text:
    Mutual Construction Company, Appellee, v. Frank L. Baker et al., on appeal of Mary R. Waller, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,747.
    1. Mechanics’ mens — when lessor chargeable through agent on lessees’ contract for alterations. Where a son, who was the general agent of the owner of property, was fully aware of what was being done in connection with alterations and repairs before they were undertaken and while they were being done, and was the means of bringing the complainant and the tenant of the building together in negotiations for the contract, the owner was chargeable with all the knowledge the son had, and the owner was held to have “knowingly permitted” her lessees to contract for work done within the meaning of section 1 of the Mechanics’ Liens Act, Cahill’s St. ch. 82, IT 1.
    2, Mechanics’ mens — actual scope of agency as affecting owner’s changeability on tenant’s contract made with agent’s knowledge.
      The owner will be held to have knowingly permitted repairs or alterations contracted for by a tenant to be done, where notice or knowledge of such work comes to an agent of the owner and such agent is in general charge of the property, although the agent might not have authority broad enough to permit him to make a contract for the work himself which would be binding on the principal in the absence of specific approval by the latter. The scope of such agent’s authority is such that, when notice or knowledge of the work comes to him, it becomes his duty to communicate that knowledge to his principal.
    3. Mechanics’ liens — Tien liability of lessor on tenant’s contract for repairs. A decree for a mechanic’s lien against the owner of a building, for work done under contract with the tenants, was not subject to reversal because the owner’s agent advised the contractor that he would have to look to the tenants for his pay; and even if such statement had been made by the owner herself and the work was done, a lien would nevertheless have attached to the owner’s interest, provided she knowingly permitted the work to proceed and be done.
    4. Mechanics’ liens — when payments by tenants credited on nonlienable items to sustain decree against lessor. Where a mechanic’s lien was sought upon a lump-sum contract, and the master found that certain items might not be lienable, the decree allowing the lien for the balance due was affirmed, where the total, with extras, amounted to over $5,000, and the tenants with whom the contract was made bad paid $3,700, and the master found that at most the items which might not be lienable amounted to a few hundred dollars only, and that complainant was entitled to have the amount which the tenants had paid credited in such a way as to pay for these nonlienable items; and as the evidence was such as to make it possible to determine the fact that the nonlienable items amounted to less than the tenants had paid under the contract, complainant' was held entitled to a lien for the balance due.
    5. Payment — application of payments by equity. Equity will credit payments so as to give a creditor the best security for the debt remaining unpaid.
    Appeal by defendant from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscab Hebel, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed June 17, 1925.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Sidney W. Worthy, for appellant; Charles H. Chapman, of counsel.

      Joseph Rosenberg, for appellee; Benjamin Rosenberg, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.

The complainant, Mutual Construction Company, filed a bill to enforce a mechanic’s lien against the property of which the defendant, Mary R. Waller, was the owner and Baker and others were the tenants. The chancellor held that the complainant established its right to a hen to the extent of $1,925, and entered a decree to that effect. To reverse that decree Mrs. Wraller has perfected this appeal.

Mrs. Waller had owned the premises in question, located at 719 1ST. Clark street in the City of Chicago, for about forty-five years. She testified that as far as she could remember she had never been to the building, but that her son, J. Alexander Waller, managed it for her. She did not even know whether the building had a basement, — she supposed it did have because such buildings generally did. She further testified that she never knew Baker, the tenant, nor did she know who the tenants were who were occupying the premises in August, 1917; that her son 11 signed the leases there and collected the rents.” She testified that her son never signed any lease without first consulting her and reporting the terms and facts concerning them, and that he never did anything to the building without consulting her.

The testimony shows that Baker had a lease on the premises in question. He had first leased them in 1911 and this original lease was later renewed. This tenant maintained a billiard hall and bar in the premises and it seems that this business did not pay, and in May, 1917, Baker went to see Waller, the agent, and told him that he was going to discontinue the billiard hall and bar and convert the place into a cabaret, and that in that connection he was going to repair and remodel the place. He testified that on that occasion Waller told him that was all right, — to go ahead and do it, — “He just looked at the blueprint and said he thought I would do business if it was fixed up. * * * He said, ‘All right, go ahead and make the change. ’ ” At the time Baker undertook to make the change in his business he took in a partner, whose name was Byan, and the latter accompanied Baker when he went to discuss the matter of the alterations with Waller. Byan testified that before he entered into his partnership with Baker he took up with Waller the question of getting an extension on the lease; that the then existing lease was for a period of five years, two of which had expired, leaving a balance of three years. Byan testified that: “We went up there with our blueprints to Mr. Waller and showed him the blue prints and the work we were going to do at Superior and Clark streets and I told him I could not see where I could go ahead with this $5,000 improvement on a three year lease and wanted two years more. I told him I was to become a partner and he said, all right, he would give us two years more, and made out a rider and pinned it to the old lease. ’ ’ The lease then covering the premises had been executed by Waller, as agent for his mother, and after he had executed the rider, testified to by Byan, the record shows the work contemplated by the tenants was done.

A witness connected with the complainant company testified that about the time the complainant entered into its contract with the tenants, the latter stated that the complainant had been recommended to them by Waller and after that the witness had a conversation with Waller, who stated that Baker was one of the tenants in the building in question, and he inquired of the witness how the plan was getting along, on the figuring for the work that was to be done, and the witness replied that the figures had been submitted to the tenants. This witness further testified that Waller asked how they were going to remodel the premises and he told him that they were going to make a large cabaret room and that the work would be an improvement to the building; that after they had begun the work, and while it was going on, he had another talk with Waller and the latter asked how the complainant was getting on with the work, and the witness stated they were getting on well and “Waller said that he thought the boys would make out all right over there, and I agreed with him.” On cross-examination this witness testified that his first conversation with Waller about this work was had sometime in 1917, at which time Waller said he had a tenant in the premises in question whom he had referred to the complainant and he inquired whether the tenant had called the complainant up and what, if anything, the complainant was doing in the matter; that the next conversation occurred about two months later when the witness told Waller that the complainant had submitted figures on the work, together with a sketch, and that later, when the work had been started, Waller again asked how the matter was progressing.

Waller testified that he knew that the work in question was going on but that he did not see it during its construction; that the witness who testified for the complainant asked him about the tenant, and said he thought he was going to do some work for him on these premises, and wanted to know what he, Waller, knew, and he replied, that “he had been a tenant of mine for some time; that I knew nothing about his financial responsibility, except that he paid me the rent and was slow at times, but he would have to take his own responsibility.” Waller further testified that: “I told Mrs. Waller, my mother, that they were going to take out the bar and make a restaurant of it. * * * At that time I did not know much of the proposed changes except that they Were going to take out the bar.” On cross-examination, he testified that he did hot know whether he told his mother that the bar was going to be removed before or after it was done. He testified that he had made repairs on the building, when they were needed, but never without consulting his mother; that he ordered all the repairs but went to her first before ordering them.

In our opinion, the evidence in this record clearly establishes that the defendant owner “knowingly permitted” her lessees to contract for the work done, within the meaning of section 1 of the Mechanics ’ Liens Act (Cahill’s St. ch. 82, 1), and that, therefore, her property is subject to lien. That her son, who was her agent in the management of this property, was not only fully aware of everything that was being done in connection with these alterations and repairs, both before they were undertaken and while they were being done, but that he was the means of bringing the complainant and the tenants together in negotiations which resulted in the contract for the repairs and alterations, is clearly established. We are further of the opinion that under the evidence Mrs. Waller must be charged with all the knowledge her son had concerning these alterations and repairs.

Counsel for Mrs. Waller contend that she may not be properly charged with the knowledge her son had, because the scope of his authority was not broad enough to authorize him to make a contract for repairs and alterations of this nature, and, therefore, notice to him, that they were going to be made by the tenant, could not bind his mother. This is not a case where the contractor is seeking to enforce a lien because of the provisions of the Act which give the contractor a lien against the property of an owner, where the contractor has entered into a contract with the owner or with one duly authorized to contract by the owner, but it is a case where the contractor is seeking to enforce a lien under the provision of the statute, to the effect that he may have a lien, where he makes a contract for repairs or alterations with one whom the owner has, “knowingly permitted to contract,” for such work. In our opinion, the agent of the owner of property may have such an authority in the management of the property as will make any knowledge the agent has, as to repairs or alterations that are about to be made to the premises, or as are being made, chargeable to the owner, although the scope of authority of that agent may not be so broad as to give the agent authority to enter into a contract for that work, which would be binding upon the owner. The owner will be held to have knowingly permitted repairs or alterations contracted for by a tenant to be done, where notice or knowledge of such work comes to an agent of the owner and such agent is in general charge of the property, although the agent might not have authority broad enough to permit him to make a contract for such work himself which would be binding on the principal in the absence of specific approval by the latter. The scope of such an agent’s authority is such that, when notice or knowledge of the work comes to him, it becomes his duty to communicate that knowledge to his principal. The court said in Trentor v. Pothen, 46 Minn. 298, a case cited by counsel for the appellant, that “the facts of which the agent had notice must be within the scope of the agency, so that it becomes his duty to act upon them or communicate them to his principal. * * * In other words, the knowledge or notice must come to an agent who has authority to deal in reference to those matters which the knowledge or notice affects.” The foregoing sentences were quoted with approval in Jefferson v. Leithauser, 60 Minn. 251. In the latter case the agent was authorized by the owner to make leases and collect rents, to care for and look after the property generally and look after the interests of his principal, with regard to the property, and it was held that notice to such an agent, that improvements were being made on a building located upon the owner’s real estate, was binding on the owner. In the course of the opinion in the case last cited, the court referred to the fact that both parties had cited the case of Sandberg v. Palm, 53 Minn. 252, where an agent, whose authority was limited to the sale of real estate, acquired knowledge that a building was being constructed on his principal’s land, and it was held that such knowledge could not be imputed to the principal. In the latter case the court said that “to make knowledge of an agent equivalent to knowledge of the owner, his authority must be such that he could bind his principal by consenting to so charge the land,” and the court in Jefferson v. Leithauser, said that that proposition was “too broadly stated.”

That J. Alexander Waller was the general agent of his mother, in the management, care and control of the premises involved in the case at bar, is too clearly established by the evidence in the record to admit of argument. There was nothing done with reference to the care and management of this property that he did not know about and do for her. She paid the taxes annually and paid the insurance premiums but that was all. The property had been hers and her husband’s for forty-five years. Mrs. Waller’s husband had been dead for thirty-five years, and yet she had never even seen the property, and hardly knew what it consisted of, but she testified that her son managed it for her. Where knowledge comes to such an agent as that, to the effect that improvements and alterations are being contracted for by a tenant, to the extent of over $5,000, he even introducing the contractor to the tenant, under all the circumstances shown in this record, we are of the opinion that such knowledge of the agent must be imputed to the owner, even though he would not have had authority to make a contract for those repairs and alterations, which would have been binding on the owner in the absence of written and specific authority, from the owner, covering the work involved. Counsel for Mrs. Waller, in contending the contrary, has called our attention to a number of cases, among them McAlear v. New York Life Insurance & Trust Co., 177 Ill. App. 339, It is urged that this court held in that case that improvement of a building is not within the scope of the authority of an agent authorized to rent the premises and collect rents, and that knowledge of such an agent of an improvement upon the principal’s property cannot be imputed to the owner, so as to charge such owner with having “knowingly permitted” the improvement, and thereby subjected his property to a mechanic’s lien. In our opinion, that case is not authority for such a statement. It was there held that the improvement in question did not, in fact, amount to an improvement of the premises, but consisted of a trade fixture. Furthermore, the contractor in that case sought a lien on the ground that the agent had “authorized and knowingly permitted” the contractor to do the work involved, and all that the decision comes to is that the evidence fails to show that the agent was so authorized.

Counsel for the appellant further contend that the decree appealed from should be reversed because the appellant’s agent advised the complainant that the latter would have to look to the tenant for his pay for the work which was to be done by the complainant under its contract with the tenant. Even if such a statement had been made to the contractor by the owner herself and the work in question was done, the lien would, nevertheless, attach to the owner’s interest in the property, provided she knowingly permitted it to proceed and be done. Loeff v. Meyer, 209 Ill. App. 382.

It is further contended that the contract in connection with which complainant seeks a lien was a lump-sum contract and that inasmuch as the master found that certain items claimed by the complainant might not be lienable, no lien may properly be given for any part of the work. In support of this contention, Cronin v. Tatge, 281 Ill. 336, is cited. In that case there was a lump-sum contract for work for part of which only a lien could be attached, and the court pointed out that, under the evidence, it could not be ascertained what part of the entire contract price was for the nonlienable part of the contract and what for the remainder. It was further held that a lien could not be enforced for any part of the work done under the contract. In that case it does not appear that any payments had been made under the contract, but the contractor was seeking a lien for an amount equal to the full amount due under the contract. That is not the situation presented in the case at bar. The amount called for by the original contract in this case, together with certain extras thereafter ordered and done, was $5,656.15. The tenant with whom the complainant made the contract had paid a total of $3,700 for the work done, leaving a balance due of less than $2,000. The master found that at most the items which might not be lienable amounted to a few hundred dollars only, and that the complainant was entitled to have the amount which the tenants had paid under the contract credited in such a way as to pay for those nonlienable items, and that the complainant was entitled to a lien for the balance due under the contract. While the master’s report does not specify just what the total amount of the nonlienable items was, it is quite clear that it was considerably under $3,700. The evidence in this record being such as to make it possible to determine the fact that the nonlienable items amounted to less than the- amounts the tenants had paid under the contract, we are of the opinion that the complainant is entitled to a lien for the balance due. It is a general principle that equity will credit payments so as to give a creditor the best security for the debt remaining unpaid. Monson v. Meyer, 190 Ill. 105; Barbee v. Morris, 221 Ill. 382.

For the reasons stated the decree of the superior court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

O’Connor, P. J., and Taylor, J., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Johnston

license: Public Domain

text:
    Sarah Levy et al., Appellees, v. F. B. Odell et al., Joseph E. Hesser and H. F. Soden, Appellants.
    Gen. No. 29,545.
    1. Foreclosure of mortgages — title of purchasers pending redemption period under void decree. Where the decree in proceedings supplemental to foreclosure proceedings was held void and a nullity by the Supreme Court as to the heirs of a deceased comortgagor, because they were not made parties to that suit, the purchasers at the foreclosure sale acquired no legal rights under the decree as to such heirs, notwithstanding that the decree in the supplemental proceedings sought to make the decree in the original proceedings binding on such heirs; and the latter were held entitled to redeem, although they had not availed themselves of that right under the decree in the supplemental proceedings.
    2. Notice and record of title — constructive notice of foreclosure proceedings hy purchasers under decree. Even as to purchasers who are strangers to proceedings, the law presumes that they inspected the public records before purchasing, and they will be bound where the record disclosed the fact that necessary parties had been omitted in original proceedings, and also disclosed the want of jurisdiction to bind such parties by a decree in supplemental proceedings.
    3. Judicial sales — duty of purchasers to inspect records of proceedings. The rule that purchasers at a judicial sale were under no legal obligation to inspect the records further than to determine whether the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties, and that they were under no legal obligation to determine whether the court had correctly decided whether it could bind parties who had been omitted from the original suit, by a decree in supplemental proceedings, has no application where the decision in the supplemental proceedings was void and a nullity as to the parties.
    4. Judgments — collateral attack on void decree. The rule protecting a judgment or decree from collateral attack where the court had jurisdiction is not applicable when the judgment or decree is void or a nullity.
    Appeal by defendants from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar Hebel, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed June 22, 1925.
    Rehearing denied July 10, 1925. Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).

      Benjamin F. J. Odell, for appellants.
    Alanson C. Noble, Otto Baer and Earl J. Walker, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal by Joseph E. Hesser and H. F. Soden, defendants, from a decree allowing Buth Levy, Julia Levy and Katherine Levy Goldman, complainants, as heirs of their father, Emanuel Levy, to redeem from a mortgage executed by Emanuel Levy and his wife, Sarah Levy, to F. B. Odell, to secure the payment of an indebtedness of $8,400.

On the death of Emanuel Levy, Odell, as owner, and the Chicago Title & Trust Company, as trustee, filed a bill to foreclose the mortgage. The bill alleged that the heirs of Levy were unknown, that the title to the mortgaged property was held in joint tenancy by Emanuel and Sarah Levy, and therefore passed to Sarah Levy upon Emanuel Levy’s death. Sarah Levy and the unknown heirs of Emanuel Levy were made parties to the suit, but on motion of the complainants the cause was dismissed as to the heirs. A decree of foreclosure was rendered in May, 1917, and the mortgaged premises were sold by the master on June 25, 1917, to Orra W. Bussell, to whom a certificate of sale was issued. On April 22, 1918, by leave of court, Odell and Orra W. Bussell filed a supplemental bill, alleging the filing of the original bill against Sarah Levy and the unknown heirs, the dismissal of the unknown heirs of Emanuel Levy and the subsequent proceedings resulting in the decree of foreclosure and the sale to Orra W. Bussell.

The supplemental bill alleged that Buth Levy, Julia Levy and Katherine Levy Goldman were the heirs of Emanuel Levy. They were made parties defendant to the supplemental bill and appeared and answered the supplemental bill. The prayer of the supplemental bill was that the rights of the heirs, Ruth Levy, Julia Levy and Katherine Levy Goldman, might be determined, and that their right to redeem, if any, might be limited to the period of redemption fixed by the master in the sale under the decree in the original foreclosure proceedings. On a hearing of the supplemental bill a decree was entered finding that all of the material allegations in the supplemental bill were proved, and ordering that the previous decree of sale in the original foreclosure proceedings should be made binding on the heirs, Ruth Levy, Julia Levy and Katherine Levy Goldman, as though they had been made defendants in the original foreclosure proceedings,, except that the heirs should be given 90 days additional to redeem from the sale in the original foreclosure proceedings.

The additional 90 days for redemption still left the time for redemption less than the period provided by the statute.

No appeal was prayed from the decree in the supplemental proceedings. After the expiration of the time fixed by the supplemental decree for the heirs to redeem, Orra W. Russell, the purchaser of the mortgaged property at the sale in the original foreclosure proceedings, sold the property to the defendants Hesser and Soden.

Subsequent to the purchase of the property by Hesser and Soden from Orra W. Russell, a writ of error was prosecuted from the decree in the supplemental proceedings to the Appellate Court, and the Appellate Court affirmed the decree. (Odell v. Levy, 224 Ill. App. 345.) The case was taken to the Supreme court by certiorari and the Supreme Court reversed the decree and remanded the cause. (Odell v. Levy, 307 Ill. 277.)

The defendants Hesser and Soden were not parties to the supplemental proceeding, but they were parties to the writ of error in the Appellate Court and also to the writ of error in the Supreme Court.

After the decree in the supplemental proceedings was reversed by the Supreme Court the heirs, Ruth Levy, Julia Levy and Katherine Levy Goldman, the complainants began the suit in the case at bar to redeem the mortgaged property from the mortgage, which was sought to be foreclosed in the original foreclosure proceeding and Hesser and Soden were made defendants.

On the hearing in the case at bar the court entered a decree giving the complainants, the heirs, Ruth Levy, Julia Levy and Katherine Levy Goldman, the right to redeem the mortgaged property. It is from this decree that the defendants, Hesser and Soden, have prosecuted the present appeal.

The ultimate question to be determined is whether Hesser and Soden had a legal right to rely on the decree in the supplemental proceedings, and were protected by the decree notwithstanding that it was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court. The determination of this question depends on the question whether the decree in the supplemental proceedings was void as to the complainants, the heirs, Ruth Levy, Julia Levy and Katherine Levy Goldman. Numerous collateral questions have been argued by counsel for the defendants; but we do not think that it is necessary to enter into a discussion of those questions, as in our opinion the controversy properly may be confined to the small compass which we have indicated.

The rule is well established that a person purchasing real estate under a judgment or decree to which he is not a party will, where there is no defect of jurisdiction, and the purchase is made in good faith, hold the estate, notwithstanding a subsequent reversal on error of such judgment or decree. Smith v. Erittenham, 109 Ill. 540, 552; Kuzak v. Anderson, 267 Ill. 609, 612. It does not follow, however, that because a court has acquired jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter that the court has the power to render a judgment or decree that transcends the law. In the case of Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, the court said (p. 143):

“Where a .court, after acquiring jurisdiction, has assumed to enter a decree for a sale which goes beyond the limits of the jurisdiction and transgresses the law, the decree is void, and the sale based thereon is likewise an absolute nullity. * * * One of the essentials of a valid judgment is that the court have jurisdiction to render that particular judgment.”

The controlling question then in the case at bar is whether in the supplemental proceedings the decree of the court transcended the law. In other words, was that decree void and a nullity in so far as the complainants, the heirs, Buth Levy, Julia Levy and Katherine Levy Goldman, are concerned? If it was, then the defendants, Hesser and Soden, were not protected by the decree and did not acquire a valid title by virtue of their purchase of the mortgaged property from Orra W. Bussell.

According to our interpretation of the decision of the Supreme Court on the writ of error in the case of Odell v. Levy, supra, the decree in the supplemental proceedings was void and a nullity as to the complainants in the case at bar, and the defendants, Hesser and Soden, acquired no legal rights under the decree as against the complainants. Adopting a phrase from the opinion in the case of Young v. Lorain, 11 Ill. 625, 637, we would say that the decree in the supplemental proceedings was “rendered in the exercise of an usurped authority.”

In the case of Odell v. Levy, supra, the court held (p. 280) that the decree in the original proceedings to foreclose the mortgage was “void” and a “nullity” as to the complainants in the case at bar, for the reason that the complainants were not parties to that suit; and the court also held that “there was no authority” for making the complainants parties “to the decree of foreclosure and binding them by the sale made under it by means of a supplemental bill.” The court said (pp. 281, 282):

“ Since the decree was void as to them, the court could not in any kind of a proceeding give it any validity against them. Their land was subject to the mortgage debt in accordance with the terms of the mortgage, which could be enforced against them only in accordance with the usual and ordinary process of foreclosure. A decree to which they were not parties was not even prima facie evidence against them of anything and they could not through any proceeding be bound by its terms. The purchaser at a foreclosure sale upon a decree to which the owner of the equity of redemption is not a party and which is therefore void as to him becomes the equitable assignee of the mortgage and acquires the legal title to the land which was in the mortgagee, but the right of the owner of the equity of redemption to redeem will be unaffected by the decree. * * * The relief sought by the supplemental bill was to make the decree of foreclosure already rendered, and the sale already made, binding on the plaintiffs in error. This could not be done. * * * The plaintiffs in error had a right to redeem from the mortgage even after the decree and after the sale, which were both void as to them, without paying any of the costs incurred in the foreclosure proceeding; and this would be so if they had come into court as complainants, asking to be allowed to redeem in equity. (Rodman v. Quick, supra.) [211 Ill. 546.] Clearly the plaintiffs in error.were entitled to redeem the premises, without regard to the void decree, by the payment of notes, with the interest, and so prevent a foreclosure or sale. Their liability could not be increased by a proceeding to foreclose the mortgage to which they were not parties. (Moore v. Kirby, 76 Wis. 273.) The court had no jurisdiction of the plaintiffs in error in the original suit, and the purchase price at the sale under the original decree could not be the measure of the amount required to redeem. (Bradley v. Snyder, 14 Ill. 263.) The plaintiffs in error are bound by the mortgage but not by the decree or sale. The statute secures to the mortgagor the right to redeem from a decree of foreclosure within twelve months after a sale under the decree, but the decree under review cuts off the right to redeem without any decree of foreclosure. The defendants in error had a right to foreclose their mortgage against the plaintiffs in error, but they could not make the plaintiffs in error parties to a decree of foreclosure rendered in their absence and without an opportunity for a hearing.”

Counsel for the defendants argue that since the court had jurisdiction of the complainants, Buth Levy, Julia Levy and Katherine Levy Goldman, who were actually parties defendant in the supplemental proceedings, and since the court also had jurisdiction of the subject matter in the supplemental proceedings, the decree in the supplemental proceedings was valid and binding on the complainants, Buth Levy, Julia Levy and Katherine Levy Goldman, until reversed, and that Hesser and Soden, who were strangers to the original and supplemental proceedings, and who purchased the mortgaged property before the decree in the supplemental proceedings was reversed, had a legal right to rely on the decree in the supplemental proceedings.

It may be conceded for the sake of argument that the court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter in the original and supplemental proceedings, but in our opinion, as previously stated, the court transcended its jurisdiction when it attempted to bind the complainants in the case at bar by the decree in the supplemental proceeding. In this view it is immaterial whether the defendants in the case at bar were strangers to the original and supplemental proceedings, or parties to those proceedings. Even if they should be regarded as strangers to those proceedings, the law presumes that they inspected the public records before purchasing; and as the record in the supplemental proceedings disclosed the fact that the complainants who were necessary, parties to the original proceedings had been omitted in that proceeding and also disclosed the want of jurisdiction of the court to bind the complainants by a decree in the supplemental proceedings, the defendants were not protected by the decree in the supplemental proceedings.

The rule is well settled that the law presumes that all men inspect public records through which a title to property is derived, before purchasing the property. If they fail to do so, the law will not protect them from the consequences of purchasing property under a void decree. Rabbitt v. Weber & Co., 297 Ill. 491, 498; Morris v. Hogle, 37 Ill. 150, 155.

Counsel for the defendants contend that the defendants were under no legal obligation to inspect the record in the supplemental proceeding further than to determine whether the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; that the defendants were under no legal duty to determine whether the court had decided correctly the question whether it could bind the complainants by a decree in the supplemental proceeding. The contention of counsel for the defendants may be right where the decision of the court is merely erroneous but not void. The rule, however, does not apply where the decision, as in the supplemental proceeding, was void and a nullity as to the complainants. Armstrong v. Obucino, supra (pp. 140, 143).

It is contended further by counsel for the defendants that the suit in the case at bar is a collateral attack on the decree in the supplemental proceedings, and that the decree in the supplemental proceedings must be regarded as valid and binding on a collateral attack. Even if the proceeding in the case at bar should be regarded as a collateral attack on the decree in the supplemental proceedings, the rule protecting a judgment or decree from collateral attack, where the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, is not applicable when the judgment or decree is void and a nullity. Armstrong v. Obucino, supra (p. 143); Figge v. Rowlen, 185 Ill. 234, 241. And we have held that in the case at bar the decree in the supplemental proceeding was void and a nullity as to the complainants.

For the reasons stated in the opinion the decree of the chancellor is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McSurely, P. J., and Hatchett, J., concur.


text:
    Citizens Trust & Savings Bank, Appellant, v. Ernest I. Dresher, Appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,839.
    1. Limitations of actions — when amended declaration does not allege new cause of action within statute. No new cause of action within the bar of the statute of limitations is alleged by a declaration in trover for the conversion of securities where a plea of discharge in bankruptcy was sustained to the original declaration on demurrer to the plea and the amended declaration was identical with the original except for the addition of the words “wilfully and maliciously” to the charge of conversion, inserted for the purpose of avoiding the bar by discharge, and where both the original and the amended declaration charged, in legal effect, only that defendant was guilty of a wanton, reckless disregard of duty, amounting to wilfulness and malice within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.
    2. Appeal and bbbob — contention presented for review on appeal from ruling on demurrer. A plaintiff, suing in trover for the conversion of certain securities, whose original declaration was held vulnerable to a plea of discharge in bankruptcy, by the overruling of his demurrer to the plea, and who thereupon amended his declaration by adding the words “wilfully and maliciously” to the charge of conversion to meet the bar of the discharge, does not seek a review of the ruling on his demurrer to the plea of discharge contrary to his waiver of his demurrer by amending, where he asks for a review of the trial court’s ruling overruling his demurrer to a plea of the statute of limitations to the amended declaration and contends that no new cause of action was stated by the amended declaration, even though a construction of the original declaration is thereby called for in the reviewing court, since by standing on the amendment he presents for review only the question of the sufficiency of that pleading.

      Appeal by plaintiff from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John A. Swanson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed June 22, 1925.
    Sonnenschein, Berkson, Lautmann & Levinson, for appellant; Henry S. Moser, of counsel.
    Jacobson, Merrick & Latter, for appellee; Sidney C. Nierman, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal by the Citizens Trust & Savings Bank, the plaintiff, from a judgment overruling the demurrer of the plaintiff to the plea of the statute of limitations filed by Ernest I. Dresher, the defendant, to the amended declaration of the plaintiff.

The action was one of trover brought by the plaintiff to recover the value of certain stock certificates alleged to have been converted by the defendant to his own use. To the original declaration the defendant pleaded the general issue and discharge in bankruptcy. The plaintiff demurred to the plea of discharge in bankruptcy and the demurrer was overruled. The plaintiff then filed an amended declaration. The defendant filed three pleas to the amended declaration, ■ — the general issue, discharge in bankruptcy and the statute of limitations. The plaintiff demurred to the plea of discharge in bankruptcy and to the plea of the statute of limitations. The court sustained the plaintiff’s demurrer to the plea of discharge in bankruptcy and overruled the plaintiff’s demurrer to the plea of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff elected to abide by the amended declaration.

The theory on which the court overruled the plaintiff’s demurrer to the plea of the statute of limitations was that the plaintiff’s amended declaration stated a new cause of action, and that more than five years had intervened between the date of the alleged conversion by the defendant and the date of the filing of the amended declaration.

The question to be determined is whether the amended declaration stated a new cause of action.

The original declaration was substantially as follows :

“First Count: On May 27th plaintiff was possessed of securities (listing securities in question) of the value of $10,000. Plaintiff lost the securities and they came into possession of defendant by finding. Well knowing securities were the property of the plaintiff, defendant refused to return the same and converted and disposed of the same to his own use.
“Additional Count: On August 25, 1917, defendant was indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $8800.00 and executed and delivered to plaintiff three (3) notes to evidence the indebtedness. To secure the payment of the indebtedness defendant deposited with plaintiff securities (listing securities in question) of the value of $10,000. On February 27, 1918, defendant, for the purpose of obtaining possession of the securities executed and delivered to plaintiff a trust receipt agreeing to hold the securities in trust for plaintiff and as plaintiff’s agent, and to account for same in ten days. That plaintiff delivered securities to defendant upon the terms of said receipt. That the defendant failed to return the securities or to account for same, but converted and disposed of same to his own use.”

The amended declaration was as follows:

“First Count: On May 27th plaintiff was possessed of securities (listing securities in question) of the value of $10,000. Plaintiff lost the securities and they came into possession of defendant by finding. Well knowing the securities were the property of the plaintiff, defendant wilfully and maliciously refused to return same and wilfully and maliciously converted and disposed of same to his own use.
“Second Count: On August 25, 1917, defendant was indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $8800.00 and executed and delivered to plaintiff three (3) notes to evidence the indebtedness. To secure the payment of the indebtedness defendant deposited with plaintiff securities (listing securities in question) of the value of $10,000. On February 27, 1918, defendant, for the purpose of obtaining possession of the securities executed and delivered to plaintiff a trust receipt agreeing to hold the securities in trust for plaintiff and as plaintiff’s agent, and to account for same in ten days. That plaintiff delivered securities to defendant upon the terms of said receipt. That the defendant wilfully and maliciously failed to return the securities or to account for same and wilfully and maliciously converted and disposed of same to his own use.”

The only difference between the original declaration and the amended declaration is that the amended declaration contains the additional words “wilfully and maliciously.”

The precise question to be decided is whether these words had the effect of creating a new cause of action.

It is contended by counsel for the plaintiff that in the sense in which the words are used in the Bankruptcy Act, they did not change the content of the amended declaration at all; that they do not mean actual malice or wilfulness, but only such acts as evidence a wanton, reckless disregard of duty; and that the allegations in both the original declaration and the amended declaration, to the effect that the defendant as trustee of certain funds converted those funds to his own use, are sufficient to connote a wanton, reckless disregard of duty, or, in other words, wilfulness and malice within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.

We agree with the contentions of counsel for the plaintiff.

In the case of McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U. S. 138, 141, 142, the court held that one who, being intrusted with the possession of corporate stocks as security for an indebtedness, deliberately sells them and appropriates the proceeds, in excess of the debt secured, without the knowledge or consent of their owner, is guilty of a “wilful and malicious” injury to property within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.

In the case of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, the court said (p. 487) that “ a wilful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an act which is against good morals and wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally, may he said to be done Avilfully and maliciously, so as to come Avithin the exception” of the Bankruptcy Act.

In the case of In re Stenger, 283 Fed. 419, the court said (p. 421):

“While there was formerly some doubt and conflict as to whether a claim for the conversion by an agent of money or other property intrusted to his custody by or on behalf of the owner thereof is a wilful and malicious injury within the meaning of section 17 (2), and therefore dischargeable in bankruptcy, it is, in my opinion, now settled law that a claim based on a conversion such as that here involved is a Avilful and malicious injury, which claim, under section 17 (2), is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U. S. 138.”

In the case of Mason v. Sault, 93 Vt. 412, in an action in trover for the conversion of a mare, the court said (pp. 415, 416, 417):

“It remains to consider whether the unauthorized sale of the mare, in the circumstances disclosed in the evidence, was ‘a wilful and malicious injury’ thereto within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. Prior to the pronouncement by the Supreme Court of the United States in McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U. S. 138, 61 L. Ed. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 38, there was a conflict respecting this matter in the decisions of the inferior courts. But that case has clarified the situation and renders the holdings of other courts to the contrary of no force as precedents. * * * Some of the cases hold that for a conversion to be Avithin the exception it must amount to larceny. But such is not the holding in McIntyre v. Kavanaugh. The rule fairly deducible therefrom is that the disposal of another’s property without his knowledge or consent, done intentionally in disregard of what one knows to be his duty, to the other’s injury, is a wilful and malicious injury to property within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.”

On the above authorities we are of the opinion that the additional words “wilfully and maliciously,” which were inserted in the amended declaration, did not state a new cause of action; that although the words “wilfully and maliciously” were omitted from the original declaration, that declaration states the same cause of action as the amended declaration.

It has been analogously held, in an action for damages for a personal injury, that an additional count, which for the first time charges the defendant with “a wanton and reckless disregard of its duty” and with “negligent, unlawful and wanton misconduct,” instead of mere negligence, does not state a'new cause of action. Blayney v. Cotton, 189 Ill. App. 205, 209.

Counsel for the defendant contend that in taking the position that the words “wilfully and maliciously,” which were added to the amended declaration, do not state a new cause of action, the plaintiff is, in effect, seeking to review the action of the court in overruling the plaintiff’s demurrer to the plea of discharge in bankruptcy, which the defendant interposed to the plaintiff’s original declaration; that the plaintiff did not stand on the demurrer and appeal, but amended the declaration; and that, therefore, the plaintiff has waived “its right to insist that the declaration was sufficient to charge a cause of action to which a plea of a discharge in bankruptcy would not be a defense. ’ ’ In support of their contention counsel for the defendant cite authorities which hold that where the demurrer of a party is overruled and the party pleads over, he waives the grounds of demurrer and cannot raise the legal questions presented by the demurrer.

In our opinion the plaintiff is not asking for a review of the court’s action in overruling the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s plea of discharge in bankruptcy to the original declaration. The plaintiff is asking for a review of the ruling of the court that the amended declaration stated a new cause of action, and was, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations. When the plaintiff’s demurrer to the plea of the statute of limitations, which was interposed by the defendant to the amended declaration, was overruled, the plaintiff elected to abide by the amended declaration. This, of course, was in accordance with proper procedure. The question, therefore, that is presented for review relates to the amended declaration, not to the original declaration. It is true that when we hold that a new cause of action was not stated in the amended declaration by the insertion of the additional words “wilfully and maliciously,” it necessarily follows from our opinion that the original declaration was sufficient to bring the defendant within the exception of the Bankruptcy Act without the additional words. We are not, however, passing directly on the sufficiency of the original declaration. We are considering only the amended declaration. The plaintiff cannot be denied its right to have the question whether it was justified in abiding by the amended declaration reviewed merely because a determination of that question incidentally involves a question relating to the original declaration.

For the reasons stated in the opinion, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to sustain the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s plea of the statute of limitations.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

McSurely, P. J., and Hatchett, J., concur.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

text:
    First District.
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Irving Yuditsky, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 29,147.
    Prosecution for larceny. Defendant convicted. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William E. Helander, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    Landfield & Levin, for plaintiff in error.
    Robert E. Crowe, State’s Attorney, Edward E. Wilson and Clyde C. Fisher, Assistant State’s Attorneys, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    J. O. Nessen, defendant in error, v. Charles Horn, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 29,176.
    Motion for order vacating order dismissing bill of complaint for want of equity and for simple dismissal with costs against complainant,. Motion granted. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. George Fred Rush, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.

      Gertiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    David K. Tone, for plaintiff in error.
    McCormick, Kirkland, Patterson & Fleming and Good, Childs, Bobb & Wescott, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Joseph Gentkowski and Julia Gentkowski, appellees, v. Pauline Sielski, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,223.
    Forcible entry and detainer. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Bernard P. Bar asa, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    D. W. Heffron, for appellant; J. H. Perkinson, of counsel.
    Walter T. Stanton, for appellees; Michael W. Kaveney, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Taylor

text:
    M. Louise Craig, for use of James Nelson, defendant in error, v. Chicago Trust Company, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 28,787.
    Case consolidated with 236 Ill. App. 223. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Alfar M. Eberhardt, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed February 2, 1925.
    Defrees, Buckingham & Eaton, for plaintiff in error; Don Kenneth Jones and Vincent O’Brien, of counsel.
    Clarence A. Samuel, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Emma N. Arnold, appellee, v. Frederick W. Cox et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 28,922.
    Bill to foreclose a trust deed. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Denis E. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1923.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    Frederick Mains, for appellants.
    Adolph H. Easter and Charles H. Mitchell, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ida Vorman, appellee, v. City of Chicago, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,020.
    Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in falling upon a sidewalk. Judgment for the plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. John J. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1923.
    Affirmed.
    Thomson, J., dissenting.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, and John J. Kelly, City Attorney, for appellant; Daniel V. Gallery, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel.
    Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mary Quigley, appellee, v. W. N. Macqueen & Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,048.
    Action on a contract for the exchange of mortgages for stock. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Wells M. Cook, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1923.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    J. S. Dudley, for appellant.
    Mather & Hutson, for appellee; Lawrence C. Traeger and Helmer Brandell, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    R. L. Fordyce et al., copartners, trading as Great Lakes Coal & Coke Company, appellants, v. Chicago Coal & Mining Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,060.
    Action on contract for the purchase of coal. Judgment for the defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Wells M. Cook, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1923.
    Reversed and judgment here.
    Thomson, J., specially concurring.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    Winston, Strawn & Shaw, for appellants; Frank H. Towner, of counsel.
    Charles N. Goodnow, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Carl P. Sorby, defendant in error, v. Kristian Baun, for use of Dansk Tidende, garnishee, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 29,132.
    Garnishment process on judgment against defendant. Judgment against garnishee. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Asa G. Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    C. W. Larsen, for plaintiff in error; F. J. Karasek, of counsel.
    Sumner C. Palmer and Waldemar A. Bauer, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George W. Swigart and Charles J. Canfield, appellants, v. S. Klein, appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,159.
    Action by assignee to recover amount due on contract to manage and care for property. Demurrer to complaint sustained. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Harry M. Fisher, Judge, presiding. Hoard in the third division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    Samuel J. Nordorf, for appellants.
    Sonnensehein, Berkson, Lautmann & Levinson, for appellee; Avern B. Scolnik, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Thomson

text:
    L. Samuels and I. Edelson, defendants in error, v. A. O. Ritzler et al., plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 28,702.
    Action on claim for printing. Judgment for plaintiffs. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Emanuel Eller, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Reversed and judgment here.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    William R. Jordan and George S. Marks, for plaintiffs in error.
    No appearance for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Denis J. Leahy, appellee, v. Finch Truitt Company, Inc., appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,011.
    Action to recover salary as salesman. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Laurence B. Jacobs, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1923.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    Pennish & Rashbaum, for appellant; F. D. Shobe, of counsel.
    Musgrave, Oppenheim, McKeever & Lippincott, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Sir. Justice Thomson

text:
    Marshall O. Densby, appellee, v. Frederick H. Bartlett, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,045.
    Action to recover damages for injuries sustained through the negligent operation of an automobile by the defendant. Judgment for the plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lee W. Carrier, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1923.
    Affirmed.
    Taylor, J., dissenting.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.

      Vail, Vail & Plamondon, for appellant.
    Vincent G. Gallagher, for appellee.
   Sir. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, v. Morrow Harding, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 29,100.
    Prosecution for assault with deadly weapon. Defendant convicted. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John J. Rooney, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    Rehearing denied February 24, 1925.
    Clanton & Jones, for plaintiff in error.
    Robert E. Crowe, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Edward E. Wilson and Clyde G. Fisher, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Nancy Healy, defendant in error, v. Edwin Robie, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 29,171.
    Bastardy proceeding. Judgment against the defendant. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William L. Morgan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 5, 1925.
    Arthur W. Kettles and Charles W. Bidwill, for plaintiff in error.
    Robert E. Crowe, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Ideal Tool & Manufacturing Company, appellee, v. J. Wadsworth Staff, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,307.
    Action for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for the plaintiff. See 236 Ill. App. 633. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William N. Gemmill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    Joel C. Carlson, for appellant.
    Herbert Bebb, for appellee; John A. Russell, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Marshall O. Densby, plaintiff in error, v. Frederick H. Bartlett et al., defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 29,508.
    Case consolidated with Gen. No. 29,045, supra. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lee W. Carrier, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed February 11, 1925.
    Vincent G. Gallagher, for plaintiff in error.
    Vail, Vail & Plamondon, Bassler, Bippus, Rose & Reeve and Sinden & Hassell, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

text:
    Mary E. Proctor, plaintiff in error, v. S. B. Chapin et al., defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 29,436.
    Action for money had and received for investment by defendant stockbrokers. Judgment in plaintiff’s favor for small amount, entered over plaintiff’s objection upon a directed verdict. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. George B. Holmes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Edward H. Morris and James B. Cashin, for plaintiff in error.
    Custer & Cameron and Thomas B. Lantry, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Fred Thoma, defendant in error, v. Fred W. Gehrer, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 29,444.
    Suit in attachment. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph B. David, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Adams, Pollansbee, Hawley & Shorey, for plaintiff in error; Samuel Adams, Melvin M. Hawley and Howard H. Wikoff, of counsel.
    Hovak & Novak, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Martin J. Funk, administrator of the estate of Albert B. Funk, deceased, plaintiff in error, v. Ratledge Bone Construction Company, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 29,467.
    Action to recover damages for death of plaintiff’s intestate caused by defendant’s negligence in driving motor truck. Judgment for defendant. Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Timothy D. Hurley, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    James C. McShane, for plaintiff in error.
    Joseph D. Ryan, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frank J. Smithie, appellee, v. Mack-International Motor Truck Corporation, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,479.
    Action to recover sum paid to defendant under duress. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William R. Fetzer, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Adams, Pollansbee, Hawley & Shorey, for appellant.
    Marshall-E. Gallion, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles Andrews, trading as Andrews Realty Company, appellant, v. George H. Heppe, appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,502.
    Suit by real estate broker to recover commissions upon the sale of real estate. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. George B. Holmes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and judgment here for $5,400 with finding of facts.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.

      Mclnerney & Power, for appellant.
    McMahon & Cheney, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Walter W. Tackett, appellee, v. Ward M. Jones et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 29,519.
    Suit for money had and received. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John Richardson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 16, 1925.
    Litsinger, Healy & Reid, for appellants.
    Beckman, Olson & Hough, for appellee; Charles E. Carnahan, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Barnes

text:
    Augusta J. Glendinning, defendant in error, v. William G. Palmer and Thomas Davis, plaintiffs in error.
    Gen. No. 29,430.
    Action of trespass for assault and battery and false imprisonment, joined with count for malicious prosecution. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. David M. Brothers, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this
    court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Pitch, P. J., dissenting in part.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Hayes, McKinney, Cornelius Lynde and George H. Grear, for plaintiffs in error; John J. Healy, of counsel.
    Gleland, Lee & Phelps, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    R. M. Tashjian, appellee, v. H. M. Tashjian, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,491.
    Action upon a stated account. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Alfar M. Eberhardt, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the
    first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Edward C. Guilmez, for appellant.
    Jeffery, Townley, Wild, Campbell & Clark, for appellee; Charles V. Clark and Frederick D. Carroll, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Edward I. Barton, appellee, v. Elizabeth Hoyt et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 29,500.
    Proceedings for removal of chief electrician of park board. Order entered upon writ of certiorari quashing record of proceedings of board ordering removal. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Philip L. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 16, 1925. Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Daniel A. Roberts and Elizabeth H. Buehhalter, for appellants.
    Kremer, Branand & Hamer, for appellee; Robert Branand, Jr., of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Richard L. Williams, complainant and appellee, v. Charles S. Williston, trustee, et al., defendants, on appeal of Alexander W. Marmor, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,290.
    Foreclosure suit. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Francis S. Wilson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 16, 1925.
    William Slack and Abram E. Adelman, for appellant.
    Slottow & Leviton, for appellee; Charles Leviton, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Gridley

text:
    Regina Boer, plaintiff in error, v. Albert Revesz and Emery Szoeke, defendants in error.
    Gen. No. 29,454.
    Assumpsit for money due. Dismissed for want of prosecution. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. J. Fred Gilstcr, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Fassett, Abbott & Hughes, for plaintiff in error; John E. Hughes, of counsel.
    Lester L. Bauer, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Margaret A. Flynn, appellee, v. Francis X. Busch et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 29,484.
    Mandamus to compel payment to petitioner of a certain sum from the Firemen’s Pension Fund. Writ issued. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Philip L. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, for appellants; Albert H. Veeder, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel.
    Michael F. Girten, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Dominick Gavigan, appellee, v. Charles R. Gold, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,489.
    Action for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Emanuel Eller, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 16, 1925.
    Alfred Roy Hulbert, for appellant.
    James C. MeShane, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John H. Meier, appellee, v. John A. Eck Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,505.
    Action on contract for the sale of merchandise. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. George A. Curran, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 3, 1925.
    Stewart Reed Brown, for appellant.
    Hart E. Baker, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

text:
    William E. Sharp, appellee, v. Charles Cohn, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,465.
    Suit on agreement to pay for repair of automobile damaged by defendant’s minor son. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John J. Lupe, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Bulkley, More & Tallmadge, for appellant.
    Adams & White, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Claude R. Faunt, appellee, v. Henry G. Elfborg, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,504.
    Suit to recover shares of stock. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar Hebei, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 23, 1925.
    Jeffery, Townley, Wild, Campbell & Clark, for appellant; Morris Townley, of counsel.
    McCormick, Kirkland, Patterson & Fleming, for appellee; Charles F. Rathbun and Robert M. Golding, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Carrie A. Maginnis, appellant, v. Eugene Maginnis, appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,573.
    Divorce. Order modifying alimony provisions in decree. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas J. Lynch, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Millard R. Powers, for appellant.
    George A. McCorkle and Edward G. Purkhiser, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    E. C. Meyers, trading as Meyers Motor Car Company, appellant, v. Cox-Stratton Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,583.
    Suit on contract of sale. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. James J. O’Toole, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 23, 1925.
    D. M. Dever and Moses H. Kamerman, for appellant.
    Tyrell & McCarthy and Frank J. Tyrell, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mary F. Peck et al., trustees of the estate of P. F. W. Peck, appellants, v. Rees Davis Toy Company, appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,594.
    Suit to recover amount alleged to be due on a written lease. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago;

      the Hon. Frank E. Reed, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and judgment here for plaintiff for $575.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 23, 1925.
    E. E. Melum, for appellants; L. J. Haigler, of counsel.
    Clarence T. Morse, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Isaac N. Chellew and William N. Young, appellants, v. Charles M. Armstrong, appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,610.
    Suit to recover balance alleged to be due for real estate brokers’ commissions on sale of defendant’s property. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Laurence B. Jacobs, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Charles H. Miller and Lyman M. Paine, for appellants.
    Frank Hall Stephens, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Molnar Janos, appellee, v. Security Trust & Deposit Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,621.
    Suit to recover money alleged to have been deposited in safety deposit box rented from the defendant. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Edgar A. Jonas, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 23, 1925.
    W. B. Wilson, for appellant; Alvin E. Stein, of counsel.
    Walter Boerger, for appellee; William Scott Stewart, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Harry R. Curran and Mandel Lowenstine, appellants, v. William Thanos, appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,645.
    Suit against guarantor of rent of leased premises to recover month’s rent. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William R. Fetzer, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Theodore Rubovits, for appellants.
    Ralph F. Stern, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Joseph Sipka, appellee, v. Sam Berman, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,654.
    Action of forcible entry and detainer. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William E. Yiner, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Isidore Brown, for appellant.
    Stough, Harrington, Carolan & Loy, for appellee; Charles E. Loy, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    M. W. Douglas et al., copartners, trading as Douglas Products Company, appellees, v. Louis Meyer, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,787.
    Action by tenant against landlord to recover for damage to merchandise from flooding of basement caused by clogged drains and down spouts. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. George B. Holmes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Charles J. Mueller, for appellant.
    A. S. and E. W. Eroehlich, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Burge Machine Works, appellee, v. S. Rugendorf, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,836.
    Action to recover balance due on contract for installing refrigerator in defendant’s meat shop. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Timothy D. Hurley, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924. Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 23, 1925.
    Shulman, Shulman & Abrams, for appellant.
    Alden, Latham & Young, for appellee; Charles Martin, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    William Harry Brown, trading as Argo-Summit Dairy, appellee, v. Bowman Dairy Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,867.
    Action to recover damage to plaintiff’s truck in collision with defendant’s truck. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Edgar A. Jonas, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924. Reversed and judgment of nil capiat.

    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 31, 1925.
    F. J. Canty, for appellant; Max F. Allaben, of counsel.
    Alice Hurt Thompson, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Arthur Ritz, appellee, v. Western & Southern Life Insurance Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,888.
    Action on life insurance policy. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Asa G. Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Hoyne, O’Connor & Rubinkam, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Peter Schnabl, appellee, v. Joseph Moll, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,906.
    Action to recover damages sustained in automobile collision. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Muuicipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Francis Borrelli, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.

      Louis J. Behan and William J. Corrigan, for appellant.
    Carpenter, Earnhardt & Reynolds, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The Shear Company, appellee, v. James R. Baker & Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,254.
    Action for breach of contract. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Edward I). Shurtleff, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed March 9, 1925.
    Rehearing denied March 23, 1925.
    Tenney, Harding, Sherman So Rogers, for appellant.
    Levinson,
    Becker, Schwartz & Frank, for appellee; Marshall Solbcrg, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Eli Jewelry Company, appellee, v. City of Chicago et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 29,985.
    Injunction suit to restrain defendants from preventing plaintiff from selling its merchandise at auction. Temporary injunction issued. Appeal from interlocutory order from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Hugo M. Friend, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 23, 1925.
    Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, for appellants; Leon Hornstein, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel.
    Hyman J. Rosenberg, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr. Justice Matchett

text:
    Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, appellee, v. Rebecca Heckelman, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,977.
    Suit to cancel policy of life insurance and to restrain suit thereon. Interlocutory order restraining suit on policy. Interlocutory appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon.. Charles M. Foell, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed March 23, 1925.
    Kremer, Branand & Hamer, for appellant.
    Hoyne, O’Connor & Rubinkam, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Benjamin Fishbain, appellee, v. City of Chicago et al., appellants.
    Gen. No. 30,013.
    Injunction suit to enjoin defendants from interfering with eonstruction of building. Injunction issued. Appeal from interlocutory order from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Ira Ryner, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed.
    Opinion filed March 23, 1925.
    Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, for appellants; Albert H. Veeder, William L. Sullivan, Thomas J. Sheehan and Barnet Hodes, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel.
    Wilber J. MeGinness, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Per curiam.

text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. John Erickson, petitioner, v. David M. Brothers, a judge of the circuit court of Cook county, respondent.
    Gen. No. 29,976.
    Original petition for mandamus to compel signing of bill of exceptions.
    Writ awarded.
    Opinion filed March 23, 1925.
    Olds & Tourje, for petitioner.
    Chas. O. Rundall, for respondent.
   Per curiam.


text:
    Ida Marks, appellee, v. Sons and Daughters of Abraham, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,556.
    Action on insurance certificate. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Edward E. Laughlin, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1925.
    Freundlich & Froehlich, for appellant.
    Sonnenschein, Berkson, Lautmann & Levinson, for appellee; Bernard Nath, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Margaret Powers McLaughlin, appellant, v. Kate Hahn et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 29,507.
    Partition suit. Decree for complainants. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Hugo M. Friend, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1925.
    Rehearing denied April 18, 1925.
    Dawson & Dawson, for appellant; George E. Dawson, of counsel.
    Bassler, Bippus, Rose & Reeve, for appellees; Harold L. Reeve, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Robert E. Crowe, State’s Attorney, defendant in error, v. Arthur George Hulbert, plaintiff in error.
    Gen. No. 29,523.
    Prosecution for violation of Illinois Securities Law. Defendant convicted. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Philip J. Finnegan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1925.
    P. R. Boylan and Gurdon Williams, for plaintiff in error.
    Robert E. Crowe, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; Edward H. Taylor, Mortimer C. Grover and Edward E. Wilson, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mary Erdei, plaintiff in error, v. Garden City Sand Company, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 29,533.
    Action for personal injuries sustained in being run over by motor truck. Judgment for defendant. Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Emanuel Eller, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1925.
    Charles C. Spencer, for plaintiff in error.
    Alfred Roy Hulbert, for defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court,


text:
    Walter Lakomski, for use of Walter Berandys, appellant, v. Joseph Leonard, appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,571.
    Garnishment on judgment confessed. Judgment against one garnishee and. order of dismissal as to other. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Francis Borrelli, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1925.
    Peden, Graydon, Kahn & Murphy, for appellant; Gerald Ryan, of counsel.
    Mo appearance for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Daniel Madigan, appellee, v. George F. Nixon & Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,587.
    Action to recover for damage to stock and business by boiler explosion. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. George A. Curran, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1925.
    Alexander H. Marshall, for appellant; Frank G. Marshall, of counsel.
    Schuyler, Ettelson & Weinfield, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Parisian Novelty Company, appellant, v. Matthew T. Dunn and Frank Dunn, trading as Dunn Brothers, appellees.
    Gen. No. 29,591.
    Action for breach of warranty of goods sold. Judgment for defendants. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John J. Lupe, Judge,' presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1925.
    Edgar J. Schoen, for appellant; Maurice J. Green, of counsel.
    Krauss, Goldman & Allshouse, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Shattuck School, Inc., appellant, v. James A. Davis, appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,513.
    Assumpsit for tuition and board for defendant’s minor son. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jacob H. Hopkins, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1925.
    Arnd, Gavin, Cook & Griffin, for appellant; Frederick Arad, of counsel.
    McKinney, Lynde & Grear, for appellee; Cornelius Lynde and Joseph M. Larimer, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    George Comerford and Frank Duwaldt, copartners, trading as Comerford & Duwaldt, appellees, v. William E. Balousek, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,559.
    Action to recover real estate brokers’ commissions. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. James J. O’Toole, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed with finding of facts.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1925.

      William F. Bigelow, for appellant.
    Harry A. Silverstein, for appellees.'
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Julia V. Jenkins, appellee, v. P. H. Houy, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,584.
    Motions to set aside judgment by confession and for change of venue. Motions denied. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. David M. Brothers, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1925.
    Frisch & Frisch, for, appellant; Douglas O. Gregg, of counsel.
    George A. MeCorkle and Edward G. Purkhiser, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Frank Fleszar, appellant, v. Anna Fleszar, appellee.
    Gen. No. 29,595.
    Bill to review decree of divorce. Bill dismissed. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. John J. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 3, 1925.
    Rehearing denied April 18, 1925.
    Max Kasmar, for appellant.
    James Young, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    A. I. Gidwitz, appellee, v. Celia Levine and Bernhard M. Levine, appellants.
    Gen. No. 29,633.
    Bill to foreclose deed of trust. Decree affirming master’s report recommending decree in accordance with prayer of bill. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. diaries M. Foell, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Samuel Grossman and H. J. Rosenberg, for appellants.
    Frederick A. Brown and Shulman, Shulman & Abrams, for appellee; William G. Worthey and Marion T. Martin, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    William Kotsakis, appellee, v. Peter Orphan and Dennis J. Egan, appellants.
    Gen. No. 29,775.
    Suit to recover possession of property claimed under foreclosure of chattel mortgage and attached by the defendant. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Charles Schaefer, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924. Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Rehearing denied April 27, 1925. Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    William R. Brand, for appellants.
    Harry S. Cowan and Van Natta & King, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Thordarson Electric Manufacturing Company, appellant, v. Clara McCabe, otherwise known as Clara Andrade, and C. L. Andrade, appellees.
    Gen. No. 29,800.
    Action to recover damages to plaintiff from alleged wrongful acts of the defendants in sale of plaintiff’s merchandise. Judgment for defendants. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John J. Lupe, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Lambert & Mayer, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles A. Griffin, appellee, v. Alfred Hodges, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,818.
    Suit for real estate broker’s commissions. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. J. R. Pritchard, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Rehearing denied April 27, 1925.
    Ellis & Westbrooks, for appellant; Harris B. Gaines and Blaine G. Alston, of counsel.
    Alonzo E. Tansil, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Mattie Lockhart, administratrix of the estate of J. W. Lockhart, deceased, appellee, v. A. Silver, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,845.
    Suit by administratrix for balance due for merchandise sold to defendant by plaintiff’s intestate. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. George A. Curran, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Lewis, Adler, Lederer & Kahn, for appellant.
    Julian J. Luster, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Freda Wincon, appellant, v. Dennis J. Egan et al., appellees.
    Gen. No. 29,857.
    Motion to vacate order quashing writ of replevin and ordering return of replevied property. Motion denied. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Marshall, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Novak & Novak, for appellant; Frank H. Novak, of counsel.
    Harold 0. Mulks, for appellees.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


author: Mr,. Presiding Justice McSurely

text:
    Kazimer Jamontas, appellee, v. Freda Wincon and James Wincon, appellants.
    Gen. No. 29,858.
    Motion to vacate judgment by confession. Motion denied.' Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John J. Rooney, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Novak & Novak, for appellants.
    Harold 0. Mulks, for appellee.
   Mr,. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    T. Fred Laramie, appellee, v. Yellow Cab Company, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,876.
    Action to recover damage to automobile struck by defendant’s taxicab. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Richard V. Carpenter, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    McGreaham, Blake & Sharp, for appellant; I. Harvey Levinson, of counsel.
    Joseph J. Kroupa, for appellee.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Walter W. Ahlschlager, appellee, v. I. Irving Jordan, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,918.
    Suit to recover balance due for fees as an architect. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. William J. Pulton, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Gottlieb, Schwartz & Markheim, for appellant; Harry Markheim and Claude A. Roth, of counsel.
    Sonnensehein, Berkson, Lautmann & Levinson, for appellee; Henry S. Moser, of counsel.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Philip D. Kaplan, plaintiff in error, v. Isaac Stein, defendant in error.
    Gen. No. 29,163.
    Suit for an accounting on profit-sharing contract. Decree for certain amount to be paid to complainant. Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Denis E. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Robert P. Burkhalter and Edwin White Moore, for plaintiff in error.
    Clithero, Van Sehaick & Stevens, for defendant in error.
    Delbert A. Clithero, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Anna Holmes, appellee, v. Bertha M. Carra, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,215.
    Suit for conversion by defendant of certain household goods. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Charles P. McKinley, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.

      Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).
    Affirmed on remittitur; otherwise reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Rehearing denied April 27, 1925.
    Henry L. Kane and Rose & Symmes, for appellant.
    Porest Garfield Smith, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Sherley Karpen, appellee, v. Elmer Jones, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,233.
    Action for personal injuries sustained in automobile collision. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Philip L. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.

      John A. Bloomingston, for appellant.
    Irving G. Zazove, for appellee; Morris K. Levinson, of counsel.
   Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    John F. Fay, appellee, v. Jacob Miller, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,301.
    Action by tenant against landlord to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by reason of alleged negligence of defendant in care of stairway. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Philip L. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Affirmed on remittitur; otherwise reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Rehearing denied April 27, 1925.
    Anthony J. Schmidt, for appellant.
    Harry D. Knight, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    James S. Deming, administrator of the estate of James L. Morris, deceased, appellee, v. City of Chicago, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,347.
    Action to recover for death of minor caused by contact with electric wires. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Emanuel Eller, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, and John J. Kelly, City Attorney, for appellant; Daniel V. Gallery, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel.
    Charles C. Spencer, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    T. V. Beckwith, trading as Snyder-Beckwith Company, appellee, v. David F. Curtin, appellant.
    Gen. No. 29,380.
    Action to recover commission on sale of real estate. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Daniel P. Trude, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    James R. Glass and James M. Slattery, for appellant.
    Mills & Howe, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.


text:
    Charles H. Kaplan, assignee of Central Trust Co. of Illinois, trustee in bankruptcy for John M. Tananewicz, trading as Tananewicz Savings Bank, appellant, v. Paul Norkus and Anna Norkus, appellees.
    Gen. No. 29,399.
    Suit on promissory note. Judgment for defendants. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William R. Fetzer, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1924.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 13, 1925.
    Jaffie & Kaplan, for appellant; Stephen F. Riordan, of counsel.
    Robert F. Munsell, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.