the dark by the young man in whom she had become interested, and he takes advantage of the occasion to drive her about in an automobile all night and to engage her affections. At a later date he betrays her, and her family is plunged into sorrow and disgrace by her delicate condition. Still unbaffled, the roué gets her to accept a dinner in a private room of a restaurant, where, continuing his designs, he insinuatingly expresses to her this sentiment: “Men are becoming as tolerant as women and every experience makes a woman more lovable.” Another scene shows her in his private rooms, and when he finds his seductive arts have failed he assumes to have and to assert love for her. Then follows a disclosure of her delicate condition, and when she reminds him of the Mephistophelian sentiment he had previously expressed, he replies: “That was before I loved you.” Other scenes characterized by a like disregard of moral standards might be mentioned, but we have described enough to justify our conclusion. The fact that the play ends in the marriage of the young couple does not redeem it from its moral ugliness.

Good morals are established by well known general usages of society, and a verdict in defiance of the moral standards they recognize should not be upheld. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed cmd remmded.

Gridley, P. J., and Fitch, J., concur.


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    Isabel Waller Knott, Appellee, v. Globe Indemnity Company, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 30,642.
    1. Insurance — construction of accident policy provision exempting frown coverage loss due to acts, etc., which if done hy sane I person would he deemed intentional. A special provision, of an accident insurance policy exempting from coverage a “loss due to any means, act, injury or disease which, if used, done or self-inflicted by the assured while in the possession of all mental faculties, would be deemed intentional,” precludes recovery where the death of an assured is due to his act in leaping from the window of an office building, regardless of his sanity at the time of so doing, or of the presence or absence of an intent on his part to injure or kill himself.
    2. Insurance — sufficiency of evidence to support recovery under policy insuring against death hy accidental means. Where in an action upon a policy insuring against death by accidental means it appeared without contradiction that the death of the assured resulted from his act in leaping from the window of an office building, and the policy expressly exempted from coverage a “loss due to any means, act, injury or disease which, if used, done or self-inflicted by the assured while in the possession of all mental faculties, would be deemed intentional,” proof that the assured was insane at the time he made such leap was immaterial and did not warrant a judgment against the defendant.

      Appeal by defendant from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Arnold Heap, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed October 5, 1926,
    Cassels, Potter So Bentley, for appellant; Ralph F. Potter, of counsel.
    Hicks & Folonie, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a judgment against defendant for $15,000 in a suit upon a policy of accident insurance issued by defendant to one J. Waller Knott, brought by his mother as the beneficiary named therein.

The policy provided for payment of said sum to the beneficiary in the event that the insured during the term of the policy should lose his life “directly and exclusively by bodily injury sustained through accidental means.” It also provided in “Special Provision A” of the policy that it does not cover “loss due to any means, act, injury or disease which, if used, done or self-inflicted by the assured while in the possession of all mental faculties, would be deemed intentional.”

Plaintiff’s statement of claim alleged that the assured came to his death by reason of bodily injury sustained solely through the accidental means of a “fall” or “jump” of the assured from a window in an office building known as 25 West Washington Street in the City of Chicago, while he was not in possession of his mental faculties, and that his said death was unintentional “being due to means, act or disease occurring to the said insured while not in the possession of all mental faculties.”

Defendant’s affidavit of merits admitted that the assured came to his death by reason of a “fall” or “jump,” but denied that the assured was not in possession of all his mental faculties at the time, and denied that at the time thereof the assured was insane and that “said death was unintentional or was done by means, act or disease occurring to the said assured while not in the possession of all mental faculties.” The pleading also set up “Special Provision A,” as aforesaid, and averred that the death of the assured was due to the act of “jumping” from the window, which, if done by the said J. Waller Knott “while in the possession of all mental faculties, would be deemed intentional. ’ ’

Defendant also pleaded want of liability on other grounds which we deem it unnecessary to consider.

It was clearly plaintiff’s theory of the case that the insured was insane at the time of the act which resulted in his death, and that, whether his death came from a “fall” or “jump” it was unintentional and accidental in the eye of the law, and that the provision in question could not be interpreted to exempt defendant from liability under such theory.

It was the theory of the defense that the question of intent is not to be determined from the condition of mind of the assured, — whether he was in possession of all his faculties — but from the character or nature of the act resulting in death judged from the viewpoint of having been done by one while in the possession of all mental faculties; and, if upon such a view, the act imports an intention to commit it, then it would be deemed intentional under said “Special Provision A” and not accidental, whether done by one sane or insane. Hence, the main argument before this court is addressed to the construction of said provision.

Our attention is directed to many cases interpreting similar provisions, and so-called “suicide clauses,” intended to exclude “self-destruction” and injury by “self-inflicted” acts from coverage of policies for accident insurance. Many of these cases are collected and discussed in a note in 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) pp. 261-270, to the case of Cady v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 134 Wis. 322, there reported and which is relied on by plaintiff in support of the theory that the burden was cast on defendant to prove that the assured was at the time, “conscious of the physical consequences of the act” and therefore intended it.

It appears that in consequence of the varying judicial interpretations of so-called “suicide clauses” designed to exempt the insurer from liability, the insurance companies have adopted language like or similar to that of “Special Provision A,” eliminating the word “suicide” or the words “suicide, sane or insane,” with the view of employing language that would be universally recognized as free from ambiguity or doubt. In the interpretation of such clauses the courts have indulged in much refined distinction which seems to belong, as said in Spruill v. North Western Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 N. C. 141, to the domain of speculative psychology rather than to the practical administration of the law. In interpreting suicide or self-destruction clauses in some of these cases distinctions have been drawn with reference to whether the insured was conscious of the physical nature and consequences of his act or lacked an intention to cause his death, or was driven by an irresistible insane impulse, or, whether they contemplated and included a felonious suicide, or a suicide committed by one conscious of the physical nature and consequences of his act. In other cases these distinctions have been ignored. But, in our opinion, the meaning of “Special Provision A” is so clear as to obviate the necessity of discussing them. Whatever ambiguity may exist in other forms of so-called suicide or self-destruction clauses, in determining the fundamental question whether the act or injury upon which liability is predicated in the instant case is accidental or unintentional, there is in our opinion no room for two constructions of the provision in question. Its manifest meaning is that when the act of the insured resulting in his injury or death would be deemed intentional if done by a sane person, loss therefrom is not covered by the policy. By such language the test is not the capacity of the assured to form an intention to commit the act, or his consciousness of the physical consequences thereof, but the nature or character of the act itself viewed from the standpoint of being done by one in the possession of all his faculties. To state it more concretely, if a sane person had jumped from such a window it would unquestionably be conceded to be intentional. Under a logical construction of said provision, it matters not, therefore, what was the state of mind of the assured at the time if, as a matter of fact, he leaped from the window.

In Clemens v. Royal Neighbors of America, 14 N. D. 116, it was urged that the following clause of a certificate issued by the defendant, to wit: “If the member holding this certificate * # * shall die * * * by any means or act which if used or done by such member while in possession of all natural faculties unimpaired would be deemed self-destruction,” was ambiguous. The court held that the language conveyed one meaning, and that the idea conveyed was that if the assured should die by his own act, or through means of his own selection, the certificate would be void, whatever his condition of mind at the time. The court said: “It is equivalent to saying ■ that if the assured should die by his own hand, whether sane or insane, the certificate would be void.”

It was held in Seitzinger v. Modern Woodmen of America, 204 Ill. 58, that the words, “sane or insane” were introduced in the certificate in that case by the insurer for the purpose of excepting from its operation any self-destruction, whether the assured was of sound mind or in a state of insanity, and that it was competent for' the insurance companies to contract for such exemption from liability. In Zerulla v. Supreme Lodge, etc., 223 Ill. 518, it was held that where the insured committed suicide, and where the by-laws of the defendant society provided that “if the death was due to the voluntary or involuntary suicidal act of the deceased member, whether he was at the time sane or insane, no benefit should be paid on account of the death of such member,” there could be no recovery under the contract, “whether he was sane or insane, — and this without regard to the degree of sanity, if he was insane at the time.” Whatever be the view of the courts in other jurisdictions the courts of this State have denied recovery where such words were used in the exempting clause. A list of cases disclosing like rulings may be found in the note on page 265 of 17 L. R. A. (N. S.). These decisions are pertinent only as the phraseology in “Special Provision A” may be deemed, like that in the Clemens case, supra, as “equivalent to saying that if the assured should die by his own hand, whether sane or insane.” A like construction to a similar provision to that in the latter case was given in Keefer v. Modern Woodmen of America, 203 Pa. 129. In Cotter v. Royal Neighbors of America, 76 Minn. 518, the court held there was no ambiguity in a like provision, saying that “it was evidently adopted, in view of the decisions of the courts on the subject, so as to exempt the company from liability in case of self-destruction of the insured, whatever might have been her mental condition at the time of the act.” In those cases the provision ended with the words “would be deemed self-destruction.” Here it ends with the words “would be deemed intentional.” Bearing on the question of intent, the phrase used in the case at bar is in fact more explicit.

It is true that in Andrews v. United States Casualty Co., 154 Wis. 82, language very similar to that of “Special Provision A” was deemed ambiguous, and for that reason was resolved on familiar principles against the insurer. But if, as we hold, there is no ambiguity in “Special Provision A,” the policy in question must be construed as precluding recovery in ease the assured leaped from said window.

As to the fact whether the insured leaped or fell from the window there is room for only one conclusion from the evidence. Only one witness testified on that subject. From the opposite side of the court he saw the insured raise the lower sash of the window clear up, then turn from it and immediately .reappear —within two to four seconds — in what he described as a “jump out of the window,” a “head dive” out of it, “a dive over,” — “head first just like a head dive.” There was no testimony tending to show a situation in which he could have fallen accidentally from the window, and plaintiff’s theory of the accident is based not in the nature of the act, but the state of mind of the assured. The window was 54 inches wide. Its sill was 33 inches from the floor. From the inside of the sill to the outside of the coping was 23 inches. When the lower sash was raised clear up there was an opening 54 inches wide and 36 inches high. There was no evidence tending to show that the insured stood by the opening after raising the sash or leaned out of it. Under such circumstances the conclusion is inevitable that the assured leaped from the window. That being practically an unquestioned fact, to which the court was to apply the provision in question, and there being no other material fact in controversy, under our construction of the provision defendant was entitled, in accordance with its motion, to an instructed verdict.

Plaintiff’s case was predicated on the theory that the assured was insane and the case was tried on that theory and no other. There was no proof offered or that tended to rebut plaintiff’s evidence of insanity. The crucial fáct that the assured leaped from the window being uncontroverted, it was immaterial whether the assured was sane or insane at the time of the act, for the act being one that would he deemed intentional, whatever the state of mind of the assured, and, therefore, not accidental, no recovery could he had under the terms of the policy.

Accordingly the judgment is reversed. -

Reversed.

Gridley, P. J., and Fitch, J., concur.


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    The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Edward Kamm, Plaintiff in Error.
    Gen. No. 30,858.
    Criminal procedure — indictment for attempted burglary loith intent to steal goods, etc., value not alleged, as basis for conviction of attempted larceny of goods of certain value„ A conviction of attempted petit larceny of property of the value of $14 is void where resulting from a trial without a jury upon a plea of not guilty to an indictment charging attempted burglary as defined in Cahill’s St. ch. 38, f 66, with iiitent to steal goods, etc., but containing no allegation as to the value of such goods, notwithstanding the defendant waived a jury following the waiver by the People of the felony charge.
    Error by defendant to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Walter P. Steffen, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1926.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed October 5, 1926.
    Eugene McCaffrey, for plaintiff in error.
    Egbert E. Crowe, State’s Attorney, Edward E. Wilson and Clarence E. Nelson, Assistant State’s Attorneys, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.

This writ brings up for review the conviction of plaintiff in error of “attempted petit larceny, value of property $14 upon the indictment.”

The indictment charges plaintiff in error with attempted burglary as defined in section 37 of our Criminal Code [Cahill’s St. ch. 38, [[66]. The intent necessary to the commission of that offense as specified in the indictment is to steal, etc., the personal goods, etc., of a certain corporation. There is no allegation therein of the value of the goods.

Upon the assumption that the crime thus charged includes the misdemeanor of which plaintiff in error was convicted, the court, as recited in the judgment order, permitted a waiver of the felony by the state’s attorney, and a waiver of jury by plaintiff in error. The cause was then submitted for trial without a jury on the plea of “attempted petit larceny,” resulting in the conviction, as aforesaid.

But the indictment charges the single offense of attempted burglary, which being a felony under the statute cannot be tried on a plea of not guilty without a jury. (Harris v. People, 128 Ill. 585.) Even if the act described includes an attempt to steal, without an allegation of. the value of the property there would be no valid charge of such an offense. An indictment for larceny is not valid without an allegation of the value of the property stolen (Brown v. People, 173 Ill. 34, and People v. Silbertrust, 236 Ill. 144), and as an indictment for an attempted crime must adequately describe the crime attempted, an allegation of value would also seem requisite to a valid charge of attempted larceny.

But while value is an essential element of larceny, committed or attempted, it is not an element of burglary or attempted burglary. Nor is larceny a necessary element of burglary. It is only one of various objects of burglary that may characterize the intent necessary to' a commission of the offense. It is the breaking and entering the building with intent to steal and not the attempt to steal that is the essential element of the offense here charged. The theory that from that intent there may be inferred an intention to steal something of value will not justify a conviction without an allegation of value.

Cases cited by counsel for the People where there was an express charge of a lesser offense, either in the same count or another count of the indictment, or where from the very nature of the offense the charge thereof necessarily includes a minor one, are not in point.

The crime charged being a felony, and the indictment not including the offense of which plaintiff in error was convicted, and trial having been had without a jury, the judgment is void and must be reversed. The cause will be remanded for a legal disposition of the case.

Reversed and remcmded.

(triplet, P. J., and Fitch, J., concur.


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    Home Bank & Trust Company, Appellant, v. Lester Bogorad, Appellee.
    Gen. No. 30,912.
    1. Negotiable instruments — availability of primary defenses in action against maker of check by bank accepting instrument for deposit only as agent for collection. Where a depositor’s account with his bank was subject to an express agreement that checks accepted by the bank for deposit were accepted only as,agent of the depositor for collection, such bank did not become a holder in due course under Cahill’s St. eh. 98, If 72, of a check indorsed in blank by such depositor as payee thereof, so as to preclude the maker from setting up, in an action by the bank upon such check, such defenses as he had as against the payee, notwithstanding the bank, after receiving such check as a deposit, permitted the payee to draw against the same.

      2. Negotiable instruments — sufficiency of evidence to rebut prima facie title of bank to check indorsed to it in blank by depositor. The prima facie title of a bank to a check held hy it, after indorsement in blank by the payee, is rebutted by proof that it was the intent of the parties aforesaid that the bank should hold the check only as agent of the depositor for collection.
    Appeal by plaintiff from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Laurence B. Jacobs, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1926.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 5, 1926.
    Rehearing denied October 18, 1926.
    Cheney & Peterson, for appellant.
    Hyman A. Pierce, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action brought on a check of defendant for $185 on Second North-Western State Bank of Chicago, payable to the order of H. Lechenger, and by him indorsed in blank and deposited in plaintiff’s bank where he had a checking account. The check was immediately put through the clearing house for collection, and payment having been stopped by the drawer, it was refused by the bank on which the check was drawn.

On the inside cover of the bank book issued by plaintiff to Lechenger is what is styled an “important notice” in print which in part reads as follows:

“It is expressly understood and agreed that all checks, drafts and other items deposited with and received by this bank for collection or credit * * * are delivered to and received by this bank expressly and only upon condition that this bank acts only as your agent for your account and convenience, and assumes no responsibility whatever * * *.
“Any credit allowed for checks, drafts or-other items on this or any other bank or party, is only provisional and is expressly made subject to payment and subject to rights of charge back, until the proceeds thereof in money shall have been actually received in our hands. ’ ’

On the deposit of said check with plaintiff bank Lechenger’s account was credited with its amount and in consequence of the nonpayment of the check and his drawing against the same his account became overdrawn to the extent of $122.50.

Plaintiff rested on proof of these facts by its assistant cashier, who on cross-examination testified that Lechenger’s account was subject to the rules contained in said notice. Defendant in his own behalf testified that he gave'the check to Lechenger on his promise to deliver on the same day his promissory note therefor, indorsed by two specified persons, and that he failed to do so. The court’s finding and judgment were for defendant.

The ultimate question for decision is whether the bank is the owner of the check. If it is, then it must be on the ground that it became the holder in due course, as defined by section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law [Cahill’s St. ch. 98, 72], and took the same in good faith and for value, in that it gave credit therefor, and without notice of the facts pleaded and proven. In that case the defense could not be made against it. But if it took the deposit merely as agent to collect, then the depositor is still the owner of the check, against whom such a defense may be made.

There is a great diversity of opinion bearing on this subject. On similar facts there are opposite rulings. Some cases stress one fact or circumstance and some another. An attempt to distinguish them would require a discussion much beyond proper limits of an opinion. An extensive line of authorities oh the effect of the deposit of.indorsed paper to pass title to the bank, under varying circumstances, may be found in an annotation in 11 A. L. R. 1060. It is there said that the majority of cases hold that where there is no definite understanding between the depositor and the bank as to the ownership of the paper, and the paper is indorsed without restriction and deposited to the depositor’s account and he is given credit therefor with the right to draw thereon, title passes to the bank. Decisions in this State are in line with those authorities. (American Trust & Savings Bank v. Gueder & Paeschke Mfg. Co., 150 Ill. 336; Doppelt v. National Bank of the Republic, 175 Ill. 432; American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Theummler, 195 Ill. 90; Anderson v. Keystone Chemical Supply Co., 293 Ill. 468.)

But none of the cases cited involves a special agreement, as does the case at bar. Even in cases in other jurisdictions where there was a special agreement or understanding the decision has often turned on some special circumstance, like the usual course of business followed between the parties, or some circumstance deemed to constitute a waiver of its provisions. That there may be such a waiver is decided in Jefferson Bank v. Merchants Refrig. Co., 236 Mo. 407; American Trust & Savings Bank v. Austin, 25 Misc. Rep. 454, 55 N. Y. Supp. 561, aff’d 47 App. Div. 635, 62 N. Y. S. 1131.

But the case at bar is not affected by any such feature. There is no proof of a previous course of business or of any circumstance that may be construed as a waiver of the notice or contract.

Whatever be the rule as to passing title where there is no agreement between the bank and its depositor, the case before us stands clearly on the construction to be given to such notice as to the relationship of the parties thereto. In view of the admission of the bank’s cashier that the deposits were taken subject to its terms there would seem to be no room for controversy as to such relationship. Rules of that character printed on the inside of a pass book are held to constitute a contract between the bank and a depositor. (See authorities cited in Annotation 5 A. L. R. 1203 and 1204.) The rules and terms of said contract are specific and emphatic to the effect that in receiving checks and drafts to a depositor’s account the bank acts only as his agent.

So far as the contract relates to provisional credit it need not be considered. There are many cases holding that the fact that a bank may charge back a dishonored check or draft is not inconsistent with its ownership thereof. But it is utterly inconsistent that the bank should accept checks for deposit on an express understanding that it does so as agent only, and at the same time assert ownership thereto against the maker. It cannot occupy both positions in the same transaction. It is a contract of its own making and one mutually binding dn the parties thereto. The logical conclusion therefrom is that the bank’s relationship is that of agent, and, therefore, it did not obtain title to the check.

While it may be said that from the face of the instrument and the blank indorsement the bank prima facie would have title, under authorities and the Negotiable Instruments Law, the presumption is rebut-table and overcome by the intent of the parties as expressed in the agreement.

The bank still had recourse against the depositor and has already satisfied his debt so far as his account would permit. Should it recover in this case for the amount of the check it would necessarily be for the depositor’s use so far as it has already been paid. The fact that the bank has credited his account to that extent would indicate its intention to hold him to the express terms of the contract. Had the depositor’s account been sufficient to pay the bank in full on the “charge back,” manifestly it would not have claimed’ ownership or had any interest in the check, but have tendered it back to the depositor.

It has been generally regarded that a notice in the customer’s pass book that the bank acts only as agent in receiving checks or drafts prevents the passing of title to the bank. Cases to this effect are In re State Bank, 56 Minn. 119; South Park Foundry & Machine Co. v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 75 Minn. 186; Farmers’ Guaranty State Bank v. Burrus Mill & Elevator Co. (Tex.), 207 S. W. 400; American Trust & Savings Bank v. Austin, 25 Misc. Rep. 454, 55 N. Y. Supp. 561; People’s State Bank v. Miller, 185 Mich. 565. In some of these and other cases bearing on the subject there were other' circumstances stressed by the court. But it would serve no good purpose to note distinctions where the understanding or the provisions of the contract are variant from those in the case at bar or where emphasis is laid on a feature of the case not present here. In the absence of any proof of circumstances indicating a waiver or a different pourse of business than the agreement itself suggests, and the express admission that" the check was taken under the terms of the contract, which upon its face admits of only one construction, namely, that of agency on the part of the bank, we think the bank is in no position to assert the claim of ownership of the check. The fact that the bank gave provisional credit, which was a mere gratuitous privilege given at the bank’s risk, and which is contemplated by the agreement, has no direct bearing on the question of title in view of the express provisions as to the agency of the bank.

We have not discussed the Negotiable Instruments Law for we think if plaintiff saw fit to establish such a contractual relationship with its depositor it must be held to have taken the paper, not under the provisions of that law, but upon conditions which negatived the right to rely upon it. In other words, it acted solely as agent and took the risk of extending credit •for the check before collecting it. What would be the rights of a third party are not involved in this case. We do not think, therefore, that appellee is precluded from setting up the real state of facts as to the ownership of the check, and that the defense he has against the drawer, in view of that relationship,, is good against the bank.

Accordingly the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Gridley, P. J., and Fitch, J., concur.