author: RICHARD BARAJAS, Chief Justice.

text:
    ALLEGHENY CASUALTY CO. (Agent Alberto J. De La Chica, Jr. d/b/a La Chica II Bail Bonds), Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
    No. 08-03-00226-CV.
    Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.
    April 7, 2005.
    Rehearing Overruled May 4, 2005.

      Louis Elias Lopez, Attorney At Law, El Paso, for Appellant.
    Jose R. Rodriguez, County Atty., El Paso, for Appellee.
    Before Panel No. 4 BARAJAS, C.J., LARSEN, and McCLURE, JJ.
   OPINION

RICHARD BARAJAS, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s entry of a final judgment finding a bond forfeiture in which Appellee was granted final forfeiture of a bail bond of $1,500 against Appellant. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The substantive facts in this case are not disputed. The criminal defendant-principal Jorge Rios Renteria, a citizen of Mexico, applied for admission to the United States on February 24, 2002 as a non-immigrant visitor. At that time, he was found to be smuggling approximately forty-six pounds of marijuana into the United States. He was paroled into the United States for prosecution proceedings related to the smuggling. He was indicted by the State of Texas on March 19, 2002 and charged with the felony of possession of marijuana in the quantity of more than five pounds but less than fifty pounds. The principal, Jorge Renteria, secured an appearance bond in the amount of $1,500 on March 1, 2002 with Appellant as surety. The effect of the issuance of the bond is that the principal is authorized by law to be released by the Sheriff. Because the principal in this case is a Mexican national who had been paroled into the United States for a temporary purpose, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had filed a detainer with the Sheriff which provided that upon release from incarceration, the individual would be released to the INS and taken to an INS facility for holding until his return to Mexico. In conjunction with his parole into the United States for the criminal prosecution, the Honorable Gary Burkholder, immigration judge, issued an Order of Removal providing for removal from the United States to Mexico for the reason that the immigration officer believed him to be a trafficker of controlled substances. The issuance of a bond triggered his release to INS and subsequent removal from the United States.

On May 8, 2002, the principal failed to appear at his hearing to answer the felony drug possession charges pending against him. On May 13, 2002, the trial court issued a Judgment Nisi A hearing on the Judgment Nisi was held on March 6, 2003, the trial court received evidence from both the Appellant and the Appellee and reviewed the exhibits and trial briefs filed by both parties. On March 26, 2003, the trial court issued an order stating “[t]he case will be held in abatement until April 9, 2003 at 5 pm to produce Mr. Renteria by use of ‘parol’ [sic] or other method.” A Final Order on Judgment Nisi was entered on April 16, 2003 finding that the bond of $1,500 should be forfeited. Appellant did not request findings of fact or conclusions of law.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

In two issues for review, Appellant challenges the court’s granting of the bond forfeiture claiming that a bail bond surety is not liable for a bail bond when the principal is deported prior to the time that the principal is to appear in court. Appellant’s second issue asserts that liability of a bonding company for a bond forfeiture is excused by a finding of uncontrollable circumstances and that the fact of federal deportation is sufficient for a finding of excuse under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22.13. We read these issues as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s non-finding of deportation of the principal as a defense to a bond forfeiture case as a matter of law. Similarly, we construe both issues as attacking the trial court’s non-finding of uncontrollable circumstances as an affirmative defense to the bond forfeiture liability for the reason that the principal had been deported as a matter of law.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A “no evidence” or legal insufficiency point is a question of law which challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a particular fact finding. There are two separate “no evidence” claims. When the party having the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding, the point of error challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence should be that the fact or issue was established as “a matter of law.” When the party without the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding, the challenge on appeal is one of “no evidence to support the finding.” In re Estate of Livingston, 999 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.); see Creative Manufacturing, Inc. v. Unik, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

When attacking the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse finding on an issue for which he had the burden of proof, i.e., challenging the trial court’s finding as a matter of law, the appellant must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence conclusively established all the vital facts in support of the issue. In re Estate of Livingston, 999 S.W.2d at 879; Sterner v. Marathon Oil Company, 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989); Kratz v. Exxon Corp., 890 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, no writ); Chandler v. Chandler, 842 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied). A party attempting to overcome an adverse fact finding'as a matter of law must surmount two hurdles. In re Estate of Livingston, 999 S.W.2d at 879; Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690. First, the record must be examined for evidence that supports the finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary. In re Estate of Livingston, 999 S.W.2d at 879; Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690; Kratz, 890 S.W.2d at 902. Second, if there is no evidence to support the finding, then the entire record must be examined to see if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. In re Estate of Livingston, 999 S.W.2d at 879; Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690; Kratz, 890 S.W.2d at 902. Only if the contrary position is conclusively established will the point of error be sustained. In re Estate of Livingston, 999 S.W.2d at 879-80; Kratz, 890 S.W.2d at 902; Chandler, 842 S.W.2d at 832.

In reviewing a factual sufficiency point of error, the appeals court must weigh all of the evidence in the record. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.1996). Findings of fact may be overturned only if they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id. In that event, the appeals court must state clearly why the finding is factually insufficient or so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust. Id.

An “insufficiency” point invokes a broader standard, requiring this Court to consider all of the evidence and ascertain whether the evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or the evidence to the contrary so overwhelming, that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965).

Legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence standards of review govern appeals of nonjury trials on the merits. IKB Industries (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex.1997); Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex.1992); Hall, Standards of Appellate Review in Civil Appeals, 21 St. Mary’s L.j. 865, 919-20 (1990). When a party appeals from a nonjury trial, it must complain of specific findings and conclusions of the trial court, because a general complaint against the trial court’s judgment does not present a justiciable question. Fiduciary Mortgage Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 762 S.W.2d 196, 204 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied). Accordingly, findings of fact and conclusions of law are mandatory for a party to file to avoid the onerous presumptions that apply in an appeal from a nonjury trial. When an appellant does not request or file findings and conclusions by the trial court, the appellate court presumes the trial court found all fact questions in support of its judgment, and the reviewing court must affirm that judgment on any legal theory finding support in the pleadings and evidence. Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex.1987).

If the appellant does not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact, when filed, these facts are binding upon both the party and the appellate court. Wade v. Anderson, 602 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1980, writ refd n.r.e.). Accordingly, it is incumbent for the appellant to attack the findings by appropriate legal and factual sufficiency points of error. Lovejoy v. Lillie, 569 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In an appeal of a nonju-ry trial, findings are specifically and meaningfully tied to appropriate standards of appellate review and are therefore truly beneficial to appellate review. See Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 853.

It would have been helpful for the court to have articulated its findings of facts and conclusions of law but because no findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested or filed in this case, we will presume that the trial court found all necessary facts to support the judgment.

IV. DISCUSSION

After the principal on the bond failed to appear, the State initiated the proceedings to forfeit the bail bond that had been posted in this case. The evidence is undisputed that the principal failed to appear at the required time and has not appeared to answer the felony possession of marijuana charges pending against him. The question raised by Appellant is merely whether the fact of deportation of an alien from the United States automatically triggers a defense to the obligation imposed by the writing of the bond and whether the fact of deportation is an uncontrollable circumstance that excuses nonappearance at a court proceeding.

In Castaneda v. State, , the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the issue of the liability of a bonding company under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.16 and outlines the procedure that is necessary for a bonding company to raise a defense to liability on the bond. Castaneda involved a contention on the part of the bonding company that it was excused from liability under the bond in five cases where individuals had been released to the custody of INS. Significantly, in three of the five cases, the bonding company had complied with the statute and provided proof in the form of verification from the sheriff that the individuals were in the custody of the federal agency. The Castaneda court held that such proof was sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute and the bonding company was excused under those circumstances. The fourth case involved a technical release of the surety on other grounds not relevant to our case. The fifth case was factually distinguishable because the bonding company did not submit proof of compliance with the statute in the form of the verification of incarceration from the sheriff and the surety was not released. See generally Castaneda v. State, 138 S.W.3d 304 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). The Court of Criminal Appeals notes that the statutory provision does not provide for “absolving liability where a principal is deported from the United States but is not shown to be in the custody of the foreign jurisdiction, ...” id. at 309, but does not reach the merits on the question of deportation as a defense because of the lack of evidence of the fact of deportation in the Castaneda record. Id. Significantly, the Court of Criminal Appeals does not discuss the option of “parole” available to deported aliens who wish to return.

Interestingly, the fact situation presented in the case before us appears to mirror the factual scenario contemplated by the Castaneda dissent. The Castaneda dissent describes an opportunity for nefarious drug dealers to take advantage of the release provision provided by the bond, allowing the drug “mules” to avoid prosecution and return to Mexico with virtually no consequences other than a small inconvenience and slight disruption to the drug trafficker’s supply train. See Castaneda, 138 S.W.3d at 314. In Castaneda, the court described a scenario which fits our situation almost exactly. Mr. Renteria, carrying less than fifty pounds of marijuana, presented himself for entry to the United States as a tourist. When caught smuggling the drugs, and because the amount in question did not appear to be significant enough to warrant federal prosecution, he was turned over to the State for prosecution of the felony under state law. The Federal government’s interest in him was limited to the immigration violation which triggered the immigration hold. Because the felony charge resulted in a relatively small bond, with a correspondingly smaller bonding fee, Mr. Renteria was able to obtain the services of a bonding company who was willing to write a bond for an individual who listed only a minimal address in Juarez, Mexico for purposes of identification. The result was that the bond triggered Mr. Renteria’s release to INS which then transferred him to the border where he has disappeared into Mexico. Now Appellant would like this Court to excuse it from its minimal obligation under the bond entirely, allowing it to make a tidy profit on a scheme which is obvious to all but the most naive.

Appellant has asserted that the mere fact of the deportation of the principal triggers a judicial excuse to their obligation under the bond because of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.16. We strongly disagree and look to the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion in Castaneda for guidance.

The surrender of a surety bond is covered by Article 17.16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which states;

Discharge of liability; surrender or incarceration of principal before forfeiture
(a) A surety may before forfeiture relieve himself of his undertaking by:
(1) surrendering the accused into the custody of the sheriff of the county where the prosecution is pending; or
(2) delivering to the sheriff of the county where the prosecution is pending an affidavit stating that the accused is incarcerated in federal custody, in the custody of any state, or in any county of this state.
(b) For the purposes of Subsection (a)(2) of this article, the bond is discharged and the surety is absolved of liability on the bond on the sheriffs verification of the incarceration of the accused.

In addressing a factually similar situation, the Castaneda court interpreted the requirements established by Article 17.16. By its plain language, Article 17.16 releases a surety from liability on a bond when verification of the principal’s incarceration in another jurisdiction is requested and the sheriff is able to verify that incarceration. When incarceration in the receiving jurisdiction is verified, the surety is automatically released from liability; neither further action by the surety nor approval by a court is required. There is no requirement that the surety notify the trial court, or anyone else, that the bond has been surrendered or to request that a detainer or arrest warrant be entered so that, the principal is subject to return to the sending jurisdiction. Castaneda, 138 S.W.3d at 308.

In Castaneda, as in our case, the other jurisdiction was federal. In the Castaneda cases, the court noted that the bonding company was hired to post bond so that the principals would be transferred to federal custody. After the bonds were posted and his principals transferred into INS custody, the bonding company filed, for three of the principals, the forms requesting verification by the Hidalgo County sheriff. In these three cases, the sheriff verified that the principal was in INS custody and provided a verification form. In these three cases, the bonding company then filed an Affidavit of Bondsman for Surrender of Principal, with the verification form attached, and requested the trial judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the principal. Such requests are not required to release the surety from liability under the plain language of Article 17.16, but appear to have been a courtesy notification to the trial court that the principal was no longer in the custody of Hidalgo County. In each case, however, the trial court refused to issue the warrant. Id.

In due course, each case was called for trial, and in each case, the principal failed to appear. Even though, by operation of law, the bonding company had been released from liability on the three bonds, the State requested, and the trial court granted, a judgment nisi against the bonding company and each principal. The Castaneda court held that because the bonding company’s liability on those three bonds had been exonerated “on the sheriffs verification of the incarceration of the accused,” the trial court was without authority to find the bonding company liable for those bonds. Castaneda, 138 S.W.3d at 308.

Our case, though similar, is factually distinguishable on two significant grounds. First, the Appellant did not show that the principal was incarcerated in another jurisdiction and did not have the sheriffs verification of such incarceration triggering the automatic release from liability under the statute. In fact, there is no evidence in the appellate record that Mr. Renteria, though in the custody of the INS for a short time, was in the custody of any jurisdiction at the time for appearance in the Texas state courts. Further, Appellant did not present an affidavit of bondsman for surrender of the principal which would have triggered the requirement for verification by the sheriff under Article 17.16. Clearly the statute contemplates excusing a bondsman from liability on the bond when an individual is securely confined in another jurisdiction. It intends to reheve the bondsman of any responsibility for the principal’s location or required appearance to answer pending charges only upon verification of the incarceration by the sheriff. It should not, however, be construed as allowing a bonding company to become a participant in a game of cat and mouse where the State is the loser. In sum, Appellant did not show that Mr. Renteria was securely in the custody of any other jurisdiction nor did Appellant comply with the minimal statutory requirements outlined by Article 17.16 to trigger a verification by the sheriff. Because there is no evidence of compliance with the statute, we overrule Appellant’s Issue No. One and hold that the mere deportation of an individual without more is not sufficient to trigger a release from liability on the part of a bondsman under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.16 as a matter of law.

Appellant has also urged that the deportation of the principal in this case is an uncontrollable circumstance which prevented the appearance of the principal and should result in a mandatory release of liability under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22.13.

Castaneda is also helpful in reviewing this issue by holding that the principal must appear before final judgment on the bond to answer the accusation against him or show sufficient cause for not so appearing. In Castaneda, the surety was held liable on the bond for failing to show the circumstances which justified the defense of “uncontrollable circumstance” before the final judgment on the bond was entered because the bondsman had not proved that the principal was in fact deported to Mexico. In our case, it is clear from the record that the principal was returned to Mexico, Appellant urges that the mere fact of the principal’s departure from the United States is sufficient to show as a matter of law that the bonding company is excused from liability on the bond by reason of “uncontrollable circumstance” as contemplated by Article 22.13. See Castaneda, 138 S.W.3d at 310. We hold that it does not.

The plain language of Article 22.13 provides for exoneration for responsibility for the bond under limited circumstances. Article 22.13 provides for exoneration if “uncontrollable circumstance” prevented the principal’s appearance and it is shown' that the principal’s failure to appear arose through “no fault on his part.” Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 22.13(a)3 (Vernon Supp .2004-05).

Cases that have addressed the issue of “uncontrollable circumstance” appear to consider the “fault” of the principal as having a significant bearing on the ultimate determination of whether the “uncontrollable circumstance” truly excused the principal’s failure to appear. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 955 S.W.2d 96, 99-100 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). None of the cases that have reviewed this issue before, contemplated the unique factual twist presented by the evidence in this casé which included the option of temporary parole being available to a defendant-principal to allow the individual to return to the United States for the purpose of answering the pending criminal charges against him or her.

The trial court was presented with the deposition testimony of Ronald Marcell, a senior immigration inspector with the Immigration and Naturalization Service in El Paso, Texas. Mr. Marcell provided detailed testimony about the option of parole, and appropriate procedure to be followed by an individual who has the desire to return to the United States to answer criminal charges pending against him or her. Further, Appellant’s representative, Mr. Alberto J. De La Chica, Jr. testified that he was familiar with and had, in fact, participated in circumstances whereby individuals from Mexico returned to the United States and were paroled into this country for the limited purpose of appearing at a court proceeding. Mr. De La Chica confirmed that he personally had assisted individuals by meeting individuals at the bridge and facilitating the individual’s request for parole.

The evidence also established that in the event parole was denied, the denial may be appealed for further review. Mr. Marcell also testified that his records did not reflect a request for parole by Mr. Renteria ever occurred nor did Appellant contend that Mr. Renteria had presented himself to INS and been denied parole. Rather, what occurred in this case is precisely the type of machinations contemplated by the Castaneda dissent.

We note that federal law provides for parole of individuals into the United States for purposes of appearing at court proceedings. Because there is no evidence to reflect that Mr. Renteria attempted to present himself for parole and avail himself of the opportunity to return and answer the charges against him, we hold that Appellant has not shown uncontrollable circumstances to justify exoneration from liability on the bond as a matter of law. We also note that the burden to justify exoneration from liability on a bond should be high and is on Appellant in order to discourage the outrageous consequences of creating a virtual swinging door to allow drug dealers a rapid return to Mexico with essentially no consequences and no corresponding deterrent effect or compulsion to insure the principal’s appearance to answer pending charges. The bonding companies should have some incentive to insure that there is a meaningful intention to produce an alien defendant for appearance at court proceedings after a bond has been approved.

The Court of Criminal Appeals in Hill discussed the exoneration of responsibility contemplated by “uncontrollable circumstance” of Article 22.13 and the contributing impact of the principal’s actions in determining “fault.” Clearly, the court contemplates that the principal’s conduct is a significant factor and cannot be disregarded when analyzing the situation nor should the statute be liberally interpreted to encourage excusing the principal upon a failure to appear. See generally Hill v. State, 955 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The principal and the bonding company both have a responsibility to insure that the principal appears to answer the charges pending against the principal. When the principal does not appear, the “uncontrollable circumstance” truly should be “uncontrollable,” and there should be no fault on the part of the principal. Here, the fact of parole as an available alternative negates any argument of lack of fault on the principal particularly where there is no showing that the principal attempted to avail himself of the opportunity. We therefore overrule Appellant’s Issue No. Two in its entirety.

Having overruled each of Appellant’s issues on review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

LARSEN, J., not participating.

      . Under federal law, an alien may be admitted to the United States for a temporary period, as determined on a on a case-by-case basis, for humanitarian reasons or for the public benefit. This action is referred to as a “parole'' into the country. See 8 USC § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1999).

      . Though the record reflects that Mr. Renteria was in fact removed from the United States which is legally distinguishable from deportation, Appellant refers to Mr. Renteria as having been deported. For purposes of this appeal, the term used is irrelevant because the net effect -of the proceedings is that Mr. Renteria is no longer in the United States. We note, however, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that Mr. Renteria is incarcerated in Mexico only that he was removed by the INS, suggesting that he is no longer in the United States.

      . This is sometimes referred to as a “failure to find” or a "non-finding.”

      . Castaneda v. State, 138 S.W.3d 304 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

      . Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.16 (Vernon 2005).

      . See 8 USC § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1999).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Miguel SAMONTE, Jr., M.D., Ostensible Agent of Las Palmas Medical Center, Relator.
    No. 08-04-00253-CV.
    Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.
    April 7, 2005.

      Karen L. Landinger, Ray, Valdez, McChristian & Jeans, P.C., El Paso, for Relator.
    Gonzalo Garcia, El Paso, pro se.
    Abelardo P. Bernal, Oaxaca, Bernal & Assoc., El Paso, for Interested Part.
    Before Panel No. 2 BARAJAS, C.J., McCLURE, and CHEW, JJ.
   OPINION

RICHARD BARAJAS, Chief Justice.

In this mandamus proceeding, Miguel Samonte, Jr., M.D. complains of the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss a medical malpractice suit. The motion challenged the sufficiency of the unsigned and undated expert report filed by the plaintiff below. The report also failed to meet the minimum statutory requirements and did not reflect that the report was prepared by an expert capable of rendering an expert opinion regarding the applicable standard of care, failed to include the qualifications, training, experience, current or past employment or specialty of the testifying expert, is unsigned and undated. Relator raises the question of whether such a report, as tendered to the defendant, demonstrates a good faith effort on the part of plaintiff to comply with Tex. Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art 4590i, now Tex. Civ. PRac. & Rem Code Ann. § 74.001 et seq. Finding that the reports were filed in good faith, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. We conditionally grant relief.

I. FACTUAL SUMMARY

The underlying cause of action arises from a medical malpractice case involving the care and treatment of Ricardo Rangel. Rangel had elected to undergo carpel tunnel surgery to be conducted by Dr. Andrew Joseph Palafox at the Las Palmas Medical Center on November 1, 2002. Defendant Miguel Samonte, Jr., M.D. was the anesthesiologist managing the anesthesia of Ricardo Rangel. Subsequent to the surgery, Ricardo Rangel suffered a cardiac arrest. All efforts to resuscitate him were not successful and he was pronounced dead approximately one and a half hours after the surgery.

The decedent’s mother, Julia Rangel, filed her Original Petition against Samonte and the other treating physician present during Ricardo Rangel’s surgery and the hospital, asserting various claims of medical negligence.

The plaintiff timely filed an expert’s report as required by the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (the Act). The report is purportedly prepared by Dr. George Mychaskiw II, D.O. and is included in the appellate record. Relator has urged that the report as prepared and produced is deficient for a variety of reasons including substantive defects as to the form and content of the report. He contends that it does not comport with the requirements of the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act and, therefore, the cause against him should be dismissed.

Samonte moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs claims against him and the court conducted a hearing to address the adequacy of the report. Samonte argued that the report was deficient because it did not state that Mychaskiw had knowledge of or was qualified to discuss the accepted standards of care, did not state that the expert was board certified, whether he was practicing medicine at the time, or whether he was qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer a report, and was not signed. He also argued that the purported expert’s curriculum vitae was not included with the report. Plaintiffs counsel argued that the tendered report should be considered a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of the act.

After a hearing on the issue, the trial court denied Samonte’s motion. Relator has filed an Original Petition for Writ of Mandamus seeking relief from this Court and raising five issues on appeal. Issues One, Two, and Four attack the trial court’s failure to dismiss the cause on the grounds that the expert’s report fails to comply with the requirements of the Act, Issue Three asserts that the plaintiffs report as produced does not equate to a good faith attempt to comply with the Act, and finally, that the defendant does not have an adequate remedy at law and is therefore entitled to mandamus relief. For the reasons stated below, we agree with Relator and conditionally grant relief as noted.

II. THE STATUTE

The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (the Act) was enacted by the Texas Legislature to curtail frivolous claims. Hart v. Wright, 16 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied); Horsley-Layman v. Angeles, 968 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.). In order to encourage the screening of medical malpractice claims by an expert prior to filing, the Act requires a plaintiff to provide each defending physician or health care provider with one or more expert reports relating to liability and causation. Wood v. Tice, 988 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied); see Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(d). The expert report, along with a curriculum, vitae of each expert, must be furnished to the defendant not later than the 180th day after the date on which a health care liability claim is filed or the last day of any extended period as permitted under the statute. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(d). If a plaintiff fails to comply with this provision and the defendant files a motion seeking sanctions pursuant to Section 13.01(e), a trial court has no discretion and must enter an order dismissing the case with prejudice. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(e)(3); Hart, 16 S.W.3d at 876. Where an expert report is tendered, the defendant may challenge the adequacy of the report. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(Z); Hart, 16 S.W.3d at 876. The trial court is authorized to grant a motion to dismiss “only if it appears to the court, after hearing, that the report does not represent a good faith effort to comply with the definition of an expert report in Subsection (r)(6) of this section.” Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(i). An expert report is defined as a fair summary of the expert’s opinions regarding: (1) applicable standards of care, (2) the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and (3) the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed. Id. § 13.01(r)(6).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a dismissal under -Section 13.01(e)(3). American Transitional Care Ctrs. of Texas, Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex.2001); Hart, 16 S.W.3d at 875; Tibbetts v. Gagliardi, 2 S.W.3d 659, 663 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). Mandamus will he only to correct a clear abuse of discretion. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992) (orig.proceeding). A clear abuse of discretion warranting correction by mandamus occurs when a court issues a decision which is without basis or reference to guiding principles of law. See Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding). An appellate court rarely interferes with the trial court’s exercise of discretion and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839-40. The relator must therefore establish that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision. Id. at 840. Even if we would have decided the issue differently, we cannot disturb the trial court’s decision unless it is shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. With respect to a trial court’s determination of the legal principles controlling its ruling, the standard is much less deferential. A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. A clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ. Id.

An appellate court will deny mandamus relief if another remedy, usually appeal, is available and adequate. Id. Mandamus is intended to be an extraordinary remedy, available only in limited circumstances. The writ will issue only in situations involving manifest and urgent necessity and not for grievances that may be addressed by other remedies. Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex.1989).

IV. INADEQUACY OF THE EXPERT’S REPORT

The sole question for the trial court was whether the report tendered represented a good faith effort to comply with the statutory definition of an expert report. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 875. Because the Act focuses on the contents of the report, the only information relevant to the inquiry is contained within the four corners of the document. Id. at 878. The trial court should look no further than the report itself in determining whether it constitutes a fair summary of the expert’s opinions about the applicable standard of care, the manner in which the care provided failed to meet that standard, and the causal relationship between that failure and the claimed injury. Id. Further, the report itself must establish the expert’s qualifications on the basis of training and experience. See In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding).

A trial court may grant a motion challenging the adequacy of an expert report only if it appears, after hearing, that the report does not constitute a good faith effort to comply with the definition of an expert report. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(Z). An “expert report” is defined as “a written report by an expert that provides a fair summary of the expert’s opinions as of the date of the report regarding applicable standards of care, the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed.” Id. § 13.01(r)(6). While the report does not have to present all the plaintiffs proof, it must include the expert’s opinion on each of the elements identified in the statute. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878. The report must inform the defendant of the specific conduct being questioned and provide a basis for the trial court to conclude the claims have merit. Id. at 879. A report that merely states conclusions about the standard of care, breach, and causation is not sufficient. Id. Nevertheless, the report does not have to meet the same requirements as the evidence offered in support of a summary judgment proceeding or at trial. Id.

One basis upon which Samonte attacked the report provided by plaintiff is that it failed to include any information describing Dr. Mychaskiw’s qualifications to render an opinion on the matters in controversy, specifically the standard of care and possible breach. A person may qualify as an expert witness on the issue of whether a physician departed from accepted standards of medical care only if the person is a physician who (1) is practicing medicine at the time such testimony is given or was practicing medicine at the time the claim arose, (2) has knowledge of accepted standards of medical care for the diagnosis, care, or treatment of the illness, injury, or condition involved in the claim, and (3) is qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer an expert opinion regarding the accepted standards of medical care. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 14.01(a). In determining whether the expert is qualified on the basis of training or experience, the court is to consider whether, at the time the claim arose or the testimony is given, the witness is board certified or has other substantial training or experience in an area of practice relevant to the claim and is actively practicing medicine in rendering medical care services relevant to the claim. Id. § 14.01(c); Hagedorn v. Tisdale, 73 S.W.3d 341, 349 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).

Every licensed doctor is not automatically qualified to testify as an expert on every medical question. Hagedorn, 73 S.W.3d at 350; Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex.1996). On the other hand, the fact that an expert is not a specialist in the particular branch of the profession for which the testimony is offered will not automatically disqualify him as an expert. Hagedorn, 73 S.W.3d at 350; Blan v. Ali, 7 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). The issue is the specific subject matter and the expert’s familiarity with it. Hagedorn, 73 S.W.3d at 350; see Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153; Blan, 7 S.W.3d at 745. As already noted, there are specific criteria to be met under the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act for an expert to testify as to whether a physician departed from accepted standards of medical care. Hagedorn, 73 S.W.3d at 350.

An expert report, as defined in Section 13.01(r)(6), must be the written report of an expert. By definition also, a person giving opinion testimony regarding a physician’s breach of accepted standards of medical care is an expert only if qualified to testify under the requirements of Section 14.01(a). Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(r)(5)(A). A Section 13.01 report concerning standards of care for physicians authored by a person who is not qualified to testify under Section 14.01(a) thus cannot constitute an adequate report. That the person is so qualified must appear from the report, with its accompanying curriculum vitae. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 511; Chisholm v. Maron, 63 S.W.3d 903, 907 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.). It follows that a challenge to the adequacy of a report under Section 13.01(0 may be based on a claim that it fails to demonstrate the person rendering the opinion is qualified to testify, as well as on other claims of its inadequacy. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 511.

The parties appeared at a hearing on February 27, 2004. No witnesses were called and the trial court reviewed the motion and response of the parties. The trial court found only that the plaintiff had made a good faith effort to comply with the statutory requirements of the Act because, the document, “provides for a first summary of the report.” The trial court also held that based upon the affidavit of a former employee of plaintiffs attorneys, the plaintiff had provided a copy of the curriculum vitae to defendant. We note that the curriculum vitae does not appear anywhere in the appellate record. The affidavit referred to by the trial court is included and the affidavit references a report the affiant produced to defendant’s attorney. Attached to the affidavit, is a copy of the three-page document purportedly prepared by George Myehaskiw II, D.O. as the purported expert’s report but it does not include a copy of the missing curriculum vitae. Though the trial court specifically held that the plaintiff had provided a copy of the curriculum vitae to defendant’s counsel, we have not seen such a document. We agree that a copy of the curriculum vitae of the expert must be provided as an attachment to the report and note that the document should appear in the appellate record but does not. Tex. Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(d)(1). As noted, the determination of Mychask-iw’s qualifications to provide an expert report must be made on the basis of the contents of the report and curriculum vitae. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 511; Chisholm, 63 S.W.3d at 907; see Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878. A court reviewing the adequacy of a Section 13.01 report should look no further than the report itself because all information relevant to the inquiry is contained within its four corners. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 511; Bowie Memorial Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex.2002); Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878. Accordingly, we must make our determination from a review of the actual document provided to us as Mychaskiw’s report noting the missing curriculum vitas.

As discussed previously, in a suit against a physician, the expert report required by Section 13.01 is a written report by an expert qualified to testify under the requirements of Section 14.01(a), which mandates the witness: (1) be practicing medicine at the time of his testimony or at the time the claim arose; (2) have knowledge of the accepted standards of care for the diagnosis, care, or treatment of the condition involved; and (3) be qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer an expert opinion on those accepted standards of care. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 14.01(a). Section 14.01(c) provides a court with factors it is to consider in determining whether a witness’s training or experience qualifies the witness as an expert under the Act. The factors are whether, at the time the claim arose or when testimony is given, the witness (1) is board certified or has other substantial training or experience in an area of medical practice relevant to the claim; and (2) is actively practicing medicine rendering medical care services relevant to the claim. Id. Courts have referred to the standards discussed in Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.1996) in applying the criteria specified in Sections 14.01(a) and(c). In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 511; see Forrest v. Danielson, 77 S.W.3d 842 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2002, no pet.); Hagedorn, 73 S.W.3d at 341; Tomasi v. Liao, 63 S.W.3d 62 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.). Broders teaches that one offering expert medical testimony must establish that the expert has expertise regarding “the specific issue before the court which would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular subject.” In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 512; Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153. The analysis focuses on “the very matter” on which the expert is to give an opinion. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 512.

In Tomasi, the court affirmed the dismissal of a claim after finding the plaintiffs expert, a psychiatrist, could not give an expert opinion on the standards of care for post-operative care after neurosurgery, despite his status as a diplomat of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. The court' noted it was possible for experience similar to that-described in the expert’s curriculum vitae to qualify a witness to testify about the specific matters at issue, but citing Broders, found the witness had not provided sufficiently detailed information to justify the conclusion he was qualified to do so. See In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 512; Tomasi, 63 S.W.3d at 66.

Similarly, in Forrest, an orthopedic surgeon submitted a Section 13.01 report in a suit against a neurosurgeon and two vascular surgeons regarding surgery to remove a lumbar disc protrusion, fuse vertebra, and install a pedicle screw and rod system. The court noted that orthopedic surgery deals with correction of disorders of the skeletal system, that the spine is a part of that system, and that an orthopedic specialist should be familiar with procedures to correct problems of the spine. Concluding that the expert’s specialization in orthopedics might thus be relevant to the claim involved in the case, the court nonetheless found there was nothing in the report and curriculum vitae to indicate his familiarity with the procedures used by the defendant physicians, and the plaintiff had failed to establish his qualifications to give an expert opinion with respect to those procedures. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 511; Forrest, 77 S.W.3d at 848.

In reviewing the qualifications of one rendering a Section 13.01 report, the “issue is the specific subject matter and the expert’s familiarity with it.” In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 513; Hagedorn, 73 S.W.3d at 350, citing Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153. The requirement that a Section 13.01 report and curriculum vitae set forth the expert’s knowledge of the procedure being questioned applies even when the defendant physician and the expert share certification in the same specialty. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 511; see Richburg v. Wolf, 48 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2001, pet. denied).

Broders recognized also that when the subject under inquiry is substantially developed in more than one field, testimony can come from a qualified expert in any one of them. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 513; Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 154. Likewise, courts have recognized that some standards of care are applicable to multiple schools of practice, and some subjects of inquiry will be common to all fields of practice. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 513; see Blan v. Ali, 7 S.W.3d 741 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). In Silvas v. Ghiatas, 954 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied), a divided panel found an orthopedic surgeon qualified to testify against a radiologist as to the issues there involved, stating that the specialties are intertwined and it is common knowledge that orthopedic surgeons and radiologists work closely together.

The report provided by George Mychaskiw II, D.O. does not contain any information within the document that describes his qualifications, informs the reader that he has ever worked in the field of anesthesiology, or is currently working in the field. The report does not appear on letterhead, is not dated, nor is it signed. The report does not discuss his training or experience, nor does it establish how he is qualified to render an opinion on the standard of care and the alleged breach of that standard. The only reference to identify the purported author of the report is contained in four lines that appeal’ at the end of the report. The lines only include the following information: George Mychaskiw II. DO [sic], Professor and Clinical Director, Department of Anesthesiology, University of Mississippi School of Medicine. The bare minimum of information provided in no way complies with the level of disclosure contemplated by the Act. We believe that the legislature was clear in its directive, the report itself must contain sufficient information to establish that the ostensible expert is qualified to render an opinion on the acceptable standards of care at issue. The report provided by My-chaskiw does not meet that standard.

From the four corners of the report, we find no basis for a conclusion that My-chaskiw’s training or experience qualify him to offer an expert opinion on the standard of care for the use of anesthesia during a surgical procedure. That being the case, the report is not an expert report within the requirements of Section 13.01. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 514; Chisholm, 63 S.W.3d at 907; see Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879; In re Morris, 93 S.W.3d at 390-91; Whitworth v. Blumenthal, 59 S.W.3d 393, 398-99 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. dism’d by agr.) (en banc).

We agree with Palacios that an expert report by which the expert simply states that he or she knows the standard of care and concludes it was not met is not sufficient to meet the requirements of Section 13.01. See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880. It likewise cannot be sufficient for one rendering a Section 13.01 report simply to state in conclusory fashion that he is qualified by training or experience to testify as to a particular matter. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 512-14; cf. Coastal Transport Co., Inc. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227 (Tex.2004); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex.1999). We note that the Mychaskiw report does not even contain such a statement. The report appears to be a summary of the facts leading up to the incident with a critique of the incident but contains no basis for the opinions provided.

In many of the cases which we have reviewed for guidance, e.g., Forrest, 77 S.W.3d at 844; Tomasi, 63 S.W.3d at 63, appellate courts were reviewing decisions of trial courts to dismiss cases. The case before us, however, involves a claim that the trial court has abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the case as a sanction for noncompliance with the statutory requirements. We consider the requirement that the Section 13.01 report and curriculum vitae set forth the expert’s familiarity with the particular procedure at issue to be sufficiently well established, though, to require its application here. Accordingly, we conclude that under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Palacios, the trial court misapplied Section 13.01(1) to the report submitted by the plaintiff in this case, and so abused its discretion. In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d at 512-14; see Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Having found that the report as provided does not comply with the statutory requirements, it is, therefore, not a good faith effort to comply. Accordingly, we sustain Relator’s Issues One through Four.

Y. INADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

In Issue Five, Samonte contends that he has no adequate remedy at law because a post-trial appeal cannot remedy the deprivation of a statutory due process right to pretrial dismissal with prejudice. We agree with Samonte’s position and have addressed this issue previously in In re Tenet Hospitals Ltd., 116 S.W.3d 821, 823-27 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, orig. proceeding). Relator also directs us to In re Collom & Carney Clinic Ass’n, 62 S.W.3d 924 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding). There the court found mandamus proper because the Act requires dismissal where a proper expert report is not timely filed. We agree, as has our sister court in Amarillo. See In re Rodriguez, 99 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding); In re Morris, 93 S.W.3d 388, 390 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, orig. proceeding). Where a report totally omits one of the three required elements, the trial court has a ministerial duty to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice and has no discretion to do otherwise. In re Tenet Hospitals Ltd., 116 S.W.3d at 823-27. We sustain Issue Five.

Because we have found that the expert report as filed does not comply with the requirements of the Act and finding also that Relator has no adequate remedy by appeal, we will conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. We are confident the trial court will grant the relief to which Relator is entitled under Section 13.01(e) and this opinion. We will direct the Clerk to issue the writ only in the event the trial court does not do so.

      . The plaintiff apparently nonsuited the other defendants prior to the hearing on this matter.

      . Act effective August 29, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039 (as amended)' (former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, §§ 1.01-16.02 (the "Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act”)), repealed by Act effective September 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex Gen. Laws 847, 884. Many of the provisions of former article 4590i are now codified at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 74.001-74.507 (Vernon Supp.2004 — 05). Because this case was filed before September 1, 2003, the provisions of former article 4590i apply. Subsequent references to the repealed act will be cited as "former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i.”


author: DAVID PURYEAR, Justice. JAN P. PATTERSON, Justice,

text:
    David Edwin WIEDE, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
    No. 03-03-00267-CR.
    Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.
    April 14, 2005.

      John Fahle, Carter and Fahle, San Antonio, for Appellant.
    James F. Booher, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., San Marcos, for State.
    Before Chief Justice LAW, Justices PATTERSON and PURYEAR.
   OPINION

DAVID PURYEAR, Justice.

In 1997, a jury found David Edwin Wie-de guilty of possession of methamphetamine. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d) (West 2008). The court sentenced Wiede to ten years’ imprisonment; imposition of the sentence was suspended and he was placed on community supervision for ten years. In 2002, the State moved to revoke his community supervision, alleging that he had violated the terms of his community supervision by again possessing methamphetamine. Wie-de pleaded not true to the allegations and moved to suppress the evidence as the product of an unlawful search of his car. The district court denied Wiede’s motion, admitted the evidence, found the State’s allegations to be true, and sentenced him to ten years in prison. On appeal, Wiede challenges the revocation of his community supervision contending that the district court erred by admitting the methamphetamine into evidence because (1) the State failed to prove the chain of custody of the drugs admitted and (2) the drugs were the fruit of an unlawful search of his car. The State responds that there was sufficient proof of chain of custody and that the search was lawful because (1) there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in Wie-de’s wrecked vehicle in light of the statutory authority of the police to investigate a traffic accident, and (2) there was probable cause to believe the car contained contraband.

Wiede raised the same contentions in his appeal of the revocation of his community supervision in a separate adjudication in Caldwell County. See Wiede v. State, 157 S.W.3d 87, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 452 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, pet. filed) (Wiede I). In Wiede I, the State based its motion to revoke on the same allegation of possession of methamphetamine presented in this appeal. See id. 157 S.W.3d at 94-95. For essentially the same reasons stated in our opinion in Wiede I, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

The record in the present case differs slightly from the record in Wiede I, but the basic account of Wiede’s car accident and the subsequent search of his car is sufficiently set forth in our prior opinion. We will limit our discussion to those aspects of the record which differ from the evidence presented in Wiede I and whether those differences have an effect on our determination of the lawfulness of the search. We will also address the State’s contention that Wiede’s lessened expectation of privacy in his car, along with the statutory authority for the police to investigate the accident, combine to permit the search.

Standard of Review

Although the standard of review in a revocation proceeding is whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the State proved a violation of the conditions by a preponderance of the evidence, the evidence on which a trial court bases its determination must be properly admitted in accordance with established search and seizure law. Wiede I, 157 S.W.3d at 94-95, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 452, at *10-11; see Gordon v. State, 4 S.W.3d 32, 35 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.) (overlapping standards of review when considering suppression of evidence in decision to revoke probation); State v. Barnett, 790 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no pet.) (applying standard of review for suppression in revocation of probation determination). We review the district court’s decision to admit the methamphetamine discovered in the contested search giving almost total deference to the district court’s determination of historical facts, and we review the district court’s application of search and seizure law de novo. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). When, as here, the district court does not make explicit findings of historical facts, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the district court’s ruling and assume that the district court made implicit findings of fact supported in the record. Id. We must affirm the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress if it can be upheld on any valid theory of law applicable to the case— even if the district court did not base its decision on the applicable theory. State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543-544 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).

Relevant Facts

Our review of the record points to three significant differences between the evidence presented in this case and that found insufficient to support a valid search in Wiede I. The first difference is in the witness Roy Tambunga’s account of Wie-de’s traffic accident and Wiede’s actions inside his car while awaiting medical care. In Wiede I, Tambunga gave only a brief description of the accident and was not asked about its cause. By contrast, in this case Tambunga clarified that the truck made a left turn in front of Wiede. When asked directly by the trial judge whether the truck failed to yield the right of way, Tambunga responded:

Truthfully, I think that you should know that when you’re driving a big truck like that, you can’t move very fast. I think he pulled out and didn’t give enough room for the traffic, but I also think that the white ear was traveling a little bit faster than the speed limit.

When compared to the record in Wiede I, Tambunga’s testimony more clearly reflects that Wiede’s collision with the truck was at least as attributable to the actions of the truck driver as to either recklessness or intoxication on the part of Wiede.

Tambunga’s testimony also differs in his description of Wiede’s furtive gesture. In Wiede I, Tambunga testified that he never saw what Wiede placed between the seat and the console of the car because Wiede’s hand was closed all the way around the item. In this case, Tambunga testified that he did see what Wiede was hiding:

It appeared to be — it was covered by his hand for the most part and it was — it appeared to be made out of plastic, clear plastic similar to a sandwich bag.

At trial, Tambunga was uncertain if he told the officers at the scene that what he saw was plastic. However, in reaching his decision to admit the evidence the trial judge observed that Tambunga must have told the officer who conducted the search because he informed the officer that the first plastic bag removed from the car was too small to be the item he saw Wiede conceal.

The third relevant distinction between this record and Wiede I is in Officer McGuairt’s account of his actions after the methamphetamine was discovered in Wie-de’s vehicle. When asked if he notified EMS that he had found the methamphetamine, McGuairt replied:

Okay. I do recall. I do recall. After the substance was located — I do recall this. I did walk up to the back door of the EMS. It was still there. I remember even knocking on the door and having a paramedic come to the back door and I advised him. I didn’t show them where it had been located.

McGuairt did not testify in Wiede I that he informed EMS of the discovery of the methamphetamine. When asked on cross examination in that case whether he had requested that EMS test Wiede for controlled substances, McGuairt stated that this would have been the duty of another officer.

Although the majority of our discussion of the search of Wiede’s car in Wiede I remains unaffected, the differences in the record between the two hearings require additional discussion of whether the search of Wiede’s car was supported by probable cause or was justified as part of the officers’ community caretaking function. We will also discuss the statutory authority of the police to investigate a traffic accident and its relevance to the lawfulness of the search.

Diminished Expectation of Privacy and Transportation Code

The State contends that Wiede had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his car after colliding with the truck and, therefore, the search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Citing a provision of the transportation code that gives police the authority to investigate traffic accidents, the State argues that the owner of a vehicle involved in a collision has reason to believe the car will be removed from the roadway and a search of its contents conducted. Thus, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and the search was proper.

We find that the cases cited in the State’s brief discussing the diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle do not support the proposition that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy once a vehicle is disabled in a traffic accident. Clearly, much of the contents of a vehicle are in plain view and open to inspection in the course of the investigation of a traffic accident. However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the Fourth Amendment applies to motor vehicles and that the police must have probable cause to search. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149, 45 S.Ct. 280 (warrantless search of automobile not unreasonable under Fourth Amendment if supported by probable cause); Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297; see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (“A citizen does not surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile.”). The Supreme Court recognized the diminished privacy interest and inherent mobility of motor vehicles only by eliminating the requirement that police obtain a warrant prior to searching a vehicle. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

The transportation code also does not grant the police additional authority to search a vehicle. The State cites section 550.041(a) of the transportation code:

A peace officer who is notified of a motor vehicle accident resulting in injury to or death of a person or property damage to an apparent extent of at least $1000 may investigate the accident and file justifiable charges relating to the accident without regard to whether the accident occurred on property to which this chapter applies.

Id. § 550.41(a). We find no authority construing this statute — certainly none that would permit a peace officer to search a vehicle outside of the well delineated constraints of the Fourth Amendment. In fact, our review of the history of section 550.041(a) suggests that the provision was intended merely to clarify a peace officer’s authority to investigate some traffic accidents which occur on private property rather than on the public roadways. See Act of August 28,1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 526, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 1175, § 43(A) (recodified and amended 1995) (current version at Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.041). Prior to its recodification in the transportation code, the statute specified that a peace officer was permitted to investigate some accidents which occurred on private property but not others:

without regard to whether the accident occurred on a public street or highway ... or on private property commonly used by the public such as a supermarket or shopping center parking lots ... [i]t is specifically provided, however, that this Section shall not apply to accidents occurring on privately owned residential parking areas or • on privately owned parking lots where a fee is charged for the privilege of parking or storing a motor vehicle.

Id. § 43(A). The caption of this provision also explains that the purpose of the act is to extend the traffic laws to certain private property. Id. Nothing in the statute indicates that it was intended to establish an independent power to investigate accidents beyond the ordinary community caretaking functions of the police.

In light of the language and history of section 550.41(a), we cannot conclude that the statute was intended to expand the authority of the police so as to permit the search of a vehicle absent probable cause. In any event, a statutory provision can not erase Fourth Amendment protections. Although we acknowledge that an individual possesses a reduced expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle, this diminished privacy interest has been recognized in well established search and seizure law. We will not further construe this reduced expectation of privacy to dispense with the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement altogether when a vehicle is involved in a traffic accident. See Class, 475 U.S. at 112, 106 S.Ct. 960; Wiede I, 157 S.W.3d at 98-99, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 452, at *23-24.

Probable Cause

The State also asserts that the police had probable cause to believe Wiede’s car contained contraband. In Wiede I, we concluded that the evidence presented did not demonstrate that the police had probable cause to believe that Wiede’s vehicle contained evidence of a crime. See 157 S.W.3d at 99, 2005 TexApp. LEXIS 452, at *24. We explained that Wiede’s furtive gesture in the context of a vehicle collision amounted at most to reasonable suspicion and that the officer’s duty to investigate a traffic accident would not elevate that suspicion to probable cause. Id. The additional facts in the present record do not change that conclusion.

The most significant difference in the record in this case with regard to probable cause is the fact that Tambunga testified that he saw clear plastic in Wie-de’s hand when Wiede made his furtive gesture. The trial court also found that this observation must have been communicated to the officer conducting the search. The State points to the comments of the trial court that, “with officers seeing dope in plastic bags all the time,” Tambunga’s observations represented probable cause for police to believe Wiede possessed drugs. However, the court of criminal appeals has repeatedly held that there is nothing inherently suspicious about a plastic bag. See Gonzales v. State, 648 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Sullivan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (“a clear plastic bag is not an object that is inherently dangerous, contraband, or stolen goods”); Duncan v. State, 549 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). For a plastic bag to gain the significance attributed to it by the trial judge, there must be evidence that the seizing officer knew at the time of the search that drugs were commonly packaged in plastic bags and suspicious circumstances that would lead an officer to believe the bag contained drugs. Sullivan, 626 S.W.2d at 60; see Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 90 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Here, the State was unable to even identify the officer who conducted the search and there is nothing in the record establishing any officer’s knowledge that plastic bags are ordinarily used to contain drugs. Furthermore, there are no suspicious circumstances in the record that would lead an officer to believe that Wiede was in possession of drugs.

Tambunga’s comments regarding the cause of the accident also weaken the State’s argument on probable cause when compared to Wiede I. Tambunga essentially dispelled any notion that Wiede’s collision with the truck was evidence of intoxication. Tambunga testified that the truck pulled out in front of Wiede’s vehicle without leaving enough room for traffic and that Wiede was only traveling a “little bit” faster than the 55 or 60 mile per hour speed limit.

We conclude that, even when viewed most favorably to the district court’s decision, the totality of the circumstances presented at the hearing did not demonstrate that the unidentified police officer had probable cause to believe that Wiede’s vehicle contained evidence of a crime. The additional evidence that Tambunga may have seen a plastic bag, without any evidence in the record of suspicious circumstances or of the searching officer’s experience and knowledge of the use of such materials as packaging for drugs, does not lead us to a different conclusion than in Wiede I. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 90; Sullivan, 626 S.W.2d at 60.

Community Caretaking

We thoroughly discussed the application of the community caretaking doctrine to the search in Wiede I and concluded that it did not justify the search. Although the record in this case is somewhat different, this difference only affects our analysis of the application of the emergency doctrine component of the police’s community care-taking function. However, we remain convinced that the record does not demonstrate that the search of Wiede’s car was conducted in furtherance of the officers’ community caretaking function.

The most significant variation in the record between this case and Wiede I is Officer McGuairt’s testimony regarding his interaction with EMS. In Wiede I, we examined the State’s contention that the search of Wiede’s car was justified out of concern that Wiede might be under the influence of drugs and that producing the drugs was necessary to assist in his medical treatment. See 157 S.W.3d at 99-100, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 452, at *26. McGuairt testified that Tambunga’s description of Wiede’s furtive gesture provoked the thought that he should inform medical personnel if what had been removed from his pocket was found to be a controlled substance. In rejecting the claim we noted:

McGuairt did not inform the medical personnel of the possibility Wiede was intoxicated, did not tell anyone else to tell them, and did not know whether anyone told them.

Id. 157 S.W.3d at 101, at *31. In the present case, McGuairt did not testify that he was concerned for Wiede’s medical care. He characterized the search as an investigation of the accident as well as a criminal investigation. However, McGu-airt did testify that, upon locating the drugs, he showed them to EMS personnel.

Although we cannot explain the disparity in the record between these two hearings conducted within a month of each other, we find that McGuairt’s actions after the discovery of the methamphetamine has little relevance in determining the motivation of the officers prior to conducting the search. A search is justified under the emergency doctrine if, at its onset, (1) the officer’s actions were totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence, (2) there was an immediáte, objectively reasonable belief that the search is necessary in order to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury, and (3) the scope of the search was strictly circumscribed by the facts of the emergency. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861-62 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Gonzalez v. State, 148 S.W.3d 702, 708 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, no pet. h.). We apply an objective standard of reasonableness and independently scrutinize the facts without regard to the subjective conclusions of the police. Gonzalez, 148 S.W.3d at 707.

Applying this standard, we focus only on those facts known to the officers at the time of the search. Even if McGuairt’s actions in showing the drugs to EMS is evidence of his concern for Wiede’s safety, at its inception the search must have been based on an “objectively reasonable belief’ that it was necessary to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury. See Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 861-62; Gonzalez, 148 S.W.3d at 708. As we explained earlier in this opinion and in Wiede I, the facts known to the police demonstrated only a reasonable suspicion that there was contraband in the car. Such speculation is insufficient to demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief under the emergency doctrine. See Gonzalez, 148 S.W.3d at 709. Furthermore, McGuairt admitted, and the record clearly reflects that the search was conducted, at least in part, as a criminal investigation. Thus, the search was not totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence. See Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 861-62; Gonzalez, 148 S.W.3d at 708. We hold that the search was not justified under the emergency doctrine.

Because the State did not establish that there was either probable cause to support the search of Wiede’s vehicle, or that the search was justified under an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement, we hold that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the methamphetamine. The sole ground advanced in the State’s motion to revoke community supervision was based on Wiede’s possession of methamphetamine. Therefore, the admission of the methamphetamine into evidence was the only basis for the district court’s decision to revoke Wiede’s probation. The error in its admission was thus harmful.

Because the remaining issue concerning inadequate proof of the chain of custody of the methamphetamine would not require any greater relief, we need not address it.

Conclusion

The district court erred by admitting the methamphetamine into evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment revoking Wiede’s probation and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

JAN P. PATTERSON, Justice,

dissenting.

Because the trial judge is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and we are to uphold the trial court’s ruling on any theory of law applicable to the case, and because this probation revocation hearing involves an application of law to facts, the outcome of which turns on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, I would affirm the trial court’s revocation order. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853 (2000). We accord the trial court its necessary and proper role because it is the trial court that observes firsthand the demeanor and appearance of witnesses. But brushing aside the standard of review here, the majority reviewed a cold record, resurrected soundbites of testimony to support its own fact-finding, and engaged in a post hoe evaluation of governmental conduct that the trial court had found was reasonable in its context. Because the majority failed to adhere to the appropriate standard of review, I dissent.

At a hearing on the State’s motion to revoke probation, the record reveals the following facts. Ray Tambunga, a high school teacher with the Austin Independent School District, was taking his son to school at approximately 7:00 a.m. on April 17, 2002. He stopped at the T-intersection of Siebert Drive and F.M. 150 in Hays County behind an 18-wheeler truck loaded with sod. He waited while the truck turned left onto F.M. 150. As Tambunga turned right on F.M. 150, he saw appellant’s white sports car pass by a “little bit faster than the speed limit.” Tambunga watched as appellant collided with the truck that continued on down the roadway.

Tambunga pulled off the highway and stopped to check on appellant’s condition. Tambunga went over to the driver’s side window of appellant’s car and asked appellant if he was all right. There, Tambunga observed that appellant was dazed and bleeding. Within a few minutes, a department of public safety trooper stopped to help.

DPS Trooper Christopher MeGuairt testified that he came upon the accident shortly after it occurred as he was traveling from Austin to San Marcos with another trooper to conduct a DPS training exercise for new officers. MeGuairt testified that he saw a vehicle in the road, facing the opposite direction, with severe damage to the front portion of the car. The officers called in the accident, located the 18-wheeler that was also involved in the accident, and began directing traffic. Appellant was badly injured with cuts and abrasions, and was bleeding on his face.

As other law enforcement personnel arrived on the scene, Tambunga remained near appellant’s car. At one point, appellant’s movements led Tambunga to believe he was going to fight a cigarette. Leaning forward to dissuade appellant from smoking, Tambunga saw appellant make some movements, reaching across his body with his left hand “as if he was getting something out of his pocket.” Tambunga told the officers that he saw appellant “reach across his body and hide something between the seat, the driver’s seat and the console.” Tambunga testified that the item covered by appellant’s hand appeared to be “clear plastic similar to a sandwich bag.” The officer retrieved an item from the area near the console. Tambunga testified:

[A]t first, he [the officer] produced a little — a small square about two by two plastic wrapper that had been torn— ripped open and I saw and said, no. It was — I told him, I said it appeared larger than that. It looked like it was bigger than that. So he went back and he produced a sandwich size bag, you know, with something in the bottom, some kind of off-white, whitish in the bag.

It “looked like powder.”

McGuairt also testified that Tambunga advised the officers that appellant had “removed something from his pocket and reached back and placed it around the console area.” McGuairt testified that the circumstances of the accident and Tam-bunga’s tip caused him to be suspicious that appellant had hidden “some type of contraband.” He observed another officer “reach into the center console area and remove[ ] a substance” that was “off-white colored” and inside a clear plastic bag. McGuairt took possession of the bag.

Appellant had been removed from the car and placed in the ambulance. McGu-airt testified that he knocked on the back door of the emergency vehicle to advise the EMS personnel of the existence of the bag of white powdery substance. When DPS Trooper Freeman, the investigating officer, arrived on the scene, McGuairt turned the substance over to him. Because appellant’s car was disabled and blocking traffic, it was towed from the scene by a private wrecking service. Appellant was charged with having no liability insurance and with failure to control speed. At the hearing on the State’s motion, Freeman testified that the accident was caused by appellant “traveling at an unsafe speed.”

In reviewing a ruling on a challenge to the admission of evidence, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and review the court’s application of law de novo. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492, 2005 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 399, at *8 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). When the trial court does not make explicit findings of historical facts, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported in the record. Id. We must affirm the trial court’s ruling if it can be upheld on any valid theory of law applicable to the case— even if the trial court did not base its decision on the applicable theory. State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

When a defendant appeals from a probation revocation hearing, the question presented is whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation. Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). In determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred, we review the evidence adduced at the revocation hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order. Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). At a probation revocation hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and determines the credibility of the witnesses. Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195,198 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The trial court must find that the State satisfied its burden of showing that “the greater weight of the credible evidence ... creates a reasonable belief that a condition of probation” was violated, and has “proved every element of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Kulhanek v. State, 587 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).

Once the defendant establishes that a police search was not supported by a warrant, the burden shifts to the State to prove the reasonableness of the search and seizure and the admissibility of the evidence. See Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). It is undisputed in this case that appellant was not arrested and that the search was warrant-less. To uphold the court’s determination in this case, the evidence on which the court based its determination must have been properly admitted.

The State contends that the evidence was properly admitted because the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his automobile after he was involved in an accident that left the vehicle disabled and blocking a lane of highway traffic. The State also contends that the circumstances at the accident scene provided probable cause for the officers to search appellant’s car.

The Texas Transportation Code expressly provides that “[a] peace officer who is notified of a motor vehicle accident resulting in injury ... may investigate the accident and file justifiable charges relating to the accident ...” Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.041(a) (West 1999 & Supp.2004-05). Not only are officers authorized to investigate accidents, they have a duty to do so, and conducting an investigation of the vehicles involved is a necessary part of fulfilling that duty. Sandel v. State, 158 Tex.Crim. 101, 258 S.W.2d 283, 285 (1952). Here, the parties agree that the search was conducted as part of an accident investigation rather than a traffic stop or inventory search. The officers were authorized to investigate the accident scene pursuant to section 550.041(a) of the Texas Transportation Code. The question remains whether they could lawfully retrieve the bag of methamphetamine located near the console.

Courts have long recognized that the physical characteristics and uses of an automobile result in a lessened expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 382, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). An automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, allowing officers to search vehicles without first obtaining a warrant in certain limited situations, has long been recognized by the Supreme Court. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld in circumstances in which a search of a home or office would not. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 382, 96 S.Ct. 3092; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589-90, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). This exception is derived from both the “ready mobility” of vehicles and the reduced expectation of privacy attached to vehicles. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-92, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). Courts have recognized that the inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of exigency that make enforcement of the warrant requirement impossible. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367, 96 S.Ct. 3092; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280.

This reduced expectation of privacy as to automobiles is further diminished by the public nature of automobile travel. In Cardwell v. Lewis, the Supreme Court observed that:

One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its content are in plain view.

417 U.S. at 590, 94 S.Ct. 2464. The Court has recognized that, “as an everyday occurrence,” vehicles are subjected to police stops and examinations to enforce pervasive governmental regulations, Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092, and are “exposed to traffic accidents that may render all of their contents open to public scrutiny.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297. Recognizing still that drivers do not relinquish the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment and the right of individuals to be free of unreasonable governmental intrusion, in Cardwell the Supreme Court observed that “insofar as the Fourth Amendment protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone” of the inquiry. 417 U.S. at 591, 94 S.Ct. 2464. It is this touchstone of privacy that prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures.

The Supreme Court recognized that a warrantless search could still be constitutionally reasonable under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). The Court reasoned:

Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.

Id. at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523. This case falls within the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement as formulated by the Supreme Court in Cady and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). In Wright, the court of criminal appeals addressed the issue of whether a deputy acted reasonably in stopping a vehicle out of concern for the defendant’s welfare, after the officer observed the defendant, a passenger, retch out of an open rear window. Id. at 150. In its opinion, the court made clear that the proper inquiry is whether the police officer acted reasonably under the totality of circumstances to render services in performing his duty to “serve and protect.” Id. at 151. As to whether the officer acted reasonably, the court set forth four nonexclusive factors: (1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone and/or had access to assistance independent of that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual — if not assisted—presented a danger to himself or others. Id. at 152.

In this case, the record demonstrates that appellant was seriously injured, located at the scene of an automobile collision, and in need of medical attention; he was removed from the car due to his injuries and transported to the hospital. At the time the officers executed the search pursuant to the tip, appellant had been removed from the car and the car was in the custody of the officers. Based on Tam-bunga’s tip, the officer could infer — and the record supports — that the information was relevant to the existing circumstances, either the accident investigation or appellant’s medical treatment. Indeed, Trooper McGuairt testified that he advised the emergency personnel of the existence of the drugs. Given these facts alone, the officers’ actions were justified under the Wright four-factor test.

The record also establishes that the privacy interest at stake here was minimal. The automobile was demolished and inoperable; it was in the roadway, blocking a lane of the highway and was soon to be towed from the accident scene. The testimony at the hearing established that appellant made no requests or statements regarding the disposition of his vehicle. Appellant had no reason to believe that his car would not be removed from the roadway. Law enforcement, fire, and emergency personnel were on the scene handling the emergency; the DPS troopers were investigating the cause of the accident as charged by law. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.041. This a fortiori included following up on the information provided by Tambunga. The investigation at the scene performed an important and routine administrative purpose.

Even if the investigation of the accident scene was not justified by the community caretaMng exception, the State also contends that the search was supported by probable cause. We review the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the search is supported by probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The circumstances are viewed in light of the officer’s knowledge and training on how to conduct searches and accident investigations. United State v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 686 (5th Cir.1995). “[A] ‘trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions ... that might well elude an untrained person,’ and evidence collected ‘must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.’ ” United States v. Reed, 882 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). If the circumstances are such that a person of reasonable caution would have probable cause to believe that either contraband or evidence of a crime is likely to be found in the vehicle, then the officers are justified in searching the area suspected of containing such evidence or contraband. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); Powell v. State, 898 S.W.2d 821, 827 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 107 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry include (i) rendering aid or assistance to persons whom the officers reasonably believe are in need of assistance or (ii) preventing the destruction of evidence or contraband).

Sufficient probable cause can result from a disinterested informant’s tip. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Information from a citizen who advises an officer in person that an individual present on the scene is committing a crime should be given serious attention and great weight by the officer. United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 763 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1978). Such information given by a citizen, who is not connected with the police or who is not a paid informant, is inherently trustworthy. Id. Several factors can enhance the reliability of an informant’s tip. An “explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles the informant’s tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.” State v. Adkins, 829 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 234, 103 S.Ct. 2317). The tip is also more rehable when the informant “came forward personally to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). A face-to-face informant who is located in close proximity to his own vehicle is more credible because his car provides a method by which his identity may easily be traced, thereby holding him accountable for his intervention. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d at 763 & n. 1.

As the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony at the hearing, the trial court reasoned:

The officer was there. The officer had a right to be there, and if he comes up with probable cause to believe that a crime occurred, he can investigate and he can search if he has probable cause.
I’m inclined to believe that that’s probably probable cause to investigate further in this day and age and when an officer says that — has a witness tell him that he has now — has knowledge that somebody secreted a plastic bag, when there are police officers standing all the way around the vehicle, I think that’s probable cause to search right now....
But that’s where I’m leaning to believe that that officer has probable cause and possibly a duty to investigate a possible crime in progress when it appears that somebody just secreted — And you add to that the fact that the guy might have been under the influence of drugs because an accident had just occurred and the fact that there are police officers all the way around, the totality of the circumstances — 'if I’m a cop, and I used to be one, I’m going to search there and see what’s there.
You got probable cause to believe that contraband is there and there’s a crime afoot and they’re about to tow the car away and you’re not going to get a chance to check again, I think the officers would have been negligent not to check it.

An abundance of evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that Ray Tambunga was a credible and reliable witness, and that probable cause existed. Tambunga was not an anonymous informant. Rather, he had a face-to-face conversation with the officer, gave a sworn statement of his report and remained on the scene, provided his name and contact information to the officers, and subsequently appeared at the hearing to testify. Tambunga was in close proximity to his own vehicle at the time of his report. These facts enhance Tambunga’s reliability because they make him accountable for his statements. It is undisputed that Tam-bunga was a disinterested witness; he was not paid for the information, nor did he have any dealings with the police that would give him a motive to lie. That the trial court found Tambunga credible is clear from the record. After Tambunga testified, the court observed: “We actually had a good Samaritan. I think that’s the first time I’ve ever heard testimony from a good Samaritan in the nine years that I’ve been on this bench. You hardly ever see that.”

Based on Támbunga’s detailed eyewitness account, a reasonable officer, given his training and experience, could infer that appellant’s actions, in the context of the automobile collision, were consistent with the illegal use of alcohol or narcotics. Tambunga’s report provided specific and articulable facts warranting the officer’s belief that evidence of a crime or contraband was hidden in the console of appellant’s car and gave rise to probable cause which justified the officer’s warrantless search of the specified area.

As the trier of fact at the hearing, the trial court is free to believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness’s testimony. The trial court’s decision here to admit the methamphetamine into evidence was based on its evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to .the trial court’s ruling, I conclude that the record supports the court’s determination.

In sum, I would hold that the district court properly admitted the evidence and did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s motion to revoke appellant’s probation.

      . None of the cases cited as authority for the diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle deal with a search similar to the one in this case. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 592-93, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (observation of paint scrapings on outside of car); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375-76, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (inventory search); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (no warrant required for search of motor home); Robertson v. State, 541 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (inventory search).

      . As in Wiede I, the record does not support a finding that an inventory search was conducted.

      . See also Wiede v. State, 157 S.W.3d 87, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 452 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet. h.).