author: Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

text:
    Aneta Abramovici et al., Appellees, v. L. O. Thieme, Trading as L. O. Thieme and Company, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,908.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Joseph W. Cox, of Chicago, for appellant.
    Paul O’Donnell, of Chicago, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.

June 22,1935, plaintiffs filed their complaint in chancery for an accounting, claiming they were heirs of Wolf Mandel, a resident of New Jersey, who died there intestate; that defendant had received from the estate $8,552.15, and that they were entitled to this sum with interest thereon from the time it was received by defendant. It was alleged that defendant had maliciously converted or embezzled the funds. Defendant answered, and the cause was referred to a master in chancery, who took the evidence and made up his report. He found that defendant should be charged with having received $7,743.31, expended $1,049.50, leaving a balance due plaintiffs of $6,693.81, and that plaintiffs were entitled to interest on this sum at five per cent per annum from August 15, 1930, or $2,119.70, making a total of $8,813.51. Objections to the report were overruled; afterward a decree was entered in accordance with the recommendations of the master, and defendant appeals.

The master in his report found that Wolf Mandel, a resident of New Jersey, died intestate December 3, 1928, leaving a number of heirs, including plaintiffs,. who were residents of Roumania; that the estate was probated in the orphan’s court of Passaic county, New Jersey; that William II. Young was appointed administrator of the estate and Herman.W. Fishbein, an attorney and master in chancery, was appointed attorney for the estate; that defendant L. 0. Thieme, as L. 0. Thieme & Co., had for more than 25 years been in the business of seeking heirs and any collateral matters in connection therewith, with its principal offices in Chicago; that on his letterheads appears the following: “L. 0. Thieme & Co. International Law and Banking Exchange, L. 0. Thieme, Commissioner of Deeds and Oaths for the States of New York and California”; that on November 29, 1929, defendant addressed a circular letter to attorneys at Bucharest, Roumania, in which he said: “We have ascertained that in your country several collection agents (under the pretentious names of bankers), . . . have without authority, obtained . . . information regarding decedent’s estates, in which foreign heirs are interested, and that they call on persons in Europe, and without having any authority, prevail upon them under any unfounded pretext to execute powers of attorney.

“In order to stop such misconduct, we shall wire you in cases of substantial estates,” etc., and blank forms of powers of attorney were inclosed. The master further found that on December 28, 1931, defendant addressed another letter to the same attorneys concerning the securing of powers of attorney from heirs of persons who died in the United States leaving heirs in Roumania, in which he said: “We take this opportunity to call your attention to the fact that during the last few years, there have appeared in Europe, American ‘Banking houses’ which are neither bankers nor lawyers by profession, who persuade the heirs of decedents whose estates are pending in America, by all kinds of questionable ways and means to execute powers of attorney ....

“It does not help the heirs at all if people correspond with an administrator or executor from the States.” The master further found that heirs in Roumania executed powers of attorney to the attorneys of Bucharest to collect their distributive shares of the Mandel estate in New Jersey; that afterward those attorneys executed powers of attorney substituting the defendant in their stead; that thereafter defendant retained an attorney in New Jersey to take charge of the matters; that shortly before this was done, Young, administrator of the estate, filed his final accounting in the New Jersey court, showing cash receipts of more than $13,000, and two mortgages, one for $3,800 and the other for $2,000. The report also showed expenditures of $3,437.77, leaving "a balance, including the two mortgages, .of $15,400.75 to be distributed among the Mandel heirs; that the Mandel heirs, represented by defendant, were entitled to 5/9ths of the estate, as of August 15,1930, and after deducting-certain inheritance taxes, found the net amount to be $7,743.31. The master further found that defendant agreed to and did accept the two mortgages, aggregating $5,800, in lieu of cash, and received the balance, $1,943.31, in cash, coming to the heirs; that the mortgages were uncollectible, and defendant instructed his New Jersey attorney to institute foreclosure proceedings, which was done, one of which proceeding was still pending. The other mortgage was foreclosed, the premises bought in the name of defendant and afterward disposed of by him for $1,121; that there was a parcel of real estate belonging to Mandel in his lifetime, and defendant authorized a partition suit to be filed, which was still pending; that defendant remitted $807.07 to the attorney in Bucharest, but at no time rendered a complete or detailed account. The master then found that defendant, for the first time, offered an itemized account on the hearing, showing cash receipts of $3,199.58, the two mortgages for $5,800, and a number of items of disbursement totalling $3,216.77. The master recommended the disallowance of certain of the expenses as follows: (1) $640 for traveling expenses of defendant in going to New Jersey, as defendant had retained an attorney in New Jersey and the expense was unnecessary and a part of this item was for other business defendant was attending to in the east; (2) $36 for telephone calls to New Jersey, as no sufficient reason was given for incurring this expense; (3) $56.18 for cablegrams to Roumania, which the master found were not for the benefit of the heirs but were in reality warnings to the attorney in Roumania to prevent the attorney for the administrator, who went to that country, from securing the signatures of the heirs; (4) $35 for investigation in Canada, where he endeavored to secure powers of attorney for other heirs in that country; (5) $740, claimed by defendant for compensation and expenditures made by him in foreclosing the two mortgages, aggregating $300.91, for the reason that defendant was not authorized to take the mortgages in lieu of money, and that his action “comes dangerously close to champerty and maintenance. He advised his correspondents not to communicate with administrators or executors or their attorneys, reflected upon their fairness and recommended litigation rather than settlement of Estates,” etc. ;-(6) $158.22 miscellaneous expenses of New York office of defendant, there being no proof that they were actually incurred or that they were necessary. The master further said, “The entire course of conduct of the defendant in representing the foreign heirs of Wole Handel evidences a surprising want of appreciation of the rights and duties of one occupying a position of trust and confidence. . . . That instead of representing the foreign heirs, he was acting for his own profit,” etc.

The chancellor sustained the master, and upon a careful consideration of all the evidence in the record and the argument of counsel, we are of opinion that the findings and recommendations are warranted by the evidence and the law. In Lehman v. Rothbarth, 159 Ill. 270, the court said (p. 282): “It is well settled that a trustee or agent can recover no fees or commissions for his services unless he has faithfully discharged his duties toward his principal or cestui que trust. (Hoyt v. Shipherd, 70 Ill. 309; Brannan v. Strauss, 75 id. 234.) ‘If he has neglected his duties, exercised bad faith in the conduct of his trust, or committed a breach of his obligation in any way, he forfeits his right to a compensation. ’ (27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 187 . . . .)”

Defendant contends that the court erred in allowing interest from August 15,1930, the date of the distribution, for the reason that, “No right to receive interest could exist . . . prior to the time a demand is made upon this defendant”; that there was an honest dispute between the parties as to the amount due, if any, which depended upon a consideration of the terms of the powers of attorney and upon certain questions of fact, and that there was no unreasonable or vexatious delay. The master found, and the undisputed evidence shows, that on August 15,1930, the $7,743.31 was turned over to defendant. This sum included the two mortgages aggregating $5,800. Defendant had no right to accept these mortgages but might have received a less amount if the mortgages had been discounted. He made no detailed account until the hearing before the master, and the evidence shows and the master found that throughout the whole proceeding he acted in his own interest and contrary to that of plaintiffs, and this finding was approved by the chancellor. The master made his report December 15, 1936. The expenditures to which we have above referred, for which defendant claims credit, were unwarranted, as were the two foreclosure suits, during all of which time plaintiffs have been kept out of their money. In these circumstances we think plaintiffs were entitled to interest. Sec. 2, ch. 74, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 67.02].

The decree of the superior court of Cook county is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

McSubely and Hatchett, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor Mr. Justice HcSurely

license: Public Domain

text:
    William Knox Steele, Appellant, v. Rosehill Cemetery Company, Appellee.
    Gen. No. 39,955.
    McSubely, J., dissenting.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 25, 1938.
    Francis M. Lowes, of Chicago, for appellant.
    Ashcraft & Ashcraft, of Chicago, for appellee; Carroll J. Lord and Rufus D. Beach, both of Chicago, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.

William Knox Steele, the owner of a lot in defendant cemetery, filed his complaint in equity alleging that he inherited the lot from his wife, who inherited it from her father, who obtained title to the lot by warranty deed from the Rosehill Cemetery Company October 25, 1866; that plaintiff, as owner of the lot in fee simple, was entitled, when the time came, to be buried there without paying defendant $403 for its claimed charges for cutting grass on the lot from 1926 to 1936; that he was entitled to recover $151 from defendant, which he paid to it under protest as a condition for the burial of his wife on the lot on November 10,1926, and that being the owner in fee simple, he had the right to alienate parts of the lot not needed for burial purposes without the payment of $3,878.95 which defendant demanded as a condition to its consent to such alienation.

The theory of defendant was that plaintiff did not own the lot in fee simple but had a mere right of easement for burial purposes; that defendant had the right to require plaintiff to pay $151 and $403 to defray the expense in cutting the grass from the lot over a period of years and that it had the right to impose the payment of $3,878.95 to put the lot under perpetual care as a condition to its consenting to plaintiff selling parts of the lot. There was a hearing before the chancellor, finding the equity against plaintiff, a decree entered dismissing his bill, and he appeals.

The material facts, in short compass, are that defendant, Rosehill Cemetery Company, was incorporated by a special act of the legislature approved February 11, 1859. By the act certain named individuals were created a corporate body as the Rosehill Cemetery Company; with a board of managers who were authorized to purchase real estate not exceeding 500 acres for cemetery purposes in the township of Lake View, Cook county, Illinois, were given power to lay out and ornament the grounds for a cemetery and to make such “rules and regulations from time to time, for the government of lot holders and visitors to the cemetery as they deem necessary”; that all lots sold for burial purposes be free from taxation, execution and attachment provided that no person should hold at any one time more than four lots so exempted. Section 6 of the act provided: “Every lot sold by the cemetery company for burial purposes shall be held by the proprietor for the purpose of sepulture only, and shall be transferable only by the consent of the managers, and no lot holder shall permit interment in or upon any lot held by him, for a consideration.” February 13, 1863, the charter of the Rosehill Cemetery Company was amended by an act of the legislature, the preamble of which recites: “Whereas, the lot holders in Rosehill Cemetery have become fearful that the said cemetery may, after the lots therein have been sold, come to be neglected and left without care; therefore, to prevent the possibility of such results the Rosehill Cemetery Company proposes these amendments to its charter:” The act then provides that there be set apart 10 per cent of the moneys received from the sale of lots until the fund amounted to $100,000, and that it be “kept and preserved as a fund, for all time to come, for the preserving, maintaining, and ornamenting the grounds, lots, walks, shrubbery, memorials, boundaries, structures, and all other tilings in and about said cemetery and belonging to said corporation, so that the purpose and intention thereof shall be carried out, and so that said grounds shall be and continue as cemetery grounds forever ’ ’; that the moneys be turned over to a board of three trustees who were owners of lots in the cemetery, who were authorized to invest the funds in certain securities to be held for the use and purpose specified and for no other purpose, and that only the income therefrom be expended. The act further provided for the acceptance of it by the board of managers of the Cemetery Company. The act was approved by the board on March 6,1863.

The deed to the lot in question was executed October 25, 1866, from the Rosehill Cemetery Company to Harvey M. Thompson and Deville R. Holt, the terms of which were: the Cemetery Company “does Grant, Bargain, sell and Convey” to Thompson and Holt “their heirs and assigns forever” the lot in question for a consideration of $600, ‘ ‘ To have and to hold . . . the premises as a place of interment to the said Grantee, their heirs and assigns forever, subject, however, to the provisions and restrictions of an Act of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois, entitled ‘An Act to Incorporate the Rose Hill Cemetery Company, ’ approved February 11th, 1859, and all amendments thereto, and also subject to the conditions and limitations, and with the privileges and restrictions specified in the Rules and regulations hereto annexed, and which are made a part of the conveyances, or which the said company may hereafter make in conformity with said act, or with any amendments thereto, and the said Rose Hill Cemetery Company does hereby covenant to and with the said Grantee, their heirs and assigns, that said Trustee, as aforesaid, is lawfully seized of the herein above granted premises, in fee simple ; that said Rose Hill Cemetery Company have full right and power to sell and convey the same for the purposes above expressed.”

The rules and regulations on the back of the deed stated: “All lots shall be held in pursuance of an ‘Act to Incorporate the Rose Hill Cemetery Company, ’ and amendments heretofore or hereafter made thereto and of rules, regulations and by-laws and all amendments thereto in conformity with said act. Proprietors shall not allow interment in their lots for a remuneration, nor shall any transfer or assignment of any lot, or any interest therein be valid without the consent of said company. ’ ’

The lot in question was inherited by plaintiff’s wife, an adopted daughter of the grantee Thompson. She died in November, 1926, and thereupon plaintiff became the owner of the lot. As a condition to the burial of plaintiff’s wife November 10, 1926, defendant required plaintiff to pay $151 for cutting grass on the lot over a period of years, which he did under protest.

The record further discloses that plaintiff, who is more than 80 years of age, is the only member of the family who upon his decease will be buried in the lot, and that defendant company, as a condition of permitting his burial, requires him to pay $403 for cutting the grass on the lot from 1926 to 1936, and that thereafter the cost would be about $40 a year. Shortly after the death of plaintiff’s wife in 1926 he took up, with defendant, the question of a sale of two portions of the lot on which no bodies were buried, stating that he did not need this space for his own burial. Defendant agreed to consent to the sale upon payment by plaintiff of $3,878.95, which included the cost — $3,030—of putting the lot under perpetual care, and the balance for the “cost of refilling, grading and seeding the lot level, and the unpaid grass cutting charges.” Afterward plaintiff filed the instant suit.

Defendant’s vice president testified that since 1901 or 1902, no lots had been sold without requiring the purchaser to provide for the perpetual care of his lot; that where a burial is sought to be made and the charge for cutting the grass has not been paid, if an affidavit is presented showing that the “person is without any means, if they are destitute, the burial will be permitted”; that no charge had been made for cutting grass until 1922 or 1923. “Labor got so high we just couldn’t do it any more. ’ ’ Defendant also offered evidence that the charge made for cutting the grass was reasonable ■and in fact much below the cutting rate in similar cemeteries in the Chicago area.

Defendant contends plaintiff has no right to relief in a court of equity because he has an adequate remedy at law. We will not stop to consider the cases cited because we are clearly of opinion that if plaintiff is entitled to relief he cannot obtain adequate relief except in a court of equity. He seeks a construction of his deed, the repayment to him of $151, and an injunction against defendant’s attempt to charge for the cutting of the grass, etc., as a condition precedent to the issuing of a permit for plaintiff’s burial in the lot when the time comes, and that he be authorized to sell portions of the lot without restrictions or conditions sought to be imposed by defendant.

Plaintiff contends that the granting clause of the deed of the Cemetery Company through which he derived his title by inheritance, granted title in fee simple for burial purposes and that the granting clause cannot be cut down by the habendum clause, therefore the Cemetery Company had no right to impose the payment of $151 as a condition to the issuance of a permit for the burial of his wife, and payment of the $403 as a condition to permitting plaintiff, when the time comes, to be buried in the lot, and the condition requiring the payment of $3,878.95 to put the lot under perpetual care, etc., are wholly unwarranted; that since he has the fee simple title to the lot, he can alienate portions of it without the consent of defendant.

The statute incorporating the Bosehill Cemetery Company and the amendments thereto are in contemplation of the law a part of the deed and must be read into it. Section 6 of the act of 1859 expressly provides that lots may be sold for the “purpose of sepulture only, and shall be transferable only by the consent of the managers, and no lot holder shall permit interment in or upon any lot held by him, for a consideration.”. The deed of the Cemetery Company, executed in 1866 to Thompson and Holt expressly provided that the conveyance was made subject to the provisions and restrictions of the act of 1859 and the amendment of 1863, and also subject to the “conditions and limitations, and with the privileges and restrictions specified in the rules and regulations hereto annexed.” And the rules on the back of the deed specifically stated that any lot owner should not transfer or assign any lot or interest therein “without the consent in writing of the said company first had and endorsed upon such transfer or assignment. ’ ’ Plaintiff is not the owner of the lot in fee simple but has only an “easement for burial purposes as long as the ground is used for a cemetery,” and this easement passes to the grantee’s family at his death. Brown v. Hill, 284 Ill. 286; People v. Bloomington Cemetery Assoc., 353 Ill. 534. We think it obvious that plaintiff has no right to transfer parts of the lot in question without the consent of the Cemetery Company and he is not in a position to complain that the Cemetery Company required him to put the lot under perpetual care and to pay other charges as a condition to its assent.

But plaintiff further contends that all the conditions imposed by defendant, such as the payment for cutting the grass, perpetual care, etc., were unwarranted because the lot was already under perpetual care; that it had been under such care from the time it was purchased in 1866, and that this was the view of defendant because it made no claim until about 1926, a period of almost 60 years, that the lot owner was required to pay for the cutting of the grass; that in 1923 defendant first passed a resolution providing that the expense for perpetual care, cutting and watering the grass, etc., should be done at the owner’s expense and that snch expense “must be settled before the lot can be used for burial.” We think plaintiff’s contention, except his right to sell portions of the lot without the consent of the defendant, must be sustained. “After one has purchased a lot in a cemetery the managers have no power to abridge his right to sepulture by any unreasonable limitation." People v. Bloomington Cemetery Association, 353 Ill. 534.

The Cemetery Company (a quasi public corporation, Rosehill Cemetery Company v. Hopkinson, 114 Ill. 209) received its charter in 1859; “it was organized and its charter obtained for the primary purpose of devoting these lands to cemetery purposes, and of selling them out in burial lots, for profit.” Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 Ill. 301. It was not until 1901 or 1902 that the company required a purchaser of a lot to arrange for perpetual care at the time of purchase.

In 1863, which was but a few years after the cemetery was chartered by the State, it proposed an amendment to its charter to the State legislature in which it was stated that the lot holders in the Cemetery Company had become fearful that after the lots were sold they might be neglected “and left without care” and therefore the legislature amended the charter by permitting the Cemetery Company to reserve 10 per cent of the moneys received from the sale of lots for “preserving, maintaining, and ornamenting the grounds, lots, walks, shrubbery, memorials, boundaries, structures,” etc. And after the amendment of the charter in 1863, the 10th part of the proceeds of the sale of lots was reserved for “preserving, maintaining and ornamenting of grounds, lots, walks, shrubbery, memorials, boundaries, etc. ’ ’ The lot in question was not sold until after the amendment of 1863. Thompson, the purchaser, paid $600 for it, and we think that defendant was required under its charter to cut the grass at its own expense and could not require the payment of this expense by plaintiff in the instant case. We therefore hold that plaintiff is entitled to the return of his $151 and that defendant be perpetually enjoined from charging or attempting to charge plaintiff with the cost of cutting the grass or taking care of the lot, but that he can not transfer parts of the lot without the consent of defendant company.

The decree of the circuit court of Cook county is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions to enter a decree in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion.

Affirmed in part reversed in part and remanded with directions.

Hatchett, J., concurs.

Mr. Justice HcSurely

dissenting: I dissent from that part of the opinion which holds that the Cemetery Company is obligated by the charter amendment of 1863 to cut the grass on the lot in question free of charge. I read this amendment as providing means for the care of the grounds and things mentioned in the amendment — “belonging to said corporation” — and not to provide for the care of individual lots thereafter sold. This must have been the view of Thompson and Holt, the original grantees, who, by the deed to them in 1866, accepted a provision therein that if any lot “shall, by the neglect of proprietor thereof, become unsightly,” the officers of the Cemetery Company had the right to put the lot in proper order “and make a reasonable charge for the same.” Manifestly, this would include cutting the grass.

To the argument that the Cemetery Company has by its actions construed this amendment as imposing on it the obligation of caring for individual lots sold, it is sufficient to say that the auditor of the Cemetery Company testified that no part of the income from this trust fund, created by the amendment, was used on a single lot but all was used to keep up the “ornamental grounds. ’ ’


author: Mr. Justice Matghett

text:
    City of Chicago, Appellee, v. The Chicago River and Indiana Railroad Company, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,823.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.

      Sidney C. Murray and Harold E. Christensen, both of Chicago, for appellant.
    Barnet IIodes, Corporation Counsel, for appellee; Joseph F. Grossman, First Assistant Corporation Counsel, and Alexander J. Besa, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matghett

delivered the opinion of the court.

The railroad company appeals from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $2,000 entered upon the finding of the court. The action was based upon the alleged obligation of the defendant to pay compensation at the rate of $400 a year for license granted under an ordinance of January 11, 1922, by which defendant was permitted to construct, maintain and operate railroad switch tracks at grade across West 47th. street and West 43rd street, at points described in the ordinance. Section 2 of the ordinance provided that the authority granted should cease in 20 years, should at all times be subject to modification, amendment or repeal without consent of the grantee, and that: “In the event of the termination of the authority or privileges hereby granted -by the repeal of this ordinance, the grantee by the filing of the written acceptance hereinafter mentioned, shall be understood as consenting that the City shall retain all money it shall have previously received from said grantee under the provisions of this ordinance, said money to be considered and treated as compensation for the authority, permission and privileges enjoyed from the date of the passage of this ordinance until such repeal.” Section 2 also provided that by the filing of the written acceptance of the ordinance, “Said grantee hereby agrees to elevate at its own expense and without any expense, damage or liability to the City of Chicago of any kind whatsoever, the switch tracks herein authorized, upon notice so to do from the Commissioner of Public'Works, or failing so to do, shall within sixty (60) days after being notified to that effect by the Commissioner of Public Works, remove the switch tracks herein referred to. Said switch tracks, if elevated, shall be elevated under the direction and supervision and to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Public Works, and the construction and material used in the elevation of said switch tracks shall be of the same character as that used in the construction of the main tracks with which said tracks connect.”

Other provisions of the ordinance were that during its life the grantee should keep the portion of the streets occupied by the switch tracks in good condition and repair and safe for public travel, to the satisfaction and approval of the commissioner of public works; that “At the termination of the rights and privileges herein granted, by expiration of time or otherwise, the said grantee shall forthwith restore such portion of said streets occupied by said switch tracks to a condition safe for public travel, similar to the remaining portion of said streets in the same block, to the satisfaction and approval of the Commissioner of Public Works.”

If the grantee failed so to do the city might cause the work to be done, charging the costs and expenses to the grantee.

Other provisions were that the operation and maintenance of the switch tracks should be subject to all existing ordinances of the city then in force or which might thereafter be in force relating to the use and operation of the switch tracks and railroad tracks.

The provision for the payment of compensation was contained in section 5 of the ordinance, which provided that the grantee agreed to pay as compensation “for said switch tracks” the sum of $400 per annum, payable annually in advance; that if default was made the mayor might immediately revoke the privileges granted, or the ordinance be repealed by the city council.

Section 6 provided that the grantee should execute a bond in the sum of $10,000 before doing any work by virtue of the authority granted.

Section 7 provided the ordinance should take effect from and after its passage provided that a written acceptance should be filed with the city clerk within 60 days.

The evidence shows without contradiction that pursuant to the terms of this and other ordinances of the city and pursuant to the order and directions of the commissioner of public works, the tracks of the defendant railroad at 43rd and 47th streets were elevated prior to January, 1929, and that prior to that time these switch tracks (pursuant to such ordinances and directions) were removed from the streets and similar switch tracks placed upon the elevated right-.of-way of the roads. The evidence also shows that all compensation which became due under the ordinance up to that time was paid in full by the railroad company.

It is the contention of defendant that upon the removal of these switch tracks from the surface of the street and the reconstruction of the same upon the elevated roadbed of the railway, the obligation of defendant to pay compensation under the terms of this ordinance ceased, although the 20 years declared to be the life of the ordinance had not expired. It was also contended that by a later amendment to a prior ordinance by which defendant was required to elevate its tracks at the streets named, this ordinance of January 11, 1922, in so far as it required the payment of compensation, was repealed, and that after the elevation of the tracks that obligation wholly ceased.

The determination of either question requires a consideration of the three ordinances in evidence dealing with the subject matter of the elevation of these tracks. The ordinances in question were all special as distinguished from general ordinances. The first was passed April 4, 1912, its provisions being applicable not only to defendant but to other railroads having tracks in the same vicinity. This ordinance required that the railroad should elevate its roadbed and tracks at the places indicated therein, prescribing the manner of elevation and the extent thereof specifically. Paragraph 7 of the ordinance of April 4, 1912, provided that nothing in the ordinance should prevent the different railroad companies from changing the location of their tracks by mutual agreement as they might deem necessary, that no change of location should be made that would prevent the operation of the grade tracks as contemplated in the ordinance; that the companies were authorized and permitted to construct elevated embankments upon their rights-of-way and to maintain and operate thereon such number of railroad tracks as they might deem necessary or convenient for the transaction of their business, and to carry such additional tracks over all intervening streets, avenues and alleys in the same manner as therein provided for existing tracks. Section 4 provided that subways should be constructed beneath certain streets. Section 12 that the companies should begin the actual work of construction not later than January, 1913, and diligently prosecute and complete the same by December 31, 1918, unless prevented by certain causes enumerated. The ordinance was to take effect from and after its passage. All ordinances and parts of ordinances in conflict with its provisions were repealed.

The evidence shows affirmatively that nothing whatever was done by the railroad companies in the way of the elevation of their tracks, as provided by this ordinance, prior to 1926. In the meantime, however, the ordinance of January 11, 1922, as already described, had been enacted and accepted by defendant. In 1926 the council passed an amendment to the ordinance of April 4, 1912, in particular amending paragraph 1 of section 12 to provide that the railway companies should diligently prosecute the work of construction to completion and complete the elevation of their tracks by December 31, 1927, and that in the event defendant, Chicago River and Indiana R. Co., with other railroads named, should agree among themselves to separate the grades of their respective tracks at places named therein, they were “permitted to make such alterations in their structures and embankments and tracks on their right of way as may be necessary to permit the completion of all of the terms of this ordinance; all such changes and alterations to be subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Public Works of the City of Chicago, so far as they may affect any public streets or alleys.” The amendment also repealed all ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict with the provisions of this ordinance as amended.

In 1926 defendant and other railroads began the work of elevating their tracks as required by these ordinances. They finished that work in 1929, separating the grades of a number of railroads over several streets which included 43rd and 47th streets. All this work was done under the terms and provisions of the ordinance of April 4, 1912, as amended by the amendment thereto in 1926. An examination of all the ordinances dealing with this matter discloses that there was no provision in any one of them whereby compensation was to be paid for laying any tracks or switch tracks on the right-of-way of defendant, when the same were elevated. Pursuant to the terms of these ordinances switch tracks laid at grade were removed and never replaced at grade in the street. Indeed, it can hardly be said that the same switch tracks were ever reconstructed on the elevation. Defendant in conforming with the requirements of these ordinances has expended altogether about $850,000. Was it the intention of the parties to the ordinance of January 11, 1922, that defendant should be required to pay compensation after the removal, by direction of the City and in conformity with the ordinance, of the switch tracks which the ordinance gave them the permission to construct and operate ? Keeping in mind the evident purpose to the accomplishment of which every provision of all these ordinances were directed, we think the answer to that question must be in the negative. While the ordinance provided that the permission and authority granted should cease and determine 20 years from the date of its passage, there are provisions in it indicating that it was within the contemplation of the parties that compensation should not necessarily be paid during all that time. This is indicated by the fact that the entire amount to be paid is separated into equal annual instalments, thus indicating that payments might cease with any instalment. Section 2 of the ordinance indicates it was the intention of the parties that the privileges granted and the payment of compensation therefor should be concurrent and correlative. It provides: “In the event of the termination of the authority or privileges hereby granted by the repeal of this ordinance, the grantee by the filing of the written acceptance hereinafter mentioned, shall be understood as consenting that the City shall retain all money it shall have previously received from said grantee under the provisions of this ordinance, said money to be considered and treated as compensation for the authority, permission and privileges enjoyed from the date of the passage of this ordinance until such repeal.”

When, by the provisions of this and other ordinances, the privilege of maintaining switch tracks at grade ceased and determined, the purpose of the ordinance had been accomplished. The consideration upon which the compensation was based failed and the obligation to pay the compensation ceased. When the right to occupy the surface of the street was ended the obligation to pay compensation for the occupation also ceased and determined.

The law applicable is stated in 37 Corpus Juris, p. 288, sec. 189:

“A license may be terminated by revocation by the licensor; by the death of either party; by the accomplishment of its purpose; by the destruction of the subject matter; by a taking of the premises under the law of eminent domain; by a sale of the premises under an execution against the licensor; by the licensor losing title by the continued adverse possession of another; by the expiration of the time fixed for the existence of the license; by abandonment or nonuser by the licensee. ’ ’

It is evident from all the evidence in this case that the purpose for which this license was issued ended with the elevation of the railroad tracks; that when, under the provisions of this and other ordinances and by direction of the commissioner of public works of the city, the switch tracks were removed from the space theretofore occupied by them, the obligation to pay compensation for the right or license which had been taken away from the defendant ceased. It is not, as we see it, a question of whether the license was expressly revoked by the enactment of another ordinance. The City, under the terms of this ordinance, might repeal it or amend or modify it without the consent of the defendant railroad company. Every ordinance in evidence indicates the wish of the City and its purpose to get these tracks out of the street and off the street as soon as possible. We hold that when that was accomplished and the switch tracks were removed the right of the City to collect compensation under the ordinance ceased. We hold this was the intention of the City and the railroad company as disclosed by the terms of these ordinances. We think, too, that the ordinance of April 4, 1912, as amended in 1926, eovered the whole subject matter and was inconsistent with the payment of compensation after the removal of the switch tracks. Booth v. Town of Carthage, 67 Ill. 102. The effect of that amendment was to repeal, if not expressly at least by implication, section 5 of the ordinance of January 11, 1922, requiring the payment of compensation. Harrison v. People, 195 Ill. 466; Cook & Rathborne Co. v. Sanitary District, 177 Ill. 599; People ex rel. Williams v. City of Chicago, 209 Ill. App. 142. At any rate it is altogether contrary to reason that after taking away the license upon which the payment of compensation was based, plaintiff should continue to collect compensation.

The judgment is reversed.

Beversed.

O’Connor, P. J., and McSurely, J., concur.


author: Mr. Justice Matchett

text:
    Ford Motor Company, Appellee, v. National Bond and Investment Company, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,833.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 25, 1938.
    John W. Creekmur, Nolan H. Tepper, Milton Sílbelo and Leonard M. Cohen, all of Chicago, for appellant.
    Shannon, Morrill & Johnson, of Chicago, for appellee ; Carl M. Johnson, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.

In an action by Ford against the investment company for the conversion of nine automobiles and upon trial by the court there was a finding for plaintiff with judgment. There is practically no dispute as to the facts. The automobiles were delivered to Cooper Motor Sales, Inc., a dealer in Chicago with its principal place of business at 5230 Milwaukee avenue, under the terms of a sales agreement in writing made between Ford and Cooper on January 18, 1935. Pursuant to this agreement, plaintiff, on January 6, 7 and 8, 1936, through a transport company of Chicago, delivered these automobiles to Cooper. Cooper gave to the transport company checks to the amount of the purchase price and the transport company delivered these checks to the plaintiff’s cashier. The checks were drawn on the National Security Bank of Chicago and were payable to plaintiff; were deposited by plaintiff in the Drovers National Bank at Chicago for collection and returned by that bank “ N. S. F. ” On January 11, 1936, before the checks were returned, the defendant investment company claiming under trust receipts issued to it by Cooper took these automobiles from the possession of Cooper Motor Sales, Inc. Plaintiff: has not been paid for the automobiles. Plaintiff demanded possession from defendant and upon its refusal brought this suit and obtained judgment for the value of the automobiles, $4,660.68.

The question for decision is whether under the terms of the contract of January 18, 1935, between Ford and Cooper, plaintiff has title and right to possession of the automobiles or whether the investment company, by virtue of the trust receipts issued to it as “entruster” by Cooper “trustee” pursuant to the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, eh. 121%, pp. 2840 — 44; Smith-Hurd Ill. Anno. Stats., ch. 121%, §§ 166-187 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 135.17(1)-135.17(22)] and by taking possession thereunder has the title and right to possession. The contract of January 18, 1935, between Ford and Cooper is a quite lengthy printed document consisting of 11 paragraphs in 133 lines. The agreement recites it was made at Dearborn in the State of Michigan between Ford Motor Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at Dearborn, Michigan, and Cooper Motor Sales, Inc., a corporation of the State of Illinois, therein described as the “dealer.” The Ford Motor Company is described as the “company.” Paragraph 1 provides:

“Company agrees to sell and Dealer agrees to purchase, for resale for use within the boundaries of the United States of America, Ford automobiles, trucks, . . . upon the terms, conditions and provisions hereinafter specifically set forth and subject to the right reserved by Company to sell to other Dealers and direct to retail purchasers in any part of the United States without obligation for any commission to Dealer on any such sale. ’ ’ Paragraph 2 provides:

“Company will sell its products to Dealer f. o. b. Detroit, Michigan, at such net list price, or at such discounts from published list prices as are from time to time fixed by the Company. Payment by Dealer is to be- in cash before delivery, or by paying sight draft attached to bill of lading, including exchange. Receipt from Dealer or Dealer’s bank of any check, draft or other paper shall not be held to constitute payment, and if Company is unable to obtain IT. S. currency on any such check, draft or other paper for any reason whatever within 30 days after receipt of same, Dealer shall reimburse Company, upon request, in full, including any expenses sustained by Company in endeavoring to realize on such paper. ’ ’ Paragraph 6 provides:

“Title to all, Company products until actually paid for by Dealer shall be and remain in Company; but regardless of title remaining in Company or having-passed to Dealer all shipments shall be at Dealer’s risk from the time of delivery to carrier at place of shipment. ’ ’

The trust receipts under which defendant claims were issued by the dealer Cooper under an arrangement whereby defendant financed or “floor-planned” Cooper’s purchase. The evidence shows that plaintiff knew that defendant was financing these purchases. The evidence also shows that defendant knew or might easily have known of the terms of the contract between plaintiff and the dealer Cooper with reference to the title remaining in plaintiff until actual payment was made. The trust receipts under which defendant claims were made pursuant to a statement of trust receipt financing- executed by the dealer Cooper as trustee and by the defendant as entruster, and filed with the Secretary of State of Illinois on August 8, 1935, as required by the uniform trust receipts statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, ch. 121%, W166-187, pp. 2840-44 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 135.17(1)-135.17(22)].

It is contended by the defendant in the first place that under the terms of the agreement of January 18, 1935, the sales made by plaintiff to Cooper were sales on credit which vested title in the dealer and not, as plaintiff contends, a conditional sales agreement by which title was retained in plaintiff. Defendant says (as against it) plaintiff therefore had neither title nor right to possession on the date of the alleged conversion. Defendant argues this is true because of the language of the agreement. It points out that the first paragraph of the agreement specifically states that the goods are delivered “for resale.” So also it is said the second paragraph provides that if Ford, the vendor, is unable to obtain United States currency on the check, draft or other paper given by the dealer vendee within 30 days after receipt of same the dealer will reimburse the Ford Company upon request. These provisions, say defendant, are inconsistent with any construction of the contract holding a sale thereunder to be conditional and inconsistent with an intention that the title to the goods sold should remain in the vendor.

We do not so construe the agreement. The provision that the goods are transferred “for resale” fairly construed in the light of other provisions of the agreement we think must be held to refer to a resale which is to be made after and not before the vendee shall have paid for the goods ordered by him. The provision that the vendee should within 30 days reimburse the vendor for any check, etc., on which plaintiff is unable to realize cash does not, fairly construed, mean that plaintiff promises to give the dealer an extension of credit for that period of time but only that the plaintiff might hold the paper for 30 days if he elects so to do. We do not construe it to be an agreement on the part of the seller to give credit to the dealer in view of the provisions which clearly express the intention of the parties that the dealer vendee is to pay cash or its, equivalent on or before delivery, and that payment and delivery are to be concurrent.

Defendant argues that the conduct of the parties in this particular transaction was such as to indicate that an absolute sale was intended. "It is said this must be inferred from the fact that Cooper was permitted to pay by check instead of cash or by draft drawn as specifically provided in the agreement. It is further urged that this must be inferred from the fact that plaintiff, as defendant says, permitted the automobiles to be placed in Cooper’s showrooms for the purpose of selling them. We think these inferences are not justified. The checks were mere credit instruments used for the purpose of transferring cash from the dealer to the seller. There is no evidence tending to show that plaintiff affirmatively assented to the placing of these automobiles in the showroom of the dealer prior to the payment therefor. Defendant also points out that plaintiff, by its agreement, did not reserve to the plaintiff the right to repossess itself of the automobiles in case of nonpayment. Such express reservation was not necessary. The right to repossess at the option of plaintiff followed immediately upon the dishonor of the checks.

The defendant, for the purpose of showing acts of the plaintiff inconsistent with the reservation of the title, introduced in evidence the books of account of the plaintiff. These show that when a car ordered by a dealer was ready for delivery an invoice was made and posted to a summary sheet termed the “Draft Register. ’ ’ This sheet showed the name of the dealer, the amount of the invoice, a date stamp opposite each invoice number and a distribution of the invoice price to various accounts. When a dealer’s check in payment for a car was received by plaintiff from the transport company the date was stamped on the sheet opposite the dealer’s name and invoice number. This stamping was called “dead-checking,” and the “dead-checking” indicated that plaintiff had received some form of payment for the automobile. The books of plaintiff also showed that plaintiff kept a ledger account in the name of the dealer, which account showed sales of automobile parts on credit and debits for “N. S. F.” checks given by the dealer in payment for automobiles. These books showed that when informed by its bank that Cooper’s checks had been returned marked “N. S. F.” the plaintiff debited the amount of these checks against Cooper’s account. In making entries on account, a balance was struck after each debit and credit entry, etc. The defendant contends that the fact that these books of account were kept in this way shows clearly that the sales made by plaintiff to the dealer were sales on credit. The evidence shows that there was an arrangement between Cooper and plaintiff entirely independent of the written agreement (covering parts only) whereby a monthly credit of $500 was extended payable on the 10th of each month, but at no time was there any extension of credit to the dealer on account of automobiles purchased by him. The method of bookkeeping by which the account was kept was not important or determinative. The relationship between the parties was determined so far as the automobiles were concerned by the written contract which we have held showed the intention of the manufacturer and the dealer that payment should be either concurrent -with or precede delivery, and that until such payment was made in full the title should remain with plaintiff.

The effect of all these provisions of the contract, defendant says, was that plaintiff attempted to place itself in a dominant position so that it could elect between an absolute sale vesting title in the dealer and a conditional sale reserving title in itself, as defendant says, attempting to 1 ‘straddle the fence.” It is urged that the courts have held that legal effect will not be given to a clause reserving title where other provisions of the instrument evince an intention to make an absolute sale. Defendant cites In re Harrington, 212 Fed. 542; Flanders Motor Co. v. Reed, 220 Fed. 642; In re King Motor Co., 31 Am. Bankr. Rep. 172; Frick Co., Inc. v. Cox, 101 Ind. App. 402, 199 N. E. 462; Martin v. Michigan Trust Co., 23 F. (2d) 609 (6 C. C. A. 1928); Scott County Milling Co. v. Grayson, 88 F. (2d) 190 (5 C. C. A. 1937) and Riedlinger v. Mack Machine Co., Inc., 117 N. J. Eq. 334, 175 Atl. 790. Defendant does not cite any decision of any Illinois court, and the cases cited are, we hold, clearly distinguishable on the facts from this case in that in each instance the property sold was delivered under a contract by which the payment to be made to .the vendor was to be deferred until after the resale of the property. Here it appears the intention was that delivery and payment should be concurrent. In other words, in the cases cited the property was delivered on credit under an open account, while here the contract indicates the intention of the parties that payment should precede or be concurrent with delivery, and that until such payment was made the title to the property was not to pass to the vendee.

While the law of this State was at one time otherwise, section 20 of the Uniform Sales Act, enacted in 1915 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, ch. 121% [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 121.24]) expressly legalizes such a contract. It provides:

“Where there is a contract to sell specific goods, or where goods are subsequently appropriated to the contract, the seller may by the terms of the contract or appropriation, reserve the right of possession of property in the goods until certain conditions have been fulfilled. The right of possession or property may be thus reserved notwithstanding the delivery of the goods to the buyer. ’ ’

In Horwitz v. Leibowitz, 274 Ill. App. 196, this court said: “It seems to be settled by the weight of authority that ‘where by the written contract of the parties it is expressly provided that the title to the property shall remain in the vendor until the purchase price is fully paid, and there is no reservation of a lien, the transaction is a conditional sale, and not a mortgage. ’ (6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, — 2d Ed. — p. 446.) ”

Many other cases decided in this and the Supreme Court of the State are to the same effect. (Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Piasa Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 276 Ill. App. 389; Leopold v. Universal Credit Co., 290 Ill. App. 305; Conner v. Borland-Grannis Co., 294 Ill. 58; Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432; National Bank of Republic v. Wells-Jackson Corp., 358 Ill. 356.) These cases show that (whatever the law of this State may have been in the past) it is now the rule that generally speaking a vendor can not convey a better title than he has. Defendant also argues that plaintiff was estopped because the checks given by Cooper were not presented in a reasonable time. There is no proof, as a matter of fact, that the checks were not presented within a reasonable time. Hence, that defense cannot prevail.

Again, however, defendant contends that the Sales Agreement between Ford and Cooper specifically provides that it is a Michigan agreement and shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Michigan. Defendant says (citing a number of cases) that under the Michigan law this sales agreement is held to be a chattel mortgage. Defendant argues that being a chattel mortgage it is unenforceable against defendant because it is not recorded either in Michigan or Illinois. By statute this court takes judicial notice of “all laws of a public nature enacted by any State or territory of the United States. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, ch. 51, if 48A, p. 1633 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 107.122]; Christensen v. Blinstrup, 284 Ill. App. 163; In re Estate of DuMont, 293 Ill. App. 406.) We take judicial notice of the statutes of Michigan. Defendant concedes that under the Michigan law it was not necessary to record this sales agreement. The argument of defendant seems to be that since by Michigan law the agreement was a chattel mortgage, and since by the Illinois law an instrument declared by Illinois law to be a chattel mortgage must be recorded, therefore it was necessary to record this Michigan agreement in Illinois. We cannot accede to this view. Whether a conditional sales contract is effective to enable the vendor to retain title is determined by the law of the State where the chattel is at the time of the sale (Restatement, Conflict of Laws, sec. 272) and if by the terms of the agreement for a conditional sale the chattel is to be delivered by the vendor to the vendee in another State before the transaction.is complete the law of the State where the transaction is completed by delivery to the vendee and not that of the State where the transaction was initiated by the contract determines whether or not the vendor retains title to the chattel. These are the general rules. (See Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 272, fifí A, B, and C.) In this case the contract specifically provides that the law of Michigan shall be applicable. Under Michigan law, although the instrument is held to be a chattel mortgage, recording is not necessary. On the other hand, if we regard the law of Illinois as applicable the agreement is one for a conditional sale which by the law of Illinois need not be recorded. Therefore, whether we regard the law of Michigan or of Illinois as applicable, and whether we regard the agreement as a chattel mortgage in Michigan or a conditional sales agreement in Illinois, it was unnecessary that the agreement be recorded. There is no statute in Illinois requiring an instrument to be recorded in this State solely because under Michigan law it would be denominated a chattel mortgage. The character of the instrument rather than the name given it would seem to be determinative. The question as to what instruments are required by the law of Illinois to be filed for record is a matter determined by the public policy of Illinois as expressed in its statutes. We hold it was unnecessary to record this agreement either in Michigan or in Illinois.

The general rule in Illinois is that the dealer cannot convey to a buyer a better title than it possessed. (Drain v. LaGrange State Bank, 303 Ill. 330; Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432.) While the specific question has not been decided by the courts of this State hitherto, we hold this rule has not been changed by the enactment of the later Trust Receipts Act. A later act is usually construed in such manner as not to destroy an existing property right. Thus, in Standard Motors Securities Corp. v. Yates Co., 257 Ill. App. 394, it was held that a statute which gave to persons repairing automobiles a lien for the cost of such repairs could not prevail against the lien of a chattel mortgage which was a prior lien under a prior statute. As we have seen, the rule that a conditional sale is valid although possession is given to the vendee in the absence of an estoppel is not contrary to the public policy of this State.

Again, the defendant contends that if the sales agreement is construed to be a conditional sales contract it is unenforceable by reason of section 23 of the Uniform Sales Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, ch. 121%, § 23 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 121.27]). That section provides:

“ (1) Subject to the provisions of this act, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.”

Defendant argues that by permitting the automobiles to be placed in the salesroom of a known retail dealer for the purpose of resale, plaintiff is precluded from asserting its ownership against the defendant under the terms of this statute. The defendant, therefore, says that as matter of law plaintiff could not recover and cites Illinois Bond & Investment Co. v. Gardner, 249 Ill. App. 337, and Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432. The defendant says that in this last case the Supreme Court of Illinois distinguished two kinds of conditional sales contracts — one in which possession of the vendee is accompanied by indicia of ownership or the right to sell; the other in which goods are sold conditionally to the vendee for his own use or consumption; that a purchaser from the conditional vendee is vested with absolute ownership if the vendee had the power to resell or if the vendee was vested with indicia of ownership by the vendor. There is no doubt that under this section of the Sales Act a plaintiff holding a conditional title may be estopped from asserting his ownership, but we think on the undisputed evidence in this case the plaintiff did not make any representation or do any act on which such an estoppel might be based. Defendant does not stand in the position of a purchaser who buys an automobile offered for sale in a public market in good faith. Defendant is not a “buyer in the ordinary course of trade,” as defined by the Uniform Receipts Act. Defendant took possession of the automobiles as the evidence tends to show, without permission of the dealer whose financial partner, without the dealer’s knowledge, notified defendant that he was withdrawing his support from the dealer’s business, and thereupon defendant, without giving the dealer any notice, immediately moved everything out of his place of business without the assent of the dealer. A transaction of that sort by which an entire stock of automobiles was removed could hardly be said to have been a purchase in good faith and in the usual course of business. There is no basis for an estoppel here under section 23 of the Sales Act; nor, we hold, is there any basis for estoppel (as defendant argues) because of the failure of plaintiff to file a reply to defendant’s answer. As a matter of fact, the evidence for and against was submitted and the issue tried without objection. Thus defendant waived a replication. (Scholz, v. Com’rs of Lincoln Park, 264 Ill. App. 409; Central Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Schild, 284 Ill. App. 267.)

Defendant also contends that there was no competent evidence as to damages. The answer of defendant admits that defendant took possession of these automobiles in the hands of the dealer on January 11, 1936, and that they had been delivered by plaintiff to the dealer on January 7, 8 and 9, 1936. They were, therefore, new automobiles. The branch manager testified that he had been such manager for 15 years and in the employ of the plaintiff for 25 years; that he knew the wholesale value of the automobiles; that his opinion was based on the fact that he had sold thousands of similar automobiles to dealers for the price which he testified was the value of these. He knew the wholesale market value, stated what it was, and the finding of the court was based upon that testimony. In the absence of evidence to the contrary we think this was sufficient.

Defendant says that in event the judgment of the trial court is affirmed we should overrule our former opinions in Illinois Bond & Investment Co. v. Gardner, 249 Ill. App. 337; National Bond & Investment Co. v. Shirra, 255 Ill. App. 415, and Gordon Motor Finance Co. v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 261 Ill App. 536. Each and all of these are cases in which we applied the law of estoppel under section 23 of the Uniform Sales Act in conformity with rules therein stated. Not one of these cases is inconsistent with the views herein expressed. These same rules have been applied in the more recent case of Leopold v. Universal Credit Co., 290 Ill. App. 305. The Uniform Trusts Receipts Act does not and apparently was not intended to change the existing law of the State with reference to conditional sales. Defendant has placed in the record a copy of the Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings for 1933, which contains a clear statement of the things which the Uniform Trust Receipts Act was to accomplish. Under the title of “What the Uniform Trust Receipts Act Does, ’ ’ paragraph 3, page 249, it is stated that the purpose of the act is always “expressly limited.” “Hence, the act leaves the existing law of chattel mortgages and conditional sales unchanged, except in peculiar cases which need special coverage.” Prof. Bogart analyzing the act in University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 3, p. 29, says:

‘ ‘ The act is intended to be without effect on the preexisting law of conditional sales and chattel mortgages, nor may the lender under the act be a consignor of goods who places them with a consignee for sale as agent. The law of consignor and consignee is not intended to be affected by the act.”

That the act is a beneficent one we do not doubt, but its provisions cannot avail defendant on this record. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

O’Connor, P. J., and McSurely, J., concur.


text:
    First District.
    Northern Trust Company et al., appellees, v. Marguerite Cook et al., defendants. Roy D. Keehn, appellant.
    Gen. No. 38,772.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1938.
    W. M. Keeley, for appellant. Judah, Reiehmann, Trumbull, Cox & Stern, for appellees; Arthur M. Cox and Randolph Thornton, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice O'Connor

text:
    Reliable Manufacturing Company, appellee, v. Vaughan Novelty Manufacturing Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,703.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1938.
    Rehearing denied March 14, 1938.
    Frederick C. Jonas and J. J. Cooke, for appellant; Edgar A. Jonas, of counsel. Arthur J. Goldberg and Edward A. Gorenstein, for appellee; Arthur J. Goldberg, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O'Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice MeSurely

text:
    John J. Van Der AA, appellant, v. Gerrit Eenigenburg and Pietertje Eenigenburg, appellees.
    Gen. No. 39,816.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1938.
    Bradburn & Dammam, for appellant. Markman, Donovan & Sullivan, for appellees; John A. O’Neil, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice McSurely

text:
    Sylvia Vrba, appellee, v. Emil Venclik and Anna Venclik, appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,845.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1938.
    Joseph J. Kroupa, for appellants. Daniel L. Madden, for ajipellee; Aaron R. Eppstein, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Eli Frankel, appellee, v. Goldie Koslow Frankel, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,866.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1938.
    Morris A. Haft, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Bertha Arlt, conservatrix of estate of Emil Arlt, insane, appellee, v. Chicago Motor Coach Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,159.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1938.
    Rehearing denied March 14, 1938.
    Barrett, Barrett, Costello & Barrett, for appellant; Chester D. Kern, of counsel. Finn & Miller, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Mateliett

text:
    Bertha Zister, administratrix of estate of Anthony M. Zister, deceased, appellee, v. William E. Pollack et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,631.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1938.
    John A. Bloomingston, for appellants. Robert E. Crowe, Gerald R. Gorman and V. Russell Donaghy, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Mateliett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frances Kral, appellee, v. Antonie Kulicek, appellant. John O. Sykora and Joseph Dort, appellees.
    Gen. No. 39,675.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1938.
    Rehearing denied March 14, 1938.
    Harry J. G-uyon and John T. Murray, for appellant. Kerner, Jaros & Tittle, for appellee Joseph Dort; Julius H. Selinger, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James C. Kelsey, appellee, v. Florraine W. Kelsey, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,773.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1938.
    Elliodor M. Libonati, for appellant; Abraham Miller, of counsel. Teed, Kammermann & Johnson, for appellee; Hugh E. Johnson, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    I. Sidney Neiman, appellee, v. Templeton, Kenly and Company, Ltd. et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,827.
    Opinion filed February 28, 1938.
    Charles E. Loy, for appellants. Jacobson, Merrick, Nierman & Gilbert, for appellee; David Gilbert and Arthur Altsehul, of counsel.
   Per Curiam.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Friend

text:
    Julius A. Bisno, appellant, v. Benjamin J. Broxton, appellee.
    Gen. No. 39,565.
    Opinion filed March 11, 1938.
    Reuben G. Flacks and William L. Flacks, for appellant; Reuben S. Flacks, of counsel. Bernard W. Yinissky, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Friend

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    W. J. Pine, appellee, v. Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc., appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,574.
    Opinion filed March 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied March 30, 1938.
    Pomeroy & Colitz, for appellant; Paul F. Pomeroy and Patrick B. Prescott, Jr., of counsel. Young, Pares & Peterson, for appellee; Thomas J. Young, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Friend

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John Muschelewicz et al., appellees, v. James O. Koontz and Helen Koontz, appellants. Calumet City State Bank and William L. O’Connell, defendants.
    Gen. No. 39,593.
    Opinion filed March 11, 1938.
    James O. Koontz, pro se and for other appellant. John E. Pavlik, for appellees; John M. Bryant, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Friend

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Julius Pelkey, appellee, v. R. F. Eagle and Virginia Eagle, appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,875.
    Opinion filed March 11, 1938.
    Cassels, Potter, Bentley, for appellants; Ralph F. Potter and Kenneth B. Hawkins, of counsel. Norman Peters and Leo G. Hanna, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Friend

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Seanlan

text:
    Alice Byram Howard, individually and as executrix under last will and testament of Harold A. Howard, deceased, appellee, v. Mary Katherine Jones Ormonde, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,388.
    Opinion filed March 11, 1938.
    Denis E. Sullivan, Jr., for appellant. Anderson & Clarke, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    City National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, appellant, v. Rose Wainauskas, also known as Rosdijci Wainauskas, appellee.
    Gen. No. 39,399.
    Opinion filed March 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied March 30, 1938.
    L. Claude Dollahan, for appellant. Irene V. McCormick, for appellee; Nellie Mae Ñamara, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Lena Rodeghier, appellee, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,551.
    Opinion filed March 11, 1938.
    Hoyne, O’Connor & Rubinlcam, for ajDpellant; Nathaniel Rubinkam and William S. Allen, of counsel. Sissman & Sissman and Harold Epstein, for appellee; Peter Sissman, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Milton M. Maremont, appellee, v. Lawyers Mutual Benefit Association, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,817.
    Opinion filed March 11, 1938.
    Bennett & Colbaeh, for appellant. Rabens, Waldman & Perlman (George C. Rabens), for appellee; Preston Clark, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Sally Chain Stores, Inc. et al., appellees, v. Bernard Adlerblum and Bertha Adlerblum, appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,876.
    Opinion filed March 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied March 30, 1938.
    Krinsky, Levitan & Glassner, for appellants; Harry H. Krinsky and Moses Levitan, of counsel. Poppenhusen, Johnson, Thompson & Raymond, for appellee Sally Chain Stores, Inc.; Frederick Mayer, of counsel. Melnerney, Epstein & Arvey, for other appellees; Louis M. Mantynband, George L. Siegel and Leonard R. Hartenfeld of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Homer Puckett, appellee, v. American Life of Illinois, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,899.
    Opinion filed March 11, 1938.
    Musgrave, Oppenheim, Price & Ewins, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Seanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice John J. Sullivan

text:
    Isadore Cohen, appellee, v. Syd Fineman and Max Gerrick, appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,051.
    Opinion filed March 11, 1938.
    Delmar J. Hill and Hinshaw & Culbertson, for appellants; Oswell G. Treadway, of counsel. Irving G. Zazove and Wolf & Love, for appellee; Alexander Wolf and B. L. Poliak, of counsel. Bowe & Bailey, for appellee Melvin A. Hansen; Joseph A. Bailey and Henry H. Caldwell, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice John J. Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Hebei

text:
    Margaret Fendi, appellee, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,625.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 1, 1938.
    Hoyne, O’Connor & Rubinkam, for appellant; Nathaniel Bubinkam and William S. Allen, of counsel. Guy C. Guerine and Stebbins, McKinley & Price, for appellee; William McKinley and Paul E. Price, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Julius F. Smietanka, appellant, v. Rose Mikalauskas et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 39,659.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    George H. Kriete, for appellant. Alice Greenaere, for appellee May C. Hall. - Peden, Melaniphy, Byan & Andreas, for certain appellees. Ostrowski & Noel, for appellee Edward W. Ostrowski.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Dr. Louis E. Schmidt, appellee, v. Fred D. Michael, also known as Frederick Dalton and Frederick Dalton Michael, appellant. The Northern Trust Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 39,669.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 1, 1938.
    Hubbard, Baker & Bice, for appellant. Sumner C. Palmer, for appellee Dr. Louis E. Schmidt.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    South Side Window Frame Shop, Inc., appellee, v. L. D. Parker and Acme Sash and Door Company, appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,682.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    George A. Bosomburg, for appellants. C. J. Morgan, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Josephine Yasbec, appellee, v. A. A. Sprague and Britton I. Budd, receivers for Chicago Rapid Transit Company, defendants, and Albert A. Sprague, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,708.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Gardner, Foote, Morrow & Merrick, for appellant; Walter M. Fowler, of counsel. Royal W. Irwin, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Edward Johnson, appellee, v. Frank Vizgard, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,725.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Julius L. Kabaker, for appellant. Castle, Williams & McCarthy, for appellee; Howard R. Brintlinger, Robert F. Carey and Robert R. Hanley, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frances Ciesiolkiewicz, administratrix of estate of Matthew Ciesiolkiewicz, deceased, appellee, v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,735.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Hoyne, O'Connor & Rubinkam, for appellant; Nathaniel Rubinkam and William S. Allen, of counsel. Thaddeus C. Toudor, for appellee; Alee E. Weinrob and H. Smollar, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Hall

text:
    People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Martin Even, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 39,590.

      Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 1, 1938.
    Herbert M. Wetzel, for plaintiff in error; William J. Earley, of counsel. Thomas J. Oourtney, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, Melvin S. Rembe and Blair L. Varnes, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Walter Allen Stults, appellee, v. E. E. Stults Realty Co., appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,594.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Harry C. Moran and Reginald D. Osgoodby, for appellant; Charles W. Paltzer, of counsel. Jarvis & Treff, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Byron Goggin, administrator of estate of Louis D. Lee, appellee, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,619.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 1, 1938.
    Hoyne, O’Connor & Rubinkam, for appellant; Nathaniel Rubinkam and William S. Allen, of counsel. Samuel A. Rinella and Joseph Barbera, for appellee; Joseph Barbera, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Chicago Title and Trust Company, appellee, v. Harvey M. Anderson et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,629.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 1, 1938.
    Cohon & Goldstein, for appellants. Defrees, Buckingham, Jones & Hoffman, for appellee; Arthur 0. Graves, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Andrew Dolejs, appellee, v. Lietuva Building and Loan Association, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,643.

      Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Libby & Zipperman, for appellant. Alfred M. Looser, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Richard C. Mazer, appellee, v. Consumers Company and Clarence Anderson, appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,653.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Jones, Key & Chapman, for appellants. Ryan, Sinnott & Miller, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    General Insurance Agency, Inc., appellant, v. Ajax Motor Service, Inc., appellee.
    Gen. No. 39,683.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    William J. Popper, for appellant. Marcus J. Golden, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    L. L. Mosher, Jr. et al., appellants, v. Chicago Title and Trust Company and George A. Lee, appellees.
    Gen. No. 39,699.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Louis E. Levinson and Clarence W. Shaver, for appellants. George Gillette, Edmund J. Reynolds, M. G. Kaufman and James J. Kilgallon, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Hall

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Denis E. Sullivan

text:
    George R. Fisher for use of Kiniry, appellant, v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., appellee.
    Gen. No. 39,336.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.

      Miller, Gorham, Wales & Adams, for appellant; Herbert O. De Young, Charles F. White and Robert E. English, of counsel. Anson H. Brown, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Denis E. Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Benjamin Harris and Company, appellee, v. Western Smelting and Refining Company and Mitchell-Jackson, Inc., appellees. Appeal of Bekins Van and Storage Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,646.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Isaac K. Goodman, for appellant. A. J. Schanfarber and Sidney J. and Arthur Wolf, for certain appellee; Sidney J. Wolf, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Denis E. Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George N. Case, appellee, v. Green Oil Soap Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,665.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 1, 1938.
    Robert E. Cantwell, Jr., for appellant; Martin W. Grosse, of counsel. Mortimer A. Rothstein and Alexander Rothstein, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Denis E. Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mary Norton, appellant, v. Guy A. Richardson et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 39,677.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 1, 1938.
    Danaher & Garriott, for appellant; Clement D. Cody, of counsel. Frank L. Kriete, C. 0. Cunningham, Arthur J. Donovan, for appellees; John R. Guilliams, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Denis E. Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles F. Spindler, appellee, v. Robert G. McKay et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,741.
    Opinion filed March 16, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 1, 1938.
    Charles A. Phelps and Simon A. Zelden, for appellants. Nat M. Kahn, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Denis E. Sullivan

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ernest Kahn, appellee, v. Milton S. Plotke and Irene D. Plotke, appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,346.
    Opinion filed March 21, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 4, 1938.
    Irwin Grossman, for appellants. Aaron Soble, for appellee; Theodore D. Kahn and Max Chill, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Rose Kramer et al., appellees, v. Safeway Lines, Inc. and Illinois Safeway Lines, Inc., appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,769.
    Opinion filed March 21, 1938.
    Wetten, Pegler & Dale, for appellants. Lederer, Livingston, Kahn, Adler & Adsit, for appellees; Archie H. Siegel and Harry H. Kahn, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice 0 ’Connor

text:
    Benjamin F. J. Odell, appellant, v. Earle G. Wahlgren et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 39,820.
    Opinion filed March 21, 1938.
    Charles Hudson, for appellant. Sonnenschein, Berkson, Lautmann, Levinson & Morse, for appellee Earle G. Wahlgren; Henry L. Kohn, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice 0 ’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frank E. Merrill, appellee, v. Eunice M. Merrill, appellant. Foreman-State Trust & Sav. Bank and Charles H. Albers, receiver, co-defendants.
    Gen. No. 39,901.
    Opinion filed March 21, 1938.
    Foreman, Bluford, Krinsky ■& Schultz, for appellant; Victor Hedberg, Owen Rail and David C. Kenyon, of counsel. Harry A. Biossat and Edward J. Hess, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Armin F. Hillmer and Katie Sack, appellants, v. Robert J. Graf et al., appellees. Oscar Engelhard and J. S. Armitage, appellants, v. Robert J. Graf et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 39,916.
    Opinion filed March 21, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 4, 1938.
    Leonard & Leonard, Seyfarth & Atwood and Owens & Owens, for appellants; Gordon MeLeish Leonard and George Edward Leonard, of counsel. Thomas D. Nash and Michael J. Ahern, for appellee Robert J. Graf.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    In the matter of estate of Carrie Aumer, deceased. Elizabeth Steggers, appellant, v. Estate of Carrie Aumer, appellee.
    Gen. No. 39,961.
    Opinion filed March 21, 1938.
    George J. Dreiske and John A. Filpi, for appellant. Joseph D. O’Donnell, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice MeSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Matehett

text:
    Arnold A. Schwartz, appellee, v. George L. Babcock and Bankers Trust Company, appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,839.
    Opinion filed March 21, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 4, 1938.
    Packard, Barnes, MeCaughey & Schumacher, for certain appellant; Russel J. MeCaughey, of counsel. Pope & Ballard, for certain other appellant; Ferris E. Hurd and Herbert Pope, of counsel. Stewart Reed Brown, for appellee; K. B. Czarneeki, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Helen Witton, appellee, v. Edwin J. Nelson, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,850.
    Opinion filed March 21, 1938.
    Additional opinion filed April 4, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 4, 1938.
    Frisch & De Haan, for appellant; Samuel J. Nordorf, of counsel. Ditehburne & Lounsbury, for appellee; Harry S. Ditehburne and Nicholas J. Bohling, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Thomas G. Nichols, appellant, v. Foundation Desk Company, Inc., appellee.
    Gen. No. 39,861.
    Opinion filed March 21, 1938.
    Royal J. Schmidt and William N. Brady, for appellant. Whitman, Holton & Tews, for appellee; Charles R. Holton and Stuart C. Abbey, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Louise Thompson, appellee, v. Vernon Thompson, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,874.
    Opinion filed March 21, 1938.
    John P. Costello, for appellant. Irving S. Toplon, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Byron F. Verdung, appellee, v. Robert J. Dunham et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,912.
    Opinion filed March 21, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 4, 1938.
    Charles Center Case, for appellants; Martin G. Loeff, of counsel. Michael F. Ryan, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

text:
    Winifred Baker, appellee, v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,842.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 25, 1938.
    Hoyne, O’Connor & Rubinkam, for appellant; Nathaniel Rubinkam and William S. Allen, of counsel. Danaher & Garriott, for appellee; Melvin L. Griffith and I. R. Ross, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Raechel T. Kauders, appellant, v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, appellee.
    Gen. No. 39,847.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 25, 1938.
    Bowe & Bowe, for appellant; Augustine J. Bowe, of counsel. Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, for appellee; Miles G. Seeley, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frieda Gerard, appellant, v. Harry J. Guyon et al., appellees.
    Gen, No. 39,869.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 25, 1938.
    Baymond C. Sehnell, for appellant. John T. Murray and William J. Kafka, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Pocahontas Coal Sales Company, appellee, v. Quality Coal Sales Company et al. Quality Coal Sales Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,883.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Musgrave, Oppenheim, Price & Ewins, for appellant. Henry T. Martin and Bruce E. Brown, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    J. K. Bering Coal Mining Corporation, appellee, v. Quality Coal Sales Company et al. Quality Coal Sales Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 39,884.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Musgrave, Oppenheim, Price & Ewins, for appellant. Henry T. Martin and Bruce E. Brown, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frank Hruby, appellee, v. Anton Janura et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 39,926.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 25, 1938.
    William E. Oplatka, for appellants; Golan, Blumenthal & Golan, of counsel. Harry A. Eerins and John A. Cooke, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, appellee, v. Sol Rubin et al. Maurice R. Union, appellant.
    Gen. No. 40,074.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Max M. Grossman and Edward M. Keating, for appellant. Hoyne, O’Connor & Rubinkam and George Gillette, for appellee; Nathaniel Rubinkam, Norbert B. Tyrrell and William S. Allen, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Lileian C. Gardner et al., appellants, v. City of Chicago, appellee.
    Gen. No. 39,696.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Howard F. Bishop and Clinton Merrick, for appellants; Daniel S. Wentworth and Urion, Bishop & Sladkey, of counsel. Barnet Hodes, Corporation Counsel, for appellee; Alexander J. Resa, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    B. J. Dolan, plaintiff, v. Rubin Morensky et al., defendants. E. R. Burnett et al., appellants, v. Peter B. Carey et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 39,892.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 25, 1938.
    Earl V. Brown, for certain appellant. William C. Bauseh, for certain other appellants. Shulman, Shulman & Abrams and Rosenfeld & Bromberg, for apellees; Meyer Abrams, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matehett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Minnie Johnson, appellant, v. Dennis J. Finn, appellee.
    Gen. No. 39,979.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 25, 1938.
    John E. Erickson, for appellant. .Maurice A. Barancik, for appellee; Maurice A. Barancik and Bernard L. Goldstein, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    David Jetzinger, appellant, v. Louis Metcoff et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 39,994.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    John A. Brown, for appellant. Robert L. Huttner and Louis R. Connell, for appellees; Robert L. Huttner, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Per curiam.

text:
    B. J. Dolan, plaintiff, v. Jacob Dubov et al., defendants. E. R. Burnett et al., appellants, v. Peter B. Carey et al., appellees. B. J. Dolan, plaintiff, v. Samuel Firer et al., defendants. B. J. Dolan, plaintiff, v. Morris B. Scher et al., defendants. B. J. Dolan, plaintiff, v. Isidore Goldblatt et al., defendants. B. J. Dolan, plaintiff, v. James La Velle et al., defendants. B. J. Dolan, plaintiff, v. Harry Lieberman et al., defendants. B. J. Dolan, plaintiff, v. Jacob Rotter et al., defendants.
    Gen. No. 39,891.
    Gen. No. 39,893.
    Gen. No. 39,894.
    Gen. No. 39,895.
    Gen. No. 39,896.
    Gen. No. 39,897.
    Gen. No. 39,898.
    Opinion filed April 11, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 25, 1938.
    Earl V. Brown, for certain appellant. William C. Bausch, for certain other appellants. Shulman, Shulman & Abrams and Rosenfeld & Bromberg, for appellees; Meyer Abrams, of counsel.
   Per curiam.


author: Mr. Justice Huffman

text:
    Second District.
    A. W. Francke et al., appellants, v. Benjamin Eadie et al. William W. Eadie, executor of last will and testament of Benjamin Eadie, deceased, et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 9,243.
    Opinion filed February 15, 1938.
    Rehearing denied March 23, 1938.
    Walter E. Healy, for appellants. Burrell & Burrell and Nack & Nack, for certain appellee; David M. Burrell, of counsel. Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, for certain other appellee; Frederic Burn-ham and Carl Cohn, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Huffman

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Dove

text:
    H. H. Antrim, appellee, v. Walter C. Pfender, executor of last will and testament of Margaret Caldwell, deceased, appellant.
    Gen. No. 9,231.
    Opinion filed March 10, 1938.
    George F. Korf and John H. Page, for appellant. Osear E. Heard, Oscar E. Heard, Jr. and Robert L. Bracken, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dove

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    G. C. Wilson, appellant, v. Henry W. Person et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 9,239.
    Opinion filed March 10, 1938.
    James Berry, for appellant. Carl Solomonson, for appellee David Carlson Roofing Co.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dove

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Bertha Schafer et al., appellants, v. Lorette Robillard and Amos H. Robillard, appellees.
    Gen. No. 9,264.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1938.
    T. R. Johnston and Victor 1ST. Cardosi, for appellants. Robillard & Holland, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Dove

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Fulton

text:
    Third District.
    Alvin W. Ahrens, appellee, v. Caroline C. Lutz et al., appellees. Kline Brothers Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 9,092.
    Opinion filed January 17, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 5, 1938.
    Trapp & Trapp, for appellant. Fred I. Edgell, for certain appellee. Brown, Hay & Stephens and Edwin C. Mills, for certain other appellees; Paul W. Gordon, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Fulton

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Stone

text:
    Fourth District.
    Lena Wolf, appellant, v. Emil Hohlt et al., appellees.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1938.
    Thomas P. Moore and Turner, Holder & Ackermann, for appellant. Felsen & McMurdo, for appellees; L. H. Degnan, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Stone

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Murphy

text:
    L. V. Knepper and E. E. Cornwell, appellees, v. Security Insurance Company of New Haven, Conn., appellant.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1938.
    Rehearing denied April 15, 1938.
    Ward P. Holt and Samuel Levin, for appellant. Harry F. Johnson, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Murphy

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George Novacic and Louise Novacic, appellants, v. Clyde Allen, appellee.

      Opinion filed March 9, 1938.
    Beasley & Zulley, for appellants. Turner, Holder & Aekermann, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Murphy

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Elizabeth A. Holliday, appellee, v. James T. Holliday, appellant. James T. Holliday, appellant, v. Elizabeth A. Holliday, appellee.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1938.
    James °0. Miller, for appellant; R. H. Horner, of counsel. F. E. Merrills, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Murphy

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles Taylor, appellant, v. Jean Taylor, appellee.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1938.
    Meyer & Meyer, for appellant. No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Murphy

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    People of the State of Illinois for use of Harry D. Tindall, administrator of estate of Nathan C. File, deceased, appellee, v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Company of America, appellant.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1938.
    Rehearing denied March 27, 1938.
    Loyd M. Bradley, for appellant. Orwin H. Pugh, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Murphy

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ella Baxter, administratrix of estate of Bernard E. Morgan, deceased, appellant, v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, appellee.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1938.
    R. B. Hendricks and T. S. Morgan, for appellant. Kramer, Campbell, Costello & Wieehert, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Murphy

delivered the opinion of the court.