text:
    George W. Schwartz, appellant, v. Frances J. Patterson, appellee.
    Gen. No. 35,781.
    Opinion filed February 8, 1933.
    Rehearing denied February 20, 1933.
    Bennett & Colbach, for appellant; Herbert Bebb, of counsel. Eugene L. McGarry, for appellee; Scott M. Hogan, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Hebei

license: Public Domain

text:
    Sam Brodsky, defendant in error, v. Albert Wechsler and Anna Wechsler, plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 35,808.
    Opinion filed February 8, 1933.
    Shulman, Shulman & Abrams, for plaintiffs in error; Meyer Abrams, of counsel. Brenner, McBride & Ostberg, for defendant in error; Thomas G. McBride, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Norman Moren, defendant in error, v. Jacob Siegel et al., plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 35,820.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1933.
    Elmer W. Arch, for plaintiffs in error; A. J. Schmidt, of counsel. Tarnopol & 'Flamm, for defendant in error; Irving H. Flamm, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of. the court.


author: •Mr. Justice Hebei

text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. David L. Johnson, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 35,848.
    Opinion filed February 8, 1933.
    Johan Waage, for plaintiff in error. John A. Swanson, .State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; James L. Henry and Herman S. Weinberg, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel.
   •Mr. Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Harry H. Malkin, appellee, v. Charles M. Ross et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 35,854.
    Opinion filed February 8, 1933.
    Rehearing denied February 20, 1933.
    Harold J. -Finder, for appellants. Malkin & Malkin, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion. of the court.


author: Per curiam.

text:
    P. W. Bauman, appellee, v. C. I. T. Corporation, appellant. The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. C. I. T. Corporation, Realtor, v. John H. Lyle, Judge of the Municipal Court of Chicago.
    Gen. No. 36,332.
    Opinion filed February 8, 1933.
    Short, Rothbart, Willner & Lewis, for appellant; George H. Meyer, Seymour Lewis and Dwight McKay, of counsel. Gettleman & Adelman, for appellee; Milton M. Adelman, of counsel.
   Per curiam.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Seanlan

text:
    Mary Kazeta, defendant in error, v. Sylvester Norman, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,016.

      Opinion filed February 21, 1933.
    John A. Bloomingston, for plaintiff in error. Murphy O. Tate and Eugene Cohen, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    In re Estate of Laura Hogan, deceased. Howard H. Hanks, appellant, v. The Estate of Laura Hogan, deceased, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,294.
    Opinion filed February 21, 1933,
    Gaylord D. Adsit and Bangs, Crane & Slater, for appellant; Martin Crane and Drennan J. Slater, of counsel. M. D. Dolan, pfo se.

   Mr. Presiding Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion oí the court.


text:
    In re Joseph Harold Leven, arrested at suit of General Contract Purchase Corporation. Joseph Harold Leven, appellant, v. General Contract Purchase Corporation, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,328.
    Opinion filed February 21, 1933.
    Rehearing denied March 14, 1933.
    Vale & Vale, for appellant. Allan S. Jackson, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Dr. I. I. Kaplin, appellee, v. Evelyn Gutterman et al., respondents. Evelyn Gutterman, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,502.
    Opinion filed February 21, 1933.
    Max F. Adler, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Gridley

text:
    Avery Brundage, appellee, v. South Park Commissioners, appellant.
    Gen. No. 35,444.
    Opinion filed February 21, 1933.

      George E. Gorman, for appellant; W. W. Patterson, of counsel. Poppenhusen, Johnston, Thompson & Cole, for appellee; Edward J. Fleming, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Avery Brundage, appellant, v. South Park Commissioners, appellee.
    Gen. No. 35,448.
    Opinion filed February 21, 1933.
    Poppenhusen, Johnston, Thompson & Cole, for appellant; Edward R. Johnston and Edward J. Fleming, of counsel. George E. Gorman, for appellee; W. W. Patterson, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Nick De Angelis, plaintiff in error, v. Clarence H. Ben Venuti, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 36,024.
    Opinion filed February 21, 1933.
    Thomas C. Hollywood, for plaintiff in error; T. Fred Laramie, of counsel. Thompson, Tyrrell & Chambers, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ruth Anderson, defendant in error, v. Arthur Anderson, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,169.
    Opinion filed February 21, 1933.
    Harry M. Phipps, for plaintiff in error. Benjamin H. Ehrlich, for defendant in error; Aaron H. Cohn, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Bonnet-Brown Corporation, appellant, v. Press Record Publishing Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,219.
    Opinion filed February 21, 1933.
    Rehearing denied March 14, 1933.
    J. B. Luse, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court. •


author: Mr. Presiding Justice MeSurely

text:
    Helen Dennis, appellee, v. D. S. Komiss & Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,296.
    Opinion filed March 6, 1933.
    Marshall & Marshall, for appellant; Frank G. Marshall and Leon B. Gross, of counsel. Blake & Burns, for appellee; Harris J. Blake, Jr., of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Catherine Grams, appellee, v. Chicago City Railway Company et al., defendants, on appeal of City of Chicago, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,371.
    Opinion filed March 6, 1933.
    William H. Sexton, Corporation Counsel, and Alexander M. Smietanka, City Attorney, for appellant; Benjamin Nelson and Jacob Sehug, Assistant City Attorneys, and Carl J. Appell, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel. Hogan & Simon, Paul V. Pallaseh and Ewart Harris, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Matchett

text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. William Kleats, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,415.
    Opinion filed March 6, 1933.
    Rehearing denied March 20, 1933.
    Ellis & Westbrooks, for plaintiff in error; Richard E. Westbrooks, of counsel. Thomas J. Courtney, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Otho S. Fasig and Edward E. Wilson, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Andrew A. Scowley, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,427.
    Opinion filed March 6, 1933.
    Rehearing denied March 20, 1933.
    John J. Whiteside, for plaintiff in error; H. M. Phipps, of counsel. Thomas J. Courtney, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Edward E. Wilson and Grenville Beardsley, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice O’Connor

text:
    Frank McGlinn, appellee, v. Deep Rock Oil Corporation, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,196.
    Opinion filed March 6, 1933.
    H. P. Reynolds, for appellant. Jacob Kosbie, for appellee.-
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Loretta R. Farwell, appellee, v. J. Arthur Farwell, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,212.
    Opinion filed March 6, 1933.
    Rehearing denied March 20, 1933;
    Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, for appellant. Hopkins, Starr & Godman, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Joseph R. Von Kesler, appellant, v. Ning Eley, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,293.
    Opinion filed March 6, 1933.
    Rehearing denied March 20, 1933.
    Banks, Crane & Slater, for appellant; Martin Crane, of counsel. Edward R. Johnston and Kenneth G. Meyer, for appellee; Edward J. Fleming, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Alphonse Mercier, appellant, v. Gerard A. Connor, administrator of the estate of Leontine Kiszewski, deceased, appellee.
    Gen. No. 36,315.
    Opinion filed March 6, 1933.
    Nat M. Kahn, for appellant. Rathje & Connor, for appellee; William A. Cannon, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The Mantle Lamp Company of America, defendant in error, v. Ida Mai Bultman, individually and as executrix of the last will and testament of Charles E. Bultman, deceased, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 36,358.

      Opinion filed March 6, 1933.
    Rehearing denied March 20, 1933.
    Ernest D. MacDougall, for plaintiff in error; Samuel W. Banning and Loueks, Eckert & Peterson, of counsel. Benjamin Levering and W. H. F. Millar, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    P. W. Bauman, appellee, v. C. I. T. Corporation, appellant.
    Gen. No. 36,332.
    Opinion filed March 8, 1933.
    Short, Rothbart, Willner & Lewis, for appellant; George H. Meyer, Seymour Lewis and Dwight McKay, of counsel. Gettleman & Adelman, for appellee; Milton M. Adelman, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

text:
    Second District.
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Percy B. Sullivan, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 8,375.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    F. R. Wiley and H. H. Morey, for plaintiff in error. Robert M. Niven, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Richard Frank, appellant, v. Johanna Glinney, executrix of the estate of John Glinney, deceased, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,493.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Faulkner & Faulkner, for appellant; James W. Faulkner, of counsel. Lagger & Blatt, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Everett Beal, trustee under the last will and testament of Gustavus Bruington, deceased, appellee, v. Frances Marie Clough et al., defendants. Frances Marie Clough et al., appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,528.

      Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Hebei & Lutrell, for appellants. E. P. Field, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    State Bank & Trust Company, plaintiff in error, v. Charles R. Lincoln et al., defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 8,551.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Ralph D. Shanesy, for plaintiff in error; Walter B. Hobbs, of counsel. Hall & Hulse, for certain defendant in error; Albert L. Hall and Marshall Meyer, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Swords Bros. Company, appellee, v. Security First Mortgage Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,556.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Rehearing denied May 2, 1933.
    Frank E. Maynard, for appellant. Welsh & Welsh, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

delivered the opiinion of the court.


text:
    Weber-Furman Hardware Company, appellee, v. Frank M. Gambino et al., appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,567.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Welsh & Welsh, for appellant. John H. Page and Stanley H. Guyer, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ethel McClary, administratrix of the estate of Amel W. McClary, deceased, appellee, v. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,576.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Gower, Gray & Gower and W. H. Dyer, for appellant. Frank J. Burns and James T. Burns, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Elmer Benson, appellee, v. Walter Hochsprung and Albert Hochsprung, individually and trading as Hochsprung Brothers, appellants.
    Gen. No. 8,582.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    George R. Warner and David J. Peffers, for appellants. Charles A. Darling, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Baldwin

text:
    Maxcy-Barton Organ Company, appellant, v. Glen Building Corporation, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,465.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Church, Haft, Robertson, Crowe & Spence and Samuel J. Howe, for appellant; Egbert Robertson, of counsel. Hadley, Weaver & Woodward, for appellee; Charles W. Hadley, Willard E. Cain and John S. Woodward, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Illinois Refining Company, appellee, v. Illinois Oil Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,485.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Robert W. Olmsted and Poppenhusen, Johnston, Thompson & Cole, for appellant; Floyd E. Thompson, of counsel. Connelly, Walker, Searle & Hubbard and A. B. Honnold, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Jennie F. White, defendant in error, v. Frank M. White, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 8,507.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    A. H. Brown, for plaintiff in error; Chester Strawn, of counsel. Hadley, Weaver & Woodward, for defendant in error; Palmer Leren and William C. Atten, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    E. D. Risser, appellant, v. Frank Bishopp et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 8,512.

      Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Rehearing denied May 2, 1933.
    J. Bert Miller, John P. Pallissard and F. P. Benjamin, for appellant. C. G. Hirseh, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr.;Justice Baldwin

text:
    The Glidden Company, plaintiff in error, v. Harding P. Fedde, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 8,520.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    H. H. Whittemore, for plaintiff in error. Harry S. Streeter, for defendant in error.
   Mr.;Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mae Rastman, appellee, v. Emma Lindstom, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,529.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Large & Reno, for appellant. North, Linscott, Gibboney & North, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Phenix Banking Company, Inc., appellee, v. W. W. Jones, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,534.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    John W. Fling, Jr., and Harley D. Jones, for appellant. Brian & McManus, for appellee; Robert J. Hartley, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Alexander Lumber Company, appellant, v. John C. Coberg et al., appellees, and Hammerschmidt & Franzen Company, intervening petitioner, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,554.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Hadley, Weaver & Woodward, for appellant Alexander Lumber Company. Michael Kross, for appellant Hammerschmidt & Franzen Company; Charles W. Hadley, Michael Kross, Palmer Leren, Willard E. Cain and William C. Atten, of counsel. Church, Haft, Robertson, Crowe &' Spence, for appellees; Charles M. Haft, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Lena A. Gray, administratrix of the estate of Lee Roy Gray, deceased, appellee, v. Peoria Bus & Baggage Line, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,557.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Michel & Barnes, for appellants. Herget & Hoffman, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Esther Whipple, appellee, v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,569.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Hall & Hulse, for appellant. Runyard & Behanna, for appellee; Eugene M. Runyard and George S. MeGaughey, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mary Fisk, appellee, v. Charles F. Mittan et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 8,577.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Rehearing denied April 12, 1933.
    Charles F. Preston, Ray E. Lane and George' O. Dixon, for appellants. Dixon, Devine, Bracken & Dixon, for appellee; Robert L. Bracken, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The Larabee Flour Mills Company, appellant, v. Frank Weindruch and Isador Pesses, trading as Eagle Kash & Karry Markets, appellees.
    Gen. No. 8,590.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Connelly, Walker, Searle & Hubbard, for appellant; Franklin P. Searle, of counsel. Sweeney & Eagle, for appellees; Edward L. Eagle, of counsel. ’ •
   Mr. Justice Baldwin

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Jett

text:
    Albert H. Felman and Hazel Felman Buchbinder, appellants, v. Louis M. Rubens et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 8,327.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.

      Ringer, Wilhartz & Hirseh, for appellants; Samuel E. Hirseh and Ben A. Stewart, of counsel. Snapp, Heise & Snapp, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Leah Liebman, defendant in error, v. Charles Rahm et al., plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 8,384.
    Opinion filed February 23, 1933.
    Herbert P. Folkers, Joseph Keig and John H. Garnsey, for plaintiffs in error. John H. Savage and James G. Holbrook, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Jett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Eldredge

text:
    Third District.
    R. O. Ahlenius, appellee, v. Bunn & Humphreys, Inc., appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,506.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    Stone & Taylor and B. L. Catron, for appellant. W. K. Bracken and Bracken, Livingston & Murphy, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Yelloway Pioneer System, Inc., plaintiff in error, v. Emma C. Dean, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 8,627.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    Rehearing denied April 5, 1933.
    John E. Cassidy, for plaintiff in error. E. O. Mills, Peter Murphy and Harold F. Trapp, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Willis Lyons, appellee, v. Moorman Manufacturing Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,669.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    Rehearing denied April 5, 1933.
    Wilson & Sehmiedeskamp and Rearick & Meeks, for appellant. Jones, Melntire & Jones, for appellee; V. W. Mclntire, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    S. C. Van Horn, appellant, v. Harry Dorrell, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,677.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    M. A. Brennan, for appellant. William R. Bach, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding. Justice Eldredge

text:
    Kate Albers and Carrie Menken, appellants, v. Tobias H. Rademaker et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 8,692.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    Charles M. Peirce, for appellants. Peter Murphy, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding. Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Minnie F. Robinson, appellant, v. Skiles, Rearick and Company, Bankers, Inc., appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,708.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    Hair grove & Absher, for appellant. Charles A. Gridley, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Niehaus

text:
    H. A. Shank, appellee, v. Alva F. Adams, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,671.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    A. R. Hall and Graham & Dysert, for appellant. Charles Troup, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    William Haas, appellee, v. Thomas Thornber, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,700.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    William H. Hartzell, Bert M. Cavanagh and Edward S. Martin, for appellant. Clyde P. Johnson, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Niehaus

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Shurtleff

text:
    Lena Hans, defendant in error, v. John Riedlinger, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 8,660.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    Charles O. LePorgee, Thomas W. Samuels and Charles Y. Miller, for plaintiff in error. .McDavid, Monroe & ’ Mann, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Security Life Insurance Company of America, appellant, v. Katie Fuchs, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,670.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    A. L. Yantis, for appellant; Bull, Lytton & Olson, of counsel. John J. Baker, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Petrinelle Deltuva, appellee, v. Albert Yuochunas, appellant.
    Gen. No. 8,681.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    Rearick & Meeks, for appellant. Fleming & Henderson and P. S. Duffin, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Edward J. Cullinan, appellant, v. Richard A. Cullinan, appellee.
    Gen. No. 8,690.
    Opinion filed January 16, 1933.
    Rehearing denied April 5, 1933.
    William A. Potts and Robert H. Allison, for appellant. William J. Reardon and George Z. Barnes, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

text:
    Fourth District.
    Ethel Fisher, defendant in error, v. Elmer Westerhold, plaintiff in error.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.

      Williamson, Burroughs & Simpson, for plaintiff in error; James L. Reed, of counsel. Tunnell & Tunnell, for defendant in- error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    N. C. McLean et al., appellees, v. Adrian J. DeHaan, appellant.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    R. B. Hendricks, for appellant; Karch, Hendricks & Moran, of counsel. ■ Baker & Lesemann, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, appellee, v. George Biehl, appellant.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    Preston K. Johnson, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the -opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles Foulk, appellee, v. Alcoa Ore Company, appellant.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    Kramer, Campbell, Costello & Wieehert, for appellant. James O. Miller, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barry

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Edwards

text:
    Waverly Manees, appellee, v. Otto Finger, appellant.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    D. B. Reid, for appellant. Peyton Berbling, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Edwards

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The Fidelity Trust Company, etc., appellant, v. Aloys Gundlach, appellee.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    Rehearing denied February 24, 1933.
    E. W. Kreitner and Farmer & Klingel, for appellant. Kramer, Campbell, Costello & Wieehert, Norman J. Gundlach and Preston K. Johnson, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Edwards

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Associates Investment Company of Illinois, appellant, v. A. T. Peterson et al., appellees.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    Prank E. Doyle, C. C. Dreman and Paul J. Luker, for appellant. No appearance for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Edwards

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Zola Lawrence, administratrix of the estate of Carlson Lawrence, deceased, appellee, v. De L. Reid, appellant.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    William P. Boynton, for appellant. Virgil M. Jacoby, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Edwards

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Louise Keilbach, appellee, v. Walter Clayton, appellant.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    R. Guy Kneedler, for appellant; Richard G. Kneedler, Jr., of counsel. J. P. Streuber, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Edwards

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Dorothy Wolfe, appellee, v. Roy Hunt et al., appellants.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    Sumner & Lewis, for appellants. T. H. Cunningham, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Edwards

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Pulton

text:
    Nora B. Forester, administratrix of the estate of John W. Forester, deceased, appellant, v. Central Illinois Public Service Company, appellee.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    D. P. Rumsey and K. C. Ronalds, for appellant. Stevens & Herndon and Miley & Combe, for appellee; A. D. Stevens, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Pulton

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Fulton

text:
    Roscoe Cheatham, appellant, v. Mildred Cheatham, appellee.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    F. M. Guinn and Meyer & Meyer, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Fulton

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Charles E. Pixley and Herbert C. Libkie, plaintiffs in error.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    T. H. Creighton and P. J. Kolb, for plaintiffs in error. P. C. Walters, State’s Attorney, and Shaw & Huffman, Special Counsel, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Fulton

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Hugh M. Stokes, appellee, v. M. E. Fulkerson, appellant.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    P. J. Kolb, for appellant. Ulys Pyle, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Fulton

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James J. Fogerty, appellee, v. Edward C. Mauer, appellant.
    Opinion filed January 23, 1933.
    Wheeler, Oehmke & Dunham, for appellant. Kramer, Campbell, Costello & Wieehert, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Fulton

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Moran, P. J.

text:
    The Birmingham Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg v. Emilie Pulver, for use, etc.

      Fire Insurance — Amount of Loss — Notary's Certificate — Evidence— Opinion of Witnesses — Cross-Examination—Discretion—Remarles of Trial Judge —Instructions.

    1. In an action on a policy of Are insurance the amount of loss is a question for the jury, and the recovery is not limited to the amount stated as the loss in the notary’s certificate,
    2. The opinion of a witness as to the quantity of the goods burned, formed from an inspection of the debris, is inadmissible.
    3. The court may, in its discretion, confine counsel within reasonable limits in the cross-examination of witnesses.
    4. In the case presented, certain inadvertent remarks of the trial judge in ruling upon objections, did not operate to the injury of the appellant and do not constitute such error as to require a reversal.
    5. It is a matter of discretion with the court to give instructions cautioning the jury against prejudice toward one party, or favor to the other.
    6. Appellant can not complain of the refusal of the court to give instructions asked, when every material issue in the case was fully and properly submitted to the jury by instructions prepared by the court,
    [Opinion filed June 13, 1888.]

      Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John P. Altgeld, Judge, presiding.
    Messrs. Moses & Hewman, for appellant.
    Messrs. Kraus, Matee & Stein, for appellee.
   Moran, P. J.

The judgment from which this appeal is prosecuted was rendered against appellant on a policy of insurance. The case was tried by a jury, and upon all the issues there was a bitter contest.

It is very strongly urged upon us that the verdict is against the evidence, and that .this court should reverse the case without remanding it. We have examined the record with care, and find evidence tending to support the contention of appellee on every issue of fact raised in the case. There is, it is true, a conflict of evidence, but where there is such conflict, the verdict of the jury must be treated as settling it in favor of the successful party, and this court is not authorized to interfere with such verdict unless some error of law has intervened, or unless such verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence. We can not say that the verdict rendered in this case is against the weight or preponderance of the evidence. There are many errors of law assigned, and, while we have examined each, and carefully considered the argument of counsel in support of their contentions, we shall not attempt to discuss all their points in detail, but shall notice briefly such as appear to be chiefly relied on.

The policy sued on insured appellee to the amount of §1,000, and she held two other policies for §1,000 each on the property covered and alleged to have been destroyed. The assured claims her loss to be upward of §3,800. The policy required the assured to furnish a certificate from a magistrate or notary public, stating the amount of loss which such officer verily believed the assured had sustained on the property insured.

Appellee furnished a certificate of a notary attached to the proof of loss, in which said notary certified that the insured ^sustained by the fire loss and damages on the property insured to the amount of §1,000, as stated in the foregoing proof of loss.” In the proof of loss appellee stated the amount of her joss to be §3,886.95, as shown by a schedule. It was contended on the trial, and is urged here, that the notary’s certificate controlled as to the amount that could be recovered under the policy, and as the proof of loss disclosed that there were two other policies on the same property, appellant was liable under the pro-rating clause only for one-third of the §1,000 certified by the notary to be the loss. We have been referred to no authority in support of counsel’s position, and we are aware of no principle on which it can be sustained. The certificate is furnished as a compliance with the condition of the policy, but statements contained in it in no manner conclude either the assured or the company. There is no magic in such a certificate and it creates no estoppel as against either party. Even if the proof of loss proper had contained the statement, under the oath of the assured, that the loss was $1,000, she would not be precluded from showing on the trial that the loss was greater. The amount of the loss is, on the trial, a question for the jury under all the evidence, and there is no rule of Haw that limits the recovery to the amount stated as the loss in the notary’s certificate, or in the proofs of loss. Miaghan v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 24 Hun, 58; Lebanon Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kepler, 106 Pa. St. 28.

It was sought by appellant on the trial to introduce in evidence the opinions of certain witnesses as to whether it was probable, judging from the appearance of the debris after the fire, that snch a quantity of goods could have been burned as appellee claims was burned. This evidence was excluded by the court, and, as we think, properly. Inferences from facts are not for the witness, but for the jury. Proof of the amount and appearance of the debris, and all other conditions manifest upon the premises after the fire was proper, but the conclusions to be drawn from such appearance was entirely for the jury. The evidence sought to be introduced was not upon a matter within the domain of opinion or expert evidence, but related to a subject within the common knowledge and experience of men.

Complaint is made of the course of the trial judge, in interfering with the cross-examination of some of the witnesses and because of remarks made in ruling on points in reply to arguments of counsel. The cross-examinations were in some instances inordinately extended, and it is in the discretion of the court to confine counsel within reasonable limits. We have found no abuse of such discretion in this case. While “patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice,” the judge has the direction of the trial and is much better able to perceive what is unnecessary than counsel who is engaged in a heated contest with the witness.

The remarks or comments of the court, mainly complained of, were made in ruling upon objections, and are statements that the evidence upon certain points was thus and so. The admissibility .of evidence offered frequently depends upon the evidence already introduced, and it is not unusual for the court in ruling to allude to such evidence as is in the record to make his meaning plain. This, of course, should be done in such a manner as to express no opinion as to what such evidence proves. Owing to the regard which is paid by jurors to the opinion of the judge, lie should use great caution in expressing his opinion on any question which it is the province of the jury to determine. But every unguarded expression of the Judge in stating reasons to counsel for his rulings, can not he treated as a ground for granting a new tidal. To do so would be to greatly embarrass the administration of justice. The jury were told that they were the judge of the weight of the evidence, and of the credibility of the witnesses, and were given the usual instructions as to the preponderance of the evidence; and from the whole course of the trial, no doubt, thoroughly understood that it was their province to determine what were the facts established by the evidence.

We are of opinion that the inadvertent remarks of the court did not, in fact, operate to the injury of appellant, and do not constitute such error as to require us, for that reason, to reverse this case.

Appellant submitted some nineteen instructions to be given to the jury, but the judge refused to give said instructions, and also refused appellee’s- instructions, and gave to the jury instructions drawn by himself. Appellant contends that the court erred in refusing its instructions. We have been at some pains to examine the instructions refused in connection with the instructions which the court gave in lieu of them, and while the court did not, by his instructions, cover every point in detail which appellant covered in the instructions requested, we are of opinion that every material issue in the case was fully and properly submitted to the jury by the court and that they were fairly and dearly instructed as to all questions of law.

Many of appellant’s instructions were correct propositions of law, and might have been given by the court, but appellant can not complain of the refusal to give them, as the same propositions were contained in the instructions given by the court. Some of appellant’s propositions, which the court failed to incorporate in his instructions, might have been given, but they are o£ such a nature that error can not be predicated on the omission to give them. It is matter of discretion with the court to give instructions cautioning the jury against prejudice toward one party, or favor to the other, and the giving or refusal of instructions of that class can not be assigned for error.

We are of opinion, upon the whole record, that there is no error which requires a reversal of the judgment, and it will, therefore, stand affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Rollin P. Blanchard, Adm’x, v. The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company.

      Limitations — Additional Count — Error without Prejudice — Railroads—■ Personal Injury — Action for Damages — Former Appeal.

    2. An additional count in which the plaintiff’s cause of action is merely re-stated does not warrant a plea of the statute of limitations, although filed after the time limited for the commencement of the suit.
    2. This court will not reverse for an error which worked no injury to the appellant.
    S. In an action against a railroad company to recover damages for causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, wherein this court upon a former appeal adjudged the plaintiff to have been a trespasser, it is held: That the evidence fails to show negligence on the part of the defendant so great as to amount to wanton and willful misconduct; and that the court properly-directed a verdict for the defendant.
    [Opinion filed April 11, 1888.]
    Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John P. Altoeld-, Judge, presiding.
    Messrs. Thomas Dent and William P. Black, fo-r appellant.
    This court held in Haynie v. C. & A. R. R. Co., 9 Ill. App. 105, that “a plaintiff may re-state his canse of action by way of amendment, without its being obnoxious to the objection of introducing a new cause of action.”
    The additional count was but a re-statement of the cause of action for which the suit was brought, and was not obnoxious to the objection of introducing a new cause of action. In fact, the statute on which the action is based gave but one right of action, and the additional count referred to this and no other-cause of action; and for this reason the additional count could properly be filed without being subject to the bar of the statute. Dickson v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 81 Ill. 217.

      The plaintiff was entitled to have the case put to the jury upon the question whether his intestate exercised ordinary care under all the circumstances, and was also entitled to have the case put to the jury as to whether the action of the railroad company should not be deemed gross negligence or willful and unlawful misconduct Chicago & E. I. R. R. Co. v. Hedges, Adm’r, 105 Ind. 398; Byrne v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 382; Cassida v. Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., 13 Pacific Rep. 438. The railroad company should be estopped to allege that the plaintiff’s intestate was a trespasser.
    It was for the jury to determine whether there was a want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff under the evidence as presented. “Negligence is not a legal question, but is one of fact.” ‘ Great Western R. R. Co. v. Haworth, 39 Ill. 353.
    The trial court was not authorized to instruct the jury to find for the defendant, unless the plaintiff’s testimony was “wholly insufficient, considering all it proved or tended to prove.” Holmes v. C. & A. R. R. Co., 94 Ill. 444.
    Hr. Pliny B. Smith, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

This case was in this court before, and is reported in the 15th Ill. App. 582. The facts of the case were very fully stated in the opinion then rendered, and it is not deemed necessary to re-state them here.

When the case was re-docketed in the court below, plaintiff obtained leave to file an additional count to the declaration. To this additional count defendant filed a plea of the statute of limitations, which plea was demurred to by plaintiff, and the demurrer was overruled by the court, and judgment entered for defendant on said plea. A- trial was had upon the other counts of the declaration, and at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence, the judge instructed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. We agree with the counsel for appellant that the additional count filed was nothing more than a re-statement of plaintiff’s cause of action, and was not in any sense the statement of a new cause of action.

It follows that the statute of limitations was not a good plea to said additional count, and that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to it. But that error can not avail appellant, because he was not injured by it.

It is not claimed that all the evidence which appellant had was not introduced. Therefore, if his evidence does not make a case which entitles him to a verdict, an error depriving him of an appropriate pleading does not injure him.

The former judgment of this court left no ground on which the plaintiff could recover, unless he should furnish proof that the accident was the result of negligence on the part of defendant so gross as to be wanton and reckless misconduct, equivalent in legal contemplation to a willful tort.

We are of opinion that plaintiff wholly failed to introduce any evidence from which the jury would be at liberty to find any such degree of negligence. The facts seem to us to be the same in all respects as they were when the case was before considered in this court, and the law as then stated must control now.

The court below properly instructed the jury to find for the defendant, and the judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.


text:
    Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company v. John Maher.

      Bailroads — Injury at Highway Crossing — Evidence—Instructions.
    In an action against a railroad company to recover damages for injuries to himself and to his horse and wagon at a highway crossing, this court affirms the judgment of the court below, the verdict being fairly supported by the evidence and there being no substantial error committed by the court.
    [Opinion filed May 16, 1888.]

      Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elliott Aethory, Judge, presiding.
    Mr. E. Walker, for appellant.
    The Supreme Court has held, as a matter of law, that when persons are about to cross a railroad track it is their duty to use all their faculties to discover the approach of a train, not only by listening but by looking. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Gersten, 15 Ill. App. 614.
    This is not only the rule of the Supreme Court of our State, but also of the Supreme Courts of other States, notably of Hew York and Pennsylvania. T. W. & W. R. W. Co. v. Miller, 76 Ill. 278; Railroad Company v. Henderson, 43 Pa. St. 449; Meyers v. I. & St. L. Ry. Co., 113 Ill. 386.
    Messrs. MoElhebee, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from a judgment recovered by appellee in an action brought by hitn against appellant for injuries to himself, and to his horse and vehicle, sustained by being run into by a locomotive engine being driven by the servants of appellant, at the intersection of Wood Street with appellant’s railway tracks in the city of Chicago.

The verdict is fairly supported by the evidence, but it is contended that the court erred in giving and refusing instructions. We have examined the instructions given and refused, and have considered the points which counsel for appellee has made upon the action of the court below in that regard, and the authorities cited by counsel in support of his contention, and we are of opinion that no substantial error was committed by the court.

We must be content with stating this conclusion, as we have not the time to enter upon a discussion of the position taken by the counsel, and of the facts of this case, which, in our opinion, distinguishes it from cases in which instructions refused by the court in this case, wore approved and sustained.

We find no error, and the judgment of the Superior Court must therefore be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.


text:
    Chicago City Railway Company v. Mary A. Robinson, Adm’x.

      Personal Injuries — Street Railway — Death of Child —A etion for Damages — Questions for Jury — Negligence—When not Imputed to Parent.

    1. In an action against a street railway company to recover damages for' causing the death of a child, it is held: That the court properly overruled a motion to instruct the jury to find for the defendant; and that the questions whether the deceased was in the exercise of reasonable care and whether the defendant was guilty of negligence, were for the jury.
    2 It is ordinarily a question for the jury whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, a failure to stop until the view is clear and look for an approaching train is such negligence as should defeat a recovery.
    8. Where the child injured is in the exercise of ordinary care the question whether the parent was negligent does not arise.
    4. Where the evidence is sharply conflicting this court will not interfere with the verdict of the jury.
    [Opinion filed May 31, 1888.]
    Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John J. Glenn, Judge, presiding.
    Messrs. Hynes & Dunne, for ap ell ant.
    Messrs. Fbank J. Smith & Helmeb and Melville W. Fullee, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The action in this case was brought to recover damages for killing the cl.ild of appellee through the alleged negligence of the servants of appellant.

Appellant was operating a double track street car line on State Street in Chicago, and the trains, each of which consisted of a "grip” and one or two passenger cars, were driven by a cable running beneath the surface of the road at a speed of seven miles an hour. There was a gate across the platform of each car on the side toward the track on which the trains traveled in opposite directions, which prevented passengers from getting on or off the cars on that side of the train.

Plaintiff’s evidence tended to show that on the morning of the accident, the plaintiff, with her hoy, five and one-half years of age, and some relatives with their children, got on a north bound train, on State Street, on their way to attend a funeral, and rode to Twenty-fourth Street, intending to proceed west on the north side of said street. The train stopped on the north foot crossing of Twenty-fourth Street and the party alighted from the east side of the rear platform. A boy about nine years old, who was of the party, was the first to get off, and next to him the deceased, closely followed by his mother. The older boy ran westward across the west track of appellant and the deceased ran after him, and was struck by the grip” of a south bound train and killed.

The running of the cable over the pulleys in the street and through the “grip” of the standing car made considerable noise, and the approach of trains is almost noiseless, and the south bound train was not heard by plaintiff’s witnesses, and their evidence tended to show that there was no bell or gong sounded, and no signal or warning of the approach of the train given, and that the movement of the train was very rapid. The standing train obstructed the view of the west track so that persons alighting from said train on the east side would not see the south bound train until it passed the rear of said standing cars.

On the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, counsel for the defendant company moved the court to instruct the jury to find for the defendant on the ground of the absence of proof of due care on the part of plaintiff, and the absence of proof of negligence on the part of defendant. The court overruled the motion, and this is the principal ground of error urged upon ns for a reversal of the case.

"We are of opinion that the court properly overruled said motion. The questions whether deceased was in the exercise of reasonable care, and whether the defendant company was guilty of negligence, were properly questions for the jury to determine. Appellant’s counsel invokes the doctrine that it is negligence per se to cross a railroad track without stopping and looking to see that there is no approaching train, and argues that as there is no proof that defendant’s train was running at an unlawful rate of speed, they could not be held guilty of any negligence.

The doctrine invoked is not to be applied as a hard and fast rule in every case of an injury, even at crossings of steam railroads. Ordinary care and prudence under all the circumstances in the particular case is all that the law requires, and it is ordinarily for the jury to decide whether, under the circumstances, a failure to stop until the view is clear and look for an approaching train, is such negligence as should defeat a recovery.

We are not willing to state, as a matter of law under all the circumstances of this case, that deceased was, at the time of the injury, guilty of a want of ordinary care, nor can we say that the evidence did not warrant the submission of the question of defendant’s negligence to the jury. To rush a train going in one direction over a street crossing at a rapid speed, and without signal or warning, while a train bound in the opposite direction is discharging passengers at the crossing^ and where persons young and old are liable to be crossing the street, is such an act as, in our opinion, fully warrants the conclusion of negligence.

In passing on this branch of the case we of course consider only plaintiff’s evidence, and the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it. There is a sharp conflict on several points when defendant’s evidence is looked at, but the conflict has been settled by the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

There is one objection urged against an instruction given? and that is, that plaintiff’s instruction excluded the question of the mother’s negligence, if any, from the consideration of the jury. The plaintiff’s theory was, that the child was in the - exercise of ordinary care, and hence that no negligence could be imputed to the parent This is the rule of law. Ihl v. Forty-second Street R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317; Cummings v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 6 Cent. Rep. 394.

The court instructed the jury very fully as to the question of the mother’s negligence, at the request of the defendant, and considering the instructions as a series, the whole law arising upon all theories of the case was given to the jury.

We are of opinion that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.


text:
    Willard H. Alexander et al. v. The North Western Masonic Aid Association et al.

      Administration — Personal Property — Rights of Widow — Mutual Benefit Certificates.

    Upon the death of a husband leaving no child or children or descendants of a child or children, the widow is entitled to the entire proceeds of mutual benefit certificates payable “ to the heirs at law” of the deceased.
    [Opinion filed May 31, 1888.]
    In error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Gwynn Garnett, Judge, presiding.
    Messrs. Cratty Brothers & Ashcraft, for plaintiffs in error.
    Mr. E. Walker, for defendant in error.
   Per Curiam.

The questions in this case arise upon a bill of interpleader brought by the North Western Masonic Aid Association and the personal representatives of the estate of Elijah S. Alexander, deceased, against the appellants, heirs of said deceased, for the purpose of a judicial determination of the question of the disposition of a fund of $8,500, in the hands of said association, and accruing by reason of the membership therein of said deceased in his lifetime, and three certain certificates of the association issued respectively January 28, 1882, whereby the said association promised and agreed to pay to the devisees or to the heirs at law of said Elijah S. Alexander, etc., the sums specified in each, aggregating said sum of $8,500. The said Alexander died intestate, February 23, 1886, leaving no child or descendants of a child, but leaving Josephine P. Alexander, his widow, him surviving.

The court below by its decree determined that said widow was the sole heir at law to the personal property of said deceased and that the other heirs at law, the father, mother and brother, etc., had no right, title or interest in said fund or any part thereof.

From that decree this appeal was taken. Upon due consideration we are of opinion that the case is governed by the rules announced in Richards v. Miller, 62 Ill. 417, and that the decree below should be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.


author: Bailey, J.

text:
    Alfred H. Andrews, Impleaded, etc., v. Mary Boedecker, Administratrix, etc.

      Master and Servant— Volunteer — Motive—Liability of Master — Persona l Inj ury — Instructions.
    1. The master is liable for a personal injury caused by the negligence of a third person in piling lumber handed him by a servant of the master for that purpose, although the service performed by such third person was voluntary and without compensation.
    2. In the case presented, it is held.: That the relation of master and servant, as respects the rights of third persons, was established when such volunteer was allowed to assist in the defendant’s work; and that the motive which induced him to perform gratuitous service is unimportant.
    [Opinion filed May 31, 1888.]

      Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Joseph E. Gaby, Judge, presiding.
    Messrs. Lyman M. Paine and Allan C. Story, for appellant.
    The court, in the first instruction given for the appellee, told the jury that if the teamsters of Andrews piled the lumber in question, with the voluntary and gratuitous assistance of Honey, then Andrews would be liable for any negligence in the piling. But under the law as laid down in the text books and in the cases cited, the conclusion does not follow the premises. As a matter of fact, Honey alone did the piling, so far as the fall of the pile was caused by negligence in the piling. The evidence does not show that appellant had the slightest control over the manner in which the piling was done. It is certain beyond controversy that appellant had no control over the pile after it was built. The yard had gates with locks, and appellant had no key. It was not the business of appellant to pile the lumber when delivered to the kiln.
    The duty of the teamsters was simply to deliver the lumber in the yard. When delivered, either upon the platform or elsewhere, it passed immediately into the control of Douglas and Honey. The instruction assumes to give all the facts necessary for a verdict of guilty. The Supreme Court has said that such an instruction must state fully all that need be proved, so that if there were no other evidence, there could be no question as to the rights of the parties. St. L. & S. E. Ry. Co. v. Britz, 72 Ill. 256; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 507.
    The instruction is erroneous in not informing the jury that, in addition to the facts named, they must also find that, in piling the lumber, the teamsters and Honey must be engaged in the business of appellant, and that the person guilty of negligence must be under the control of appellant while performing the negligent act, before they could find the appellant,guilty.
    Was Honey acting as a servant of Andrews in piling the lumber? Was he not, rather, on the pile all the way up, " directing and placing the lumber until the pile was completed” ? Did he represent the will of appellant, "not merely in the ultimate result of his work but in all its details”? Shearman & Bedfield on Negligence, Sec. 73.
    If Honey had any interest in having the lumber piled as he himself piled it, then he was not a mere volunteer. The instruction should have been qualified by the court so as to draw a distinction between Honejr’s voluntary assistance with the intention of doing Andrews a service and his voluntary assistance with the intention of rendering his contract with Andrews more easily performed by himself. Holmes v. N. E. Ry. Co., 6 L. R. 123; Wright v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., 1 L. B. Q. B. Div. 252.
    In no respect does Honey fit the description of servant; neither in putting up the pile nor in taking it down. This court found from the evidence on the former trial that all the work done by Honey for Andrews was done, not as a servant, but as an independent contractor, and the evidence in this record is in all material respects the same. If the teamsters could be considered at all as assisting in the construction of the pile in question, it is clear that in so doing they were assisting Honey, and in such case, if negligent, their negligence could not be imputed to Andrews. Shearman & Bedfield on Negligence, Sec. 73.
    George W. Stanford, for appellee.
    It is not denied that the primary duty- to safely pile this lumber was upon the teamsters of appellant. This is too firmly established by the evidence to admit of doubt. Their duty was to safely pile the lumber; and if, while acting for the appellant, they permit some one else to interfere and assist them in the work, and injury comes by reason of negligence of the one whom they permit to interfere, the negligence is theirs, and their principal would be liable. Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355; Wood’s Master and Servant, Sec. 308, p. 588; Randleson v. Murray, 8 Ad. & Ell. 109. The men who piled this lumber which fell, were at all times under the absolute control of appellant and his foreman. It will not be contended by the appellant that he could not, either by his foreman or in person, if he had desired, have absolutely controlled and shaped his work. Manifestly if the foreman had ordered the lumber to be cross-piled or braced it would have been so piled. The control of this work was wholly with appellant, and if his teamsters, acting alone, or acting with Honey as a mere volunteer assistant, have been guilty of negligence, the principal ought to be held to respond for damages resulting from such neglect.
    The whole logic of the first instruction is that the liability of appellant could not be lessened by the fact that his teamsters had permitted a volunteer to aid them, and 1 do not think that any of the authorities cited by counsel militate against tin's instruction in that particular.
    The acts of Honey while assisting the teamsters in piling this lamber were the acts of the teamsters. They controlled him, or had. the right to do so, and if Honey was acting in a negligent manner it was their duty to control him. Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355, as also Booth v. Mister, 7 Car. & P. 76.
   Bailey, J.

This was an action on the ease brought by the administratrix of Henry J. Boedecker, to recover damages for the death of her intestate. The suit was originally brought against Alfred II. Andrews and Frank Douglas, and, at a former trial, the jury found defendant Andrews guilty and assessed the plaintiff’s damages against him at 85,000, but found defendant Douglas not guilty. Judgment having been rendered on said verdict, Andrews appealed to this court, and on such appeal said judgment was reversed on account of an erroneous instruction to the jury, and also for the reason that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive. Andrews v. Boedecker, 17 Ill. App. 213. A second trial has now been had, resulting in a verdict and judgment against Andrews for 82,500, and he has again appealed to this court.

The material facts in the case are set forth at length in Andrews v. Boedecker, supra, and need not be repeated here. The principal controversy at the second trial was upon the question whether the lumber which fell and caused the death of the plaintiff’s intestate was piled up by a person or persons between whom and the defendant there existed the legal relation of master and servant, so as to call for an application of the maxim respondeat superior.

The evidence tended to show, and, we think, warranted the jury in finding, that a teamster, in the service of the defendant unloaded the lumber constituting the lower portion of said pile from the defendant’s wagon, and piled the same without assistance, the pile thus formed being about five feet high. Subsequently said teamster brought the residue of said lumber to the yard where it was to be unloaded, and took it from the wagon and placed it on said pile with the assistance of Andrew It. Honey, thus making the pile about twelve feet high. In unloading and piling said lumber said teamsters stood on the ground, and after raising each piece of lumber so as to balance it on the stake' of the wagon, raised the opposite end up so that Honey, who was standing on the pile of lumber, could get hold of it Honey then took it and placed it on the top of the pile.

The service thus performed by Honey was voluntary and without compensation. He had a contract with the defendant by which he was to be paid 20 cents per thousand feet for taking the lumber from the piles and placing it on the platform of the dry-kiln, but aiding in unloading the lumber from the defendant’s wagons and piling it in the yard does not seem to have been within the terms of his contract. There is also some evidence tending to show that piling the lumber in the yard to a considerable height, rendered it easier for him afterward to transfer it to the platform. 1

That the relation of master and servant existed between-the defendant and his teamster is not questioned. Did it also exist between the defendant and Honey ? He was a volunteer, it is true, and was giving his services to the defendant gratuitously, but we are unable to see how that circumstance should change the liability of the defendant as to third persons. The services which Honey performed were in all respects subject to the defendant’s direction and control and it was wholly immaterial whether Honey was paid for them or not.

On this question the case of Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355, is directly in point. There it was held that a master who direeted his servant to remove snow and ice from the roof of his house was responsible for an injury thereby occasioned to a passer-by, whether the negligence was that of the servant or of a third person who volunteered to assist him. Booth v. Mister, 7 Carr. & P. 76, was an action on the case for damage done to the plaintiff’s cabriolet from the negligence with which the defendant’s cart was driven, and it was held that the defendant would be liable, although it should appear that the defendant’s servant was not driving at the time of the accident, but had intrusted the reins to a stranger who was riding with him, and who was not in the service of the defendant.

The instructions of the court to the jury were in harmony with the principles above stated, and, applying those principles, the evidence was clearly sufficient to charge the defendant with liability for the negligence of Honey.

But it is urged that the motive which induced Honey to render defendant these voluntary and gratuitous services was, that by piling up the lumber in the yard in the way he did, he rendered its subsequent removal to the platform of the dry-kiln more easy, and it is urged that for that reason a different rule should apply. The evidence being clear that the unloading of the lumber from the wagons and piling it in the yard was no part of Honey’s contract, we are unable to see how the motive by which he was induced to perform gratuitous services for the defendant can be of any consequence. The work which he did was the defendant’s and not his, and so far as he was allowed by the defendant to take part in its performance, he must be held to have established between himself and the defendant, so far at least as third persons are coneerned? the relation of master and servant.

We have carefully considered thé other questions raised by the defendant’s counsel in their briefs, and are of the opinion that none of them are well taken. As we find no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.


author: McAllister, J.

text:
    Wiley S. Scribner et al. v. Samuel B. Chase et al.

      Recorders — Control of Original Instruments and Boohs — Right to Mahe Abstracts — County Commissioners — Resolution—Injunctions.
    1. Prior to the acts of May 31 and June 16,1887, persons engaged in the business of making abstracts of title to real estate were not entitled to have access' to original instruments and to books of records in the recorder’s office, to make abstracts thereof for purposes of their business.
    2. This court is of the opinion that a resolution of the board of commissioners of Cook County, directing the recorder to deny the use of his office to all abstract firms, companies and corporations, for the purpose of making abstracts, was unauthorized and void.
    [Opinion filed June 13, 1888.]
    Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County, the Hon. Henry M. Shepard, Judge, presiding.
    This was a bill in chancery brought February 25, 1886, by appellees, composing the firm of Handy & Company, who were engaged in the business of keeping an abstract office and furnishing to customers and patrons, for hire or reward, abstracts of title to real estate situate in the county of Cook, against the appellant Scribner and the other appellants comprising the individual members of the board of county commissioners in and for said county, for an injunction. The bill, after setting out in detail the nature of complainants’ business, alleged that on February 17, 1886, said recorder caused them to be served with the following copy of a notice:
    “ Cook County Recorder’s Office. ) “February 17th, 1886. j
    “Messrs. Handy & Co.

      “Gentlemen; The board of commissioners of Cook County, at its regular session, held on Monday, February 15, 1886, having adopted the following resolution, to wit:

      “Resolved, that the recorder of deeds be and is hereby directed to deny to all abstract firms, companies and corporations, the privilege of using the recorder’s office for the purpose of advancing their private business.
    “Row, therefore, in compliance with said resolution, and as I am by law entitled and empowered to do, I hereby give you notice that it will be necessary for you on or before Saturday, February 27, 1886, to withdraw from this office the force of men here employed by you in making copies or abstracts from the original instruments and records of this office, and that from and after that date I shall be compelled to deny access to the original instruments and records of this office to all parties desiring to make copies or abstracts of the same for speculative purposes or for their own private gain,
    “Very respectfully yours,
    “Wiley S. Scribner,
    “Recorder of Deeds.”
    The bill set out a claim of absolute legal right on the part of complainants to have their clerks, employes and agents, to occupy at all such times as should be convenient to them, such portions of the recorder’s office as was necessary for the purpose, and to use and handle all original instruments left in said office for record as well as all books of records pertaining to real estate in said county, without hindrance or interference on the part of said recorder, in order that complainants might continue their tract indices and abstract books kept in their office for the purposes of their business as aforesaid. It alleged an intention on the part of the defendants to deprive complainants of that right, and irreparable damages which they would suffer in consequence, and prayed for an injunction against the defendants to restrain them from denying access to such original instruments or record books or interfering with such clerks, etc., in making use of, handling or abstracting the contents of such originals or records, and that such injunction be made perpetual. Upon hearing on pleadings and proofs the following decree was entered, from which defendants appealed:
    “ This cause having come on to be heard upon the amended bill of complaint, the answer of the defendants thereto, and the replication of the complainants to such answer, and the proof, oral and documentary, taken in open court in said cause, and having been argued by counsel for the respective parties, the court upon due consideration thereof doth find that the material allegations of said amended bill of complaint are true and that the equities of this cause are with the complainants, and thereupon it is ordered, adjudged and decreed, and the court doth hereby order, adjudge and decree that the said defendant Wiley S. Scribner, recorder of deeds of Cook County, and his successors in office, and his and their deputies, clerks, employes, agents and servants, and the said defendants, Christian Casselman, Peter Fortune, Christian Geils, John Hannigan, Henry Heinmelgarn, M. E. Leyden, C. F. Lynn, F. A. MacDonald, B. S. HcClaughrev, James J. McCarthy, Frank Heisen,. B. M. Oliver, John E. Van Pelt, Daniel J. Wren, Geoi-ge Klehm, board of county commissioners of Cook County, and their successors in office,'and their deputies, clerks, employes, agents and servants, be, and they, and each and every one of them, are hereby perpetually enjoined and restrained from excluding from the office of the recorder of deeds of Cook County, the said complainants, or any of them, or their clerks, or employes, and from denying to the said complainants, or any of them, or their clerks or employes, access to the original instruments filed in said office, and the records and record books in said office, and from interfering with thé said complainants, their clerks or employes, or any of them, in making use of, handling and abstracting the contents of said original instruments and records in the same manner as they have heretofore used, handled and abstracted such original instruments and records, and from interfering with" or in any manner hindering the said complainants, or any of them, or their clerks or employes, from examining all the original instruments filed for record in said office, and from taking such memoranda thereof as may be necessary to make up original entry sheets, and to verify the same as they have heretofore done. But this decree shall not be construed to prevent the recorder of deeds from changing the method or manner of conducting the business of his office, when required by the public interests, such changes to apply to all persons alike without discrimination. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the complainants recover of" the defendants their costs to be taxed by the clerk.”
    Mr. J. L. High, for Wiley S. Scribner, appellant.
    At common law no person was entitled to an inspection of records of a public or quasi public nature, unless some personal or property right of the person seeking such inspection was involved. King v. Lucas, 10 East, 235; King v. Tower, 4 Maule & S. 162; King v. Justices of Staffordshire, 6 Ad. & El. 68; King v. Allgood, 7 T. R. 746; Rex v. Merchant Tailors Co., 2 Barn. & Ad. 115; Crew v. Saunders, 2 Strange, 1005; Ex parte Hutt, 7 Dowling’s Pr. Rep. 690; Hereford v. Bridgewater, Bunb. 269; Attorney-General v. Coventry, Bunb. 290; Ex parte Briggs, 1 Ell. & Ell. (E. C. L.) 881; King v. Clear, 4 Barn. & Cress. (E. C. L. R. 10), 899.
    The courts will not by mandamus or injunction compel a recorder of deeds, or clerk of a court of record, to submit his records to be examined or abstracted by persons engaged in the business of furnishing abstracts of title for private gain, such persons having no interest in the property in question. Webber v. Townley, 43 Mich. 534; Bean v. People, 7 Colo. 200 ; Buck v. Collins, 51 Geo. 391; United States v. Anderson, United States Circuit Court, District of Indiana, unreported.
    To the same effect see also In re McLean, 9 Cent. Law Jour. 425 ; Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299.
    Mr. William Law, Jr., for board of county commissioners appellant.
    Mr. Melville W. Fuller, for appellees.
    Uothing is better settled than that a municipal corporation can not enact ordinances that are unreasonable and oppressive, or such as will create a monopoly. Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405; Chicago v. Bumpff, 45 Ill. 90; Bloomington v. Wahl, 46 Ill. 489.

      An unreasonable ordinance is void. 8th Coke, 126; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 465; Commissioners v. Gas Company, 12 Pa. St. 322. “A by-law must he reasonable though made in pursuance of an express power, or it will be void.” Kennebec R. R. Co. v. Kendall, 31 Maine, 477. “If by-laws are unequal in their operation they will be void.” Boston v. Shaw, 1 Metcalf, 130, 135; Mayor of Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige, 263; Mayor of Columbia v. Beasley, 1 Humphrey, 241; Mayor of Memphis v. Winfield, 8 Humphrey, 707, 709.
    .Inasmuch as the object of the resolution in question and its effect, if carried out, was and would be to create a monopoly in the abstract business, it was utterly void, and as the effort; of the recorder to put it in operation would result in irremediable injury to the complainants, they were entitled to the preventive interposition of a court of equity.
    ■Access to the records of deeds, mortgages, etc., is the absolute right of every citizen in relation to his own property, or property whose owners he represents.
    And since deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing authorized to be recorded, take effect and are in force from and after the time of filing the same for record, and the evidence establishes that such documents can not, in fact, be spread upon the records until weeks after they are filed, access to the originals can not be denied.
    The argument ab inconvenienti has no application, for a public official can not be allowed in this country to complain that it is inconvenient for him to allow the dissemination of the information his office was created to impart.
    Judge Dillon in his work on Municipal Corporations says, See. 240: “Every corporator has a right to inspect all the records, books and other documents of the corporation upon all proper occasions; and if upon application for that purpose the officer who has the custody refuse to show them, the court will grant a mandamus to force his right. When the corporator’s application to inspect is founded on his general right he has a mandamus, but when it is founded on a suit pending he obtains a rule.” See People v. Cornell, 47 Barb. 329; Herbert v. Ashburners, 1 Wilson, 297.

      Iii Townsend v. Register of Deeds, 7 How. Pr. 413, if was held that any person so desiring had a right to examine the books of record, without charge, and this would be accorded not as a privilege, nor as a favor, but as a matter of absolute right. In State v. Williams, 41 N. J. 332, the English cases are considered at length, and it is said: “It seems, therefore, to be sufficient if the person seeking inspection has such an interest in a specific controversy as will enable him to maintain or defend an action for which the public documents will furnish competent evidence or necessary information. ¡Nor is it essential that his interest should be private, capable of sustaining a suit or defense on his own personal behalf. It will justify his demand for inspection, if he may act in such suit as a representative of a common or public right.”
    The evidence establishes, and it will not be denied, that all real estate transactions in the county of Cook, selling, borrowing, etc., have been for years conducted upon the basis of these abstracts of title, and that the entire business community reposes upon this system, which has obtained for so long- a time that the present generation can not remember to the contrary.
    The attempt by action under the resolution in question to put an end to complainants’ business is destructive of the fruits of the uninterrupted labor of fourteen years, since the fire, and subversive of the public interests, not only furthered by but absolutely based upon the system, which has subsisted for thirty-four years.
    That the continuation of the existing abstracts of title is of public concern is sufficiently apparent from the evidence, and is expressly recognized as such by the “Act to remedy the evils consequent upon the destruction of any public record, by fire or otherwise,” (Hurd’s Rev. Stat. 1881, 877,) by section 23 of which the business is largely regulated.
    Threatened with special injury, the complainants can in their own names vindicate the public interests. Chicago v. Un Build’g Asso., 102 Ill. 379.
    Messrs. Goudy & Green, also for appellees.
   McAllister, J.

The transactions in question took place, and the bill in this case was brought, before the statutes concerning recorders and the inspection of records in the office of the former, approved respectively May 31 and June 16, 1887, were passed. (Sess. Laws, 1887, p. 256, 258.) Consequently, the provisions of those acts can have no application to this case,, and it must be decided upon the law as it stood at the time of bringing the suit. The question therefore is, were the complainants entitled, as a matter of legal right, to have access to the original instruments left in the custody of the recorder for the purpose of having them recorded, and to books of records in the office, and to handle, use and make abstracts of them, for the purposes of their business, without interference or hindrance on the part of the recorder of deeds? There is nothing in the statute relative to recdrders of deeds, as it then existed, which gives the least color to any such claim. By such statute, the oath for the faithful discharge of his duties, Sec. 22, requires him to give a bond with sufficient security in the penal sum of §20,000, and prescribes the condition of that bond, which shall be “ for the faithful discharge of his duties, and to deliver up all papers, books, records and other things appertaining to his office, whole, safe and undefaeed, when lawfully required so to do.” 2 Starr & C. Ill. Stat. p. 1984. That provision is a plain, indisputable, legislative recognition of the common law rules applicable to such officer and his duties, to the effect, that by virtue of his office he becomes the legal custodian of all papers, books and records appertaining to his office, and is responsible for their preservation from injury, alteration, mutilation, defacement or safekeeping.

Mow, can it be maintained that the law is so unreasonable as to charge a public officer with such duties and responsibilities, but deny to him the power, control and discretion, as to the subject-matter, necessary to his protection? The question is not new in the courts of this country. It has arisen and been decided in various courts of the highest respectability, against the claim set up here, in cases that can not be distinguished from this case with regard to the reasons and principles governing tlicir decision. Webber v. Townly, 43 Mich. 534; Bean v. People, 7 Col. 200; Buck v.Collins, 51 Ga. 391; Cormack v. Wolcott, Register, 37 Kan. 391.

The effect of the decree in this case is to divest the recorder of the power conferred upon him by the law, of exercising a reasonable discretion in the care, management and government of his office, and the preservation of original deeds, hooks and records, confided to his custody. The decree is, for that reason, unauthorized by law, and manifestly erroneous. The Title Guarantee Trust Co. v. Reilly, Register, 38 Hun, 429; The German-American Loan & Trust Co. v. Richards, Register, 99 N. Y. 620.

The resolution of the board of county commissioners, embodied in the notice given by the recorder to complainants, and set out in our statement of the case, was, in our opinion, unauthorized and void. And it seems to us that the only-decree to which the complainants were entitled, would have been a decree declaring such resolution void and restraining defendants from attempting to carry it into effect.

The decree of the court below will be reversed and the cause remanded, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.