author: D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J.,

text:
    Monica McPEEK, et al. v. Melinda S. LOCKHART.
    Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section, at Knoxville.
    December 6, 2004 Session.
    March 24, 2005.
    Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court Oct. 3, 2005.

      Thomas C. Jessee, Johnson City, Tennessee, and Thomas Dossett, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellants, Monica McPeek and Eldridge McPeek.
    Leslie T. Ridings, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, Melinda S. Lockhart.
   OPINION

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court,

in which CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

Monica McPeek and Melinda S. Lock-hart (“Defendant”) were involved in an automobile accident. Monica McPeek and her husband, Eldridge McPeek, (“Plaintiffs” or “Ms. McPeek” and “Mr. McPeek” respectively) sued Defendant. The case was tried and the jury found Ms. McPeek to be 40% at fault for the accident and Defendant 60% at fault and awarded Ms. McPeek damages of $4,000 and Mr. McPeek zero damages. Plaintiffs appeal claiming the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant an additur or a new trial after the jury refused to award loss of consortium damages to Mr. McPeek and that the Trial Court erred by allowing the introduction of certain of Ms. McPeek’s medical records. We affirm.

Background

The issues involved in this appeal pertain only to the jury’s failure to award loss of consortium damages to Mr. McPeek, and the admission of certain of Ms. McPeek’s medical records. We, therefore, will confine our discussion to those facts directly relevant to these issues on appeal.

At trial, Mr. McPeek testified regarding his loss of consortium claim. Mr. McPeek testified he has a prosthetic leg and has “developed sugar” and told about how things have changed since the accident. He stated that prior to the accident:

She did everything for me. She, like I say, she cooked two — at least two full course meals a day. I have sugar, and in between those I have to have so much snacks ever so often, and she fixed me those. She fixed my bath water, she got my towels and everything, and she helped me to the bathroom, and a lot of times I used her for a crutch. I got her at the nape of the neck, and after the accident, I couldn’t get her at the nape of the neck.

Mr. McPeek explained that prior to the accident, he either would stay with his mother, or his daughter or son would stay with him to assist him with his daily activities when his wife was working. Mr. McPeek admitted that his wife still is able to help him with his medications, help him when he tests himself, and still is able to cook supper for both of them from time to time.

Mr. McPeek testified that before the accident, he and his wife had sex two or three times a week, but stated that since the accident “I can’t remember when was the last time [we had sexual relations].” When asked why the situation changed, Mr. McPeek stated: ‘Well, she hurts all the time — about all the time. And I hurt, and, you know, I’ve developed sugar, but that really doesn’t have anything to do with it. I mean, it’s_” Mr. McPeek did not dispute that his wife went to Dr. McCoy, asked Dr. McCoy for something for Mr. McPeek’s erectile dysfunction, and was given Viagra. In fact, he admits he has a prescription for Viagra, but claims he does not need it. When Mr. McPeek was asked if his wife was telling Dr. McCoy the truth when she said Mr. McPeek had erectile dysfunction, he replied “I don’t believe that she brought it up. He had some samples in there that he gave me once before, and I hadn’t used them. Then he wrote the prescriptions — he just went ahead and wrote a script for it, and it’s out there in the vehicle.” Mr. McPeek stated: “I don’t have any problems.”

Ms. McPeek also testified regarding what she did for her husband before the accident. She stated “if he goes up an incline, or down a hill or anything, he holds me around the neck to keep him from falling, because his leg don’t bend like a normal leg. So he — he kind of uses me like a crutch.” She also testified that before the accident, “I helped him out of the tub. El will try to help me, you know, support his self with his arms and stuff, but once he gets up, he hops and — to the bedroom, and he will hold me around the neck and hop, you know, on one leg till he gets in there till I can help him put his leg on.” She testified that now her husband can’t use her “like a crutch” and says he has been crawling to keep from hurting her.

Ms. McPeek testified that the accident has affected their marital relationship:

in a lot of different ways. We’ve — you know, I’ve been in pain and I can’t — I used to cook, you know, meals — breakfast, gravy and biscuits, and things like that. And now I don’t cook as much, because I don’t feel like standing and lifting heavy pots and stuff, and — you know, for long periods of time. So I fix, you know, things that are quick, easy, and he just don’t — he’s got sugar so he’s — I’m not fixing the big meals and things like I used to try to fix.

When asked if she helps her husband in and out of the bathtub and does other things like she used to, Ms. McPeek replied:

No, I don’t. He wouldn’t let me, if I — even if I would, but I don’t do it, because when I do, then I hurt, and suffer, and have to lay on heating pads and stuff. So now I’ve been bringing the leg in there in the bathroom to him, and trying to do things like that to ....

Mr. McPeek also was asked about medications his wife was taking prior to the accident. He testified that his wife was not taking medications on a regular basis and stated: “The only time she took medication was when she had kidney stones, the tumor that — she had the tumor removed. Then after she had the tumor removed, she had two more tumors develop, and that’s .... ” Mr. McPeek also testified that prior to the accident, his wife did not take Percocet and Lortab on a regular basis.

At trial, Defendant had a paralegal read into the record a summary of the prescription records from five different pharmacies showing the prescriptions filled for Ms. McPeek during the year before the accident. Ms. McPeek’s physician testified during his cross-examination that certain specific medications, including Percocet and Lortab, are for pain. These specific pain medications were listed in the summary of Ms. McPeek’s prescription records read to the jury. Plaintiffs objected under Rule 403 that these records were irrelevant and that the probative value, if any, was outweighed by the unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. The Trial Court overruled the objection.

Later during the trial, Defendant read portions of the records of several of Ms. McPeek’s medical providers into the record, and Plaintiffs specifically stated they had no objections to each of these records. Plaintiffs also read certain other portions of those samé medical provider records into the record.

Discussion

Although not stated exactly as such, Plaintiffs raise two issues on appeal: 1) whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant an additur or a new trial after the jury awarded damages to Ms. McPeek but refused to award loss of consortium damages to Mr. McPeek; and, 2) whether the Trial Court erred by allowing the introduction of the medical and pharmacy records.

“Findings of fact by a jury in civil actions shall be set aside only if there is no material evidence to support the verdict.” Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d). As our Supreme Court has explained:

It is the time honored rule in this State that in reviewing a judgment based upon a jury verdict the appellate courts are not at liberty to weigh the evidence or to decide where the preponderance lies, but are limited to determining whether there is material evidence to support the verdict; and in determining whether there is material evidence to support the verdict, the appellate court is required to take the strongest legitimate view of all the evidence in favor of the verdict, to assume the truth of all that tends to support it, allowing all reasonable inferences to sustain the verdict, and to discard all to the contrary. Having thus examined the record, if there be any material evidence to support the verdict, it must be affirmed; if it were otherwise, the parties would be deprived of their constitutional right to trial by jury.

Crabtree Masonry Co., Inc. v. C & R Constr., Inc., 575 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tenn.1978).

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the verdict is inadequate because the jury failed to award loss of consortium damages to Mr. McPeek and, in the alternative, that the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant a new trial because “the jury rendered an inconsistent verdict by awarding damages to the plaintiff, Monica McPeek and failing to award loss of consortium damages to Eldridge McPeek.”

Tenn.Code Ann. § 25-1-106 provides for a right of recovery of loss of consortium for a person whose spouse is injured. Tenn.Code Ann. § 25-1-106 (2000). While a loss of consortium claim is a derivative claim, it is also a distinct and separate cause of action from that of the injured spouse’s claim. Hunley v. Silver Furniture Mfg. Co., 38 S.W.3d 555, 557-58 (Tenn.2001). This Court has defined consortium as follows:

“the conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of each to the company, cooperation, affection and aid of the other in every conjugal relation” ... loss of services is a part of the loss of consortium....

Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 116-17 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989) (quoting Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 1973)).

To begin, we note that a jury verdict finding for the injured spouse but also denying a loss of consortium claim is not necessarily inconsistent because loss of consortium is “a distinct and separate cause of action from that of the injured spouse’s claim.” Hunley, 38 S.W.3d at 557-58. As loss of consortium is its own separate cause of action, it does not necessarily follow that simply because the injured spouse is found to have a legitimate claim that there then must be loss of consortium for the non-injured spouse.

Plaintiffs claim there is no material evidence to support an award of zero damages to Mr. McPeek. After our review of the record, we disagree. Plaintiffs testified that prior to the accident, Ms. McPeek did things for her husband including cooking meals and helping him get out of the bathtub. Although both Plaintiffs claimed that things were not like they were prior to the accident, Mr. McPeek admitted his wife still is able to cook meals and Ms. McPeek testified that she now cooks meals that are quick and easy rather than big meals. In addition, Ms. McPeek testified that instead of helping her husband to get out of the bathtub and to the bedroom to put on his prosthetic leg as she used to do, she now brings the prosthetic leg to the bathroom for him.

In addition, Mr. McPeek testified that prior to the accident, he and his wife had sexual relations two or three times a week, but he cannot remember the last time they had sex since the accident. However, when asked why their sex life has changed, Mr. McPeek stated: “Well, she hurts all the time — about all the time. And I hurt, and, you know, I’ve developed sugar, but that really doesn’t have anything to do with it. I mean, it’s .... ” Mr. MePeek also admitted that Dr. McCoy gave his wife samples of Viagra and later wrote a prescription for him for Viagra.

The jury was free to find, and they apparently did, that Mr. MePeek has not suffered any damages. Witness credibility determination is the responsibility of the jury, and this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury as to witnesses’ credibility. Also, Plaintiffs admitted Ms. MePeek still is able to assist her husband, even though it may not be in exactly the same manner as she did prior to the accident. In addition, the jury was free to believe, and they apparently did, that changes in Plaintiffs’ sex life, if any, were not a result of the accident.

Taking the strongest legitimate view of all the evidence in favor of the verdict, assuming the truth of all that tends to support it, allowing all reasonable inferences to sustain the verdict, and discarding all to the contrary, as we must, we find that there was material evidence to support an award of zero loss of consortium damages. We, therefore, affirm on this issue.

We next consider whether the Trial Court erred by allowing the introduction of certain medical records.

As this Court stated in DeLapp v. Pratt:

Issues regarding admission of evidence in Tennessee are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dickey v. McCord, 63 S.W.3d 714, 723 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). “[TJrial courts are accorded a wide degree of latitude in their determination of whether to admit or exclude evidence, even if such evidence would be relevant.” Id. Our Supreme Court discussed the abuse of discretion standard in Eldridge v. Eldridge, stating:
Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s ruling “will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to [the] propriety of the decision made.” A trial court abuses its discretion only when it “applie[s] an incorrect legal standard, or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that causefs] an injustice to the party complaining.” The abuse of discretion standard does not permit the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn.2001) (citations omitted).
Appellate courts ordinarily permit discretionary decisions to stand when reasonable judicial minds can differ concerning their soundness. Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 709 (Tenn. Ct.App.1999). A trial court’s discretionary decision must take into account applicable law and be consistent with the facts before’ the court. Id. When reviewing a discretionary decision by the trial court, the “appellate courts should begin with the presumption that the decision is correct and should review the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision.” Id.

DeLapp v. Pratt, 152 S.W.3d 530, 538 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004).

On appeal, Plaintiffs argue the Trial Court erred in admitting the records of various medical providers claiming that the fact that a record is admissible does not mean that every entry in that record is admissible and that “[djeclarations made by physicians in records that are not evidence but are opinions must be substantiated by actual testimony.” However, Plaintiffs not only did not object to the admission of the records of the medical providers during trial, but affirmatively stated they had no objection to the entry of each of these records.

As this Court stated in Grandstaff v. Hawks,

Objections to the introduction of evidence must be timely and specific.
A party who invites or waives error, or who fails to take reasonable steps to cure an error, is not entitled to relief on appeal. Failure to object [to] evidence in a timely and specific fashion precludes taking issue on appeal with the admission of the evidence.

Grandstaff v. Hawks, 36 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs not only failed to make timely and specific objections to the introduction of the medical provider records, but affirmatively stated their lack of objection. Plaintiffs, therefore, waived any objections to the admission of these records and may not take issue on appeal with the admission of these records.

Plaintiffs did object at trial to what they characterize as “a rather unusual method of presentation” of the prescription records. Plaintiffs objected to these records claiming that under Rule 403, the records were irrelevant and that the probative value, if any, was outweighed by unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. The Trial Court overruled the objection.

As to Plaintiffs’ specific Rule 403 objection to these prescription records, we believe reasonable minds could disagree as to the propriety of the decision made by the Trial Court to admit the prescription records, the very essence of a discretionary decision. We believe this to be so given that the prescription records showing that Ms. McPeek received multiple pain medications, including Percocet and Lortab, on a regular basis during the year preceding the accident are relevant to the issues of the severity and chronic nature of Ms. McPeek’s preexisting condition. We also note that it goes to Mr. McPeek’s credibility regarding how many and what kind of medications Ms. McPeek was taking on a regular basis before the accident. Given this, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the Trial Court, and we find no abuse of discretion regarding the admission of the prescription records.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the Trial Court for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against the Appellants, Monica McPeek and Eldridge McPeek, and their surety.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BILL VANCE, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Lawrence Keith McNEIL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
    No. 10-03-00395-CR.
    Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco.
    Aug. 17, 2005.
    John A. Kuchera, Waco, for appellant.
    John W. Segrest, McLennan County Dist. Atty., Waco, for appellee.
    Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
   OPINION

BILL VANCE, Justice.

A jury convicted Lawrence Keith McNeil of one count of aggravated assault of a public servant and assessed 55 years in prison. The jury acquitted him of a second count of the same offense. McNeil appeals, asserting in two issues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. We will affirm.

In his first issue, McNeil claims that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of resisting arrest. In his second issue, he alleges that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of evidence revealing McNeil’s two prior convictions for indecency with a child and subsequent civil commitment as a sexually violent predator.

McNeil did not move for a new trial or request a post-verdict hearing on trial counsel’s strategies or the reasons for the challenged conduct.

Strickland v. Washington

The legal standard set out in Strickland v. Washington applies to McNeil’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). To prevail on his claims, McNeil must first show that his counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; see Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). Specifically, McNeil must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard of professional norms. Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642.

Second, McNeil must show that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Stñckland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064 (“This [prejudice prong] requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”). As explained in Mitchell, “[t]his means that the appellant must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642. A “reasonable probability” is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642.

Appellate Review of Ineffective Assistance Claims

Appellate review of defense counsel’s representation is highly deferential and presumes that counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Under normal circumstances, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or strategic decision-making as to overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and professional. See Goodspeed v. State, - S.W.3d-,-, 2005 WL 766996 at *2 (Tex.Crim.App. April 6, 2005); Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642.

Rarely will the trial record contain sufficient information to permit a reviewing court to fairly evaluate the merits of such a serious allegation: “[i]n the majority of cases, the record on direct appeal is simply undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the failings of trial counsel.” Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813-14 (Tex.Crim. App.1999) (to defeat the presumption of reasonable professional assistance, “any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness”); see also Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 655 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (“[t]he record does not reveal defense counsel’s reasons for not objecting to the prosecutor’s comments. Given the presumption of effectiveness and the great deference we give to decisions made by defense counsel, we see nothing in the present record that would compel us to find counsel ineffective.”); Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642 (“[generally the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient as to meet the first part of the Strickland standard. The reasonableness of counsel’s choices often involves facts that do not appear in the appellate record. A petition for writ of habeas corpus usually is the appropriate vehicle to investigate ineffective-assistance claims.”).

In the absence of evidence of trial counsel’s reason for the challenged conduct, we assume a strategic reason for trial counsel’s conduct, if one can be imagined. Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (“an appellate court ‘commonly will assume a strategic motivation if any can possibly be imagined,’ and will not conclude the challenged conduct constituted deficient performance unless the conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.”) (quoting 3 W. Lafave, et al., Criminal PROCEDURE § 11.10(c) (2d ed.1999) and citing Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814). But, if nothing in the record reveals trial counsel’s reason, it is improper for us to speculate on it. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814; Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). “A reviewing court can frequently speculate on both sides of an issue, but ineffective assistance claims are not built on retrospective speculation; rather, they must ‘be firmly founded in the record.’ ” Avila v. State, 2003 WL 21513440 at *10 (Tex.Crim.App. July 2, 2003) (not designated for publication) (quoting Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833).

Analysis

McNeil was acquitted of one of the two counts of aggravated assault of a public servant; we cannot say that his trial counsel’s performance was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it. Without a record that reveals the reasons for the challenged conduct of McNeil’s trial counsel, we cannot speculate whether McNeil’s trial counsel was ineffective.

Conclusion

In this appeal, we have not decided that McNeil did or did not receive effective assistance of counsel at trial. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814 (“We are not deciding on this direct appeal, therefore, that appellant did or did not receive the effective assistance of counsel during trial.”). Instead, without a record revealing trial counsel’s strategy or motivation, McNeil has not defeated the strong presumption that his trial counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See id. Thus, we overrule McNeil’s two issues without prejudice. See Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 813 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (“the proper procedure will be for the appellate court to overrule an appellant’s Sixth Amendment claim without prejudice to appellant’s ability to dispute counsel’s effectiveness collaterally.”).

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Chief Justice GRAY concurring.

      . In his brief, McNeil, citing Bone v. State, acknowledges the presumption that trial counsel employed sound strategy cannot normally be overcome on direct appeal because the record will not contain evidence of the trial attorney’s reasons for his conduct. See Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). He states that he nonetheless seeks to comply with this Court’s directive that all appellate arguments be made that might “conceivably” persuade the Court. See Tau-lung v. State, 979 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex.App.Waco 1998, no pet.).


author: FELIPE REYNA, Justice. TOM GRAY, Chief Justice,

text:
    Anthony PETRUCCELLI, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
    No. 10-03-00034-CR.
    Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco.
    Aug. 17, 2005.

      Stan Sehwieger, Waco, for appellant.
    Kathryn J. Gilliam, Falls County Dist. Atty., Marlin, for appellee.
    Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
   OPINION

FELIPE REYNA, Justice.

Anthony Petruccelli was convicted of the aggravated assault of his wife, Carol. He was sentenced to seventy years’ confinement. He argues on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in admitting and publishing to the jury in the guilVinnocence phase of the trial a “day in the life” video depicting Carol’s activities at a rehabilitation facility; (2) there is legally insufficient evidence to prove Petruccelli’s prior conviction; (3) there is legally insufficient evidence to prove that his hands were deadly weapons; and (4) the trial court erred in admitting prejudicial photographs of Carol in the hospital. We affirm.

Background

On an August morning at 9:15am, Everett Platt, Petruccelli’s neighbor, noticed that the rear window of Petruccelli’s truck was smashed. Platt stopped and asked Petruccelli what happened to his window. Petruccelli stated that he threw a pipe into the back of his truck, but it bounced up and hit the rear window. Platt inquired about Petruccelli’s wife, Carol, and he replied that “the bitch is in the bedroom passed out, drunk on the bed.” He explained that he found Carol drunk at a bar last night, brought her home, and that he may have “backhanded” her.

At 10:30am, Platt received a call from Petruccelli who was worried that he could not wake Carol up. He said that she was making gurgling sounds and asked Platt what he should do. Platt told Petruccelli to take Carol to a hospital. At the same time, the Falls county Sheriffs Department received a 9-1-1 call, but all that could be heard was a beeping noise. After tracing the call to Petruccelli, Sheriff Jerry Cowin went to investigate. Petruccelli met Cowin at the front door and told him that everything was alright, and that he had just misdialed. Cowin left.

At noon, Platt drove by Petruccelli’s house. He talked to Petruccelli who again expressed concern over Carol’s condition, that she continued to make noises, and that she would not wake up. Again, Platt told him to take Carol to the hospital. Petruccelli finally agreed and asked Platt for his help in getting her to his truck. Platt followed Petruccelli into the house where he saw Carol laying half on the bed and half on the floor with bruises covering her face, eyes, and shoulders. As they were carrying her limp body to the truck, Platt heard Petruccelli say “Oh baby, look what I’ve done to you.”

At the hospital, Carol was listed in critical condition. Her head and body were covered in bruises. She suffered severe head trauma, causing her to have problems with her memory, her thought processes, her speech, and her balance. She also lost most of her vision. Her injuries required that she be placed in a rehabilitation facility.

While at the hospital, Petruccelli told Platt, several medical professionals, and police officers that he did or might have slapped Carol around a few times, backhanded her, hit her, or accidentally hit her. Subsequently, Petruccelli was charged with aggravated assault.

Finding that he used his hands as a deadly weapon, a jury found Petruccelli guilty of aggravated assault. In the punishment phase of the trial, it was shown that Petruccelli had a history of beating his wife and that he had a prior felony conviction for assault and armed robbery. Petruccelli was sentenced to seventy years’ confinement.

Admission of Evidence—

The Photographs

Petruccelli argues in his fourth issue that the trial court erred in admitting photographs of Carol in the hospital because the probative value of the photographs is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

We review a court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Gipson v. State, 82 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, no pet.). Under Rule 403, a trial court may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Tex.R. Evid 403. When conducting a Rule 403 analysis, we look to four non-exclusive factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential to impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible, way; (3) the time needed to develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence. Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 489 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389-90 (Tex.Crim.App.1990)).

Six 14 by 24 inch photographs and four 4 by 6 inch photographs were admitted into evidence. They all portray Carol unconscious in her hospital bed, shortly after she was admitted. Most portray her nude in various positions in order to adequately display the extent of her injuries. Bruises on her arms, breasts, back, buttocks, thighs, and knees are clearly visible along with standard hospital equipment. Also, some pictures depict a close-up of Carol’s face showing bruising around her eyes, a cervical collar, and various tubes entering her mouth and nose.

The State argues that the probative value of this evidence is not outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect because proof of serious bodily injury is an element of the offense of aggravated assault. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). While it is true that the State has the burden to prove serious bodily injury beyond a reasonable doubt, Petruccelli stipulated that there was serious bodily injury. Therefore in this respect, the photographs have limited probative value.

However, one of Petruccelli’s defensive theories was that Carol received her injuries by twice falling out of his moving truck. The State’s expert witnesses emphatically denied that Carol’s injuries were of the sort typically received when a person falls out of a moving vehicle. They explained that if Petruccelli’s theory were true, Carol should have numerous cuts and abrasions usually described as “road rash,” and they referred to Carol’s hospital photographs to demonstrate the absence of road rash on Carol’s body. Thus these photographs are directly relevant and probative to counter the defense’s theory, and the State’s need for this evidence is clear. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387-88 (holding evidence is admissible to rebut a defensive theory); Richards v. State, 54 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd) (holding that despite the defendant’s stipulation to the cause of death, photographs were probative to prove intent).

Because the photographs are genuinely helpful to the jury in making its decision, the photographs are admissible unless the emotional and prejudicial impact of the pictures substantially outweighs their helpfulness. Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 490. We also consider “the number of photographs, the size, whether they are in color or are black and white, whether they are gruesome, whether any bodies are clothed or naked, and whether the body has been altered by autopsy.” Id. at 489. While some of the photographs are fairly large, they number only ten, and none of them portray blood or bleeding wounds. The photographs show a very bruised woman, but they are certainly not so gruesome as to impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible way. Id. Nor are they so appalling that a juror of normal sensitivity would find it difficult rationally deciding the critical issues of the case after viewing them. See Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 370-71 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the photographs. We overrule Petruccelli’s fourth issue.

Admission of Evidence — The Videotape

In his first issue, Petruccelli argues that the trial court erred by admitting in evidence a videotape demonstrating the daily activities and treatment of Carol at a rehabilitation facility. Specifically, Petruc-celli argues that the videotape is victim-impact evidence that is inadmissible during the guilt/innoeence phase of a criminal trial. Further, he argues that, even if found not to be victim-impact evidence, the videotape is inadmissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Before analysis, we must begin with a description of the content of the videotape. The tape is approximately 35 minutes long and consists of three sections: Carol walking in the facility; Carol with her memory specialist; and Carol with her occupational therapist.

In the first section, Carol is seen walking through the rehabilitation facility, which is decorated for Christmas. She has trouble with her balance, is using a walker, and has someone holding her arm to guide her. At one point, Carol asks about a particular person named Wendy. The person guiding her replies that Wendy is holding the camera. Carol attempts to find Wendy by walking straight up to the camera until she brushes her nose against the lens, all the while repeating with a smile, “I can’t see you. Where is she?”

Next Carol is seen sitting at a table next to a window with her memory specialist sitting opposite her. She is shown an array of photographs of her children and her grandchildren. Carol is asked to identify the people in the pictures, but she cannot and frequently holds the pictures upside down while guessing at what they show. Frustrated, Carol states that she will see the pictures better tomorrow. When asked why, she replies, “I’m going to pray tonight that God will let me see. God’s going to help me see.” Then Carol asks if she can take the pictures back to her room so that she can see her kids in the daylight. The therapist answers that it is daylight, and points to the window. Carol replies, “No, it’s dark.” When asked, she does not remember the year, day of the week, or month, though she was told this information earlier. Nor does she remember how she received her injuries. At different times she states that she slipped and fell, or had a stroke.

Next Carol is seen in her room at the facility. An occupational therapist leads Carol around the room by a belt at Carol’s waist. She guides Carol in counting the steps to her closet and the bathroom, and she teaches Carol how to brush her teeth and put on her shoes. At one point, Carol attempts for approximately five minutes to put on a sock. Unable to do so, she gives up and the therapist puts the sock on for her.

The videotape was published to the jury in its entirety during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial , and was later played to the jury without sound during the State’s closing argument while the State urged the jury to remember Carol when they debated their verdict.

Outside of the context of homicide cases, victim-impact evidence is generally defined as evidence regarding “the physical or psychological effect of the crime on the victims themselves.” Lane v. State, 822 S.W.2d 35, 41 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); see Matchett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 922, 931 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); DeLarue v. State, 102 S.W.3d 388, 403 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd); see also Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. ART. 56.03 (Vernon 2002).

Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a victim’s medical records or a doctor’s testimony concerning the technical procedures required in caring for the victim are not victim-impact evidence, we find that this evidence is distinguishable. See Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 929 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). The videotape does not consist solely of technical medical information as communicated by a third party or as seen on paper. Rather, it is a portrayal of not only Carol’s physical therapy, but also of her emotional and psychological state of mind as she struggles with daily living. While we hesitate to label the videotape a “day in the life” video, sometimes found in civil cases, we note that the video does give an impression of what Carol's day to day life must be like. The video portrays the physical and emotional effect the crime of aggravated assault had upon Carol, and therefore constitutes victim-impact evidence. Nonetheless, regardless of its characterization, we review this evidence under a Rule 403 analysis using the nonexclusive factors referred to above. Era-zo, 144 S.W.3d at 489.

Victim-impact evidence is generally not admissible in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, but can be admitted in the punishment phase when that evidence has some bearing on the defendant’s personal responsibility and moral culpability. Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). However, the characterization of this evidence as victim-impact evidence does not necessarily preclude its admission in the guilt/innoeence phase, because this evidence may also be characterized as evidence necessary to prove an element of the offense.

The State argues that the videotape is necessary to prove serious bodily injury, an element of the offense of aggravated assault, as stated above. Tex. Pen.Code § 22.02(a)(1). Yet, as explained, Petruccelli stipulated to serious bodily injury. And while the photographs are probative to rebut the defensive theory that Carol sustained her injuries while falling out of a moving vehicle, the videotape does not rebut this theory or add anything meaningful to the issue. Therefore, the probative value of the evidence is minimal. Also, given the admission of the photographs of Carol in the hospital, the State’s need for the evidence is slight. The only possible reasons for the admission is to prove serious bodily injury or to inflame the minds of the jury. The former was stipulated to, and the latter is not acceptable under the Rules of Evidence if offered solely for that reason. Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 489-90.

Miller-El v. State, is directly on point. Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). In Miller-El, the victim was shot in the spinal chord by the defendant. Id. at 894. During the punishment phase of the trial, the victim’s doctor testified concerning the “special needs” the victim would require for the rest of his life due to the seriousness of his injury. Id. The State argued that this evidence was admissible in the guilt/innocence phase because it was probative of the defendant’s intent to kill the victim, and the nature of the victim’s injuries. Id. at 895. Therefore, the State argued, the evidence should be admissible in the punishment phase also. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed. They found that while the bare facts of the victim’s paralysis was admissible in the guilt/innocence phase, “the victim’s future hardship as a paraplegic [did not have] any tendency to make more or less probable the existence of any fact of consequence at the guilt stage of trial.” Id.

The videotape in question is highly prejudicial. And, while relevant and probative in the punishment phase of the trial, its contains no information that would have any tendency to make more or less probable the existence of any fact of consequence at the guilt stage of trial. Therefore the videotape was inadmissible in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.

Further, we note a point of concern. When this type of evidence is being offered in the punishment phase, judges are cautioned to place appropriate limits on the amount, kind, and source of victim-impact evidence. Salazar, 90 S.W.3d at 336 (citing Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 262-63 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)). The Court of Criminal Appeals requires heightened judicial supervision of this type of evidence in the punishment phase. Salazar, 90 S.W.3d at 336. Most assuredly, the same supervision applies in the guilt/innocence phase. We also find it disconcerting that there is no indication that the trial court viewed the videotape before admitting it into evidence. “It is equally difficult for a trial judge to weigh the probative value against the potentially unfair prejudice of a particular item of evidence without first reviewing it.” Id. at 336-37.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court erred by admitting the videotape in evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of trial.

Harm Analysis

Having found error, we consider the harm, if any, caused by the admission of the tape. We will disregard any error that does not affect a substantial right of the defendant. Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b); Haynes v. State, 85 S.W.3d 855, 859 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref'd). “A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). We do not reverse if, “after examining the record as [a] whole, [we have] fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); see also Schutz v. State, 63 S.W.3d 442, 444 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). The reviewing court should consider everything in the record, including all the evidence admitted, the arguments, and voir dire. Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 358 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). The strength of the evidence of guilt, especially if it is overwhelming, is a factor to be considered. Id. at 357-58; Haynes, 85 S.W.3d at 859 n. 4. However, if there are “grave doubts” about whether the error did not effect the outcome, then the error is treated as if it did effect the outcome. Thomas v. State, 137 S.W.3d 792, 796 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, no pet.) (citing Fowler v. State, 958 S.W.2d 853, 865 (Tex.App.-Waco 1997), ajfd, 991 S.W.2d 258 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)).

After examining the evidence as a whole, we conclude that the admission of the videotape had only a slight effect on the jury. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d at 417; Castillo, 910 S.W.2d at 127-28; Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 30. The record reveals numerous admissions from Petruccelli, including a signed statement, that he hit Carol. This, along with the medical testimony that Carol’s injuries were caused by multiple impacts consistent with being beaten, is more than enough evidence of guilt to render the erroneous admission of the videotape harmless. Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 357-58. While we note that the State emphasized the videotape during closing argument, it was for a short period of time and without audio. Though a close question, we cannot say that we are in “grave doubt” about whether the error affected the outcome. Thomas, 137 S.W.3d at 796. Given the strength of the evidence of guilt, we find the erroneous admission of the videotape harmless. Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 357-58.

Accordingly, we overrule Petruccelli’s first issue.

Insufficiency of the Evidence— Deadly Weapon

Petruceelli argues in his third issue that there is factually insufficient evidence to prove that he used or exhibited his hands as deadly weapons capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we “consider[] all of the evidence in a neutral light” and determine whether the factfinder was “rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Davis v. State, 147 S.W.3d 554, 556 (Tex.App.Waco 2004, no pet.).

[T]here are two ways in which the evidence may be [factually] insufficient. First, when considered by itself, evidence supporting the verdict may be too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, there may be both evidence supporting the verdict and evidence contrary to the verdict. Weighing all the evidence under this balancing scale, the contrary evidence may be strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met.

Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484-85.

A person commits the felony offense of aggravated assault if he commits assault and (1) causes serious bodily injury to another, or (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (Vernon 2003). A deadly weapon is anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purposes of inflicting serious bodily injury or anything that, in the manner of its use or intended use, is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A), (B) (Vernon 2003).

Petruccelli’s indictment alleged that his hands constituted deadly weapons. Body parts, such as hands and knees, may be deadly weapons based on their manner of use or intended use and their capacity to produce death or serious bodily injury. Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1983); Vela v. State, 159 S.W.3d 172, 182 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.). To determine whether something is a deadly weapon, the jury may consider all the surrounding facts, including the defendant’s words. Blain v. State, 647 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Vela, 159 S.W.3d at 182. The State does not have to prove that the complainant actually sustained serious bodily injury for the alleged weapon to be a deadly weapon. Jefferson v. State, 974 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.). The State need prove only that the hands were capable of causing serious bodily injury in the way they were used or intended to be used. Hill v. State, 913 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Jefferson, 974 S.W.2d at 892; Vela, 159 S.W.3d at 182.

Petruceelli made numerous admissions that he hit Carol. This evidence, coupled with medical testimony that Carol’s injuries were consistent with being beaten multiple times with someone’s hands, constitutes factually sufficient evidence. Vela, 159 S.W.3d at 182. Looking at the evidence from a neutral viewpoint, we find that the jury was rationally justified in finding that Petruceelli used or exhibited his hands as deadly weapons. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484. Accordingly, we overrule Petruccel-li’s third issue.

Insufficiency of the Evidence— Prior Conviction

Petruceelli argues in his second issue that there is legally insufficient evidence to prove his prior conviction because the conviction was not final.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 389-90 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). The critical inquiry is whether, after so viewing the evidence, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

The trial court admitted a penitentiary packet from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, but it contained no judgment or sentence. The packet is accompanied by an affidavit that states that the documents pertain to an Anthony Petruccelli with the same date of birth as Appellant Petruccel-li. It contains two pictures of Petruccelli, identifying marks, and fingerprints that were later identified by the State’s expert witness as Petruccelh’s fingerprints. The packet also includes a “complaint of indictment data” stating that Petruccelli was charged with assault and armed robbery, and a warrant for commitment stating that Petruccelli was convicted of armed robbery and assault and is to be committed to ten years’ confinement. Also, a Certificate of Parole is included which shows that Pe-truccelli was paroled by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Parole Board.

When an out-of-state penitentiary packet has been introduced as evidence of a prior criminal record in the punishment phase, the State must establish, either by proof or request, that the trial judge took judicial notice of what our sister state considers sufficient documentary proof of a final conviction. See Langston v. State, 776 S.W.2d 586, 587-88 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). In this case, the State did not do so. Therefore, in the absence of proof of the laws of the Massachusetts, we will presume that the law is the same as that of Texas. Id.

The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt prior convictions alleged for the purpose of enhancement of punishment. Zimmer v. State, 989 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd). Our case law is clear that “before a conviction may be relied upon for enhancement in a later case, such prior conviction must be final.” Beal v. State, 91 S.W.3d 794, 796 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). In order for a conviction to be considered final, a penitentiary packet must contain a properly certified judgment and sentence. Langston, 776 S.W.2d at 587-88. “[W]hen the State offers into evidence a certified copy of a judgment and sentence, it has made a prima facie ease that the conviction reflected within that judgment and sentence is a final conviction worthy of respect.” Jones v. State, 77 S.W.3d 819, 822-23 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). A document that is the “functional equivalent of the judgment and sentence required by Texas law to prove up a valid conviction” may be used in the absence of a judgment and sentence. Langston, 776 S.W.2d at 588.

A commitment order is considered a functional equivalent of a judgment and sentence. See Doby v. State, 454 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.Crim.App.1970) (holding that despite the absence of a judgment and sentence, the “recitations of the commitment” document from New Mexico were sufficient to prove a final prior conviction); Wilson v. State, 15 S.W.3d 544, 555 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. ref'd) (a commitment order has a “similar purpose” as a judgment and sentence).

The commitment order states the offense committed and the sentence. See Francis v. State, 792 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref d) (Louisiana commitment order showing the offense committed and sentence was sufficient to establish prior conviction). The commitment order is accompanied by an affidavit from the Central Records Supervisor of the Massachusetts Department of Correction stating that the attached documents are true and accurate copies and giving the commitment order an indicia of authority. See Banks v. State, 158 S.W.3d 649, 653 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (commenting on the court’s inability to find a Texas case holding that a pen packet lacking a judgment and sentence and devoid of any indicia of authenticity is prima facie proof of a prior conviction); Johnson v. State, 740 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd) (holding that New York certificate of commitment, when accompanied by certification of authenticity, was sufficient to prove a prior conviction); Williams v. State, 1999 WL 442010, *5, 1999 Tex.App. LEXIS 4876, *13-14 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 1999, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (holding that certified copies of records from the Florida Division of Corrections were the functional equivalent of a judgment and sentence and were sufficient to prove a prior conviction). Therefore, we find that the commitment order containing identifying fingerprints, photographs, and marks, stating the offense committed and the sentence imposed, and containing an indicia of authenticity is the functional equivalent of a final conviction.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that there is legally sufficient evidence to prove Pe-truccelli’s prior conviction. See Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 389-90. Accordingly, we overrule Petruecelli’s second issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Petruccelli’s issues, we affirm his conviction.

Chief Justice GRAY concurring.

TOM GRAY, Chief Justice,

concurring.

Because, with regard to issue two, the majority now holds the Massachusetts pen packet is sufficient evidence of a prior felony conviction to support the enhancement, I withdraw my Dissenting Opinion issued March 9, 2005 and concur in the judgment of the Court now affirming the trial court’s judgment in all respects. I must again note, however, that the only issue necessary for our disposition of issue two was whether the Massachusetts pen packet was admissible. Petruccelli’s issue is that the “trial court erred in allowing evidence of Appellant’s prior conviction.” The brief goes on to discuss the standard of review regarding the admission of evidence, not the sufficiency thereof.

With these comments, I concur in the judgment but not in the opinion.

      . During a hearing on the admission of the videotape, Petruccelli’s counsel asked that the tape be published to the jury without sound, and the State agreed, yet the trial court ruled only that the tape be admitted. However, it is apparent from the record that the tape was played with sound because the State’s witness was asked to identify for the jury the voices heard on the videotape. Furthermore, when the tape was played for the jury at closing argument, the reporter’s record notes that it was played without the audio portion. There is no such indication in the record when the tape was first published.

      . In homicide cases, victim-impact evidence is traditionally defined as "evidence concerning the effect that the victim’s death will have on others, particularly the victim’s family members.” Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

      . See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hoke, No. 14-99-00503-CV, 2001 WL 931658, *13 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Pittsburgh Coming Corp. v. Walters, 1 S.W.3d 759, 772-73 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied); Apache Ready Mix Co., Inc. v. Creed, 653 S.W.2d 79, 83-84 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1983, writ dism’d).

      . Though Petruccelli argues that the trial court erred in admitting the prior conviction because it was not final, we interpret this issue as including the argument that there is no evidence to support the enhancement allegation. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(e), 38.9.